
Includes bibliographical references and index.


DT14.A37435 2005
960'.03—dc22
2004020222

Printed in China
of survival in the Americas, as the roots of African American branches and leaves, or, at the most dialectical, as a concept conjured up by New World blacks as a trope of racial unity.

Yet, in truth, the cultures of both Africa and the Americas have shaped each other through a live dialogue that continued beyond the end of the slave trade. In ways easily documented since the eighteenth century, travel by free Africans and African Americans (by which I mean people of African descent throughout the Americas) has continued to shape political identities and cultural practices in North and South America, the Caribbean, and Africa.

Since the eighteenth century, enslaved or free black seamen have woven a living web of links among the most diverse points around the Atlantic perimeter, transporting ideas, practices, and people between diaspora and homeland and among diaspora locales. Black seamen were especially cosmopolitan in their reflections on the black experience, which they freely spread among Providence, New York, Charleston, New Orleans, Havana, Kingston, Porto-Au-Prince, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town, London, and Lagos. So, it is no accident that, for example, seamen wrote the first six autobiographies published in English by blacks, all before 1800, or that Denmark Vesey used his network of black sailors to spread his revolutionary doctrine. Massachusetts shipper Paul Cuffe (1759–1817) is considered by some to be the father of Black Nationalism. Through such black mariners, the inhabitants of Lagos and Cape Town were never far removed from political and cultural developments surrounding Porto-Au-Prince and New York. Nor were the inhabitants of Rio and Havana out of touch with developments in Lagos or Freetown, Sierra Leone. Likewise, for centuries, free and slave sailors made Rio and Luanda into twin cities, while Cape Verde seamen and shipowners linked networks of kin stretching from Rhode Island and Massachusetts to Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique.

Hence, not all of these transatlantic links were transitory. Many were kin networks or the foundations of international political movements. For example, thousands of English-speaking blacks from Jamaica, the United States, and Canada immigrated to Freetown in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while thousands from the United States immigrated to Liberia in the nineteenth century. Similarly, from the 1700s to the late 1800s, thousands of Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking blacks emigrated from Cuba and Brazil to the Gulf of Guinea coast, between Lagos, in what is now Nigeria, and Accra, now in Ghana. Hence, from Monrovia to Lagos, returnees formed a culturally hybrid bourgeoisie with extensive international links, on the basis of which they also established the cultural and the ideological foundations of the nation-states that would later emerge in coastal West Africa. Many Afro-Latin returnees continued to travel back and forth, trading in slaves and other merchandise between the Guinea coast and Bahia, Brazil. They tended to maintain ties among relatives, former owners, slaves, and friends on multiple continents.

As we shall see, Afro-Latin travelers such as Martiniano do Bonfim of Bahia and Adechina of Cuba profoundly influenced African American religiosity through the ideas they bore among Afro-Atlantic locales. While English-speaking travelers like the
Saint Thomas-born Edward Wilmot Blyden revolutionized black political thought not only in the United States, the greater West Indies, and West Africa but, through Afro-Latin travelers in Lagos, in Bahia, as well. Over the past century these religious and political streams have converged in various Yoruba-affiliated political-religious movements in Nigeria, Brazil, Cuba, and the United States.

Missionaries, traveling entertainers, and audio recordings from the African diaspora have also profoundly reshaped African popular culture and politics. In turn, free Africans who immigrated to the Americas have deeply influenced African American popular cultures. Some Africans who had never been slaves chose freely to immigrate to Brazil or the Caribbean in the 19th century. Indeed, some of the founding figures in the Afro-Brazilian Candomblé religion are said to have entered Brazil as free persons. King Christophe is said to have recruited 4,000 free Dahomeans into the police force of postrevolutionary Haiti, and over 15,000 free West and Central Africans, some of them rescued from slave ships by the British Royal Navy, were settled in the British West Indies after abolition in 1834. One such immigrant built an important temple to the Dahomean Vodun gods on the Caribbean island of Trinidad. A few of these immigrants returned to Africa in the 1840s, sharing their berths with freed Afro-Cubans, also en route to the ancestral motherland. These examples illustrate the antiquity and scope of a live dialogue that continues to constitute both African homeland and diaspora well into the early 21st century.

Neither then nor now has the effect of this dialogue always been harmony or unity. Returnees from the African diaspora regularly organized themselves socially, economically, and politically as a distinct class of intermediaries between Africans and Europeans. In the most shocking case, the America-Liberians set themselves up as a distinct and oppressive caste, unapologetically dominating the indigenous peoples of Liberia for a century and a half. More recently, African immigrants to the United States in the late 20th and early 21st centuries have, in turn, tended to emphasize their distinctness from native-born African Americans, lest they be treated like members of a native-born caste regularly despised by the dominant group in North American society. Yet African merchants and hairdressers in the United States often take advantage of their comparative advantage in the sale of the symbols of Afrocentric identity, such as African clothing and hairstyles. By contrast, the nineteenth-century Afro-Latin returnees to Lagos have been integrated seamlessly into Lagosian society and, although contemporary African American residents of South Africa are sometimes resented as interlopers, black South African education, politics, and culture generally are deeply influenced by black North American models that were warmly embraced from the 1890s to the 1920s. Thus, this live dialogue between Africa and its American diaspora has produced, if not always harmony, then a set of new, hybrid discourses of self-expression and identity. This article is intended to illustrate the historical and ongoing influence of this dialogue on the political identities, cultural practices, and, in particular, the religious practices of Africans and African Americans.

Transatlantic Dialogues over Political Identity

Since the 1800s, free Africans and African Americans have interacted in ways less notable for their large numbers than for their momentous influence on subsequent political developments at and around the sites of that interaction. The circumstances and outcomes of such interactions have varied, but all have been affected by the emergence of the idea of territorial nationalism in eighteenth-century France and its subsequent imitation all over the globe. Moreover, this black Atlantic dialogue has occurred amid the specific rise of the British, French, and U.S. empires over their Portuguese and Spanish predecessors, as well as the peculiar racial ideas and policies propagated by Great Britain, France, and the United States.

Twenty-first-century Africa has hosted several major settler colonies, including Algeria, Kenya and the former Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe). Better integrated into the Atlantic system, the other three major settler colonies have also lasted much longer. Sierra Leone, Liberia, and South Africa border on the Atlantic and have been characterized by pivotal, long-running, and mutually transformative dialogues with the African diaspora. Sierra Leone and Liberia were first colonized by diasporic blacks seeking political independence from white oppression. These returnees thus founded novel creole societies held together by alliance, patronage, oppression, commerce, and reciprocal emulation between Africans and Westernized black settlers. South Africa's geographical location and its mineral wealth made it a major commercial hub of the Atlantic world. Most of South Africa's colonial settlers were white, creating a racially hierarchical system akin to, and regularly in dialogue with, those in the Americas. Thus, all three of these settler colonies have long hosted influential missionaries, scholars, sailors, diplomats, and entertainers from the diaspora, while sending numerous students and other visitors in return. Moreover, Africa's Atlantic settler colonies have been an important theme in African Americans' reflections on their own political identity and potentials, just as the activities and writings of African Americans have powerfully shaped Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and South African politics.

Recently freed people from England, called the Black Poor, first colonized Sierra Leone in 1787. These overseas returnees were joined by another sizeable group of ex-captives. Over the next decade and a half, they were joined by 1,190 Nova Scotian blacks (British Loyalists who had fled slavery in the rebellious 13 colonies) and 550 maroons, former fugitive slaves from Jamaica. As part of Britain's efforts to enforce legislation against the slave trade, the Royal Navy rescued over 50,000 Africans from slave ships over the next seven decades and settled them in Freetown, the future capital of Sierra Leone. Many of these so-called recaptives had come from the Oya kingdom in what is now Yorubaland, in Nigeria.

Though a British divide-and-conquer strategy initially sowed dissent among these groups, their intermarriage and embrace of missionary education welded them into a community known as Creole, or in their own hybrid language Krio. Their equally hybrid culture reflected both their Western education and their
diverse African and diasporic origins. Not only did the Krios provide the core of what would become the national language, culture, and early leadership of Sierra Leone, but they exported their Creole culture. Oya-born missionaries trained in Sierra Leone combined Oya language with a variety of neighboring dialects and coinages from the diaspora, giving form for the first time to the language that came to be called standard Yoruba. They then reduced this composite to writing. While missionizing the hinterland of Lagos, they introduced standard Yoruba and its texts, including a translation of the Bible, which became foundations of an emergent Yoruba identity and of the fame that followed its progressive reinterpretation in the African-inspired religions of Brazil, Cuba, Trinidad, and the United States.

The Yoruba identity is not the only one in Africa that appears to have postdated the dispersion of its would-be bearers. Many of the black ethnic groups, or nations, to which the slaves of Cuba, Brazil, Trinidad, and Haiti belonged—and the religious nations, or denominations to which many of their descendants still belong—had not existed in ancient Africa but were instead labels imposed by slave traders. These ethnic labels reflected the captives’ African port of embarkation more often than they did any cultural, linguistic, or political category recognized by Africans in the homeland. However, labels such as Rada in Haiti, Lucumi in Cuba, Mina in Louisiana, and Jeje in Brazil were often embraced and institutionalized through American religious brotherhoods, denominations, secret societies, work crews, and rebel armies.

Much as the Yoruba identity was conflagrated by Western-educated exiles in Sierra Leone and only then introduced into the Lagos hinterland to refer collectively to a score of disparate linguistic and political units, the Jeje identity was constructed and labeled as such in Brazil, and only then introduced as an identity into the African ancestral home of its Brazilian bearers. Even though the speakers of the sometimes mutually comprehensible Ewe, Gen, Aja, and Fon language varieties were exported to Brazil in the greatest numbers before 1800, I have found no written mention of the name Jeje in the Gulf of Guinea region before 1864, after the effective end of the slave trade. On the other hand, the term Jeje appears in Brazilian documents as early as 1739, around 125 years earlier than its first appearance in Africa. In Brazil, the origin of this ethninem is subject to much speculation, but the leading lexicographer of Fon, Segurola, denies that the term originates in that language, even though the Fon people were once among its primary referents. The term may have had some prior referent in West Africa now lost to memory, but it could not have referred to the entire Ewe-Gen-Aja-Fon dialect cluster and then gone unnoticed by the scores of European and American travelers who published accounts of their visits to the Gulf of Benin between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. In sum, Brazil, it’s slave-traders, and its former slaves are the most likely sources of the Jeje ethninem in Africa.

However obscure the origins of this term, its use in Africa after 1864 reveals much about the transatlantic history of African ethnicity and nationality. From the middle third of the nineteenth century onward, hundreds and perhaps thousands of Brazilian Jejes returned to the Gulf of Benin—to Lagos, Porto Novo, Ouidah, Grand-Popo, Petit-Popo, Aguou, and Porto Seguro (this last having been founded by the returnees themselves). It was evidently these travelers who applied the name Jeje to all the Africans whom they considered their compatriots, despite the fact that these compatriots had probably never previously identified themselves in these terms.

We know of these developments through the writings of the priests of the Society of African Missions—a French organization that, as guests of the prosperous Afro-Brazilian returnees, missionized this region at the end of the nineteenth century. The priests of this society were the first Europeans to designate Ewe, Gen, Aja, and Fon as the same language, and the first Europeans to call this language and all its speakers Jeje. Though after 1859 this ethnic label described only the speakers of these language varieties in the city of Porto-Novo, the term continued to be used until the 1930s to distinguish the alleged natives of colonial southern Dahomey (now Benin Republic) from the Yoruba, whose British commercial and cultural connections made them threatening to French colonials. Ignoring the reality that ancestors of the Yoruba had lived in this land for centuries, the French thereby implied that the British-influenced Yoruba were foreigners to French territory. Hence, not only did the British prepare the ground on which Yoruba became a major African ethnic identity but the French, in an effort to naturalize and secure their domain against British influence, subsidized the Jeje identity introduced by the Brazilian returnees. Eventually, the Jeje identity in West Africa gave way to such categories as Fon and Goun. Nonetheless, what remains clear is the powerful role of the European-dominated Atlantic political economy in creating the conditions of the black Atlantic dialogue over collective identity.

The changing political conditions of Anglo-America propelled North American and Anglophone West Indian blacks headlong into this transatlantic dialogue as well. Since the time of the American Revolution, black North American leaders reflected on blacks’ exclusion from the rights of citizenship in the new republic. The many who had lost hope in the United States dreamed of immigration to Africa, Haiti, Brazil, or elsewhere as places to form a community and live out their collective black identity as a territorial nation. The West African nation of Liberia resulted from the most successful emigrationist project in U.S. history. Though advocacy by the white-dominated American Colonization Society put off many potential emigrants, about 16,000 U.S. blacks and 400 Afro-West Indians settled in Liberia between 1822 and 1900. By 1846 the American-Liberian repatriates had achieved their own political and commercial independence from the American Colonization Society, well in advance of Sierra Leone’s liberation from the British colonizers in 1961. Much like the rulers of Haiti, the Americo-Liberians barred whites from citizenship and land ownership in their black republic.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of the most quoted figures in black North American debates over collective identity and political strategy—such as Martin R. De-
LANEY, Edward Wilmot Blyden, and W. E. B. Du Bois—were equally often quoted in Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and Lagosian debates over the proper shape of their own emergent national societies. Many returnees to Liberia had envisioned themselves not only achieving freedom for themselves but enlightening a benighted, heathen Africa. In their ambivalent regard for Africa, however, they often behaved oppressively toward indigenous Liberians. There are doubts about accusations that the Americo-Liberians enslaved their African neighbors, but, if they are true, Americo-Liberians would join the company of many Sierra Leonean settlers and Afro-Latin returnees to the Gulf of Benin coast who did undoubtedly capture and sell African slaves during the decades after the British had outlawed the trade. Many of these reparations from the African diaspora indeed modeled their lifestyles on those of their Euro-American former masters. In turn, the Creole cultures they produced, including the forms of transatlantic racial identity that they propagated, became objects of both resentment and imitation by their indigenous neighbors around the Gulf of Guinea.

It is well known that important leaders of West African independence movements in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, had reversed the direction of African American return and gone to the United States for training in historically black colleges. Nkrumah, for example, studied at the historically black Lincoln University during the 1930s and joined the Beta Sigma fraternity, the same fraternity to which Alain Locke, Booker T. Washington, James Weldon Johnson, George Washington Carver, and future president of Liberia William Tubman belonged. Nkrumah also studied the writings of Jamaican-American emigrant and Pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey. Nkrumah subsequently became not only the first president of Ghana, but also the most committed Pan-Africanist head of state in Africa's history. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these leaders' experience of Joe Crow and of black North Americans' ideology of racial unity and struggle helped to shape their later resolve to struggle against British colonialism.

What is less often recognized is the age of African Americans' dialogue with black South Africa's political leadership and the centrality of its enduring effects. For example, in the early 1890s a small group of African Americans and Africans in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, established an interregional economic union, the goal of which was job creation, management training for black-owned businesses, and the promotion of black unity and racial uplift. They hoped to use a capitalist economic base to gain political power locally. John Dube, president of the South African National Congress, which was the forerunner of Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC), had been influenced profoundly by Booker T. Washington and had even visited Tuskegee Institute. Therefore, during the first third of the twentieth century, he was known as the Booker Washington of South Africa. At the turn of the century, as black South African churches sought independence from white missionary denominations, they hosted a visit from Henry McNeal Turner, bishop of the black North American African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME). His visit also inspired future ANC president James Thaele to seek training at Wilberforce University, another historically black college in the United States. Thaele was, in turn, responsible for introducing Garveyism to the ANC. Both Garveyism and the ideas of W. E. B. Du Bois were well known in South Africa from the 1920s to the 1940s. Another ANC president, Alfred Bitini Xuma, who served until 1949, visited the United States, married a black North American, and endorsed the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) as a model for the ANC. The Black Consciousness Movement of the 1970s, which is best known for the martyrdom of its spokesman Stephen Biko, embraced the influence of Eldridge Cleaver's Soul on Ice (1967), Alex Haley's The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1965), Charles Hamilton's and Stoneley Carmichael's Black Power (1967), the theology of James Cone, and Franz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth (1963). Hence, both its place in the Atlantic economy and its political commonalities with the American settler colonies have placed South Africa in sustained dialogue with the black Americas.

In the 1980s as black North Americans seemed more besieged and less unified than they had in decades, one issue that appeared to invite no controversy in the divided black political class was the Free South Africa movement. The persistence and success of Randall Robinson's TransAfrica lobby is a rare example of African American success at shaping U.S. foreign policy in the interest of black people globally. In the democratic South Africa of the 1990s, African American immigrants and businesspeople have perhaps sentimentalized this history and overestimated the degree to which black South Africans would welcome their arrival. Whereas many African Americans expect to be welcomed home, many South Africans regard them as interlopers, too anxious to claim the credit for South Africa's democratization and too ready to take corporate jobs that black South Africans feel rightfully belong to them. In South Africa, as in many parts of the continent, African American visitors, with their varied complexities and Western ways, are hardly recognized as black, much less as long-lost African brothers and sisters. Such identifications have repeatedly been negotiated and renegotiated over time according to the circumstances—no less in the Americas—(where, for example, light-skinned people have not everywhere and always been considered black)—than in Africa. And the dialogue continues.

Indeed, African immigrants often report that they had not indentified themselves as black until they immigrated to the United States or Britain. Few Africans in Africa outside Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa had had any reason to do so. In the daily lives of most Africans, blackness constitutes neither a barrier nor an admission pass to any particular social rights, and it signals no salient political or cultural identity. In the Americas, the social stigma attached to blackness and the rebellious conduct identified with black Americans in fact become a reason for African immigrants to demand recognition as different from the native blacks. In the United States, this option has become more possible for all immigrant groups of African descent since the official desegregation of housing and educational institutions in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
On the other hand, some African immigrants to the United States have been leaders in the articulation of Pan-African identity. First, they were often ill-informed about Africans of other national origins, many Africans in the United States vocalize a sense of cultural unity and social camaraderie with the entire community of immigrants from Africa. For example, many North American universities host an African students’ organization. Second, the information available about African culture profits knowledge and information that many African Americans have, in the past 20 years, come to embrace as signs of their ancestral roots. Thus, peddlers of kente cloth, itinerant diviners, and scholars of African art have a vested interest in Pan-Africanist and culturally nationalist forms of black identity.

Several factors have combined to make Lagos and New York City into international epicenters of black identity-formation and reaction to racism. First, these were prosperous cities that beckoned black immigrants from far and wide. Black-led rebellions were crushed in Brazil in 1835 and in Cuba in 1844, leading to deportations and general oppression. Many of the victims fled to Lagos, where they enjoyed British protection from reenslavement and from the expropriation of their belongings by African rulers. Beginning in the 1860s and 1870s, whites in the United States South reacted violently to the civil rights gains of blacks during Reconstruction, thus accelerating the flight of blacks to Harlem, New York, and other northern cities, as well as the eastward immigration of smaller numbers to Liberia. New York City’s prosperity and temporarily liberal U.S. immigration laws also drew numerous West Indians and black Latin Americans, as well as a small but influential coterie of Africans, into the city in the 1900s and 1910s.

Lagos emerged as a capital of black identity for a second reason as well. Late-nineteenth-century U.S. racism had its parallel in British West Africa. Since the early nineteenth century Western-educated Africans (including those who had returned from servitude in England or the Americas and those rescued from slave ships by the British Royal Navy) enjoyed, by and large, the respect of cooperation of British colonialists and missionaries. However, racial discrimination against the black bourgeoisie of British West Africa appeared to increase sharply in the 1880s and 1890s, when improvements in tropical medicine enabled increasing numbers of whites to immigrate and compete with blacks for the best jobs. Subject to a sudden upsurge in racial discrimination, these highly Western-educated Africans who had thoroughly identified with the British colonial project felt compelled to turn the tools of their rescuers in their own defense. Culturally Creole Lagos became the hotbed of an ingenious cultural nationalism.

These multiregional and multicultural convergences of privileged and elite blacks in prosperous cities, unified by the shared experience of racial marginality but relatively safe from the coordinated violence suffered by their kin elsewhere, inspired lively literary and cultural movements in both Lagos and New York City. In the 1890s Lagos hosted a cultural renaissance that at once opposed British racism, endorsed the virtue of black racial purity, and canonized an emergent, internationally inspired Yoruba culture as the paramount exemplar of black racial dignity. The elites of Lagos thus produced a black literary and cultural explosion without parallel in its day. Both in the texts they produced and in person, they influenced generations of Afro-Latin Americans and Afro-Latin Americanists, who have judged the Yoruba superior to other Africans. Where Afro-Latin Americans in Cuba and Brazil have embraced the value of cultural and racial purity, they appear to do so under the influence of the Lagosian cultural renaissance of the 1890s.

From around 1914 to 1920 Jamaican immigrant Marcus Garvey led the largest mass organization in black North American history, boasting an estimated eight million members at its height. Though headquartered in New York City, Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association had branches all over the black world. His plan to repatriate blacks to Africa failed, but hardly any subsequent black nationalist movement has escaped the influence of his ideology and iconography. In the 1920s the culturally diverse immigrants who converged on Harlem produced another culturally and racially nationalist explosion of political, literary, and musical creativity—namely the Harlem Renaissance. Together, Garveyism and the Harlem Renaissance made black New York the inspiration, epicenter, and model for similarly racially nationalist cultural movements all around the Atlantic perimeter in the 1920s and 1930s, including the Afro-Cubanismo of Nicolás Guillén and others, the Haitian cultural nationalism of Jean Price-Mars and François Duvalier, and the Negritude that, through Martinique’s Aimé Césaire and Senegal’s Leopold Senghor, captured the whole black Francophone world. In turn, the ideas and the vocabulary of Negritude have lately been taken up in the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Americas, while the influence of the North American Black Power Movement of the 1960s, in many ways the successor to the Harlem Renaissance, has been felt in Trinidad’s Black Power Movement and South Africa’s Black Consciousness Movement in the 1970s as well.

It can be no accident that these most influential cultural renaissance movements arose in cities where cosmopolitan, culturally diverse, and culturally hybrid populations were compelled by racism to articulate and rationalize a cultural basis for their political unity. Nor is it an accident, in an age of increasing Anglo-Saxon military and economic dominance, that the most influential sites of such movements were Anglophone. Over the two centuries under consideration, the English language and the English-language publishing industry have afforded unparalleled media access to black Atlantic leaders who could write, record, or broadcast in English.

In general, both African Americans’ experience of racially marked oppression in the lands of their birth and contemporary Africans’ sojourns outside the continent have sparked unprecedented reflections on the collective nature of black experience and political identity. It is no surprise, then, that the best-documented and most influential Pan-Africanist dialogues have taken place in European or Euro-American metropolises, where the diverse black subjects of Britain, France, and the United States in particular have conferred over their shared values and conditions of struggle. From 1900 to 1945 a sequence
of Pan-African Congresses brought together the leading intellectuals and politicians of the black Atlantic world in London, Paris, Lisbon, New York, and Manchester. Thus, in the formative years of the African and West Indian independence movements, North Americans like W. E. B. Du Bois and William Monroe Trotter came to know the Senegalese Blaise Diagne, while Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Nigeria’s Nnamdi Azikiwe came to know the likes of Trinidad’s George Padmore and Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta. Far more than the African American emigration and colonization movements of the nineteenth century, the Pan-African congresses of the 20th century occasioned a dialogue among far-flung peers and a novel consensus among the elites of the Afro-Atlantic world that their constituencies shared a common spirit, political interest, and destiny. Though Pan-Africanism had begun in the Americas, this series of congresses demonstrated that, by 1945, it was no longer the dream of African Americans alone. In contrast to the paternalistic missionary aspirations of the nineteenth-century emigrationists, the new Pan-Africanists of the 1945 congress condemned Christianity for its exploitation of West African peoples. The diverse black peoples of the Atlantic perimeter surely shared numerous traditions, conventions, and political aspirations before the nineteenth- and twentieth-century dialogue among such free people began, but the changing investments of the black Atlantic political and intellectual classes shaped new and powerfully centripetal standards of Afro-Atlantic education, entertainment, worship, and other cultural symbolism. These are the subject of the next section.

Transatlantic Dialogues over Cultural Practices

Education and popular culture around the black Atlantic clearly share deep ancestral roots, but they have also been transformed over the past two centuries of transoceanic dialogue and debate among free Africans and African Americans. In the nineteenth century black North American missionaries in Africa inspired generations of young Africans to seek higher education in the United States, very often at predominantly black, church-related institutions. Booker T. Washington and his successors at Tuskegee Institute initiated various agricultural, educational, and economic development projects in Liberia, German Togo, and British West Africa during the first half of the 20th century and found powerful advocates in educator Dr. James Aggrey of Gold Coast/Ghana and Harry Thuku of Kenya, as well as European colonial governments themselves. The ideas of W. E. B. Du Bois were also known and debated in West Africa during the first third of the century. This transoceanic dialogue thus helped to inspire the founding of both Tuskegee-style industrial-training institutes and liberal arts colleges in Africa. In turn, Robert R. Moton, the president of Tuskegee Institute from 1915 to 1935, acquired fame as a spokesperson for African affairs and integrated the aim of acquainting black North American students with African affairs into the Tuskegee project. This dialogue on education is imbued with the history and the ambiguous motives of African Americans’ 19th-century project to “uplift” Africa, which was premised on a degree of accommodation to Western and white dominance and, by and large, on a sense of African cultural inferiority. However, the dialogue with those who had been most brutally enslaved by the West ultimately provided Africans with models of resistance to cultural assimilation and political domination as well. As we have seen, a number of the West African protagonists in this dialogue led their own countries to independence.

Black South African cultural leaders in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries found these models similarly attractive. A major secessionist movement swept through the black churches of South Africa between 1892 and 1894, when Reverend Magena M. Mokone left the white-dominated Wesleyan Methodist denomination and founded the Ethiopian Church. The movement of cultural, political, educational, and religious autonomy that he inspired thus came to be known as Ethiopianism. Soon thereafter, in 1896, Bishop Henry McNealy Turner of the U.S.-based AME Church visited South Africa, whereupon many Ethiopian churches in South Africa attached themselves to this African American denomination. Many leaders of the Ethiopian movement traveled to the United States to study in historically black colleges, until the Ethiopian churches themselves founded the University of Fort Hare in South Africa in 1916.

Simultaneously, in the realm of entertainment, missionized South African Christians were creating an urban identity modeled on British colonial high society, which, in South Africa, had itself embraced American-style minstrelsy as the dominant form of musical and theatrical entertainment. By the 1850s, soon after the first minstrel shows were performed in New York, they became popular among South African whites and, like those in New York, regularly featured made-up white performers. Black South Africans much more readily embraced performances by visiting African American sailors, adventurers, and professional performers who arrived late in the century. Coloured performers in Cape Town were particularly impressed with the music and dance styles of visiting black North Americans and West Indians. In the 1890s Cape Coloureds and the nascent African middle class witnessed performances of the Fisk Jubilee Singers and McAdoo’s Jubilee Singers, who inspired much local imitation. Thereafter, local minstrel shows increasingly featured black religious music from the southern United States. Visiting African American performers helped black South African performers to recognize the commercial potential of their own musical creativity, through which a richly hybrid South African musical style has emerged and been reexported by such contemporary groups as Ladysmith Black Mambazo. Yet Ladysmith Black Mambazo is not the first African group to speak back to America. In the mid-1890s a black South African minstrel troupe called the African Native Choir toured the United States. When the troupe ran out of funds in the midwestern United States, the African Methodist Episcopal Church stepped in and offered educational opportunities, whereby eight members of the troupe eventually earned bachelor’s degrees at historically black Wilberforce and Lincoln Universities. Their own cultural work continued when they returned to urban South Africa, imbued with black North American ideas about education and racial progress. For example, during and after their tour, African Native Choir member Charlotte Manye con-
continued to cultivate contacts between the African Methodist Episcopal Church and the growing number of independent African clergymen.

Thus, at the turn of the century, music, religion, and education dovetailed in the genesis of urban black South African identity just as they did in the genesis of black North American identity. The Fisk Jubilee Singers, for example, sang the sacred music of African American slaves in a manner adapted to the concert hall. Their project was both a statement about the dignity of African Americans in an age of Jim Crow and a fund-raising venture for black higher education. The consequence has been a permanent and widespread transformation of black North American musical tradition. The songs now honored as Negro Spirituals are far closer to the adaptations of the Fisk Jubilee Singers than they are to the antecedent improvisational folk genre of the same name. It is understandable, then, that music played such an important and enduring role in the emergence of black South African identity during the same period and that African American performers found such a willing interlocutor in black South Africa. Yet, in the first half of this century, the colonial Gold Coast (now Ghana, West Africa) also hosted a tradition of blackface minstrelsy, African American spirituals, and humorous plantation songs. Its continued influence in Ghana is, however, less evident.

Yet West Africa engaged actively in the transoceanic musical dialogue in other ways. Since the early nineteenth century, Afro-Latin returnees to the Gulf of Benin coast and the troops of the British West India regiments were introducing urban West Africa to the syncretic musical styles of the African diaspora, as and Brazilian returnees to Lagos exercised a particularly profound influence on the popular music of Lagos. Moreover, in the early twenty century, European firms began importing gramophone discs into West Africa. The most influential of these were recordings of Afro-Cuban groups such as Septeto Habanero and Trio Matamoros. The importation of Afro-Cuban recordings and instruments, such as maracas, congas, and bongos, grew lively after World War II, further inspiring the growth of highlife music, which integrated the influence of black North American vaudeville and Trinidadian calypso as well. “As incredible as it may seem to Africans today,” writes Wolfgang Bender, “the gradual re-Africanization [of urban African music] proceeded in a roundabout way via Afro-American percussion instruments.” Bender makes a similar point about the fabulous growth of Afro-Cuban-inspired rumba music in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Congo-Kinshasa) since the 1950s and its re-Africanization (i.e., the increase in rhythmic elements) under the influence of recordings by black North Americans like James Brown and Aretha Franklin in the mid-1960s. Since the 1950s hardly any region of western Africa—from Senegal to Congo-Kinshasa—has been exempt from the influence of Afro-Cuban music or, since the 1960s, from the influence of soul, reggae, and disco.

As in the case of Afro-Atlantic music, much of the shared vocabulary of Afro-Atlantic dance is a shared ancestral legacy. However, some African dance performances, such as Bumba-Meu-Boi, were introduced to the Gulf of Benin coast by Afro-Brazilian returnees, and some Brazilian dance performances, such as that of the Egungun masquerade, are said to have been introduced to Brazil by free immigrants from West Africa.

Not all cultural legacies are continuous and none is prismatic. Anthropologist Melville Herskovits, I think, correctly intuited the endurance of certain intergenerationally learned African bodily habits among the peoples of the African diaspora. However, the meanings given to them and the performances in which they are structured sometimes follow patterns that are hardly reducible to passive cultural inheritance. And, most importantly for the present argument, Africans and African Americans share many forms of movement and meaning, but many of them are products of a recent, transoceanic dialogue.

In fact, the politically inspired and government-sponsored dialogue between Africans and African Americans has played an important role in creating a number of national dance traditions on the Atlantic perimeter. Since the 1940s, Trinidadian Pearl Primus and black North Americans Katherine Dunham, Alvin Ailey, and Judith Jamison—perhaps the most famous dance professionals in the black Atlantic world—have all traveled extensively in contemporary Africa, with the support of the U.S. government or foundations, and have collaborated with African governments and artists to establish an unprecedented tradition of Afro-Atlantic concert dance.

Katherine Dunham and Pearl Primus were the founders of black North American concert dance as we know it, and, as long as we have known it, its roots have been cosmopolitan. Primus, choreographer and anthropologist, combined African and West Indian ritual, music, and movement in her dance compositions and introduced these into black North American concert dance. In 1949 she received a Rosenwald Fellowship to make the first of several journeys to Africa—this time, for eighteen months in Gold Coast/Chana, Angola, Cameroon, Liberia, Senegal, and the Belgian Congo/Congo-Kinshasa. In 1959 President William Tubman of Liberia, himself an American-Liberian, appointed Dunham director of the National Dance Company of Liberia and head of the African Performing Arts Center in Monrovia.

Dance anthropologist Katherine Dunham traveled and performed many times in Africa, after similar stints in Jamaica and Haiti. Her choreographic style integrates African and Afro-Caribbean myths and dance techniques with modern dance. By her efforts, not only African dance but Haitian dance has become canonical in the black North American concert dance. During her first audience with Senegalese president Léopold Senghor, she was told that her work “had caused a cultural revolution” and that various sub-Saharan African heads-of-state “had been encouraged by her formula and format. . . . [Dunham’s presence] in Africa thus opened a new vista for blacks [and] aided in spearheading Africa’s cultural revolution.” Senghor appointed her a technical and cultural adviser and teacher at Senegal’s National Ballet.

In the 1960s and 1970s Alvin Ailey and Judith Jamison also traveled extensively in Africa (under U.S. government sponsorship), collaborated with African artists, and integrated urban African dances they saw into their choreography. In particular, Ailey collaborated with South African jazz trumpeter Hugh
Masekela, himself a frequent sojourner in the United States, in a work that was ostensibly about South African apartheid but, according to one of Alley’s dancers, was intended to evoke the U.S. South as well. “Cry,” one of Alley’s most highly praised works, dramatizes the auctioning off of an African American slave woman and, according to Judith Jamison, features dance moves that Jamison and Alley had seen in Zaire. Jamison recounts that one night, in a club, she and Alley had seen movements that would eventually become the last steps in “Cry.”

It should not be forgotten that their travels placed Alley and Jamison in direct dialogue with anthropologist, cultural nationalist, and Kenyan president Jomo Kenyatta, as well as Négritude poet, romanticist of black dance, and Senegalese president Léopold Senghor. As the successive directors of the most popular black dance company in the United States, Alley and Jamison have done more than any other artists to establish the Pan-African character of black North American concert dance. Yet, in this tradition, they are disciples of Primus and Dunham. By the appointment of early African presidents, aesthetic Pan-Africanists Primus and Dunham have even participated in setting the standards of national dance performance in a number of African countries. Hence, by their efforts, the folklorics that are now staged as representations of emergent African national identities and those staged to represent the Pan-African identity of Anglophone New World blacks have emerged from a set of choreographers in close communication with each other. The New-World Anglophone choreographers have not only borrowed models of folkloric dance from the black Francophone world (e.g., Congo-Kinshasa, Haiti, and Senegal) but demonstrated influential forms of cultural nationalism resistant to Francophone black elites’ usual drift toward European aesthetic models.

Perhaps the most famous cultural nationalism of the black Atlantic world is Négritude, which had its very beginnings in a transatlantic dialogue and, like the dialogue concerning dance, bridged the gap between Francophone and Anglophone in the Atlantic world. Long before he became the president of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor was a student in Paris, where, in 1931, he met Martinican poet, eventual mayor of Fort-de-France, and deputy to the French national legislature, Aimé Césaire. At this early stage in their careers, both men had begun to feel dissatisfied with their total immersion in French culture, and had grown curious about Africa. Through the numerous African American intellectuals who sojourned in Paris, Senghor and Césaire learned about the Harlem Renaissance, a cultural and literary movement in the 1920s that celebrated and scrutinized black culture worldwide. Under this inspiration, the Francophone Antilleans and Africans who founded La Revue du Monde Noir published articles on the black world, including extensive commentaries on blacks in the United States, Tuskegee Institute, the black colonizers of Liberia, the poetry of Afro-North American Langston Hughes, and Jamaican-American Claude McKay. In the 1930s Senghor read the work of other African American poets, as well as that of W. E. B. Du Bois and Carter G. Woodson. He read journals such as the NAACP’s The Crisis and the Urban League’s Opportunity, and Alain Locke’s famous edited volume The New Negro (1925)—a book that also deeply influenced Nigerian nationalist politician Nnamdi Azikiwe. The title of Locke’s volume so impressed Senghor that he used its translation, le nègre nouveau, to identify the new man and the new attitudes he hoped to see in French-speaking blacks. Through the hybrid cultural and literary movement they founded, Césaire and Senghor endeavored to recognize and validate the shared spirit of the world’s black cultures and thereby redeem it from the image of inferiority and undermine the contempt that so often divided Africans from France’s black Antillean subjects. These were the transatlantic and cross-linguistic roots of Négritude, the most enduring literary expression of Pan-Africanism in Atlantic history.

Yet the forms of unity envisaged in political Pan-Africanism and of spiritual commonality imagined in Négritude are seldom fully realized where Africans and African Americans meet in person. For the most seemingly common of experiences sometimes evoke profoundly different meanings for the two groups. For example, African American visits to the coastal slave forts have, in recent decades, become an increasingly important dimension of tourism in West African countries such as Ghana and Senegal. Though no other sites better typify the African American link to Africa, they are the locus of clashing interpretations. For African American tourists, filmmakers, tour guides, and other culture brokers, Ghana’s Elmina Castle, to give one example, is a somber place—“sacred ground not to be desecrated.” Ghanaians, however, have a much more complex relationship with the fort that extends beyond its uses as a slave market. Hence, Ghanaians, visitors, merchants, and government officials envisage a redeployed Elmina as a festive place and often regard the African American tourists as too emotional. Hence, rather than preserving the fort as it is, Ghanaian planners wish to convert it into a bustling commercial center. These differences in thought and feeling reinforce the sense that African Americans, not unlike their white counterparts, are foreigners to Africa, even as those African Americans understand themselves to be coming home.

On the other hand, Kwame Nkrumah’s prime ministership (1960–1966) has cast a long shadow over public opinion in Ghana, where, perhaps more than in any other African country, African Americans are publicly recognized as Pan-African brothers and sisters. Even if slave fort tourism has not yet created an interpretive consensus, it has enhanced Ghanaians’ interest in their own cultural history and linked diverse black Atlantic populations in projects of local West African development and in the movement to secure reparations for the descendants of those victimized by the slave trade. Among the greatest sponsors of the reparations movement has been the late president-elect of Nigeria, Moshood Abiola. The Gambian government, for its part, has made moves to develop Alex Haley’s ancestral town, Jufureh, in order to attract African American tourists. A representative of The Gambia’s National Council for Art and Culture even presented the outlines of this effort for discussion at a North American conference on diaspora research. Though relatively few black North Americans’ ancestors may have embarked from Elmina or any Nigerian coastal
site, Chanaïans and Nigerians have now joined Senegalese and African Americans in forging new political alliances and validating new local symbols of their shared cultural history.

Under many circumstances, the will to unity has inspired many Africans and African Americans to undo their differences and search for the terms of similarity. Throughout the history of black North Americanist anthropology and folklore studies, both foes and advocates of African American dignity have looked for African survivals in black North American lifeways. "Should some weird, archaic, Negro doctrine be brought to his attention," writes Newbell Niles Puckett of one common interpretive error, the average white man "considers it a 'religion of African heathenism,' though in four cases out of five it is a European dogma from which only centuries of patient education could wean even his own ancestors."

Mekville J. Herskovits led many subsequent generations of scholars and other culture brokers, such as dancer Katherine Dunham, in the study of Africa's positive contributions to African American cultures, though many equally well-intentioned scholars, such as E. Franklin Frazier, have preferred to attribute any cultural differences between black and white North Americans to the effects of oppression and deprivation on the blacks. The Gullah people of the Georgia Sea Islands have long been the focus of scholarly investigation into what remains culturally African about black North Americans, despite what all agree is their generally high degree of acculturation in Western ways. Geographical isolation long kept the speech and lifeway of the Sea Coast Islanders somewhat distinctive. Various scholars have sought to explain that distinctiveness as a debt to the cultures of what are now Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the rice farmers of the Sea Coast Islands drew many of their workers from the rice-growing regions of Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the term Gullah might derive from the ethnonym of Sierra Leone's Gola people. On the other hand, African captives had come to these islands from many other regions as well, and students of the local creole language, known as Gullah or Geechee, have identified an extremely diverse set of African origins in its lexicon and in its proudly famous basket-making tradition. Indeed, some identify the term Angola as the more likely source of the term Gullah.

As African Americans have grown more willing to embrace Africa as a cultural model and emblem of collective identity, the decline of Gullah language and crafts has been reversed. Indeed, the Africanness of Gullah basketry has become its major selling point and a means of livelihood for many craftspeople in coastal South Carolina. However, it was the intervention of Joseph Opala, anthropologist and former member of the Peace Corps in Sierra Leone, that established the local conviction that Sierra Leone in particular was the source of the islanders' Africanness and the appropriate target of their return to the motherland. Indeed, the interest in this ahistorically specific tie was reciprocal. President Joseph Saidu Momoh of Sierra Leone paid a highly public visit to the Sea Coast Islands in 1985 and encouraged the islanders to visit their ancestral homeland, which a score of them did in 1989. President Momoh continued

the American tradition of attributing the islanders' linguistic distinctiveness to their African roots and identified Gullah's similarities to Sierra Leonian Krio, or creole, as proof. In fact, both language varieties are predominantly English in their lexicon, since Krio resulted largely from the interaction of African American returnees, British-educated reaptives, British administrators, and Anglophone missionaries in Freetown. Thus, the similarity of condition between Gullah and Krio is highly ambiguous evidence of the Gullah people's African roots. Yet a complex, politically, economically, and academically shaped dialogue made the highly creolized Gullah dialect into the grounds of a powerful new kinship—of a so-called family across the sea.

Contemporary New York City is the site of an equally complex and identity-transforming dialogue. Whereas the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s and the Black Power Movement of the 1960s extensively involved Afro-Caribbean immigrants in the reformulation of African American collective identity, the more recent Yoruba renaissance and Afrocentrism have, since the 1980s, increasingly involved African priests, scholars, and merchants as well. Itinerant African priests, such as Wande Abimbola, Afolabi Epega, and Sikiru Salami, have begun initiating Yoruba priests in the New World and have introduced a new standard of authenticity into already well-established American religions like Brazilian Candomblé, Cuban Santería, and Trinidadian Shango. As African civilization has come to be regarded as the classical origin of African American cultures, African academics have become increasingly prominent interpreters of that classical legacy in art history and Afro-American studies departments. Finally, African hairstylists and merchants of cloth, leatherware, and sculpture are now the chief suppliers of the African blazonry of popular Afrocentrism in the United States. African clothing, jewelry, wood carvings, and beads are now found in virtually every black North American home. Much to these merchants' profit, they have integrated not only wares from African ethnic groups far beyond their own but also imagery of American origin, such as Malcolm X t-shirts.

The role of African merchants in cobbling together and supplying a Pan-African imagery of black North American identity has not, however, created a Pan-African uniformity of political opinion. For example, when New York City officials forcibly removed Harlem's "African Market" from its existing location in 1992, African American merchants tended to blame the eviction on white racism, while African merchants tended to blame a plot by the black Muslims.

Transatlantic Dialogue over Religious Practices

A staple of the Herskovitsian literature on Haiti, Suriname, Brazil, and the United States, as well as that of Brazilian and Cuban folklore studies generally, has been the "survival" of African religious forms in the Americas. On the other hand, African American missionaries and others imbued with the mis-
sionary zeal to redeem Africa have played significant roles in Africa's cultural history, above all in West Africa and South Africa. Since the mid-1970s, when reggae music became popular in English-speaking West Africa, some young West African Christians have adopted RASTAFARIAN ideals and symbols, such as ganja-smoking, dreadlocks, and dread speak. The influence of this religion has increased at the hands of Jamaican and Anglo-Jamaican missionaries, who set up communities in West Africa in the 1970s, and of West African travelers who met Jamaican Rastas in London and Amsterdam.

Much American religious culture that is thought to have survived slavery was in fact introduced, sustained, or deeply modified by free migrants from Africa to the Americas. The Brazilian Candombé, for example, is often identified as an exemplary, if not the most exemplary, survival of African culture in the Americas. Yet the oral history identifies many of the founders of its leading institutions as voluntary immigrants from Africa. For example, Olampé Ojaró, founder of the Alakutu temple; Marcos Pimentel, a nineteenth-century chief priest of the Mocambo temple on the island of Itaparica; and, most importantly, Iya Naso, founder of the ancient Casa Branca temple, are all identified as free immigrants from Africa. Iya Naso's mother is said to have secured her own manumission in Bahia and returned to Africa but voluntarily moved to Bahia to found this first of the three most famous Candombé temples in Brazil. Her successor, Marcelina, is said to have gone from Africa to Bahia, Brazil, voluntarily, and then returned to Africa for an extended sojourn before returning finally to Bahia to assume the leadership of the Casa Branca temple. Verger reports that it was Marcelina who first brought to Bahia the famous Bamboose—the babalawo diviner from Oya and founder of Brazil's most illustrious line of male priests.

Similarly, in Cuba, the famous African-born Adechela is said to have been enslaved in Cuba but to have returned to Africa for initiation as a babalawo diviner, later returning to Cuba. The oral history also identifies a free-born African woman named Elfunche (also Efunsetan or La Funche) who traveled as a free person to Cuba and there reformed Afro-Cuban religion in the 19th century.

These reports are made largely credible by archives documenting the return of thousands of Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Cubans to the West African coast. Moreover, in the lamentably incomplete Bahian archives of return voyages from Lagos, I have counted dozens of ships and hundreds of free Africans traveling from Lagos to Bahia or through Bahia to Rio or the State of Pernambuco, Brazil, between 1855 and 1898. Journalistic, epistolary, and ethnographic evidence reveals repeated journeys of another score of African-Brazilian travelers up to the 1930s. Many of them carried British passports, and most appear to have engaged in commerce, selling ethnically marked Brazilian merchandise (such as salted meat and Afro-Brazilian religious paraphernalia) to returnees in West Africa and authentically African merchandise (such as the cola nuts and woven cloth used in the Candombé) to their black customers in Brazil. Thus, under British protection and motivated by their own commercial interests, a generation of back-and-forth travelers consolidated a set of novel, religiously based, and transnational identities unprecedented before the slave trade and as yet fragmentary before the 19th-century return of Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Cubans to Africa. These were the Yoruba and Jeje identities.

As these identities blossomed in early 1900s Brazil, they displayed not only the memory of religious icons, myths, and practices from the Africa that preceded the slave trade but the effects of the radical ideological transformations of late-nineteenth-century Yoruba ethnogenesis, which occurred primarily after the end of the slave trade. The interaction of Westernized African receptives and returnees in Sierra Leone and Lagos in the 19th century had produced, for the first time, a self-ascribed Yoruba identity that embraced the diverse peoples of Oyo, Esiri, Ile-Ife, Egor, Egbado, Ilesa, and so forth. Their Western education gave the returnee advocates of this identity privileged access to international markets and to the emergent colonial administrations of British and French West Africa. Moreover, their literacy allowed them an unparalleled opportunity to articulate their own vision of their culture and history. Thus, at the British-dominated crossroads of African/African American interaction, the Yoruba acquired a highly publicized reputation for superiority to other Africans. This reputation for superiority was useful in the 1880s and 1890s, as the bourgeois black Lagosians faced new forms of economic disadvantage and racial discrimination. Their reaction was a literary and cultural movement extensively documenting Yoruba traditional religion, advocating racial and cultural purity, and popularizing the adoption of African names in lieu of the European ones with which many returnees and receptives had grown up. On the contrary, the cultures of the Guinea Coast, including the forbears of Yoruba culture, had long embraced the virtues of interethnic marriage and cultural hybridity. The dominant culture of 19th-century Brazil was highly Eurocentric, and though the movement of independence from Portugal appeared to valorize the Indian as a symbol of Euro-Brazilian autonomy, the sizable African presence in Brazil tended to be regarded as polluting. From the 1930s onward, Brazilian nationalist culture embraced the virtue of a cultural hybridity that blended African, European, and native Brazilian blood and culture into one new and uniquely beautiful amalgam. In sum, neither Brazil nor pre-19th-century West Africa appears to be the origin of the extraordinary value that the dignitaries and advocates of the Brazilian Candombé religion have, since the early 20th century, placed on black racial and religious purity. These values seem to be rooted in the racial and cultural nationalism of the Lagosian renaissance in the 1890s, during and after which time Afro-Brazilians were traveling back and forth between Lagos and Bahia. Long after that time, letters, newspapers, and Lagosian renaissance-inspired writings on Yoruba traditional religion and its alleged superiority continued to cross the Atlantic. At least one priestly traveler who sojourned in late-nineteenth-century Lagos appears to have used his readings to justify the invention of a new category of priests—the obas, or ministros, of
Xango—in what is still described as Brazil’s most purely African Candomblé temple, Ilê Axé Opô Ajonjá.

Ironically, beyond the marked prestige and pursuit of purity articulated in this transatlantic religious culture, a most persistent set of its shared institutions and motifs derives from a British institution—Freemasonry. Freemasonry took its modern form as a male fraternal order and speculative philosophy, rather than as an association of craftsmen, in the early 1700s. Over the next two centuries, it spread beyond England to other parts of Europe and to Europe’s overseas colonies, where membership often became a highly prestigious marker of bourgeois status or an equally prestigious context of conspiracy against European rule, as it became in the British North American colonies. Avowedly based on pre-Christian philosophical and religious principles and parallel to many Afro-Atlantic religions in it fraternal secrecy, Freemasonry and its iconography have proved inviting to numerous West Africans, Afro-Brazilians, Afro-Cubans, Haitians, and black North Americans. Thus, tens of thousands of black men around the Atlantic perimeter are united by their shared membership in this British-founded fraternity.

Moreover, Freemasonry has inspired several neo-traditional spin-off organizations, such as the Reformed Ogboni Fraternity and the Aborigine Ogboni Fraternity of Nigeria, while the Masonic compass, the All-Seeing Eye, and the secret handshakes turn up in the apparently “traditional” religions of Nigerian villages, Haitian Vodou temples, the Afro-Cuban Palo Mayombe order, and at least one Afro-Brazilian diviner’s office.

And there is a further irony. Americans have helped to re-Africanize religious policies of African nation states through bank, civil service, and school holidays. On the one hand, West African nation-states in the 20th century have tended to marginalize non-Christian and non-Islamic religions. For example, only Christian and Islamic religious holidays tend to be recognized through civil service and school vacations. On the other hand, the West African-inspired religions of the African diaspora have grown exponentially in wealth and membership since the 1960s. In Brazil, Cuba, Trinidad, and the Cuban-American and African American communities of the United States—not to mention Haiti, where it occurred well before the 1960s—these religions have become emblems of national identity. In Brazil, military dictators and democratic politicians alike have sought popular support through the temples of Afro-Brazilian religion.

During the past forty years, the Brazilian government, the United Nations (UNESCO), and various U.S. corporate foundations have repeatedly sponsored Brazil’s exchange of priests, professors, and museum exhibitions with state institutions in Nigeria and the People’s Republic of Benin. These exchanges have highlighted the Yoruba and Ewe-Gen-Aja Fon religious legacy that Brazil shares with Africa. Brazil’s official support appears to be motivated partly by its desire for political and commercial leadership in the nonaligned world. Whatever Brazil’s public relations motives might be, the Brazilian government established African-diaspora religion as a medium of transatlantic diplomacy and helped pave the way for numerous subsequent transoceanic priestly exchanges, involving Haitians, U.S. Latinos, Trinidadians, and black North Americans as well. Thus, New World governments, foundations, and priests have now inspired changes in the official cultural policies of at least one African government. The Beninese government has now reversed the pattern among African states and established an official and annual holiday for the Vodun gods, on January 10.

Hence, the cultural history that unites African and African American religions consists of much more than pre-slave trade African origins and American survivals. Much that appears to be primordial in so-called African traditional religion is in fact the product of a live Afro-Atlantic dialogue, and much that appears to survive of African religion in the Americas is in fact shaped by an African cultural politics that long postdated the slave trade. No less than the dialogue over political identity, the dialogue that has produced the most African of Afro-Atlantic religions is often mediated through European languages, colonial and postcolonial capitals, European institutions, and texts published in Roman script. For example, in the 20th century, texts such as Col. A. B. Ellis’s The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa (1890), Samuel Johnson’s The History of the Yorubas (1921), Melville J. Herskovitz’s The Myth of the Negro Past (1941), and Robert Farris Thompson’s Flash of the Spirit (1983), have all exercised a momentous influence on African Americans’ conception of their religion and cultural identities generally. Even more importantly, these transatlantic cultural politics demonstrate the overwhelming role of black volition in reshaping inherited and imposed cultural realities.

Conclusion

Melville J. Herskovitz is correct in observing that intergenerational learning of belief, practice, and bodily habits continues to link contemporary African Americans to the African cultures of their ancestors. On the other hand, Paul Gilroy (author of The Black Atlantic, 1993) is also correct in observing the numerous discontinuous forms of communication by which locales in the African diaspora have influenced each others’ culture and politics. This essay is intended to illustrate the further point that the diaspora and Africa itself are united by discontinuous and mutually influential dialogue that has continued long beyond the end of the slave trade. The dialogue between Africans and African Americans has not always produced the harmony and unity dreamt of by Pan-Africanists, but they have produced significant transformations of political identity, religious practice, and culture generally in both Africa and its diaspora. Thus, the conventional narrations of cultural history that identify the roots of African American culture in Africa and trace their survival, syncretization, or gradual dissolution in the Americas tell only part of the story. Not unlike other diasporas and their homelands—Jewish, Chinese, Irish, South Asian, and Lebanese—the African diaspora in the Americas reflects the effects of an enduring dialogue and a dialectic of mutual transformation over time.