
From “Survival” to “Dialogue”: Analytic Tropes in the Study of African-Diaspora Cultural History

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Before I ever physically visited Africa, I met a Cuban santera – as the practitioners of the African-inspired Santería, or Ocha, religion are called – who taught Spanish at Howard University, in Washington, D.C. Five gold bangles on her arm quietly announced Dr. Contreras’s devotion to and protection by the Yoruba-Atlantic goddess Ochún.¹ I suspected mystery in their meaning before I knew what they were, and so I reached out with an inquisitive touch. With serpentine speed and balletic grace, Contreras withdrew them just beyond my reach. Following the map laid out by Roger Bastide’s African Religions of Brazil ([1960] 1978), I stopped over in Brazil, retracing what he and William Bascom (1972) identified as the great arc of Yoruba influence in the Americas. Consequently, Yorubaland was the capital of the Africa that I sought.

I have been in love with Africa since I was five years old, partly owing to a book. Physically, all that is left of my Illustrated Book about Africa by Felix Sutton and H. B. Vestal (1959) is the front cover and the first thirty pages of text and vivid lithographs, along with the strips of masking tape with which my mother attempted, on multiple occasions, to repair it. Through these pages, I learned of the desert aoudad, the Egyptian cobra, the rock hyrax, the fennec, and the bustard, as well as the “jungle” okapi, most of which I had never seen in the zoo. I would spend many more years searching for these creatures in American zoos, game parks, pet shops, and

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books. Nothing in the book, however, fascinated me as much as what were called the “plate-lipped Sara women,” the kente-draped Ashanti, the “blue-veiled Tuaregs,” the Bedouin falconer, the leg-o-mutton-sleeved Herero woman, or the “Watusi” dancer with his red skirt, dance wands, and colobus-fringed headdress. I have since come to regard this indiscriminate merging of African ethology and ethnology as racist, but this book became the seed, or the roots, of my equally indiscriminate love for Africa and longing to embrace her.

My late sister and role model Yvedt also loved Africa. She followed her passion for African art—a passion stoked by the books and danced lectures of Yale University art history professor Robert Farris Thompson, a white man from Texas—and connected our family to a great black pilgrimage cycle, which, from the 1960s until the present, has made the journey to Africa almost as important a rite of passage for bourgeois African Americans as the tour of Europe has been for bourgeois Euro-Americans. Before that time, in the early 1950s, my maternal aunt and her family had lived in Liberia. By the 1970s and 1980s, their ultra-modern New Jersey split-level was full of African art, not unlike the kind that Picasso had popularized in modernist European circles at the beginning of the century but was new to our recently-secularized and suburbanized family. My Liberian-born cousin ultimately married a Nigerian, as I did, and now both lives and works bi-continentally. A paternal first cousin became Muslim and married a Senegalese man. In the 1940s, long before any of these events, my parents had been introduced to each other by a Nigerian classmate of theirs at Howard University, a man who (like at least one other Howard classmate of theirs) repeatedly hosted my and my sister’s late-20th-century visits to Nigeria.

My past decades of research in West Africa, Brazil, Cuba, and the black-ethnic populations of the United States have in many ways been devoted to the question of what makes me African American, apart from my physical appearance and the social encumbrances that my family and I tend to share with other descendants of enslaved Africans. The sort of cultural connections that seemed so obvious to Afro-Brazilianists and Afro-Cubanists and are so readily named by Brazilians and Cubans have been vigorously debated among North Americans. This chapter considers how our choice of scholarly language is shaped by real, human lives. It also asks whether the cask of our descriptive discourse flavor the wine of our pan-American relationship with Africa?

Metaphors and Tropes

The phenomenon that I wish to reconsider in this essay is the cultural history of the African diaspora. I’ll analyze some of the central analytic metaphors and tropes of anthropological research about that diaspora—starting with “survival,” “creolization,” “memory,” and ending with some reflections on my earlier proposal of the metaphor “dialogue” (see Matory 1999). Though this analytic metaphor arises from my research on African-diaspora religion in Brazil, Cuba, Nigeria, and the United States, it also helps us understand the similar historical dynamics of music, dance, politics, education, and so forth around the Atlantic perimeter and other heavily traveled transregional complexes.

Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980) argues that metaphors structure all of our language. They are pervasive. They both reflect and produce behavioral choices that are as arbitrary as any other aspect of culture. For example, much US American parlance about the verbal exchange of ideas analogizes such exchange to warfare, as in “I shot his ideas down” and “She blasted his argument out of the water!” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 4). Any given metaphor compares one thing (a “target,” which is in need of clarification) to another (a “source,” whose nature is concrete and clear enough to clarify the target by analogy). In doing so, argue Lakoff and Johnson, the metaphor also “highlights” a number of similarities between the compared objects and “hides” various dissimilarities. Thinking of an argument as a war, for example, highlights its competitive nature and naturalizes the motive of mutual destruction between the participants. Metaphors and other figures of speech, or tropes, pervade even our scholarly language, in which settings I call them “analytic” metaphors and tropes.

Here I hope to clarify what is highlighted and hidden by the preeminent analytic tropes in the study of African-diaspora cultural history. Among the realities that most of these analytic tropes hide are the messy, real-life experiences of the researcher. The alternative analytic language that I propose arises from an unflinching look at the often well-known realities and personal experiences that previous generations of ethnographers and theorists of diasporas have tended to bracket.

For each analytic trope I discuss, I tell a story about the dimensions of cultural history that it highlights, as well as the equally valuable dimensions of cultural history that it hides, and, sometimes, the effect that its usage has had on the cultures so described. Hence this text might be construed as autobiography. However, it is also a history. Alongside the other essays in this volume, it is an intellectual history of ethnography in which a range of
authors have studied transnationally mobile populations and cross-border identities. We root these discussions not in high-flown theory and secondary references but in the messy currency-changing, language-switching, passport-inspecting, bribe-demanding, police-and-customs-supervised, and generally boundary-filled world of physically itinerant lives.

As intellectual history, this essay excavates the under-recognized, under-examined, and under-exploited scholarly precedents of transnational ethnography in the study of the African diaspora, a task I share with other colleagues in this volume (see also the contributions in Yelvington 2006). As event history, it retraces the ignored Afro-Atlantic precedents of today's much-vaunted transnationalism. This reexamination of the long-charted routes of black Atlantic cultural history also offers both a theoretical model and a critique of the language we have used to describe the forms of translocal, transtheoretical cultural intercourse that have long shaped intra-African cultural history — along trade routes, at the convergence of Tutsi and Hutu, Hausa and Fulani, Bantu and “pygmy” or Khoisan, “Arab” and “African,” and so forth. But it also offers models for an improved description of newer transnational communities, as well. What do existing analytic metaphors highlight and hide about translocal cultural formations? How do such metaphors reshape local social life?

Survivals

Melville J. Herskovits was once the whipping boy, but he is now the preeminent model, of African-American talk about our cultural connection to Africa. The metaphor of “survivals” — or recalcitrant leftovers from a people’s historically original state — is the linchpin of his analysis. He asks, What aspects of African culture “survived” in the Americas? Where did they “survive” and how (Herskovits [1941] 1958)? I argue that Herskovits’s choice of an analytic metaphor begs the question of what he is looking for and where he will look to find it.

For Herskovits, the term “survival” described the ancient and timeless African practices left over — in any given New Word black population — from earlier stages of acculturation to the dominant Euro-American culture. This metaphor implies (and Herskovits’s argument assumes) that Africa is the past of the American present. It assumes that Africa is so changeless and isolated from the rest of the world that 20th-century Dahomean culture, for example, could provide evidence of the culture that reached Haiti in the 18th century and has survived ever since then. According to the “survival” metaphor, Africa is to the past as the black Americas are to the present.

Herskovits was one of a cohort of scholars in the 1920s and 1930s, some of whom agreed and some of whom disagreed with the importance and depth Herskovits accorded to these African “survivals.” But they all employed this analytic metaphor and a host of its cousins, including “memories,” “heritage,” “retention,” the sartorial metaphor of “vestiges” — which literally suggests clothing — and their logical entailments. Hortense Powdermaker (1939) for example, shared Herskovits’s doubt that captivity had rendered African Americans — in an extension of the clothing metaphor — entirely “culturally naked” (Powdermaker cited in Herskovits [1941] 1958: 29).

Herskovits’s major contribution was to amplify these metaphors by inverting the sartorial image of the “vestige.” Hence, rather than the African American wearing his or her Africanness on the outside, he or she is said to contain or embody that inheritance as an unconscious “underlying logic” or “bent” within apparently Euro-American external forms, such as being filled enthusiastically with the Holy Ghost in the midst of Sunday meetings at my grandfather’s Church of God in Christ in the State of Virginia. Nonetheless, all of these analytic metaphors suggest that African Americans’ contact with Africa is limited to the past and that the “survival,” “memory,” “vestige” or “retention” resembles a self-existent, unchanging object bequeathed to the living by dead forebears.

This unchanging object will appear, over time, behind different masks, but the object remains the same. In imitation of Afro-Brazilianist Arthur Ramos, Herskovits called this masking “syncretism.” The paradigm case is the Afro-Latino American “masking” of African gods behind the statues and lithographs of Catholic saints. For Herskovits, syncretism was “the tendency to identify those elements in the new culture with similar elements in the old one, enabling the persons experiencing the contact to move from one to the other, and back again, with psychological ease” ([1945] 1966: 57). In the classic example, Herskovits employed the term to describe Haitians’, Brazilians’, and Cubans’ use of the images of Roman Catholic saints in the worship of iconographically similar African gods.2 For example, among

2 Note that the use of the syncretism trope links Herskovits and his followers to a rather different figuration of Africa’s “ethnohistorical” links to the Americas. Herskovits’s elder, Raimundo Nina Rodrigues in Brazil, his contemporary Fernando Ortiz in Cuba; his junior colleague, the French sociologist Roger Bastide; and their followers emphasized the consequences of “transculturation” (Ortiz), the “interpretation of civilizations” (Bastide), and similar forms of Afro-European cultural hybridity in shaping whole national cultures, rather than
Santeros in Cuba and its diaspora, statues of Saint Bárbara, patroness of firefighters, are used to represent the Yoruba-affiliated god of thunder, lightning, and fire, Changó. By extension, Herskovits regarded “shouting” in black North American Protestant churches as a syncretic survival of African religious practice – that is, as an African disposition toward the practice of spirit possession adapted to and hidden behind a Western Christian name and conception of God.

In their day, Herskovits’s “survival” and “reinterpretation” metaphors helped highlight what many people had overlooked – the reality of cultural continuity and transformation in African-American history. However, one might justly be dissatisfied with Herskovits’s and the Herskovitsians’ relative inattention to diverse contextual meanings of apparently similar signifiers. For example, highlighting the formal similarities among possession by the Holy Spirit in North America, the river goddess Yemoja in Nigeria, and the eponymous sea goddess Iemanjá in Brazil might lead the analyst to overlook the radically different theologies and ritual complexes that buoy them.

Herskovits’ model was far more attentive to psychological and unconscious “dispositions” than to agency and strategy in the reproduction of cultural forms. What, for example, might be any given actor’s motive (beyond inertia) to reproduce an African cultural form, or to identify such a form as “African”? Such an actor is likely to have alternatives to the African-looking form, and might risk reprisal or disapproval for adopting even the most camouflaged of non-Western forms. And he or she might choose to interpret that form as non-African in origin. Are antecedent and intergenerational “dispositions” or the desire to hold onto the past (now trenchly called cultural resistance) sufficient explanations for the genealogy of African American cultural choices?

In 1976, Sidney Mintz and Richard Price’s influential revision of Herskovits’ method embraced the conventions of mid-20th-century sociocultural anthropology, rejecting Herskovits emphasis on genealogies of inheritance and favoring, instead, the idea that any cultural practice should be interpreted in terms of how it is integrated into its contemporaneous social context. However, today’s anthropologists have come to doubt the integrity of any given culture and to recognize the diversity and contradic-

tory relationship among local discourses, it is not clear that Herskovits’s critics are more correct than he.

Creolization

The second most influential analytic metaphor in African American Anthropology is “creolization” – a model indebted to Sidney Mintz and Richard Price ([1976] 1992). It emphasizes the New-World social institutions, organizations, and sanctioned spaces that made the practice of African creative models possible in the Americas. According to Mintz and Price, African-American populations came to the Americas equipped not with whole and particular African cultures but with the hodgepodge of beliefs and practices that the culturally heterogeneous “crowds” of Africans brought to any given New World locale. New, African American cultures formed in the spaces and around the aspects of social life where the dominant planter class allowed African-American cultures to be distinctive.

Moreover, argue Mintz and Price, these newly African-American cultures took shape quickly and enduringly – first, on the slave ships and then in the early years of any given American slave society. They formed quickly because they had to address the local need for people of diverse aboriginal cultures and languages who were working under the same plantation labor regime to communicate and cooperate immediately with their masters and with each other.

»The rapidity with which a complex, integrated and unique Afro-American religious system [or, presumably, other cultural system] developed” and stabilized in a particular American locale is shown to be analogous to the rapidity with which the local creole language variety developed and stabilized.« (Mintz and Price 1992: 22-26)

Their creole language metaphor, particularly when it is interpreted in the light of the white-dominant plantations that are the prototypical setting of this model of cultural history, suggests that African-American cultures are internally systematic and bounded local systems. They are walled off by the slaves’ alleged immobility, the masters’ restrictions, and the long-term stability of the resulting local social systems. No longer could we follow Herskovits in merely counting up the African shreds and patches that decorate otherwise Euro-American shirts and pants – the arbitrarily ordered and nonfunctional heirlooms that Herskovits traced to the African past.

What I will argue is that the political and demographic contexts shaping African American cultures are seldom produced through a once-and-for-all
departure from Africa and are seldom isolated from a broader, circum-
Atlantic context. I submit that, unlike languages (as they are conventionally
understood), African-American cultures should not be considered integrat-
ed, internally systematic, and bounded in discrete units; they are crosscut
(à la Bakhtin; for example, 1981) by multiple transnational languages,
discourses, and dialogues.

Collective Memory

An important analytic metaphor that regularly overlaps with the “creoliza-
tion” metaphor is “collective memory” and “forgetting.” Advocates employ
these terms to highlight what they regard as the chief mechanism of socio-
cultural reproduction and the chief mechanism of diasporas’ relationship
to their homelands. Roger Bastide (1960), Joan Dayan (1995), Karen McCar-
thy Brown (1989), and others have followed Maurice Halbwachs (1925) in
arguing that the preservation of myths, for example, can occur only when
the social relationships or places to which these myths refer or the institu-
tions to which they are relevant remain intact. Bastide argues, for example,
that the Yorùbá goddess Yemọja continues to be thought of as a mother in
Brazil because lower-class Afro-Brazilian families tend to be what Bastide

Though Bastide understood Candomblé to be a socially structured but
involuntary “memory” of Africa and 1980s ethnographers of Candomblé
tend to regard it as the product of white, bourgeois manipulation, these
scholars were probably quite aware that leading figures in the 19th- and
early 20th-century Candomblé—such as Martiniano do Bonfim, Felisberto
Sowzer, and Joaquim Devodê Branco—were transatlantic travelers who
frequented Lagos and Porto Novo (Matory 2005). These travelers were
often fluent in English or French, and like some of their counterparts in
Afro-Cuban religions, many studied in Anglophone West African mission
schools, where their teachers were Anglophone Africans.

Consequently, on their return journeys from Lagos to Bahia and Ha-
vana, they carried with them not just the memories of a past Africa but also
the cultural nationalism of contemporary Lagos, which was then a British
colony. In Lagos, rising British racism during the 1880s and 1890s had
inspired a lively literary and cultural movement called the Logosian Cul-
tural Renaissance, which documented the diverse regional practices that
this movement would redefine as “Yoruba” culture and proclaimed the
unique dignity of that culture (Matory 1999: 82-86).

This new “Yoruba” ethnic identity amalgamated a number of previously
distinct cultural strands. The term Yoruba appears to come from a term
that the Hausa people applied to Oyo, a savannah kingdom that would only
later be amalgamated with the Egba, the Egbado, the Ijebu, the Ifẹ, the
Awori, and so forth within the same, pan-ethnic identity (ethnic groups in
what are now Nigeria and the People’s Republic of Benin).

This pan-ethnic identity probably first took shape on the slave ships in
the Americas. Many African-American ethnic identities were named by
maritime slave traders after the African port of embarkation, where captives
of diverse ethnic affiliations were normally gathered together. Thus, Ger-
hard Kubik (1979) notes that the ethnonyms that came to describe Africans
in the New World were initially little more than “trademarks.” The bearers
of these trademarks thus became ethnic groups for themselves in the Amer-
icas. Rather, they came to think of themselves as unified ethnic groups for a
series of accumulating reasons. They did so, first, because people gathered
from the same African port were, in the Americas, often selected by the
same buyers for their similar technical skills and, second, because the
Roman Catholic Church often missionized them through trademark-
targeted brotherhoods. The cultural similarities they then discovered in the
Americas had probably held little conscious importance in the context of the
context of their lives in Africa, much as Nigerians who live in Nigeria today seldom
cognize themselves as members of “the black race.” Only when they move
to the West, where their appearance places them in a visible minority and
subjects them to an experience of skin-color-based discrimination, do they
come to think of themselves as “black.” Similarly, there had been few
occasions for the 19th-century denizens of Oyo, Ekiti or Ijebu to think of
themselves as one people. In the context of pre-colonial 19th-century
hinterland of the Bight of Benin, Africa, the differences among their respec-
tive language varieties and political organization almost certainly mattered
vastly more to them than the relative similarities among them-

Thus, the Lucumi in Cuba and the Nago in Brazil were among those
“trademark” groups that initially became ethnic groups for themselves in
the Americas. Only much later did their ethnic counterparts in Africa
receive the name Yoruba. They first received the name “Yoruba” not in
what is now called Yorubaland but in Freetown, which is now the capital of
Sierra Leone. Samuel Ajayi Crowther (1809-1891) had been one of the captives from the interior of the Bight of Benin whom the British Royal Navy rescued from the slave ships whose traffic the British had outlawed in the early 19th century. The British typically resettled these “re captives” in Freetown, where, like many captives, he was educated after the Western model by missionaries. Crowther would eventually become a bishop of the Church of England. In the service of the missionary project, he cobbled together a new and hybrid dialect intended to be equally comprehensible to the Oyo, the Egba, the Egba, the Awori, the Ijebu, and so forth, who, again, had never previously thought of themselves as a single ethnic group. Crowther and his collaborators reduced that language to writing – the first book in this language was the Bible – making it into an emblem of the new ethnic identity (Matory 1999). Much of its vocabulary came from the diaspora, as thousands of Cuban Lucumí and Brazilian Nagôs who had either secured their manumission or been expelled from their Latin American host societies “returned” to Africa and settled in the British Protectorate of Lagos. They were later joined by thousands of other returnees from Freetown. Together, they established a thriving creole society in Lagos, whose core was built by Brazilian hands in Brazilian architectural style. Their hybrid, written language, which Crowther named “Yoruba,” became the first shared symbol of a common identity with the same name, and its capital was not Oyo but Lagos.

Particularly in the context of the struggle against Hausa hegemony in the Nigerian nation-state, some Yoruba nationalists resent what they see as the potential implication that today’s Yoruba people are not a timeless obligatorv unit of cooperation. They argue that, even in the absence of the term “Yoruba,” this collective identity had existed from time immemorial, since the rulers of the kingdoms that are now called “Yoruba” all claim descent from a dynasty founded centuries earlier in the city of Ilu-Ife. On the other hand, partisans of Ilu-Ife’s defining role also tend to include the non-Yoruba kings of Benin City among the descendants of the Ife dynasty. Projecting the “Yoruba” identity onto Oyo and thereby establishing its existence before the 19th-century would be like identifying US “American” as primordial because our system of governance has British roots, which we also share with Australians. US Americans intermittently invoke the British crown and the English language as symbols of a pan-Anglophone political and cultural alliance. For example, advocates of US intervention during the world wars invoked this notion in order to persuade anti-interventionists that we should put ourselves at risk in order to rescue England from the Germans. It worked, but it would be absurd to call this alliance “American” or project “Americanness” back onto the originators of the British political system. However, historicizing such strategic invocations of Anglophone identity in no way delegitimizes them. It simply recognizes the non-inevitability, the agency and the optionality that are elements of every human identity and identity choice. Just as the returnees helped to create Yoruba identity in West Africa, so did the products of West African cultural nationalism transform Latin American cultures. For example, the 19th-century founder of Afro-Brazilian studies (Rodrigues 1900) and the 20th-century founder of Afro-Cuban studies (Ortiz 1906; 1916) read the publications of the Lagosian Cultural Renaissance and cited them as proof of Yoruba superiority to other Africans. They cited this literature in the defense of the Yoruba-affiliated denominations in Brazil and Cuba — to the exclusion of their “Congo,” “Angola,” “Mayombe,” and Efi-related counterparts.

The “collective memory” – based literature on the African diaspora contains several rich discussions of the ways in which changing social conditions and political needs shape the selective reproduction, transformation, and meaningful reinterpretation of past cultural forms. Diaspora scholars would do equally well to recognize that commemoration is always strategic in its selections, exclusions, and interpretations. But why call such cultural reproduction memory — a term that hides rather than highlights the unending struggle over the meaning and usage of gestures, monuments, words, and memories? This analytic metaphor implies the organic unity of the collective “rememberer,” anthropomorphizing society rather than highlighting the heterogeneity, strategic conflicts, and unequal resources of the rival agents who make up social life. Of course, experts on the psychology of personal memory know how complex, variable, and socially conditioned it is. For example, personal memories are reshaped by conversations and conflicting collective interests. However, if we are seeking a clear metaphoric source that makes the unclear process of cultural reproduction easier to understand, isn’t it unwise to choose a metaphoric source whose implications and entailments are themselves so unsettled and so unclear? In daily life and everyday language, who thinks of personal memory as quintessentially strategic or as subject to the conflicting agency of subjects with

3 Of course, the literature addressing sociocultural reproduction beyond the African diaspora in terms of such tropes as cultural memory, social memory, and collective memory is also broad and deep, addressing agency and strategy among different themes and to variable degrees, e.g., Appadurai (1981); Maliki (1995), Comaroff and Comaroff (1987); Connerton (1989); Werbner (1998).
different resources to propagate their versions of the past? Metaphors are
usually chosen for the concreteness and clarity of the source, which enables
the metaphor to clarify what is otherwise unclear or inchoate about the
target (Fernandez 1986). As the literature on “social memory” demon-
strates, the source itself (that is, personal memory) needs just as much
clarifying as the target (that is, the collective interpretation and reenactment
of the past).

Invoked casually, the comparison of collective cultural practices to the
recording system of an individual mind projects onto collective social
reproduction a certain passivity, involuntariness, absence of strategy, and
political guilelessness and neutrality that seem quite foreign to the process-
es that have in fact shaped African and African American cultures over
time. In general, the “memory” metaphor complements the nationalist
personification of the nation and its tandem fiction of innocent, pristine,
and primordial folkways, which give proof that the nation has always been
one and is rooted in God and Nature, rather than human strategy or history
that could have turned out some other way.

Among the unavoidable failings of the “memory” metaphor is that by
making a figurative person of the collective remembrer, this analytic
metaphor risks concealing the fundamental pluralness of the agents of this
“collective memory.” Any memory that might be called collective is ready
ground for sharp disagreements and interested rival constructions, and any
form of personal memory describable in terms of “sharp disagreement” and
“interested rivalries” would be considered non-normative – or sick. In fact,
as richly suggestive as all of them have been, the “survival,” “reinterpret-
ation,” and “creolization” metaphors share the potential for similar underes-
timations of heterogeneity and conflicting strategy in socio-cultural
reproduction. They lend themselves to the premise that, like the survivor of
a disaster, like the interpreter of a text, or like a creole language, any given
Afro-Atlantic culture is self-existent, internally integrated, bounded, and
possessed of its own agency and autonomous authorship. That is to say, to
the degree that it is like a person’s memory, as conventionally conceived,
any given Afro-Atlantic culture must not be rent by multiple and contradic-
tory discourses, languages, perspectives, and interests; and that each such
Afro-Atlantic culture has evolved in organic isolation or discreteness from
the others.

An alternative metaphor might represent these cultures not as self-
existent but as organically part of a dialogue – less as evolving languages or
as isolated readers of self-contained national pasts than as interacting and
mutually transformative sets of participants in a conversation. The meta-
phor of dialogue places traditions – or strategically constructed genealogies
of cultural reproduction – into a context beyond nation and region, a con-
text from which they are rarely extricable.

The Metaphor of “Dialogue” and its Antecedents

In the same year, art historians Michael D. Harris (1999) and Moyo Okediji
(1999) and I (Matory 1999) simultaneously but independently published
essays likening the transformative exchange of people and ideas between
Africa and the Americas to a “dialogue.” The empirical fact that people of
the African diaspora have traveled, carrying goods and ideas among various
locales on the Atlantic perimeter, has long been known. The intercontinen-
tal movement of corn, cassava, cowpeas, peanuts, tobacco, palm oil, and
cowries has, over the past five hundred years, wrought incalculable demo-
graphic and political changes everywhere on the Afro-Atlantic – changes
dwarfing the oft-cited consequences of Europe’s importation of the potato.
Afro-Atlantic peoples were not only victims but also major agents of these
seismic shifts, during and long after the transatlantic slave trade. Focusing
on the migration and commerce between Bahia (Brazil) and West Africa,
Pierre Verger described this phenomenon in terms of a tidal metaphor –
transatlantic exchange of people and goods also shaped the well-
documented political and cultural histories of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola,
and South Africa. Such transatlantic exchange is also the foundation of
Zairean/Congolese Soukous music, of Senegalese president Léopold Sen-
ghor and Fort-de-France mayor Aimé Césaire’s widely cited Nègritude
poetry, and of Ghanaian president Kwanu Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism – all
of which have origins and reciprocal outcomes in the African diaspora. The
Afro-Atlantic dialogue is economic, political, literary, and musical.

Just as Africa and its diaspora are linked, diverse African-diaspora loca-
ces are linked to each other by migration, commerce, and the mutual gaze
among them, which are the subject of Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic (1993).
Drawing examples primarily from the English-speaking black populations
of England, the United States, and the Caribbean, Gilroy retheorizes the
scope and mechanisms of cultural reproduction that he sees posited in the
nationalist and racist cultural histories of black people in the West. For him,
the cultural exchanges among diasporic locales undermine and falsify the
boundaries that nationalists imagine around the races, nations, and cultures
of the Atlantic perimeter. Thus, for Gilroy, the ships that carry ideas and
cultural artifacts between locales are more emblematic of black Atlantic
culture than are the national boundaries and watery divides that separate one locale from another. In the place of continuous forms of “memory” constituting geographically bounded cultural units, Gilroy prioritizes the “discontinuous” forms of cultural reproduction by which ideas and images from one place constantly amplify and modify the cultural genealogies of other places (see also Roach 1996).

Gilroy’s Black Atlantic argues further that the shared cultural features of African-diaspora groups result far less from shared “survivals” or cultural “memories” of Africa than from black Atlantic populations’ mutually influential responses to their shared exclusion from the benefits of the Enlightenment legacy of national citizenship and political equality in the West. In charting the history of Anglophone black Atlantic culture, Gilroy’s “ship” metonym prioritizes cultural exchange across territorial boundaries over the territorially divergent but uninterrupted “memory” of Africa posited by Bastide and followers of Melville J. Herskovits.

Yet Gilroy remains curiously comfortable with the notion of the African diaspora’s continuous “memory” of slavery. For example, Gilroy believes that black Atlantic ballads about lost love symbolically commemorate slavery. But when genres inaugurated by one ethnic group, nationality, or race are adopted by another (such as soul music in Jamaica, reggae in Puerto Rico, or rumba in West Africa and Congo/Zaire), whose collective past is being “remembered,” who is the rememberer? Weren’t the regimes of slavery in the different “remembering” communities, nations, and regions different? Wouldn’t the diversity of musical genres suggest that the rememberers are diverse and at least partially constituted by nationality or locality?

Yet Gilroy, like transnationalist theorist Arjun Appadurai (1990), represents the territorial nation and the local identities it generates as contradictions to (rather than agents or optional objectives of) these ship-borne cultural crossings. Yes, local identities are in dialogue with each other across borders, but strategically bounded identities continue to structure much of the dialogue. That is, the exchange of ideas, objects, and personnel certainly crosscuts national, ethnic, and other social boundaries. However, numerous and powerful social actors retain a stake in defining and policing those boundaries. The power to speak on behalf of a group, to protect its monopoly on certain resources or means of livelihood, and to determine access to those resources and means, keeps collective identities passionately alive and makes them impossible for cross-cultural interlocutors to ignore. I recognize this reality every time I pass through customs.

Hence, the fact of extensive exchange across locales and populations should not blind us to the fact that reifications of the bounded social group — such as those implicit in arborescent metaphors and other organismic metaphors of society (i.e., the notion of society as a living body) — perform real and powerful work on behalf of the social and political actors who invoke them. And no such actor can neglect to acknowledge them, in even the most translocal of interactions. And if, for Gilroy, “collective memory” usefully highlights something about Afro-Atlantic peoples’ relationship to their past, why is the “memory” of Africa selected for denial in Gilroy’s model? The credibility of this representation of black Atlantic cultural history relies less on disproof of Africa’s role than on a silence about it. I offer, then, the briefest summary of an alternative analytic metaphor in the cultural history of the black Atlantic.

The Afro-Atlantic Dialogue

The metaphor of “dialogue” would instead highlight the ways in which the mutual gaze between Africans and African Americans, multidirectional travel and migration between the two hemispheres, the movement of publications, commerce, and so forth have shaped African and African-American cultures in tandem, over time, and at the same time. It highlights the ways in which cultural artifacts, images, and practices do not simply “survive” or endure through “memory”; they are, rather, interpreted and reproduced for diverse contemporary purposes by actors with culturally diverse repertoires, diverse interests, and diverse degrees of power to assert them. As in a literal dialogue, such interpretations and reproductions can also be silenced, articulated obliquely, paraphrased, exaggerated, or quoted mockingly as well.

My metaphor of “Afro-Atlantic dialogue” (Matory [1994] 2005; 1999; 2005) suggests that Gullahs and Sierra Leoneans, Yoruba people and the New World worshippers of the gods that became “Yoruba” (despite the originally Christian uses of this ethnonym), African Americans, black Britons and Jamaicans, and “light” and “dark” Brazilians are not discrete systems or cultures but participants in a continuous, mutually transformative dialogue. No local population is an isolated collective rememberer of a self-contained national past. Rather, recollections and other performances are responses to the claims of other actors and self-proclaimed classes of actors.

Ethnic or national groupings articulate the boundaries that separate them not insofar as they have historically been insulated and isolated from
one another but insofar as they have engaged in complementary dialogue, including competition and confrontation, with each other. The metaphor of Afro-Atlantic dialogue places traditions—or strategically constructed genealogies of cultural reproduction—into a context beyond nation and region, into a larger, transoceanic context. Local cultures do not result merely from inheritance or from the local inertia of quick-forming, slow-changing systems. Rather, actors produce their cultures in dialogue.

Yet that dialogue is not a conversation among equals. It draws together more powerful and less powerful actors. Relative wealth, linguistic proficiency, nationality, and unequal access to the means of communication and reward distinguish one class of actors from another. On the other hand, the “dialogue” metaphor does posit one type of equality: temporal equality. It posits the radical coevalness (see Fabian 1983) of Africa, Latin America, and the United States in a dialogue that, even following the conclusion of the slave trade, has continually reshaped all of these regions. In other words, Africa is not to its diaspora as the past is to the present. Rather, Africa is an ongoing interlocutor in the cultural history that shapes us all—no less in North America than in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Equally evident is the fact that metaphors through which we think of our African-American connection to Africa shape how we live our lives. For me, a Yoruba proverb sums up this phenomenon well: “Ewe ti d’ọṣṣẹ” — “The leaf has become the soap.” Though it usually refers to how long-resident outsiders become insiders to the community, it also suggests that a leaf wrapping that once gathered up and shaped a quantity of soap eventually disappears into that soap ball, and only the historically wise are aware that the shape of the soap ball deriving not from the soap but from a now-invisible leaf. Such is the role of analytic tropes in reshaping the social realities that they once only poetically described. It is when the metaphor dies that it becomes the most inescapable model of and for a lived reality.

Hence, in the 1970s and 1980s, the “roots” and “survivals” metaphors offered African Americans a new way of imagining ourselves and of interacting with Africa. These metaphors modeled and mimed our increased willingness to dress, marry, worship, and conduct religious or heritage tourism in ways that we understood to reflect a timelessly African past and our continuous connection to it. A new understanding of our “kinship across the seas” persuaded us—in the Free South Africa Movement and the movement to stop the atrocities of Sudanese Arabs against that country’s black population—to intervene in the African present.

Conclusion

The study of the African diaspora has generated a series of productive analytic metaphors, highlighting the cultural, historical, economic, and political dimensions of diaspora with increasing refinement over time. Yet much of the existing analytic metaphors in Afro-Atlantic studies have led us to overlook is productively highlighted in a new metaphor—one that represents homelands not as the past but as the contemporaries of their diasporas, and diverse diasporic locales not as divergent streams but as interlocutors in supraregional conversations. Africa and its American diaspora reflect the effects of an enduring dialogue and a dialectic of mutual transformation over time.

The dialogue metaphor is not intended to posit equality of influence or power among the interlocutors, just their continuous and meaningful presence in each other’s cultural history and self-construction. Indeed, as the greatest of the imperial powers, England and the United States have furnished the means for certain black “interlocutors”—i.e., Anglophone—to “speak” far louder than others.

Though I question the likeness of Afro-Atlantic creole lifeways to quick-forming, bounded, and internally integrated “languages,” the analytic metaphor I propose builds on the legacy of the linguistic analogy. I must emphasize that “dialogue” is a metaphor and is not intended to suggest that all or even most aspects of Afro-Atlantic cultural exchange and reproduction are linguistic. Not all aspects of this exchange and reproduction are like language, but even the paradigmatic aesthetic forms of the Afro-Atlantic world—dance and music—bear traces of it and bear comparison to it. For example, Afro-Atlantic music regularly includes lyrics, imitates the tones and patterns of speakers’ mutual responsiveness, or is emically understood to “speak to” people and to “call” gods. But, of course, music involves techniques and produces feelings beyond the range normally associated with speech.

Nonetheless, I am arguing that the cultural reproduction of dispersed ethnic groups, neighboring ones, and ones surrounding ocean perimeters regularly share in the coeval and interactive qualities of dialogue, and that those who dominate the verbal and written interpretation of the gestures and artifacts of social life exercise a disproportionate influence on the social consequences of those gestures and artifacts (e.g., Matory 1999).

Perhaps, at least in our analytic language, culture is better spoken of in the singular and regarded as a process than denominated in the plural, and cultures should not be regarded as discretely countable things. As countable
and discrete things, cultures are but provisional, debated, and evanescent assertions by political leaders, marketing experts, and unreformed anthropologists.

The Afro-Atlantic is one of the most important transnational cultural fields of the past five hundred years. Yet it has long engaged in a mighty dialogue with the Middle East and the Indian Ocean as well. Various Afro-Atlantic interlocutors have embraced and transformed Islam (see, e.g., I. M. Lewis 1989; Lincoln 1973) and even Hinduism (see Rush 1999) for their own purposes. Cuban Santeros employ Chinese porcelain vessels and “syncretize” the orichas with various avatars of the Buddha and the Chinese bodhisattva Kwan Yin. Moreover, this model of mutually transformative interregional communication in the history of culture is applicable to the lifeways of non-black populations of the Atlantic perimeter as well. Indeed, there is no natural reason to isolate the “black Atlantic” from the Atlantic world as a whole, any more than there is a reason to isolate the Atlantic perimeter from the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Far Eastern regions with which it has long interacted. The field of Atlantic history has similarly examined the politics, economics, and ideas that have united the Americas with Europe, not the least of which constituted the slave trade (see Bailyn 1996). Like “Atlantic history,” the “Afro-Atlantic” construct highlights the politics, the economics, the ideas, and above all the will of a specific group of people to communicate and shape each other’s lives. Hence, by the efforts of people who reason strategically about their sameness and their diversity – and therefore about the pasts that unite and divide them – the Afro-Atlantic world has always been focused rather than bounded.

Like Gilroy’s “black Atlantic,” the logic of the “Afro-Atlantic dialogue” highlights the under-examined mobility and agency of black people in creating this world and the specific role of black consciousness in the creative and historical making of black distinctiveness. Like Robert Farris Thompson’s “black Atlantic,” “Afro-Atlantic dialogue” restores Africa, Africans, African cultures, and Americans’ vision of Africa to a central role in the making of the black Atlantic world. Borrowing Fabian’s parlance, this model posits the “coevalness” of Africa and the Americas, rather than imagining present-day Africa as the past of the black Americas. The world’s future is likely to reflect much that the past and present of the African diaspora is already available to teach us. Diasporas and homelands continue to make each other over time, and they are shaped by a dialogue among numerous other coeval interlocutors of unequal power and unequal access to the means of communication.

Now that many of us not only study and travel to Africa but also have African immigrant neighbors and spouses, I ask you to imagine how much more productive the dialogue might be if we recognized its rich precedents – precedents that have involved as much commerce, musical exchange, mutual religious conversion, and transatlantic struggles against European domination as survivals of a four-century-old past.

And why limit the implications of this model to recent centuries? The Swiss editor of a prestigious European journal of biblical studies told me that his pet peeve is people who translate texts without a full knowledge of the language and cultural context of the original writing. Provoked by the fact that his own contribution to his field and his personal comparative advantage were so close to the time-honored convictions of my own discipline, I decided to challenge him and myself.

I asked why we should not also consider the possibility that textual language was also shaped by the inter-cultural and inter-linguistic exposure of the authors. He conceded that the succession of translations of a text might help to reveal earlier meanings and contexts that have been lost, but he refused the idea that the people who first articulated the oral forms of biblical stories or the people who wrote them down may have been multilingual (like the editor and me), that their syntactic and word choices may have been influenced by calques and borrowings (as are his English and my German), or, therefore, that the inter-linguistic context of a text might add valuable new insights to the study of its intra-linguistic context.

He insisted that I was assuming something entirely wrong about pre-modern human life. He repeated the oft-heard dictum that, before the invention of the bicycle, the vast majority of people never traveled more than ten kilometers away from home. What about nomads and pastoralists, I asked, and long-distance traders, who, though small in number, were probably disproportionately influential in local storytelling traditions? Had the ancient Hebrews themselves not reported their origins in Ur of the Chaldees, in present-day Iraq, their capture and enslavement of numerous indigenous Canaanites, their captivity in Mesopotamia and Egypt? Did the Acts of the Apostles not report the regular convergence of linguistically diverse populations and the miracle that the Holy Spirit suddenly enabled the disciplines of Christ to speak languages that would enable them to proselytize these numerous strangers? Did the Greeks and the Romans not conquer and enslave people from far and near, integrating them into the heart of their households, where they would influence the master’s children from birth? The conversation ended in a total stalemate, with this highly esteemed scholar feeling that he was right because he knew for a fact that
only the most assimilated and educated of slaves were allowed to educate elite children. So, he concluded, the ancient world was entirely different from the lessons that I had drawn from American slavery. So the lessons of the Afro-Atlantic, to his mind, simply did not apply to the ancient Mediterranean or Levant. As I confessed to him, I am no expert on the ancient Mediterranean, and my confidence in the applicability of the translocal “dialogue” model is much greater beginning with the Islamic period, during which it is impossible to understand West African life without acknowledging the flows of ideas, books, gold, and slaves that circulated on camelface around the vast and continuous desert sea between the western Sahara and the Gobi.

However, I could not help but feel that he was as proud of his intensive knowledge of specific ancient languages as I was of my intensive experience of translocal flows. So I must entertain the possibility that I have underestimated the importance of bounded local places in human cultural history. But I am equally suspicious that my interlocutor’s convictions arose from insufficient attention to the physical metaphor of the text. For those who have not read Bakhtin, or do not take him seriously, the physical boundedness of a book or a manuscript may resemble proof that meaning systems and the populations that create them were, until some recent disruption, equally bounded.

Perhaps it is the religious systems I study that make me comfortable with the normalcy of mutually transformative dialogue among apparently separate places and populations. The Afro-Atlantic religions – such as West African Yoruba orisha-worship, Brazilian Candomblé, Cuban Santería, or Ocha, and Haitian Vodou – think of life and worship as a continual transaction between this world and another, with surprising and unpredictable results. That other world is talked about simultaneously as another plane of existence and as another geographical place. Like foreign influences, new revelations come from the other world all the time, and they are welcome. To the same degree, the textual traditions of the Abrahamic religions emphasize the fixity of texts, the authority of their original, God-given meaning, and the careful exclusion of texts that can be judged non-original.

Just as metaphors shape how we see the world, they also emerge from the parts and aspects of the world at which we choose to look.

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