

The Impact of California Senate Bill 967 on Reporting of Sexual Assault on College Campuses

Prepared for: Anna Voremberg, End Rape On Campus

Prepared by: Bronwen Wade, Master of Public Policy Candidate

The Sanford School of Public Policy Duke University Faculty Advisor:
Elizabeth Frankenberg

Disclaimer: This student paper was prepared in 2017 in partial completion of the requirements for the Master's Project, a major assignment for the Master of Public Policy Program at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. The research, analysis, and policy alternatives and recommendations contained in this paper are the work of the student who authored the document, and do not represent the official or unofficial views of the Sanford School of Public Policy or of Duke University. Without the specific permission of its author, this paper may not be used or cited for any purpose other than to inform the client organization about the subject matter. The author relied in many instances on data provided by the client and related organizations and makes no independent representations as to the accuracy of the data.

Research Question: Has California Senate Bill 967 increased reporting of sexual assaults at California universities that offer four-year degrees or higher?

Introduction

Sexual assault on college campuses is a longstanding and pervasive problem. Increasing media coverage has led to growing concern about sexual violence on college campuses and most universities' failure to respond appropriately. However, sexual assault continues to be a frequent and underreported crime.

Federal legislation has traditionally governed the way colleges handle sexual assault cases; but the California legislature now leads the way on this issue. Senate Bill 967 has set a new standard for how colleges define and respond to cases of sexual assault in California. Passed in 2014, it defines consent as an affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity from both parties (California Legislative Information, 2014). It also requires enhanced training of campus officials involved in the adjudication and investigation process, comprehensive prevention programs, collaborative partnerships with community based organizations that support survivors, and a number of additional rules that have set a high bar for how institutions respond to sexual assault (California Legislative Information, 2014).

The goals of SB 967 are to support survivors in coming forward and to create a definition of consent that is affirmative, ongoing, and voluntary; thus making it easier to report sexual assaults that were perpetrated by someone with whom the victim had a pre-existing relationship, while a survivor was incapacitated, or other scenarios that used to be very difficult to prosecute. Activists' ultimate goal is to create a society in which sexual violence is less prevalent and in which all survivors that wish to report are supported, heard, and treated with respect. Creating

policies that make it easy for survivors to come forward is an important first step. Since the law's focus is on improving the reporting process and the legal definition of sexual assault, this paper addressed the question of whether it increased reports of sexual assault on college campuses.

Interaction of Federal and State Policy on Campus Reporting

While California has set new state-level standards for how colleges address sexual assault, these policies have traditionally been set at the federal level. Title IX and the Clery Act are the two national policies that have shaped universities' behavior on the issue of sexual assault.

Title IX is a federal law that was passed in 1972 and the OCR (Office for Civil Rights) is tasked with holding universities responsible for following it (DOE, 2007). The essential purpose of Title IX was to prohibit sex discrimination in education (Bolger). The federal government mandated that colleges handle sexual assault cases with the rationale that gender based violence perpetuates inequality (Bolger). Title IX investigations on a college campus do not preclude survivors from pursuing a criminal case through the police, but are instead a parallel option (Bolger). The Title IX option exists because it is difficult to achieve a conviction in criminal cases, but the burden of proof in a Title IX case is lower. The survivor may want to be protected from their assailant but avoid the emotional toll of a lengthy trial, and the Title IX process provides students with additional resources, protection, and access to care.

Some researchers assert that Title IX investigations are a better option for survivors than criminal proceedings. In a criminal case, the standard for conviction is "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt;" for Title IX cases, the standard for conviction and sanction is a "preponderance of evidence," or a more than 50% chance that the accused committed the crime

(Bolger). Additionally, schools are able to suspend or expel offenders quickly and can force the accused to change schedules, housing, or classes to avoid the accuser while the investigation is in progress (Bolger). A number of state laws do not legally recognize or prosecute sexual assault or domestic violence for same gender couples, and universities can choose to ignore these discriminatory practices (Bolger). These options have the potential to make reporting easier for survivors, but whether Title IX is successful in reality is a contentious issue.

In addition to Title IX, the Jeanne Clery Act is the other federal policy governing how colleges address sexual assaults on their campuses. The Clery Act was passed in 1990 and requires universities to disclose 3 years worth of campus crime statistics and security policies (Clery Center, 2016a). The Clery Act, as it's generally referred to, is habitually updated with new requirements on reporting and information. Most recently, the Campus SaVE (Sexual Violence Elimination) Act was passed in 2013 to update the Clery Act and added a number of new requirements (Clery Center, 2016b). In addition to expanded reporting metrics, it clarifies minimum standards for disciplinary procedures and requires universities to provide prevention and awareness programs for all incoming students, bystander intervention programs, information on risk reduction, and ongoing prevention and awareness programs (Clery Center, 2016b).

While both the Clery Act and Title IX had good intentions, many researchers have critiqued how they have been implemented and how successful they are at meeting their goals. One of the issues is a lack of adequate resources. The Office for Civil rights has lost funding as its caseload has gone up (Kingkade, 2016). Others have critiqued the Clery Act and Title IX's inadvertent effect of providing incentives for colleges to suppress or ignore information on sexual assaults. This is discussed further later in the paper.

California Senate Bill 967

California's Senate Bill 967 is the first of its kind in the country (End Rape On Campus). Commonly referred to as the "Yes Means Yes" bill, Senate Bill 967 raises the standards for how campus officials investigate sexual assault reports and requires "affirmative consent" from both parties (Smith, 2014). The bill goes beyond the typical "no means no" standard, which has introduced ambiguity in investigations of sexual assault (Chappell, 2014).

"Affirmative consent" means that each party must have the affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity (California Legislative Information, 2014). The lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent (California Legislative Information, 2014). Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time (California Legislative Information, 2014). It also specifically states that the existence of a dating relationship, or past sexual relations between two people, is not an indicator of consent (California Legislative Information, 2014). This is valuable to state explicitly, since it is notoriously difficult to prosecute rapes that happened within a relationship. In addition to the new legal definition of consent, it clarified the following things (California Legislative Information, 2014):

- The accused must have taken reasonable steps to ascertain whether the complainant affirmatively consented
- The lack of affirmative consent is not excused by the accused being intoxicated
- The standard used to ascertain guilt is a "preponderance of the evidence"
- The complainant can not have given affirmative consent if they were asleep, unconscious, incapacitated due to drugs/alcohol/medication, or were unable to communicate due to a mental or physical condition

- In order to receive state financial aid funds through Calgrant, which nearly all public and private universities receive, the governing boards of colleges must adopt a detailed and victim-centered policy and protocol regarding sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking. The policies must include:
 - A policy statement on how the institution will provide appropriate protections for the privacy of individuals involved, including confidentiality
 - Initial response by institution's personnel, including details on assisting the victim, victim interview protocols, preserving evidence, contacting and interviewing the accused, identifying and locating witnesses, procedures for confidential reporting, investigating allegations that drugs or alcohol were involved in the incident, and participation of victim advocates and other supporting people
 - Response guidelines for sexual assaults committed by a stranger and sexual assaults committed by someone known to the survivor
 - Providing written notification to the complainant about the availability of, and contact information for, on and off campus resources and services and coordination with law enforcement if appropriate
 - The role of institutional staff supervision
 - A comprehensive, trauma-informed training program for campus officials involved in investigating and adjudicating sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking cases
 - Providing that an individual who participates as a complainant or witness won't be subject to disciplinary sanctions for violation of the institution's student

conduct policy at or near the time of the incident, unless the violation was egregious (such as actions that place the health or safety of another person at risk)

- Governing boards of universities must enter into memoranda of understanding or collaborative partnerships with community-based organizations to refer students for assistance or make services available to students
- Governing boards shall implement comprehensive prevention and outreach programs addressing sexual violence, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking
- Outreach programming shall be included as part of every incoming student's orientation

This bill also ensures that, if additional costs were accrued as a result of these requirements, reimbursements would be made to universities by the state. The bill was passed on 9/28/14 (California Legislative Information, 2014). It went into effect on January 1, 2015 (California Department of Justice, 2015).

Literature Review

Prevalence of Sexual Assault on College Campuses

It is absolutely crucial to understand the results of California's groundbreaking policy. Sexual assault has a severe, negative impact on survivors' lives and research has consistently shown that sexual violence is extremely pervasive on college campuses, in spite of low report numbers on universities' annual Clery Reports. The Association of American Universities conducted one of the largest, most comprehensive, and recent surveys on sexual assault on college campuses in spring, 2014. It is also the only large survey that does not treat gender as a binary variable, which has historically left out the experiences of many queer people.

The AAU study demonstrates that 11.7% of students across surveyed universities had experience nonconsensual penetration or sexual touching by force or incapacitation since enrolling (AAU, 2015). However, these rates vary significantly by gender, whether the students are undergraduates or graduate students, and how long they have been on campus (AAU, 2015). AAU split gender into 3 categories: male, female, and TGQN (transgender, genderqueer, questioning, and gender nonconforming) (AAU, 2015). 21.5% of TGQN individuals, 18.9% of females, and 4.3% of males surveyed had experienced nonconsensual penetration or touching by sexual force or incapacitation since starting college (AAU, 2015). If nonconsensual sexual contact or penetration includes instances of coercion or the absence of affirmative consent, these rates jump higher still. 23.6% of females, 5.8% of males, and 27.8% of TGQN individuals experienced nonconsensual contact with this new definition (AAU, 2015).

By the time undergraduates are seniors, 27.2% females, 30.8% of TGQN individuals, and 6.5% of men have experienced attempted or completed sexual contact involving penetration or sexual touching as a result of physical force or incapacitation (AAU, 2015). Among undergraduate women, as many students reported nonconsensual penetration by physical force as reported by incapacitation (AAU, 2015). In that study, “incapacitation” was defined as being unable to consent or stop what was happening because the victim had passed out, was asleep, or was incapacitated due to drugs or alcohol (AAU, 2015). This ratio confirms the importance of a sexual assault policy that defines consent as conscious, affirmative, and ongoing.

A national study conducted in 2007 found that 46% of college women who were raped were incapacitated, drugged, or too drunk to consent and 54% were raped by force without drugs, alcohol, or incapacitation (Conoscenti et. al, 2007). This study is consistent with the findings from the AAU’s more recent research. While both are national studies rather than

California specific, AAU's data demonstrates that perpetration rates are similar across states (AAU, 2015). In addition, it showed that women who were drunk, drugged, or incapacitated were far less likely to report their assaults to police than women who were conscious and raped through physical force (Conoscenti et. al, 2007). This survey reflected that nearly half of sexual assaults are committed when someone is incapacitated, and that type of sexual assault has an even lower chance of being reported than sexual assaults committed with the use of physical force alone. This study again reflects the need for SB 967 and the opportunities for change.

Large-scale surveys across many college campuses have been rare and many of the studies are now outdated. However, most of them show that somewhere between 20 and 30% of women are sexually assaulted during their time in college. Recent studies also demonstrate that rapists frequently attack people who are incapacitated. For those individuals, prosecuting their assailant under the traditional "no means no" legislation is much more difficult.

Reporting Rates

A review of universities' annual Clery Reports demonstrates a widespread and consistent trend. While surveys of college populations demonstrate the extremely high frequency of sexual assault, reporting rates remain incredibly low. The vast majority of colleges have fewer than one in one thousand enrolled students reporting a sexual assault each year. This means that, based on the AAU's data on the prevalence of sexual violence, less than 1% of sexual assaults that occur are being reported. Many people who go through the trauma of an assault understandably do not wish to go through the emotional challenge of reporting. However, even if 99% of people who were assaulted did not want to report, the reporting numbers would still be a cause for concern. They imply that colleges and universities are creating an environment in which reporting is a difficult and discouraging process that pushes survivors away.

A growing body of research has provided insight into why reporting rates are so low on college campuses. The U.S. Department of Justice, legal expert Nancy Chi Cantalupo, and the AAU (Association of American Universities) have all produced reports on what is driving the low reporting rates. Each organization or researcher approached the issue from a slightly different perspective. Some gathered victims' statements, some compiled records from court cases and investigations, and others analyzed the political and policy structures. Combining their insights produces a nuanced, multifaceted understanding of the various factors that drive low reporting rates. This knowledge can then be used to understand whether California Senate Bill 967 is likely to change sexual assault reporting rates on college campuses.

Cantalupo attributes this low reporting rate to the problematic behavior of universities (Cantalupo, 2011). After reviewing numerous sexual assault cases on college campuses, she outlines the most common responses from schools to reports of sexual assault: 1) the school does nothing, 2) they do nothing to investigate the claim or protect the reporting student after the accused student denies it, 3) the school takes months or years to investigate, 4) school officials investigate in a way clearly biased against the reporting student, 5) the school determines that sexual violence did occur but only prescribe minimal punishment for the perpetrator and doesn't protect the survivor from retaliation, 6) school officials determine that sexual violence occurred but make the survivor change their schedule in order to avoid the perpetrator, 7) school officials simply tell the victim not to tell anyone else (even when the perpetrator is determined to be guilty), 8) the school requires the survivor to confront their assailant or go through mediation with the assailant before filing an official investigation, 9) schools distribute a press packet to local media about a survivor claiming that they were charged with disorderly conduct at the time of the assault, 10) school officials set up an athletic recruitment program to "show players a good

time” and ignore reports of sexual violence, and 11) school officials admit or readmit student athletes with a history of sexual violence (Cantalupo, 2011). These unethical institutional failings at the school level create a hostile environment in which survivors are not comfortable reporting. This means that serial rapists are not caught and the cycle of violence continues.

Cantalupo also illuminated many of the policy structures that provide incentives for schools to ignore reports of sexual violence or silence survivors who come forward. The Clery Act requires that colleges provide annual data on sexual assaults and other crimes. This means that schools that ignore the problem and have fewer reported problems look safer, while schools that encourage reporting have more reports and look less safe (Cantalupo, 2011). Appearances are then the opposite of reality, even though most campuses have relatively similar rates of sexual violence (Cantalupo, 2011). Schools then choose to avoid or remain unaware of issues with sexual violence because they are afraid of damaging their reputation, student application pool, and funding opportunities (Cantalupo, 2011). Cantalupo also asserts that, since most rapists are serial rapists and continue because they are not caught, low reporting rates contribute to high rates of sexual violence on campuses (2011).

The Department of Justice’s report is slightly dated, as it was published in 2002, but still provides valuable information about ongoing issues on college campuses (Cullen, Fisher, & Karjane, 2002). It uncovered that few colleges provide sexual assault response or sensitivity training to those most likely to hear about sexual assaults first (Cullen et. al, 2002). Less than half of schools require campus law enforcement or security officers to go through sexual assault training (Cullen et. al, 2002). It also found a significant number of schools that did not provide information on the process of filing a sexual assault complaint on campus (Cullen et. al, 2002). All of these are significant barriers to reporting for survivors. Policies that restrict survivors’

ability to make their own choices about reporting or the proceedings also reduce reporting (Cullen et. al, 2002). Finally, most survivors don't define their experience of rape as a crime (Cullen et. al, 2002).

The Department of Justice report also found information on what attributes make someone less likely to report. They found that active support from friends is the primary factor that distinguishes victims who do or do not report (Cullen et. al, 2002). This was a particular challenge since, at the time of the survey, only 40% of schools provided students with sexual assault training (Cullen et. al, 2002). The passage of the federal SaVE Act and California's SB 967 should help change the lack of peer training or knowledge.

In a second report for the Department of Justice in 2007, researchers showed the different reasons that college women chose not to report their sexual assaults split out by the type of sexual assault that occurred (Conoscenti et. al, 2007). For women who were raped while drugged, drunk, or incapacitated, the most common reasons for not reporting were that they were unclear that a crime had occurred or harm was intended and they didn't think it was serious enough to report (Conoscenti et. al, 2007). For those who were raped while fully conscious by physical force, their largest concerns were not wanting family members to know, not wanting others to know, and fearing reprisal (Conoscenti et. al, 2007).

California Senate Bill 967 could help many of these problems. It has a more expansive definition of sexual assault, an affirmative consent rule, and requirements for trauma-informed training. This means that first responders are more likely to provide survivor-focused support that is sensitive, informed, and makes survivors feel safe coming forward. The clear rules about what constitutes consent and sexual assault also contribute to an environment that does not minimize certain types of sexual assault, such as instances where the victim is incapacitated.

Finally, Senate Bill 967 requires schools to provide survivors with information on reporting, including options for confidential reporting. This removes barriers to reporting and provides survivors with more choice.

Previous Research on Affirmative Consent Rules and Sexual Assault Reporting

California is the first state to pass an affirmative consent policy and the legislature required the bill to be fully implemented in universities by January 1, 2015 (California Department of Justice, 2015). This means that 2015 is the first full year for which data is available after the bill went into full effect. As a result, no analyses of its impact have been completed. New York and Illinois are the only states with similar affirmative consent laws for college campuses (End Rape On Campus; New, 2015). The New York law requires: all colleges to adopt comprehensive procedures and guidelines for sexual assault cases, a uniform definition of affirmative consent, an amnesty policy to ensure that students reporting a sexual assault are granted immunity from certain campus policy violations such as alcohol use, a students' bill of rights with information on resources for sexual assault survivors, and comprehensive training for new staff, students, and administrators (Governor's Press Office, 2015). The Illinois bill requires awareness programming, bystander intervention, a comprehensive response policy, trauma-informed and survivor-centered care, and an affirmative definition of consent (Legiscan, 2015). However, this New York law was signed in July 2015 and the Illinois law was signed in August 2015, a full year after California's bill was passed (Governor's Press Office, 2015; Legiscan, 2015). At this time, no information is available on the impact of state-level laws addressing sexual assault on campus.

On the other hand, a number of individual schools have crafted their own affirmative consent policies (End Rape On Campus). Some have commented on the outcome of their

affirmative consent policies and claimed that it has improved reporting (AACRAO, 2015).

However, this information has been largely anecdotal rather than a process of rigorous academic research.

Since California SB 967 is a new and unprecedented law, there are many gaps in knowledge that need to be filled. Others have written research on the frequency of sexual assault on college campuses and the causes of low reporting. This will inform the analysis of SB 967, but this paper will attempt to go beyond existing research and answer the question of whether this specific legislation altered the likelihood of reporting on college campuses.

Campus Save ACT:

The Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act of 2013, commonly referred to as the “Campus Save Act,” may also contribute to increase reporting trends across the country between 2013 and 2015. This is a federal law passed in March of 2013 that required institutions of higher education to educate students, faculty, and staff on the prevention of sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking (Campus Clarity, 2013). Schools were required to report compliance by October 2014 (Campus Clarity, 2013). The law also made schools report a broader range of sexual violence incidents and required an equitable disciplinary proceeding (Know Your IX). This means that there may be a trend towards increased reporting across the United States. However, this should impact all states similarly.

Data and Methods:

This paper utilizes a difference-in-difference method for statistical analysis. California serves as the “treatment” and a group of similar states serves as the “control” or counterfactual. This control should satisfy the “parallel trend” requirement. In other words, while other states

may have underlying differences from California, those differences should stay constant over time. Additionally, even if reporting rates change over time, the trend should be “parallel” to the change in California in the absence of SB 967. Then, subtracting the change in reporting rates over time in the counterfactual from the change in reporting rates over time in California should yield the impact of California’s SB 967.

In building the counterfactual, states were selected that were most similar to California across a range of attributes. The counterfactual includes primarily coastal states where the majority of students are enrolled in large public universities. The other metrics that were used to build a counterfactual include: the ratio of universities that offer four-year degrees or higher (rather than community colleges or trade schools which offer 2-year or shorter programs), demographic characteristics, the percent of the overall student population that are undergraduates, and the percent of state residents who identified as “Democrats or Leaning Democrat” in a 2014 Pew Center Poll (Pew Research Center). While not a large coastal state, Texas was selected for its large system of public institutions and because it is demographically most similar to California. Michigan also has a large public higher education system and similar political features. While New York and Illinois have attributes that would make them excellent “control” states, both also passed laws similar to California in 2015 (Governor’s Press Office, 2015; Legiscan, 2015). This means that neither can provide a good “counterfactual” example of what would have happened in absence of the law.

Table 1: California & Counterfactual States: Attributes

	California	Texas	Washington	New Jersey	Oregon	Michigan	Maryland
% of students enrolled in public (vs. private) institution – Fall 2014	80.4%	87.8%	85.6%	80.5%	82.1%	83.1%	83.5%
% of colleges that are 4 years (vs. 2 years or less)	54.9%	50.8%	57.7%	65.2%	63.3%	70.1%	66.1%
% of students female - Fall 2014	55.0%	56.4%	55.5%	55.1%	55.2%	56.3%	57.5%
% of students white - Fall 2014	33.4%	46.0%	62.5%	50.9%	68.5%	67.8%	50.5%
% of students black - Fall 2014	6.8%	12.9%	4.0%	13.0%	2.4%	12.8%	26.9%
% of students hispanic/latino -Fall 2014	25.9%	29.0%	6.7%	14.0%	6.0%	2.8%	4.3%
% of students asian/native/multi-racial - Fall 2014	17.1%	6.0%	12.4%	8.5%	7.5%	4.0%	7.0%
% of students nonresident alien - Fall 2014	3.2%	3.7%	3.5%	4.0%	2.9%	3.6%	4.0%
% of students who are undergraduates (vs. graduate students) - Fall 2014	90.1%	88.6%	90.6%	85.3%	88.1%	86.5%	80.9%
% Democrat or Lean Democrat	49.0%	40.0%	44.0%	51.0%	47.0%	47.0%	55.0%

States with fewer than 150,000 total enrolled students enrolled (in both graduate and undergraduate studies) were not used due to their dissimilarity to California and the need for power. 15 states had fewer than 150,000 total enrolled students in Fall 2014, most of which were rural, conservative states. While sexual assault is an unfortunately common experience, reporting assault is a rare occurrence. In most universities, less than 1 in 1,000 enrolled students report a sexual assault each year. This means states with small populations will add relatively little power to the sample.

The universities in both the sample and counterfactual are also restricted to those with at least 3,000 enrolled students in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Given the infrequency of reporting, universities with fewer than 3,000 students often have no reports of sexual assault in a year or extremely few reports of sexual assault in a year. Gathering data on each school adds significant additional time and power is barely increased by adding these smaller schools. Due to time constraints, the sample and counterfactual were thus restricted to larger schools. This does limit the generalizability of the findings to schools with at least 3,000 enrolled students. However, for every state included in the analysis, data was gathered on all universities with at least 3,000 enrolled students. This means that there is complete data on the entire population of interest.

Unfortunately, data on the frequency of sexual assaults cannot be collected; only reports of sexual assaults can be observed. However, it seems irrational and unlikely that this law would increase the incidence of sexual violence. Research on domestic violence has found that more punitive or strict policies for perpetrators increase reporting but do not increase perpetration rates in the long run (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009; Schmidt, Sherman, Smith & Rogan, 1992; Berk & Sherman, 1984). Studies often show inconclusive or conflicting evidence about whether perpetration rates decrease or stay the same with harsher penalties for perpetrators (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009; Berk & Sherman, 1984).

Furthermore, an increased likelihood of reporting is also a worthy goal itself. When survivors report, they get referrals to care and resources. Increased reporting rates also mean that rapists, most of whom are repeat offenders, are more likely to be stopped sooner.

Legislative Endogeneity

One concern that arises when analyzing the effect of a state-level law is legislative endogeneity. This issue occurs when a policy is passed because a state has a set of beliefs,

behaviors, or policies that drive both the outcome of interest and the passage of legislation. For example, one could argue that California passed this law because they are more liberal, and it is being liberal that also affects the reporting of sexual assault. However, the difference-in-difference approach allows researchers to get around the issue of legislative endogeneity. The comparison states may be different from California, but these differences should be constant over time. Using the difference-in-difference approach thus “differences” out these fundamental, underlying qualities that are constant over time.

Standard Errors:

Standard Errors are generally calculated with the assumption that a researcher’s observed data are a sample from a much larger population. A sample gives an estimate of something’s frequency, likelihood, or expected value in a population that is too large or expensive to observe. The standard errors calculated in this paper are calculated using these traditional methods and clustered at the school level, to account for behavioral spillovers within schools. For example, across years, the reporting behaviors of student at UC Berkeley are more similar to one another than they are to the reporting behaviors of UCLA students.

Unfortunately, using the traditional method of calculating standard errors is likely to overestimate them. The data I have assembled reflects the entire population of universities with at least 3,000 students enrolled each year in California and the 6 similar states. Because data is available on the entire population, findings could hypothetically be reported without any standard errors. However, causal estimates on finite populations are still affected by random variation in the available data. Reports of sexual assault are rare and finite (although the incidence of sexual assault is high). This means that, despite having data on the entire population of interest, the data is still noisy and has substantial random, yearly variation.

Academics have only just begun to research the calculation of standard errors for finite populations and rare events (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, & Woolridge, 2014). These methods have not been reviewed and tested, and no code is easily accessible for researchers. This paper will thus report standard errors in the traditional fashion and add clustering at the school level. Readers should bear in mind that the reported standard errors are likely too large.

Data Collection & Model:

The Clery Act is a national law that requires all colleges and universities eligible for federal financial aid to publish yearly reports summarizing crimes reported by students on campus, off campus, and on public property. The yearly data is based on the calendar year, not the academic year. Nearly all universities are eligible for federal financial aid, so only a tiny fraction are not required to publish yearly crime data. Universities published the crime data for 2015 in October 2016. 2015 sexual assault numbers were gathered by finding every university's Annual Security Report. The 2012, 2013, and 2014 numbers were collected by accessing the Department of Education's database on campus security for every university in the United States (U.S. Department of Education Office of Postsecondary Education).

In addition to sexual offenses, information on other crimes was gathered as well. These crimes include: burglaries/robberies, aggravated assaults, and crimes covered by the Violence Against Women Act (dating violence, domestic violence, and stalking). SB 967 may have changed reporting of sexual assault, but it seems unlikely that it would affect reports of burglaries or robberies. The burglaries and robberies metric is used to create a falsification check for the model.

On the other hand, many of the crimes reported under the Violence Against Women Act can include or be correlated with sexual assault. Domestic violence or dating violence can include sexual violence and stalking can be associated with sexual violence. Thus, SB 967 does have the potential to increase reporting of crimes covered by the Violence Against Women Act. This possible reporting spillover is investigated.

In addition to data on crime reports, information was gathered on school attributes. The additional metrics pulled were: yearly enrollment in fall, the ratio of students who were women, whether the university was in an urbanized area, the ratio of students who were black, the ratio of students who were mixed or non-black racial or ethnic minorities, and whether institutions were public or private. These data were available through the National Center for Education Statistics data portal. The demographic data came from 2014, since this is the last year for which the information is currently available. It is highly unlikely that demographic attributes of a school would drastically shift in reaction to this law, particularly given that it was passed in August, right before the academic year starts at most universities. It would be advantageous to include a variable for the percent of individuals who are trans, genderqueer, gender nonconforming, or nonbinary, but this data is not usually available at the individual school level.

The National Center for Education Statistics uses a locale framework from the U.S. Census Bureau to classify areas into the following categories: City-Large, City-Midsize, City-Small, Suburban-Midsize, Suburban-Small, Town-Fringe, Town-Distant, Town-Remote, Rural-Fringe, Rural-Distant, and Rural-Remote (NCES). City-Large and City-Midsize are territories inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with a population of 100,000 or more; Suburban-Large and Suburban-Midsize are territories outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with a population of 100,000 or more (NCES). City-Small and Suburban-Small

have a population smaller than 100,000 (NCES). The Town and Rural category are further removed from urbanized areas (NCES). In this analysis, “more urbanized” includes City-Large, City-Midsize, Suburban-Large, and Suburban Midsize. The logic behind this choice is that these locales have larger populations and are fairly urban, even if they are just outside a principal city.

These variables are important as controls, since women experience sexual violence at higher rates than men and racial groups that experience greater police brutality may be less comfortable reporting. In addition, the number of students enrolled fluctuates over time. In order to get a true sense for the change in reporting numbers over time, it is crucial to adjust these numbers for changes in student enrollment. Data on fall enrollment for each year is used to accomplish this. It is important to note that all crime data (sexual assaults, domestic violence, and burglaries/robberies) in this paper is reported as a rate of how many were reported per 1,000 students enrolled in that year. This allows for comparison on the frequency of reporting both across schools and over time.

Regression Model:

SB 967 was passed in August 2014 and required California universities to be compliant by January 1, 2015 as a condition of receiving state funds for student financial assistance (California Department of Justice). Almost all California colleges utilize Calgrants, and only a fraction of California schools were ineligible in 2015 (California Student Aid Commission, 2017). Universities probably did not implement all of these changes on December 31st, 2014. This means that SB 967 is likely to affect both the 2014 and 2015 numbers of sexual assaults. The American Association of University’s paper demonstrates that most sexual assaults occur at the beginning of fall semester when students first arrive. This means that SB 967 could have a large effect on 2014 reports of sexual violence, depending on how long it took for universities to

implement the policy requirements. They may have expected the law to pass and begun to make changes earlier or they may have waited as long as possible to create the changes that SB 967 required. Thus, regressions are used that include 2015 and 2014 data separately and 2015 and 2014 data pooled (which adds greater power). This is the primary regression model:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1\text{California} + B_2\text{Post-SB967} + B_3\text{California*Post-SB967} + B_4\text{Private}_i + B_5\text{RatioBlack}_i + B_6\text{RatioWomen}_i + B_7\text{MoreUrbanized}_i + B_8\text{RatioMixedOrOtherNon-BlackMinority}_i + \varepsilon$$

The variables in the regressions will include: Y= expected reporting rates at an individual school, California as an indicator variable (1 if California and 0 if not California), Post-SB967 as an indicator variable (1 if Post-SB967 and 0 if Pre-SB967), Private as an indicator variable (1 if private and 0 if not), RatioBlack as a continuous variable (for the ratio of students that are black at the university), RatioWomen as a continuous variable (for ratio of students that are women at the university), MoreUrbanized as an indicator variable (for colleges or universities in more urbanized areas), RatioMixedOrOtherNon-BlackMinority as a continuous variable (for the ratio of students that are mixed or non-black racial and ethnic minorities), and i refers to individual school attributes. B_3 is the key variable of interest and will provide an estimate of the effect of SB 967 on reporting rates at the school level. The standard errors will be clustered at the school level, since externalities and spillover effects are likely to occur at the individual institution level.

Missing Data and Corrections

There were four universities that were missing 2015 Clery data or pieces of the Clery data. These colleges were excluded from the regression. They represent a small percentage of the total sample, so it is unlikely that this would bias the results.

A large number of universities were also missing data on domestic violence crimes from 2013 and one was missing domestic violence data for 2013 and 2014. However, the impact of SB967 on domestic violence reports is considered a secondary question. The primary impact of the bill is expected to be on reports of sexual assault. While the research still explores whether SB 967 impacted domestic violence reports in universities without missing data, the large number of schools with missing data on domestic violence reports are not considered a threat to the primary purpose of this analysis.

Baker College of Michigan also presented issues with missing data. Baker College has numerous, separate institutions throughout Michigan that are each independent. While data on yearly enrollment at each individual campus was available in the IPEDS data before 2015, the 2015 data only provides the total enrollment number across all Baker Colleges. The 2015 data is not split out by individual campuses. In order to project the individual campus-level enrollment for 2015, the ratio of Baker College students attending each university in 2014 is applied to the 2015 total Baker College enrollment numbers.

Another issue is that the University of Texas at Brownville and University of Texas Pan American merged together with some other small universities to create the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley in 2015. Sexual assault data is split out at the campus level for only part of 2015, and enrollment data is not split out at all. As a result, total sexual assaults and total enrollment across all of University of Texas Rio Grande Valley is used for the 2015 entries for University of Texas at Brownville and University of Texas Pan American.

For University of Texas Pan American, demographic data and information on the degree of urbanization was not available for 2014 or earlier in IPEDS. Information on the demographic data was found from a college comparison website for 2014 (College Tuition Compare). The

degree of urbanization for University of Texas Pan American was found by looking at this metric for the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, which is based in the same city that University of Texas Pan American was in (NCES).

The last issue faced is with Texas A&M University-San Antonio. Demographic data was not available for 2014 and 2015 demographic data was only available for the undergraduate population. Less than a quarter of the university students are graduate students and I assumed that the demographic ratios for the undergraduate student population were the same as the demographic ratios for the graduate students (NCES).

Given the large dataset and breadth of information, missing data issues are of minor concern to the statistical validity of the outcome. Demographic and enrollment data had to be imputed for a handful of schools and two schools merged together during the final year. However, sexual assault data is available across almost all schools. While missing domestic violence data may create issues for interpretation, this finding is of secondary importance to the paper.

Results:

Primary Regressions:

A number of different regressions were run to test the impact of SB 967. SB 967 was rolled out in September of 2014 and required universities to be compliant by the start of 2015 (California Legislative Information, 2014). This means it is likely that most colleges started implementing the changes required by the new legislation before the end of 2014. Universities also may have begun to implement these changes after the bill was introduced but before it was passed. The AAU study demonstrates that most sexual assaults occur at the beginning of the


school year. Since most colleges' academic year begins in August or September, this law was passed at approximately the time when many sexual assaults occur.

This means that some of the impact will likely occur in 2014, though the full effect is expected to be seen in 2015. It is important to note that the Clery Data covers a calendar year, not an academic year. Even though the bill only impacted part of the 2014 data, it was passed during the time at which most sexual assaults occur. The table below reports sexual assault reports for California and the 6 similar states over time. There is a general increase in reporting rates over time, but this trend is more pronounced in California.

Table 2: Summary Table: Sexual Assault Reporting by Year for California and the Counterfactual

	California		Counterfactual (Similar 6 States)	
	Sexual Assaults Reported	Sexual Assaults Reported per 1,000 Students Enrolled	Sexual Assaults Reported	Sexual Assaults Reported per 1,000 Students Enrolled
2012	307	0.314	545	0.307
2013	385	0.393	575	0.322
2014	519	0.522	771	0.426
2015	607	0.604	877	0.473

Graph 1: Sexual Assaults Reported per 1,000 Students Enrolled



In addition to this summary table and graph, regression models are run to estimate the magnitude and statistical significance of Senate Bill 967. Table 3 provides four different models for estimating the impact of the law, the effect of time, and various demographic characteristics on sexual assault reporting.

Table 3: Models for Sexual Assault per 1,000 Students Enrolled

	Base1	Expanded1	Base2	Expanded2
California	-0.0150 (-0.22)	-0.0105 (-0.12)	-0.0150 (-0.23)	-0.0104 (-0.12)
2015	0.161** (3.66)	0.164** (3.72)		
CA*2015	0.0952 (1.31)	0.0936 (1.28)		
2014	0.0934** (2.69)	0.0934** (2.68)		
CA*2014	0.124* (1.68)	0.124* (1.68)		
% black 2014		-0.299 (-1.28)		-0.299 (-1.29)
% women 2014		0.0426 (0.12)		0.0473 (0.13)
urbanized		0.0231 (0.35)		0.0232 (0.35)
private university		0.163* (1.73)		0.163* (1.73)
% mixed/other 2014		-0.300* (-1.89)		-0.300* (-1.90)
post			0.127** (3.59)	0.128** (3.62)
California*post			0.110* (1.67)	0.109 (1.64)
Constant	0.369** (8.36)	0.403** (2.10)	0.369** (8.37)	0.400** (2.08)

In this table, the t-statistics are in parentheses. Results are marked as follows: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Base1 shows results without demographic variables and with results split out for 2014 & 2015. Expanded1 shows results with demographic variables and with results split out for 2014 & 2015. Base2 shows results without demographic variables and with results pooled for 2014 & 2015. Expanded2 shows results with demographic variables and with results pooled for 2014 & 2015.

The regressions are run first with only the variables of primary interest, and then with control variables added in. The sexual assault outcome variable is the ratio of reported incidents per 1,000 students enrolled. The Base1 and Expanded1 model both split out 2014 and 2015 data, rather than pooling 2014 and 2015. In Base1 and Expanded1, CA*2014 and CA*2015 are thus the primary variables of interest. The Base2 and Expanded2 models pool 2014 and 2015 data, making the California*post metric the variable of interest in those regressions. Both of the “Expanded” models include demographic controls that are not used in the “Base” models.

The impact of the policy actually appears to be larger and more statistically significant in 2014. Neither are statistically significant at the traditional, $p=.05$ level, but these standard errors likely overestimate the range of error for the causal effect on a finite population. Adding control variables changes the coefficients on CA*2014, CA*2015, and California*post only slightly. It also does not change the t-statistics or p-values substantially for any of these terms. While only one of the control variables has a statistically significant impact, the R-squared value of the regression more than doubles when controls are included. This demonstrates that adding these variables in helps to explain a larger proportion of the variation.

In the Base2 regression where 2014 and 2015 data is pooled, the coefficient for California*post is not statistically significant at the traditional $p=0.05$ level. However, it is marginally significant with a p-value of .097. The large and highly significant coefficient for “post” means that sexual assault reporting is increasing over time. The coefficient for California*post (.109) is almost as large as the overall time effect for 2014 and 2015 (.128). This means that California Senate Bill 967 nearly doubled the overall trend toward increased reporting.

None of the demographic variables are statistically significant at the $p=.05$ level, but the percent of students who were mixed or other racial minority groups and the indicator for whether a university is private are fairly close. The percent of students who are mixed or non-black racial minorities has a large, negative influence on the number of sexual assaults reported. The percent of students who are black is also negatively related to the number of sexual assaults reported, but this is further from statistical significance. Private schools, on the other hand, appear to have higher reporting rates. The inverse relationship between sexual assault reporting and the percentage of black, mixed, and minority students was expected and is likely a result of police brutality and distrust of the police or other pseudo-legal authorities. It is not clear why private universities have higher reporting rates. It could be driven by higher frequency of sexual assault or a more supportive reporting structure for survivors.

Secondary Regressions:

In addition to assessing the impact of SB967 on reports of sexual assault, this paper also assesses the impact of SB967 on reporting frequency for domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking. These are grouped together into an overall “domestic violence” metric. The idea is that more supportive policies on sexual assault may also have “spillover effects” and lead people to be more likely to report incidents of domestic violence, dating violence, or stalking.

Unlike the regressions for sexual assault reporting, a large number of schools are missing domestic violence data. The same regressions were run for the domestic violence outcome as for the sexual assault outcome. The regressions reported below include one model where all demographic characteristics are included and 2014 and 2015 data are split out (Unpooled) and one model where all demographic characteristics are included and 2014 and 2015 data are pooled

(Pooled). Again, the outcome is a ratio for the number of reported incidents per 1,000 students enrolled in that year.

Table 4: Models for Domestic Violence per 1,000 Students Enrolled

	(1) Pooled	(2) Unpooled
California	-0.0145 (-0.15)	-0.0151 (-0.15)
post	0.271** (5.50)	
postCalif	0.0282 (0.36)	
% black 2014	0.685 (0.98)	0.685 (0.97)
% women 2014	0.222 (0.35)	0.202 (0.32)
urbanized	-0.0448 (-0.40)	-0.0453 (-0.40)
private	-0.166 (-1.33)	-0.163 (-1.31)
% mixed~2014	-0.530 (-1.62)	-0.529 (-1.61)
2015		0.372** (5.55)
CA*2015		0.0386 (0.40)
2014		0.173** (3.27)
CA*2014		0.0193 (0.24)
constant	0.547** (2.06)	0.558** (2.11)

In this table, the t-statistics are in parentheses. Results are marked as follows: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Model (1) Pooled pools data from 2014 and 2015 and model (2) Unpooled splits out 2014 and 2015 data.

In this table, both the small coefficient size and large p-values imply that SB 967 did not have a substantive impact on domestic violence reports in either 2014 or 2015. Even after pooling the data, which adds substantial power, the coefficient is small and the p-value is fairly large. There is thus little evidence to suggest that SB 967 had spillover effects on reports of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking. On the other hand, there is statistically significant evidence that reporting rates for domestic violence are increasing over time. Both the “post” variable in model 1 and the 2014 and 2015 variables in model 2 show a robust and meaningful increase in reporting over time.

However, given the large amount of missing data, there is reason for concern that nonrandom attributes may be driving the missing data problem. A regression is run to examine whether observable attributes are affecting whether universities have missing domestic violence data.

Table 5: Predictors for Having Missing Data on Domestic Violence

	(1)
	Predictors
% black 2014	0.116* (1.74)
% women 2014	-0.0198 (-0.22)
urbanized	-0.0111 (-0.83)
private	0.0398** (2.25)
% mixed~2014	-0.00723 (-0.17)
constant	0.286** (5.61)

In this table, the t-statistics are in parentheses. Results are marked as follows: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

The results support the hypothesis that nonrandom factors influenced whether universities had missing domestic violence data. Private colleges were almost 4 percentage points more likely to have missing domestic violence data. It is unclear why private colleges are more likely to have missing data on domestic violence reports. Lower reporting by private university could be caused by having fewer resources to provide accurate reporting or it could be an intentional effort to suppress reports of domestic violence in order to attract applicants.

Falsification Checks:

Two falsification checks were run for this analysis. The first tests the “parallel trends” assumption that is part of difference-in-difference analysis. While there are differences between California and comparison schools, those differences should stay constant over time. Running a difference-in-difference analysis from 2012 to 2013 tests this assumption. California did not pass any state laws on campus sexual assault during the 2012-2013 time frame. Thus, any differences between California and other schools on sexual assault reporting should stay constant over time. This means that, while the indicator variable for California and 2013 can be statistically significant, the Calif2013 interaction term for California and 2013 should not be. This falsification check confirms the parallel trends assumption by showing a small and statistically insignificant coefficient on the Calif2013 interaction variable.

Table 6: Falsification Checks

	(1) Check1	(2) Check2
California	-0.0506 (-0.48)	0.357 (1.47)
year2013	0.00386 (0.06)	
Calif2013	0.0422 (0.54)	
% black 2014	-0.351 (-1.61)	4.029** (4.54)
% women 2014	-0.0366 (-0.09)	-1.715 (-1.07)
urbanized	0.00646 (0.08)	-0.133 (-0.64)
private	0.209* (1.92)	0.425 (1.64)
% mixed~2014	-0.252 (-1.55)	
post		-0.369** (-2.78)
CA*post		-0.0717 (-0.36)
constant	0.438** (2.19)	1.957** (2.13)

In this table, the t-statistics are in parentheses. Results are marked as follows: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Model (1) performed a difference-in-difference analysis for sexual assault reporting on 2012 and 2013 data in order to check the parallel trends assumption. Model (2) tested whether SB 967 had an effect on burglaries and robberies.

The second falsification check was performed by running a regression with burglaries and robberies (per 1,000 enrolled students) as the outcome variable of interest. Burglaries and robberies should not have been affected by the passage of SB 967. The statistically insignificant

coefficient on postCalif demonstrates that SB967 is not seen to be spuriously driving changes in burglaries or robberies. It also supports the argument that there is a causal tie between the passage of SB967 and increasing rates of sexual assault. SB967 did not affect reports of other crimes and random spikes in crime in California did not drive increases in sexual assault reporting.

Analysis:

The results demonstrate that SB 967 had an impact on reports of sexual assaults in both 2014 and 2015. When demographic controls and pooled data are used, there is a .109 increase in the reports of sexual assaults per 1,000 students enrolled in a school and this result has a p-value of .102. This regression model provides the greatest statistical power and precision. While this does not meet the traditional threshold of $p=.05$ for statistical significance, there is still strong evidence that the law had a positive impact on reporting of sexual assaults on college campuses in California. SB 967 essentially doubled the upward trend in reporting rates in California.

Furthermore, the standard errors used to calculate the p-value are probably too large. Standard errors are calculated with the assumption that the data is a random sample from a large population. However, the research analyzed in this paper is complete data on a rare event (reports of sexual assault) in a finite population (medium and large college campuses). There is still random variation in yearly reports of sexual assault and this should be accounted for in calculating standard errors for causal estimates. Unfortunately, these methods are fairly new and not yet usable. While the p-value using traditional standard errors clustered at the school level is .102, the true p-value should probably be much lower.

On the other hand, there is not support for the argument that SB967 increased reporting of other interpersonal violence, such as dating violence, domestic violence, and stalking. While there is compelling evidence that the law increased sexual assault reporting rates, there appears to be limited “spillover” on reporting rates for other types of crime. However, there is a large amount of data missing on domestic violence reports and there is evidence that nonrandom features drove which universities had missing data.

For example, private universities are more likely to have missing domestic violence data. Thus, there is limited ability to make a definitive causal statement about whether or not SB 967 had an effect on reporting of domestic violence. A regression was also run on sexual assault reporting rates using only colleges without missing domestic violence data. The coefficient on the Post*CA term of interest was very similar to the one calculated when including schools with missing domestic violence data. The only differences were the larger standard error and smaller t-statistic, which was probably caused by using a smaller dataset.

The falsification checks provide additional support to the causal claim made in this paper. SB 967 is not seen to be spuriously driving changes in the rates of burglaries or robberies. In addition, when the same regression is run on 2012 and 2013, there is not a statistically significant coefficient. This supports the “parallel trends” assumption that is part of difference-in-difference analysis. While California and the states in the counterfactual have underlying, unobservable differences, those differences do appear to be constant over time.

Conclusion:

There is strong evidence that California Senate Bill 967 caused increases in sexual assault reporting rates on college campuses in California. The results are not statistically significant at

the 0.05 level traditionally used, but have a p-value of .10. Furthermore, traditional standard errors likely overestimate the actual range of error for the estimate of the impact of SB 967. Complete data is available on the incidents and population of interest. However, while we have the entire “population,” the population is finite and the event studied is rare and has sizable year-to-year variation.

Additional work is needed in order to develop the tools for calculating standard errors for causal estimates in finite populations or with rare events. This is an emerging area of research and hopefully new methods can be applied to strengthen the results in this paper. However, in lieu of these newer methods, the findings in this paper provide compelling support for the assertion that California Senate Bill 967 has increased reporting of sexual assaults on campuses in California.

These findings have meaningful policy implications for the future. The research demonstrates that reporting of sexual assaults has increased over time on college campuses. However, even with the improvements over the last several years, only a tiny fraction of survivors are reporting their assaults to campus authorities. Previous work focusing on sexual assault on college campuses demonstrates that universities have frequently attempted to suppress reports and discourage survivors from coming forward.

The success of California’s Senate Bill 967 offers a glimmer of hope for a longstanding and entrenched problem at universities. Ensuring that colleges use an “affirmative consent” standard, requiring detailed and “victim-centered” policies, and collaborating with local rape crisis centers have all helped create a more supportive environment on college campuses. These policies have helped shift university policies and priorities away from practices that have harmed

sexual assault survivors. The law had a dramatic effect on reporting rates and nearly doubled the general upward trend over time.

Other states and the federal government should hold up California's Senate Bill 967 as a template for success in addressing the issue of campus sexual assault. New York and Illinois' adoption of similar laws demonstrate that other state governments are observing and learning from California's success. The United States federal government should ultimately adopt this model as part of its Title IX requirements. However, particularly in the current political environment, there may need to be widespread state support before federal rules can reasonably be expected. States should continue to adopt laws similar to California's Senate Bill 967 and work to ensure that college students who are assaulted can expect a fair, safe, and supportive process that makes reporting easier and more accessible.

References

- AACRAO. (2015, July 22). *When a State Decides that 'Yes Means Yes,' What Does that Mean for Colleges?* Retrieved from: <http://www.aacrao.org/resources/resources-detail-view/when-a-state-decides-that--yes-means-yes---what-does-that-mean-for-colleges-909eb3daa89.pdf>
- Abadie, Alberto, Athey, Susan, Imbens, Guido W., & Woolridge, Jeffrey M. (2014, July). Finite Population Causal Standard Errors. *NBER Working Paper Series*. Retrieved from: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/contenido_archivo/b104cc7f94d402c4353b39972d5c2909eb3daa89.pdf
- Aizer, Anna & Dal Bó, Pedro (2009, April). Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships. *Journal of Public Economics*, 93(3-4).
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272708001370>
- Association of American Universities. (2015). *Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct*. Rockville, Maryland: Bruce, C., Candor, D., Chibnall, S., Fisher, B., Lee, H., Thomas, G., & Townsend, R.
http://www.aau.edu/uploadedFiles/AAU_Publications/AAU_Reports/Sexual_Assault_Campus_Survey/AAU_Campus_Climate_Survey_12_14_15.pdf
- Berk, Richard A & Sherman, Lawrence W. (1984, April). The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault. *American Sociological Review*, vol. 49, p. 261-272.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2095575?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- Bolger, Dana. *9 Things to Know About Title IX*. Retrieved from: <http://knowyourix.org/title-ix/title-ix-the-basics/>

- California Student Aid Commission. (2017, March 3). *Eligible Cal Grant Schools for 2016-17*. Retrieved from http://www.csac.ca.gov/pubs/forms/grnt_frm/2016_17_eligible_cal_grant_schools.pdf
- California Department of Justice. (2015). *New and Amended Campus Safety Laws; Points of Collaboration between Campus Personnel and Law Enforcement*. Retrieved from: https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/law_enforcement/info-bulletin-dle-2015-01.pdf
- California Legislature Information. (2014). *SB-967 Student safety: Sexual assault*. Retrieved from: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB967
- Campus Clarity. (2013). *Campus Save Act*. Retrieved from <http://www.campussaveact.org>
- Cantalupo, N. C. (2011). Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge Avoidance and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence. *Loyola University Chicago Law Journal*, vol. 43, p.205-266. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829425
- Chappel, B. (2014, September 29). California Enacts ‘Yes Means Yes’ Law, Defining Sexual Consent. *NPR*. <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/09/29/352482932/california-enacts-yes-means-yes-law-defining-sexual-consent>
- Clery Center. (2016a). *Legislative History*. Retrieved from: <http://clerycenter.org/legislative-history>
- Clery Center. (2016b). *The Campus Sexual Violence Elimination (SaVE) Act*. Retrieved from:

<http://clerycenter.org/campus-sexual-violence-elimination-save-act>

College Tuition Compare. (n.D.) *The University of Texas Pan-American*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.collegetuitioncompare.com/edu/227368/the-university-of-texas-pan-american/enrollment/>

Conoscenti, M.A, Dean, G. K., Kilpatrick, D.G., McCauley, J., Resnick, H.S., & Ruggiero, K.J

(2007). Drug-facilitated, Incapacitated, and Forcible Rape: A National Study. Final Report, NCRJRS Grant # 2005-WG-BX-0006. Charleston, SC: Medical University of South Carolina. <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219181.pdf>

Cullen, F.T., Fisher B.S., & Karjane, H.K. (2002). Campus Sexual Assault: How

America's Institutions of Higher Education Respond. Final Report, NIJ Grant #

1999-WA-VX-0008. Newton, MA: Education Development Center, Inc.

<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196676.pdf>

End Rape on Campus. "*Yes Means Yes*" & *Affirmative Consent*. Retrieved from:

<http://endrapeoncampus.org/yes-means-yes/>

Governor's Press Office. (2015, July 7). *Governor Cuomo Signs "Enough is Enough"*

Legislation to Combat Sexual Assault on College and University Campuses.

Retrieved from: <https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-enough-enough-legislation-combat-sexual-assault-college-and-university>

Kingkade, Tyler (2016, June 16). There are Far More Title IX Investigations of Colleges Than

Most People Know. *The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d

Know Your IX. (n.d). *Understanding the Campus Save Act*. Retrieved from

- <http://knowyourix.org/understanding-the-campus-save-act/>
- Legiscan. (2015). *Bill Text: IL HB0821*. Retrieved from <https://legiscan.com/IL/text/HB0821/2015>
- NCES (National Center for Education Statistics). (n.d). *NCES Locale Classifications and Criteria*. Retrieved from https://nces.ed.gov/programs/edge/docs/LOCALE_CLASSIFICATIONS.pdf
- NCES (National Center for Education Statistics). (n.d.). *IPEDS*. Retrieved from <https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/Home/UseTheData>
- NCES (National Center for Education Statistics). (n.d.). *College Navigator*. Retrieved from <https://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/>
- New, Jake. (2015, December 15). State Action on Sex Assaults. *Inside Higher Ed*. Retrieved from <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/12/15/state-lawmakers-tackle-campus-sexual-assault>
- Pew Research Center. *Party affiliation by state*. Retrieved from <http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/compare/party-affiliation/by/state/>
- Schmidt, Janell D., Sherman, Lawrence W., Smith, Douglas A., & Rogan, Dennis P. (1992b). Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence. *American Sociological Review*, vol. 57, p. 680-690. http://users.soc.umn.edu/~uggen/Sherman_ASR_92.pdf
- Smith, Nick. (2014, September 29). ‘Yes Means Yes’ California SB 967 Sex Assault Bill Signed by Gov. *ABC7*. Retrieved from <http://abc7chicago.com/news/yes-means-yes-california-sb-967-sex-assault-bill-signed/328741/>
- United States Department of Education. (2007). *Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual*

Violence. Retrieved from <http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf>

U.S. Department of Education Office of Postsecondary Education. *Campus Safety and Security*. Retrieved from <https://ope.ed.gov/campussafety/#/>