Studies in Aetiology and Historical Methodology in Herodotus

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Classical Studies in the Graduate School
of Duke University

2016
ABSTRACT

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Abstract

This dissertation interrogates existing scholarly paradigms regarding aetiology in the Histories of Herodotus in order to open up new avenues to approach a complex and varied topic. Since aetiology has mostly been treated as the study of cause and effect in the Histories, this work expands the purview of aetiology to include Herodotus’ explanations of origins more generally. The overarching goal in examining the methodological principles of Herodotean aetiology is to show the extent to which they resonate across the Histories according to their initial development in the proem, especially in those places that seem to deviate from the work’s driving force (i.e. the Persian Wars). Though the focus is on correlating the principles espoused in the proem with their deployment in Herodotus’ ethnographies and other seemingly divergent portions of his work, the dissertation also demonstrates the influence of these principles on some of the more “historical” aspects of the Histories where the struggle between Greeks and barbarians is concerned. The upshot is to make a novel case not only for the programmatic significance of the proem, but also for the cohesion of Herodotean methodology from cover to cover, a perennial concern for scholars of Greek history and historiography.

Chapter One illustrates how the proem to the Histories (1.1.0-1.5.3) prefigures Herodotus’ engagement with aetiological discussions throughout the Histories. Chapter Two indicates how the reading of the proem laid out in Chapter One allows for Herodotus’ deployment of aetiology in the Egyptian logos (especially where the pharaoh Psammetichus’ investigation of the origins of Egyptian language, nature, and custom are
concerned) to be viewed within the methodological continuum of the Histories at large. Chapter Three connects Herodotus’ programmatic interest in the origins of erga (i.e. “works” or “achievements” manifested as monuments and deeds of abstract and concrete sorts) with the patterns addressed in Chapters One and Two. Chapter Four examines aetiological narratives in the Scythian logos and argues through them that this logos is as integral to the Histories as the analogous Egyptian logos studied in Chapter Two. Chapter Five demonstrates how the aetiologies associated with the Greeks’ collaboration with the Persians (i.e. medism) in the lead-up to the battle of Thermopylae recapitulate programmatic patterns isolated in previous chapters and thereby extend the methodological continuum of the Histories beyond the “ethnographic” logoi to some of the most representative “historical” logoi of Herodotus’ work. Chapter Six concludes the dissertation and makes one final case for methodological cohesion by showing the inextricability of the end of the Histories from its beginning.
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Abbreviations

Journal names are abbreviated according to *L’année philologique*. Modern reference works, ancient authors, and ancient works are abbreviated according to the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford, 1996).
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Introduction

Since antiquity, aetiology has occupied an indispensable place in the study of history. As the scholar and critic of Greek and Roman historiography, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, once postulated, “those who read histories do not derive sufficient benefit from hearing the outcome (τέλος) of deeds alone, but everyone demands that the causes (ἀιτίας) of events be related as well—including the ways in which things happen, the designs behind them, and cases of divine intervention—and that they remain ignorant of nothing that naturally attends these matters.”1 Dionysius’ deep concern on many levels for origins and causes (i.e. αἰτία (pl.), αἰτίη (sg.), the root of our word aetiology) finds one of its earliest expressions in Herodotus, whose inquiry, the Histories, constitutes the oldest fully-extant work of its kind in Greek. Though it has long been recognized that aetiology looms large in the Histories from the very beginning when Herodotus first sets out to explain why barbarians and Greeks came to war against one another (δι’ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι, 1.1.0),2 it is only somewhat recently that scholars have begun to look carefully at the meaning of aetiology and its many roles throughout such a vast and varied work.

---

1 …τοῖς ἀναγνώσκουσι τὰς ἱστορίας οὐχ ἰκανόν ἐστιν εἰς ὑφέλειαν τὸ τέλος αὐτό τῶν πραγμάτων ἀκούσαι, ἀπατεῖ δ’ ἐκαστὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἱστορήσαι τῶν γινομένων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὰς διανοίας τῶν πραξάντων καὶ τὰ παρὰ τὸ δαιμονίων συγκυρήσαντα, καὶ μηδὲνός ἁμένης γενέσθαι τῶν περικότων τοῖς πράγμασι παρακολούθην (Ant. Rom. 5.56.1). See also Cic. De or. 2.63 on the responsibilities of the orator in writing history: Haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus, ipsa autem exaedificatio posita est in rebus et verbis: rerum ratio ordinem temporum desiderat, regionum descriptionem; vult etiam, quomiam in rebus magnis memoriaque dignis consilia primum, deinde acta, postea eventus exspectentur, et de consiliis significari quid scriptor probet et in rebus gestis declarari non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo, et cum de eventu dicatur, ut causae explicantur omnes etc. Cf. Polyb. 3.32.6 & 12.25b and Verg. G. 2.490.
2 See Chapter 1.1 below for a detailed discussion of this passage.
In what can be considered the first work devoted to aetiology in Herodotus, Pagel’s dissertation, *Die Bedeutung des aitiologischen Momentes für Herodots Geschichtsschreibung* (1927), inaugurated the modern discussion on the subject by making the word αἰτίη the measuring stick of why things happen the way they do in the *Histories* and by situating αἰτίη in light of vengeance (τίσις). However, as Immerwahr later demonstrated in his landmark article, “Aspects of Historical Causation in Herodotus” (1956), αἰτίη is ineffective as the sole criterion of causality, not only because it is just one of several terms that may explain historical outcomes of varying significance (e.g. πρόφασις, πρόσχημα, etc.), but also because αἰτίη and its derivatives fail to reach a consensus of meaning and to describe causality systematically in the *Histories*. Thus, Immerwahr advocated instead for the existence of “individual schemes of causal complexes” of “fundamental” and “incidental” varieties at the level of the λόγος (pl. λόγοι), the basic narrative building block of the *Histories*.

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3 For support of the vengeance motif as a guiding causal principle in the *Histories* (now a minority view), see e.g. de Romilly (1971) and Lang (1972). In the vein of Pagel (1927), see also Hart (1982) 72-112 for a traditional causal analysis of the *Histories* beginning with Croesus.

4 Immerwahr (1956) 243-247 (see also Maddalena (1942) 59-63 for an early approximation of this thesis). Even at the most basic level, αἰτίη (along with the corresponding adjective αἴτιος and substantive αἴτιον) encompasses a range of meanings in Herodotus, as Powell (1960) shows (ad loc.): αἰτίη: 1) “reason why”, 2) “alleged reason”, 3) “charge, fault, blame”; αἴτιος: 1) “responsible”, “to blame”; 2) subst. τὸ αἴτιον: “cause”. What’s more, some uses of αἰτίη, αἴτιος, κ.τ.λ. could be classified under more than one of the categories established by Powell (see e.g. Lateiner (1989) 279 n. 5, Evans (1991) 29-33). For a case-by-case study of the uses of αἰτίη in the *Histories*, see Bornitz (1968) 139-163. Kirkwood (1952) 45 notes that πρόφασις also accommodates a range of meanings like αἰτίη and its derivatives, and can connote not just the usual sense of “pretext”, but “cause” as well (e.g. Hdt. 4.79). For a general overview of the distinction between αἰτίη and πρόφασις in Herodotus and Thucydides, see Sealey (1957).

5 Immerwahr (1956) 278.

6 Immerwahr (1956) 253.

7 Immerwahr (1956) 276. For a schematic breakdown of the λόγοι which make up the *Histories*, see e.g. Cagnazzi (1975).
Following in the footsteps of Immerwahr’s circumspect treatment of aetiology in the *Histories*, Gould and Lateiner (whose chapters in their respective books from 1989, *Herodotus* and *The Historical Method of Herodotus*, still represent the most recent and most detailed discussions dedicated to the subject)⁸ argued that Herodotus’ understanding of why things happen is too complicated to be reduced to individual motives (e.g. vengeance) and analyzed according to post-Aristotelian rubrics that would have been alien to a fifth century audience.⁹ To demonstrate this, Gould and Lateiner each measured Herodotean causality not just within the framework of the word αἰτίη and its relatives, but also according to “the richness and diversity of suggestive comparisons, analogues, parables, and parallels”¹⁰ which so vividly color the *Histories*. Thus, both scholars concluded in the vein of Immerwahr that no individual factor can account for causal primacy throughout the *Histories* at large, but that aetiology is fundamentally multiplex for Herodotus.

Although the major studies of Immerwahr, Gould, and Lateiner have made great strides towards improving our understanding of aetiology in the *Histories*, much work remains to be done. In keeping with the consensus that “Herodotus’ perception of causation embraces variety and multiplicity in the answers that he gives to the question:

---


⁹ See also Hunter (1982) 224: “…it is quite mistaken to abstract types of causation from [Herodotus’] narrative, for example, to distinguish political from “metaphysical” causes. As correct and natural as it may appear, it has nothing to do with the categories of Herodotus’ mind. Such levels of causation, which are modern and so anachronistic, distort the fluidity both of the process of history itself and of the dynamic of that process, as Herodotus perceived it.” For overviews of Aristotelian causality, see e.g. Hankinson (1998) 125-200 and Shields (2014) 43-115.

why did this happen?"\textsuperscript{11}, this dissertation enriches existing scholarly paradigms regarding aetiology in the \textit{Histories} and opens up new avenues to approach a complex and varied topic. Since aetiology has mostly been treated as the study of cause and effect in the \textit{Histories},\textsuperscript{12} my work expands the purview of aetiology to include Herodotus’ explanations of origins more generally and what “naturally attends these matters”, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus does.\textsuperscript{13} My overarching goal in examining the methodological principles of Herodotean aetiology is to show the extent to which they resonate across the \textit{Histories} according to their initial development in the proem, especially in those places that seem to deviate from the work’s driving force (i.e. the Persian Wars). Though I focus on correlating the principles espoused in the proem with their deployment in Herodotus’ ethnographies and other seemingly divergent portions of his work, I also demonstrate the influence of these principles on some of the more “historical” aspects of the \textit{Histories} where the struggle between Greeks and barbarians is concerned. In turn, I make a novel case not only for the programmatic significance of the proem, but also for the cohesion of Herodotean methodology from cover to cover, a perennial point of contention among scholars of the \textit{Histories}.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Lateiner (1989) 189-210 is something of an exception, but even his nuanced and sophisticated investigation of the methodology of Herodotean aetiology is limited to five causal systems and their mostly political ramifications (206): 1) divine jealousy (phthonos), 2) a) fate (moira), b) the cycle (kyklos), 3) divinities (theos, theoi, to theion), 4) act & retribution (tisis), and 5) historical analysis (logos; first person verbs and pronouns).
\textsuperscript{13} i.e. …τῶν περικότον τοῖς πράγμασι παρακολουθεῖν (\textit{Ant. Rom.} 5.56.1). See n. 1 above, including the similar manner in which Cicero describes aetiology.
\textsuperscript{14} For a general overview of the question of the unity of the \textit{Histories} as it has been posed since antiquity, see e.g. de Jong (2002).
In the six studies that comprise this dissertation, I base my arguments on close readings of the original Greek of Herodotus, using the contextual approach pioneered by Immerwahr in *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (1966) and advanced by his most influential successors.\(^\text{15}\) Though the following vignettes on aetiology are necessarily selective, these studies have broad ramifications for the interpretation of the *Histories* beyond the confines of the particular passage in question. Careful attention paid to context makes this possible, since Herodotean λόγοι, the Janus-faced accounts which comprise the narrative building blocks of the *Histories*, do not “…exist in isolation, but form the link between what precedes and what follows.”\(^\text{16}\) The study of aetiology in the *Histories* thereby transcends textual fixedness and becomes more than the sum of its parts, not only as it concerns narrative, but also as it comes to bear upon Herodotus’ unique intellectual outlook.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{15}\) See Immerwahr (1966) 7 for a distillation of this approach: “The best method of studying Herodotus seems to us a close investigation of narrative structure, and of the stylistic means by which this structure is wrought. On the simplest level, Herodotus’ work is a prime example of archaic parataxis, by which short individual items are placed in a row to build up larger compositions. In this manner, individual accounts, or parts thereof, are combined in Herodotus into larger pictures, like the pebbles in a mosaic.” Modern proponents of this contextual approach include (but are certainly not limited to) e.g. Dewald (1987), Thomas (2000), Munson (2001), and Baragwanath (2008), to whom I owe a great deal in crafting my own work.

\(^\text{16}\) Hunter (1982) 183, with specific reference to Cambyses’ invasion of Ethiopia. This remark likely has its genesis in Immerwahr (1956) 276: “The Herodotean logos, as a unit of narrative, is to a large degree self-contained, but nevertheless related to its surroundings by overt references and thematic connections.” See also n. 15 above.

\(^\text{17}\) Momigliano (1958b) 202 sees aetiology as the *sine qua non* of Herodotus’ innovativeness: “If I had to answer the famous question an Oxford undergraduate once put to Sir John Myres—‘Sir, if Herodotus was such a fool as they say, why do we read him for Greats?’—my answer would be that Herodotus was not only the founder of European historiography in a generic way: he provided European historiography with one of its leading and recurring themes, the study of a war, in its origins, main events, results.”

5
Chapter One illustrates how the proem to the *Histories* (1.1.0-1.5.3) prefigures Herodotus’ engagement with aetiological discussions throughout the *Histories*, even in those sections which do not ostensibly concern the work’s raison d’être. Building on Cook’s remark that “the great exemplum of the *History* is not the Persian War but… the method of *historie* [i.e. historical inquiry] itself”,¹⁸ I make a case for seeing how “narrative and explanation are one”,¹⁹ beginning with an analysis of the multivalence of the word αἰτίη in the opening sentence of Herodotus’ work. In correlating αἰτίη with ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξης (the “display of inquiry”), I argue in turn for the inextricability of aetiology from its narrative presentation starting in the very first sentence of the *Histories*. In not limiting himself to one answer to the question why Greeks and barbarians came to war with each other (δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἔπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι, 1.1.0), I maintain that Herodotus establishes an important precedent by not refuting individual explanations, but by combining them with others. He thereby shows the study of causes and origins to be fundamentally integrative from the start. In so doing, Herodotus ultimately invites the reader to look past the status quo and to continue his wide-ranging inquiry beyond the aetiological question at hand.

Chapter Two indicates how the reading of the proem laid out in Chapter One allows for Herodotus’ deployment of aetiology in the Egyptian λόγος to be viewed within the methodological continuum of the *Histories* at large. By juxtaposing the inquiries of the pharaoh Psammetichus with those of Herodotus (i.e. the narrative persona), I contend

¹⁸ Cook (1976) 62.
that the aetiological discussions surrounding the origins of Egyptian language, nature, and custom do not merely represent the products of an anomalous ethnography, but reaffirm the goals of the proem and look forward to their further substantiation in latter portions of the *Histories*.

Chapter Three connects Herodotus’ programmatic interest in the origins of ἔργα (i.e. “works” or “achievements” manifested as monuments and deeds of abstract and concrete sorts) with the patterns addressed in Chapters One and Two. In examining representative ἔργα from a variety of narrative contexts, I argue that “works”, like all components of Herodotean aetiology and methodology considered in this dissertation, cannot be privileged absolutely or taken as a part to represent the whole. Instead, when seen within the context of the *Histories* as a cohesive entity, ἔργα can offer further evidence that aetiology constitutes a nexus of mutually inclusive factors which belie homogeneity of explanation.

Chapter Four examines aetiology in the Scythian λόγος. Rather than viewing this ethnographic narrative as an aberrancy in the grand scheme of Herodotus’ work, I argue that it, like the analogous Egyptian λόγος, is an integral part of the *Histories*, as indicated by the methodology of the many aetiologies that harken back to the proem.

Chapter Five investigates the origins of the Greeks’ collaboration with the Persians (i.e. medism) in the lead-up to the battle of Thermopylae (7.148-171). Beginning with an analysis of the paradigm of the Argives, I demonstrate how the aetiologies of this λόγος recapitulate programmatic patterns isolated in previous chapters and thereby
extend the methodological continuum of the *Histories* beyond the “ethnographic” λόγοι to some of the most representative “historical” λόγοι of Herodotus’ work.

Chapter Six concludes the dissertation by showing the inextricability of the end of the *Histories* from its beginning. In pairing these all-important bookends, I make one final case for methodological cohesion by signaling the influence of those patterns brought to the fore of discussion in previous chapters on the work’s end. In particular, I emphasize that the manner in which Herodotus concludes his work by prompting us, the readers, to see the bigger picture and to perpetuate his inquiry by undertaking our own investigation of the origins of the past finds its inception in the work’s programmatic introduction, and so likens teleology to aetiology in the *Histories*. 
1. Establishing a Paradigm: Aetiology in the Proem to the Histories

Leo Strauss once remarked that “a hundred pages—no, ten pages—of Herodotus introduce us immeasurably better into the mysterious unity of oneness and variety in human things than many volumes written in the spirit predominant in our age.”\(^1\) It is not unreasonable to suppose that Strauss had in mind the beginning of the Histories, including the proem to the work\(^2\) (i.e. 1.1.0-1.5.3).\(^3\) Indeed, from a methodological standpoint, there is perhaps no other place in the Histories where the paradoxical “unity of oneness and variety” is so pronounced. Though scholars have long sought to demonstrate the existence of this sort of unity in the Histories,\(^4\) there have been surprisingly few attempts (none of them systematic or comprehensive) to locate its genesis in the proem,\(^5\) in large part because 1.1.0-1.5.3 has typically been seen as an anomaly in the grand scheme of Herodotus’ work.\(^6\) Instead of dismissing the proem as an incongruity, the following chapter argues that the proem is in fact paradigmatic of the

---

\(^1\) Strauss (1989) 343.
\(^2\) The exchange between Gyges and Candaules just three chapters later (see 1.8 ff.) was instrumental in Strauss’ early formation of esotericism, according to a letter written to Jacob Klein in October 1938 (Lampert (2009) 66).
\(^3\) I define the proem according to the textual range established by Jacoby (1913) cols. 283-285.
\(^4\) See n. 14 in the Introduction.
\(^5\) See e.g. Węcowski (2004) for a wealth of bibliography on the proem.
\(^6\) See e.g. Starr (1968) 142, whose critique of the proem condenses the traditional objections to the integration of the proem with the rest of the Histories that will be addressed throughout this chapter: “If Herodotus could only have introduced his work with a few brief but pithy paragraphs, like those in which Thucydides discussed the difficulty of establishing the truth and proclaimed his own zeal in ferreting it out, we should be likely to think much better of the Father of History; but alas! he actually commences with a faradiddle of women-stealing…” See also Hankinson (1998) 79-81 for similarly dismissive remarks.
ways in which Herodotus deals with causes and origins more generally across his vast
work, as subsequent chapters will substantiate in turn.

1.1 Setting the Stage: the Einleitungssatz

One of the major obstacles to this thesis is the opening sentence of the *Histories*
(hereafter referred to as the *Einleitungssatz*), which does not seem to clearly define the
objective of the forthcoming project:

`Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ὃς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα εξ ἀνθρώπων τοῦ
χρόνον εξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἑλληνικά, τὰ δὲ
βαρβάρους ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλέα γένηται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι᾽ ἥν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν
ἄλλοις (1.1.0).`\(^7\)

This is the display of the inquiry of Herodotus of Thurii, so that the things brought
into being by humans may not grow faded in time, and so that great and wondrous
works, some manifested by Greeks and others by barbarians, may not be without
glory, and in particular the reason why they came to war with one another.

Although there is still no firm consensus on how to parse the *Einleitungssatz,*\(^8\) most
scholars now accept Krischer’s tripartite division, which evinces a gradual winnowing
not of one objective, but of *objectives,* from the vague to the specific:

1. Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε,
2. ὡς α). μήτε (α) τὰ γενόμενα
   (β) εξ ἀνθρώπων
   (γ) τοῦ χρόνου εξίτηλα γένηται,
   b). μήτε (α) ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά
      (β) τὰ μὲν Ἑλληνικά, τὰ δὲ βαρβάρους ἀποδεχθέντα,
      (γ) ἀκλέα γένηται,
3. τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι᾽ ἥν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἄλλοις.\(^9\)

---

\(^7\) Except where noted otherwise, passages cited in Greek from Herodotus’ *Histories* are taken from
Legrand’s Budé edition (1932-1954) and translations of primary sources are my own.

\(^8\) For a survey of scholarship from the past century on the *Einleitungssatz,* see e.g. Erbse (1992) 123-125.

\(^9\) Krischer (1965) 159-160. This division is endorsed explicitly by Bakker (2002) 6 and implicitly by
While the paratactic structure\(^\text{10}\) of the *Einleitungssatz* does appear to build to a climax in the third and final colon (i.e. “and in particular the reason why Greeks and barbarians came to war with one another”), this clause does not negate the importance of what comes before.\(^\text{11}\) As we will see throughout this dissertation, Herodotus’ concern for the preservation of “the things brought into being by humans” (τὰ γενόμενα εξ ἀνθρώπων) and “great and wondrous works” (ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά) will have programmatic significance as well.\(^\text{12}\) For our immediate purposes, however, it is most significant, as Krischer argues, that the final colon of the opening sentence of the *Histories* serves to respond to the first, much in the way that the final clause of the similarly paratactic opening sentence of the *Iliad* expands upon the premise laid out in the first:\(^\text{13}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{μὴν} & \text{ οἶδε} \text{ θεά Πηλημίδεω Αχιλῆος} \quad & 1 \\
\text{oὐλομένην}, & \text{ ἢ μυρὶ’ Αχαιοῖς ὠλγε’ ἔθηκε,} \quad & \text{5} \\
\text{πολλὰς δ’ ἱρὸμιους ψυχὰς Αἴδι προῖασε} \quad & \\
\text{ὁρών, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐλώρα τεῖχε κύνεσιν} \quad & \\
\text{οἰωνοῦσι τε πᾶσι, Διὸς δ’ ἐτελεῖτο βουλῆ,} \quad & \\
\text{ἐξ οὐ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε} \quad & \\
\text{Ἀτρείδῃς τε ἄναξ ἀνδρόν καὶ δῖος Αχιλλεύς} \quad (1.1-7).
\end{align*}
\]

Sing, goddess, of the rage of Achilles, son of Peleus, and of its destruction, which set countless woes upon the Achaeans and hurled many stout souls of heroes into Hades

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\(^\text{10}\) Parataxis has been recognized as the hallmark of Herodotean style since the time of Aristotle (i.e. *Rh.* 1409a 24). On the importance of parataxis to the analysis of the *Histories*, see e.g. Dewald (1998) xix-xx and Immerwahr (1966) 7 (cited at n. 15 in the Introduction).

\(^\text{11}\) I support Wood (1972) 14 in his belief that τὰ τε ὀλλα καὶ in the third and final colon (“and in particular”) is indicative of a “perspective…which views discrete events as parts of a whole” and not to the exclusion of one another.

\(^\text{12}\) For a dedicated treatment of ἔργα, see Chapter Three. On Herodotus’ desire to preserve κλέος (glory) in the proem (a fundamentally Homeric enterprise), see e.g. Nagy (1987).

\(^\text{13}\) Krischer (1965) 161-163. See also Bakker (2002) 6 ff.
and provided them as carrion for dogs
and all birds, and the will of Zeus was done,
from the time when the son of Atreus, lord of men, and godlike Achilles,
first stood apart in their quarrel.

Thus, “the reason why Greeks and barbarians came to war with one another” (δι’ ἧν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἄλληλοισι) comes to be subordinated to “the display of the inquiry of Herodotus of Thurii” (Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἢδε).

This Homeric analogue affirms that aetiology is not only a programmatic concern of the highest order from the very beginning of the Histories; it also affirms that it is inextricable from its narrative presentation. Though there is much debate on what this “display of inquiry” (ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις) entailed and how it was originally transmitted, there can be no denying that it is subjected to the author’s persona from the get-go. By giving his name in the genitive case (Ἡροδότου) and placing it at the very beginning of the sentence, Herodotus thereby asserts his authority over the entirety of the work that is to follow in a way that recalls the conventions of the Homeric proem, but notably invokes a human agent instead of a divine one. That Herodotus’ display can innovate and still remain rooted in the traditions of its progenitors is a dichotomy we will revisit many

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14 The main point of contention among scholars is whether ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις constitutes a performance or a publication, whether as a memorialization of the past in the former or as a product of contemporary scientific inquiry in the latter (see e.g. Nagy (1987) and Thomas (2000) 249-269 respectively). For extensive bibliographies on the interpretation of ἀπόδεξις, see Asheri et al. (2007) 72-73 (ad 1.1.0) and Bakker (2002) 8 n. 11. See also Kirk (2014) for a new interpretation of ἀπόδεξις as a display of inventory, a perspective which will lend itself to the interpretation of “works” (i.e. ἔργα, another concern of the Einleitungssatz) discussed in Chapter Three below.

15 N.B. When I refer to Herodotus throughout this dissertation, I mean the narrative persona and not the autobiographical figure (except where noted otherwise).
times in the course of this dissertation on aetiology in the *Histories*. However, before we can address the nature of this uniquely heterogeneous display and the authority behind it, we must first consider the meaning of *αἰτίη*, the foundational word which this ἀπόδεξις has already been shown to govern.

**1.2 Charting the Difference**

As with nearly every other aspect of the *Einleitungssatz*, controversy abounds over what the last clause is actually referring to. Attempts to isolate “the reason (*αἰτίην*) why Greeks and barbarians came to war with each other” by studying the use of the word *αἰτίη* in the *Histories* inevitably come up short, since the semantic range of this word and its derivatives (e.g. “reason why”, “alleged reason”, “charge”, “fault”, “blame”, etc.) is too broad for one single meaning to be applied absolutely to this particular usage. Nevertheless, if we remain mindful of the influence of parataxis, we may find that careful

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16 See Moles (1993) 92-98 for a discussion of how this and other Homeric analogues show the proem to be a “glorious mixture” (98), in which “Herodotus has it all possible ways” (96). Herington (1991b) 14 attributes this to the *Histories*’ position “at the frontier where two great literary eras meet: the era in which poetry and legend were the prime media for the interpretation of our world, and the era of prose, of history, of rational enquiry generally.” It is no wonder, then, that according to a recently discovered inscription from Hellenistic Halicarnassus dating from around the second to the first century B.C.E. (see Isager (1998) for the *editio princeps*), Herodotus was lauded as “the Homer of history in prose” (Ἡρόδοτον τὸν πεζὸν ἐν ἱστορίαισιν Ὅμηρον, ln. 43). For an overview of how this distinction held for Herodotus’ critics throughout antiquity, see e.g. Priestley (2014) 187-220.

17 Powell (1960), ad aἰτίη. Cf. the entries for αἴτιος and τὸ αἴτιον.

18 The conclusion of the comprehensive word study of aἰτίη conducted by Bornitz (1968) 139-163 nicely illustrates this point: “Die Interpretationen zeigten, daß Herodot an allen Stellen, selbst wenn die Vorgeschichte ungewöhnlich ausführlich dargestellt war, immer den bestimmten Punkt sorgsam herausstellte, an dem die eigentl inkriminierbare Schuld oder schuldhafte Verbindlichkeit eintrat, aus der rechtliche Forderungen ableitbar wurden. *Die einzige Stelle, die noch ungeklärt blieb, ist die aἰτίη am Ende des ersten Satzes im Werke Herodots*” (163, emphasis my own). See also n. 4 in the Introduction.
attention paid to context can once again provide an illuminating solution in the very next sentence:

Περσέων μὲν νῦν οἱ λόγιοι Φοίνικας αἰτίους φασὶ γενέσθαι τῆς διαφορῆς · (1.1.1)

The Persian logioi say that the Phoenicians were responsible [aitious] for the difference.

Here, Herodotus begins to address the question of why (aἰτήν) Greeks and barbarians came to war with one another by looking at the implicated parties (αἰτίους) in a way that invites further comparison with the analogous opening to the Iliad:\(^{19}\)

Τίς τάρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; Λητοὺς καὶ Διὸς υἱός · (1.8-9)

Which of the gods set them [i.e. Agamemnon and Achilles] to quarrel?
It was the son of Leto and Zeus [i.e. Apollo].

But whereas the role of Apollo in instigating the strife between Agamemnon and Achilles is unequivocal in the Iliad, the question of responsibility in the corresponding passage in the Histories is opaque, not least of all because the culpability of the Phoenicians is alleged indirectly (φασί) by the Persian λόγιοι, whose identity and function is subject to interpretation.\(^{20}\) As Dewald argues, this oblique frame is the first of several warnings that “narrative is likely to be self-interested”\(^{21}\) in what follows of the proem.\(^{22}\) However, Herodotus does not despair at this reality nor does he allow it to remain an ironic gesture.

\(^{19}\) Krischer (1965) 160-161. See also Nagy (1987) 180 for a discussion of this and other parallels in verse.
\(^{20}\) Luraghi (2009) 444 makes a compelling case for understanding λόγιοι as “...a quality that a person may possess to a varying degree, [and] not a term that identifies a category of people [i.e. “masters of speech” (Nagy (1990) 221, following Nagy (1987) 175-184) and “unlettered oral memorialist[s]” (Evans (1991) 95)].”
\(^{22}\) On the use of oratio obliqua to prompt the reader to reflect upon the veracity of a given account, see esp. 2.2-3 and 4.5-12 (discussed in Chapters 2.1 and 4.1).
As we shall see, his commitment to extricating the claims stemming from 1.1.1 will ultimately make him responsible for explaining not only the war, but also the difference (διαφορά) between Greeks and barbarians, thereby establishing aetiology in the Histories as more than just the study of the causes of the historical conflict of the fifth century and their influence on a single group of people.\(^{23}\) However, before this ecumenical and fundamentally multiplex undertaking can be realized,\(^{24}\) Herodotus must defer from interjecting in *pro patria persona* in order to weigh additional claims.

Following the indictment set out above in 1.1.1, the Persian λόγιοι seek to substantiate the claim that the Phoenicians were to blame for the “difference” between Greeks and barbarians by relating their abduction of Io, the daughter of the Argive king Inachus (1.1). Though the Greeks agree with the Persians that Inachus’ daughter was named Io (τὸ δὲ οἶονομα ἔναι, κατὰ τῶν τὸ καὶ Ἔλληνες λέγουσι, Ἰοῦν τὴν Ἰνάχου, 1.1.2), they do not agree with their explanation for how she came to Egypt (Οὗτῳ μὲν Ἰοῦν ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἀπικέσθαι λέγουσι Πέρσαι, οὐκ ὡς Ἐλληνες..., 1.2.1). This point of contention raised by the Greeks represents the first of several “shifting focalizations” in the proem, in which all of the implicated parties seek to absolve themselves of...

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\(^{23}\) Bakker (2002) 17-19, who sees the arbitration of difference as part and parcel of the duties of the ἵστωρ (see discussion of 1.5.3 ff. in the next section below). Bakker’s broad interpretation of διαφορά which I advance is made possible in part by the *Einleitungssatz*, which in no way states that the content of the forthcoming work will be confined to the Persian Wars (see e.g. Immerwahr (1966) 17-19 and Payen (1997) 88-91).

\(^{24}\) Though I am somewhat wary of using the word “universal” to describe Herodotus’ project as it is laid out in the proem (for fear of employing an anachronism that would have been out of place in the fifth century), I support van Wees (2002) 321 in his assessment of the Histories as a wholly ecumenical work, beginning with the programmatic introduction (see also van Wees (2002) 321 n. 1 for an extensive bibliography on this interpretation).
wrongdoing. So, just as the Greeks dispute their role in this “first injustice” (τῶν ἀδικημάτων πρῶτον τοῦτο ἄρξαι, 1.2.1), so, too, do the Phoenicians, who counter that they did not kidnap Io, but that they facilitated her voluntary departure from Argos in order to allow her to save face after she slept with the ship’s captain and became pregnant by him.

In juxtaposing the self-serving views of the Persians, Greeks, and Phoenicians, Herodotus’ narrative signals a fundamentally human bias inherent in the process of historical inquiry and so takes the first step towards establishing aetiology as something that is to be fundamentally multiple in the Histories. The second step comes after the Persian λόγιοι relate how a group of Greeks went to Phoenicia and kidnapped Europa to requite the theft of Io. While scholars usually accept that this second seizure (ἁρπαγή) was originally undertaken as an act of “tit for tat” vengeance (Ταῦτα μὲν δῆ ἴσα πρὸς ἴσα σφι γενέσθαι, 1.2.1), Rood is right to observe that retribution does not in fact achieve equilibrium in any sense in the proem. Key to this observation is the notion that Cretans were perhaps responsible for Europa’s abduction (εἴησαι δ’ ἂν οὗτοι Κρῆτες, 1.2.1) and not “the Greeks” as in 1.1. If the two groups were in fact distinct as the passage intimates,

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26 On the role of primacy in the proem, see n. 60 below.
27 Περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰοῦς οὐκ ὁμολογέουσι Πέρσης οὕτω Φοινίκες· ὦ γὰρ ἁρπαγῇ σφέας χρησαμένους λέγουσι ἄγαγεν αὐτὴν ἐς Αἴγυπτον, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἀργεῖ ἐμίσχετο τῷ ναυκλήρῳ τῆς νεός· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐμιθεὶ ἄγκυρος ἔοισα, αἰδεομένη τοὺς τοκίας, οὕτος δὲ ἐθελοντὴν αὐτὴν τοῖς Φοινίξι συνεκπλώσαι, ὡς ἄν μὴ κατάδηλος γένηται (1.5.2).
it would therefore be unreasonable to posit that the Cretans (who had a reputation for thievery and deceitful practices in general throughout antiquity) were actually retaliating for Io by abducting Europa. This disparity provides an early indication of the inability of revenge to explain the source of the enmities between Greeks and barbarians by itself. While reciprocity (or the lack thereof) does play a decisive role in the denouement of the proem, there is more behind the actions of the protagonists than the desire to demand and receive satisfaction alone. For instance, after the Greeks initiate the second round of women-stealing by abducting Medea from Colchis (1.2.2-3), Paris proceeds to abduct Helen from the Greeks, not because he wants to avenge the kidnapping of Medea, but precisely because he thinks that he will not have to pay the penalty for stealing a woman to be his wife, since nobody before him had (ἐπιστάμενον πάντως ὅτι οὐ δόσει δίκας· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνους διόδωμι, 1.3.1). Although Paris turns out to be mistaken in this assumption, the remainder of the narrative suggests that the Greeks’ motivation to retaliate is also predicated on more than just vengeance:

(4.) Μέχρι μὲν ὄν τοῦτον ἄρπαγάς μούνας εἶναι παρ’ ἄλληλων, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτον Ἑλληνας δὴ μεγάλως αἰτίους γενέσθαι· προτέρους γὰρ ἄρξαι στρατεύεσθαι ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην ἣ σφέας ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην. [2] Τὸ μὲν νῦν ἄρπάζειν γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν

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30 See e.g. Callim. Hymn 1.6-9 (modelled after Hes. Theog. 26): Ζεὺς, σὲ μὲν Ἰδαίοισιν ἐν οὐρείσι φασὶ γενέσθαι, // Ζεὺς, σὲ δ’ ἐν Ἀρκαδίῃ· πότεροι, πάτερ, ἐψεύσαντο; // ‘Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται’· καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο // Κρῆτες ἐτεκτήναντο. This echoes the proverbial sentiment of the Presocratic Epimenides paraphrased in Titus 1.12: εἶπεν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης, Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί.
31 Rood (2010) 56, with bibliography at 56 n. 34.
32 “…even in those initial exchanges the rhetoric of revenge becomes a matter of excuse and opportunity as much as motivation” (Pelling (2000) 287 n. 51).
33 See discussion of 1.4-1.5.1 immediately below.
34 On the concept of δικὰς/δικὴν δίδοναι in the Histories at large, see e.g. Lateiner (1980).
ἀδίκων νομίζειν ἐργον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἄρπασθεισέων σπουδὴν ποιῆσασθαι τιμωρέειν ἀνοικτῶν, τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ὦρην ἔχειν ἄρπασθεισέων σωφρόνων· δῆλα γὰρ δὴ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ αὐτὰ ἐβουλοῦστο, οὐκ ἦν ἠρπάζοντο. [3] Σφέας μὲν δὴ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης λέγουσι Πέρσαι ἄρπαζομένων τῶν γυναῖκῶν λόγον οὐδένα ποιῆσασθαι, Ἐλληνας δὲ Λακεδαιμονίης εἰνεκεν γυναῖκας στόλον μέγαν συναγερμαῖ καὶ ἔπειτα ἐλθόντας ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην τὴν Πριάμου δύναμιν κατελεῖν. [4] Απὸ τούτου τοίνυν ἠγίασασθαι τὸ Ἐλληνικὸν σφίσι εἶναι πολέμιον. Τὴν γὰρ Ἀσίην καὶ τὰ ἐνοικεία τὸ ἔθνος βάρβαρο ὀικημοῦνται οἱ Πέρσαι, τὴν δὲ Εὐρώπην καὶ τὸ Ἐλληνικὸν ἤγινται κεχωρίσθαι. (5.) Οὕτω τούτου τοίνυν λέγουσι γενέσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὴν Ἰλίου ἁλωσιν εὐρίσκουσι σφίσι ἑοῦσαν τὴν ἄρχῃ τῆς ἔχθρης τῆς ἑς τούς Ἐλληνας (1.4-1.5.1).

(4.) Up until this point, the Persian logioi say that there had only been abductions from each other, but from that point on, the Greeks became greatly to blame, for they invaded Asia before the Persians invaded Europe. [2] Now they consider the act of stealing women to be the work of unjust men, but once women have been stolen, they consider it the mark of senseless people to be eager to exact retribution for their theft and the mark of sensible people not to pay it any mind, for it is clear that if these women had not wanted it, they would not have been abducted. [3] The Persians say that they for their part took no account of the abductions of their women from Asia, but the Greeks amassed a huge army for the sake of a Spartan woman and then invaded Asia and destroyed Priam’s power. [4] From this time on, they have always considered the Greeks to be their enemy, for the Persians claim Asia and the barbarian nations that live there as their own, but they consider Europe and the Greeks to be separate. (5.) This is what the Persians say happened, and in the sack of Troy they find the beginning of their hostility towards the Greeks.

In making their case that the Greek response to the rape of Helen was excessive, the Persian λόγιοι show reciprocity to be dependent on cultural norms that are only spelled out once they have been violated irrevocably.35 And yet, even if their expectations had been stated more clearly before Troy was sacked, the fact that the Greeks seek to

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35 Note 1.3.2, which shows that all parties need to be on the same page for reciprocity to work: Οὕτω δὴ ἁρπάσαντος αὐτοῦ Ἑλένην, τοῖσι Ἕλλησι πρῶτον πέμψαντας ἀγγέλους ἀπαιτέειν τε Ἑλένην καὶ δίκας τῆς ἁρπαγῆς αἰτέειν. Τοὺς δὲ προφέροντον ταῦτα προφέρειν σφι Μηδείης τὴν ἁρπαγήν, ὡς οὐ δόντες αὐτοὶ δίκας οὐδὲ ἐκδόντες ἀπαιτεώντος βουλοίτω σφι παρ’ ἄλλων δίκας γίνεσθαι. In this vein, see Braun (1998) for a fascinating look at reciprocity in the Histories when construed broadly as “the exchange of goods and services in any sense” (159). See also Gould (2001) 283-303 on the principles of “give and take” in the Histories.
destroy Priam’s power (δύναμιν, 1.4.4) in the process of requiting the loss of Helen implies an additional, Realpolitik motive in the invasion of Asia. The Persians seem to recognize this when they respond by claiming Asia and all of the peoples who live there for themselves (οἰκηιοῦνται, 1.4.4). But while Braund’s point is well taken, that “the failure to understand fully the nature of reciprocity provides the impetus to imperialism, in the Persian Wars as in general”, what originally created this impetus remains ambiguous by the end of the exemplum of the ἁρπαγαί, in no small part because the motivation of the respective parties is beholden to what the λόγιοι say. Narrative, then, becomes inextricable from aetiology. But what role does Herodotus have to play in this?

1.3 Reconciling the Difference

It should be noted that nowhere in the preceding accounts of the Persians and the Phoenicians (and by proxy, the Greeks as well) has Herodotus offered any overt authorial interjection to support or refute the many possible reasons why the Greeks and barbarians came to war with one another. This may seem incongruous in light of the subordination of aetiology to “the display of the inquiry of Herodotus” which we saw in our discussion of the Einleitungssatz (1.1.0). However, by the time Herodotus does step

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36 On the force of δύναμις in the Histories, see e.g. Immerwahr (1966) 206-208, who argues that Herodotus anticipates Thucydides in using the term as a byword for empire (see Chapter Six below).
37 Cf. 9.116.3 (discussed below in Chapter 6.2). Saïd (2012) 104 posits that οἰκηιοῦνται “metaphorically assimilates this land [i.e. Asia] to a ‘house’ (oikos) and is elsewhere used for claiming kinship. It reinforces the suggestion that ‘empire will be for the nation what rape is to the individual, the lust that leads to violence’ [pace Ayo (1984) 36]”. This is but one of many examples Said cites throughout the Histories in which the Trojan War “serves as a backdrop to deepen the understanding of the cycle of history and to highlight universal laws” (105).
out of the narrative to lend his perspective in *pro pria persona*, he ultimately shows that the authority behind the display of his forthcoming inquiry will not stem from absolutism of any kind:

Ταῦτα μὲν νῦν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοίνικες λέγουσι. Εγώ δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἑρέων ὡς οὗτος ἢ ἄλλως κοις ταῦτα ἐγένετο, τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἁδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας, τοῦτον σημῆνας προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὁμοίως μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἁστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξειών (1.5.3).

This is what the Persians and the Phoenicians say. But I am not going to talk about these matters, that they happened this way or some other way. Instead, having indicated the man I myself know to have been the first to undertake unjust deeds against the Greeks, I will proceed with my *logos* by going through great and small human settlements alike.

In analyzing this passage, several scholars have noted that the way in which Herodotus begins by juxtaposing the accounts of the Persians and the Phoenicians (Ταῦτα μὲν νῦν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοίνικες λέγουσι) with his own knowledge (Ἐγὼ δὲ…, τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς…) finds much in common with the priamel,40 a rhetorical device designed to “single out one point of interest by contrast and comparison”,41 as deployed famously by the lyric poet Sappho in the opening of her ode to Anactoria:42

οἰ μὲν ἵππησιν στρότον οἱ δὲ πέσδον
οἱ δὲ νάων φαίστ' ἐπ[ι] γάν μέλαι[ν]αν
ἐ]μεναι κάλλιστον, ἑγώ δὲ κῆν' ὀτ-
tω τίς ἔραται' (Fr. 16.1-4)

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41 Race (1982) x.
42 If Watkins is correct in his interpretation of the so-called “Nestor’s cup” (i.e. SEG XIV, 604), we may even find a similar priamel-like contrast ingrained in what is arguably the oldest Greek inscription yet discovered: “Nestor’s cup is good to drink from; but he who drinks from this cup (ἱος δ’ α<ν> τοῦ δε πείσι
ποτέριο) forthwith him will seize desire of fair-garlanded Aphrodite” (see Watkins (1976) 39-40).
Some say a troop of horsemen is the finest thing on the dark earth, others a troop of soldiers or a fleet, but I say whatever one loves.

This paradigmatic example of the priamel is significant in that Sappho’s authorial interjection does not amount to a *tout court* rejection of what precedes it. As Race proposes, Sappho’s first person remark in the climax about what she thinks is κάλλιστον (ἔγω δὲ κἂν’ ὄττω τις ἐραται) is not to the exclusion of what others say in the foil (οἱ μὲν…, οἱ δὲ…). On the contrary, “rather than dispute with them which στρότον is most beautiful, Sappho shifts the argument to another level by stating a principle which embraces their choices as well as her own.”

If we look carefully at the analogous priamel in the end of the proem to the *Histories*, we find that Herodotus’ climax (τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ., 1.5.3) denies categorical claims much as Sappho does. Though scholars often view Herodotus’ decision to change direction and follow up on the first person he himself knows to have perpetrated unjust deeds against the Greeks (i.e. the Lydian king Croesus) as an indictment of the veracity of the account of the λόγιοι, Herodotus indicates no such intention. Instead of signaling that the *cherchez la femme* explanation for the difference

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43 On the distinction between a priamel and a recusatio, see e.g. Pelliccia (1992) (see also n. 46 below).
44 Race (1982) 64.
45 The beginning of the next section (Κροῖσος ἦν Λυδὸς…, 1.6.1) appears to confirm that Croesus is the object of Herodotus’ knowledge in the priamel (τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς, 1.5.3). See, however, Shimron (1973) on traditional objections to this assignment.

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between Greeks and barbarians offered in the foil is a “false-start”, a joke, or a wholesale fabrication. Herodotus’ expression of personal knowledge in the climax seems rather to suggest that we cannot be certain about the distant past in the same way that we can about events closer to our own time. This is not to say, however, that the mythological exemplum set out above is without considerable merit for what it can tell us about human inquiry as it relates to epistemology (or, for that matter, that οἰδά is without limitations of its own). We have already seen, for instance, how the λόγιοι showed through their account of the abductions of Io, Europa, Medea, and Helen that narrative tends to be self-interested, a point which demonstrated that the Histories is likely to be concerned with more than showing one particular outcome as it “actually” happened. For this and other reasons we will see in later chapters of this dissertation,

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46 i.e. Pelliccia (1992), who believes that proem “has the purpose of rejecting [Hecataean] ἡρωολογία” (76). While Herodotus’ rationalizing take on the abductions of Io, Europa, Medea, and Helen does imply a contrast with mythical genealogy, it is excessive to write 1.5.2 off as a “false-start recusatio.” Pelliccia himself suggests as much when he acknowledges that “what Herodotus does…is demote, not expel, eros as a force in world events” (79).

47 As with Cobet (1986) 4, Fowler (1996) 83, Moles (1993) 96, and Saïd (2012) 101-102, I see the account of the λόγιοι as more than just a tongue-in-cheek parody (contra Drews (1973) 88-90, Lateiner (1989) 41-42, Thomas (2000) 268, and Węcowski (2004) 151-152), but as a serious guide to the forthcoming inquiry. 48 i.e. Fehling (1989) 50-59, who understands the source citations in 1.1-5 to be an invention of the author. For an excellent critique of this now mostly marginal position of the “Liar School”, see e.g. Fowler (1996) 80-86, who argues that the account of the λόγιοι in the proem “is not ‘fictive’ in any helpful sense, but an intelligent putting together of all the information available to him” (86). In this vein, see also West (2002a), who shows (albeit more circuitously than Fowler) that the events related by the Persians in the proem are not spun out of whole cloth nor are they lifted directly from Stesichorus, Hecataeus, et al.

49 Shimron (1973).

50 Baragwanath and de Bakker (2012) 27.

51 See below.
Herodotus straddles the *spatium mythicum* and the *spatium historicum* without privileging either one categorically, just as the priamel in 1.5.3 suggests.\(^2\)

The notion that Herodotus is to occupy an intermediary place in aetiological discussions according to this programmatic statement coheres with his being likened by scholars to a ἱστωρ, a kind of arbitrator or witness whose duties varied throughout the Greek world depending on time and place.\(^3\) Though Herodotus does not use this term to describe himself,\(^4\) several studies conducted on authorial self-presentation in the *Histories* have convincingly shown that “the patterns of arbitration associated with the word ἱστωρ provide a powerful metaphor for [Herodotus’] intellectual activities including the rigorous examination of evidence, choosing between conflicting claims and versions, assessing responsibility, and the consequent building of a consensus within a community.”\(^5\) But while these activities do require Herodotus to assume a position of authority, such a stance is not predicated on omniscience.\(^6\) According to Dewald, this is because the ἱστωρ is concerned with defining the boundaries of knowledge as much as he is with moving past them.\(^7\) In calling attention to the former through his many struggles

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\(^2\) In the context of the Trojan War narratives (see also 2.112-120), Saïd (2012) 88 makes the telling observation that the word μῦθος is never used. On the exemplarity of these narratives to the *Histories* at large, see n. 37 above.

\(^3\) On Herodotus’ comparison to a ἱστωρ, see e.g. Dewald (1987), Nagy (1990) 250-273, Connor (1993), and Dewald (2002).

\(^4\) See Evans (1990) 94-95 for this and other objections to the application of the term ἱστωρ to Herodotus.


\(^6\) See e.g. Baragwanath (2008) 35-54.

\(^7\) For a summary of this dichotomy explored throughout Dewald (1987) and Dewald (2002), see e.g. Dewald (1987) 163: “The histōr lays considerable stress upon the partiality and the ambiguities of the record that he can write. Much of his energy as a critic goes into emphasizing the serious limitations of his data. 2.123 and the forty other expressions of outright disbelief do not express the cynical irresponsibility of someone writing to please rather than to instruct, nor are they the crude formulations of an insufficiently
to master the λόγοι which make up his ἱστορίη.\textsuperscript{58} Herodotus thereby urges us, the readers, to struggle with them, too.\textsuperscript{59}

This dichotomy finds programmatic expression in Herodotus’ arbitration of the aetiological accounts of the Persians and the Phoenicians in the remainder of the proem. On the one hand, the first person interjection in the climax of the priamel (τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς…, 1.5.3) indicates that Herodotus will place his knowledge at the fore of the forthcoming inquiry. On the other hand, the fact that he can only vouch for the responsibility of Croesus in being the first of the barbarians to commit injustices against the Greeks reveals that his own knowledge will itself be circumscribed. But even when Herodotus points to his limitations, he does not succumb to ἀπορία. And yet, by showing us what he does know, Herodotus does not rule out the potential for other parties to have contributed to the development of the conflict at an earlier point in time.\textsuperscript{60} He thereby prompts us to consider a range of possibilities in elucidating origins and so to look past the way things may appear \textit{prima facie}.

The author’s invitation to the reader to see beyond a given explanation or expectation is extended in the last section of the proem, after he promises to “go through sophisticated historian. They rather express the \textit{histōr}’s working experience of the fact that knowledge of the world is difficult to get, and partial and provisional at best.”\textsuperscript{58} On the possible shared etymology of ἱστορίη and ἵστωρ, see Bakker (2002) 14-16. \textsuperscript{59} Dewald (1987) 167. \textsuperscript{60} On the notion that primacy is not altogether primal, see e.g. 2.2-3 and 4.1 (discussed in Chapters 2.1 and 4.1 respectively). Cf. 1.2.1 (see above).
great and small human settlements alike” (ὁμοίως μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξέγερα, 1.5.3).61

For many of those settlements that were great in the past have become small, and those that were great in my time were once small. Knowing, then, that human prosperity never abides in the same place, I will mention both alike.

Herodotus’ remarkable statement about contingency and mutability as they pertain not to ethnicity but to humanity in general (ἀνθρωπηίην) is indicative of a cosmopolitan mindset that will be shown to inform the Histories as a whole. This broad frame of reference is augmented further by the way in which Herodotus integrates the present (γέγονε, ἐπιστάμενος), the past (ἦν), and the future (ἐπιμνήσομαι), suggesting that his work will be a timeless one.62 But as Grethlein notes in comparing 1.5.4 to an inscribed memorial, which is endowed not only with the task of commemorating the past but also with creating a dialogue with future viewers, timelessness does not presuppose a fixedness of meaning or interpretation.63 Rather, by projecting into the realm of what once was and what could be, Herodotus “…anticipates future vantage points which…will bestow new significance on the narrative of the Histories.”64 Thus, “in reading the

61 Cf. Hom. Od. 1.3: πολλὰν δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω. On this Homeric analogue, see esp. Marincola (2007), who hypothesizes that “some symmetry may…be at work here: as the closing of this preface echoes the Odyssey, so the opening had made reference to the κλέος of the great deeds of Greeks and barbarians and in this way to the Iliad” (14).
63 Grethlein (2013) 222, with special reference to the inscription in honor of those from Phyle who restored the democracy at Athens following the rule of the Thirty (see Aeschin. 3.190).
64 Grethlein (2013) 222.
inscription on his monument”, as Bakker posits, “we not only become, implicitly, speakers who acknowledge Herodotus’ achievement; we are also are cast in Herodotus’ own role. Standing not before the publication or presentation of the Inquiry, but before the Inquiry itself, its enactment, we are asked to do what Herodotus did himself: to listen critically, to question, and to judge.” In doing so, we become “the origo of a deictic act that will be performed as long as the monument is standing, and read.”

To sum up, the preceding chapter has made the case for seeing aetiology and narrative presentation as an inextricable whole, beginning in the very first sentence of the Histories. But whereas the study of causes and origins in the paradigmatic example of the proem has been shown to be dependent upon the authority of Herodotus, the knowledge behind this authority is not total. Though Herodotus takes measures to show what he does know (in a manner befitting his unique and innovative ἀπόδειξις), his unwillingness to posit one single explanation or source for the difference between Greeks and barbarians betokens the fundamental multiplicity of aetiology in the Histories, which belies an “either…or” distinction. However, this is not simply the result of ignorance or an unwillingness to commit to one version of an account. As the finale of the proem affirms, we the readers are directed to see beyond the aetiological question at hand as more than just a monologic discourse founded on certainty, but as a window into a world

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of possibilities. So that we may begin to understand how this pattern manifests itself throughout the *Histories* in even the most disparate places, let us now turn to the Egyptian λόγος, which will be shown to speak intimately to the aetiological principles established in the opening to Herodotus’ work.
2. Exemplifying the Egyptian *Logos*: the Inquiries of Herodotus and Psammetichus

In *The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others*, Paul Cartledge characterizes Herodotus’ account of Egypt (Αἰγύπτιος λόγος) as follows:¹

Book 2 on Egypt is a conspicuous anomaly in Herodotus’ work, raising in a particularly acute way all the most awkward questions about the author’s literary project as a whole. Father of History—or lies? Critical student of scrupulously collated oral traditions—or credulous tourist retailing mere travellers’ tales? Historical geographer belatedly converted to history proper—or geographical historian with a special interest in Egypt? Father of comparative ethnography and cross-cultural history—or mere narrative artist in prose? I begin with a consideration of the book as such, which in its present form and location constitutes a kind of giant excursus from his main project of ‘the Median things.’²

Here, then, is a paradox: the Egyptian λόγος is at once an outlier and the very standard of Herodotean methodology.

Scholars have often viewed the Egyptian λόγος as an anomaly, since it is exceptionally long and is populated by an unusually large number of first person interjections.³ Furthermore, its tendency to scientific investigation in the context of autopsy and argumentation contrasts with “the wise but riddling authorities” that make up some of the most memorable episodes of Book One (e.g. the interaction of Solon and

¹ It ought to be noted that Book Two and the Egyptian λόγος are not (or at least should not be) interchangeable, as the initial 38 chapters of Book Three may be said to correspond to the Egyptian λόγος as well (see Johnson (1994) 247, Spiegelberg (1927) 3, Asheri et al. (2007) 397 ad Hdt. 3.1). Since the division of the *Histories* into books probably took place after Herodotus’ lifetime (Cagnazzi (1975) 386), I refer to Hdt. 2.1-3.38 as the Egyptian λόγος, in keeping with Herodotus’ conceptualization of his own narrative framework according to λόγοι.
³ Marincola (1987) 121 counts an average of two such remarks per OCT page. See also Darbo-Peschanski (1987) 185 and Benardete (1969) 36 (including n. 15).
Croesus, the oracles, etc.).\textsuperscript{4} To top it off, the separation of the Egyptian \textit{λόγος} from the Persian Wars which Book One first anticipates distinguishes this part of the \textit{Histories} as a digression in the eyes of many scholars.\textsuperscript{5} Some have even argued that it was originally designed to be a stand-alone monograph before Herodotus ultimately decided to incorporate it into the \textit{Histories}.\textsuperscript{6}

Scholars on Herodotean methodology, however, have seen the Egyptian \textit{λόγος} as representative of the work as a whole. We find this especially in discussions of Herodotus’ use of autopsy and argumentation as far as they concern historical methodology. For instance, Marincola’s efforts to locate Herodotus’ presence as a narrator in the \textit{Histories} holistically confines itself almost exclusively to the Egyptian \textit{λόγος}.\textsuperscript{7} Likewise, Thomas devotes an entire chapter of \textit{Herodotus in Context} to the role of inductive and deductive reasoning in the \textit{Histories} at large, but draws nearly all of her support from Book Two.\textsuperscript{8}

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\textsuperscript{4} Johnson (2009) 13. I thank Professor Johnson for sharing this unpublished work with me.
\textsuperscript{5} See Jacoby (1913) col. 381 for the genesis of this influential idea (see also n. 6 below).
\textsuperscript{6} This view was first put forward by Bauer (1878) and was later popularized by Jacoby (1913): “Es ist wohl anerkannt, daß wir im zweiten Buche ein vollkommen selbständiges Werk über Ägypten besitzen usw.” (col. 331). The most influential proponent of this belief in recent times has been Fornara (1971): “Book II was written to instruct and entertain. It reveals Herodotus’ basic interest in history and his natural inclination to research, the making of inquiries. But it is the work of a younger man not yet in control of the techniques or in possession of the mental attitudes of the author of Book I. The change in Herodotus’ technique from such a book as II to the immeasurably more complex portions of his history as, especially, I and VII-IX, is the mark of an increasingly mature and practised style. More especially, however, it denotes also a shift in intentions and a new conception of his role” (21). In this vein, see also De Sanctis (1926), Powell (1939) 39-62, and von Fritz (1967) 158 ff. (as cogently summarized by Drews (1973) 63-69).
\textsuperscript{7} Marincola (1987).
\textsuperscript{8} i.e. “Argument and the language of proof” (Thomas (2000) 168-212). Even Dewald (1987), whose study is considered one of the most sensitive discussions of narratology and historical methodology in Herodotus, is similarly limited where eyewitness statements are concerned (Johnson (2009) 9).
In some respects, it is understandable why this contradiction has come about. Book Two does allude often to the process of historical inquiry, most notably with terms like ὀψις ("autopsy"), ἀκοή ("hearsay"), and γνώμη ("judgment"). But these markers of what Nino Luraghi calls "meta-historiē" are not relegated solely to Book Two and cannot encompass the totality of Herodotean inquiry on their own. Instead, when taken together, such markers may be said to constitute "an apodexis in the fullest sense, an exhibition to the audience that superior method has resulted in a significantly fuller and more accurate account." As far as our discussion of aetiology and historical methodology is concerned, it is significant that the markers of historical inquiry in the Egyptian λόγος have been interpreted collectively as an ἀπόδεξις, not only because this requires us to look back to this word’s programmatic use in the proem (and thus to see the elements of what ostensibly distinguishes the Egyptian λόγος already at work at the outset of Book One),

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9 For an overview of ὀψις, ἀκοή, and γνώμη, see Darbo-Peschanski (1987) 84-101, 184-89. For numerical comparisons of these sorts of citations with other books in the Histories, see e.g. Shrimpton and Gillis (1997) and Marincola (1987) 137 and 122 n. 5. For a detailed discussion of these and other terms of inquiry in the context of Book Two, see especially Lloyd (1975) 77-140.

10 "Taken together, first-person statements on the process of collecting and assessing information and 'they say' references form a sort of meta-discourse, running parallel to the narrative surface of the Histories and commenting on its nature and origin. Since Herodotus in his proem calls the activity he is engaging in historiē the statements about such activity could be called meta-historiē; they form the core of modern reconstructions of Herodotus' historical method" (Luraghi (2006) 77).

11 On the latter point, see especially Verdin (1971): "A classification of the sources, however, is unknown to him [i.e. Herodotus]. Still, his opposition of various ways of obtaining information, such as ὀψις, ἱστορίη, ἀκοή, γνώμη indicates that he did not regard the materials of history as an amorphous mass" (224). See also Dewald (2002), who reminds us that "there is an enormous additional amount of metanarrative comment spread throughout all nine books that is not explicitly added by the first-person narrator per se" (275).


13 The conclusion to Lloyd’s (1975) exhaustive discussion of source criticism in the Egyptian λόγος is particularly telling in this regard: “Finally, let it be emphatically reiterated that Herodotus’ relationship to
but also because this requires us to consider the extent to which “narrative and explanation are one.”\textsuperscript{14} As we saw in the previous chapter, Herodotus’ expansive understanding of αἰτίη (“reason why”, “alleged reason”, “charge”, “fault”, “blame”, etc.)\textsuperscript{15} embraces “variety and multiplicity”\textsuperscript{16} from the very beginning of the Histories. Rather than limit himself to just one answer to the question “why Greeks and barbarians came to war with each other” (δι᾽ ἧν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι, 1.1.0), Herodotus broaches the topic of aetiology in such a way that defies singular explanations and expectations, signaling the complexities and ambiguities inherent in the discernment of origins. Although Herodotus ultimately leaves the bulk of this task to the reader, the manner in which he steps out of the narrative underscores the programmatic importance of the display of his inquiry (ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις, 1.1.0). Herodotus thereby shows the reader not only the breadth, circumspection, and novelty of the inquiry presented, but also the extent to which an integrative approach to the complex study of origins can better approximate accuracy where “the truth” is a scarce to non-existent monolith. Thus, it is no exaggeration to state that for Herodotus, “historie makes the apodexis an aitie”,\textsuperscript{17} that is, inquiry makes its display a “reason why.”

Building on these arguments made in the previous chapter, we shall illustrate how Herodotus’ understanding of aetiology in the Egyptian λόγος may be viewed within the

\textsuperscript{14} Gould (1989) 85.
\textsuperscript{15} See Powell (1960) ad loc.
\textsuperscript{17} Cook (1976) 64.
wider methodological framework of the Histories. Instead of relying upon a genetic approach\textsuperscript{18} to make this connection, the exploits of the pharaoh Psammetichus as recounted in Book Two will be examined in a series of case studies together with what we have already concluded from our initial investigation of the proem in Book One. This will be done in such a way as to refute the notion that the Egyptian λόγος is altogether aberrant from the grand scheme of Herodotus’ work. Because the aetiological inquiries of Psammetichus are reflective of many of the same concerns voiced by Herodotus \textit{in propría persona}, these case studies will distill broad issues, much in the way Herodotus himself does, in order to reassess some of the most persistent and acute controversies in the Histories.

2.1 The Bekos Experiment

The Egyptian λόγος begins simply enough. In 2.1.1 we are reminded of the death of the Persian king Cyrus at the hands of the Massagetae a few chapters earlier (1.214.3) and we learn of the succession of his son Cambyses. We expect to see Cambyses’

\textsuperscript{18} This approach (also known as the “developmental hypothesis” as set forth in Jacoby (1913) cols. 333-392) assumes that we can chart Herodotus’ intellectual development on the basis of a close reading of the Histories and thereby deduce when the constituent λόγοι were originally composed. However, this is infeasible both from practical and abstract standpoints. The little we do know about composition and “publication” in the classical period suggests a degree of flexibility that cannot be detected without a fifth century exemplar of the Histories. For example, advances in papyrology (see e.g. Johnson (1994) 229 n. 4) have all but silenced Lattimore’s classic lament, that Herodotus “could not, if he found something objectionable on page 8, take it out and write a new page, number it 8, and put it in the stack where it belonged” (Lattimore (1958) 9). Furthermore, the presence of many narrative personae which Herodotus dons and doffs throughout the Histories makes a genetic approach appear equally fruitless (see Drews (1973) 69). Thus, as far as the Egyptian λόγος is concerned, the most sensible (albeit guarded) conclusion is the one drawn by Dewald (1987) 157 n. 25: “The inclusion of book 2 in the Histories shows that whenever Herodotus conceived of the work as a whole, he had not renounced the authorial attitudes there displayed.” See also n. 6 above.
proposed expedition against Egypt commence immediately, but we must wait more than 180 chapters after the plan is first announced to see it come to fruition in 3.1.1.

It may come as a surprise to those who view the Egyptian λόγος as a complete incongruity relative to other λόγοι that it takes Herodotus so long to close the ring. However, given what we have learned in our discussion of the proem about Herodotus’ penchant for challenging initial impressions and directing us to look past the status quo, we should be trained to expect the unexpected by now. Then again, what follows is not entirely unexpected if we are cognizant of what has come before the Egyptian λόγος.

With this in mind, let us start by considering the famous linguistic experiment of the pharaoh Psammetichus (the so-called bekos experiment) which first preempts Cambyses’ campaign and establishes itself as the “frontispiece” and “keynote” to the Egyptian λόγος:

Οἱ δὲ Αιγύπτιοι, πρὶν μὲν Ἡ Ψαμμήτιχος σφέων βασιλεύσαι, ἐνόμιζον ἑωτούς πρῶτους γενέσθαι πάντων ἀνθρώπων. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Ψαμμήτιχος βασιλεύσας ἠθέλησε εἰδέναι οἵτινες γενοῦτο πρῶτοι, ἀπὸ τούτου νομίζομεν Φρύγας προτέρους γενέσθαι ἑωτοῦ τῶν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἑωτούς. [2] Ψαμμήτιχος δὲ ὡς οὕκ ἑδύνατο πυνθανόμενος πόρον οὐδένα τούτου ἀνευρεῖν οἵ γενοῦτο πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιτεχνᾶται τοιόνδε. Παιδία δύο γεγονὰ ἅπαξ ἑωτῶν τὸν ἐπιτυχόντων διδοῖ ποιμένι τρέφειν ἐς τὰ ποίμνια τροφήν τινα τοιούτου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπιτυχούσα, ἐπιτέλεστο [ὁ] Ψαμμήτιχος θέλων ἀκούσαι τῶν παιδιῶν, ἀπαλλαχθέντων τῶν ἀστήμων

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19 As Herington (1991a) has demonstrated, this is not excessive by Herodotean standards, as the conclusion of the Histories (9.108-122) may be said to exhibit signs of triple ring composition, harkening as far back as the proem (see Chapter Six below).
20 On this all-important theme in the Histories, see e.g. van der Veen (1996).
21 Benardete (1969) 32.
22 West (1991) 153 n. 52.
Before Psammetichus became their king, the Egyptians used to consider themselves the first of all humans. But after Psammetichus became king and desired to know who actually came first, ever since then they have considered the Phrygians to be older than themselves, and themselves older than the rest. [2] But when Psammetichus was unable to discover any means of learning which people came first, he contrived the following. He gave two newborn children belonging to random people to a shepherd to raise among his flocks according to such an upbringing, commanding that no one should utter a word in the children’s presence, but that they should remain by themselves in an isolated hut, and that the shepherd at the appointed time should bring them goats and then go about his other tasks after giving them their fill of milk. [3] Psammetichus did these things and issued these commands out of a desire to hear which word the children uttered first, once they were past the age of unintelligible cries. And this actually came to pass, for after the shepherd had done these things for two years, both children fell upon him as he opened the door and went inside, and they began to shout “bekos”, stretching out their hands. [4] When the shepherd first heard this, he kept it to himself, but when he kept hearing this word in coming often and paying close attention, he finally indicated this to his master and brought the children before him as he had commanded. And when Psammetichus himself heard them, he inquired as to which people call something “bekos” and discovered in the course of his investigation that this was what the Phrygians called “bread.” [5] Thus, judging from this, the Egyptians conceded that the Phrygians were older than themselves. This is what I heard happened from the priests of Hephaestus in Memphis, but the Greeks say lots of other ridiculous things, like how Psammetichus cut out the tongues of some women and made the children live with them.

In one paragraph, Herodotus leaps about a hundred years without notice from Cambyses’ invasion of Egypt (525 BCE) to the time of the pharaoh Psammetichus I (664-
610 BCE). This is initially striking, inasmuch as Psammetichus’ reign in the Late Period is far removed from where someone as deeply concerned with origins as Herodotus might ordinarily start his account.23 Furthermore, because Psammetichus is eventually discussed in his proper chronological place relative to a host of other Egyptian rulers (2.152-154), from the earliest predynasts (i.e. Min) to the last of the Late Period pharaohs (i.e. Amasis), his proleptic appearance in 2.2 suggests his importance.24

Indeed, for a fifth-century historian writing in Greek, the reign of Psammetichus was a watershed. The founder of the 26th dynasty (Saite), Psammetichus sanctioned the first permanent settlements of Ionian and Carian mercenaries in Egypt (2.154). Though Greeks had experienced Egypt and engaged with its culture directly long before Psammetichus came to power,25 this particular pharaoh institutionalized modes of cultural exchange that had a lasting impact on the interaction between Greeks and Egyptians. These policies were influential to the extent that Herodotus is able to claim

23 Compare for example Diodorus Siculus’ account of Egypt in the first book of the Βιβλιοθήκη, which lays out the origins of Egypt ab ovo, beginning with the creation of the universe (1.6 ff.). For an outline of Herodotus’ Egyptian chronology, see Lloyd (1975) 185-194.
24 See Groten (1963) 82. In addition to the reasons I shall set out below, it is also possible that the pharaoh’s conspicuous role at the front of the Egyptian λόγος may speak to contemporary geopolitical concerns over the role of empire in the wake of the Persian Wars, a subject which interested Herodotus not a little (see esp. Chapters Five and Six below on this kind of prolepsis). Not only would Herodotus’ account of Egypt have resonated with a fifth-century audience in light of Athens’ expedition of 445/4 BCE to Egypt in response to Inarus’ rebellion (see Meiggs (1972) 101-108; Luraghi (2009) 443-444), but references to Psammetichus in particular may have struck some as well, since a Saite rebel king of the same name donated 40,000 medimnoi of wheat to the polis in a time of need (see Plut. Per. 37.4, Schol. Ar. Vesp. 718, Philoch. FGrH 328 F 119, and analysis at Meiggs (1972) 95, 268).
25 For a concise summary of Greek interactions with Egypt before the seventh century BCE, see Lloyd (1975) 1-13.
accurate knowledge of Egyptian history starting from Psammetichus’ reign,\textsuperscript{26} thanks in large part to the creation of the class of Greek-speaking interpreters (ἐρμηνεύεις), which endured to Herodotus’ day (2.154.2, 2.164) and furnished him with sources that expanded the scope of his inquiry.\textsuperscript{27} On a more abstract level, the achievements of Psammetichus are perhaps most significant in that they are symbolic of what we might term a “global” view of the world and are in turn reflective of the diverse Mischung that is Herodotus’ cultural and intellectual milieu. Given what we have already deduced from our likening of Herodotus to a ἱστωρ, it is not unreasonable, then, to posit that the Father of History might have identified with Psammetichus and his arbitrations between Greeks and barbarians, especially where they concerned issues as fundamental to the process of inquiry as language and its origins.\textsuperscript{28}

Like other prominent rulers and statesmen in the Histories, Psammetichus may also be counted among the “inquisitive kings”\textsuperscript{29} whom Herodotus has engage in inquiry much like his own.\textsuperscript{30} Psammetichus’ experiment with the two newborns is characterized by the sort of investigative language which Herodotus often uses of himself (e.g.

\textsuperscript{26} ... τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτον γινόμενα ἀπὸ Ψαμμητίχου βασιλέως ἀρξάμενοι πάντα [καὶ] τὰ ὕστερον ἐπιστάμεθα ἀτρεκέως (2.154.4). On the historical significance of Psammetichus’ reign from this standpoint, see Lloyd (1975) 14-17, 24-25 and Lloyd (1988) ad Hdt. 2.154.
\textsuperscript{27} Herodotus tells us that he employed a ἑρμηνεύς to interpret the inscriptions on the Pyramid of Cheops (2.125.6, discussed in Chapter 3.1 below).
\textsuperscript{28} As a Hellenized Carian exile who wrote in the Ionic dialect, Herodotus may have identified with Psammetichus on a personal level for having enlisted Ionian and Carian mercenaries to secure the throne following a period of exile (2.152). For a biographical discussion of the controversial (yet decidedly heterogeneous) origins of Herodotus (the historical figure), see Brown (1988a).
\textsuperscript{29} Christ (1994) 167.
\textsuperscript{30} See especially Christ (1994), who juxtaposes Herodotean inquiry with the inquiries of Solon, Cambyses, Darius, and Xerxes among others. See also Munson (2005) 19-23, who fittingly entitles her section on the bekos experiment, “Another ἱστωρ: Psammetichus and the origin of language.”
ἐνόμιζον, ἠθέλησε εἰδέναι, ἐπιτεχνᾶται, θέλων ἀκούσαι, ἐπυνθάνετο, εὑρίσκει, σταθμοσώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.).31 But while there certainly does exist a “dialectical relationship” between Herodotus and Psammetichus,32 it is not as straightforward as one might initially perceive. As Gruen warns, “the historian does not engage here in straight and simplistic reportage.”33

Herodotus begins by stating that the *bekos* experiment was conducted because Psammetichus wanted to know which people came first (Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Ψαμμήτιχος βασιλεύσας ἠθέλησε εἰδέναι οἵτινες γενοίατο πρῶτοι…, 2.2.1). As Bloomer has observed, superlatives like πρῶτοι (“first”)34 often defy expectations in the *Histories* by casting into doubt the answers to seemingly obvious questions. This in turn can instigate a process he calls “superlative revision,”35 whereby the reader is made to reassess the commonplaces inherent in a superlative claim in such a way that “animates and directs the story”36 beyond preconceptions and clichés.37 Nevertheless, however much this process may advance the course of ἱστορίη, it can only go so far. For this reason,

31 See Johnson (2009) 10. When set beside Psammetichus’ inquiry, Herodotus’ follow-up in 2.3 (discussed below) is uncannily similar in how it deploys the language of ἱστορίη (cf. ἤκουσα, ἐθέλων εἰδέναι, νομίζων).
33 Gruen (2011b) 80–81.
34 For a discussion of how “πρῶτος ist auch Superlativ” where invention and discovery is concerned in Herodotus, see Kleingünther (1933) 40-65 (quotation at 47). On the connection between the introduction to the *bekos* experiment and proemial phrases of primacy in Homer (e.g. *Il* 1.6, 11.217, 16.113), see Nagy (1990) 221 n. 34.
36 Bloomer (1993) 44.
37 The consequence of the *bekos* experiment is a good example, insofar as a dubious superlative claim of Egyptian primacy in 2.2 is followed by “a cluster of genuine [Egyptian] firsts (2.4): the discovery of the calendar year, of the twelve gods, of altars, images, and temples, of bas-relief” (Bloomer (1993) 41 n. 28). See also 1.30-33 for the paradigmatic exchange between Croesus and Solon over the identity of the “most blessed” (ὦλβιώτατος).
Herodotus is wont to “draw attention to the limits of human knowledge” through superlative revision.

If we look back to the beginning of the Histories, we may find a paradigmatic example of superlative revision in the priamel which caps off the proem (Ταῦτα μὲν νῦν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοίνικες λέγουσι. Ἐγώ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 1.5.3). As we argued in the previous chapter, Herodotus’ decision to follow up with Croesus, the first barbarian whom he himself knew to have perpetrated unjust deeds against the Greeks (τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὑτὸς πρῶτον…, 1.5.3), should not be understood as an indictment of the claims of primacy and responsibility offered by the Persians and the Phoenicians in the preceding accounts of 1.1-4, but rather as a delineation of what can and cannot be known based on historical inquiry about so distant a dispute as the ultimate origin of enmities between Greeks and barbarians. The result was such that even though Herodotus ultimately assigned Croesus the distinction of being πρῶτος in the spatium historicum, he did not discount the possibility that someone else might have been first in the spatium mythicum. Thus, through this circumscription of knowledge, Herodotus asked us to see beyond absolutes in conducting ἱστορίη.

Herodotus asks us to do much the same when he goes to verify the results of the bekos experiment:

Κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὴν τροφῆν τῶν παιδίων τοσαύτα ἔλεγον. Ἡκουσα δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐν Μέμφι, ἐλθὼν ἐς λόγους τοῖς ἱρεύσα τοῦ Ἡραίστου καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐς Θῆβας τε καὶ ἐς Ἡλίου πόλιν αὐτῶν τούτων ἐνέκειν ἐπαρπόμην, ἐθέλων εἰδέναι εἰ συμβῆσονται τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ἐν Μέμφι. οἱ γὰρ Ἡλιοπόλιται λέγονται Αἰγυπτίων εἶναι

This is what they [i.e. the priests of Hephaestus] said concerning the children’s upbringing. But I also heard other things in Memphis in the course of my conversations with the priests of Hephaestus. I also went to Thebes and Heliopolis specifically for this purpose, out of a desire to know whether they would agree with what was said in Memphis, for the Heliopolitans are said to be the most authoritative Egyptians. [2] Now I am not eager to relate the sort of stories I heard about the gods, except their names alone, because I think that all peoples have equal knowledge of them. But whatever mention I may make of them, I will do so when compelled by the logos.

In what amounts to a recapitulation of the opening priamel, Herodotus contrasts what he was able to learn from the priests of Hephaestus at Memphis, the Thebans, and the Heliopolitans (whose epithet λογιώτατοι immediately recalls the Persian λόγιοι of 1.1.1) with his own belief (νομίζων, 2.3.2), namely, that all peoples have equal knowledge of the gods (…πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἱσον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπίστασθαι, 2.3.2). This personal interjection is important not only in that it closes the ring opened by the Egyptians at the outset of the experiment (ἐνόμιζον ἑωυτοὺς πρῶτους γενέσθαι πάντων ἀνθρώπων, 2.2.1), but also because it climaxes with the same concern for human affairs which marked the conclusion of the proem:

Ταῦτα μὲν νῦν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοίνικες λέγουσι. Ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν τῶν οὐκ ἔχωμαι ἐρέων ὡς οὐτως ἢ ἄλλως καὶ ταῦτα ἐγένετο, τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἐργῶν ἐς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας, τοῦτον σημίνας προφητεῖμα ἐς τὸ πρόσω ποὶ τοῦ λόγου, ὀμοίως μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξείων. [4] Τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρά γέγονε· τὰ δὲ ἐπ’ ἐμέ ἦν μεγάλα, πρῶτον ἦν σμικρὰ. Τὴν ἀνθρωπείην ἄν ἐπιστάμενου εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμὰ ἐν τῶν θεῶν μένουσαν, ἐπιμενήσομαι ἀμφότερον ὀμοίως (1.5.3-4).

This is what the Persians and the Phoenicians say. But I am not going to talk about these matters, that they happened this way or some other way. Instead,
having indicated the man I myself know to have been the first to undertake unjust deeds against the Greeks, I will proceed with my logos by going through great and small human settlements alike. For many of those settlements that were great in the past have become small, and those that were great in my time were once small. Knowing, then, that human prosperity never abides in the same place, I will mention both alike.

What’s more, Herodotus’ cosmopolitan belief about all peoples’ equal knowledge of the gods is no more to the exclusion of what the Memphites, the Thebans, or the Heliopolitans say in 2.2-3 than it was to the exclusion of what the Persians or the Phoenicians said in 1.1-4. Rather, as in the case of the programmatic analogue of 1.5.3-4 set out above, Herodotus’ decision to project into the realm of human affairs at the end of the bekos experiment instead of offering categorical support for one account over another directs us once again to consider a veritable world of narrative perspectives, none of whose methodological components can be privileged or written-off wholesale in the process of ἱστορίη.39

The danger of allowing a part to speak for the whole is about the closest thing to a “moral” that we can glean from the bekos experiment, which, like the structurally and thematically analogous proem to the Histories, has precluded a consensus of interpretation since Herodotus’ time.40 This lack of agreement is understandable, though,

39 For a concise discussion of the variegated foundations of Herodotean knowledge and their holistic importance, see e.g. Verdin (1971) 223-234, esp. 224: “The survey of the sources mentioned by Herodotus (p. 2-35) mainly intends to demonstrate that this historian intuitively practiced what modern scientific theory preaches: anything that can furnish information on man’s past must be regarded as historical evidence. The most diverse kinds of archaeological remains, inscriptions, literary testimony (the works of predecessors as well as poetry and collections of oracles), pieces of a more documentary nature, and finally, a large amount of oral testimony, all were employed by Herodotus as sources of information.” See also n. 11 above.

40 See Gera (2003) 68-111, who brilliantly demonstrates how the bekos experiment has attracted myriad interpretations, from Aristophanes (i.e. Nub. 398) to the present, by virtue of its being “both stimulating
because the outcome of the *bekos* experiment in 2.2 suggests that languages (however ancient) cannot be definitively traced back to a single *Ursprache* from which all other languages spring.\footnote{i.e. “The *ἀρχαῖα* are not the *ἀρχαί*” (Benardete (1969) 35).} Furthermore, Herodotus’ refusal to see language either as a purely cultural or purely natural phenomenon makes such variance all the more understandable.\footnote{See e.g. Griffiths (2001) 164 for a consideration of how the *bekos* experiment belies a strict interpretation according to φύσις or νόμος alone. On this dichotomy, see 2.30 ff (discussed below).} However, Herodotus’ follow-up in 2.3 should remind us that whatever biases\footnote{Salmon (1956) 329 argues that the priests of Hephaestus recounted the *bekos* story as they did because they were biased against Psammetichus’ policies as pharaoh. On the other hand, Benardete (1969) 34 believes that the priests recounted the experiment according to their dogmatic understanding of mimesis in keeping with their role as servants of Hephaestus, “the author…of imitation.”} or logical fallacies\footnote{According to Benardete (1969), it is illogical for the Egyptians to think that “speaking is natural to men” (32). Though Benardete is right to point out that there is a distinction between λόγος and γλώσσα which the Egyptians fail to notice (33), the notion that speaking would have been seen as natural is not altogether in keeping with fifth century linguistic theory or with what we are told about the experiment: “since the non-verbal act of supplication of the children, which we would regard as highly conventional, is certainly not learned from the goats but innate, the same could be said for their first word” (Munson (2005) 22, see also Gera (2003) 83-92 for a similar discussion of the importance of gestures).} scholars may detect in the experiment are dependent upon accounts which make no claim to speak from first-hand knowledge about controversies in the distant past. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that Psammetichus’ eye witness investigation (ἐς ὄψιν, 2.2.4) is set within the oral account of the priests (Ἔλεγον, 2.3.1) within the written account of Herodotus, all of which are stacked on top of one another like a Russian doll. Through this process of focalization,\footnote{See Dewald (1999) on focalization (discussed in Chapter One above).} aetiology and narrative thus become inextricable. For this reason, Herodotus makes a point of informing us of the

*and open to refutation*” (100). Particularly noteworthy among these are the overlapping theories proposed by several Enlightenment thinkers to explain the word *bekos*: “A plea (Condillac), an onomatopoeic word (Vico), the awareness of an animal’s existence (Herder), or perhaps a call for affection (Rousseau): all could have a place in Herodotus’ tale” (87, discussed at 97-105).
lengths to which he has gone to arbitrate multiple perspectives in order to adhere to the
dictates of an expansive and panoptic λόγος and so guard against the vagaries of
monology. Nevertheless, no matter how circumspect Herodotus may strive to be in this
regard, some ambiguity remains.

If we step back and look at these conclusions in light of what has come before the
Egyptian λόγος, we may find a fitting comparison in Herodotus’ treatment of the earliest
Greek peoples in the so-called “Pelasgian controversy” (1.56-8). Here, as in the bekos
experiment, Herodotus not only addresses the obscure origins of language, but also
mitigates difference and complexity without rectifying them fully (in a manner which,
one might add, anticipates the argumentative and scientific mannerisms characteristic of
the Egyptian λόγος in the midst of the Lydian λόγος). While Herodotus is unable to
determine conclusively which language the Pelasgians spoke (Ἡντινα δὲ γλῶσσαν ἰέσαν
οἱ Πελασγοί, οὐκ ἔχω ἀπρεκέως εἰπεῖν, 1.57.1), he does say that the Pelasgians’
intermingling with Greeks and other barbarians created a multitude of nations (αὐξηται ἐς

46 We can compare the phrase, “compelled by the λόγος” (ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐξαναγκαζόμενος, 2.3.2), to the
metaphor of the road of the λόγοι (λόγων ὁδός, 1.95.1), which often leads Herodotus, the quintessential
traveler (see Pohlenz (1937) 43), beyond where he might otherwise be inclined to go, independent of time
or place (see e.g. Immerwahr (1960) 276 and Wood (1972) 12). As Dewald (1987) has argued, the manner
in which Herodotus makes himself subject to the λόγος casts him less in the light of “an authoritative tour
guide” than as “a detached... observer like ourselves” (155). This process, which may be said to constitute a
“re-enactment of his own modes of dealing with the λόγοι and an invitation to us, as readers, to wrestle
with them too” (167), decentralizes knowledge in such a way that undermines the absolute power of any
one party. It is not surprising, then, that Connor deduces that such a metaphor “coincides with ἤστωρ
terminology” (Connor (1993) 12 n. 33). On the ἤστωρ, see esp. Chapter One above.
πλῆθος τῶν ἐθνῶν, 1.58). All the same, no amount of compromise can hide the fact that certain aspects of this controversy remain intractable for the ἵστωρ.49

Because Herodotus is concerned to show the limits of human inquiry throughout the Histories, it is unfair to conclude, then, that Psammetichus is merely a straw man, a methodological “exemplum e contrario.”50 The fact that both Psammetichus’ and Herodotus’ inquiries are described with the same investigative language and are immediately juxtaposed should cast serious doubts upon this assertion.51 Furthermore, the fact that Herodotus disputes neither the methodology nor the “anthropological meaning”52 of the experiment makes it even harder to believe that his intention was to expose the pharaoh’s naïveté.53 Even if this were the case, Psammetichus’ creation of the class of bilingual interpreters later on (2.154.2) acknowledges diversity in a way that moves past the notion of linguistic primacy which caused the bekos experiment to be conducted in the first place.54 Nevertheless, whatever fault Herodotus may have found with the pharaoh or the experiment itself, he does not make it explicit.

48 Herodotus deploys a similar strategy in elucidating the barbarian aetiology of the language spoken by the first oracle of Dodona (2.54-57). While Herodotus is more resolute in his opinion (γνώμη, 2.56.1) about its origins here than in the Pelasgian episode, his γνώμη is still founded on the reconciliation of two mutually-inclusive, dialogical traditions (see Benardete (1969) 50).
49 See e.g. McNeal (1985), who makes a case for seeing the Pelasgian controversy as an innately difficult passage which no amount of textual criticism can amend.
50 Vannicelli (1997) 216. See also Salmon (1956), Knobloch (1985), and Erbse (1992) 113-116, who argue that Herodotus has Psammetichus make leaps of logic concerning the origins of speech and language intentionally in order to make the pharaoh look ridiculous (and by extension, the Egyptian people as well).
51 See n. 31 above.
52 Munson (2005) 23.
53 See n. 50 above.
In light of Herodotus’ intellectual proclivities, it is understandable that he does not pronounce judgment against Psammetichus, as we may gather from sociologist A. Sulek’s illuminating defense of the science behind the *bekos* experiment:

Psammetichus abandoned a conviction so important to himself and the Egyptians under the influence of a single empirical counterargument [i.e. that *bekos* was a Phrygian word]. He could have resorted to various loopholes. In the infants’ utterings he could have heard native words rather than the alien word *becos*. He could have invalidated the whole experiment by pointing out that *becos* was not a natural but an imitated sound [i.e. the bleating of the goats]. He could have also stated that one experiment was not sufficient to have drawn a verdict concerning the antecedence of the peoples of the earth. Present-day experimenters sometimes resort to such strategies…Thus the intellectual honesty of Psammetichus is astonishing. He could become the patron of present-day experimenters not only on the account of his inventiveness, but of his honesty as well. If any busts and statues of him have survived, they ought to stand in the rooms of social science laboratories.\(^{55}\)

From this standpoint, the remarkable openness of Psammetichus makes it hard to imagine a more compelling case for the pharaoh to be a considered a ἱστορ and thus for Herodotus to want to emulate him in probing original claims. However, being a ἱστορ does not presuppose the ability to discern truth in every instance. No matter how sound the process of ἱστορίη may be, there are always limits to what can be known. As Christ astutely points out, the manner in which Herodotus acknowledges this reality ultimately

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\(^{55}\) Sulek (1989) 650-651. The soundness of the empirical foundations of the *bekos* experiment is supported by Lloyd (1976) 5 ff., who provides evidence for just how “very carefully controlled” the experiment is (5). See also Froidefond (1971) 140-144 and Campos Daroca (1992) 52-53, who discuss how Psammetichus’ inquiry is a natural outgrowth of some of the most pressing questions of Ionian science. Such fundamental aetiological concerns prevailed independent of time and culture to the point that Frederick II, James IV, and Akbar the Great all conducted experiments in the vein of the *bekos* experiment (Sulek (1989) 647-648). For additional examples, see also Gera (2003) 68-111, esp. 92-106 (discussed in n. 40 above).
has major ramifications for the exegesis of the *Histories* far beyond the *bekos* experiment:

The historian distinguishes himself from kingly inquirers not only through the particular criticisms he levels against them, but also through the privileged position he assumes as an analyzer and arbiter of principles of inquiry whenever he treats regal investigation. This confers a special status on his *historie*—it is not only an inquiry itself, but also an investigation of inquiry—and lends a certain credibility to the inferences that the historian draws in the course of his investigations: the self-conscious critic of others’ inquiries may be thought to be less prone to error himself. To be sure, the critical attitude that Herodotus encourages through his analysis of kingly research is one that readers may in turn apply to his *historie*. When they do so, however, they pay tribute to the self-conscious inquirer who has inculcated in them a critical awareness of the pitfalls and possibilities of human investigation.  

As we have now seen in our analysis of the *bekos* experiment, the most dangerous investigative pitfalls encountered up to this point in the Egyptian λόγος have been situated around narrative—who is giving the account and to what end. While no area of historical inquiry is devoid of such hazards, they are especially prevalent in Egypt, a topsy-turvy land whose very name lent itself to the Greek expression “αἰγυπτιάζειν”, that is, “to be sly and crafty.” Some proponents of the “Liar School” might contend that this is exactly what Herodotus does when he recounts the *bekos* experiment in the style of a folk tale, an act which is wont to cast him more in the light of a fabulist (λογοποιός) like Aesop than a ἱστορ. Though there are grounds for Herodotus to be considered

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57 Cratin. fr. 378 (definition per LSJ). On the topos of Egypt as the locus of duplicity, see e.g. Ar. Th. 922, Aesch. fr. 373, Pl. Leg. 747c, Theocr. Id. 15.48, and Strab. 17.1.29.
58 For some tentative remarks on the resonance of the *bekos* experiment with *Volksmärchen*, see Aly (1969) 62-63.
59 For Herodotus’ own discussion of the life of Aesop the λογοποιός, see 2.134.
among the former, the fact that he is wont to intermingle λογοποιία with ἱστορίη sets him more comfortably among the latter from a technical standpoint, inasmuch as he reconciles the two in such a way as to show that λόγοι can ultimately point to truth independent of the historicity of the events recounted therein (such as the omnipresence of bias in historical inquiry). In a place as liminal as Egypt, at a time when the lines between Greek and barbarian and archaic and classical modes of thought were becoming increasingly blurred, truth was necessarily predicated on a variety of perspectives. After all, the word λόγος in the Histories can denote a “fable” just as it can an “account.”

This dichotomy lies at the heart of Cicero’s assessment of Herodotus in the opening of the De legibus: “Even in Herodotus, the Father of History, there are countless tall tales” (...et apud Herodotum patrem historiae... sunt innumerabiles fabulae, 1.5.1). As unflattering as this may sound, Cicero’s evaluation need not be taken as a dubious distinction, as Kurke argues:

Although by Cicero’s time, the opposed terms have become “history” versus “poetry,” neatly aligned in the opening dialogue of the De Legibus with “truth” (veritatem) versus “pleasure” (delectationem), we might see behind this the older opposition of historiē versus logopoïēa, “science” versus tall tales. What Cicero acknowledges is that Herodotus’s strange text is compounded of both. But why should Herodotus take these risks and cast himself in this somehow discreditable

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60 For evidence of the association of Herodotean style with that of Aesop in antiquity, see e.g. Plu. Mor. 871D = De Herodoti malignitate 40 (pace Nagy (1990) 322): οὐκέτι Σκύθαις οὐδὲ Πέρσαις οὐδ’ Αἰγυπτίοις τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ λόγους ἀνατίθησι πλάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοῦ Πυθίου προσώπῳ χρώμενος ἀπωθεῖ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμίνι πρωτείων τὰς Ἀθήνας. 61 See n. 43 above on bias and focalization. 62 “We are perhaps at a point where ideas about knowledge and truth are on the move, different and competing conceptions coexist of how to get at the truth, the unknown, from the poets, from experience and evidence of experience, to schematic of abstract theories, all with their own plausibility, none quite satisfying or sufficient by itself to jettison all the rest” (Thomas (2000) 101). 63 Murray (2001) 25. See n. 67 below ad Hdt. 1.141.
position? Presumably because he feels his message is an urgent one and this the most effective means of persuading the powerful.\textsuperscript{64}

If the proliferation of investigative language which marks both Psammetichus’ inquiry and that of Herodotus is indeed “indicative of an urgency of engagement with a readership who are in turn implicitly instructed—constructed—towards a similar activeness of far-ranging inquiry”,\textsuperscript{65} it is not surprising, then, that 2.2-3 embodies fabulistic traits according to Kurke’s interpretation of Cicero’s dichotomy. However, it would be a mistake to make λογοποιία define the essence of ἱστορίη by itself and so contradict the fundamental heterogeneity of Herodotean thought and methodology. It would be an even bigger mistake to equate λογοποιία with the purposeful distortion of the truth, a concept which, though a concern for Herodotus, was considerably more subjective and variable in his day than it was in subsequent ages, especially where it related to places like Egypt.\textsuperscript{66} Ultimately, λογοποιία represents but one implement in Herodotus’ sizeable toolkit, whose deployment in the keynote to the Egyptian λόγος may be viewed as a way of prompting the reader to question the very notion of what truth

\textsuperscript{64} Kurke (2011) 431. The main example Kurke marshals to this effect is Hdt. 1.27, in which a sage (ostensibly either Bias or Pittacus, who nevertheless exemplifies features that are redolent of Aesop) persuades Croesus not to invade the Ionian islanders by means of a fable (see also Kurke (2011) 126-136, 428-431). For similar perspectives on Cicero’s reception of Herodotus, see Dunsch (2013) and Priestley (2014) 209-212.

\textsuperscript{65} Johnson (2009) 20.

\textsuperscript{66} Branscome (2013) 9 shrewdly observes that Herodotus does not make a programmatic claim to tell the truth in the proem, but when he does concern himself explicitly with ἡ ἀλήθεια/τὸ ἀληθές, “he comments not so much on his own truthfulness as on the relative truthfulness or certitude of a given source or detail” (9 n. 16). The objectivity of Herodotus’ stance, which fits squarely within the model of the ἱστοράς advanced in this dissertation, was founded on the knowledge that “the truth” was a largely subjective concept in his intellectual milieu, distinct from what we might term “truthfulness” (see Marincola (2007), esp. 64-66). Fehling (1994) 9 terms this “verisimilitude”, which need not always contrast with truth. See also Momigliano (1958a), Evans (1968), Moles (1993), Rhodes (1994), Murray (2001) 25, and Baragwanath (2008) 19.
looks like in historical inquiry and how it should be brought to bear on the range of investigative challenges that will have to be confronted in order to extricate original claims in the land of paradox and inversion.67

2.2 The Nile

The next time we see the pharaoh Psammetichus in the Histories, Herodotus shows him engaged in researching a topic no less mysterious, controversial, or important than the origins of language: the sources of the Nile:


67 For another example of a fable which asks the reader to look closer at the larger framework of original claims, see 7.152 (discussed in Chapter 5.1 below). In the vein of λογοποία, consider also the αἶνος (see e.g. Nagy (1990) 215-338, Payen (1997) 66-74, esp. 72-74, and Hollmann (2011) 132-142), “a code that carries the right message for those who are qualified and the wrong message or messages for those who are unqualified” (Nagy (1990) 148). Ceccarelli (1993) sees the workings of the αἶνος in the λόγος which Cyrus tells to the Ionians and the Aeolians about the flute-player and the fish (1.141). Ceccarelli’s shrewd take on Cyrus’ λόγος is important in that it evinces a multiplicity of intra- and extra-textual meanings and interpretations in 1.141, all of which prohibit the sharp division of history and mythology (see also van Dijk (1997) 272-274 on the open-endedness of 1.141). This comparison becomes all the more germane in light of Ceccarelli’s correlation of Cyrus’ λόγος with the portent of the fish witnessed by Artaÿctes at the end of the Histories (see Ceccarelli (1993) 49-54 ad 9.120-22, discussed in Chapter 6.2 below). By juxtaposing 1.141 with 9.120-122, Ceccarelli in effect posits that “...the whole of Herodotus’s Histories becomes a fable with its deferred resolution wrt large, ostensibly addressed to different internal audiences (Ionians and Aeolians, Artaÿctes), while offered as an interpretive challenge to an external audience that understands the complex, indirect, multiple meanings encoded in this discursive form” (Kurke (2011) 404).
οία [δὲ] ἐμβάλλοντος τοῦ ὕδατος τοῖς ὀρεσι, ἡ δύνασθαι καταπειρητηρίην ἐς βυσσόν ἴναι (2.28).

No one with whom I spoke—Egyptian, Libyan, or Greek—professed to know the sources of the Nile, except the scribe of the sacred treasury of Athena at Sais in Egypt. [2] This man, however, seemed to me to be joking, though he alleged that he had accurate knowledge. This is what he said: there are two mountains with sharp peaks called Krophi and Mophi which lie halfway between Syene in the Thebaid and Elephantine. [3] The sources of the Nile, which are bottomless, flow from the midst of these mountains. One half of the water flows to Egypt towards the north, and the other half flows to Ethiopia towards the south. [4] The scribe said that Psammetichus, king of Egypt, tested the notion that the sources are bottomless, for having woven a rope of many thousands of fathoms, he let it down there and it did not reach bottom. [5] If this scribe was in fact telling the truth, he showed (as far as I understood) that there are some strong eddies there, such that a sounding line is not able to touch bottom when let down due to the crashing of the water against the mountains.

Psammetichus’ attempt to locate and verify the sources of the Nile strongly evokes the bekos experiment in a way that reaffirms Herodotus’ programmatic understanding of all that αἰτίη and its cognates stand for, as Benardete notes:

In both cases we can sense an attempt to go back to the beginnings; to discover the single source for what appears in fact as an infinite variety of phenomena: either the whole set of different languages or Egypt itself, with its great number of customs and monuments. Somehow all of the latter must be traced back to the river and the land, but to look for one origin of them all is as mistaken as to look for one language, from which all others would have sprung. The multiplicity of things cannot be reduced to one.68

Herodotus’ objections to a pars pro toto conception of aetiology might convict Psammetichus in this instance of the same sort of naïveté that some scholars have seen in Herodotus’ representation of the pharaoh’s actions in the bekos experiment.69 However, the manner in which Herodotus sets his own inquiry alongside that of Psammetichus in

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68 Benardete (1969) 41.
69 See n. 43 above.
the Nile episode once again makes this line of reasoning just as hard to accept in 2.28 as it was in 2.2-3, in no small part because Herodotus describes himself physically measuring the alluvial deposits of the Nile just a few chapters earlier.\(^{70}\) What’s more, in spite of conducting a circumspect inquiry employing manifold approaches, Herodotus is just as hard-pressed to determine the sources of the Nile as Psammetichus.\(^{71}\)

As was the case in the \textit{bekos} experiment, this is due in large part to narrative—who is giving the account and to what end. That the scribe (\textit{γραμματιστής}) of the sacred treasury of Athena at Sais is said to be the narrative custodian of Psammetichus’ experiment recounted at 2.28 has a significant bearing on the way in which Herodotus broaches the question of the sources of the Nile. If Evans is right to view this \textit{γραμματιστής} as the forebear of the \textit{iερογραμματεύς} of the Ptolemaic period, such a figure would have been more than just a lowly sacristan or dragoman.\(^{72}\) Consequently,

\(^{70}\) i.e. 2.5.2: Πρῶτα μὲν προσπλέων ἐτι καὶ ἠμέρης δρόμον ἀπέχων ἀπὸ γῆς, κατεῖς καταπειρητηρίην πηλόν τε ἀνοίσεις καὶ ἐν ἑνδεκά ὄργυιέσι ἔσεαι· τοῦτο μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο δὴλοι πρόχυσιν τῆς γῆς ἐοῦσαν. On this point, see Christ (1994) 172. Herodotus’ geographical measurements adhere to the egalitarian principles of the \textit{ἱστωρ}, insofar as they provide equivalences that extend across national and socio-economic divisions. For example, in 2.6, before relating that the coastline of Egypt is 3600 stades in length (στάδιοι έξακόσιοι καὶ τρισχίλιοι), Herodotus provides the means to convert this Greek figure into schoeni and parasangs (Δύναται δὲ ὁ μὲν παρασάγγης τριήκοντα στάδια, ὁ δὲ σχοῖνος ἕκαστο, μέτρον ἐὸν αἰγύπτιον, ἐξήκοντα στάδια), units used respectively by Egyptians and Persians of varying means (οἳ δὲ πολλὴν ἔχουσι, παρασάγγησι· οἳ δὲ ἄφθονον λίην, σχοίνωσι). The diversity of Herodotus’ geographical nomenclature is also reflected in the way he organizes the liminal zones of the \textit{οἰκουμένη} (“known world”), not just according to \textit{πείρατα} (“limits”) as in Homer, but according to a broader schema, comprising that which is ἀφανής (“unknown”), ἐρήμος (“desert”), μακρότατα (“furthest reaches”), etc. (see Romm (1992) 32-41, esp. 37-38, and Immerwahr (1966) 315).

\(^{71}\) “Herodotus relates this tradition just at the very beginning of his discussion of the problem of the sources of the Nile (28–34), contrasting once more Psammetichus’ ambitions and his own aim to circumscribe what is actually knowable and verifiable” (Vannicelli (2001) 238-239).

\(^{72}\) See Evans (1991) 136-137 (contra Spiegelberg (1927) 17-18). Though Lloyd (1976) does not make a connection between \textit{γραμματιστής} and \textit{iερογραμματεύς}, he does acknowledge that the former has “an official ring to it” (111).
his place within the temple hierarchy would have made it hard for Herodotus to deny his aetiology of the Nile’s sources categorically, not just because of his elevated social standing, but also because of the authority he would have commanded (φάμενος εἰδέναι ἀτρεκάως, 2.28.2) thanks to his access to historical records of both the written and oral sort. These are compelling reasons which may explain why Herodotus reports the account of the γραμματιστής in spite of voicing misgivings about the veracity of his narrative (Οὗτος δ’ ἐμοιγε παίζειν εἴδοκε κ.τ.λ., 2.28.2) and demarcating them with indirect speech (‘Ελεγε δὲ ὁδε; ἐφη, 2.28.2, 3) and other distancing statements (εἰ ἄρα ταῦτα γενόμενα ἔλεγε; ὡς ἐμὲ κατανοέειν, 2.28.5). Even more compelling, however, is Herodotus’ adherence to one of the governing principles of the Egyptian λόγος expressed later on in Book Two:

Τοῖσι μέν νυν ὑπ’ Αἰγυπτίων λεγομένοισι χράσθω ὅτεῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα πιθανά ἐστι· ἐμοὶ δὲ παρὰ πάντα τὸν λόγον ὑπόκειται ὅτι τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπ’ ἑκάστων ἀκοῇ γράφω (2.123.1).

Now let whoever considers such things credible make use of what is said by the Egyptians. My task for the entire logos is to write what is said by everyone as I hear it [akoe].

73 Brown (1988b) 83 suggests that Herodotus acknowledges the account of the γραμματιστής perhaps in part for reasons of tact, because he “did not wish to call the priest a liar!”
74 On priests as a source of information in the Histories, see Lloyd (1975) 89-113. Though the accuracy of such information would not have been of the caliber we might expect from a modern historian (Evans (1991) 137-139), this does not mean that the account of the γραμματιστής is altogether false or simply an invention ex nihilo, a point which even Fehling (1989) 89 is hard-pressed to defend. For evidence in light of Egyptian oral traditions that “Herodotus…surely had no need to invent the tales he relates of kingly inquiry” (Christ (1994) 197) in a case like 2.28, see Lloyd (1976) 114-115 and Moyer (2002) 87-88.
75 Cf. 7.152.3 (discussed in Chapter 5.1 below), which in effect reiterates the dictates of 2.123.1 and applies them to the rest of the Histories, including 2.28 (see Lloyd (1975) 87)): ‘Εγώ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαι γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω (καὶ μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω ἐς πάντα τὸν λόγον). On other such epistemological statements in Herodotus, see Dewald (1987) 151 ff.
With the μέν…δέ contrast, Herodotus casts himself unmistakably in the light of a ἱστωρ. However, this remark does not mean that he is styling himself here as an omniscient arbiter in possession of all the answers. Though a ἱστωρ, he, too, is beholden to the dictates of the “notoriously polyvalent” λόγος. Since the λόγος must partake of more than oral sources (ἀκοή) alone in order to inform something as vast and varied as ἱστορίη, which we will recall entails “both bare narrative account (apodexis) and explanation of the bare facts (aitie),” it is understandable that Herodotus moves past the account of the scribe into the realms of autopsy and conjecture in order to track down the sources of the Nile. But even though Herodotus fails to locate the sources of the river in the end, he does not resign himself to ignorance or even the status quo. Much in the way he offers an explanation for the hypothesis of the scribe in 2.28.5 (even though he is wary of the premise ipso facto), or in the way he reconciles the obscure origins of hostilities between Greeks and barbarians in the proem by naming Croesus as the first

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77 Cook (1976) 35.
79 The acknowledgement of ἀπορία in and of itself is not, however, disadvantageous for Herodotus, as Boedeker (2000) 111 posits: “Even in the freedom to admit ignorance, what Denniston called his “winning fallibility,” the narrator displays the superiority of his logos; as Thomas Rosenmeyer has noted, poetry presents itself as complete and authoritative, but history, based as it is on the human knowledge that can be gathered by the narrator, gets its authority from being less certain.”
80 That Herodotus asks such an aetiological question in the first place is a step forward, seeing as the Egyptians he encounters seem content to attribute their country’s geological and geographical anomalies to the “gift of the river” (δῶρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ, 2.5.1) without explanation (2.19.1). While Herodotus’ curiosity (Πρόθυμος δὲ ἔα τάδε…πυθέσθαι, 2.19.2) forces him to see beyond the topos that the Nile was indisputably central to Egyptian civilization (see Vasunia (2001) 106-108 and Wainwright (1953)), it is telling that he records this explanation at all.
barbarian to his knowledge (τὸν δὲ οἶδα, 1.5.3) to have committed injustices against the
Greeks.\textsuperscript{82} Herodotus ultimately shows us what he does know about the unknown.

This may be discerned from the ensuing section (2.29-34) in which Herodotus
pushes back against the epistemological limits imposed by the sources of the Nile:

‘Ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός οὐδὲν ἐδυνάμην πιθέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε μὲν ἄλλο ἐπὶ
μικρότατον ἐπιθύμην, μέχρι μὲν Ἐλεφαντίνης πόλιος αὐτόπτης ἐλθὼν, τὸ δ’ ἀπὸ
τούτου ἄκοη ἤδη ἱστορέων (2.29.1).

I was not able to learn anything [about the sources of the Nile] from anyone else,
but I did learn as much as I could by travelling as far as the city of Elephantine
and seeing it for myself [autoptes], but beyond this I investigated through hearsay
[akoe].

Although the contrast between “seeing…for myself” (αὐτόπτης, a relative of ὄψις) and
“hearsay” (ἄκοη) may imply the primacy of the former because of the proximity of
eyewitness investigation, Herodotus undermines such a hierarchy in an elaborate account
of the Libyan hinterlands just after tracing the course of the Nile as it is known in Egypt
(2.29-30):

Τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτῳ οὐδές ἔχει σαφέως φράσαι· ἔρημος γάρ ἐστι ἡ καύματος. (32.) Ἀλλὰ τάδε
μὲν ἠκούσα ἀνδρῶν Κυρηναίων φαμένων ἐλθεῖν τε ἐπὶ τὸ Ἅμμωνος χρηστήριον καὶ ἀπικέσθαι ἐς λόγους Ἐτεάρχῳ τῷ Ἀμμωνίῳ βασιλέϊ, καὶ κως ἐκ λόγων ἄλλον ἀπικέσθαι ἐς λέσχην περὶ τοῦ Νείλου, ὡς οὐδείς
αὐτοῦ οἴδε τάς πηγάς. Καὶ τὸν Ἐτέαρχον φάναι ἐλθέιν κοτε παρ’ αὐτὸν ἐκ λόγων
Νασαμῶνας ἀνδρᾶς· [2] (τὸ δὲ ἔθνος τοῦτο ἐστὶ μὲν Λιβυκόν, νέμεται δὲ τὴν

\textsuperscript{82} The relationship between 1.5.3 and 2.28 is striking (see Gianotti (1988) 54-55), inasmuch as Herodotus
follows up on the disagreement or ignorance of several national authorities (i.e. Phoenicians and Persians in
the former, and Egyptians, Libyans and Greeks in the latter) by deploying his own knowledge in the style
of a priamel. Cf. 2.15-17 and 2.20-27, in which he also counters national authorities (i.e. Ionians and
Greeks more generally) by proposing his own theories for the physical demarcation of Egypt and the causes
of the Nile flood respectively. Curiously, both of these theories, like 2.28, are formulated in light of a three-
fold division. In the former, Greeks think the world consists of three parts—Asia, Europe, and Libya—but
Herodotus thinks that a fourth part should be added: the Egyptian Delta (2.16.2). In the latter, Greeks
propose three reasons for why the Nile floods (2.20-23), but Herodotus advocates his own theories (2.24-
27).
Beyond this, no one is able to speak reliably [about the trajectory of the Nile], for this land is uninhabited due to the heat. (32.) But I did hear the following from some men from Cyrene who alleged that they had come to the oracle of Ammon and had conversed with Etearchus, king of the Ammonians, and that after discussing various topics, they somehow came to the subject of the Nile, how no one knows its sources. And Etearchus said that some Nasamonian men had once come to see him. [2] These people are Libyan, who inhabit Syrtis and the land just east of it. [3] When the Nasamonians arrived and were asked if they had anything more to tell about the wilds of Libya, they said that there were some rowdy sons of chieftains among their people who concocted some harebrained schemes once they had come of age. Foremost among these schemes was that they selected five members of their group by lot to see the wilds of Libya and if they could see more than had ever been seen before.

It is perhaps ironic that this account of the Nasamonians, though replete with the language of sight and observation (ὀψομένους…ἵδοιεν…ἵδομένων, 2.32.3), fails to enhance Herodotus' understanding of the Nile by itself.\(^{83}\) Given what we have now learned about Herodotus' opposition to \textit{pars pro toto} exemplifications, however, the negation of sight as the end-all, be-all of historical methodology should come as little surprise. Indeed, as we may gather from the final climactic two chapters of the account of the Nile, Herodotus is only able to approach knowledge (however tentatively)\(^{84}\) via

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\(^{83}\) “While they [the Nasamonians] succeed in \textit{seeing} more than those before them had seen…they fail to draw significant inferences from their observations” (Christ (1994) 176). Compare Psammetichus' direct, eyewitness contact with the children in the \textit{bekos} experiment (ἐς ὄψιν, 2.2.4), which still leaves so much open to question.

\(^{84}\) The fact that Herodotus relates the account of 2.29-34 fifth hand and conspicuously calls attention to its indirect transmission (φαμένων, φάναι (bis), ἔφασκε, ὡς οἱ Κυρηναῖοι ἔλεγον, etc.) may be said to reflect his reticence to accept the account altogether (Marincola (2007) 58). For a comprehensive discussion of
Etearchus’ conjecture (συνεβάλλετο, 2.33.2) about observations made in the context of an oral narrative.85

(33.) So much for my account of what Ammonian Etearchus said. I will add, however, that he alleged that the Nasamonians had made it back home, according to the men from Cyrene, and they had reached people who were all magicians. [2] Etearchus conjectured that the river which flowed alongside them was the Nile, and this reasoning is, in fact, correct, for the Nile flows from Libya and cuts through the middle of it. And if I may conjecture about the unknown based on what is manifest, it is equal in length to the Ister. [3] For the Ister starts in the land of the Celts and the city of Pyrene and flows through the middle of Europe, splitting it. The Celts are outside the Pillars of Heracles and they share a border with the Cynesians, the people who live furthest to the west of those who make

oratio obliqua as a distancing strategy in the Histories, see Cooper (1974) 23-76 (ad loc. p. 40). See also Scardino (2012). On focalization more generally, see Chapter One.

85 Etearchus’ account is a case in point for understanding Herodotan geography as a “complex of several different kinds of data” (Gould (1989) 92), which squares with the methodological statement of 2.99.1: Μέχρι μὲν τούτου ὄψις τε ἐμή καὶ γνώμη καὶ ἱστορίη ταῦτα λέγουσά ἐστι. When we recall that ἱστορίη can refer to both “oral inquiry” (ἀκοή) and “investigation” (Lloyd (1975) 82), we can see the trifecta of Herodotean inquiry (i.e. ἀκοή, ὄψις and γνώμη) at work in 2.33-34 (see Luarghi (2006) 77 ff. and Hedrick (1993) 22-23). On the amalgamating tendencies of conjecture in particular, see Hohti (1977).
their home in Europe. [4] The Ister empties into the Black Sea, flowing through all of Europe, where the Milesian colonists inhabit Istria. (34.) Because the Ister flows through the inhabited world, it is known by many, but no one is able to speak about the sources of the Nile, for the part of Libya through which it flows is uninhabited and desert. But about its trajectory, I have said as much as I could learn through inquiry. It empties into Egypt, the part which lies just about opposite the mountainous area of Cilicia. [2] From there, a straight journey to Sinope for an unencumbered man takes five days. And Sinope lies opposite the place where the Ister empties into the sea. Thus, I think that the Nile, in traversing all of Libya, is equal in length to the Ister. So much, then, for matters pertaining to the Nile.

Once again, in spite of reaffirming his ignorance about the sources of the Nile (περὶ δὲ τῶν τοῦ Νείλου πηγέων οὐδείς ἔχει λέγειν, 2.34.1), Herodotus goes to great lengths to show as much as he can deduce from inquiry (ἐπ’ ὅσον μακρότατον ἱστορέοντα ἦν ἐξικέσθαι, 2.34.1). The result is an unparalleled conjecture (ὡς ἐγώ συμβάλλομαι, 2.33.2), not about the sources (πηγαί) of the Nile, but about its course (ῥεῦμα), which may be likened (ἐξισοῦσθαι) to that of the river Ister (i.e. Danube).87 Scholars note that this analogy runs counter to statements Herodotus makes in other contexts, namely, that the Nile goes against nature (τὰ ἔμπαλιν πεφυκέναι τῶν άλλων ποταμῶν, 2.19.3) and so should defy comparison (συμβάλλειν).88 But while Herodotus acknowledges this contradiction (and later in the Scythian λόγος even the extent to which

86 Hohti (1977) 5 observes that Herodotus’ use of συμβάλλεισθαι in the middle voice to mean “conjecture” is unique in Greek historiography.
87 See also 2.26, in which Herodotus first offers such a comparison (albeit more tentatively): ...διεξιόντα δ’ ἄν μιν διὰ πάσης Εὐρώπης Ἐλλάδος ἐποιέων ἀν τὸν Ἰστρον τὰ περ ὧν ἐγράψατο τὸν Νείλον.
88 See e.g. Corcella (1984) 79: “Insomma, Erodoto vuole che un problema scientifico sia spiegato per mezzo di cause generali, che siano valide per tutto il campo del reale, ma che d’altra parte siano anche empiricamente falsificabili o verificabili, e non puri postulate.” See also Thomas (2000) 175 ff. and Munson (2001) 83-85 for fine discussions of this paradox.
the Ister and Nile are *not* analogous),\(^89\) he does so in way that still allows him to display his intellectual capabilities and liken the Nile to other rivers. Rhetorically speaking, then, Herodotus can have his cake and eat it too:

Like the priests, I also came to the conclusion that most of the aforementioned land has been recently gained by the Egyptians; for the part of the land between the aforementioned mountains which lies south of the city of Memphis appeared to me to have once been a sea gulf, like the area around Ilium and Teuthania and Ephesus and the plain of the Maeander, so far as it is possible to compare small things with great things, [2] for of the rivers which form these lands, none of them is worthy to be compared in terms of size to one of the five mouths of the Nile. [3] But there are other rivers, too, which, though not as great as the Nile, have produced great changes. I can relate their names and others, too, not least of which is the Achelous, which, flowing through Acarnania and emptying into the sea, has already turned half the Echinades islands into mainland.

The paradoxical conclusion of 2.10 (i.e. that the Nile is at once unique and comparable to other geographical bodies) anticipates another paradox about the Nile that permits Herodotus to draw comparisons between this river and the Ister later on in 2.33-

\(^89\) Herodotus notes in 4.50 that the Ister is bigger than the Nile (when measured according to their tributaries) and exhibits a different flood pattern (see Lloyd (1966) 344 n. 1). For a comparison of the treatment of geography in the Egyptian and Scythian λόγοι, see e.g. Romm (1989) (discussed in Chapter 4.2 below).

\(^90\) Cf. 2.29.3 (*pace* Munson (2001) 84 n. 119), in which Herodotus compares the part of the Nile just south of Elephantine to the Maeander.
34. As Thomas points out, it is significant that Herodotus conjectures in this instance about “the unknown” (τὰ μὴ γνωσκόμενα, 2.33.2) and not “the invisible” (τὸ ἀφανές) as he does in an earlier discussion about the aetiology of the Nile flood (2.23-24).91 This distinction implies that “the source of the Nile is not strictly invisible in the same way that the causes for its flooding are: it is potentially visible, and susceptible to enquiry.”92 Perhaps this is why Herodotus juxtaposes the Nile and the Ister in such a novel way. If the sources of the Nile were knowable and the Ister was already well-known (πρὸς πολλῶν γινώσκεται, 2.34.1), then the need to display his intellectual abilities and contribute an original argument to such a famous debate would have warranted an unprecedented (though guarded) speculation.

Given the emphasis Herodotus places on relating as much as he possibly can through inquiry (Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ρεύματος αὐτοῦ, ἔπι δ’ ὅσον μακρότατον ἱστορέων ἢν ἔξικέσθωι, εἴρηται, 2.34.1), it is understandable that he juxtaposes the Nile and the Ister in this manner even while he signposts the problems of such an analogy. Although this act resonates with the model of the ἱστορίη that has been put forth in this dissertation, Herodotus’ investigation of the sources of the Nile in light of Psammetichus’ investigation should remind us that there is more to being a ἱστορίη than the reduction of difference alone. Not only does Herodotus repeatedly show us what can (and cannot) be known in the face of manifest doubt and ambiguity—he also shows us how such knowledge is new and unique to his own sort of ἱστορίη, in adherence to a programmatic

91 For a good discussion of the invisible in Herodotus, see Thomas (2000) 200 ff.
standard established in the proem to the *Histories*: if “all history is revisionism, even the first historian’s first story” and if Egypt was as well-worn a topic of discussion among Greeks of the fifth century as it appears, Herodotus would have endeavored to do more than simply collate what had already been said by his many forebears and contemporaries in composing the Egyptian λόγος. Though this was innovative in and of itself, the case studies considered in this chapter all demonstrate the extent to which Herodotus would have found it necessary to advance his own claims. For Herodotus, this meant embracing a dichotomy as confounding as Egypt itself: “to make sense of things scientifically goes hand in hand with a fear of the ideological consequences of oversimplification.”

As this chapter has argued, such an ethos should direct the analysis of the *Histories* as much as it does the work’s methodology, but oversimplification has historically posed a danger to Herodotean scholarship. For example, while it is reasonable to draw a connection between Herodotus’ understanding of the unknown in the discussion of the Nile with that of Anaxagoras according to the maxim, “appearances are

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93 Lateiner (1989) 42.
94 On the topic of Egypt (specifically its geography) as de rigueur, see Fornara (1971) 16. While Hecataeus was doubtlessly a major force against whom Herodotus saw himself contending directly in the process of composing the Egyptian λόγος (see e.g. 2.143-144 and discussion in West (1991) and Moyer (2002)), we should be mindful of how many other voices Herodotus would have had to contend with as well (see Fowler (1996)).
95 See Fowler (1996), esp. 79: “…awareness of the disagreement or absence of sources as a general problem requiring theoretical attention and the development of critical tools is not found in either poets or early mythographers. It is found in Herodotos.”
96 van Paassen (1957) 133. See also n. 13 above.
97 Munson (2001) 84.
the sight of things unclear” (ὄψις τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα),\(^98\) it is unreasonable to assume that Herodotus was primarily influenced by this aspect of Presocratic thought in circumscribing τὰ μὴ γινωσκόμενα.\(^99\) Not only does Herodotus show himself to be doing something different from the Ionian scientists in even the most scientific parts of the *Histories*—he also shows that this is but one tree in a vast forest of knowledge and influence from which he draws the timber to build his own unique λόγοι.\(^{100}\) As we have now demonstrated in our discussions of the *bekos* experiment and the Nile, the Egyptian *people*—those with whom Herodotus interacts directly—are just as indispensable to his inquiry as his Greek scholarly forebears.\(^{101}\) Together they provide the foundations upon which Herodotus fashions his own thoughts and conjectures that make the *Histories* exceptional. For our final case study in this chapter, let us now consider how Herodotus’

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\(^98\) DK 59, B 21a = Sex. Emp. 7.140.
\(^99\) i.e. Diller (1932) 16-17. As Hedrick (1993) 19 reminds, “when the principles of Quellenforschung are applied brutally, there is no recognition that the event, even for the contemporary observer, is itself a kind of multivalent text that cannot be seen without being read and interpreted differently by different observers.”
\(^100\) See e.g. Lloyd (1966) 344, with reference to the Nile-Ister analogue: “Compared with Empedocles and other Presocratic philosophers (in so far as we can judge their use of analogy from the extant evidence) Herodotus is, in this passage, both more explicit in his formulation of his argument, and more reserved in the claims which he makes for his conclusions.” See also Thomas (2000) 206 ff. for similar critiques of this comparandum and its application to Hippocratic thought. In looking macroscopically at the influence of science on the understanding of causality in fifth century historiography, Pelling (2000) 83-85 rightly notes that the expectations of technical genres from which a figure like Herodotus sometimes draws do not always square with the results of his inquiry. In particular, Herodotus’ acknowledgment of ambiguity and his admission of ignorance belies the notion that his was an altogether specialist discourse: “No forensic pleader will end by saying ‘so I don’t think I’m to blame, but of course you may well think differently’. And it would be a rare philosopher or scientist who would leave the choice of cosmological explanations to his audience. Those are the worlds where monology rules. Doctors strike the same confident note; few people, after all, have ever admired their doctor for lacking assurance” (Pelling (2000) 84).
\(^101\) See Bakker (2002) 14, who takes Thomas (2000) to task because she “obscures the fact that the direct object of Herodotus’ historiē of Egypt, both grammatically and notionally, is not the land or its mysterious river, but people interrogated, informants: it is the Egyptians themselves who tell Herodotus about the wonders of their land.”
depiction of Psammetichus’ relationship with his people complements and enriches this plurality.

2.3 Custom

In the midst of Herodotus’ discussion of the trajectory (and by extension the origins) of the Nile, we find Psammetichus mired in another controversy about origins, this time as it relates to something even more elusive than the genesis of language or the sources of a river:

Sailing from this city [i.e. Meroë], you will reach the Deserters in the same amount of time it took you to go from Elephantine to the capital city of the Ethiopians. These Deserters are called “Asmach”, which translates in Greek as “those who stand at the left hand of the king.” These men, comprising 240,000 Egyptians of the warrior class, went over to the Ethiopians for the following reason. When Psammetichus was king, garrisons were posted in the city of Elephantine against the Ethiopians and another in Pelusian Daphne against the Arabians and Assyrians and another in Marea against Libya. [3] And still in my
time the Persian garrisons hold the same positions as they did in Psammetichus’
time, for the Persians keep guard in both Elephantine and Daphnae. Now no one
had relieved the Egyptian guards from garrison duty for three years. After they
had deliberated and formed a plan together, they all deserted Psammetichus for
Ethiopia. [4] Once Psammetichus learned of this, he gave chase, and when he
cought up with them, he begged them at length not to abandon their ancestral
gods, their wives, and their children. One of these men is reported to have pointed
to his genitals and said that wherever this was, they would have wives and
children. [5] These men then reached Ethiopia and gave themselves to the
Ethiopian king, and he gave them this in return. He ordered the Deserters to drive
out some Ethiopians with whom he was quarreling and to inhabit their land. Once
they had settled among the Ethiopians, the latter became more civilized, having
learned Egyptian customs [ethes].

In deciding to leave Egypt for Ethiopia, it is striking—even shocking—that the
Deserters appear to pay no heed to the ancestral gods (θεοὺς πατρωίους, 2.30.4), at least
the ones invoked by Psammetichus. Ward posits that this may be because the Deserters
see in themselves the ability to become ancestral gods through their own generative
powers,102 as evidenced by one soldier’s gesture to his genitals. On the other hand, Keith
takes this gesture to be emblematic of Herodotus’ response to Psammetichus’ other
aetiological inquiries in the Egyptian λόγος, namely, that “we cannot know the origin of
the human species itself or the world, but we do know the origin of the most relevant
beings to us, ourselves and our children. This is the natural power of reproduction, which
nature has left us free to organize in any way we choose.”103 While the Deserters
themselves would likely agree with this last statement, the final section of 2.30
complicates this interpretation somewhat. Though the Deserters may be free to do as they
choose, they are not entirely free from all constraints. Like any society, they are still the

products of their ἤθεα (2.30.5), one of several words Herodotus uses to refer to custom (along with νόμος, νόμιμα, νόμαια, τρόπος, δίαιτα et al.) throughout the Histories.

On the surface of 2.30, it may seem strange that Herodotus concludes the story of the Deserters with a remark about custom and then immediately jumps back to his discussion of the Nile in 2.31. Given Herodotus’ fondness for juxtaposition, this is not in itself remarkable. However, the manner in which he sets custom alongside nature in 2.30 and 2.31 is noteworthy, inasmuch as this pairing may be said to evoke the νόμος/φύσις debate which raged among many of Herodotus’ contemporaries. Yet instead of debating one side over another, Herodotus here (as in the bekos experiment) subtly posits that both custom and nature need to be seen together as two sides of the same coin. Thus, immediately after concluding his discussion of the Nile, the great exemplum of Egyptian φύσις, Herodotus sets the river alongside Egyptian ἤθεα and νόμοι:

Αἰγύπτιοι ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ τῷ κατὰ σφέας ἑοντι ἑτεροίῳ καὶ τῷ ποταμῷ φύσιν ἀλλοίην παρεχομένῳ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ποταμοί, τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἐμπαλιν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἀνθρώποισι ἐστήσαντο ἤθεα τε καὶ νόμους (2.35.2).

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104 Consider Demaratus’ reply to Xerxes when asked why free Spartans would fight against the Persians though impossibly outnumbered: Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος κ.τ.λ. (7.104.4). For a good discussion on how this passage relates to custom as it is understood throughout the Histories, see Humphreys (1987).

105 While there are slight differences in meaning between these words, they all describe culture in a way that coheres with what we might term “custom” (Redfield (1985) 98-99). Furthermore, the fact that Herodotus frequently juxtaposes these terms (e.g. ἤθεα τε καὶ νόμος (2.35.2), discussed below) suggests that they are not fundamentally divergent from this meaning (Wendell (1989) 349).

106 For an overview of the νόμος/φύσις antithesis, see Guthrie (1969) 55-134. For additional bibliography, see Thomas (2000) 124 n. 48.

107 “…we can see no sign in the Histories of the extreme antithesis of nomos and physis in which the writer takes sides, offers moral judgement for one in order to dismiss the other. This ‘judgemental, antithetical’ approach is visible, for instance, in the extreme espousal of nature as in some way ‘true’ as against the mere conventions and falsities of nomos [in e.g. Antiphon and Hippias]” (Thomas (2000) 124). On the resonance of this stance with the bekos experiment, see n. 42 and the accompanying discussion above.
Together with their climate, which is unique to them, and their river, which has a nature [physis] different from other rivers, the Egyptians have established customs [ethea] and practices [nomoi] which are almost entirely opposite those of other people.

This transition is likely motivated by several factors. Firstly, the decision to throw custom into the mix with nature not only reinforces Herodotus’ general opposition to pars pro toto exemplifications, but also moves past the monolithic stance of his contemporaries and forebears, for whom Egypt appears to have been little more than a place on a map—a geographical construct devoid of people. As Herodotus submits at the close of the Egyptian λόγος, to privilege a land above its inhabitants is tantamount to the brazen conduct of the Persian king Cambyses, whose contempt for Egyptian customs contributes to his demise. And yet, in spite of the undeniable importance of custom to Herodotus, νόμοι and other such cultural markers can only explain so much by themselves. Much in the way Herodotus indicates in the story of the Deserters that we may discern the basis of Egyptian ἤθεα (i.e. the ancestors) but not their ultimate source (gods? humans?), he suggests in 2.35.2 that the “peculiarity [of Egyptian customs] has

108 See e.g. 2.17-18 and discussion in Immerwahr (1956) 260 n. 38.
109 On Cambyses’ flagrant disregard for Egyptian custom and law, see 3.28-38, especially 3.29, in which he commits the outrageous sacrilege of stabbing the sacred Apis bull in the thigh. Though Herodotus is skeptical in one instance that this act precipitated Cambyses’ downfall by itself (3.33), his relation of the fact that the Persian king was fatally wounded in the same place where he stabbed the Apis bull (3.64.3) suggests otherwise. Characteristically, Herodotus does not express a preference for one aetiology over another (εἴτε δὴ διὰ τὸν Αἴγιν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλως, 3.33), but his consideration of poetic retribution even in the face of bald, rationalizing criticism affirms that custom may have a causal force, whereby demonstrating yet again that in the Histories, “multiple aetiology is supplementary rather than contradictory” (Lateiner (1989) 208).
111 Benardete (1969) 41.
its origin, if not its full explanation, in the peculiarity of their land.\textsuperscript{112} φύσις, then, can provide a check, but not a catchall solution.\textsuperscript{113}

Given what we have already learned about aetiology in the \textit{Histories}, it is not unusual that Herodotus brings custom and nature together in the manner of a ἱστωρ. As we will recall from our analyses of the \textit{bekos} experiment and the discussion of the Nile, however, this entails more than just the facile reduction of difference. While Herodotus does not deny the complexity of this dichotomy, he does not succumb to it either. As is his programmatic inclination when failing to find one clear way to explain, Herodotus offers many possible ways of moving forward. The result in this instance is a sizeable catalogue of Egyptian ἠθεα and νόμοι provided as a follow-up to 2.35.2, which shows the reader how much he \textit{does} know. However, as was the case in the proem, this will prove to be a paradoxical sort of knowledge, in that it complicates as much as it clarifies what can and cannot be known about something as varied and subjective as custom, the topic of the next section of the Egyptian λόγος (2.35-98).\textsuperscript{114}

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Ἐν τοῖσι αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες ἀγοράζουσι καὶ καπηλεύουσι, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες κατ’ οἴκους ἐόντες ύφανουσι. Υφανουσι δὲ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἄνω τὴν κρόκην ὠθέοντες, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ κάτω. [3] Τὰ ἄχθεα οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλέων φορέουσι, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ τῶν ὀμω. Οὐρέουσι αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες ὀρθαί, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες κατήμενοι.}
\end{align*}\]

\textsuperscript{112} Benardete (1969) 37. Compare Oedipus’ rebuke of his sons in a similar passage from Sophocles’ \textit{Oedipus at Colonus: ὢ πάντε ἐκείνω ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ νόμοις // φύσιν κατεικασθέντε καὶ βιον τροφάς (OC 337-338). See also n. 116 below.

\textsuperscript{113} For this reason, scholars have rightly shied away from granting pride of place to an argument from climatic or geographic determinism in 2.35-36 (see e.g. Lateiner (1985) 16, West (1998) 5, Thomas (2000) 112, and Chiasson (2001) 57-58). For general remarks on the inefficacy of these forms of determinism throughout the \textit{Histories}, see e.g. Glacken (1967) 80-91 (esp. 88-91), Lachenaud (1979) 441-449. See also n. 20 in Chapter Six below.

\textsuperscript{114} See e.g. Wiedemann (1890) 147 (\textit{pace} West (1998) 3): “Die betreffenden Punkte sind für die Kritik Herodots sehr werthvoll; sie sind alle richtig und falsch zu gleicher Zeit.” See Lloyd (1976) ad loc. for a demonstration of how this also holds true for the historicity of the customs described in this passage.
Εὐμαρείη χρέωνται ἐν τοῖσι οἴκοισι, ἐσθίουσι δὲ ἐξω ἐν τῇσι ὁδοῖσι, ἐπιλέγοντες ὡς τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ ἀναγκαῖα δὲ ἐν ἀποκρύφῳ ἐστὶ ποιέειν χρεόν, τά δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ ἀναφέροντες. [4] Ἱρᾶται γυνὴ μὲν οὐδεμία οὔτε ἔρσενος θεοῦ οὔτε θηλέης, ἄνδρες δὲ πάντων τε καὶ πασέων. Τρέφειν τοὺς τοκέας τοῖσι μὲν παισὶ οὔτε βουλομένοις, τῇσι δὲ θυγατρίσι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη καὶ μὴ βουλομένησι. (36.) Ὡς Ἱεροσόλυμαι ἄνθρωποι νόμος ἁμισοῦ ἁμισοῦ καὶ καταβολής ταῖσι μὲν ἀθετεῖ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ ἀναφέροντες, χρεόν, θηρίων <ἡ> γὰρ διὰ τῷ τῇσι μὲν ἄλλης κομῶσι, ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ ξυροῦνται. Τοῖσι μὲν ἄλλοισι ἄνθρωποις νόμος ἁμισοῦ ἁμισοῦ καταβολῆς, ἀπὸ ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἄλλοισι ἀθετεῖ τὰς μὲν αἰσχρὰ ἀναφέροντας, τοῖσι δὲ πάντων τε καὶ πασέων νόμος ἁμισοῦ ἁμισοῦ καταβολῆς.

For example, women do the shopping and trading, while men stay at home and weave. Other people weave by pushing the woof up, while the Egyptians push it down. [3] Men carry loads on their heads, while women carry them on their shoulders. Women urinate standing up, while men do so sitting down. They defecate inside their homes, but they eat outside in the streets, explaining that shameful necessities must be done in secret, while the opposite must be done in the open. [4] No woman serves a god or goddess as a priestess, while men serve every god and goddess. There is no compulsion for unwilling sons to take care of their parents, while there is every compulsion for daughters, even for those who are unwilling. (36.) Elsewhere, the priests of the gods wear their hair long, but in Egypt they shave their hair. Among other people, it is customary for those most concerned with the act of mourning to cut the hair on their heads, while Egyptians allow their hair to grow following a death, both on the head and the chin, being previously clean-shaven. [2] Other people live apart from animals, while Egyptians live together with them. Other people live off of wheat and barley, but there is the greatest reproach for the Egyptian who lives off of these. Rather, they make their bread from hulled wheat, which some people call “emmer.” [3] They knead dough with their feet, and clay with their hands, and they pick up dung. The Egyptians practice circumcision, while other people leave their genitals as they were to begin with, except for those who learned from them. Each man has two
garments, while each woman has one. Other people attach the rings and reefing ropes outside the sail, while the Egyptians attach them inside. Greeks write and perform calculations by moving the hand from left to right, while Egyptians move from right to left. And in so doing, they say that they themselves do it right, while Greeks do it left-handed. They employ two kinds of writing, one of which is called “sacred”, while the other is called “demotic.”

This passage has the potential to be written off as a brusque critique of Egyptian otherness relative to Greek norms. While Herodotus does set himself up repeatedly to make such an essentializing judgement (what with the litany of μέν…δέ contrasts), nowhere does he assert the primacy or normalcy of custom from his own point of view. What’s more, only two of the seventeen contrasts in this section juxtapose Egyptian ἤθεα and νόμοι specifically with those of the Greeks (i.e. computation and writing, 2.36.4). Instead, the ἤθεα and νόμοι of other human beings (τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἀνθρώποισι, ὧλλοι, etc.) are usually contrasted with those of the Egyptians.

In fashioning this “cultural ‘matrix’” according to a universalizing framework, Herodotus undermines exceptionalism of all stripes and “confounds all expectations of how human beings should behave.” On the surface, the Greeks appear to be the main target of this matrix, inasmuch as their practice of writing from left to right is the only custom to be criticized by the Egyptians, who assert that they themselves write “from the

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115 Froidefond (1971) 133, for example, sees in 2.35-36 an awkward mix of “généralisations abusives” and “particularisations abusives.”
116 Sophocles, on the other hand, has Oedipus rail against Egyptian customs as “abnormal and degenerate” (West (1998) 8) in a passage from Oedipus at Colonus (OC 337-345) which seems to criticize at least one of the customs described in Hdt. 2.35-36 (see also n. 112 above). That Herodotus does not comment on the moral or ethical validity of custom in 2.35-36 à la Oedipus squares more with a categorical reticence to judge ἤθεα, νόμοι, etc. (see esp. 2.3.2, 3.38, 7.152) and less with a reductive “virtuosité…sophistique” (Froidefond (1971) 133).
right” (ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν, 2.36.4) and therefore “rightly” (ἐπιδέξια, 2.36.4). Although this jibe on the part of the Egyptians does confute the notion that Greeks are unique in their customs and are “exclusive representatives of normalcy”, Herodotus offers other comparanda in the Histories which suggest that the Egyptians are not unique either, as Harrison deftly observes:

The Babylonians indulge in laments for their dead which are very similar to the Egyptians’ (Herodotus 1.198); whereas the Egyptian priests kill no animal “except for sacrifice”, the Magi kill everything apart from dogs and men with their own hands (Herodotus 1.140); the Egyptians - in this example we see again the germ of the use of foreign peoples as a model of the just constitution (cf. Herodotus IV.26 for the “equal power” of Issedonian women) - are similar to the Spartans in the signs of respect which they offer to their elders (Herodotus II.80).

This observation is a valuable reminder not only of how the ecumenical principles of 2.35-36 (and indeed those of the bekos experiment and the proem as well) extend far beyond their immediate narrative contexts, but also of how the Greek/barbarian dichotomy is limited in a way that Herodotus’ understanding of custom and aetiology is not. That barbarian ἐθνεα can disagree among themselves and a Greek ἐθνος can agree with a barbarian ἐθνος demonstrates the extent to which “the Histories are not so much

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119 On this pun, see Marincola’s note ad loc. in de Sélincourt (2003) 637 n. 24. Later on, Herodotus informs us that the Egyptians call everyone who does not speak Egyptian “barbarians” (βαρβάρους δὲ πάντας οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι καλέουσι τοὺς μὴ σφίσι ὁμογλώσσους, 2.158.5). This turns out to be a major challenge to cultural primacy when we note that the remark at 2.158.5 is one of only two instances in the Histories (the other being—possibly—1.4.4) where βάρβαρος can refer to a Greek (Munson (2005) 65 n. 151).

120 Munson (2001) 76.


122 “No gloss in the Histories proclaims the uniqueness of the Greeks, and only two passages attribute to all barbarians a nomos that the Greeks do not have [i.e. 8.105.2, 1.10.3]. In a rare instance where Herodotus attributes the same nomos to all barbarians, the statement highlights the similarity between the Spartans and
a mirror…but a hall of mirrors with multiple reflections.”123 If Herodotus was as keen to connect “self” with “other” as these contexts intimate, it is not surprising, then, that “in stressing the arbitrary diversity of individual customs, [he] does not thereby deny the objective validity of Custom as such.”124 As in every other case we have now examined in this chapter, the result here is such that even when Herodotus cannot elucidate how something came to be, he can still find ways to advance knowledge in a manner that defies singular explanations and expectations. We will return to this cosmopolitan understanding of τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων (1.1.0) many times over the course of this dissertation, but for the moment, let us now turn to the next chapter, where we will consider another one of Herodotus’ programmatic concerns as it relates to aetiology: “the great and wondrous works (ἔργα) manifested by Greeks and barbarians alike” (1.1.0).

the barbarians [6.58.2]. The Histories both presuppose as a given and discourage the commonplace notion of a Greek/barbarian polarity” (Munson (2001) 76).
123 Braund (1998) 178 (contra Hartog (1988)). For similar critiques of this structuralist dichotomy, see especially Chapter Four below.
124 Immerwahr (1966) 320, with special reference to “custom is king” passage (3.38, discussed in detail in Selden (1999)). Cf. 2.3.2 (discussed above) and 7.152 (the “market of evils” passage, discussed in Chapter 5.1 below).
3. Bridging the Divide: Ergon, Logos, and Aetiology

Just before Herodotus juxtaposes nature (φύσις) and custom (ήθεα and νόμοι) in the section of the Αἰγύπτιος λόγος we discussed in the conclusion of the previous chapter (2.35.2 ff.), he explains his reasons for lengthening his account of Egypt:

Ἐρχομαι δὲ περὶ Αἰγύπτου μηκονέων τὸν λόγον, ὅτι πλείστα θωμάσια ἔχει [ἡ ἡ ἀλλη πᾶσα χώρη] καὶ ἔργα λόγου μέζω παρέχεται πρὸς πᾶσαν <Ἀλλην> χώρην· τούτων εἴνεκα πλέον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσεται (2.35.1).

I am going to extend my logos about Egypt because it has very many wonders and it offers more works [erga] than every other land. For these reasons, more shall be said about it.

We would be remiss if we, too, did not extend our account of Egypt for the same reasons, as the emphasis on “works” (ἔργα, sg. ἔργον) reaffirms one of Herodotus’ programmatic aims in composing the Histories:

Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ιστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα εξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ εξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλης, τὰ δὲ βαρβάρωσι ἀποδεχθέντα, ακλέα γένηται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι’ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἄλληλοισι (1.1.0).

This is the display of the inquiry of Herodotus of Thurii, so that the things brought into being by humans may not grow faded in time, and so that great and wondrous works [erga], some manifested by Greeks and others by barbarians, may not be without glory, and in particular the reason why they came to war with one another.

In parsing the meaning of ἔργα here in the proem, scholars tend to fall into one of two camps: that of Stein, who argued that ἔργα represent physical monuments alone,¹ or

¹ According to Stein (1962), ἔργα are “…die Werke, opera, die dauernden Denkmäler (μνημόσυνα) menschlicher Arbeit und Tüchtigkeit” (ad Hdt. 1.1.0).
that of Regenbogen, who saw ἔργα denoting both concrete and abstract “works.”

Though Stein’s position garnered significant support in the first half of the twentieth century, most scholars now side with Regenbogen. This is due in large part to Immerwahr’s influential article on ἔργα, in which he convincingly advanced Regenbogen’s thesis by construing ἔργα in the “widest possible sense as “achievements” or “works,” including both monuments and deeds” and ultimately as “the finished product of an activity.”

Our initial consideration of the proem in Chapter One has borne out this broad interpretation by accepting ἔργα in the sense of “works” as one inherently multivalent part of an inherently multivalent first sentence. While some scholars dispute such a semantically-open reading of ἔργα in the context of the proem, there can be no denying that in the Histories at large, ἔργα 1) accommodate both monuments and deeds of abstract and concrete varieties throughout and 2) constitute a driving force behind the work as a whole. Even a cursory look at Herodotus’ inquiry shows these two points to be correct. For example, in the case of 1), ἔργα can describe works as far-ranging as the brave actions of the Tegeans and the Athenians recounted prior to the battle of Plataea (9.26-27), the construction of river embankments on the Euphrates (1.86), and the killing

3 See Jacoby (1913) col. 334 ff.
5 Immerwahr (1960) 264.
6 Immerwahr (1960) 269.
of winged serpents by ibises in Arabia (2.75). In the case of 2), Herodotus acknowledges on several occasions that his interest in ἔργα is so great that it affects the course of his narrative, most notably in his accounts of Samos (3.60) and Egypt (2.35).

Although the more than 140 uses of the word ἔργον found throughout the *Histories* make it clear that these markers of both tangible and intangible works are of great importance to Herodotus, the ramifications of ἔργα for the development of Herodotean methodology have not yet been studied to the extent that they deserve. David’s unpublished dissertation, the only comprehensive treatment to date on the subject, puts forth the idea that ἔργα (when taken to mean “objects”) operate primarily as “mnemotechnic devices” according to the framework of anthropologist J. Vansina’s research on oral tradition and memory. While David breaks new ground in some important respects, his emphasis on the mnemonic function of ἔργα downplays their role as windows into Herodotean epistemology and narratology. As we will see, Herodotus’ engagement with ἔργα is predicated on more than the desire to know, “Who built that mega ergon? For what else is he or she famous?”

Rather than dispute David’s basic thesis (which he acknowledges represents a first foray into a complex topic with many avenues of approach), the following chapter

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7 For a representative list of ἔργα according to abstract and concrete categories, see Powell (1960) ad loc.
8 David (2006) defines “mnemotechnic devices” (pace Vansina (1985) 44-48) as “physical cues used to recall a memory” (3 n. 4).
9 See especially pp. 69-89, which offers the most extensive follow-up to Immerwahr (1960) to date, and pp. 287-296, which contains a very useful reference index of all objects mentioned in the *Histories*. Cf. Lateiner (1987) 95-100, 115-116.
will offer some novel insights into the workings of ἔργα from the standpoint of aetiology.

In addition to building upon the commonplace that an ἔργον can create a cause for an explanatory narrative,\(^{12}\) this chapter will also explore some representative examples both within and without the Egyptian λόγος where an ἔργον creates a cause for Herodotus to grapple with matters fundamental to his methodology. These cases will demonstrate that ἔργα, like all components of Herodotean aetiology and methodology we consider in this dissertation, cannot be privileged absolutely or taken as a part to represent the whole.

Instead, when seen within the context of the Histories as a cohesive entity, ἔργα can offer further evidence that aetiology constitutes a nexus of mutually inclusive factors which confound homogeneity of explanation and direct the reader to look past the matter at hand. To illustrate this, let us start by returning to the section of the Egyptian λόγος we first considered at the opening of this chapter.

### 3.1 Ergon and Logos

On a superficial level, the motivation behind Herodotus’ self-proclaimed interest in extending his account of Egypt because of its ἔργα (2.35) appears straightforward. Since ἔργα are mentioned more in the Egyptian λόγος than in any other λόγος when taken to mean “monuments and votive offering groups”, and since they are correlated with Egyptian rulers on an almost one to one ratio, it is not far-fetched to conclude in line with

\(^{12}\) Vansina’s neologism “iconatrophy” (discussed below) has been used by several scholars to describe “etiological commentaries on existing objects” (Vansina (1985) 7) that are seen throughout the Histories (see e.g. Flower (1991) 69, Keesling (2005) 43-46, and David (2006), esp. 24-68). For a list of narratives in the Histories which may be considered iconatrophic (including those not discussed below), see David (2006) 36 n. 24.
David that ἔργα serve primarily to recall past greatness in their role as mnemotechnic
devices.\textsuperscript{13} This is indeed suggested by the proem, in which Herodotus proclaims that he
will relate both events and works so that they may not grow faded or be without glory (ὡς
μήτε τὰ γενόμενα…ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα… ἀκλέα γένηται, 1.1.0).

However, there is more at stake here than the preservation and glorification of memory alone.

As Hedrick remarks, the very idea that mute ἔργα need realization in λόγος is
something of a paradox, but a paradox that makes sense in the realm of the\textit{Histories}:

The oxymoron, however, accurately represents the necessarily ambivalent
relationship between verbal and material sources. The thing is conceived as more
real than the word, but it also must be supplemented by the word to have
meaning.\textsuperscript{14}

This dichotomy is precisely what we see in 2.35 when Herodotus pairs works with words
in the phrase ἔργα λόγου μέζω. While the immediate proximity of ἔργα and λόγου
presupposes a symbiotic relationship between works and their ability to be depicted in
narrative, a careful look at this passage shows that such a relationship is not as clear-cut
as it may seem at first glance. Far from meaning simply “storied works”,\textsuperscript{15} the phrase
ἔργα λόγου is dependent upon the comparative μέζω, which most translators render as
something like “works beyond description.” If read in isolation, this passage may
suggest that works actually do defy narration because they are somehow more “real” than
words. Parry takes this stance when he argues that Herodotus’ understanding of the

\textsuperscript{14} Hedrick (1993) 26. In a similar vein, see also Hedrick (1995) 57-64, esp. 60-61.
\textsuperscript{15} David (2006) 77, 202, 204.
λόγος/ ἔργον dichotomy conforms to a “popular distinction” (i.e. “logos is false, but ergon is real”). Though Parry is right to call attention to the fact that Herodotus “uses the opposition of λόγος and ἔργον much as Homer did, as two sides of the same coin”, he is wrong to deduce solely on the basis of the two examples he cites (where λόγος refers exclusively to the speech of the inscribed interlocutors and not to narrative qua narrative) that Herodotus is “heedless of the implications” of this dichotomy. The essence of Parry’s criticism is at least as old as Thucydides, who seems to chafe against what he takes to be Herodotus’ disproportionate use of ἔργα to measure historical outcomes. As David points out, however, Thucydides was only able to react this way against ἔργα because Herodotus had already shown their shortcomings (albeit “inadvertently”). While this thesis is basically sound, the following chapter will offer some examples to show that Herodotus is largely aware of the limitations of ἔργα and often distinguishes them as such.

We find that this is much the case if we look, for instance, at Herodotus’ famous discussion of the Labyrinth near Lake Moeris:

Καὶ δὴ σφι μνημόσυνα ἔδοξε λιπέσθαι κοινῇ· δόξαν δὲ σφι ἐποιήσαντο λαβύρινθον, ὁλίγον ὑπὲρ τῆς λίμνης τῆς Μοίριος κατὰ Κροκοδείλων καλεομένην πόλιν μάλιστα κη κείμενον. Τὸν ἐγὼ ἤδη εἶδον λόγου μέζω. [2] Εἰ γάρ τις τὰ Ἑλλήνων τείχεά τε καὶ ἔργων ἀπόδεξιν συλλογίσαιτο, ἐλάσσονος πόνου τε ἂν καὶ δαπάνης φανείη ἐόντα τοῦ λαβυρίνθου τούτου· καίτοι ἀξιόλογός γε καὶ ὁ ἐν Ἐφέσῳ ἔστι νηὸς καὶ ὁ ἐν Σάμῳ. [3] Ἡσαν μὲν νυν καὶ αἱ πυραμίδες λόγου

16 i.e. Parry (1981) 48, who sees this as the outgrowth of a Solonic paradigm: ἐς γὰρ γλῶσσαν ὁρᾶτε καὶ εἰς ἔπη αἰμύλου ὁμόλογος, // εἰς ἔργον δὲ οὐδὲν γεγονόμενον βλέπετε (Fr. 11.7-8 in West (1972)).
19 See e.g. Thuc. 1.10, 1.22, and 2.41.2 (discussed in Hornblower (1987) 30-33).
20 David (2006) 9 (see also pp. 69-89).

The dodecharchs resolved to leave behind a common memorial, and once they had reached this decision, they built a labyrinth just south of Lake Moeris very close to the place called Crocodilopolis. Now I have seen it myself and it defies description [logou mezo], [2] for if one were to gather all the walls and public works of the Greeks, the labor and cost would be shown to be less than what was expended on this labyrinth (though the temples at Ephesus and Samos are noteworthy in their own right). [3] The pyramids also defy description [logou mezones] and each of them is equal to many great Greek works, but the labyrinth, in fact, surpasses even the pyramids, [4] for it has twelve covered courtyards with gates opposite one another, six facing north and six facing south in one continuous row. A single wall encloses them from the outside. Within are two sets of chambers, some underground, others above ground, totaling 3,000 with 1,500 on each level. [5] Now we ourselves saw the chambers above ground in the process of going through them, so we talk about them based on observation, but we learned about the underground chambers from the accounts of others, for the Egyptians in charge were in no way willing to show them to us, because they said the tombs of the kings who first built the labyrinth and those of the sacred crocodiles were there. [6] Thus, as far as the underground chambers are concerned, we speak from hearsay. But we ourselves saw that the chambers above ground were superhuman works, for the corridors leading through the rooms and the incredibly intricate passages winding through the courtyards offered countless wonders as we went from a courtyard to chambers, from chambers to colonnades, from colonnades to other chambers, and from chambers to other courtyards. [7]
The roof covering the entire labyrinth is made of stone like the walls, and the walls are full of carved figures, and each colonnaded courtyard is made out of fitted blocks of white stone. By the corner where the labyrinth ends, there is a pyramid forty fathoms high, on which are carved huge animals. A passage to it has been built underground.

What should strike us immediately about the Labyrinth is how Herodotus introduces it as a work that defies description (λόγου μέζω, 2.148.1), but then goes on to describe it in lavish detail. Though this may seem like a curious incongruity, we will recall from previous chapters how Herodotus consistently and repeatedly strives to move beyond ἀπορία and advance knowledge in innovative ways. One of these distinctively Herodotean innovations is the deployment of terms expressing grandeur to convey what subsequent generations have termed “the sublime”, as Porter notes:

From Homer and the poets, the tradition of the material sublime drew on images of poetic grandeur and ephrastic possibilities of elaborate material description. From the Presocratics, it acquired a conceptual vocabulary and an array of cosmic and natural imagery. From the visual arts came other impulses, typically incorporating influences from adjacent art forms (as in the sepulchral tradition, which combined poetry with architecture and statuary or relief sculpture). From Herodotus, who was aware of all these tendencies, the sublime tradition could draw on a vocabulary for an enlarged sense of space and time, one that was secular and of this world, which is to say, neither mythological nor cosmological, but rather empirical and anthropological.21

Herodotus’ unique understanding of the sublime applies as much to the proem as it does to the description of the Labyrinth, both of which have at their core the display of great and wondrous works (ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, 1.1.0).22 That the Labyrinth is

21 Porter (2010) 472-473. This shrewd observation is based on remarks made as early as the Roman period on the uniqueness of Herodotean aesthetics (see e.g. [Longinus] Subl. 18.2, Dion. Hal. Pomp. 4.3, and esp. Dion. Hal. Thuc 5 (pace Porter (2010) 472 n. 66)).
22 On the sublime as it relates to the proem, see Porter (2010) 472.
both great (more so than even the pyramids) and a wonder (θῶμα, 2.148.6) makes this plain, but Herodotus does not leave these labels to qualify such an ἔργον by themselves. Like other wonders of both abstract and concrete varieties in the Histories (i.e. θῶματα, θωμαστά, θωμάσια, etc.), the Labyrinth induces Herodotus to continue his survey in spite of the monument’s overwhelming power, in this case, by moving from qualification to quantification. While there may exist a precedent in epic poetry for Herodotus to offer numbers to describe an ἔργον like the Labyrinth, the manner in which he offers them is in fact without precedent. By showing himself physically engaged (διεξιόντες, διεξίῳσι) in reckoning the number of courtyards and chambers of the Labyrinth and including us in its display with the use of the first person plural (ὁρῶμεν, λέγομεν, ἐπιθυμανόμεθα), Herodotus explains to us how the Labyrinth is a great and wondrous

23 For other examples of how wonder can function as a springboard for further inquiry, see also e.g. 1.23-24, 1.194, 2.21 (discussed above in Chapter 2.2), 4.30, 4.129, 7.187, and esp. 9.122 (discussed below in Chapter 6.2). This is in keeping with Aristotle’s assessment of wonder as the beginning of philosophy (διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, Metaph. 982b; cf. Pl. Th. 155c-d), whence wise men may be led from ἀπορία (περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, Metaph. 982b) to “theorize the cause” (ἀρχονται μὲν γάρ …ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν θαυμάτων ταυτώματα τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ., Metaph. 893a). Other effects of wonders in the Histories have been well-studied, so no dedicated treatment of θωματα etc. will be offered here. For good overviews, however, see e.g. Barth (1968), Hartog (1988) 230-237, Hunzinger (1995), Thomas (2000) 135-167, and Munson (2001) 232-265.

24 Armayar (1977-1978) 68-70 offers several Homeric analogues to Herodotus’ description of the Labyrinth, namely the palaces of Priam (Il. 6.242 ff.) and Odysseus (Od. 22.126 ff.).

25 For a general overview of the novelty of Herodotus’ aestheticism relative to his archaic forebears, see Philipp (1968) 28-31.

26 The “display of works” (ἔργων ὑπόδεξις, 2.148.2) is an important collocation in other contexts as well (cf. 1.1.0, 1.208, 2.101, 6.15, 7.23, and 8.90). As Kirk (2014) 33 argues, Herodotean ὑπόδεξις “…from an initial physical showing…takes on a specialized meaning, still with the sense of a visual display, but involving words.” That ὑπόδεξις may therefore entail a kind of “multimedia inventory” (35) or “simulcast” (38) squares with the symbiotic relationship between λόγος and ἔργον as well as the larger integrative approach to historical methodology advocated throughout this dissertation.

27 Cf. 2.5.2 and 2.28 (discussed in Chapter 2.2 above). On the first person plural, see especially Chamberlain (2001), who argues that Herodotus adapts this convention from poetry to be “a genuine shifter, a deictic term whose essential ambiguity is ready to be exploited” (14) depending on how “we”
work and thereby distinguishes the empirical and anthropological basis of his interpretation of space. Nevertheless, however much he may surpass the limits imposed on his inquiry and advance the course of knowledge in original ways, certain aspects of this ἔργα remain out of reach.

Herodotus acknowledges this in 2.148.5-6 when he makes a distinction between what he was able to learn about the Labyrinth based on what he saw (εἶδον, ὤρθομεν, θεησάμενοι) versus what he gleaned from informants (λόγοισι ἐπινθανόμεθα, ἄκοη παραλαβόντες λέγομεν). In spite of the proliferation of the language of autopsy, however, Herodotus does not discount what he hears, as he describes the layout and the number of the lower chambers of the Labyrinth even though he was not allowed to see them for himself. This amalgamating approach offers further evidence for Herodotus’ heterogeneous and integrative methodology as seen throughout this dissertation. And yet, even when the findings of ὄψις and ἄκοη are combined, the account of the Labyrinth suggests that ἔργα have the potential to pose questions that are beyond the ken of even the most wary historical inquirer. Sometimes, then, ἔργα do in fact remain λόγου μέζω.

happen to construe it, so that he “can establish an interpretive distance between himself as a knower and what he knows, and take up the position of a judge of others rather than that of a competitive individual subject to judgment” (21). For the resonance of this thesis with the practices of the ἱστωρ, see Dewald (1987) 155. This perspective is further validated by Keyser’s work on Herodotean counting and arithmetic (i.e. Keyser (1986) and Keyser (2006), esp. 346-349), a phenomenon very similar to the sort of numerical reckoning we see in the Labyrinth episode: “Herodotos wants his readers to learn with him, while Thucydides wants us to believe his research (cp. 6.55.i). Herodotos candidly shares his reasoning and evidence, while Thucydides explicitly states conclusions. Thucydides asks us to trust his results (1.22.3-4), while Herodotos provides the source of his accounts so that we can form our own opinions” (Keyser (2006) 349).

29 Cf. e.g. the bekos experiment and Herodotus’ discussion of the Nile (both discussed in Chapter Two vis-à-vis the proem to the Histories).
These sorts of limitations are further amplified by another great work which also “defies description”: the pyramid of Cheops. After providing its dimensions (like the Labyrinth) and relating two possible methods of its construction (in classic ἱστορ fashion), Herodotus recounts a moment in the course of his visit to the pyramid when he is at odds to explain its origins:

Σεσήμανται δὲ διὰ γραμμάτων αἰγυπτίων ἐν τῇ πυραμίδι ὁσα ἐς τε συρμαίην καὶ κρόμμια καὶ σκόρδα ἀνασιμωθή τοίσι ἐργαζόμενοι· καὶ ὡς ἐμὲ εὐ μεμνήσθαι τὰ ὁ ἐρμηνεύς μοι ἐπελεγόμενος τὰ γράμματα ἑφή, ἔξακοσία καὶ χίλια τάλαντα ἄργυριου τετελέσθαι. [7] Εἰ δ’ ἐστι οὕτως ἔχοντα ταῦτα, κόσα οἰκὸς ἄλλα δεδαπανθῆται ἐστὶ ἐς τε σίδηρον τῷ ἐργάζοντο καὶ σιτία καὶ εὐθήτα τοίσι ἐργαζόμενοι, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκέω, ἐν τῷ τούς λίθους ἔταμνον καὶ ἤγον καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆν ὄρυγμα ἐργάζοντο, οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον; (2.125.6-7)

The amount of radishes, onions, and garlic consumed by the workers is indicated in Egyptian script on the pyramid of Cheops. As I well remember, my interpreter, in reading the writing for me, said that 1,600 talents had been spent. [7] If this is correct, how much more is likely to have been expended on iron with which they worked and food and clothing for the workers for as long as I have mentioned it took them to build the works, including the time it took (no small amount, I should think) to quarry and haul the stones, and to dig underground?

Most of the attention this passage has received has been concerned with the veracity of the inscription. While scholars are sharply divided in this matter, Herodotus himself appears more ambivalent. Though he may accept what the interpreter tells him, he does

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30 i.e. Ἡσαν μέν νυν καὶ αἱ πυραμίδες λόγου μέξονες κ.τ.λ. (2.148.3, see above). For other uses of this paradoxical phrase, see e.g. 9.37.2, where Hegesistratus of Elis’ remarkable escape from Spartan captivity is recounted in considerable detail (even though it is “a deed beyond recounting” (ἐργὸν ἐργάσατο μέξον λόγου), and 7.147.1, where Xerxes spares the lives of Greek spies so that they may report the “unspeakable” power of the Persian expedition (…τὰ ἑωυτοῦ πρήγματα…ἔόντα λόγου μέξον), which Herodotus nevertheless numbers and describes exhaustively (7.61-100).

31 See 2.124.4-5 and 2.125.1-4 respectively.

not do so without qualification (Εἰ δ’ ἐστι οὕτως ἔχοντα ταῦτα, …οἰκὸς…ἐστι, 2.125.7). Even if this hypothetical argument could be taken to indicate a categorical approval on Herodotus’ part, he nevertheless shows that inscriptions cannot always “speak for themselves”, as it were, or be taken at face value. Like other successful inquirers in the Histories, Herodotus must interpret the interpretation and so project into the realm of conjecture and possibility in order to discern the genesis of this ἔργον (i.e. what else would inevitably have been required by the laborers to build the pyramids apart from radishes, onions, and leeks). In this way, we can see the trifecta of ὀψις, ἀκοή, and γνώμη at work in 2.125.6-7. But even when all of the self-professed components of Herodotean inquiry are brought together, much about the inscription remains opaque.

These shortcomings are underlined by the interrogative which abruptly concludes the discussion of the inscription. This question not only emphasizes the inability of historical inquiry to achieve absolute, unambiguous knowledge, but also provides an

34 David’s failure to consider 2.125.7 in his analysis of 2.125.6 is what likely leads him to the indefensible conclusion that Herodotus “accepted this [inscription] without question” (David (2006) 222).
35 I use the clever turn of phrase of Livingstone and Nisbet (2010) 37, which they apply to Herodotus’ circumspect interpretation of the manifold dedications to the fallen at Thermopylae, including several inscriptions (7.225-228).
36 A good example of the need to interpret an interpretation comes towards the end of the Lydian λόγος, where Cyrus must read beyond the words of his ἐρμηνεύς to discover the true (i.e. human) significance of Croesus’ mournful utterances delivered from the pyre (1.86). For a discussion of this and other examples of the gaps between language, culture, and comprehension which ἐρμηνεύς signal, see Munson (2005) 74-77 and Hollmann (2011) 142, 245-248. For good overviews of how this relates specifically to the interpretation of objects in the Histories, see Dewald (1993) and Hollmann (2011) 176-207 (both discussed in the next section of this chapter).
37 See 2.99.1 (discussed in Chapter Two, n. 85).
opportunity for the reader to reflect in an open-ended way\textsuperscript{38} on the origin and function of an \textit{ἔργον} as great as the pyramid of Cheops “through the travails of the ages.”\textsuperscript{39} While Herodotus characteristically does not pose one single question here, his interest in the huge amounts of time and resources that would have been required to create the pyramid independent of the amounts specified on the inscription invites a meditation on grandeur.\textsuperscript{40} Ironically (but not unexpectedly), this in turn evokes Herodotus’ programmatic interest in greatness as an expression of transience and vicissitude across time and space, as laid out early on:

\[
\ldots \text{προβήσωμαι ύς το τρόσι τον λόγου, ομοίως μικρά και μεγάλα ἀστεα} \\
\text{ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξών. [4] Τά γάρ το πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τά πολλά αὐτών σμικρά} \\
\text{γέγονεν: τά δὲ ἐπ' ἐμόν ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά. Τήν ἄνθρωπην ἃν} \\
\text{ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαίμονην ὑπάρχαν ἐν τῶν μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφότεροι} \\
\text{ὁμοίως (1.5.3-4).}
\]

…I will proceed with my \textit{logos} by going through great and small human settlements alike, [4] for many of those that were great in the past have become small, and those that were great in my time were once small. Knowing, then, that human prosperity never abides in the same place, I will mention both alike.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} When interpreted as an inscription, the inscription in 2.125.6-7 functions much as the first sentence of the proem does (see Chapter 1.3 above). By reading \textit{Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε} as if it were affixed to a monument, we are made “the \textit{origo} of a deitic act that will be performed as long as the monument is standing, and read” (Bakker (2002) 30). In amalgamating \textit{λόγος} and \textit{ἔργον} in this way, we “not only become, implicitly, speakers who acknowledge Herodotus’ achievement; we are also cast in Herodotus’ own role. Standing not before the publication or presentation of the Inquiry, but before the Inquiry \textit{itself}, its enactment, we are asked to do what Herodotus did himself: to listen critically, to question, and to judge” (Bakker (2002) 32).

\textsuperscript{39} I cite as a comparandum the incipit of G. S. Patton, Jr.’s 1922 poem “Through a Glass, Darkly” (reprinted and discussed in Prioli (1991) 118-122), whose reflections on the “changeless changing shape” (ln. 14) of warfare across the millennia echo Herodotus’ fascination with much the same dichotomy of vicissitude and constancy (see also n. 41 below).

\textsuperscript{40} See e.g. Hornblower (1987) 31-32, who asserts that the discussions of \textit{ἔργα} such as the pyramids occupy a central place in the grand scheme of the \textit{Histories}, in that they serve “to introduce us to the scale of the problem which Cambyses was taking on when he invaded Egypt” (32).

\textsuperscript{41} For reverberations of the reversal of fortune motif and other similar themes across the \textit{Histories}, cf. e.g. the Croesus \textit{λόγος} (1.26-91.6, esp. 1.29-33), Croesus’ advice to Cyrus (1.207.2), the change of the Egyptian
As the remainder of this chapter will show, Herodotus’ emphasis on mutability as one of the leitmotifs of the Histories has a significant bearing on the way ἔργα are examined and portrayed. Through them we may discern even more instances in which aetiological discussions allow Herodotus to refute superficial impressions and direct the course of his inquiry in challenging new ways.

3.2 Iconatrophy

Immediately following the discussion of the inscription of the pyramid of Cheops and its open-ended prompt, Herodotus offers another challenge to orthodoxy and expectation in the form of an “iconatrophic” narrative, that is, a story triggered by an ἔργον which purports to explain its origin:


Cheops stooped to such wickedness that, needing money, he put his own daughter in a brothel and instructed her to charge a certain sum (how much they did not say). She did as she had been told by her father, but she was minded to leave behind her own memorial as well, so she asked everyone who came to her to give her one block of stone. [2] From these stones, they said that the pyramid was constructed, the one in the middle of the three in front of the great pyramid, whose sides are one and a half plethra long.

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landscape in the vastness of time (2.11-13), Xerxes’ tearful survey of his massive army (7.44-46), the Athenians’ rebuttal to the Tegeans before the battle of Plataea (9.27.4), and Artaÿctes’ governorship and execution (9.114-122). The ways in which Herodotus integrates the past with the future in 1.5.3 and then makes these points indeterminate (see Chapter 1.3 above) speaks to the inextricability of aetiology from teleology in the Histories, a paradox we will return to in the final chapter of this dissertation.

42 See n. 12 above.
While Flory is right to call attention here to the ironic juxtaposition between great and small (which further substantiates the interpretation of the inscription advanced above), it is difficult to accept his position that this pyramid (one of the so-called “subsidiary” pyramids)\textsuperscript{43} constitutes “proof” for Cheops having prostituted his daughter.\textsuperscript{44} Herodotus himself seems to suggest otherwise, not only by framing the entire narrative obliquely with verbs of reported speech (ἐλεγον, ἔφασαν),\textsuperscript{45} but also by relating an alternate Egyptian tradition which attributed the authorship of the pyramids (including, as it seems, the subsidiary pyramid described above) not to Cheops or his brother Chephren, but to Philitis, a local shepherd.\textsuperscript{46} That so lofty a monument could be ascribed to so lowly a figure becomes all the more ironic when we recall that the pyramid described in 2.126 was supposedly built as a memorial (μνημήιον, 2.126.1) to Cheops’ daughter and not to any pharaoh.

The aetiologies presented by this iconatrophic narrative bear witness to the fluidity of coexisting traditions, which can make it impossible to locate and verify a

\textsuperscript{43} For an overview of the “subsidiary” pyramids, see e.g. Edwards (1986) 123 ff.
\textsuperscript{44} Flory (1987) 41.
\textsuperscript{45} See Cooper (1974). The use of δὴ here to intensify an indefinite construction (ἀργύριον ὄκόσον δὴ τι, 2.126.1) may also betray a sense of doubt or irony, as the particle is wont to do (see Denniston (1954) 203-240, esp. 229-234). As Professor Johnson points out to me, these verbs of reported speech are not of the generalizing sort (i.e. “the Egyptians say…”), but the particular (i.e. “they told (me)”), which may further emphasize the restricted nature of the source.
\textsuperscript{46} Herodotus is not explicit in identifying which pyramids were alternately ascribed to Philitis (…καὶ τὰς πυραμίδας καλέουσι ποιμένος Φιλίτιος, 2.128). Most translators render the definite article in a general sense as “the pyramids” (see e.g. Godley (1920), Grene (1987), Waterfield (1998), and de Sélincourt (2003) ad loc.), which I also interpret collectively in this context.
single, unanimous origin for any given ἔργον. The failure of the subsidiary pyramid to preserve memory unequivocally in spite of its role as memorial is a stark reminder of this, but Herodotus does not stand aside to gloat over such an ironic point and further precipitate the lapse of this ἔργον into oblivion. As much as he may acknowledge the inevitable degeneration of memory and the limitations of narrative to describe works, he cannot divorce λόγοι from ἔργα because their very integration in the act of writing perpetuates memory regardless of how accurate it may be. By allowing memory to exist in layers like the palimpsest that any ἔργον is intrinsically, Herodotus permits the multivalence of historical works to live on in all of their richness and complexity for future generations to study and engage with, thereby perpetuating memory even further.

47 Lloyd’s likening of the shepherd aetiology (2.128) to a “rags-to-riches story of a common wish fulfillment type” (Lloyd (1988) ad loc.) points to the possibility that Philitis could have been both a shepherd and a king at different points in his life. Indeed, as How and Wells (1912) observe (ad loc.), this story may have its antecedent among the Hyksos or “Shepherd Kings” of the Second Intermediate Period. While this theory is not without controversy (see Lloyd (1988) ad loc.), both commentators recognize in separate ways that the multiple origins of the pyramids related by Herodotus are not necessarily contradictory (recall Lateiner (1989) 208, Gould (1989) 65, and Pelling (2000) 86).

48 I accept Porter’s interpretation (contra Immerwahr (1960) 271) that “Herodotus does not emphasize the preservation of monuments more than he does their destruction. Indeed, the marvel with which he beholds the survival of historical monuments—which is to say, memorials of history—is strictly commensurate with and contingent on their possible non-survival” (Porter (2010) 474). This is perhaps most strongly suggested by the piquant use of ἐξίτηλα (“evanescent”) in the proem (1.1.0), a word whose association with organic processes of fading (see Nagy (1987) 182-183) presupposes the inevitability of the decay of ἔργα as a fact of nature.

49 On writing as a protection against oblivion in the Histories, see e.g. Johnson (1994) 251-252 (with additional bibliography at 252 n. 58) and Rösler (2002) 94.

50 A programmatic example of Herodotus’ ambivalence towards the accuracy of memory may be found in 2.77.2, where the superlative memory of the Egyptians (μνήμην ἀνθρώπων πάντων ἐπασκέοντες μάλιστα λογιώτατοι εἰσὶ μακρῷ) is observed in passing with anthropological detachment (Lidov (2002) 207-208). This is yet another indication that memory, though of unquestionable importance to Herodotus and worthy of preservation in and of itself, is but one aspect of his inquiry and so must be considered in tandem with other components of ἱστορίη. For a demonstration of how this applies to the Egyptian λόγος according to the major epistemological and methodological statements made therein (i.e. 2.99, 2.142, 2.147, 2.154—discussed in Chapter Two), see e.g. Murray (2001) 26.
When taken together, then, the heterogeneity of ἔργα provides a fitting model for the heterogeneity of the λόγοι that describe them.

This multiplicity extends across time, space, and culture to other ἔργα outside the Egyptian λόγος. One of the most famous of these ἔργα is the tomb of Alyattes in Lydia, a monument which finds ready comparison with the works we have already considered above:


Lydia does not have as many wonders to record as other lands, except for the gold dust that is brought down from Mount Tmolus. [2] But it does offer one work [ergon] which is much the greatest, except for those of the Egyptians and Babylonians. In that place is the tomb of Alyattes, son of Croesus, whose foundation is made of great stones, but the rest of the tomb is made of heaped earth. It was built by the traders, the craftsmen, and the working girls. [3] And even in my day there were still five markers on top of the tomb, and letters had been carved into them, indicating what each group of people had contributed. Once it had been measured, the work of the working girls appeared to be the greatest, [4] for all the daughters of the Lydian people, in fact, prostitute themselves to collect their dowries. They do this until they get married, and they pick their own husbands. [5] The circumference of the tomb is six stadiles and two plethra, and the width is thirteen plethra. There is a great lake near the tomb which the Lydians say is ever-flowing. This is called the Lake of Gygges. That, then, is what the tomb is like.
The tomb of Alyattes is important in that it establishes several continuities for the viewing and interpretation of ἔργα across the constituent λόγοι of the Histories. These continuities would be apparent even if Herodotus did not make a point of connecting the tomb explicitly with the ἔργα of other peoples (“Ἐν δὲ ἔργον πολλὸν μέγιστον παρέχεται χωρίς τῶν τε Αἰγυπτίων ἔργων καὶ τῶν Βαβυλωνίων, 1.93.2). That he uses empirical measurements to convey the tomb’s grandeur (as in the case of both the Labyrinth and the pyramids) and then calls that greatness into question with the mention of the tomb’s lowly builders (as in the case of the attribution of the pyramids variously to slaves, a prostitute, and a shepherd) should resonate across geographical and cultural divides with the ironic presentation of ἔργα we have already considered above.\textsuperscript{51} But Herodotus’ deployment of aetiology in this instance should speak to these continuities, too.

As David argues, this iconatrophic narrative is fundamentally syncretic in that it relies on (at least) two traditions to explain the origin of the tomb, one deriving from the

\textsuperscript{51} While West (1985) 296 is probably right to see in 1.93 a warning “not to be overawed” by the tomb, it seems misguided to view this strictly as a caution against “the pomp and circumstance of an Oriental monarchy” (emphasis my own). Even if the stress of 1.93 were placed on a moralizing critique of Lydian culture (Kurke (1999) 169-171), and not on broader anthropological desires to show the objective validity of sexual practices across cultures (Arieti (1995) 114-115) and “to go over great and small alike” (just as in the analogous example of the pyramids), the overarching conclusions ought to be much the same. This may be deduced from the section which immediately follows the discussion of the tomb, where Herodotus notes that Lydian customs are practically the same as those used by Greeks (Λυδοὶ δὲ νόμοισι μὲν παραπλησίοισι χρέωνται καὶ Ἕλληνες, 1.94.1). Though the former differ in that they prostitute their daughters (…χωρίς ἢ ὅτι τὰ θήλη τέκνα καταπορνεύουσι, 1.94.1), both Greeks and Lydians build and esteem ἔργα. As Lydians represent a midway point between barbarian and non-barbarian θύεων in the Histories (see e.g. Cook (1976) 54 and Pelling (1997) 56), the account of 1.93-94 may then speak to the universality of ἔργα as fundamentally human constructs (cf. 2.35-36 (discussed above in Chapter 2.3) for a similarly egalitarian perspective on νόμου). From this standpoint, Herodotus seems to undermine greatness itself rather than the notion that humble folk can have no part in greatness as an aristocratic ideal (contra How and Wells (1912) ad. 1.93.4, who see a class distinction at play in the manifestation of this Lydian custom as indicated by the word δήμου).
association of the ἔργον with prostitutes and the other from the Lydian king Alyattes.\(^{52}\)

What remains to be emphasized is that the traditions Herodotus integrates here are no more to the exclusion of one another than the traditions surrounding the pyramids.\(^{53}\) As he intimates in his analysis of the five markers on top of the tomb (οὐροι, 1.93.3), the prostitutes who undertook the bulk of the work (αἱ ἐνεργαζόμεναι παιδίσκαι, 1.93.2) should be considered authors of the ἔργον just as much as Alyattes himself.\(^{54}\) Though Herodotus may emphasize the contributions of certain agents over others, the fact that he acknowledges the additional influence of yet other tradespeople (οἱ ἀγοραῖοι ἄνθρωποι καὶ οἱ χειρώνακτες, 1.93.2) speaks eloquently to the innate multiformity of the tomb’s agency and memory. Herodotus’ account of the tomb thus comes to reflect the physical stratification of the ἔργον, all of whose layers show that its construction was a collective enterprise. From this perspective, then, multiple aetiology shows itself more than just a rhetorical tactic born out of an unwillingness to commit to one origin or another because of the difficulty of historical inquiry. For someone as committed as Herodotus to relating

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\(^{52}\) David (2006) 37-40. In elucidating the iconatrophic associations of the tomb with prostitutes, David offers a useful parallel in the Δειπνοσοφισταί (13.31). Here Athenaeus relates (via Clearchus the peripatetic) that Gyges gathered all the Lydians to build a tomb for his lover, which was still known in Clearchus’ day as the “Courtesan’s Memorial” (τὸ νῦν ἐτὶ καλούμενον τῆς Ἐταίρας μνήμα). For a discussion of other analogues which speak against the idea that Herodotus’ description of the tomb of Alyattes is an ahistorical “wild Greek surmise” (West (1985) 296), see e.g. Pritchett (1993) 167-170.

\(^{53}\) See n. 47 above.

\(^{54}\) Even though the verbal derivatives of ἔργον appear several times in 1.93 (i.e. ἐξεργάσαντο (bis), ἐνεργαζόμενα), it is not clear whether they refer to the physical act of building the tomb or financing its construction. Regardless of their meaning in this context, the vagueness of these terms suggests that the work of the prostitutes and tradespeople is indivisible from that of Alyattes and so further substantiates the tomb’s multiple agency.
λόγοι and ἔργα across the spectrum of great and small, multiple aetiology becomes a given.

This is not to say, however, that Herodotus is undiscerning when it comes to profiling the layers that make up ἔργα. On the contrary, Herodotus frequently shows himself a shrewd critic of the power of ἔργα to mask their origins. We may see this clearly in the paradigmatic account of Croesus’ contributions to Delphi (1.50-51). For instance, after describing the first batch of Croesus’ sumptuous offerings (including couches, cups, ingots, and a golden statue of a lion weighing ten talents), Herodotus concludes with a consideration of the questionable provenance of several other ἔργα:


Once he had finished these, Croesus sent them to Delphi along with other offerings including the following: two immensely great kraters, one of gold and

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55 i.e. 1.50.
the other of silver. The former lies on the right when you walk into the temple, the latter on the left. [2] These were also relocated when the temple burned down. The gold krater lies in the treasury of the Clazomenians and it weighs eight half talents and twelve minae. The silver krater lies in the corner of the vestibule and it holds six hundred amphorae, for it is used to mix wine by the Delphians during the festival of the Theophania. [3] The Delphians say that this is the work of Theodorus of Samos, and I think that is right, for it does not appear to me to be just any old work. Croesus also sent four silver jars, which stand in the treasury of the Corinthians, and dedicated two perirrhanteria for lustral water, one of gold and the other of silver. An inscription on the gold perirrhanterion claims that it is an offering of the Spartans, but they are wrong, [4] for this comes from Croesus, too. Some Delphian inscribed it because he wanted to ingratiate himself with the Spartans. Though I know his name, I will not mention it. But the statue of the boy through whose hand water flows does come from the Spartans, though neither of the perirrhanteria does. [5] Croesus sent many other uninscribed offerings along with them, including round silver bowls as well as the image of a woman measuring three cubits, which the Delphians say is a likeness of Croesus’ baker. In addition, Croesus also dedicated his own wife’s necklaces and girdles.

As Pritchett notes, this passage is as much an indicator of the mutability of ἔργα as it is of Herodotus’ “critical faculty.” Herodotus’ refusal, for example, to recall the name of the Delphian who falsely inscribed one of Croesus’ περιρραντήρια on behalf of the Spartans (τοῦ ἐπιστάμενος τὸ ονόμα οὐκ ἐπιμνήσομαι, 1.51.4) provides fitting insights into both of these issues. On one level, Herodotus’ omission of the name demonstrates his knowledge of the competing traditions surrounding the περιρραντήριον and thus his control over the narrative and the aetiologies given therein. On another level, the fact that he memorializes a spurious tradition at all shows that while this ἔργον may ultimately have one true verifiable origin, it cannot tell the whole story by itself.

57 Lateiner (1989) 69. See also Flory (1987) 65 for other types of omissions in addition to the withholding of names.
58 To this end, compare the mixing bowl in 1.51.2, which is given by Croesus, but is the “work of Theodorus of Samos” (Θεοδώρου τοῦ Σαμίου ἔργον εἶναι, 1.51.3). While this presupposes a distinction
requires not only the discerning gaze of the ἵστωρ to see past the apparently straightforward attribution, but also the simultaneous consideration of other original claims from other sources, which, though false, can themselves furnish truths that have ramifications beyond ἔργα alone. 59 S. West, for example, sees in the story of the forged περιρραντήριον “a warning against undue confidence in epigraphic evidence.” 60 Alternatively, Arieti sees tacit critiques both of the relationship between the Spartans and the Delphians and of the questionable reputation of the Delphians, the latter of which may serve as a warning “to be wary even when it comes to the oracle at Delphi.” 61 Though Herodotus leaves it to us to make up our own minds about these possible meanings, the broader context of 1.51 nevertheless signals the unquestionable polyvalence of ἔργα.

This is perhaps best indicated by the lengthy—even leisurely—manner in which Herodotus profiles the contributions of Croesus. On one level, the length of the account grants Herodotus many opportunities to display his acumen in order to explain these ἔργα and thus to transcend the conventions of the inventory. 62 On another level, the sheer between dedicator and manufacturer, both could be said to be in their own ways the originators of the ἔργον (cf. the agency of the pyramids and the tomb of Alyattes discussed above).

59 As Dewald (1987) 160 notes, this contrast is characteristic of Herodotean methodology, in that “most…statements of knowledge or certitude concern a specific and often rather trivial detail - a piece of supporting information in a larger, complex problem that the histor does not guarantee in toto”, which nevertheless demonstrates the extent of his inquiry.

60 West (1985) 280.


62 On novelty as a driving force behind the account of 1.50-51, see e.g. Parke (1984) 209 ff.: “Everything points to the conclusion that no one had previously described these objects in writing nor recorded their story. So it was appropriate for Herodotus to undertake the task and make them the climax of his account of the kings of Lydia.” Even if Herodotus did borrow from a previously-written source for the Delphic contributions (see Flower (1991) 65 and n. 53), it is unlikely to have evinced any criticism of the ἔργα
number of ἔργα related in 1.51 offers a tangible picture of just how much Croesus had and therefore how much he had to lose. In light of this paradox, it makes sense, then, that Herodotus runs the gamut of criticism in going over great and small alike according to the principle set out at 1.5.3. What’s more, because Delphi constitutes one of the largest multi-national repositories for objects in the *Histories*, Herodotus’ assessment of the mutability of ἔργα in the case of Croesus’ contributions turns out to have major significance beyond the Lydian λόγος.

Indeed, even when Herodotus does not depict himself in the act of observing or interpreting objects, the ability of ἔργα to morph and conceal their original identities may be discerned throughout the narrative of the *Histories* at large. One of the most vivid and memorable examples comes towards the end of the Egyptian λόγος, where the pharaoh Amasis employs a golden footbath to make a point not only about his own origins, but also of origins in general:


mentioned therein, if the “generally formulaic and predictable” inventories of the Parthenon and other classical sites on the Athenian acropolis are any indicator (see Harris (1995), quotation at p. 22).

63 Flower (1991) 68. See also Bassi (2014) 184-193 on the ephemerality of Croesus’ tangible remains.

64 Discussed above. Compare Herodotus’ detailed account of the Delphic offerings of Croesus’ ancestor, Gyges, in 1.14.
After Apries had been deposed, Amasis became king. He came from the province of Sais from the city called Siouph. At first, the Egyptians despised him and held him in no great esteem because he used to be a commoner and was not from a distinguished family. But later, Amasis won them over not by harshness, but by craft. Among his countless possessions, there was a golden footbath, which Amasis himself and all of his drinking buddies sometimes used to wash their feet in. Now, having broken down this footbath, he made a statue of a god out of it and erected it in the most ideal part of the city, and the Egyptians began to frequent the statue and revere it greatly. When Amasis learned what the people were doing, he gathered the Egyptians together and revealed to them that the statue had been made out of a footbath, in which the Egyptians once used to vomit and piss and wash their feet, but which they now revered greatly. He then went on to say that he himself had fared much as the footbath had, for even if he had been formerly a commoner, he was now their king, so he ordered them to honor and respect him. In this way, he prevailed upon the Egyptians to agree to serve him.

In likening his elevation in power and stature to the elevation of the footbath (ποδανιπτήρ) from object of scorn to object of veneration (ἄγαλμα), Amasis upends hierarchy, tradition, and expectation in such a way that speaks to the continued relevance of the reversal of fortune motif to the interpretation of ἔργα across the Histories. Though it scarcely need be mentioned that Amasis ends up echoing many of the same concerns over great and small which Herodotus himself voices in pro pria persona, the
precise manner in which Amasis goes about making these known to his people also resonates with such a comparison, but has largely escaped the notice of scholars. For instance, it is significant that the subjects of Amasis could not have had any idea their cherished ἄγαλμα was once a filthy ποδανιπτήρ until the pharaoh gathered them together and brought the fact to light (ἐξέφηνε, 2.172.4). This detail offers additional evidence to support the thesis advocated throughout this chapter that objects require explanation and that λόγοι therefore become inextricable from ἔργα. However, explanation does not entail the judgment of meaning, because, as Dewald reminds us, “the meaning of things is very likely to be multiple.” While the footbath of Amasis is an extreme case, we will recall from all of the examples we have considered above that Herodotus declines to judge explicitly the meaning of objects. In this regard, we can see the extent to which all ἔργα are in fact λόγου μέζω for Herodotus. Thus, as much as he succeeds in advancing the course of his inquiry in innovative ways through his interpretations of the origins of ἔργα, Herodotus demonstrates time and again that there is always something beyond what can be known absolutely and definitively. In order to show the extent to which these principles reverberate beyond the Egyptian and Lydian λόγοι, let us conclude by looking

(8.124.2)) makes this connection all the more salient, inasmuch as wise advisers have been shown to reflect and inscribe Herodotus’ own methodology (see esp. Chapter Six below).
67 Hollmann (2011) 177.
68 Cf. 3.43, where Amasis explains (correctly) the symbolism of the ring of Polycrates. On this episode, see e.g. van der Veen (1996) 6-22. Cf. also 2.131, where Herodotus explains the loss of the hands of the statues of Mycerinus’ attendants not as an indication of their purported punishment (according to one tradition), but as a consequence of decay over the ages.
69 Dewald (1993) 70.
at a formative ἔργον from Book Four as a way of prefacing our upcoming chapter on the Scythian λόγος:


I was not able to reckon the population of the Scythians accurately, but I kept hearing differing accounts of their numbers, for some say that the Scythians—that is, those who are actually Scythians—are very numerous and others that they are few. [2] They did, however, show me the following. Between the Borysthenes and Hypanis rivers there is a place called Exampaeus, which I mentioned just a little while ago when I said that there was a salt spring from which water flows and makes the Hypanis undrinkable.70 [3] In this place there is a bronze cauldron six times as big as the krater at the mouth of the Black Sea which Pausanias son of Cleombrotus dedicated. For anyone who has not seen it, I will show how this is the case. [4] The cauldron in Scythia easily holds six hundred amphorae and is six fingers thick. The local inhabitants told me that this was made out of arrowheads, [5] for their king, Ariantas, desiring to know the population of the Scythians, ordered all of the Scythians to bring one arrowhead from each of their quivers. Whoever failed to do so was sentenced to death. [6] A great quantity of arrowheads was brought and Ariantas resolved to make a memorial out of them and leave it to posterity. And from these he made this cauldron and dedicated it at this place, Exampaeus. This, then, is what I heard about the population of the

70 i.e. 4.52.
Scythians.

One of the most remarkable things about Herodotus’ examination of the krater of Ariantas is the way in which he shows the inability of such a grandiose ἔργον to lay out its origins accurately and unequivocally. Though Herodotus acknowledges this from the start (οὐκ οἶός τε ἐγενόμην ἀτρεκέως πυθέσθαι, 4.81.1), he still shows us (ὧδε δηλώσω, 4.81.3) what he was able to learn about the krater. By providing its enormous dimensions just as he did in the case of the Labyrinth, the pyramids, and the tomb of Alyattes,71 Herodotus ends up answering his own question (i.e. whether the Scythians are many or few), having reframed it after coming to a dead end in 4.81.1. Nevertheless, what he sees (Τοσόνδε μέντοι ἀπέφαινόν μοι ἐς ὄψιν, 4.81.2)72 does not allow him to discern the krater’s original function as a physical manifestation of the number of Scythians under Ariantas’ rule; rather, the reports (λόγους, 4.81.1) of local informants (Τοῦτο ὦν ἔλεγον οἱ ἐπιχώριοι κ.τ.λ., 4.81.4) must perform this task.73

In this respect, Hedrick is right to note the inextricability of sight from sound and thus the inextricability of ἔργον from λόγος in Herodotus’ investigation of the krater:

71 See 2.148, 2.124-125, and 1.93 respectively (discussed above).
72 West (2000) 22 advances the minority interpretation (following a hesitant suggestion by Macan (1895) ad loc.) that ἀπέφαινόν μοι ἐς ὄψιν means “they were for showing” (i.e. “they offered to show me”) and thus that Herodotus did not actually see the krater. This is not only a tortured and tendentious reading of the imperfect (ἀπέφαινον), but it is also incompatible with the following section, in which Herodotus implies that he did in fact see the krater (ὁς δὲ μὴ εἶδέ κ.τ.λ.. (see Pritchett (1993) 136)). Nevertheless, whether Herodotus is actually speaking from autopsy here is immaterial to the larger argument advanced below, that the krater’s very appearance, whether seen firsthand or imagined, can only indicate so much by itself.
73 On local knowledge in the Histories, see e.g. Luraghi (2001), who concludes that “through such statements Herodotus is clearly, if implicitly, defining the limits of possible knowledge in time and space” (145) in order “to make explicit what today’s oral historians would call its [i.e. local knowledge’s] ‘social surface’—that is, the group to which it belongs, the group which holds it to be true” (158-159).
“This same object, then, must serve simultaneously as a reminder and as a verification for oral tradition.”^74 But what it verifies turns out to be just as paradoxical as the methodological dichotomy of λόγος and ἔργον itself. While Herodotus appears to accept that the krater is in fact composed of arrowheads representing all of Ariantas’ subjects,^75 it is impossible for him to learn from it how many subjects the Scythian king actually had due to the monument’s plasticity. This ought to defeat the whole purpose behind Ariantas’ desire to commemorate (μνημόσυνον…λιπέσθαι, 4.81.6)^77 the number of Scythians in his realm (Βουλόμενον …τοῦτον εἰδέναι τὸ πλῆθος τὸ Σκυθέων, 4.81.5), but Herodotus does not despair at the inefficacy of ἔργα to preserve memory, as memory, like aetiology, is innately variform. Though Ariantas may stake a claim to this great krater, its composition, based on countless small contributions, indicates how this ἔργον could be considered as much a memorial to the king as to his lowly subjects. In light of the examples we have examined throughout this chapter, it is not surprising, then, that Herodotus distinguishes the layers of the krater as he does even while he points to the

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^74 Hedrick (1995) 63. “It is not simply…that objects are dependent for their meaning on oral accounts. They also play an important role in fixing the tradition. They may be regarded as reminders, prompts which trigger stories which are already known, and as verifications, which demonstrate the truth of the tale. Monuments, for Herodotus, preserve and guarantee oral tradition even as they are dependent on it” (Hedrick (1995) 60). See also n. 14 and accompanying discussion above.

^75 Note again how the introduction of indirect speech immediately before the iconatrophic narrative (ἔλεγον, 4.81.4) implicitly calls the veracity of the whole account into question ipso facto (see n. 45). Cf. 2.126 above.

^76 Dewald (1993) 70. We can compare Herodotus’ description of the spits (ὀβελοί) offered as a memorial (μνημήιον) by the ἑταίρη Rhodopis. Though the spits are supposed to represent a tenth of Rhodopis’ wealth accumulated through prostitution, they can give no numerical indication of how wealthy she actually was (2.135.3-4). Kurke (1999) 224 takes this to mean that Herodotus “resolutely remonetarizes her offering, dragging it back from the symbolic domain of sacrifice to real money.” This seems excessive, however, in light of Herodotus’ desire to quantify ἔργα as many ways as he can in order to translate greatness empirically and thus objectively (see above, especially the discussion of the Labyrinth).

^77 Cf. 2.126 (discussed above).
shortcomings of this ἔργον. With this contrast in mind, let us now turn to some other episodes from the Scythian λόγος which will speak to the continuities we have already established in earlier chapters with regard to aetiology.
4. Same Difference: the Scythian Logos

Beginning in the very first paragraph of the Scythian λόγος, we should find ourselves on familiar ground:

Metà δὲ τὴν Βαβυλώνος αἱρεσιν ἐγένετο ἐπὶ Σκύθας αὐτοῦ Δαρείου ἔλασις. Ἀνθεούσης γὰρ τῆς Ἀσίης ἀνδράσι καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων συνιόντων ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Δαρείος τείσασθαι Σκύθας, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἰρήνης ἐκείνης ἐσβαλόντες εἰς τὴν Μηδικῆν καὶ νικήσαντες μάχη τοὺς ἀντιομένους ὑπῆρξαν ἀδικίς. [2] Τῆς γὰρ ἅνω Ἀσίης ἠρξαν, ὡς καὶ πρότερον μοι εἰρήνης, Σκύθαι ἔτεα δύο δέοντα τριήκοντα. Κιμμερίους γὰρ ἐπιδιώκοντες ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην, καταπαύοντες τῆς ἀρχῆς Μήδους· οὗτοι γὰρ πρὶν ἢ Σκύθας ἀπικέσθαι ἠρχον τῆς Ἀσίης (4.1.1-2).

After the capture of Babylon, Darius himself launched an expedition against the Scythians, for he was eager to exact retribution against the Scythians when Asia was full of man-power and large amounts of resources were coming in, since they were the first to commit injustice by invading Media and conquering those who opposed them in battle. [2] As I have said earlier,¹ the Scythians had ruled upper Asia for twenty-eight years, for in their pursuit of the Cimmerians, they invaded Asia and stripped the Medes of their empire, who used to rule Asia before the Scythians arrived.

That Darius’ expedition against the Scythians is predicated on avenging (τείσασθαι, 4.1.1) a primal injustice (ὑπῆρξαν ἀδικίς, 4.1.1) ought to immediately recall the series of tit for tat retributions which first set Greeks and barbarians against one another according to the proem to the Histories.² However, just as Herodotus limited the causal force of vengeance in the proem,³ so too does he suggest in the introduction to the Scythian λόγος that vengeance is not the sole explanation in this case either. Herodotus indicates as much

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¹ i.e. 1.104-106.
² Cf. esp. 1.2.1: ὡς καὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων πρότον τοῦτο ἄρξαται μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Ἑλλήνων τινάς (οὐ γὰρ ἔχοισιν τούνομα ἀπηγησασθαί) φασι τῆς Φοινίκης ἐς Τύρον προσσχόντας ἀρπάσαι τοῦ βασιλέως τὴν θυγατέρα Ἑυρώπην· ἄρησαν δ' ἀν οὐτοὶ Κρῆτες. Ταῦτα μὲν ὡς ἂν πρός ισα σφι γενέσθαι· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Ἑλλήνας αἰτίως τῆς δεύτερης ἀδικίας γενέσθαι.
³ See Chapter One above.
when he relates in the same breath that Darius embarked on a retributive campaign against the Scythians when Asia was at the height of its power and was flush with resources (Ἀνθεούσης γὰρ τῆς Ἀσίης ἀνδράσι καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων συνίόντων ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Δαρεῖος τείσασθαι Σκύθας, 4.1.1).⁴ Though it is difficult to determine whether vengeance here amounts to a pretext for expansionism or whether it may itself be considered “an immediate cause”,⁵ there can be no denying that the aetiology of the Persian invasion of Scythia is fundamentally multiple.⁶ So, while it is not unreasonable to attribute Darius’ desire for retribution to Herodotus’ own fondness for explanations based on reciprocity,⁷ the juxtaposition noted above in 4.1.1 implies that vengeance is but one part of a much larger causal complex.

The Scythian λόγος thus challenges us from the start to look past surface impressions and to engage broadly and mindfully with the forthcoming narrative as it relates to the Histories as a whole. In this regard, Herodotus’ integrative yet open-ended approach to the origins of the Persian invasion of Scythia may already be seen to echo programmatic patterns we have brought to the fore of discussion in previous chapters. Far from being an isolated case, though, the introduction to the Scythian λόγος will be shown

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⁵ Hunter (1982) 202. Hunter (1982) 188 also notes that while the Scythians themselves recognize vengeance as a viable motive for Darius’ campaign, they cannot rule out an expansionist motive either, because the Persians had previously conducted campaigns against other peoples (e.g. the Thracians) with whom they had no pre-existing grievances (see 4.118.4; cf. 3.134 and 7.20.2). The historical record also points to a multiplicity of reasons for a Persian incursion (including just such an explanation from Realpolitik), though none has won universal approval among modern scholars (see Gardiner-Garden (1987) 342-345). For a general overview of the historicity of Herodotus’ account of Darius’ campaign, see e.g. Georges (1987).
⁶ Cf. esp. 1.4 (discussed in Chapter 1.2 above).
to prefigure Herodotus’ presentation and understanding of aetiology throughout the λόγος at large. From this perspective, the following chapter will ultimately demonstrate that the Scythian λόγος is not the anomaly it is often made out to be, but that it occupies a rightful place in the methodological framework of the Histories.8

4.1 The Origins of the Scythians

After closing the ring opened in 4.1.1 by relating how Darius was now marshaling an army to exact retribution against the Scythians (Τῶν δὲ εἵνεκα ὁ Δαρεῖος τείσασθαι βουλόμενος συνήγειρε ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς στράτευμα, 4.4),9 we expect the Persian invasion to proceed forthwith. However, we must wait nearly eighty chapters before the expedition can ultimately commence. This deferral finds immediate comparison with the opening of the Egyptian λόγος, which also anticipates a Persian invasion that takes many chapters to manifest.10 This is not mere happenstance, however. As the intervening accounts of the origins, the land, and the customs of the Scythians unfold, we are asked time and again to look back to the Egyptian λόγος and by extension to the proem as well, since they offer many of the same keys to unlocking the riddles posed by the Scythian λόγος. And yet, few have ever sought to connect the Scythian λόγος with these analogues in any substantive way.11 However, to ignore their influence would be to disregard the essence

8 See e.g. West (2004a) 86, echoing much the same sentiments of Jacoby (1913) et al. about publication and completeness that have been used to portray the Egyptian λόγος as an outlier among the constituent λόγοι of the Histories (see notes 6 and 18 in Chapter Two above).
9 On ring composition in the opening of the Scythian λόγος, see Asheri et al. (2007) ad 4.4 (following Corcella (1993) ad loc).
10 i.e. 3.1, following up on 2.1.2 (see Chapter 2.1 above).
11 One of Dewald’s main criticisms of Hartog (1988), which is still the most comprehensive study of the Scythian λόγος to date, is the structuralist’s failure to consider more evidence external to Book Four in
of the Scythian λόγος itself. Some comparanda will therefore be offered to make a case for reading this λόγος as an integral part of Herodotus’ work as a whole.

The extent to which the proem to the *Histories* and the *bekos* experiment resonate with the Scythian λόγος becomes clear in the first of a series of three aetiological narratives which portend the importance of multiplicity to Herodotus’ accounts of the Scythians later on in Book Four:

(5.) The Scythians say that theirs is the youngest of all nations and that it came about in this way. The first man to be born in this land when it was uninhabited was named Targitaüs. They say (though they do not seem to me to be trustworthy, but they say it all the same) that the parents of this Targitaüs were Zeus and a daughter of the river Borysthenes. [2] In any case, they say that Targitaüs was the product of some such union, and that he had three sons: Lipaxaïs, Arpoxaïs, and the youngest, Colaxaïs. [3] In the reign of these men, golden objects came from the sky and fell upon Scythian territory: a plow, a yoke, an ax, and a bowl. Seeing these objects first, the eldest son drew near out of a desire to take hold of them, but the gold burned when he approached. [4] When he left, the second went forward and the same thing happened to him. The burning gold drove both of them back, but the gold stopped burning when the youngest of the three went up to it, and he took the golden objects with him. In light of this, the elder brothers then agreed to give the kingdom to the youngest. (6.) From Lipaxaïs, those Scythians of the class called Auchatae were born, from Arpoxaïs (the middle son), those Scythians called Catiaroi and Traspies, and from the youngest (their king), those called Paralatae. [2] Together, they are called Scolotoi, but the Greeks gave them the name “Scythians” after the king. (7.) Now the Scythians say that they came about in this way, and that all the years that have passed since the time of the first king Targitaüs up until Darius’ crossing into their territory amount to a thousand—no more, no less. And the kings guard this sacred gold jealously and they approach it with great sacrifices in propitiation every year.

What should strike us straightaway about the opening of this account is how the Scythians begin their aetiological narrative with a superlative like the Egyptians before them. Though the Scythians consider themselves to be “the youngest of all nations” (νεώτατον ἁπάντων ἐθνέων, 4.5.1) instead of the “first of all peoples” (πρώτους…πάντων ἀνθρώπων, 2.2.1), this distinction should cause us to be just as wary as we were at the start of the bekos experiment, since superlative claims have already been shown to rebuff expectations and to circumscribe knowledge throughout the Histories.12 Another note of caution is indicated by the framing of the superlative claim within the verb λέγομαι

12 See especially the discussion of 2.2-3 in Chapter 2.1 above (following Bloomer (1993)). Bloomer, however, makes no connection between the superlative claims in 4.5.1 and 2.2.1, but then again, neither do most scholars (see however Benardete (1969) 101-103).
(4.5.1) as a way of introducing an elaborate chain of indirect statements that will extend to all three aetiological tales and so implicitly call into question the Märchen-like narrative that ensues. And yet, while we are directed by the oratio obliqua to evaluate the veracity of what follows, it is telling that Herodotus himself never questions the truth of the account, but only disputes the trustworthiness of one aspect of it (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιστὰ λέγοντες, 4.5.1), namely, the assertion that Targitaüs possessed a divine lineage.

The lack of any categorical distinction based on truth in this first aetiological tale may stem from several factors. One possibility, for instance, may be owed to the fact that the ritual of the sacred gold described in 4.7.1 substantiates the story told in 4.5 because it is still performed, as it seems, in Herodotus’ day. Another possibility (and one I will advocate here) is that Herodotus recognizes that this narrative is just one piece of the puzzle and so must preclude a consensus of interpretation until additional perspectives

13 Cf. 4.8.1 (discussed below): Σκύθαι μὲν ὄδε…λέγουσι, Ἑλλήνων δὲ…όδε. On the ambiguous role of oratio obliqua in this passage, which mirrors Herodotus’ own place between poetry and science, see e.g. Aly (1969) 114-115. See also Cooper (1974) 42 (ad loc.) and the nuanced follow-up of Harrison (2000) 250.

14 Contra Bickerman (1952) 69 and Hartog (1988) 22, who see this statement indicating the overall falsehood of the narrative (cf. 4.11.1, discussed below). This sort of targeted claim is a tactic employed by the ἱστωρ to show the breadth of his critical acumen as well as its limitations (Dewald (1987) 160-161). However, the reliability of one aspect of a set of traditions is not an insurmountable obstacle to a greater truth. To this end, see e.g. Chiasson (2012b), who argues that Herodotus’ recounting of the rise and fall of Cyrus manages to capture “a fundamental truth about the strength and weakness of humanity that Greeks are accustomed to discern in the experience of their own native heroes” (232), based on sources which exhibit varying degrees of trustworthiness (see 1.95 and 1.214.5 for these acknowledgements in propria persona).

15 Compare the Scythian belt-clasps (4.10.1, 4.10.3) and the Scythian tombs (4.11.4) in the following two aetiologies, whose survival up until Herodotus’ own day also serves to substantiate the stories told about them (see Baragwanath and de Bakker (2012) 32-33). In light of the conclusions reached in Chapter Three about the λόγος/ἔργον dichotomy, it makes sense that Herodotus acknowledges both tangible and intangible components of these aetiologies in tandem without accepting or denying either one completely. This even-handedness may also be a result of Herodotus’ pious “discretion” in dealing with aetiologies of rituals (see Harrison (2000) 188-189).
have been weighed.\textsuperscript{16} This would be in keeping not only with Herodotus’ persistent objections to taking a part to represent the whole, but also with what the passage itself says about parts and their whole. As Lincoln notes, for example, each of the golden objects that falls from the sky corresponds with a different Scythian class (γένος, 4.6.1), all of which collectively betoken the diversity of the Scythian \textit{peoples} (Σύμπασι δὲ εἶναι οὖν Σκολότους κ.τ.λ, 4.6.2).\textsuperscript{17} Though Hartog wants to read this episode as a means of privileging the aristocratic class because the son of Targitaüs who is destined to rule (i.e. Colaxaïs) is the only one able to collect the gold,\textsuperscript{18} his interpretation falls short, since Colaxaïs is only able to become king once he has received \textit{all} of the golden objects representing \textit{all} of the Scythian classes (4.5.4).\textsuperscript{19} Truly, then, “the multiplicity of things cannot be reduced to one.”\textsuperscript{20}

It thus stands to reason that Herodotus exemplifies multivalence here as a result not only of the fundamental heterogeneity of his aetiology and methodology, but also as a result of where this account falls in relation to the analogous \textit{bekos} experiment. Just as Herodotus predicates his inquiry in the case of the latter not only what the Memphites say

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. 3.9, where Herodotus offers two accounts for how Cambyses watered his army on the march to Egypt. In spite of his misgivings about the reliability one of these accounts, Herodotus is obliged to recount the less credible version because it is still a part of the tradition (Οὗτος μὲν ὁ πιθανώτερος τῶν λόγων εἴρηται, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄσσον πιθανόν, ἐπεὶ γε δὴ λέγεται, ῥηθῆναι, 3.9.2).

\textsuperscript{17} Lincoln (1986) 157-158, following Christensen (1914) 137-138, Dumézil (1930) 119-121, Benveniste (1938) 534-537, et al. See also Lincoln (1991) 192 for additional bibliography.

\textsuperscript{18} Hartog (1988) 21, 195.

\textsuperscript{19} Lincoln (1986) 158. Further evidence to support the thesis that the golden objects collected by Colaxaïs symbolize different Scythian classes is found in comparing 4.5-6 with a passage in Curtius Rufus (7.8.17-18, quoted at Lincoln (1986) 158 n. 41), in which Scythian ambassadors inform Alexander the Great that they use what appears to be the same golden bowl cited by Herodotus for ritual libations.

\textsuperscript{20} Benardete (1969) 41, ad. 2.28 and 2.2-3 (see Chapter 2.2 above).
(2.2) but also on what the Thebans and the Heliopolitans relate (2.3), his decision to follow up on the first account of the origins of Scythians (4.6-8) with a second accords with a pattern established early in the Egyptian λόγος: like 2.2-3, the sequel to 4.6-8 will signal a range of themes and interpretations that belie an “either…or” understanding of who the Scythians are:

(8.) Σκύθαι μὲν ὡδε ὑπὲρ σφέων τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς χώρης τῆς κατύπερθε λέγουσι, Ἑλλήνων δὲ οἱ τὸν Πόντον οἰκέοντες ὧδε. Ἡρακλέα ἐλαύνοντα τὰς Γηρυόνεω βοῦς ἀπίκεσθαί ες γην ταύτην ἐσούσαν ἐρήμην, ἦτταν νῦν Σκύθαι νέμονται. [2] Γηρυόνην δε οἰκείειν ἔξω τοῦ Πόντου, κατοικημένον τὴν Ἑλλήνες λέγουσι Ἑρακλέαν νήσον, τὴν πρὸς Γηδείροισι τοίσι ἔξω Ἡρακλέων στηλέων ἐπὶ τὸ Ὡκεανῷ· τὸν δὲ Ὡκεανὸν λόγῳ μὲν λέγουσι ἀπὸ ἡλίου ἀνατολέων ἀρξάμενον γην περὶ πᾶσαν ρέειν, ἐργα δε οὐκ ἀποδεικνύοσι. [3] Ἐνθεῦτεν τὸν Ἡρακλέα ώς ἀπίκεσθαί ες τὴν νῦν Σκυθικὴν χώρην καλομένην, —καταλαβεῖν γὰρ αὐτὸν χειμῶνα τε καὶ κρύμον, —ἐπειρωσάμενον [δε] τὴν λεοντῇ καλομένην γην· ἐνθαῦτα δε αὐτῶν εὑρεῖν ες ἄντρῳ μιξοπάρθενον τινα ἔχειδε διάφυεα, τὰς δὲ οἱ ἵππους τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἅρματος νεμομένας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἄφανσην θείῃ τύχῃ. (9.) Ὡς δ' ἐγερθῆναι τὸν Ἡρακλέα, δίζησθαι, πάντα δὲ τῆς χώρης ἐπεξελθόντα τέλος ἐπειρεσάμενον ἐς τὴν Ὑλαίην καλεομένην γῆν· ἐνθαῦτα δὲ αὐτὸν εὑρεῖν ἐς ἄντρῳ μιξοπάρθενον τινα ἔχειδε διάφυεα, τὰς δὲ ἰππους τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἅρματος νεμομένας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἄφανσην θείῃ τύχῃ. (10.) Τὸν μὲν δὲ εἰρύσαντα τῶν τόξων τὸ ἕτερον (δύο γὰρ δὴ φορέειν τῶν Ἡρακλέα) καὶ τὸν ζωστῆρα προδέξαντα παραδοῦσαι τὸ τόξον περί ἄκρης τῆς συμβολῆς φιάλην χρυσέην, δόντα δὲ ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι. Τὴν δ', ἐπεὶ οἱ γενομένους τῶν παῖδας ἀνδρωθῆναι, τοῦτο μὲν σφι οὐνόματα θέσθαι, τῷ δ' ἑπομένῳ Γελωνόν, Σκύθην δὲ τῷ νεωτάτῳ· τούτῳ δὲ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς
This is what the Scythians say about themselves and the land to the north, but the Greeks who live around the Black Sea say the following, that Heracles, in driving Geryon’s cattle, reached this land which the Scythians now inhabit but was then uninhabited. Geryon lived outside the region surrounding the Black Sea, having settled on the island which the Greeks call Erytheia near Gadeira, outside the Pillars of Heracles on the shores of Ocean. They say that Ocean begins where the suns rises and flows around the whole world, but they do not show this to be so in point of fact. From there, they say that when Heracles reached the land now called Scythia, he pulled his lion skin over himself and fell fast asleep, for bad weather and bitter cold had overtaken him. At this time, his mares disappeared by divine fortune while they were yoked to his chariot. When Heracles awoke, he began to look for them, and having searched all over, he finally came to the land called Hylaea. There in a cave he found a half-viper/half-maiden, who from the buttocks up was a woman, and from the buttocks down was a snake. After seeing her and being amazed, he asked if she had seen his mares wandering about somewhere. She replied that she herself had them and would not give them back until he had sex with her, and Heracles did have sex with her according to these terms. However, she kept postponing the return of the mares out of a desire to be with Heracles as long as possible, though he wanted to take them and go. Finally, after giving them back, she said, “I kept these mares safe for you here when they arrived, and you gave me a thank-offering in return, for I have three sons by you. When they have come of age, tell me what to do with them. Should I settle them here (for I myself have power over this land) or should I send them to you?” This is what she asked, and they say that he gave this reply. “When you see that the boys have become men, you would not be mistaken to do the following. Whichever one of them you see stringing this bow like this and putting on this belt like so, make that one settler of this land. Whoever fails in these tasks which I enjoin, expel him from this land. And if you do these things, you will gladden yourself and do what I have commanded.” Then, having strung one of his bows (for Heracles used to carry two up until then) and having showed her how to put on the belt, he gave her both the bow and the belt, which had a golden cup on the tip of the buckle, and then left. Once the boys had grown into men, she gave them names: Agathyrsos to the eldest, Gelonus to the next, and Scythes to the youngest. Then, remembering her instructions, she
did as she had been commanded. [2] Two of her sons, Agathyrsus and Gelonus, were unable to pass the test that lay before them, so they went away, having been thrown out of the land by their mother. The youngest of them, however, passed the test and stayed in the land. [3] And from Scythes, son of Heracles, came those Scythians who are always kings, and because of his cup, the Scythians still carry golden cups on their belts to this day. This is the only thing Scythes’ mother did for him. This, then, is what the Greeks who live around the Black Sea say.

Apart from the general bizarreness of this second aetiology (which Herodotus only questions implicitly with indirect speech, but in no way refutes),\(^\text{21}\) one of the most striking aspects of the account of the Greeks who live around the Black Sea is how jumbled the lineage of Scythes, Agathyrsus and Gelonus turns out to be. That they are the offspring of an indigenous half-viper/half-human (μιξοπάρθενόν τινα ἔχιδναν διφυέα, 4.9.1) and of a Greek demigod (i.e. Heracles) should cause us to take note of how remarkably heterogeneous the Scythians are and thus how difficult they will be to classify later on, standing astride the facile categories of beast, barbarian, “other”, or even “Scythian” as they already do here.\(^\text{22}\) Likewise, the amalgam that the Scythians represent collectively should also prompt us to think about the many pieces that constitute the whole of their origins. When we do, we find that the account of the Greeks in 4.8-10, like that of the Scythians before them in 4.5-7, is ultimately unable to stand on its own, but must work together with the other accounts.

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\(^{21}\) On oratio obliqua, see n. 13 above and the corresponding discussion. Vandiver (1991) 172-181 is right to point out that Herodotus never in fact marks out the spatium mythicum from the spatium historicum anywhere in this episode in spite of its outlandishness.

\(^{22}\) In a typical contradiction, Hartog emphasizes such polar extremes (including “distantness”) even while noting how the Scythians embody many of the same ambiguities innate in their mythical progenitors (see Hartog (1988) 23-27). Skinner (2012) 170-172 takes these contrasts to be indicative of the hybridity of Greco-Scythian society, as evidenced by remains from material culture.
On one level, this may be due to the fact that the respective accounts contradict one another\(^{23}\) in spite of exhibiting a few common motifs (e.g. three sons, trials based upon the use of objects still used in Herodotus’ time,\(^{24}\) etc.).\(^{25}\) On another level, the failure of either account to take precedence may also be owed to the fact that the two narratives are mostly concerned with two different aetiological questions: in the former, how the Scythians came to be organized as a society, and in the latter, how the Scythians came to exist in the first place. Though these questions are not mutually exclusive, the progression from a sociological to a biological line of inquiry asks the reader to dig deeper and so seek the ultimate source of the Scythians. It is natural, then, that Herodotus continues his search and comes to offer a third aetiological account according to a now familiar pattern:

(11.) "Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος ἔχων ὤδε, τῷ μάλιστα λεγομένῳ αὐτῶς πρόσκειμαι. Σκύθας τοὺς νομάδας οἰκέοντας ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ, πολέμῳ πιεσθέντας ὑπὸ Μασσαγετέων, οὔχεσθαι διαβάντας ποταμὸν Αράξην ἐπὶ γῆν τὴν Κιμμερίην· τὴν γὰρ γὰρ νῦν νέμονται Σκύθαι, αὕτη λέγεται τὸ παλαιὸν εἶναι Κιμμερίον. [2] Τοὺς δὲ Κιμμερίους ἐπιόντων Σκυθέων βουλεύεσθαι ὡς στρατοῦ ἐπιόντος μεγάλου· καὶ δὴ τὰς γνώμας σφέων διαμάχεσθαι; τὸν δὲ δήμου φέρειν γνώμην ὡς ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι πρῆγμα εἴη μηδὲ πρὸς πολλοὺς δεῖ σφέων κινδυνεύειν, τὴν δὲ τῶν βασιλέων διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς χώρης τοῖσι ἐπιούσι. [3] Οὐκ οὖν δὴ ἐθέλειν πείθεσθαι οὔτε τοῖσι βασιλεύσι τὸν δῆμον ὑπεράσπισθαι· τοῖσι δὲ βασιλεῖσθαι δόξαι ἐν τῇ ἑωυτῶν κεῖσθαι ἀποθανόντας μηδὲ συμφεύγειν τῷ δῆμῳ, λογισμοῦντες ὅσα τε ἀγαθὰ πεπόνθασι καὶ ὅσα φεύγοντας ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος κακὰ ἐπίδοξα καταλαμβάνειν. [4] Ὡς δὲ δόξαι σφι ταῦτα,
diasstantas kai arithmon ısous genvomewnous machebdai proz allhloous· kai touς μὲν
apothanontas pantas up` eouetov theaiv ton deymon ton Kimmerion· para potamion
Tyrin (kai sfeon esti delio esti o tarpoc), thagnantas de ou toυ tihn ezodon ek tis
choris poiesebai. Skithas de epelthonantas laben ti tihn chorin erimih. (12.) Kαι νυν
estin mën en ti S Kıthikî Kimmérias teîxea, esti de perithmia Kimmérias, esti de ka
chori ouvoma Kimméri, esti de Bósperos Kimmérios kalomenvos. [2] Phainontai
de oi Kimmeriou fygontes es tihn Asîn touς Skithas kai tihn xerxônhsou
ktisantes en ti nûn Sînôphei polis Eîllass oiketai· faneroi de eisai kai oi Skithai
diôzanthes autous kai eîbalontes es ēn tihn Mnikeîn, amartontes ti̇s odoû· [3]
i mên gár Kimmériou aie ti̇n parî thalassan eîfugon, oie de Skithai en dezî ti̇n
Kawkasîn eîchontes edîwkon es ou eîsêbalon es ēn tihn Mnikeîn, es meôgáian ti̇s
odoû traphlêntes. Oûtos de állos zinûs Eîllînou te kai Varpharon leîmámenos
lógoû eîrîthai (4.11-12).

(11.) There is yet another story, to which I myself am particularly inclined, that
goes like this. Having been pressured in war by the Massagetae, the nomadic
Scythian tribes living in Asia left and crossed the river Araxes into Cimmerian
territory, for the land which the Scythians now inhabit is said to have belonged to
the Cimmerians long ago. [2] When the Scythians were marching against them,
the Cimmerians debated what to do in light of the invasion of a great army.
Opinion was split—both sides were firmly entrenched, but the judgment of the
princes was better, for the judgment of the common people held that it was
advantageous to leave and that there was no need to risk sticking it out against so
many invaders, while the judgment of the princes held that they should do their
utmost to defend their land from the invaders. [3] Each side refused to be
persuaded by the other. The common people decided to leave their land without a
fight and hand it over to the invaders, while the princes resolved to lie in their
own land once they were dead and not to flee with the common people, having
recalled all the good things they had enjoyed and all the terrible things that would
likely overtake them if they fled their homeland. [4] Since these were their
decisions, the princes split into two equal groups and fought against each other.
They all died at one another’s hands and the Cimmerian commoners buried them
by the river Tyras, where their tombs can still be seen. Having buried them in this
way, they made their way out of the land, and the Scythians invaded and took an
uninhabited land. (12.) Even now in Scythian territory there are Cimmerian walls,
Cimmerian ferry crossings, a piece of land called Cimmeria, and a Cimmerian
Bosphorus. [2] It is clear that the Cimmerians fled from the Scythians into Asia
and settled the peninsula where the Greek city of Sinope now stands. It is also
clear that the Scythians chased after them and invaded Median territory because
they lost their way, [3] for the Cimmerians always fled along the coast, while the
Scythians kept the Caucasus on their right in their pursuit up until the point when
they invaded Median territory, where they turned inland. This, then, is another
account that is told by Greeks and barbarians alike.

By placing his own aetiological account immediately after those of the Scythians (4.5-7) and the Greeks (4.8-10), Herodotus in effect echoes the priamels found at the end of the proem (1.5.3) and at the end of the *bekos* experiment (2.2-3). Even if these two precedents were not apparent,\(^{26}\) the conspicuous tripartite divisions (i.e. three brothers, three lands) as voiced by two national authorities (Σκύθαι μὲν ὧδε...λέγουσι, Ἑλλήνων ὀδ...οδε, 4.8.1) still ought to anticipate a third account as well as a priamel. However, as we have now seen in our analysis of both of these programmatic examples above, the foils offered (i.e. a says x, b says y, *but I say z*) do not represent categorical repudiations. While they do allow Herodotus to display what he knows, his knowledge in these instances is neither total nor absolute, as he acknowledges himself. This proves to be the case in 4.11-12 as well when Herodotus notes that the account he gives is the one to which he is particularly inclined (τῷ μάλιστα λεγομένῳ αὐτὸς πρόσκειμαι, 4.10.1).

Though some scholars take this to be a rejection of the two preceding accounts,\(^{27}\) nowhere in the text does Herodotus’ inclination lead him to deny the veracity of what has already been recounted.\(^{28}\) As Flory argues, this is because the third account, like the first and second before it, only purports to explain one aspect of the origins of the Scythians, namely, how they came to inhabit the land they now possess.\(^{29}\) Thus, while such an aetiology based on patterns of historical migration may correspond with a

\(^{26}\) See Chapters One and Two respectively.

\(^{27}\) e.g. Hunter (1982) 272 and Braund (2004) 27.

\(^{28}\) See n. 14 above.

\(^{29}\) Flory (1987) 71.
characteristically Herodotean predilection for rational explanation, it is excessive to conclude that this secular account is simply “a way out”\textsuperscript{30} of the spatum mythicum, as 4.11-12 represents but one perspective in an intricate series of accounts, none of which are privileged or excluded outright.\textsuperscript{31}

Although Herodotus desires to reconcile these diverse perspectives in the conclusion of his own account (Οὗτος δὲ ἄλλος ξυνὸς Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ Βαρβάρων λεγόμενος λόγος εἴρηται, 4.12.3),\textsuperscript{32} we would do well to remember that agreement does not entail the reduction of difference on Herodotus’ part. As we have seen many times now, this is because the ἱστορ is concerned with demarcating the limits of knowledge as much as he is with surpassing them. In either case, however, this is rarely made explicit because Herodotus wants us to struggle with the narratives as he does and ultimately come to our own conclusions.\textsuperscript{33} In the context of 4.5-12, then, it seems shortsighted to

\textsuperscript{30} Benardete (1969) 106.
\textsuperscript{31} Contra Fehling (1989) 46-47. We may find a fitting comparandum for the aetiologies of the Scythians (4.5-12) in Herodotus’ discussion of the origins of Cyrene later on in the Libyan λόγος. After relating the accounts of the Theraeans and the Cyreneans (4.151-153) and showing the extent to which they agree (Ταῦτα δὲ Θηραῖοι λέγουσιν, τὰ δ’ ἐπίλοιπα τοῦ λόγου συμφέρονται ἤδη Θηραῖοι Κυρηναίοισι, 4.154.1), Herodotus demonstrates in the following section the extent to which they disagree (οὐδαμῶς ὁμολογέουσι, 4.154.1), namely, in their traditions regarding their founder, Battus (4.154-156). Though there is much Herodotus could find to quibble over in the largely mythological accounts of the Theraeans and the Cyreneans (e.g. the oracular impetus for the expedition), the only criticism he offers concerns the origin of Battus’ name (4.155). Thus, while Herodotus’ response does show what he knows, it is hardly the foil that the priamel construction might otherwise anticipate (i.e. Theraeans say x, Cyreneans say y, but I say z), since his claim can only support the veracity of one aspect of two complex traditions, neither of which can be reconciled with or divorced from one another completely. For a demonstration of how inextricable these traditions have proved to be for modern scholars, see e.g. Giangiulio (1981) 4 n. 7 (following Jacoby (1913) cols. 435-436, against Graham (1960) 96 ff.). Cf. the Pelasgian controversy (1.56-58, discussed in Chapter 2.1 above). For a general discussion of aetiology in the Libyan λόγος at large, see Baragwanath’s contribution to The Shaping of the Past: Greek Historiography, Mythography, and Epigraphic Memory (forthcoming, BICS).
\textsuperscript{32} Cf. the egalitarian premise of the Histories: …μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἐλληνικὰ, τὰ δὲ βαρβάρους ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλέα γένηται κ.τ.λ. (1.1.0).
\textsuperscript{33} See Dewald (1987) 167 (discussed in Chapter Two).
attribute Herodotus’ integrative treatment of the three aetiologies to a “difficulty in mastering his sources.” As this section has argued, the plurality of sources rather seems to be owed to the plurality of possibilities that exist to explain the origins of the Scythians in their many forms, from the origins of their social structure (4.5-7), to their biological origins (4.8-10), and to their geographical origins (4.11-12). In leaving the question of their validity effectively open, Herodotus prompts us the readers to examine the bigger picture beyond singular explanations and superficial impressions, thereby reinforcing the same programmatic message delivered in the corresponding bekos experiment: look closer—aetiology is never as black and white as it may appear at first glance.

4.2 Geography

Given this close association between the openings of the Scythian and Egyptian λόγοι, it makes sense that Herodotus subsequently extends his account of the origins of the Scythians into the domain of geography just as he does in his account of the Egyptians. Though other λόγοι in the Histories are ordered according to this general sequence as well, the link between the Egyptian and Scythian λόγοι is particularly strong in that the epistemological and methodological underpinnings of the respective geographical inquiries turn out to be virtually the same. This becomes clear shortly after

34 West (2002b) 441. See also West (2004a) 83 for a similar critique.
35 Recall Christ (1994) 200 (discussed in Chapter 2.1 in the context of the bekos experiment).
36 i.e. 2.5-2.34.
37 Jacoby was the first to call attention to how Herodotus is wont to order his ethnographic λόγοι (including the Lydian, Babylonian, Ethiopian, and other smaller λόγοι) according to this basic schema: 1) land, 2) peoples (i.e. their history and customs), and 3) wonders (see Jacoby (1913) cols. 330-333, following Jacoby (1909)). See also Trüdinger (1918) 14-37 for an elaboration of this schema.
Herodotus introduces the problem of the geographical origins of the Hyperboreans via Aristeas, whose poem, the Ἀριμάσπεα, incites Herodotus to probe the edges of the far north (4.13-15): 38

Τῆς δὲ γῆς τῆς πέρι ὅδε ὁ λόγος ὅρμηται λέγεσθαι, οὐδεὶς οἶδε ἀτρεκέως ὅ τι τὸ κατύπερθέ ἐστι. Οὐδενός γὰρ δὴ αὐτόπτεω εἰδέναι φαμένοι δύναμαι πυθέσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ Αριστέης, τοῦ περ ὀλίγῳ πρότερον τούτων μνήμην ἐποιεύμην, οὐδὲ οὕτως προσωτέρω Ἰσσηδόνων αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖσι ἔπεσεν ποιέων ἔφησε ἀπικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ κατύπερθε ἐλεγε ἄκοῃ, φᾶς Ἰσσηδόνας εἶναι τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας. [2] Ἀλλ' ὅσον μὲν ἡμεῖς ἀτρεκέως ἐπὶ μακρότατον οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἀκοῇ ἐξικέσθαι, πᾶν εἰρήσεται (4.16).

No one knows exactly what lies north of the land which this account has set out to describe, for I have been unable to learn from anyone who claims to know firsthand. Not even Aristeas himself (whom I mentioned just a little while ago) claimed in his verses to have made it past the land of Issedones, but he described the regions beyond based on the accounts of others, alleging that the Issedones were the ones who told him these things. [2] Nevertheless, I will recount as much as I could accurately learn from the accounts of others.

This passage is important for our purposes not only in that it provides further evidence for Herodotus’ desire to move past ἀπορία and to advance knowledge through his inquiry, but also because it makes a major case for the parallelism of the Scythian and Egyptian λόγοι. For instance, Herodotus’ emphasis on relating as much as he could possibly learn about the regions beyond the Issedones (Ἀλλ’ ὅσον μὲν ἡμεῖς ἀτρεκέως ἐπὶ μακρότατον οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἀκοῇ ἐξικέσθαι, πᾶν εἰρήσεται, 4.16.2) bears an uncanny resemblance to his discussion of the origins of the Nile we have already considered in Chapter Two:

Ὁ μὲν δὴ Ἰστρος, ῥέει γὰρ δὶ’ οἰκεομένης, πρὸς πολλῶν γινώσκεται, περὶ δὲ τῶν τοῦ Νείλου πηγέων οὐδεὶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἀοίκητὸς τε γὰρ καὶ ἔρημός ἐστι ἡ Λιβύη

38 For an overview of Aristeas and his work, see e.g. West (2004b).
δι' ἧς ρέει. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ρεύματος αὐτοῦ, ἐπ' ὅσον μακρότατον ιστορέοντα ἦν ἐξικέσθαι, εἴρηται (2.34.1).

Because the Ister flows through the inhabited world, it is known by many, but no one is able to speak about the sources of the Nile, for the part of Libya through which it flows is uninhabited and desert. But about its trajectory, I have said as much as I could learn through inquiry.

The similarities between 4.16.2 and 2.34.1 do not stop at the philological. As Romm observes in a comparison of these two passages, Herodotus ends up engaging in much the same discussion over limits in Scythia as he did in Egypt, in spite of standing physically opposite where he stood earlier in Book Two.39 Just as he began his investigation of the sources of the Nile with the account of the scribe of the sacred treasury of Athena at Sais (2.28) before moving into the realm of autopsy at Elephantine (2.29), so, too, does he begin his investigation of the farthest reaches of Scythia with a consideration of Aristeas’ poem on the subject (4.13-15) before venturing out to see them for himself, starting with the trading station at the mouth of the Borysthenes (i.e. Dniepr, 4.17.1).40 Though Romm is right to point out how this move from ἀκοή to ὄψις in the Scythian λόγος amounts to

39 Romm (1989) 111-112. See 4.36.2 on sameness (and difference) on opposite sides of the world (discussed below).
40 Though Herodotus does not explicitly say whether he is engaging in eyewitness inquiry following 4.17.1, the implication is that he began his geographical survey based on autopsy. This is suggested by a remark he makes in 4.24 regarding his interaction with those Scythians and Greeks who frequented the Black Sea trading post (ἐμπόριον) now commonly identified with Olbia (see Braund (2007) 38-62), the same one mentioned in 4.17.1 at the start of the account of the Hyperboreans (see, however, West (2007) 80 ff. on the problems associated with this identification). Apart from the description of the krater of Ariantas later on (4.81.2, discussed above in Chapter 3.2), Herodotus does not in fact claim to rely specifically on ὄψις anywhere in the Scythian λόγος. However, even the most unabashed proponents of the Liar School will not deny that it was Herodotus’ intention to at least give the impression of autopsy in Scythia (see e.g. Armayor (1978) on 2.104 and 4.86.4). While the historicity of Herodotus’ claims to autopsy will be all but inconsequential to the forthcoming discussion on epistemology and methodology, this should not be taken as an indictment of the overall accuracy of such claims, which Pritchett (1993) defends convincingly (see esp. pp. 132-138 and 191-226).
the same methodological progression exhibited in the discussion of the Nile, it remains to be emphasized that Herodotus’ drive towards knowledge in both cases complicates as much as it elucidates.

The narrative framework of the geographical section of the Scythian λόγος anticipates this paradox even before Herodotus sets out to locate the Hyperboreans. By nesting his inquiry within Aristeas’ own work (4.16) and revealing the work to be the outgrowth of the poet’s bizarre supernatural exploits (namely, his supposed resurrection and his divine apparition to the Metapontines), Herodotus raises doubts about what follows the programmatic statement of 4.16.2 up until the time the ring is closed a few chapters later (Ταῦτα μέν νων τὰ λέγεται μακρότατα εἴρηται, 4.32.1). But while Aristeas’ place in Herodotus’ account does direct us to question the veracity of what follows, Herodotus himself reveals no such purpose. If the accounts which focalize the parallel discussion of the sources of the Nile are any indicator (i.e. the tales of the scribe of the sacred treasury of Athena at Sais and Etearchus the Ammonian king), Herodotus seems more concerned to warn the reader not to neglect prudent consideration of context or to take a part to represent the whole.

42 See 4.14 and 4.15 respectively.
43 As in the case of the first aetiology of the Scythians (see 4.5.1 above, including n. 14), Herodotus only challenges the trustworthiness (not the truth) of one aspect of the account of 4.16.2-4.32.1, that is, the reports of a goat-footed people living beyond the Argippaei (Οἱ δὲ φαλακροὶ οὗτοι λέγουσι, έμοι μὲν οὐ πιστὰ λέγοντες, οἰκέσιν τὰ ὅρασιν αἰγίποδας ἄνδρας κ.τ.λ., 4.25.1).
44 See 2.28 and 2.31-2.33.1 respectively (discussed in Chapter 2.2 above).
This message rings true in 4.16-4.32 when we look carefully at how Herodotus profiles the peoples who inhabit the land between the shores of the Black Sea in the south and the land of the Hyperboreans in the north. As Thomas observes in this section, it is noteworthy that “Scythia is meticulously described and subdivided” according to a variety of peoples.\(^{45}\) On the one hand, the litany of ἔθνεα which Herodotus presents (i.e. Callipidae, Alizones, Neuri, Borysthenites/Olbiiopolites, Androphagi, Melanchlaeni, Sauromatae, Budini, Thyssagetae, Argippaei, Issedones, Arimaspians, Sindi, Hyperboreans, etc.)\(^{46}\) indicates how much he knows about the inhabitants of Scythia and where they live. On the other hand, the fact that Herodotus notes the existence of agricultural Scythians (4.17.1), nomadic Scythians (4.19), royal Scythians (4.20.1), and even Greek-Scythians (i.e. the Callipidae, 4.17.1) both within and without the territory formally designated as “Scythia” implies that it is impossible to lump that which is Scythian into a single ethnic or geographic category.\(^ {47}\) This is further suggested by the

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\(^{45}\) Thomas (2000) 64.
\(^{46}\) Respectively given (see 4.17-32). For a helpful visualization of how these peoples are organized in relation to the land, see Cole (2010) 208 (adapted from Shaw (1982-1983) 10).
\(^{47}\) See e.g. Erbse (1992) 161-165, quotation at 161: “…ein Volk der Skythen…im schlichten Sinne des Wortes gar nicht gibt.” The only major challenge to this thesis in the Scythian λόγος is Herodotus’ statement at 4.2.2, that the Scythians are not agricultural, but nomadic (Σκύθαι...οὗ γύρον ἄρονται εἰς ἄλλα νομάδας). However, this passage, along with 4.2 as a whole, is fraught with problems. Though Bravo (2000) 59-64 cannot be faulted for wanting to explain them as marks of interpolation on the basis of source criticism and syntax, it seems excessive to write this passage off as a specious imitation. Instead, as Zuev (1995) and Griffiths (2001) 168-173 suggest, Herodotean parataxis is more likely responsible for these issues (however intractable they may be). Even if the question of Scythian nomadism did not appear to be firmly anchored to the context of this particular passage (as the γύρ in 4.2.2 intimates), nomadism itself is not a monolith in the Histories, but is a system that “accommodates many different rules of life” (Hartog (1988) 195). See also Braund (2004) 28, who argues that the nomadism of the Scythians is not incompatible with their attachment to their land. Cf. 4.46 (discussed below), where the question of nomadism (φρέοις ἐόντες πάντες, 4.46.3) also appears to be anchored to the context of this particular passage, which has at its core the explanation of the Scythians’ ability to resist the upcoming Persian invasion and not a blanket characterization of all Scythians. For a different perspective, see Corcella
fact that the Thyssagetae (4.22.1), who are counted among other Scythian tribes (Ὑπὲρ δὲ τούτων τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἠῶ ἀποκλίνοντι οἰκέουσι Σκύθαι ἄλλοι κ.τ.λ., 4.22.3), and the tribe of the “bald men” (φαλακροί), who dress like Scythians (ἐσθῆτι δὲ χρεώμενοι Σκυθικῇ, 4.23.2), are both said to live beyond the river Tanaïs where Scythia proper ends (Τάναϊν δὲ ποταμὸν διαβάντι οὐκέτι Σκυθικὴ, ἀλλ’ ἠ μὲν πρώτῃ τῶν λαξίων Σαυροματέων ἐστί κ.τ.λ., 4.21). Conversely, the Androphagi, who are totally distinct from the Scythians (…μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἔρημον Ἀνδροφάγοι οἰκέουσι, ἔθνος ἐὸν ἴδιον καὶ οὐδαμῶς Σκυθικόν, 4.18.3), inhabit Scythian territory. In light of this evidence, Herodotus’ refusal to pigeonhole the Scythians is sensible (not to mention unique in the history of Greek literature). However, what truly distinguishes the historian is that he builds the entire account of 4.16-32 around the peoples who populate the land and so underscores the identification of geography with ethnography as in the Egyptian λόγος.

This foundation is reinforced in characteristically Herodotean fashion immediately after the conclusion of the survey of the region. Though Herodotus in the end is unable to trace the geographical origins of the Hyperboreans as he first set out to

(1992), who hypothesizes that Herodotus inherited a set of mutually-inclusive (albeit confused) terms to describe both agricultural and nomadic Scythians.

48 Cf. 4.45.2 for further demonstration of the inefficacy of Scythia’s borders to encompass Scythians.

49 See e.g. Hall (1989) 110-112, who cites Hecataeus (FGrH F 184-194), Sophocles (fr. 707), and others to demonstrate that “…in the fifth century as throughout antiquity the term Skuthai often embraced all peoples to the north of the Danube. It was Herodotus who argued for a stricter classification of the northern tribes” (quotation at 110; cf. Strab. 11.6.2, whose description of Scythia presupposes just such a classification). On this point, see also Finley (1962) 56-57, who notes that even in the Christian period, a figure as well-educated as the neoplatonist Synesius of Cyrene could use the term “Scythians” to refer to Goths in the De regno.
do in 4.16, the knowledge he does convey about this elusive northern people entails much more than knowing where to locate them on a map:


(32.) I have now said as much as can be said about these regions. But concerning the Hyperboreans, neither the Scythians nor any of the other people who live there have anything at all to say about them, except, perhaps, the Issedones. In my view, however, these people don’t have anything to say about them either, for if they did, the Scythians would have something to say about them, too, just as they do about the one-eyed people. But there is mention of the Hyperboreans in Hesiod as well as in the Epigoni of Homer (that is, if Homer did in fact write this poem).

(33.) The Delians say much more about them, claiming that sacred offerings wrapped in wheat-straw are brought from the land of the Hyperboreans and reach Scythia. Receiving these offerings from the Scythians, each of their neighbors takes them in succession as far west as the Adriatic. [2] From there, the Dodonans are the first Greeks to receive the offerings sent south. From these people they
make their way down to the Melian Gulf and pass through to Euboea, and they are sent from city to city up to Carystos, but skip Andros, for Carystians take the offerings to Tenos, and Tenians to Delos. [3] This is how these sacred offerings reach Delos now, but the Hyperboreans initially sent two girls to carry the sacred offerings, whom the Delians say were called Hyperoche and Laodice. For their protection, the Hyperboreans sent five of their men as escorts, who are now called “Perpherees” and are held in high esteem by the Delians. [4] When those dispatched by the Hyperboreans did not come back home, they feared that it would always be their lot not to get back the ones they sent out. For this reason, then, they carry the sacred offerings wrapped in wheat-straw to their borders and entrust them to their neighbors, commanding them to relay the offerings from one nation to another. [5] And in this way they say that these offerings reach Delos. I myself know of something similar to this. Whenever the women of Thrace and Paeonia sacrifice to Queen Artemis, they always have wheat-straw with their offerings.

In examining how the Hyperboreans’ offerings are relayed to the Delians via a chain of intermediaries, scholars are wont to emphasize the distance between these two peoples. While the intricate nesting of the Delians’ own aetiological narrative (Δήλιοι λέγουσι κ.τ.λ., 4.33.1) within the accounts of the Issedones, Hesiod, and Homer (4.32) does seem to belie the Hyperboreans’ proximity on some level (and thus the truth of their existence), Herodotus himself never refutes what the Delians say, but in fact seems to support their claims with repeated interjections of personal knowledge (Οἶδα δὲ αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ.; Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταύτας οἶδα ποιεύσας, 4.33.5). However, he does not declare absolute allegiance to one account or tradition alone. Nevertheless, his unwillingness to deny a connection (however remote) between a Greek people in the heart of the Aegean and a barbarian people at the ends of the earth makes a powerful statement about the human basis of geography: ἔθνεα, no matter how distant, are not islands unto themselves.

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We will return to the ecumenical implications of this conclusion shortly, but for the moment, it is enough to note that this passage reaffirms that the study of geography in the Histories constitutes a holistic union of peoples and places, comprising more than cartography alone.\(^{52}\)

By situating an expansive array of ἔθνεα at the center of his inquiry into the origins of the Hyperboreans after exhausting the possibilities of ὄψις and ἀκοή, Herodotus thus closes his discussion of the farthest reaches of Scythia almost exactly as he does his discussion of the farthest reaches of the Nile.\(^{53}\) All that remains to make this connection unassailable is to round out the trifecta of ἱστορίη and extend into the realm of judgement (γνώμη), which is precisely what we discover following the Delians’ account of the Hyperboreans:


Let this suffice about the Hyperboreans, for I will not tell the story about Abaris (who is said to have been Hyperborean), which relates how he carried his arrow around the world without eating anything. But if there are Hyperboreans, there are also Hypermotians. I laugh at the large number of people who draw maps (none of them reasonably) and draw Ocean flowing around a circular earth, as if it were traced by a compass, and make Asia equal to Europe. For this reason, I will in a few words show the size of each of these continents and how each ought to be drawn.

\(^{52}\) Cf. 4.45 (discussed below).

\(^{53}\) Recall 2.28-2.35 (discussed below).
What is perhaps most noteworthy about the closure of the Hyperborean λόγος is the manner in which Herodotus visibly exerts his authority in propria persona. Since there are many people (πολλοί, 4.36.2) who have failed to reasonably explain (οὐδένα νόον ἐχόντως ἐξηγησάμενον, 4.36.2) why they apply symmetrical principles to map-making as they do, it should come as little surprise by now that Herodotus steps out of the narrative with two forceful exclamations (Γελῶ and δηλώσω, 4.36.2) in order to challenge conventional thinking by means of his own explanation and so distinguish himself from his peers and forebears in 4.36.54 In what amounts to a uniquely Herodotean ἀπόδειξις,55 we can see how the Scythian λόγος evinces the same sort of argumentative language which scholars have often used to make the Egyptian λόγος out to be an anomaly in the grand scheme of the Histories.56 But what undermines the supposed disparity between these two λόγοι even further is the fact that Herodotus’ innovative display of knowledge turns out to be just as much of a paradox as it was in the case of the Nile.

54 Though the wry use of Γελῶ (4.36.2) may suggest that Herodotus is basing what follows on Hecataeus’ work alone (cf. οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, eisiv, FGrH 1a.1.F), he is not simply cribbing his Ionian predecessor (see Asheri et al (2007) 568, contra Jacoby (1957) 371). As we are now coming to recognize, there were in fact many people (πολλοί, 4.36.2) whose work was influential upon Herodotus in this setting (see e.g. Thomas (2000) 215-216 on the “faint echo” of the Heraclitean language of proof and Branscome (2010) 5-10 on Anaximandrian cartography), yet none can be singled out as the dominant archetype that dictated the intellectual trajectory of the Histories on its own (see the discussion on custom below for other examples of Herodotean innovation in the Scythian λόγος).

55 The conspicuous use of δηλώσω (4.36.2) exemplifies the principles of ἀπόδειξις as the showcase for a uniquely Herodotean kind of knowledge (cf. the discussion of the Labyrinth (2.148) in Chapter 3.1 for a good demonstration of the explanatory force of such a display).

56 See Chapter Two.
An epistemological contradiction may be detected from a close reading of what Herodotus says about polarity in the conclusion of the Hyperborean λόγος, but not the one that most usually cite. Though scholars are often inclined to convict Herodotus of inconsistence in accepting the symmetrical principles espoused in 4.36.1 and then refuting them in 4.36.2, there appear to be two different premises latent in these two sections: in the former, the issue of north-south symmetry (exemplifying the regions beyond Scythia and Egypt respectively), and in the latter, the issue of east-west symmetry. As Romm argues, it is not incompatible with Herodotus’ methodology that he can support the first premise based on climate and repudiate the second based on an excessive application of geometry (i.e. the circle of Ocean drawn by compasses). And yet, if we look carefully, we find that Herodotus’ support for the former never reaches beyond the tentative and the hypothetical (Εἰ δέ εἰσι ὑπερβόρεοί τινες ἄνθρωποι κ.τ.λ.). This may be because climatology has already been shown to be ineffective as a causal principle in the Histories because it cannot explain (least of all) why things happen the

57 See e.g. How and Wells (1912) ad loc.: “It is curious to see H. appealing to the very symmetry which three lines later he denounces.” See also Legrand (1945) 69 n. 3 for an attempt to go against the grain and see this statement purely as a parody (pace Romm (1989) 108).
58 See Romm (1989) 110 (following Lachenaud (1980) 49-52): “Herodotus relies heavily on climate as the organizing principle of world structure, so that North-South correspondences appeal to him as naturally oikóta. East and West, however, defined by the risings and settings of the sun rather than by winds and temperatures, do not mirror one another to nearly the same degree; therefore the geometry of the circle improperly extends that of the latitudinal line in that nothing about it conforms with τὸ οἰκός. Thus, although the symmetrical constructs of 4.36.1 and 4.36.2 have seemed to modern readers to be closely akin if not identical, Herodotus actually has intelligible reasons for embracing the first while rejecting the second.”
59 On Ocean, see also 2.21, 2.23, and 4.8.2. Scholars often use the remark about Ocean in 4.36.2 to support the claim that Herodotus despised maps altogether (see e.g. Dilke (1985) 57), but as Branscome (2010) argues in comparing 4.36.2 with Aristagoras’ map (5.49), it is not the map itself, but the way it is used that can cause Herodotus consternation (see esp. pp. 9-10).
way they do at an historical level. In any case, regardless of the interpretation of this passage, Herodotus’ understanding of polarity is hardly polar.

It may come as a shock that Herodotus can bring us to the point where the Egyptian and Scythian λόγοι are found to mirror each other so closely and then appear to pull the rug out from under us. However, given Herodotus’ interests and the place where this equivocal conclusion about binarism falls in relation to what has come before, we should not be taken aback. This is because the very suggestion that the north/south and east/west poles are not altogether analogous serves to problematize the cultural polarity at the core of such a geographical schema, namely the Greek/barbarian dichotomy, which Herodotus has already subverted on many occasions so as to “construct the subordinate discourse, in which the dichotomy was qualified—helping articulate the barbarian as both other and significantly comparable to the self.”

As we shall see, in light of Herodotus’ continuous drive to elucidate origins in the Scythian λόγος and to explore the Scythians’ connections with other peoples, it makes sense that he continues his inquiry in the next section just as he did in the Egyptian λόγος by seeking out custom, the root of geography. However, just as every other component of Herodotean inquiry

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60 This is in keeping with Herodotus’ ambivalent views regarding environmental determinism (see n. 113 in Chapter Two above, ad 2.35.2), which contrast with the more schematic views of the author of *Airs, Waters, Places* (cf. esp. chapters 18-22 on the Scythians, discussed in Thomas (2000) 80-91 and Chiasson (2001) 45 ff.).

61 See Lloyd (1990) 243-244.

62 Sourvinou-Inwood (2003) 144, with special reference to the Pelasgian controversy (1.56-58, see Chapter 2.1 above). On this dichotomy of sameness and difference where it concerns culture, see also Pelling (1997) 53 and Braund (2004) 39-40. For a helpful list of parallels between Herodotus’ descriptions of Egypt and Scythia that exemplify this dichotomy, see Vasunia (2001) 96-98. On the notion of imperfect symmetry as it relates to the νόμοι of women and a variety of ἔθνες across the *Histories*, see Rosellini and Saïd (1978).
has been shown to be lacking on its own, so too will custom be shown to be insufficient unless viewed in tandem with other principles.

4.3 Custom

Shortly after setting out to correct the way the world has traditionally been drawn

(Ἐν ὀλίγοισι γὰρ ἐγώ δηλώσω μέγαθός τε ἐκάστης αὐτέων καὶ οἷς τίς ἐστι ἐς γραφὴν ἐκάστη, 4.36.2), Herodotus runs into a problem:


I cannot guess why the earth, which is a single mass, has three names, all deriving from women, or why its boundaries were set at the Egyptian river Nile and the Colchian river Phasis (or, as some say, at the Maeotian river Tanaïs and the Cimmerian Ferries). I am also unable to learn the names of those who fixed these boundaries or where they got the names from. [3] For example, Libya is said by many Greeks to derive its name from Libya, an indigenous woman, and Asia is said to be named after Prometheus’ wife. The Lydians stake a claim to this name as well, since they allege that Asia is called after Asies, son of Cotys, son of Manes, and not after Prometheus’ Asia, after whom the tribe of the Asiads in Sardis is named. [4] But as for Europe, no one in the world knows if it is surrounded by water, or where it got its name from, or the person who actually gave it its name, unless we say the land took its name from Tyrian Europa, which in earlier times was nameless just like the others. [5] But this woman clearly came
from Asia and did not reach this land which is now called Europe by the Greeks, but only made her way to Crete from Phoenicia and to Lycia from Crete. Let these things now suffice for this matter, for we shall employ the customary names for these lands.

On the surface, it is curious that Herodotus can express so much doubt about the conventional names of the continents and still decide to use them in the end (τοῖσι γὰρ νομιζομένοισι αὐτῶν χρησόμεθα, 4.45.5). This paradox encapsulates the tension between φύσις and νόμος which the conclusion of the Hyperborean λόγος suggested with its contrast between climate and the conventions of map-making. And yet, as much as Herodotus may desire to ascribe natural origins to the names of the continents instead of arbitrary ones, the force of custom in establishing these names cannot be discounted. To do so would not only go against Herodotus’ essentially integrative approach to aetiology, but also against some of the formative patterns we have already noted throughout this dissertation. For instance, Herodotus’ individual statements of ἀπορία in this passage (Οὐδ’ ἔχω συμβαλέσθαι… οὐδὲ…πυθέσθαι κ.τ.λ., 4.45.2; …γινώσκεται πρὸς οὐδαμῶν ἀνθρώπων, 4.45.4) should not lead us to believe that he will resign himself to ignorance about the issue as a whole. On the contrary, even if Herodotus cannot know how the customary names of the continents came to exist, what he does know about custom can advance the course of the Scythian λόγος in challenging and innovative ways, as the following paragraph deftly displays:

Ὁ δὲ Πόντος ὁ Ἑὐξείνος, ἐπ' ὃν ἐστρατεύετο ὁ Δαρεῖος, χωρέων πασέων παρέχεται ἐξω τοῦ Σκυθικοῦ ἐθνεὰ ἀμαθέστατα· οὔτε γὰρ ἔθνος τῶν ἐντὸς τοῦ

63 See 4.36.1 and 4.36.2 respectively (discussed above).
64 Harrison (2000) 256 sees in 4.45 an underlying desire to pinpoint the sort of “natural appropriateness of names” set forth in Plato’s Cratylus (ὀρθότητα τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων περιφέρεσθαι κ.τ.λ., 383a-b).
The region around the Black Sea, against which Darius made an expedition, contains—apart from the Scythians—the most ignorant nations on earth. For we cannot single out any nation in this region for their cleverness nor do we know of the existence of any learned man, excluding the Scythians and Anacharsis. For the Scythians have discovered the single greatest thing in human affairs and the cleverest of all those we know (though in other respects I do not admire them), namely, that no one who comes against them can escape or overtake them if they do not wish to be found. This is because they possess neither cities nor walls, but they all carry their dwellings around with them and shoot bows on horseback; they do not live off of tilling, but off of their flocks, and their homes are on their wagons. How, then, could these people not be impossible to do battle with and engage with?

As Braund observes, Herodotus’ admiration for the Scythians is predicated first and foremost on their decision to make their nomadic customs agree with their land.65

The harmonious amalgamation of νόμος and φύσις which makes the Scythians famous for being impossible to pin down (ἀποροί, 4.46.3) has an analogous precedent in the closing of the geographical discussion of the Egyptian λόγος which we first considered in Chapter Two:

Together with their climate, which is unique to them, and their river, which has a nature \textit{[physis]} different from other rivers, the Egyptians have established customs \textit{[ethea]} and practices \textit{[nomoi]} which are almost entirely opposite those of other people.

I would like to propose that the message of 4.46 turns out to be much the same as it was in 2.35.2: even when individual schemata (e.g. nature, custom, etc.) cannot explain the origins of a given people, they must still be considered together. If we accept this invitation to integrate what we find in the forthcoming section on the customs of the Scythians and to view the results in the context of the universalizing framework which the Scythian \textit{λόγος} has already begun to build,\footnote{For signs of the eventual push towards an ecumenical understanding of the Scythians, see esp. 4.8-10 and 4.32-33 (discussed above).} we will achieve a more comprehensive understanding of who the Scythians are fundamentally, beyond reductive impressions based on piecemeal considerations. We will thereby discover that the Scythians do not epitomize “the other” nearly as much as some critics would have us believe.

The extent to which the Scythians in fact defy alterity can be measured by Herodotus’ use of the word σοφίη (“wisdom”, “skill”, “cleverness”, etc.) and its derivative, σοφώτατα, to describe Scythian cultural practices in 4.46. As Munson notes, it is significant that the Scythians exemplify the same kind of practical cunning which distinguishes other έθνεα in the \textit{Histories}.\footnote{Munson (2001) 117-118.} For instance, while the Athenians are perhaps best known for their σοφίη,\footnote{The wisdom of Solon (see 1.29-33, specifically 1.30.2) is usually taken to be metonymic of Athenian wisdom, but even this gold standard of σοφίη is not unimpeachable (see esp. 1.60.3, when the Athenians, contrary to their sterling reputation for cleverness among Greeks and barbarians alike, are duped by Megasles and Pisistратус into thinking that the latter’s restoration to the tyranny has been sanctioned by Athena herself (see Munson (2001) 210 for this and other examples)). Lévy (1981) 64 does not think the} the Egyptians are at one point considered “the wisest of all

\footnote{Munson (2001) 117-118.}

\footnote{The wisdom of Solon (see 1.29-33, specifically 1.30.2) is usually taken to be metonymic of Athenian wisdom, but even this gold standard of σοφίη is not unimpeachable (see esp. 1.60.3, when the Athenians, contrary to their sterling reputation for cleverness among Greeks and barbarians alike, are duped by Megasles and Pisistратус into thinking that the latter’s restoration to the tyranny has been sanctioned by Athena herself (see Munson (2001) 210 for this and other examples)). Lévy (1981) 64 does not think the}
peoples” (τοὺς σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων, 2.160.1) according to the Eleans. On the other hand, the fact that a similarly superlative distinction of σοφίη is awarded to the Scythians (Τῷ δὲ Σκυθικῷ γένεϊ ἓν μὲν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπηίων πρηγμάτων σοφώτατα πάντων ἐξεύρηται τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, 4.46.2) because of their disregard for fixed settlements and their mobility in battle allows them to be compared with the Spartans in turn, whose opposition to verbosity, foreign customs, and outside intervention at the expense of their autonomy offers additional points of correspondence with these northerners.69

From a certain point of view, Herodotus’ praise for Scythian σοφίη might convict the historian of the sort of idealizing “philobarbarism” for which he was sometimes criticized in antiquity.70 Although Herodotus’ admiration for the Scythians appears to be genuine in this case, it cannot rightly be called philobarbarism. This is because our consideration of σοφίη within the broader context of the Histories has indicated that the very typology of barbarism is nebulous at best,71 if both the Athenians and the Spartans

σοφίη of the Scythians can refer to the sort of “sagesse…universelle” exemplified by Solon, but as Dewald (1985) 52-53 shows, there is a fine line between practical and abstract wisdom in the Histories which many of the figures who are paradigmatic of σοφίη are wont to blur, including Solon (cf. Thales, Bias of Priene, Pittacus of Mytilene, Hecataeus, etc.). On Herodotus’ general admiration for those who posseess σοφίη regardless of ethnicity, see n. 66 in Chapter Three above.

69 See Braund (2004) 30-40 on the Scythians’ and the Spartans’ shared laconism (4.77, 4.127), their hostility towards other peoples’ νόμοι (as exemplified by the accounts of Anacharis and Scyles (4.76-80) and the Spartans’ reference to all βάρβαροι as ξένοι (9.11.2, 9.55.2)), and the need to preserve their freedom (cf. 4.128 and 7.104). See also Munson (2001) 117, who postulates that the Scythians may also be seen to resemble the Spartans “in their social war ethics and spare way of life.”

70 See e.g. Plu. Mor. 857A = De Herodoti malignitate 12. For an overview of Plutarch’s engagement with Herodotus in this treatise, see e.g. Baragwanath (2008) 1-34.

71 Herodotus’ own mixed Greco-Carian lineage is a case in point, which Lavelle (1991) 314 notes is conspicuously absent from Hartog (1988). On the potential importance of Herodotus’ ancestry as it relates to the Egyptian λόγος, recall n. 28 in Chapter Two above.

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can be shown to embody what makes the Scythians appear exceptional. What’s more, the agreement of two distinctive (and often disparate) Greek ἔθνεα with both Egyptian and Scythian ἔθνεα (who themselves are dead-set against foreign ways)\(^{72}\) makes the construct of Hellenism appear just as nebulous in turn (not to mention the sort of one-to-one ethnic analogues favored by structuralists).\(^{73}\) In light of the inextricability of difference and sameness in 4.46, then, the discussion of custom in the Scythian λόγος is designed from the start “objectively to represent the foreignness of the Scythians and at the same time to overcome it by promoting the audience’s discovery of their affinity with them.”\(^{74}\) As the remark about the Scythians’ skills in the realm of “human affairs” suggests (τῶν ἀνθρωπηίων πρηγμάτων σοφώτατα πάντων, 4.46.2), Herodotus will achieve this goal by shifting from an ethnographical to an anthropological framework.

Herodotus’ move to transcend the barbarian typology of the Scythians in human terms may also be observed throughout the section on custom that follows the introduction at 4.46.\(^{75}\) Given Herodotus’ persistent desire to look past superficial impressions and to seek out the fundaments of the issue at hand, it is not unexpected that he should proceed to further destabilize the paradigm of “the Scythian” which he first

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\(^{72}\) Cf. 2.79 and 4.76-80.
\(^{73}\) See e.g. Hartog (1988) 44-57, who understands the Persians to be fulfilling the role of Greek hoplites in their invasion of Scythia. Pelling (1997) 51 puts his finger on the problem of this reductive framework when he notes that “…only one polarity can be used at a time. The Persian mirror reflects the Scythian Other, just as in its turn it will become the Other itself when contrasted with Greek normality.” See also Dewald (1990) 222 for additional critiques of this analogue. For a detailed discussion of the instability of the typology of Hellenism vis-à-vis barbarism as it concerns the last few all-important chapters of the Histories, see Chapter 6.2 below.
\(^{75}\) i.e. 4.59-80.
undermined by means of his collective consideration of individual Scythian ἔθνεα in the Hyperborean λόγος.76 However, some of the larger effects of Herodotus’ rejection of a blanket categorization in his search for the identity and the origins of the Scythians according to their νόμοι have been understated heretofore. For instance, it is remarkable that Herodotus spares no detail (however gruesome) in relating Scythian customs that would havejarred Greek sensibilities, but does not comment on their moral or ethical validity from the audience’s standpoint,77 as in the case of the human sacrifices performed on behalf of Ares:78


As many of the enemy they take prisoner, they sacrifice one man out of a hundred, not in the same way as sheep, but differently. Once they pour wine on the men’s heads, they cut their throats over a bowl and then, bringing the blood up to a pile of sticks, they pour it down a straight sword. [4] While they carry the blood up above, they do the following down below by the sacred pile: having cut off all the right shoulders of the men who have been slain, they hurl these into the air along with their arms and then they go away after they have sacrificed the other victims. An arm lies wherever it falls and the body apart from it.

76 i.e. 4.17-32 (discussed above). Cf. 4.8-10.
77 Recall Immerwahr (1966) 320 ad 2.35-36 (discussed in Chapter 2.3 above).
78 Cf. 4.71-72 (discussed below), 4.94, and 4.103. On the practice of human sacrifice as “abnormal and deviant” among Greeks, see e.g. Henrichs (1981) 195-235 (quotation at 232). It is no wonder, then, that authors from Ephorus (pace Strabo) to Aristotle to Tertullian denigrate the related custom of cannibalism among the Scythians and other peoples living around the Black Sea (see Strab. 7.3.9, Pol. 1338b & Eth. Nic. 1148b, and Adversus Marcionem 1.1 respectively), which Herodotus records, but does not consider to be abhorrent (see 4.26; cf. 1.216 and 3.38.3-4). On the historicity of cannibalism in the Histories, see e.g. Murphy and Mallory (2000).
That Herodotus does not explicitly judge these or any other cultural practices of the Scythians to be reprehensible (including scalping (4.64), the use of human skulls as drinking cups (4.65-66), and the ritual slaughter of the deceased king’s entourage for burial with the monarch (4.72)) sets him apart from his peers and successors, by whom the Scythians were frequently demonized to the point of being dehumanized. But what truly distinguishes Herodotus in his innovative depiction of the Scythians is that he allows their νόμοι to exist as they are without any patent bias regarding ethnicity, and so reveals custom to be an essentially human phenomenon, just as our examination of the νόμοι and ἣθεα of the Egyptians in Chapter Two has already demonstrated. So that we may understand just how important this point is to our study of aetiology and historical methodology in the Histories at large, let us now consider one final example from the Scythian λόγος that will make an even stronger case for cohesion at all levels of the text.

79 In their compendium of primary sources for the Scythians, Lovejoy and Boas (1965) 315-344 catalog many degrading portrayals among both Greek and Roman authors, such as Clearchus’ scathing indictment of the Scythians as “the most wretched of all mortals” (πάντων ἀθλιώτατοι βροτῶν, pace Ath. 524c, cited in full on pp. 322-324). In addition to cannibalism (see n. 78 above), scalping (4.64) was also considered savage (see Soph. Fr. 429 (Nauck ed.), cited at Lovejoy and Boas (1965) 316). For a general survey of the topos of Scythian savagery as it was construed by Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and other fifth century authors contemporary with Herodotus, see e.g. Hartog (1988) 12-13. Though it should almost go without saying, it is remarkable that Herodotus nowhere reduces the Scythians (or any other barbarian people for that matter) to the borderline sub-human categories championed by Aristotle (see e.g. Pol. 1252b ff. and Eth. 1145a), which were to have a tremendous impact beyond antiquity (see e.g. Pagden (1982) 15-56 on the influence of Aristotelian thought on the question of natural slavery in the Age of Discovery (esp. pp. 16-18, 41-50)).

80 Recall especially the emphasis on human beings (τοῦτοι ἄλλοισι ἄνθρωποι, ἕλλοι, etc.) in Herodotus’ catalogue of Egyptian νόμοι and ἣθεα (2.35-36). Cf. the anthropological basis of the “custom is king” passage (discussed above in Chapter 2.3): Εἰ γάρ τις προθείῃ πᾶσιν ἄνθρωποις ἐκλέξασθαι καλεόν νόμους τοὺς καλλίστους ἕκ τῶν πάντων νόμων, διασκεύασον οὖν ἐλεύθεροι τοὺς ἐφοίτητοι· οὐτοὶ νομίζουσι πολλὰ τὰ καλλίστα τοὺς ἐφοίτητοι νόμους ἐκεῖστοι εἶναι· Ὡς δὲ οὕτω λεγόμενοι τὰ περὶ τοῖς νόμοις οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, πολλάκις τε καὶ ἄλλοισιν εἰκώνισαν πάρεσθε σταθμώσασθαι κ.τ.λ. (3.38.1-2). See immediately below on the programmatic underpinnings of this cosmopolitan mentality.
4.4 Seeing the Bigger Picture: the Exemplarity of the Sauromatae

After describing the foundational stories, the land, and the customs of the Scythians as a way of setting the stage for the Persian invasion in the latter half of the Scythian λόγος, Herodotus turns his attention to the peoples who are invited to form an alliance against Darius’ forces (4.102-119). Conspicuous among them are the Sauromatae, a Scythian people, whose origins are the subject of a substantial aetiological narrative (4.110-117). Ostensibly, the point of this narrative is to explain how the Sauromatae came to inhabit the land they now possess and to adopt their present customs (4.116-117). However, as with every other major aetiology we have dealt with, the story of the Sauromatae elucidates more than the origins it sets out to explain. In this case, it also reveals how the source of the identity of the Sauromatae is not a question of ethnicity alone. In order to discern this, we will have to pay close attention to context, as the oblique frame should signal from the start (ὡς λέγεται; τότε λόγος…, 4.110.1):

In her monograph on the Amazons, Blok (1995) expresses disappointment that the Sauromatae “do not explain who the Amazons are” in the account at 4.110-118, but rather that “the traditional Amazons appear as an explanation [aition] for what the Greeks perceive. The story as such reverses the argument at the narrative level: it begins with this [aition] and ends with the unusual situation which it is supposed to explain” (88). While this is not an unfair criticism, it assumes that Herodotus is only interested in explaining the Sauromatae according to typologies as they presently exist and not in pushing past them to discover who they are ab ovo, as the discussion will argue below.
ἀποβᾶσαι ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων αἱ Ἀμαζόνες ὁδοιπόρεον ἐς τὴν οἰκεμένην. Ἐντυχοῦσα δὲ πρώτῳ ὕποφορβίῳ τοῦτο διήρπασαν καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἱππαζόμεναι ἐληίζοντο τά τῶν Ἱκυθέων (4.110).

The following story is told about the Sauromatae. When the Greeks were at war against the Amazons (whom the Scythians call Oiorpata, meaning “mankillers” in Greek, for their word for “man” is oior and “kill” pata), the story goes that after the Greeks had won victory at the battle of Thermodon, they sailed away on three ships, taking with them as many of the Amazons as they could capture. While on the open sea, the women attacked the men and killed them. However, they did not know ships or how to use rudders or sails or oars, so once they had killed the men, they were carried by wind and wave, and they reached Cremoni on Lake Maeotis, belonging to the territory of the free Scythians. Then the Amazons disembarked and began to make their way to inhabited land. They seized the first herd of horses they came across, and riding off on them, they began to pillage the land of the Scythians.

On the surface, the violent introduction to the account of the origins of the Sauromatae presupposes a series of rigid binary oppositions, chiefly, the dichotomy of Scythian and Amazon and, by extension, the dichotomy of man and woman. Though the presence of these polarities is undeniable here, it would be misguided to predict that Herodotus would advocate a slavishly dualistic interpretation even at the start of this episode in light of all of the nuanced discussions that have come before it. Indeed, if we look carefully at the sequel to 4.110, we will find that no single binary ever overrides the other fully. Rather, like every other component of aetiology, the binaries are to be understood as an insoluble entity.

The need to integrate presents itself in the first close encounter between the Scythians and the Amazons in the following section of the account. Initially, the

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82 Though the Scythians do not yet know that the Amazons are women, the fact that the latter are known by the epithet “manslayers” (ἀνδροκτόνοι, 4.110.1) insinuates a distinction based on gender from the start of the narrative. See also n. 85 below on the dichotomy of war and marriage.
Scythians’ failure to understand the Amazons’ way of life (let alone their speech, their dress, or their nationality) suggests a polarizing otherness that might preclude the possibility of fruitful interaction and exchange between the two groups. However, as Pelling notes, the fact that the Scythians themselves are the ones to make this normative assessment in spite of their supposed status as the archetypical “other” effectively removes the distinction of otherness that scholars have often used to set them apart from other ἔθνεα in the Histories. In other words, though the Amazons may seem strange to the Scythians, they are not altogether different. This message is hammered home when the Scythians set out to learn the identity of the Amazons and discover that they are not in fact men, but women (4.111.1). Rather than being put off by this, though, a group of Scythian men prevail upon the Amazons to come together and procreate with them (4.111.2-113), thereby producing the first generation of Sauromatae.

This aetiology is significant not only in that it further weakens the monolith of “the Scythian” as a homogenous cultural category, but also because it pushes beyond ethnicity altogether. As Dewald observes in her analysis of the new Sauromatian society created by the Amazons and the Scythians in the next section of the narrative (4.114-115), the interaction between these groups is overwhelmingly egalitarian. Though the

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83 Οἱ δὲ Σκύθαι οὐκ εἶχον συμβαλέσθαι τὸ πρῆγμα· οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν οὔτε ἐσθῆτα οὔτε τὸ ἔθνος ἐγίνωσκον κ.τ.λ. (4.111.1).
85 Dewald (1981) 100-101. See also Dewald (1990) 222-223, where she refutes Hartog’s thesis that the Scythians are fulfilling the binary opposition between war and marriage in coupling with the Amazons (Hartog (1988) 219). Cf. Munson (2001) 127-130, who stands with Dewald in advocating for such a reading based on gender and sexual parity in this episode (contra Brown and Tyrrell (1985)). In this vein,
women must take the initiative in making their living arrangements because the men do not know the Amazons’ language, neither gender nor ethnicity nor custom stand in the way of them forming what turns out to be an incredibly equitable and peaceful synoecism, devoid of the savage marauding stereotypical of both groups. What’s more, the fact that the Scythians and the Amazons come together in spite of all odds to reproduce shows that in the end, biology trumps all other differences. In this regard, it is hard to imagine a better example of how Herodotus’ treatment of the Scythians first and foremost as human beings is “subordinated to his comprehensive world-concept and the general history of the oikouménē,” a notion that is fully in keeping with his programmatic commitment to preserve τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων (1.1.0) and to expand our worldview by projecting into the realm of ἀνθρωπηίην...εὐδαιμονίην (1.5.4). But what truly makes the ecumenical basis of the depiction of the Scythians unassailable is the way the account of the Sauromatae ultimately concludes.

Despite the harmony achieved by the Scythians and the Amazons, it soon becomes clear that their society cannot continue to exist where it was first born, due to differences between their neighbors and the impossibility of blotting out the stain of past injustices committed against them (4.114.2-3). Thus, the Scythians and the Amazons

see also Mayor (2014) 52-59, esp. 55-59. Recall from 4.5.4 how Colaxaïs’ mandate to rule the Scythians is also predicated on the sharing of responsibilities among the classes (see above).
86 The criteria for the Amazons’ otherness in 4.111.1 (i.e. clothes and language) are signifiers of custom throughout the Histories (see e.g. 2.35-36, 4.78, 4.106, 4.168).
87 Dewald (1981) 100.
88 Harmatta (1990) 121. In defense of this thesis, Harmatta cites many references within and without the Scythian λόγος to demonstrate the pervasive influence of the Scythians across seven of the nine books of the Histories (see pp. 121-123).
89 See Chapter 1.3 above.
decide to go off and live by themselves (ἔπειτα ἐλθόντες οἰκέωμεν ἐπ’ ἡμέων αὐτῶν, 4.114.4) beyond the river Tanaïs, where the Sauromatae reside in Herodotus’ time (… ἐν τῷ νόν κατοίκηνται, 4.116.2). As Munson observes, the denouement of this account is uncannily similar to the final chapter of the Histories in which a group of Persians petitions their ruler, Cyrus, to relocate, in order to seek out a better life in a better land than the one they possess90 and so perpetuate a pattern of human migration that knows no bounds in a world that is truly one for Herodotus (μιᾷ ἐούσῃ γῇ, 4.45.2).91 As we shall see in the conclusion to the dissertation, this is a tremendously significant comparandum, since Herodotus’ drive to obtain ever greater knowledge about origins and their manifold meanings beyond the scope of the here and now will lead us to an inexorable conclusion in the final chapters of the Histories about aetiology, historical methodology, and unity as they relate to the work as a whole. Before turning to the end of Book Nine, however, let us first consider how this same tendency to expand the scope of our inquiry in human terms manifests itself in the build-up to the second Persian invasion of Greece.

91 See Demand (1988) for additional examples of the cross-cultural phenomenon of μετοίκησις in the Histories (1.162-170, 5.12-15).
5. “Let this statement hold for my entire narrative”: the Medizing Logos

By the time Herodotus shifts his focus to the Persian invasions of Greece in the λόγοι corresponding with Books Six through Nine of the Histories, his voice appears to shift as well. From then on, we are less likely to encounter Herodotus the intrepid eyewitness, the polemical scientist, or the inquisitive ethnographer than we were in Books One through Five where his critical faculties were so prominently displayed, especially in the accounts of Egypt and Scythia that we have now considered at length in Chapters Two, Three, and Four.¹ Marincola attributes this apparent about-face to the fact that the Persian Wars were not as temporally, spatially, or culturally removed from the experiences of Herodotus’ fifth-century Greek audience as the words and deeds of barbarians from far-off lands.² But while distance may help to explain the supposed division between the “ethnographic” and “historical” λόγοι corresponding with Books One through Five and Six through Nine respectively,³ the methodological underpinnings of the latter are not altogether distinct from the former. One need only consult Shrimpton

1 Noteworthy exceptions not treated below include Herodotus’ description of the origins of Thessaly as a geological phenomenon (7.129), the Pelasgians and the nations of the Peloponnese (8.44 & 8.73), and perhaps most importantly, Demaratus’ series of exchanges with Xerxes about custom (see especially Branscome (2013) 54-104 ad 7.101-105, 7.209, and 7.234-237). All of these examples could be marshalled to substantiate the claim of de Jong (2001) 108, that Xerxes’ expedition against Europe constitutes a kind of reverse ethnography of Greece, situated at the core of the military campaigns of the “historical” λόγοι. See also Christ (1994) for other potential evidence to this effect.
3 At the heart of this division is the “genetic” or “developmental” hypothesis promulgated by Jacoby (1913) cols. 333-392, that Herodotus, an erstwhile ethnographer, became an historian in the process of composing the Histories. For an overview of the pervasive influence of this belief on Herodotean scholarship during the last hundred years, see e.g. Skinner (2012) 30-34 and 243-244. See also Chapter Two (esp. notes 6 and 19) on the shortcomings of this hypothesis.
and Gillis’ appendix of source citations collated from the entirety of the *Histories*\(^4\) to refute Marincola’s remark, that “in the books other than II, Herodotus is still present but no longer participant.”\(^5\) However, as Dewald reminds, even in cases where Herodotus does not claim to rely on ὀψίς (“autopsy”), ἀκοή (“hearsay”), or γνώμη (“judgment”) in the first person, it is still possible to detect his authorial presence across the *Histories.*\(^6\)

The following chapter will explore this dichotomy of meta-narrative as it relates to the origins of how and why the Greeks did (or did not) come to consort with the Persians (i.e. medize) during the Persian Wars. Though the focus of this discussion will be Herodotus’ salient treatment *in propria persona* of the Argives’ alleged overtures to the Persians prior to the battle of Thermopylae (7.148-152), some less overt interjections will also be considered. In any case, we will demonstrate how these aetiologies recapitulate programmatic patterns isolated in previous chapters and thereby extend the methodological continuum of the *Histories* beyond the “ethnographic” λόγοι to some of the most representative “historical” λόγοι of Herodotus’ work.

### 5.1 The Argives

After laying out Xerxes’ designs on capturing not just Athens, but all of Greece,\(^7\) Herodotus tells of a gathering of like-minded Greeks in 481/480 BCE who have assembled to counter the Great King’s invasion of Europe (7.145). Having given pledges

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\(^5\) Marincola (1987) 133.  
\(^7\) Η δὲ στρατηλασίη ἡ βασιλέως οὔνομα μὲν εἴχε ὡς ἐπ’ Ἀθήνας ἐλαύνει, κατίετο δὲ ἐς πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα (7.138.1). Cf. 7.157.1.
and having agreed to break off hostilities among one another, they resolve to send spies to Sardis to gauge the Persians’ strength and to dispatch messengers to several polities to form a coalition (i.e. the Hellenic League),\(^8\) knowing that their survival will depend on “putting their heads together” (συγκύψαντες) and unifying as a single Greek force (τὸ Ἑλληνικόν).\(^9\) The first people to whom they appeal are the Argives, who are still reeling from their defeat by the Spartans at the battle of Sepeia more than a decade earlier in 494 BCE.\(^10\)

For our purposes of showing the resonance of programmatic patterns of aetiology beyond the first half of the *Histories*, it is significant that the representatives from the newly-formed Hellenic League approach this particular group before consulting Gelon of Syracuse (7.153-162), the Corcyreans (7.168), and the Cretans (7.169-171), inasmuch as the theft of the Argive princess, Io, was what originally set off hostilities between Greeks and barbarians in the proem (1.1). That the Argives will continue to play an important role as the Hellenic League takes shape is further indicated by the priestess of Apollo at Delphi, who prophesies that Argos will be the “head that protects the body” (κάρη δὲ τὸ σῶμα σαώσει, 7.148.3). Our analysis will show this to be the case in more ways than one. However, before Herodotus can make this known, he must first relate what the Argives say about their encounter with the Hellenic League when representatives for the coalition attempt to enlist their aid against the Persians.

\(^8\) For an historical overview of the Hellenic League, see e.g. Brunt (1993) 47-83.
\(^9\) See 7.145.2.
\(^10\) See 7.148.2. On the battle of Sepeia, see 6.77-82. On Argos’ prior enmities with Sparta and other Greek states, see also 1.82 and 5.61.
In addition to the reference to the primacy of Argos cited in the prophesy above, Herodotus also evokes the proem to the *Histories* by framing the Argives’ account obliquely (Ἀργεῖοι δὲ λέγουσι τὰ κατ’ ἑωυτοὺς γενέσθαι ὤδε κ.τ.λ., 7.148.2) and deferring judgment until the two competing accounts have also been relayed via indirect speech (Ἔστι δὲ ἄλλος λόγος λεγόμενος ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα κ.τ.λ., 7.150.1; Συμπεσεῖν δὲ τούτοις καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον λέγουσί τινες Ἑλλήνων κ.τ.λ., 7.151.1). As we have now come to expect from the proem and a host of related examples discussed in earlier chapters, the juxtaposition of several sources in the aetiology of the Argives’ purported medism will stem from more than just an aversion to *pars pro toto* arguments on the part of the ἱστορ (and certainly not from an ineptitude at selecting and managing his sources).11 Rather, the series of shifting focalizations12 will signal fundamentally human biases innate in historical inquiry. Consequently, this framework will prompt the reader not only to see the inextricability of aetiology from narrative, but also to consider a range of possibilities posed by original questions, which in no way admit monologic explanations or interpretations.

We can begin to glimpse this multiplicity once the Argives issue their demands for allying themselves with the Hellenic League, namely, a thirty-year peace treaty with Sparta to recoup their losses from the battle of Sepeia and a half-share in the allied ἡγεμονίη.13

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12 Dewald (2002) 225 (see discussion of 1.1-5 in Chapter One above).
13 See 7.148.4.
The Argives say that this is the reply the council gave, although the oracle forbade them from making the alliance with the Greeks. However, in spite of their fear of the oracle, they were eager to make a thirty-year treaty, so that their sons might actually grow to adulthood during these years. But they were concerned that if there were no treaty, they would be the Spartans’ subjects indefinitely if another disaster befell them at the hands of the Persians in addition to the evil they had already suffered. [2] Those messengers from Sparta gave the following reply to the pronouncements of the council, that they would refer the question of a treaty to a majority of their citizens, but that they had been instructed to reply to the question of leadership and to tell them that they had two kings while the Argives had one, so it was not possible for either of the Spartan kings to yield his leadership, but that there was nothing to prevent the Argive king from having an equal vote with their two kings. [3] For this reason, then, the Argives say that the Spartans’ greed was intolerable, but that they preferred to be ruled by the barbarians than to give an inch to the Spartans, and they told the messengers to leave Argive territory by sundown or else be considered enemies.

As Baragwanath submits, the Argives’ dilemma set out in 7.149.1 represents one of the first instances in the Histories where the opposition between idealism and pragmatism “comes gradually to be eclipsed by the different opposition of motives versus
necessity." In light of Sparta's burgeoning imperial ambitions and the crippling losses Argos had already sustained at her hands at the battle of Sepeia (which were so catastrophic that slaves had to administer the affairs of state until the children of citizen males who had fallen in battle came of age), it is understandable that the Argives end up spurning the common good of the Greeks at the expense of their own interests. But while their motivation for rejecting the offer of the Hellenic League may seem cut and dried, we must bear in mind the fact that this entire passage is situated around what the Argives themselves say about their own predicament (Ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσι κ.τ.λ., 7.149.1). When the question of the origins of the Argives' decision to rebuff the envoys is reframed in the following two chapters, it will not be so easy to pinpoint a single αἰτία for their actions:

This is what the Argives themselves say about these things, but there is another story told throughout Greece, that Xerxes sent a herald to Argos before he set out to make war on Greece. This herald is said to have arrived and spoken thus: [2]

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15 On greed (expressed at 7.149.3 as πλεονεξίη) as an impetus to empire for Greeks and barbarians alike across the Histories, see Balot (2001) 99-135 (see 108-111 ad loc.).
16 Ἀργὸς δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐχηρώθη οὕτω ὥστε οἱ δοῦλοι αὐτῶν ἔσχον πάντα τὰ πρήγματα ἄρχοντές τε καὶ διέποντες, ἐς ὃ ἐπήβησαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολομένων παῖδες (6.83.1).
“Argive men, King Xerxes offers the following words to you. ‘We believe that it is Perses from whom we are descended, son of Perseus, son of Danaë, offspring of Andromeda, daughter of Cepheus. That would make us your descendants, so it is improper for us to march out against our own progenitors and for you to oppose us by helping others, but you should live by yourselves in peace, for if all goes according to plan, I shall lead none better than you.’” [3] When they heard this, the Argives are said to have made much of it, but made no promises or demands straightaway. However, when the Greeks approached them for help, they demanded a share of the command so that they might have a pretext to be at peace because they knew that the Spartans would not grant them a share.

On the surface, it may seem incredible that the emissary dispatched by Xerxes can not only connect the Persians’ lineage with the Argives’, but also persuade them of its veracity. However, as Georges has adduced from a host of evidence internal and external to the Histories, “the Argives could seriously entertain the view that their own Perseus had founded the line of Persian kings, and not merely because it flattered them to believe that an Argive hero was ancestral to the world monarchy on their horizon.”17 But even if the Argives only use the Persians’ appeal to kinship as a pretext to avoid taking part in the Hellenic League (ἵνα ἐπὶ προφάσιος ἱσυχίην ἔγωσι, 7.150.3), it is important to note that this ulterior motive is dependent upon the potentially self-serving explanation of the source which frames this second account (Ἐστὶ δὲ ἄλλος λόγος λέγομενος, 7.150.1), just as it is in the proem when the Persian λόγιοι imply a Realpolitik motivation in the Greeks’ invasion of Troy independent of their motivation to requite the rape of Io and

17 Georges (1994) 66-71 (quotation at 70). The most compelling testimonia outside of the Histories which Georges cites to this effect are found in Aeschylus (i.e. Pers. 79-80, 185-187) and the fragments of the Argive mythographer Acusilaus. See also Jones (1999) 28-29 and Vannicelli (2012).
Helen.\textsuperscript{18} As the denouement of the third account will indicate, neither the Argives nor the Greeks as a whole will be alone in their desire to protect and preserve their own interests:

Some Greeks say that this squares with the following account which happened many years later, when some Athenian messengers happened to be in Memnonian Susa on some other business, including Callias son of Hipponicus and those who had gone up with him. The Argives had also sent messengers to Susa at the same time to ask Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, if the friendship they had made with Xerxes still held good, as they desired, or if they were considered enemies by him. King Artaxerxes said that their friendship did indeed hold good and that he considered no city friendlier than Argos.

Here, the latent reference to an Athenian peace treaty with Persia, which is thought to have been brokered by Callias about thirty years after the Argives’ negotiations with the Hellenic League,\textsuperscript{19} is proleptic in more than just a chronological sense. In prompting the reader to look past the temporal limits of the Argives’ negotiations per se, this account also urges the reader to see beyond stereotypes of certain groups’ proclivities towards medism. The very suggestion that the Athenians would approach Artaxerxes to secure their own imperial holdings after reproaching those who made such overtures in the Persian Wars and after “saving” Greece from the fleet of

\textsuperscript{18} See especially the discussion of 1.4 in Chapter 1.2.

\textsuperscript{19} The date for the Peace of Callias is usually set at 449 BCE (\textit{pace} Diod. Sic. 12.3-4). For an overview of this Peace, see e.g. Badian (1987). See also e.g. Cawkwell (1997) and Samons (1998) for critiques of this standard treatment.
Artaxerxes’ father at the battle of Salamis a generation earlier shows that even the most high-minded ἔθνος can pursue what it considers to be expedient to its own ends in the longue durée. But rather than decry such a move as morally contemptible, Herodotus interprets this matter from a wider perspective by the time he actually weighs in on the question of the origins of the Argives’ allegiances. Before we examine the conclusions he himself draws from 7.148-151, however, let us first consider another piquant reference to Artaxerxes in Book Six that will elucidate Herodotus’ eventual interjection about this matter:

After doing these things (i.e. making sacrifices at Delos), Datis first set sail for Eretria with his army, taking Ionians and Aeolians with him. Once Datis had put to sea from here, Delos was shaken by an earthquake for the first and last time up until my day. God revealed this to mankind, I suppose, as a portent of the evils to come.

20 Cf. 9.11, where the Athenians themselves threaten to make a deal with Xerxes. On Athens’ avowed intolerance of medizers, see 8.140-144 and 9.4-5. The fact that Herodotus’ expresses the widely-reviled opinion (Ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλείων ἀνθρώπων, 7.139.1) that the Athenians became the saviors of Greece through their victory at Salamis (Ἀθηναίους …σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 7.139.5) implies that their role changed following the Persian Wars when the Histories were composed. On the programmatic notion of Athens’ reversal, see Chapter 6.2 below.

21 Outside of 7.151, the follow-up in 7.152 (discussed below), and 6.98 (discussed below), Artaxerxes is only mentioned once in the Histories (i.e. 7.106.1).
come, [2] for during the three successive generations when Darius son of Hystaspes and Xerxes the son of Darius and Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes sat on the throne, more bad things happened to Greece than in the other twenty generations prior to Darius, some of which happened to it as a result of the Persians, others as a result of the chieftains when they were warring over rule. [3] For this reason, it is not at all strange that Delos was shaken, though it had never moved before [And the following was written in an oracle about it: “I shall move Delos, too, though it had never moved before.”] In the Greek tongue, Darius means “doer”, Xerxes means “warrior”, and Artaxerxes means “great warrior.” The Greeks would be correct in calling these kings by such names in their own tongue.

The reference to the three successive generations of rulers is significant not only in that it helps to fix a *terminus post quem* for the publication of the *Histories*, but also because it establishes a continuum for the events of the Persian Wars and beyond. As Munson notes, the immediate juxtaposition of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes (Δαρεῖος ἔρξης, Ἐρξης ἄρης, Ἀρτοξέρξης μέγας ἄρης, 6.98.3) “define what is, from the point of view of the Greeks, a unitary period in history”, which will encompass a century of evils (κακά, 6.98.2) and extend from the Persians Wars down to the Pentecontaetia and even the Peloponnesian War. Though the violent epithets of the Persian rulers which Herodotus translates may suggest that these men alone will be responsible for inflicting such evils, suffering will not be a one way street in the three generations to come.

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22 The regnal years of Artaxerxes I (ca. 464-424 BCE) have been used variously to establish such a date, but scholars have yet to reach a consensus on when the *Histories* were published. However, none to my knowledge has proposed a date before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 BCE, which Herodotus appears to reference when he mentions the Theban capture of Plataea (see 7.233; cf. Thuc. 2.2-6). For a summary of this controversy as it was discussed in the previous century, see e.g. Nenci (1998) ad 6.98. For a recent attempt to extend the date of the composition of the *Histories* into the Peloponnesian War and past 413 BCE (against the traditional interpretation of 9.73, that Herodotus’ failure to mention the Spartan occupation of Decelea in that year provides a *terminus ante quem* for the work), see Irwin (2013).

23 Fornara (1971) 82 n. 10.

24 Munson (2005) 50. See also Munson (2001) 201-205 for a full discussion of this passage.
Instead, mankind as a whole (ἀνθρώποισι, 6.98.1) will face these κακά irrespective of ethnicity,²⁵ both in the wars themselves and the ensuing power struggles (τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Περσέων αὐτὴ γενόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν κορυφαίων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς πολεμεόντων, 6.98.2).²⁶ But what these struggles will be exactly (and who or what will initiate them) is not clearly defined.²⁷

In light of Herodotus’ expansive yet elliptical interpretation of the Delian earthquake and its ramifications for a variety of unnamed conflicts in the fifth century,²⁸ it makes sense that he ultimately gives his take on the Argives’ supposed medism as he does after hearing out the three λόγοι which we have now considered above (7.148-151). But while his forthcoming remarks on evils and their indiscriminate bearing on all of humanity have clear antecedents in 6.98, these will be shown in the end to hark back to the proem:


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²⁵ Cf. 5.97.3, where the Athenian ships dispatched to assist the Ionians in their revolt against the Persians are called the “beginning of evils”, not just for these particular groups, but “for both Greeks and barbarians” (Αὕτα δὲ αἱ νέες ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγένοντο Ἐλληνικαί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι). Recall also the Einleitungssatz (1.1.0) and the proem’s egalitarian premise as a whole (discussed immediately below and in Chapter One).

²⁶ The use of the rare word κορυφαίων (“chiefains”) recalls the point during the Constitutional Debate at Susa when Darius rejects Megabyzus’ proposal for oligarchy on grounds that such men create factional strife and murder in vying with their opponents for virtue (3.82.3), a sentiment that is prophetic of the internecine struggles that will follow the Persian Wars.

²⁷ Munson (2001) 205.

²⁸ For a recent discussion of how the Delian earthquake “is less a seismic event, than a semiotic one” for Herodotus, see e.g. Rusten (2013) (quotation at 142).
Now whether Xerxes dispatched a messenger to Argos who said these things or Argive messengers went up to Susa to ask Artaxerxes about friendship, I cannot say accurately, nor do I declare any judgement about these things other than the one the Argives themselves say. [2] However, I do know this, that, if all peoples brought their own evils along to market out of a desire to exchange them with their neighbors, each of them would gladly bring back what they had brought in after looking carefully at the evils of those next to them. [3] Thus, nothing absolutely shameful was done by the Argives. Though I am obliged to say what is said, I am not obliged to believe it altogether (and let this statement hold for my entire narrative), since it is also said that the Argives were the ones who summoned the Persians to Greece because their war against the Spartans had gone badly, desiring anything other than their present grievance.

What should strike us straightaway about this remarkable passage is how Herodotus’ decision to counter his lack of secure knowledge about the aetiologies of 7.148-151 with what he does know (οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν…) Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ τοσοῦτο, 7.152.1-2) effectively recapitulates the priamel that follows the accounts of the women-snatchings in the first four chapters of the Histories:

Ταύτα μὲν νῦν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοινικεῖς λέγουσι. Ἔγω δὲ περὶ μὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἔρεων ὡς οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως καὶ ταύτα ἔγνετο, τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἄδικων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, τούτων σημήνας προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὢμοίας μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεζών. [4] Τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτὸν σμικρὰ γέγονε· τὰ δὲ ἐπʼ ἐμέ ἦν μεγάλα, πρῶτον ἦν σμικρὰ. Τὴν ἀνθρωποπηθήν ὄν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίῃν οὐδαμὰ ἐν τῶν τούτων μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι ἄμφοτέρων ὦμοίως (1.5.3-4).

This is what the Persians and the Phoenicians say. But I am not going to talk about these matters, saying that they happened this way or some other way. Instead, having indicated the man I myself know to have been the first to

29 For other uses of οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν et sim., cf. 1.57.1, 1.160.2, 2.103.2, 3.116.1, 4.187.2, 8.8.2, 8.87.1, and 9.18.2.
undertake unjust deeds against the Greeks, I will proceed with my *logos* by going
through great and small human settlements alike. [4] For many of those
settlements that were great in the past have become small, and those that were
great in my time were once small. Knowing, then, that human prosperity never
abides in the same place, I will mention both alike.

As was the case in the proem, Herodotus’ decision to decline to comment on the veracity
of the aetiological question at hand in favor of making a point of import to “all peoples”
(*πάντες ἄνθρωποι*, 7.152.2) should not be taken as a lapse in critical judgment or as an
indictment of the preceding accounts of 7.148-151. Though Plutarch construes
Herodotus’ self-avowed obligation “to say what is said, but not to believe it absolutely”
(*Ἐγὼ δὲ ὁφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαί γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὁφείλω*, 7.152.3) as
a sign of his circuitous duplicity, Herodotus does not appear to want to obfuscate the
truth, but rather to induce his readers to think hard about the very notion of what truth
is. Herodotus extends this invitation with his metaphor of the marketplace, where he
postulates that everyone, regardless of their nationality, would ultimately bring home

30 Compare Herodotus’ egalitarian commitment voiced in the conclusion to the proem to go through both
great and small human settlements alike (*μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων*, 1.5.3), in recognition of the
mutable state of human fortune (*Τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην…εὐδαιμονίην*, 1.5.4). See below for further discussion of
these parallels. Cf. the similarly-phrased dictum of 3.38 (referenced in connection with 2.35 in Chapter 2.3
above).

31 Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐχ, ὅπερ αὐτὸς τὸν Αἰθίοπα φησι πρὸς τὰ μύρα καὶ τὴν πορφύραν εἰπεῖν, ὡς δολερὰ μὲν τὰ χρίματα δολερὰ δὲ τὰ εἵματα τῶν Περσέων ἐστί, τοῦτ’ ἀν τις εἴποι πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς δολερὰ μὲν τὰ ρήματα δολερὰ δὲ τὰ σχήματα τῶν Ἡροδότου λόγων, ἔλικτα κοινών ψήχις ἄλλα πάν πέριξ, ὡσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι τὰ λαμπρὰ τῇ σκιᾷ τρανότερα ποιοῦσιν, οὕτω ταῖς ἀρνήσεσι τὰς διαβολὰς ἐπιτείνοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ὑπονοίας ταῖς ἀμφιβολίαις βαθύτερας ποιοῦντος; (*Mor. 863E = De Herodoti malignitate* 28) In this vein,
see e.g. Flory (1987) 66 and to a lesser extent Benardete (1969) 201-203. As Pritchett (1993) 286 notes, it
is strange that a major proponent of the “Liar School” like Feiling (1989) could fail to acknowledge such
an important passage about truth and credibility as well as the similarly programmatic statement at 2.123.1
(discussed in Chapter 2.2 above).

10-11. See also Harrison (2000) 24-29 for a useful doxography on this passage.
their own evils (οἰκήμα κακά, 7.152.2) if given the opportunity to exchange them with other peoples. This metaphor, which bears an uncanny resemblance to the dichotomy of familiar and foreign κακά in Aesop’s “Two Packs” (Πηραμ δύο),33 is a prime example of the deployment of the same sort of open-ended fable we have already seen in the bekos experiment which prefaces the Egyptian λόγος.34 As was true in that case, the lack of an explicit meaning for the marketplace fable is likely to stem not only from Herodotus’ impartiality as a ἱστωρ ipso facto,35 but also from his meta-narrative goal of instilling in the reader a desire to look more closely at the larger framework of original claims. This has already been prompted by the careful focalization of the three accounts of 7.148-151, which have now substantiated the implication of the marketplace fable, that all peoples prefer their own things as a matter of course, including historical explanations.36 But even though Herodotus ultimately posits that cultural relativism cannot furnish an unequivocal, singular truth to untangle these competing aetiologies (and as much as he may empathize with the mitigating factors that might require there to be one such truth),37 the kind of

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33 See Nagy (1990) 315 ad Chambry 303/Perry 266: Προμηθεύς πλάσας ἀνθρώπους δύο πήρας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπεκρέμασε, τὴν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων κακόν, τὴν δὲ ἰδίων. καὶ τὴν μὲν τῶν οθνείων ἔμπροσθεν ἔταξε, τὴν δὲ ἔτέρων ὑπερήψε ἐπήρτησε. ἐξ οὗ δὴ συνέβη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ μὲν ἀλλότρια κακά ἐξ ἀπόπτου κατοπτάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἰδία μὴ προσορᾶσθαι. Recall also 6.98 above.
34 Nagy (1990) 314-316. On the bekos experiment (2.2-3) and its resonance with fables, see Chapter 2.1. 35 On how Herodotus’ commitment “to say what is said” (λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα) indicates that “technically, the historia of Herodotus corresponds to the process of arbitration, not to the actual outcome”, and thus is in keeping with documentary evidence for the practices of the ἱστωρ, see Nagy (1990) 316 ff. (quotation at 317).
36 The idea that we need to look carefully in evaluating other peoples’ things may also be prompted in part by ἐγκύψαντες (7.152.2), a salient ἅπαξ λεγόμενον in the Histories.
37 Herodotus’ declaration of the γνῶμην of the Argives in 7.152.1 should not be understood as a validation of the truth of what actually transpired during negotiations with the Hellenic League, as the translation of Godley (1921) insinuates (ad loc.), but rather as an acknowledgment of their plight and concomitant motivations.
circumspect, cosmopolitan mentality which this metaphor asks us to adopt can set us on the path to expanding our own inquiries and so better the course of knowledge.\textsuperscript{38}

The preceding analysis of the origins of the Argives’ alleged medism should now lead us to several conclusions. For a start, Herodotus’ engagement with the accounts of 7.148-152 has made it clear that he can apply his critical apparatus to the not-so-distant past just as he does to the extrication of aetiologies from exotic lands and mythical times. But more than just exemplifying a vague tendency to underscore the fundamental multiplicity of complex original narratives, his treatment of the question of the Argives’ medism adheres to a paradigm whose roots lie firmly in the proem to the \textit{Histories}. As was the case in this programmatic introduction, the priamel-like construction which caps off the accounts of 7.148-151 (οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν... Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ τοσοῦτο, 7.152.1-2) does not wallow in ἀπορία, but the answer it does provide looks far beyond the matter at hand in its consideration of what \textit{might} have happened if another group had been substituted for the Argives under the same pressing circumstances. The pronounced anthropological language in both cases has already been shown to instigate this kind of broad thinking in a general sense,\textsuperscript{39} but the analogous account of the portent of the Delian earthquake (6.98) should remind us that these episodes will also be proleptic of the events of the forthcoming narrative.\textsuperscript{40} So, while our likening of Herodotus’ conclusions in the

\textsuperscript{38} Munson (2001) 230.
\textsuperscript{39} See n. 30 and the accompanying discussion above on the resonance between πάντες ἄνθρωποι (7.152.2) and the ecumenical parameters of 1.5.3-4.
\textsuperscript{40} On Herodotus’ conception of time in the proem, see Chapter 1.3 (with further discussion ad 7.169-171 below).
proem about universal self-interest to those he reaches in 7.152 does presuppose a methodological continuum across his entire work, just as he says (…καὶ μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἐπος ἔχετω ἐς πάντα τὸν λόγον, 7.152.3), the reaffirmation of these principles in this particular context will have an especially important bearing on what follows.

5.2 Gelon

Even before he relates the next petition of the Hellenic League to Gelon and its effect on the question of the Sicilian tyrant’s subsequent medism, Herodotus asks us to engage in circumspect thinking about the ensuing account. This is prompted by a discussion of how Gelon’s ancestor, Telines, paved the way for his descendant’s hegemony by restoring Geloan exiles to their native city of Gela through the use of objects sacred to the goddesses of the underworld:

ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε ἢ <ei> αὐτὸς ἐκτήσατο, τοῦτο [δὲ] οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· τούτοις δ’ ὃν πίσυνος ἐὼν κατήγαγε, ἐπ’ ὃ οἱ ἀπόγονοι αὐτοῦ ἱροφάνται τῶν Θεῶν ἔσονται. [4] Θῶμα μοι ὦν καὶ τοῦτο γέγονε πρὸς τὰ πυνθάνομαι, κατεργάσασθαι Τηλίνην ἔργον τοσοῦτο· τὰ τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔργα οὐ πρὸς τοῦ ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς νενόμικα γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ψυχῆς τε ἀγαθῆς καὶ ῥώμης ἀνήριης· ὁ δὲ λέγεται πρὸς τῆς Σικελίης τῶν οἰκητῶν τὰ ὑπεναντία τούτων πεφυκέναι θηλυδρίης τε καὶ μαλακώτερος ἄνήρ (7.153.3-4).

Where he got these [sacred objects] from or whether he created them himself, I am unable to say, but by relying on them, he restored the exiles on condition that his descendants be hierophants of the gods. [4] According to my research, I am amazed that Telines accomplished such a deed, for I do not think that such deeds can come about from any man, but from one with a good heart and courageous strength. However, Telines is said by the inhabitants of Sicily to have been the opposite of these things as both an effeminate and rather soft man.

In a move typical of the ἱστορ, Herodotus counters his ignorance about the origin of the sacred objects of Telines (ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε ἢ <ei> αὐτὸς ἐκτήσατο, τοῦτο [δὲ] οὐκ
έχω εἰπεῖν, 7.153.3) with a piece of knowledge that is more secure,\textsuperscript{41} namely, the fact that Telines’ very reliance on the sacred objects helped to restore the Geloan exiles to Gela regardless of how Telines acquired them (τούτοις δ’ ὅν πίσυνος ἤὼν κατήγαγε…, 7.153.3). Nevertheless, Herodotus’ expression of wonder in the face of such an unlikely achievement (Θομά μοι ὅν καὶ τὸ τὸ γέγονε πρῶς τὰ πυνθάνομαι…,7.153.4) should incite us to inquire further, as his reaction to the wondrous Labyrinth in Egypt did,\textsuperscript{42} and thus to project beyond the question under immediate investigation.

This open-ended aetiology invites just such an examination after the representatives of the Hellenic League arrive at Syracuse and beseech Gelon to aid the common Greek cause in repelling the imminent Persian invasion (7.157). Although Gelon is initially incensed at this request because the Greeks had refused to assist him in his war against the Carthaginians years earlier (7.158.2-3), he agrees to send a substantial force (including the means to feed the entire Greek army, 7.158.4) on the sole condition that he be made “commander and chief of the Greeks against the barbarian.”\textsuperscript{43} However, the Spartan representative, Syagros, trounces this offer with a retort that recalls a much more ancient conflict than the one currently under discussion:

«Ἡ κε μέγ’ οἰμώξειε ὁ Πελοπίδης Αγαμέμνον πυθόμενος Σπαρτιήτας τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀπαραιτήσθαι ὑπὸ Γέλωνός τε καὶ Συρηκοσίων. Ἀλλὰ τούτου μὲν τοῦ λόγου μηκέτι μνησθῆς, ὅκως τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τοι παραδώσωμεν ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν βούλεας βοηθεῖν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἵσθι ἀρξόμενος ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰ δ’ ἀρα μὴ δικαιοῖς ἄρχεσθαι, σὺ δὲ μηδὲ βοήθεε.» (7.159)

\textsuperscript{41} See Dewald (1987) 160 on this tendency.
\textsuperscript{42} See Chapter 3.1 above (ad 2.148).
\textsuperscript{43} Ἐπὶ δὲ λόγῳ τοιῷδε τάδε ὑπίσχομαι, ἐπ’ ὅ ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ ηγεμὼν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐσομαι πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον ἐπ’ ἀλλῳ δὲ λόγῳ οὔτε ἀν αὐτός ἐλθομι οὔτε ἀν ἄλλους πέμψαμι (7.158.5).
“Loudly indeed would Agamemnon son of Pelops wail if he learned that the Spartans had been robbed of their leadership by Gelon and the Syracusans. Rather, put this thought out of your mind that we will entrust the leadership to you. But if you wish to help Greece, know that you will be led by the Spartans. However, if you do not think it right to be led, do not help at all.”

As scholars have long observed, the notion that Agamemnon “would wail loudly indeed” (Ἦ κε μέγ’ οἰμώξειε) at Gelon’s appropriation of Spartan hegemony to oppose the Persian incursion into Europe bears an uncanny resemblance to Nestor’s reproach of the Achaeans in the Iliad for not wanting to oppose Hector in a duel:


Oh, for shame! Great sorrow comes upon the land of the Achaeans.

Loudly indeed would the old horse-breaker Peleus wail, good counselor and speaker of the Myrmidons, who once, when questioning me in his house, rejoiced in asking the generation and birth of all the Argives. If he heard everyone shrinking from Hector now, many times he would raise his dear hands up to the immortals and the energy from his limbs would go down into the house of Hades.

The Athenian envoy appears to acknowledge this allusion to epic when he joins Syagros in bemoaning the prospect of Syracusan hegemony (even after Gelon offers to lead the

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44 See e.g. Butler (1905), Smith and Laird (1908), and How and Wells (1912) ad 7.159. The most extensive and sensitive treatment of this passage to date is found in Grethlein (2006), whom I follow closely in the forthcoming analysis. See also Zali (2015) 203-217, who focuses on the rhetorical underpinnings of this important passage.
land army or the fleet alone, instead of the entire Hellenic force (7.160.2) as he originally demanded in 7.158.5) with support from Homer:


[2] As long as you were asking to lead the entire Greek force, we Athenians were content to keep quiet because we knew that the Spartan was quite capable of speaking on behalf of us both. But now that you have been excluded from the whole and you are asking to command the fleet, this is how matters stand: even if the Spartan does allow you to command the fleet, we will not, for this is ours, which the Spartans themselves do not want. We will not oppose them if they do desire to lead, but we will not permit any one else to be admiral. [3] For we would have obtained the largest navy of the Greeks in vain if we, being Athenians, were to yield our command to the Syracusans, since we can demonstrate that we are the most ancient nation of the Greeks and we alone have not moved from our original home. Even Homer the epic poet said that of those who came to Troy, the best man at ordering and arraying an army belonged to our ancestors.45 For this reason, we can in no way be reproached for saying these things.

Because Syracuse is an ascendant power which did not exist in the time of Homer, it is understandable that Gelon ultimately parts company with the representatives from the Hellenic League by looking to the achievements not of time past, but of time to come:46

45 This is usually taken to be a reference to the Athenian warrior, Menestheus, whom Homer mentions in the Catalogue of Ships (τὸν αὖθ’ ἠγεμόνευ’ υἱὸς Πετεῖο Μενεσθεῦς. // τὸ δ’ οὐ πώ τοι ὁμοίος ἐπιχθόνιος γένετ’ ὄνη // κοσμῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδώτας, Il. 2.552-554). However, Grethlein (2006) 497 thinks the antecedent may no longer be extant.
“Athenian stranger, you seem to have many leaders, but you will have no followers. Now, since you wish to have everything without making any concessions, you could not go back soon enough and tell the Greeks that spring has been taken away from her year.” [2] The sense of this phrase is this: clearly, just as spring is the most excellent time of year, so too was Gelon’s army the most excellent of the Greeks’. And so he likened Greece deprived of his alliance to if spring had been taken away from the year.

As Kirchhoff noted more than a century ago, Gelon’s metaphor of spring being taken away from its year (ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὸ ἔαρ αὐτῇ ἔξαραιρητα, 7.162.1) bears a close resemblance to two comments Aristotle makes regarding a funeral oration delivered by Pericles on behalf of the departed heroes of the Samian War in 440/439 BCE, more than a generation after the embassy of the Hellenic League to Syracuse:47

…οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνηρήσθαι ὀσπερ τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἔξαραιρθεὶ (Rhet. 1365a31-33).

…as Pericles said in his funeral oration that the youth had been taken away from the city, just as if spring had been taken away from the year.

…ὁσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἡφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὀσπερ εἰ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλῳ (Rhet. 1411a1-4).

…just as Pericles said that the youth killed in the war had been obliterated in this way, just as if someone had removed spring from the year.

47 Kirchhoff (1878) 19. On this comparandum, see also Treves (1941).
By juxtaposing this prolepsis in Gelon’s speech with the epic analepses in the speeches of the Spartan and Athenian envoys much as he did in the accounts of the Argives’ meeting with Hellenic League and the Peace of Callias discussed above, Herodotus implies an intimate relationship between what was and what will be as regards the contentious leadership of the Greeks, from the *spatium mythicum*, to the Persian Wars, and beyond.  

But no matter how secure these references to Homer and Pericles may seem, we must be mindful of the fact that Herodotus does not provide any such attribution explicitly. Even if we were to regard the words that immediately follow Gelon’s *mot* as a genuine authorial interjection (Ὄτος δὲ ὁ νόος τοῦ ῥήματος, τὸ ἐθέλει λέγειν κ.τ.λ, 7.162.2) and not as an interpolation as some editors have argued, we would still find that the explanation offered by the ἱστωρ is essentially an interpretive gloss, which aids the reader in comprehending an obscure image at a basic level, but does not entail the judgment of meaning, since meaning is fundamentally multiple and cannot be fixed absolutely or indefinitely. Instead, to paraphrase Heraclitus’ remarks about Apollo and his oracle at Delphi, Herodotus here neither reveals nor conceals, but rather points to past and future analogues for his readers to ponder and so leaves possibilities open.

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49 See e.g. Hude (1927), Stein (1962), and Rosén (1987) ad loc.
51 Recall Dewald (1993) 70 (discussed at length in Chapter 3.2). See also Grethlein (2006) 487 for a summary of how this point relates to his exploration of the literary precedents of the Hellenic League’s embassy to Gelon: “...as recipients respond differently to texts, the understanding of intertextual relationships varies. Even if the parallels at the levels of language and content are strong, it cannot be claimed that every recipient will understand and follow the link.”
52 ὁ ἄναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει (Fr. 22 B93 DK). For a study of how oracles are “good to think with” (35) in the paradigmatic Croesus λόγος of the *Histories*, in
This concern for what might have been and what may yet be is further indicated by the account of Gelon’s actions after the Hellenic League leaves Sicily without forging an alliance with the Syracusans:

Οἱ μὲν δὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄγγελοι τοιαῦτα τῷ Γέλωνι χρηματισάμενοι ἀπέπλεον· Γέλων δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα δείσας μὲν περὶ τοῦτο Ἐλλησι μὴ οὐ δύνωνται τὸν βάρβαρον ὑπερβαλέσθαι, δεινὸν δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἀνασχέτων ποιησάμενος ἐλθὼν ἐς Πελοπόννησον ἀρχισθαί ὑπὸ Δακεδαμιονίων, ἐόν Σικελίης τύραννος, ταῦτην μὲν τὴν ὁδὸν ἡμέλησε, ὁ δὲ ἄλλης εἴχετο. [2] Ἐπείτε γὰρ τάχιστα ἐπύθετο τὸν Πέρσην διαβεβηκότα τὸν Ἑλλησποντόν, πέμπει πεντηκοντόρωσι τρισὶ Κάδμου τὸν Σκύθεω ἄνδρα Κόδων ἐς Δελφοὺς, ἐχοντα χρήματα πολλὰ καὶ φιλίους λόγους, καραδοκήσοντα τὴν μάχην τῇ πεσέεται, καὶ ἴνα μὲν ὁ βάρβαρος νικᾷ, τὰ τε χρήματα αὐτῷ διδόναι καὶ γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ τῶν ἀρχεῖ ὁ Γέλων, ἢν δὲ οἱ Ἑλληνες, ὅπισώ ἀπάγειν (7.163).

After these dealings with Gelon, the Greek messengers sailed back. But Gelon, fearing for the Greeks, that they would not be able to overcome the barbarian, and thinking it a terrible and intolerable thing if he, as tyrant of Sicily, were to come to the Peloponnese to be ruled by the Spartans, ignored this plan, but followed another, for as soon as he found out that the Persians had crossed the Hellespont, he sent a Coan man named Cadmus, son of Scythes, with fifty-three penteconters to Delphi with lots of money and friendly words to await the outcome of the battle, and if the barbarian won, to give him the money along with earth and water from the territories which Gelon ruled, but if the Greeks won, to bring them back.

Gelon’s plan to act according to the outcome of the impending battle between the Greeks and the Persians may suggest purely selfish, even Machiavellian motivations on his part. But as understandable as it would be for the Syracusan tyrant to slight those who slighted him in their equally selfish refusal to accept his compromises over the leadership of the Hellenic League (7.160.2), the origins of Gelon’s actions will not be so easily circumscribed once the rest of the narrative is taken into account.
This multivalence is anticipated by Gelon’s selection of one of two “roads” (ταύτην μὲν τὴν ὁδὸν ἠμέλησε, ὁ δὲ ἄλλης εἶχετο, 7.163.1), a favorite metaphor of the ἱστωρ which serves in part to prompt reflection on potentiality, both in terms of what actually happened and what might have occurred if the other road had been taken.53 Indeed, even after we are informed that Gelon’s emissary, Cadmus, eventually returned to Sicily following the Greek victory at Salamis without submitting to Xerxes,54 Herodotus relates via the “inhabitants of Sicily” (Λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίῃ οἰκημένων, 7.165) that Gelon would have helped the Greeks, even at the expense of his subordination to the Spartans (ὅμως καὶ μέλλων ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Γέλων ἐβοήθησε ἄν τοῖσι Ἐλλησι, 7.165), had his battle against the Carthaginians and their three-hundred thousand allies at Himera not been fought on the exact same day as the battle of Salamis.55 On the one hand, the fact that this explanation is endorsed by Gelon’s own countrymen may betray the same sort of national bias and self-interest which marked his engagement with the envoys from the Hellenic League.56 On the other hand, this same explanation reinforces the power of necessity to trump even (patently) altruistic desires, as we saw in the defining exemplum of the Argives.57 In either case,

53 On counterfactuals in Herodotus (with special emphasis on the accounts of the battles of Marathon, Artemision, and Salamis), see Baragwanath (2013). For other proleptic functions of the metaphor of the road in the Histories, see n. 46 in Chapter Two.
54 …ἐπεὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐπεκράτησαν τῇ ναυμαχίῃ καὶ Σέρρης οἰχώκεε ἀπελαύνων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐκείνος ἀπίκετο ἐς τὴν Σικελίην ἀπὸ πάντα τὰ χρήματα ἄγων (7.164.2).
55 Πρὸς δὲ καὶ τάδε λέγουσι, ὡς συνέβη τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης ἐν τῇ Σικελίῃ Γέλωνα καὶ Θήρωνα νικάν Αμάλκαν τὸν Καρχηδόνιον καὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τοὺς Ἐλλήνας τὸν Πέρσην (7.166).
56 On the favorable ideological implications to Western Greeks of the synchronization of the battle of Salamis with the battle of Himera, see e.g. Feeney (2007) 44-47.
however, Herodotus does not comment on the veracity of such motives, but leaves it to us to grapple with this dichotomy when he closes his account of what happened in Sicily with an inconclusive aetiology (much as he introduced it),\textsuperscript{58} in this case, with the mysterious disappearance of the Carthaginian general, Hamilcar, after his defeat at the battle of Himera (7.166-167).

5.3 The Corcyreans

In his next case study on medism, Herodotus invites further investigation beyond the matter at hand with his discussion of the actions of the Corcyreans during the second Persian invasion of Greece. The Corcyreans’ agreement to help the Hellenic League after the appeal by the same representatives who supplicated Gelon should alert us to Herodotus’ forthcoming distinction of possibility in his consideration of what might have been and what has yet to be:

Οἱ δὲ παρατίκα μὲν ύπίσχοντο πέμψειν τε καὶ ἁμινέειν, φράζοντες ὡς οὐ σφι περιστετή ἐστὶ ἢ Ἑλλὰς ἀπολλυμένη· ἢν γὰρ σφαλῇ, σφεῖς γε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δουλεύσουσι τῇ πρῶτῃ τῶν ἡμερῶν· ἄλλα τιμωρητέον εἶ ἡ ἐς τὸ δυνατώτατον (7.168.1).

The Corcyreans promised straightaway to send aid and join the defense, declaring that they could not overlook the destruction of Greece. For if Greece fell, there would be nothing to stop them from being enslaved on the very first day, but they felt it necessary to provide as much assistance as possible.

The conditional demise of the Corcyreans along with the rest of the Greeks (ἂν γὰρ σφαλῇ κ.τ.λ.) prefigures several remarks in the account of 7.168 which emphasize the mutability of the forthcoming actions. These center around the Corcyreans’ shift from

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. 7.153.3-4 (see above).
outward enthusiasm at the prospect of participating in the pan-Hellenic defense of Greece to equivocation once they actually decide to commit and send a fleet of sixty ships (Ὑπεκρίναντο μὲν οὕτω εὐπρόσωπα· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔδεε βοηθέειν, ἀλλὰ νοεῖντες ἐπλήρωσαν νέας ἡξηκοντα…, 7.168.2). Though the ensuing account leaves little doubt that the Corcyrean fleet remained moored off the Peloponnese without taking part in the battle of Salamis in order to hedge their bets and await the outcome of the war (προσέμειξαν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ περὶ Πύλον καὶ Ταίναρον γῆς τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀνεκώχευον τὰς νέας, καραδοκέοντες καὶ οὗτοι τὸν πόλεμον τῇ πεσέεται, 7.168.2), the motivation behind this change of heart and how exactly it came to fruition is much more difficult to pin down.

Central to this question is whether the Corcyreans decided to leave the Greeks in the lurch before they even set sail or whether the specter of defeat forced them to wait in the wings once they realized the scale of what they were up against. On the one hand, Herodotus seems to support the former explanation when he notes the speciousness (εὐπρόσωπα, 7.168.2) of the Corcyreans’ commitment. On the other hand, the abruptness of their transition from eagerness (Οἱ δὲ παραυτίκα μὲν ὑπίσχοντο πέμψειν τε καὶ ἀμυνέειν κ.τ.λ., 7.168.1) to despair at the expectation of the Persians’ total victory (ἀελπτέοντες μὲν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ὑπερβαλέεσθαι, δοκέοντες δὲ τὸν Πέρσην κατακρατήσαντα πολλὸν ἄρξειν πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 7.168.2) suggests a shift in their initial motivation. This is corroborated by Herodotus’ striking remark in propria

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persona that the Coreyleans might have achieved their hope of gaining favor with the Persians had they actually won (Τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἥλπιζον πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων οἴσεσθαι· τά περ ἄν καὶ ἐγένετο, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκέει, 7.168.3), which implies a revision of their earlier, less-realistic expectations. Apart from this one tenuous interjection based on a hypothetical event, however, Herodotus does not come down on either side of the argument, but instead concludes his account with the pretext the Coreyleans themselves offer:

Τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἥλπιζον πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων οἴσεσθαι· τά περ ἄν καὶ ἐγένετο, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκέει. [4] Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας σφι σκῆψις ἐπεποίητο, τῇ περ δὴ καὶ εχρήσαντο· αἰτιωμένων γὰρ τῶν Ἐλλήνων ὅτι οὐκ ἐβοήθησαν, ἔφασαν πληρόσαι μὲν ἐξήκοντα τριήρες, ὑπὸ δὲ ἐπησιέων ἀνέμων ὑπερβαλεῖν Μαλέαν οὐκ οἷοί τε γενέσθαι· οὕτω οὐκ ἀπικέσθαι ἐς Σαλαμίνα καὶ οὐδεμιῆ κακότητι λειφθῆναι τῆς ναυμαχίης. Οὕτωι μὲν οὕτω διεκρούσαντο τοὺς Ἐλλήνας (7.168.3-4).

In saying such things, they hoped that they would gain something over the others, and as it seems to me, these things would have actually happened. [4] But they had prepared a pretext to answer the Greeks, which they did in fact use, for when the Greeks were accusing them of not helping, the Coreyleans said that they had filled sixty triremes, but that they had been prevented from rounding Cape Malea by trade winds and were not able to come. For this reason they said that they did not reach Salamis and that they missed the naval battle on account of no cowardice. This is how they evaded the Greeks.

In the face of the Greeks’ accusations that the Coreyleans shirked their duty to the Pan-Hellenic cause (αἰτιωμένων…τῶν Ἐλλήνων ὅτι οὐκ ἐβοήθησαν, 7.168.4), it is perhaps not surprising that the Coreyleans attribute their absence at Salamis to a force majeure which they say exonerates them from any wrongdoing (οὐδεμιῆ κακότητι λειφθῆναι τῆς ναυμαχίης, 7.168.4). This statement calls to mind the conclusion of the paradigmatic

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60 Baragwanath (2008) 221-222.
account of the Argives’ medism, that all people prefer their own things as a matter of course,\(^61\) including historical explanations. The fact that the Corcyreans are the ones to frame this point (ἐφασαν, 7.168.4) may mark them out as being unique in their selfishness. However, the subordination of this remark to the “blaming Greeks” (αἰτιωμένων…τῶν Ἑλλήνων, 7.168.4) suggests that this group is no more immune to fundamentally human biases and the need for self-preservation than any other party we have considered above, from the Syracusans, to the Argives, and all the way back to the Persian λόγιοι, whose allegations in the opening of the Histories focalized their own prejudices.\(^62\) In light of the recapitulation of this cosmopolitan sentiment, then, it makes sense that Herodotus ultimately directs us beyond the matter at hand and invites us “to understand the Corcyreans’ predicament, rather than simply sharing in making accusations.”\(^63\)

This humane perspective in turn furnishes a fascinating counterpoint for Thucydides’ interpretation of the Corcyreans’ isolationism at the start of the Epidamnus Affair later on in ca. 435-433 BCE.\(^64\) But while Munson is right to find more than a bit of irony in the fact that “…the city that had been fence-sitting in the hour of need for Greece later came out of its famous neutrality only to contribute to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War”,\(^65\) this can hardly be considered the “point of Herodotus’

\(^61\) Baragwanath (2008) 222.
\(^62\) On blame and responsibility in the proem, see esp. 1.1.1 (discussed in Chapter 1.2).
\(^63\) Baragwanath (2008) 222.
\(^64\) For the principal account of the Epidamnus Affair, see Thuc. 1.24-55. For an overview of this pivotal event in the history of the Peloponnesian War, see e.g. Wilson (1987) 25-64.
\(^65\) Munson (2001) 221.
narrative. As we saw even in a case like Gelon’s exchange with the representatives from the Hellenic League, which alluded to many more specific textual comparanda than the ones offered in 7.168, Herodotus once again suggests a path for us to follow without obliging us to walk down it.

5.4 The Cretans

In the final case study of the medizing λόγος, Herodotus once again urges his reader to adopt a panoptic outlook through his account of how the Cretans come to reject the appeal of the Hellenic League:

Κρήτες δὲ, ἐπείτε σφέας παρελάμβανον οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις ταχθέντες Ἑλλήνων, ἐποίησαν τοιῶν: πέμψαντες κοινὴ θεοπρόπους ἐς Δελφοὺς τὸν θεόν ἐπειρώτων εἰς σφετερίαν τιμωρέουσι γίνεται τῇ Ἑλλάδι. [2] Ἡ δὲ Πυθία ὑπεκρίνατο· «Ὤ νῆπιοι, ἐπιμέμφεσθε ὅσα υἱὸν ἐκ τῶν Μενέλαω τιμωρημάτων Μίνως ἔπεμψε μηνίων δακρύματα; ὅτε οἱ μὲν οὖ συνεξεπρήξαντο αὐτῷ τὸν ἐν Καμικῷ θάνατον γενόμενον, ὡμείς δὲ ἐκεῖνοι τὴν ἐκ Σπάρτης ἀρπασθεῖσαν υπὸ ἄνδρος βαρβάρου γυναίκα.» Ταῦτα οἱ Κρήτες ὡς ἀπενειχθέντα ἢκουσαν, ἔσχοντο τῆς τιμωρίης (7.169).

But the Cretans, when those who had been commanded by the Greeks for this purpose were soliciting their aid, did the following: having sent emissaries jointly to Delphi, the Cretans asked the god whether it was in their best interest to help Greece, [2] and the Pythia replied, “You fools! Do you find fault with all the tears which Minos sent you in his rage for helping Menelaus because they [i.e. the Greeks] did not join in avenging his death at Camicus, but you joined them in avenging the woman abducted from Sparta by a barbarian?” When the Cretans heard these things that were brought back, they refrained from providing help.

In noting the oracle’s constraint on the Cretans, Herodotus recalls the prohibition which the oracle imposed on the Argives in forbidding their alliance with the Hellenic League. Although the Argives ultimately ignore this command, their failure to heed the

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66 Munson (2001) 221

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oracle (ostensibly so as to preserve their state from Spartan dominion)\footnote{See 7.149.1 ff.} does not set them apart entirely from the Cretans, whose obedience is unlikely to derive from religious scruples alone. Rather, as Herodotus later insinuates, the Cretans also act under compulsion in spite of their desire to assist the common cause of the Greeks (Ἡ μὲν δὴ Πυθίη ὑπομνήσασα ταῦτα ἔσχε βουλομένους τιμωρέειν τοσί "Ελλησι, 7.171.2). But while this remark perfectly exemplifies the gap between motives and necessity which we have analyzed at length above,\footnote{On the dichotomy of motives and necessity, see Baragwanath (2008) 205 (discussed above).} Herodotus does not single out one motive in this account\footnote{Munson (2012) 211.} any more than he does in the previous case studies of the medizing λόγος, but instead looks to the broader ramifications of the Cretans’ deeds in his intervening elaboration of the Pythia’s aetiology of 7.169.2:

(170.) Λέγεται γὰρ Μίνων κατὰ ζήτησιν Δαιδάλου ἀπικόμενον ἐς Σικανίην τὴν νῦν Σικελίην καλεομένην ἀποθανεῖν βιαι ἑθάντω. Ἀνὰ δὲ χρόνον Κρῆτας θεοῦ σφέας ἐποτρύναντος, πάντα πλήν Πολυχνιτέων τε καὶ Πραισίων, ἀπικομένους στόλῳ μεγάλῳ ἐς Σικανίην πολιορκέειν ἔπε’ ἔτεα πέντε πόλιν Καμικόν, τὴν κατ’ ἐμὲ Ἀκραγαντίνου ἔνεμοντο. [2] τέλος δὲ οὐ δυνάμενους οὔτε ἔλειν οὔτε παραμένειν λιμῷ συνεστεώτας, ἀπολιπόντας οἴχεσθαι. Ὡς δὲ κατὰ Τηπυγῆν γενέσθαι πλέοντας, ὑπολαβόντα σφέας χειμῶνα μέγαν ἐκβάλειν ἐς τὴν γῆν· συναραχθέντων δὲ τῶν πλοίων (οὐδεμιὰν γὰρ σφι ἐκιδομήν ἐς Κρῆτην φαῖνεσθαι), ἐνθαῦτα ὑπὸ τῆν πόλιν κτίσαντας καταμείηνας τε καὶ μεταβαλόντας ὁμιλῆσαν διὰ τῆς Κρήτης ὕστερον πολλῷ ἐξαναστάντες προσέπταισαν μεγάλως ὃστε φόνος Ἕλληνικός μέγιστος οὔτος δὲ ἐγένετο πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἔδειν, αὐτῶν τε Ταραντίνων καὶ Ψηγίνον, οἱ ὑπὸ Μικύθου τοῦ Χοίρου ἀναγκαζόμενοι τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ἀπικόμενοι τιμωροὶ Ταραντίνους ἀπέθανον τρισχίλιοι οὕτω. αὐτῶν δὲ Ταραντίνων οὐκ ἐπὶ ἄρθρῳ. [4] Ο ὁ δὲ Μίκυθος, οἰκείτης ἐν Ἄναξίλεω, ἐπιτροπὸς Ἀσημίνου κατελέλειπτο, οὕτος δὲ περ ἐκπεσόν ἐκ Ἁγίου καὶ Τεγέην τὴν Ἀρκάδων οἰκήσας ἀνέθηκε ἐν Ὀλυμπίῃ τούς πολλοὺς ἀνδριάντας. (171) Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Ἀσημίνους τε καὶ Ταραντίνους τοῦ λόγου μοι παρενθηκή γέγονε. Ἐς δὲ
Since it is said that after arriving at Sicania (which is now called Sicily) to look for Daedalus, Minos died a violent death. In time, at the urging of a god, all of the Cretans except for the Polichnians and the Praesians reached Sicania with a large fleet and besieged the city of Camicus for five years, which the Acragantines used to inhabit in my time. In the end, since they were unable to capture the city or stick around after being beset by hunger, they picked up and left for home. But when it happened that they were sailing off Iapygia, a great storm overtook them and cast them out onto land. Since their ships had been wrecked and they no longer had any way of getting back to Crete, they then founded the city of Hyria and remained there, having changed from Cretans to Messapian Iapygians and from islanders to mainlanders. From the city of Hyria they set up other colonies, including those which the Tarentines in much later times tried to destroy and suffered such a terrible defeat that this became the greatest Greek slaughter of all those we know, both for the Tarentines and the Rhegians. Three thousand citizens from the latter died, who had been forced by Micythus son of Choerus to come to the Tarentines’ aid. There was no count of the Tarentines who were killed. Micythus, who was a slave of Anaxilaus, had been left behind as governor of Rhegium. This was the man who after being expelled from Rhegium and after settling in Arcadian Tegea set up all those statues at Olympia. But these matters pertaining to the Rhegians and Tarentines have come about as an addendum to my account. But as the Praesians say, other peoples, mostly Greeks, settled on Crete after it had been deserted. In the third generation after Minos’ death, the Trojan War broke out, in which the Cretans showed themselves to be not the least capable avengers for Menelaus. But in exchange for this, the Cretans got plague and famine when they came home, both they and their flocks. The result is that with Crete having been deserted a second time, the Cretans who now inhabit the island represent the third wave along with those who had remained from before.

Although it is not a stretch to infer from this complex narrative that the Cretans are driven to act as they do for fear of being decimated by the waves of war and migration that plagued their island in the time of Minos and the Trojan War, Herodotus...
does not tell us whether this was what truly spurred their repudiation of the Hellenic League. However, what he *does* tell us (i.e. that the ensuing battle of 473 BCE between the Tarentines and the Rhegians\(^{70}\) was the “greatest slaughter of all those we know” (…φόνος Ἑλληνικὸς μέγιστος οὖτος δὴ ἐγένετο πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἱδον, 7.170.3)) can explain this apparent omission if we think back to a basic feature of Herodotean aetiology first expressed in the priamel in the proem to the *Histories*. Just as the remark that Croesus was the first person he *knew* (τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸν πρῶτον…, 1.5.3) to have inflicted unjust deeds against the Greeks demarcates what can be known about the historical versus the distant past, so, too, does the first person interjection about the battle between the Tarentines and the Rhegians in the Cretan aetiology delimit what can be deduced from ἱστορίη.\(^{71}\) But while this paradoxical distinction may serve to underscore the mendacity of these proverbial liars and so undercut the veracity of their account, we must be mindful of the fact that Herodotus does not disavow the events of either the *spatium mythicum* or the *spatium historicum* in 7.170-171 any more than he does in 1.5.3.\(^{72}\) Instead, he asks us to see these points in time as part of an inextricable whole and to consider their possible bearing on what has yet to be.

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\(^{70}\) On the historical context of this battle, see e.g. Munson (2006) 266-267 and Prontera (2013) 129-130. See also n. 75 below for a different interpretation of this reference.

\(^{71}\) Munson (2012) 211-212. That the battle between the Tarentines and Rhegians was the “greatest” Greek slaughter (μέγιστος, 7.170.3) may also serve to signpost an epistemological obstacle and thereby prompt “superlative revision” (see Bloomer (1993), discussed in Chapter 2.1).

\(^{72}\) The fact that the entire account is framed by oratio obliqua in one form or another (Λέγεται, 7.170.1; ὡς λέγουσι Πραίσιοι, 7.171.1) may also alert us to the problems of trusting Cretans (see n. 30 in Chapter One on this topos) and of Quellenforschung in general, but as in 1.1-5 and the derivative examples of 2.2-3 and 4.5-12 we have now studied in Chapters 2.1 and 4.1, implicit questioning via indirect statement does not amount to a patent, wholesale indictment.
The manner in which Herodotus establishes this continuum by fusing the past with the narrative present (and by extension the future) finds yet another point of departure in the proem, namely, the section that immediately follows the priamel:

…I will proceed with my *logos* by going through great and small human settlements alike. [4] For many of those settlements that were great in the past have become small, and those that were great in my time were once small. Knowing, then, that human prosperity never abides in the same place, I will mention both alike.

As we discussed in Chapter One, Herodotus’ integration of the present (γέγονε, ἐπιστάμενος) with the past (ἠν) and the future (ἐπιμνήσομαι) in the conclusion to the proem invites a dialogue with subsequent generations of readers about the nature of change far beyond the confines of the event under immediate consideration, yet stops short of positing one explicit meaning or citing one specific parallel. The aetiology of 7.169-171 exemplifies this pattern in that it builds up towards the explanation of the evolution of the Cretans from islanders to mainlanders in the time of Minos (7.170.2) and then to islanders again after the Trojan War (7.171.2), a point which ultimately raises the question of what further changes the Cretans will undergo in the generations to come.

While Irwin may be right to see the answer to this question in Minos’ search for Daedalus

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74 The remark that “…the Cretans besieged Camicus, which the Acragantines inhabited in my day” (πολιορκέοιν…Καμικόν, τὴν κατ’ ἐμὲ Ἀκραγαντῖνοι ἐνέμοντο, 7.170.1) is a prime example of what Naiden (1999) calls the “prospective imperfect.” On this construction, see esp. Chapter Six below.
in Sicily (κατὰ ζήτησιν Δαιδάλου, 7.170.1), which she believes looks ahead to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and even the doomed Sicilian expedition, this apparent association is never marked out directly. Rather, as with every case study we have now considered in this chapter, the aetiology of 7.169-171 turns out to be proleptic of points that are not absolutely circumscribed. So that we may better understand this programmatic tendency of Herodotus to use original narratives to expand our critical gaze and cause us to project into the realm of the unknown, let us turn to the all-important end of the Histories and offer some conclusions based on our findings from previous chapters.

Irwin (2007) 220-222. In addition to viewing ζήτησις as a kind of code word for the Sicilian expedition (cf. Thuc. 1.20.3 and Eur. Cyc. 14), Irwin also sees Herodotus’ comment on the battle between the Rhegians and the Tarentines being “the greatest Greek slaughter of all those we know” (…φόνος Ἑλληνικὸς μέγιστος οὗτος δὴ ἐγένετο πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδομεν, 7.170.3) as a reference to Thucydides’ assessment of the demise of the Athenian fleet at Syracuse in 413 BCE (ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δὲ ἔρμοις καὶ ἄν ἀκοῆ Ἑλληνικὸν ἴδμεν κ.τ.λ., Thuc. 7.87.5-6). But even if ζήτησις were not a common word throughout the Histories (e.g. 1.94.6, 2.44.4, 2.54.2, 4.140.1, 5.21.2, etc.), there would still be problems assigning such a late date to the composition and publication of Herodotus’ text during the Peloponnesian War (see n. 22 above).
6. What’s Past is Prologue: Seeing Aetiology as Teleology

The preceding chapters of this work have all sought to demonstrate the programmatic significance of aetiology to Herodotean methodology in even the most disparate places in the Histories. However, by directing us consistently to look past the question of origins at hand and pushing us ever deeper into the unknown, Herodotus may seem fundamentally more concerned with ends than beginnings. On one level, this is consistent with the maxim of his alter ego, Solon,¹ who informs Croesus in the Lydian λόγος that “it is necessary to look carefully at the end of every matter to see how it will turn out” (Σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται, 1.32.9).² But while Solon’s teleological outlook does indeed reverberate throughout the Histories, this perspective does not negate the importance of aetiology to Herodotus’ work.³ On the contrary, if we follow Solon’s advice and look to the end of the Histories, we will discover that the message there is much the same as it was in the beginning of the work, namely, that there is always something beyond what can be known definitively about the past and the future, both of which turn out to be complementary points on the chronological spectrum. Therefore, in order to make this final case for narrative and methodological cohesion across the Histories as far as aetiology is concerned, we will

¹ See e.g. Shapiro (1996) 348 n. 1 and Pelling (2004) 103 n. 43 for lists of scholars who see Solon functioning as the inscribed author of the Histories (now a commonplace in Herodotean studies).
² See below for further discussion.
³ In addition to the paradigmatic examples from the life of Croesus set out below, the speech of Socles (5.92), the longest in the Histories, is also directed towards an end (i.e. inchoate Athenian hegemony), but an end that is vague and contingent upon dubious prophecies from the past (see e.g. Stadter (1992) 781-785, Moles (2007), and Grethlein (2013) 215-223).
conclude by indicating the correspondence between these all-important bookends and the λόγοι they enclose. As a way of prefacing these remarks, let us start by considering the advice of Solon in more detail.

6.1 Back to the Future: Anticipating a Chronological Paradox

As several scholars have observed in the case of the teleological dictum set out at 1.32.9, it is something of a paradox that Solon’s words can portend Croesus’ end so assuredly, yet still be so vague in articulating how and when it will come about.4 While certain narratological demands may account for this contradictory type of prolepsis (such as the need to create and maintain suspense),5 Solon’s failure to specify what constitutes “the end of every matter” (παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τέλευτήν) substantiates a thematic point of critical importance to Herodotus’ own intellectual outlook that is reiterated throughout the Histories: in the great march of time, the end is never quite the end.6 Indeed, even after Croesus is deposed, he himself does not come to an end, but is paradoxically saved

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4 On the one hand, the fact that Croesus’ rejection of Solon’s mandate to look to the end (1.33) is immediately juxtaposed with his impending downfall (Μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον, 1.34.1) appears to validate Solon’s teleological perspective. On the other hand, the multivalence of Solon’s remarks in the Lydian λόγος leading up to the climatic dictum in 1.32.9 make it difficult to discern what Solon is actually referring to here (see e.g. Pelling (2006b) and Branscome (2013) 24-53). Compare the similarly prescient yet vague warning of Croesus’ doom issued at 1.13.2.

5 See e.g. Grethlein (2009) 164 (following de Jong (1999) and Rengakos (2006)): “It can be concluded that the reconfiguration of time in the Histories establishes a strong discrepancy between characters and readers. The temporal organization of the narrative combined with the use of perspective and focalization emphasizes on the one hand the disappointment of expectations at the level of action, and, on the other, safely guides the readers through the narrative without major surprises, while at the same time maintaining suspense as to the exact character of the further development.”

6 See Lateiner (1989) 44-45 for examples of how Herodotus’ closing formulae exemplify this theme on the most basic textual level throughout the Histories.
from death on the pyre by recalling Solon’s dictum to his conqueror Cyrus (1.86). From there, he is made to serve in much the same capacity as Solon once did for him, first as “wise adviser” to Cyrus (1.207), and then to Cyrus’ successor Cambyses (3.36) before all but vanishing from the narrative.

That this sort of reversal of fortune will not be limited solely to Croesus as the Histories unfold is presaged by the programmatic statement made in the conclusion of the proem, which encapsulates the dichotomy of vicissitude and constancy inherent to Herodotus’ worldview:

…προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὡμοίως μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξῆρων. [4] Ὁ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρὰ γέγονεν: τὰ δὲ ἐπ’ ἐμέ ἦν μεγάλα, πρῶτον ἦν σμικρά. Τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον ἐν τῷ ὑπό μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι ἄνθρωπον ὡμοίως (1.5.3-4).

…I will proceed with my logos by going through great and small human settlements alike, [4] for many of those that were great in the past have become small, and those that were great in my time were once small. Knowing, then, that human prosperity never abides in the same place, I will mention both alike.

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7 The impetus for Croesus’ rescue from the pyre stems from his recollection of the maxim of 1.32.9: Τῷ δὲ Κροίσῳ ἑστεῶτι ἐπὶ τῆς πυρῆς ἐσελθεῖν, καίπερ ἐν κακῷ ἐόντι τοσοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος, ὡς οἱ εἴη σὺν θεῷ ἐφαρμένοι, τὸ «μηδένα εἶναι τῶν ζωόντων ὄλβιον» (1.86.3). While Croesus’ equation of the end with death is a reduction of a much more general understanding of ends which Solon hints at (see Pelling (2006b) 159 and Branscome (2013) 49-50), the teleological focus of 1.32.9 is nevertheless instrumental in bringing about the paradoxical extension of Croesus’ life.

8 For summaries of the “wise adviser” motif in Herodotus, see e.g. Bischoff (1932), Lattimore (1939), and Immerwahr (1966) 72-75. For discussions of Croesus’ own ambiguous role as wise adviser following the Lydian λόγος, see e.g. Stahl (1975), Shapiro (1994), and Pelling (2006b).

9 With the exception of several analepses (i.e. 5.36, 6.37, 6.125), we never hear what happens to Croesus after he flees from the wrath of Cambyses (3.36). As Evans (1978) postulates, the historical tradition surrounding Croesus’ fate was vague enough to have allowed Herodotus to subject the Lydian king to a less decisive end than the ones handed down by others (cf. esp. the third ode of Bacchylides, discussed in Crane (1996)). Though it is impossible to determine with certainty whether Croesus’ indistinct end amounts to an ironic affirmation of Solon’s maxim in 1.32.9, this is not unlikely given Croesus’ role as a literary model in the Histories.
The conclusion to the proem is remarkable not only for the way it seamlessly blends the past, the present, and the future together, but also for where it falls in the grand scheme of Herodotus’ text. Though it scarcely need be mentioned that Solon’s adage about ends is supported most explicitly in the beginning of the Histories, this irony has been largely understated. We will therefore strive to emphasize the significance of this chronological paradox to the conclusion to the Histories and so demonstrate the inextricability of aetiology from teleology.

By the time we reach Book Nine of the Histories, the extent to which things appear to have changed since Herodotus first began to trace the humble origins of Persian hegemony in Book One is huge. Against all odds, a loose confederation of Greek states has managed to repel the might of the Persian Empire’s second expedition across the Aegean, thereby shifting the balance of power in favor of the former with a resounding victory at Salamis (8.40-125). But while the changes following the events of 480-479 BCE are themselves enormous, Herodotus begins to suggest at this stage in his narrative that the nature of these changes is not altogether surprising or out of step with several key patterns established towards the beginning of the Histories. One of the first indicators of this reversal comes in the form of an anecdote about the aftermath of the battle of Plataea (9.25-89), when the victorious Spartan general, Pausanias, puts goods abandoned by the Persians in the wake of their defeat to an unusual use:

10 Grethlein (2013) 222 observes that the use of the prospective imperfect to describe “…a future that is indefinite, perhaps infinite” (pace Naiden (1999) 142) may also be located in the three uses of ἔν in 1.5.3-4. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Chapter 1.3.
When Xerxes was fleeing from Greece, he left his things to Mardonius. Now when Pausanias saw Mardonius’ things decked out in gold and silver and embroidered hangings, he ordered the bakers and cooks to prepare dinner as they would for Mardonius. [2] And they did this at Pausanias’ bidding, and then, when he saw the gold and silver couches with beautiful coverings and the gold and silver tables and accoutrements befitting the feast, he was struck by all the good things lying before him, and as a joke, he ordered his attendants to prepare a Spartan dinner. [3] Once the meal was ready, Pausanias laughed at the huge difference and summoned the Greek generals. When they were all there, Pausanias pointed to each of the two meals and said, “Men of Greece, I brought you here because I wanted to show you the foolishness of the Persian king, who invaded our land with such a lifestyle as this in order to rob us of the meager one we possess.”

Even before he relates this anecdote about Pausanias, Herodotus seems ambivalent about the consequences of a Greek victory at Plataea when he calls it the “fairest victory of all those we know” (νίκην…καλλίστην ἁπασέων τῶν ἴδμεν, 9.64.1), a distinction which evokes the sort of irony that has already gone hand-in-hand with many superlative statements made throughout Histories.11 This interpretation is

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11 See esp. the discussion of 2.2-3 in Chapter 2.1 (following Bloomer (1993)).
substantiated not only by two conspicuous instances of joking and laughter in the scene
above (which Lateiner has shown to be signs of impending reversal in Herodotus),
but also by what has led up to Pausanias’ mock-Persian banquet and what will follow. And
yet, Herodotus does not pass explicit judgment on the meaning of this episode, but rather
points to past and future analogues for us to ponder and so reach our own conclusions. As
we shall see, his reasons for doing so will find justification in the programmatic
statements concerning the inextricability of teleology from aetiology set out above.

With the benefit of Thucydides’ account, Pausanias’ conduct at the banquet may
be said to foreshadow the Spartan general’s purported medism after Plataea, including his
indulgence in the very Persian luxuries he decries in the passage immediately above.
Although Herodotus himself seems to hint at this about-face on at least two occasions,
we must be mindful of the fact that the question of Pausanias’ allegiances was as
controversial in antiquity as it is today. And yet, even if his reputation as a medizer had
been more secure, Herodotus is unlikely to have judged Pausanias’ role in the
Pentecontaetia on a personal level, not only because reputation is unstable in the longue

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12 See Lateiner (1977) 177 ad loc. See also Raafaub (1987) for a general discussion of Herodotus’ role as
dramatic ironist (see pp. 245-246 ad loc.).
13 On Pausanias’ medism, see Thuc. 1.94-95 and 1.128-138. On Pausanias’ hypocritical adoption of
luxurious Persian clothes and diet, see esp. Thuc. 1.130.
14 Cf. 5.32 and 8.3.2.
15 See e.g. Evans (1988) for an analysis of two conflicting traditions regarding Pausanias in antiquity,
which make a consensus about his medism all but impossible to reach. Compare Herodotus’ depiction of
Themistocles, which, though less opaque than that of Pausanias, is also ambiguous when the Athenian
general’s conduct before and after the battle of Salamis is weighed together (see e.g. Blösel (2001) and
durée,\textsuperscript{16} but also because Pausanias’ banquet says more about a human tendency than an individual one, namely, the proclivity towards acquisition that can lead to empire.

This point is reinforced if we look back to the speech that the wise-adviser Sardanis gives to Croesus on the eve of his doomed campaign across the river Halys, which explains how the Persians came to acquire the sort of fineries the Spartans mock at Pausanias’ banquet:


“O King, you are preparing to march out against such men as these, who wear leather trousers and other clothes made of leather, and eat not as much as they want, but as much as they have because they have a rugged land. [3] What’s more, they do not use wine, but are water-drinkers, and they do not have figs to eat or anything else that is good. Now, if you conquer them, what will you deprive them of since they have nothing? But if you are conquered, know how many good things you will throw away, for once they have tasted our good things, they will cling to them and they will be impossible to get rid of. [4] I for my part thank the gods for not putting it in the minds of the Persians to march out against the Lydians.” In spite of these words, Sardanis did not persuade Croesus. Indeed, before they overthrew the Lydians, the Persians did not have anything fine or good.

\textsuperscript{16} Recall 1.5.3-4 (see above). Though Fornara (1971) 64-65 is right to apply Solon’s maxim from 1.32.9 to the case of Pausanias, he takes the sage’s words much as Croesus does (see n. 7) to refer not to ends themselves, but to the “instability of good fortune.” In light of Pausanias’ wretched demise in Thucydides (1.134), this interpretation is not incorrect, but it takes for granted what Herodotus only suggests implicitly and so circumscribes Pausanias’ end more than the programmatic statements concerning teleology instruct us to do.
The fact that the Persians come to embrace luxury goods only after they have conquered their Lydian foes in this, their first step towards the enlargement of the Achaemenid Empire, makes an even stronger case for seeing the banquet of Pausanias as a foreshadowing of the Greeks’ internecine struggle over empire, which also has its origins in the most unpretentious simplicity. However, the matter-of-fact conclusion of this aetiology (Ταύτα λέγων οὖκ ἐπειθε τὸν Κροῖσον. Πέρσηςι γάρ, πρὶν Λυδοὺς καταστρέψασθαι, ἣν οὔτε ἁβρὸν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, 1.71.4) suggests that what happened to the Persians will not be unique to them or to any other people for that matter (the dubious influence of climate and geography notwithstanding). This broad interpretation is consistent not only with Herodotus’ ecumenical understanding of ethnicity advocated.”

17 Note Croesus’ warning to Cyrus about the dangers of the Persians ransacking Lydian goods at Sardis: Πέρσαι, φύσιν έόντες ὑβρισταί, εἰς ἀχρήματι. Ἡν ὁν σὺ τούτων περιόδης διαφανέσαντας καὶ κατασχόντας χρήματα μεγάλα, τάδε τοι ἔξ αὐτῶν ἑπίδοξα γενέσθαι· ὡς ὁ αὐτῶν πλείστα κατάσχη, τούτων προσδέκεσθαι τοῦ ἐπαναστηρησόμενον (1.89.2).

18 Recall 9.82.3, noting in particular the Pan-Hellenic implications of Pausanias’ address to “Ἀνδρείς Ἐλληνες.” That Pausanias here describes the Spartan way of life as “woeful” (ὀϊζυρὴν) may also indicate ironic foreshadowing, given the word’s status as a ἁπάξ λεγόμενον in Herodotus and its strong poetic associations with war and grief in Homer (e.g. Il. 3.112, Od. 5.105). See Flower and Marincola (2002) ad loc. for additional examples.

19 See e.g. Harrison (2009) 391-392 on the imperial proclivities of the most unlikely groups of people in the Histories (e.g. Ethiopians, Thracians, etc.), which, though unsubstantiated in this particular narrative, could very well be made manifest in the future given Herodotus’ emphasis on the mutability of national character (see the discussion of 9.120.4 ff. below for a vivid demonstration of this reversal).

20 Sardanis’ juxtaposition of a land’s quality (χώρην…τρηχέαν, 1.71.2) with its luxuries or lack thereof (e.g. wine and figs, 1.71.3) may point to an argument from climatic and geographic determinism, thereby limiting his warning to certain peoples. Though the existence of this schema is not unfounded in the Histories, Herodotus suggests here as elsewhere that this sort of determinism cannot account for a people’s devolution from hard to soft by itself (see esp. 2.35-36 and 4.36, discussed in Chapters 2.3 and 4.2 respectively). Other factors such as a given people’s customs (i.e. νόμοι et al.) and way of life (i.e. δίαιτα) must account for this change as well (see Thomas (2000) 102-114). Even then, there are suggestions that those ἐθνά that are predisposed to softness are not without “hard” qualities (see e.g. 1.79.3 for the remark about the courage and bravery of the Lydians (discussed in Thomas (2000) 109) and 9.40, 9.62-63, 9.68.1, 9.71.1, 9.102.3 on the excellence of Persian warriors (discussed in Pelling (1997) 62-63)). On the hard/soft dichotomy, cf. 1.155-156, 1.211, 5.49, and esp. 9.122 (discussed below).
throughout this dissertation, but also with the open-endedness of ends we have already started to glimpse in the examples above. To solidify the validity of this reading, no end will be more important than the last chapter of the *Histories* (9.122), which will also hearken back to 1.71 along with several other antecedents corresponding with the beginning of the work. For the moment, however, it is enough to note that our analysis of Pausanias’ banquet has required us to look back in order to look forward to a future that appears at once assured and imprecise. In order to show just how closely aetiology and teleology are bound to one another in this regard, let us proceed with our discussion of the aftermath of the battle of Plataea as a way of prefacing our consideration of the conclusion to the *Histories*.

6.2 Coming Full Circle

After recounting another Greek victory won against the Persians at the battle of Mycale (9.93-107), Herodotus initiates the process of concluding the *Histories*. But the closer he gets to the ending of the work, the more we are directed to look to its beginning. This is in keeping with the conventions of ring composition exemplified in Homeric poetry, whose influence on the final chapters of Book Nine has been detected by a number of scholars. Noteworthy among them is Herington, who convincingly correlates
three sets of episodes in both the end and the beginning of the Histories: A) the lustful actions of Xerxes and Candaules (9.108-113 and 1.8-13), B) the execution of Artaýctes and the Greco-Persian conflict in the proem (9.116-121 and 1.1.1-5), and C) Cyrus’ epilogue and the very beginning of the Histories (9.122 and 1.1.0 ff.). These pairings are important not only in that they make one of the strongest cases yet argued for the completion of the Histories, but also because they collectively show, better than any individual example, that the opposing ends on the chronological spectrum are indeed dialogic in Herodotus.

Even if the philological similarities between the two corresponding episodes in case A) were not so pronounced, it would still be easy to read Xerxes’ sexual misconduct towards the wife and daughter of his brother Masistes in Book Nine as a reprise of Candaules’ own misconduct towards his wife at the start of the Lydian λόγος. But while Xerxes’ transgressions (including the eventual murder of Masistes) may be emblematic of a stereotypically “oriental” morality, such depraved acts will not be limited to Persian

for discussions of this convention and other compositional techniques in the end of the Histories. See also Myres (1953) 62-64, 300 on the influence of “pedimental” composition in this place.


24 For the reasons set out below, the following discussion will stand with Herington (1991a) 150: “While the book [i.e. the Histories] is open-ended as a strictly historical narrative, as a work of archaic art it is perfectly and unambiguously closed.” This is not to say, however, that Herodotus’ work, though structurally complete, necessarily represents a “final draft.” For an introduction to this complex question pertaining to the composition of the Histories (which still lacks a consensus), see Jacoby (1913) cols. 372-379. See also Boedeker (1988) 30-32 for additional bibliography.

25 See Herington (1991a) 152-153, following Wolff (1964), ad 9.108-113. The most striking parallels concern two major programmatic motifs: fate (…χρήν γάρ Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς κ.τ.λ., 1.8.2; Τῇ δὲ κακῶς γὰρ ἐδει πανοικῇ γενέσθαι, 9.109.2) and wonder (Ὁ δὲ Γύγης τέως μὲν ἀπεθανείτε τὰ λεγόμενα κ.τ.λ., 1.11.3; Ὁ δὲ Μασίστης ἀποθωμάσας τὰ λεγόμενα, 9.111.3), both of which admit a huge amount of ambiguity for the reader to work through (see below). See also Blok (2002) 230-232 for a discussion of how this episode relates to the issue of female agency in the Histories.
court intrigues. As the wheel of fortune turns and the mantle of power is transferred in the last chapters of the *Histories*, we are led back inexorably to the proem with Xerxes’ renewal of a familiar cycle of violence and retribution, which will blur not only the distinction between reality and pretext, but also the distinction between Greek and barbarian.

These categories start to meld into one another as soon as Herodotus shifts his focus back to the relentless drive of the Greeks against the Persians following the battle of Mycale (case B in Herington). For instance, it is significant that those Greek forces dispatched with the express purpose of destroying the Persian bridges spanning the Hellespont do not fall back even when they find the Persians’ escape route already broken up. Instead, they stay as ordered by the commanding Athenian general, Xanthippus, so as to “make an attempt upon the Chersonese” (πειρᾶσθαι τῆς Χερσονήσου, 9.114.2). From a certain point of view, Xanthippus’ decision to lay siege to the occupied town of Sestos in spite of his objective already having been achieved (and

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26 See Boedeker (2011) 232 for an exploration of how “ruling Persians do not differ so much in kind from other men and women in the “Histories”, but because of the immense power they wield, their history shows in larger scale the unforeseen, far-reaching effects that occur when these two different kinds of human beings interact.” On the Masistes’ episode in particular, see pp. 220-221.
27 See Ayo (1984) 43 for an eloquent summation of this reciprocal phenomenon: “Prolog lusts lead to epilog invasion defeats and court intrigues of incest, mutilation, and parricide. Greed leads to war. In the epilog, lust and war are not now seed and harvest; they rage on as passions out of control, one feeding the other like the strophe and antistrophe of a tragic chorus.”
28 In this respect, we are already well on our way to Thucydides, whose coexistent causal schemes (e.g. aἰτίαι, προφάσεις, etc.) find much in common with Herodotus’ multivalent understanding of aetiology advocated throughout this dissertation (see Pelling (2000) 82-103).
29 …τὰς γεφύρας εὕρεν διαλελυμένας…καὶ τούτον οὐκ ἢκιστα εἶνεκεν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλησπόντον ἀτίκοντο (9.114.1).
the repeated requests from his men to return home) presupposes the existence of imperialist motives from the get-go. Even though Herodotus does not explicitly deny such ulterior aims on the part of the Athenian general who is also Pericles’ father, the denouement of the siege of Sestos, set precariously astride the border of Europe and Asia, presupposes additional motives (e.g. vengeance) stemming from an older and more complex struggle. As we have now come to expect from Herodotus’ fundamentally integrative approach to aetiology, the reasons for the Greek expedition against the Hellespont will entail more than the passing of the baton of hegemony from one regional power to another.  

The notion that the siege of Sestos represents not only a contest of Realpolitik but a primordial struggle as well is indicated by the manner in which the local Persian governor Artaïctes comes to occupy the tomb and sanctuary of the hero Protesilaus, the first Greek to die in the battle for Troy. Though it later turns out that Artaïctes has more

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30 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιορκεομένοισι σφι φθινόπωρον ἔπεγίνετο, καὶ ἡσαχαλλὸν οἱ Αθηναῖοι ἀπὸ τῇ τῆς ἱστοι ἀποδημόνες καὶ οὔ δυνάμενοι ἔξελεῖν τὸ τείχος, ἐδέσοντο [τε] τῶν στρατηγῶν δόκως ἀπάγουν σφέας ὀπίσω· οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἔφασαν πρὶν ἢ ἔξελον ἢ τὸ Αθηναίων κοινὸν σφέας μεταπέμψαι· οὕτω δὴ ἐστεργον τά παρεόντα (9.117).  
31 Herodotus’ ambivalence about empire is exemplified in his account of the birth of Pericles, in which he records that Pericles’ mother, Agarista, dreamed that she gave birth to a lion (6.131.2), an animal with “polyvalent connotations” in the Histories (Munson (2001) 244-247, quotation at 245). See also Fornara (1971) 53-54.  
32 See Boedeker (1988), esp. pp. 32-33, where she posits that Herodotus reveals his knowledge of (at least) two traditions for the siege of Sestos (i.e Athenian and Chersonesian), neither of which are privileged.  
34 Cf. 4.1.1-2 (discussed in Chapter 4.1 above).  
35 …τὸν δ’ ἔκτανε Δάρδανος ἄνηρ // νηὸς ἀποθροσκοῦντα πολὺ πρότισθον Ἀχαιῶν (II. 2.701-702).
selfish motives for taking over the sanctuary of Protesilaus than the ones he intimates,\textsuperscript{36} he prevails upon Xerxes to let him have it, ostensibly “so that all may learn not to make war against your land” (…ίναι καὶ τις μάθη ἐπὶ γῆν τὴν σὴν μὴ στρατεύεσθαι, 9.116.3). That Artaïctes resolves to pay back the Greek who stood at the fore of the initial incursion into Asia, a land which the Persians consider to be entirely their own (τὴν Ἀσίην πᾶσαν νομίζουσι ἐωυτῶν εἶναι Πέρσαι, 9.116.3), takes us straight back to the proem, where requital for original wrongs during the Trojan War led to the establishment of the continental boundary that is still being contested at the end of the \textit{Histories}:\textsuperscript{37}

\begin{quote}
[3] Σφέας μὲν δὴ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης λέγουσι Πέρσαι ἀρπαξμένων τῶν γυναικῶν λόγον οὐδένα ποιήσασθαι, Ἐλληνας δὲ Λακεδαίμονις εἰςκεκιβηκέν γυναικὸς στόλον μέγαν συναγείραι καὶ ἔπειτα ἔλθόντας ἐς τὴν Ασίην τὴν Πριάμου δύναμιν κατελεῖν. [4] Απὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἰς ἐν τῇ Ἑλληνικῷ σφὶ εἶναι πολέμου. Τὴν γὰρ Ασίην καὶ τὰ ἔνοικον ἐθνόν ἐξαίρεσθαι καὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ἄφηναι (1.4.3-4).
\end{quote}

[3] The Persians say that they for their part took no account of the abductions of their women from Asia, but the Greeks amassed a huge army for the sake of a Spartan woman and then invaded Asia and destroyed Priam’s power. [4] From this time on, they have always considered the Greeks to be their enemy, for the Persians claim Asia and the barbarian nations that live there as their own, but they consider Europe and the Greeks to be separate.

It is no wonder, then, that Artaïctes’ subsequent defilement of Protesilaus’ shrine with the theft of sacred objects, unlawful agriculture, and illicit sex\textsuperscript{38} in the context of this volatile setting reignites ancient enmities that make the end of the \textit{Histories} look much

\textsuperscript{36} See n. 38 below.
\textsuperscript{37} Boedeker (1988) 42.
\textsuperscript{38} …τὰ χρήματα ἐξ ᾿Ελαϊοῦντος ἐς Σηστόν ἔξοφρησε καὶ τὸ τέμνονς ἔσπειρε καὶ ἔνεμε, αὐτὸς τε ὅκως ἀπίκοπτο ἐς ᾿Ελαϊοῦντα, ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ γυναῖξ εἴμιστο (9.116.3). These actions as well as their consequences are foreshadowed at 7.33.
like the beginning. But while the punishment that is eventually meted out against Artaγctes for his wrongdoing may appear to be a simple case of “tit for tat” like the Greeks’ abduction of Europa early on in the proem (ἰσα πρός ἵσα, 1.2.1), there are a number of indications that what happens to the Persian governor will be no more reciprocal than the actions that brought about the delineation of Europe and Asia in 1.4.3-4.39

The first such indication comes after the Greeks break the siege of Sestos and capture Artaγctes, who witnesses a remarkable portent of a dead fish come back to life and then explains it to a prison guard as follows:

Ξείνε Ἀθηναῖε, μηδὲν φοβέο τὸ τέρας τούτο· οὐ γὰρ σοὶ πέφηνε, ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ σημαίνει ὁ ἐν Ἐλαιοῦντι Προτεσίλεως ὁτι καὶ τεθνεώς καὶ τάριχος ἐστὶν ὁ δύναμιν πρὸς θεῶν ἔχει τὸν ἀδικέοντα τίνεσθαι. [3] Νῦν ὃν ἄποινά μοι τάδε ἐθέλω ἐπιθήναι, ἀντὶ μὲν [χρημάτων] τὸν ἔλαβον ἐκ τοῦ ἱροῦ ἐκατὸν τάλαντα καταθεῖναι τῷ θεῷ, ἀντὶ δὲ ἐμεουτοῦ καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς ἁποδώσω τάλαντα διηκόσια Ἀθηναῖοις περιγενόμενος (9.120.2-3).

“Athenian stranger, do not fear this portent, for it is not meant for you, but it is for me that Proteílaus from Elaeus indicates that he, though dead and dry, has power from the gods to exact retribution against the one who commits injustice. [3] Now I am willing to impose the following penalty upon myself: to offer one hundred talents to the god in exchange for what I took from the shrine; and I will pay two hundred talents to the Athenians for myself and my son if I am left alive.”

Artaγctes’ recognition of the ability of Proteílaus to seek redress for his impious acts at the behest of the gods (…δύναμιν πρὸς θεῶν ἔχει τὸν ἀδικέοντα τίνεσθαι, 9.120.2) makes divine vengeance seem like a foregone conclusion, especially in light of the disaster that befell Xerxes for his similar transgressions just a few chapters earlier.40 Although his

39 On the lack of reciprocity in the proem, see Chapter One.
40 See above (ad 9.108-113).
eventual punishment may ultimately have some such impetus, Herodotus does not explicitly identify the agency of the gods any more than he does in the proem.\(41\) The agency of the Greeks, however, is on full display once they reject Artaýctes’ personal indemnity (ἄποινα, 9.120.3) of two hundred talents (which could have gone a long way towards funding their nascent imperial ambitions) in order to undertake an act of primal retribution:\(42\)

\[\text{In spite of these promises, he was getting nowhere with the general Xanthippus, for the Elaeans were asking that he be strung up as punishment for Protesilaus, and the general himself was so minded. So they led him away to the headland where Xerxes had bridged the strait (though some say that they led him to the hill overlooking the city of Madytus), and they fastened him to boards and hung him up. Then they stoned Artaýctes’ son before his eyes.}\]

As Desmond observes, it is noteworthy that the method of execution the Greeks choose for Artaýctes is similar to the one preferred by the Persians.\(43\) Not only does

\(41\) See Hollmann (2011) 237-239 for a good discussion of the broad semiotic valence of the portent at 9.120.2-3, which Herodotus ultimately leaves open. Compare the similar parable of the fish and the flute-player, which Cyrus tells to the Ionians and the Aerolians (1.141, discussed at n. 67 in Chapter Two).

\(42\) This enormous indemnity represents a third of Athens’ allied tribute at the start of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.13.3), equal to about five metric tons of silver (see Sosin (2014) 43 for this conversion and other helpful equivalences). Ransom is also a unifying force in the bookends to the \textit{Iliad} (see e.g. Wilson (2002) and Cairns (2011) on ἄποινα and other forms of compensation in Homer). But whereas Achilles ultimately accepts Priam’s “boundless ransom” (ἀπερείσι’ ἄποινα, \textit{Il.} 24.578) for Hector at the close of the \textit{Iliad}, Xanthippus rejects Artaýctes’ similarly boundless offer, suggesting that the conflict between Persians and Greeks will ultimately continue beyond the end of the \textit{Histories} (see Herington (1991a) 158-160 for other such indications based on a close reading of the last book of the \textit{Iliad}).

“hanging and fastening to boards” (σανίδας προσπασσαλεύσαντες ἄνεκρέμασαν) find much in common with the Persians’ penchant for impalement and other brutal forms of public execution; the extension of the father’s punishment to the son while in full view of one another also mirrors the actions of Cambyses, Darius, and Xerxes earlier on in the Histories. As Pelling notes, the fact that Xanthippus is the one to supervise this act implies that “…the style of the Athenian expansion is bound to destabilise any univocal picture of what is Greek and what is barbarian. The Greekest of states—‘the Greece of Greece’, as an epigram put it (Anth. Pal. 7.45)—is now falling into the barbarian pattern, and the Other is coming very close to home.”

Since this role reversal of the sort predicted in 1.5.3-4 makes one of the best cases yet argued for Herodotus’ desire to see past ethnic stereotypes in order to get to the bottom of their common human foundations, it would be out of keeping with this ethos of circumspection to read the execution of Artaēctes purely as an occasional warning about burgeoning Athenian imperialism. This is not to say that the references to subsequent fifth century history which Stadter (1992), Moles (1996), and others have

44 See Desmond (2004) 34-35 for a series of examples. Some of these bear a striking resemblance to the Athenian ἀποτυμπανισμός, which was designed to achieve much the same result as the apparatus used in Artaēctes’ execution.
46 Pelling (1997) 61. In this vein, compare Antiphon’s maxim in On Truth: ἐν τ[ο]ύτῳ οὖς ἀλήθειαν ἐπει φύσει γε πάντα πάντες ἐν τοῖς ἐν καὶ βάρβαροι και Ἕλληνες εἶναι (Fr. 44 (A2), in Decleva Caizzi (1989)).
47 See Gruen (2011a) for a discussion of the many corresponding similarities between Greeks and Persians in the Histories (echoed in Gruen (2011b) 21-39), through which “…Herodotus seeks neither to commend nor to condemn, but rather to employ ambiguities that allow each society to reflect in subtle ways, one upon the other” (74). See also Thomas (2011) for similar conclusions based primarily on an analysis of Herodotus’ Persian ethnography (ad 1.131-140) and Momigliano (1979) for some general remarks to this effect (see esp. pp. 146-149).
seen here and elsewhere in the *Histories* were not necessarily meant to anticipate the events of the Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War. However, our equation of aetiology with teleology in the first two sections of this chapter has already demonstrated that Herodotus’ programmatic interest in ends and beginnings need not be so rigidly defined. After all, in light of the broad parameters of the proem, who could say whether Athenian imperialism in the grand scheme of things would have been that much of a concern for Herodotus, whose commitment to recording the changes of both great and small settlements appears to know no cultural or temporal limits?

Such boundlessness is further suggested by what happens immediately after the execution of Artaïctes:

Ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσαντες ἀπέπλεον ἐς τήν Ἑλλάδα, τὰ τε ἅλλα χρήματα ἄγοντες καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ὅπλα τῶν γεφυρέων ὡς ἀναθήσοντες ἐς τὰ ἱερά. Καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐτος τοῦτο οὐδὲν ἐπὶ πλέον τούτων ἐγένετο (9.121).

Once they had done these things, they sailed back to Greece, bringing with them various goods including the cables of the bridges to set up as offerings in their temples. And nothing else happened this year.

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48 See n. 33 above.
49 i.e. 1.5.3-4 (see above, including n. 10). In light of this ecumenical stance, I tend to side with Gould (1989) 118-119 over Formara (1971) in the universal vs. temporally-specific debate (summarized in n. 33 above): “I should not want to say that at some level of consciousness Herodotus did not perceive the events of his own lifetime as somehow falling into the same pattern as the events of two generations earlier that he was engaged in narrating, but to see that parallelism as forming the ‘message’ of his work and the reason for his writing is to focus the reader’s attention on things that are peripheral to Herodotus’ purpose and to preclude understanding of the tradition in which he sees himself as working. It implies that Herodotus’ obligation in writing is to his contemporary readers and (in spite of Formara’s careful distinctions) it makes his purpose closely parallel to that of Thucydides, in that they both see the narrative of past events as justified by present or future understanding of human experience. That is not quite what Herodotus himself says, and the difference is an important one. In his introductory sentence, he implies firstly that the obligation he is discharging in writing is to the heroic figures of his own narrative, and secondly that the justification of his narrative lies in its function of preserving the human past from oblivion, from being simply erased from memory by the passage of time.”
On the one hand, the Greeks’ departure with the bridge cables used by the Persians to conduct their doomed invasion of Europe signals that Herodotus’ own historical narrative is all but complete.\(^{50}\) On the other hand, we get the sense that not everything has been wrapped up as neatly as the conquering Greeks might imagine, not least of all because we are left with the image of Artaÿctes suspended above the symbolically-charged Hellespont without knowing whether this brutal punishment has befit his crimes and thus whether the ancient conflict that has already claimed his son must continue to be fought, one reprisal after another.\(^{51}\) Although Herodotus leaves it to us to decide whether justice has in fact been done and order has been restored in the final sentence of this chapter, the emphasis on what happened in *that* year (\(\text{Καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔτος τοῦτο οὐδὲν ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦτον ἐγένετο}\)) suggests that he could extend his historical narrative to subsequent years, but will instead leave it open for others to engage with.\(^{52}\) Indeed, for Thucydides, who picks up with the siege of Sestos in the opening of his discussion of the Pentecontaetia, the end of the *Histories* will be just the beginning.\(^{53}\)

\(^{50}\) Herington (1991a) 157. See also Cobet (1971) 172.

\(^{51}\) Desmond (2004) 34. See also n. 42 above for the possible significance of Xanthippus’ rejection of Artaÿctes’ ransom towards the perpetuation of the struggle between Greeks and Persians.

\(^{52}\) Flower and Marincola (2002) ad loc. Compare the concluding formulae at 6.42.1, 9.41.1, 9.107.3. For a discussion of how this particular formula has been variously interpreted by scholars, see Dewald (1997) 67 n. 13.

\(^{53}\) See Thuc. 1.89. Xenophon’s *Hellenica* in turn picks up where Thucydides leaves off (though, perhaps, as Professor Baragwanath points out to me, with a slight temporal gap) in 411 B.C.E. (\(\text{Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.}\), 1.1.1), at the Hellespont, no less. As far as can be discerned from the fragmentary state of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, this work also seems to have begun immediately after Thucydides’ account (see e.g. Bruce (1967) 3-27 and McKechnie and Kern (1988) 7-24 for overviews of this continuity, including its possible application to the works of Theopompus, Cratippus, and other historians of the classical period). The notion that the end of one work will be the beginning of another is also part and parcel of the conventions of ring composition as evidenced in the epic cycle. In addition to the Homeric analogues noted above (see n. 42), this tendency may also be seen in Hesiod, who ends the *Theogony* by announcing the beginning of the
Our analysis of the Artaýctes episode has now demonstrated the inextricability of aetiology from teleology as first suggested by the programmatic examples cited in the opening of this chapter. Just as Herodotus indicated the impossibility of assigning one original cause or agent to the conflict that first pitted Greeks and barbarians against one another in the proem, so too does he submit at the end of his work that there can be no absolute distinction between imperialist motives and more fundamental ones in the Artaýctes episode. But more than just validating the commonplace that Herodotus’ understanding of origins and causes “embraces variety and multiplicity”,\textsuperscript{54} this analysis has shown that both the analogous beginning and end of the Histories, like the λόγοι they enclose, ask us to look past the status quo and so continue Herodotus’ far-reaching inquiry. Thus, while it possible to say that the Artaýctes episode is open-ended because aetiology (and now, by extension, teleology as well) is inherently variform in the Histories, it is also possible to say that Herodotus distinguishes this feature as part of his intellectual mission to urge us to take up the tools of ἱστορίη and put them to use in our own time.

Even if this polyvalent approach were not already apparent by the end of the historical narrative, the so-called “epilogue” to the Histories (case C in Herington) would still permit an open reading of the end of Herodotus’ work:

\textit{Tούτου δὲ τοῦ Αρταύκτεω τοῦ ἀνακρεμασθέντος προπάτωρ Αρτεμβάρης ἔστι ὁ Πέρσης ἐξηγησάμενος λόγον τὸν ἑκείνοι ὑπολαβόντες Κύρῳ προσήνεικαν λέγοντα τάδε: [2] «Ἐπεί Ζεὺς ... Πέρσης ἤμεμοντιν ὀδῷ, ἀνδρῶν δὲ σοί, Κυρέ,}

\textit{Catalogue of Women} in the last two lines of the poem (i.e. 1021-1022). For a general overview of Hesiodic narrative, see e.g. Rengakos (2009).
\textsuperscript{54} Gould (1989) 65.
κατελὼν Ἀστυάγεα, φέρε, γὴν γάρ ἐκτήμεθα ὀλίγην καὶ ταύτην τρηχέαν, μεταναστάντες ἐκ ταύτης ἄλλην σχόμεν ἀμείνοι. Εἰσὶ δὲ πολλαὶ μὲν ἀστυγείτωνες, πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ ἐκαστέρω, τὸν μίαν σχόντες πλέσσει ἑσόμεθα ἁθομαστότερον· οίκος δὲ ἄνδρας ἀρχοντας τοιαύτα ποιεῖν. Κότε γὰρ δὴ καὶ παρέξει κάλλιον ἢ ὅτε γε ἀνθρώπων τε πολλῶν ἄρχομεν πᾶσης τε τῆς Ἀσίης;» [3]


The ancestor of this Artaÿctes who was strung up was Artembares, who devised a proposal for the Persians who took it and brought it before Cyrus: [2] “Since Zeus gives hegemony to the Persians, and to you among men, Cyrus, now that you have deposed Astyages, let us move away from this land and get a better one, since the land we possess is small and rugged. There are many on our borders and many farther away. If we get one of these, we will be more wondrous to more people. It is fitting for men who have power to do these things, for when will there be a finer opportunity than the present, when we rule so many people and all of Asia?” [3] Though Cyrus was not amazed by their proposal when he heard it, he told them to do it, but in that case, he advised them to prepare to no longer be rulers, but subjects, on grounds that soft men are wont to come from soft lands, for it is not possible for wondrous fruit and men who are good at war to grow from the same land. [4] So admitting their mistake, the Persians went away, having been bested by Cyrus’ judgment, and they chose to rule by living in a poor land rather than to sow fields and be slaves to others.

Though there is no longer much opposition to the thesis that Cyrus’ valediction does in fact constitute the end of the Histories from a structural standpoint,55 there is still debate over what it is meant to indicate. As Dewald notes, there are three basic interpretations for this passage that are typically advanced by scholars: 1) Cyrus saves the Persians from

55 The reticence of von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1893) I.26, Jacoby (1913) cols. 372-379, and Pohlenz (1937) 163-177 to accept 9.122 as the conclusion to the Histories on compositional or historical grounds has lost favor with scholars, most of whom now argue in the vein of the close contextual reading of Immerwahr (1966) 144-147. See Boedeker (1988) 30-32 for a helpful survey of these respective positions (including additional bibliography).
expanding outside of their land against Artembares’ wishes and sets a good example for the Greeks in turn; 2) the Persians eventually forget Cyrus’ advice to the benefit of the Greeks, who ultimately prevail over eastern despotism; and 3) both the Persians and the Greeks forget Cyrus’ advice as a result of their respective imperial ventures.  

The existence of three such interpretations resonates with the model of the priamel whose echoes we have now heard in many key places throughout the Histories, all of which emanate from the one paradigmatic example at the end of the proem. This association is germane since Herodotus here expresses no more of a preference for the accounts of the original enmities between East and West than he does for the range of meanings implicit in Cyrus’ valediction. While the lack of an authorial interjection in propria persona may make this seem like an argument from silence, there are several indications in 9.122 which suggest that the interpretation of the end is in fact meant to be left to the readers (like the Masistes and Artaÿctes episodes before it) as a way of inciting them to carry on with the process of ἱστορίη begun by Herodotus.

The most pronounced indication comes with Cyrus’ lack of wonder at Artembares’ proposal to relocate (οὐ θομάσας τὸν λόγον, 9.122.3), which the Persian king rejects on grounds that “it is not possible for wondrous fruit (καρπόν…θωμαστόν, 9.122.3) and men who are good at war to grow from the same land.” The placement of

56 Dewald (1997) 73-75 for full discussion and relevant bibliography for each of the three positions.
57 i.e. 1.5.3. See esp. Chapter 1.3 for discussion and bibliography on the priamel.
59 Dewald (1997) approximates this conclusion, but appears unwilling to accept it because of the thematic and structural inconcinnity of the end of the Histories, which at one point she calls a “tacked-on pendant” (64). See also pp. 65 and 69-70 for other signs of this strange ambivalence.
θωμάζω and its deverbal θωμαστόν here is significant not only because the concern for great and wondrous works in the programmatic first sentence of the Histories (ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, 1.1.0) is firm evidence that Cyrus’ epilogue does indeed mark the end of the work (in good ring compositional style), but also because the ἀπορία-inducing qualities of wonder have already been shown to serve as a springboard for further inquiry. Furthermore, the fact that Cyrus is the one to prompt us to look back to this all-important precedent and at the same time look forward to an indeterminate future is equally significant, since his role as wise adviser, like that of Solon and Croesus before him, inscribes Herodotus’ own expansive outlook. Thus, when Cyrus allows Artembares and his Persian comrades to choose whether to rule or be ruled (ἐλοντο, 9.122.4), it is entirely possible to read this as Herodotus’ own affirmation of the importance of giving historical actors and their interpreters the freedom to come to their own decisions. As we have now seen time and again in our study of aetiology and historical methodology in the Histories, this emphasis on human agency has exerted a tremendous influence on Herodotus’ work beginning in its very first sentence (τὰ

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60 Recall Aristotle’s assessment of wonder as the beginning of philosophy (διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν (Metaph. 982b, cf. Pl. Thet. 155c-d)), whence wise men may be led from ἀπορία (περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες (Metaph. 982b)) to “theorize the cause” (ἀρχονται μὲν γὰρ …ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν θαυμάτων ταύτωμα τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ. (ibid. 983a)). In this vein, see esp. the discussion of Herodotus’ description of the Labyrinth (2.148) in Chapter 3.1, including n. 23 for a comprehensive bibliography on wonder in the Histories.

61 “The wise saying of Cyrus…is another case where one who once stood in need of advice becomes one who gives it” (Lattimore (1939) 32). See n. 8 and corresponding discussion above.

62 For similarly multivalent advice given by Cyrus, cf. 1.141 (and to a lesser extent, 1.125-126). Compare also 6.11.2-3, where Dionysius gives the Ionians a choice between freedom and slavery.
γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, 1.1.0), but its emphasis at the end of the Histories does more than make one last cogent case for reading the proem programmatically. It also asks us the readers to continue to examine origins and their causes beyond the here and now, just as the preceding λόγοι have instructed, and so to see ἱστορίη as something greater than the sum of its parts.

63 Chiasson (2001) 59 takes this to be the first of many indicators of the subordination of climatic and geographic determinants to human action and achievement in the Histories despite the piquant reprise of the language from 1.71 (i.e. γῆν...τρηχέαν, 9.122.2) set out above (see Chiasson (2001) 62-65, with Thomas (2000) 106-108), a position which this dissertation has corroborated throughout (see n. 20 above).
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**Biography**

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