Confronting the 'Post-Conflict’ Label: An Exploration of Ethno-Sectarian Identity in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

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Abstract

Ghosts of conflict haunt many societies around the world. In those that remain divided, sectarian sentiment governs societal norms and structures. Assigning the 'post-conflict' label to these societies marginalizes the need to actively work towards reconciliation between opposing communities. It also creates a hierarchical perception of suffering by dismissing experiences of first-hand and trans-generational trauma. This thesis aims to challenge the 'post-conflict' label by extending the popular definition of violence past that of bloodshed to one that encompasses representational forms of violence. I will explore patterns of representational violence in societies divided along ethnic lines through the lens of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. These case studies will be placed side by side to demonstrate the shared patterns that enable sectarian sentiment to perpetuate and resurface throughout time.

Both Northern Ireland and Cyprus are considered 'post-conflict' on the basis of treating their most recent eras of violence, the Troubles and the Cyprus Problem respectively, as isolated historical events. These are not isolated events, but parts of much larger conflicts driven by centuries-old Irish-British and Greek-Turkish rivalries. In the first chapter, I will outline legacies of Greek-Turkish and Irish-British tension. In the second chapter, I will explore the heroic and villainous archetypes that perpetuate ethno-sectarianism in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. In the third chapter, I will explore present-day spatial and mental divisions that inhibit interaction between opposing communities and harden existing ethno-sectarian tensions. The patterns revealed in Northern Ireland and Cyprus may aid in understanding the social practices of divided societies around the world.
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I would like to express my gratitude to all those in Northern Ireland and Cyprus who shared their personal stories with me and who openly answered difficult and emotionally provocative questions throughout my research. Their willingness to speak with me allowed me to develop a more genuine understanding of Northern Irish and Cypriot society that I could not have otherwise gained. The privilege of listening to their experiences also taught me much about the delicate balance in life between beauty, tragedy and persistence. My deepest gratitude also goes to those in Belfast and Nicosia who welcomed me as a friend, who put much time and effort into making me feel at home and with which I have been lucky to make lasting connections.

Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude towards those who invested much time and effort towards mentoring my primary research. I would like to specifically acknowledge Kate Laverty for sharing her own expertise with me and for guiding me through Belfast during my time in Northern Ireland. I would also like to acknowledge the invaluable guidance of the staff at Healing Through Remembering (HTR), especially that of Kate Turner and Sarah Jankowitz, as well as that of Shirin Jetha and Daphne Lappa at the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR). Working with these organizations provided me access to networks and information I may not have otherwise found.

Furthermore, I would like to thank the Irish Republican History Museum in Belfast and the National Struggle Museum in south Nicosia for allowing me to access and photograph their exhibits. I would especially like to thank the staff at the Irish Republican History Museum for taking the time to speak with me about the museum's history and the individual artifacts it contains.

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Introduction

"There is something uniquely shameful about Cyprus. The political quagmire our children have inherited is just being passed on, unresolved, in a dread motionless state." - Mike Hajimichael

I sat on the peaks of Beşparmak Dağları gazing at the sun set around me. Waves caressed the sparkling shoreline down below. An ophiolite, this paradise rose out of the sea more than 20 million years ago. The Mediterranean's turquoise complexion reaches in all directions towards the invisible distance. In Greek mythology, this is the birthplace of Aphrodite: goddess of love and beauty.

The previous summer I had stood nearly five thousand kilometers away atop Clochán an Aifir, sapphire waves striking jagged rocks down below. Brisk winds whispered across the 'Emerald Isle' skyline. In Irish folklore, this is the land of magic; its lush green meadows are home to fairies and leprechauns.

Beneath these realms of beauty lurk grim realities. Northern Ireland and Cyprus are both haunted by ghosts of conflict. Pervasive memories of violence ensure that old wounds remain open and that both societies remain divided along ethno-sectarian lines.

In Northern Ireland, Nationalists are loyal to Ireland and Unionists are loyal to the United Kingdom. In Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are more loyal to Greece or Turkey than to the island itself. In Chapter One I will discuss the history of these divisions, focusing on the most recent eras of violence known as the Troubles and the Cyprus Problem.

The Troubles in Northern Ireland officially began in 1969 and ended in 1998. The Cyprus Problem officially ranges from 1955 to 1974. Yet these are not isolated

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historical events. In the quote above, Greek Cypriot Mike Hajimichael insists Cyprus' "political quagmire" to be ongoing.\(^2\) The same is true in Northern Ireland.

Start and end labels for the Troubles and Cyprus Problem disregard Greek-Turkish and British-Irish tensions persisting for centuries. Passed down through generations, these tensions perpetuate present-day sectarianism. Political Scientist Edward Azar coined the phrase 'protracted social conflict' to describe such conflicts that lie dormant and periodically resurface.\(^3\) This calls the 'post-conflict' label into question.

**Why Northern Ireland and Cyprus?**

Similarities between Northern Ireland and Cyprus render their comparison useful in exploring the implications of a 'post-conflict' label. Unlike most ethno-sectarian cries of nationalism, those in Northern Ireland and Cyprus did not beckon independent statehood. Each proclaimed allegiance to a perceived motherland: Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece or Turkey.

While most national struggle narratives end in triumph, those in Northern Ireland and Cyprus differ once more. These are failed nationalisms; neither side in the Troubles or Cyprus Problem fully attained their goals. This will prove important in understanding constructions of national pride in the case studies that will follow.

Geography is another important factor linking Northern Ireland to Cyprus. As islands, both Ireland and Cyprus are geographically isolated. Their nearest neighbors are the United Kingdom and Turkey: actors in the Troubles and Cyprus Problem. This meant there was no escape from political violence, starkly distinguishing the Troubles

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\(^2\) Hajimichael, "Where Is the Movement?", 125.

and Cyprus Problem from conflicts resulting in mass migration to neighboring safe havens.

Post-colonial legacy also links Northern Ireland to Cyprus. Both were subject to British colonialism, the aftermaths of their conflicts negotiated in large part by the British government. The main difference is that Cyprus' positioning at the crossroads of continents resulted in a revolving door of colonizers throughout its history. The entirety of Ireland only experienced British colonization.

In the context of this thesis, the similarities between Northern Ireland and Cyprus are more important than their differences. These similarities will prove important in understanding the political manifestations of the following case studies. It will also require an understanding of how each was conducted.

**Methodology**

I spent the summer of 2014 living in Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland. Here I experienced life on an interface: places where peace walls divide Nationalist neighborhoods from Unionist neighborhoods. The interfaces around my temporary home in west Belfast are the most economically deprived and conflict-prone areas of the city.\(^4\)

Throughout the summer I worked with an organization called Healing Through Remembering (HTR) that works to address the legacy of the Troubles on Northern Ireland's present-day peace process. One of my primary duties was to assist in the creation of a newspaper archive related to The Troubles. I also spent time monitoring an exhibition in downtown Belfast titled Every Day Objects Transformed by the Conflict. These opportunities exposed me to a wide variety of artifacts and

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individuals enabling me to develop a deeper understanding of Northern Irish society.

In the summer of 2015 I lived in Nicosia, the divided capital of Cyprus. Nicosia is located in the center of the island and is split between the Greek Cypriot south and Turkish Cypriot north. It is referred to by Greek Cypriots as Λευκωσία and by Turkish Cypriots as Lefkoşa. My home was in Strovolos, suburb of the Greek Cypriot south.

Throughout the summer I worked at the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR), an organization promoting inter-communal dialogue between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. AHDR's office is located in the Home for Cooperation, a home to several inter-communal NGOs located inside the United Nations buffer zone. The building itself was home to an Armenian Cypriot family, abandoned at the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.5

My primary duty at AHDR was to aid in the development of an online educational game called Nicosia is Calling. An expansion of one of AHDR's history education programs, the game details the history of Nicosia's different quarters and landmarks. Its purpose is to develop a sense of shared history between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot children. AHDR also exposed me to historical and political debates enabling me to gain a deeper understanding of Cypriot divisions.

Throughout my research I conducted case studies to better understand the structure of narratives driven by sectarian sentiment. In Northern Ireland, I focused on the narrative in the Irish Republican History Museum. In Cyprus, I focused on the narrative in the National Struggle Museum. I chose these museums because they honor main actors in the Troubles and Cyprus Problem: the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (EOKA). Unless otherwise

5 "History." Home for Cooperation 2015.
specified, all the photos in this thesis were taken by me.

To support these studies I also conducted interviews. In Belfast I interviewed thirteen members of the Nationalist and Republican community. Many were former members of various IRA factions. In Nicosia I interviewed six scholars and Greek Cypriots. My interviews enabled me to draw comparisons between official narratives such as those in the Irish Republican History and National Struggle museums and personal narratives.

Challenges

Conducting research in Northern Ireland, I faced the challenge of timing. The 'Boston tapes' are an oral history archive containing incriminating evidence of paramilitary activity during the Troubles. Interviews were conducted under the premise that they would not be released until after death. I arrived in Belfast shortly after a legal battle resulted in the release of some interviews to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the subsequent imprisonment of implicated individuals. For this reason, many refused or were quite hesitant to speak with me about the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Conducting research in Cyprus I faced the challenge of exclusivity. The ex-prisoner groups that exist in Northern Ireland do not exist in Cyprus. Information about ex-paramilitary members is in most cases not publically known. There is also a desire to keep it unknown. This rendered my search for interviewees more difficult than it was in Northern Ireland. I will thus supplement the interviews I conducted in

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7 Ibid.
8 Papadakis, Yiannis. Interview by Laura Brody (2015).
Nicosia with interviews from studies conducted by scholars such as sociologist and Greek Cypriot Yiannis Papadakis.

**Terminology**

I will refer to the opposing communities in Northern Ireland as Nationalists and Unionists. Nationalists desire to reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland and Unionists desire it to remain a part of the United Kingdom. I may also refer to more extreme subsets of Nationalism and Unionism as Republicanism and Loyalism. Republicans and Loyalists hold the same beliefs as their less extreme counterparts, yet are more willing to use violence to achieve their goals.

It is also important to clarify the role of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Although Catholics are overwhelmingly Nationalist or Republican and Protestants are overwhelmingly Unionist or Loyalist, this is not a perfect equation. There are indeed Protestant Nationalists, Protestant Republicans, Catholic Unionists, and Catholic Loyalists. To avoid bias, I will avoid referring to these by their religious affiliation.

I will refer to the opposing communities in Cyprus as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. In popular discourse, they are often referred to as Greeks and Turks. When I employ these terms it will be to reference the wider historical context of tension between the Greek and Turkish nationalities. These distinctions will prove vital as I proceed with the following chapters.
The Nation and its Rivals: Irish-British and Greek-Turkish Tensions Throughout History

"The Nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them...in Nationalist thought there are facts which are both true and untrue, known and unknown."

-George Orwell

In July 2014 I stood before a raging fire. From all directions Loyalists launched petrol bombs towards a towering pyramid of wooden crates. Explosions expelled unbearable amounts of heat into the surrounding area. I stood astonished as Irish tricolors went up in blazing flames and Union Jacks waved through polluted air. Loyalists enveloped in red, white and blue drunkenly danced around their creation.

Unfolding before me was the Ulster Defense Association's (UDA) Eleventh Night bonfire in south Belfast. Each year on this night sectarian propensity erupts across Northern Ireland. Loyalist organizations prepare bonfires for weeks in advance to torch Nationalist emblems: political posters, flags, effigies and so forth. The ritual ushers in the following day's celebrations of The Twelfth.

The next morning I watched Unionists and Loyalists strut down Lisburn Road in commemoration of The Twelfth. These parades honor the Glorious Revolution: William of Orange's victory over James II in the 1690 Battle of the Boyne, marking the advent of Protestant supremacy in Ireland. Nationalists and Republicans perceive both the Eleventh Night and The Twelfth July to be attacks on Irish nationalism;

avoiding potential violence, many tend not to emerge until the celebrations have ended.

When the parades were over, I wandered through deserted streets towards my home in west Belfast. Cheers faded into the distance. In my path I crossed several bonfires gently crackling from the night before. Even as an outsider, sectarianism in Northern Ireland is hard to ignore.

**Collective Memory**

Remembering and forgetting are mutually dependent. Just as there are crimes against humanity, Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel asserts there are crimes against memory.\(^{10}\) Abolishing memory, even in the interest of social cohesion, violates the right to remember.\(^ {11}\) Yet forgetting is inevitable. Psychologist Paul Reber asserts that humans process information faster than it can be stored and that memory capacity depends on "download speed".\(^ {12}\)

This renders collective memory a choice. Historical events are consciously emphasized or erased according to political motive, undermining the notion that memory is unequivocally positive and necessarily complete. Historian Peter Burke deems collective memory "not an innocent act of memory” but a tool deployed in coercing shifts toward a desired reality.\(^ {13}\)

As such, history often tells us more about a desired future than it does the past. Sociologist Nico Carpentier asserts that in divided societies, “There is no reality of


\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) Hadhazy, Adam. "What's the Most We Can Remember?" BBC Future: 4.

the past…it has evolved into something else, which is the present.” Present-day political goals determine the beginning, middle and end of historical narratives.

Contesting national narratives dominate the political landscapes of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. These narratives are constructed according to self-victimization and the vilification of opposing communities. Historian Anthony Buckley asserts that upholding one community's narrative over another is a means of declaring “allegiance and identity” in the present moment.

As I will discuss in Chapter Two, this process is less about the politics of remembering than the politics of forgetting. Philosopher Ernest Renan deems forgetting essential in maintaining a unified national identity. Yet understanding this process first requires an understanding of the nation itself: the idea of the nation, the origins of that idea, and the symbols and practices that accompany it.

**Nation vs. State**

Social psychologist Karina Korostelina delineates three conceptions of the nation: ethnic, multicultural and civic. Ethnic nationalists define the nation in terms of cultural and linguistic homogeneity. Multicultural nationalists embrace multiple cultures and languages within the nation's borders. Both ethnic and multicultural nationalists believe national identity to be an unalterable inheritance. For civic nationalists, national identity is a choice. It is a contract between individuals and the

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18 Ibid.
nation, to which ethnicity is insignificant. In this thesis I am concerned with ethnic nationalism.

For ethnic nationalists there is a clear distinction between the nation and the state. Although states cling to nationalist fervor as legitimization, not every nation is also a state. The state is a recognized territory exercising political sovereignty, but the nation is comprised of individuals perceiving common descent, language and culture with one another. Nations require collective memory to engender a sense of national destiny. States demand only cooperation and may function without perceived homogeneity.

The nation may also exist without a proper territory. The Kurdish nation, disseminated throughout Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, serves as an example. Just as the nation may exist without territory, the state may exist without a unique sense of national identity. The kingdom of Sardinia exemplifies as an autonomous state with a strong show of Italian nationalism. This dissonance between the nation and the state is a persistent source of modern conflict. Throughout this thesis I will employ Northern Ireland and Cyprus as a lens to explore conflict incited by competing nationalisms within a single state.

National Origin and Development

Most nationalism theorists declare the nation a product of modernity. Historian Benedict Anderson cites its origin as the development of print-capitalism and print-language. These 15th century developments created fields of exchange above spoken vernaculars, allowing speakers who may have difficulty communicating

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19 Korestelina, "History Education and Social Identity", 40.
in person to relate via paper.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 44} Forming what Anderson calls the "embryo" of national consciousness, millions of individuals became aware of others in their language field.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 6.}

Anderson also insists the nation is an "imagined" entity existing only in representation.\footnote{Ibid.} A people with differing aspirations in regards to governance, social structure and economy cannot realistically embody homogenous goals. Members of a nation imagine a sense of solidarity with fellow-members, each of which they will never come to know.\footnote{Ibid.}

Historian Ernest Gellner insists that the need for nations arose as a result of specifically modern economic and scientific conditions which, in contrast to earlier times when culture existed as a means of emphasizing status and identity in hierarchical societies, created a world of industrialism and social mobility where individuals no longer had a stable position in society.\footnote{Gellner, Ernest. \textit{Thought and Change}. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, 147.} Anderson and Gellner's definitions assert the nation to be a product of the desire for mass literacy and public education, one's status in the nation being determined by the extent to which they fulfill this need.

Historian Michael Ignatieff asserts the nation a manifestation of the innate human desire to belong, a safe space that shelters from violence.\footnote{Ignatieff, Michael. \textit{Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism} New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995: 10.} This feeling of belonging requires an awareness of those who do not belong. International and national consciousness are thus mutually dependent. The ability to recognize nations to which we don't belong relies on sentiments of pride and solidarity for the nation to which we do belong. I will discuss this further in Chapters Two and Three.

\footnotesize{22 Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 44
\footnotesize{23 Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 6.
\footnotesize{24 Ibid.
\footnotesize{26 Ignatieff, Michael. \textit{Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism} New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995: 10.}
Developing a shared perception of unity doesn't happen overnight. Hobsbawm delineates three phases of the nation's development: the first of these phases is the idea of the nation in purely cultural form with no nationalist implications, the second the commencement of rallying support for the "national idea", and the third a phase in which nationalist movements are successful in acquiring mass support\textsuperscript{27}.

We see an example of this in the development of Irish nationalism, with the first phrase corresponding to Gaelic culture and influence in prehistoric Ireland until the 17th century, and the second phase corresponding to 18th century movements such as that of the Irish Patriot Party calling for more autonomy from the British Empire.\textsuperscript{28} The third phase is embodied in the era of Theobald Wolfe Tone and the Society of United Irishmen who with the goal of founding an independent Irish Republic launched the Irish Rebellion of 1798, although independence was not gained until after the Anglo-Irish War at the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922.\textsuperscript{29}

Among theorists, the role of history in the creation and maintenance of the nation has sparked much debate. Gellner and Hobsbawm contend that pre-modern history is irrelevant to the modern nation. Gellner calls upon the Estonians as an example, noting their nationalism and creation of a culture despite their "lack of ethnic consciousness" until the beginning of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{30}

Yet historian Anthony Smith contends that modern nationalism cannot be understood without reference to pre-modern ethnic ties and memories; modernism explains only “half of the story” because it fails to address the collective

\textsuperscript{29} English, \textit{Irish Freedom}, 307.
\textsuperscript{30} Gellner, Ernest. "Do Nations Have Navels?" \textit{Nations and Nationalism} 2, no. 3 (1996), 368.
understanding and popular motivation critical to nations that so many people are prepared to die for.11

Such nationalist fervor is evident in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus, the Republican and Loyalist communities in Northern Ireland, as well as in many other modern conflicts. While Smith acknowledges that not every nation is founded upon ties to pre-modern history and culture, he insists that nations possessing these ties are more likely to be unified in the modern world.31

This paper seeks to address why certain nationalist movements gain mass support and others do not, and thus why individuals are willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the nation. Renan contends that it is the memory of suffering rather than joy that binds the nation together, rendering it willing to repeat such sacrifice.32 I will discuss this in the following chapters through an examination of the Irish Republican and Greek Cypriot narratives of struggle and how they foster nationalist sentiments that perpetuate sectarianism.

**National Symbols and Practice**

Members of modern nations reject the idea of the nation as a recent creation, perceiving it to stem instead from pre-historic cultures and communities with whom they are linked through common language, homeland, tradition and so forth. From this perspective, the nation has always existed but has been simply in a state of slumber until awoken by nationalist uprisings. This is the means by which the world of nations has come to seem the natural world.

Historian Eric Hobsbawm contends that the illusion of belonging to a nation is

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32 Renan, *Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation?* 6.
constructed through the "social engineering" of national symbols and practice. The symbols and practices that create the nation are "invented traditions" seeking to instill specific values and norms within a nation's members. Pride and loyalty, for example, are oftentimes elicited through the personification of the nation in symbols such as the American Uncle Sam or the French Marianne.

One way of enforcing such ties is through the development of symbolism. Such symbols assert continuity with the past, but only a "suitable" past, thus one that has oftentimes been constructed or adapted from its original form. The insistence of using the term Québécois serves as an example, as it is something manufactured with little real connection to the original French settlers in Canada. These settlers used the term Canadien to distinguish themselves from the British, although those who identify as Québécois today do their best to disassociate themselves with the term, and claim that the Québec nation has existed since the French settlers arrived on the continent.

Renan asserts that “acts of mourning are more potent than those of triumph” because they require a common effort to combat, engendering the willingness to make similar sacrifices in the future. As such, memories preserved in the national narrative are primarily of collective sacrifice. Such willingness to sacrifice one's life for the sake of the nation is embodied in eras of violence such as The Troubles and the Cyprus Problem.

34 Ibid.
35 Hobsbawm, Inventing Traditions, 1.
37 Renan, Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation? 29.
National Identity and History Education

Korostelina offers three categories of national identity: cultural, reflected and mobilized. Cultural identity refers to the nation's traditions: cuisine, music, dance and so forth. Reflected identity is the awareness of national origins, history perspective and desired destiny in relation to other nations. Mobilized identity stipulates competition; it is the focus on comparing power and status with that of other nations. As it has the strongest power to incite conflict, this thesis is concerned with mobilized identity.

History education plays a strong role in mobilizing national identity. Narratives are presented as "the only possible way of thinking" and become foundation of individual behavior. Historical narratives also stress the importance of loyalty to the nation in uniting against its enemies. Most importantly, these narratives treat the nation as morally superior to other nations.

I argue in this thesis that history is the tool by which national narratives are constructed, but how and why they are constructed is a product of present needs and desires within a given community. For example, the Greek Nationalist narrative in Cyprus asserts that the island's history begins with the presence of the Mycenaeans, the pre-cursor to the Ancient Greeks, in the 14th Century BC, while the Turkish Nationalist narrative asserts that the island's history begins with the Ottoman invasion of the island in 1571.

38 Korostelina, "History Education and Social Identity", 27.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Korostelina, "History Education and Social Identity", 34.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
Each narrative is constructed by certain pieces of history, but which piece of history is employed is a result of either the Greek Cypriot community's assertion of Cyprus as a Greek island in order to legitimize their desire to unite with Greece, or the Turkish Cypriot community's assertion of Cyprus as a Turkish island in order to delegitimize the Greek Cypriot desire to unite with Greece.

In the context of this thesis, it is important to understand the extensive histories of Irish-British and Greek-Turkish relations because they are still alive in current discourse. Individuals call upon events that happened centuries ago to vilify opposing communities in the present moment. Deploying these events as weapons aligns with the view that the nation has existed as a single actor throughout time. Breaking down such patterns will also aid in understanding the representations presented in Chapters Two and Three.

**Relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom**

In the 12th century civil war in Ireland led to the Anglo-Norman invasion. The King of Leinster, Diarmait MacMurchada, was forced in 1166 to flee Dublin at the will of other Irish kings. To regain his throne MacMurchada sought assistance from King Henry II of England. Henry II's Anglo-Norman barons helped MacMurchada regain his throne in 1169, yet remained in Ireland seizing both land and power.

Henry II felt his barons were becoming too powerful and invaded Ireland to reassert his own authority in 1171. All six Irish kings pledged their loyalty to Henry II, viewing his invasion a protection from the Anglo-Norman barons seizing lands. Yet when Henry II returned to England his barons built strongholds to ensure their own power, importing English peasants and laborers that expelled Gaelic natives from

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46 Ibid.
their lands.\textsuperscript{48}

Ireland’s new feudal system remained in place for the next few centuries. In 1541 King Henry VIII of England became the official King of Ireland after an uprising by the Earl of Kildare, Silken Thomas.\textsuperscript{49} Thomas had been a fervent Catholic who led a movement to bestow control of Ireland on the Pope and Emperor Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire for fear of Protestant ascendancy during the Reformation. These events fired up tensions between Catholic Ireland and Protestant England that led to several more wars throughout the 17th century. With England in full control of Ireland thousands of Protestant settlers from England and Scotland displaced Catholics in Ireland. England officially abolished the Irish Parliament with the 1801 Act of Union, declaring itself the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.\textsuperscript{50}

While Catholic Nationalism in Ireland was too prevalent to be ignored by the British government, Protestant Unionism was also too prevalent in the province of Ulster to be ignored by Catholic Nationalists.\textsuperscript{51} Throughout the 19th century and early 20th century Catholic Irish Nationalists opposed to the "Protestant culture of ascendancy" sought to establish self-government in the midst of British colonization.\textsuperscript{52} This Home Rule movement saw a brief success. In 1914 the United Kingdom passed the Government of Ireland Act ensuring home rule for a new Irish parliament, but due to the outbreak of WWI this never took effect.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{48} Schama, Simon. "Invasions of Ireland from 1170 - 1320." BBC History: 2.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} English, \textit{Irish Freedom}, 249.
\textsuperscript{52} English, \textit{Irish Freedom}, 242.
Home Rule activists in Ireland took advantage of England's vulnerability in WWI to reassert its independence. The Irish Volunteer Force (IVF) was established by Eoin MacNeil in 1913 with the goal of maintaining Ireland’s “right and duty” to defend itself without British intervention. It was also intended to prevent the emergence of additional volunteer forces like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) fighting to hold Ireland for the British Empire.

In April 1916 the IVF staged the Easter Rising, an insurrection against British authority lasting for six days, and during which IVF forces seized control of over 1200 buildings in Dublin. Historian Richard English notes the “marked Catholicism” of the event, as the rebels were lifted into Catholic martyrrology when British authorities suppressed the rebellion and executed many of its participants. This martyrdom only sparked further tension between Ireland and the United Kingdom.

Irish Nationalists established a revolutionary legislature known as the Dáil Éireann in 1919. Subsequently the IVF transitioned into the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and subsequently began its battle against British forces in the Irish War of Independence. The war ended in 1921 with the Anglo-Irish Treaty, authorizing the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 and providing the northern six counties of Ireland with the right they exercised remain a part of the United Kingdom, the official partition of Ireland.

Upon Northern Ireland's establishment, IRA forces divided into anti-Treaty and pro-Treaty factions. The vast majority of the original IRA chose to join the anti-Treaty forces and maintained the name of the IRA, while the pro-Treaty forces were

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54 English, Irish Freedom, 274.
56 English, Irish Freedom, 261.
57 English, Irish Freedom, 252, 272-274.
rebranded as the Irish National Army by the parliament of the Irish Free State. The Irish Civil War broke out and the IRA was defeated. It did not resurface until its 1956-1962 Border Campaign, a failed attempt to overthrow British rule in Northern Ireland and to establish an independent and democratic Irish Republic.

In the late 20th century Northern Ireland still had trapped within it a significant Catholic Nationalist minority that the Protestant Unionist population suppressed through practices of gerrymandering and violence. As a result, an era of violence and political struggle for power between Nationalists and Unionists known as the Troubles broke out in 1969.

**Case Study: The Troubles**

Ireland is divided today between the Republic of Ireland (ROI) in the south and the province of Northern Ireland (NI) in the north. As written above, the island's partition is rooted in the turbulent events of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The most recent era of violence in Northern Ireland known as the Troubles began in the late 1960s and ended in official discourse with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Yet memories of violence and conflict continue to haunt the island today.

Although the Troubles are often portrayed as a conflict between two opposing communities - Protestants and Catholics - this simplification engenders the false

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impression that the conflict is about religion as well as keeps hidden the divisions that exist within these two wider communities. The conflict in Northern Ireland is not about religion, but control over territory. Broadly speaking, Nationalists and Republicans, the majority of whom happen to be Catholic, desire to reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. Unionists and Loyalists, the majority of whom happen to be Protestant, desire for Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom under British rule and Protestant leadership.

Although religion is used as a political indicator in Northern Ireland, it does not produce a perfect equation. There are indeed Protestant Nationalists, Protestant Republicans, Catholic Unionists, and Catholic Loyalists. There are also those individuals who identify politically and not religiously, or vice versa, and those who don’t identify with religion or politics at all. Furthermore, the wider political communities mentioned above are not without their own internal division.62

The Republican community can be taken as an example. Irish playwright Brendan Behan famously stated that the first item on any Republican agenda is ‘the split.’63 After a largely inactive period from the 1920s throughout the 1960s, the IRA split in 1969 between the Official IRA (OIRA) and the Provisional IRA (PIRA). Violent feuding ensued between the two factions and as the Troubles progressed, several more groups including, but not limited to, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), Continuity IRA (CIRA), Real IRA (RIRA), and Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) - Irish for ‘Soldiers of Ireland’ - emerged from OIRA and PIRA as a result of ideological disagreements. The term Oglaigh na hEireann translates to “soldiers of Ireland” and has been claimed by several factions of the Irish Republican Army in a

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quest to be perceived as the true *Oglaigh na hÉireann* since the organization’s establishment in the early 20th century.\(^{64}\)

Nationalists declared discrimination against the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland to be justification for violent rebellion, and Unionists viewed this violence in conjunction with the Dublin parliament’s refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the state as sufficient reasoning that society should remain in Unionist control.\(^{65}\) Despite the tendency by outsiders to view Unionism as the aggressor, historian Richard English contends that there was nothing “inherently irrational” about the Unionist community responding in an attempt to protect their political and religious interests, as this was exactly what Catholic Nationalists wanted to claim for themselves.\(^{66}\)

The Troubles were characterized by weekly killings that became so routine that they “scarcely merited a headline” outside of Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland, and many children grew up during this era believing violence to be normal.\(^{67}\) As the Troubles progressed and violence escalated, the Republic of Ireland gradually withdrew its support for the Irish Nationalist cause and the events had become something that “most Southerners wanted nothing to do with” by the mid 1970s.\(^{68}\)

Historian Ed Moloney contends that by the 1990s, the peace process had become as much about the “triumph” of those Nationalists who saw the future in terms of peaceful Sinn Fein politics over those who saw it in terms of strict militarism as it was about ending political violence.\(^{69}\) As the peace process advanced, PIRA leader Gerry Adams ensured that IRA volunteers did not rebel by telling them that “it would sometimes be necessary to say or do things that the IRA or Sinn Fein didn’t

\(^{67}\) Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, xvii.
\(^{68}\) Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 152.
mean” in order to build an alliance with other Nationalist organizations. Moloney contends that the peace process “would never have gotten off the ground” if the IRA volunteers knew the truth.

The Good Friday Agreement was signed on April 10th, 1998, essentially marking the end of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Historian Ed Moloney contends that the two communities “struck a bargain” for Republicans to abandon their goal of Irish unity and Unionists to behave “in a more civilized manner” than they had throughout the 20th century. Despite the Good Friday Agreement, violence between the two communities such as that I experienced during the Eleventh Night and Twelfth July in Belfast persists today.

relations between Greece and Turkey

At the Battle of Malazgirt in 1071 the Seljuk Turks defeated the Byzantines, thus marking the beginning of Turkish settlement on the Anatolian peninsula. The Byzantine Empire survived until the fall of Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, thus marking the consumption of the entire Byzantine and Greek world within the Ottoman Empire. Greeks and Turks lived amongst one another until the modern Greek state was carved out of the Ottoman Empire in 1832, facing Greeks with the difficult task of abandoning “the Turk within” in an attempt to engender a new national identity.

Despite modern Greeks actually having little in common with the people of ancient Greece and referring to themselves as Romans, their new identity was based

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73 Ibid.
74 Volkan, “Two Rocks in the Aegean Sea”, 123.
upon that of ancient Hellenistic culture. As a means of revival, individuals studied folk tales, dances, poetry and other aspects of Hellenistic lifestyles that resulted in the emergence of the *Megali* (Great) Idea, under which all Classical and Byzantine lands of Hellenistic culture would be reunited under the modern Greek state. This would include those territories still under Ottoman control, which led to further dispute between the Greek and Turkish nations.

The borders of modern Turkey were established with the Lausanne Treaty in the 1920s, directly after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but also after their success at pushing the Greek presence out of Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, known as the Father of the Turks, began to implement policies of Westernization referred to as Kemalism, thus rendering the entity of the West both an enemy and a role model to the Turkish nation. While Turkey despised modern Greeks, they idealized the ancient Hellenistic culture upon which much of Western civilization was founded and upon which Greece drew its identity.

Frequent disputes between the two modern states from this point forward over land, air space, energy and other matters have only perpetuated the culture of hostility between the two nationalities, and have thus also led to suspicion regarding Greek and Turkish minorities in Turkey and Greece respectively. In the midst of such disputes one can understand easily the ways in which the geographical importance of Cyprus, its close proximity to both Greece and Turkey and its vulnerability as a small island has developed into what is known today as the Cyprus Problem.

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75 Volkan, “Two Rocks in the Aegean Sea”, 121.
76 Volkan, “Two Rocks in the Aegean Sea”, 123.
77 Volkan, “Two Rocks in the Aegean Sea”, 132.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
Case Study: The Cyprus Problem

Although Cyprus is widely considered to be a post-conflict society, the memory and present-day reality of centuries of conquest, violence and division have prevented a solution to what historians deem the 'Cyprus Problem'. Each of the two dominant communities – Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots – are more loyal to either Greece or Turkey than they are to the island itself, and Greek and Turkish flags are used across the island to mark each community’s territory.

Cyprus' strategic position at the crossroads of continents rendered it a coveted Mediterranean territory; the island has known the rule of several foreign conquerors, including that of the Venetians and the Ottomans, throughout its history and became a part of the British Empire in 1878. Cyprus gained independence in 1969 and today the Greek Cypriot community inhabits the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) in the southern half of the island and the Turkish Cypriot community inhabits the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the northern part of the island, the legitimacy of which only Turkey recognizes. Memories of dispute between the perceived homelands of these two communities, Greece and Turkey respectively, aggravate already existing tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

After more than three centuries of Ottoman rule, Cyprus was taken under British control in 1878. During this period of colonization, the presence of both Greek and Turkish nationalism on the island, in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities respectively, rose significantly.\(^1\) The right-wing Greek nationalist paramilitary group known as *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (EOKA), or the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, emerged in 1955 in hopes of attaining *enosis*: the Greek word for 'union' referring to the irredentist desire to unite Cyprus with Greece.

EOKA waged war against the British presence on the island in an attempt to achieve *enosis*. Although independence was never the desire, the struggle is commonly mislabeled EOKA's Struggle for Independence since it resulted in the independence of the island and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. At its establishment, the new state consisted of 80% Greek Cypriots, 18% Turkish Cypriots and 2% other minorities such as the Armenian and Maronite communities.\(^2\)

Boiling tensions between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities throughout the 1950s proved a challenge to the stability of the young state. Where the Greek Cypriot community had been campaigning for *enosis*, the Turkish Cypriot community was striving for *taksim*: the Turkish word for 'partition', referring to the desire to partition the island between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The right-wing Turkish nationalist paramilitary group *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati* (TMT), or the Turkish Resistance Organization, emerged during EOKA’s war in 1958 out of the desire to defend the Turkish Cypriot community from what they viewed as Greek Cypriot terrorism.

At the establishment of the ROC and the abolishment of British presence on the island, the Turkish Cypriot community intensified their campaign for *taksim*; they believed that the new Greek Cypriot president of the island, Archbishop Makarios,

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\(^{1}\) Papadakis, Peristianis & Welz. “Introduction: Modernity, History and Conflict in Divided Cyprus.” 2.
\(^{2}\) Papadakis, Yiannis. “Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus.” *History and Memory* 20, no. 2 (2008): 128-48, 130.
who had also been the political voice of EOKA in the 1950s, was suppressing Turkish Cypriot rights in the development of a new constitution.83 EOKA responded to Turkish Cypriot cries for *taksim* with the Akritas Plan; the aim of this plan was to achieve enosis through the extermination of the Turkish Cypriot population.84 Consequently, the decade of the 1960s amounted to a period of extreme violence between both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which sparked the arrival of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) on the island in 1964.

Nearly a decade later in the 1970s, tension between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities was complemented by the development of extreme intra-communal tension among Greek Cypriots. President Makarios had abandoned the goal of *enosis* in favor of rapprochement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Right-wing Greek nationalists who were still striving for Cyprus' union with Greece viewed this as betrayal.85 A second Greek nationalist paramilitary organization, EOKA-B, emerged in the early 1970s claiming to be a continuation of the original EOKA of the 1950s.

In partnership with the Greek Junta, a right-wing military organization that staged a coup d'état against the Greek government in 1967 and became the subsequent rulers of the Greek state, members of EOKA-B carried out a coup d’étéat against Makarios' government in July of 1974.86 Later that same month, Turkey came to the aid of the Turkish Cypriot community and invaded the northern part of Cyprus. At this time, Greek Cypriots who had been living in the northern part of Cyprus fled south, while Turkish Cypriots who has been living in the south fled north. The Turkish

84 Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem*, 35.
85 Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem*, 41.
invasion enabled the self-declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which was succeeded by the TRNC through a declaration of complete sovereignty in 1983.  

After living in isolation from one another for over three decades, the border between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities was opened in 2003 with authorization from the then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdoğan. The ROC became a member of the European Union in 2004 and is recognized internationally as the entire island, whereas the TRNC is recognized as an illegal occupation. The Annan Plan, a plan for a bi-federate United Republic of Cyprus, was voted down the same year; the referendum failed with 76% rejection on the Greek Cypriot side as opposed to 66% acceptance on the Turkish Cypriot side.

Despite several attempts, a solution to the ongoing 'Cyprus Problem' has yet to reached; in the words of writer and economist Mehmet Hasgüiler, “The EU’s attitude toward Cyprus has not only been an exercise in passing the buck rather than moving toward a solution, it has also caused a hardening of the existing divisions between the communities.”

Conclusion

This chapter is meant to provide the necessary background to understand ethno-sectarian patterns and manifestations of national identity in post-conflict societies. This will prove useful in interpreting the political implications of the 'post-conflict' label. It will also prove necessary to understanding the case studies in Northern Ireland and Cyprus presented in the following two chapters.

87 Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 49.
89 Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 76.
90 Tüzünkan, & Hasgüiler, "Cyprus at a Crossroads." 70
Villains and Heroes: Sustaining Silence in Narratives of National Struggle

“We had grown up in Cyprus as the proudest of Greeks. As everyone knew, ancient Greeks were the original creators of civilization, the people who gave its light to the West. We had learned at school that our dialect, the Greek dialect of Cyprus, was etymologically much closer to ancient Greek than any other dialect of Greece. The other reason we were the truest Greeks, of course, was that we had suffered so much throughout history at the hands of the Turk.” - Yiannis Papadakis

To be Greek in Cyprus is to suffer a specific belligerence: that of the Turks. In the above quote Yiannis Papadakis presents this as an indisputable fact; having grown up a Greek Cypriot "everyone knew" they were the "truest Greeks" as a result of the suffering inflicted upon them by Turks, namely the Turkish Cypriot community. Greek Cypriot identity is thus defined more by the actions of Turks than by the actions of Greeks. Scholars refer to this pattern as the 'constitutive outside'; the identity of the outsider constitutes, or creates, the identity of the insider.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the collective memory of the nation is defined in terms of protagonists and antagonists. In this chapter I will refer to the protagonists as 'heroes' and the antagonists as 'villains'. I employ these terms because they allude to characters whose noble or evil motives are centrally important to the plot of a story; as such, they represent the moral justifications and indictments permeating national memory in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus. These moral implications are the intentional consequence of choosing which historical events to preserve, or not to preserve, in the collective memory of the nation.

Historian Michelle Perrot says it best: “Ce qu'on ne raconte pas, n'existe pas”. This translates to “What we don't tell, does not exist.”

92 Ibid.
manifests itself in varying forms of representation: speech, art, museums, memorials and so forth. These representations are passed down through generations. Historical events that are omitted from the national narrative do not transfer to the next generation. When this event outlives generational memory of the nation's members, it becomes nonexistent. The moral implications of that event are henceforth seen to be untrue; to break down these implications, I direct our attention not to what the national narrative contains, but to what it doesn't contain.

Each shares a common characteristic: what the self did wrong and what the other did right is missing. The remaining pieces, what the self did right and what the other did wrong, are woven together to create the national narrative. Papadakis' statement at the beginning of this chapter is a prime example: the labels hero and villain are clearly assigned by defining Greeks as the creators of civilization and Turks as perpetual aggressors. Yet it is important to note that these narratives are only selective and not untruthful in which parts of history they choose to reveal and which parts to keep deeply hidden, rendering resulting stereotypes difficult to combat. If they lie, they lie with the truth.

Most research focuses on the way national narratives discriminate and engender stereotypes against their opposing communities. Sociologist Nico Carpentier asserts that self-discrimination also plays an important role. A member of a group is expected to advocate pre-determined group characteristics; failure to do so may result in their removal from the group. Yet these expectations beckon internal discrimination. The expectation that Greek Cypriots hate Turkish Cypriots disavows those who feel neutral or positive attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots. This silences

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95 Translated by author.
the voices of internal dissenters who wish to remain a part of the group.

Shared qualities between the national narratives of Northern Ireland and Cyprus are more important than those that make them unique; these similarities reveal an underlying pattern representative of collective memory in many post-conflict societies. The outcome of this pattern is to oftentimes perpetuate sectarian tension between opposing communities. Yet breaking down these patterns enables them to be made sense of; this understanding may combat lingering sectarianism. In an effort to outline these shared characteristics I will juxtapose the narratives of two national struggle museums: the Irish Republican History Museum in Belfast and the National Struggle Museum in south Nicosia.

Case Study: Irish Republican History Museum

An hour's walk from Belfast City Centre, the Irish Republican History Museum is tucked away in the corner of the former Conway Mills. This 19th century linen mill complex was the first of its kind in west Belfast. Today, it is an important historical landmark in Northern Ireland. Yet the complex feels quite deserted compared to the streets buzzing with tourists just beside it. Just across the street tourists gaze at an IRA memorial festooned with Irish tricolors. It is clear that this is a Nationalist neighborhood. To reach the main entrance of the Irish Republican History Museum one must venture into the complex and down a dimly lit walkway filled with wooden crafted Celtic crosses and harps. At the end of the walkway a door taken from Armagh Gaol introduces an exact replica of cells for female IRA prisoners. The solemnity of this atmosphere makes one feel as if they are intruding upon private memories.

Passing through the main entrance, information pamphlets available in
multiple languages suggest otherwise. Yet it is worth noting that a quick scan of the visitor book told me that the majority of visitors are indeed Belfast locals. The first time I entered the Irish Republican History Museum my attention turned immediately to the sound of traditional folk rhythm. Irish tunes accompanied by revolutionary lyrics referenced Ireland's struggle for freedom from British occupation. The sound of folk instruments lends an earthy appeal to the museum’s narrative. This welcoming vibe is amplified by a sense of vibrancy in the museum's collections; an immediately deducible color scheme of green and orange mirrors the Irish tri-colors hanging around throughout the main room.

**Case Study: National Struggle Museum**

A ten-minute walk from south Nicosia's Old Town, the National Struggle Museum is tucked away behind the former Archbishopric Palace inhabited by Archbishop Makarios at the height of the Cyprus Problem. This 17th century Ottoman complex is today home to the more frequented Byzantine Art Museum, Ayios Ioannis Bibis Church and Cyprus Folk Art Museum, keeping the National Struggle Museum neatly hidden out of sight. Those who venture slightly past the Archbishopric Palace and towards a passageway seemingly leading to nowhere chance upon a small sign pointing towards a gate on the left. This sign and gate serve as the portal to the National Struggle Museum, revealing a pathway leading to a small white building calling no particular attention to itself at first glance. The museum's covert location makes a statement much like the Irish Republican History Museum that it is not
intended for outsiders.

Unlike the Irish Republican History Museum, this feeling of exclusivity extends to the museum's interior. Many displays lack English translation and there are no Turkish translations, despite Turkish Cypriot settlements less than half a kilometer away. The superior status of Greek suggests that the museum's narrative is aimed predominately towards Greek Cypriots. These unwelcoming vibes are amplified by the museum's austere appearance; dimly lit and lacking both color and vibrancy.

Much unlike the Irish Republican History Museum, the walls inside the National Struggle Museum are entirely white; both photos and text are printed in black and white. Even the few Greek flags scattered throughout the museum’s collections are so old and tattered that their faded blue appearance fails to offer any splash of color to the washed out and clinical atmosphere surrounding them. Yet this austerity has a mysterious way of intensifying the seriousness of what is on display.

**Villains**

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, group identity is forged in large part by those excluded from the group. The archetypes of the hero and the villain are a prime example; heroes face villains and villains face heroes. Self-defining as the hero and imposing villainous identities on others are strategies employed in national struggle narratives to both garner sympathy for the communities they represent and engender negativity towards those they oppose. Vilifying an opposing community is a
careful process. The villain is constructed through meticulous choices of language and imagery designed to evoke negative emotions against its subjects. Those constructing the narratives are careful not to reveal any pieces of history that may reveal inside aggression or outside suffering, lest their status as hero be mistakenly reversed with that of the villain. In this section I will examine in greater depth patterns of vilification found in the Irish Republican History Museum and the National Struggle Museum.

Throughout the Irish Republican History Museum, the power of language to engender and perpetuate negative perceptions of a perceived enemy manifests itself in references to the British Army as "terrorists", to the Royal Ulster Constabulary as "brutes in uniform" and to Loyalists as members of "death squads." Language choice may also engender a hierarchy based upon varying levels of villainy. In the Museum of National Struggle words such as "slaughter", "massacre" and "barbaric" refer to EOKA members who died at the hands of Turkish Cypriots, while words such as "killed" or "died" describe those who died at the hands of the British Army. The less powerful words referencing actions of the British Army assign a lower degree of villainy to the British Army than to the "barbaric" Turkish Cypriots. Varying forms of imagery enhance or sometimes replace language's power to construct desired identities. A closer look at documents found within these museums will highlight these patterns.

In the middle of the Irish Republican History Museum, an old typewriter frames a handwritten statement. Upon visiting the museum this display immediately caught my eye; that a handwritten statement is situated within a typewriter is odd. Knowing the typewriter could not have produced the document, I wondered about its

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97 National Struggle Museum, Nicosia.
98 Ibid.
relation to the document it houses.

Rhythmically titled 'Murder, Murder, Murder' the document's first sentence reads, "This morning the murder squad from England the so-called 'British Army' once again butchered an innocent civilian." In this phrase alone, the chosen terms "murder squad", "butchered" and "innocent civilian" characterize the British Army at best as systematic serial killers and at worst as a barbaric gang of heartless murderers. Referring to them as the "so-called British Army" sardonically strips them of legitimacy. After reading this sentence I was struck by the typewriter's significance; that I was gazing upon a handwritten document where it didn't belong paralleled the argument that the British are where they don't belong. The documents brutal representations of the British Army are placed within a typewriter signifying Northern Ireland itself. Illustrations of weeping skulls intensify the eeriness of this display as if shedding tears on behalf of Irishmen and Irishwomen who died struggling to claim justice in the face of British oppression.

This document is hardly the only construction of British villainy in the Irish Republican History Museum. Upon my discovery of the poster below, a British soldier appeared to issue a cold gaze in my direction. Yet the words surrounding this cold gaze beckon museum visitors: "To the General Public", the poster reads, "Beware of British Army Terrorists." That the poster's message is addressed to a general audience seems to encompass museum visitors into the national narrative's

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99 Irish Republican History Museum, Belfast.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
audience. No longer on the outside looking in, visitors have been awarded license to imagine themselves transported back to the era of British occupation during which posters of this genre were likely to be distributed.

The illustration of the soldier with the cold gaze is super-imposed upon an illustration of the British royal crown. An extended warning reads:

"Men, dressed as above, are roaming our streets and shooting our people at will… if seen they should be avoided by the general public. Do not approach them, they are liable to open fire. The mass media are collaborating with these terrorists by issuing false statements from terrorist headquarters in Lisburn."

Here again, language is powerful. The term "terrorist" presents British soldiers to be uncontrollable killers targeting even those innocent individuals who unwittingly cross their path. That terrorism typically denotes non-officialdom delegitimizes the official status of the British Army. Failing to refer to these men as British soldiers and opting instead for the phrase "men dressed as above" directly enforces this delegitimization.

Yet the image also plays with the idea of legitimacy. The depiction of the royal crown seems to back up the British soldier in a reinforcement of the British Army's power by way of British state legitimacy. Legitimizing the British Army serves the reverse purpose of its delegitimization by strengthening claims of Irish weakness. Legitimized, the British Army is an overwhelming force. The weaker the Irish can be, the more support they are likely to accumulate. The utility of adopting such weakened identities will be further discussed in the following section.

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103 Irish Republican History Museum, Belfast.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
Constructing villainy requires identically attentive language choice in the National Struggle Museum. The following label is attached to a glass case full of weaponry:

“At the height of the inter-communal clashes, which were being secretly encouraged by the British, a group of thirty Greek Cypriots were led by British soldiers to a spot outside the Turkish village of Kioneli, where they were forced to get out of the bus. Turks from Kioneli who had been appropriately informed beforehand by the British were waiting in ambush and massacred eight of the Greek Cypriots. During the so-called trial that followed, none of the Turks were convicted since it was not possible to prove who had killed whom.”

These words carry quite a heavy assumption: the British Army and the Turkish Cypriot community are co-conspirers in a ruthless attack on Greek Cypriots in the village of Kioneli. Both parties are guilty of murder; it was simply the Turkish Cypriots who performed the deed. The representational arguments in this label directly align with the hierarchical nature of villainy discussed earlier in this chapter; the National Struggle Museum tends to vilify Turkish Cypriots to a greater extent than members of the British Army.

Interestingly yet unsurprisingly, this recounting of events in the national memory of Turkish Cypriots claims the reverse; the British Army engendered tensions between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots by forcing Turkish Cypriots to serve in their police unit. While serving in the unit, Turkish Cypriots were forced to combat the Greek Cypriot struggle for enosis and were then called out by the British Army for being driven by sectarian motives to attack Greek Cypriots. The above circumstances in Kioneli were one such circumstance. In this version of events, the Turkish Cypriots are but innocent pawns in a game of British manipulation.

Criminalizing words are but one strategy to construct villainous identities.

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106 National Struggle Museum, Nicosia.
Another strategy is to deploy faux neutrality, revealing the opposing community's participation in undesirable circumstances directly contradicting the goals of one's own community. A close examination of the cartoon "Savage Life" in the National Struggle Museum reveals this pattern.\textsuperscript{107}

This cartoon tells the classic story of David and Goliath: a much weaker opponent with noble intentions faces a much bigger and stronger opponent with evil intentions. Yet in this version it is not the hero who prevails: slingshot in hand, the Greek Cypriot hero has fallen. The British villain holds a freshly fired gun above his opponent; shrugging his shoulders in a blasé manner he turns toward an audience just behind: "He was getting ready to shoot me, sir, so I acted first."\textsuperscript{108}

The man on the receiving end of this statement stands before a British flag waving in the wind; in his top hat he represents the presence of the British Army in Cyprus throughout the 1950s. His smug facial expression communicates amusement; judging by the joyful appearance of Turkish Cypriot soldiers just beside him, this feeling is undoubtedly shared. The imagery in this cartoon not only communicates a sense of sadistic pleasure in violence, but also perpetuates the notion of the British Army and Turkish Cypriots as co-conspirers against Greek Cypriots. From this image it is also clear that assigning the villain label does not require directly criminalizing language.

This pattern is quite prominent in the National Struggle Museum. Elsewhere a display titled “Turks celebrating the London and Zurich Agreements” presents a

\textsuperscript{107} National Struggle Museum, Nicosia.  
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
collection of several photos of the Turkish Cypriot community at Cyprus' 1960 declaration of independence.\textsuperscript{109} Turkish Cypriots are referred to simply as Turks: an insistence on Cypriot identity's incompatibility with any language and culture other than that of Greece. In the photo on the left a sign carried by Turkish Cypriot demonstrators reads “Conquerors of Cyprus, we embrace you with gratitude.”\textsuperscript{110}

Although nothing explicitly negative is stated about the Turkish Cypriots, we know that the independence of Cyprus represents the Greek Cypriot failure to attain union with Greece. By default this casts a negative light on Turkish Cypriots for celebrating it. It is clear once again that silence is equally powerful as vilifying language.

Heroes

Heroes face villains; more importantly, heroes overcome great challenges imposed by villains. This renders the villain the 'constitutive outside' of the hero; as such, the villain's construction is of vital importance to the construction of the hero. Constructions of heroes have two distinct parts: emphasis on victimhood and emphasis on strength. These are mutually dependent; where emphasis only on victimhood simply communicates weakness, emphasis only on strength risks at worst communications of aggression or at best insignificance. Historian Kris Brown declares the construction of the hero a simultaneous "ticking of the victim and fighter box" to relay this message: "We’re ready to fight, but we’re weak and we're the

\textsuperscript{109} National Struggle Museum, Nicosia.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
underdogs”. The bravery of the underdog alludes once more to the classic tale of David and Goliath; if David had not been the underdog he would not have been the hero. A closer look at both the Irish Republican History Museum and the National Struggle Museum reveals these patterns.

A predominant tactic in self-victimization is to display graphic imagery of injured fighters. The image on the left comes serves this purpose in the Irish Republican History Museum; the image on the right belongs to the National Struggle Museum:

Both of these images present badly bruised and bloodied individuals; gruesome as it may be, these are the faces of justice. That the men in these photos are willing to fight for their national cause despite such dire consequence communicates not only a sense of desperation but a sense of moral justness; this sense of morality links them directly to the noble intentions of a hero.

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111 Brown, Kris. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
This tactic does not stop here; intensifying the image of brutality intensifies the hero's sense of moral justification. One way to do this is to extend the image of the victim from injury to death. In the Irish Republican History museum, the striking image on the left depicts a skeletal hunger striker.112

This image references the period of hunger strikes in Long Kesh prison during which several Irish Republicans died protesting the criminal status imposed upon them by the British government. Nearing death, this hunger striker holds his head in the air with his mouth hanging open, as if moaning out cries of painful desperation. Around him prison walls feature cracks and missing pieces: a silent protest of inhumane prison conditions criminalizing the British government keeping him there. The words "Dying for Justice" imply martyrdom, and this martyrdom a sense of unjust oppression.113 As stated above this message is crucial to the construction of the hero. Without such moral implications, the above prisoner would not be a hero at all.

Another means of communicating martyrdom does not require such brutal imagery. On the top floor of the National Struggle Museum there are three nooses hanging from the ceiling. These nooses reach down through an opening towards the floor below, hovering above visitors no matter where they are in the museum.

On my visits to the National Struggle Museum an eerie feeling haunted me;

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112 Irish Republican History Museum, Belfast.
113 Ibid.
those nooses hanging above me seemed to be beckoning victims. I watched them sway occasionally from side to side as if still waiting for heavy bodies to still their movements. This reminded me that although Cyprus is generally considered to be a post-conflict society, lingering tensions alienate one community from the other.

Once on the top floor the brutality of these nooses is juxtaposed with quite a peaceful setting. Surrounding them on all sides are candlelit memorials to "EOKA heroes" who died fighting for national justice, reducing their lives simply to their role in the struggle for enosis.\textsuperscript{114} The plaques accompanying each fighter indicate that many were hung by the British Army. Their faces gaze out upon the nooses that had become their fate. This subtle juxtaposition directly aids the construction of EOKA fighters as heroes.

Identifying as a hero attributes all actions of resistance to justice, thus depictions of one's own violence communicates bravery rather than villainy. One of the plaques surrounding the nooses in the National Struggle Museum demonstrates. According to the image on the left, EOKA fighter Katelaris Pantelis died “in the explosion of a bomb he was making.”\textsuperscript{115} If Pantelis was a member of the Turkish Cypriot TMT, the fact that he was making a bomb would criminalize him as violent and cruel. Yet Pantelis was a member of EOKA and this narrative belongs to the Greek Cypriot community. As a result, Pantelis' act of violence is transformed into an act of heroism and bravery that seeks to protect the honor and destiny of the Greek Cypriot people.

\textsuperscript{114} National Struggle Museum, Nicosia.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
In the Irish Republican History Museum, IRA violence is identically justified. The following newspaper article is displayed on a wall above Irish Republican weaponry. Titled "IRA blasts Brits where it hurts," the article insists the following:\footnote{116}

"Bombs in England would have to rain on British Army quarters for a few centuries to fully make up for the suffering of the oppressed Irish people! But the scales of justice have been given a tilt in the right direction on two consecutive Saturdays in London with the bomb outside Chelsea barracks and with the booby-trap explosion on the car of Lieutenant General Sir Stewart Pringle, godfather of the Royal Marine Commandos, a regiment presently based in West Belfast."\footnote{117}

If these bombs had been placed by either the British Army or Loyalists they would signify villainy; yet within the Irish Republican narrative they symbolize a heroic desire to defend one's nation from further oppression.

In an interview with IRA member Paul Norney I was introduced to the way this moral justification transferred into the personal narratives of those who took part in such violence:

"I grew up in a very different, strange environment, you know what I mean? There was just war. There was just fighting, rats, barricades up, British soldiers who were alien to me. So what do you do? These people are attacking my community. They’re attacking my friends. I see my friends battered, smashed to bits, shot. What do you do? You resist...We were never a nation who attacked people. Never aggressive. We did defend ourselves."\footnote{118}

Norney's words are a testament to the significance of the national narrative in the hearts and minds of those it claims; especially for those who bear dire memories of violence fighting to protect it.

\footnote{116}{Irish Republican History Museum, Belfast.}
\footnote{117}{Ibid.}
\footnote{118}{Norney, Paul. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).}
In the National Struggle Museum the personal words of EOKA leader Georgios Grivas correspond. In a letter to the British Army he writes the following:

“We feel sorry we had to strike at you and kill a few of your comrades… We had warned you, however, that should you continue to fight the Cypriot patriots who struggle for nothing else than the right to live free we would take reprisals against you and you would be treated with their bullets… You will receive much harder and pitiless blows if you keep obeying your officers’ orders who apply in Cyprus Hitler’s and Mussolini’s abominable criminal methods. Cyprus will then become a big British cemetery… NO POWER IN THE WORLD CAN SUPPRESS OUR MOVEMENT. The right is on our side and we are all determined to die for our freedom.”¹¹⁹

Much like Norney, Grivas emphasizes EOKA violence to be merely a defense strategy in the face of British oppression. He even presents Greek Cypriots as a merciful people who desire to avoid bloody conflict in expressing remorse for fallen British soldiers. That they want "nothing more than to live free” beckons along with Grivas' declaration "the right is on our side" the sense of moral justness imperative to the hero archetype.¹²⁰

As stated above, the construction of the hero requires more than victimization. It requires levels of bravery and perseverance sufficient to combat this victimization. Accompanying bravery and perseverance are representations of national unity. Throughout both of these museums this message is copiously relayed.

In the National Struggle Museum a life-size statue immediately draws attention to itself. The statue's sheer size renders a more tangibly authentic experience for museum visitors, transporting them back in time to EOKA's 1950s struggle for enosis.

¹¹⁹ National Struggle Museum, Nicosia.
¹²⁰ Ibid.
Expressions of care and concern adorn the faces of EOKA fighters as they aid their fallen comrades: a statement of unity. Onlookers absorb these same emotions, making them feel as if they belong themselves to the community of men they gaze upon.

The Greek flags these fighters carry represent what bonds them together: their loyalty to Greece and willingness to die for it. These messages of bravery and loyalty are the mirror image of heroism. That the statue lacks color seems to freeze the moment in time: preserving the heroic qualities of EOKA fighters and passing it on to the present generation of Greek Cypriots. This communicates another essential quality of the hero: perseverance throughout time.

In the Irish Republican History Museum these qualities are emphasized for a specific hero:

“For inside that grim prison lay a brave Irish soldier, his life for his country about to lay down. He went to his death like a true son of Ireland, and the firing party he bravely did face. When the order rang out present arms and fire, James Connolly fell into a ready-made grave.”

This poem is dedicated to renowned Irish hero James Connolly. In April of 1916 Connolly led the six-day insurrection against British authority in Ireland known as the Easter Rising. The Irish Volunteer Force, the pre-cursor to the Irish Republican Army, seized control of over 1200 buildings in Dublin before facing defeat. Captured participants faced execution; the above poem depicts that of Connolly.

Connolly's execution is shown here as a defiant act of bravery; he is donating his life to the cause for Irish freedom rather than having it unwillingly ripped away by British attackers. Yet his "ready-made grave" insists he is not special; this heroic act will repeat itself again and again because all those who fight for Ireland's freedom from British authority have been branded as heroes. Our heroic characteristic is

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121 Irish Republican History Museum, Belfast.
122 English, Irish Freedom, 261.
123 Irish Republican History Museum, Belfast.
revealed: the perseverance to resist defeat even after death. This sends an important message: to defeat a hero is not to defeat the hero's cause.

Silencing Internal Dissent

Allegiance is the nation's membership requirement. Belief in the nation's version of heroes and villains affirms allegiance. Dissent is labeled traitorous. Yet national homogeneity is unrealistic. Expecting homogeneity triggers internal discrimination.

Many individuals dispute the nation's version of heroes and villains. Partial dispute implies partial agreement. Agreement lends attachment to the national community. Attached members avoid traitorous accusations. Avoiding accusations silences dissenting opinions.

The national narrative asserts a clear villain. The Irish Republican History Museum and the National Struggle Museum have one in common: the British Army. Yet my interviews suggest an unclear villain. For some the British Army is more friend than foe.

Former Official IRA member Seamus Kelly views the British Army as heroic. Attacked by the Provisional IRA, British soldiers saved his life. Shot and wounded, Kelly recalls:

"I was glad that they were there, because they saved my life. I mean really, when I think about it, I probably would have been dead today. The man would have finished me off, you know what I mean?" \(^{124}\)

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\(^{124}\) Kelly, Seamus. By Laura Brody (2014).
The Irish Republican History museum’s narrative asks Irish Nationalists to despise the British Army. Kelly believes he owes the British Army his life. My interviews in Northern Ireland suggest his opinion is not unique.

Greek Cypriot Mikis Hadjineophytou describes an amicable relationship with the British Army. He recalls from his childhood:

"I remember having a very good time with the English soldiers, they used to come to my village for their target practice, and of course, we used to go after them asking for biscuits, money, and what not, and they obliged."

The National Struggle Museum’s narrative asks Greek Cypriots to recall British belligerence. Hadjineophytou recalls amusement. My interviews in Cyprus suggest many Greek Cypriots view the British Army in positive or neutral terms.

Some I interviewed offered alternative versions of the villain. Irish Republican Socialist Party member Fra Halligan blames conflict in Northern Ireland on the capitalist system:

"The enemy is the capitalist system. It's a class war, not a religious war. It’ll do more damage than thirty-eight years of conflict here ever did. There’s absolutely no doubt about that."

For Halligan, viewing the British Army and Loyalists as villains buries the true enemy: capitalism. Ignoring capitalism's damage prevents peace. His opinion is shared by many in Northern Ireland, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Hadjineophytou labels his own community as villainous. He is the only person to do so among those I interviewed. This does not eliminate the possibility of his opinion being shared. During our interview he claims:

"I strongly believe that the Greek Cypriot side, my side unfortunately, bears most of the responsibility. The Greek Cypriot side never really accepted the independent state of Cyprus, the Cyprus we inherited in 1960. It was like a

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bastard child - we set out for a different target: enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. And of course the Turkish Cypriots reacted to the cry for enosis, and I don’t blame them because it brought out what we call the Crete syndrome. When Crete became independent, most of the Turkish community of Greece was eradicated. There is not a single Turkish-speaking Cretan left in Crete now. The call for enosis, really scared the Turkish Cypriot community. They thought that, quite likely so I believe, union with Greece would mean their demise.”

Although he assigns the villain label to Greek Cypriots Hadjineophytou persists in using the term "we" to describe Greek Cypriot actions. This demonstrates an earlier point. To dispute the national narrative is not to desire disassociation from the national community. Hadjineophytou also acknowledges an important characteristic of sectarian conflict: the suffering of both sides. In the Irish Republican History Museum and National Struggle Museum the struggle of opposing communities is denied. Their experience is purely one of villainy. Hadjineophytou argues that Turkish Cypriot fear was justified. Justified fear implies justified defense.

The Irish Republican History Museum denies Unionist and Protestant suffering. Much like Hadjineophytou Halligan denies the national narrative, reflecting on Protestant membership in the Irish Republican Socialist Party:

"The Republican Socialist movement tried to break that stereotypical sort of view by having Protestant members. And we were all the richer for their experience and what they could bring to the table. For what they could talk to other younger members about and say ‘Look, there are Protestants who are suffering the same as yourself with poor housing, poor education, etc. The British government are giving them as hard a time as they’re giving you.”

In legitimizing the suffering of a traditional villain Halligan disputes their villainy. He presents Protestants as equals. As equals they suffer from the same oppression. As stated above Halligan's version of the villain is capitalism.

Internal feuding is also silenced in the Irish Republican History Museum and

128 Ibid.
National Struggle Museum. Yet as discussed in Chapter One, internal feuds tested the strength of both Irish Republicans and Greek Cypriots. Many recalled these feuds in my interviews. Former Provisional IRA member Tim Brannigan says, "The feuds would be to Republicanism as home-baked apple pie is to the sense of Americans."\textsuperscript{130} It is to be expected. Republicanism fractured on multiple occasions throughout the Troubles. Each new faction was considered traitorous to the faction from which it broke.

Ideological difference was strong enough to split families. Belfast local Kay Laverty shared one such occasion:

"I had an experience when the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA split. I had brothers that would cross the street and wouldn’t talk to each other just for the simple fact of politics. Growing up as kids they were close… once the split happened, they didn’t stop and fight each other in the street or anything - but if I had maybe say a brother come in here and the other brother rapped the door while he was sitting here, he would just walk out."\textsuperscript{131}

While one of Laverty’s brothers joined the Official IRA another joined the Provisional IRA. As members of opposing factions they stopped speaking. This demonstrates the importance of the nation in daily life. There was no greater cause than national justice.

The Greek Cypriot community also fractured according to ideological difference. The most significant fracture was between DISY and AKEL. As discussed in Chapter One both political parties desired enosis. The difference was in methodology. Left-wing AKEL opposed violent means. DISY frequently referred to AKEL members as Communists. Right-wing DISY endorsed violent means. EOKA became the military extension of DISY.

Papadakis explores the DISY-AKEL rivalry in his own research. Interviews

\textsuperscript{130} Brannigan, Tim. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
\textsuperscript{131} Laverty, Kay. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
conducted with former DISY and AKEL members offer important insight. In one of Papadakis' interviews a DISY member states:

“We were the leaders of the anti-colonial struggle in the area, and some of our members died for EOKA. Not like the Communists. I will say it openly, out of the teeth: the Communists were traitors. They were against EOKA.”

An interview with a former AKEL member confirms the rivalry:

“Everyone knows the story of the man stoned to death by the masked killers of EOKA. They tied him to a tree and stoned him to death because he was a communist, with no proof that he had done anything wrong. Maybe not everyone knows it now. You are young. But we AKEL people all do. EOKA killed so many Communists accused of treachery. Did you know that EOKA killed more Greek Cypriots than English?”

DISY and AKEL shared a goal: enosis. Yet each condemns the other's actions. The above statements also demonstrate the dissonance between national memory and personal memory. As personal memories, they are excluded from national memory. To acknowledge them would be to delegitimize Greek Cypriot solidarity.

Support for nationalist movements may be misinterpreted. The IRA desired Northern Ireland's reunion with the Republic of Ireland. EOKA desired Cyprus' union with Greece. Many individuals shared these desires, but some had other motives.

One alternative motive is protection. Violence breeds fear; especially that which fails to distinguish between combatants and civilians. Many civilians in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus fell victim to sectarian violence. The reaction to fear is to seek protection. Some believed support for paramilitary organizations could provide such protection. This was Laverty's view:

"We would have supported the Provisional IRA because there wasn’t anybody else to save us or protect us, do you know what I mean? It wasn’t to be unified

\[\text{References} \]

133 Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, 160.
with the Republic, not for me. Just that they were helping us as a community. They were saving us."\(^{134}\)

Supporting a movement can also provide protection from the movement itself. Hadjineophytou describes this to be the case in Cyprus:

"There was a lot of support for Makarios, coming from a very immature people that had never lived under a proper democratic regime. People supported him, obviously because of his priesthood as well. So his word was the word of God. Any person who tried to go against him even lightly would suffer a lot. I think even people who did not agree with *enosis* could not express themselves in this way, not explicitly, because they would be silenced by EOKA."\(^{135}\)

Hadjineophytou's testament demonstrates the point of this section. Fear increases power and breeds faux loyalty. Dissent is labeled traitorous. Traitors are punished. Those who fear punishment are silent. Yet fear cannot be broken in the midst of silence.

**Conclusion**

The Irish Republican History and National Struggle museums lack resolution. They represent losing battles. In both Northern Ireland and Cyprus competing nationalisms laid claim to the same territory and none succeeded. Northern Ireland remains separate from the Republic of Ireland. Yet Unionists must share power with Nationalists. Cyprus remains separate from Greece. Yet the Turkish Cypriot north is labeled illegitimate.

Each of these nationalisms held a common belief: they were heroes. As heroes they fought for justice. As heroes, they cannot lose faith in justice. For without justice, national suffering remains an open wound. The call to heal this wound travels

\(^{134}\) Laverty, Kay. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
\(^{135}\) Hadjineophytou, Mikis. Interview by Laura Brody (2015).
Throughout generations in the heroic and villainous representations discussed above.

They lend life support to the quest for national justice. Yet as I will discuss in Chapter Three, a quest for justice denies the quest for peace.
Peaceful Violence: Underlying Division in the ‘Post-Conflict’ Era

“The Troubles started in 1969 officially, but to me they started before that. They went off and on for hundreds of years. That’s the way history does, it repeats itself every so often if you don’t deal with it. If there were an end to the conflict, it’d deal with the past as well. Today they haven’t dealt with the past yet, and it’s going to repeat itself I think.” - Seamus Kelly

In July 2014 I came to a sudden halt on the Springfield Road. I had been warned that July in Northern Ireland is turbulent. Only now I believed it. Stones flew from Nationalist territory into Unionist territory through a temporarily open peace gate in west Belfast. Each was reciprocated from the other side. I heard the slurs 'Fenian' and 'Prod' shot in either direction. Yet none of this surprised me. I was struck by something else: youth.

These were children throwing stones. They didn't experience the Troubles firsthand. They even grew up in a model of post-conflict peacebuilding. In my mind this had exempt them from sectarian ideology. Yet they still conveyed such fiery hatred for the other side of this so-called peace wall. I realized in this moment how very wrong I was.

Children are not exempt from sectarian ideology. They inherit it. Sectarianism is transmitted to younger generations through the heroic and villainous representations discussed in the previous chapter. Spatial divisions enhance mistrust for the other side. Marking territory safeguards insiders and threatens outsiders.

In the quote at the beginning of this chapter former Official IRA member Seamus Kelly predicts history will repeat itself in Northern Ireland. I argue that history has already done so. In fact, it never stopped. The Troubles and the Cyprus Problem are fragments of much larger conflicts that have been ongoing for centuries.

Moments of reduced political violence are not moments of peace. Representative and spatial division is a continuation of violence. Sociologist Nico Carpentier insists that this continuation is "simply lethal" and "can lead people to killing each other." As I had just seen, it could certainly lead children to throwing stones. This renders the term 'post-conflict' inappropriate.

**Trans-generational trauma**

Psychologist Sigmund Freud proclaims a clear distinction between mourning and melancholy. Mourning is a conscious and healthy response to loss. Taking place in the unconscious mind and stripping away the sense of self, melancholia is pathological. It is the response to a loss that is not yet identified or understood.

Opposing nationalisms in Northern Ireland and Cyprus believe themselves cheated of national justice. Yet a loss must be something first acquired. For Northern Ireland and Cyprus, national destinies were perceived yet never obtained. As such, they cannot be lost. Believing in the loss traps Northern Ireland and Cyprus in a perpetual state of melancholy. Having lost the sense of self, opposing nations cling even more tightly to national identity.

Sociologist and Turkish Cypriot Vamik Volkan coined the phrase "chosen trauma" to describe historical constructions born out of national melancholia. The heroic and villainous archetypes discussed in Chapter Two exemplify 'chosen traumas' in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Exhibiting chosen traumas ensures their deposit in younger generations.

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139 Ibid.
Volkan asserts national trauma passed down "under the premise that it can be kept safe" until the opportunity for justice arises. Each generation is brought up in the shadows of representational and spatial divisions that plant seeds of nationalist fervor and revenge in its inner psyche. As such, children grow up in Northern Ireland believing themselves Irish or British. In Cyprus they are Greeks and Turks. Never are they Northern Irish or Cypriot.

History education plays an important role in delivering chosen traumas to younger generations. In both Northern Ireland and Cyprus, school systems are segregated according to national affinity. Opposing nationalisms tell the same history with radically different messages. Greek Cypriot Hadjineophytou insists:

"Young kids can easily be lead on, as you know, and if you press on these things in the minds of young children they will become fanatics when they grow up. I've seen this happen all these years."

Hadjineophytou testifies to history education's leading role in perpetuating ethno-sectarianism. Child development is a process of absorption. With no alternative to absorb they will believe in the political ideology presented to them, regardless of its sectarian nature.

In a 2008 study Papadakis juxtaposed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot history textbooks. A Greek Cypriot textbook describes the 1570 Conquest of Nicosia when the Ottoman Empire first landed in Cyprus:

"It was obvious that one day the Turks would try to grab Cyprus. The way that the state of the Sultan expanded, little Cyprus appeared like a weak mouse in the claws of a wild lion."

The above paints Turks at best as a bestially savage people ceasing at nothing to

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141 Volkan, Trans-generational Transmissions, 86.
143 Papadakis, "Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus", 133.
snatch what isn't theirs. It directly commands both hatred and fear. With such lessons, it is no wonder Greek Cypriot children are mistrusting towards Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

Growing up in Cyprus Papadakis reflects on his own experience in the Greek Cypriot history classroom: “Every important date in our history as Greeks bespoke our encounters with Turkish barbarism. And I was a product of this history.” Here Papadakis asserts his identity to have formed in large part due to the historical narratives he was told as a child.

After visiting Turkey for the first time, Papadakis comments, "I thought my trip to Turkey had made it impossible for me to remain a Greek. I did not hate the Turks, and that was what being Greek meant, or so my schoolbooks had taught me." Here Papadakis testifies to the Turk's role in defining Greek identity. To be Greek is to hate Turks, and suppressing this hate is national treason.

History education in Northern Ireland is equally contested. After the partition of Ireland, Protestant leadership redesigned Northern Irish history curriculum to develop a "strong British national identity and loyalty." The Ministry of Education inspected textbooks to ensure sufficient emphasis on British rather than Irish history.

In the 1940s Catholic leadership advocated for more emphasis on Irish history. Protestant leadership responded with the revised textbook *Northern Ireland, Its History, Recourse and People*. The new curriculum included Ulster history, but failed to satisfy Catholic leadership by presenting Ulster as inseparable.

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144 Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, 8-9.
145 Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, 43.
146 Korestelina, "History Education and Social Identity", 30.
147 Ibid.
Some Catholic schoolteachers simply ignored the Ministry of Education's stipulations for history curriculum. Northern Irish journalist Eamonn McCann recalls from his childhood a teacher "at pains to discredit English propaganda." At the beginning of each school year, the teacher would "lead the class through the set textbooks and instruct them to tear out pages of fiction.

In the 1960s the European Association of Teachers created an Irish Board to assist in the development an unbiased history curriculum in the hopes it would diffuse ethno-sectarian tensions in Northern Ireland. The attention these arguments acquired demonstrates just how conscious and powerful a tool history education is in the formation of national identity and allegiance. However, these tools may also take place outside of schools.

Family is another important passage for chosen traumas to travel through younger generations. Familial loyalty may incite national loyalty. In the Community Foundation of Northern Ireland's 2014 study, former Official IRA member recalls:

“I joined because of family tradition. My family had been involved since 1918-19, so there was always someone in the family in prison or active. So you just saw it as your duty to do that. It was an alien place we lived in, my family had burned out; our home had been burned twice since 1918. My great grandparents’ house was burned and my grandparents’ was burned. My father was five years old when his house was burned, and he left home and ran away with his 7 year-old brother and they were lost for a week. These are things that I lived on, and they made me think that I had to help get rid of this state, this British occupation.”

The above testimony reveals an important point. One reason people join nationalist

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151 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
155 “From Conflict to Prison and from Prison to Peace: Reflections." Belfast: Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, 2014: 30.
groups is to protect those they love. Family suffering engenders an implied duty to seek justice. If rooted in ethno-sectarianism, nationalist fervor may swiftly follow. The above also reveals the Troubles not isolated from previous centuries of Irish-British sectarianism.

In Cyprus family belief also plays an important role in perpetuating ethno-sectarianism. In an interview with PRIO, Greek Cypriot Lolly discusses the effect of her mother's hate towards Turks:

“I hate Turks not only because my mother transmitted it to me: I believe that even if my mother did not say anything I would hate them. Sometimes when I listen to what the Turks are asking for, absurd things...such as in the referendum they were asking us to vote yes. But yes would mean like agreeing to sell Cyprus. That is why I hate them...No, we cannot co-exist. I would not like to live with Turkish Cypriots... they did so many things to us and besides that, there is what they did in 1915 to the Armenians, in Greece in 1821...”

Lolly's testament not only demonstrates an automatic absorption of her mother's hatred, but also calls upon history long before the Cyprus Problem to incriminate Turks. She demonstrates that the Troubles and Cyprus Problem are parts of much larger conflicts persisting to the present day. I will discuss the manifestations of present-day divisions in the following sections.

**Divided Space**

Many scholars label territoriality an innate human trait. Geographer David Smith insists that it is not innate but always a "means to some end" such as political control or material survival. In this case territoriality requires motive. Smith says


that nationalism is one powerful motive in both uniting and dividing territory. In Northern Ireland and Cyprus, dividing space is a means of legitimizing national identity. These spatial divisions take various forms.

Peace walls separate Nationalist and Unionist neighborhoods in Belfast and show few signs of coming down. Many reach over seven meters in height. The first walls built in 1969 were meant to be temporary. Yet over forty walls remain, many built after the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

In an interview with Belfast local Kay Laverty I learned just how alienating these walls are. Laverty declared:

"They tell you that there’s a ceasefire in Northern Ireland now and there’s the peace agreement; but if you go to walk along the Falls Road, you’ll come to peace gates everywhere. You’ll come to the peace walls. You’ll come to bridges that are built. If we live in peace, why are all the walls up? Why are all the gates closed? Because we can’t live in peace."[159]

Laverty's opinion is not unique. In 2012, sociologist and Belfast local Johnny Byrne conducted a study on attitudes to peace walls. He found that 69% deem peace walls necessary to avoid sectarian violence.[160] Only 38% could imagine a future without them.[161]

In Cyprus a United Nations patrolled buffer zone separates the Greek Cypriot south and Turkish Cypriot north. The zone is over 180 kilometers long and in some places reaches over 7 kilometers in width. Access remained restricted until the first pedestrian crossing opened in 2004. The same year, an agreement was proposed to reunite the Cypriot north and south, but was down-voted by 76% of Greek

[159] Laverty, Kay. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
[161] Ibid.
Cypriots. Today there are a handful of crossings, but the border remains intact.

The Peace Research Institute of Oslo's (PRIÖ) Nicosia branch conducted a 2007 study on prospects of reconciliation in Cyprus. In one interview, Turkish Cypriot local Gümüş expresses gratitude for the buffer zone: "It is not possible to forget what happened, but it is possible to not repeat it. Now we live separate and I feel safe". The desire to remain separate is shared by many participants in the study. About 80% claim Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot interaction non-existent or extremely limited. Around 60% believe reconciliation impossible or improbable.

Territorial markings enhance physical division. One way to mark territory is with flags. Flags in Northern Ireland and Cyprus demand attention. Sociologist Michael Billig contrasts these to "banal" flags that go largely unnoticed, such as those on United States government buildings. These disappear into society's background because they don't compete for territory. In Northern Ireland and Cyprus, flags serve as warnings for those on enemy territory.

In Northern Ireland Irish flags mark Nationalist territory and British flags mark Unionist territory. Some sidewalks are painted in national colors: green, white and orange for Nationalists, red, white and blue for Unionists. These markings seek to legitimize territorial claims. As discussed in Chapter One, Loyalists seek to delegitimize the Nationalist claim by burning Irish flags.

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163 Sitas, Prospects of Reconciliation, 46.
164 Sitas, Prospects of Reconciliation, 10.
165 Sitas, Prospects of Reconciliation, 60.
In Nationalist territory flags are often accompanied by sectarian slogans. The photo to the left is an example. I took this photo in Derry in June 2014. Attached to this flagpole is a sign that reads "Brits Out Now" and is signed by the IRA. This is not unique. I have seen many images like it. The slogan "Brits Out Now" and others like it abound in Nationalist territory. Paramilitary graffiti also abounds, from my experiences, much more so than in Unionist territory.

In Cyprus, territory is marked with the flags of perceived motherlands. Yet each community uses a second flag. In the Greek Cypriot south, the Greek flag accompanies the internationally recognized Cypriot Republic flag. In the Turkish Cypriot north, the Turkish flag accompanies the flag of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) that only Turkey recognizes.

Greek and Turkish flags exist in greater abundance than Cypriot flags. On Greek Cypriot territory the Greek flag often stands alone. Yet the Cypriot Republic flag usually accompanies a Greek flag. On Turkish Cypriot territory the Turkish flag stands alone but the TRNC flag does not. The TRNC flag always accompanies the Turkish flag. These patterns suggest for both communities that being Cypriot is secondary to being Greek or Turkish.

Greek Cypriots label the TRNC flag illegitimate. Turkish Cypriots issued a response. On the Kyrenia mountain range, both the Turkish and TRNC accompany the words "Ne mutlu Türküm diyene" translating to "How happy is the one who can say he is Turkish." Targeting a Greek Cypriot audience, this

\[167\] Translated by author.
display faces the south.

I took the photo on the right at the top of Shacolos Tower in Greek Cypriot Nicosia. It demonstrates the display's visibility kilometers away on enemy territory. A colleague who lives on Turkish Cypriot territory told me she only notices the flags on Greek Cypriot territory or in the buffer zone where our office was located. I faced them daily working by the office window.

This display sends Greek Cypriots a hostile message. Directly printed on the mountainside, it communicates permanence. The motto not only expresses content with being Turkish, but underlying superiority to being Greek. The entire display lights up at night as if mocking the Greek Cypriot south, and most importantly, to ensure its permanent visibility.

Dividing space via physical barriers and territorial markings is a pattern shared by many post-conflict societies. This does not imply that each is identical. Northern Ireland and Cyprus share many patterns, but they also divide space in distinct ways. This chapter does not have the capacity for an exhaustive list, so I will offer one example in each location.

Political murals mark territory in Belfast. These murals come from extreme versions of Nationalism and Unionism: Republicanism and Loyalism. The messages they send play a large role in transferring trauma to the next generation.

The following depiction of IRA hero Bobby Sands is located on the Falls Road in West Belfast. Sands led the 1981 Republican hunger strike for political prisoner status in Long Kesh prison. During the strike he was elected Republican MP of Belfast.
After 66 days on strike he died before taking office. His death was followed by the deaths of nine other prisoners.

Today Sands represents what he and his comrades were fighting for: justice. The mural reads, "Everyone Republican or otherwise has their own particular role to play...our revenge will be the laughter of our children." These are some of Sands' most famous words. They remind those who read them not to lose faith in justice, an essential quality of heroism discussed in Chapter Two.

The depiction of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) below appears on the Shankill Road in West Belfast. The UVF was a Loyalist paramilitary group that opposed the IRA. The mural shows the faces and names of five UVF volunteers who died during the Troubles, along with four masked volunteers holding machine guns. They surround the UVF's slogan: "For God and for Ulster." These words mark the UVF heroic rather than villainous, and as a result, brave rather than violent.

Both of the above murals are calls to justice. Bobby Sands and the UVF volunteers are martyrs. They represent national suffering. For those who experienced the Troubles, these depictions deepen old wounds. For children, they create them. Each glance at these murals and others like them is a reminder to seek revenge.

In Cyprus language marks territory. In the Greek Cypriot south signs are in Greek and English. In the Turkish Cypriot north they are in Turkish in English. Each
side welcomes tourists with the English language, yet neither uses the language of its closest neighbor. This message is clear. Greek Cypriots don't welcome Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots don't welcome Greek Cypriots.

As an outsider I was not used to switching languages within a stretch of ten yards. If after spending time in the north I instinctively used the Turkish 'Merhaba' with a Greek Cypriot officer, I received an incriminating glance. If I used the Greek 'Yassas' with a Turkish Cypriot officer, the glance was less incriminating than annoyed. This made it clear to me that language choice communicates communal allegiance in Cyprus.

Spatial division was meant to promote peace in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Instead it promotes sectarianism. It is a perpetual reminder to declare allegiance. To declare allegiance is to declare an enemy. Shared space is limited in Northern Ireland and non-existent in Cyprus. Without shared space, cross-communal interaction is limited, enabling mistrust and fear to multiply.

**Divided Minds**

Volkan compares group identity to a tent.\(^{168}\) On peaceful days the tent remains empty. Yet during a storm it offers protection.\(^{169}\) Individuals seeking shelter flock to it, just as individuals cling to group identity seeking protection from social turbulence.\(^{170}\) The greater the turbulence, the tighter the grasp. The term 'post-conflict' is inappropriate to describe Northern Ireland and Cyprus because the representational divisions discussed in Chapter Two, and the spatial divisions to be discussed in the following section, may be viewed as representational violence. They indicate that

\(^{168}\) Volkan, *Trans-generational Transmissions*, 83.
\(^{169}\) Ibid.
\(^{170}\) Volkan, *Trans-generational Transmissions*, 84.
Northern Ireland and Cyprus are still stuck in storms. Clinging to national identity shelters them from turbulence.

I interviewed former Provisional IRA member Tim Brannigan at Healing Through Remembering. The office houses a large collection of photos related to the Troubles. Browsing the photos on the wall, Tim remarked, "If you walked in here without knowing anything these may not make a lot of sense, but to me that’s the gravity of my life." Brannigan was born in 1966, three years before the Troubles began. As a child of the Troubles, Brannigan considered violence a normal part of life.

Pointing to the scene of an explosion he reflects on his own participation in political violence:

"There've been times I’ve cheered when I’ve seen that scene and there’ve been times where I’ve been appalled when I’ve seen it, you know? Depending on what the target was and who planted the bomb."  

Irish Nationalists have been seeking justice throughout Brannigan's entire life. Loyalist violence was villainy and obliged Republicans to fight back. Republican violence meant justice.

As a black man, national identity plays an even larger role in Brannigan's life. During his childhood there were very few blacks living in Northern Ireland. He recalls being stopped by the British Army as young as six for entertainment:

"So they would ask me questions, but it wasn’t because they wanted to know where I’d been since I was only a six year-old child. It was so I would speak so that they could all hear this Irish accent and think ‘Fuck, a black guy with an Irish accent! Have you ever heard the like of it?’ Today it's still seen as odd."  

Brannigan shared that many people accuse him of lying when he says he is Irish. As

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172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
such, he fights that much harder to claim his national identity. Brannigan has been fighting for his nation his entire life.

In an interview with PRIO Greek Cypriot Pitsa expresses the importance of national identity in her own life. She exclaims: “I have grown up as a Grivas-supporter. I believe the island is Greek...I cannot sacrifice my ethnic pride and dignity or even my land for anybody.”

Referencing dignity, Pitsa labels national allegiance a matter of morality. National identity is non-negotiable. Personal pride is defined by national pride. Carpenter claims that the importance of national identity in unresolved conflicts "triggers the need for justice" and perpetuates sectarianism. This mental division inhibits progress towards peace.

In a 2014 study conducted by the Community Foundation in Northern Ireland about Belfast's prospects for peace, a former member of the Ulster Defense Regiment admits:

“Today I have no Catholic friends...they are not people that I would like to socialize with or build any great friendships with. I am happy enough to stay within my own community. It is not so much about the Catholic religion, but more about the fact that they are Nationalists and Republicans. We will never, never agree.”

The Ulster Defense Regiment was part of the British Army. It was meant to be a neutral peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland, but its makeup was overwhelmingly Unionist. The statement above demonstrates my point that mental divisions inhibit peace. Peace requires change and change requires work. But work requires motivation. If people are satisfied with the status quo they feel no reason to work towards peace.

174 Sitas, Prospects of Reconciliation, 47.
176 "From Conflict to Prison", 74.
Such mental divisions persist in Cyprus as well. In PRIO's study on reconciliation, Greek Cypriot Onyx explains her feelings about interacting with Turkish Cypriots:

"Even if a Turkish Cypriot comes here and we talk, it will not feel the same as it feels with Greeks. I will not be able to trust him; I will not see him the same as I see the Greek Cypriot."\(^ {177}\)

Turkish Cypriot Mehmet mirrors this mistrust:

"When I visit South Nicosia, the Greeks look at me differently because I am a Turk. How can you feel comfortable among the Greeks?"\(^ {178}\)

As in Northern Ireland, these quotes demonstrate disinterest in pursuing reconciliation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. The attitude is to leave well enough alone. By referring to Greeks and Turks rather than Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, Mehmet also affirms motherland identity playing a larger role than Cypriot identity.

In both Northern Ireland and Cyprus individuals blame disinterest in reconciliation on the other community. Each community claims to be open to peaceful negotiation while the other is too villainous to consider it. This mirrors the hero and villain archetypes discussed in Chapter Two.

On the topic of forgiveness a Greek Cypriot claims: "We have it in our religion but they don’t have it in theirs."\(^ {179}\) The statement implies that the Muslim religion will always prevent the Turkish Cypriot community from working towards a solution with the Greek Cypriot community. It also assigns Greek Orthodoxy the moral inclination towards reconciliation aligned with heroism.

In Northern Ireland a similar pattern emerges. In my interview with former

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\(^{177}\) Sitas, *Prospects of Reconciliation*, 57.

\(^{178}\) Sitas, *Prospects of Reconciliation*, 55.

\(^{179}\) Sitas, *Prospects of Reconciliation*, 46.
PIRA member Paul Norney he declared:

"People have different perceptions of the past. That’s understandable... we need to sit down and talk about this. Unfortunately, I’m prepared to do it. But these other people aren’t prepared to do it because they define themselves as victims. And they’re the only victims. My father wasn’t a victim, my brother wasn’t a victim, my cousin wasn’t a victim, my friends weren’t victims - in their perception...we're all victims here. You’ve got to understand that. Everybody who’s in a war who died is a victim, and until they understand that we can’t – we can’t talk, like you know what I mean?"\(^{180}\)

Norney condemns the Unionist and Loyalist inability to acknowledge Nationalist and Republican victimhood, simultaneously upholding Nationalist and Republican readiness to acknowledge Unionist and Loyalist victimhood for the sake of peace. As in Cyprus, the statement upholds the moral righteousness of Norney's own community.

Yet choosing not to vilify the other side may have its own consequences. When individuals don't seek protection within large group identity, they are left on the outside of both communities. In his research Papadakis interviewed a Turkish Cypriot reflecting on his decision to remain in south Cyprus when Turkish Cypriots fled north in 1964:

“"I used to live here and when everyone left in 1964 I decided to stay. The children threw bricks at my house. They called me names: Crazy Turk, dog Turk and more. It was hell. That’s when I began to get ill. So I went to the other side and there I was a traitor again because I had stayed on this side. They did not leave me alone either."\(^{181}\)

The negative effects of failing to choose a single side in sectarian conflict encourages individuals to take more extremist stances in order to prove their allegiance. Proving their allegiance to a single community enables them to remain under the shelter of the group identity in times of societal upheaval.

\(^{180}\) Norney, Paul. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).

\(^{181}\) Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, 156.
Memory: Too Much or Too Little?

Some scholars believe commemorating past conflict prevents future conflict. Holocaust survivor Ruth Kluger disagrees:

"The statement 'Let us remember, so the same thing doesn’t happen again,' is unconvincing. A remembered massacre may serve as a deterrent, but it may also serve as a model for the next massacre."\(^\text{182}\)

For Kruger and many others, obsessing over memories of conflict plays a significant role in perpetuating sectarianism. Refusing to forget is refusing to forgive.

This was a popular debate during my time in Northern Ireland. Yet there is no clear answer. In terms of memory, what is right for society may not be what is right for individuals. Commemorating national struggle may perpetuate sectarianism for some and encourage healing for others.

In 2014 the Community Foundation of Northern Ireland published a collection of reflections on the Troubles. Participants were interviewed from various paramilitary groups from both the Republican and Loyalist sides. A former UVF member says:

"People might have lost a son or a brother or an uncle or a mother due to the conflict or the Troubles so those people aren’t, when the ceasefire is called, going ‘Alright, everything is fine now.’ There is still a hatred there of what happened and there is still a process that people have to go through to try and come back from that."\(^\text{183}\)

The above statement demonstrates an important point. The notion of simply getting over the past and moving on for the good of society, so often impressed upon post-conflict societies by outsiders, is much easier said than done.


\(^{183}\) "From Conflict to Prison", 66.
For some, there is a very fine line between the positive and negative ramifications of memory. Nationalist and Belfast local Kay Laverty makes a clear distinction between remembering and celebrating. She recalls:

"I said to this young lad one day ‘What is that fire for?’ He didn’t know who I was and he said, ‘We’re celebrating internment,’ and I said, ‘Well what do you want to celebrate internment for?’ He really didn’t have a clue, he was only fifteen. I suppose like any other country you remember your dead or you remember the bad things that happened, but to go out and celebrate, I think no. I think it only stirs up tensions again, do you know what I mean? Lighting fires and celebrating is rubbish."\(^{184}\)

In our interview Laverty testified that remembering the internment of Republican prisoners during the Troubles honors their memory and increases solidarity within the Nationalist and Republican communities. Yet celebrating Republican internment only provokes sectarian tensions on both sides.\(^{185}\)

Historian and Belfast local Bill Rolston complicates this debate by declaring that individuals have a right to remember. In our interview Rolston expressed his belief that sectarianism will not dissipate unless vocalized:

"So just by pulling down the murals and flags you don’t in itself change the politics or indeed the mindsets behind painting murals and flying flags...I think I’ve got an even more basic argument that people have a right to remember. If people don’t have the right to display their bad politics, where are you going to get the opportunity to confront them? I’m all for the representation of memory even if I don’t like the message, because if I don’t like the message I’ve one of two choices. I ask the person, ‘Excuse me, why are you doing this to me?’ Or I just walk away and at least I know what I’m walking away from."\(^{186}\)

Bill's sentiment reflects that of Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel in Chapter One: violating memory is a crime against humanity. Although it doesn't automatically bring peace, the right to remember opens the possibility for peace. Oppressing traumatic memories may only destroy the prospect.

\(^{184}\) Laverty, Kay. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
\(^{185}\) Ibid.
\(^{186}\) Rolston, Bill. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
Future Prospects

Many believe that history in Northern Ireland and Cyprus will repeat itself and periods of intense violence will again arise. Kelly's testament at the beginning of this chapter is an example. For Laverty, the abundance of national symbolism is the culprit:

"Until they get the marching season fixed and this flag protest, I think it’s not going to stop. I really do think history will repeat itself one day here. I really do. People are saying it can’t, we won’t let it; but because of the flag, because of the marching season, because they won’t get over the past...maybe it won’t be today or tomorrow, maybe it won’t be in ten or twenty years, but I think it will repeat itself again one day." 187

Laverty's opinion aligns with the viewpoint that too much memory and commemoration is harmful to the prospect of a peaceful future. It is the abundance of national symbolism that provokes these memories.

Amongst those I spoke with in Cyprus, the possibility of relapse into political violence is also thought to be strong. In an interview with PRIO one Turkish Cypriot claimed:

“‘You should not forget my words: eventually these Greeks will attack us again, because history repeats itself. Every 30-40 years, the Greeks create trouble and call for a slap... they have the ambition to expand their territory and this desire exists, and has existed throughout their history...’" 188

In this statement Greek Cypriots are assigned a predisposition for conquest. They are stripped of their Cypriot identity, associated only with the history of Greek conquest to support the premise of history repeating in Cyprus. Yet again, this demonstrates that the Cyprus Problem is not an isolated historical event and is tied to centuries of tension between competing Greek and Turkish nationalisms.

187 Laverty, Kay. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
188 Sitas, Prospects of Reconciliation, 46.
Despite such negative outlooks, some believe that progress has already been made and may continue to be made towards peace. In our interview, Nationalist and Belfast local Cara McCann expressed one such positive outlook:

"I was eighteen when my son was born and he’s twenty now. He can sit in the City Centre and go out for the night, and I was like, ‘You’d never have done that when I was your age’. You just didn’t. You stayed in your own area where you knew you’d be safe...we just stayed in our own areas and that was just that. But twenty years later, you can see how things have changed, you know?"

Cara's statement is a testimony that although children in Northern Ireland inherit politicized ideology, there is more interaction between Nationalists and Unionists today than there was throughout the Troubles. Such interaction may encourage the cross-communal interaction and learning necessary for peace.

Similarly, Greek Cypriot Hadjineophytou reflects positively on Cyprus' prospect for peace in the near future:

"It’s pleasing to see that many people now are beginning to realize now that things have to change...there is a breath of fresh air. I feel it blowing over Cyprus. This also has to do with the election of Mr. Akinci as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community... He is the right man at the right time and he has a huge respect within the Greek Cypriot community...You have to exempt the nationalists, they don’t understand anything...but I think Akinci could even become the president of Cyprus in the event that there is a solution."

Hadjineophytou not only expresses hope for reconciliation in Cyprus, but also cites the Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci as a possible leader for both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. His statement directly contradicts the Greek Cypriot notion of Turkish Cypriots not belonging on the island.

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189 McCann, Cara. Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
Conclusion

In this chapter I do not mean to suggest that sectarian attitudes in Northern Ireland and Cyprus are unanimous. I will only argue that the overwhelming evidence of continued sectarianism renders the 'post-conflict' label inappropriate. Makeshift solutions may have reduced political violence, but they have failed to erase lingering tensions between communities. The 'post-conflict' label only distracts attention from societies like Northern Ireland and Cyprus in need of attentive progress towards peace.
Conclusion

Labeling a society 'post-conflict' implies that conflict is no longer present in that society. A lack of conflict implies peace. Yet as demonstrated in the previous chapters, opposing communities in Northern Ireland and Cyprus struggle to co-exist peacefully. Underlying sectarian sentiment drives social structures and norms in both locations.

Isolated by artificially assigned start and end dates, both the Troubles and the Cyprus Problem appear resolved. Yet they are parts of much larger conflicts going back centuries. Ignoring ongoing tensions enables them to persist and resurface throughout time. Labeling Northern Ireland and Cyprus 'post-conflict' thus distracts from their desperate need for attention.

The post-conflict label carries other complications. One worth noting is its instillation of a hierarchical perception of suffering. Labeling a society 'post-conflict' determines present-day trauma and suffering invalid. It trivializes both first-hand trans-generational trauma by insisting it is not extreme enough to be associated with conflict.

This hierarchical perception of suffering prevents progress towards peace. It engenders both conscious and unconscious tension in individuals who feel their suffering has been marginalized. The feeling of being marginalized only intensifies sectarian sentiment between opposing communities.

Reinventing perceptions of suffering requires reinventing perceptions of violence. In this thesis violence does not only pertain to bloodshed. Representational and spatial divisions in Northern Ireland and Cyprus are also manifestations of violence.
Representational and spatial divisions require active effort to invent and sustain. The sectarian mindsets they produce are not biological, but a matter of choice. Greeks and Turks are not born hate one another, just as the Irish and British are not born to hate one another. Sectarian mindsets are upheld in social constructions absorbed by younger generations.

Perceptions of the nation are equally constructed. Writer Taiye Selasi questions its legitimacy, asking, "How can I come from a nation? How can a human being come from a concept?"\(^1\) Selasi continues, "History is real but countries were invented."\(^2\) Selasi's mindset is applicable to societies like Northern Ireland and Cyprus divided along ethnic lines.

National identities are constructed just as ethno-sectarianism is constructed. Yet the possibility to construct something implies the possibility for its demise. The active effort sustaining national and ethno-sectarian perceptions of identity in Northern Ireland and Cyprus will require just such active effort to destroy.

The temporary solutions in Northern Ireland and Cyprus that resulted in spatial division between communities are not effective. Instead, they enhance conflict by restricting physical and mental interaction between communities. I demonstrated this throughout the Chapter Two and Chapter Three.

The notion that time and separation will dissipate inter-communal tension is too idealistic. Opposing communities may not resume peaceful co-existence if there was no peaceful co-existence in their pasts. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, Greek-Turkish and Irish-British tensions have persisted for centuries, remaining hidden but still present in perceived moments of peace.

\(^1\) Selasi, Taiye. 2014. *Don't ask where I'm from, ask where I'm a local.* TEDGlobal.
\(^2\) Ibid.
Opening borders is also not a solution. An open border is still a border, and open borders do not indicate open minds. The opening of the peace gates in Northern Ireland and of the UN Buffer Zone in Cyprus did not erase the perceived need for separation between communities.

Instead, these borders need to be destroyed. In order to do so and to foster productive negotiations towards peace, the mindsets leading to the construction of these borders need to be addressed. An important place to start is by breaking the hero and villain archetypes discussed in Chapter Two.

One means of breaking stereotypes is through cross-communal storytelling. Storytelling challenges the reduction of conflict to a series of statistics and pre-conceived group perceptions by placing a human face on suffering. It directly challenges desensitization to opposing communities' suffering.

I have seen instances of storytelling resulting in cross-communal reconciliation in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus. For example, a 'Shared History' group in Belfast enables Protestants and Catholics to come together to discuss differing identities and experiences of the Troubles. The 'Sharing an Island' project brought together young Greek and Turkish Cypriots to share the experiences behind the identities they inherited growing up in Cyprus.193

Many individuals I interviewed expressed the belief that peace can be reached through economics. Brannigan contends that poor economics may prevent individuals from shifting their focus towards peace:

"I don’t care if the people that built that big bonfire would be Protestants and I don’t care if they burn the picture of the pope on it, I’m more worried about how they spend their lives. How much money they earn. Are they working?"

Because if you want them to stop burning stupid bonfires with stupid religious emblems on them, give them a reason to live.\textsuperscript{194}

Indeed, the authors of the 2011 World Development Report insist that poverty traps societies in cycles of violence.\textsuperscript{195} Both Northern Ireland and Cyprus suffer from poverty.

Addressing the issues of spatial division and poverty may contribute to breaking sectarian stereotypes. To address these issues effectively, they must receive widespread attention. Yet such attention requires removing the 'post-conflict' label from Northern Ireland and Cyprus that distract much needed attention elsewhere.

Defining a society as 'post-conflict' reduces their identity to nothing but the conflict they experienced in the past. Refraining from labeling a society 'post-conflict' is not a refusal to allow it to move forward. Likewise, the absence of a 'post-conflict' label does not imply the presence of a 'conflict-ridden' label. Refraining from the term 'post-conflict' only limits the control memories of violence have over present-day societal structures and norms.

\textsuperscript{194} Brannigan, Tim Interview by Laura Brody (2014).
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