Counter-Marketing Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Best Practices from the Truth Initiative

April 2017

Prepared for:
Global Engagement Center
United States Department of State

Prepared by:
Michael S. Williams
The Sanford School of Public Policy
Duke University

Faculty Advisor:
Professor Tom Taylor
Professor of the Practice of Public Policy

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Policy Question and Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Policy Question</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Client and Policy Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Introduction to Marketing and Counter-Marketing Terminology</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Problem Assessment and Background</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Islamist Recruiting Strategy and the Media</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Individual Motivations for Joining Jihadist Organizations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 U.S. Counter-Messaging efforts against AQ and ISIS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 U.S. Government Advertising Programs and DOD Recruiting</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Office of National Drug Control Policy – “Above the Influence” Campaign</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Tobacco, Terrorism, and the “War of Ideas”</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: The Truth Initiative and the Truth Campaign</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 The History of the Truth Campaign</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 The Truth Initiative as a Nonprofit Organization</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Finances: The Costs of Operations and Counter-Marketing</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Measuring Success of the Truth Campaign: Brand and Advertising Awareness</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Counter-Marketing for a New Generation of Youth</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Policy Options</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Criteria for Analysis</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Analysis of Policy Options</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: Policy Recommendations and Conclusion</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1: U.S. Department of State and GEC Organizational Charts</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2: GEC Offices &amp; Responsibilities / GEC FY16 Plans</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3: Examples of “Above the Influence” Advertising Content</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4: Examples of “Truth Campaign” Advertising Content</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5: Truth Initiative Financial Data</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 6: Policy Option Evaluation Matrix</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

Policy Question. Using the Truth Initiative as a case study, which counter-marketing and organizational best practices should the Global Engagement Center (GEC) use to diminish the recruiting influence of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)?

Recommendation. I recommend the GEC use a “Truth-like” counter-marketing methodology to discourage youth from joining FTOs. As a component of a long-term U.S. counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, the GEC should target the 200 million Arab youth currently under the age of 25, use a brand-based approach to unify partner efforts, and establish a digital repository of incriminating FTO and counter-marketing material that can be shared with global partners. The GEC should consider, but not recommend to Congress, a revision of the domestic audience prohibition in Section 1287 of the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). While this option has merit, it needs to be further evaluated for legal standing. Moreover, the current political climate will likely reject this option. The public outcry may generate negative publicity for the GEC and could erode political support for the other recommended options.

Background. Over the last sixteen years, the U.S. government executed a military-centric CT strategy in the Middle East and Africa, absent an integrated and synchronized information component in what is now recognized as a generational “War of Ideas.” The void of information alternatives enabled the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014 to acquire prolific brand recognition and global market share, which in turn, fueled the organization’s unprecedented foreign fighter recruiting efforts. U.S. government and partner efforts to counter-messaging and propaganda from ISIS, al Qaeda (AQ), and other FTOs, continue to face criticism. Opinions from CT experts, practitioners, and policy makers range from saying that the U.S is not doing enough to the argument that the U.S. government has no business and no credibility with the audiences we are attempting to influence. While both arguments have merit, previous U.S. government efforts were not only ineffective, but in some instances, were likely counterproductive.

This project identifies a number of counter-marketing best practices from America’s largest non-profit anti-tobacco organization, the Truth Initiative, which could improve the GEC’s counter-messaging mission against FTOs. It is important to acknowledge that the counter-marketing of tobacco and terrorism are not perfect comparisons, and this paper does not intend to imply that they are. This project recognizes a counter-marketing approach to CT messaging will not be a panacea, as a media campaign will not fix poor governance, or address legitimate grievances that lead individuals and FTOs to commit violence. This project consists of a policy problem assessment, a case study of the Truth Initiative and Campaign, a comparative analysis of other U.S. government activities, and a series of policy recommendations.

Truth Initiative. The Truth Initiative (known as the American Legacy Foundation until 2015) funded the creation of the Truth Campaign in 2000. The Truth Initiative is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. The Truth Initiative employs a multi-disciplinary staff of approximately 110 employees and has an annual FY16 operating budget of $116 million, of which $79 million funds the Truth Campaign. The Truth Campaign was named one of the top ten best advertising campaigns of the 21st Century, in addition to receiving over 400 awards for reducing the prevalence of youth smoking in the U.S. from 23% in 2000 to 6% in 2016.
**Truth Campaign.** The idea of the Truth Campaign was to “un-market tobacco” at a time when the tobacco industry was spending $13 billion a year on advertising and controlled the most powerful brands in the world. The approach the Truth campaign pursued was to out-brand tobacco and acquire market share by creating a “cooler” brand than tobacco, exposing industry lies and manipulation, fulfill youth psychological needs state, and keep the campaign as far away from adults and authority figures as possible to retain message authenticity. The Truth used tobacco industry documents to create a fact-based counter-marketing campaign. They also pioneered grassroots experiential-marketing techniques to connect youth at popular events with television and radio based advertising. Truth-branded “experiences” became an alternative for youth to rebel against the tobacco industry and were not simply counternarratives teenagers watched on television or heard on the radio.

The original Truth Campaign targeted “rebellious, high-sensation seeking teenagers,” who were generally unaware of the deceptive tobacco industry advertising directed against them. Due to successful counter-marketing campaigns since 2000, youth today are largely aware of the harmful effects of tobacco use, the manipulative tobacco industry practices, and have greater access to information through social media and the internet. Given this data, the Truth Initiative currently targets youth between the ages of 15 to 21 years old and spends approximately 40 percent of its annual marketing budget on “empowering participatory engagement” through social media. The Truth Campaign employs well-known internet and social media “influencers” who add credibility to messages and help propagate content across youth-centric audiences.

**Policy Options.** The Truth Initiative identifies three best practices contributing to the success of the campaign: (1) the youth-centric, peer-to-peer messaging strategy, (2) the use of branding, (3) and the authentic, fact-based, anti-tobacco industry theme. This project developed and analyzed four policy options based on these, and other best practices from the Truth Initiative:

- **Option 1:** Pursue a strategic messaging approach targeting susceptible global youth.
- **Option 2:** Seek private sector assistance to create a “truth-like” brand to counter-market Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Utilize brand and advertising awareness modeling to measure the effectiveness of FTO messaging and GEC counter-marketing campaigns.
- **Option 3:** Establish a digital repository of incriminating foreign terrorist material and counter-marketing content.
- **Option 4:** Recommend that Congress revise Section 1287 (FY17 NDAA) to explicitly allow the GEC to promote fact-based narratives to relevant audiences inside of the U.S.

**Criteria.** The four policy options are assessed against the following four criteria:

- Reduce the number of individuals who favorably view Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
- Uphold Executive Order 13721 and Section 1287 of the FY17 NDAA.
- Ensure political acceptability within the Legislative and Executive branches.
- Ensure organizational feasibility within the GEC.
CHAPTER 1: POLICY QUESTION AND INTRODUCTION

1.1 Policy Question: Using the Truth Initiative as a case study, which counter-marketing and organizational best practices should the Global Engagement Center (GEC) use to diminish the recruiting influence of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)?

1.2 Client and Policy Introduction

The research client for this report is the Global Engagement Center (GEC) within the Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the U.S. Department of State (DOS) (See Appendix 1). President Obama signed Executive Order 13721 on March 14, 2016, establishing the GEC as a replacement for the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), which was established in September 2011 by Executive Order 13584. The CSCC had a narrower mission, a smaller staff of approximately 60 personnel, and a smaller annual budget of approximately $5 million. The GEC’s FY17 annual budget request is $21.5 million (FY16 actual was $15.9 million), representing one percent of the DOS’s $1.849 billion budget for Public Diplomacy and International Media. The GEC comprises an interagency staff of approximately 60 personnel (increasing to approximately 150 by FY18) working in five core offices: Network Engagement, Content/Production, Data Analytics, Partnerships, and Resources (See Appendix 2). In late 2016, Congress passed legislation expanding the mission and resources of the GEC.

On December 23 2016, President Obama signed the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which included the Countering Disinformation and Propaganda Act under section 1287. The Countering Disinformation and Propaganda Act codified the GEC in statute and expanded both the Center’s mission and resources. The new expanded mission of the GEC is to “lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining United States national security interests.” The NDAA authorizes the GEC as much as $80 million each year for both FY17 and FY18, of which the Department of Defense (DOD) is authorized to transfer up to $60 million to the DOS to meet the $80 million authorization. The NDAA also authorizes the GEC to provide grants and contracts to “civil society groups, media content providers, nongovernmental organizations, federally funded research and development centers, private companies, or academic institution.”

1 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.” Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
2 Global Engagement Center Fact Sheet and author interviews with GEC employees. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259376.htm
4 Ibid. pg. 162-163.
The counterterrorism mission of the GEC per Executive Order 13271 is to “lead the coordination, integration, and synchronization of Government-wide communications activities directed at foreign audiences abroad in order to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist organizations.” According to the DOS, “the GEC is designed to be an agile, innovative organization, that uses modern, cutting-edge technology and takes advantage of the best talent and tools throughout the private sector and government.” Recognizing the U.S. government is not always the most effective messenger, the GEC focuses on empowering and enabling credible voices from government and nongovernmental organizations. Current counterterrorism messaging efforts are focused on decreasing the allure of the Islamic State (ISIS) and preventing the recruitment of new extremists.⁶

1.3 Introduction to Marketing and Counter-Marketing Terminology

This project uses terminology from the field of marketing. To ensure an equal level of understanding of the language used, the following definitions and explanations are provided:

**Counter-Marketing** is a mass-market communication strategy designed to reduce the demand for a product, service, or behavior. Counter-marketing is most commonly used in the field of public health and is a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recognized best practice for reducing the consumer uptake of tobacco. Counter-marketing is also used to combat unhealthy food products and practices as well as in political campaigns to lessen the demand of a political opponent.⁷

**Marketing** is anything a company or business does to acquire and maintain customers. Marketing encompasses the process for developing and delivering communications for customers, clients, partners, and the whole of society. Examples include, but are not limited to public relations, advertising, and sales.⁸

**Advertising** is a specific form of marketing communication (advertisement) that provides information on a communications platform (mail, TV, radio, internet, print, etc.) to a consumer for purposes of increasing demand for a particular product or service.⁹

**Branding** is a marketing technique to distinguish a company or an idea from a competitor(s) by “creating a lasting impression in the minds of consumers.” A “brand” is the total consumer experience that involves the collection of images and ideas such as a name, logo, slogan, song, and design scheme. Consumer brand recognition is developed over time by exposure to advertising and other marketing communication and is measured in a value called Brand Equity.¹⁰

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⁹ http://www.dictionary.com/browse/advertising
CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM ASSESSMENT AND BACKGROUND

Diminishing the allure of, and undermining foreign fighter recruitment efforts of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are critical problems facing the United States government. To date, the U.S. government effort led by the GEC to counter-messaging from al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (ISIS) continues to face criticism for a deficient strategy resulting from inadequate resourcing and bureaucratic hindrances. This project seeks to identify best practices from America’s largest non-profit anti-tobacco organization, the Truth Initiative, which could improve the GEC’s counter-messaging mission against FTOs. The Truth Initiative, previously known as the American Legacy Foundation, created one of the most successful advertising campaigns in history, the Truth Campaign.

The policy problem is that the U.S. government continues to lack an effective organizational and marketing strategy to win the media-centric “War of Ideas” against international terrorist organizations. The “War of Ideas” is a widely-accepted characterization of the multi-decade conflict between the West and jihadist organizations, predominately ISIS and AQ. In the “War of Ideas,” violence is used as a tool in support of information operations to acquire legitimacy and influence over susceptible populations. ISIS and AQ employ the same marketing principles to acquire legitimacy and influence that global marketing agencies use to acquire customers and sell products.

2.1 Islamist Recruiting Strategy and the Media

In 2004, Islamist strategist Abu Bakr Naji published an online book titled, The Management of Savagery, outlining a strategy for AQ and other extremists to create an Islamic caliphate. The book is referred to as the “handbook for ISIS,” and details a multipronged strategy, one of which is the need for jihadist groups to continuously win the hearts and minds of

11 “A truly effective [counterterrorism] campaign will ineluctably be predicated upon a strategy that effectively combines the tactical elements of systematically weakening and destroying enemy capabilities alongside the equally critical, broader strategic imperative of breaking the cycle of terrorist and insurgent recruitment and replenishment, which have respectively sustained al-Qaeda and fueled the Islamic State’s emergence and rapid numerical and geographical expansion. The vast numerical proliferation and geographical expansion of foreign fighters joining both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in recent years underscores the failure of the current strategy’s counter-messaging efforts.” Bruce Hoffman. “The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism Challenges Facing the Next Administration.” CTC Sentinel. November 30, 2016.


13 “We are losing the broader “battle of ideas” against a violent extremist ideology that is infecting a whole new generation of Muslim millennials and defining what it means to be Muslim in the twenty-first century.” Juan Zarate and Farah Pandith. “Winning the War of Ideas.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 16, 2015.


the youth in the media. It states that “[the cause] is only invigorated by an event which draws youth into the movement; these youth bring new blood, and the group enters the vicious cycle all over again.” AQ, and now ISIS, understand the importance of legitimacy and influence and is highlighted by a famous 2005 quote from AQ’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri to the AQ in Iraq leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi:

“More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle race for the hearts and minds of our umma [Arabic word for “community or nation”]. And however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us”.  

The irony of the quote is that a strategic-level U.S. capability to fight AQ on the media battlefield was almost nonexistent until the establishment of the CSCC six years later in 2011.

However, the CSCC was ill-equipped and unprepared to counter the sophisticated global messaging from ISIS that went viral in 2012. The propaganda shocked global audiences with fear and intrigue as well-produced, violence-laden videos permeated social media and TV news outlets. Most important for ISIS was that the sophisticated marketing strategy resonated and inspired over 36,500 individuals from over 120 different countries including 250 Americans to travel to fight in the Syrian Civil War, on behalf of the group. ISIS continues to exploit the use of social media by creating a virtual caliphate of public and private forums. Experts call this social media phenomenon a “radicalization echo chamber,” where individuals from any country can view and discuss jihadist narratives without the presence of competing alternative voices.

2.2 Individual Motivations for Joining Jihadist Organizations

Research indicates that foreign fighters are motivated to join ISIS and other jihadist groups for a multiple of different reasons, counter to the commonly held belief that the Islam is the predominant influencer. Qualitative research based on an interview sample of 49 jihadists conducted in 2015 by the Lebanon-based, Quantum Communications, found nine distinct motivations (status, identity, revenge, redemption, responsibility, thrill, ideology, justice, and death) for joining jihadist organizations in Iraq and Syria. Researchers coded over 18 hours of previously recorded television interviews that aired on Middle Eastern, European, and American broadcast channels between 2013 and 2015.

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The sample included 48 men and one woman ranging in age from 18 to 43 who joined one of the following groups: ISIS, al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, or the Free Syrian Army. 18 identified as external fighters who traveled from a foreign country and 31 identified as internal fighters who remained in their country of residence. 21 27 of the 49 (55%) interviewed jihadists cited identity and status improvements driven by monetary and recognition as the reason they joined one of the groups. 11 of the 14 (79%) jihadists who traveled from foreign countries, acknowledged viewing violent jihadist online material as an initial motivating factor. 22

One of the many challenges with countering terrorist (CT) and violent extremist (CVE) messaging is identifying and targeting this small segment of the nearly 7.4 billion global population. In the Middle East and North Africa, there are 200 million Arab youth under the age of 25, representing 60 percent of the total Arab population. According to the 2016 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, 77 percent of sampled youth were concerned about the rise of the ISIS, but nearly 20 percent said they were either unsure or that they could support the group if ISIS did not use so much violence. The Arab youth represent one of the key targeting demographics for both extremist organizations and the counter-messaging efforts of the GEC. 23

2.3 U.S. Counter-Messaging efforts against AQ and ISIS

Previous attempts to counter ISIS and AQ propaganda by the U.S. were criticized by marketing and CVE experts for reactive public-service announcement-style approaches and the use of U.S. government branding on content. 24 It is important to note that these criticisms are anecdotal, and no known independent public research has been conducted on measuring the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of U.S counter-propaganda efforts. However, public service announcements (PSA) directed at youth are widely regarded in research literature and amongst advertising professionals as generally ineffective, and sometimes counter-productive. The effect of PSAs tend to be minimal because youth are interested in autonomy and do not like to be told what not to do by authority figures. 25

21 Quantum Communications.
22 4 did not provide a response, thus the use of 14. Quantum, Understanding Jihadists in their own Words.”
One of the more notably unsuccessful attempts was a late-2013 CSCC campaign titled “Think Again, Turn Away.” The campaign was remarkably similar to an early anti-smoking public announcement titled “Think, Don’t Smoke.” Both campaigns received negative feedback for the use of a parental and authority figure-like messaging strategy directed at youth, while the “Think, Don’t Smoke” campaign was actually proven to encourage teenage smoking (see examples below). Recent efforts by the GEC, which appeared in an October 20, 2016, Wall Street Journal article, indicate an interest in refocusing messaging tactics and leveraging social media platforms for advertising counter-ISIS content.

During the month of September 2016, the GEC spent $15,000 on a Facebook advertising campaign targeting 13 to 34-year-old unmarried men and women in Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. Using Facebook advertising services, the GEC was able to geofence these individuals by location, use their Facebook profile demographics, and then target individuals who expressed an interest in Iraq, Syria, or ISIS. The month-long campaign reached 6.9 million people and generated 781,000 visits to anti-ISIS websites. While social media platforms can measure the reach and engagement rates of advertising campaigns, challenges exist for the GEC with regard to measuring the effectiveness of diminishing the recruiting influence of terrorist organizations. While the campaign videos did not contain U.S. government branding, the content was disseminated on U.S. government branded social media accounts. Experts cited in the article acknowledged the positive direction the GEC is taking, but criticized the use of U.S government accounts, noting that “among the targeted communities, the U.S. government is not a credible messenger.”

28 Ibid.
2.4 U.S. Government Advertising Programs and DOD Recruiting

Changing human behavior is very difficult, and effective advertising campaigns must be built on behavior change theory.\(^9\) Behavior change advertising is about creating a first and lasting impression on how individuals live their lives. Behavior change advertising has been used by public and private organizations to reduce smoking, increase recycling, decrease drinking and driving, reduce drug use, and increase seat belt use.\(^0\) Effective behavior change advertising requires a clearly defined target audience and a message designed to influence a knowledge, belief, social norm, or attitude that will lead to a clearly defined behavior change. Messages must be tailored to specific demographics and regularly market-tested to ensure effectiveness amongst changes in environmental variables.\(^1\)

According to a 2016 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the U.S. government spent approximately $1 billion annually over the last decade on public relations and advertising campaigns, designed to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. The GAO noted four categories of federal advertising and public relations activities including public education and awareness, customer service, general information and recruitment, and compliance with laws and policies. The DOD has the largest advertising budget in the U.S. government and spends approximately $600 million annually on military recruiting campaigns.\(^2\)

The Joint Advertising and Marketing Research Studies (JAMRS) office within the Defense Manpower and Data Center (DMDC) is responsible for conducting research on the “perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes of American youth as they relate to joining the military.”\(^3\) The target DOD recruiting population is men and women aged 17-24 years old, which is approximately 34 million individuals according to 2015 population estimates. However, the DOD estimates that over 24 million in the target population (71 percent) are ineligible for service due to an inability to meet medical, legal, and education based service requirements.\(^4\) In order to reach and effectively target the remaining 10 million individuals for recruitment, the DOD uses an aggressive and expensive experiential-focused marketing\(^5\) strategy based on proven private sector models, including the Truth Campaign.\(^6\)

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\(^3\) JAMRS Official Website. http://jamrs.defense.gov/
\(^5\) “Experiential marketing is loosely defined as messaging you can touch, feel or view in a physical space. It's on the rise in recent years as marketers of everything from cars to movies aim to make their brands a tangible presence in consumers' lives either in person or digitally through YouTube videos, tweets and Instagrams... the anti-smoking “Truth” work from the Legacy Foundation five years ago [was] an inflection point that made everyone want to do something similar.” Shareen Pathak. “Just What Is Experiential Marketing, and How Can It Be Measured? *Adage.com*. March 11, 2014. http://adage.com/article/agency-news/experiential-marketing-measured/291972/
The DOD uses a three-phase advertising strategy to meet recruiting goals: awareness, engagement, and lead generation (See Figure Below). Awareness is based on broad-based messaging designed to inform the U.S. population about “opportunities to serve in the military” and “distinct characteristics of each military service.” Engagement is based on precise audience targeting of groups that exhibit characteristics of potential recruits. Engagement provides potential recruits “additional information to aid their decision-making process” and typically occurs online at websites and on social media. Lead generation is based on targeting specific individuals who are ready to discuss enlistment. Lead generation is often conducted in person with a direct recruiter to recruit interaction, over the phone, or through email. A successful technique the DOD uses for lead generation is experiential advertising at major sporting events using military vehicles and personnel.37

Marketing and advertising experts understand that individual advertisements alone are unlikely to have a lasting effect on a potential consumer or potential military recruit.38 Influencing or changing behavior often requires a comprehensive plan, also called a “fully-integrated” marketing approach, where media-based messages support grassroots activities seeking to change social norms.39 The Truth Campaign is a rare example of a fully-integrated marketing campaign that successfully achieved a behavior change objective to reduce youth smoking in the U.S. Another example of a successful marketing campaign is the anti-drug “Above the Influence” campaign created by the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

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38 Ibid.
39 “No matter how motivated consumers may be to try your product or service, or how unhappy they may be with their current situation, if you do not focus on a comprehensive plan for changing their behavior, then you are unlikely to have a significant influence on them.” Art Markman. “Don’t Persuade Customers – Just Change their Behavior.” Harvard Business Review. February 10, 2014. https://hbr.org/2014/02/dont-persuade-customers-just-change-their-behavior
2.5 Office of National Drug Control Policy – “Above the Influence” Campaign

The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The mission of ONDCP is to “advise the President on drug-control issues, coordinates drug-control activities and funding, produces the National Drug Control Strategy,” and, until March 2014, execute the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. The anti-drug campaign titled, “Above the Influence (ATI),” was funded by the ONDCP and is now run by the non-profit organization, Partnership for Drug-Free Kids. While ATI is notable as a successful behavior change campaign, early advertising efforts by the ONDCP were ineffective.

From 1998 to 2004, ODNCP spent approximately $1.2 billion on the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. Research confirmed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that teenage girls who viewed these public service announcement-style advertisements, mainly focused on anti-marijuana efforts, were more likely to try drugs. Research also found that boys who viewed the ads were no less likely to use drugs than those who did not (see examples below). The key finding was that the public service announcements resonated amongst parents, but did not resonate with the youth-focused target audience. As noted earlier regarding PSAs, this finding is grounded in research that shows most teenagers do not want to be told what to do by parents or authority figures; teenagers want autonomy to make their own decisions and to take risks.

40 ONDCP official website. https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/about
41 Above the Influence official website. http://abovetheinfluence.com/about/
43 “Research shows that at least half of teens are sensation-seeking. Taking chances is exciting. It's developmentally part of being a teenager to buck adult rules and take moderate risks. Drug use is implicitly seen as a way to become autonomous and independent from your parents and everybody else.” Quote by Michael Slater. Shaunacy Ferro. “The Science of PSA: Do Anti-Drug Ads Keep Kids Off Drugs?”
Recognizing the ineffective nature of youth-targeted public service announcements, the ONDCP shifted to a brand-based approach and ran a campaign from 2005 to 2009 titled, “Be Under Your Own Influence.” In 2010, the ONDCP rebranded the campaign to “Above the Influence” to “have a brand that speaks to teens.” The campaign was created and run by the marketing firm Foote, Cone & Belding (now known as the Draftfcb division of the Interpublic Group of Companies) and received approximately $540 million from the U.S. government from 2005 to 2010. The marketing idea was to identify the types of activities that kids who do not use drugs participate in, and promote those activities to kids who are considered at risk for drug use. Above the Influence (ATI) is considered a fully-integrated and experiential marketing campaign targeting youth on television, print media, digital advertising, and at the local grassroots level (See Appendix 3). The ATI campaign is not just a message, it provides an alternative to drug use similar in approach to how the Truth Campaign is an alternative for tobacco use amongst youth.

44 The American Marketing Association defines a brand as “a customer experience represented by a collection of images and ideas; often, it refers to a symbol such as a name, logo, slogan, and design scheme. Brand recognition and other reactions are created by the accumulation of experiences with the specific product or service, both directly relating to its use, and through the influence of advertising, design, and media commentary.” Accessed 27 March, 2017. https://www.ama.org/resources/pages/dictionary.aspx?dLetter=B
ATI partners with hundreds of youth service-based organizations across the country to provide anti-drug training and outreach to local communities. Research published in the *American Journal of Public Health* and the *Journal of Drug Education* provides evidence that youth exposure (awareness and interaction, see table below)\(^\text{47}\) to ATI increases anti-drug beliefs leading to lower rates of marijuana usage. The success of ATI is also measured by brand awareness, and ONDCP measurements found that 85 percent of teenagers were consistently found to be aware of the brand.\(^\text{48}\) Similarities exist in best practices from the ONDCP’s ATI Anti-Drug Campaign and the Truth Initiative’s Truth Campaign.

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\(^{47}\) ATI Activities Toolkit 2013. pg. 3.

2.6 Tobacco, Terrorism, and the War of Ideas

What does a major tobacco company like Phillip Morris have in common with a terrorist organization such as ISIS? Both are globally recognized brands that value long-term investments in strategized youth-centric marketing. Both organizations place a large emphasis on empowered advertising to recruit rebellious youth, notably the use of the “Marlboro Man” and “Jihadi John” as leading role models in advertisements. Recent ISIS propaganda is alluring to youth because it communicates to them in a credible, yet sophisticated style. High definition images and videos, coupled with upbeat, inspirational music, is the content model that global youth demand of all marketing and advertisements in the digital era, regardless of product or service.

While there are certainly significant differences between the susceptible audiences for tobacco and terrorist organizations, the human psychology inherent in both advertising strategies is generally considered universal. For example, sensation-seeking is the psychology trait for individuals who exhibit tendencies to pursue sensory pleasure and excitement. Research indicates that sensation-seeking can be a driver for both smoking tobacco and joining terrorist organizations.

“The Truth Campaign and the War of Ideas,” published by the West Point Center for Combating Terrorism (CTC) suggests that a counter-brand approach similar to the Truth Campaign launched in 2000 to “un-sell” tobacco in the U.S. could be used to counter the recruiting efforts of AQ and ISIS. The Truth Campaign remains active today and does not attempt to preach against smoking, but focuses on long-term social changes in attitudes amongst youth. The Truth Campaign targets youth aged 12 to 21 years old by using facts to expose the lies of the tobacco industry and by fostering an alternative way for young people to rebel, instead of using tobacco. Experts from the CTC argue that a similar approach could be used to counter the lies of AQ and ISIS through the use of the groups’ own documents, defectors, and propaganda videos.

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50 “ISIS propaganda is appealing for the same reasons – it is credible and young people can relate to it, even more so than the propaganda produced by their al-Qaida predecessors.” LTC Bryan Price and Pete Favat. “The Truth Campaign and the War of Ideas.” CTC Sentinel. July 2015.


52 “Sensation-seeking, also called excitement-seeking, is the tendency to pursue sensory pleasure and excitement. It’s the trait of people who go after novelty, complexity, and intense sensations, who love experience for its own sake, and who may take risks in the pursuit of such experience.” Psychology Today. https://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/sensation-seeking

53 “A consistent theme emerges from the writings of terrorism observers and experts: sensation seeking. This theme has been especially salient in descriptions of contemporary homegrown jihadists. Indeed, many claim that Muslim youth radicalize, in part, because of the seductive and adventurous dimensions of jihad (Atran, 2008; Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010; Stern, 2006).” Daniel Hiebert and Lorne Dawson. “Personality Traits and Terrorism.” Canadian Security Intelligence Service. December 2015.


55 Ibid.
CHAPTER 3: THE TRUTH INITIATIVE AND THE TRUTH CAMPAIGN

Originally known as the American Legacy Foundation until September 2015, the Truth Initiative continues to be the largest non-profit public organization in the U.S. dedicated to eliminating tobacco use. The American Legacy Foundation was created from the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between four major U.S. tobacco companies (Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard), 46 states, five U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. The 1998 MSA restricts the advertising, promotion, sale, and marketing of tobacco in the U.S and requires the tobacco industry to provide funding for anti-tobacco programs. The MSA remains the largest civil litigation settlement in U.S. history, and tobacco companies have disbursed over $106 billion in settlement funds as of 2015. Settlement funds received by states and the American Legacy Foundation continue to support anti-tobacco advertising campaigns, education, and research.56

The most well-known and successful counter-smoking marketing campaign is called Truth and was created by the American Legacy Foundation beginning in 2000. The American Legacy Foundation measured success not only by reduced youth and young adult smoking rates, but also by peer-reviewed journal reports that found significant reductions in societal healthcare costs, ranging from $1.9 billion, to as much as $5.4 billion.57,58 The Truth Campaign was named one of the top ten best advertising campaigns of the 21st Century, in addition to receiving over 400 awards for reducing the prevalence of teen smoking from 23% in 2000 to 6% in 2016.59 Over the previous two decades, efforts by the Truth Initiative contributed to a 52 percent reduction in youth smoking in the U.S.60

3.1 The History of the Truth Campaign

Before 2000, tobacco companies had conducted extensive research over the last century on how to best market cigarettes to youth. The tobacco companies knew they needed “replacement smokers” and that if they could hook a child early, they would likely have the customer for life.61 Research conducted by the British-American Tobacco Company in the 1950’s discovered a universal “Age of Assertion” around the age of 10, where a child seeks control and wants to make his or her own decisions. The British-American Tobacco Company exploited this condition by marketing tobacco as a means to rebel against authority. Research also supported tobacco company efforts to appeal to the teenage “emotional need states” of taking risks, fitting in, being independent, self-expression, and feeling respected. Early Truth

Campaign designers believed that because marketing had created powerful brands like Marlboro and Camel, marketing could also be used to diminish tobacco brand influence. The Truth Campaign counter-marketed the appeal of tobacco use by creating a more rebellious brand and by exposing the lies of the tobacco industry.\(^{62}\)

The American Legacy Foundation launched the nationwide Truth counter-marketing campaign in February 2000. The Truth Campaign was built from successful state-level anti-tobacco pilot campaigns that were run in Massachusetts and Florida from 1998 to 1999. Following the MSA, the American Legacy Foundation submitted a request for anti-tobacco advertising proposals and ultimately awarded a joint contract to the advertising firms of Arnold Worldwide and Crispin Porter and Bogusky. Arnold and Crispin joined forces to win the contract, by combining their successful anti-tobacco pilot campaigns from Florida (Crispin) and Massachusetts (Arnold). Arnold-Crispin developed the Truth Campaign with the knowledge that the worst advertisement they could produce was a public-service type announcement telling youth not to smoke because it is dangerous. Alternatively, youth had to believe that the message was authentic and coming from other youth, not authoritative figures such as the government or adults. This best practice emerged from research and execution during the pilot campaigns in Florida and Massachusetts.\(^{63}\)

One of the early challenges to the Truth Campaign’s anti-tobacco advertising (and other advertising) was identifying how to reach various audiences separated by different language, cultural, and ethnic interests. To combat this challenge, Arnold-Crispin subcontracted with various firms across the U.S. to develop and disseminate Truth Campaign content with similar themes, but designed specifically for different demographic audiences. Arnold (based in Boston, Massachusetts) and Crispin (based in Miami, Florida) hired the following firms for their respective audience expertise: Burrell Communications Group, a predominately African-African-focused firm based in Chicago, Illinois; Bromley Communications, a predominately Hispanic-focused firm based in San Antonio, Texas; and Imada Wong “IW” Communications Group, a predominately Asian-focused firm based in Los Angeles, California. Unifying the efforts of these five advertising firms enabled the Truth Campaign to reach susceptible youth audiences in different demographics across the U.S.\(^{64}\)

One of the original creators of the Truth Campaign, Pete Favat, compares the counter-smoking campaign to the battle between David and Goliath. The initial advertising budget of the Truth Campaign in 1999 was a few hundred million dollars, compared to $13 billion in annual tobacco industry advertising spending. Additionally, the average 14-year old in 1999 had been exposed to more than $20 billion in tobacco marketing since the age of six. Knowing that 80% of smokers start before the age of 18, the Truth’s strategy was to target youth early in an attempt to out-brand big tobacco. The key components of the Truth strategy were to make a brand cooler than tobacco, expose industry lies and manipulation, keep the campaign far away from adults, and fulfill what psychologists call teenage “emotional need states.”\(^{65}\) To be successful, Truth

\(^{62}\) Favat. USMA Presentation.

\(^{63}\) Author interview with Pete Favat. November 10, 2016.

\(^{64}\) Author interview with Pete Favat.

\(^{65}\) “Emotional need states are a psychological or mental requirement that usually centers on such basic feelings as love, fear, anger, sorrow, anxiety, frustration, and depression and involves the understanding, empathy, and support
Campaign strategists knew they had to use human psychology to create a stronger appeal to teenage empowerment and rebellion than the tobacco companies.\(^{66}\)

Pete Favat and the Truth Campaign strategists developed a unique, youth-centric social rebellion strategy to out-brand big tobacco companies. The teenager-centric, guerilla-style brand of the Truth Campaign was a key tenet of the success. The Truth Campaign used experiential advertising to empower youth into fostering a grassroots movement led by television advertisements, radio recordings, events at schools and sporting events, and by the distribution of branded material, such as t-shirts, stickers, and stencils.\(^{67}\) Truth purchased twelve bright orange “stunt vans,” and drove them cross-country to events such as the Vans World Tour and the Rockstar Energy Drink Inked Up World Tour as a way to reach youth in person. The Truth Campaign partnered with Sony and outfitted the vans with televisions and stereo equipment to attract the tens of thousands of youth who attended the events. By using print, television, radio, and in-person experiential advertising, the Truth Campaign successfully employed a “360-degree” strategy to raise brand awareness (See Appendix 4 for Examples).\(^{68}\)

The Truth Campaign was more than a message or a counternarrative against tobacco; it was a cooler, more rebellious alternative to smoking. The Truth Campaign did not preach to youth about not smoking, the campaign encouraged young people to rebel against the rich tobacco executives who were profiting from manipulation and murder. However, the campaign did not want to be portrayed as “anti-smoker,” and advertisers carefully worded messages to ensure the enemy was the tobacco industry and that smokers were the victims. In order to counter the advantage of the tobacco industry, the Truth Campaign used the tobacco industry’s own research, documents, and recorded statements against them to provide fact-based, incriminating material to the counter-marketing campaign.\(^{69}\)

### 3.2 Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library

The 1998 MSA required the major tobacco companies to publicly disclose documents related to youth-centric marketing strategies and the adverse health effects of tobacco. These documents were turned into a counter-marketing campaign to expose the “truth” of the tobacco industry using their own words. In 2001, the American Legacy Foundation awarded a $15 million endowment to the University of California – San Francisco (UCSF) to physically and digitally store all MSA disclosed documents and to create a publicly accessible database previously known as the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL).\(^{70}\)

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\(^{66}\) Ibid.


\(^{68}\) Author interview with Pete Favat.

\(^{69}\) Pete Favat. Presentation at the 2015 Senior Leader Conference at West Point – “The War of Ideas.” Audio and Slide Show.

Prior to digital storage, the Truth Campaign employed multiple individuals to sort through the industry documents in search of incriminating material that could be used to counter-market the tobacco companies. Now the repository is publicly searchable and is known as the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library. The UCSF database plans to operate indefinitely from the endowment and continues to provide over 14.7 million documents (over 88 million pages) and nearly 5,000 video and audio files available for public viewing.\textsuperscript{71} The example below is from a “secret” RJ Reynolds (tobacco company) strategic research report from 1984 titled “Younger Adult Smokers: Strategies and Opportunities.” This internal report provides recommendations to the company regarding the importance of targeting youth smokers for the future of the business and the tobacco industry.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} Truth Tobacco Industry Documents website. https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/

\textsuperscript{72} Report available at the following link: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tqq46b00
3.3. The Truth Initiative as a Non-Profit Organization

The Truth Initiative is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. Robin Koval became Chief Executive of the Truth Initiative in October 2013 and is a well-known business leader in fields of advertising, marketing, and brand building. The organization is comprised of a multidisciplinary team of over 100 individuals with backgrounds in policy, law, communications, marketing, academia, and research. The Truth Initiative’s mission is to “achieve a culture where all youth and young adults reject tobacco.” The Initiative works to achieve its mission by “speaking, seeking, and spreading the truth about tobacco” through education, research, policy studies, community activism, engagement, and counter-marketing. Internally, the Truth Initiative is organized by the following offices: Evaluation Science and Research, Community Engagement and Youth Activism, Advocacy, Corporate Alliances, Grants and Contracts, Marketing, and a research and policy organization called the Schroeder Institute. According to the Truth Initiative CEO Robin Koval, the initiative is working to connect the success of the Truth Campaign with the initiative’s broader anti-smoking efforts.73

3.4 Finances: The Cost of Operations and Counter-Marketing

The American Legacy Foundation received $1.45 billion from the 1998 MSA in its first three years from 2000 to 2002. The foundation converted the $1.45 billion into an endowment to indefinitely sustain the foundation’s anti-tobacco efforts through annual investment revenue. As of FY16 financial reporting, the Truth Initiative maintains an average endowment account balance of approximately $1 billion. The FY16 annual operating budget is $115.9 million with $79 million allocated for “countermarketing and communications” and $36.7 million allocated for research, grants, outreach, and administrative operating expenses. From 2000 to 2016, total annual operating costs for the organization fluctuated from as low as $53 million in 2012 to as high as $150 million in 2004.74

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends anti-tobacco counter-marketing campaigns spend at least $1 to $3 per capita in their respective media markets.75 The Truth Campaign targets approximately 40 million youth in U.S. and will exceed the CDC recommendation in 2016, but was below the recommendation in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Truth Campaign expenses (recorded as “counter marketing and communications”) average approximately 63 percent of annual operation expenses and fluctuated from as low as $18.6 million in 2012 to as high as $132 million in 2001. The Truth Campaign and related communications spending total $1.13 billion since the foundation’s inception in 2000 (See Appendix 5).76

73 Truth Initiative official website.
74 Author compiled data from American Legacy Foundation and Truth Initiative Annual Reports: 2000 to 2001 and from 2004 to 2015. The 2002 and 2003 Annual Reports were not available for review. Fiscal years begin on July 1 and conclude on June 30, the annual report for 2016 was not released in time for this report. The “countermarketing and communications” financial data from 2002 and 2003 was acquired from an article title, “The Truth about American Legacy” by Nancy Lewis. October 5, 2009, Youth Today. https://youthtoday.org/2009/10/the-truth-about-american-legacy/
75 CDC. “Designing and Implementing an Effective Tobacco Counter-Marketing Campaign.” October 2003. pg. 16.
76 Ibid.
3.5 Measuring Success of the Truth Campaign: Brand and Advertising Awareness

The purpose of the Truth Campaign is to influence youth attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately change tobacco use behavior. The Truth Initiative uses a number of different methods and metrics to determine the reach and effectiveness of their anti-tobacco campaign. In a December 2016 article published in the *Journal of Advertising Research*, Truth Initiative researchers highlighted four best practices for counter-marketing success:

- “Young people who are not engaged in a targeted, at-risk behavior can influence those who engage in at-risk behavior.”
- “The messaging strategy for a campaign seeking behavioral change should be aligned with the target audience’s current aspirations and interests.”
- “The efficacy of message execution and delivery strategies should be assessed continuously.”
- “Concept, premarket, and in-market testing can inform optimal message effectiveness.”

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The Truth Initiative designs, executes, and evaluates the Truth Campaign using a robust research model built upon these best practices. Truth Initiative researchers use the following three-phased approach to evaluate the campaign design, implementation, and effects:

- “Formative Studies: Redefine the campaign’s target audience and develop the message strategy.”
- “Campaign Implementation Studies: Monitor advertisement receptivity, awareness, and recall after implementation across media platforms.”
- “Impact and Engagement Studies: Understand the influence of message awareness on changes over time in tobacco-related knowledge, attitudes, and ultimately tobacco use.”

While the Truth Initiative conducts unilateral research, it also partners, collaborates, and contracts with marketing and health research firms specializing in youth audiences. The Truth Initiative also utilizes data from the National Youth Tobacco Survey (NYTS), the Monitoring the Future Survey, and the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). Examples of ongoing studies include a three-year longitudinal cohort study and weekly awareness surveys.

Over the long-term, the Truth Initiative partnered with GfK International (a global market research firm) to run a three-year, 10,000-person (aged 15 to 21) longitudinal cohort study to assess the awareness, attitude, knowledge, belief, and ultimately behavior change in youth regarding tobacco use. The cohort study began in 2014 and will run through 2017, with individual participants interviewed on a six-month basis.

Over the short-term, the Truth Initiative samples 100 individuals per week over the phone to measure awareness of the Truth Campaign, with a target of 75 percent advertising awareness and a target of 80 percent brand awareness. They also conduct a weekly online survey of 140 individuals aged 15 to 21 asking questions related to brand and advertising awareness, beliefs about tobacco, and general attitudes and behaviors. The Truth Initiative found significant correlation between the levels of youth awareness and changes in targeted attitudes, specifically the intention to not smoke.

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81 Ibid.
82 “To gauge advertising awareness, respondents are shown between four and six screenshots of each “truth” advertisement and asked whether they have seen that advertisement. To measure brand awareness, respondents are asked to identify the cause or message the logo it is associated with from a list of five options. Respondents who correctly identify antitobacco are classified as having brand awareness.” Vallone, et al. “Agents of Social Change.” p. 421
Through research, the Truth Initiative determined that behavior change is exponentially increased when Truth brand awareness in youth is between 70 to 75 percent. If the Truth Initiative marketing department encounters a weekly sample below 73 percent awareness, changes are made to the following week’s marketing strategy. The marketing department sees weekly awareness modeling as a more effective holistic measure for the Truth Campaign than measuring individual engagement and viewing rates of specific content. These marketing efforts earned the Truth Initiative the award for the number one most effective brand (tied with Walmart and CVS Health) and as a top five marketing firm in North America for 2016 by the globally recognized Effie Index.

3.6 Counter-Marketing Tobacco for a New Generation of Youth

The original Truth Campaign targeted “rebellious, high-sensation seeking teenagers,” who were generally unaware of the deceptive tobacco industry advertising directed against them. Due to successful counter-marketing campaigns since 2000, youth today are largely aware of the harmful effects of tobacco use, the manipulative tobacco industry practices, and have greater access to information through social media and the internet. As a result, the Truth Initiative continues to adapt its marketing and organizational strategies to keep pace with the evolving tobacco industry, which continues to spend approximately $9.5 billion annually on “advertising and promotional expenditures.” The mission of the initiative is now focused on empowering youth to formulate their own decisions about smoking, exposing tobacco industry marketing tactics, and propagating facts about the adverse health and social consequences of tobacco use. The major factors that have changed from the early 2000’s are the target audience, context, and the communications environment.

In recent years, the Truth Initiative discovered that the average smoking initiation age changed from 13 to 14 years old to an older demographic between 18 and 19 years old. This shift required a change to the target audience and a new “content-driven” marketing strategy more focused on digital outreach. Additionally, research indicated that youth were beginning to view regular smokers and social-smokers as two distinct groups, in which social-smoking was seen as more acceptable.

Given this data, the Truth Initiative is currently targeting youth between the ages of 15 to 21 years old and is spending approximately 40 percent of its marketing budget on social media. While the Truth Initiative continues to purchase television advertising spots on MTV and VH1,

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85 Sarah Sluis. AdExchanger.  
88 Sarah Sluis. Interview at AdExchanger.  
89 “Content marketing is a marketing technique of creating and distributing valuable, relevant and consistent content to attract and acquire a clearly defined audience – with the objective of driving profitable customer action.” Josh Steimle. “What is Content Marketing?” Forbes.com. September 19, 2014. https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshsteimle/2014/09/19/what-is-content-marketing/#55fffc19410b9  
90 Agents of Social Change. p. 419.  
91 According to 2015 population estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau, there are approximately 47 million youth aged 12 to 21 in the U.S. http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
they now have a robust digital campaign running across Google, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Vine, Snapchat, and Instagram. Key lessons learned from the early Truth Campaign remain unchanged, and the focus remains on communicating with youth in a way that is relevant to them. Authenticity comes from the position of a peer or a peer influencer, not from an authority figure such as a parent or teacher. As an example, the Truth Campaign employs well-known internet and social media “influencers” who add credibility to messages and help propagate content across youth-centric audiences.92

Launched in 2014, one of the Truth Initiative’s major on-going campaigns is called “Finish It” and seeks to encourage Generation Z youth (born between 1996 and 2010) to be the generation that ends tobacco use. The campaign specifically targets Generation Z’s research-identified desire to influence positive social change through “participatory engagement” on social media platforms. “Finish It” encourages non-smoking youth to recruit their peers to a digital army speaking the truth against tobacco use.93 The Truth Initiative CEO’s vision is to unify the initiative around the 93 percent of youth who do not smoke and indirectly focus on the 7 percent of remaining youth smokers. Her goal is to create enough social youth resistance (peer pressure) in the 93 percent of non-smokers to eventually reduce the future 7 percent of youth smokers down to zero.94

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93 Agents of Social Change. p. 419.
CHAPTER 4: POLICY OPTIONS

This chapter presents a summary of policy options for evaluation. In order to improve U.S. efforts to diminish the recruiting influence of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the GEC should consider the following policy options:

Option 1: Pursue a strategic messaging approach targeting susceptible global youth.

Focus strategic counter-messaging campaigns on youth. Not on adults and individuals who are already committed to Foreign Terrorist Organizations and are likely targeted by DOD information operations or covert influence programs run by the intelligence community. This option is a long-term approach that seeks a generational change in the negative attitudes of youth toward FTOs, specifically the 200 million Arab youth currently under the age of 25. This option would reduce the current GEC target audience age from 34 years old to 24 years old. However, market research would need to be completed in specific countries and regions to identify an exact age range. The GEC should utilize a peer-to-peer youth messaging strategy targeting youth who are openly against terror organizations as a means to influence those around them who might consider recruitment. This option could be pursued with partner countries using experiential advertising techniques,95 such as those used by the DOD for recruiting and those used by the ATI and Truth Campaigns, as well as behavioral targeted advertising on Google, Facebook, and other online platforms.

Option 2: Seek private sector assistance to create a “truth-like” brand to counter-market Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Utilize brand and advertising awareness modeling to measure GEC and FTO marketing campaigns.

Create a “truth-like” brand around a common identifiable theme.96 This option is different from current and previous attempts to counter FTOs by using “U.S. government” branded, PSA-style content. A brand should be created using private sector assistance with the intent to obscure U.S. government affiliation for authenticity purposes. Specialized content and brand production firms with local and regional expertise could create a new brand, or modify an existing CVE brand in use by an NGO, partner country, or a civil society organization. The creation and subsequent promotion of a brand should seek to unify existing CVE and CT messaging efforts in order to acquire market share from the powerful brands of FTOs such as AQ and ISIS.

95 See Section 2.4 (DOD), 2.5 (ATI), and 3.1 (Truth) for additional details on experiential advertising techniques.
96 The American Marketing Association defines a brand as “a customer experience represented by a collection of images and ideas; often, it refers to a symbol such as a name, logo, slogan, and design scheme. Brand recognition and other reactions are created by the accumulation of experiences with the specific product or service, both directly relating to its use, and through the influence of advertising, design, and media commentary.” Accessed 27 March, 2017. https://www.ama.org/resources/pages/dictionary.aspx?dLetter=B
To measure the effectiveness of this option, the GEC could utilize brand and advertising awareness modeling to evaluate its counter-marketing campaigns against FTOs. Awareness modeling is an identified best practice for the Truth Initiative and the ATI campaign, but requires the use of a brand to measure. Without a brand, the GEC could only use this policy option to measure FTO brands and would have to rely on engagement rate measuring that the organization is currently using.

**Option 3: Establish a digital repository of incriminating foreign terrorist material and counter-marketing content.**

Establish a digital repository of incriminating terrorist documents, videos, and images, that could be used to counter-market terrorist organizations, similar to the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents library. The U.S. Department of Defense and Intelligence Community members have an undisclosed number of captured documents, images, videos, and media stored at the National Media Exploitation Center that could be further exploited and declassified for counter-marketing purposes. The online library could be made accessible to other governments, NGOs, civil society partners, and researchers who could use the material for their CVE programs. The library could centrally store successful counter-marketing audio/visual content and primary source FTO material for use by partners around the world. One option is to expand the existing Harmony Program Database hosted by the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. The Harmony online database is the only known searchable repository of declassified terrorist material in the United States.

**Option 4: Recommend Congress revise Section 1287 of the FY17 NDAA to allow the GEC to promote fact-based narratives to relevant audiences inside of the United States.**

Paragraph (b)(4) of Section 1287 restricts GEC operations to “narratives abroad” and to “audiences outside the United States.” Revising Section 1287 of the NDAA could allow the GEC to counter-market FTOs that are conducting propaganda, disinformation, and recruiting operations inside of the United States. This option reflects the convergence of the terms “domestic and foreign audiences” in an era where individuals with internet access can acquire information from inside nearly any other country, regardless of the user’s location. This option could also allow the GEC to do content creation and market testing on U.S.-based audiences prior to the use of content in partner nations.
CHAPTER 5: CRITERIA FOR ANALYSIS

This chapter describes the four criteria used to assess each of the policy options proposed in chapter four. The organizational characteristics of the Truth Initiative, best practices noted from the Truth Campaign, and information gathered from research and interviews were used to establish the criteria presented below.

- Reduce the number of individuals who favorably view propaganda of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Any policy recommendations should adhere to the mission of the GEC to diminish the influence of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, predominately AQ and ISIS. This criterion measures the potential impact on future FTO recruitment as it relates to GEC messaging efforts.

- Uphold Executive Order 13721 and Section 1287 of the 2017 NDAA. This criterion ensures that any policy changes fit within the GEC mission, authorities, and scope as prescribed by executive order and Congressional statute. This criterion assumes non-U.S. government branded content is permitted to be used by the GEC under current laws and authorities.

- Ensure political acceptability within the Legislative and Executive branches for sustained efforts. This criterion evaluates the extent to which any policy change would be accepted and supported by the political leadership given the current political and terror threat environment. This criterion also evaluates the impact on GEC CT messaging due to the recent mission expansion, to include countering state sponsored propaganda and disinformation.

- Ensure organizational feasibility within the GEC. Organizational feasibility evaluates the degree to which a policy alternative could be realistically implemented given administrative, financial, personnel, and bureaucratic constraints faced by the GEC.
CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS

This chapter presents an analysis of the four policy options and supporting best practices identified from research against the four criteria. For a complete evaluation matrix of all four policy options, please see Appendix 6.

Alternative 1: Pursue a strategic messaging approach targeting susceptible youth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY OPTION</th>
<th>Reduces FTO Favorability</th>
<th>Upholds EO and NDAA</th>
<th>Ensures Political Acceptability</th>
<th>Ensures Organization Feasibility</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Target Youth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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Criteria Assessment Guide: 0 = Fails to Satisfy, 1 = Partially Satisfies, 2 = Mostly Satisfies, 3 = Best Satisfies

Best Practice: “Younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50 years.”

Best Practice: “And the youth there, with their pure, innate nature, long to follow in the great history of Islam. They are only waiting for one who will guide them and define their movement and (tell them) who among the enemy they should begin [targeting]...these youth bring new blood and the group enters the vicious cycle all over again.”

Best Practice: Use a youth-centric peer-to-peer messaging strategy – “young people who are not engaged in a targeted, at-risk behavior can influence those who engage in at-risk behaviors.”

Targeting susceptible youth is a strategy used by the tobacco industry, the Truth Campaign, the ATI campaign, DOD recruiting, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and could be employed by the GEC. This policy option is a strategic shift away from targeting an older demographic towards targeting the 200 million Arab youth currently under the age of 25. This shift reflects a long-term proactive approach toward reducing the favorability of FTOs, as opposed to a reactive approach of targeting older individuals who already favorably view FTOs. Focusing counter-marketing activities on youth will reflect the generational nature of the conflict, while still enabling U.S. defense and intelligence agencies to conduct information operations against older demographics in support of specific operational and political objectives.

Nothing in Executive Order 13721 or Section 1287 of the NDAA directs or prohibits the GEC from targeting a specific age demographic. Shifting the strategic approach towards youth would support paragraph (b)(7) of Section 1287 which directs the GEC to “identify countries and populations most susceptible to propaganda and disinformation.” Marketing research from various fields of industry all indicate that youth are more susceptible to influence than adults.

The policy option to target youth faces uncertain political acceptability. While the new administration is actively seeking new approaches to defeating terrorism, the prevailing policy options appear to be military in nature. A long-term, expensive approach focused on youth counter-marketing is unlikely to garner immediate attention in either the Legislative or Executive branches due to the impatient nature of government.

Targeting the youth demographic would likely have little to no burden on the GEC. Additional research would be needed to identify the exact youth age demographic within a particular country or region. Existing advertising contracts with Facebook, where older demographics are targeted, could be modified or allowed to run to term. Using the Truth Initiative’s best practice of youth peer-to-peer messaging, the GEC would have to expand and broaden counter-marketing efforts which would raise expenses and could increase staffing requirements.
Option 2: Seek private sector assistance to create a “truth-like” brand to counter-market Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Utilize brand and advertising awareness modeling to measure GEC and FTO marketing campaigns.

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<tr>
<th>POLICY OPTION</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduces FTO Favorability</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Create a Brand and use Awareness Modeling</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

Best Practice: “Truth” is a brand that youth and young adults can affiliate with as an alternative to tobacco brands.\(^{100}\)

Best Practice: Target youth with authentic messages – contract content development to firms that are experts in specific demographic audiences.\(^{101}\)

Best Practice: Weekly awareness modeling is a more effective holistic measure for the Truth Campaign than measuring individual engagement and viewing rates of specific content.\(^{102}\)

The Truth Campaign strategy to create a new brand to compete with big tobacco could be applied in a similar approach to counter-market FTO influence. A truth-like brand could be viewed as an alternative to competing FTO-like brands from AQ and ISIS. This policy option differs from the previous approaches of U.S. government-branded content or the distribution of generic unbranded content. The creation of a brand could be used as a means to acquire market share from FTO brands by unifying existing global CVE efforts around a common theme. Creating a brand could also further the promotion of authentic messaging, as opposed to public service announcement style government messaging. A successfully implemented brand approach would likely reduce FTO favorability as it did for the anti-drug ATI campaign and the anti-tobacco Truth Campaign.

\(^{100}\) Allen et al. “The Truth Campaign: Using Countermarketing to Reduce Youth Smoking.”

\(^{101}\) “After watching, seeing some of the [counter-ISIS] material the government has produced, is that all of the videos feel like they are coming from the government, you know made by older people. They feel very disingenuous. And the key to getting to young people still, whether I’m trying to sell you a bag of chips or trying to get you to stop smoking, is authenticity. If the message doesn’t have authenticity attached to it, it is really really hard for it to be successful. Because teens are smart, they can smell that. So, when you are talking about Tunisian youth, it better feel like the message is coming from other Tunisian kids.” – Pete Favat.

Neither the E.O. nor the NDAA explicitly prohibit the GEC from creating a brand and distributing non-U.S. government-branded content. Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 1287 authorizes the GEC to “facilitate the use of a wide range of technologies and techniques by sharing expertise among Federal departments and agencies, seeking expertise from external sources, and implementing best practices.” The creation and use of a brand are identified best practices from the Truth Campaign, the ATI campaign, DOD recruiting,103 and satisfies the EO and NDAA criterion.

The GEC will likely have political acceptability from the Legislative and Executive branches for the policy option of creating a brand. A possible argument against creating a brand is that the U.S. Department of State should not be disseminating content that does not explicitly identify it as originating from the U.S. government. However, there is no known legal provision preventing the DOS from disseminating non-government identified content. Additionally, the ONDCP successfully ran the ATI campaign in the U.S. and did not identify U.S. government sponsorship in many of its advertisements as a means to preserve authenticity with the youth-centric audience.

Creating a brand using private sector assistance will likely be expensive and will require significant upfront costs that exceed the GEC budget. This assessment is based on comparative analysis of financial data from the Truth Initiative, ONDCP, and the DOD. The GEC should solicit proposals from private marketing firms and present these proposals per paragraph (b)(6) of Section 1287, “Identify gaps in U.S. capabilities in areas relevant to the purpose of the Center and recommend necessary enhancements or changes.” The Truth Initiative (and almost every other company) and the ONDCP (ATI Campaign) did not create their own brand, nor did they produce their own advertising content. Private companies contract external support from specialized firms. While CVE is a unique problem, contracting professional expertise in content development might yield better results than State Department produced content, just as the DOD contracts with private firms to run recruitment advertising in the U.S. and the ONDCP contracted with a private firm for the ATI campaign.

To measure the effectiveness of this option, brand and advertising awareness modeling could be used to measure counter-marketing success and failures in audiences where the GEC distributes content. Awareness modeling could also be used to measure FTO influence in target audiences to determine market share comparison. Surveying brand and advertising awareness provides actual metrics from individuals showing positive or negative interests compared with engagement and viewing rates that only show online activity. Utilizing awareness modeling will not likely require any additional staffing, but would probably add costs to the GEC budget due to the requirement to run target audience surveys unless this capability already exists within the Bureau of Public Diplomacy.

103 “Private sector advertising industry experts we spoke to emphasized the importance of maintaining a unique brand and strategy for each of the service components when there is competition for a target audience.” GAO-16-396: DOD Advertising. pg. 11
Option 3: Establish a digital repository of incriminating foreign terrorist material and counter-marketing content.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY OPTION</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduces FTO Favorability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Establish a Digital Repository</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Best Practice: "Use their own material against them to illuminate tobacco industry manipulation of consumers." 104

Creating an online repository of documents, videos, images, and defector stories would satisfy the criteria of reducing FTO favorability by providing a source of material to U.S. and partner counter-marketing efforts. The use of internal tobacco industry documentation and statements from tobacco industry executives were critical in establishing authentic, fact-based narratives during the creation of the Truth Campaign.

Section 1287 of the FY17 NDAA under paragraph (f) “Information Access Fund,” subsection (1)(b), authorizes the GEC to “provide grants or contracts of financial support” to “civil society groups, media content providers, nongovernmental organizations, federally funded research and development centers, private companies, or academic institutions” for the purpose to “collect and store examples in print, online, and social media, disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda directed at the United States and its allies and partners.” This explicit statutory authorization supports this policy option.

One of the biggest challenges to implementing this policy option is the exploitation and declassification of incriminating terrorist material captured on the battlefield or acquired through intelligence collection. Political acceptability is likely from Congress due to the statutory authorization, but is uncertain from the Executive branch. Members of the Intelligence Community will likely object to the declassification of significant captured and collected terrorist material to protect on-going intelligence and military operations. As an example, tens of thousands of documents (physical and digital) were captured during the Bin Laden raid on May 2, 2011, but only 265 have been declassified and released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) website for public viewing. 105 Although some incriminating documents could be declassified for GEC purposes, the protection of sources and methods or the

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104 “When we approached the problem, we asked ourselves what would the tobacco executives not want people to see, what would make them crap their pants. It is the same thing for Al Qaeda and ISIS, what are the things that the senior leaders would absolutely lose their minds if they got out to the public?” - Quote from Pete Favat.

protection of other ongoing CT operations might take precedence over a counter-marketing campaign. Due to the history of Executive branch objections to the declassification of terrorist material, this criterion is assessed to be uncertain.

Creating a repository will likely add organizational burden to the GEC, with respect to personnel staffing and financing. The GEC will likely have to hire an individual to serve as a repository manager, or train a current member to oversee the project as an additional duty. The GEC could contract repository services to a university that already has experience managing libraries and databases. A viable option is expanding the Harmony Program at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the U.S. Military Academy. The Harmony Program is an online research database created in 2005 to host AQ documents declassified from military battlefield collection.106 A grant or contract could be provided to an institution such as the CTC to catalog and store material provided by the GEC. While actual GEC financial costs would have to be calculated, a point of reference is the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library at the UCSF which has an annual operating budget of approximately $225,000.107

**Option 4: Recommend Congress revise Section 1287 of the FY17 NDAA to allow the GEC to promote fact-based narratives to relevant audiences inside of the United States.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>POLICY OPTION</th>
<th>Reduces FTO Favorability</th>
<th>Upholds EO and NDAA</th>
<th>Ensures Political Acceptability</th>
<th>Ensures Organization Feasibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Recommend New Authority to Message Inside of the United States</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The GEC is directed by statute to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter” propaganda and disinformation aimed at U.S. national security interests, but the GEC is restricted from operating inside of the U.S. While this policy option is the most controversial, the U.S. government does not currently have an agency or department dedicated to countering state or non-state propaganda and disinformation inside of the U.S. Thus, susceptible U.S. audiences are generally able to view terrorist material without alternative narratives in social media “echo chambers.” Revising Section 1287 of the NDAA to allow the GEC to promote fact-based narratives to audiences inside of the U.S. could reduce the favorability of FTOs.

106 CTC’s Harmony Program. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program
107 The budget includes two librarians, server maintenance, and general facility costs. Data provided to the author via email from a UCSF librarian.
The GEC is limited by paragraph (b)(1) and (b)(4) of Section 1287 to “expose and refute foreign misinformation and disinformation and proactively promote fact-based narratives and policies to audiences outside of the United States.” EO 13721 also specifies GEC activities must be directed at “foreign audiences abroad.” These restrictions were based on the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012\textsuperscript{108} that states in section 208 paragraph (a) that “no funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States.”\textsuperscript{109} The general authorization of the bill states:

“The Secretary and the Broadcasting Board of Governors are authorized to use funds appropriated or otherwise made available for public diplomacy information programs to provide for the preparation, dissemination, and use of information intended for foreign audiences abroad about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, the Internet, and other information media, including social media, and through information centers, instructors, and other direct or indirect means of communication.”

The purpose of the 2012 amendment was to allow the Voice of America (VOA), which is funded by the DOS through the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), to reach diaspora communities inside of the U.S. After the passing of the amendment, the VOA issued a statement stating they have no intention to create programing specific for U.S. audiences, but that they would provide native language broadcasts to U.S. communities by request.\textsuperscript{110} The GEC could seek a similar authorization for a fact-based counter-marketing campaign directed against FTOs.

This policy option would likely generate unfavorable media coverage under the current political climate. It is uncertain whether the Executive and Legislative branches would be willing to amend the statute and the E.O. to allow the GEC to distribute content to U.S. audiences. However, the ATI campaign is one example of a previous U.S. government fact-based counter-marketing campaign directed at U.S. audiences.

Distributing content to U.S. audiences would likely only have a marginal impact on the GEC. The target audience would be relatively small inside of the U.S. and likely only be focused on small Middle Eastern and African diaspora communities. Authorization to access these communities would also likely improve the effectiveness of U.S. international efforts as content could be market-tested through U.S.-based marketing firms.

\textsuperscript{108} This bill amended the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 and passed in the FY13 NDAA, under Section 1078. Dissemination abroad of Information about the United States. https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/4310?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22A%5B%22hr=4310%22%5D%7D&r=3


CHAPTER 7: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter provides a summary of policy recommendations for the GEC. These policy options are considered in light of the criteria discussed in chapter 5 and were developed from Truth Campaign and Truth Initiative counter-marketing best practices. It is important to acknowledge that the counter-marketing of tobacco and terrorism are not perfect comparisons, and this research does not intend to imply that they are.

A counter-marketing approach to CT/CVE messaging will not be a panacea, but this research indicates there is value for its use in U.S. counter-messaging efforts executed through the GEC. While a viral social media campaign will not fix poor governance, or address legitimate grievances that lead individuals to commit violence, a Truth-like strategy should be used to improve the effectiveness of a long-term approach directed at discouraging youth from joining Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Based on my research and findings, the GEC should implement the following:

Option 1: Focus on Youth. Targeting susceptible youth is a strategy used by the tobacco industry, the Truth Campaign, the ATI Campaign, DOD recruiting, FTOs, and should be used by the GEC. This policy option is a strategic shift away from targeting an older demographic towards targeting the 200 million Arab youth currently under the age of 25.

Option 2: Create a “truth-like” brand. A brand approach can unify existing global CT and CVE messaging efforts around a common, identifiable theme in order to compete for market share against prolific brands like ISIS and AQ. The GEC should contract with a private marketing firm with regional expertise that can effectively market test new or existing brand ideas from NGO’s and civil society organizations.

Option 3: Establish a digital repository of incriminating terrorist material and counter-marketing content. The use of internal tobacco industry documentation and statements from tobacco industry executives was critical in establishing authentic, fact-based narratives during the creation of the Truth Campaign. An online repository of declassified original documents, videos, images, and defector stories would be an invaluable source of material for U.S. and partner counter-marketing efforts.

At this time, I do not recommend implementing option 4:

Option 4: Recommend Congress revise Section 1287 of the FY17 NDAA to allow the GEC to promote fact-based narratives to relevant audiences inside of the United States.

While this option has merit, it needs to be further researched and evaluated for legal standing. More importantly, the current political climate will likely reject this option. The public outcry will likely generate negative publicity for the GEC and could erode political support for the other recommended policy options.
APPENDIX 1: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

Source: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99484.htm
Global Engagement Center – Organization Chart by Office

APPENDIX 2: GEC OFFICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES / FY16 PLANS

NETWORK ENGAGEMENT (Staff Size: Currently 5; increasing to 17 by fiscal year 2018)
This office is the action arm for coordinating, integrating and synchronizing messaging efforts across and within all U.S. government and coalition partners’ countering violent extremism (CVE) lines of effort. The team consists of personnel from seven different agencies, which is a critical aspect of effectively coordinating messaging. They bring with them information and many resources and capabilities used to support CVE messaging activities.

DATA ANALYTICS (Staff Size: Current 13; increasing to 37 by fiscal year 2018)
This office uses big data analytics technologies to assess the violent extremists’ activity online and through social media, as well as to assess the impact of counter-messaging efforts on foreign audiences. This effort includes using the latest government technologies, like DARPA’s Quantitative Crisis Response system, and Silicon Valley technologies, like Crimson Hexagon. These tools help quantify and measure the effect of efforts to diminish the influence of violent extremists abroad.

CONTENT/PRODUCTION (Staff Size: Currently 25; increasing to 44 by fiscal year 2018)
This office generates digital content and messaging themes to counter Daesh’s narratives and expose the organization’s true nature. Both independently and in collaboration with various partners, GEC develops and amplifies narratives to reduce Daesh’s appeal with at-risk audiences and encourages positive influencers to intervene. The team uses a variety of dissemination vehicles, including social media platforms, NGOs, U.S. embassies, DoD assets and other U.S. government and coalition communicators and officials.

PARTNERSHIPS (Staff Size: Currently 7; increasing to 22 by fiscal year 2018)
This office engages partners in priority areas around the globe to expand the network of credible voices against Daesh and violent extremist ideology. Cultivating an interconnected, empowered network that includes coalition partners, messaging centers, civil society organizations, NGO’s, grassroots activists and sub-national governmental entities, in which elements work individually and in concert to “break the brand” of Daesh and other violent extremist groups.

RESOURCES (Staff Size: Currently 5; increasing to 18 by fiscal year 2018)
The team is the action office for executing all internal management functions, as well as for assuring management-related liaison with all external parties. It works to ensure that resources are aligned and integrated to enable the activities of other offices and to advance the mission of the center.

GEC NEW APPROACH/FY 2016 PLANS

To drive a new, integrated approach, the new Global Engagement Center, like the CSCC before it, draws on an interagency staff from the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security, State, USAID and the intelligence community to implement new approaches to disrupt extremist propaganda.

THE GEC’S NEW STRATEGY FOCUSES ON FIVE AREAS

1. **Data-driven Activities:** The GEC aims to fully exploit data and analytics to develop, test and evaluate themes, messages and messengers. This requires: identifying, combining and managing multiple sources of data from across the U.S. government and its partners; and using advanced data-analytics models to optimize operational outcomes and yield better decision making. The GEC will develop a clear strategy for how to use data and analytics to compete and deploy the right technology architecture and capabilities.

2. **Third-party Focus:** The GEC will use interagency and private sector expertise to craft messaging that is effective in countering the propaganda of violent extremists. Its content will be created through two means: content production and content collection/curation. GEC’s focus on sharing and curating content written by third-party subject matter experts will work to facilitate a variety of perspectives, sentiments and objectives.

3. **Thematic Campaigns:** The GEC will conduct messages and campaigns primarily with a global network of partners and unilaterally as required. GEC campaigns will build narratives around thematic campaigns about the reality of Daesh, such as poor governance, abuse of women and the narratives of defectors.

4. **Develop a Global Network of Partners:** The GEC recognizes that violent extremist organizations abroad operate as a decentralized, resilient network. To counter radicalization and recruitment, the GEC is working to cultivate and empower a stronger information-sharing network of credible voices worldwide. This includes building, maintaining and sustaining partnerships from grassroots to national levels, with private-sector entities, non-governmental organizations and others as appropriate in support of the GEC mission.

5. **Innovative, Agile and Flexible Approaches:** To effectively operate the GEC has adopted a startup mentality that is 1) innovative, drawing from industry and partner ideas and technologies; 2) agile, capable of anticipating and moving in the information space at or faster than the pace of violent extremist organizations; and 3) flexible, having the organizational ability to adapt in size, responsiveness and technology, in addition to having the ability to achieve objectives and goals.

APPENDIX 3: EXAMPLES OF “ABOVE THE INFLUENCE”

The following images are examples of “Above the Influence” content:
Official YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/abovetheinfluence
APPENDIX 4: EXAMPLES OF THE “TRUTH CAMPAIGN”

The following are examples of Truth Campaign advertising content from 2000 to present:
Official YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCU6Yv6QttlTcwf96aafYHkQ
Truth “Left Swipe Dat” Case Study Video: https://vimeo.com/205603179

Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=80W66vI9jNc&list=PL1636A3D95C587D20

Truth Magazine Ads encouraging youth to participate in the campaign: “Dog Poop and Urine Contain Urea and Ammonia, So do Cigarettes Thanks to Tobacco Companies, Enjoy.”

Magazine and billboard ads encouraging youth to “See and Speak the Truth” about the tobacco industry
The images above show the original orange “stunt” vans still in use today and examples of Truth-branded apparel. The image below is an overview of the “Unpaid Tobacco Spokesperson” ad that ran during the 2014 MTV Video Music Awards.
APPENDIX 5: TRUTH INITIATIVE FINANCIAL DATA

See Section 3.4 Finances: The Cost of Operations and Counter-Marketing.\textsuperscript{111}

\textbf{Truth Initiative: Annual Operating Budgets since 2000}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Assets (End of Year)</th>
<th>Annual Operating Budget (Program Expenses)</th>
<th>Counter Marketing and Communications</th>
<th>Other Programs and Expenses</th>
<th>Percent of Operating Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$957,383,000</td>
<td>$115,889,000</td>
<td>$79,152,000</td>
<td>$36,737,000</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$1,090,791,000</td>
<td>$105,241,000</td>
<td>$69,001,000</td>
<td>$36,240,000</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$1,151,507,000</td>
<td>$60,948,000</td>
<td>$30,213,000</td>
<td>$30,736,000</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$1,091,727,000</td>
<td>$68,856,000</td>
<td>$38,987,000</td>
<td>$29,971,000</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$1,038,738,000</td>
<td>$52,737,000</td>
<td>$18,801,000</td>
<td>$34,136,000</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$1,100,584,000</td>
<td>$63,077,000</td>
<td>$33,435,000</td>
<td>$29,942,000</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$978,729,000</td>
<td>$79,178,000</td>
<td>$45,386,000</td>
<td>$33,792,000</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$933,263,000</td>
<td>$91,880,000</td>
<td>$51,093,000</td>
<td>$40,787,000</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$1,156,773,000</td>
<td>$113,069,000</td>
<td>$86,827,000</td>
<td>$46,242,000</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$1,211,461,000</td>
<td>$101,530,000</td>
<td>$80,289,000</td>
<td>$41,241,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$1,082,792,000</td>
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<td>$62,620,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>$71,685,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$980,324,000</td>
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<td>$91,713,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>$75,800,000</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>$93,300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$820,620,743</td>
<td>$102,124,309</td>
<td>$132,109,018</td>
<td>$30,015,293</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$486,770,000</td>
<td>$117,680,648</td>
<td>$109,104,474</td>
<td>$8,586,174</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{111} Author compiled data from American Legacy Foundation and Truth Initiative Annual Reports: 2000 to 2001 and from 2004 to 2015. The 2002 and 2003 Annual Reports were not available for review. Fiscal years begin on July 1 and conclude on June 30, the annual report for 2016 was not released in time for this report. The “countermarketing and communications” financial data from 2002 and 2003 was acquired from an article title, “The Truth about American Legacy” by Nancy Lewis. October 5, 2009, \textit{Youth Today}. 
APPENDIX 6: POLICY OPTION EVALUATION MATRIX

The numerical values were assessed based on how effectively each policy option satisfied each criterion. For further analysis, please see Chapter 6 of this report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY OPTIONS</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>Reduces FTO Favorability</th>
<th>Upholds EO and NDAA</th>
<th>Ensures Political Acceptability</th>
<th>Ensures Organization Feasibility</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Target Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Create a Brand and use Awareness Modeling</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Establish a Digital Repository</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Recommend New Authority to Message Inside of the United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criteria Assessment Guide:
0 = Fails to Satisfy
1 = Partially Satisfies
2 = Mostly Satisfies
3 = Best Satisfies
REFERENCES


Truth Initiative (previously the American Legacy Foundation. “Annual Reports: 2010 to 2015.” Available at: https://truthinitiative.org/annual-reports


