Electoral Institutions, Party Organizations, and Political Instability

by

Daniel M. Kselman

Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date: March 30, 2009
Approved:

___________________________  Herbert Kitschelt, Supervisor

___________________________  Emerson Niou

___________________________  Timur Kuran

___________________________  Pablo Beramendi

___________________________  Judith Kelley

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University

2009
ABSTRACT

Electoral Institutions, Party Organizations, and Political Instability

by

Daniel M. Kselman

Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date: March 30, 2009
Approved:

___________________________
Herbert Kitschelt, Supervisor

___________________________
Emerson Niou

___________________________
Timur Kuran

___________________________
Pablo Beramendi

___________________________
Judith Kelley

An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University

2009
ABSTRACT

A majority of formal theoretic research in political science treats political parties as unitary actors, and endows them with decision-making powers not unlike those of strategic individuals. In contrast, my dissertation examines strategic equilibria which arise when competition takes place simultaneously within parties over organizational control and between parties over political office. I first distinguish between three intra-organizational elements: a party’s parliamentary group, its activist cadre, and its executive leaders. Chapters 2-4 develop a set of foundational game theoretic models which identify the equilibrium balance of power among these 3 organizational elements as a function of a country’s electoral institutions and voters’ relative responsiveness to marginal policy changes. In turn, this more complete understanding of intra-party competition sheds light on a number of important questions in comparative politics and comparative political-economy. For example, it helps to identify conditions under which Duverger’s argument that proportional representation (PR) should tend to generate multi-party competition may not apply; and, in contrast to Lijphart’s famous argument, conditions under which PR may instigate rather than mediate social conflict. Ten months of intensive field research conducted in Turkey provide both the quantitative and the qualitative data which constitute the dissertation’s most basic empirical material, including a data set of over 3,000 observations on party-switching in the Turkish Parliament (1983-2007).
Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iv

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................... vii

List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... viii

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... ix

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1. Duverger, Lijphart, and Turkey .................................................................................... 1
   1.2. The Macro-Theoretical Framework ............................................................................ 11
   1.3. The Micro-Level Argument ......................................................................................... 18
   1.4. Empirical Implementation ........................................................................................... 28

2. Legislative Equilibrium and Political Corruption under Alternative Electoral Rules .... 33
   2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 33
   2.2. Legislators, Voters, and Utility Functions .................................................................. 35
   2.3. Legislative Equilibrium under Proportional Electoral Rules .................................. 44
   2.4. Electoral Rules and Mechanisms of Democratic Accountability ............................ 60
   2.5. Corruption and Intra-Party Choice ............................................................................. 69

3. Party Leaders, Party Activists, and Party Choice ............................................................... 83
   3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 83
   3.2. Party Primaries and Party Activists in Spatial Political Theory ............................. 89
   3.3. Party Leaders, Party Activists, and Voters ................................................................. 93
   3.4. Median Activist Theorems ......................................................................................... 103
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.5. Nash Equilibrium in Two-Party Elections</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6. Nash Equilibrium in Multi-Party Systems</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7. Summary</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Legislative Defection in Centralized Parties</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Introduction</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Organizational Centralization in Low Partisanship Electorates</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Candidate Selection in Parliamentary Regimes</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Legislative Defection and Party Entry in Centralized Party Systems</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Easy Come, Easy Go: Party Switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Introduction</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Party Switching in Comparative Perspective</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Party Switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Operationalization and Measurement</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 District Magnitudes, Electoral Lists, and Party Switches</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Conclusion</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1. Chapter 2 Appendices</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2. Chapter 3 Appendices</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biography</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 1.1: Electoral Systems and Voter Responsiveness. ...................................................... 13

Table 2.1: Varieties of Electoral Systems............................................................................. 71

Table 2.2: Aggregate Data .................................................................................................. 73

Table 2.3: Electoral Rules and Corruption ......................................................................... 75

Table 2.4: Controlled Regression Analysis ......................................................................... 78

Table 2.5: Conditional Hypotheses .................................................................................... 81

Table 3.1: Partisanship, Dispersion, and SPNE................................................................. 122

Table 5.1: Political Parties in Turkey .................................................................................. 175

Table 5.2: A Typology of Switching Behaviors................................................................. 179

Table 5.3: U-Shaped Hypotheses ....................................................................................... 205

Table 5.4: ‘Open’ Party Switches ....................................................................................... 209

Table 5.5: ‘Occupied’ Party Switches ................................................................................ 210
List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Cycles of Instability in Turkey ................................................................. 6
Figure 1.2: The Macro-Argument .............................................................................. 16
Figure 2.1: Party Choice in a District Whose Representative is from Party A .......... 42
Figure 2.2: MARNE under OLPR Competition ............................................................ 54
Figure 2.3: Constituency Effort under Alternative Electoral Rules ................. 59
Figure 3.1: Party Supporters in a Three-Party System ................................................. 99
Figure 3.2: Party Activists in a Three-Party System .................................................. 104
Figure 3.3: Cycling in Two-Party Elections ................................................................. 119
Figure 4.1: The Ideal Points of Ideology Leaders ...................................................... 157
Figure 4.2: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 1)? ....................................................... 161
Figure 4.3: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 2)? ....................................................... 163
Figure 4.4: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 3)? ....................................................... 164
Figure 4.5: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 4)? ....................................................... 165
Figure 4.6: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 5)? ....................................................... 166
Figure 5.1: Party Switching in Turkey ..................................................................... 176
Figure 5.2: Votes and Seats in 1991 ................................................................. 191
Figure 5.3: Probability Switch = 1 ................................................................. 206
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my parents, Rachel Levy, Oliver Barajas, Alvin Levy, Mike Witt, Kelsey Krews, and most especially my Dissertation Advisors and Committee members for their help and patience throughout this process.
Chapter 1. Introduction: Electoral Institutions, Party Organizations, and Political Instability

“Hence…doubtless there is a fairly strong probabilistic association between proportional representation or runoff elections on the one hand and the multi-party system on the other.” (Riker 1982, pg. 760)

“It so happens that the proportional system has a lesser probability of rebellion than the majority system […].” (Reynal-Querol 2002, p. 35).

“The greater the degree of electoral proportional representation, the lower the degree of high-level ethnic conflict.” (Cohen 1997, pg. 614)

1.1 Duverger, Lijphart, and Turkey

Formal electoral institutions used to elect a country’s Legislature occupy an important place in comparative political science. The most oft-noted distinction is that between proportional representation (PR) institutions in which parties receive seats in multi-member electoral districts in some proportion to their district-level vote shares;¹ and majoritarian (MAJ) institutions in which legislators are elected by some form of plurality rule, the most common example of which is the single-member-district (SMD) system used in American and British legislative elections. The MAJ-PR distinction has been invoked as one of explanatory relevance in a variety of thematic areas, ranging from studies of political party systems and representation, to comparative analyses of economic policy,

---

¹ A majority of continental European states use proportional allocation mechanisms to elect their Parliamentary representatives.
to the search for political institutions capable of averting outbreaks of ethnic and/or socio-economic conflict.

Here I briefly discuss two arguments, previewed in the chapter’s opening quotations, which help to motivate the research’s driving theoretical and empirical questions. Begin with Maurice Duverger (1954), who formulated two basic propositions as to the relationship between electoral institutions and party system fragmentation. The first, labeled Duverger’s Law, states that MAJ elections of the Anglo-American variety should generate party systems with only two viable political parties. This party system concentration results from both the ‘mechanical’ effects of plurality rule institutions, whose winner-take all logic makes it exceedingly difficult for smaller niche parties to gain legislative representation; and the related ‘psychological’ effect by which voters, aware of the penalties incurred by small parties in MAJ systems, choose not ‘waste’ votes on parties with little chance of legislative representation.2

The second proposition, labeled Duverger’s Hypothesis, states that multi-member-district PR systems (as well as majority runoff systems) will ‘favor’ the advent of party systems with some number \( N > 2 \) viable political parties. I enclose the term ‘favor’ with

2 Riker (1982) has since reformulated this law to incorporate the possibility of multi-party competition in MAJ systems when either: a.) parties which are small at the national maintain a plurality presence in particular regions or localities (e.g. Canada), or b.) when a large party occupies the political center and is therefore a perpetual Condorcet Winner against some number \( N \geq 2 \) smaller parties at the system’s ideological poles (e.g. the Congress Party in India).
quotation marks to highlight the caution Duverger himself employed in putting this hypothesis forth. Noting a number of historical counter-examples, i.e. countries in which PR institutions co-existed with two-party competition, Riker (1982) reformulates this hypothesis as one of permissiveness: PR institutions *permit* rather than *generate* organizational fragmentation. These reservations aside, even skeptics generally assent to the existence of a *probabilistic relationship* between PR and multi-party competition. This probabilistic hypothesis finds support in empirical studies which uncover a strong correlation between PR competition and the number of parties competing in a system (Rae 1971, Lijphart 1984).

The relationship between electoral institutions and party systems is crucial to the *consociationalist* paradigm for democracy in divided societies. Arend Lijphart (1977) famously argued that the minority representation and multi-party competition fostered by proportionality grant effective veto power in key policy areas to ethnic or socio-economic minorities, thus credibly guaranteeing their access to valuable public resources, and averting the social conflict which may emerge from political exclusion. On the other hand, by inhibiting the parliamentary representation and political participation of ethnic and socio-economic minorities, MAJ systems impel perpetually excluded groups to pursue their demands confrontationally, and outside of the parliamentary arena. Consociationalism has since transformed itself from an empirical project into a normative and prescriptive one, promoting the use of PR systems in newly
democratizing countries. Lijphart himself contributed to the intellectual and practical politics of constitutional choice in post-apartheid South Africa.

Despite this intellectual and public prominence, the precise causal status of PR systems in consociational theory is in fact somewhat murky. Not surprisingly, critiques of the paradigm often portray consociationalists as claiming that PR is not only necessary, but also practically sufficient, for the establishment of civil order in divided societies (Reilly 2001). If pushed most proponents of consociationalism would likely pull back from such strong causal claims, and argue more modestly that PR is a key ingredient of any larger recipe for stable democratic competition in ethnically heterogeneous contexts. On the other hand, a quick glance at this list suggests why some more recent consociationalist research has, as critics argue, come precipitously close to positing a relationship of necessity between PR and ethnic mediation. Of all the factors mentioned, a country’s electoral institutions are the most malleable, and thus carry the ‘prescriptive’ burden in consociational thought. Indeed, the above lists’ final two elements (traditions of elite accommodation and popular support for democracy) are only minimally distinct from the civil order they purport to explain, leaving precious little conceptual space

---

3 Along with PR, proponents often highlight the importance of segmented social organizations which minimize inter-ethnic interaction; the absence of ethnic or socio-economic groups which alone comprise over 50% of the population; traditions of elite accommodation; and a popular commitment to institutions of democratic governance.
between *explananda* and *explanandum*, and certainly no room for short-term political engineering. Arguments of necessity and sufficiency aside, the above quotations leave little doubt that a probabilistic hypothesis not unlike Duverger’s above motivates much empirical work on the relationship between electoral institutions and civil order.\(^4\)

Duverger and Lijphart’s hypotheses as to the consequences of PR constitute fundamental elements in our corpus of scientific knowledge, propositions whose intuitive properties are supported with a variety of empirical data, ideas which most undergraduate majors appropriate. That said, as with nearly all social scientific generalizations they seem to apply probabilistically rather than deterministically. In turn, the quest for cumulative knowledge which characterizes scientific inquiry impels us to seek out social, historical, or natural conditions which might upset the predicted relationships. This responsibility is all the more pressing when social scientific propositions find their way into real-world political processes. In recommending PR to newly democratizing countries without a qualified understanding of its effects, we risk a measure of intellectual culpability if transitional politics deteriorate into civil conflict.

Turkey’s experience with PR underscores the point. In 1960, the Turkish military deposed a democratically elected regime in no small part to its hyper-majoritarian

\(^{4}\) Both cited papers claim to uncover evidence in favor of this argument, although Alonso and Ruiz (2005) argue otherwise.
tendencies, which in the 1957 general election had permitted the once opposition Democratic Party a near complete monopoly of political power despite gaining less than half of all votes cast. In devising a new Constitution, to be employed upon the reinstitution of democratic competition, both the Constituent Assembly and its military consultants chose PR so as to fragment the Democratic Party’s electoral support and minimize the risk of one-party government (Ahmad 1993). Consider the consequences:

Figure 1.1 plots the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) in the Turkish Grand National Assembly for every fully democratic election held since the advent of

Figure 1.1: The Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties
Turkey: data taken from http://www.belgenet.net/, arrows denote elections which precede periods of political conflict.
PR in 1961 (except the most recent, on which more shortly).\(^5\) Note first that the plot exhibits a marked cyclicality. Each intervening decade begins in a state of relative party system fragmentation, but trends towards concentration near its end. In the 1960’s and 1970’s the two primary beneficiaries of this party system concentration were Justice Party (JP) and Republican People’s Party (RPP). In the late 1990’s and early 21\(^{st}\) century, legislative seats became monopolized by the RPP and the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP).\(^6\)

Secondly, note that each of Turkey’s spikes in party system concentration has been coterminous with periods of social and political instability, as indicated by the Figure’s arrows and ‘éclatements’. In both 1971 and 1980 the Turkish military was forced to intervene in civilian politics in response to outbreaks of intense social unrest and violence. In 2006-2007 tensions between the ruling JDP and the opposition RPP simmered, resulting in a period of constitutional crisis. This newest period of instability was punctuated by secularist/nationalist protests of over 1 million people in the streets of Ankara and Istanbul (May 2007), harsh crackdowns against ‘May-Day’ labor rallies in Istanbul’s Taksim Square (2007 and 2008), and increased threats of cross-border strikes

\(^5\) ENPP is calculated by: a.) summing each party’s squared percentage of legislative seats after a particular election, and b.) dividing 1 by this aggregate sum.
\(^6\) The trends are not perfectly parallel; in particular, the party system took longer to concentrate in the 1990’s than the previous decades, and first underwent a period of increased fragmentation (i.e. the curve is ‘humped’ rather than ‘linear’). Nevertheless, the global trend is clear.
aimed at rooting out Kurdish insurgents in Northern Iraq. More recently the Turkish Constitutional Court (traditionally allied with the military) initiated a legal process in favor of dismantling the JDP, which it claims constitutes a threat to Turkish secularism.

Turkey’s recent political history thus provides a sharp counter-example to both Duverger and Lijphart’s hypotheses as to consequences of PR institutions. Furthermore, not only does PR co-exist with periods of two-party competition and political conflict in Turkey; these periods also exhibit a high degree of correlation. The research contained in this dissertation demonstrates that this correlation is not random. In the subsequent chapters I will explain why conflictual two-party competition might arise despite the use of PR to elect a country’s Legislature. Comparative institutional scholars might immediately point out the obvious, namely that Turkey’s version of PR uses high electoral thresholds and the d’Hondt electoral formula, both of which mechanically reduce the number of parties in PR systems. Furthermore, analysts of Turkish politics often point to cultural traits which might upset the proper functioning of cooperative consociational bargains.

Although these institutional and cultural particularities have a place in the following argument, their causal status is secondary. In fact, I will assert that these traits are themselves outcomes to be explained, political phenomena which originate from more fundamental causal parameters. Put succinctly, the party system concentration and political conflict witnessed in Turkey should be characteristic of an entire class of closed-
list proportional representation (CLPR) systems when employed in countries whose voters are highly responsive to competing partisan appeals. CLPR is a system in which voters choose between political parties, but cannot influence which of a party’s many potential candidates eventually assume office, and can be compared to open-list-proportional-representation (OLPR) systems in which citizens simultaneously vote for political parties and individual candidates from within parties’ electoral lists. Voters are responsive when party identification is low and ‘elasticity’ to competing policy appeals is high, such that they readily alter their party choice from one election to the next.

This dissertation argues that the implementation of CLPR in fluid electoral environments leads to the creation of highly centralized political parties. Although ceteris paribus party activists attach value to controlling their own organizations, in high responsiveness environments such activists will recognize the need for electoral flexibility and maneuverability. Furthermore, in a game theoretic sense they will understand that activists in other parties recognize these same demands. Indeed, if activists in one party choose to restrict their party leaders’ flexibility while activists in other parties do not, the former will pay a severe price at the polls. This shared recognition of one another’s incentives to delegate leads activists from all parties to a mutually reinforcing abdication of rank & file power.

In turn, it is the incentives of office-maximizing political party leaders at the helm of centralized party organizations which ultimately generate the periods of
conflictual two-party competition documented in Figure 1.1. Unlike more stable environments in which the size of the available electoral market is limited, electioneering in fluid CLPR party systems allows organizational leaders the option of designing campaigns with the intention of securing a parliamentary majority. However, such campaigns require the construction of heterogeneous voting blocs whose various social elements have little in common, which in turn makes organizational discipline difficult to maintain. Indeed, while organizational centralization and organizational discipline might *prima facie* seem like two sides of the same coin, the opposite is in fact true. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, Turkish political party organizations are among both the world’s most centralized and most unruly. In part *because of* the fact that executive leaders maintain strict control over nominations and campaign appeals, organizations are subject to frequent defection by dissatisfied representatives or parliamentary factions. Party executives must thus balance the need to create voting blocs with majority potential and disciplined party organizations. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the most effective tools at their disposal in squaring this seemingly circular strategic dilemma are *institutional manipulation* and *ideological polarization*. Finally, it is institutional opportunism and ideological extremism which are ultimately responsible for Turkey’s cyclical periods of two-party competition, social violence, and democratic instability.
1.2 The Macro-Theoretical Framework

Variance in institutions which govern both the act of voting and the manner in which votes are aggregated and converted into legislative office is often evoked as an explanatory variable in comparative politics and comparative political-economy. Duverger (ibid) first codified the notion that PR should tend to support multi-party competition, whereas MAJ systems should tend towards two-party competition. Cox (1997) identifies more rigorously the key mechanism generating this correlation: an electoral system’s average district magnitude, which naturally is higher in multi-member PR systems than in the most common MAJ system (winner-take-all competition in single-member districts).7

In many studies it is not PR per se, but rather the coalition government often accompanying multi-party competition, which constitutes the primary mechanism linking proportional electoral institutions to political-economic outcomes. PR served as the backbone of multi-ethnic coalitions which contributed to the preservation order and peace in ethnically divided European societies (Lijphart 1973). More recently, Iversen

7 In a distinct set of papers Cox (1987, 1990) argues that the presence of a large number of viable candidates combined with the inability of voters to support more than one such candidate at a time (both traits are characteristic of PR systems), leads a subset of candidates to adopt more extreme ideological positions.
and Soskice (2006) have identified PR’s role in facilitating the cross-class coalitions necessary for socio-economic redistribution. Sachs and Roubini (1989) argue that the coalition government characteristic of most PR systems tends to generate higher average budget deficits than single-party government; for similar reasons Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2004) argue that PR leads to larger public sectors as a share of GNP.

Though by no means exhaustive, this list serves to demonstrate the prominence of electoral institutions in past and present comparative research. It also demonstrates the heavy emphasis on an electoral system’s relative proportionality as the determining institutional parameter. My dissertation argues first that PR is a heterogeneous institution whose political-economic consequences will vary according to the form of PR employed; and second, that even institutionally identical PR systems may generate distinct political-economic outcomes depending on the sociological environment in which elections unfold. The key mechanism by which these differing consequences arise is *intra-party competition*. The above-reviewed research treats political parties as unitary actors, and studies the consequences of electoral rules for the competition between perfectly unified party organizations. The current theoretical framework first addresses the manner in which distinct forms of PR interact with the sociological environment to determine the relative balance of power inside political parties; and then considers how these intra-party equilibria subsequently condition the relationship between electoral institutions and the political-economic outcomes reviewed above.
The key institutional distinctions I examine are those between *open-list proportional representation* (OLPR), *closed-list proportional representation* (CLPR), and *single-member district* (SMD) systems. The three systems’ distinguishing features are outlined below. The key sociological distinction drawn is that between countries in which voter choice is highly responsive to marginal policy shifts, and those in which high levels of party loyalty dilute voter responsiveness. Electorate’s characterized by high voter responsiveness can be conceptualized as the mirror image of those with high levels of party loyalty, in which attachment to individual party organizations dulls citizens’ susceptibility to new political appeals. Voter responsiveness is, of course, a continuous parameter. As a conceptual heuristic, consider a dichotomous distinction between ‘low’ and ‘high’ responsiveness electorates. This discussion implies to the following 3 X 2 classification of the dissertation’s most fundamental explanatory variables:

**Table 1.1: Electoral Systems and Voter Responsiveness: an Explanatory Typology.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>CLPR</th>
<th>OLPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Responsiveness</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Responsiveness</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I will refer to the numbers contained in Table 1.1’s cells as the associated political system’s type. For example, I refer to cases of low voter responsiveness combined with SMD electoral rules as ‘type 1’ systems; those with high voter responsiveness and OLPR electoral rules as ‘type 6’ systems; and so on.

Electoral institutions and voter responsiveness impact political and economic outcomes via their impact on competition which occurs within political party organizations. I analyze the intra-party competition between 3 primary partisan actors: a party’s members of Parliament (MP’s), party activists, and a party’s executive leaders. These actors must simultaneously compete with one another for organizational hegemony and with competing party organizations for political office. Competing organizations are themselves populated by MP’s, activists, and leaders faced with the same need to balance the considerations of intra-party and inter-party competition. The equilibrium balance of power among parties’ MP’s, activists, and executive leaders will depend on the form of PR employed and the extent of voter responsiveness, as these two variables

---

8 In order to specify causal arguments, I take Table 1.1’s two dimensions as independent. Indeed previous research demonstrates the existence of country’s which fall into each of Table 1.1’s cells (Kselman 2007), suggesting that no necessary relationship exists between a country’s electoral rules and the volatility of its electorate. That said, the Concluding chapter returns to the potential relationship between institutions and voter responsiveness, and addresses how this relationship might affect the dissertation’s theoretical arguments. The discussion highlights the fact that some political systems may exhibit self-enforcing properties. For example the use of CLPR in volatile electorates may itself make further stabilization of the electorate unlikely, i.e. CLPR may serve to reinforce electoral volatility in some new democracies.
combine to define the electoral incentives intra-party actors must respond to in their internal bargaining.

Intra-organizational equilibria then condition a number of party system phenomena, the most prominent of which are a system’s locus of accountability, its equilibrium number of political parties, and these parties’ ideological polarization. By a country’s ‘locus of accountability’ I mean to denote the mechanisms which tie voters to elected officials. For example, Carey and Shugart (1995) famously distinguish between ‘party-centered’ systems in which voter choice is grounded in the performance of parties as organizational units; and ‘candidate-centered’ systems where voter choice is grounded in the evaluation of individual legislators from within a party’s legislative ranks. An alternative distinction is between systems which generate programmatic party competition, where voter choice is grounded in the evaluation of national-level policy performance; and those which generate clientelistic party competition in which voter choice is based on direct material exchange between citizens and elected officials (Kitschelt and Stevenson 2007).

Unlike the locus of accountability, whose conceptual exposition merited a paragraph, the number of parties competing in party and system and these parties’ ideological polarization are more straight-forward to define. The former refers quite simply to the number of viable parties which compete for office in a particular country. Measures like the ‘effective number of parties’ used to generate Figure 1.1 above allow
us to operationalize the notion of ‘viability’ by discounting the presence of extremely small parties of little electoral consequence. By a party system’s ideological polarization I mean its tendency to generate viable party organizations which adopt radical or ‘extremist’ campaign platforms, where again the notion of viability implies that extremist organizations must demonstrate some minimal electoral and/or governmental consequence for a party system to be polarized.

As noted above, I argue that a country’s locus of accountability, its effective number of political parties, and these parties’ ideological polarization are determined by that country’s electoral institutions and the responsiveness of its electorate; and that these explanatory variables exert their impact through the mechanism of political parties’ organizational balance or power. Figure 1.2 summarizes this causal sequence:

**Figure 1.2: The Macro-Argument**

The dashed two-sided arrows linking a country’s locus of accountability, effective number of political parties, and party system polarization highlight the fact that, while
conceptually distinct, these three party-system phenomena are often simultaneously determined as components of individual theoretical equilibria. Put simply, these three elements often represent ‘distinct sides of the same coin’. For example, as discussed in the following Section, the combination of CLPR elections in high responsiveness electoral environments tends to generate party-centered competition in which two polarized party organizations compete.

Intra-party equilibria thus play a crucial role in conditioning the relationship between electoral institutions and political outcomes. The theoretical results which emerge from a more complete analysis of this role serve to qualify and contextualize a number of the most basic hypotheses reviewed above, including Duverger’s classical argument concerning the relationship between proportionality and multi-party competition. Furthermore, while my current emphasis is on developing the relationships laid out in Figure 1.2, the Concluding chapter outlines how the party system phenomena which constitute the final element in Figure 1.2’s causal chain ultimately condition a country’s political-economy and susceptibility to outbreaks of social conflict. As such, the framework will eventually also qualify and contextualize a number of well-known institutional arguments linking PR systems to social order (Lijphart ibid), income redistribution (Iversen and Soskice ibid), and public good provision (Persson and Tabellini ibid).
1.3 The Micro-Level Argument

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 use game theoretic modeling to investigate Figure 1.2’s causal sequence. Chapter 2 begins by deriving a set of foundational theoretical results differentiating legislative incentives in SMD, CLPR, and OLPR systems. These results serve to endogenize a country’s locus of accountability, and more particularly the prevalence of candidate-centered as opposed to party-centered competition. In all PR elections political parties present lists of candidates to the electorate, and the number of office-winning candidates from within these lists is determined by parties’ relative vote proportions in particular electoral districts. CLPR and OLPR differ in the manner in which a party’s legislative seats are allocated among the members of that party’s electoral list. In CLPR systems voters play no role in deciding which from among a party’s many candidates gain office, as the order of electoral lists is fixed prior to the election according to political party’s extant nomination procedures. In OLPR systems, voters are given the option not only of supporting a political party label, but also individual candidates from within political parties’ lists. In turn, after the election is held it is those candidates who secure large numbers of intra-party preference votes who are allocated a party’s legislative seats.

OLPR is not an unfamiliar institution in comparative politics. Carey and Shugart (1995) intra-party voting in OLPR should significantly increase the incentives of legislative candidates to cultivate ‘personal’ voting constituencies who can be counted
on to deliver targeted support at election time. Similarly, Ames (1995) and Desposato (2006) have identified the role of OLPR in generating the particular mix of decentralized party organizations, legislative party-switching, and pork-barrel politicking characteristic of Brazilian politics. These studies argue that preference voting in OLPR systems induces the consummation of ‘personal’ relationships between individual legislators and their constituencies. On the other hand, recent research on the relationship between electoral institutions and corruption (Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005) asserts that, while more constituency-oriented than CLPR systems, OLPR systems fail to generate the strong accountability personal characteristic of SMD systems. The authors argue that strong accountability levels in MAJ electoral systems should reduce corruption when compared with their PR counterparts, and present empirical evidence in support of this claim.

None of these papers develops an explicit model of intra-party competition between members of the same party list. This is an important omission, as it implies the absence of an explicit equilibrium analysis of the precise mechanism which distinguishes OLPR and CLPR systems. Chapter 2 assumes the task of developing such a model, analyzing a game in which all members of parties’ electoral lists must simultaneously decide how to allocate a fixed amount of effort between pursuing their constituents’ interests and pursuing their personal interests in material and/or
professional advancement, taking into account both their list-mates’ effort allocations and those of individual candidates from competing parties.

As foreshadowed above, the model’s Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy vector depends not only on the form of electoral rule in place, but also the relative responsiveness of voter choice. More particularly, the model contains a parameter $\lambda$ which captures the percentage of party loyalists in the electorate, voters who will predictably vote for a particular party regardless of candidates’ effort allocations. As it turns out, when electoral volatility is low (i.e. the electorate contains high levels of party loyalty), OLPR systems generate qualitatively identical patterns of legislative effort allocation as do CLPR and SMD systems: legislators devote all of their effort to party service and none to the cultivation of regional voting blocs grounded in constituency service. In other words, the commonplace assumption that OLPR generates personal vote seeking is only correct when voters display the requisite responsiveness to legislative constituency service.

On the other hand, as the number of party loyalists in an electorate begins to drop OLPR systems quickly outpace both CLPR and SMD systems in their tendency to generate legislative constituency service. In essence, the personal vote-seeking incentives characteristic of high volatility OLPR systems serve as a credibility creating mechanism. Incumbent $i$ can count on his or her fellow incumbents’ incentives to secure district-level support, which in turn impels $i$ to do the same so as to keep pace with his or her
legislative counterparts. This leads to the emergence of Mutually-Assured Re-election Nash Equilibria (MARNE) in which legislators act so as to mutually ensure one another’s organizational ascendance over both prospective intra-party legislative challengers and their parties’ executive leaders.9

An implication of the model is that, in most electorates, OLPR should generate more decentralized party organizations and more ‘candidate-centered’ campaigns than CLPR and SMD systems. A further implication is that CLPR systems generate highly ‘party-centered’ political campaigns regardless of an electorate’s levels of party loyalty. A hybrid problem of collective action arises among CLPR co-partisans, i.e. incumbent MP’s from the same party list: since list positions are fixed in CLPR systems, those incumbents with high list positions can free-ride on the constituency service efforts of incumbents with low list positions, which in equilibrium prevents all but a small minority of legislators from choosing to develop a personal political following.

However, this is not to say that all CLPR competition is the same. The following chapters 3 and 4 develop a spatial model of political competition which demonstrates the fundamental distinction between party-centered politics in low as opposed to high

9 The chapter’s empirical section links these higher levels of accountability to lower levels of political corruption. The Concluding chapter returns to these analytic properties, arguing that incumbent legislators’ shared interest in ensuring one another’s ability to develop personal voting constituencies, both within and across party lines, serves as a key theoretical mechanism linking OLPR to the potential for conflict reduction in newly democratizing societies.
responsiveness electoral environments. In terms of the typology presented in Table 1.1, these chapters develop a theoretical model for understanding the important differences between ‘Type 2’ and ‘Type 5’ political systems (i.e. low vs. high responsiveness CLPR systems). Unlike most spatial models, which treat political parties as unitary actors and endow them with choice functions not unlike those of strategic individuals, I explicitly model the *intra*-organizational competition over organizational control which takes place simultaneously to the *inter*-organizational over political office. To do so I develop a formal model of political parties in which *party activists*, *party leaders*, and *party legislators* must balance their respective interests in electoral victory with their interests in organizational power, objectives which may not always be mutually compatible.

Perhaps the most important step in developing such a formal framework is specifying a set utility functions to capture the ways in which activists, leaders, and MP’s effectuate the balance between organizational and electoral concerns. Here I begin with a qualitative presentation of these utility functions defining, and then briefly discuss their meaning and justification. Later chapters present the utility functions’ mathematical expression and discuss their implications and justifications in greater depth. Beginning with the party’s rank and file cadre, I assume that party activist utility functions contain three terms: one capturing their interest in securing national-level policies which are to their liking; one capturing their interest in securing the benefits of governmental incumbency; and a final term denoting an intrinsic ‘representational’
interest in preventing their party form diverging too far from the traditional ‘party-line’. The latter objective will at times come into conflict with the former, as campaign strategies designed to secure political incumbency are often incompatible with those which approximate the a party’s traditional platform.

Moving a step up in the organizational hierarchy, I attribute to party legislators a utility function which is also characterized by an interest in securing satisfying policy outcomes and political incumbency. However, unlike party activists I do not attribute to legislators any intrinsic interest in keeping their parties ‘close to home’. As discussed at greater length in Chapter 3, party activists have a variety of both material and psychological reasons for their interest in preserving the party’s traditional platform. Although not subject to these same motivations, party legislators have a distinct interest which serves to operationalize their particular tradeoff between electoral and organizational concerns: organizational ambition, or the desire to move from being a legislator to being a party executive. Under certain circumstances this ambition will impel MP’s to form or join new parties for the sake of gaining greater organizational power, even if the choice to do so upsets their chances at political incumbency.

Finally, party leaders are those actors who currently hold a party organization’s executive reigns. Unlike legislators, who display a concern with policy outcomes, I model party leaders as opportunistically interested only in political incumbency and their own organizational hegemony. As with the activist-legislator distinction, the
distinction between legislators and party leaders has both material and psychological justifications. In a certain sense, this set of organizational utility functions serves to operationalize the notion that ‘organizational power corrupts, and absolute organizational power corrupts absolutely’. As one moves from activists, to legislators, to party executives, the corresponding utility function becomes less and less concerned with matters of policy and representation, and more and more concerned with matters of governmental incumbency and organizational hegemony. Note that this need imply anything about the spatial preferences of organizational actors. It is possible both for activists to be more ‘radical’ than party leaders, and vice versa; both for legislators to be more ‘radical’ than activists, and vice versa; etc. The distinction has to do not with spatial preferences but with organizational motivations. Although the preference progression moving from activists through legislators to party leaders enters the subsequent formal models as an assumption, I also provide empirical and theoretical arguments for its viability.

With these utility functions in hand, Chapter 3 develops a model in which party leaders and party activists compete with one another over the choice of a party organization’s campaign platform. While the traditional Downsian spatial model assumes that party leaders are essentially unrestricted in their choice of policy platforms, McGann (2002) derives a set of spatial equilibria under the assumption that candidates are constrained to adopt the most-preferred policy position of their median
party activist. The equilibrium results endogenize this constraint, identifying conditions under which a party’s median activist will be compelled to allow organizational leaders maximum flexibility in adopting policy positions. The central parameter influencing activists’ choice whether or not to delegate policy-making prerogative to organizational leaders is voters’ responsiveness to policy shifts. In ‘Type 2’ polities which combine CLPR with low responsiveness, the electoral payoff to deviating from a party’s traditional positions will by definition be minimal, as the number of voters susceptible to alternative campaign appeals is minimal. More importantly, not only do activists in one party recognize this relative absence of electioneering incentives; they also know that activists in other parties recognize the absence of responsiveness, and their mutual recognition of this fact is common knowledge. As a result, when low responsiveness is common knowledge, activists from all parties can count on one another’s incentives to constrain the electioneering of opportunistic party leaders. In equilibrium, party leaders are thus constrained to adopt the policy position of their current median-activist in elections.

The internal balance of power inside political parties is distinct in ‘Type 5’ systems, i.e. CLPR systems with high voter responsiveness. When the electoral payoff to deviating from a party’s traditional positions is relatively more pronounced, activists become more likely to tolerate such deviations, and this increased tolerance is shared and common knowledge among activists from competing parties. In equilibrium, if
voter responsiveness surpasses some critical threshold, activists from a party system’s various organizations can no longer count on one another to constrain their respective executive leaders. Once one set of activists deviates even slightly from its previous policy positions for the sake of vote-maximization, activists in other parties are faced with the choice between: a.) losing the election with a significantly higher probability; and b.) allowing their own organizational leaders to effect similar vote-maximizing deviations. In equilibrium, the result is a spiraling situation of mutually-reinforcing abdication by activist cadres from competing parties of their respective organizational powers. In turn, in ‘Type 5’ systems, a party’s executive leaders will have the option of choosing platforms which diverge from their median-activist’s ideal point.

Low levels of party identification increase the marginal vote returns to incremental policy shifts, and divergent activist preferences make the prospect of electoral victory by one’s opponent increasingly distasteful. Once the median activist in one party decides on a deviation from her ideal point, median activists in other parties do the same; indeed, there exists no Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in which median activists from one party choose their ideal point while those in others choose to maximize votes. No longer able to count on one another’s restraint of party leaders’ vote maximizing incentives, median activists thus engage in mutually-reinforcing deviations from their most-preferred policy stances.
Chapter 4 then argues this mutually-reinforcing deference to leaders’ vote-seeking incentives generates centralized party organizations, such that electoral competition can be modeled as a contest between opposing party leaders. However, this does not imply the unrestricted vote maximization assumption characteristic of traditional spatial models. Party leaders themselves face certain risks and constraints in choosing optimal campaign platforms. Firstly, the act of introducing new elements into a party’s selectorate is risky insofar as these new candidates and activists may with some probability mount a leadership challenge so as to place ‘one of their own’ in the party’s executive position. Secondly, as executive leaders incrementally shift their party’s platform away from status quo party position, they risk defection by marginal organizational elements alienated by their parties’ new policy stance and membership base. The chapter’s final Section develops a model of the latter phenomenon in which potential party leaders currently serving as Members of Parliament for a status quo party must decide whether or not to defect and join or form a new organization. Unlike past models of party entry, which analyze situations in which new parties emerge from civil society, this model represents one of the first strategic analyses of party entry resulting from organizational schism. Among other results, it demonstrates that legislative defection is more likely in multi-party systems than in two-party systems; and that legislative defection will be particularly unlikely in polarized two-party systems where two large parties adopt highly divergent policy stances.
Chapter 4 contains the dissertation’s final formal theoretic results, but not its final theoretical argument. Chapter 4 demonstrates that two-party competition in which both competing organizations are polarized has the potential to generate high levels of party discipline. In turn Chapter 6 argues that executive leaders in charge of highly centralized party organizations will have every incentive to create situations of two-party polarization so as to simultaneously maximize their probability of governmental incumbency and the discipline of their party organizations. They can do so by making marginal alterations to the CLPR institutions in place, as well as by choosing to run focus their campaigns on highly polarizing issue dimensions. Ultimately, it is thus the utility maximizing behavior of executive party leaders at the helm of centralized organizations which explains why Turkish politics generates polarized two-party competition despite the use PR as an electoral rule.

1.4. Empirical Implementation

The research contained in the following chapters is in a very real sense relentlessly theoretical. While each stage of the theoretical development presented above generates distinct hypotheses, only a subset of these hypotheses is in fact subjected systematic empirical confirmation. Chapter 2 presents data on political corruption, demonstrating that high accountability OLPR systems generate systematically less corrupt governance than SMD or CLPR systems. Chapter 5 then uses a newly created data set of over 4,000 observations on party switching in the Turkish Parliament to
investigate Chapter 4’s comparative static predictions. Statistical analysis confirms the hypothesis that the likelihood of legislative defection to new party organizations is positively correlated to the number of Parliamentary parties. It also confirms theoretical predictions as to the strategic conditions under which MP’s will join incumbent parties and/or change parties so as to maximize their short-term material benefits. In short, an MP’s ‘type’ conditions the nature of his or her switching options in accordance with theoretical predictions.

An outline of future empirical research is provided in Chapter 6. One element of this research will investigate the relationship between electoral institutions, voter responsiveness, and the internal organization of political parties. For example, Chapter 3 argues that party leaders in ‘Type 5’ (i.e. high responsiveness CLPR) systems should be delegated substantial discretion over the party’s platform in political campaigns, while those in ‘Type 2’ (i.e. low responsiveness CLPR) systems should be constrained to adopt the ideal point of their current median activist. In empirical terms, the model thus suggests that control over candidate selection, platform choice, campaign strategy, etc. should be more centralized in ‘Type 5’ systems than in ‘Type 2’ systems. Qualitative data comparing Turkey (a prototypical ‘Type 5’ system) with Western Europe’s more stable PR party systems (‘Type 2’) is consistent with this prediction, demonstrating for example that powers of candidate selection tend to be much more decentralized in the latter, whether through the institution of regional nominating conventions whose delegates
are selected in local level party branch elections, or through *nominating primaries* in which a party’s rank and file are given some measure of control over the party’s candidate pool.\(^{10}\) Full cross-national analysis of this hypothesis will become possible with the publication of an ambitious new dataset on *democratic linkage mechanisms* (Kitschelt et al. 2008), a dataset which uses expert survey judgments to generate information on political parties’ internal organization in a sample of over 80 countries.

As well, building on Chapter 2’s theoretical results, the concluding chapter lays out a both normative and empirical research plan whose goal is to establish the comparative advantage of OLPR as compared to CLPR high responsiveness electoral environments, i.e. the benefits of ‘Type 6’ as compared to ‘Type 5’ systems. In contrast to Lijphart’s famous argument (1977) that PR elections should generate minority inclusion and social peace in divided societies, chapter 4 identifies conditions under which CLPR competition in high responsiveness environments generates the ideological polarization often responsible for outbreaks of civil violence. In future research I will examine in larger cross-national samples the interactive effects of a system’s electoral institutions

\(^{10}\) Further support is provided by the fact that selection powers in West European party organizations have become increasingly centralized over time, especially where voter choice has become increasingly volatile (i.e. ‘responsive’ to policy shifts). This is established using standard measures of party system volatility and the Katz and Mair (1992) data manual on West European party organizations.
and the responsiveness of its electorate on both its effective number of parties and its propensity for social conflict.

Finally, Chapter 6 outlines the archival, quantitative, and interview-based information which I will use in future research to examine the parallel patterns of party system concentration and social polarization which have contributed in seminal ways to the democratic instability which has plagued Turkish democracy since 1960. Detailed historical information gathered from both primary and secondary source materials, as well as observational information obtained from my time spent with members of contemporary Turkish parties, demonstrates the close relationship between Turkish party-system concentration and patterns described in the theoretical work above. This information pertains to, among other dynamics, internal leadership elections, intra-organizational struggles over candidate nomination procedures, and instances of break away factions from one party forming independent organizations.

Observational analysis also helps to explain why the above model’s predictions have been only partially born out by recent. The period in the run-up to 2007-2008 fit the cyclical pattern described above, with the party system beginning to concentrate around two political parties (the Justice and Development Party and the Republican People’s Party), and becoming increasingly polarized despite the seeming presence of responsive voters at the ideological ‘center’ who might have been eager for a moderate alternative. However, neither the predicted concentration nor the accompanying social polarization
has yet been fully achieved, and indeed the election in 2007 sent a 3rd party (the Nationalist Action Party) to Parliament, while a recent and polarizing Court case threatening to close the Justice and Development Party (JDP) ended with surprising compromise. This suggests a potentially fundamental difference between the JDP’s and past parties. A discussion of the unique nature of political Islam and Islamic social networks, and how they allowed JDP leaders to make moves towards the electoral median without alienating their more extreme activists or threatening their own leadership positions.
Chapter 2. Legislative Equilibrium and Political Corruption under Alternative Electoral Rules

“The possibility of holding individual politicians accountable through open-lists seems a less powerful deterrent [for corruption] than individual ballots associated with plurality rule.” (Persson and Tabellini 2003; pgs. 195-196)

“Because open-list proportional representation systems share features of both closed-list proportional representation and plurality systems, they occupy an ‘intermediate’ category in monitoring corrupt self-enrichment.” (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; pg. 585)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter refutes, both theoretically and empirically, the above quotations’ shared thrust, not to mention an increasingly accepted wisdom in comparative studies of electoral rules and corruption: namely that majoritarian (MAJ) systems, and in particular single-member district (SMD) systems of the Anglo-American variety, outperform both their open- and closed-list proportional representation counterparts (OLPR and CLPR respectively) in deterring political corruption. Although grounded in distinct theoretical approaches, the above cited studies both argue that SMD systems foster stronger ties of accountability between individual legislators and voters than PR systems, and in turn reduce elected officials’ ability to engage in political graft. Importantly, both also argue that the possibility of targeted candidate voting in OLPR systems is insufficient to contravene the diluted accountability levels fostered by the presence of multi-candidate party lists. In contrast, this chapter demonstrates that open-
list systems generate both theoretically higher levels of legislative accountability and empirically lower levels of political corruption than either SMD or CLPR systems.

In addition, the equilibria derived below set the stage for the dissertation’s remaining theoretical chapters, insofar as they endogenize the mechanisms of accountability which connect citizens to their elected officials and vice versa. Carey and Shugart (1995) distinguish between candidate-centered systems in which voter choice is determined largely by the individual performance of local legislative personalities, and party-centered systems in which voters choose based on their allegiance to one or another political party organization rather than individual legislative performance. Within the latter category, I further distinguish between systems in which voter choice is driven by parties’ programmatic positions on issues of national-level public policy and those in which a more ascriptive and non-instrumental party identification determines electoral outcomes. Of course, these two forms of party-centrism are themselves not entirely distinct, as symbolic attachments to particular party organizations rise and fall in part as a function of these organizations’ evolving ideological programs. However, the distinction proves theoretically useful in identifying the relationship between electoral institutions and patterns of democratic accountability.

Sections II and III develop a game theoretic model which identifies the equilibrium level of constituency service effort exerted by individual legislators as an interactive function of a country’s electoral institutions and the prevalence of partisan
bias among its voters. The results suggest that OLPR systems generate systematically higher levels of constituency effort than either CLPR or SMD systems, and that this effect becomes stronger as the number of party loyalists in an electorate decreases. Section IV then investigates these results implications’ for a country’s accountability patterns demonstrating first that, with one important caveat pertaining to district magnitudes, CLPR generates party-centered competition even if electorates are characterized by low partisan and/or programmatic biases; and second that accountability patterns in OLPR systems contains a number of theoretically desirable properties which suggest its potential as a mediating device in societies prone to civil conflict. Finally, Section V operationalizes and tests the model, demonstrating a strong and consistent corruption reducing effect of open-list institutions in a sample of 84 contemporary democracies. Taken together, the theoretical and empirical results provide a strong counterargument to the notion that SMD systems generate better governance than their PR counterparts.

2.2. Legislators, Voters, and Electoral Competition

In this chapter I examine a simple two-party game, which is sufficient to identify a set of fundamental distinctions between SMD, CLPR, and OLPR competition. That said, and the following is a crucial point in any model of proportional representation, the model is robust to situations of multiparty competition (see Kselman 2007). When $N > 2$ political parties compete, things become numerically more complicated, but the
equilibrium properties identified below persist. In a chapter length analysis which aims
to operationalize and test the argument empirically, investigating the two-party case
helps to communicate parsimoniously the model’s basic equilibrium dynamics.

Consider a country comprised of \( M \) evenly sized regions identified by the
marker \( j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, M\} \), in which two political parties \( P \in \{A, B\} \) compete for office. Let
the country’s Legislature contain \( M \) incumbent legislators, each of which belongs to one of
the two competing political parties, and each of which hails from exactly one of the
country’s \( M \) evenly-sized regions, such that no two incumbents hail from the same
region. Incumbents possess 1 unit of effort which they divide exhaustively between: a.)
pursuing the interests of their regional constituents (\( f_j^P \)); and b.) pursuing their own
material, professional, or personal interests (denoted \( r_j^P \)). This implies the effort
constraint \( f_j^P + r_j^P = 1 \).
Behaviors associated with $f_j$ include securing regionally targeted policies and infrastructure projects (pork), providing constituents with individual-level transfers (clientelism), and serving as a link between constituents and the state bureaucracy (ombudsman services). Behaviors associated with $r_j$ are more heterogeneous. At one end, it may include outright *graft and political corruption* aimed solely at personal material enrichment. It may also include behaviors designed to further one’s *partisan career*, such as participating in the development and implementation of a party’s public policy initiatives (e.g. research and analysis and intra-legislative persuasion), attending national-level social events and fundraisers, etc. Finally, $r_j$ may simply involve *leisure time* spent with family and friends. The dissertation’s remaining chapters discuss in greater detail the institutional, cultural, and individual-level factors conducive to one or another of these various possibilities. For the moment, note simply that effort devoted to $r_j$ is that which incumbents devote to their personal interests rather than those of regional constituents.

While legislators benefit directly from $r_j$, they benefit from $f_j$ indirectly. The provision of constituency effort generates regional supporters whose choice at election time has less to do with issues of national level public policy than with their allegiance to local politicians with a reputation for constituency service. Office-minded legislators
may thus benefit from $f_j^p$ if the consequent increased regional vote shares increase their chances of re-election. Define $\pi_j(f_j^p)$ as the probability that the incumbent affiliated with region $j$ will gain re-election in the subsequent election given allocation $f_j^p$, and let $\beta$ denote the fixed benefit associated with gaining re-election. We can then write the incumbent affiliated with region $j$'s utility as follows:

$$U_j^p = r_j^p + [\pi_j(f_j^p) \cdot \beta].$$ \hspace{1cm} (1)

Utility functions (1) and (2) allow us to identify a basic tradeoff all legislators face when making effort allocation decisions, formalized in the model of voter choice below. Effort devoted to $f_j^p$ will increase their regional constituents’ utility, and thus their regional vote share; but unlike $r_j^p$ it generates no intrinsic utility for the legislator in question. Conversely, effort devoted to $r_j^p$ yields an intrinsic utility, but does not increase the incumbent’s regional vote share.

*Voters* in this model gain utility from two distinct sources: a.) the specific level of club goods and constituency service parties target to their region; and b.) a *party*

---

2 This utility function implies that legislators care only about winning back their own seat, and not about the total number of seats their party wins. It is also possible to examine a model in which the value of $\beta$ is higher among those legislators whose party wins enough seats to form a government, capturing the notion that legislators in parliamentary systems prefer being in the governing majority to being in the opposition. The basic equilibrium dynamics uncovered below remain largely unchanged in this more complicated theoretical environment.
preference parameter which captures both voters’ general identification with a party’s historical and ideological legacy and their preferences for party’s respective national-level policy platforms. In Section IV below as well as later chapters these distinct sources of organizational utility are separated. For the moment I lump all partisan attitudes in the same parameter, treat them as exogenously set, and ask the following question: given some distribution of partisan attitudes in the electorate, what is the equilibrium level of club goods and constituency service provided by parties’ legislative incumbents? We’ve already defined $f^P_j$ as the effort invested by party $P$ to provide voters in region $j$ with particularistic goods and services. Define $\sigma_i$ as voter $i$’s relative preference for party $A$ as compared to party $B$, where higher values of $\sigma_i$ correspond to more favorable general attitudes towards party $A$ and lower values to more favorable attitudes towards party $B$. We can then write voter $i$ in region $j$’s utility over parties $A$ and $B$ as:

$$u_{i,j}^A = f_j^A + \sigma_i \quad \text{and} \quad u_{i,j}^B = f_j^B - \sigma_i.$$  \hfill (2)

Assume that partisan attitudes in region $j$ vary according to a uniform distribution over the support set $[\sigma_j, \overline{\sigma}_j]$, where $\overline{\sigma}_j > 0 \ (\sigma_j < 0)$ represents the attitude of the voter in region $j$ who is most inclined to vote for party $A \ (B)$.$^3$ In addition, and without loss of generality, we will assume that $-1 \leq \sigma_j \leq 0 \leq \overline{\sigma}_j \leq 1$ and that $\overline{\sigma} - \sigma = 1$, where

$^3$ Though not a necessary assumption, the calculus of uniform distributions simplifies the analysis.
the latter implies that both the ‘height’ and the ‘width’ of the uniform distribution are equal to 1. Given these distributional assumptions, regions whose partisan attitudes are distributed over the support set [0,1] are most ‘biased’ towards party A; those whose partisan attitudes are distributed over the support [−1,0] are most ‘biased’ towards party B; and those with the partisan support set [−½,½] are most ‘neutral’.

In the game’s first stage, all M legislators simultaneously make decisions as to how to allocate their single unit of effort between $f_j^p$ and $r_j^p$; and in the second stage an election is held and citizens choose between parties A and B. Note that (by construction) citizens in regions whose current incumbent is from party A receive constituency-level effort only from this party’s representative and never from a representative of B; and similarly for citizens in regions whose incumbent is from B. As such, it is convenient to model voter choice as the decision to retrospectively ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ the party of one’s regional incumbent after observing the effort allocation $f_j^p$.

The notion of a reservation utility is a useful for capturing this dynamic. Define the reservation utility $\mu$ as the satisfaction level at which voters feel sufficiently pleased with the party of their incumbent legislator to choose that party in the game’s election.

Without loss of generality, I normalize the reservation utility to the level $\mu = 0$. In turn, voters from regions whose incumbent legislator is from party A will choose A if $u_{i,j}^A > 0$. Similarly, voters from regions whose incumbent is from B will choose B if
Define $\lambda_j$ as the percentage of party loyalists in region $j$, voters whose value of $\sigma_i$ is such that they will choose the party of their current incumbent even if this incumbent chooses $f_j^P = 0$. In regions where the incumbent is from party $A$ ($B$) loyalists are thus voters for whom $\sigma_i > 0$ ($-\sigma_i > 0$). For example, in a region whose partisan attitudes are distributed over the support set $[-\frac{3}{4}, \frac{1}{4}]$ and whose incumbent is from $A$, the loyalist percentage is $\lambda_j = \frac{1}{4}$. Similarly, in a region whose partisan attitudes are distribution over the support set $[-\frac{3}{8}, \frac{3}{8}]$ and whose incumbent is from $B$, the loyalist percentage is $\lambda_j = \frac{3}{8}$. More generally, in a district where the current incumbent is from party $A$ ($B$) the percentage of loyalists is $\lambda_j = \bar{\sigma}_j$ ($\lambda_j = -\bar{\sigma}_j$).

In turn we can derive $V_j^P(f_j^P)$, party $P$’s vote share in a region where the incumbent is from $P$, given some effort allocation by this incumbent (Appendix A). $V_j^P(f_j^P)$ is simply the percentage of voters in region $j$ whose utility surpasses $\mu = 0$:

$$V_j^P(\cdot) = \begin{cases} [f_j^P + \lambda_j] & \text{if } f_j^B < 1 - \lambda_j, \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$  

(3)

Naturally, $P$’s vote share increases with the constituency service of its legislative incumbent ($f_j^P$) as well as with the number of regional loyalists ($\lambda_j$), and any effort allocation at or above the level $f_j^P = 1 - \lambda_j$ yields $V_j^P(\cdot) = 1$. Figure 1 displays these vote shares visually for a region whose incumbent is from party $A$.  

Building on past retrospective voting models (e.g. Ferejohn 1986), in each region whose current incumbent is from party A (B), opposing party B (A) fields a challenger candidate who has no explicit strategic move, but who may accumulate the support of voters dissatisfied with their regional incumbent.\(^4\) Assume that voters cannot abstain, such that those constituents not satisfied by their incumbent will simply choose the opposing party.\(^5\) As such, B’s vote share in a region whose incumbent is from A equals \(1 - V_j^A(\cdot)\), and A’s vote share in regions where the incumbent is from B is \(1 - V_j^B(\cdot)\).

---

\(^4\) The model is in fact robust to the weaker assumption that incumbents have a constituency building advantage over challengers.

\(^5\) Abstention can be modeled with the same techniques used to extend the model to contexts with more than 2 political parties (Kselman 2007).
I begin by studying optimal incumbent effort allocations in SMD elections of the Anglo-American variety. To model such elections we must assume that a country’s $M$ geographic regions are coterminous with electoral districts, such that each electoral district sends exactly one legislator to the Legislature. In Anglo-American SMD systems, plurality rule is used to determine which of a district’s candidates wins the district’s single legislative seat, i.e. the seat goes to the candidate with the highest vote total. Given our assumption that only two parties compete, incumbent legislators in SMD elections need to receive just over 50% of votes in their district to secure re-election; if they receive less than 50% the seat goes to the opposing party’s challenger candidate.

Define $\hat{f}_{j}^{p}$ as the critical level of constituency effort an incumbent from party $P$ in region $j$ must exert so as to secure the bare vote majority necessary for re-election. Using the vote share equation (3) it is straight-forward to identify this critical effort level as $\hat{f}_{j}^{p} = \frac{1}{2} - \lambda_{j}$.\footnote{In regions where $\ell_{i} \geq \frac{1}{2}$ incumbents can thus set $\hat{f}_{j}^{p} = 0$ and gain re-election with only loyalist support.} Returning to (2) above, we can now identify the conditions under which incumbent legislators in SMD systems will in fact choose to exert this critical level of effort. First note that the utility they receive from this effort allocation is $[1 - \hat{f}_{j}^{p}] + \beta$, i.e. they receive the fixed benefit associated with re-election with probability 1, and devote the surplus effort left over after satisfying their re-election constraint to pursuing
their personal interests (such that \( r_j^p = 1 - \hat{f}_j^p \)). Were incumbent legislators to forgo re-election, the optimal allocation would be to choose \( r_j^p = 1 \), as incumbents who decide against re-election have every incentive to devote all effort to the pursuit of personal interests. Thus, a straight-forward utility comparison tells us that the incumbent from district \( j \) will choose re-election if \( \hat{f}_j^p + \beta > 1 \), which simplifies to the condition \( \beta > \hat{f}_j^p \). Not surprisingly, the higher the benefit associated with re-election, and the lower its costs in terms of legislative effort, the more likely incumbents will choose re-election over the short-term pursuit of personal gain.

### 2.3 Legislative Equilibrium under Proportional Electoral Rules

Legislative behavior in SMD elections is decision-theoretic: since each incumbent competes individually in a single legislative district, their chances for re-election are not interdependent. In contrast, rather than regions being perfectly coterminous with electoral districts as in SMD systems, in PR systems legislative districts comprise multiple regions, each of which sends 2 or more legislators to the Legislature. In turn, incumbents’ vote seeking efforts affect not only their own likelihood of re-election, but also that of other incumbents from the same electoral district. As a result, identifying optimal effort allocation in PR systems becomes a game theoretic problem. I now present a slight amendment to (2) which incorporates the fact that legislators’ re-election probabilities are now a function of both their own vote-seeking efforts as well as that of
other incumbents. Define $f_j \equiv \{ f_{j,1}, \ldots, f_{j,t}, \ldots, f_{j,M} \}$ as the strategy vector containing the constituency effort levels chosen by all incumbent legislators except that from region $j$.\(^7\)

In turn, rewrite incumbent $j$’s expected utility as:

$$U_j = r_j + [\pi_j (f_{j,1}, \ldots, f_{j,t}) \cdot \beta].$$

(3)

To model PR in its purest form, let the entire electorate (i.e. voters from all regions) reside in a single national electoral district with $M$ seats.\(^8\) I employ a simple quota and largest remainder rule to capture the proportional allocation of seats to parties $A$ and $B$. Define $q = 1/M$ as the electoral quota needed to earn an individual legislative seat.

Consider the case in which $M = 10$ (i.e. the national district contains 10 seats), such that $q = 10\%$. To determine party $P$’s aggregate vote share in a general election, we simply sum $V_j (\cdot)$ across all regions and divide by 10. As an example, if party $A$ wins 58% of the aggregate vote share and party $B$ wins 42%, then party $A$’s vote share contains 5 full quotas and party $B$’s vote share 4, implying that in a first allocation $A$ and $B$ will receive 5 and 4 seats respectively. As for the final seat, it will go to $A$ because her remainder of 8%, the vote share left over after her 5 quotas are subtracted, is larger than $B$’s remainder.

---

\(^7\) Drop the $P$ superscripts inside the vectors $f_j$ for notational convenience.

\(^8\) Such a system exists, for example, in Israel and the Netherlands. As demonstrated below, one could just as easily assume that the $M$ regions are divided into some number $M/2 < K < 1$ of electoral districts, each with 2 or more representatives. In this case, the results presented in Theorems 1 and 2 below would apply to each individual multi-member district rather than a single national district.
of 2%. In a final tally A will win 6 seats and B will win 4. If both parties have identical remainders of 5%, assume the final seat is allocated with a non-biased coin-flip.

At election time both parties present a list of $M$ candidates to the electorate. Among these $M$ candidates are the legislative incumbents from party $P$ and its challenger candidates. If a party wins some number $X \subseteq M$ legislative seats, these seats are subsequently allocated to the top $X$ candidates on the party’s list. We now recall the distinction between closed-list and open-list PR systems made above. Under CLPR competition voters choose only political parties, and do not have the option of expressing targeted support for individual candidates from within a political parties’ electoral list. Candidates’ list positions are thus fixed prior to the general election according to their respective parties’ internal candidate nomination procedures. In turn, effort devoted to $f_j^p$ affects the incumbent in question’s probability of re-election only indirectly, by increasing party $P$’s aggregate vote share. On the other hand, it does not affect the incumbent’s order on his or her party’s electoral list, and thus his or her likelihood of receiving one of the $X$ legislative seats $P$ eventually wins.

As a result, high list positions become valuable commodity in CLPR systems: parties can generally count on some minimum number of safe seats, such that candidates high on their party’s list will almost certainly be elected regardless of the particular instantiation of $f_j$. On the other hand, candidates low on a party’s list can do little to
ensure their own victory as they will be dependent on the party’s aggregate success and thus, at least in part, on the vote-seeking efforts of their co-partisans. The consequences of this closed-list mechanism are easiest to present for the case in which *incumbent legislators from both parties A and B occupy higher list positions than their respective parties’ challengers*. This assumption is sufficient but not necessary for the following results (Appendix B). If incumbents find themselves ahead of challenger candidates on party lists it is straight-forward to show that, given any electoral outcome, either party A or party B will have all of its incumbents re-elected. For example, consider the case in which $M = 10$, parties $A$ and $B$ hold 7 and 3 seats respectively, and an election is held in which $A$ wins 4 legislative seats and $B$ the remaining 6. Then all of $B$’s incumbents (and 3 of its challengers…) secure re-election, while only 4 of $A$’s incumbents are re-elected. We can now characterize the Equilibrium of the following CLPR game:

**The CLPR Game**

- Stage 1: all incumbents simultaneously choose an effort allocation subject to the effort constraint $f_j^p + r_j^p = 1$;
- Stage 2: elections are held in which voters choose according to the reservation utility rule;
- Stage 3: $A$ and $B$’s respective vote shares are aggregated across all regions, and the Droop quota/largest remainder rule is employed to determine how many seats each party receives;
- Stage 4: a party’s $X$ seats go to the top $X$ candidates on that party’s list.
Define $f^* = \{ f_1^*, f_2^*, \ldots, f_M^* \}$ as a Nash Equilibrium strategy vector, and $f^o = \{ 0, 0, \ldots, 0 \}$ as the full-shirking strategy vector, that in which all incumbents choose $r_j^p = 1$ and devote no effort to their constituents’ interests. As well, let $P^+(P^-)$ denote the party whose incumbents are (are not) all re-elected when the full-shirking vector $f^o$ is played, and define $S$ as the number of ‘safe seats’ won by $P^-$ at the full-shirking vector $f^o$. Recalling the utility function specified in (2) above, no incumbent who secures re-election given the full-shirking electoral outcome has any incentive to alter his or her effort allocation: they secure re-election despite having chosen $r_j^{px} = 1$, and any deviation would represent a needless transfer of effort away from the pursuit of valuable personal rewards. This applies to all incumbent candidates from $P^+$ and to the top $S$ incumbents candidates on $P^-$‘s electoral list, where $S$ denotes the number of ‘safe seats’ currently held by $P^-$. What about the decision facing an incumbent from $P^-$ at list position $S+1$, i.e. the highest position not to receive one of the party’s safe seats? In order to secure re-election this marginal candidate must devote just enough effort to constituency mobilization such that $P^-$‘s aggregate vote share is sufficient to
receive $S+1$ rather than $S$ seats. Define $\hat{f}_{S+1}$ as this critical level of constituency service, and $f^*_{S+1}$ as the marginal candidate’s equilibrium choice. Theorem 1 demonstrates that only the marginal candidate from $P^-$ ever devotes any effort to personal vote seeking:

* **Theorem 1:** The vector $f^* = \{0, \ldots, 0, f^*_{S+1}, 0, \ldots, 0\}$ is the unique Nash Equilibrium the CLPR game, where $f^*_{S+1} \in \{0, \hat{f}_{S+1}\}$ depends on the game’s exogenous parameters.

In short, under CLPR competition at most one incumbent ever devotes effort to constituency service. Consider the incentives of a candidate ranked first on party $A$’s list, who by definition only needs $A$ to receive 1 legislative seat in order to secure re-election. Under almost all circumstances, $A$ will win this single legislative seat even if the candidate placed atop her party list chooses $f^A_j = 0$. As such, this list leader can choose $r^A_j = 1$ and nonetheless gain re-election by free-riding on the constituency service efforts of incumbent candidates placed lower $A$’s list. As a result, candidates lower on the electoral list understand that any constituency effort they exert will be usurped by candidates higher on the list. The proof in Appendix B demonstrates that, at any vector other than $f^*$ in Theorem 1, either incumbents high on the list will defect so as to free-ride on their co-partisans’ mobilizing efforts; or incumbents low on the list will defect to avoid having their efforts appropriated by those with more favorable list positions.

49
In CLPR systems voters choose only political parties. When turning out to vote in OLPR systems, voters simultaneously choose a political party and a particular candidate from within that party’s list. To model this process, we will let $V_j^p(\cdot)$ represent not only the percentage of votes from region $j$ which accrue to party $P$’s aggregate total, but also the percentage of preference votes received by the region’s incumbent. By the same token, in OLPR systems votes cast against one’s regional incumbent serve not only to increase the opposing party’s aggregate vote share, but also as candidate votes for the regional challenger on the opposing party’s list. For example, while $V_j^a(\cdot)$ represents the percentage of candidate votes received in region $j$ by the incumbent from party $A$, \(1-V_j^a(\cdot)\) represents the percentage of candidate votes accrued by party $B$’s challenger candidate in the same region. Aside from the 4th and final stage, the OLPR game proceeds identically to the CLPR game outlined above. In this final stage, after $P$ wins some number $X \subset M$ legislative seats, these seats are allocated to the candidates on $P$’s list with the highest $X$ preference vote totals in their respective regions. As such, devoting effort to $f_j^p$ and increasing $V_j^p(\cdot)$ not only increases the number of seats $P$ wins, but also the likelihood that one of these seats will go to the incumbent in question.

In this chapter I investigate a stylized situation in which the number of party loyalists $\lambda_j$ is identical in all regions. As with the other simplifying assumptions noted above the model is robust to situations in which levels of party loyalty vary across
regions (Kselman ibid). Define this uniform level of loyalty as \( \lambda \in [0,1] \). For readers interested in the theoretical mechanisms which give rise to the following results, Appendix C contains both the general theoretical analysis and expository examples. The body of the chapter presents only the OLPR model’s basic intuitions.

Define \( \overline{P}^{MA} (\overline{P}^{MI}) \) as the number of seats held by the current majority (minority) party. Proposition 1 in Appendix C shows that, when \( \lambda \geq 1 - \left[1/(2 \cdot (2\overline{P}^{MA} - M))\right] \) the full-shirking vector \( f^0 \) is the OLPR game’s Nash Equilibrium. Put simply, when \( \lambda \) is sufficiently high incumbent legislators can count on enough vote support from their party’s loyal partisans to minimize the need for constituency service. Things change drastically as levels of party loyalty decrease, and in particular when drops below the value \( 1 - \left[(\overline{P}^{MA} - \frac{1}{2})/M\right] \).\(^9\) When this occurs, incumbents from both parties desirous of re-election support must devote effort to \( f_j^p \), as intra-party challenger candidates will have high enough preference vote totals to compete for a party’s seats (see example in Appendix C). In addition to increasing one’s own preference vote total, this effort has two important strategic consequences: a.) it increases one’s own party’s aggregate vote

---

\(^9\) When \( 1 - [(P^{MA} - \frac{1}{2})/M] \geq \ell > 1 - [1/(2 \cdot (2P^{MA} - M))] \), Proposition 2 in Appendix C demonstrates that only legislative incumbents from the current majority party must devote effort to \( f_j^p \) in order to secure re-election, whereas incumbents from the minority party gain re-election without any constituency service. It also demonstrates that majority party incumbents will only do so if their utility for re-election \( \beta \) surpasses a critical threshold. Proposition 2b demonstrates that, if this critical re-election utility threshold is not met, some but not all majority party incumbents choose re-election.
share; and b.) it decreases the number of preference votes received by the competing party’s challenger candidate in the same region.

Despite the fact that, in a game theoretic sense, electoral competition is purely non-cooperative, these dynamics lend a strong collusive flavor to electoral competition in OLPR systems with lower levels of partisan bias. For example, although competing with incumbents from one’s own party over high list positions, this competition also benefits the party as a whole by increasing its aggregate vote share. Similarly, although competing with opposing party incumbents over legislative seats, the votes these opposing party candidates receive simultaneously serve to reduce the ability of intra-party challengers to receive high list positions. When \( \lambda < 1 - \frac{\alpha}{M} \) and \( \beta + \lambda > \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{2M} \), these open-list dynamics yield Mutually-Assured Reelection Nash Equilibria (MARNE) in which all legislators gain re-election, and all legislators from the same party devote identical effort levels to \( f_j^P \) (proof in Appendix C):\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) If the condition \( (\beta + \ell) > \frac{(2P^M - 1)}{2M} \) is violated, the equilibrium becomes a quasi-MARNE (Proposition 3 in Appendix C). Quasi-MARNE differ from pure MARNE in that: a.) some subset of incumbents does not gain re-election; and b.) they are equilibria in weakly-dominant strategies. That said, among those incumbents who do gain re-election the basic equilibrium properties identified in Theorem 2 persist. These properties only begin to dissipate when \( (\beta + \ell) < 1/2 \) (Propositions 4 and 4b), i.e. when incumbents attribute unusually low utility to re-election. Naturally, when incumbents discount the value of re-election they will exert little effort to that end.
Theorem 2

* Under OLPR with \( \lambda < 1 - \left( \frac{F^{\text{MA}} - \frac{1}{2}}{M} \right) \) and \( (\beta + \lambda) > \left( \frac{2F^{\text{MA}} + 1}{2M} \right) \), any Nash Equilibrium must satisfy the following conditions, and any vector satisfying these conditions must be a Nash Equilibrium:

a) all incumbents gain re-election;
b) all incumbents from the same majority (minority) party receive identical vote shares \( V_{j}^{\text{MA}} (V_{j}^{\text{MI}}) \) in their respective districts;
c) \( V_{j}^{\text{MA}} = 1 - V_{j}^{\text{MI}} \).

Consider the case in which A and B have 6 and 4 current incumbents respectively. Then the condition \( (\beta + \lambda) > \left( \frac{2F^{\text{MA}} - 1}{2M} \right) \) is equivalent to the condition \( (\beta + \lambda) > .55 \). For example, if \( \beta = .5 \) and \( \lambda = .2 \) then one strategy vector which meets Theorem 2’s requirements is that at which all of A’s incumbents set \( f_{j}^{A} \) high enough to receive \( V_{j}^{A}() = 60\% \) and B’s incumbents set \( f_{j}^{B} \) high enough to receive \( V_{j}^{B}() = 40\% \): at this outcome A and B win back their 6 and 4 seats by the quota/remainder rule, and condition (c) from Theorem 2 is satisfied (Figure 2.2a). Another vector which meets these requirements is that at which \( V_{j}^{A}() = 64\% \) and \( V_{j}^{B}() = 36\% \) for all incumbents from A and B respectively (Figure 2.2b).
Example (a): $V_j^A = 0.6$ and $V_j^B = 0.4$

Example (b): $V_j^A = 0.64$ and $V_j^B = 0.36$

Figure 2.2: MARNE under OLPRE Competition
In fact, when $\beta = .5$ and $\lambda = .2$ any outcome which meets the following three criteria satisfies Theorem 2’s requirements:

| a) $V_j^A(\cdot)$ and $V_j^B(\cdot)$ are identical for all incumbents from $A$ and $B$ respectively; |
| b) $55\% < V_j^A(\cdot) \leq 65\%$ and $35\% \leq V_j^B(\cdot) < 45\%;$ |
| c) $V_j^A(\cdot) = 1 - V_j^B(\cdot).$ |

At any such strategy vector, devoting more effort to $f_j^P$ is unnecessary for re-election; and condition (c) guarantees that devoting less constituency effort would drop her preference vote total to just below that received by her party’s challengers.

The results derived in Sections II and III, along with the accompanying theoretical appendices, allow us to evaluate the aggregate level of constituency effort generated by different electoral systems at various levels of party loyalty. By aggregate constituency effort, I simply mean the total equilibrium effort devoted to $f_j^P$ summed across all of the Legislature’s $M$ incumbents. For example, return to the OLPR case in which $M = 10$ and parties $A$ and $B$ hold 6 and 4 seats respectively. As well, assume for the sake of argument that the level of party loyalists is $\lambda = .25$. In turn, if the MARNE displayed in Figure 2a were to be the game’s outcome then, using the vote share equation from Appendix A, we
see that all incumbents from party A set $f_j^A = .35$ and all those from B set $f_j^B = .15$, the levels required to make $V_j^A = .6$ and $V_j^B = .4$. The aggregate constituency service in such a situation would thus be equal to $\{(6 \ast .35) + (4 \ast .15)\} = 2.7$. On the other hand, in CLPR systems aggregate effort is equal to the constituency effort exerted by the marginal candidate, as only this candidate exerts any constituency service. And again, in SMD systems aggregate effort is simply the sum of all effort exerted by legislators acting according to the re-election criteria defined in Section II above.

In conducting aggregate analysis, for convenience and without loss of generality I continue to assume that the number of loyalists $\lambda$ is identical across all regions. I also assume for the sake of argument that the re-election utility $\beta = 1$. If this is the case then OLPR systems generate higher aggregate levels of constituency service than their counterparts except at extremely high levels of party loyalty (i.e. when $\lambda$ approaches 1). Were I to let $\beta$ approach 0, the same thing becomes true at extremely low levels of party loyalty, i.e. aggregate constituency service under OLPR approaches that of CLPR and SMD systems when $\lambda$ approaches 0. The basic implication that OLPR generates systematically
higher constituency effort obtains regardless of $\beta$’s size. If legislators show moderate interest in re-election then $\beta = 1$ serves as a useful heuristic.

While I presented Theorems 1 and 2 in the context of systems whose entire electorate served as one electoral district (found for example in Israel and the Netherlands), the equilibria apply equally in countries whose legislative seats are divided into more than one district. In such cases, Theorems 1 and 2 simply apply in each multi-member electoral district. I will thus consider a country with a 200 seat Legislature divided into 40 distinct 5-member districts, and a status quo legislative distribution of power in which party $A$ controls 115 seats and party $B$ the remaining 85 according to the following district by district breakdown:

- 15 districts in which party $A$ has 4 seats and party $B$ has 1 seat
- 10 districts in which party $A$ has 3 seats and party $B$ has 2 seats
- 10 districts in which party $A$ has 2 seats and party $B$ has 3 seats
- 5 districts in which party $A$ has 1 seat and party $B$ has 4 seats

This particular Legislature size and district distribution has no bearing on the following results. In fact, the relatively small district magnitude of $M = 5$ biases the following analysis against the basic implication that OLPR outperforms CLPR
and SMD in generating legislative accountability: the aggregate-level comparative statics become more pronounced in PR systems with larger electoral districts (Section IV). Finally, as Theorem 2 allows for a range of equilibria I analyze, again without loss of generality, the equilibrium whose aggregate level of constituency effort represents the mean of all possible equilibria. Define $F_{SMD}$, $F_{CLPR}$, and $F_{OLPR}$ as the aggregate levels of constituency effort which arise in the associated electoral system. Figure 2.3 presents makes use of the results from Sections II and III as well as the accompanying theoretical appendices to plot $F_{SMD}$, $F_{CLPR}$, and $F_{OLPR}$ as a function of $\lambda \in [0,1]$.
The figure’s ‘x-axis’ plots an electorate’s level of party loyalty, descending from left to right. The figure’s ‘y-axis’ plots $F_{[\text{SMD}]}$, $F_{[\text{CLPR}]}$, and $F_{[\text{OLPR}]}$ given the particular simulation described above. Each particular value labeled on the x-axis represents a point at which at least one of the aggregate effort functions $F_{[\cdot]}$ has an inflection point. When party loyalty is relatively high ($\lambda \geq \frac{5}{6}$) all three systems generate negligible constituency accountability. When $\lambda$ drops below $\frac{5}{6}$ OLPR and CLPR elections immediately begin to generate higher levels of constituency service, while $F_{[\text{SMD}]}$ continues to equal 0. At $\lambda = \frac{3}{4}$ CLPR systems revert to generating no
constituency service, but constituency service in OLPR systems continues to increase. Once $\lambda$ surpasses $\frac{1}{2}$ all three systems begin to generate higher levels of constituency service such that $F_{[OLPR]} > F_{[SMD]} > F_{[CLPR]}$. As well, the distance $F_{[OLPR]} - F_{[SMD]}$ is larger than the distance $F_{[SMD]} - F_{[CLPR]}$, i.e. the most significant distinction is that between OLPR systems and their counterparts. Finally, below the value $\lambda = \frac{1}{4}$ CLPR systems drop and begin to lag behind OLPR and SMD systems, and the former continue to outpace the latter. In short, in all but the most loyalist heavy electorates OLPR systems generate considerably higher constituency-level accountability than both SMD and CLPR systems, while the relationship between the latter two systems varies, and is only genuinely disparate in extremely low partisanship electorates. Importantly, these results are not dependent on the particular simulation I’ve chosen to analyze. Regardless of the Legislature’s size and the district-level distribution of legislative seats, OLPR systems are always characterized by higher levels of constituency service than SMD or CLPR systems, and the SMD-CLPR ordering depends on the electorate’s levels of party loyalty (Appendix D).

### 2.4 Electoral Rules and Mechanisms of Democratic Accountability

Recall Carey and Shugart’s distinction between party-centered and candidate-centered electoral competition. Figure 3 exposes the inherent lack on candidate-centered politics in CLPR systems. Regardless of an electorate’s partisanship, in closed-list elections
voter-choice is determined largely by organizational preferences rather than allegiance to individual regional politicians. Indeed, unlike the other aggregate effort in OLPR and SMD systems, the relationship between $F_{[CLPR]}$ and $\lambda$ is non-monotonic: somewhat counterintuitively $F_{[CLPR]}$ at times decreases with the electorate’s levels of party loyalty ($\lambda = \frac{3}{4}$ and $\lambda = \frac{1}{4}$), i.e. decreases despite the fact that voters become increasingly susceptible to individualistic appeals. This particular dynamic arises due to the fact that, even marginal candidates willing to expend the effort necessary to secure their party an additional seat often do not have sufficient non-loyalist voters in their district to do so, and thus have no choice but to choose $f_j^*(S+1) = 0$.

The argument that CLPR elections generate party-centric elections, however, must be qualified in two important ways. Firstly, in electoral districts with extremely low district magnitudes, for example those which send only two or three representatives to the country’s Legislature, CLPR elections may in fact generate considerable constituency service. Consider an electoral district which sends only two representatives to Parliament. In this case, even if only the district’s marginal candidate devotes effort to constituency service, this means that one of the district’s two representatives is elected for candidate-centered rather than party-centered reasons. In turn, if an entire country is composed of small electoral districts (e.g. Chile), CLPR may in fact generate levels of constituency service which outpace those of SMD systems and approach those of OLPR
systems. This distinction becomes important in later chapters, as district magnitude varies substantially in Turkey, with many smaller electoral districts occupying the heavily tribal Southeast and Black Sea regions. The more personalistic politics which emerges in these smaller districts contributes to the localized endurance of candidate-centered competition in an otherwise party-centered political system.

The second qualification concerning democratic accountability in CLPR systems is that party-centered competition comes in many forms. For the sake of analytic parsimony, Section’s II and III lump all voter evaluations of party organizations into the single term $\sigma$. In fact, organizational preferences can be separated into ‘policy’ and ‘party identification’ components. Consider a uni-dimensional policy space $x = [0,1]$ in which political parties must announce campaign platforms and implement policy programs, and define $x_i$ as voter $i$’s most-preferred policy position, i.e. her ideal point in $x = [0,1]$. Voter $i$’s organizational utility for party $P \in \{A, B\}$ can then be rewritten as $\sigma_i = \sigma_i^p - (x_i - x^p)^2$, such that voters may have some independent symbolic attachment to a party’s historical and ideological legacy (if $\sigma_i^p > 0$) which is independent from their evaluation of $P$’s policy stances. The distinction between CLPR systems in which voters display strong party identification and those in which voters care only about parties’ policy stances is crucial to the dissertation’s overriding argument, and its implications are examined explicitly in the following theoretical and empirical chapters.
Unlike CLPR systems, accountability patterns in OLPR and SMD systems vary considerably with an electorate’s partisanship, predictably becoming more candidate-centered as voters’ levels of party loyalty decrease. However, OLPR and SMD competition exhibit important quantitative and qualitative differences. Regarding the former, at all but the highest levels of partisanship OLPR generates substantially more constituent accountability than SMD systems. This quantitative difference generates yields the primary empirical hypothesis tested in Section V, namely that high constituent accountability in OLPR systems should make them more suited to the minimization of outright political corruption by elected officials.

Note also the qualitative distinction between legislative incentives in SMD as opposed to OLPR systems. In SMD systems individual legislators compete in separate single-member constituencies, and their chances at re-election have little to do with the performance on legislators outside their district. On the other hand, the theoretical analysis of equilibria in OLPR systems uncovered patterns of legislative behavior in which individual representatives in fact depend on one another for their respective re-election. Furthermore, these incentives apply not only to legislators from the same party but also to those from competing parties, as the constituency-level effort of opposing party legislators reduces the level of support received challenger candidates from one’s own party, and helps to solidify current incumbents’ re-election chances.
Consider for example a majority party $A$ which competes with a smaller opposition party $B$. In OLPR systems, legislators in this majority party have every incentive to *allow their opposition counterparts some access to public resources*: were the majority party $A$ to deprive the legislative opposition of said access, this would allow intra-party challengers from the majority party $A$ to gain votes at the expense of the minority party $B$’s incumbent legislators. The subsequent increase in candidate votes earned by intra-party challengers from $A$ will in fact threaten the re-election of $A$’s current incumbent legislators. As a result, neither legislators nor voters need rely on the executive incumbency of their particular party to partake in the ‘public pie’. The shared incentives fostered by OLPR thus may potentially create a ‘non-zero-sum’ form of political competition between opposing parties.

It is tempting to conclude that these ‘non-zero-sum’ incentives make OLPR a well-suited institution for mediating political conflict in ethnically or economically divided societies, and indeed the dissertation’s Conclusion will investigate just this proposition. However, like their closed-list counterparts, open-list voting systems are not a panacea for democratic conflict. To preview the Conclusion’s discussion, note first that OLPR’s cooperative incentives arise only in *mixed electoral districts* which contain incumbents from competing ethnic or social groups. If electoral districts are segregated along economic or ethnic lines then political competition will retain its zero-sum characteristics: if a majority party $A$ and a minority party $B$ do not compete in the same
electoral districts, it is no longer the case that the majority party’s incumbents will rely on the legislative effort of their minority party counterparts to keep intra-party challengers at bay. This distinction has been important in Sri Lanka, which despite using OLPR as an electoral system has witnessed continual conflict between its Tamil and Sinhalese populations. Horowitz blames this conflict in part on the majority-minority dynamic which arises in the absence of mixed electoral districts:

“Sri Lanka's homogeneous constituencies produced Sinhalese governments with no reason to include the Tamils.” (Horowitz 1993, pg. 28; italics not in original)

OLPR’s conflict capacity as a conflict mediating institutions may also be impaired by its consequences for party organizations’ internal distribution of power. As is clear from Figure 3, voter choice in OLPR systems with low levels of partisanship is heavily determined by the success of local legislative personalities in delivering targeted goods and services to particular regional strongholds. As a result, office-minded political party leaders find themselves to a large extent dependent on the personal vote-seeking of their respective parliamentary factions at election time. Under low partisanship OLPR competition the intra-party balance of power between a party’s organizational leaders and its parliamentary faction should thus be tilted in favor of the latter.

In turn, in OLPR systems organizational leaders have may wish to increase levels of partisanship in the electorate, thus diminishing the importance of legislative
constituency service in voters’ decision calculus and strengthening their organizational position *vis á vis* legislative representatives. Since organizational utility is expressed as 

$$\sigma_i = \sigma_i^p - (x_i - x^p)^2,$$

we see that party leaders can increase partisanship in two ways: by manipulating party identification or by choosing policy positions which make voters increasingly partisan. The former is quite difficult, as symbolic attachments are by definition cultivated over time. On the other hand, party leaders can manipulate partisanship in the short run by choosing highly polarized policy positions. For example, if parties A and B choose platforms in \(x = [0,1]\) near the competing extremes \((x = 0\) and \(x = 1)\), this will by definition increase voters’ ‘bias’ towards one or the other party, in reducing their susceptibility to particularistic appeals from individual legislators. Thus, to state one of the dissertation’s recurring theme, *party leaders may use political polarization as a tool for organizational ascendancy*, and in so doing counteract OLPR’s potential as mediating institution in divided societies.

**2.5 Corruption and Intra-Party Choice**

Studies of electoral institutions and corruption have generated mixed predictions as to the consequences of constituency-level accountability. Authors of the chapter’s opening quotations argue that constituent accountability should reduce corruption by allowing voters the institutional means to control politicians’ avarice, although they underestimate the importance of OLPR in
generating constituency level accountability between voter and elected officials.

Others suggest that excess accountability might in fact generate corruption in the form of particularistic public policy designed to satisfy special interest groups or targeted regional constituencies (Chang and Golden 2005). However, when evaluating the governance consequences of high accountability OLPR systems, we must not simply consider the potential costs of particularism; we also must think counter-factually, i.e. understand the type of policy which would be generated in the absence of particularism. Recall the heterogeneity of potential behaviors associated with $r_j^p$: from pursuing short-term material gain, to developing one’s national reputation and policy expertise, to spending time with friends and family. If, given a switch from OLPR to SMD or CLPR elections, legislators’ career incentives would lead them to devote $r_j^p$ to the design and implementation of national-level public policies, then particularism may indeed have negative governance consequences.

In contrast, the same would not be true were increases in $r_j^p$ devoted to graft and political corruption. In this case, though particularism may not be the most efficient accountability mechanism by which to generate public policy, it is nonetheless better than the absence of accountability. While in particularistic
systems the provision of public services, regulatory policy, human security, etc may be motivated by vote-seeking rather than efficiency-maximizing incentives, at least they are provided. A majority of the world’s democracies have been democratic for less than 40 years, many for little more than a decade, and few have the long-standing legal traditions and disciplined party organizations necessary to check self-interested legislators. As such, in most cases high levels of constituent accountability should be preferred to the graft and corruption which emerge in the absence of institutionalized constraints. This implies the following hypotheses as to the relationship between electoral rules and governance:

* **Hypothesis 1:** On average, OLPR systems should be associated with less corruption than both SMD and CLPR systems.

* **Hypothesis 2:** OLPR’s systems should be even less associated with corruption where legal and bureaucratic constraints to rent-seeking are weak.

I now test these Hypotheses in a cross-section of 84 states. Both the country sample and the particular time period (1995-1998) are identical to those used in Persson and Tabellini’s landmark empirical work on the economic consequences of democratic institutions (2003).¹¹ Using parallel samples allows

¹¹ I exclude Belarus, which is in their data set, due to problems of data availability. Among the remaining 84 countries are a number with questionable democratic credentials; as such I conduct robustness tests in a reduced sample of 64 countries, corresponding to those which have
me not only to generate results directly comparable to those of previous studies, but also to profit from the vast array of control variables contained in Persson and Tabellini’s publicly available data set. To operationalize the above model I begin by coding the variable SMD, which measures the percentage of a country’s legislators elected in single-member districts in the year 1997. For most countries this variable is equal to 0 or 1, but in countries with mixed electoral systems it may assume a value between 0 and 1.

To measure the difference between CLPR and OLPR electoral rules, I account for the presence of non-effective preference votes in a subset of PR systems.

sufficiently democratic scores on both the Polity IV and Gastil Indices of Civil and Political Liberties (less than 4 on the Gastil Index and higher than 5 on Polity IV).

12 My measurement of electoral institutions was compiled from a combination data sources, including the International Parliamentary Union’s Parline Database, the data Appendix to Gary Cox’s seminal work on electoral institutions (1997), Matt Golder’s database on Democratic Electoral Systems around the World (2004), and a more recent dataset collected Jessica Seddon et al. on Political Particularism around the World (2002). I cross-referenced these sources so as to ensure accurate measurement.

13 For example, Mexico uses a two-tiered electoral system in which 200 legislators are using PR elected in a single national district, while the remaining 300 are elected individual single-member districts. As such, Mexico is assigned the value .6 on the variable SMD. The exception to this rule is corrective systems in which a second electoral tier serves to compensate for any disproportionality which arises in the lower SMD tier. For example, in German legislative elections, parties which receive a less than proportional seat return in the SMD tier are awarded a greater than proportional share of seats in the PR tier. As legislative outcomes are thus qualitatively identical to those found in pure PR systems, I code Germany SMD=0.
In five cases (Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) individual preference votes rarely affect the order of electoral lists chosen by the party organization, making list dynamics qualitatively identical to those in CLPR systems (Ortega 2006). The variable OLPR measures the percentage of legislators elected using open-list PR electoral rules for the year in 1997, and codes the five countries with non-effective preference votes as CLPR systems. In order to ensure robustness, all tests below are also run with variable PREF, which shifts these cases to the open-list category.

Table 2 contains electoral system codings for the entire sample. 29 of the 84 countries examined used SMD as their predominant legislative electoral system (i.e. have values of SMD > .5), another 33 used CLPR as their predominant system, and another 14 used OLPR. Russia has a value of SMD = .5, and thus technically has no ‘predominant’ system. The remaining seven countries from the 84 country sample have hybrid electoral systems which I assign the label open-list majoritarian (OLMAJ), as they combine intra-party voting with some form of plurality rule seat allocation formula. Perhaps the most well-known
OLMAJ system is the *single-non transferable vote* (SNTV) used in Japan until 1993, and currently used in Taiwan.\(^{14}\)

### Table 2.1: Varieties of Electoral Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>CLPR</th>
<th>OLPR</th>
<th>OLMAJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAHAMAS</td>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGLADESH</td>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>CHILE</td>
<td>CYPRUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARBADOS</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>MALTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELIZE</td>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>CZECH REPUBLIC</td>
<td>MAURITIUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
<td>COLOMBIA</td>
<td>ESTONIA</td>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>COSTA RICA</td>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>TAIWAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIJI</td>
<td>DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>GREECE (OLPR = .975)</td>
<td>THAILAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>ECUADOR</td>
<td>LATVIA</td>
<td>TAIWAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMBIA</td>
<td>EL SALVADOR</td>
<td>LUXEMBURG</td>
<td>THAILAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>POLAND (OLPR = .85)</td>
<td>TAIWAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>GUATEMALA</td>
<td>SLOVAK REPUBLIC</td>
<td>TAIWAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMAICA</td>
<td>HONDURAS</td>
<td>SRI LANKA</td>
<td>THAILAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN (SMD = .6)</td>
<td>HUNGARY (CLPR = .54)</td>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>ICELAND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAYSIA</td>
<td>ISRAEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXICO (SMD = .6)</td>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAL</td>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN</td>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPUA NEW GUINEA</td>
<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>NICARAGUA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. VINCENT</td>
<td>PARAGUAY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRINIDAD</td>
<td>PERU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>SENEGAL (CLPR = .583)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKRAINE</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{14}\) Also included in this category are the *single-transferable vote* (STV) found in Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta; the *bloc vote* (BV) found in Thailand and Singapore; and Australia’s *alternative vote* (AV). In fact, Australia represents a coding quandary: on the one hand AV systems hold individual elections in single-member districts; on the other they allow voters to cast preferential votes which rank order a district’s candidates, both those from different parties and those occupying the same party label. While here I code AV as OLMAJ, all below regressions are run also with Australia coded as a pure SMD system.
Kselman (ibid) demonstrates that the equilibrium patterns identified in Theorem 2 are identical in a game with SNTV as the electoral rule. This identity holds despite the absence of vote pooling and proportional seat allocation under SNTV competition, and attests to the strength of intra-party competition as an effort inducing mechanism. The sample’s remaining hybrid systems (ftn 14) are subject to similar incentive structures, insofar as candidates must compete both against opposing political parties and against their co-partisans from the same party list. Like OLPR and SNTV, all such systems should be especially prone to generating constituency accountability on the part of incumbent legislators, leading to the following corollary Hypothesis:

* **Hypothesis 3**: On average, open-list systems (whether OLPR or OLMAJ) systems should be associated with less corruption than both SMD and CLPR systems.

* **Hypothesis 4**: Open-lists should be even less associated with corruption where legal and bureaucratic constraints to rent-seeking are weak.

To operationalize corruption I employ the widely used ‘GRAFT’ index from the World Bank’s *Governance Indicators* database. These widely used indicators compile information from a variety of sources, all of which measure in some way or another
people’s *perceptions* of a particular state’s propensity to generate political corruption.\(^{15}\) I rescale the data such that the measure runs from 0 to 10, with 0 (10) representing the worst (best) possible corruption outcome, and rename the variable ‘CLEAN’ in accordance with the scale’s direction (higher values imply better outcomes). For the year 1998, Table 2 contains the sample mean and standard deviation of GRAFT for the year 1998, along with its mean values in the four electoral system types distinguished above (SMD, CLPR, OLPR, OLMAJ):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Rule</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Clean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLMAJ</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLPR</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLPR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Sample Statistics and Statistics by Electoral Rule

\(^{15}\) Detailed discussions of the data, the data generating methodology, as well as an archive of all individual data sources, can be found at [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp).
Table 2.2 contains suggestive evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1 and 3: on average OLPR and OLMAJ systems rank substantially higher than their SMD and CLPR counterparts when it comes to controlling corruption. Furthermore, the identity intuition driving Hypothesis 2 is upheld, as the various governance indices have nearly identical means in OLPR and OLMAJ systems. I now examine these predictions using weighted-least squares (WLS) regression analysis.\textsuperscript{16} Hypothesis 1 predicts that the variable OLPR should improve governance outcomes in a statistically significant manner. To test Hypothesis 3 I create variable OPEN, which codes the percentage of legislators elected by some form of open-list system, be it OLPR or OLMAJ.

The first set of regressions (presented in Table 3) examines the impact of electoral rules on corruption without control variables. These regressions contain the variable MAJ, which codes the percentage of seats elected by some form of plurality rule or majoritarian electoral formula (be it SMD or OLMAJ); and the variable WTDMAG, which codes a country’s effective district magnitude.\textsuperscript{17} As noted in the literature review

\textsuperscript{16} The number of information sources aggregated to derive the six governance indicators varies from country to country depending on data availability. Naturally, we should have less confidence in observations whose governance scores are generated with less information. WLS weights observations by the inverse standard deviation of the data sources used to generate their score, assigning more inferential weight to observations of which we can be more confident.

\textsuperscript{17} WTDMAG measures the average district magnitude across political tiers. In one-tier systems, or two-tier systems in which the second-tier simply allocates seats unallocated in the first tier,
above, both the traditional MAJ/PR distinction as well as a system’s district magnitude have been invoked as key explanatory variables in past studies of electoral rules’ economic consequences, and in particular in studies of the relationship between electoral rules and corruption. Table 3 allows us to compare their impact to that of intra-party preference voting:

Table 2.3: Electoral Rules and Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N = 84</th>
<th>DEPVAR = CLEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLPR</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.577)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTD MAG</td>
<td>5.778 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.450)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONS</td>
<td>5.778 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.450)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | .007           |
|        | (.006)         |
|        | .007           |
|        | (.006)         |
|        | 5.501 **       |
| WTD MAG| 5.501 **       |
|        | (.410)         |

Standard errors in parentheses, where * → \( p[z] < .1 \); ** → \( p[z] < .05 \); *** → \( p[z] < .01 \)

WTD MAG is the average district magnitude for the system’s 1st electoral tier. Otherwise, it is a weighted function of the percentage of seats elected at different magnitudes, mathematically equivalent to an ‘expected’ magnitude. For example, since Mexico has a 2 tier system with 300 SMD’s and a national PR district with 200 seats WTD MAG = \( \{200/500 * 200\} + \{300/500 * 1\} = 80.6 \). The notion of an effective magnitude represents an improvement as compared to most past empirical studies, which generally used as a proxy the average district magnitude in a system’s 1st electoral tier, without incorporating the presence of 2nd tiers.
As demonstrated in the first set of results, the variable OLPR leads to improved corruption outcomes across the board, although effect falls slightly below standard levels of significance. That said, the effect is in fact fairly robust, and much closer to statistical confidence than both MAJ and WTDMAG. When included in a regression with OLPR, the latter two variables fail to confidently predict governance outcomes. The second set of results in Table 3 provides even stronger evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. The variable OPEN leads to strong and statistically secure improvements in corruption control, improvements which are both substantively larger and statistically more significant than those for the variable OLPR; and once again, the variables MAJ and WTDMAG fail to significantly predict governance outcomes.

I now investigate Hypotheses 1 and 2 in a controlled regression environment. Past research invokes a series of explanations for corruption which form the body of control variables used in studies of electoral rules and corruption. These same controls, borrowed from Persson and Tabellini’s publicly available data set (2003), appear in Table 4 (Appendix D provides a more description variable by variable description of the data). Political-economic controls include a country’s logged per capita GDP and its level of trade openness (LYP and TRADE); cultural controls include the British colony dummy, the percentage of both Protestant Christians and Catholics as a portion of the
population, and a measure for overall ethno-linguistic fragmentation (UK_COL, PROT, CATH, and AVELF); political controls include a Presidentialism dummy variable, a Federalism dummy variable, and the democracy’s age, i.e. the number of years since the country’s first free and fair election (PRES, FEDERAL, and DEM_YEARS); and regional controls include a Latin America dummy and an OECD dummy (LAAM, OECD). Table 4 presents the results of controlled regression analysis:
Table 2.4: Controlled Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$DEPVAR = CLEAN$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$N = 84$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OLPR</strong></td>
<td>.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPEN</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.424 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAJ</strong></td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.290)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WTDMAG</strong></td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRES</strong></td>
<td>-.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEM_YEARS</strong></td>
<td>.006 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.007 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FEDERAL</strong></td>
<td>-.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COL_UK</strong></td>
<td>.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROT80</strong></td>
<td>.013 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.013 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CATH80</strong></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVELF</strong></td>
<td>-.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.560)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.558)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAAM</strong></td>
<td>-.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LYP</strong></td>
<td>1.063 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.019 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRADE</strong></td>
<td>.005 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OECD</strong></td>
<td>1.204 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.183 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONS</strong></td>
<td>-4.167 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-3770 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.675)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once again the effect of intra-party voting on governance is positive, substantively significant, and statistically significant in the case of OPEN (nearly so in the case of OLPR). Furthermore, this effect once again strongly outweighs the predictive capacity of either MAJ or WTDMAG. Why might these results diverge so substantially from results Persson and Tabellini (quoted above) and Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (quoted above), both of whom find that open-list voting is a weak predictor of corruption outcomes? Diagnostic tests and straight-forward ocular variable comparisons suggest it has a lot to do with coding choices. For example, the variable MAJ employed in Tables 3 and 4 differs from Persson and Tabellini’s majoritarianism variable in important ways. They choose to code Fiji, Mexico, Hungary, Russia, Senegal, and South Korea as proportional systems. Of these Mexico, Hungary, Russia, are Senegal have mixed electoral systems with a majoritarian and proportional component, something accounted for in my measurement of MAJ. As well, for the years in question Fiji and South Korea used patently majoritarian systems, suggesting a coding error by the authors. Finally, Persson and Tabellini code both Chile and New Zealand as majoritarian. This does not account for New Zealand’s institutional reform; or for the fact that Chile in fact uses an OLPR system, though its small district magnitudes have lead some to question its empirical status. By recoding these cases and including the new variable in regressions, MAJ begins to regain some of its lost importance, though its effect continues to be outdone by the corruption-reducing impact of OLPR and OPEN.
To test the interactive hypotheses 2 and 4, I must develop proxies for the presence of ‘legal and bureaucratic constraints on political corruption’. The information from Table 4 provides a straightforward method for doing so. Note that three variables consistently predict levels of corruption: PROT80, DEM_YEARS, and LYP. The reasons Protestant heritage, extended democratic experience, and economic development might reduce rent-seeking have been addressed at length elsewhere, and need not detain us here. We will use these three indicators to operationalize ‘bureaucratic and legal constraints’. The median value of LYP is 8.4; the median value for DEM_YEARS is 20; the median value for PROT80 is 3, such that the real distinction in the latter is between countries who had greater than 3% Protestant population in 1980, and those that had effectively no Protestants in their 1980 population.

Table 2.5 presents the results of regression analysis in which the effects of OPEN and OLPR are tested first in systems which have above average constraints to political corruption (i.e. those in which LYP > 8.4, DEM_YEARS > 20, and PROT80 > 3); and then in systems have below average exogenous constraints to corruption (LYP < 8.4, DEM_YEARS < 20, and PROT80 < 3). The former are in the Table’s left-hand column, and the latter in the Table’s right-hand column. All insignificant control variables from Table 2.4 are omitted to maximize degrees of freedom:
Table 2.5: Conditional Hypotheses
* → \( p[z] < .1 \); ** → \( p[z] < .05 \); *** → \( p[z] < .0 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( DEM_{YEARS} &gt; 20 )</th>
<th>( DEM_{YEARS} \leq 20 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td>( .689 ) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>( -.049 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTD_MAG</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>( -.002 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYP</td>
<td>1.81 ***</td>
<td>( 1.13 ) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROT_80</td>
<td>.016 ***</td>
<td>( .025 ) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONS</td>
<td>-9.62 ***</td>
<td>( -4.57 ) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYP &gt; 8.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>.771 *</td>
<td>( 1.42 ) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>( -.071 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTD_MAG</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>( .003 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM_YEARS</td>
<td>.018 ***</td>
<td>( .018 ) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROT_80</td>
<td>.023 ***</td>
<td>( .019 ) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONS</td>
<td>5.45 ***</td>
<td>( 3.52 ) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROT_80 &gt; 3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>( .982 ) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>-.454</td>
<td>( .454 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTD_MAG</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>( .001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYP</td>
<td>1.45 ***</td>
<td>( 1.42 ) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM_YEARS</td>
<td>.001 ***</td>
<td>( .009 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONS</td>
<td>-6.16 ***</td>
<td>( -7.24 ) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81
The coefficient sizes and significance levels in high constraint countries are reported in the Table’s right-hand column and those in low restraint countries in the left-hand column. Of course, rather than splitting the sample and running separate regressions I could here use interaction terms to investigate the conditional effects of OPEN and OLPR. Indeed, the results of an interactive specification are qualitatively identical to those in Table 2.5. The split sample captures the intuition nicely, and obviates the need conduct the additional tests necessary to investigate the substantive effects and significance levels of interacted variables; as such I report the split sample results here. The results are strikingly consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 4: in all cases both the substantive size and statistical significance of the open-list variables are more pronounced in ‘low constraint’ than in ‘high constraint’ political environments, providing strong evidence in favor of the argument that localized accountability is better than the absence of accountability in many world democracies.

“After all, in the real world candidates are both office-oriented and issue-oriented, and it is important to know what happens when candidates have these complex goals.” (Wittman 1983, pg. 142)

“Instead of treating parties as vote maximizing candidates able to take any position, parties [in this model] are assumed to be controlled or at least constrained by their supporters.” (McGann 2002, pg. 37)

3.1 Introduction

Last chapter’s theoretical results demonstrated that, outside of countries where multi-member districts are unusually small, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) generates party-centered competition regardless of the electorate’s partisanship. Even in cases where voters have almost no a priori inclination to vote for one party organization or another, and are thus more susceptible to particularistic appeals from individual legislators, a hybrid problem of legislative collective action yields electoral competition governed primarily by voters’ organizational preferences, however fleeting. As such, in CLPR systems the behavioral motivations of political party organizations become essential to any understanding of democratic politics. In formal theoretic terms, such motivations are captured by the particular utility function political parties maximize in conducting electoral campaigns and/or governing democratic states; in comparative terms, they constitute the set of objectives party organizations pursue in campaigns and
governance, or more aptly the balance political parties strike between competing but often similarly worthy causes.

The traditional spatial model of politics assumes a quite simple but powerful motive for political parties, namely the pursuit of office. In most spatial models the pursuit of office implies a vote-maximizing electoral strategy, as maximizing the number of votes one receives is under most circumstances an obvious path to political incumbency.\textsuperscript{18} Wittman (1983, quoted above) complicated this picture by arguing that political parties may choose spatial positions with an eye towards securing the best policy outcome given some exogenously fixed ‘party ideal point’, generally interpreted as the party leaders’ most-preferred policy position. Strom (1990) further distinguishes between the pursuit of office and vote maximization, arguing for example that in a dynamic setting it may pay to sacrifice votes in the current election so as to maximize one’s chance for office in a subsequent election. He thus presents a three-dimensional ‘motivation space’ in which parties must balance the potentially competing objectives of office-, policy-, and vote-seeking.

Although certainly more complete than the pure office-seeking in Downs’ original formulation (1957), all such motivations eventually revert to the desire for

\textsuperscript{18} Cox (1987, 1990) demonstrates the qualitative identity of vote-maximization (i.e. optimizing vote-share) and office-maximizing (i.e. optimizing one’s probability of election) for a wide range of spatial models.
political incumbency, whether for its own sake or for the sake of policy implementation.\textsuperscript{19} Missing even in Strom’s fairly exhaustive analysis is the distinction made by Kitschelt (1992) between ‘electoral competition’ and ‘constituency representation’, where the latter denotes strategies which have little to do with political incumbency and more to do with providing a public ‘voice’ to certain ideas or popular preferences, i.e. with representing constituents’ attitudes irrespective of their compatibility with the pursuit of incumbency. In this vein, McGann (2002) develops a spatial model in which party leaders are constrained to choose a policy platform at or near the ideal point of their organization’s median activist, regardless of its electoral viability, and argues that this approach more accurately describes the behavior of parties in continental European party systems than do other variants of the spatial model.

Most spatial theoretic and comparative political-economic models attribute to political parties an exogenously imposed utility function, and examine the equilibrium outcomes of electoral competition \textit{given} particular behavioral assumptions. On the other hand, precious little theoretical work has attempted to endogenize the behavioral motivations of political parties’, i.e. argue that party organizations’ utility functions should themselves \textit{emerge in strategic equilibria}. Chapter 2 raised the distinction between

\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, these motivations’ fundamental similarity is identified formally by Calvert (1985) who shows that, in two-party elections which satisfy a series of well-known criteria, vote-maximizing and policy-maximizing strategies both pull party platforms towards the median voter’s ideal point in.
party-centrism in electorates with high levels of effective ‘party identification’ as opposed to those in which electoral choice is governed almost exclusively by voters’ instrumental preferences for party organization’s programmatic stances. This chapter argues that an electorate’s level of party identification is crucial in determining party organizations’ behavioral motivations.

I do so by developing a model in which spatial competition takes place both between competing political party organizations over popular votes and within particular parties over the choice of a campaign platform. Most spatial models assume that political parties are unitary choice-making entities. Put otherwise, individual candidates in most spatial models respond to the electoral incentives provided by a general electorate, but not to those provided by an intra-party selectorate. Studies which relax the unitary actor assumption can be roughly divided into those emphasizing the role of party activists in determining parties’ ideological positions, and those emphasizing the importance of primary elections in generating party system dispersion. Although an important body of work, Section II argues that both literatures have been limited by their emphasis on one aspect of intra-party competition to the other’s exclusion. Section III then develops a two-stage spatial model in which party activists, who must strike a balance between policy-influencing, office-seeking, and purely ‘representational’
motivations, compete with opportunistic party leaders over the choice of a campaign platform.\textsuperscript{20}

Past research on two-stage spatial competition either implicitly or explicitly addresses \textit{two-party Presidential elections}. In these models’ first stage both parties hold primary elections, after which a general election is held between the two parties’ respective nominees. In contrast, Section IV introduces a set of \textit{median-activist theorems} which allow for the extension of two-stage spatial competition to multi-party systems, both those using pure plurality rule as well as those in which proportional representation elections are followed by a coalition bargaining stage. These results greatly facilitate the subsequent analysis of equilibrium outcomes under alternative institutional. Furthermore, given the importance of spatial modeling for research in comparative political-economy (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2000), democratization and authoritarianism (e.g. Acemoglu and Ronbinson 2005), and ethnic conflict (e.g. Shepsle and Rabushka 1972) to name but a few, the median-activist results may represent the dissertation’s most original and broadly applicable contribution to formal theories of political party competition.

Sections V and VI employ the median-activist Theorems to identify, under differing institutional circumstances, the conditions under which party leaders will be

\textsuperscript{20} I define ‘representational motivations’, which often in fact have a material basis, in Section III.
forced to adopt the ideal point of their party’s median activist; and those under which median activists will tolerate deviations from their ideal point so as to gain additional votes, which in turn permits the pursuit of office- and/or policy-based objectives. Though the model yields numerous comparative static implications, perhaps the two most important are: a.) \textit{ceteris paribus}, median activists will allow a party’s executive leadership to deviate from their ideal point in electorates with low levels of party identification, i.e. when the \textit{floating vote} is significant; and b.) \textit{ceteris paribus}, median activists will tolerate such deviations when parties’ respective activist cadre are dispersed in policy space, i.e. when activists from opposing parties share highly divergent policy preferences.

Low levels of party identification increase the marginal vote returns to incremental policy shifts, and divergent activist preferences make the prospect of electoral victory by one’s opponent increasingly distasteful. Once the median activist in one party decides on a deviation from her ideal point, median activists in other parties do the same; indeed, there exists no Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in which median activists from one party choose their ideal point while those in others choose to maximize votes. No longer able to count on one another’s restraint of party leaders’ vote maximizing incentives, median activists thus engage in mutually-reinforcing deviations from their most-preferred policy stances. As a result of these strategic dynamics, Section V proves that two-party plurality rule competition need not
always generate Nash Equilibria, and that the non-existence of equilibrium is particularly likely when parties’ respective activist cadre have highly divergent policy preferences. Similarly, Section VI’s results demonstrate that three-party plurality rule competition need not always generate the absence of Nash Equilibria. Finally, the same formal framework yields predictions as to the conditions under which ideological extremism will become self-reinforcing, as radical activists from competing parties share an interest in promoting one another’s respective organizational ascendancy.

3.2 Party Activists and Party Primaries in Spatial Political Theory

Aldrich (1983) argues that voters’ perception of political parties’ spatial positions comes not primarily from campaign platforms, but rather from the ideological positions of parties’ respective median activists.21 The paper identifies two-party activist-participation-equilibria in which no additional citizen wishes to join or leave either party’s cadre, and demonstrates that these equilibria leave parties’ median activists well-removed from the political system’s ideological center. Aldrich and McGinnis (1989) and Schofield (2006) extend Aldrich’s work by introducing party leaders into the equation, and modeling strategic competition between opposing party leaders when each must simultaneously take into account the preferences of intra-party actors and those of the

21 Activists are defined as those citizens who choose to devote more than simply their vote to the political process, assisting their most-preferred political party by making campaign contributions, canvassing, participating in turnout drives, etc.
general electorate. When such leaders tailor their campaign platforms too particularly to the interests of the electorate’s median voter, they will alienate more ideological activists, whose withdrawal of support affects a costly penalty on the party in question. On the other hand, overly extreme platforms designed to satisfy intra-party activists will damage the party’s standing with moderate voters whose support is pivotal for gaining office. The balance between these competing incentives yields Nash equilibria in which, again, parties’ policy positions diverge in non-negligible ways from those of the median voter.

Activists constrain party leaders in these models by withholding their effort and/or monetary contributions when leaders cultivate too close an ideological relationship to the electorate’s median voter. An alternative and perhaps more direct way in which a party’s cadre might keep its executive candidates ‘close to home’ is through the institution of primary elections. Aaronson and Ordeshook (1972) and Coleman (1972) first developed the notion of two-stage spatial elections in which candidates must first win an intra- and then an inter-party election in order to gain political office. In the former, the authors assume that candidates form expectations as to their likelihood of winning both a primary and a general election, and then maximize the joint probability of winning both elections. However, these expectations do not emerge endogenously based on considerations of activist and/or voter behavior; and the
model falls short of being fully game theoretic, considering the choice perspective of candidates in one party while holding its competitor’s choice constant.

Coleman (ibid) allows candidate expectations to emerge endogenously, and also provides the outline of a game theoretic analysis in which pivotal voters inside both parties play mutual-best responses to one another’s platform decisions. Owen and Grofman (2006) extend Coleman’s framework, modeling primary voters as choosing candidates with an eye towards their viability in the general election. Among other results, they demonstrate that open-seat elections tend to generate party positions symmetrically dispersed about the general electorate’s median; and that incumbency yields an electoral advantage as long as voters in the opposing party’s primary attribute a high enough utility to having someone close to their ideal point in office.22

Adams and Merrill (2008) develop a model of two-stage elections which differs from that of Owen and Grofman in both its assumptions as to the behavior of voters in political primaries and its results regarding the affects of political incumbency. Rather than being fully strategic, primary voters in this model choose ‘expressively’, i.e. choose the primary candidate closest to their own ideal point. Interestingly, despite pulling

22 Serra (2008) extends Owen and Grofman’s work in a number of significant ways, demonstrating that both divergence from the general election median and the nature of incumbency advantage depend on the level of competitiveness within primary elections. In a counterintuitive result with obvious contemporary relevance, the paper demonstrates that holding a divisive primary may actually benefit the party in question in a subsequent general election.
candidates away from the general electorate’s median voter, holding primaries in fact increases a party’s chances of gaining office by allowing party organizations to choose their most adept campaigners for the subsequent general election. Given that incumbent parties do not generally hold primaries, this ‘valence benefit’ dulls the incumbency advantage posited above, and makes holding primaries especially beneficial for ‘underdog’ parties who would otherwise have little chance of gaining office.

The reviewed research has taken important strides in opening the black box of party organization in spatial political theory. That said, research on party activism recognizes that a party’s cadre is often willing to sacrifice an element of viability in the general election to keep their organization’s policies ‘close to home’; but without an explicit model of primary elections a number of these incentives’ implications remain unidentified. On the other hand, research on primary elections has developed elegant models of two-stage spatial competition, but has yet to fully address the unique incentives of party activists, who must balance concerns of electoral viability with those of organizational ascendancy when making intra-party voting decisions.23 Sections III,

---

23 As demonstrated in more detail below, primary voters in Owen and Grofman (ibid) choose strategically according to concerns of electoral viability, but their utility functions do not contain a purely organizational component. In contrast, Adams and Merrill (ibid) allow primary voters to ‘expressively’ choose the primary candidate closest to their ideal point, but do not explicitly model their equally valid incentive to choose viable candidates for the general election. In an online supplement to the paper the latter authors do provide an analysis of strategic primary voting; but unlike the current model, neither the utility function analyzed in the published paper
IV, and V develop a two-stage spatial model which explicitly addresses the tradeoffs intra-party voters face between their organizational and electoral incentives, and in turn allows us to investigate the comparative static consequences of altering the weight attached to each utility component. This new model of activist utility not only allows for a more complete assessment of primary elections’ consequences in two-party Presidential contests; it also provides the conceptual and theoretical and material necessary to extend theories of two-stage competition to alternative institutional environments.

3.3 Party Leaders, Party Activists, and Voters

In this model each of $N$ political parties $P \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\}$ must choose a policy platform for an upcoming general election. These policy stances emerge from an internal nominating contest in which candidates for the party’s leadership position announce the general election platforms with which they would campaign. As addressed in Chapter 4, the empirical instantiation of these contests will vary according to the institutional setting: in presidential systems they often take the form of primary elections for the party’s presidential nomination, while in most parliamentary systems they constitute

nor that in the online supplement allows one to explicitly model the tradeoff between sincere and strategic primary voting, and investigate this tradeoff’s comparative static implications. The results developed here highlight that varying the weight which primary voters attach to strategic as opposed to sincere concerns has fundamental political consequences.
leadership elections to the party’s chief executive post. As a result, the implications of all subsequent results will vary according to institutional context. However, despite this very real relationship between ‘context’ and ‘meaning’, identical formal mechanics can be used to study platform-choice in both scenarios. Intra-party contests thus provide substantial leverage as an explanatory parameter in spatial models.

In keeping with previous work on two-stage elections, assume that inside all $N$ parties exactly two candidates compete for the nomination (Assumption 1). Define the set of candidates in all $N$ parties as $\mathbf{C} = \{A1, B1, A2, B2, ..., AN, BN\}$, such that each party has a candidate $A$ and candidate $B$. Electoral competition takes place in a single spatial dimension $x \in [0,1]$. In the game’s first stage all $2N$ nomination candidates simultaneously announce platforms on the issue dimension $x = [0,1]$. Define candidate $A$ in party $P$’s policy platform as $x_A^P$, candidate $B$’s platform as $x_B^P$, and the strategy vector of all candidates’ platforms as $\mathbf{x} = \{x_1^1, x_2^1, x_1^2, x_2^2, ..., x_N^N, x_N^N\}$. In the second stage each organization holds intra-party elections from which one of the two potential nominees emerges victorious. In the third stage a general election is held in which voters choose from among all of the nominated candidates. I will assume that candidates’ policy positions are fixed for the entire game, i.e. that they cannot alter their platforms.
between the nominating contest and the general election (Assumption 2). Finally, in
the game’s fourth stage a government is formed (each of these stages is examined at
length below). Consider the following utility function for candidates:

\[
U(AP) = U(BP) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if candidate loses the nomination} \\
\omega + \alpha^P \lambda & \text{if candidate wins the nomination}
\end{cases}
\] (1)

The parameter \(0 \leq \alpha^P \leq 1\) captures the percentage of cabinet portfolios won by \(P\) after
the game’s election, such that \(\lambda\) is the utility gained if \(P\) forms a single-party
government, and \(\alpha^P = 0\) if \(P\) does not enter the government. Assume \(\omega, \lambda > 0\)
(Assumption 3), i.e. that candidates’ most-preferred outcome is to win both the intra-
party contest and enter government, but that they prefer winning the nomination and
losing the general election to winning nothing at all.

Having seen their nominees’ platform announcements, in the game’s 2rd stage all
\(N\) parties simultaneously hold intra-party elections in which intra-party voters must
choose between their parties’ two potential nominees. For simplicity, assign the label
\textit{party activist} to any individual granted voting rights in his or her party’s internal
nominating contest. By this definition, in American presidential contests all party
members are technically ‘activists’ insofar as they may participate in electoral primaries.

---

\(^{24}\) Adams and Merrill (ibid) justify this restriction at some length (pg 346). Section V argues that
the assumption is in fact more applicable in parliamentary systems than in the presidential
elections two-stage spatial models have previously addressed themselves to.
On the other hand, in the party leadership elections characteristic of parliamentary government the category ‘activist’ applies to a more restricted set of citizens. We must thus develop a model which captures the varied incentives of intra-party voters in quite heterogeneous institutional circumstances. To do so, I specify a model of activist utility in which the balance between organizational and electoral incentives may vary.

Define $x_j^P$ as the most-preferred policy position of activist $j$ in party $P$, i.e. activist $j$’s ideal point in the policy space $x \in [0,1]$. History is replete with examples of entrenched activists restraining the office-seeking tendencies of party leaders despite incurring significant electoral costs as a result. As such, define $\phi_j^P$ as the intrinsic value which activist $i$ from party $P$ attaches to keeping her party’s platform close to her own ideal point $x_i^P$. The size of $\phi_j^P$ will be a function of both ‘expressive’ and ‘instrumental’ factors. Regarding the former, party activists often develop not only personal but also reputational attachments to particular positions: having sought the support of family, friends, and acquaintances based on the proximity of a party’s policy stances to one’s own, activists incur costs to their credibility and status when parties subsequently announce divergent campaign platforms. Framed more generally, Panebianco (ibid) identifies the desire for ‘solidarity’, i.e. membership in a social group comprised of individuals with shared goals and attitudes, as an essential motivation for heightened political engagement. When parties deviate from policies which encapsulate these
shared interests, the sense of ‘belonging’ which one derives from group membership is diminished.

In addition to these ‘expressive’ concerns $\phi_j^p$ will be affected by a number of more ‘instrumental’ considerations. In varying degrees, political party organizations control both material and professional resources of value to party activists. Activists’ access to such resources should tend to be decreasing in the distance between their ideal point and the policy positions adopted by general election candidates: for campaign platforms to be genuinely credible party leaders must not only make public policy statements, but also receive support from the social interest groups and constituencies traditionally associated with said public policies. One obvious way of securing such endorsements is to transfer some portion of the party’s organizational endowment from traditional to prospective supporters (Chapter 4). The nature of parties’ professional and material resources, and as such the size of $\phi_j^p$, will of course vary in different institutional environments. For now simply note that, for both expressive and instrumental reasons, organizational voters in intra-party elections will attach some intrinsic value to keeping their parties ‘close to home’.
Activists must balance these organizational concerns with their interest in electoral viability. Before presenting the exact manner in which $\phi^P_j$ enters activist $j$’s utility function, I develop the model of voter choice which determines how activists evaluate their parties’ chances in the subsequent general election. Recall from last chapter that voters evaluate parties in three distinct dimensions: a.) the level of regionally targeted club goods provided to voters by parties’ legislative representatives; b.) parties’ policy positions on issues of national-level public policy; and c.) a separate ‘party identification’ parameter which captures (potential) bias towards one party or another based on a symbolic attachment to that party’s historical or ideological legacy. As our concern in this chapter is with party-centered electoral competition, we consider a utility function in which only parameters (b) and (c) appear.

Label voter $i$’s most-preferred policy position $x_i$, and let all voters’ most-preferred policy positions be distributed over the support set $x \in [0,1]$ according to a continuous and twice differentiable probability distribution function $f(x)$. As well, define $x^P$ as the policy platform of the nominee that eventually emerges victorious from $P$’s internal contest, and $\sigma^P_i$ as voter $i$’s relative ‘identification’ with party $P$. We can then write voter $i$’s utility for party $P$ as follows:\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{25} Throughout the paper I use standard quadratic loss functions to capture the fact that both voters and activists’ utility for positions decreases as these positions become further their own ideal.
\[ u_i(P) = \sigma_i^p - (x^p_i - x_i)^2. \] (3)

Voters in this model sincerely choose the candidate who yields them the highest utility. To simplify things, assume that if \( \sigma_i^p > 0 \) for party \( P \) then \( \sigma_i^{-p} = 0 \) for all remaining parties (i.e. voters identify with at most one party); and that a party’s supporters comprise all voters in some continuous range \([x_i^p, \bar{x}_i^p]\) of the support set \( x = [0,1] \) (Assumption 4), where \( x_i^p \) (\( \bar{x}_i^p \)) is the ‘lowest’ (‘highest’) ideal point in \( P \)’s set of supporters.26

Let \( x_{-p} = \{x^1_i, ..., x^{p-1}_i, x^{p+1}_i, ..., x^N_i\} \) represent the vector of policy proposals which emerges victorious from all intra-party elections except that in party \( P \).

26 Assumption 4 excludes the following type of situations: a voter with ideal point \( x_i = .4 \) is a partisan of party 1, a voter with ideal point \( x_i = .5 \) is a partisan of party 2, but a voter with ideal point \( x_i = .6 \) is a partisan of party 1. In short, it means there are no ‘breaks’ the range of party \( P \)’s set of supporters. The assumption’s effect on the below equilibrium results is explicitly addressed when relevant.
Then define $v^P(x^p_A, x_{-p})$ as $P$’s general election vote share given that candidate $AP$ is $P$’s nominee, i.e. the percentage of voters who prefer $x^p_A$ to all the platforms in $x_{-p}$. Similarly, define $v(x^p_A) = \{v^1(x^p_A, x_{-p}),...,v^P(x^p_A, x_{-p}),...,v^N(x^p_A, x_{-p})\}$ as the vector of vote shares for all $N$ parties given that candidate $AP$ is $P$’s nominee. Finally, let $v^P(x^p_B, x_{-p})$ and $v(x^p_B) = \{v^1(x^p_B, x_{-p}),...,v^P(x^p_B, x_{-p}),...,v^N(x^p_B, x_{-p})\}$ represent the same vectors if candidate $BP$ is $P$’s nominee. The manner in which these votes shares affect parties’ government participation will naturally depend on the Institution $(I)$ in place, and in particular whether it is a plurality rule ($PLU$) contest as opposed to a proportional representation ($PR$) contest followed by coalition bargaining ($I \in \{PLU, PR\}$). Plurality rule is governed by a winner-take-all logic by which the election’s highest vote-getter is granted a monopoly over cabinet portfolios (single-party government). In proportional representation systems, unless one party wins more 50% of the vote, a coalition government will form in which cabinet portfolios are partitioned among multiple parties. I model both institutions in Sections IV and VI.

This model of voter choice allows us to fully characterize activist utility functions. Activists’ interest in electoral viability arises from both policy- and office-based concerns. Regarding the former, activists naturally would prefer that
the policy implemented after the election be as close as possible to their ideal point $x_j^p$. In plurality rule contests this policy is simply the plurality winner’s platform; in proportional representation contests, without a single-party majority it will be a weighted function of all coalition members’ platforms. Let $x^*[v(\cdot), I]$ represent the game’s policy outcome as a function of votes and institutions.

Activists also attach independent value to having their organization in office due to the various perks associated with political incumbency. Label activists’ independent incumbency benefit as $b_j^p$, and redefine party $P$’s portion of government cabinet portfolios to emphasize that as a function of votes and institutions: $\alpha^p[v(\cdot), I]$. We can then write activist $i$ in party $P$’s utility for candidate $AP$ as follows:

$$u^p_i(AP) = -\phi^p_j(x_A^p - x_j^p)^2 - \{x^*[v(x_A^p), I]-x_j^p]\}^2 + \alpha^p[v(x_A^p), I] \cdot b_j^p. \quad (3)$$

The first term in (3) represents the intrinsic ‘organizational’ cost that party $P$’s activists incur when parties announce policy positions removed from their ideal points, a cost which is weighted by $\phi^p_j$, and is incurred regardless of whether or not $P$ wins the election. The second term represents $j$’s utility for the general election’s eventual policy outcome. The final term represents $j$’s intrinsic benefit for $P$’s government participation, weighted by the percentage of cabinet portfolios party $P$ in fact gains.
qualitatively identical utility function captures $j$’s utility for $BP$. In comparison to previous two-stage models, the papers by Owen and Grofman (ibid) and Serra (ibid) contain no equivalent to the organizational utility captured in (2)’s first term, while Adams and Merrill assume that primary voters vote purely expressively, i.e. purely according to what are labeled ‘organizational’ considerations. As well, none of the above papers incorporate the intrinsic utility activists associate with incumbency ($b_j^p$).

We can now specify the decision calculus of activists in intra-party elections. Given a set of platform proposals in other parties $x_{-p}$, activists in party $P$ can compare the vote share vector if $AP$ wins $P$’s nomination $v(x_A^p)$ to the vote share vector if $BP$ wins $P$’s nomination $v(x_B^p)$. In turn, given any vector $x_{-p}$ they can compare their game payoffs given the nomination of $AP$ as opposed to $BP$. Activists in intra-party elections then choose, from among their two potential nominees, he or she whose platform yields them a higher end-game utility according to the preference model specified in (3). Finally, since only two candidates compete for each parties’ nomination, I will assume parties use plurality rule to determine the winner of intra-party contests (Assumption 5), such that any potential nominee who receives the support of at least 50% of all activist votes by definition wins their party’s nomination.
3.4 Median Activist Theorems

To summarize the game’s chronology, in stage one all $2N$ potential nominees simultaneously announce campaign platforms; in stage two parties hold intra-party elections to choose between their two potential candidates; in stage three a general election is held in which all voters choose between the set of $N$ nominees which emerge victorious in stage two; and in stage four a government is formed based on the vote shares which emerge from stage three as well as the electoral institution in place. We will thus be deriving all $2N$ candidates’ subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) policy platforms in stage one taking account of equilibrium outcomes in later stages.

Not unlike the above restriction on a party’s set of ‘identifiers’, in the activist-participation equilibria derived by Aldrich (ibid) the set of activists from party $P$ comprises all voters who occupy some continuous range $[\tilde{x}_j^P, \bar{x}_j^P]$ in the support set $x = [0,1]$, where $\tilde{x}_j^P$ ($\bar{x}_j^P$) is the ‘lowest’ (‘highest’) ideal point in $P$’s set of activists:
For reasons of both parsimony and plausibility I address situations in which party activism obeys this intuitive property. Specifically, we will let the set of all $P$’s activists be a subset of all $P$’s supporters, such that all party activists are party supporters, but not necessarily vice versa: $[x_j^P, \bar{x}_j^P] \subset [x_j^P, \bar{x}_j^P]$. Define $x_m^P$ as the ideal point of $P$’s median activist such that the value of $x_m^P$ is defined implicitly by:

$$\frac{\int_{x_j^P}^{x_m^P} f(x) \, dx}{\int_{x_j^P}^{x_m^P} f(x) \, dx} = \frac{\bar{x}_j^P}{\bar{x}_j^P}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Let $\hat{x}_m^P(x,P)$ represent the most-preferred position, or best response, of $P$’s median-activist given that platforms $x_{-P}$ are adopted by all parties except $P$. Note, this best response need not be the median-activist’s ideal point $x_m^P$: depending on the size of $b_j^P$, the intrinsic value they attach to keeping their parties close to home (labeled $\phi_m^P$), other parties’ policy proposals $x_{-P}$, and the institution in place $I \in \{PLU, PR\}$, median
activists may prefer that potential nominees announce policies which deviate from their most-preferred position $x_m^P$ in order to gain additional votes. Begin with the case in which only two parties $P \in \{1,2\}$ compete, such that plurality rule and proportional representation are qualitatively identical: regardless of the institutions in place, whichever party which wins at least $\frac{1}{2}$ of the popular vote forms a single-party government. Define $x = \{x_1^1, x_1^2, x_2^1, x_2^2\}$ as a strategy vector. In turn, the assumption that $\phi_j^P = \phi^P$ does not vary among activists from the same party (Assumption 6) is sufficient, but not necessary, to establish the following median-activist Theorem for two-party competition:

* **Proposition 1:** In any two-candidate election, only the following strategy vector can ever be a SPNE:

$$x = \{\hat{x}_m^1(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^2(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^1(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^2(\cdot)\}$$

The proof of this result is found in Appendix A. Proposition 1 tells us that, given any platform which emerges victorious from their opponent’s primary, in any NE all candidates will adopt the policy position most-preferred by their party’s median activist. Importantly, this result obtains regardless of the electorate’s levels of party identification, and indeed applies to the traditional spatial model in which voters care only about policy (the case in which $\sigma_i^P = 0$ for all voters). Proposition 1 does not imply
that the game has a SPNE; only that if the game does have a SPNE, then in this
equilibrium all candidates choose their median activist’s best response to the opposing
party’s platform. The Proposition follows from Assumption 3 that candidates prefer
winning their primary to winning nothing at all. Given any platform adopted by the
opposing party, the same vote jockeying which leads to Downs’ original median-voter
result thus occurs in the intra-party election, and stops only when both candidates reach
the median activist’s best response to the opponent’s platform.

While the result seems intuitive enough, in fact the formal derivation is
substantially more complex than that of the original median-voter result. This
complexity arises due the difficulty of specifying the median activist’s best response
\( \hat{x}_m^P(\cdot) \) when nomination candidates from the opposing party adopt distinct positions.
Consider a situation in which all 4 potential nominees choose different policy platforms.
Each party thus has a ‘more moderate’ candidate and a ‘less moderate’ candidate,
defined such that the former’s proposed platform is closer to the median voter’s ideal
point than that of the latter. The following situation may then arise: if party 2’s ‘less
moderate’ candidate wins 2’s nomination, then party 1’s median activist prefers her
party’s ‘more moderate’ candidate; but if party 2’s ‘more moderate’ candidate gains 2’s
nomination, party 1’s median activist prefers her party’s ‘less moderate’ candidate. As
well, this lack of a consistent best response may also be true of party 2’s median activist.
Fortunately, Lemma 1 in Appendix A allows us to avoid the theoretical problems associated with these indeterminate preferences. The Lemma proves that no strategy vector $\mathbf{x}$ in which all four candidates adopt distinct positions can be a SPNE. The proof is built on the fact that a party’s candidates for nomination will always prefer to win their party’s nomination under as many circumstances as possible. For example, returning to the above example, if party 1’s ‘less moderate’ candidate has the opportunity to adjust her platform such that she wins 1’s nomination regardless of who party 2 chooses, she will do so. As a result, party 1’s two candidates adopt defection-proof if and only if neither candidate can alter her platform so as to increase the number of situations in which she wins 1’s nomination. Lemma 1 demonstrates that, if two candidates from one party choose defection-proof strategies, then at least one candidate in the opposing party has the incentive to defect from her current platform. Put simply, it is not possible for candidates in both parties to simultaneously play defection-proof strategies, which implies that no strategy vector $\mathbf{x}$ in which all four candidates choose distinct platforms can be a SPNE. Having established that a party’s two potential nominees must choose the same platform, it is then straightforward to show that, in any SPNE, nominees in both parties must choose their median activist’s best response to the opponent’s platform. In turn, Proposition 1 can be extended to any $N$-party plurality rule election:
**Theorem 1: the Median Activist Theorem**

* In any \( N \)-party plurality rule contest, only the following strategy vector can ever be a SPNE:

\[
x = \{ \hat{x}_m^1(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^2(\cdot), \ldots, \hat{x}_m^n(\cdot) \}.
\]

As with Proposition 1, this result obtains regardless of the electorate’s levels of party identification, and does not imply that a SPNE exists in any \( N \)-party plurality rule contest, but rather that if a SPNE exists then all candidates must choose their median activist’s best response to opponents’ strategies. Kselman (2008) contains a fairly unwieldy proof of Theorem 1. I am currently implementing a more parsimonious theoretical derivation whose outline I present here, and which will soon be available upon request. The proof extends the definition of ‘defection proof’ strategies to an \( N \)-party situation, and then demonstrates that no party’s candidates can play defection-proof strategies without at least one candidate in another party wishing to alter her policy platform (Lemma 2). This establishes that in any SPNE both candidates in any party \( P \) must choose identical platforms, which in turn implies the result. Theorem 1 greatly simplifies the analysis of any plurality rule election: rather than a game in which all \( 2N \) potential nominees simultaneously announce platforms, we can now analyze the
game as an $N$-player contest in which all $N$ parties’ median-activists compete against one another.

In plurality rule and/or two-party systems the election’s highest vote-getter wins office outright. Move now to cases which combine multi-party competition (i.e. $N \geq 3$) with proportional representation. In such systems, if the election’s highest vote-getter wins less than 50% of all parliamentary seats, a coalition government will form in which two or more party organizations combine their parliamentary strength so as to survive votes of investiture and confidence. In this chapter I restrict my analysis of coalition-based systems to cases in which the number of parties is $N = 3$, and reserve the general $N$-party analysis for future research. To model proportional representation I assume that parties’ seat percentages in parliament reflect exactly their vote percentages in the electorate. This assumption is helpful but not necessary for the upcoming Proposition, and will indeed be relaxed in later chapters, where I introduce elements of disproportionality into proportional representation elections.

If the election’s highest vote-getter receives less than 50% of the vote, then I will let this plurality winner be designated the formateur charged with forming a coalition government. The parties’ relative cabinet shares in a coalition government $\alpha^P[\mathbf{v}(\cdot), PR]$, as well as the game’s policy outcome $x^*[\mathbf{v}(\cdot), PR]$, will be a weighted function of coalition members’ relative vote shares in the game’s general election. In any two-party
coalition government containing parties $P$ and $K$, such that $K$’s platform is ‘higher’ than $P$’s ($x^K > x^P$), define the cabinet shares and policy outcome as:

$$\alpha^K[v(\cdot), PR] = \frac{v^K(\cdot)}{v^K(\cdot) + v^P(\cdot)} = 1 - \alpha^P[v(\cdot), PR], \text{ and}$$

$$x^*[v(\cdot), PR] = x^K - \left(1 - \frac{v^K(\cdot)}{v^K(\cdot) + v^P(\cdot)}\right)(x^K - x^P).$$

Naturally, the higher is $v^K(\cdot)$ as a portion of the coalition members’ combined legislative strength, the larger will be $K$’s share of cabinet portfolios, and the closer will be $x^*[v(\cdot), PR]$ to $x^K$. To derive the government formation subgame’s equilibrium I employ a stylized version of Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) well-known coalition bargaining model in which: a.) the formateur offers a coalition to the smallest of the two remaining parties so as maximize its share of cabinet portfolios; and b.) the smaller party accepts the coalition offer and receives some fraction of cabinet portfolios. I now present the paper’s third and final median-activist theorem:

*Proposition 2*: In a proportional representation system with $N = 3$ political parties, only the following vector can ever be a SPNE:

$$x = \{\hat{x}_m^1(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^1(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^2(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^2(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^3(\cdot), \hat{x}_m^3(\cdot)\}.$$
Like the previous median-activist results, Proposition 2 holds regardless of the electorate’s relative partisanship levels, and presents a necessary but not sufficient condition for SPNE. As with Theorem 1, a first draft of the derivation of Proposition 2 is available in Kselman (2008); here I briefly outline a more parsimonious proof which will soon be available upon request. Despite the existence of coalition governments in proportional systems, it is again possible to identify a set of defection-proof strategies for party $P$’s candidates; and in turn to establish that, when all 6 potential nominees choose distinct platforms, candidates in all three parties cannot simultaneously be playing defection-proof strategies (Lemma 3). Having shown that in any SPNE candidates from the same party choose identical platforms, Proposition 2 follows. The previous median-activist results were driven by the logic of plurality rule, which made it impossible for candidates in all parties to simultaneously choose defection-proof strategies. The same jockeying for plurality-winner status drives the proportional representation equilibrium, though now in the form of electoral competition over the position of formateur.

3.5 Nash Equilibrium in Two-Party Elections

Section IV’s results reduce what was a $2N$-player game between all parties’ potential nominees to an $N$-player game between all parties’ median activists. As well, they provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for the existence of SPNE. This
Section derives the game’s SPNE in two-party systems where \( P \in \{1,2\} \). Section VI moves to alternative institutional environments. Label the ideal point of the electorate’s median voter as \( x_M \), which is defined implicitly with the following function:

\[
\int_{0}^{x_M} f(x) = 1/2.
\]  

(7)

As is well-known, the traditional Downsian median-voter result becomes less stable in multi-dimensional contexts (McKelvey 1978). In this model the presence of both spatial preferences and an independent ‘party identification’ term in voter utility functions creates a multi-dimensional political space. Recall Assumption 4 above that a party’s supporters comprise all voters in some continuous range \([x^p_i, x^p_i]\) of the support set \( x = [0,1] \). Consider an additional restriction on voter partisanship, namely that \( \sigma^p_i = \sigma^p \) for all of party \( P \)'s supporters, i.e. that all supporters of party \( P \) identify equally with the party (Assumption 7).\(^{27}\) Note, \( \sigma^p \) may still vary across parties, i.e. supporters of different parties may still feel distinct levels of partisanship. Appendix A

\(^{27}\) Of course, empirically speaking relative levels of identification will certainly vary some among partisans. Proposition 3 emerges unscathed as long the variation in identification levels among a party’s supporters are sufficiently compressed. Furthermore, note that the absence of equilibrium is not in itself a problem for this chapter’s argument. The following Chapter argues that the absence of SPNE in any particular game specification is in fact a result which provides significant insight into how party organizations should be structured, and what motivations they’re likely to exhibit in electoral competition. As such, although the existence of SPNE is less certain without Assumptions 4 and 7, this in itself is a substantive result worthy of consideration.
demonstrates that, taken together, Assumptions 4 and 7 above guarantee that voter preferences satisfy the single-crossing property (Persson and Tabellini 2000) sufficient for maintaining median-voter results in multi-dimensional contexts:

* Lemma 4: When only two parties \( P \in \{1,2\} \) compete, whichever party secures the support of the electorate’s median voter wins the election.

Note the distinction between this result and Downs’ median-voter theorem: in the latter both candidates adopt the median voter’s ideal point, while Proposition 3 implies less strictly that whichever candidate secures the median voter’s support wins the election.

Without loss of generality, assume that party 1’s (2’s) median activist’s ideal point is located to the ‘left’ (‘right’) of the median voter’s ideal point: \( x_{m}^{1} < x_{M} < x_{m}^{2} \); and that the median voter ‘identifies’ with party 1 rather than party 2 (\( \sigma_{M}^{1} \geq 0 \) and \( \sigma_{M}^{2} = 0 \)). Define the strategy vector at which both median activists choose their own ideal point as the activist-ideal-point strategy vector \( x_{aip} \). If both median activists choose their own ideal points and \( \sigma_{M}^{1} \geq 0 \), then party 1 wins the median voter’s support as long as

\[
\sigma_{M}^{1} - (x_{m}^{1} - x_{M})^2 > -(x_{m}^{2} - x_{M})^2.
\]

Let \( x^* = \{x^1, x^2\} \) represent a SPNE strategy vector; Proposition 3 stipulates the conditions under which \( x^* = x_{aip} \):
*Proposition 3:* If $\sigma_M^1 > 0$ and $\sigma_M^1 - (x_m^1 - x_M)^2 > -(x_m^2 - x_M)^2$ then the game’s unique SPNE will be $x^* = x_{aip}$ if at least one of the following criteria is met:

(a.) $\sigma_M^1 > (x_M - x_m^1)^2$

(b.) $\phi_m^2 > \left\{ \frac{b_m^2 + (x_m^2 - x_m^1)^2}{(x_m^1 + x_m^1 - 2x_M + \sigma_M^I)^2} \right\} - 1$

This and all subsequent proofs for the Section are contained in Appendix A. As long as $\sigma_M^1 - (x_m^1 - x_M)^2 > -(x_m^2 - x_M)^2$, the game’s outcome at $x_{aip}$ is perfectly satisfactory to party 1’s median activist: she chooses her own ideal point, wins the election, and implements this ideal point as a policy while collecting 100% of cabinet portfolios. To evaluate whether or not $x^* = x_{aip}$, I thus need only to consider whether or not party 2’s median activist wishes to deviate. Condition (a) guarantees that no such deviation would reverse the electoral outcome. If this inequality holds then $\sigma_M^I$ is large enough that, even if party 2’s median activist chose to adopt $x_M$ as a platform, the median voter would still vote for party 1. As such, party 2’s median activist has every incentive to stay put at her own ideal point. If condition (a) is not satisfied, then party 2’s median activist has at least one deviation which would sway the median voter to her
side, thus reversing the election’s outcome. Inequality (b) establishes the conditions under which no such deviation is optimal. If the inequality holds, then party 2’s median activist’s best response is to adopt her own ideal point and lose the election despite the fact that an outcome altering deviation exists. As a result, 1’s median activist knows that 2’s median activist has little incentive to court the median voter, which in turn allows both median activists the shared confidence necessary to choose their own ideal points in equilibrium.

Under what conditions will party 2’s median activist forgo an opportunity for political incumbency? Most obviously, when $\phi_m^2$ is large and $b_m^2$. Naturally, the lower the benefit to attaining office, and the higher the intrinsic value 2’s median activist attaches to keeping her party ‘close to home’, the less likely she will find it in her interest to deviate. As well, as $\sigma_m^1$ increases the likelihood of deviation decreases: when the median voter’s bias is high, this forces 2’s median activist to move her policy platform particularly close to $x_m$ if she wants to secure the median voter’s support, thus increasing the organizational cost (weighted by $\phi_m^2$) of an outcome altering deviation. Similarly, deviation becomes less likely as $x_m^1$ approaches $x_m$. When $(x_m - x_m^1)$ is small, the benefits of an outcome altering deviation are reduced, as a relatively centrist policy position will be implemented by party 1’s median activist regardless; and the organizational cost of an outcome altering deviation increases, as party 2’s median
activist must move her platform particularly close to $x_M$ if she wants to outbid her opponent for the median voter’s support. Finally, under most circumstances increases in $x_m^2$ will reduce the likelihood that inequality (b) holds. As $x_m^2$ moves closer to the extreme point $x = 1$, party 2’s median activist’s distaste for the policy position $x_m^1$ increases, augmenting the incentives for an outcome-altering deviation. When combined with the fact that decreases in $x_m^1$ make deviation more likely, this final implication tells us that activist-ideal-point SPNE are less likely when median activists’ ideal points are significantly dispersed around the median voter’s ideal point.

The condition $\sigma_M^1 - (x_m^1 - x_M)^2 > -(x_m^2 - x_M)^2$ holds by definition if $x_m^1$ is closer to $x_M$ than $x_m^2$, since the median voter favors party 1’s median activist on grounds of both policy and ‘identification’. It also holds when $x_m^2$ is closer to $x_M$ than $x_m^1$, but $\sigma_M^1$ is large enough to make up the difference. It is only violated when $x_m^2$ is significantly closer to $x_M$ than $x_m^1$, i.e. when the median activist identifies with a party which is considerably further from her ideal point than its competitor. Empirically speaking, this should be a relatively rare occurrence. In these somewhat unusual circumstances, all above comparative static results persist except that relating to $\sigma_M^1$. In this case, increases in $\sigma_M^1$ imply higher median voter utility for the losing party at $x_{aip}$, thus decreasing the
organizational cost of an outcome altering deviation, and increasing the likelihood that such a deviation will be undertaken.

When both conditions (a) and (b) from Proposition 3 are violated, the median activist in the losing party will deviate from $\mathbf{x}_{\text{alp}}$, and move her campaign platform just close enough to $x_M$ so as to gain the median voter’s support and win the election. In response, the opposing median activist will move her platform slightly closer to $x_M$ so as to regain the median voter’s support, which then forces her opponent to do the same, and so on. This vote jockeying for the median voter’s support resembles that found in Downs’ original median voter Theorem, and may lead to the same outcome:

**Theorem 2: Median Voter Convergence**

* In the two-party game when $\mathbf{x}_{\text{alp}}$ is not a SPNE, the game’s unique SPNE will be $\mathbf{x}^* = \{x_M, x_M\}$ as long as both of the following conditions hold:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{a.}) & \quad \phi^P_m < \frac{b^P_m}{2(x^p_m - x_M)^2} \quad \text{for} \quad P \in \{1, 2\} \\
(\text{b.}) & \quad \sigma^1_M = \sigma^2_M = 0
\end{align*}
\]

In contrast to past models, which have argued that primary elections are a sufficient condition for party system dispersion in two-candidate elections, Theorem 2 shows that two-stage competition is not a sufficient condition for party system
dispersion in spatial models. When criteria (a) and (b) are both met, in equilibrium both median activists choose the median voter’s ideal point $x_M$ and win the election with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Inequality (a) guarantees that neither median activist prefers to choose her own ideal point and lose the election with certainty than to choose $x_M$ and win probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Not surprisingly, this inequality is more likely satisfied when $\phi_m^2$ is small and $b_m^2$ is large.

As well, it is more easily satisfied when both median activists’ ideal points are located close to $x_M$ in policy space. When there is little distance separating $x_m^p$ and $x_M$, the organizational cost (weighted by $\phi_m^p$) of adopting $x_M$ is reduced, making $P$’s median activist more inclined to pursue a median-voter strategy. This raises a seeming inconsistency in the argument: Proposition 3 demonstrated that low levels of median activist dispersion increase the likelihood that $x^* = x_{\text{mp}}$, while Theorem 2 demonstrates that low levels of median activist dispersion increase the likelihood that $x^* = \{x_M, x_M\}$. Note however that Theorem 2 only applies to situations in which $\sigma_M^p = 0$ for both parties, i.e. when the median voter is completely unbiased. As a result, Theorem 2 thus tells us that, as long as median voter is completely unbiased ideological moderation is a self-reinforcing phenomenon: when both median activists are already relatively centrist, the NE will often be maximally centripetal.
If \( \sigma^p_M > 0 \) for one of the two competing parties, then even when both median activists are relatively moderate, the median voter outcome is not a SPNE. This results from the fact that, when \( \sigma^p_M > 0 \) for one party and both median activists choose \( x_M \), the outcome is not a tie which each party wins with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \) but rather a certain victory for party \( P \). In turn, the opposing party’s median activist has every incentive to defect and choose her own ideal point since she loses the election regardless. This deviation then impels \( P \)'s median activist to move away from \( x_M \), as she no longer needs to compete so assiduously with for the median voter’s support, which in turn pulls the opposing party’s platform back towards the median voter’s ideal point due to the renewed prospect of gaining the median voter’s support, and so on ad infinitum.

![Figure 3.3: Cycling in 2-Party Elections](image)

In other words, the initial deviation sets in motion a cycling process in which both parties take turns moving their platform away from and then towards the median voter’s ideal. Theorem 3 demonstrates that, when \( x_{\text{spn}} \) is not the game’s SPNE, the
condition that $\sigma^p_m > 0$ for at least one party is one of two sufficient conditions for the
absence of SPNE in the two-party game:

\[ \begin{align*}
\textbf{Theorem 3: Non-Existence of SPNE (N=2)} \\
\text{* In the two-party game when } x_{aip} \text{ is not a SPNE, game's will have no SPNE will be as long as one of the two following conditions hold:} \\
\text{(a.) } \sigma^p_m > 0 \text{ for at least one party} \\
\text{(b.) } \phi^p_m > \frac{b^p_m}{2(x^p_m - x_M)^2} \text{ for at least one party}
\end{align*} \]

Like condition (a), condition (b) guarantees that at least one median activist will deviate from the strategy vector at which both median activists choose the median voter’s ideal point, which then sets in motion an infinite cycling process. This condition is more likely satisfied when median activists’ ideal points are substantially dispersed around the median voter’s ideal point. Thus, even if the median voter is completely unbiased, if median activist ideal points are sufficiently dispersed the game has no SPNE. When combined with above result that deviations from $x_{aip}$ are more likely when median activist ideal points are highly dispersed, this result allows us to conclude forcefully that ideological dispersion of median activist ideal points has a destabilizing impact in two-party elections. When both median activists are relatively extreme, the incentives
increase for median activists to deviate from the strategy vector at which both choose their ideal points, since the policy proposed by one’s opponent is by definition far from one’s own ideal point. Reinforcing this motivation is the fact that winning the median voter’s support requires less organizational sacrifice when one’s opponent is more extreme. In short, when both median activists are relatively extreme, neither can count on one another implementing a policy close to the median voter’s ideal point, which in turn means that neither can count on one another forfeiting the general election by choosing his or her own ideal point. This leads to a mutually-reinforcing delegation to all parties’ executive leaders of the right to announce platforms which deviate from $x^p_M$.

This Section’s results can be summarized with a 3 X 3 table measuring from left to right increasing levels of median voter bias $\sigma^p_M$, and from top to bottom increasing levels of dispersion between median activist ideal points:
### Table 3.1: Partisanship, Dispersion, and SPNE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \sigma_M = 0 )</th>
<th>Intermediate Bias</th>
<th>Large Bias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Dispersion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Activist Ideal-Point Outcome OR Absence of SPNE</td>
<td>Activist Ideal-Point Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>median-voter outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate Dispersion</strong></td>
<td>Activist Ideal-Point Outcome</td>
<td>Activist Ideal-Point Outcome</td>
<td>Activist Ideal-Point Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Dispersion</strong></td>
<td>Absence of SPNE</td>
<td>Absence of SPNE</td>
<td>Absence Of SPNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This Table is not meant to present the model’s results deterministically, as the precise SPNE outcomes (or lack thereof...) will also depend on the values of $\phi_m^p$ and $b_m^p$. Rather, it describes the model’s comparative static tendencies as the two variables of primary interest vary. Its basic implications are twofold: a.) regardless of the level of median voter bias, increasing party system dispersion makes it more likely that the game has no SPNE; and b.) regardless of the dispersion of median activist ideal points in policy space higher levels of median activist bias make it more likely that median activists choose their own ideal point in equilibrium ($x_{aip} = x^*$). The following Section extends these results to cases in which $N = 3$ political parties compete.

### 3.6 Nash Equilibrium in Multi-Party Systems

To simplify the multi-party model I will let voter preferences be distributed uniformly over the support set $x = [0,1]$ so as to eliminate the need for excessive integral notation in the exposition. This restriction is purely technical, and has no bearing on equilibrium results. Without loss of generality let the median activists from parties $P \in \{1,2,3\}$ be distributed such that $x_1^m < x_2^m < x_3^m$, where $x_1^m < x_M$ and $x_3^m > x_M$. I begin by analyzing the case in which $x_2^m = x_M$ and $\sigma_i^p = 0$ for all voters, i.e. in which the ‘centrist’ party’s median activist shares the median voter’s ideal point and voters do not ‘identify’ with political parties (i.e. choose purely according to policy preferences).
Having solved this most simple case I address the model in more complicated theoretical environments.

In the two-party plurality rule model Lemma 4 allowed us to examine the entire game as an auction for the median voter’s support. The median voter’s influence dissipates when more than two parties compete, as the election’s plurality winner is no longer by definition the party which secures the median voter’s support. At the activist-ideal point strategy vector \( x_{aip} \), where all three median activists choose their ideal points as platforms, there are instead two distinct plurality winner scenarios. In the first, either the ‘leftist’ party 1 or the ‘rightist’ party 3 earns plurality status at \( x_{aip} \), and in the second the ‘centrist’ party 2 wins plurality status at \( x_{aip} \). Begin with the first case in which one of the more ‘extreme’ parties is the game’s plurality winner at \( x_{aip} \), and assume for the sake of argument that this plurality winner is the leftist party \( (x_M - x_m^1 < x_m^3 - x_M) \).

Proposition 4 identifies the conditions under which \( x_{aip} \) is the game’s SPNE given this scenario:

* Proposition 4: If \( x_m^2 = x_M \), \( \sigma_i^p = 0 \) for all voters and party 1 wins at \( x_{aip} \), then \( x_{aip} = x' \) is the three-party plurality rule game’s unique SPNE as long as condition (a) and either condition (b) or condition (c) hold:
As with the multi-party results presented above, a first draft of all this Section’s derivations is available in Kselman (2008). More parsimonious proofs will soon be available upon request. The outcome described in Proposition 4 is satisfactory to party 1’s median activist: she chooses her own ideal point, wins the election, and implements this ideal point as a policy while collecting 100% of cabinet portfolios. To evaluate whether or not \( x^* = x_{alp} \), I thus need only consider whether or not median activists in parties 2 and 3 wish to deviate. Inequality (a) establishes the conditions under which no such deviation is optimal for party 3’s median activist. If the inequality holds, then 3’s median activist’s best response is to adopt her own ideal point and lose the election despite the fact that an outcome altering deviation exists. Note this result is nearly identical to inequality (b) in Proposition 3 above. Despite the presence an additional party in this model, 3’s median activist in party has a very similar optimal deviation to that studied in the two-party case, namely to alter her platform so as to receive just slightly more votes than 1’s median activist. Since by construction \( x_m^2 = x_M \), this implies moving just close enough to the median voter so as to become the election’s plurality winner. Unlike the two-party case above, this does not mean winning the median voter’s
support; the median voter herself still chooses party 2 (which adopts the platform $x_M$ at $x_{\text{sup}}$). Inequality (a) in Proposition 4 is less likely to hold when $\phi^3_m$ is small and $b^3_m$ is large, and when $x^1_m$ and $x^3_m$ are significantly dispersed around the median voter’s ideal point. As above, when dispersion increases 3’s median activist becomes increasingly displeased with the policy position $x^1_m$, making deviation more likely.

What about party 2’s median activist? Her optimal deviation, if available, would be to adopt a policy platform just to the left of $x^1_m$, thus ‘jumping’ over party 1’s median activist ideal point in attempt to gain an electoral plurality with the support of all voters in the range $[0, x^1_m]$. If condition (b) in Proposition 4 is met, than this deviation is not outcome-altering: there are insufficient voters in the range $[0, x^1_m]$ to secure an electoral plurality, and deviating implies not winning the election but rather handing the election to party 3’s median activist. If condition (b) is not satisfied but condition (c) is satisfied, then 2’s median activist could secure an electoral plurality by ‘jumping’ party 1’s median activist, but does not place enough emphasis on the benefits of office for this to be an optimal deviation. Both (b) and (c) are more likely to be satisfied when $x^1_m$ is centrist, while (c) is more likely to be satisfied when $x^3_m$ is non-centrist, somewhat blurring the relationship between party system dispersion and SPNE uncovered in the chapter’s previous theoretical results.
Move now to the case in which the ‘centrist’ party 2 is the game’s plurality winner at the activist-ideal-point strategy vector. In this case, to determine the conditions under which \( x_{alp} = x^* \) I evaluate whether or not median activists in parties 1 and 3 have an optimal deviation:

* **Proposition 5:** If \( x_m^2 = x_M \), \( \sigma_i^p = 0 \) for all voters and party 2 wins at \( x_{alp} \), then \( x_{alp} = x^* \) is the three-party plurality rule game’s unique SPNE as long as conditions (a) and condition (b) hold:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(a.)} \quad \phi_m^1 &> \left\{ \frac{4 \cdot [b_m^3 + (x_m^1 - x_m^3)^2]}{(2x_m^1 - x_m^3 + x_M^3)^2} \right\} - 1 \\
\text{(b.)} \quad \phi_m^3 &> \left\{ \frac{4 \cdot [b_m^3 + (x_m^3 - x_m^1)^2]}{(2x_m^3 + x_M - x_m^1 - 2)^2} \right\} - 1
\end{align*}
\]

Conditions (a) and (b) guarantee, respectively, that median activists in parties 1 and 3 do not have an optimal deviation when party 2 wins at \( x_{alp} \). Both are less likely to be satisfied as the median activist in question’s ideal point becomes further removed from the median voter’s ideal point. In short, once again we see the destabilizing influence of party system dispersion on median activist competition.

127
Propositions 4 and 5 present necessary and sufficient conditions for activist-ideal-point SPNE in three-candidate plurality elections. Theorem 4 demonstrates that when $x_{aip}$ is not the game’s SPNE, than the three-party game has no SPNE:

**Theorem 4: Non-Existence of SPNE ($N=3$)**

* In the three-party game with $x_m^2 = x_{mf}$ and $\sigma_i^p = 0$ for all voters, when $x_{aip}$ is not a SPNE game will have no SPNE.

When $x_{aip}$ is not the game’s SPNE, then the three-party contest reverts to the absence of equilibrium which characterized three-party competition in the traditional spatial model. Unlike the two-party contest analyzed in Section V, there is never a median voter result, since the outcome at which all three parties choose the median voter’s ideal point is itself not a SPNE. The afore-mentioned paper extends these results to situations in which party 2’s median activist ideal point is located to the left or right of the median voter’s ideal point, and to situations in which some subset of voters have party identification parameters $\sigma_i^p > 0$. Recall Assumption 4 above that a party’s supporters comprise all voters in some continuous range $[x_{i}^p, \bar{x}_{i}^p]$ of the support set $x=[0,1]$. To make the three-party model more tractable, the Appendix assumes that voters can only identify with the party whose median activist is closest to their own in
policy space (Assumption 8). Note, this need not imply that all voters have $\sigma_i^p > 0$, only that if $\sigma_i^p > 0$ then party $P$'s median activist is located closer to $x_i$ in policy space than are the other two parties' median activists.\(^{28}\) The first and most basic implication is that increasing levels of party identification in the electorate make the equilibrium outcome $x_{\text{split}} = x^*$ substantially more stable. When party identification is high, median activists have less incentive to engage in vote-seeking, as the returns to doing so are less. As well, under most conditions the outcome $x_{\text{split}} = x^*$ becomes more stable as the median voter's ideal point becomes more biased to the left or right. Finally, when $\sigma_i^p > 0$ for some subset of voters a new class of SPNE emerge in which median activists on the right and the left adopt policy positions equidistant from the median voter's ideal point, and each win with probability $\frac{1}{2}$; however, such SPNE only apply if party 2's median activist ideal point is again located at $x_m^2 = x_M$.

As for the chapter's final theoretical contribution, note that the implications of Proposition 4, Proposition 5, and Theorem 4 translate to three-party competition in proportional representation environments with coalition-bargaining. Although the results display slight numerical differences due to the weighting of both policy outcomes and cabinet shares expressed of equations (5) and (6) above, the comparative

---

\(^{28}\) This assumption should be fairly true to the empirical world, where ideological preferences and party identification are known to exhibit a high degree of interdependence (Fiorina 1979).
static implications remain unchanged. In the coalition-based model, potential vote jockeying for formateur status induces similar SPNE dynamics to those uncovered above: median activists become more likely to tolerate deviations from their ideal points when partisanship is low and median-activist dispersion is high.

3.7 Summary

This chapter develops a model of two-stage electoral competition with party activists, and then examines the model’s implications in a variety of institutional settings. Its two most important implications are: a.) \textit{ceteris paribus}, median activists will allow a party’s executive leadership to deviate from their ideal point in electorates with low levels of party identification; and b.) \textit{ceteris paribus}, median activists will tolerate such deviations when parties’ respective activist cadre are dispersed in policy space, i.e. when activists from opposing parties share very different policy preferences. Criterion (a) implies that the electorate has sufficient ‘floating’ voters to make vote-seeking worthwhile; criterion (b) implies that the benefits of vote-seeking are substantial, as no median activist wishes the incumbency of an opponent whose policy preferences are highly divergent from her own. When both criteria are met, median activists have strong incentives to allow party leaders the leeway to maximize votes. As well, party activists understand that their counterparts in competing parties harbor similar electioneering incentives. In equilibrium, this shared understanding of one another’s disincentive for
keeping party platforms ‘close to home’ leads to a mutually-reinforcing abdication to behaviors preferred by vote-seeking party leaders.

The following chapter examines these results implications for the structure of political party’s internal organization. It argues that parties in systems where $x_{alp}$ is not the game’s SPNE will tend to be more centralized than those in systems where $x_{alp}$ is the game’s SPNE. In turn, this organizational centralization has a number of important consequences for the structure of political party competition in party-centered election. Indeed, it is this organizational centralization which in a large part generates the legislative, party system, and democratic instability which has characterized politics in the 2nd and 3rd Turkish Republics.
Chapter 4. Legislative Defection in Centralized Parties: Polarization and Organizational Discipline

“Perhaps the most serious criticism that can be leveled at this book is that...[t]here is no attempt to capture in either the formal or quantitative analysis the impact of intraparty tensions on the emergence of new parties. The major implication of this assumption is that party fissions and genuinely new parties are treated as equal.” (McElroy 2002, pg. 1228)

4.1 Introduction

Last chapter established the conditions under which party leaders will be forced to adopt campaign platforms at or near their median activist’s ideal point, and those under which median activists will permit deviations from their ideal points in order to gain additional popular votes. The latter occurs when the electorate is characterized by low levels of party identification and/or median activists from competing parties have highly divergent policy preferences. Low levels of party identification increase the marginal vote returns to incremental policy shifts, and divergent activist preferences make the prospect of electoral victory by one’s opponent increasingly distasteful. Once the median activist in one party decides on a deviation from her ideal point, median activists in other parties do the same; indeed, there exists no Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in which median activists from one party choose their ideal point while those in others choose to maximize votes. No longer able to count on one
another’s restraint of party leaders’ vote maximizing incentives, median activists thus engage in mutually-reinforcing deviations from their most-preferred policy stances.

In this chapter, I first argue that this mutually-reinforcing deference to vote-seeking leads to the centralization of party organizations (Section II). An immediate objection might occur, namely that last chapter’s results assumed the presence of intra-party elections, i.e. that the last chapter assumed decentralized political parties. However, I demonstrate below that it is not via the elimination of internal elections that parties become centralized, but rather via party leaders’ ability to control the size of scope of party selectorates. In turn, this organizational prerogative emerges when party activists are inclined to adopt positions which deviate from their ideal points. In order to credibly deviate from status quo platform stances, political parties must do more than simply ‘announce’ new policies; they must also widen the party’s organizational scope to include activists, candidates, and civil society leaders associated with the ideological messages parties wish to communicate. This inclusion effectively shifts the median position in parties’ activist cadre, and thus the organizational ‘principal’ to who party leaders must respond. Thus, the mutually-reinforcing deviation from party activist ideal points is tantamount to a mutually-reinforcing abdication of their organizational prerogative.

I then argue that, where party activists are impelled to delegate campaign responsibilities, electoral competition can be modeled as a contest between opposing
party leaders. However, this does not imply the unrestricted vote maximization assumption characteristic of traditional spatial models. Party leaders themselves face certain risks and constraints in choosing optimal campaign platforms. Firstly, the act of introducing new elements into a party’s selectorate is risky insofar as these new candidates and activists may with some probability mount a leadership challenge so as to place ‘one of their own’ in the party’s executive position. Secondly, as executive leaders incrementally shift their party’s platform away from status quo party position, they risk defection by marginal organizational elements alienated by their parties’ new policy stance and membership base.

Section IV develops a model of the latter phenomenon in which potential party leaders currently serving as Members of Parliament for a status quo party must decide whether or not to defect and form a new organization. Unlike past models of party entry, which analyze situations in which new parties emerge from civil society, this model represents one of the first strategic analyses of party entry resulting from organizational schism (see McElroy quote above). Among other results, it demonstrates that legislative defection is more likely in multi-party systems than in two-party systems; and that legislative defection will be particularly unlikely in polarized two-party systems where two large parties adopt highly divergent policy stances.

Before proceeding, recall the two phenomena identified as generating mutually-reinforcing abdication by party activists: the existence of ‘floating voters’ (i.e. non party-
identifiers) and ideological dispersion of parties’ activist cadre. While partisanship levels are at least in part determined by structural, cultural, and historical traits particular to individual countries, the former is itself a strategic phenomenon subject to manipulation by party leaders in their search for organizational power. As such, this chapter’s comparative hypotheses are framed in terms of partisanship and the presence of ‘floating voters’, which is independent of the competitive patterns this and the remaining chapters seek to explain. However, in the dissertation’s conclusion I return to the relationship between ideological dispersion and organizational centralization, arguing that this relationship helps to understand why the centralization of party organizations may be a self-enforcing phenomenon: once party leaders in low partisanship electorates have acquired a free reign over platform and selectorate choice, polarization may constitute a key tool in the maintenance of organizational hegemony.

4.2 Organizational Centralization in Low Partisanship Environments

How can a model which assumes intra-party elections predict organizational centralization? Put otherwise, how can activists be said to be ‘delegating’ powers and ‘abdicating’ prerogatives when party leaders are bound to adopt median activists’ best response to other parties’ platforms (see last chapter’s median activist theorems)? The answer is that, when a party’s activist cadre wishes its party leaders to adopt vote-seeking campaign platforms, they must grant party leaders the means with which to do
so credibly. Importantly, these ‘means’ involve much more than the permission to make public pronouncements to that effect. While spatial theories of electoral competition typically emphasize campaign pronouncements and other ‘aural’ mechanisms by which the electorate acquires information, voters often make use of more direct and ‘ocular’ informational shortcuts for placing parties in policy space.

Aldrich (1983) identifies one key heuristic which voters employ to identify parties’ genuine policy stances: the policy preferences of a party’s median activist. Voters will discount the credibility of policy stances which diverge significantly from those of a party’s pivotal activist, lacking the confidence that such stances accurately reflect the organization’s policy priorities. According to this logic, party leaders will only be able to adopt new policy stances by altering the identity of their party’s pivotal activist. Voters will also use endorsements by important social and political personalities to evaluate the credibility of party’s campaign messages. Without the legitimacy lent by popular figures with a known association to the desired ideological current, campaign rhetoric which deviates significantly from a party’s status quo may fall on deaf ears.

Parliamentary regimes provide voters an even more straight-forward heuristic for placing organizations in policy space: parties’ legislative candidates. In such regimes voters cast ballots for individual candidates or party lists in their respective electoral districts, and must simultaneously evaluate a party’s slate of district-level candidates and the policy stances taken by national party leaders, making inconsistencies between
party rhetoric and party personnel detectable. Furthermore, voters understand that party leaders are constrained by their parliamentary caucuses in designing and implementing public policy. As such, the identity of district level candidates will be crucial to voters’ evaluations of parties’ policy positions, and in order to be taken seriously policy pronouncements must be backed up with ‘policy-relevant’ nominees.¹ Section III highlights this important and underappreciated relationship between the selection of parliamentary candidates and the choice of campaign platforms in a variety of contexts.

Median activists wishing to adopt campaign platforms which diverge from their ideal point must thus grant party leaders the license to broaden their party’s organizational scope, so as to include social elements associated with the desired policy messages. An important consequence of this organizational delegation is to grant party leaders effective control over the size and scope of party selectorates. Indeed, one fundamental effect of inviting new social elements into a party organization is to change the identity of that organization’s median activist, which itself is necessary for making new policy pronouncements credible. The inclusion of new activists often happens as a matter of

¹ Something similar may occur in Presidential regimes if voters may the credibility of presidential candidates’ policy pronouncements unless accompanied by the nomination of ‘policy-relevant’ congressional candidates. That said, the weakened link between Executive and Legislative branches of government in Presidential regimes makes the relationship more tenuous, especially when legislative and presidential elections are held non-simultaneously.
course when party leaders solicit new candidates and/or civil society endorsements: the political personalities these solicitations target are themselves often leaders of large and well maintained social organizations and/or informal networks, and may make the effective inclusion of such entities in the party’s ranks a precondition for delivering their reputation to the party’s campaign. The effect is reinforced by what Aldrich (ibid) labels the ‘calculus of activism’ in which potential party activists join political party organizations when the party’s policy platform becomes sufficiently close to the potential activist’s ideal point. When party leaders alter their party’s program and rhetoric, the ‘calculus of activism’ thus pushes new entrants into the party’s cadre.

In short, if median activists wish their parties to adopt new policy platforms, they must grant party leaders organizational prerogatives which may ultimately subvert their own status as the party’s pivotal player. As argued in the previous chapter, this self-disempowerment will occur when the policy and office benefits to platform shifts outweigh their organizational costs, and when there are sufficient floating voters in an electorate to make platform shifts effective. In these circumstances party leaders will no longer be strictly beholden to the wishes of their current median activist, as they will control the resources and procedures necessary to alter the organizational ‘principal’ on whom their executive incumbency depends.

This resolves the seeming paradox of a model grounded in intra-party elections which nonetheless generates predictions as to the conditions under which parties will
become centralized. *Organizations become centralized not by eliminating internal executive contests, but by giving party leaders the right to assign voting rights in those contests.* A related point is that the presence or not of competitive leadership elections should not be employed as an indicator of organizational centralization. Obviously, in many circumstances centralized parties are characterized by uncompetitive leadership elections, as current party leaders take care to design a selectorate which will safely uphold their executive incumbency. However, even centralized parties often hold contentious leadership elections.

Two examples from Turkey, whose political parties are notoriously centralized, serve to make the point. Prior to the 1965 general election, moderate candidate Süleyman Demirel won a surprise victory over his more radical opponent Dr. Saadettin Bilgiç in the center-right Justice Party’s leadership election, after a subset of convention delegates moved to his camp on the very eve of the poll (Sayarı 1975). The surprising outcome happened in no small part due to the organizational presence of new activists and candidates who defected from smaller center-right parties to join the Justice Party between 1961 and 1965. This intra-party election fundamentally altered the Justice Party’s internal balance of power.

Seven years later the left-leaning Bulent Ecevit won a perhaps even more unexpected victory over İsmet İnönü in the 1972 Republican People’s Party leadership election. This victory came after years of organizational expansion in which the
Republican People’s Party had adopted an increasingly ‘left of center’ stance in ideological space. As part of this electoral strategy, İnonu had authorized the party’s General Secretary Bulent Ecevit to introduce new elements into party’s organizational ranks so as to broaden its electoral appeal. Dissatisfied with İnonu’s compliance with military rule, in 1972 Ecevit mounted a leadership challenge in an intra-party election, in which he emerged victorious in large measure due to the support of new and younger party activists (Bektaş 1988).

In both cases, public and competitive leadership elections took place between two viable candidates, the outcomes were patently unexpected, and the victors became their respective parties’ Prime Ministerial ‘nominees’ in the subsequent general election. As well, both events occurred after periods of significant organizational ‘broadening’ in which vote-maximizing electoral strategies were accompanied by organizational overtures to new activists and legislative candidates. These examples demonstrate that, even in party systems whose organizations are highly centralized, executive leaders face certain constraints and/or risks when designing vote maximizing campaign strategies. In both cases, newly introduced organizational actors whose intra-party presence was a direct result of vote maximizing campaign strategies proved disloyal to the status quo party leadership. Section IV explicitly introduces the risk of leadership challenge, as well as the risk of organizational defection, as constraints in party leaders’ utility functions. Before doing so, the following Section addresses perhaps the most important ‘tool’ for
broadening one’s organizational ranks in Parliamentary regimes, namely the control over legislative candidate selection procedures.

4.3 Candidate Selection in Parliamentary Regimes

The link between adopting spatial positions and nominating parliamentary candidates has been recognized in some form at least since Schattschneider’s famous invocation that:

“The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nomination is owner of the party. (Schattschneider 1942, pg. 64)

Numerous examples of this crucial and underappreciated link appear in the dissertation’s empirical chapters on Turkish electoral competition. Here I present an example from a very different context which serves to forcefully expose the role of nominations in crafting campaign platforms. In the early 1970’s, Jeffrey Obler authored a series of articles on the methods which Belgian political parties employed to choose their parliamentary candidates (Obler 1973, 1974). To situate the papers in their broader intellectual context, Obler begins by referencing Schattschneider’s claim:

“Leaders and activists in most Western political parties…jealously guard their right to choose parliamentary candidates. They realize that candidates play a crucial role in shaping voters’ images of the parties as well as in formulating the party policies.” (Obler 1974, pg. 163, italics added)

Belgian party organizations have traditionally used district-level primary elections in which all dues paying party members may voice their preferences over the identity of
a parties’ nominees. These decentralized nominations served to ensure that parties’
nominated candidates in keeping with their traditional social constituencies’ policy
beliefs. In the Christian Social Party primaries served as key mechanism in ensuring that
the various ‘standen’ (professional/socio-economic groups) represented in the
organizational ranks were adequately represented on electoral lists. In the Belgian
Socialist party they ensured the nomination of long-standing party activists who had
expended years appropriating the party ideology and climbing its organizational ladder.
In the Liberal Party primaries were used to secure safe seats for the party’s anti-clerical
and anti-socialist wings.

For decades Belgian party competition had demonstrated a marked stability in
which the Christian Social Party and Belgian Socialist Party vied for plurality status in
national elections. The smaller Liberal Party accepted its third party status in part due to
the presence of coalition governments which ensured its share of the public pie; and in
part because voters’ allegiances were largely fixed, and grounded in a strongly
‘pillarized’ organizations where party membership also implied membership in an
encompassing sub-culture of ancillary organizations, insurance cooperatives,
neighborhood associations, etc. However in 1958, after a historic compromise on the
issue of education policy which had sharply cleaved clericals and anti-clericals, Liberal
party leaders perceived a new opportunity to pursue the support of middle-class
Catholics dissatisfied with the Christian Social Party’s stance issues of economic
redistribution and public regulation. After a series of failed attempts to woo Catholic voters, Liberal Party leader Omer Vanaudenhove proposed an aggressive new electoral strategy:

“Toward this end, the old Liberal party was abandoned, and in its place the Party of Liberty and Progress (PLP) was formed. All anti-clerical rhetoric was removed from the party’s program and policy pronouncements…. Despite these rather marked modifications, Vanaudenhove feared that the voters would still see the PLP as a mere shadow of its predecessor. He felt that some kind of visible and concrete evidence of the Liberal’s transformation was necessary to erase generations of Catholic-Liberal hostilities. One solution…was to place prominent political personalities from the Catholic world, who had absolutely no connection with the Liberal Party, in prominent positions on the PLP’s electoral lists.” (Obler 1973, pg. 172)

In order to secure prominent list positions for Catholic candidates, Vanaudenhove had to expend every ounce of organizational capital available. Eventually, he reached an agreement with local party militants in which primaries continued to be used to select a large majority of PLP candidates, while in specified districts a quota of relatively safe list positions were reserved for Catholic candidates. The results were unmistakable:

“The election returns certainly justified Vanaudenhove’s plan: the PLP won a greater proportion of seats in the Chamber of Representatives—22.6 percent, and a greater share of the popular vote—21.6 percent, than the Liberals had won since 1919.”

This account of candidate selection in the Belgian PLP provides an elegant demonstration of the organizational linkages between adopting policy platforms and choosing legislative candidates. After a first failed attempt at wooing Catholic voters
with cosmetic changes to the party platform, PLP leaders recognized the importance of choosing Catholic candidates in order to legitimize their policy pronouncements, a strategy which ultimately paid off. It also provides a tangible glimpse of the sacrifices a party’s cadre must make if they wish party leaders to adopt vote-seeking strategies: in parliamentary systems, the adoption of vote-seeking deviations from the median activist’s most-preferred policy positions involves increasingly centralized control over a party’s procedures for candidate selection.

Finally, the account provides suggestive evidence in favor of the hypothesis, derived formally last chapter, that median activists will be more likely to tolerate vote-seeking behaviors when the number ‘floating voters’ is high. Once the conflict over public education was resolved, a subset of Catholic voters whose historical identification with the Christian Social Party was grounded largely in this defining political cause found themselves more responsive to competing programmatic positions. Militants’ understanding of the increased marginal vote returns to electioneering played a key role in their ultimate deferral to Vanaudenhove on the issue of Catholic candidacies.

In fact, when combined with last chapter’s comparative static implications, this discussion suggests the following more general empirical hypothesis:

**H1:** In Parliamentary regimes, the relative centralization of political parties’ candidate selection procedures should be positively correlated with the size of the ‘floating vote’.
A quick comparison of nomination procedures in Turkey with those in most Western Europeans countries provides information compatible with H1. It is often noted that candidate selection in Turkey is patently centralized, such that organizational leaders face almost no organizational constraint in devising a party’s electoral list.\textsuperscript{2} As well, the Turkish electorate is characterized by extremely low levels of party identification, and voters frequently switch their organization of choice from one election to the next, in turn generating high levels of party system volatility (Chapter 1).

In contrast, a large majority of West European political parties grant regional and/or local party activists a stronger role in the nomination of legislative candidates.\textsuperscript{3} The particular mechanism employed to secure this role varies from place to place. German, Norwegian and Swedish parties use regional-level conventions whose delegates are chosen in intra-party contests at the district-level. Finish and Belgian parties use participatory primaries open to all card carrying party members. British candidates are chosen as the result of bargaining between local party officials and national party leaders; when push comes to shove the latter often come out on the losing end. West European electorates have also traditionally demonstrated far more stable

\textsuperscript{2} Heper and Landau (1991) and Rubin and Heper (2002). My fieldwork in Turkey strongly confirmed this accepted wisdom, and provided a number of telling anecdotes which demonstrate the extent of leader control as well as its pervasiveness across parties.

\textsuperscript{3} See the essays in Gallagher and Marsh eds (1988), Norris eds (1997), and Katz and Mair eds (1992).
patterns of electoral choice than those found in Turkey. Of course, this stability has waned somewhat over the past two to three decades with the appearance of new political issues and party organizations. Perhaps it is thus no great coincidence that organizational control over candidate selection procedures has shifted markedly in favor of ‘entrepreneurial’ party leaders over the same time period. The dissertation’s concluding chapter presents suggestive evidence in H1’s favor, and discusses a variety of newly emerging data sources with which this and other organizational hypotheses can be invested in a statistical setting. It also addresses the more general theoretical and empirical leverage that candidate selection procedures present to researchers seeking to unpack the calculus of legislative and electoral politics in Parliamentary regimes.

4.4. Legislative Defection and Party Entry in Centralized Party Systems

Section II argued that median activists wishing to adopt vote-maximizing campaign strategies must delegate substantial organizational powers to a party’s executive leaders. As well, last chapter’s formal results argued that activists will have the incentive to do so when the policy and office benefits to platform shifts outweigh their organizational costs, and when there are sufficient ‘floating voters’ in an electorate to make platform shifts effective. In such conditions, elections can thus be fairly accurately modeled as a contest between office-maximizing party leaders. However, this does not imply the unrestricted vote maximization assumption characteristic of traditional spatial
models. Party leaders themselves are constrained by organizational considerations in choosing optimal campaign platforms. As demonstrated forcefully in the examples above, the act of introducing new elements into a party’s selectorate carries certain risks, as these new candidates and activists may with some probability mount a leadership challenge so as to place ‘one of their own’ in the party’s executive position.

Secondly, as executive leaders incrementally shift their party’s platform away from status quo party position, they risk defection by marginal organizational elements alienated by their parties’ new policy stance and organizational membership. Last chapter’s median-activist Theorems derived the determining effect of a median activist’s preferences on whether or not a political party will be ‘flexible’ in adopting campaign platforms. That said, median activists are certainly not the only organizational actor capable of interfering with executive leaders’ pursuit of political incumbency. Under certain circumstances, it will be the case that a party’s median activist chooses to permit vote-seeking despite objections from activist cadre at the organizational ‘margins’, who hold the party selectorate’s most ‘leftist’ or ‘rightist’ policy preferences. Such activists do not share median activist’s pivotalness in intra-party contests, but they do have another strategic option when their party adopts distasteful campaign strategies: organizational defection. Indeed, the following chapter presents both qualitative and quantitative data on legislative instability in Turkey which captures exactly this process; historically, new
organizations have entered the Turkish political party system when a status quo legislative party experiences some form of organizational schism.

This discussion suggests the importance of distinguishing conceptually between centralized parties and disciplined parties. As noted in Chapter 1, there is significantly less formal theoretic research on the internal dynamics of political party organizations when compared to other areas of comparative political science. This paucity arises in no small part as a function of our shared intellectual uncertainty as to both the organizational dimensions worthy of analysis as well as these dimensions’ conceptual and empirical inter-relationships. A shining example is the frequent confusion of ‘centralized’ parties with ‘disciplined’ parties. Despite exhibiting centralized organizational structures, and in particular highly centralized control over candidate selection procedures, political parties in Turkey have also at times been patently unruly, and subject to organizational fragmentation. In fact, quite contrary to common wisdom, it may often be the case that organizational centralization and party discipline are in fact inversely correlated empirical phenomena. Party discipline, however measured and conceptualized, may be more likely to emerge empirically when median activists across the party system can credibly commit to keeping their party ‘close to home’, leading to more cohesive and stable organizational and systemic structures. Conversely, the constantly evolving intra-party selectorates which accompany flexible and centralized platform choice may generate
greater organizational factionalism and instability than found in more decentralized political parties.

Given this discussion, I can now specify an updated utility function for executive leaders in centralized political parties, i.e. political parties whose leaders monopolize the prerogative to assign intra-party voting rights. Adopting last chapter’s framework, assume that the leader of a centralized party \( P \in \{1,2,...,N\} \) must adopt a policy \( x^P \) in the policy space \( x \in [0,1] \). Let \( x_{-p} = \{x^1, ..., x^{P-1}, x^{P+1}, ..., x^N\} \) represent the vector of policies chosen by executive leaders in all parties except that in party \( P \). Then define \( v^P(x^P, x_{-p}) \) as \( P \)'s general election vote share given that \( P \)'s party leader chooses \( x^P \) and other leaders choose \( x_{-p} \). Define \( v(x^P) = \{v^1(x^P, x_{-p}), ..., v^P(x^P, x_{-p}), ..., v^N(x^P, x_{-p})\} \) as the vector of vote shares for all \( N \) parties given that \( P \)'s party leader chooses \( x^P \) and other leaders choose \( x_{-p} \). I then write party \( P \)'s leader’s maximization program as:

\[
\max_{x^P} \{ \alpha^P [v(x^P)] \cdot \lambda \} \quad \text{such that} \quad \pi_D(x^P) > \mu_D \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_C(x^P) > \mu_C. \tag{1}
\]

The parameter \( 0 \leq \alpha^P[v(\cdot)] \leq 1 \) once again captures the percentage of cabinet portfolios won by \( P \) after the game’s election, such that \( \lambda \) is the utility gained if \( P \) forms a single-party government, and \( \alpha^P[v(\cdot)] = 0 \) if \( P \) does not enter the government. The conditions \( \pi_D(x^P) > \mu_D \) and \( \pi_E(x^P) > \mu_E \) operationalize the risks and constraints faced
by office-seeking party leaders when choosing a policy platform, which in turn effects the size and scope of the party selectorate. I thus label them selectorate formation constraints. The first requires party leaders to keep the probability of organizational defection by dissatisfied activists and candidates at the ideological margins \( (\pi_D(x^p)) \) greater than some value \( \mu_D \); the second requires party leaders to keep the probability of a challenge to their leadership by activists and candidates recently added to the organizational ranks \( (\pi_C(x^p)) \) greater than some value \( \mu_C \). Both probabilities are written as a function of the party leader’s platform choice, since these platform choices define the extent of dissatisfaction among status quo activists at the organizational margins, as well as the political profile of new organizational personnel.

Ultimately electoral competition between centralized political parties should be modeled as an \( N \)-player contest in which \( N \) party leaders simultaneously choose policy positions taking account of the specified selectorate formation constraints. Note however that each of these constraints is itself defined by the outcome of strategic interaction, the first by the interaction of all parties’ marginal organizational elements and the second by the interaction of all parties’ new personnel. Put otherwise, the constraints should be endogenously incorporated into the model as strategic subgames. In the more general model party leaders will first choose stage 1 policy platforms, after which point a second stage will occur in which dissatisfied organizational elements and new organizational
personnel must decide whether or not to defect or challenge respectively. In this chapter’s remainder I model the first of these two subgames, namely the decision of marginal organizational elements to ‘defect’ or ‘stick’ a set of campaign platforms; the formal results structure next chapter’s empirical investigation of party switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Although saving a full game theoretic exposition for future research, Chapter 6 returns to the more general model to demonstrate that cycles of political conflict and military intervention in Turkish politics arise in no small part due to the maximization of (1) by party leaders at the helm of centralized organizations.

The following model contains two actors: voters and ideology leaders. Beginning with the former, define $x_i$ as voter $i$’s most-preferred policy position in $x \in [0,1]$, and assume that $i$’s preferences are single-peaked, such that the further a proposed policy is from $i$’s ideal point the more $i$ dislikes said policy. I will assume throughout this chapter that popular preferences are distributed uniformly: for each policy represented in the issue space $x \in [0,1]$, an identical number of voters have this particular policy as their ideal point. The assumption of uniformly distributed popular preferences is expository, and it is important to note that the proceeding argument holds for any symmetric preference distribution.\(^4\) This is so even if the distribution of popular preferences is non-symmetric, i.e. in electorates which are biased towards the ideological right or left.

\(^4\) I am currently analyzing the same model in a context of non-symmetric popular preferences, i.e. in electorates which are biased towards the ideological right or left.
preferences is uni-modal with a peak near the electoral median, as for example would be the case if preferences were distributed according to a normal distribution over \( x \in [0,1] \).

Put succinctly, the following account of party system concentration and party system polarization obtains even if the majority of an electorate’s voters are moderate.

As my goal in this chapter is to explicitly model political competition in low partisanship electorates with centralized political parties, there will be no equivalent to the ‘party identification’ parameter in this chapter’s voter utility function. I will however assume that voters demonstrate a slight risk aversion to choosing new parties, whose leaders they have not seen in action and whose organizations have not yet been put to the test of campaigns or governance. As a result, if a voter is perfectly indifferent between the spatial positions offered by an established and a new party, this voter will choose the established party. Furthermore, when comparing an established party and a new entrant, some subset of voters will prefer the established party despite the fact that the new entrant’s spatial position is located slightly closer to these voters’ ideal point in policy space. When comparing two established parties, voters choose purely on the basis of policy proximity. Define \( \rho \) as the game’s risk parameter, such that higher values of \( \rho \) indicate a greater bias towards established parties. I can then write voter \( i \)’s utility for party \( P \) as follows:
Throughout I will assume that voters simply choose the party whose policy platform, combined with their status as a new or pre-existing organization, yields them the highest utility according to (2).

The notion of an ideology leader refers to a well-known political personality whose prominence comes from his or her affiliation to a particular ideological current in Turkish political society. Ideology leaders in this model gain utility from two distinct sources: firstly, they receive an independent payoff $\kappa$ if they manage to establish executive control over their own political party organization. In addition to the psychological benefits associated with party leadership (which are commonly assumed to be significant among Turkey’s ideology leaders),\(^5\) in Turkey the position also confers a number of opportunities for direct material gain, for example through the receipt of publicly or privately allocated campaign funds disbursed with little regulatory oversight.

---

\(^5\) Cem Toker, executive leader of the Turkish Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and something of an ideology leader himself, put it starkly: “In Turkey, every child begins the school day with the equivalent of your American pledge of allegiance. In this pledge, it is stated that Turks are great, and that anyone who is a Turk is himself great. Simply put, there is a culture of self-importance and self-righteousness in Turkey; and this cultural element is essential in understanding why all Turkish members of parliament think they should run their own political party.” Although this statement is highly editorial and insufficient to capture the complex preference motivations of Turkish political entrepreneurs, it makes the point.
Beyond their interest in gaining executive control over their own party organization, ideology leaders also care about the policy outcome of general elections. Define \( x_j \) as the most-preferred policy of ideology leader \( j \), such that the further a policy is from \( x_j \) the more \( j \) dislikes said policy. As well, define \( x^* \) as the public policy implemented as the result of a general election. In turn, the simplest possible formulation of \( j \)'s utility is as follows:

\[
 u_j = \begin{cases} 
 \kappa -(x^*-x_j)^2 & \text{if } j \text{ controls her own party} \\
 -(x^*-x_j)^2 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} .
\]  

(3)

Importantly, in the following game ideology leaders face a potential tradeoff between the two elements of their utility: in some (but not all…) situations, \( j \)'s decision to form an independent party organization will push the general election’s policy outcome \( x^* \) further from \( x_j \) than it would have been had \( j \) not formed an independent party organization.

Note the absence of any purely ‘office’ related benefit in ideology leaders’ utility functions. Such incentives could be introduced quite straightforwardly into the analysis by stipulating an independent, non-policy related benefits to incumbency. Furthermore, we could investigate the model assuming that the game has an incumbency status quo, i.e. begins with the presence of a coalition government in one or more ideology leaders’ political parties participate. Neither extension changes the following results’ basic
implications; so as to more parsimoniously these basic findings I leave office related utility out of the model.

I do however complicate this basic model of ideology leader preferences with the notion of polarizing issue dimensions. I define the latter as issue dimensions which cause ideology leaders to evaluate policy proposals from competing ‘ideological families’ differently than they evaluate policy proposals from party’s of their own ideological persuasion. Research on social identity theory demonstrates that individuals use very different psychological heuristics in evaluating individuals with a shared membership or affiliation in a particular social group or milieu (the ‘in group’), as opposed individuals without such a shared affiliation (the ‘out group’). Tajfel (1981, 1982) argues that in-group biases arise because individuals arrive at a point where their self-esteem is directly linked where self-esteem, group membership, and the esteem in which one’s group is held become intricately linked. Experimental research confirms the relevance in of in-group biases identified by Tajfel and in a wide variety of social contexts (Brewer and Kramer 1985; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Mummendey et al. 2000).

Studies of ethnicity and politics often identify in-group out out-group dynamics as relevant not only for the formation of inter-group hostilities, but also for the patterns of public good provision both within and between various ethnic groups (Shepsle and Rabushka 1972, Horowitz 1985, Posner et al. 2005). Chapter 6 uses qualitative evidence to demonstrate a similar set of considerations in Turkish politics surrounding the issue
of Political Islam. For the moment note simply that certain issue dimensions cause political actors to use ‘extra-spatial’ heuristics in evaluating political outcomes. Conveniently, spatial theory provides one simple and yet untested manner of introducing considerations of social identity into spatial models: we will allow for the possibility that ideology leaders evaluate policies on ‘their side’ of the median voter’s ideal point differently than they evaluate policies on the ‘other side’ of the median ideal point:

\[ u_j = \begin{cases} 
\kappa - (x^* - x_j)^2 - \Psi \cdot (x_M - x^*)^2 & \text{if } j \text{ controls her own party} \\
-(x^* - x_j)^2 - \Psi \cdot (x_M - x^*)^2 & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases} \]  

(4)

The parameter \( \Psi \) will equal ‘0’ if the policy outcome \( x^* \) is on the ‘same side’ of the median voter as \( x_j \), but may be greater than ‘0’ if the policy outcome \( x^* \) is on the ‘other side’ of the median voter as \( x_j \). For example \( \Psi = 0 \) for a leftist ideology leader evaluating a policy outcome on the ideological center-left, but \( \Psi \geq 0 \) for the same ideology leader evaluating a center-right policy outcome. As a result, when faced with two policy proposals from distinct sides of the median ideal point, ideology leader \( j \) may at times favor a policy proposal from his or her side of the median voter despite the fact the competing proposal is closer to \( x_j \) in policy space. Although an admittedly stylized mechanism for operationalizing the concerns of social identity theory, this approach yields a set of empirically relevant propositions about organizational discipline and
political polarization in centralized party systems. I solve all models for both the simple utility function presented in (3) as well as the more complicated utility function presented in (4), identifying precisely where the introducing social identity concerns into the model does (and does not…) affect equilibrium results.

I will assume throughout that the game contains exactly 4 ideology leaders, one associated with the ideological Left, one with the Center-Left, one with the Center-Right, and one with the Right. In notational terms, this implies that \( j \in \{L, CL, CR, R\} \).

Henceforth I will refer to ideology leaders by their notational shorthand: the Left ideology leader will be denoted \( L \), the Center-Left ideology leader \( CL \), and so on. Furthermore, to simplify the analysis I assume that \( x_L = .125 \), \( x_{CL} = .375 \), \( x_{CR} = .625 \), and \( x_R = .875 \).  

![Figure 4.1: Ideology Leaders’ Ideal Points](image)

The organizational state of affairs on either side of the political spectrum may assume one of three patterns. For example, the political left may find itself unified under

---

\( ^6 \) As discussed in the Appendix, relaxing this restriction on ideology leaders’ preference schedules is theoretically identical to analyzing the model in an electorate with non-symmetric preferences (ftn 11).
a single organization with ideology leader $L$ as its leader, unified under a single organization with $CL$ as its leader, or divided into two organizations controlled by $L$ and $CL$ respectively. The same is true on the political right, which may be unified under a single organization controlled by either $R$ or $CR$, or split into two distinct organizations controlled by $R$ and $CR$ respectively. For simplicity, I assume that voters equate a party’s spatial position with the ideal point of its leader, such that a party controlled by $L$ is assumed to be located at position $x = .125$, one controlled by $CL$ at $x = .375$ and so on.\footnote{In other words, I do not allow ideology leaders to credibly announce campaign platforms which diverge from their ideal points. A more general analysis would allow ideology leaders some platform flexibility, and would model explicitly the process by which voters evaluate the credibility of policy announcements which diverge from party leaders known ideological ideal points.}

The game proceeds as follows: in its first stage any ideology leader not in control of her own organization must decide whether or not to defect from their current party in order to form an independent organization and receive $\kappa$. An election is then held in which voters must choose between the various organizational options. After voters choose among the various competing parties, votes are counted and seats allocated to the parties. The game’s final parameter $\delta$ captures the nature of a system’s disproportionality, such that when $\delta > 0$ the translation of votes into legislative seats is biased towards larger parties, when $\delta < 0$ it is biased towards smaller parties, and when $\delta = 0$ the translation of votes to seats is perfectly proportional. The size of $\delta$ has a
number of real world determinants, including but not limited to a system’s electoral formula, its average district magnitude, and the threshold for entry into the Parliament. Regarding the latter, in Turkey any party not receiving at least 10% of the national vote is barred from sending candidates to the Grand National Assembly. As a result, it is often the case that a political party will win close to 50% of the vote in a particular regional stronghold, but fail to gain a single seat in Parliament because it falls just below the 10% threshold at the national level. When combined with the use of a d’Hondt electoral formula, this uniquely high threshold goes a long way to explaining the systematic large party bias in recent Turkish elections (Kalaycioglu 2001). As my present interest is in generating theoretical insights useful for the study of Turkish politics, I assume in this chapter that $\delta > 0$, and that disproportionality benefits a system’s largest party at the expense of remaining parties.\footnote{Allowing disproportionality to favor any party organization with a higher than the average vote share, rather than the system’s single largest party, does not change the model’s implications.}

Once votes are counted and legislative seats allocated, a process of government formation ensues. If any party finds itself with an absolute majority in the Legislature, it forms a single-party government and implements the ideal point of its party leader. If no

\footnote{For example, the d’Hondt formula for allocating legislative generates outcomes which systematically favor larger political parties, while the St. Lague divisor method generates outcomes which often grant smaller parties a larger than proportional share of the legislative pie.}

\footnote{Almost by definition, smaller districts tend under-represent smaller parties (Cox 1997).}
party wins an absolute majority, a coalition bargaining process ensues. I analyze a stylized process of coalition formation based loosely on Baron and Ferejohn’s seminal model (1989): the leader of the election’s highest vote receiving party is charged with forming a government, and chooses from among all possible coalitions that which generates an eventual policy outcome closest to her ideal point \( x_j \). The game’s policy outcome \( x^*[\mathbf{v}(\cdot)] \), will be a weighted function of coalition members’ relative vote shares in the game’s general election. In any coalition government containing parties \( P \) and \( K \), such that \( K \)’s platform is ‘higher’ than \( P \)’s \( (x^K > x^P) \), define the policy outcome as:

\[
\begin{align*}
    x^*[\mathbf{v}(\cdot)] &= x^K - \left\{ 1 - \frac{v^K(\cdot)}{v^K(\cdot) + v^P(\cdot)} \right\} \cdot (x^K - x^P).
\end{align*}
\]

Naturally, the higher is \( v^K(\cdot) \) as a portion of the coalition members’ combined legislative strength, the closer will be \( x^*[\mathbf{v}(\cdot)] \) to \( x^K \). To derive the government formation subgame’s equilibrium I employ a stylized version of Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) well-known coalition bargaining model in which: a.) the formateur offers a coalition to whichever of the smaller parties exacts the lowest policy concessions; and b.) the smaller party accepts the coalition offer.

The solution concept employed is subgame perfection. In particular, we are interested in the following question: taking into account the policy outcomes which emerge in the game’s government formation stage, will ideology leaders currently not in
control of their own party organization choose to abandon their current party so as to form an independent organization? All technical details are confined to the short theoretical Appendix; the text presents only their intuition. Begin with the case in which the right side of the political spectrum is divided between a Center-Right party and a Right party (controlled by ideology leaders \( R \) and \( CR \) respectively), while the left side of the political spectrum is concentrated in a single party with ideology leader \( CL \) as its leader.

![Figure 4.2: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 1)?](image)

We thus want to know whether ideology leader \( L \) will defect from her current organization to form a leftist party at \( x_L = .125 \) and gain the payoff \( \kappa \), taking into account this defection’s downstream consequences in the government formation stage. The answer is yes; \( L \) will defect and form an independent organization. Note first that if \( L \) chooses not to form an independent organization, then by the voting rule specified above the Center-Left party wins 50% of the vote, while the Center-Right and Right parties each receive 25%. Furthermore, since \( \delta > 0 \) the Center-Left party’s bare majority
in the electorate will be translated into a stable Parliamentary majority, allowing ideology leader CL to form a single-party government and implement her most-preferred policy \( x_{cl} = .375 \). In turn, by (3) above ideology leader L receives utility \( u_L = -(.25)^2 \) if she chooses not to form an independent party organization.

On the other hand, if L chooses to form an independent party at position \( x_L = .125 \) she will divide the leftist vote between two parties; but the Center-Left party will remain the election’s plurality winner due to voters’ risk aversion to new entrants.

As a result, depending on the size of both \( \rho \) and \( \delta \), one of two outcomes arises. The first and most likely possibility is that the Center-Left party wins a Parliamentary plurality but not an absolute majority, and ideology leader CL’s optimal choice is to form a coalition government with the left party run by ideology leader L, thus implementing policy \( .25 < x^* < .375 \) (depending on the parameter values \( \rho \) and \( \delta \)). In cases of extreme risk aversion and disproportionality, the Center-Left party may win an absolute majority in Parliament despite having had a portion of its voting bloc siphoned by the entry of a leftist competitor. Regardless, in either case L receives a higher utility from defecting and starting an independent organization than from staying put and granting ideology leader CL a monopoly on the political left.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) In the former case this is trivially true: not only will she receive payoff \( \kappa \), but also as a member of the left-of-center coalition government she will receive a more favorable policy outcome than
I now move to the case in which the ideological right is again divided; while the ideological left is again unified in a single organization but this time under the control of ideology leader $L$ rather than ideology leader $CL$.

![Figure 4.3: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 2)?](image)

We thus want to know whether or not $CL$ will leave the larger Left party to form her own Center-Left organization. Once again, the answer will almost always be yes. While the formal details are relegated to the theoretical Appendix, the punch-line is that by forming a new party $CL$ slightly increases the expected distance between her own ideal point $x_{CL}$ and the game’s expected policy outcome by $\bar{x}$ units. That said, entering and forming a party at $CL$ will minimize the risk of a rightist coalition between the center-right and right parties, and guarantees one’s own inclusion in the coalition, whether that possible under a single-party center-left government. In the latter case, the game’s policy outcome continues to be that associated with a single-party center-left government, but ideology leader $L$ now receives payoff $\kappa'$. 
with the left party or the center-right party. For nearly any parameter values $\kappa$ and $\Psi$ entry will thus be optimal.

The preceding analysis applies identically if the left side of the ideological spectrum is divided between a Left and Center-Left party while the right side of the ideological spectrum is unified. The general implication can thus be summarized as follows: when the current party system contains 3 political parties, only under exceedingly rare circumstances will a 4th political party fail to enter the political arena. We now turn to the analysis of two-party systems in which both the right- and left-hand sides of the political spectrum are unified under a single organization. Begin with the case in which the leftist ideology leader $L$ is in control of her side’s political party organization while the center-right ideology leader $CR$ controls the single party on the political spectrum’s right-hand side.

![Figure 4.4: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 3)?](image)

It is straight-forward to demonstrate that ideology leader $CL$ will have the incentive to form an independent organization in this circumstance: the game’s outcome will be a single-party Center-Right government regardless of her choice, so there are no policy
costs associated with forming a new party and receiving $\kappa$. An identical analysis applies to situations in which the political left is monopolized by a large Center-Left organization while the political Right is unified under the control of ideology leader $R$.

When a party system is concentrated around two large moderate parties run by $CL$ and $CR$ respectively, the likelihood of entry by a 3rd party drops:

![Figure 4.5: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 4)?](image)

Consider ideology leader $L$’s decision problem. Were she not to form an independent organization, a single-party Center-Left government would form with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and a single-party Center-Right government would form with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. On the other hand, as long as $\delta > 0$ forming an independent organization at $x_L = .125$ ensures the ascension to power of a single-party Center-Right government, yielding ideology leader $L$ payoff $u_L = \kappa - (.5)^2 - \Psi(.125)^2$. In turn, forming an independent organization is only optimal if the benefit $\kappa$ strongly counterbalances the ‘policy’ and ‘out-group’ costs associated with a single-party government of competing ideological persuasion. Importantly the reduced likelihood of entry in 2-party systems as compared to 3-party
systems obtains *even if* $\Psi = 0$, although the effect gets stronger as the ‘out-group’ tax $\Psi$ increases. The same analysis applies to ideology leader $R$.

The final case is that in which the current party system contains two polarized political parties controlled respectively by ideology leaders $R$ and $L$:

$$ x_L \quad ? \quad ? \quad x_R $$

0 \hspace{1cm} .125 \hspace{1cm} .875 \hspace{1cm} 1

**Figure 4.6: To Defect or not to Defect (Case 5)?**

This case is distinguished from the others in the importance that $\delta$ plays in conditioning the equilibrium outcome. If neither ideology leaders on the center-right nor the center-left choose to form independent organizations, then the two polarized parties receive identical vote shares, and with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ a leftist government forms at position $x^* = .125$ while with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ a right government forms at position $x^* = .875$.

Consider ideology leader $CL$’s decision calculus: As long as the parameter $\delta$ assumes modest values, said ideology leader will have every incentive to form an independent organization: the outcome of such a move would be a coalition between the Right party and the Center-Left party, yielding a payoff which is strictly greater than what they would have received otherwise. $CR$’s decision calculus is identical.

On the other hand, if $\delta$ is sufficiently large then $CL$’s incentives to form an independent party organization will significantly diminish. When $\delta$ reaches the
threshold defined in the Appendix, the consequence of forming an independent party organization is handing over the sole reigns of government to ideology leader $R$, whose electoral plurality will translate to a legislative majority. The outcome is thus a single-party Right government which implements policy $x^* = .875$. In this case, $CL$ must choose between forming an independent party at $x_{CL} = .375$, thus handing the reigns of government over to ideology leader $R$, or staying put. As demonstrated in the Appendix, if $\delta$ is sufficiently large, then regardless of the size of $\Psi$ defection from status quo parties is less likely here than in any of the three-party cases; and high values of $\Psi$ nearly ensure that centrist ideology leaders will avoid the risk of splitting their current party’s vote share. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that the most stable two-party SPNE are those which combine two extremist parties and high values of $\delta$ and $\Psi$. This discussion of theoretical results yields the following set of hypotheses, investigated in chapters 5 and 6:

* **Hypothesis 1:** In a PR system with $N = 3$ political parties, if some portion of ideological space is not currently represented by its own party organization, ideology leaders will fill this organizational void by forming a new political party in the available ideological space.

* **Hypothesis 2a:** In a PR system with $N = 2$ political parties, ideology leaders will often be reluctant to form new political parties in open ideological spaces, due to their fear of handing the reigns of executive power to a single party of competing ideological persuasion.

* **Hypothesis 2b:** Ideology leaders will be particularly reluctant to form new party organizations when the current party system contains 2 polarized political parties and the parameters $\rho$ and $\delta$ are large.
It is important to note that Hypotheses 1 and 2a apply regardless of the size of $\Psi$ and $\delta$, while Hypothesis 2b is more particularly contingent on the values assumed by $\Psi$ and $\delta$. Chapter 5 uses data on party switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly to investigate Hypotheses 1 and 2, along with a host of empirical predictions emanating from Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 6 uses qualitative data on the history of Turkish democratic competition to demonstrate the role that party leaders, in their quest to simultaneously maximize votes and organizational discipline, have played in manipulating $\Psi$ and $\delta$; and in turn this manipulation’s relationship to Turkey’s cyclical democratic instability.
Chapter 5. Easy Come, Easy Go: Party Switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly

“[Party] switching provides a unique window on politicians’ underlying preferences, including their incentives for belonging to political parties. An examination of patterns of party affiliations can reveal the roles parties play in meeting politicians’ varied career challenges.” (Desposato 2006, pg. 62)

“Group departures from parliamentary parties in Turkey have tended to occur when shifts in voter preferences are anticipated. In such situations deputies have left their parties in groups either to move to what they perceived to be the winning side or to establish a new political party which they think would respond to the oncoming shift in electoral sentiment.” (Turan 1985, pg. 27)

5.1 Introduction

Last chapter argued that political party organizations will tend to be centralized when an electorate has large numbers of ‘floating voters’, and in turn that we can model electoral competition in such environments as taking place between the executive leaders of centralized organizations. Party Leaders face two basic constraints to their vote-maximizing incentives. Firstly, vote maximization requires introducing new actors into a party organization’s activist and leadership ranks, actors whose fidelity to the current leadership may be doubtful. Secondly, vote maximization will invariably alienate activists and legislators at the organizational margins, potentially resulting in the formation of new political parties bent on invading one’s share of the electoral market.
I then developed a model of the latter phenomenon in which prominent Members of Parliament (MP’s) faced with an ensuing election must decide whether or not to defect from their current organization so as to join a new political party in ‘open’ ideological space. By ‘open’ space I imply a segment of the popular preference distribution which is under-represented in Parliament. For example if in a hypothetical election parties of the left receive 20% of the vote share but only 5% of all parliamentary seats, this segment of the populous is under-represented in Parliament. The likelihood of legislative defection and new party entry was found to be positively correlated to the number of parties with seats in Parliament, and to be especially low when two large and polarized political party organizations monopolize parliamentary seats. When Parliamentary seats are divided among numerous political parties, coalition government will be the norm. In turn, legislative defection will carry both lower costs and higher benefits: the former because defecting from one’s own party, and thus splitting that party’s vote share, will not entail handing the reigns of government to a single party of competing ideological persuasion; and the latter because even new parties with low aggregate vote shares stand a chance of entering government in multi-party coalitions.

Stated in their most general terms, the chapter thus predicts that:

**P1:** Potential party leaders will have *strong* incentives to form new party organizations in ‘open’ ideological space when the number of parliamentary parties is greater than 2.

**P2:** Potential party leaders will have *weak* incentives to form new party organizations in ‘open’ ideological space when the number of parliamentary parties is at or near 2.
This chapter tests these and related hypotheses with a new data set on *party switching* in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). Party switching occurs when a legislative MP decides to change his or her organizational affiliation during the course of a Parliamentary session. Note the emphasis in P1 and P2 on ‘potential party leaders’ and ‘new party organizations’. As I demonstrate below, party switching in Turkey is a heterogeneous phenomenon; not all parliamentarians in Turkey are ‘potential party leaders’, and not all party switches are to ‘new organizations in open ideological space’. Indeed, the theoretical results presented in Chapter 2 provide a distinct set of hypotheses as to the conditions under which MP’s will defect to the current incumbent party so as to enjoy the benefits of office; and the conditions under which rank and file MP’s will switch to new parties in exchange for the promise of ‘high list positions’ in subsequent electoral rounds. The data allows me to differentiate between the various forms of party switching which occur in the TGNA, and also between the TGNA’s various legislative ‘types’. Statistical analysis confirms last chapter’s hypothesis that the likelihood of legislative defection by prominent MP’s to new party organizations is positively correlated to the number of Parliamentary parties. It also confirms theoretical predictions as to the strategic conditions under which MP’s will join incumbent parties and/or change parties so as to maximize their effective list position in the coming election. In the TGNA, an MP’s ‘type’ thus conditions the nature of his or her switching options in accordance with theoretical predictions.
5.2 Party Switching in Comparative Perspective

Party switching has in recent years become an increasingly important subject of analysis for comparative political science, and its role in legislative politics identified and explained in a variety of national contexts. Reed and Scheiner (2003) study the causes of defection from the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prior to the 1993 general election. They identify policy preferences, and in particular the desire for political reform, as a consistent predictor of legislative defection. They also relate the likelihood of defection to an MP’s career path, arguing that junior members tended to support political reform in constituencies where the LDP vote share was low, while senior members’ preferences for reform were largely independent of electoral considerations.

Heller and Mershon (2004) investigate party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, where nearly 25% of MP’s switched parties at least once between 1996 and 2001. Italy uses a mixed-electoral system composed of both single-member districts and overlapping multi-member PR districts. The authors present two primary hypotheses, the first being that party switching should be less likely among MP’s chosen in single-member districts than those chosen in multi-member districts; and the second being that party switching should be more common among MP’s from parties with ‘ambiguous’ rather than ‘clear’ party labels. While they uncover strong evidence in support of the second hypothesis, evidence in favor of the institutional prediction is mixed.
Desposato (2006) develops a formal model of party switching in which legislators must simultaneously decide to affiliate with one of two political parties. The results imply that switching will become more likely when one party controls significantly more resources than the other, when transaction costs to switching are low, and when legislators share a sufficient degree of ideological compatibility with their party of choice. The paper tests these predictions with data from the Brazilian legislature, demonstrating among other things that legislators tend to switch from parties not in government to parties with cabinet posts (and not vice versa); that they tend to choose parties where vote pooling procedures make re-election more likely; and finally that switching is especially prominent in districts with low economic development, where access to fungible public resources is crucial to one’s re-election.

The reviewed papers all argue for the importance of distinguishing between the legislative motivations in varying strategic circumstances. I share this priority and highlight a novel set of variables for isolating legislators’ strategic incentives: the magnitude of their electoral districts and their position on parties’ electoral lists in the previous election. In contrast to past studies, I also distinguish between different forms of switching behavior by parsing the dependent variable SWITCH into 4 distinct categories, creating a comprehensive empirical framework for analyzing the relationship between an MP’s strategic considerations and his or her likelihood of changing party midstream.
5.3 Party Switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly

Party switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly is strikingly common. With a few notable exceptions cited below, this aspect of Turkish legislative life has received surprisingly little attention from comparative scholars. I now subject the phenomenon to more intense intellectual scrutiny, making use of a new and comprehensive data set on party switching in the TGNA from 1987 to 2007, collected with the generous help and contribution of TGNA library archivists.1 The data’s basic unit of observation is an individual legislator; the primary dependent variable is party switching (SWITCH), which in its most aggregated form is coded SWITCH = 0 if the MP in question remains in her current party; and SWITCH = 1 if she leaves her current party for a competing organization. As a result, some legislators enter the data set more than once. For example, an MP who makes a single party switch in any given Parliamentary session enters the data set twice, first as a member of his or her original party and second as a member of his or her new party. The first observation is then coded SWITCH = 1, while the second is coded as SWITCH = 0 since the MP in question remained with her second party until the end of the legislative session. Similarly, an MP who changes parties exactly twice in a legislative session enters the data set 3 times, and so on; naturally, any MP who does not switch parties enters the data set only once.

1 I would especially like to thank Erol Tuncer and Tuncer Yılmaz for sharing a portion of the raw information which this chapter analyzes.
The time period 1987 to 2007 includes five parliamentary sessions: the 18th from 1987-1991, the 19th from 1991-1995, the 20th from 1995-1999, the 21st from 1999-2002, and the 22nd from 2002-2007. Table 1 contains acronyms and full names of all political parties referred to in the following pages:

Table 5.1: Political Parties 1987-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties and Acronyms:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Democratic Left Party (DLP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Democratic Society Party (DSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Democratic Turkey Party (DTP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Felicity Party (FP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Freedom and Solidarity Party (FSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Justice and Development Party (JDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Motherland Party (MOP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Nationalist Action Party (NAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-New Horizon Party (NHP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-New Turkey Party (NTP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-People’s Labor Party (PRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-People’s Rising Party (PRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Republican People’s Party (RPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-True Path Party (TPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Social Democratic People’s Party (SDPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Virtue Party (VP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Welfare Party (WP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During this time, just over 2,560 MP’s entered the TGNA. Of those my data covers 2,546, with the slight discrepancy resulting from the fact that I drop MP’s whose life ended during a parliamentary session from my analysis. Of these 2,546 MP’s, a full
28.2% (719) switched parties at least once during their legislative session. A total of 84 MP’s switched parties twice during their legislative session, and another 81 changed parties more than twice, with a maximum score of six party-switches in a single-legislative session. All told the data set contains 965 total ‘switch events’.2

Figures 1 provides a more fine grained description of the aggregate phenomenon, plotting the percentage of MP’s who switch in each of the five parliamentary sessions in question (18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd):

![Figure 5.1: Party Switching by Legislative Session](image)

**Figure 5.1: Party Switching by Legislative Session**

Note that levels of party switching are markedly lower in 18th and 22nd parliamentary sessions than they are in the 19th, 20th, and 21st. In the 20th and 21st legislative sessions,

2 Kubilay Uygun, an MP from the district of Afyon near the Aegean sea, began the 20th Parliamentary session with the Democratic Left Party, moved then to center-right True Path Party, back to the Democratic Left Party, back to the True Path Party, to the Nationalist Action Party, to the newly formed Democratic Turkey party, and finally to the status of independent MP before the 1999 general election.
political parties of Islamic leaning were prosecuted and then forcibly closed for threatening the ‘secular nature’ of the Turkish Republic. In these two legislative sessions, one might expect that the increased incidence of party switching arises due to the prevalence of ‘involuntarily’ switches by MP’s from former Islamist parties to new or pre-existing party organizations. However, even without ‘involuntary’ changes, the percentage of MP’s who switch parties remains far higher in sessions 19, 20, and 21 (33%, 19%, and 21%) than in sessions 18 and 22 (8% and 9%).

The TGNA’s effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) between 1987 and 2007 moves in rough unison with the data from Figure 1C: the ENPP is particularly low during the 18th and 22nd legislative sessions (2.05 and 1.85) and substantially higher in the 19th, 20th, and 21st legislative sessions (3.58, 4.40, 4.87). Though it is tempting to interpret this correlation as a first cut of evidence consistent with predictions P1 and P2 above, such an interpretation would be premature. The inference is confounded by the heterogeneous nature of party switching, much of which has less to do with the desire to join new party organizations in underrepresented ideological segments than with short-term material and/or professional considerations.

In that vein the Sayari (2002) refers to a number of reasons that MP’s might choose to change their party affiliation:

3 ENPP is calculated by: a.) summing each party’s squared percentage of legislative seats after a particular election, and b.) dividing 1 by this aggregate sum.
“[Turkish] Parliamentarians quit their party and join another one for several reasons: (1) when they feel that their chances for renomination in the next election are not assured, (2) when they want access to political patronage resources that are controlled by another party in government, or (3) when they become disgruntled with the policies pursued by the party leadership.” (Sayari 2002, pg. 29)

Of these motivations, the third most closely approximates the strategic behavior described in P1 and P2. Turan (1985) argues that party switchers come in two primary forms: individual changers and group changers. The latter are those MP’s who switch as part of larger legislative migration to new party organizations, while individual changers switch parties ‘independently’ for reasons of short-term material and/or professional gain. Turan argues that ‘individual’ changers are more likely to come from smaller and less economically developed districts, where access to targetable patronage resources is an essential ingredient of political survival. On other hand, group changers are more likely to hail from larger urban districts, which are better suited to experimentation with new ideological positions and organizational forms. In the above opening quotation, Turan’s description of ‘group departures’ highlights two elements which bring out its similarity to the defection behavior hypothesized in P1 and P2. Firstly, it emphasizes that group defections will occur when some subset of MP’s perceives an opening in the electoral market where a new entrant may gain significant votes. Secondly, the above quotation emphasizes switches to new political parties capable of capturing this floating vote share. This is very similar to the notion that prominent
MP’s must choose whether or not to form a new party organization in ‘vacated’ ideological space.

In fact, we can distinguish between the two elements in this conceptualization, i.e. the parameter ‘open space’ and the parameter ‘new party’. It is perfectly possible to join a new party organization that nonetheless makes no attempt at capturing the votes of currently underrepresented citizens; similarly, it is possible to join a currently existing organization whose ideological position makes it well-suited to the absorption of votes from underrepresented citizens. This distinction leads to the following fourfold classification of switching behaviors:

Table 5.2: A Typology of Switching Behaviors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Party</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote-Seeking Party Entry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Enhancing Switches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo Party Entry</td>
<td>Myopic Switches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Open’ Space

No
Section IV operationalizes both parameters from Table 2, i.e. whether or not a switch occurs to a new party and whether or not it targets a party in ‘open’ ideological space. This Section’s remainder provides qualitative accounts of all four types of changes so as to more intuitively expose their basic properties.

The Table’s upper left-hand cell accumulates all changes that can be classified as ‘vote-seeking’ switches to new party organizations, i.e. switches to new party organizations in open ideological spaces. Such switches most accurately reflect the type of legislative defection modeled in last chapter’s game theoretic analysis. This form of ‘effective’ entry is a phenomenon of both numerical and substantive significance in recent Turkish history. Indeed, the process of democratization itself was initiated in 1946 by a group of Republican People’s Party (RPP) MP’s who, perceiving the electoral opening created by widespread dissatisfaction with RPP policies during WWII, decided to form the Democrat Party (DP) and push the issue of open and fair legislative elections (Karpat 1959). The DP went on to usher in the era of multi-party competition, and held the reigns of government from 1950 until its closure after the 1960 military intervention.

This experience has been a precedent for years since, as Turkish politics has repeatedly witnessed the creation of new parliamentary parties whose aim is to capture the votes of underrepresented ideological and/or social tendencies. In fact, both of today’s major parties, the modern day RPP and the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP), emerged as the result of vote-seeking legislative defections. In
with the center-left Social Democratic People’s Party (SDPP) in an uncomfortable and credibility-draining coalition with the center-right True Path Party (TPP), Deniz Baykal and other prominent SDPP parliamentarians saw the opportunity to create a new center-left organization, and in so doing gather the votes of citizens dissatisfied with the SDPP’s participation in a right-leaning government. Thus was formed today’s incarnation of the RPP. Similarly, after the ostensibly Islamist Virtue Party (VP) was forcibly closed by the constitutional court in 2001, a subset of entrepreneurial VP parliamentarians perceived an opening at the political spectrum’s center-right. Despite objections from VP traditionalists, these mostly younger MP’s formed the JDP, which has since commanded nearly half of the popular vote in recent Turkish elections. In short, it is no great controversy to assert that *nearly all consequential organizational entrants into the Turkish party system have begun their path to viability in the TGNA.*

Table 2’s lower left-hand cell accumulates all switches to new organizations in ‘occupied’ ideological spaces, i.e. ideological and/or social population segments that are equitably or excessively represented in Parliament. For example, below we will see that, during the 19th legislative session, many small new parties entered the arena on the ideological center-right. We will also see that the center-right was at this time over-represented in Parliament and leading a coalition government. These small organizations were thus ‘pseudo-entrants’, i.e. party organizations which formed in fairly ‘occupied’ ideological space, in stark contrast to the above described party entrants which
specifically targeted an under-represented segment of the aggregate preference distribution.

The Table’s upper right-hand cell accumulates what I label ‘organization enhancing’ party switches, defined as switches to pre-existing organizations who are nonetheless well-poised to gather electoral support from underrepresented voters. As an example of this form of defection, consider the legislative fate of the Democratic Left Party (DLP) during the 19th parliamentary session (1991-1995). Recall, this is the session in which the SDPP joined a right-leaning coalition, thus creating an opening ideological space on the political spectrum’s left. While some MP’s (28 to be exact) took advantage of this by joining Deniz Baykal’s newly formed RPP, another subset (17 in total) moved instead to Bulent Ecevit’s DLP which already held small number of parliamentary seat (7), and also stood to benefit from the voter dissatisfaction created by the participation of a center-left party in a right-leaning government. Finally, the Table’s lower right-hand cell contains what I label ‘myopic switchers’, i.e. party changers who do so for neither ideological nor organizational reasons. As we will see below, a large majority of observations which fall into this cell represent individual MP’s moving from a non-incumbent to an incumbent party, ostensibly to gain access to public resources not available to the political opposition.

This typology creates a general empirical domain which encompasses the behavioral types in both Sayari and Turan’s framework. Both the ‘policy disgruntled’
switchers in Sayari’s conceptualization and the ‘group changers’ from Turan’s paper correspond more or less to Table 2’s top row; neither author explicitly requires that this form of switching be to a new political party, but both emphasize the importance of ideological schism and the move to more ideologically compatible/viable party organizations. In describing ‘individual changers’ Turan emphasizes behaviors corresponding to Sayari’s second motivation: the quest for access to public resources not available to opposition parties (which fall into Table 2’s lower right-hand cell). This leaves only Sayari’s first motivation, the desire to secure a safe renomination. In fact, this final motivation will not strictly speaking be confined to any of Table 2’s 4 cells: rank and file MP’s without the clout to secure ‘safe’ list positions in their current party will ‘shop around’ for the best renomination option, which may involve moving a to a party in ‘open’ ideological space, may mean moving to an incumbent party, and may mean moving to a pseudo-entrant.

5.4 Measurement and Operationalization

Clearly, instances of party switching which fall into Table 2’s upper left-hand cell (vote-seeking entry) most closely resemble the type of legislative defection described in P1 and P2, namely to new organizations in open ideological space. To operationalize the hypotheses and their corollaries, I must now develop a strategy for measuring the two dimensions which define Table 1’s outcome set: a.) whether or not party switches are to new organizations; and b.) whether or not they are to organizations in ‘open’ ideological
spaces. To capture parameter (a) I create the dichotomous variable NEW, which equals ‘1’ anytime an MP changes his or her party affiliation to an organization which did not gain parliamentary seats in the most recent general election. The variable thus equals ‘0’ for all MP’s who change their party affiliation to an organization which already holds parliamentary seats as a result of its success in the previous election, as well as for all MP’s who did not switch parties at all during the legislative session.

For the most part this coding rule is straight-forward, but there are a limited number of observations in which the rule in fact involves a measurement choice worthy of exposition. Turkey’s particular version of proportional representation is characterized by one the world’s highest electoral thresholds: any party receiving less than 10% of the nationwide vote is barred from entering the TGNA, even if the organization receives a dominant electoral plurality in one or more individual districts. As a result, fairly prominent party organizations sometimes fail to enter the TGNA. For example, in the 2002 general election the once dominant Motherland Party (MOP) received less than 10% of the aggregated nationwide vote, and thus received 0 parliamentary seats. In turn, during the 22nd legislative session a number of parliamentarians lead by Cabinet Minister Erkan Mumcu defected to the MOP, whose leadership reigns passed to Mumcu himself. By the coding rule for NEW, any switch to the MOP during the 22nd session of Parliament would be coded ‘1’, i.e. as a switch to a new parliamentary party, despite the fact that the MOP is a fairly well established organization. In the end, this phenomenon
is only prevalent in the 22nd parliamentary session, where a handful of fairly prominent organizations failed to enter Parliament. I code these observations as NEW = 0 given the fact that their parties’ strong organizational basis. That said, I verify the robustness of all statistical findings with these observations recoded such that NEW = 0. In total, 645 of the 965 total switch events which occurred between 1987 and 2007 were to political parties with no previous parliamentary representation.

Operationalizing Table 2’s second dimension is a more complicated process, and involves first developing an indicator of parties’ positions in policy space and second developing a measurement strategy to identify ranges of this policy space which are currently underrepresented in Parliament. Both tasks first require the specification of a relevant policy space in which parties align themselves. Beginning with Mardin (1973) authors in a variety of contexts have demonstrated the presence of a fundamental divide in Turkish society between a secularist, modernizing, and state oriented center and a religiously inclined, traditional, and privately motivated periphery. Çarkoğlu (1998) demonstrated that, at least during the 1990’s, a second and less prominent political cleavage more closely mirroring the familiar ‘left-right’ socio-economic divide vied for

---

4 On the contrary, there is not a single occurrence of the phenomenon during the 18th, 19th, and 20th sessions in which all switches to new parties were in fact switches to genuinely new parties with no significant electoral or organizational history; while during the 21st session it applies only to four MP’s who joined the then excluded RPP, which failed to reach the 10% threshold in 1999.
political space. However, not only was the ‘left-right’ divide less pronounced than the center-periphery cleavage; with an important exception noted below, parties’ policy positions on the two dimensions show considerable covariance. For example, the version of Political Islam which became prominent after the 1980 coup has been heavily neo-liberal in orientation (Yavuz 2003). Indeed, among all Turkish political parties the JDP is by far the biggest proponent of liberalizing capital and product markets, privatizing state enterprises, and acceding to the European Union. On the other hand, the traditional ‘center’ parties all favor a greater hand for government in regulating and contributing to the national economy. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycíoğlu (2007) provide survey data which demonstrates the continuing importance of this basic cleavage in the Turkish electorate.

Throughout the 1990’s and into the early 21st century both academic consensus and popular wisdom (see essays in Esmer and Sayarı 2002) placed Deniz Baykal’s RPP and Bulent Ecevit’s DLP at the center-left in this policy space, while placing the MOP and True Path Party (TPP) at the center-right. As well, the Great Turkey Party (GTP) and Nationalist Action Party (NAP), along with the Islamist VP and its predecessor the Welfare Party (WP), constituted the ‘right-wing’ of Turkey’s party system. The classificatory scheme is somewhat confounded by the presence of small parties which occupy what I label the ‘progressive left’. In this category we find the various parties which have appeared to pursue the demands of Turkey’s Kurdish minority, and which
generally combine neo-leftist ideology on issues of economic governance with a particular focus on the claims of Turkey’s arguably most peripheral group. The Democratic Society Party (DSP) represents this ideological tendency’s present incarnation. The ‘center-periphery’ and ‘left-right’ preferences of Progressive Left parties do not covary in the same way as those of center-left, center-right, and right-wing parties: progressive left parties support both a strong governmental role in the economy and improving the life chances of traditionally ‘peripheral’ groups.5

Based on this discussion I create the categorical variable IDEOLOGY, which assumes one of four discrete values corresponding to the each one of the ideological ‘families’ just described. All MP’s from parties classified as ‘progressive left’ are thus assigned the value IDEOLOGY = 1; those from the center-left parties IDEOLOGY = 2; those from the center-right IDEOLOGY = 3; and those from the right IDEOLOGY = 4. The scale falls just short of being interpretable as a monotonic ideological space, since progressive left parties share traits with the center-right and right parties (a focus on conditions in the ‘periphery’) as well with the center-left parties (a focus on the state’s role in economic governance). The use of expert survey data and/or party manifestos

5 Other current examples of Progressive Left parties include the small but relevant Freedom and Solidarity Party (FSP), which regularly receives 1-2% of the vote in local and national elections, and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), both of whose platforms combine an interest in the protection/promotion of democratic and human rights as well as the public sector’s responsibility to traditionally excluded groups.
might constitute a more ambitious operationalization of parties’ ideological positions, and indeed in future research I will make use of a newly emerging data set on democratic accountability mechanisms worldwide (Kitschelt et al. 2008) to do just this. Whatever the value added of a more sophisticated approach, it doesn’t retract from the basic cogency of the ‘four family’ approach as a first cut for placing Turkish political organizations in space. Indeed, their may ultimately be virtues to the simple coding scheme here which make it preferable to a more complicated approach. I leave this question for future research.

In a large majority of cases the coding is fairly straight-forward. Importantly, this applies not only to the major parties whose ideological placement was described above, but to a majority of the new party organizations which entered Parliament as the result of legislative defections. For example, in 1997 the Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) formed as an offshoot of the TPT; the latter had formed a coalition government with the Islamist WP, thus alienating many of its own parliamentarians. The DTP adopted an explicitly center-right stance, and its leadership personnel included Hüsamettin Cindoruk and Mehmet Ali Bayar, both prominent center-right personalities. Similarly, in 2001 the New Turkey Party (NTP) formed as an offshoot of Bulent Ecevit’s DLP, which at the time led a coalition government composed of right and center-right parties, and which had recently alienated many of its electoral supporters with both policy-based and personal blunders. The NTP adopted an explicitly center-left program to contrast
with the increasingly neo-liberal policies of the Ecevit cabinet, and included prominent center-left figures such as Kemal Derviş and İsmail Cem.

While for the most part straight-forward, for a subset of observations from the 19th parliamentary session the coding process involves methodological choices in need of exposition. In 1991 the MOP’s eight-year tenure in office had just come to an end, and a number of legal restrictions were relaxed so that political leaders banned from politics after the 1980 military intervention were again allowed to compete. This led to remarkable fluidity inside the TGNA, where MP’s formed and disbanded parties with abandon as various factions vied for pre-eminent status in specific segments of the electoral market. Indeed, a total of 28 parties held at least one seat at some point during the parliamentary session! In contrast, the total number of parties to enter parliament at some point seat during the 18th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd parliamentary sessions were nine, nine, ten, and twelve respectively.

A large majority of these organizations were ephemeral, and disbanded shortly after they were formed. Take for example the New Horizon Party, which formed on the 28th of August 1993 and disbanded less than a month later on September 16th of the same year. The New Horizon Party was formed by two former MOP parliamentarians from Istanbul, İbrahim Özdemir and Leyla Yeniay Köseoğlu, who then together moved to the TPT on September 16th. There is little historical record of its existence beyond this data set and the TGNA albums from which the raw data here was compiled. In fact, in
identifying the New Horizon Party’s ‘ideological family’ we have little more to go on than the formation, affiliation, and disbandment information already presented.

This information may however be enough to code the party’s ideological family with some accuracy. Note that both the party of origin (MOP) and the eventual party of destination (TPT) are center-right parties. Upon closer inspection, nearly all of the short-lived party labels from the 19th legislative session serve similarly as ‘holding parties’ in which a small group of legislators camps out before moving to a new organization. As well, in nearly all circumstances legislators in ‘holding parties’ eventually affiliate with organizations which share their original party’s ideological pedigree. When this is the case, I attribute to the holding party the ideological family membership of its affiliated MP’s. The New Horizon Party is thus coded as center-right and assigned the value IDEOLOGY = 3. The few holding parties which contain MP’s from differing ideological currents are assigned no IDEOLOGY value, and come up as missing data in the below regression analysis.

Having created an indicator of political parties’ ideological family, I now devise a strategy for identifying segments of ‘open’ ideological space, i.e. segments of the popular preference distribution which are underrepresented in the Legislature. I employ two distinct pieces of information to do so: discrepancies between an ideological family’s electoral vote share and its legislative seat share; and the configuration of executive power. The most effective way of presenting this measurement strategy is via
example. Consider for 19th legislative session. Figure 3 presents the ideological distribution of electoral votes in the 1991 election and the election’s resulting ideological distribution of legislative seats:

![Figure 3: Votes and Seats in 1991](image)

**Figure 5.2: Votes and Seats in 1991**

The center-right TPP and MOP won 178 and 115 seats respectively, leaving them with roughly 65% of all parliamentary seats despite having won barely 50% of the popular vote. The right-wing WP was slightly underrepresented in the TGNA, having won 17% of the vote but 62 (15%) of all legislative seats. However, the most pronounced underrepresentation occurs on the ideological left, where the center-left Social
Democratic People’s Party (SDPP) and DLP won only a combined 21% of seats despite receiving 27% of the aggregate vote; and the progressive left won 5% without gaining a single seat in Parliament. Furthermore, the coalition which ruled between 1991 and 1995 consisted of the TPP and its junior partner the SDPP. As junior member of the executive coalition, the SDPP found itself ‘pulled’ (hence the arrow in Figure 3) to the ideological right on a host of policy issues. As a result, between 1991 and 1995 the most ‘open’ ideological space in the Turkish Grand National Assembly was clearly on the left-hand side of the political spectrum. I thus create the dichotomous variable OPEN which for the 19th session equals ‘1’ for any switch made to a party at the left or center-left, ‘0’ for any switch made to non-open space on the right-wing or center-right, and ‘0’ for all MP’s who do not switch parties.

Appendix B undertakes an identical process for each of the data set’s five legislative sessions, using vote-to-seat share discrepancies and executive incumbency patterns to identify ‘open’ ideological spaces. The most challenging coding question with regards to identifying ‘open’ ideological space comes in the 22nd parliamentary session, in which RPP and JDP captured a near perfect duopoly of legislative seats. While the RPP and JDP enter the data set as center left and center right parties respectively, 2002-2007 was a period of marked political polarization. This was particularly true of the RPP, whose leaders countenanced and even instigated the threat of military intervention, and whose activists organized a series of large ‘secularist rallies’
in the spring and summer of 2007. The secularist, militarist, and anti-international rhetoric which emerged from these rallies provoked some to posit the presence a fifth ideological family, the ‘nationalist left’, which combined a strong belief in the government’s economic role with a militant secularism and ‘anti-peripheralism’. Given the polarization which occurred between 2002 and 2007, assigning the RPP and JDP to ideological families becomes more of a challenge, in turn making it unclear exactly what to code as ‘open’ ideological space. To ensure that this decision is not determinative of the below results I run all statistical tests on two samples, one in which the center-left and center-right are coded as ‘open’ space for the 22nd session, and one in which open space is assigned to the ideological extremes.

The variables NEW and OPEN allow us to separate the dependent variable according to the four categories identified in Section III. A total of 289 switches fall into Table 1’s upper left-hand cell, thus resembling the ‘vote-seeking’ entry of MP’s into new organizations in open ideological space. Another 322 switch events fall into the Table’s lower left-hand cell, which gathers all switches to new organizations in non-open ideological segments. Only 110 total switch events are of the ‘organization-enhancing’ variety, i.e. to pre-existing party organizations in open ideological space. Finally, the remaining 247 switches are to pre-existing organizations in non-open ideological space. This category contains all switches made form opposition to incumbent parties, as well
as all switch events in which an MP leaves her current organization to join the ranks of independent, or ‘non-affiliated’, legislators; the latter occurs 149 times in the data.

I will in fact drop these 149 observations in the following analysis. The switch to non-affiliation is not a ‘party-switch’ per se, and indeed assigning any value to such observations on the variables ‘new’ or ‘old’ parties is by definition arbitrary; similarly there exists no good way to place ‘independents’ in ideological space. Given these empirical issues and a lack of clear theoretical expectations, these 149 observations do not enter the below analysis. Furthermore, in what follows I will recode to SWITCH = 0 any switch which occurred from the Welfare Party to the Virtue Party and any switch which occurred from the Virtue Party to the Felicity Party. These were involuntary switches which occurred due to the prior parties’ forced closure by the Constitutional Court; the subsequent party in both cases is not a genuinely ‘new’ party but rather the same organizational foundation with a new name. Such observations are not party switches per se. Finally, the same is also true for a subset of legislators in the 19th legislative session: those who formed electoral alliances. Both members of the Kurdish People’s Labor Party and (PLP) and the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) entered Parliament as part of electoral alliances, with the SDPP and WP respectively. Once in parliament, MP’s from these parties immediately left to form their own parliamentary groups. As such, these observations are not genuine switches either, and are recoded as SWITCH = 0. After these modifications, a total of 289 switches fall into Table 2’s upper
left-hand cell, thus resembling the ‘vote-seeking’ entry of MP’s into new organizations in open ideological space. Another 128 switch events fall into the Table’s lower left-hand cell, which gathers all switches to new organizations in non-open ideological segments. 110 total switch events are of the ‘organization-enhancing’ variety, i.e. to pre-existing party organizations in open ideological space. Finally, the remaining 121 switches are to pre-existing organizations in non-open ideological space. This category contains mostly switches made from opposition to incumbent parties (86 in total). I now turn to an explanation of these aggregate patterns.

### 5.5 District Magnitudes, Electoral Lists, and Party Switches

Legislators in the TGNA are confronted with different switching options according to their respective strategic situations. For example, P1 and P2 above apply to ‘potential party leaders’, a classification which only applies to prominent MP’s whose historical affiliation with a particular ideological current in Turkish society allows them the status and credibility to consider forming a new political party. As a proxy for this ‘prominence’ I will use legislators’ list position in the most recent general election. As in all multi-member district proportional representation systems, at election time Turkish political parties present distinct lists of candidates to voters in each of Turkey’s individual electoral districts. As discussed in Chapter 4, voters use the identity of parties’ list leaders in their particular district as a heuristic to help more precisely identify parties’ policy positions. Parties wishing to communicate specific message to
voters in a particular district must place candidates whose reputation is associated with the desired message at ‘high’ positions on their district-level electoral list. This applies to parties seeking to adopt platforms which deviate incrementally from the ideological current with which they are traditionally associated as well as parties wishing to communicate fidelity to their traditional tenets.

As an example, in the 2007 general election JDP leaders placed Ertuğrul Gunay, a popular center-left personality, at the top of their party list in Istanbul’s 2nd electoral precinct, with the expectation that this move would successfully woo left leaning voters. Similarly, in 2002 the JDP placed Erkan Mumcu, a popular center-right personality, at the top of their party list in the district of Isparta in order to make inroads into center-right voting constituencies. Finally, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) placed noted religious figure Yaşar Nüri Öztürk at the head of their list in Istanbul’s 3rd electoral precinct, in the hope of wooing religious moderates to vote for a party with avowedly secularist roots. Importantly, both Mumcu and Öztürk eventually defected from their respective parties to form new organizations in what they perceived to be ‘open’ ideological spaces. Mumcu’s experience was recounted earlier; Öztürk’s will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter. Suffice it to say for the moment that he left the RPP to form the People’s Rising Party (PRP), a moderate organization with ‘modernist Islamist’ leanings which aimed to attract centrist voters. I thus use an MP’s list position in the previous election to distinguish between prominent MP’s and rank
and file legislators, under the assumption that the higher a candidate is on his or her party’s list, the more likely he or she is to occupy a position of popular prominence.

The particular operationalization of list position I employ is a measure labeled ELP to denote an MP’s effective list position. This variable equals 1 for any MP who occupied the first position on his or her party’s list in the preceding general election; equals 0 for any MP who occupied the last position of her party’s list in the preceding general election; and for MP’s listed in between the top and bottom list position assumes descending values as one moves from the top to the bottom. The precise algorithm used to calculate position is:

$$ELP = 1 - \left\{ \frac{L - 1}{M - 1} \right\}$$

Where $L$ is defined as the MP’s position on his or her party’s electoral list and $M$ represents his or her electoral district’s magnitude. Regardless of district magnitude, any MP placed at the head of her party’s list receives a coding of $ELP = 1$ since for these MP’s $L = 1$. As well, any MP placed at the bottom of his or her party’s list is coded as $ELP = 0$: given that all parties nominate exactly as many candidates in each district as that district has legislative seats, MP’s at the bottom of their party’s electoral list have a value $L = M$. The ELP scores for MP’s at intermediate list positions will vary according district magnitude. For example, MP’s who occupy their party’s second list position in a district which sends 3 representatives to the TGNA will receive $ELP = .5$ (since $L = 2$ and $M = 3$).
On other hand, MP’s who occupy their party’s second list position in a district which
sends 11 representatives to the TGNA receive ELP = .9 (since \( L = 2 \) and \( M = 3 \)). Indeed,
we would expect MP’s in these two distinct situations to harbor quite distinct incentives,
given that a list position of \( L = 2 \) is much ‘higher’ in relative terms in electoral large
districts as opposed to small electoral districts. To make this more concrete, in a district
whose magnitude is 5, an MP who occupies her party’s 1st list position has an effective
list position of ELP = 1; an MP who occupies her party’s 2nd list position has ELP = .75; an
MP who occupies her party’s 3rd list position has ELP = .5; an MP who occupies her
party’s 4th list position has ELP = .25; and an MP occupying her party’s 5th and final list
position has ELP = 0.

While it is fairly uncontroversial to operationalize an MP’s relative prominence
in the electorate with his or her list position, it is also important to note that
‘prominence’ will mean different things in different electoral contexts. The previous
chapter’s model, which generated predictions \( P1 \) and \( P2 \), applies to programmatic
electoral competition, i.e. competition whose outcome is dictated largely by voters’
spatial preferences for parties’ respective policy positions. As demonstrated in Chapter
2, closed-list proportional representation systems, as employed in Turkey, generate
programmatic competition as long as district magnitudes are sufficiently large. When the
latter criterion is not satisfied MP’s will in fact have every incentive to cultivate personal
relationships based on the provision of targeted goods and services to local constituents.
Consistent with this fact, in a handful of smaller Turkish districts located predominantly in the Kurdish Southeast or in the Black Sea region, voter choice continues to be influenced by the local reputation of individual legislators. In such districts, list leaders tend to be prominent local patrons whose family has a long history in local society and politics. Such list leaders are very different from list leaders in larger urban districts, whose prominence comes not from the provision of targeted goods and services but from long-standing affiliation to particular ideological currents in Turkish society (Chapter 4). Their incumbency, and more generally their position in the community, is dependent on access to a steady stream of fungible resources with which to maintain patronage relations. This quest for public resources will impel prominent MP’s from smaller electoral districts to make every effort at affiliating with an incumbent party, whose governmental status provides access to public resources.

What about rank and file MP’s, i.e. non-prominent MP’s who occupy parties’ lower tier list positions. Lacking the prominence of ideological personalities and local notables, prominence which nearly assures such MP’s safe list positions for whichever

---

6 This distinction, which is commonly made, was put succinctly by an archivist at the Turkish State Statistics Institute, where much of the data presented in Section V below was gathered. When I asked for his take on the phenomenon of party switching in the Turkish Parliament, he prefaced his answer with the following reply, translated from Turkish: “Turkey has two politics. In cities, voters look at party logos and party performance. If a party is corrupt, or if it does not make good policies, or if it makes policies they disagree with, they will choose against it. In small districts politics is still feudal. People look to see which party list their particular Ağa (loosely translated as local ‘headman’) is on, and vote for that list.”
party they join, these MP’s basic concern will be maximizing their possibility at re-election in the subsequent electoral round. Put otherwise, these low list position parliamentarians will be MP’s motivated by what Sayari referred to as the maximization of ‘renomination probabilities’ (see quote above). As noted in Section III, this quest for renomination to a reasonably safe list position may lead rank and file MP’s to any one of the switch types identified in Table 2, and their behavior should be less systematic.

Consider first this discussion’s implications for switching behavior as an aggregate phenomenon. High list MP’s in large switch so as to maximize the returns available from their status as prominent local or ideological figures. In small electoral districts this will involve pursuing incumbency for the sake of access to scarce public resources. In large urban electoral districts this will imply forming and/or joining new party organizations in open ideological space. On the other hand, low list MP’s switch for the sake of maximizing renomination probabilities. Taken together, these motivations imply the following curvilinear hypothesis as to the relationship between party switching and MP’s list position:

**H1:** The relationship between ELP and the likelihood of party switching will be *U-shaped*: the likelihood of switching will be higher among high list MP’s and low list MP’s than it will be among MP’s at intermediate list positions.

MP’s at intermediate list positions have neither the strong political reputations necessary for forming new parties or securing access to public resources. As well, they lack the intense re-election pressures of ‘marginal candidates’ whose weaker
organizational status puts in jeopardy their likelihood of being re-nominated. This is not the first U-shaped argument to be made in studies of Turkish legislative instability. Turan (ibid) argues that switching should be more likely in very large smaller districts, and less in intermediate districts:

“…a larger percentage of party changers who have enjoyed long tenure tend to come from the largest and the smallest provinces…. It appears that party changing for deputies who represent the smallest group of provinces is often an individual act. For deputies representing the largest provinces, on the other hand, party changing tends to be part of a group move.” (Turan ibid, pgs. 26-27)

The intuition driving this hypothesis makes sense: MP’s in smaller and more ‘personalistic’ districts will switch so as to maximize their individual access to public resources, while MP’s in larger urban districts will move as part of larger ideological shifts in the legislative balance of power. Indeed, this intuition is perfectly consistent with Chapter 2’s theoretical argument that politics in large CLPR districts will be ‘programmatic’ while that in smaller districts will tend to be more ‘candidate-centered’.

However, further reflection suggests that, while this intuition as to relationship between switching behavior and district size is cogent, it does not in fact lead naturally to the hypothesis that the likelihood of party switching should exhibit a U-shaped relationship with district magnitude. In intermediately sized districts, marginal MP’s at low list positions will have no less incentive to maximize their re-nomination probability; in fact, their incentive to switch may be greater in intermediately sized districts than in large districts due to the greater scarcity of seat scarcity in such districts:
where parties cannot count on winning a large slate of seats, higher list positions become an all the more valuable commodity. As well, list leaders in intermediately sized districts are no less prominent than their counterparts in larger and smaller districts. The difference is that this prominence is of mixed origin, i.e. contains both ‘personalistic’ and ‘ideological’ elements. Recall again the MOP’s current party leader Erkan Mumcu, who hails from Isparta, an intermediately-sized district (magnitude = 6) in Turkey’s Mediterranean region. Mumcu’s reputation contains both ideological and personalistic elements; he joined the JDP just preceding the 2002 general election with the promise that, in exchange for his affiliation, he would receive a Cabinet post. He eventually became the Minister of Tourism, only to leave the JDP midstream and become the MOP’s party leader. The decision to join the JDP was clearly motivated by the quest for incumbency characteristic of legislators with local patronage networks to maintain; switching to the MOP more clearly represents a switch designed to maximize Mumcu’s organizational status and prominence as an ideological personality.

In short, while the intuition driving Turan’s hypothesis makes sense, its empirical implication applies to the nature of party switching at varying district magnitudes, and not to the overall levels of party switching at varying district magnitude. I now use logistic regression analysis to confirm that a significant U-shaped relationship exists between the likelihood of switching and an MP’s list position (H1); and that no such relationship exists between the likelihood of switching and an MP’s district.
magnitude. To test for the presence of U-shaped relationships, I use the following regression model:

\[ p(y_i = 1) = \alpha + \beta \cdot x_i + \gamma \cdot x_i^2 + \zeta \cdot z_i + \epsilon_i \]  

Observations are indexed with the subscript ‘i’. The term \( \alpha \) represents a non-varying constant, the term \( \epsilon_i \) represents a random error term, and \( z_i \) represents a vector of control variables. The dependent variable will be SWITCH, such that the equations right-hand side represents the probability that an individual observation will engage in a party change. The variable \( x_i \) is the independent variable for which I wish to test a U-shaped hypothesis, which in this case will be effective list position (ELP) to test \( H_1 \) and the natural logarithm of an MP’s district magnitude (LOGMAG) to test Turan’s alternative U-shaped hypothesis. I use magnitude’s natural logarithm to eliminate perversities introduced by the presence a highly skewed distribution of district sizes: Turkey has a small number of very large districts and a large number of intermediately-sized to small electoral districts.

The variable \( x_i^2 \) is the squared dependent variable of interest (i.e. either ELP or LOGMAG). This quadratic term captures a U-shaped relationship as long as there exists some value \( x_L \) such that \( \beta + 2\gamma \cdot x_L < 0 \) and some distinct value \( x_H \) such that \( \beta + 2\gamma \cdot x_H > 0 \) (Lind and Mehlum 2007). In turn, the value \( x^* \) such that \( \beta + 2\gamma \cdot x^* = 0 \) is the value at which point the direction of the relationship shifts, i.e. the ‘base’ of the
hump. I include controls for the number of seats an MP’s party has in parliament (SEAT_NAT); the number of seats an MP’s party won in her particular district (SEAT_DIST); the district-level vote share an MP’s party received in the preceding election (VOTE_DIST); the effective number of parties in parliament for each legislative session (ENPP); and a dummy variable which equals ‘1’ for any MP coming from the Kurdish regions in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, due to the commonly held notion that party switching is particularly likely in these areas due the persistence of tribal structures and their accompanying personalism (ftn 7). Table 3 presents the results:
### Table 5.3: U-Shaped Hypotheses

| Variable   | $\beta$  | $P > |z|$  | Variable   | $\beta$  | $P > |z|$  |
|------------|----------|--------|------------|----------|--------|
| $\sigma = SE(z)$ |          |        | $\sigma = SE(z)$ |          |        |
| N=3,022    |          |        | N=3,022    |          |        |
| ELP        | -1.18    | .066 * | ELP        | -3.33    | .069 * |
|            | (.642)   |        |            | (.183)   |        |
| ELP_QUAD   | .769     | .172   | LOGMAG     | -.225    | .413   |
|            | (.563)   |        |            | (.274)   |        |
| LOGMAG     | .227     | .003 ***| MAG_QUAD   | -.002    | .966   |
|            | (.076)   |        |            | (.054)   |        |
| ENPP       | .324     | .000 ***| ENPP       | .325     | .000 ***|
|            | (.055)   |        |            | (.055)   |        |
| SEAT_DIST  | -.001    | .896   | SEAT_DIST  | -.001    | .938   |
|            | (.010)   |        |            | (.011)   |        |
| SEAT_NAT   | -.004    | .000 ***| SEAT_NAT   | -.004 ***| .000   |
|            | (.001)   |        |            | (.001)   |        |
| VOTE_DIST  | .024     | .000 ***| VOTE_DIST  | .023     | .000 ***|
|            | (.006)   |        |            | (.006)   |        |
| KURDISH    | .187     | .158   | KURDISH    | .185     | .165   |
|            | (.133)   |        |            | (.133)   |        |
| CONS       | -2.92    | .000 ***| CONS       | -3.01    | .000 ***|
|            | (.352)   |        |            | (.459)   |        |
The results provide fairly strong evidence for the existence of a U-shaped relationship between SWITCH and ELP, and no evidence at all for such a relationship in the case of LOGMAG. Although the variable ELP*ELP falls a bit short of standard significance levels, its coefficient size clearly outpaces the size of its standard error. The reason for the slight loss of statistical significance at the margins can be seen in the following figure, which plots the predicted probabilities that SWITCH = 1 at various levels of ELP and ELP*ELP, generated using the Clarify software to hold other variables at their mean and compute predicted probabilities as ELP and ELP*ELP increase.

![Figure 5.3: Probability Switch=1 at different values of ELP (x-axis)](image_url)

Figure 5.3: Probability Switch=1 at different values of ELP (x-axis)
This Figure exposes a U-shaped relationship in which the ‘base’ of the U is \( x^* = .773 \), which is located conveniently close to ELP’s sample mean of .783; and the effect is stronger at low values than a high values of ELP, thus generating the marginal loss of significance on the quadratic term. That said, the pattern is significantly U-shaped, and certainly much more so that the variables LOGMAG & LOGMAG*LOGMAG, which display neither the right signs nor anything approaching standard significance levels.

As for the control variables, note first that ENPP has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of switching in both regressions. While it is tempting to interpret this as evidence in favor of P1 and P2 above, recall that these predictions applied only to one form of switching, that to new party organizations in open ideological space. Furthermore, note that LOGMAG also has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of switching. However, this aggregate result may be blunting a more subtle set of effects which correspond to Chapter 2’s theoretical results that electoral competition will be programmatic at high district magnitudes and candidate-centered at low district magnitudes. The expected relationship between district magnitude and party switching is thus not monotonic; rather, magnitude should have varying consequences depending on the type of switching in question.

In effect, the understanding of legislative incentives which yielded H1 as an aggregate hypothesis also provides more specific hypotheses as to the relationship
district magnitude, the effective number of parliamentary parties, and the likelihood of engaging in the particular types of behavior which appear in Table:

**H2:** The effective number of parties (ENPP) should have a positive effect on the likelihood of switching to new parties in open ideological space.

**H3:** The natural logarithm of district magnitude (LOGMAG) should have a positive effect on the likelihood of switching to new parties in open ideological space.

To test **H2** and **H3** I generated the dummy variable ‘vote-seeking switch’ (VSE) which equals ‘1’ if an MP’s changes parties to a new party in open ideological space and ‘0’ otherwise. As well, I generated dummy variables for Table 1’s remaining switching behaviors: ‘organization enhancing switches’ (OES), ‘pseudo-entry’ (PE), and ‘myopic party switching’ (MPS). Tables 4 and 5 investigate the relationship between our variables of interest and the likelihood of engaging in each individual form of switching. The regression model is again logistic regression, and estimation procedure is identical to that presented in (2) above, minus the quadratic terms:
Table 5.4: ‘OPEN’ Party Switches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N=3,022 DEPVAR=VSE</th>
<th></th>
<th>N=3,022 DEPVAR=OES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$ ($\sigma = SE$)</td>
<td>$P&gt;</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELP</td>
<td>-.381 (.324)</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>ELP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGMAG</td>
<td>.361 (.112)</td>
<td>.001 ***</td>
<td>LOGMAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP</td>
<td>.764 (.096)</td>
<td>.000 ***</td>
<td>ENPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAT_DIST</td>
<td>-.010 (.016)</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>SEAT_DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAT_NAT</td>
<td>-.004 (.001)</td>
<td>.007 ***</td>
<td>SEAT_NAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOTE_DIST</td>
<td>.051 (.008)</td>
<td>.000 ***</td>
<td>VOTE_DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KURDISH</td>
<td>.394 (.193)</td>
<td>.041 **</td>
<td>KURDISH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONS</td>
<td>-7.27 (.608)</td>
<td>.000 ***</td>
<td>CONS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.5: ‘OCCUPIED’ Party Switches

|                  | N=3,022  | β         | P>|z|   | N=3,022  | β         | P>|z|   |
|------------------|----------|-----------|-------|----------|-----------|-------|
|                  | DEPVAR=PE| (σ = SE)  |       | DEPVAR=MPs| (σ = SE)  |       |
| ELP              | -.707     | .068 *    |       | ELP       | -.815     | .008 ***|
| (.387)           |          |           |       | (.306)    |           |       |
| LOGMAG           | .212      | .213      |       | LOGMAG    | -.262     | .073 ** |
| (.171)           |          |           |       | (.146)    |           |       |
| ENPP             | .183      | .144      |       | ENPP      | -.057     | .563   |
| (.126)           |          |           |       | (.098)    |           |       |
| SEAT_DIST        | .013      | .508      |       | SEAT_DIST | .041      | .017 **|
| (.020)           |          |           |       | (.017)    |           |       |
| SEAT_NAT         | -.005     | .018 **   |       | SEAT_NAT  | -.004     | .004 ***|
| (.002)           |          |           |       | (.002)    |           |       |
| VOTE_DIST        | .022      | .094 *    |       | VOTE_DIST | -.010     | .361   |
| (.013)           |          |           |       | (.001)    |           |       |
| KURDISH          | -.558     | .157      |       | KURDISH   | -.119     | .641   |
| (.394)           |          |           |       | (.219)    |           |       |
| CONS             | -4.09     | .000 ***  |       | CONS      | 1.20      | .040 **|
| (.769)           |          |           |       | (.585)    |           |       |

Table 4 contains the results for all switches to ‘open’ ideological spaces, i.e. for the dependent variables VSE and OES; Table 5 contains the results for all switches to ‘occupied’ ideological spaces, i.e. for the dependent variables PE and MPS. The first and most basic result to take away from Tables 4 and 5 is that the effective number of parliamentary parties ENPP has a strong and positive impact on the likelihood of engaging in
'vote-seeking entry', and has no substantively significant impact on any of the other forms of switching behavior. The provides substantial support for the basic hypothesis derived from last Chapter’s model (H2) that the entry of new parties into vacated ideological spaces will be positively correlated with the number of parliamentary parties. Furthermore, the fact that ENPP has no substantively significant impact on the other forms of switching confirms that the relationship between ENPP and VSE is not an artifact of the overall reduced levels of switching in parliamentary sessions 18 and 22, when the number of parliamentary parties was particularly low; rather, it demonstrates that the very lack of new party entry predicted by last chapter’s model is in fact driving the reduced party levels of party switching in these two low fragmentation cases.

The results also provide substantial support for H3: the likelihood of engaging in vote-seeking entry increases with district magnitude. In addition, district magnitude also has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of engaging in ‘organizing-enhancing switching’, i.e. switching to an old party in open ideological space. On the other hand, magnitude has no impact on the likelihood of engaging in ‘pseudo-entry’, and has a strong negative impact on the likelihood of engaging in myopic party switching (see below). One might note that, of all the switching categories studied in Tables 4 and 5, VSE is by far the most common, with a total of 286 observations where VSE = 1 as compared 110, 128, and 121 for OES, PE, and MPS respectively.
These Tables also contain a number of subsidiary results which are worthy of notice. Note first the strongly negative impact that SEAT_NAT has on the likelihood on all switching behaviors: regardless of the behavior in questions, MP’s from parties with large numbers of parliamentary seats are always less likely to defect than those from smaller parties. On the other hand, a party’s district-level vote share has a positive effect on the likelihood of switching in most circumstances, and never has a statistically significant negative effect. The contradictory effect of party’s parliamentary strength and its local electoral strength is suggestive of any number of motivational possibilities, and certainly suggests the fruitfulness of further theoretical investigation.

As well, note that the variable Kurdish only comes up in a statistically significant way twice: it has a positive impact on the likelihood of engaging in VSE (Table 4) and a positive impact on the likelihood of engaging in OPEN (Table 6). This is surprising, given the common both popular and academic assumption that Kurdish regions are particularly prone to switching due to the persistence of tribal social forms. The data turn up little relationship between the likelihood of hailing from Eastern or Southeastern Anatolia and the likelihood of engaging in switching behavior motivated by the short term pursuit of public resources: the coefficient on ‘KURDIST’ is insignificant in regressions with dependent variables MPS, OCCU, and OLD which contain the observations of switches to an incumbent party. In fact, hailing from the East only positively increases one’s likelihood of engaging in the very form of party switching

212
which Kurdish MP’s are not reputed for: those motivated by the desire to fill a vacant ideological space. I’ll have more to say about this in the subsequent chapter.

Of course, this is not to say that some locally prominent personalities in Kurdistan do not engage in myopic switching to incumbent parties; only that they are no more likely to than their than low district magnitude counterparts in other regions, i.e. that the relationship is not driven as much by the particular structures characteristic of Kurdish society as by the natural political incentives of prominent MP’s in small electoral districts. On this subject, note the result from Table 6 which establishes the negative impact of an MP’s list position on the likelihood of engaging in switches of a more ‘myopic’ variety (see also the results on OCCU and OLD in Tables 6 and 7 respectively). This may at first seem to contradict the notion that myopic switches should be especially likely among prominent (i.e. high list) MP’s in small districts. This somewhat surprising relationship may be confounded by the fact that high list MP’s in large electoral districts are especially unlikely to engage in myopic party switches. Indeed, these prominent ideological personalities do not need the spoils of incumbency to maintain their political reputation, which is not grounded in the provision of personalistic goods. Participation in government may actually be damaging to that ideological reputation, if the government in question produces public policies discordant with one’s ideological affiliation. Indeed, the entry of new political parties into the political arena often comes as a result of defection by prominent MP’s in high districts from an incumbent party.
Chapter 6. Conclusion

The previous chapters developed a series of game theoretic models whose objective was to better integrate analysis of political parties’ organizational competition into spatial and political-economic theories. Chapter 2 demonstrated that open-list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral rules which incorporate intra-preference voting generate both quantitatively higher and qualitatively distinct patterns of constituent accountability than both closed list proportional representation (CLPR) systems without preference voting and single-member district (SMD) systems. Counter to arguments which criticize such high accountability systems as inefficient and overly ‘personalistic’, the chapter demonstrates that open-list systems generate systematically less political corruption than their CLPR and SMD counterparts.

In systems without intensive constituent-legislator interaction, political competition will turn more on voters’ evaluations of political parties as organizations than the local reputation of individual political personalities, i.e. political party competition will become more ‘party-centered’. Chapter 3 models the process by which party organizations adopt campaign and governance platforms, arguing that such platforms emerge as a function of organizational competition between party leaders and party activists. The chapter demonstrates that activists will abdicate their organizational
responsibilities when the preferences of competing parties’ activists are highly polarized, and when the presence of ‘floating’ voters in the electorate is non-negligible.

In order for party leaders to credibly announce campaign platforms which deviate from one’s current cadre’s most-preferred policies, new social and political elements must be enticed to join a party’s organizational ranks. As such Chapter 4 argues that, in systems where party activists delegate the choice of electoral strategy-making to party leaders, this delegation comes by way of allowing party leaders centralized control over the size and scope of party selectorates. This relationship between organizational expansion and vote-seeking in the electorate then implies a series of constraints faced by party leaders in adopting vote-maximizing campaign strategies. Firstly, the act of introducing new elements into a party’s electorate is risky insofar as these new candidates and activists may with some probability mount a leadership challenge so as to place ‘one of their own’ in the party’s executive position. Secondly, as executive leaders incrementally shift their party’s platform away from status quo party position, they risk defection by marginal organizational elements alienated by their parties’ new policy stance and membership base. The chapter develops a model of the latter constraint which demonstrates, among other results, that organizational defection is more likely in multi-party systems than in two-party systems; and that legislative defection will be particularly unlikely in polarized two-party systems where two large parties adopt highly divergent policy stances.
Chapter 5 tests these and related hypotheses with a new data set on party switching in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). Party switching occurs when a legislative MP decides to change his or her organizational affiliation during the course of a Parliamentary session. Party switching in Turkey is a heterogeneous phenomenon; not all party changes represent those of the type molded in Chapter 4, i.e. switches by MP’s dissatisfied with their party’s positioning in ideological space. Indeed, the theoretical results presented in Chapter 2 provide a distinct set of hypotheses as to the conditions under which MP’s will defect to the current incumbent party so as to enjoy the benefits of office; and the conditions under which rank and file MP’s will switch to new parties in exchange for the promise of ‘high list positions’ in subsequent electoral rounds. The data allows me to differentiate between the various forms of party switching which occur in the TGNA, and also between the TGNA’s various legislative ‘types’. Statistical analysis confirms Chapter 4’s hypothesis that the likelihood of ideological defection by prominent MP’s to new party organizations is positively correlated to the number of Parliamentary parties. It also confirms theoretical predictions as to the strategic conditions under which MP’s will join incumbent parties and/or change parties so as to maximize their effective list position in the coming election. In the TGNA, an MP’s ‘type’ thus conditions the nature of his or her switching options in accordance with theoretical predictions.
The introductory chapter motivated the summarized findings by pointing to the recurring and correlated periods of two-party competition and political conflict in Turkey, this despite Turkey’s use of proportional representation as an electoral system, which is often understood to generate both multi-party competition and civil order. The theoretical arguments developed in Chapter 4 serve as the key bridge between the dissertation’s analysis of intra-organizational dynamics and outbreaks of political conflict. Political conflict in CLPR systems with centralized political parties emerges as a function of party leaders’ efforts to simultaneously maximize their party’s vote share and its organizational discipline. These efforts lead eventually to the creation of ‘polarized’ and ‘polarizing’ political situations in which outbreaks of political conflict are a perpetual threat. In turn, in order to identify the institutions most suited to generating civil order in conflictual societies, we must identify institutions which change the calculus which party leaders bring to bear in electoral competition.

Implicit in this fact is a distinction between the purely office-seeking utility function attributed to leaders of party organizations and the ‘party activist’ and ‘ideology leader’ utility functions presented in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, which include both ‘office’ and ‘policy’ components. In a sense this distinction serves as a theoretical operationalization of the axiom that ‘organizational power corrupts, and absolute organizational power corrupts absolutely’. Moving from party activists, through prominent MP’s with ideological reputations, to a party’s executive leaders, the
utility functions I employ become steadily more influenced by considerations of personal organizational hegemony and electoral incumbency rather than by considerations of ‘policy’ or ‘representation’, where the latter denotes the desire to provide voice to certain attitudes and preferences in the public sphere (see Chapter 3).

Detailed analysis of intra-organizational competition in Turkey suggests the viability of such a motivating axiom. While party leaders exhibit highly opportunistic motivations, the decision of potential party leaders (i.e. ideology leaders) to defect or not from their current organizations exhibits both ‘opportunistic’ and ‘sincere’ motivations. The intermingling of representational, policy-based, and office-based motivations is highlighted in unpublished manuscripts by Sayarı (1975) and Bektaş (1988), as well as by my own field interviews with recent defectors from prominent political parties. In fact, one of the dissertation’s basic conceptual contributions is to flesh out the crucial linkage between ‘ideological’ and ‘material’ considerations in the calculus of party activists and party MP’s: decisions on matters of ideological platforms bear a direct relation to the distribution of a party organization’s material and professional resources. As such, the notion of a ‘hierarchical’ distribution of utility functions may be intrinsic to the distinctions in organizational status between activists, MP’s, and executive leaders. All theoretical research must start and end at well defined points; an integral part of any modeling process is deciding on the relevant ‘line in the sand’ between assumption and analysis. The theoretical research in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 begins the process of
endogenizing organizational motivations based on an implicit distribution of utility functions for activists, MP’s, and party leaders. In future research I hope to endogenize these individual actors’ utility functions.

The first step in establishing the causal status of centralized political party organizations in generating cyclical democratic instability in the Turkish 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Republics is establishing that Turkish party leaders do indeed pursue a balance between vote maximizing and discipline maximizing campaign strategies. To this end, I will mobilize information from a variety of both secondary and primary sources to demonstrate that party leaders in Turkey are first and foremost concerned with establishing organizational hegemony on ‘their side’ of the political spectrum. This involves keeping marginal elements inside their own organizations at bay as well as taking measures against competing organizations of the same ideological persuasions. Put succinctly, during periods of multi-party competition party leaders’ primary interest is not in the electoral success or failure of party’s of competing ideological persuasion; but in competition with their ideological compatriots for preeminent status over their particular range of the popular preference distribution.

Indeed, party leaders in Turkey have often adopted electoral strategies designed to neutralize the electoral potential of ‘intra-ideological’ competitors, even at risk of handing the reigns of government to a single-party of competing ideological persuasion. This choice was made by Bulent Ecevit in the late 1960’s, who devised a ‘left of center’
electoral strategy for the 1969 election which simultaneously reduced the Republican People’s Party (RPP) vote share in the general election but solidified Ecevit’s pre-eminent position on the ideological left against both internal rivals and the newly formed Turkish Workers Party (TWP). A similar choice seems to have been made by Deniz Baykal more recently, who as leader of today’s RPP was fairly complicit in handing the sole reigns of government to the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the 2002 election. Note the distinction between the preferences of party leaders currently at the helm of centralized organizations and the ‘ideology leaders’ whose behavior was modeled in Chapter 4. Ideology leaders can be dissuaded from organizational defection when they fear that said defection will lead to the formation of a single-party government of competing ideological persuasion. On the other hand, party leaders are often tacitly complicit in granting the reigns of government to a party of competing ideological persuasion, when such actions allow them to establish hegemony control over their own ‘side’ of the salient ideological divide.

Further anecdotal support for the above argument comes from the behavior of party leaders in coalition governments. Although coalition governments occur in Turkey, they rarely result from the fact that party leaders play ‘coalition strategies’. Conversely, although coalition governments arise in Turkish politics, they are infamously unstable, in no small part due to the possibility of single-party governance. Indeed, during the 1960’s and 1970’s Süleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit, pre-eminent leaders of the
political ‘right’ and political ‘left’ respectively, either withdrew from or annulled coalition governments in which they were the most prominent party due to their belief that electoral support sufficient for the establishment of a single-party executive monopoly was within reach.

These behavioral patterns are strongly reminiscent of those formalized Chapter 4. Party leaders in Turkey balance vote maximizing strategies whose aim is to secure single party governments with discipline maximizing strategies designed to safeguard organizational prerogatives. Here it is helpful to remember that all of this arises as a function of CLPR competition in high responsiveness electoral environments. The possibility of establishing single-party governments arises only when party leaders are free to adopt the required vote maximizing electoral strategies; in turn this strategic flexibility arises when an electorate has sufficient floating voters. Ultimately, the strategic freedom of party leaders in volatile electoral markets, and their need to exercise this freedom in such a way as to minimize its organizational costs, is at the root of Turkey’s cyclical democratic instability.

As demonstrated in the dissertation’s very first figure, the electioneering characteristic of high responsiveness environments tends eventually to end in the emergence of two pre-eminent parliamentary organizations whose MP’s monopolize power in the Legislature. In fact, this party system concentration emerges in no small part due to either explicitly or tacitly cooperative behavior by two party leaders from
competing sides of the political spectrum. Indeed, as was demonstrated formally in Chapter 4, the ability to secure hegemony over one’s own side of the political spectrum is fundamentally influenced by presence of a single-party in the opposing ideological camp. The shared incentives this provides party leaders from competing in ideological camps often leads to fairly explicit collaboration. This occurred in 1969, when Ecevit and Demirel together passed a parliamentary motion which eliminated the ‘national tier’ of electoral seats, thus effectively excluding smaller parties from the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). It surfaced again in 2002 when Deniz Baykal and JDP leader Tayı̈p Erdoğan together supported the maintenance of a 10% national threshold for entry into the TGNA despite wide ranging criticism of its ‘anti-democratic’ nature.

Beyond cooperation over institutional details, party leaders from opposing camps also have shared incentives when it comes to political polarizations. Again referring back to the theoretical results derived in Chapter 4, the success of polarization as a tool for organizational hegemony on one’s own side of the political spectrum is in fact dependent on the presence of a dominant and polarized party in the opposing political camp. Party leaders thus have the incentive to focus political competition on polarizing issues, whether the left-right divide which structure elections in the 2nd Republic (1961-1980) or today’s divide over secularism and the proper boundaries between the laws of state and the tenets of Islam. This ‘priming’ of polarizing cleavages is again an at least tacitly cooperative venture between leaders of opposing camps.
seeking issues which most easily allow for the simultaneous maximization of votes and party discipline.

Although party leaders have no \textit{a priori} inclination towards the generation of civil conflict, ultimately their utility maximizing incentives generate an environment in which conflict and violence is a likely outcome. As I’ve demonstrated formally in previous research (Kselman 2008), once a party system becomes concentrated around two large and polarized political party organizations, they risk being hijacked by radical elements that then turn a ‘dispersed’ party system into a ‘centrifugal’ party system. A centrifugal part system is defined by the fact that its political party organizations are not only distant from one another in policy space, but in a dynamic sense become \textit{increasingly so with each electoral round}. This self-perpetuating extremism arises when radical elements inside each party take actions designed to establish and/or reinforce one another’s organizational ascendancy inside their respective political parties. It is the behavior of newly empowered radical elements which constituted the most immediate cause of political violence in the late 1960’s and late 1970’s, and this same behavior which showed dangerous signs of resurfac ing in the increasingly polarized environment which emerged between 2002 and 2007.

Before turning to a more detailed discussion of this latter period, note that the basic framework used here to explain organizational and political competition provides explanations for a number of the more enigmatic, complex, and even conspiratorial
elements of Turkish political life. When compared with their earlier periods of both tacit and explicit strategic cooperation, the extreme and at times downright strange vitriol which characterized Ecevit and Demirel’s relationship constitutes a puzzle for both historians and everyday observers of Turkish politics. The framework described above suggests that these seemingly contradictory behaviors in fact correspond to two distinct phases of the above theoretical framework, the first collusive and the second conflictual.

Similarly, the oft-noted cooperation between radical elements on competing sides of the political spectrum is generally attributed to the presence of a ‘deep state’ in which elite criminal, military, and political elements collude with one another over the contours of Turkish political, social, and economic life. The above framework provides a fairly natural mechanism for generating this seemingly ‘conspiratorial’ phenomenon, namely the fact that radicalism on one side of the political spectrum tends to reinforce the strength of radicals from the opposing camp.

As a final step in this qualitative analysis, and an interesting post-script to my field work which was undertaken between February 2007 and August 2008, Turkish politics has over the past 6 months made important strides towards a non-conflictual end to the most recent phase of political polarization. Despite generating large scale street protests and hints of military intervention by pro-secularist elements, the recent political escalation over the place of Islam in Turkish public life was resolved with very little violence and without military interference. In no small part, this was due to the
restraint displayed by JDP officials and organizational members. Rather than engaging in polarizing strategies, JDP leaders went out of their way to place ‘centrist looking’ candidates on their electoral lists.

Perhaps more surprising than the strategy of moderation was the fairly muted reaction it provoked from more conservative elements inside the party’s organizational ranks. I interviewed on a number of occasions one such more conservative member, a prominent organizational personality from Istanbul’s 3rd electoral precinct. Despite having received the highest level of rank and file support of all potential JDP candidates from the precinct, national party leaders removed the official in question from the party’s electoral list in favor of a more ‘centrist’ candidate. Despite visible disappointment, both the individual in question and the larger activist cadre in Istanbul accepted the choice as a matter of national prerogative.

This suggests the following question, to be monitored in the upcoming months and years: has the JDP developed an organizational model which defies the above posited role of polarization in inducing party discipline? Is it the JDP’s particular organizational foundation which allows it to adopt moderate policies without witnessing wide scale defection by more radical elements? Or alternatively, will the threat of such defection eventually push JDP leaders to engage in more traditionally polarizing strategies. As demonstrated in the above anecdote, the JDP certainly does not defy the Turkish common denominator when it comes to organizational centralization; this and other
data and qualitative experiences point to a patently centralized control over candidate and platform selection. Indeed, I spent the very day on which Abdullah Gül was nominated as the party’s Presidential candidate in the JDP’s Beşiktaş neighborhood district headquarters. The choice was clearly ‘news’ to the activists with whom I spoke. After the 2004 local elections, Erdoğan himself also effectively shut down the JDP’s regional organizations in 10 regions where he felt insecure about their organizational loyalties. It is my inclination to believe that, ultimately, the presence of organizational centralization in CLPR environments will lead party leaders into the vote-seeking discipline-seeking trap noted above. This would suggest that eventually the JDP will face organizational challenges, whether internal or external, which will impel its leaders to engage in the ‘polarization for discipline’ tradeoff characteristic of centralized political parties. The to the extent that the unique nature of Islamic social networks, and more generally the flexibility of political Islam as a ‘cultural idiom’ (Yavuz 2003), resolves this dilemma, this in fact constitutes a very interesting exception to the rule linking organizational centralization, ideological polarization, and party discipline in highly responsive electoral environments.
A1. Chapter 2 Appendices

Appendix A: Regional Vote Shares

*Lemma 1:* Party $A$’s vote share in a region where the incumbent is from $A$ is equal to:

$$V_j^A(\cdot) = \begin{cases} 
[f_j^A + \overline{\sigma}_j] & \text{if } f_j^A \leq 1 - \overline{\sigma}_j \\
1 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}. \quad \text{(A1)}$$

*Proof:* In a region $j$ whose current incumbent is from $A$, define $\sigma_s^A(f_j^A)$ as the swing voter in region $j$, i.e., the voter whose utility exactly reaches the reservation level needed to choose re-election given allocation $f_j^A$. In other words,

$$u_{s,j}^A = \sigma_s(\cdot) + f_j^A = \mu. \quad \text{(A2)}$$

*The utility of voters in region $j$ with $\sigma_i > \sigma_s$ will thus surpass the reservation level, and they will vote for the regional incumbent. As demonstrated visually in Figure 1, the following captures the portion of voters from $j$ for whom $\sigma_i > \sigma_s$:

$$V_j^A(f_j^A) = \frac{\overline{\sigma}_j - \sigma_s(\cdot)}{\overline{\sigma}_j - \sigma_j}. \quad \text{(A3)}$$

*Recalling that $\mu = 0$ by construction, and substituting into A2 using A1 and the assumption that $\overline{\sigma}_j - \sigma_j = 1$, we obtain the following expression:

$$V_j^A(\cdot) = [\overline{\sigma}_j + f_j^A]. \quad \text{(A4)}$$

*Since $V_j^A(\cdot)$ cannot be greater than 1, any value of $f_j^A$ such that (A3) is greater than 1 implies a vote share 1, implying (A1). \hfill \blacksquare$

*An identical process yields $B$’s vote share in a region whose current incumbent is from $B$:

$$V_j^B(\cdot) = \begin{cases} 
[f_j^B - \overline{\sigma}_j] & \text{if } f_j^B \leq 1 + \overline{\sigma}_j \\
1 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}. \quad \text{(A5)}$$
Appendix B: the CLPR Nash Equilibrium

A.) Theorem 1: Proof of Existence

* Begin by proving the Theorem under the assumption that all incumbents assume higher list positions than challenger candidates. Naturally, none of the incumbents from $P^+$ defect from $f^*$ in Theorem 1, as they secure re-election costlessly on the basis of loyalist support alone. The same is true of the top $S$ incumbents from $P^-$. 

* The marginal incumbent needs her party’s aggregate vote share to reach the following level in order to gain an additional legislative seat:

$$\left(\frac{S}{M}\right) + \left(\frac{1}{2M}\right) + \varepsilon, \ (\varepsilon \to 0).$$  \hspace{1cm} \text{(B1)}

* At this level, her party’s remainder just outpaces that of the opposing party, thus securing $P^-$ an additional seat. Define $P^-$ as the number of current seats held by $P^-$. As well, define $A(f^o)$ as the aggregate vote share received by $P^-$ at the full-shirking vector. Finally, define $\lambda_{S+1}$ as the number of loyalists in the marginal incumbent’s region.

* If $A(f^o) + [1 - \lambda_{S+1}] < (B1)$, then there are not enough undecided voters in the marginal incumbent’s region to secure $P^-$ an additional legislative seat, so the marginal incumbent has no incentive to defect from $f^o$.

* When $A(f^o) + [1 - \lambda_{S+1}] > (B1)$ we can define $\hat{f}_{S+1}$ as the constituency service necessary to push $P^-$’s vote total to (B1). In such cases, the marginal incumbent will defect from $f^o$ and choose $\hat{f}_{S+1}$ as long as $\hat{f}_{S+1} < \beta$. Otherwise she will have no incentive to defect from $f^o$.

* The final step in proving Existence is demonstrating that none of $P^-$’s candidates at list positions lower than $S+1$ wish to defect. The following expression captures the aggregate vote share $P^-$ needs to gain $S+2$ legislative seats:

$$\left(\frac{S}{M}\right) + \left(\frac{3}{2M}\right) + \varepsilon, \ (\varepsilon \to 0).$$  \hspace{1cm} \text{(B2)}

* Define $\lambda_{S+2}$ as the number of party loyalists in incumbent $S+2$’s region. Regardless of the marginal candidate’s choice $f^*_{S+1} \in \{0, \hat{f}_{S+1}\}$, it is straight-forward to show (algebra omitted) that the aggregate vote share at the vector presented in Theorem 1 will not be high enough for incumbent $S+2$ to secure an additional seat, even if she wins the support of every voter in her district: $A(f^*) + [1 - \lambda_{S+2}] < (B2)$. Why? Any ‘vote surplus’ remaining after $P^-$ receives its $S$ safe seats is usurped by
the marginal candidate, such that there will not be enough floating voters in candidate $S+2$'s region to secure an additional electoral quota, and deviating is not optimal. This in turn implies the identical condition for candidates $S+3$, $S+4$, and so on. As such, no candidate higher than $S+1$ ever wishes to defect from $\mathbf{r}^*$ as stipulated in Theorem 1. ■

B.) \textbf{Theorem 1: Proof of Uniqueness}

\textbf{Lemma 2:} Any policy vector $\mathbf{f}$ in which at least one incumbent sets $f_j^P > 0$ but \textit{does not} gain reelection is \textit{not} a Nash Equilibrium (henceforth NE).

If $f_j^P > 0$ but the incumbent in question does not secure reelection, then she has the incentive to deviate by either: a.) increasing $f_j^P$ so as to secure her party an additional legislative seat; or b.) decreasing $f_j^P$ to 0 so as to gain utility $r_j^P = 1$.

Consider a strategy vector in which some number $N \geq 2$ incumbents from $P^-$ choose $f_j^{P^-} > 0$. At any such vector either: a.) all $N$ gain re-election; or b.) at least one of the $N$ does not gain re-election. If (a), then those incumbents from among the $N$ with higher list positions can defect by decreasing $f_j^{P^-}$ without losing re-election: they can free-ride on the constituency mobilization of those among the $N$ at lower positions. If (b), at least one incumbent has the incentive to defect by Lemma 1. As such, no strategy vector in which $N \geq 2$ incumbents from $P^-$ choose $f_j^{P^-} > 0$ can be a NE.

Among incumbents from $P^+$, choosing $f_j^{P^+} > 0$ is necessary for re-election \textit{if and only if} some fixed number $N \geq 2$ incumbents from $P^-$ choose $f_j^{P^-} > 0$, since by definition all incumbents from $P^+$ are re-elected when $N \leq 2$ incumbents from $P^-$ choose $f_j^{P^-} > 0$. But since we know that no strategy vector at which $N \geq 2$ incumbents from $P^-$ choose $f_j^{P^-} > 0$ can be a NE, no strategy vector at which incumbents from $P^+$ choose $f_j^{P^+} > 0$ can be a NE.

As such, in equilibrium only one incumbent from $P^-$ ever chooses $f_j^{P^-} > 0$. This will never be an incumbent at list position $Q < S+1$: they receive safe seats due to the fact that $f_j^{P^+} = 0$ for all incumbents from $P^+$. As well, this will never be an incumbent at list position $Q > S+1$: they would be choosing $f_j^{P^-} > 0$ without gaining re-election, which is ruled out by Lemma 1. ■
Appendix C: Nash Equilibria under OLPR

A.) OLPR in Electorates with High Levels of Party Loyalty

Appendix C assumes that candidate vote ties between incumbents and challengers are broken in favor of incumbents to eliminate the open-set problem which supervenes when actors can make infinitesimal moves. Without this assumption, the Nash Equilibrium results which follow in fact become quasi-equilibrium, which obey identical theoretical properties but are characterized by convergence rather than static choice.

* Proposition 1: When \( \lambda \geq \left\{ 1 - \frac{1}{2 \cdot (2 P_{MA} - M)} \right\} \), the full-shirking vector \( f^o \) is the OLPR game’s unique NE.

* Proof: When \( f^o \) is played the majority party receives an aggregate vote share of

\[
\left\{ (P_{MA} \cdot \lambda) + (P_{MJ} \cdot (1 - \lambda)) \right\} / M.
\]

(C1)

* As well, by the quota and remainder rule specified above the majority party needs the following aggregate vote share to win back all \( P_{MA} \) of its current seats:

\[
(P_{MA} / M) - (1 / 2M).
\]

(C2)

* By setting these aggregate vote shares equal to one another and solving for \( \lambda \) we obtain the expression in Proposition 1, the level of loyalists at or above which the majority party wins back all of its seats even if \( f^o \) is played. As long as \( \lambda \) reaches this level, at \( f^o \) both the majority and minority parties win \( P_{MA} \) and \( P_{MJ} \) seats respectively, and these seats are allocated to the parties’ incumbent candidates rather than their challengers due to the incumbents’ higher candidate vote percentages. As such, no incumbent wishes to deviate (Existence). As well, at any other vector at least one incumbent devotes more effort to \( f_j^p \) than necessary for re-election, and thus deviates (Uniqueness). ■

* As an example of Proposition 1, consider a case in which \( A \) and \( B \) have 6 and 4 seats respectively and \( \lambda = 3 / 5 \). When \( f^o \) is played party \( A \) receives an aggregate vote share of \( \{3 / 5 \cdot (6) + 2 / 5 \cdot (4)\} / 10 \) = 60\%, \( B \) receives the remaining 40\%, and they win 6 and 4 seats respectively. Furthermore, these seats are allocated to the parties’ respective incumbent candidates: since \( V_j^p (\cdot) = 3 / 5 \) and \( 1 - V_j^p (\cdot) = 2 / 5 \) in all regions, all incumbents receive more candidate votes than their parties’ challengers. As a result, when levels of party loyalty are sufficiently high the full-shirking vector \( f^o \) is the OLPR game’s Nash Equilibrium.
* If \(1 - [(\bar{P}^{MA} - \frac{\lambda}{M})/M] \geq \lambda > 1 - [1/(2 \cdot (2\bar{P}^{MA} - M))]\), then when \(f^o\) is played the minority party but not the majority wins all of its current seats back. By subtracting \((C1)\) from \((C2)\) we obtain the additional aggregate vote share the majority party would require to regain all of its seats:

\[
\frac{[(2\bar{P}^{MA} - M) \cdot (1 - \lambda)] - 1/2}{M}.
\]

(C3)

* Define \(\hat{f}^{MA}\) as the value of constituency effort such that, as long all minority party incumbents choose \(f^{MI} = 0\), when all majority party incumbents choose \(\hat{f}^{MA}\) the majority party will secure exactly the aggregate vote share \((C3)\). Put otherwise, as long as minority party incumbents choose \(f^{MI} = 0\), when all majority party incumbents choose \(\hat{f}^{MA}\) they divide evenly the cost of re-electing the entire party. It is then straight-forward to see that \(\hat{f}^{MA} = \frac{[(2\bar{P}^{MA} - M) \cdot (1 - \lambda)] - 1/2}{\bar{P}^{MA}}\).

* Proposition 2: When \(1 - [(\bar{P}^{MA} - \frac{\lambda}{M})/M] \geq \lambda > 1 - [1/(2 \cdot (2\bar{P}^{MA} - M))]\) and \(\hat{f}^{MA} > \beta\), in the OLPR game’s unique NE all majority party incumbents choose \(f^{*MA} = \hat{f}^{MA}\) and all minority party incumbents choose \(f^{*MI} = 0\).

* Proof: When majority party incumbents choose \(\hat{f}^{MA}\), majority and minority parties win \(\bar{P}^{MA}\) and \(\bar{P}^{MI}\) seats respectively, and these seats are allocated to the parties’ incumbent candidates rather than their challengers due to the incumbents’ higher candidate vote percentages. As long as \(\hat{f}^{MA} > \beta\), no incumbent wishes to deviate (Existence). Furthermore, at any other strategy vector at least one incumbent either: a.) devotes more effort to \(f^p_j\) than is necessary to secure re-election; or b.) sets \(f^p_j > 0\) without winning re-election. In either case at least one incumbent has the incentive to defect (Uniqueness).

* Now, define \(P^{MA}(f^o)\) as the number of seats gained by the current majority party if the full-shirking vector is played.

* Proposition 2b: If \(1 - [(\bar{P}^{MA} - \frac{\lambda}{M})/M] \geq \lambda > [(2\bar{P}^{MA} - 1)/2M]\) but \(\hat{f}^{MA} < \beta\), in the OLPR game’s NE a subset of size \(P^{MA}(f^o) + K < \bar{P}^{MA}\) majority party incumbents choose \(f^{*MA} = \beta\); the remaining choose \(f^{*MA} = 0\), and all minority party incumbents choose \(f^{*MI} = 0\). The size of \(K\) depends on the particular values of \(\lambda\) and \(\beta\).
* In Proposition 2b, those majority incumbents who choose $f^{*MA} = \beta$ ($f^{*MA} = 0$) are (are not) re-elected, while all minority party incumbents are re-elected. As well, all majority party incumbents are indifferent as to whether they are or not in the subset of re-elected incumbents: the NE is in weakly-dominant strategies (full proof omitted, see Kselman 2007).

B.) Theorem 2: Proofs of Sufficiency and Necessity

* When $\lambda < 1 - [(P^{MA} - \frac{1}{2}) / M]$ , if the strategy vector $f^*$ is played neither the majority party nor the minority party will have all of its current incumbents re-elected. For example, consider the case in which parties $A$ and $B$ have 6 and 4 current incumbents respectively, and let $\lambda = 1/3$. If $f^*$ is played, $A$'s aggregate vote share is $\{\frac{1}{3}(6) + \frac{2}{3}(4)\} / 10 = 46 \frac{2}{3}$ %, and $B$'s aggregate vote share is in turn $53 \frac{1}{3}$ %. This implies that $A$ and $B$ each receive 5 seats. Furthermore, legislative seats are allocated almost exclusively to challenger rather than incumbent candidates: at $f^*$ all incumbents choose $f_j^P = 0$ and receive only $V_j^P(\cdot) = 1/3$ preference votes, while all challengers receive $1 - V_j^P(\cdot) = 2/3$ candidate votes. Since challengers receive more candidate votes than incumbents, in the OLR game’s final stage the 5 seats $B$ receives will be allocated to 5 of the 6 challengers from party $B$, and the 5 seats $A$ receives will be allocated to the 4 challengers from party $A$ and one of $A$’s incumbent candidates.

* $f^*$ will thus not be a Nash Equilibrium. For example, given that each of $A$’s incumbents receives the same number of candidate votes when $f^*$ is played, any one of $A$’s 6 incumbents could then choose $f_j^A = \varepsilon$ ($\varepsilon \to 0$), increase her candidate vote total to just above that received by her fellow incumbents, and gain this individual seat with certainty. In turn, another of $A$’s incumbents could choose $f_j^A = \varepsilon'$ ($\varepsilon' > \varepsilon$) and herself gain the seat. But then a 3rd incumbent could do the same, and so on. Thus, the 6 incumbents from $A$ will jockey among themselves over the single legislative seat not allocated to $A$’s challengers. The following proofs of necessity and sufficiency demonstrate that, as long as the conditions specified in Theorem 2 are met, this vote jockeying continues until a MARNE is reached.

* Sufficiency: when $\lambda < 1 - [(P^{MA} - \frac{1}{2}) / M]$ and $(\beta + \lambda) > [(2P^{MA} - 1) / 2M]$ , no incumbent has the incentive to deviate from any strategy vector $f^*$ which satisfies (a), (b), and (c). All incumbents at any such strategy vector receive exactly as many candidate votes as their parties’ challengers and gain re-election, so choosing a greater level of $f_j^P$ represents an unnecessary diversion of effort from $r_j^P$, and is thus a strictly dominated strategy. Furthermore, choosing any level of $f_j^P$ lower than that stipulated by $f^*$ would drop the defecting incumbent’s candidate vote total below that of his or her party’s challengers, costing the incumbent in question re-election. $(\beta + \lambda) > [(2P^{MA} - 1) / 2M]$ guarantees that such a defection is not optimal.
* **Necessity:** At any vector which does not satisfy conditions (a), (b), and (c) at least one incumbent either: a.) devotes more effort to $f_j^P$ than is necessary to secure re-election; or b.) sets $f_j^P > 0$ without winning re-election. In either case at least one incumbent has the incentive to defect (Necessity).

* When $\lambda < 1 - [(\overline{P}^{MA} - \frac{1}{2}) / M]$ and $(\beta + \lambda) > 1/2$ but $(\beta + \lambda) \leq [(2\overline{P}^{MA} - 1) / 2M]$, the outcome becomes a quasi-MARNE.

* **Proposition 3:** When $\lambda < 1/2$ and $1/2 < (\beta + \lambda) \leq [(2\overline{P}^{MA} - 1) / 2M]$, in the OLPR game’s NE some subset of majority party incumbents choose $f^{*MA} = \beta$, the remaining choose $f^{*MA} = 0$, and all minority party incumbents choose $f^{*MI} = [1 - (\lambda + \beta)]$.

* In Proposition 3, those majority incumbents who choose $f^{*MA} = \beta$ ($f^{*MA} = 0$) are (are not) re-elected, while all minority party incumbents are re-elected. As well, all majority party incumbents are indifferent as to whether or not they are re-elected: the NE is in weakly-dominant strategies (full proof omitted, see Kselman 2007).

**C.) OLPR Equilibria when Incumbents Attribute Little Value to Re-election**

* Propositions 4 and 5 demonstrate that constituency service incentives begin to dissipate when incumbents attach little value to gaining re-election.

* **Proposition 4:** If $(\beta + \lambda) < 1/2$ and $\lambda \geq 1/[2 \cdot (2\overline{P}^{MA} - M)]$ in the OLPR game’s NE a subset of size $[P^{MA}(f^o) + K] < \overline{P}^{MA}$ majority party incumbents choose $f^{*MA} = \beta$, the remaining choose $f^{*MA} = 0$, and all minority party incumbents choose $f^{*MI} = 0$. The size of $K$ depends on the particular values of $\lambda$ and $\beta$.

* In Proposition 4, those majority incumbents who choose $f^{*MA} = \beta$ ($f^{*MA} = 0$) are (are not) re-elected, while all minority party incumbents are re-elected. As well, all majority party incumbents are indifferent as to whether they are or not in the subset of re-elected incumbents: the NE is in weakly-dominant strategies (full proof omitted, see Kselman 2007).
**Proposition 5:** If \((\beta + \lambda) < 1/2\) and \(\lambda < 1/[2 \cdot (2\bar{P}^{MA} - M)]\), then the full-shirking vector \(f^o\) is the OLPR game’s NE.

**Proof:** When \((\beta + \lambda) < 1/2\) and \(\lambda < 1/[2 \cdot (2\bar{P}^{MA} - M)]\), then if \(f^o\) is played the current minority (majority) party wins \(\bar{P}^{MA}\) \((\bar{P}^{MI})\) seats, all seats are allocated to challenger candidates, and the value of \(\beta\) is not high enough to provide incumbents the incentive to deviate (Existence). Furthermore, since no incumbent from either party will ever have the incentive to expend the constituency effort so as to receive \(V_j() = 1/2\) in their respective districts, no incumbent ever finds it worthwhile to exert the effort \(f^p_j\) needed to secure higher candidate vote totals than her party’s challengers (Uniqueness). ■

**Proposition 4b:** When \(\beta < (1/2 - \lambda)\) and \(\lambda > 1/[2 \cdot (2\bar{P}^{MA} - M)]\) then in the OLPR game’s NE then a subset of size \([\bar{P}^{MA} - M / 2]\) incumbents from the current majority party chooses \(f^{*MA} = \beta\), and all other incumbents choose \(f^{*MA} = f^{*MI} = 0\).

* In Proposition 4b, those majority incumbents who choose \(f^{*MA} = \beta\) \((f^{*MA} = 0)\) are (are not) re-elected, while all minority party incumbents are not re-elected. As well, all majority party incumbents are indifferent as to whether or not they are re-elected: the NE is in weakly-dominant strategies (proof omitted, see Kselman 2007)
Appendix D: Data Definition and Sources

- OPEN: dummy gathered for the year 1997, and coded ‘1’ if voters may cast a choice among candidates of the same party and ‘0’ otherwise. A small number of mixed cases take values between 0 and 1. I gathered this data from a variety of text and internet resources, including but not exclusive to the data base at www.electionresources.org, and the data Appendix in Cox (1997).

- MAJ: electoral systems dummy gathered for 1997, and coded ‘1’ for any plurality based system and ‘0’ for all proportional systems, with some mixed cases falling between 0 and 1; gathered using the resources listed above for OPEN.

- WTDMAG: electoral systems variable gathered for 1997 taking into account the multi-tiered structure of a subset of cases (see text for details). In addition to the resources listed above, I use Matt Golder’s recent and extensive data set (2004) and Blais and Massicotte’s (...) piece on mixed electoral systems to compile this variable.

- CLEAN: variable which goes from 1 to 10, with high values representing less corrupt government. As discussed in the text, the raw data comes from the World Bank’s governance indicators database.

- AVELF: index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization originally developed by La Porta et al. (1999), which averages 5 different heterogeneity indices (taken from Persson and Tabellini’s publicly available data set: http://www-2.iies.su.se/~perssont/data.htm).

- COL_UK: dummy variable coded ‘1’ if the case has a legacy of British colonial heritage.

- LAAM: dummy variable coded ‘1’ if the case is a Latin American country.

- OECD: dummy variable coded ‘1’ if the case is a member of the OECD.

- DEM_YEARS: the number of years a country has been democratic, computed by subtracting the year of birth of democratic competition (Persson and Tabellini: http://www-2.iies.su.se/~perssont/data.htm) from the year 1998.

- FEDERAL: dummy variable coded ‘1’ for systems with federal forms of government and ‘0’ for non-federal systems (Persson and Tabellini: http://www-2.iies.su.se/~perssont/data.htm)

- PROT80: percentage of Protestants in a country’s total 1980 population (original source is La Porta et. al (1998), taken from Persson and Tabellini’s online data set: http://www-2.iies.su.se/~perssont/data.htm)


Appendix A: Two-Player Median Activist Theorem

* Consider the assumption that $\sigma^p_i = \sigma^p$ for all of party $P$'s supporters, i.e. that all supporters of party $P$ identify equally with the party (Assumption 7). Note, $\sigma^p$ may still vary across parties, i.e. supporters of different parties may still feel distinct levels of partisanship. Taken together, Assumptions 4 and 7 above guarantee that voter preferences satisfy the single-crossing property (Persson and Tabellini 2000) sufficient for maintaining median-voter results in multi-dimensional contexts. In other words, in a two-party whichever party secures the median voter's support wins the election.

* Similarly, the assumption that $\phi^p_j = \phi^p$ does not vary among activists from the same party (Assumption 6) is sufficient that activist preferences satisfy the single-crossing property (Persson and Tabellini 2000) within a particular party organization. In turn, it is straightforward to demonstrate that adopting the most-preferred point of a party’s median activist $\hat{x}_m^p(\mathbf{x}_p)$ is a Condorcet Strategy, i.e. a strategy which cannot be defeated in a pair-wise intra-party contest. The proof is identical to that of the original median-voter Theorem.

* While it is tempting to infer Proposition 1 from the fact that adopting the median activist’s ideal point is a Condorcet Strategy, in fact the proof is not this simple; additional complexity is introduced by the difficulty of specifying the median activist’s best response $\hat{x}_m^p(\cdot)$ when nomination candidates from the opposing party adopt distinct positions. Consider a situation in which all 4 potential nominees choose different policy platforms. Each party thus has a ‘more moderate’ candidate and a ‘less moderate’ candidate, defined such that the former’s proposed platform is closer to the median voter’s ideal point than that of the latter. The following situation may then arise: if party 2’s ‘less moderate’ candidate wins 2’s nomination, then party 1’s median activist prefers her party’s ‘more moderate’ candidate; but if party 2’s ‘more moderate’ candidate gains 2’s nomination, party 1’s median activist prefers her party’s ‘less moderate’ candidate. As well, this lack of a consistent best response may also be true of party 2’s median activist.

* Fortunately, Lemma 1 allows us to avoid the theoretical problems associated with these indeterminate preferences. The Lemma proves that no strategy vector $\mathbf{x}$ in which all four candidates adopt distinct positions can be a SPNE.

* Lemma 1: Candidates from the same party choose identical policy platforms: $A1$ and $B1$ always choose the same policy position, and $B1$ and $B2$ always choose the same policy position.

* Proof of Lemma 1:

- Consider a strategy vector $\mathbf{x}$ at which all four nomination candidates choose distinct policy platforms, and begin by analyzing the strategic incentives of party 1’s two potential nominees. When all four nomination candidates choose distinct positions, party 1’s two potential nominees face one
of two possible strategic situations. In the first, either $A_1$ or $B_1$ wins the nomination regardless of the outcome of party $B$'s intra-party election. This is the case if $1$’s median activist prefers $A_1$ to $B_1$ if $A_2$ wins and $A_1$ to $B_1$ if $B_2$ wins; or alternatively if $A$’s median activist prefers $A_1$ to $B_1$ if $B_2$ wins and $B_1$ to $A_1$ if $A_2$ wins. No such strategy vector can be a SPNE: recall the assumption that $\omega, \lambda > 0$ (Assumption 3), i.e. that candidates’ most-preferred outcome is to win both the intra-party contest and enter government, but that they prefer winning the nomination and losing the general election to winning nothing at all; given this assumption, it is straightforward to see that the candidate from $1$ who loses regardless of $2$’s intra-party outcome will always prefer changing her current platform announcement to that announced by $1$’s other candidate, to so as to give herself at least a chance of winning $A$’s nomination.

The second set of cases is more complicated, namely that in which the most-preferred candidate of $1$’s median-activist depends on the outcome of $2$’s internal election. For example, it may be the case that $1$’s median-activist prefers $A_1$ to $B_1$ if $A_2$ wins but $B_1$ to $A_1$ if $B_2$ wins. Consider $A_1$’s strategic incentives. It may be possible for $A_1$ to alter her current platform to a new position at which she defeats $B_1$ regardless of the outcome of party $2$’s intra-party election. If such a deviation exists $A_1$ will always have the incentive to deviate: it is always better to win one’s primary with certainty (i.e. regardless of $2$’s intra-party outcome) than to have one’s nomination be contingent on the outcome of party $2$’s intra-party election. The same can be said of candidate $B_1$, who also will always prefer to win her primary with certainty (i.e. regardless of $2$’s intra-party outcome) than to have her nomination be contingent on the outcome of party $2$’s intra-party election.

Define a Defection-Proof strategy vector for party $1$ as a strategy vector at which neither of $1$’s nomination candidates has a platform deviation that increases the number of situations in which said candidate wins $1$’s primary. $1$’s two nomination candidates can only be playing Defection-Proof strategy vectors if the more ideologically moderate of the two nominees finds is just barely closer to the median voter’s ideal point than the most moderate of $2$’s two nomination candidates: if not, the less moderate of $1$’s two nomination candidates could adopt a position slightly closer to the ideal point of $1$’s median activist and still win the election in the event that $2$’s most moderate nomination candidate emerges victorious from $2$’s intra-party election.

If $1$’s two nomination candidates play Defection-Proof strategy vectors, neither has the incentive to defect, as neither can strictly improve her expected outcome by choosing a new platform. That said, no Defection-Proof strategy vector can be a SPNE: anytime $1$’s two nomination candidates play Defection-Proof strategy vectors, than the more moderate of $2$’s two nomination candidates has the incentive to deviate: since she just barely loses the election in the event that the more moderate of $1$’s two nomination candidates wins $A$’s intra-party election, she has the incentive to either: a) defect ever so slightly so as to be able to defeat $A$’s moderate in an election; or b) concede the election to $1$’s moderate and adopt a platform nearer to that of $2$’s median activist’s ideal point. Put simply, it is impossible for candidates in parties $1$ and $2$ to simultaneously play Defection-Proof strategy vectors. This insight is the final step in establishing that no strategy candidates from the same party adopt distinct platform positions in SPNE (Lemma 1). ■
Having proven Lemma 1, Proposition follows: given that both candidates in the same party adopt identical platforms, and given that both prefer winning their nomination to winning nothing at all, it is straightforward to see that in any SPNE candidates from both parties must choose their median activist’s best response to the opposing party’s platform: if not, at least one candidate will be able to deviate and win the intra-party election with certainty.

Proof of Proposition 3

* Recall from above that whichever party wins the support of the electorate’s median voter wins the election. If the preconditions specified in Proposition 3 obtain, than party 1 wins the election when both parties chooses $x^* = x_{alp}$, and its median-activist thus has no incentive to deviate since she both adopts her most-preferred policy and wins the elections. On the other hand, party 2 loses the election and may thus have the incentive to deviate. However, if condition (a) obtains than the median voter is sufficiently biased towards party 1 that, even if 2’s median activist were to choose to adopt the median voter’s ideal point, the median voter would still prefer party 1. Since under no conditions will the median voter choose party 2, and thus under no conditions will party 2 win the election, 2’s median activist’s best choice is to adopt her own ideal point, making $x^* = x_{alp}$. ■

* If condition (a) is not met, than it is possible for 2’s median activist to choose a platform which would make it the preferred choice of the electorate’s median voter, and thus the winner of the general election. Define $x'$ as the platform choice which puts party 2 just ahead of party 1 in the median voter’s preference ranking, i.e. the policy which allows party 2 barely win the general election. To do so, naturally party 2’s median activist must choose a platform which deviates from her most-preferred policy position. 2’s median activist must thus compare the value of losing the election with certainty but choosing her own ideal point with the value of winning the election but choosing a platform which deviates from her ideal point, in turn implying a cost weighted by $\phi_m$. Condition (b) in Proposition 3 guarantees that 2’s median activist would rather choose her own ideal point and lose with certainty than sacrifice her party’s policy platform for the sake of electoral viability, making $x^* = x_{alp}$. ■

Proof of Theorem 2

* If both conditions (a) and (b) from Proposition 3 are violated, than $x_{alp}$ is not the game’s SPNE. In this case conditions (a) and (b) from Theorem 2 ensure that both median activists will choose the median voter’s ideal point in equilibrium, and each will win the election with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Condition (a) guarantees that both median activists prefer choosing the median voter’s ideal point and winning the election with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ to choosing their own ideal point and losing with certainty. Condition (b) guarantees that both parties have a $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of winning the election when they both choose the median voter’s ideal point: if the median voter is biased towards one or the other party, than when both parties choose the median voter’s ideal point the median voter will choose the party towards which she is biased; the party which is not favored by the median voter will thus lose the election with certainty and have the incentive to deviate. If both conditions (a) and (b)
obtain, neither median activist has the incentive to deviate from the strategy vector at which both choose the median voter’s ideal point. ■

Proof of Theorem 3

* If the preconditions to Proposition 1 are not met, then $X_{aip}$ is not the game’s SPNE, as party 2’s median activist will have the incentive to defect so as to give herself a chance of winning the election. In turn, if either condition (a) or (b) from Theorem 3 is satisfied, this guarantees that the strategy vector at which both median activists choose the median voter’s ideal point is not a SPNE either, as at least one median activist will have the incentive to defect, choose her own ideal point, and lose the election with certainty. Once this median activist does so, her opponent will also defect: she can choose a policy position which more closely approximates her own ideal point and still win the election with certainty. But once she does so she sets the entire process back in motion. ■
Bibliography


Salience of Categorization.” *Society for Personality and Social Psychology* 26 (1258-1270).


Biography

Daniel Kselman was born on September 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1976 in Ann Arbor Michigan. He received undergraduate degrees in both Political Science and Philosophy from the University of Indiana in June of the year 2000. He also received a Diploma from L’Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Paris, France) in June 2000. As a graduate student at Duke University, Daniel received a Masters Degree in Economics in December of 2008, and successfully completed the above dissertation for the Department of Political in April of 2009. The article “Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections”, co-authored with Emerson Niou, is forthcoming in the journal Political Analysis. As well, Daniel has received numerous awards, honors, and fellowships since entering graduate school, including a visiting scholar Fellowship from the University of Notre Dame’s Kellogg Institute; a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation; a Bass Instructorship Award for designing and teaching a course on the comparative politics of the Middle East; two Foreign Language Advancement Scholarships from the Center for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies; and a High Distinction for his preliminary exam defense.