THE PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF WILLIAM STERN
AND PHILIPP KOHNSTAMM

BY

Cornelius A. Plantinga
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Alban G. Widgery for his constant encouragement and guidance throughout the writing of this dissertation. He should, however, not be regarded as necessarily holding any of the views herein expressed.

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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

The terms "Personalism" and "Personal Idealism" have been much used in the United States and in England during the last thirty years to represent specific philosophical movements. There is little evidence of analogous movements on the continent of Europe. Renouvier in France, who for a time described his philosophy as "Neo-Criticisme," later deliberately discarded that term and called it "Personalisme," but it can hardly be said that a personalistic movement in philosophy thrived in France. Two other European thinkers have described their positions as forms of Personalism: the late William Stern and Philipp Kohnstamm. This study is a systematic exposition and comparison of these two personalist philosophies both of which are as yet little known to English reading students. The definitely philosophical works of William Stern, comprising three large volumes and several smaller publications, are available only in German; and the even more voluminous philosophical contributions of Philipp Kohnstamm have not yet been translated from the original Dutch. In view of this
the present exposition depends almost entirely on the original sources, the passages quoted being my own translations.

William Stern was born at Berlin on the 29th of April, 1871, and died at Durham, North Carolina, on March 27, 1938. In an autobiographical sketch Stern divided his professional career into three periods. The first twenty five years of his life were spent in the city of his birth where he attended the Köllnisches Gymnasium and then the University. Having graduated from the latter in 1892, in 1897 he began a period of nineteen years of service first as instructor and then as Associate Professor at the University of Breslau. From 1916 he taught at the Colonial Institute in Hamburg until in 1919 he became Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at the newly founded University of Hamburg. Having left Germany because of discrimination against him on the grounds of his Jewish blood, in 1934 he was appointed Professor of Psychology and later also of Philosophy at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina.

When Stern entered the University of Berlin in 1888 he intended to occupy himself with the study of philosophy and philology. Realizing very soon that "the petty pursuits of philology" held no charms for him, he turned to the two major interests of all his subsequent scholarly endeavor—philosophy and psychology. With reference to philosophy Stern wrote that he found little encouragement at the University, intellectual companionship with

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his fellow students being insignificant, and guidance on the part of his professors practically nil. He failed to make contact with "the hard but significant personality of Dilthey." Stern admitted that Paulsen, through his lectures and seminars, opened for him the gateway to philosophy and gave him opportunity for philosophical discussion, but he claimed that his own position was gained chiefly through his reading and thinking.

It may be said that in the German universities of Stern's student days, and especially in the University of Berlin philosophy was at a low ebb. Speculative Idealism having collapsed, metaphysical questions were studiously avoided as incapable of scientific treatment. Teachers of philosophy turned their attention mainly to the history of the subject and to epistemology, the latter being appealed to as justifying the current derogatory evaluation of metaphysics. "Those live spirits who hankered for a world-view sought to find it not through their professors, but through the cultural tendencies of the time, which all had their origin in natural science: naturalistic art, Marxian social theory and the materialistic theory of the world and of life."²

There was a radical separation of world-view from scholarship, and this was entirely unsatisfactory to Stern. It called forth one of the fundamental traits of his thinking—the effort for speculative synthesis. At first he conceived of psychologism as the only method of unification. Psychology, as at once a natural science and a philosophical discipline, was to be the connecting link between the natural sciences and the humanities or intellectual

sciences. His first independent scholarly investigation, doctoral dissertation entitled: "Die Analogie in Volkstümlichem Denken," supported this view of the mediating function of psychology. He regarded this essay as demonstrating the necessity of psychological analysis as the foundation of logic. But his interest in psychology, which had been tremendously stimulated by his teachers, Lazarus and Ebbinghaus, subserved even more definitely a different and complementary trait of his mind—the tendency toward empiricism. Quite as strong as his love of speculative synthesis was his desire for "exact detailed work and direct contact with the concreteness of fact." This desire found satisfaction in the experimentation and exact quantitative determination of psychological phenomena such as sensory thresholds and reaction times, in which he was trained by Ebbinghaus.

A strong influence upon Stern's thinking resulted from his avid reading of Fechner who, through his combination of empirical with cosmological interests, appealed at once to both of the fundamental tendencies of Stern's mind. This influence has left unmistakable traces in Stern's philosophy, especially in its hierarchical conception of reality, its view of the mind-body relation, and its panpsychism.

Stern's philosophical development after his student days falls into three fairly distinct periods each characterized by a unique relation between his work as a philosopher and as a psychologist. In the first period, extending roughly to 1900, Stern's psychological investigations (especially of the apperception of change, the psychical present, and of individual differences) suggested certain philosophical problems as well as
definite points of view in relation to these problems. These finally brought him to the explicit formulation of his concept of Person. In the second period (1900-1924) the concept of Person was elaborated and employed as the central category of his whole system of philosophy which he designated as Critical Personalism. He expounded this philosophy in detail in a three-volume work entitled: Person und Sache. The third and last period of Stern's philosophical development is marked by an application of the concept of Person in psychology, particularly in a general empirical description of the human person as a whole. To the latter he gave the name of "personalistics."

Thus in his mature thought Stern maintained that while psychological research leads to a general personalistic outlook, the validity of his Critical Personalism could in turn be tested by its consonance with and fruitfulness for a scientific psychology. Empirical psychology is indebted to philosophy for certain basic principles and categories, for classifying them and rendering them explicit. Philosophy suggests certain problems to the solution of which psychology may contribute by the data it accumulates. Philosophy is indebted to empirical psychology for a vast accumulation of data which serves as a check upon the principles and categories derived from philosophy.

Stern's Critical Personalism falls into three main divisions, each treated in a separate volume of his Person und Sache. The first volume, Ableitung und Grundlehre (1906), presents the fullest account of Stern's general philosophy and cosmology; the second, Die Menschliche Personlichkeit (1918), consists of the application of the general metaphysical categories of the first volume to the
theory of human personality; the third, *Werttheorie* (1924), contains not only a philosophy of value but also a restatement of Stern's philosophical position with a significant difference from that presented in the first volume. Of this last volume Stern said: "Today I regard this book as the truly characteristic and at the same time, most complete expression of the personalistic attitude to nature and life, and should regret to have it always figure merely as 'volume three,' not as a self-sufficient work." He also called attention to a "noticeable development of thought and transference of emphasis from volume to volume." The primarily naturalistic point of view of Volume I gave way to a "primarily interpretational view in philosophy." His early concentration on "explanations of the given" yielded to an interest in "the appreciation of its meaning." This change of emphasis necessitated not only the introduction of new concepts but also the recognition in Volume III that the radical antithesis of the concepts of Person and Thing, which dominated Volume I, was no longer tenable.

The originality of Critical Personalism is, of course, not absolute. Stern was conscious of the debt he owed to other philosophers. "Wundt had emphasized the activity, Fechner the hierarchical arrangement, Hartmann the teleology, Dilthey the concreteness of Personality," and even the fundamental antithesis between person and thing had already been suggested by Kant. But in Critical Personalism these are incorporated in a new systematic totality, and thereby assume a fundamentally different character. The striking similarities of features of Critical Personalism

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with aspects of the philosophy of Aristotle did not come to Stern's attention until after the completion of his own system. He only scantily recognized his indebtedness to Leibniz and to Spinoza.

The method employed throughout the system is dialectical. It is difficult to classify his philosophy as monistic or dualistic, as idealistic or materialistic. His writing is characterized by unusual beauty of style and by an architectonic arrangement which, however, sometimes degenerates into pedantry.

Philipp Kohnstamm, at present professor and director of the Pedagogical Institute at the University of Amsterdam, was born of Jewish parents at Bonn, Germany, in 1875. In an autobiographical pamphlet he relates that, his childhood being spent in the Netherlands, he grew up "free from the devastating influence of racial discrimination and persecution." Only from afar came reports of the initiation of an anti-Semitic movement in Germany by Stoecker. This circumstance proved of significance for Kohnstamm in two ways. It caused him as a fifteen year old lad to choose Dutch instead of German citizenship, and it opened the way for his future acceptance of Christianity and thus to his development of a Christian theistic philosophy. As his parents had become estranged from traditional Jewish orthodoxy and were strongly inclined toward a type of deistic liberalism, Kohnstamm's early relation to Christianity was one of friendly detachment. But as a young student, influenced by the works of the romantic

atheist Douwes Dekker (Multatuli), he relinquished even the last vestiges of religious interest emanating from the kind of deism he had known as a child.

Thus the earliest stage of Kohnstamm's philosophical thought was a materialistic one in which his view of life took the form of a "panegoism" based on an atheistic ethical code." Several influences combined to shake him from this initial position. The first of these was a negative one. Without ever having made a detailed examination of its contents Kohnstamm, relying upon indirect reports, had long regarded Buchner's "Force and Matter" as the strongest bulwark of his own point of view. It was "the great arsenal from which all free-thinkers of the time drew their arguments." But upon a careful study of this book he was struck by its "barren dogmatism and fanaticism," its inconceivable impoverishment and stupid distortion of the physical world, with the result that he suffered "complete disillusionment." He felt that all his "fine materialistic and panegoistic philosophical ideas were shattered to bits." Previous to this time he had made some acquaintance with "the Platonic proof for the unity of the soul or of conscience." Its suggestion, that the world was a more complex cosmos than it was represented to be by materialism, seemed now to have received definite, if negative, support.

Kohnstamm became receptive to the personal influence of his greatest teacher in the natural sciences at the University of Amsterdam, Professor J. D. Van der Waals, later a Nobel prize winner. He was impressed primarily by Van der Waals' emphasis upon the limitations of natural science. The fact that this great scientist was a devout Christian presented a serious problem to
the youthful student who had regarded all religion as an outgrown stage in the development of human culture. But he describes how through intensive reading of the Bible he came to see its significance. It introduced him to "a voice . . . which demanded the love and fidelity of his heart." Having gradually overcome his scientific and other prejudices he declared "his faith and his complete surrender to Jesus Christ." Thereafter his religious experience became an overpowering conviction which he felt must serve as the point of departure for his entire view of the world and of life.

Though Kohnstamm devoted himself primarily to the study of mathematics and the natural sciences, his early interest in a philosophy of life was strengthened and directed into more technical channels by C. B. Spruyt, then professor of philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. None of Spruyt's lectures interested Kohnstamm so much as those relating to "the history of the problem of truth." Spruyt's epistemological position served not only as the point of departure but also as the guide of Kohnstamm's subsequent philosophical thinking.

After his graduation in 1901, with a dissertation entitled: "Experimental Investigations Suggested by the Theory of Van der Walls," Kohnstamm served as assistant in the University physics laboratory. In 1907 he was appointed instructor and in 1908 Associate Professor of Thermodynamics, a position he continued to hold till 1928 in spite of the fact that in 1919 he had also been appointed Professor of Education. The wide range of his published works may be seen in the following titles selected from them: Theory of Heat (1915), Concerning Natural Laws, Lawfulness,
and Determinism (1921), Textbook of Thermostatics (1927), Individual and Community—Collected Social-Pedagogical Essays (1929), and Creator and Creation, a three-volume work completed in 1931. This last-mentioned work contains a statement of his philosophical position as far as he has yet published it. Its subtitle, "A System of Personalistic Philosophy upon a Biblical Basis," indicates quite clearly that Kohnstamm is attempting, like Stern, to present a complete and systematic world-view. When, though seldom, he uses the term "metaphysics" it always refers to his own philosophy as representing a definite world-view standing over against other and opposing world-views.

Yet the definitely metaphysical character of his philosophy is obscured by the epistemological, pedagogical and theological titles of his works and by the formulations of his problems in terminology corresponding to these titles. Thus, though the first volume of Creator and Creation is entitled The Problem of Truth, it does not deal exclusively or even primarily with questions as to the origin and validity of knowledge, i.e., with questions as to how truth is to be attained, but rather with the question as to the content of the realm of truth. He characterizes his method as in part a transcendental one in the Kantian sense. He seeks to determine both what truths will withstand searching criticism and so may be accepted, and further what truths we must accept as to the nature of the world and of ourselves because they are presuppositions of the possibility of the knowledge we have. Similarly, his second volume entitled The Development of Personality, though it bears the subtitle, "Sketch of a Christian Pedagogy," is concerned rather with a definite view of the presuppositions and aims of education.
than with description and methodology. This system of pedagogy is grounded in a definite view of the nature of man, of his relations to his fellow men, to God, and the world, and of the system of values which education seeks to achieve. The third volume, bearing the title: The Holy One, though admittedly theological, is a work on philosophical theology presenting not only a conception of God but also of the world conceived as the creation of God.

But though his epistemological, pedagogical and theological writings are from a frankly avowed metaphysical point of view, as yet Kohnstamm has nowhere completely and systematically expounded his metaphysics. So far his metaphysics appears only in a piecemeal and fragmentary way. He proposes to write a volume of systematic metaphysics only after the completion of another trilogy of philosophical works comprising a volume on ethics and sociology, one on aesthetics, and one on the philosophy of history.

The title of his main philosophical work, Creator and Creation, suggests the double motivation of Kohnstamm's philosophy. His intense religious conviction of the existence of a personal God as Creator and Ruler of all the universe, seemed to be substantiated by his strong conviction, as a physicist, that modern scientific progress demands the abandonment of the older mechanistic (impersonalistic) concepts of natural science in favor of new formulations which point in the direction of a personalistic (theistic) view of nature as the creation of God. Hence his views of the supernatural and of the natural support each other, and together furnish the whole framework of his philosophy. The influence of Kohnstamm's other major interest--pedagogy--also
appears throughout his philosophy, most clearly, however, in his views of human personality and his philosophy of history. In the latter, like Lessing, he conceives of God's dealings with man after the analogy of the educator's dealings with the child.

Among the recent philosophers to whom he is indebted, Kohnstamm mentions, in addition to Spruyt, especially Rickert and William Stern. To a lesser degree he acknowledges the influence also of Jonas Cohn, Nicolai Hartmann, Volkelt, Husserl and Scheler. His opposition to idealism is scarcely less strong than his opposition to materialism. In his methodology he acknowledges the greatest indebtedness to Kant.

Kohnstamm's dialectical method is tortuous, and his style extremely discursive and verbose. The latter may perhaps be justified to some extent by the fact that his work is designed for popular appeal.
Chapter II
STERN'S CRITICAL PERSONALISM DIALECTICALLY DEVELOPED

The Nature of Metaphysics

William Stern recognized as the fundamental aim of his reflection the attainment of a comprehensive world-view involving a philosophy of life. He regarded it as a never-failing characteristic of man that he strives for spiritual mastery of the world. Come to the level of philosophical thought man seeks to comprehend in a general scheme all the phenomena within his experience in order to render them intelligible and to determine his own place among them. His striving is essentially one for orientation—"Gib mir, wo ich stehe!" This task is twofold in nature. Man seeks harmony and meaning on the one hand in the apparent chaos of things and processes, and on the other, in the equally chaotic realm of his own strivings and valuations. Only when he has achieved some system of thought which satisfies both strivings at once may man lay claim to have attained to a unified world-and-life view.

It is with reference to a distinction between two forms of
world-views that Stern describes metaphysics: one naive, the other critical. Religious and popular views of the world are naive, i.e., they are neither thoroughly critical nor entirely systematic. They rest upon assumptions which have not been carefully examined either as to their tenability or as to their interrelations. They accept as "facts" data which cannot stand the test of modern scientific scrutiny. In contrast, metaphysics is or should be an essentially critical and systematic view of experience or reality.

Critical metaphysics includes an examination not only of the bases of all knowledge but also of the data which by means of generalizations, hypotheses, and evaluations it seeks to incorporate into a systematic whole. It is primarily concerned with the synthesis of the highest principles of the world and of life into a unity so organized as to exhibit not merely internal consistency but also such coordination and subordination of these principles as will serve to indicate the validity and significance of any one of them by means of its relations to the others. In a secondary way metaphysics as systematic is to guide individual scientific disciplines by means of criticisms and new hypotheses of heuristic value. Thus far Stern's view of the nature of metaphysics was essentially in harmony with the conventional position of the advocates of systematic metaphysics. He was still in agreement with them when he asserted that since no individual is capable of comprehending all that man knows of reality (to say nothing of the reality beyond human experience) the task of metaphysics must forever remain an uncompleted one.

Stern departed far from the point of view of the classical
metaphysicians in his discussion of the further limitations and a-theoretical nature of metaphysics. Not only is the complete mastery (Bewaltungung) of the world by metaphysics forever a distant goal rather than an accomplished fact, but, much more seriously, even the uncompleted view of the world is inevitably infected with falsification. In man's mastery (Bewaltungung) of the world, there is always some "violence" (Vergewaltigung). It is idle to expect complete mastery in metaphysics: one may strive for a minimum of "violence." It can achieve even this goal only by an awareness of both the inevitability and the character of this forceful grasping of the world.

Kant pointed out that our knowledge of the world includes a subjective contribution which we are unable to eliminate. Similarly Hegel maintained that every philosophical system is so historically conditioned that the culture of its age comes to expression in it. Finally, as Fichte emphasized, personal idiosyncrasies of its author contribute definite characteristics to every philosophy. Viewed from these standpoints the conclusions of metaphysics cannot be regarded as absolute (timeless and unconditioned) truths. Thus in contrast with older views of metaphysics Stern held that every system, including his own, must be regarded as only relatively true. Its acceptance can never be based on the ground that it alone represents complete objective truth. A metaphysics may be accepted as presenting the most adequate and consistent general formula for the contemporary state of scientific knowledge and the fundamental tendencies of human strivings and valuations.

But though complete objectivity forever remains beyond the
grasp of the philosopher in metaphysics he still makes it the object of his quest. The relativity of every system of metaphysics to its author's personality and historical milieu involves the necessity of the appearance of ever new systems, each seeking to remove as far as possible the elements of Violence (Vergewaltigung) in its predecessors and to achieve a more thoroughgoing Mastery (Bewaltigung) of reality. Critical Personalism was thus presented by Stern not as the final philosophy but as a new and further approximation to the unattainable goal of a complete and fully objective account of the nature of the world.

With such a view of it, can it still be claimed that metaphysics is scientific knowledge (Wissenschaft)? Stern answered that question in the negative. Metaphysics is not science because it does not lie on the same plane as science and also because its characteristic function is not knowing in the scientific sense. Nevertheless metaphysics is not only possible but it is necessary as the indispensible presupposition of all science: in that lies its main justification. Without the admission of an objectively real world knowledge is impossible. Yet the reality of a trans-phenomenal world is capable of neither proof nor disproof in any theoretical way; its acceptance must therefore be a matter of a-theoretical faith.

Thus a metaphysical faith is the presupposition of all knowledge. The a priori of all metaphysical systems may be formulated in the two statements: "I believe in a real world," and "I seek this world." Every particular system of metaphysics has also its own more specific set of a-theoretical beliefs (Glaubensgehalt). Hence metaphysics in general and every actual
system of metaphysics in particular might be said to be guilty of dogmatism as involving the acceptance of dogmas—propositions incapable of proof. But there is a good as well as a bad dogmatism. Bad dogmatism consists of a confusion of belief with knowledge so that unproved beliefs are passed off as self-evident or axiomatic. Good dogmatism is the conscious critical acceptance of certain assumptions as incapable of proof, because they are in themselves ultimates of experience and thought.

Fundamental Types of World-View

A system of metaphysics may be called new either because it attempts to give new answers to old problems or because it introduces into the center of discussion a problem which is itself new. Stern claimed the latter of Critical Personalism. Nevertheless, the genesis of the new problem central in Critical Personalism can be understood only by a reference to an earlier formulation of a fundamental issue in metaphysics.

For three centuries a main problem of metaphysics has been that of the relation of the psychical to the physical. The three main types of metaphysics generated by the various attitudes taken toward this problem are idealism, materialism, and psycho-physical dualism. Idealism makes the psychical its central category subordinating the physical to it in some one of a variety of ways, materialism reverses this procedure, and psycho-physical dualism places both categories on the same level refusing to subordinate either one to the other.
As Stern considered them the concepts of the psychical and the physical are highly complex. The psychical and the physical are to be distinguished from one another in at least four ways. The first concerns individuality. The psychical (soul or spirit) is conceived as constituting a real, unique, individual unity, while the physical (body or matter) is conceived as an indifferent aggregate. The second has reference to teleology. The soul or spirit strives toward goals; body or matter accords with blind mechanical laws. The third is with regard to values. While the soul or spirit is either the bearer or the center of positive values, body or matter is either devoid of value or even hostile to value (center of negative values). The fourth Stern described as "phenomenological." The soul (or spirit) is regarded as conscious; the body (or matter) as lacking consciousness.

In modern times the last of these four distinguishing characteristics has been greatly emphasized—to the neglect of the other three. The problem of consciousness has been given a place far out of proportion to its intrinsic importance. The neglected problems of individuality, teleology, and value are, however, precisely those which are of central importance for our times. Because of that one-sided emphasis on a single distinguishing characteristic of the psychical and the physical by tradition this main problem of metaphysics has become almost entirely identified with that of the conscious and that lacking consciousness. The old expressions: psychical and physical, spirit and matter, body and mind, are no longer satisfactory. A new formulation of fundamental alternatives with a new terminology is imperatively required.
Critical Personalism seeks to provide a new formulation of the main problem of metaphysics and a new terminology. It presents as central for metaphysics the question: "Are there in the world individual, goal-seeking, and intrinsically-valuable beings?" It designates the new alternative fundamental concepts as those of Person and Thing (Sache). "The essential characteristic of the concept of Person is not the possession of consciousness, but real individual unity, the capacity for goal-seeking activity, and intrinsic value. The essential characteristic of the concept of Thing is not the absence of consciousness, but its mode of existence as aggregate and as object of mechanical law as well as its indifference to value."^{1}

Stern's method of treatment of this as of other main problems was dialectical, the critical consideration of main opposing one-sided views and their replacement by a more comprehensive view. Three different attitudes toward the Person-Thing problem are possible and have actually been taken. Stern designated them as Naive Personalism, Impersonalism, and Critical Personalism. The two types of personalism arise from a adoption of the concept of Person as the fundamental principle of their world view, just as Impersonalism arises from the adoption of the other alternative, that of Thing, as fundamental. But while Naive Personalism and Impersonalism are in absolute opposition to each other, this is not true of Critical Personalism and Impersonalism. Critical

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^{1}W. Stern, Person und Sache, Vol. 1, Ableitung und Grundlehre des kritischen Personalismus, Leipzig: Barth, 1908, p.11.

^{2}Ibid., p.12ff.
Personalism is rather the synthesis of Naive Personalism and
Impersonalism, preserving and interpreting in a richer unity
the contributions of value in these opposing points of view.
Stern insisted that both historically and logically the movement
is from Naive Personalism through Impersonalism to Critical
Personalism, a true Hegelian dialectical movement, from thesis
to antithesis and synthesis. Naive Personalism, the thesis, is
personalism in a form so crude and uncritical as inevitably to
issue in its direct antithesis, Impersonalism. Successfully
criticizing Naive Personalism at every turn Impersonalism thinks
to have supplanted it entirely. But Impersonalism proves to be
inadequate to deal with the most significant of human problems
and in the realm of values fails entirely. Thus there arises
a new personalism which shares the essential point of view of the
thesis but which, having profited by the criticisms offered by
Impersonalism, now presents itself as the synthesis of the two
earlier positions and may therefore properly be called Critical
Personalism.

*Naive Personalism.* The principal dichotomy in man's naive
conception of the world results from his distinction of the living
from the lifeless, of individual, goal-seeking persons from mere
aggregates incapable of self-activity. But while it thus recog-
nizes things (Sachen) along with persons (Personen), this point
of view is essentially personalistic because things are consistently
subordinated to persons. The existence and activities of things
are explained with reference to the experience and activities of
persons, and the value of the former is held to depend upon their
significance for the latter. But man is inevitably urged on from
this original simple belief in persons and their activities toward what may be called an exoteric personalism. This urge is twofold, including both the theoretical demand for intelligibility and the practical and aesthetic demand for symbolical representation. The theoretical need expresses itself in an attempt to fathom the nature of persons and their activities. In the course of this attempt the notorious problem of the one and the many cannot be evaded, for though persons are obviously in some sense wholes analysis leads to the discovery and isolation of many parts within these wholes. Similarly, though the activity of a person is unitary through its reference to a single goal—self-preservation—it may be analyzed into many sub-processes.

The inquiry into the causes of these phenomena (i.e., parts and partial processes) is then carried on in terms of an exoteric causality—a causality working from without. The questions are asked: "Who made this?" "Who did this?" This method is relentlessly pursued until in each case a single entity external to the parts or functions is postulated as their ultimate cause. For the world as a whole this cause is called God; for a human person the soul. The essence of the whole is sought in one of its parts which alone is held to be the source of all the being and activity of the whole and to remain identical amid all its changes. Fundamental to this procedure is a conviction, dogmatic in nature, that all unity involves simplicity and must therefore be explained by the existence of some simple entity. The same dogma is the ground of the naive exoteric "causality of making." Since unitary processes must be attributed to simple entities, these entities as simple cannot include the objects of their action, which must
therefore lie outside them and be acted upon from without.

Naive Personalism, however, fails to apply the method of analysis throughout. While it holds concrete existents to be analyzable aggregates it regards concrete occurrences as inseparable wholes. As a result all the highly complex functions of the person are attributed to a simple existent. Thus the dualism of person and thing is brought within persons. "Naive Personalism depersonifies the person as a whole, but personifies in its stead a single element; the person as a whole is for it machine plus engineer."³

This view of the person also satisfies, and equally owes its origin to, the practical and aesthetic need for symbolical representation. From among all the complexity and changeableness of the human person man seeks to isolate and picture to himself some quasi-tangible element which remains stable, in order that he may make it the object of his emotional attitudes, appeal to it, and charge it with responsibility for the actions of the person. This is the a-theoretical origin of the concept of a substantial and immortal soul. In a similar way there arises the theistic conception of God. Man is conscious of his intimate connection with and entire dependence upon the world as a whole. But, nevertheless, driven by his need for symbolical representation, he depersonifies the whole, isolating from it a single element (God) in order that toward it as a symbol he may the more easily assume the personal attitude which (because of its vastness and complexity)

³Stern, op. cit., p.46.
it is difficult to take toward the universe as a whole.

The history of culture gives abundant evidence of the prevalence of Naive Personalism as a world view. It pervades especially the realms of religion, morality, and art, but comes to expression also in various philosophical systems such as those of Plato and of Leibniz. In the philosophy of religion it appears in the form of theism. Whether the relation of God to the world be represented as that of a creator toward a creature, an educator toward a pupil, an engineer toward a machine, or an artist toward his artistic product, there is implied in each case a radical separation of God from the world, and hence an exoteric conception of divine personality.

**Impersonalism.** Impersonalism coming historically later than Naive Personalism developed out of the latter in a twofold way. On the one hand, it grew out of a criticism of the unscientific character of Naive Personalism, and on the other, it represents a logical conclusion of the analytical procedure already initiated within Naive Personalism. In its criticism of Naive Personalism's conceptions of causality, the nature of the person, etc., and its general anthropomorphism, Impersonalism goes so far as to reject not only the naivete of Naive Personalism but also its personalism, and makes the attempt to explain the world in wholly impersonal terms. But in doing so, it is merely carrying on the process initiated by Naive Personalism itself when it subjected the person to analysis and sought the essence of the whole in one of its parts. Naive Personalism stopped short of a consistent application of the analytical method to events as well as to concrete entities, but Impersonalism takes
this step also and makes analysis a universal method.

Impersonalism therefore, since it analyzes events also into their constituent elements, adds to the dogma accepted by Naive Personalism: "All process in the world is to be attributed to the activity of simple elements," its necessary complement: "Simple entities are capable of only simple functions." From this, however, follows the impossibility of the existence of simple entities to which personal (and therefore highly complex) functions may be ascribed. Complex functions are mere aggregates of the functions of many simple entities. This contention is fatal to Naive Personalism for with it the whole conception of the person as machine plus engineer must be regarded as untenable and the person resolved into a machine without an engineer. The one element which was held by Naive Personalism to be the originator of personal (complex and goal-seeking) activity, and the bearer of the value receives no recognition in Impersonalism.

But Impersonalism can be only partially understood through its critical and negative attitude toward Naive Personalism. It claims also to be a positive world view taking the place of Naive Personalism. Thus, in addition to its analytic principle, whereby it has reduced the world into a multiplicity of isolated elements, it needs a principle of synthesis whereby it may express order and unity in this multiplicity. Rejecting the synthetic function of concrete existents, Impersonalism must and does adopt an abstract synthetic principle—the principle of relation. This principle becomes the dominating one in Impersonalism. It is

*4* Stern, op. cit., p. 56.
interested not so much in concrete existents as in laws of nature, i.e., in relations obtaining between concrete existents. The result is that for it concrete existents lose in importance and relations gain in importance. Impersonalism or mechanism (as it may also be called) logically leads to a complete relativism. The relations which constitute the essence of the world for Impersonalism are, of course, goal-less, blind relations. Purpose is excluded on the ground that it is not discoverable by analysis. On the same ground all activity is excluded even though it be considered non-teleological. Hence Impersonalism substitutes for the exoteric "causality of making" of Naive Personalism the equally exoteric causality of mechanical relation which involves neither purpose nor activity but only changes in relation.

The fundamental tenets of Impersonalism were summed up by Stern in the following brief theses:

1. "There exist in the world only aggregates of simple elements and combinations of simple events."5

2. "Everything qualitative must be reduced completely to something quantitative, and every individual event must be reduced completely to a general law."6

3. "Every event is determined mechanically, that is, results according to natural law from, and is simply derivable from, the constellation of an existent together with its environmental conditions."7

4. "All purposive activity in the world is only appearance; all purposive activity is only a supplementary consequence of purposeless events occurring in accordance with natural laws; all causes are blind."8

5. "The world of existents and of events has nothing to do with values and evaluations."9

5. Stern, op. cit., p. 60.  
6. Ibid., p. 61.  
7. Ibid., p. 61.  
8. Ibid., p. 62.  
9. Ibid., p. 62.
These five theses together embody the full logical development of the standpoint of Impersonalism, though in any given case all of them may not be consciously recognized. The historical development of Impersonalism includes both an increase in the degree of consistency with which this set of theses has been accepted as a whole and an enlargement of the scope of their application. The history of Impersonalism is a record of an attempt at thoroughgoing mechanization of every realm of knowledge. It has sought to substitute things for persons, facts for values and blind mechanical causes for goal-directed striving.

"All this scientific striving toward the reification of the world finally culminates in a general philosophical theory of the world, which aims to embrace nature, spirit, and culture. It appears in very different forms ... but in its fundamental tendency it remains ever the same: it conceives the world as a non-purposive, non-valuable, quantifiable Thing-system based upon the exoteric causality of its ultimate elements."¹⁰

Critical Personalism. Naive Personalism takes the standpoint of the Person but does so in a crude and uncritical way. Impersonalism, by way of reaction, takes the point of view of the Thing. Critical Personalism returns to the standpoint of the Person but, taking account of the contributions of Impersonalism, it is at once more critical and broader in range than Naive Personalism.

According to Stern the concepts of Person and Thing are polar opposites. Person is the basic concept while Thing is

¹⁰Stern, op. cit., p.75.
derivatory. The former is to be defined positively, the latter negatively with reference to the former. This is expressed best in Stern's own words:

"A Person is that kind of being which, in spite of the plurality of parts, constitutes a real, unique, and intrinsically valuable whole, and as such, in spite of the plurality of its part functions, performs a unitary goal-directed self-activity."

"A Thing is the contradictory opposite of Person. It is that kind of being which, consisting of many parts, constitutes no real, unique, and intrinsically valuable whole, and, functioning in many part-activities, performs no unitary goal-directed self-activity."

To these formal definitions Stern appended five brief explanatory theses:

1. "The Person is a whole, the Thing is an aggregate."
   "The Person is something beyond its parts, the Thing is the sum of its parts."

2. "The Person is qualitative, the Thing quantitative."
   "The Person is individual, the Thing comparable."

3. "The Person is active (and spontaneous), the Thing is passive (and receptive)."
   "In the sphere of Persons there is inner causality (i.e., the working of the whole upon the parts); in the sphere of Things there is only outer causality (the relation of one element to another)."

4. "The Person is teleological, the Thing mechanical.

5. "The Person has an intrinsic end (Selbstzweck); the Thing has an extrinsic end (Fremdzweck)."
   "The Person is in itself a value, the Thing is in itself an indifferent existent." 
   "The Person cannot be substituted for without a remainder (it has 'value'), the Thing admits of complete substitution (it has a 'price')."

From an examination of these definitions it is immediately obvious that the words Person and Thing are here used in senses so wide as to do violence to common usage. Nevertheless, this

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extension of the application of these terms was made by Stern deliberately and with the justification of scientific precedent. Schopenhauer extended the application of the word "Will," and modern physics has done the same with the words "field," "energy," etc. With his conception, Stern's criterion for Personality could not be anthropomorphic, as it is for Naive Personalism, but must be psycho-physically neutral. The same is true for the Thing. Not the possession or lack of consciousness is decisive but rather the psycho-physically neutral characteristics enumerated in the definitions and descriptions given above.

The ontology of Critical Personalism may be indicated by two brief theses: The world consists of Persons and The Persons which constitute the world are not all in the same plane but are arranged by subordination and superordination into a hierarchy.

The first of these statements implies that, in respect to the number of its fundamental explanatory principles, Critical Personalism is monistic. Unlike Naive Personalism which accepts a radical dualism of person and thing, soul and body, God and the world, Critical Personalism derives from its single explanatory principle—the Person—the concept of the Thing with all its characteristics. This derivation of the mechanical from the teleological Stern called Teleomechanics. But this thesis also implies that in respect to the number of entities constituting the world Critical Personalism is pluralistic. There are many real individuals. Finally this first thesis involves that in respect to the nature of the entities which constitute the world, in contrast with Naive Personalism, they are not simple but concrete wholes exhibiting unity in multiplicity; and in opposition
to Impersonalism that they are Personal in character and not of the nature of Things.

The second thesis has two main implications. The first is that every Person must be regarded in a threefold way determined by its relations to Persons on its own level, on higher levels, and on lower levels, respectively. Every Person is to be thought of not only as (a) a Person in itself, but also as (b) a part included in a Person of a higher order, and as (c) constituting a unity which includes Persons of a lower order. This last consideration is especially important for a comparison of the three attitudes to the Person-Thing problem. It involves a rejection of Naive Personalism's conception of the Person as an entity existing merely along with its parts rather than a unity inclusive of its parts. The multiplicity of which every Person is a unity is regarded as a multiplicity of Persons of a lower order. The second implication of this thesis is that in spite of its pluralism of Persons, Critical Personalism is ultimately singularistic for the highest level of its hierarchical structure is a single all-inclusive Person, God.

Critical Personalism's conception of causality follows from its view of the Person. Over against the exoteric "causality of making" of Naive Personalism and the equally exoteric causality of mechanical relation characteristic of Impersonalism, Critical Personalism stands for an esoteric causality in which the whole so effects its parts as to lead to a unitary teleological functioning of the Person. Causality is no passive relation but an active effecting or striving for an end.
Critical Personalism as a philosophical world-view is at once critical and systematic. In this Stern claimed it to be superior both to Naive Personalism and to Impersonalism. The former is uncritical in its conceptions and is unsystematic because of the unresolved dualisms within it. Impersonalism, though critical, is not thoroughly systematic for it fails to find a place within its scheme for the whole realm of values. While Naive Personalism is predominantly a theory of life and Impersonalism a theory of the world, Critical Personalism expresses a thoroughly systematic synthesis of the two.

The Further Positive Defence of Critical Personalism

Stern's "dialectical proof" of the necessity of Critical Personalism as a world view includes two stages. In the first, through a criticism of Naive Personalism and Impersonalism these rival views have been rejected as unsatisfactory. But as it is conceivable that Critical Personalism might itself be inadequate, and that no satisfactory world view is possible, it is necessary in the second stage to indicate the positive value of Critical Personalism. It must be shown that it avoids the errors of its rivals and incorporates into a significant whole their elements of value.

The "stuff" with which any world-view deals consists of concrete realities or "positions," and of relations holding among these positions. Both may be approached either synthetically or analytically thus giving rise to four dogmas:

1. The hegemony of wholes. The whole is prior (logically and metaphysically) to the parts—Synthetic position.
2. The hegemony of parts. The parts are prior to the whole—Analytic position.

3. The hegemony of relations. Relations are prior to positions—Synthetic relation.

4. The hegemony of positions. Positions are prior to relations—Analytic relation.17

Stern makes three brief remarks about the interrelations of these four dogmas:

1. Dogmas 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive as also are dogmas 3 and 4.

2. Every complete Weltanschauung must adopt either dogma 1 or 2 and also either 3 or 4.

3. While dogmas 2 and 3 are merely dogmas, 1 and 4 are axiomatic, i.e., necessarily true.18

Since it seeks to base itself on the mutually exclusive dogmas 1 and 2, Naive Personalism fails to achieve unity, and since it neglects to make a choice between dogmas 3 and 4 it inevitably remains incomplete. Impersonalism, basing itself upon dogmas 2 and 3 is in so far both consistent and complete, but is forced implicitly to employ dogmas 1 and 4 which explicitly it rejects. Critical Personalism bases itself on dogmas 1 and 4 and is therefore, both thoroughly consistent and complete.

The necessity of Critical Personalism follows from the elimination of Naive Personalism and Impersonalism only if these three alternatives are exhaustive of all possible world views. This in turn depends on the question whether or not the main issue of metaphysics about which they are centered has been correctly formulated in the Person-Thing problem. That question

17Stern, op. cit., p. 39f.  
18Ibid., p. 40.
has already been referred to, but the final answer to it depends upon a consideration of Critical Personalism as a complete system.

Stern's view that Naive Personalism, Impersonalism, and Critical Personalism are in fact exhaustive of all possibilities is the less surprising when it is recognized that no one of them is to be identified with any actually occurring world-view, but that each is rather to be regarded as a type to which any actual world view in history only approximates in completeness and consistency. Both Naive Personalism and Impersonalism were conceived by Stern as very broad classifications. Under the former fall not only all the ordinary common sense and religious interpretations of the world, but also, e.g., the philosophies of Aristotle and Leibniz, and all the traditional forms of personalistic philosophy, because of their naive (anthropomorphic) criterion of Personality and their substantialization of the self, soul, or mind which is in fact only an aspect of a real whole (i.e., the Person in Stern's sense). Similarly Stern classified under Impersonalism all those views which, being analytic and abstractive in their approach, fail to do justice to individuality. Hence not only the mechanistic world view of Herbert Spencer, but also the abstract idealism of Plato finds its place here. Even modern Absolute idealism would not escape this classification.

19 See page 19.

With the exception, perhaps of Critical Personalism itself, but this is due to the historical accident that only one Weltanschauung of this type has as yet appeared. Were another metaphysics to appear sharing the essential point of view of Critical Personalism but differing from it in minor matters, this exception could no longer be affirmed.
because according to Stern it admits individuality at only one extreme of the scale of being.

In light of these contentions Stern made further criticisms of Naive Personalism and Impersonalism. The root of all the logical difficulties in Naive Personalism lies in its exoteric character whereby it "places the Persons (souls, Gods) as special substances next to other things, lets them act upon the latter from without and reach their goals through this external activity."21 It seeks to compromise between the dogma of the hegemony of wholes and the dogma of the hegemony of parts by letting the former apply to concrete existents, the latter to concrete occurrences. But since these two dogmas are mutually exclusive no compromise is in the end possible and Naive Personalism falls an easy prey to the more consistent logical development of Impersonalism. But even if this inconsistency were removed Naive Personalism would still have to be regarded as inadequate and unsystematic because of its purely negative attitude toward the achievements of Impersonalism. It makes no attempt to incorporate into its own world-view the enormous mass of empirical data securely established by Impersonalism but leaves it unexplained. These data concern the relations holding among positions rather than the positions themselves, because Impersonalism is interested in the former almost to the exclusion of the latter.

Because it is uncritical Naive Personalism fails to distinguish between the essential personal values, which it wishes

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21 Stern, op. cit., p.24. The genesis of this viewpoint has already been indicated. See page 23.
to defend against the onslaughts of Impersonalism, and the merely fortuitous and changing forms in which these values appear in history. Hence Naive Personalism is often engaged in the espousal of lost causes which are unessential to its position, e.g., particular religions, social, or political dogmas and institutions. Herein it compares very unfavorably with Impersonalism which is characterized by a bold progressive spirit.

Impersonalism, since it conceives of positions analytically, must necessarily conceive of relations synthetically, i.e., since it accepts the hegemony of parts it must provide for the connection of these parts through external relations. Consequently the abstract relations holding among positions rather than the positions themselves become the supreme explanatory principles of being and process. Nothing could be more diametrically opposed to the essence of all personalism, and yet, because of the prestige of modern science with which Impersonalism is largely to be identified, Naive Personalism accepts the Impersonalistic world of abstract value-less relations in addition to its own world of concrete valuable persons. This radical dualism, which invalidates it as a metaphysics, results, however, only from the failure of Naive Personalism to explain abstract relations in terms of concrete persons, i.e., from the fact that it has ignored the whole problem of the nature of abstract relations, a problem which Impersonalism has brought to the fore.

The basic criticism of Impersonalism is summed up very briefly in the contention that it is unmetaphysical. This appears in a twofold way. First, because of its acceptance of analysis as a universal method, its aim is not to discover unity but to
separate unities into their elements. Further, by the exclusive acceptance of the dogmas of the hegemony of parts and the hegemony of relations, Impersonalism has committed itself to a view of the world in which there are to be found only simple elements and abstract relations. But, since one cannot love or ascribe responsibility to a mere aggregate of atoms or a set of abstract relations, there is in such a world no place for values. Hence Impersonalism not only fails in fact to achieve a scientific view of life as a whole (Lebensanschauung) but makes this achievement in principle impossible.

But a view of life being essential even the Impersonalist is forced to assume the existence of real wholes or Persons as the centers of value in order to explain his own experience. The dogma of the hegemony of wholes thus proves its axiomatic nature by its being a necessity of thought. But with the admission of concrete existents it follows that the dogma of the hegemony of relations must give way to its opposite—the dogma of the hegemony of positions, for positions are the concrete existents from which relations are derived by abstraction. In this impasse the Impersonalist commonly resorts to the expedient adopted by the Naive Personalist. He separates the world of science where simple elements and blind, mechanical relations reign supreme from the world of everyday life where concrete goal-striving Persons must be acknowledged. But this limitation of the categories of Impersonalism constitutes an acknowledgment of its inadequacy to deal with the whole of our experience, and therefore of its invalidity as a metaphysical system. The full standpoint of the person alone proves adequate to make the world of everyday life
Stern emphasized over and over again that every valid metaphysics must be not only thoroughly critical but also thoroughly systematic, i.e., a consistent and comprehensive formula for all the data of our experience. The foregoing criticisms of Naive Personalism and Impersonalism have according to him shown that by these criteria both of these rivals of Critical Personalism may be eliminated as unsatisfactory. Critical Personalism is presented as the one satisfactory metaphysics.

As its very name indicates Critical Personalism claims to be both critical and personalistic. It is aware that only the explicit acceptance of the concept of the goal-striving and intrinsically valuable person as the central category in the interpretation of the world can make human life intelligible. But it rejects the anthropomorphic criterion of personality, and the restriction of the principle of analysis to concrete existents and the principle of synthesis to concrete occurrences. It does not consider the person as a bare and simple unity exhibiting no internal structure, and causality as an acting upon its object from without. As previously stated, Critical Personalism avoids this by its conception of the Person as unitas multiplex—a concrete unity in multiplicity whose causal functioning is an esoteric acting of the whole upon its parts.

The conception of the Person as unitas multiplex permits Critical Personalism to achieve a systematic (hierarchical) arrangement of Persons. This hierarchical arrangement of Persons enables it to resolve the radical dualism of person and thing, for within the hierarchy the distinction between the two concepts
loses its absoluteness. What is Person viewed from above (i.e., relatively to that which it includes) is Thing viewed from below (i.e., relatively to that within which it is included). Similarly, activities viewed from above, from the standpoint of the whole, are teleological; viewed from below, from the standpoint of the parts they appear mechanical. By means of this formula, which he called the principle of Teleo-mechanical Parallelism, Stern maintained that all the categories of Impersonalism may be derived from those of Critical Personalism. Critical Personalism, therefore, unites in a single consistent system the standpoint of the Thing with all its achievements in the exact, quantitative determination of mechanical relations, and the standpoint of the Person whose inevitability for any view of life proved to be the undoing of Impersonalism as a metaphysics.
This text cannot be accurately transcribed due to the quality of the image.
By way of reaction against what he regarded as an overemphasis on epistemology in the latter half of the 19th century, Stern was interested in elaborating the content of his system, i.e., in metaphysical construction rather than in critical examination. The latter is indeed necessary but only as subservient to creative thought. "Never can criticism precede creativity, let alone forbid it (i.e., deny us the right of metaphysical attempts altogether); but it must follow in the footsteps of invention, must control, justify, or rectify it." The epistemological discussions appearing in his works are largely determined by a polemical purpose. Stern wrote no fully developed personalistic epistemology for its own sake. Yet he regarded four features of this epistemology as essential: its critical dogmatism; its realism; its view of the media of knowledge; and its theory of categories.

2Ibid., p. 369.
The first of these need not be dealt with here because the sense in which Critical Personalism may be said to be dogmatic without ceasing to be critical has already been discussed. Of the remaining three points the last ought to be discussed first since it constitutes the proof of the necessity of the categories of Critical Personalism and the criticism of the categories of Impersonalism and thereby is properly a continuation of the dialectical proof of Critical Personalism with which the previous chapter ended.

Stern led up to an exposition of his own views in this regard by a discussion of the attitudes of the opposing theories. Impersonalistic epistemological theories may be grouped under two headings, positivism and a priorism. Though both are open to criticism, the former is to be rejected as entirely inadequate, while the latter must be recognized as making a significant contribution to personalistic epistemology. Stern contends that both must either implicitly assume the point of view of the Person at the outset or else leave gaps which only a personalistic epistemology can fill.

Positivism starts with the passive content of experience, and it regards occurrence in experience as a sine qua non of epistemological value. Only that which by the analysis of experience is found to be an actual element of it, is an object of knowledge. The task of epistemology is to purify knowledge of all elements not to be found in experience and which, therefore, may be called metaphysical. But with the application of this criterion, the

3See Chapter II, pp.17 and 18.
concepts of substance and of causality are eliminated for there is no element in experience which may be designated as a substance and neither is there any experience of activity or striving. The dualism of the physical and the psychical must be rejected, for this distinction depends only on certain groupings of experiences. Hence also the distinction of the subject and the object of knowledge disappears leaving only numerous groupings of passive experiences.

Though the positivist accepts the proposition: "All knowledge is content of experience," he is not willing to maintain its converse: "All content of experience is knowledge," for he employs some principle of selection whereby from among all the content of experience only certain elements are picked out as having epistemological value. This principle of selection may take various forms as for example Comte's: "Savoir pour prévoir," or Spencer's: knowledge for survival in the struggle for existence. In each case the result is fundamentally the same. To know means to register and to order only those experiences which serve some defined purpose of experiencing persons. Thereby teleology is reintroduced as condition of the very possibility of knowledge and positivism is seen to be self-contradictory in that it must implicitly admit what it has explicitly rejected, namely, the existence of purposeful subjects of knowledge.

Positivism very definitely takes the standpoint of the Thing rather than that of the Person for it attributes real existence only to elements arrived at by analysis and connected by exoteric relations. It is, however, unable to maintain this position without involving itself in further logical contradictions.
It claims to be purely empirical, accepting nothing which is not found in experience; yet it accepts the dogma that all being and process is analyzable without remainder, which dogma, whether true or false, cannot be found in experience. It rejects all wholes which are more than the sum of their parts; yet it is forced to recognize one such whole as presupposed in knowledge, i.e., the knowing subject itself.

The a priorism of Kant and the Neo-Kantians recognizes not only the passive content of experience but also the active forming of experiences by the subject. It recognizes also the reality of substance and causality. It agrees with positivism that they are not to be found as elements in experience, but since these concepts are nevertheless inescapable factors in knowledge, they must be our own contribution. Kant deals with the subject of knowledge from the point of view of the person. He regards it as a unity but yet not as a simple entity. It is a unity inclusive of the elements which are its objects. But when he turns to the object of knowledge Kant reverts to the point of view of the Thing for he maintains that the content produced in the personal act of knowing consists of things and of physical events. This appears most clearly in his formulation of the two chief categories: substance and causality and of their relation to each other. According to Kant our idea of the thing and its properties arises from the necessity of relating all experienced qualities to some substrate in which they inhere. Our idea of the lawfulness of nature arises from the necessity of relating experienced events to other events as their causes. Kant designates both of these necessary relating processes as syntheses,
but they are such in very different senses. With reference to substance it signifies a concrete synthesis, for Kant posits the existence of a whole which is a unity of its elements (qualities and properties) and not a simple entity external to them. With reference to causality, the synthesis is abstract since it involves only the external connection of the ultimate elements of events.

Thus Kant, in formulating the concept of causality analytically and extrinsically, approaches it from the standpoint of the Thing. In formulating the concept of substance synthetically and esoterically, in regard to that he approximates the standpoint of the Person. But he is prevented from adopting this standpoint fully by the sharp separation which he makes between these two categories. Causal connections are thought of as relating only events not substances. In the concept of substance no activity but only the fact that it is a substratum is implicated. "An inactive being and a substrateless activity stand side by side; inert existence here, abstract law there..." He does not recognize that every activity must be assigned to the substance from which it originates with the same necessity with which a property must be assigned to the substrate in which it inheres.

The radical disparity between Kant's conception of the subject of knowledge as a concrete unity achieving a unitary function, and his conception of the object of knowledge as consisting of elements externally related, gives rise to an inner contradiction within his epistemological theory which was formally expressed by Stern as follows:

4Stern, Person und Sache, vol.1, p.111.
"Presupposition of a priori knowledge: There is an activity (thinking), in which a unitary whole acts upon its parts (the content of thought).

Content of knowledge: All activity must be conceived as external connection between elementary occurrences.

Both propositions cannot be true at the same time: a decision must be made to relinquish the one or the other.

If the first proposition is true, esoteric causality exists as a knowable fact, and the acceptance of all causality as esoteric and mechanical cannot originate from any a priori necessity.

If the second proposition is true, there can be no Transcendental Unity of Apperception, and all thinking and knowing becomes impossible." ⁵

Stern further maintained that this formulation indicates the way in which this inner contradiction may be resolved for: "...; it is plain that only the first of the two propositions just named can be chosen. If we wish to preserve the possibility of thinking and knowing, we must demonstrate that the a priori necessity of thinking causality does not demand the specific form of the mechanical concept of causality, but that rather also the Personal (esoterically teleological) conceived causality is capable of an a priori foundation." ⁶ This is the task of categorical theory in personalistic epistemology.

Critical Personalism agrees with Kant in defining a category as an a priori (universal and necessary) form of knowledge. But in the development of its categorial doctrine it departs far from Kant's account of the number, grouping and nature of the categories, for:

"The necessity, which attaches to our forms of knowledge, is ... either elementary (underivable) or derived. As a result all categories fall into two groups which stand for

⁵Stern, op. cit., p.113. ⁶Ibid., p.113ff.
the relation of condition and consequence. The primary group includes only a completely inseparable triad; it owes its origin to a primordial compulsion inherent in the organization of our thinking. All the remaining categories are of secondary nature; they necessarily arise by derivation from the categories of the first group, when these are correctly conceived and formulated. It is the primary categories which finally lead to the metaphysical concept of the 'Person'; the secondary are the forms in which the psycho-physical and mechanical consideration of the world must be carried on."

The primary categories are substance, causality, and individuality. These three necessarily belong together. "The world must be conceived as consisting of unitary active beings, of substances which are at once causal agents and individuals." Causality and substance are inseparably connected. "If we represent to ourselves what it is that we necessarily conjoin with every experienced event, we realize that the formulation that this event is related to another is false." Stern maintained that:

"Every event is necessarily related to something which makes, produces, or actuates it—and only by way of this entity is it related to other events. In short, causality is also like substance, to be thought of as concrete not as abstract. It does not mean a relative togetherness; but a positive 'activity'; and this activity demands an agent with as much necessity as a property demands a 'proprietor.' Causality as isolated from a substrate which causes, is inconceivable."

Thus he conceived causality not as merely synthetic (connecting), but as a hypostatizing (unterlegende) function just as substance is. "Wherever we come across an event we may and must say: agit, ergo est; here something is active, therefore something

7 Stern, op. cit., pp.119-120.
8 Ibid., p.121.
9 Ibid., p.121f.
A similar conclusion is reached from a consideration of the concept of substance.

"Inactive being is as inconceivable as substrateless activity. If we are presented with 'substance' as the mere unity of possible states or properties, how do we know these states? Only because they act upon (according to Kant 'affect') us, the subjects of knowledge. The possession of states is therefore itself nothing but the production of activities. Even the most passive being is necessarily active, otherwise it would not exist—-for our knowledge."  

With Leibniz we must define substance as a being capable of action.

Substantial causality and functioning substance are comprehensible only when they are individualized. The category of individuality must, thus, be conjoined with the other two. The actual objects of knowledge are concrete, bounded, wholes or individuals which are the substantial sources of causal activity. That we must think of the world as consisting of individuals so defined is an a priori necessity. Which phenomena of our experience are to be accepted as manifestations of real individuals is a matter of empirical determination in accordance with some criterion of individuation. Critical Personalism arrives at its own criterion of individuation through a process of exclusion. Though it admits that in the consciousness of one's self real individuality is presented to us with the greatest possible certainty, Critical Personalism rejects the subjective criterion of individuation—selfhood—as by itself insufficient and as incapable of universal application. Scientific determination of the

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10Stern, op. cit., p.122.  
11Ibid., p.124.
existence of other selves depends upon the availability of objective symptoms of selfhood. The three distinguishing characteristics of individuality: unity, capacity for activity, and substantiality are psycho-physically neutral concepts. Likewise Critical Personalism rejects all semi-objective criteria such as spatial or temporal togetherness of phenomena or qualitative unity (Gestalt), because the source of such individuation is ambiguous. "Since every empirical content of experience is in its nature dependent both upon the object which is experienced and upon the subject which experiences, the unity of the content of experience may be attributed either to the fact that the experienced object is unitary, or to the fact that the experiencing subject reacts in a unitary way."\(^1\) Hence Critical Personalism can accept only a fully objective criterion of individuation. It designates this as self-preservation—the unity of immanent or esoteric activities. "Only where something preserves itself amid constant change, do we have the right to accept as existing, the individual causal substrate which thought demands."\(^1\) The individuals accepted as real by this criterion are complex, not simple, unities, for the unity implied in self-preservation is a unity of goal amid a manifold of changing activities. They are unities exhibiting esoteric teleology, for their activities are reflexive; the individual works causally upon a goal lying within itself. An individual of this kind, however, answers to the definition of the Person as a being which, in spite of the plurality of its parts, constitutes a real unity, and in spite of the multiplicity

\(^1\)Stern, op. cit., p.130.  
\(^1\)Ibid., p.138.
of its functions achieves a unitary, goal-directed self activity.

The theory of categories of Critical Personalism has thereby demonstrated the necessity of the fundamental concept with which Critical Personalism as a world-view deals. The Person is the focal point of individuality, substantiality, and causality. In addition to these three primary categories other necessary forms of knowledge which we may designate as secondary categories must be admitted. Among them are the traditional categories of the psychical and the physical, and the Impersonalistic categories of quantity and functional connection. The demonstration of the derivability of these secondary categories from the fusion of the primary categories of individuality, substantiality and causality (i.e., from the concept of the Person) enables Critical Personalism to resolve the dualism of mind and body and to incorporate in its world-view the valuable contributions of Impersonalistic theory. The secondary categories may be so arranged as to produce two wholly independent parallelisms which may be called the psychophysical and the teleomechanical respectively. According to the former the distinction between the psychical and the physical arises from the twofold manner of apprehension of the person. Inwardly, to himself, the Person appears as psychical; externally, to others, it appears as physical. According to the latter every existent viewed as a whole, from above, appears as a Person; viewed as a manifold of parts, from below, it appears as Thing.

The epistemology of Critical Personalism is realistic. Every experience, so Stern contended, has a real object lying outside itself. "Experience is transitive; it transfers to and aims at
something that is not itself experience." This something may be either the outside world or the experiencing person himself. The former may be called objectified experience, the latter subjectified experience. The ultimate end of objectified experience is a complete world-view, of subjectified experience complete consciousness of self. But neither ever completely attains its object. "Experiences that objectify and subjectify are thus like endless voyages of discovery into the objective world and the subjective self; the ultimate ports of 'thing in itself' and 'self in essence' are never arrived at in experience." The transcendent object of knowledge can be described only by a progressive approximation.

As to the media of knowledge Stern held that:

"Sense-experience and rational thought—regarded for centuries as solely important—prove to be insufficient; not only singly, as they are employed in the one case by the empiricists, in the other by the rationalists, but also in conjunction, as Kant treated them. For both are essentially instruments of an impersonalistic understanding; the concretely individual totality remains outside the sphere of their application. In this way a large class of possible objects of knowledge (especially historical and cultural, but also some objects of other sciences) are rendered epistemologically homeless. At this point, personalism meets (with) certain new tendencies, which attempt to do justice to the concretely holistic and personalistic aspects through different means of knowledge ('intuition,' 'insight'). But we are not content with a sheer opposition of these means to the afore-mentioned sorts. Our purpose is rather to establish a hierarchy of cognitive principles; cognition progresses by an anabasis through the three stages of lower intuition, conceptual abstraction, and higher intuition; beyond these,

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15 Ibid., p.75.
however, there is a way of knowing, whereby the self does not seek to eliminate itself, but to identify itself with its object. This is sympathetic introception, wherein the maximal approximation to the intrinsic being of personalities is attained.16

Ontology

The nature of being may be considered from three points of view: as psycho-physically neutral, as it appears objectively, and as it appears subjectively. The first of these points of view deals with the nature of being in so far as it is indifferent to the distinction between the physical and psychical, i.e., with these characters of being which are manifested by the Person both externally to others, and internally, to itself. The objective consideration deals with those characters of being which are manifested specifically in its appearance to external observers; and the subjective consideration treats of the characters of being which appear only to itself as subject.

Stern's doctrine of the Person as psycho-physically neutral may be formulated in four main theses which together form the foundation of Critical Personalism as a system of metaphysics. These four fundamental metaphysical convictions are:

1. Unitas multiplex.—The world consists of Persons, i.e., of beings which, in spite of the plurality of parts, constitute real unique, and intrinsically valuable wholes and as such in spite of the plurality of part the functions form a unitary goal-directed self-activity.

2. Hierarchy.—The world is organized into a hierarchical system of Persons such that the parts of each Person are again

Person, which again consist of parts and thus to infinity.

3. Duality of phases.—In the existence of Persons there are two phases, one latent and one actual; in the former the Person exists only in itself; in the latter in and for itself... 

4. Alternation of Phases. Both phases continually pass into one another. On the one hand previously latent persons become actual (actualization); on the other hand every particular new moment of the actual phase sinks back into the latent stable condition of the first phase ('mechanization').

Unlike all Impersonalistic philosophies Critical Personalism does not negate and deny the essential point of view of the 'philosophia perennis'—Naive Personalism, but rather expresses in clear logical form what is there crudely conceived and symbolically expressed. Like Naive Personalism it holds that there exist in the world unitary, independent, and intrinsically valuable persons whose activities are goal-directed. But whereas Naive Personalism approaches the person analytically, seeking its essence in some simple element (soul), Critical Personalism approaches it synthetically.

The unity of the Person may not be equated with simplicity, or with uniformity. The Person is not only structured but differentiated. The Impersonalistic synthesis, by means of abstract relations, of identical and substitutable elements into complexes or aggregates fails to yield real beings or Persons. Persons are wholes which are prior to their differentiated parts, not mere products of the summation of identical parts. Consequently, they can be reached neither by the method of analysis nor by the conjoining of originally separated parts. An entirely new method,

17Stern, Person und Sache, vol.1, p.177.
called by Stern "hypostasis," is required. "We arrive at real Being neither by analysis nor by synthesis, but only by 'hypostasis.'" Finally, the unity of Person cannot be equated with rigid immutability (Starrheit). Though it remains identical with itself, the identity of the Person does not exclude but positively includes change. "The multiplicity and variety of successive phases is included in the whole just as much as is the multiplicity and variety of coexistent parts."  

This conception of the Person as unitas multiplex necessarily leads to Stern's idea of a hierarchical system of Persons. Every Person being a concrete unity, may contain other Persons as parts and may itself be contained as a part in some higher personal unity. The relations involved in this hierarchical system are esoteric (inner) relations of co-ordination, sub-ordination, and super-ordination. The exoteric (next to next) relations of simple, identical, and absolutely independent elements all on a single plane is given up in favor of a systematic arrangement of concrete, differentiated, and only relatively independent unities in a three-dimensional hierarchy.  

Proceeding from the particular human individual upwards one discovers successively the superordinate Persons: the family, the nation, humanity, the earth, the solar system, the All. If one proceeds downward there are found the subordinate Persons: cells, molecules, and atoms, etc. The unities found at the various levels of this hierarchy are not merely descriptive but truly

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And to ensure the adherence of the government, regular audits are conducted to verify the compliance of the regulations. The government also implements strict penalties for any violation of the rules. In addition, the government actively monitors the market to prevent any fraudulent activities. This comprehensive approach ensures that the market remains fair and transparent, benefiting both investors and the economy.
"substantial, teleological, causal and axiological unities."\textsuperscript{20} Such, roughly, is the tentative and incomplete scheme of the hierarchy. Even if it were to be demonstrated that one or more of these entities suggested to be a true personal whole were only apparently such, this would not invalidate the general principle of hierarchical arrangement.

The two extremes of the hierarchy of Persons are of special interest because both are at once logically necessary yet inconceivable, and because the "conception" of the upper extreme is involved in the theoretical attitude of Critical Personalism to religion. "The hierarchy of Persons has an upper and a lower limit. The upper is that Person which includes all others in itself but is itself no longer part of a higher Person: the Absolute Person or God. The lower limit is that being which is only material for the superordinated Persons, but no longer includes parts in itself as a unity in multiplicity: the Absolute Thing or the material 'an sich.'" It is clear, however, that thought never adequately comprehends these limits.

"In the concept of God, we arrive at the antinomy that we must think of God as Person, i.e., as individuality, limited and isolated, but on the other hand may not think of anything as being external to him, whereby limits might be assigned to him and from which he might isolate and individuate himself. In the concept of the absolute material we arrive at the antinomy that we cannot think the world otherwise than as individuated, and yet that the material for all individuals cannot itself be individuated, since it would not then constitute the lowest level."

Nevertheless Stern insisted that we need both concepts to complete the hierarchy. "In the concept of God the fact that for every

finite Person we must think a higher one, of which it is a part and member, is absolutized; in the concept of absolute thing the fact that for every Person we must think constitutive parts, which form its raw material, is absolutized.\textsuperscript{21}

Since God as the All-Person is identified with the totality of the cosmos Critical Personalism issues in a \textit{personal pantheism}. But it is far removed from all forms of pantheism which deny reality to lower unities or persons. "For personalism the idea of the All-Person is the final application of that Person-categ−
y, which seeks to realize itself on every level of being."\textsuperscript{22} The All-Person is inclusive of all qualities and values of all Persons beneath it in the hierarchy. Thus for Critical Personalism God is a personal not a mere abstract unity. But in contrast with Naive Personalism God's personality is not conceived as a simple unity external to the world. It is a whole inclusive of the world. Forms of impersonal pantheism and theistic personalism do not exhaust the possible conceptions of God. Personal pantheism is a third possibility, regarded by Stern as preferable to both those types.

The antinomy involved in its 'concept' of God causes Critical Personalism to admit that here it has arrived at the limit of theoretical knowledge.

"As All-Person God must be conceived as concrete and individuated, as All-Person infinite and unbounded. As All-Person God is related to every finite Person, is near to him, as All-Person he is absolutely incomparable with him, stands

\textsuperscript{21}Stern, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.168, 169.

\textsuperscript{22}Stern, \textit{Person und Sache}, vol.111, p.95.
inexpressibly far from him. Between these two no reconciliation is possible through knowledge. For the latter the All-person is merely a limiting concept; it presents itself with logical necessity when once the personalistic dogmatism has been made the presupposition of all knowledge; but as content it is not attainable for this knowledge."²³

Nevertheless, content can be given to this concept through a-theoretical religious 'introception' or worship. "The All-Person is for our objectifying knowledge a mere-howbeit necessary-limiting concept, but for introception, which loves, understands, sees artistically and adores, which accepts at once immediate dependence and immediate attachment, selfhood and membership, it is the living God."²⁴

The foregoing consideration of the various levels of personality has brought into clear relief the discrepancy between the common use of the term 'person' and the technical application of it in Critical Personalism. Stern not only explicitly recognized and described this discrepancy but in his doctrine of the two phases of the Person offered a justification for this departure from common usage. As we have seen, Stern designated as a Person anything which answers to his criterion of individuation, i.e., any existent which manifests the immanent and teleological function of self-preservation. Common usage, on the contrary, restricts the term person to only such Persons as exhibit the 'higher' immanent and teleological function of conscious and spontaneous striving for perfection, i.e., the function of conscious self-development. Stern's justification of his terminology consisted

²³Stern, op. cit., p. 96.

of an attempt to show that his own and the common usage of the term person are not essentially disparate but that both are justified for each refers to one of two different phases of an identical existent.

The function of self-preservation is a *sine qua non* of Personality. Super-imposed upon this minimal condition of Personality, but not like it necessarily universal, is the function of self-development. That is necessary to explain change. When it has this function the Person becomes a person in the fullest and highest sense. In its self-preservative phase the Person (as latent and existing only in itself) seeks merely to conserve itself as a whole; in its self-developmental phase the Person as actual and existing in and for itself becomes productive, but in each case it is the same Person who is active. There is only a functional, not a substantial, difference between Stern's Person and a person as commonly conceived.25

The dualism of functions introduced into the concept of the Person by the doctrine of its two phases must now be resolved by showing that the two phases in question are not only compatible but are also necessarily related. It is evident that since the exercise of the self-preservative function characteristic of the first phase is a necessary condition for the very existence of Persons it can never be absent. The function of the second phase can only be found in addition to it, i.e., be super-imposed upon it. The self-developmental functions of the second phase are

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possible only by virtue of the fact that they can proceed from the self-preservation functions of the first phase as a basis. "An existent can exercise self-development, i.e., increase and perfect itself; only if it at the same time remains constantly identical with itself and thus also exercises self-preservation." 26

But, on the other hand, the functions of the first phase must also be regarded as the deposits or better still the "petrifacts" of the functions of the second phase. "Every function of the first phase is the creation of a function of the second." 27 The new territory conquered by the Person in self-development is maintained by the Person in self-preservation as point of departure for further new conquests.

The passage from the first or latent phase of the Person to the second or actual phase may be called "actualization." Similarly the constant shifting of newly achieved functions from the spontaneous self-developmental phase to the mechanized self-preservation phase may be called "mechanization." Empirical examples of both abound. Thus actualization is illustrated in the case of an individual organism by the transition from a sleeping to a waking state, and in the case of a nation by a transition from a period of conformity to tradition to one of cultural expansion. Likewise mechanization may be illustrated in the case of a human individual by the passage of conscious mental processes into the subconscious, and in the case of a nation by its passage from a period of empire building to one of consolidation and defense of its gains. The important point, however, is that both

26Stern, op. cit., p.173. 27Ibid., p.175.
actualization and mechanization are constantly occurring; neither stable lawful functioning, nor continual novelty and spontaneity, is by itself characteristic of the activity of the Person, but both are found in it as constantly alternating phases.

As an object for external observers the Person presents a manifold of characters which may be grouped under three headings as qualitative, temporal, and spatial. These perceived characters must indeed be admitted to be only phenomena but, unless we are content to fall into solipsism, they must also be recognized as appearances of some reality, i.e., not illusions but symbols by means of which some reality is signified or manifested. In one phase the Person manifests itself objectively in qualitative, temporal, and spatial particularity. It is qualitatively unique and both temporally and spatially limited in extension. In the other phase the Person manifests itself objectively in internal configuration (Gestaltung), i.e., in qualitative, temporal and spatial self-organization. Accepting the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernibles, Stern insisted that no two Persons admit of comparison and substitution without remainder. No two Persons are in every respect alike, but each is itself and not some other thing. It is true that certain alleged distinguishing qualities are in fact reducible to qualities dependent upon the cooperation of two or more Persons; but all such qualities as manifest persistence amid change and interference are truly irreducible distinguishing characters of Persons.

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28 Stern, op. cit., p.179f.  
29 Ibid., p.183f.
Every Person, on whatever level of the hierarchy it may be found, actively maintains its qualitative identity for only a limited period of time; it has a definite beginning and end. Experience clearly shows that not only do human Persons come into being at birth and pass away at death, but also nations, species, molecules, and astronomical bodies originate and cease to be. This teaching of experience Critical Personalism holds to be no mere appearance but a genuine feature of reality. As a result Critical Personalism comes into conflict with the philosophical doctrine of the eternity of particular substance. Stern accepted it only in the sense of a denial that origination means a transition from sheer non-existence to concrete existence and vice versa for passing away. (Ex nihilo nihil fit et in nihilum nihil fit.) Neither the totality of being nor any absolutely simple being can originate or pass away. The All-Person is eternal, for its temporal extension cannot be limited by some temporal extension external to it, since only existents are temporally extended and all of them fall within the All-Person. Absolute Thing (or stuff), too, is eternal. For as Absolute material it can possess no individuation whatsoever, and thus no temporal individuation. Here, though in a more specific form, we again encounter the antinomies found in the concepts of both extremes of the personal hierarchy; both must be individuated in every respect and therefore also temporally, and yet both are so conceived that they cannot be individuated in any respect.

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30 Stern, op. cit., p.185.  
31 Ibid., p.186f.
For all finite Persons, i.e., for all Persons lying between the two extremes of the hierarchy, and hence also for human Persons, origination and cessation are real. The ordinary religious view of human immortality cannot be upheld, for it depends upon the erroneous (naive, personalistic) conception of the human Person as having its essence in a simple entity--the soul. Were this actually the case human immortality would necessarily follow, for it has been recognized that origination and cessation do not apply to simple entities. But Critical Personalism has shown that the human Person is not a simple unity but a concrete, systematic unity of parts. Origination and cessation become possible in the sense of the acquirement or the loss of such systematic unity by some material which remains identical with itself throughout.

Every finite Person is spatially as well as temporally bounded. There is a definite extent of space in which each actively maintains itself amid changes and against interferences. Spatial extension cannot be made the distinguishing characteristic of any one type of existent, e.g., the material, for all possess it. Only the two extremes of the hierarchy of Persons must again be excepted, with the result that the antinomies inherent in these concepts here also appear in a specific form. The All-Person and Absolute Thing (stuff) both must and cannot be spatially individuated. 32

The Person of the second phase possesses all the minimal objective characters of the Person of the first phase, but now in an internally organized form. It is not, like the Person of the first phase, a mere unity in multiplicity which as particularized sets

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32 Stern, op. cit., p.188f.
itself off from other Persons; but it is rather a true whole or Gestaltung which has organized all its various parts so as to serve the ends of the whole. 33 Qualitatively this configuration makes of every Person in and for itself a true organism; not, however, in the Kantian sense of a product of nature in which everything is at once goal and means, for in this definition the function of the whole itself is neglected. The function of each part of an organism subserves not some other part but the organism itself as a whole, and the nature of the functioning of all the qualitatively different parts of an organism is therefore determined by the nature of the goals of the organism as a whole.

Through the configuration of its temporal extension the Person "in and for itself" acquires a "history," i.e., the manifold of the individual epochs through which it exists is no longer an arbitrary succession of steps but a unified developmental process. This statement that "the Person 'for itself' has a history" does not mean that it passes through an arbitrary succession of phases. "It is able to realize its individual essence only step by step in an individual process; its existence consists of a constant self-transcendence." The epochs "are constantly exchanging the roles of goal, and means. At every moment the Person in and for itself strives toward a goal lying beyond its immediate present, which, when it is reached, only becomes the point of departure for a further goal." But Stern maintained even further that these particular epochs "are not only determined the one by the other but all by the whole." 34

33Stern, op. cit., p.190.  
34Ibid., p.190.
From that standpoint the future may not be said to be fully non-existent. It is already potentially present in the form of dispositions. These dispositions are not always realized, because the Person is limited in its development by the functioning of other Persons. "The actual life-process of a Person is therefore always a resultant of the two components of inner disposition and of outer interference, limitation, and diversion." It follows that Critical Personalism must adopt a view of history in general as consisting of as many individual teleological processes as there are Persons in the second or self-developmental phase. "Every cell and every plant, every animal and every man, every species and every nation, probably even every astronomical body and every cosmic system has its history, its life-process. . . ." None of these individual processes can be derived without remainder from a single universal historical process, though they do admit of a hierarchical arrangement.

The configuration of its spatial extension by the Person 'in and for itself' is best illustrated by an example given by Stern:

"A race with its merely qualitative self-preservation is according to our terminology a 'Person in itself'; a nation organized as a state is a 'Person for itself.' The race merely fills a certain space (it has a realm of extension); the nation on the other hand shapes and orders into a whole the space which it dominates (the realm of the state), in which each point stands in a correlative relation with every other. Conquest or loss of some spatial part, shifting of boundaries, etc., always affects the whole; the central districts have other functions in the interests of the whole than the boundary districts--etc."
The psycho-physically neutral Person manifests itself not only to others in objective (physical) characters but also to itself in subjective (psychical) characters. Stern considered the concept of the psychical to be highly ambiguous. It may be given a phenomenological or a personal and teleological significance. The former identifies the psychical with actual or potential conscious experience; the latter with individual, goal-striving, and intrinsically valuable unities (souls or spirits). The psychical, phenomenologically considered as either latent or actual content of consciousness, requires a substrate with as much necessity as do physical states and events. In other words there must be a subject of consciousness. Of the nature of this subject it may be said that, as the presupposition of conscious phenomena, it cannot itself be a conscious phenomenon; it is not psychical but "meta-psychical." But since the physical and the psychical are only two different modes of the appearance of Persons the substrate of conscious phenomena is none other than the Person itself which is at once "meta-physical" and "meta-psychical."

Critical Personalism, therefore, maintains a psycho-physical parallelism, but it must be carefully distinguished from other views bearing the same name. It does not hold that what is manifested psychically and physically is something unknown or unknowable. It implies rather something which has definite features common to both the psychical and physical. These are the personal and teleological characters—individuality and goal-striving activity—found both in objective and subjective

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38 See Chapter II, p.19.
phenomena. Stern hoped thus to avoid the predicament of Spinoza, Schelling and Fechner, of denying reality to the physical and the psychical and yet being forced to center all attention upon these as the only knowable characters of the world. The parallelism of the physical and the psychical is for Critical Personalism a phenomenological fact subordinate to the ontological parallelism of the teleological and the mechanical, of Person and Thing. The psycho-physically neutral characters of any Person appear in psychical form only to that Person itself as subject. But the Person is immediately given to itself as subject only in its second or higher phase; the appearance of subjective (psychical) phenomena in the Person of the first phase can only be inferred.

The objectively manifested configuration of the Person in its second phase has its subjective correlate in that the Person as subject also unifies and organizes its experiences, including the experiences of itself as object. In so far as it does so it is a self or ego, and is said to be conscious of that which it so organizes and unifies. The individuality of the Person, therefore, appears subjectively in selfhood. Its teleological activity makes its subjective appearance as will. Both consciousness and will, however, are definitely confined to the Person in and for itself; they are functions which serve the self-development not the self-preservation of the Person. "Self-preservation goes on unconsciously, self-development makes use of consciousness. Consciousness is present only where a Person has progressive tendencies, where it strives beyond the momentary present to the new . . .

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On the other hand the ordinary constantly repeated uniformity of self maintenance in some already achieved mode of existence goes on unconsciously." 40 Through willing we strive to progress beyond the present to a more developed state.

If, then, the psychical be identified with consciousness and will, it is confined to Persons in the phase of self-development and is not universal; Persons in the first or self-preservative phase would appear only physically. This state of affairs is precluded, however, by the close relation and continual alternation of the two phases of the Person which was described as actualization and mechanization. Since the actual history of the Person is a single one, its manifestations alone being two-fold, this alternation must be found also subjectively. Accordingly phases of actual consciousness and active willing must depend upon and pass back into phases of unconsciousness and uniform reflex reaction. These latter which may be designated as dispositions, capacities, and tendencies to psychical activities must, as the source and product of psychical activities, themselves be included in the concept of the psychical. The sum total of these potentialities for and deposits of conscious experience corresponds in the main to what is in modern psychology termed "the subconscious."

The phases of the Person are, therefore, psycho-physically parallel in the appearances. The Person of the first phase which, objectively considered, strives in a uniform and lawful way for self-preservation is, subjectively considered, unconscious; the

Person of the second phase which objectively manifests itself in imperatively striving in novel ways for self-development, subjectively manifests itself as consciously willing its new goals.

To satisfy the demands of a thoroughly systematic world-view this empirically observable psycho-physical parallelism for both of the two phases of the Person must be speculatively universalized. Consequently for every physical phenomenon a psychical correlate must be postulated, and further, every Person in the second phase must be recognized to be conscious. Every Person on whatever level of the hierarchy it may be found must be admitted to possess psychical dispositions and tendencies to conscious activities; and all Persons whatsoever including cells, plants, nations, and astronomical bodies which exhibit active self-organization and self-development must be admitted to possess actual consciousness. Critical Personalism, therefore, logically issues in panpsychism. 41

Teleology

The intrinsically important problem of teleology is of special importance in Critical Personalism. Its main problem is the reconciliation of teleology and mechanism. In the end it attributes all activity and change in the world to the teleological functioning of Persons. The concepts of teleology and causality are united in a way which Stern regarded as the most

41 Stern, op. cit., p. 217ff.
original feature of his system.\textsuperscript{42} For Critical Personalism the concept of causality is inseparable from that of substance; and the criterion of real being employed is teleological in nature. 

Stern distinguished four types of teleology one of which includes two subtypes: (1) formal; (2) descriptive; (3) causal, including (a) intention, (b) disposition; and (4) axiological.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Formal teleology} is the "harmless and inevitable" methodological process in which for any given event one seeks in the preceding series of events for its causes. It, therefore, constitutes a reversal of the usual etiological approach which, starting with a given event as the initial member of a series, looks for results rather than causes. It is important to note that so far as formal teleology is concerned we are dealing only with conceptual goals; they may be real or imaginary, we are inquiring only as to the nature of the events necessary to give rise to some conceived goal event arbitrarily or methodologically chosen. This form of teleology is applied, e.g., by the historian when he seeks for the causal factors in the origin of the German empire or by the biologist when he regards the preservation of some species as due to the protective coloring which its members possess.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{Descriptive teleology} seeks to determine empirically which among the unlimited number of phenomena that may be viewed as goals of a series of events, are real goals, i.e., ends in themselves

\textsuperscript{42}Stern, op. cit., p.223.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., p.225f. Axiological teleology is the name given by Stern to his theory of values which will be dealt with in a separate chapter, and will, therefore, be omitted for discussion here.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., p.228.
which cannot be arbitrarily relegated to the status of mere means to some other goal. Certain series of facts are found to possess a peculiar purposive character. They may not only be viewed as teleological in accordance with the procedure of formal teleology, but in addition must be regarded as constituting their own ends or as including them within themselves. For example, the locomotion of an amoeba may be (formally) regarded as an end subserved by various biological conditions as means. But its locomotion may in its turn be considered as a means to a higher end of the amoeba—self-preservation. The self-preservation of the amoeba is an end which cannot thus be again converted into a means to another end, it is one of the real and final goals determined by descriptive teleology.

Causal teleology attempts to give the explanation of the teleological concepts and the teleological facts postulated by formal and descriptive teleology respectively. Its formula is: "Present existence or occurrence may be determined by future existence or occurrence." The goal-directedness of phenomena is due to the active causal functioning of the goal upon phenomena; but since the goal as future is non-existent it is represented by a goal-striving tendency whose nature is determined by the goal. This goal striving tendency may be conceived either exoterically

46 Ibid., p.238.  
47 In describing the various points of view from which teleology may be considered Stern seeks to remain entirely objective. He does not necessarily endorse in isolation any view put forward. Hence here, too, he is aware of the objection that the postulation of a goal striving tendency as representing in the present a goal existing in the future only pushes back one step the paradox of the present effectiveness of a future (hence non-existent) entity.
or esoterically thus giving rise to intention teleology or disposition teleology respectively. The former is characteristic of Naive Personalism, the latter of Critical Personalism. Intention teleology implies an external conscious striving directed upon a course of events and directed toward a consciously realized goal in accordance with some plan. Disposition teleology implies an immanent, unitary, activity within a series of events whereby these events become directed toward a goal without necessarily involving intention or consciousness.

The most inclusive and thoroughgoing application of intention teleology is found in its theologico-cosmological form in which all goal-directedness in the world is attributed to the purposeful activity of the deity. All immanent teleological phenomena are explained as products of this transcendent teleological activity, and all mechanical processes as the fixed means by which an externally imposed purpose is achieved. This purpose may be conceived in a crudely anthropocentric or in a more inclusive cosmocentric form but in either case it is definitely anthropomorphic. Whether or not the goal of the universe is identified with the goals of man, the nature of the purpose in the universe is interpreted after the analogy of human planning.48

Just as the prototype of intention teleology was human volitional activity, so the paradigm of disposition teleology is found in organic life processes. For these as all other phenomena demand a causal explanation. But since they are not explicable in terms of previous observable events their causes

48 Stern, Person und Sache, vol. 1, p. 239ff.
must be conceived as latent potentialities or dispositions to activities of a definite kind. The phenomena of living organisms most obviously in need of such causal explanation are those of self-preservation and self-development. Accordingly we must postulate the tendencies or dispositions to self-preservation and self-development as present in every living organism. The concept of dispositional causality is, however, by no means confined to the biological realm. In physics it appears in the concept of energy, in chemistry as affinity of atoms, in sociology, as tendencies toward integration and differentiation, and in ethics as the tendencies toward human perfection.\textsuperscript{49}

Critical Personalism accepts causal teleology in a thorough-going fashion. Just as in its ontology it refers all existence to the being of Persons, so in its causal teleology it seeks to explain all change in terms of the activity of Persons.\textsuperscript{50} All Personal activity, it maintains, is self-determination: the Person is at once the source and the goal of its own activity which is directed upon its parts.\textsuperscript{51} For Critical Personalism, therefore, causality is immanent or esoterical. It explains external causal relations, in accordance with the doctrine of teleo-mechanical parallelim, as the secondary products of the primary esoteric causal acts of a Person.

Critical Personalism accepts the disposition rather than the intention type of causal teleology. It hypostatizes this type of causal teleology, i.e., reduces it to a concrete existent

\textsuperscript{49}Stern, \textit{op. cit.}, p.244ff.

\textsuperscript{50}\textit{Ibid.}, p.255.

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Ibid.}, p.256.
in materials to be extracted materials based on analysis of new measurements and new information. This approach is to be investigated.

The new information brings some to account that had been overlooked. It is argued that the performance of the new approach is superior to those of current methods due to the increased accuracy and efficiency. The new approach is validated through experimental results and further improvements are suggested for future work.
as its bearer. Real existents alone can exercise purposive activities. No "shadowy powers" such as the "life-force" of vitalism, the "dominants" of neo-vitalism or other speculatively postulated tendencies or dispositions are capable of real causal activity. This hypostatization of disposition teleology in Critical personalism disposes of the logical objection raised against teleology in general that it postulates a future, and therefore non-existent, goal as an active determining factor in a present situation. It is not a future goal, as such, but a Personal whole possessing temporal extension that is active both in the present and in the future. The activity of the goal of a series of events is the activity of the Person of which the goal forms one moment but which is not exhausted in any one of its moments, be it present or future.

The activity of Persons has been called self-determination; but it is necessary to recognize the limitations of the self-determination of Persons. Persons determine only their own functioning, not their own existence. Their mode of activity is the expression of a definite mode of existence imposed upon them from without, i.e., by other Persons. The source of the existence of a Person on any level of the hierarchy lies in the functioning of the self-developmental tendency of one or more other Persons of the hierarchy. Furthermore, as has been pointed out above, the functioning (and therefore the self-determination) of every Person is always limited by the functioning of the other

\[52\text{Stern, op. cit., p. 256.}\]

\[53\text{Ibid., p. 256f.}\]

\[54\text{See Chapter.III, p. 61.}\]
Persons which form its environment. Of every Person it is true that:

"... it is not alone in the world; and the parts which constitute it, belong not only to it, but also to other Personal unities, whose parts they are as well. The actual occurrence is therefore a resultant of its own self determining tendency plus the mode of activity of all the other causal factors which exercise influence within its sphere of existence. The reality of Personal self-activity does not therefore manifest itself in the absolute attainment of the goal it has set for itself, but only in the fact that the course of events is directed toward this goal, hence in the goal-striving character of its functioning." 55

Closely connected with the problem of the nature and limitations of Personal activity is the age-old problem of the nature and relation of necessity and freedom. For Critical Personalism these two concepts are no longer mutually exclusive opposites.

"Every occurrence is necessary in the sense that whatever exists can function only as it does function; for activity is the immediate expression of being and can therefore take no other course than that which is demanded by the nature and the tendency of being. This necessity is, however, entirely independent of mechanical determinism. It is not derivable from laws indifferent to all goals and ends, but from the concrete nature of goal-striving beings themselves, to which laws and norms are again to be referred ('teleological determinism'). This determinism is also entirely independent of exact predictability of events for teleological causality, in its second phase at any rate, constantly gives rise to qualitatively new phenomena which, though necessarily determined by the nature of the causal agent are nevertheless incapable of being deduced from it by means of general formulae. Causal necessity and causal law are not to be identified." 56  "Freedom consists in the closest possible approximation of events to the goal of self-determination." 57

56Ibid., p.262.
57Ibid., p.263.
The duality of phases described in its ontological aspect as the two modes of existence of the Person appears very clearly also in the manner of its activity. From the causal point of view the activity of the Person is either purely reactive—first phase, or spontaneously and creatively active—second phase. Similarly, from a teleological point of view the goal of Personal activity is either the maintenance of self-identities amid change or the growth and development of itself at the expense of its environment.

It now becomes clear why it was maintained of the Personal function of self-development that is necessary to explain change, for if self-preservation is to be identified with reaction to an external influence threatening the self-identity of the Person it serves only as the explanation of the identity which is maintained and not of the changes amidst which it is maintained. These changes, amidst which the self-identity of the Person is maintained, and which form the very condition of the possibility of the function of self-preservative acts of other Persons, cannot be themselves acts of self-preservative for these, being again purely reactive, demand other acts to evoke them and so on ad infinitum. The interpretation of the external influences evoking self-preservative acts as being themselves self-preservative therefore leads to an infinite regress which can be oviated only by relinquishing this interpretation altogether and accepting in its stead the existence of non-reactive, i.e., spontaneous

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58 See Chapter III, pp.54, 55.

59 Ibid., p.55.
and creative activity.  

Self-preservative phenomena may be classified provisionally as either inorganic or organic on the basis of the type of restitution of self-identity which takes place in each. In the realm of inorganic aggregates restitutions are 'linear' or uni-directional, and may be explained as constant reversions to a condition of inertia after isolated disturbances of it, i.e., as mechanical epiphenomena. Thus a machine is capable of such self-preservative functions as automatic regulation of steam pressure etc., but in each case there is possible only a single definite reaction to an equally circumscribed deviation from its "normal" state. An organism, on the other hand, exhibits radial restitution; it is capable of a wide variety of responses to an equally wide variety of external disturbing influences. Moreover the self-preservative responses of an organism converge and mutually modify each other so as best to achieve their goal. Such processes are no longer mechanically explicable in terms of the first law of motion but we are forced to postulate as their explanation the existence of a self-preservative activity on the part of the unitary substrate of these processes. The highly complex behavior of the organism in its function of self-preservation is directly due to the functioning of a unitary and active determiner of this behavior—a Person. But even the explanation of inorganic processes of self-preservation as mechanical epiphenomena can only be a provisional one, for Critical Personalism, in accordance with its

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61 Ibid., p.276ff.
62 Ibid., p.369ff.
63 Ibid., p.276f.
doctrine of teleo-mechanical parallelism, derives all mechanical phenomena from teleological activities. Every mechanical law by which the regularity of the processes of an aggregate may be described will be seen to be due to the regular manner of activity imposed by some Person (in its first phase) upon its parts which constitute the aggregate.

The self-preservation of the species as a super-individual Person manifests itself in the facts of heredity. Stern maintained that all mechanistic theories have failed to explain this satisfactorily. For they are all forced either explicitly or implicitly, to assume the existence of a repetitive tendency in the species. This purposive tendency is recognized by Critical Personalism as a *vera causa*; the species as well as the individual possesses the teleological capacity for unitary self-preservation. In the same way the maintenance of cultural phenomena by a nation cannot be accounted for in terms of the activities of the individuals which constitute the nation, but the nation itself as a super-individual Personal whole actively exercises self-preservation as a unitary function, while its individual members (parts) serve only as its instruments.⁶⁴

Critical Personalism recognizes both an inner and an outer factor in self-development: "The evolution of a finite Person is possible only on the ground of its immanent tendency to self-development; but it becomes actual only through the interplay of this striving with the environmental conditions, which not only

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⁶⁴See *Person und Sache*, vol. 1, p.319, where Stern applies this view to general theories of evolution.
furnish the material upon which it acts and determine its as yet undetermined direction but also set limits to its absolute realization." The inner factor in self-development accepted by Critical Personalism is not a single universal tendency such as was postulated by Hegel. Rather to the hierarchy of Persons there corresponds also a hierarchy of individual tendencies toward self-development. Thus Critical Personalism explains all facts of self-development as well as all facts of self-preservation on the ground of an active teleological functioning of Persons.

The principle of self-development finds one of its most important applications with reference to the problem of the origin of Persons. Through their self-developmental tendency, which quantitatively considered may be called a tendency toward expansion, Persons on every level of the hierarchy give rise to other Persons. The Persons so developed are normally subordinated to the Person giving rise to them; they are lower in the hierarchy than the parent Person, i.e., parts of it. In certain maximal cases of the developmental tendency, however, the newly developed Person becomes equal in rank to the parent Person and the analogy of birth may be applied. This principle is of universal application. "Through generation and birth not only do plants originate from plants, animals from animals, human beings from human beings, but also nations from nations and species from species." The origin of new species, which has been the central problem of biological evolution, becomes for Critical Personalism only one special application, though an important one, of a more general theory.

65 Stern, op. cit., p.321.  
66 Ibid., p.335.
The species is regarded as a super-individual Person for whom self-preservation is equivalent to heredity, while its self-development takes the form of mutational changes. In accordance with the principle of alternation of phases, periods of heredity are succeeded by periods of weakening of heredity and increase of developmental emphasis. At such periods mutations occur though they are relatively few and most of them disappear again. If environmental conditions are favorable, however, some may persist and a new species be born. Stern thought that by means of this theory one of the most serious of all difficulties in other theories of evolution is obviated, namely, the "missing links"—the empirically observed gaps which make species definitely distinct. The explanation of these gaps between species is that the mutations occurring in the rather brief self-developmental phases of the Person are so few as to afford little chance of survival of paleontological remains of them.

Teleo-Mechanical Parallelism

Of the three main parts into which Stern's metaphysics is divided: ontology, teleology, and teleomechanics, the first two have already been discussed. The function of the doctrine of teleo-mechanical parallelism is to resolve the apparent dualism between Person and Thing by explicating the manner and the necessity of the derivation of all impersonalistic from personalistic categories. Since the impersonalistic categories with which this doctrine is concerned are all relational categories teleo-mechanical parallelism is alternatively designated as the doctrine of relations.
The manner and the necessity of the derivation of these relational categories of impersonalism has already in principle been indicated with reference to Stern's epistemology. This epistemological derivation can proceed either from the side of the Person or from that of the Thing. The possibility of the former depends upon the fact that the Person being unitas multiplex must be considered both directly from the point of view of the whole and indirectly from the point of view of the parts.

"Since the Person has no existence in addition to its parts, but only as the unity joining them together, the parts form the material of which it consists and upon which it exercises its activity. And in as far as the parts are such, they are 'Things,' even if in other relations they may themselves be Persons."

"They manifest—as parts—characteristics and occurrences which are only the reflections of the being and the activities of the Person which includes them, whose reality is not their own but that of the whole in which they find a place."

The necessity of a teleo-mechanical parallelism may also be shown by proceeding from the point of view of the Thing. Comparability and lawfulness, the categories upon which the impersonalistic world-view rests, are relational concepts. The dogma of 'synthetic relation' inevitably leads to a complete relativism. Attention is directed not to the existents but to the relation. But contended Stern "a relativism of this kind is an epistemological impossibility; for the requirement that everything which

67Stern, op. cit., p.146.

68Previously discussed, see above, Chapter III, pp.66, 67.
exists must ultimately be referred to substrates and everything which occurs to activities of these substrates, holds also for relations in so far as they are accepted as existent and active."

"All relations presuppose positions, and not only positions as points of reference, between which the relations are to establish connections, but also and above all, positions as points of origin, which alone render the existence of relations intelligible, hence positions which are prior to the relations. No law is possible without something which establishes the law; no quantification (comparability) without an identical entity in relation to which both of the compared moments are substitutable for each other."

Relations, in Stern's view, are secondary emanations of primary positions. As from the standpoint of Critical Personalism, Persons are the only real existents; they are the absolutes making relations possible. "The metaphysics of laws becomes a metaphysics of lawgiving Persons—and thereby absolute relativism, which is self-contradictory, is superseded."

A differentiation of two distinct aspects of the foregoing epistemological arguments serves to shed light on a difficulty as to the term teleo-mechanical parallelism as a name for the relation between the realm of the personal and the mechanical. These arguments have implied that there is on the one hand a relation of mutual interdependence between the two realms in question, but also, and more importantly, a priority in metaphysical significance of the personal over the mechanical realm. The justification of the term teleo-mechanical parallelism rests

69Stern, Person und Sache, vol.1, p.147. 70Ibid., p.148
on the former consideration. Stern points to an analogy between the two parallelisms which he postulated. Psycho-physical parallelism and teleo-mechanical parallelism must be conceived to be thoroughgoing. For every personal characteristic there must be a mechanical equivalent, and for every mechanical phenomenon a teleological meaning. As psycho-physical parallelism led to panpsychism, so teleo-mechanical parallelism leads to pantelism. But the difficulty with the term teleo-mechanical parallelism is that there seems to be implied an equality of value and of metaphysical significance between the personal and the mechanical realm, and that Stern denied. The term therefore, as he himself admitted, is an unfortunate one. 71 But it is not to be construed as involving him in a logical inconsistency.

Stern considered the category of "equality" to be foundational for all mechanistic thought and research. But the presupposition of the possibility of measurement and counting and of the subsumption of the individual and particular under general concepts and general laws is comparability (Vergleichbarkeit). He saw that if he could give equality a personalistic derivation an important part of his task would be accomplished, "for mechanistic theory in its entirety follows from the nature, types and limits of the principle of equality." 72 That the relation of equality, which seems at first sight to involve only two terms, is in fact always a three-termed relation becomes evident when we consider that there are in reality never two objects

71Stern, Autobiography, p. 375.

72Stern, Person und Sache, vol. 1, p. 349.
The text is not legible due to poor quality.
exactly alike. Absolute equality is a limiting concept never actually found in reality; equality is always equality in a certain respect. It is the particular function of teleo-mechanical parallelism to determine the third term in the relation of equality in respect of which the other two terms may be said to be equal.

Since Critical Personalism maintains that only Persons are ultimately real and that all phenomena are to be referred either directly or indirectly to Persons as their ground it follows that the common point of reference in the relation of equality must finally be sought in the Person. Though the Person is characterized primarily by individuality and uniqueness, yet, as unitas multiplex, it possesses, and, as self-preservative, it actively maintains its identity amid the multiplicity of its simultaneously or successively existing parts. It is this function of self-preservation of the Person which explains the phenomena of equality. "Equality is the teleo-mechanical equivalent of self-preservation: the possession and maintenance on the part of a whole of its identity with itself manifests itself in all the parts of the whole as equality."\(^3\)

Equality, however, may take either of two forms, each the teleo-mechanical equivalent of two distinct forms of identity maintained by the Person. The Person maintains both an identity of unique qualitative properties throughout a limited spatial and temporal extension and an identity of the goal toward which it strives. The former, since it involves the participation of the parts in the qualitative uniqueness of the whole, yields the

\(^3\)Stern, op. cit., p. 349.
qualitative equality exemplified in the relation of a class to its members. The latter, since it involves the common participation of the various parts and part-functions in the teleological functioning of the whole, yields the equality of service-ability toward the attainment of a goal. This is the origin of the categories of law and quantity.\textsuperscript{74}

The positive function of teleo-mechanical parallelism is exhausted in the personal derivation of the principle of equality; its negative function is the determination of the limits of this principle. The applicability of the principle of equality is limited by three personalistic factors, namely: the hierarchical arrangement, the multiplicity, and the temporal limits of Persons. Concerning these three factors Stern maintained the following:

1. The hierarchy of Persons: "The individual Person creates equality by permitting its parts either to participate in its unique nature or to contribute toward the attainment of its goals. The incomparability upon one level therefore leads to comparability upon the next lower level." "Every given equality is therefore confined to a single level of the hierarchy of unified existences; it does not signify the absence of uniqueness or differentiations, but only that the ever present uniuences and differentiations are irrelevant to the qualities and goals involved in the self-preservative functions upon that level. This leads to the teleo-mechanical concept of threshold (or limen)."

"When Fechner introduced this important concept, he understood by it the fact that certain physical differences

\textsuperscript{74}Stern, op. cit., pp.350ff.
do not appear to human perception to be differences but equalities; difference limens become for him the principle of the horizontal parallelism between the inner and the outer. But now it becomes evident that the psycho-physical fact of difference limens is only a special case of a much more inclusive cosmic fact, and that this cosmic fact is based upon the vertical parallelism of above and below: every difference between two things is subliminal in so far as it is not relevant to some definite Personal goal. Whether this goal be psychical (in accordance with the concept of threshold hitherto) . . . or physical . . . now becomes a secondary matter; the fact of thresholds is meta-psychophysical."

2. The multiplicity of Persons. "Since every equality whatsoever is related to some Personal identity which is its source there are no more and no fewer irreducible cases of equality than there are Persons."76

3. The temporal limits of Persons. "Since equalities are the emanations of Personal self-preservation functions, they exist only as long as a Person preserves itself and remain stable only as long as the activity of the Person is exhausted in self-preservation."77 Hence either of two conditions may cause the cessation of any case of equality; it ceases when the Person ceases to exist and it ceases also when the Person passes from the phase of self-preservation to that of self-development.

In view of what has preceded it will not be necessary to indicate the teleo-mechanical derivation of the category of causal law but only to present Stern's criticism of the mechanistic conception of the nature and scope of this category. This mechanistic conception may be formulated in three dogmas:

75Stern, op. cit., pp. 353, 354.
76Ibid., p. 355.
77Ibid., p. 357.
1. "There exist no other than exoteric causal relations."

2. "There exists no other form of causality than lawful causality; causal law therefore forms a cosmic net including all occurrences whatsoever without exception."

3. "Causal law is one; the multiplicity of laws is only a provisional stage arising from the imperfection of human abilities. In reality all the many laws of narrower scope are only specific cases of the most general law; in principle they must be conceived as capable of complete reduction to this latter." 78

According to Stern the falsity of the first of these dogmas follows from the fact that we find, in addition to apparently exoteric causal relations, also clear cases of immanent or esoteric causal relations, i.e., relations existing between a whole and its parts. Such esoteric causal relations are evident in all empirically determined cases of self-preservation or self-development. The contention that causal law is universally applicable to events is likewise false. It results from a neglect of the element of uniqueness in every event. While it is true that every event must have some cause, it is not true that for every event we can point to some general causal law. We may speak of causal law only in so far as there is repetition of identical causal relations. Hence causal law, though not causal determination, is excluded whenever there is a completely unique event and likewise is excluded in the case of every event whatsoever in so far as it is unique. No two events are equal in every respect, hence causal law is always only incompletely applicable. The complete causal explanation of any event demands specification as much as it does generalization; to say of any event that it "falls under" a causal law is to give only a partial and provisional causal explanation.

78 Stern, op. cit., p. 372.
of it. The refutation of the third mechanistic causal dogma is closely related to the foregoing. The insistence on the unity of all causal laws is an over-emphasis on the validity of generalization at the expense of the equally necessary specification of causal laws.79

If the teleo-mechanical argument has served its purpose the age-old dualisms between Person and Thing, between teleology and mechanism, have been overcome, and Critical Personalism has justified its claim to be a thoroughly monistic system of metaphysics. The mechanical has been shown to be nothing independent but only the reflection of the teleological—in short we have arrived at a 'pantelic' view of the world. This pantelism is not abstract and rationalistic, for it insists on the concrete individuality, and therefore irrationality, of the goals in terms of which the world must be understood. Nor is it a pantelism which asserts that the goals striven for are always actually attained. On the contrary, it recognizes to the full the occurrence of ateleological and dysteleological phenomena in the world, but those phenomena Critical Personalism is able to explain in teleological terms as due to the multiplicity of independent but intercrossing goal-strivings. Dysteleology, therefore, though it actually occurs, is to be understood as only an epiphenomenon of the teleological phenomena which form the actual driving forces of all cosmic change and activity.

79Stern, op. cit., p. 379.
Chapter IV

HUMAN PERSONALITY AND VALUE IN CRITICAL PERSONALISM

Since man constitutes that part of reality which is the bearer of the function of valuation, human personality may be said to occupy a mediating position between the realm of being and the realm of value. Hence in a philosophy which seeks to synthesize theory of being and theory of value, the conception of human personality must occupy a central place. Not only is a theory of human personality required as an integral and crucial part of a general philosophical system, it is also indispensable as the foundation of the so-called "Geisteswissenschaften," ("sciences of the mind") as well as for the practical cultural disciplines such as education, politics, religion and art.¹

The general metaphysical categories applicable to the Person as such, regardless of its level in the hierarchy, are taken over in the philosophical theory of human personality but prove to be insufficient to comprehend the wealth of more specific data which must now be considered. The primarily naturalistic point of

view of the first volume of Stern's *trilogy* must be supplemented by a point of view more interested in those meaningful relations of the human person to its environment which make of the human person a *personality*. Two new concepts, each expressing a distinct aspect of these relations, become necessary: the concepts of "convergence" and of "introception."\(^2\)

The philosophy of human personality may be divided for convenience of exposition into three parts: the doctrine of entelechy or the goal strivings of personality, the doctrine of convergence or the relations of the person to the world, and the doctrine of consciousness which is concerned with the significance of the experience of persons. This division involves an artificial separation of necessarily related phases of the total problem. But by the use of a single unifying and guiding principle throughout their discussion the worst consequences of this separation may be avoided. The category of goal-striving must serve as that principle. The doctrine of entelechy treats of the "ideal" personality, i.e., of the personality conceived apart from its relations to the world, as the center and bearer of a system of strivings. The doctrine of convergence shows how this "ideal" personality through its interactions with the world becomes a "real" personality. The doctrine of consciousness exhibits the teleological significance of conscious experience as an instrument in the service of the person.

The person, as at once the source and the end of immanent goal-striving activity, is a *causa finalis*. The concept of

causa finalis admits, however, of the distinction into causal agency and goal-directedness. The latter is logically prior in any consideration of the person because it is its immanent teleological character which distinguishes Personal from mechanical causality. The human person must, therefore, first be considered as a system of ends. The criterion of personality being self-determination, Person is distinguished from Thing by the fact that some of the goals which determine its nature and activities lie within itself. These goals, though manifold, form a single system in virtue of the fact that they may all be subsumed under a single total and dominant goal—the maintenance and actualization of a unitary personality.

The most important division of this system of personal goals has already been suggested by the use of the terms "maintenance" and "actualization" to which the goals of self-preservation and self-development correspond. It is in terms of this distinction between self-preservation as the minimal condition of Personality and self-development as its maximal goal that the concepts of a "real" and "ideals" personality may be formulated and distinguished.

"The Person is real in as far as it is actually presented in experience as the product of the convergence of its own goal-directed tendencies and the external influences; and it is this real Person which strives to maintain its real existence, which has thus arisen, in the process of self-preservation. The ideal Person on the other hand is the Person which would be correlated with the process of self-development if this process (contrary to its conception) could occur pure and unmixed, and further (equally contrary to its conception) were capable of being completed in time. Though the concept of the ideal Person as the goal which is not actually attained is primarily a negative one, it is also thoroughly positive as the concept of the constant activity of the goal; it thereby postulates
the conviction that self-development is found in the
Person not only as goal but also as urge.³

Stern summed up what is meant by the term "personality"
as distinct from Person in the statement: "When we wish to
emphasize especially the ideal factor within the Person we use
the more inclusive expression 'personality.' By personality we
mean, therefore, the Person in as far as its inner determination
shines through its real organization. The Person as compromise
is always real; the personality as ideal is never completed."⁴

According to Critical Personalism not only is the human person
a whole and an end in itself, but the world external to it like¬
wise consists of wholes which are ends in themselves. To this
system of external ends the person is so closely related that
the consideration of the system of a person's own peculiar ends
(autotelie) is only an abstraction which must be supplemented by
a consideration of the ends which are not inherent in himself
but which nevertheless play a part in the determination of his
nature and activity.

This part of the total system of personal ends is designated
by Stern as "heterotelie." They may be subdivided into three
groups: super-ordinated Personal ends (hypertelie), coordinate
Personal ends (syntelie), and super-ordinate non-Personal ends
(Sachzwecke) (ideotelie). The hypertelie consist of the goals
toward which the human person strives in virtue of the fact that
he, as an element in higher Personal unities, takes part in the

³Stern, Person und Sache, vol.11, p.20.
⁴Ibid., pp.20,21.
strivings of these super-ordinate persons toward the attainment of their own peculiar goals. "What is autotelie for family, nation, humanity, or deity becomes heterotelie for the individual." The syntelie comprise the goals of Persons external to the individual, but given in perception and on the same level with himself, i.e., his fellow men. Finally, the ideotelie are the abstract goals of man's logical, ethical, aesthetic, and religious strivings—the true, the good, the beautiful, and the holy. According to Critical Personalism these ideas and ideals possess no independent, but only a derived reality in as much as they represent consciously formulated aspects of the ends of super-human personal wholes. The manner in which a synthesis of autotelie and heterotelie may be effected so that, in spite of their apparent opposition, a unitary pattern of life—a personality—may be achieved, is "one of those ultimate mysteries which one cannot fully explain but only describe." This process of synthesis is called introception, a concept which will be discussed in more detail in another connection.

As causa finalis the human person must be considered not only as a system of ends but also as the unitary source of goal-striving activity, i.e., as causal agent. "The best expression for this unitary goal-striving causality is entelechy, an expression already used in a similar sense by Aristotle. 'Entelechy' is, therefore, the tendency and ability (Fähigkeit) of the person to actualize itself (i.e., the system of its own goals)." Like the Person itself, the personal entelechy is not a simple unity

5Stern, op. cit., p.44. 6Ibid., p.68.
but a unity-in-multiplicity. It admits of differentiation into many partial aspects or factors each corresponding to a partial goal of the total system of autotelie. These particular radiations (Teilstrahlle) of the entelechy are called "dispositions." Reference has already been made to the necessity of this concept\(^7\) as well as to the frequency of its misuse.\(^8\) The latter can be obviated only by a constant recognition of the fact that dispositions are not rigidly compartmentalized and independent powers discharging an unvarying function but only dependent and artificially isolated aspects of a single causal agent—the personal entelechy, and that these dispositions are susceptible to modification by the environment. The usual criticisms of dispositions are, therefore, based upon an unjustified identification of this concept with the old doctrine of mental faculties.

Over against that error it must be emphasized, in addition to what has been said above, that the concept of disposition is a psycho-physically neutral, i.e., a personal, one. The distinction between psychical and physical dispositions must indeed be made for methodological reasons, but it represents only a difference of emphasis. The most obvious examples of psychical dispositions subserve not only the production of purely mental phenomena and acts but of motor expressions as well. Likewise, physical dispositions have their mental as well as their purely bodily manifestations. "Dispositions . . . are possibilities in a twofold sense; as implements and as directional determinants of personal functioning. . . . Thus in every disposition there lodges

\(^7\)See Chapter III, p.68f. \(^8\)See Chapter III, p.69f.
at once potency and tendency. But according to the one perspec-
tive or the other either the potency or the tendency may be
considered the primary characteristic of a disposition; accordingly
instrumental and directional dispositions may be distinguished."

The fact that dispositions are potentialities and tendencies
which unequivocally determine explicit action only "with the cooper-
ation of external factors leads to a consideration of the external
factors which together constitute the "personal world." "In con-
trast to the cosmic world, the personal world is centered; each
person is the center of his own world. . . . All other characteris-
tics of the personal world are generated from the structural and
meaningful correspondence of the personal center with the world." 

In respect to its meaning for the person the personal world
may be distinguished into three spheres or "modalities": the bio-
sphere—the domain of vital functions; the world of consciously
experienced objects; and the introceptible world—the world of
values. The biosphere is the biological environment which man
shares with lower forms of life and which, as eliciting only man's
simplest self-preservative functions, does not give rise to the
recognition in consciousness of objects as distinct from the
subject. The recognition of an objective world depends upon
tension and dissonance in the life of the person. When the simple

9 Stern, General Psychology, p. 81.

10 This concept is described fully only in Stern's later works,
especially vol. 1 of the Studien zur Personwissenschaft entitled
"Personalistik als Wissenschaft," Leipzig: Barth, 1930; and the
General Psychology.

11 Stern, General Psychology, p. 88.

12 See Chapter III, p. 84.
harmonious conditions of the biosphere are disturbed and a struggle becomes necessary for self-preservation or for self-development. The conscious separation of objects from the subject takes place and experience arises as a means of resolving the conflict in favor of the person. The introceptible world is a purely human one; no trace of it is found in animals and plants. It presupposes the recognition of objective and intrinsic values to be incorporated into the person's own system of values by the process of introception.

Human personality, as we actually find it, is the product of the convergence of both of the factors that have been described thus far: the inner factor (entelechy) and the outer factor (the personal world). "We must neither seek to explain man solely in terms of the 'inborn' and specific qualities that he possesses at the outset, nor may we regard him merely as a passive mechanism for receiving fortuitous external influences." The inner determinants of human personality are dispositional in character, i.e., they have a range of free play, and the environmental forces, so far from being completely determinative, have rather the character of stimuli eliciting the operation of the dispositions. Hence by means of the theory of the interaction and convergence of these two groups of conditioning factors it is possible to transcend the equally one-sided points of view of nativism and empiricism.

"Every nativist conceives his main task to be to show how strong is the influence of hereditary factors in man and how little the environment is able to affect them. . . . Every empiricist isolates

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13Stern, op. cit., p.72. 14Ibid., p.81.
and unduly stresses those human phenomena which are obvious products of external pressures, and seeks, therefore, to minimize the resistance and independence of inner activities; he reduces man to a lump of wax owing its form largely to external sources. . . . " But the theory of convergence enables us to see that both heredity (Vorwelt) and environment (Umwelt) are by themselves only abstractions from the total set of conditions for the realization of the existence and the activity of human personality.

We have considered the theory of convergence only in so far as it contributes to the explanation of the development of the personality. But the interaction between the person and the world develops the latter as well as the former. Though the "commerce between person and world is so intimate that there is no separating cause from effect in any given case, . . . it is possible to distinguish two directions of activity in the person-world relation; the one is centripetal (world—person), the other centrifugal (person—world). In the first case the person is receptive and responsive in encountering the world, in the second he is seeking and giving. The person's activity is thus consummated in reactions in the former instance, in spontaneous actions in the latter." Through spontaneous activity the person exercises a determinative effect upon the world. Within narrowly circumscribed limits he is able to mold it into a "form which is appropriate to his essential nature."

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15 Stern, Person und Sache, vol.11, p.98.
16 Stern, General Psychology, p.89.
In the convergence theory the personal world is regarded as one of the conditions for human life. But the personal world is more than this; it is also part of the meaning of man's life. "The world, is so far as it embodies significant essentiality," enters into the unity of the Person's own system of ends. "The objective world-meanings, ends and values are utilized by man as factors in his own selfhood ..." "This meaningful 'intaking' of the not-self by the self is introception," a process whereby "the punctual selfhood of the human personality" expands itself into "a microcosmic self." Introception is the coalescence of the ends and values of the macrocosm with the private ends and values of the individual so that the individual becomes a focal center of the objective world of values, i.e., a microcosm.

Introception forms only one of three possible attitudes to the world of external values which together constitute a dialectical triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis:

**Thesis.** The individual seeks to overcome the opposition of autotelie and heterotelie by negating the latter in the interests of the former. All objective values are regarded as alien and menacing entities having at best only instrumental significance for the person, who assigns intrinsic value only to himself. For man this "centripetal" relation may be called ipsification

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18 Stern, *Person und Sache*, vol.11, p.56ff; vol.111, p.86ff. (In his *General Psychology*, p.439ff, Stern also uses this trichotomy as the basis of a typology of character).

19 Stern, *Person und Sache*, vol.11, p.56.
In its purely theoretical aspect Ver-Ichung takes the form of subjectivism; as practical it is egoism. But all such distinctions are secondary. Essential is only this: “that the autotelie is regarded as sovereign in respect to its claim to validity while yet in respect to its scope it is regarded as punctual." Though personality is glorified and absolutized it remains barren of all content because of its hostile attitude to the objective values which alone can give it content.

Antithesis. The opposition of autotelie and heterotelie is resolved by assigning intrinsic value only to the latter. Since he seeks to lose himself in the world as an instrument or part, the individual de-personalizes himself. This "centrifugal" relation to objective values may, therefore, in the case of man be termed de-ipsification, ("Ent-Ichung"). Like ipsification it may assume either a theoretical form—objectivism, or a practical one—altruism.

Synthesis. Through the unifying process of introception private and social ends lose their opposition; the individual affirms the intrinsic value of both autotelie and heterotelie without sacrificing either to the other, and achieves a unitary personality rich in content through the incorporation of the ends and values of his personal world with the system of his own ends and values. It is plain, however, that the goal of introception—the complete unification of autotelie and heterotelie in all

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20Stern, Person und Sache, vol.111, p.342. There seem to be no satisfactory English equivalents for Ver-Ichung, and Ent-Ichung; the renderings "ipsification" and "de-ipsification" suggested by Mrs. Langer in her translation of Stern's Selbstdarstellung are adopted here.
their fulness--can never exist as an accomplished fact but always remains only an ideal. The process of introception is, therefore, the never-ending task and struggle which constitutes man's "ideal vocation." 21

One of the most characteristic features of Critical Personalism is its relegation of the doctrine of consciousness to a place of secondary importance. In contrast to the usual view in which the essence of personality is thought to lie in its psychical character, Critical Personalism sees the essence of the psychical in its significance for the personal substrate of all psychical phenomena. Hence the discussion of the psycho-physically neutral characters of this personal substrate was logically prior to any consideration of the doctrine of consciousness.

As has already been pointed out experience 22 arises as a result of tensions and dissonances in life. But not all struggles and tensions of life come to experience. Only when the tension exceeds a certain minimum, i.e., when it crosses a threshold, do we become aware of it. There is selectivity on the basis of the personal relevance of the tensions. Hence though experience is fragmentary, this fragmentary character is again an evidence of the teleological nature of the person. The economy of experience is an economy of energy; experience is an instrument of the person


22 At the beginning of this discussion Stern uses the terms "consciousness," "the psychical" and "experience" interchangeably. Later he reserves the term "psychical" for consciousness plus the unconscious, vol.11, p.248. In the General Psychology he substitutes "experience" for "consciousness" because of the latter's intellectualistic implications. (General Psychology, p.71.)
used only when needed.\textsuperscript{23}

Consciousness is, therefore, "always the sign and the product of conflict." "The more acute the tensions, . . . the more impermanent—and hence uncertain—the objective situations under which the individual lives, the stronger is the conscious representation of his life."\textsuperscript{24} When life proceeds in a conservative and routine fashion, presenting no real problems, awareness is at a minimum. Conflict (and with it consciousness) arises especially when the individual faces a novel situation, when autotelie and heterotelie make opposing claims, or when the momentary tendencies of the person fail to harmonize with the tendencies he has built up in the past and the claims of the future.\textsuperscript{25}

The tensions between the person and his world are represented in consciousness through its separation of subject and object. This "Ur-Analysis" makes possible the dual process of objectification and subjectification, the goals of which are complete consciousness of the world and of the self respectively. Neither goal is ever fully attained. Our knowledge of the world even in its most objective forms is always subjectively colored and our knowledge of self is even more notoriously imperfect.\textsuperscript{26}

Because every experience is a reflection of some actual existent in the external world or in the person itself consciousness may be thought of as a mirror. But since consciousness is also an

\textsuperscript{23}Stern, \textit{General Psychology}, p.76. \textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p.76.

\textsuperscript{25}Stern, \textit{Person und Sache}, vol.11, p.226f.

\textsuperscript{26}Stern, \textit{op. cit.}, p.224f; \textit{General Psychology}, p.75.
instrument in the service of the person it cannot be a mere mirror reproducing self and world with unerring exactitude; rather it so modifies its objects and the relations of its objects as best to serve the person's individual goals. The purpose of consciousness is not to represent the self and the world as they are but to create the belief that it so represents them. "The 'truth' or the 'adequacy' of the contents of consciousness, i.e., its correspondence with that which it purports to represent, must be sufficient to give constant support and justification to this belief; but it may never go so far as to endanger the goals of the personal life . . ." 27

"Conscious phenomena must consequently be regarded now as approximations of reality, now as aberrations of it, i.e., as 'illusions'." But in designating the incongruences of the content of consciousness with its objects as 'illusions' we must not consider them only in their negative aspect. It must be emphasized that illusions also play a positive role in the life of the person; distortions of the objective world and of the inner picture one has of one's self are to be interpreted in terms of their teleological significance for the person.

One of the most striking illustrations of the teleological significance of illusions incident to the person's consciousness of the external world occurs in the personalistic theory of the limits and thresholds of perception. It has been determined that both the objective stimuli and the subjective contents of perception are serial in character, and that between the gradations of

27Stern, Person und Sache, vol.11, p.228.
of physical stimuli and the gradations in the content of perception there are correspondences. But these fall far short of perfect correlation. Two differences may be especially noted. In the first place, the perceptual series is much more limited in its range than is the physical series; the boundaries of the former may be called outer thresholds. But also within each range there is a difference between the two series, a difference which may roughly be expressed by saying that while the physical stimuli series is continuous the perceptual series is discrete. To a range of continuously varied stimuli only a narrowly limited number of steps in perception correspond. The smallest difference, between two stimuli, sufficient to produce a difference in perception may be designated as an inner threshold.28

The personalistic interpretation of these threshold phenomena proceeds in terms of their personal relevance. Out of the infinity of stimuli and their variations presented to him by the world the finite person can attend to only that limited part which is relevant to his own goals. Hence thresholds whether inner or outer denote selections meaningful to the person. The outer thresholds bound the stimulus area which has generic significance for the self-preservation of any species. Difference thresholds have a twofold personal significance. They serve the purpose of conserving and concentrating the energy of the person. Instead of responding to all fluctuations of stimulation in his environment the person responds to only those selected by the difference limen and concentrates his energy upon them. But the most important

28 Stern, General Psychology, p.171ff.
function of difference thresholds is that of making knowledge possible. By suppressing relatively insignificant differences it gives rise to certain constancies and equalities in experience without which the fixed objects and constant states necessary for knowledge would be impossible.  

Until the advent of modern depth psychology there was comparatively little recognition of the occurrence and much less of the teleological significance of the inadequacy and the illusory character of the consciousness of self. The contribution of depth psychology was its insistence that the essence of personality—the subconscious—is only symbolized in conscious phenomena, and that this symbolism is often for teleological reasons obscure and deceptive. Thus Freud showed that desires, considered dangerous because unconventional, are repressed and come to consciousness only in disguised forms. But depth psychology overemphasized the deceptive character of consciousness, for though consciousness is no adequate mirror of the self because it represents only that part of the self which is in conflict, it does represent this part with a fair degree of accuracy. It is only the inferior and weaker aspects of personality that are either repressed into the subconscious or appear in consciousness in a disguised or rationalized form.

The teleological significance of illusions of self-consciousness was emphasized even more by Adler than by Freud. Adler showed that the conscious representation of inferiorities of the

29 Stern, op cit., p.179ff.

30 Stern, Person und Sache, vol.11, 239f, 253ff.
person as points of superiority often led to the overcoming of the inferiority through overcompensation. There are, however, aspects of the teleological significance of illusions of self-consciousness which have not been recognized in depth psychology. These are concerned especially with the individual's experience of motivation. For one of the principal forms of self-deception consists in the conviction that one's consciously experienced motives and intentions at the time of action are the real impelling forces of the act. The real sources of activity are the goal-striving tendencies of the person which are never adequately represented in consciousness. But these tendencies are directed not only toward individual but also toward alien goals (Fremdzwecke). In order to maintain his sense of individuality the person must often deceive himself into believing that he is motivated by a tendency to achieve a private goal when in fact he is striving toward predominantly alien goals. Sexual drives, for example, are consciously represented as aiming at individual satisfaction whereas in fact they constitute tendencies of a higher Person (the species) to perpetuate and extend itself. This fact was recognized by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann when they attributed the sexual instinct to the strategy of nature. But this formulation is an exaggeration: for sexual drives do in part aim at individual satisfaction. Their illusory character consists only in a shifting of emphasis from the more important to the less important factor. Illusions as to motivation do not, therefore, always represent the person as better than he is. While the person often substitutes more worthy motives in consciousness for the less worthy motives which are actually operative, he may also experience altruistic
drives as egoistic because only thus can he maintain his individuality over against the overwhelming claims of non-individual goals. This self-deception is the source of all purely egoistic interpretations of human nature and of the pessimism which may be based upon them.  

It is plain from the foregoing that so far from being a purely theoretical observer interested only in the objective character of himself and the world, man is in the first place an active and struggling being. Hence the question of paramount importance for man is that of the significance of reality for his own life. The ego-centric and practical activity of determining this significance is called 'valuing,' the sum total of the convictions resulting from this process a view of life or, in its critical and reflective form, a philosophy of value.

Philosophy of value is concerned both with valuing and with the objects of this process—the values themselves. The necessary connection between the subjective and the objective pole of the sphere of value is expressed in the proposition which forms the a priori of all value theory: "I believe in objective values."  

The act of valuing is subjective; the values themselves are objective, and together they constitute the fundamental categories of the philosophy of value each of which must now be developed in some detail. For the subjective pole of the sphere of value the value-theoretical a priori assumes the form: 'I value, therefore I am.' Over against the intellectualism of

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31 Stern, op. cit., p.256ff.

32 Stern, Person und Sache, vol.111, p.34.
Descartes, it must be maintained that the ego's conviction of its own existence does not depend upon theoretical thinking but rather upon its "ability and urge to posit, recognize and create values. Through its belief in values the self ... assigns meaning to itself in a meaningful universe, in short posits itself. Therein is implied that the self which values, values also itself; ... 'I value, therefore I am--value!'" 33

The nature of the act of valuing may be explicated in part through a determination of its relation to the act of knowing. These two functions maintain a relative autonomy since science is not directly concerned with value nor practical valuation with matter of fact. Ideally theoretical knowledge is purely objective while valuing is characterized by a subjective point of view in which the ego posits itself as the center of a value-cosmos. 34

But though valuing and knowing are distinguishable functions they are nevertheless closely related. Their common pre-supposition is the metaphysical faith that science and value theory deal with the same reality, 35 though from different points of view. According to this metaphysical faith, which can be justified only by its necessity, 36 the objects of valuing are the same realities whose existence and objective nature is determined by scientific investigation. Value is therefore an attributive concept; it is being considered from the point of view of its significance. 37

Because theoretical knowledge and practical valuing have the same reality as their object they cannot be completely isolated

33Stern, op. cit., p.34f. 34Ibid., p.35
35Ibid., p.25. 36Ibid., p.28f. 37Ibid., p.41.
but must be recognized to exercise a mutual influence upon each other. Not only do our practical evaluations depend at least in part upon our intellectual convictions, but on the other hand our selections of problems for intellectual consideration depend upon judgments as to their practical significance, and likewise our solutions of these problems are never wholly disinterested but influenced by evaluative factors throughout. 33

The subsidiary functions involved in valuing may be classified into the acts of positing values (Wertsetzungen) and the acts of comparing values (Wertschatzungen). 39 The logically prior acts of Wertsetzung include the simple apprehension (Erfassen) of values, the recognition (Anerkennen) or their claims upon the subject, and the active production of objects of valuing—works of art, etc. Only upon the basis of this absolute positing of values do the secondary functions of comparing values become possible. These functions include: the distinction of qualities of values into aesthetic, ethical and similar categories (Wertqualifikation); and the distinctions of more, less, or equally valuable (Wertquantification); and which by the combination of these distinctions yielding the alternatives good and bad for ethics, beautiful and ugly for aesthetics, etc. (Wertpolarization).

For the objective pole of the value-sphere the a priori of value theory is: "There are values." The concept of value is not definable in terms of more ultimate concepts because it is itself

33 Stern, Vorgedanken zur Weltanschauung; Leipzig: Barth, 1915, pp.24ff.

an ultimate. But, as we have seen, it is possible to describe value indirectly in terms of the significance any entity may possess. It is implied that value is an attributive and not a substantial concept and consequently that every value requires a substrate or bearer (Wertträger). "Strictly one cannot say: 'This or that is a value,' but 'It has value or is valuable!'"

Since significance is always significance for something, the description of value in terms of significance implies also that value is a relational concept. Hence every value requires not only a substrate in which it may inhere but also a goal to which it must refer. Every bearer of values demands a goal (Wertziel) as the condition of its significance (value). But a goal cannot accord value to a bearer unless it itself also has value, for nothing can acquire significance through its meaning for something insignificant. It follows that value-goals must at the same time be value-bearers. In order, then, to escape an infinite regress it must be the case that there are entities whose significance (value) is not conditioned by an external goal, but is a significance for itself. These entities in which the relation of significance is an immanent one, because their value goals are included in themselves, may be said to possess intrinsic value (Selbstwert); those entities whose value-goals lie outside themselves possess derivative or dependent but not necessarily purely instrumental value (Dienstwert).

But "between the intrinsic and these purely extrinsic values we ... discern those values which--without being ends in

40 Stern, op. cit., p. 41.  
41 Ibid., p. 42f.
themselves—are participant in such ends, certain aspects or phases, external or internal renderings of intrinsic values. . . . Thus arises the significance of membership and of symbolism—which type of meaning is designated as 'radiative value' (Strahlwert)." 42 The explicit recognition of this mediating concept is one of the most original contributions of Critical Personalism's value theory. "It has always appeared as something of a falsification to ask, a propos of certain value phenomena, merely whether they were to be regarded as values in themselves, or as instrumental values for extraneous purposes." The discovery that between the poles of 'value in itself' and 'value for something else' there is also the possibility of 'value in something else' assigns the logical place to many value phenomena. 43

We arrive therefore at a tripartite classification of values into: intrinsic, radiative and instrumental. In this classification, which is determined by metaphysical categories, Critical Personalism departs from the usual procedure in recent value philosophy in which the realms of value are derived from the corresponding realms of human culture. In Critical Personalism "value philosophy is fundamentally neither anthropology nor philosophy of culture—but rather metaphysics. The category of value extends far beyond the narrow limits of humanity—even though it develops its complete fulness and scope only in its application to the human and cultural spheres." 44

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43 Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 384; and *Person und Sache*, vol. 111, p. 45.
The necessary assumption of every metaphysical conception of value theory is that its central category— intrinsic value—is inseparably connected with that of genuine reality. For "to be intrinsically valuable means to posses significance-for-self; but only that can possess significance-for-self which possesses independent reality." For Critical Personalism this means that:

"Only Persons have intrinsic value, and all Persons have intrinsic value."45

From the fact that Critical Personalism maintains every bearer of intrinsic value to be a concrete Person it follows that it must reject any conception of intrinsic value as identical with or ultimately inhering in abstract ideas, e.g., the good, the true or the beautiful. Critical Personalism rejects the abstract idealism, represented by Plato, both as ontology and as value theory. The concept of abstract being is self-contradictory; real being can be conceived only as active being, but only that can be active which is a concrete source of activity, i.e., an individual.46 Hence also an abstract idea cannot autonomously exercise the function of making a demand upon us, and therefore abstract ideas in themselves lack the essential normative character of intrinsic values.47 Positively, Critical Personalism is a system in which abstract ideas are recognized to possess value only as participant in or symbolical of some concrete whole. Abstract

45 Stern, op. cit., p.65.

46 See the categorial theory of Critical Personalism. (Chapter III, p.44ff)

ideas are therefore to be classified as radiative and not as intrinsic values.

Because the bearers of intrinsic value are personal wholes the hierarchy of intrinsic values parallels the hierarchy of Persons, and is determined by the same method in which the hierarchy of Persons was determined— the method of hypostasis according to certain fixed criteria. The actual task of determining the various stages in this hierarchy has only been begun and its results, appearing only in outline form, remain subject to correction by further scientific investigation. But "already the human individual personality, and the super-individual personalistic unities of the family, the nation, humanity, are definitely emerging . . . as genuine unities capable of self-determination, and therefore as intrinsic values." In accordance with its personal pantheism, Critical Personalism accepts, as the upper limit of the hierarchy of intrinsic values, the existence of a divine All-Person.49

But here we must admit the empirical necessity of recognizing two modifications of the hierarchy of Persons, and therefore of the hierarchy of intrinsic values, which cause it to lose much of its original neatness and clarity. The first may be called 'the principle of interpenetration,' according to which the next higher stage in the hierarchy may be ambiguous; e.g., when two individuals found a family they still remain members of their original families. The second modification of the hierarchy

48 See Chapter III, pp. 50, 51.

results from the recognition of the existence of quasi-personal entities ('personoide Gebilde') which appear to be intermediate between Persons and things. Among them are such forms as organs of the human body which exhibit a relative unity of function and a relative self-determination. They are, however, not true Persons because their unitary functioning subserves not their own self-preservation but that of the organism of which they form a part. Other quasi-personal entities are cultural institutions and certain human productions such as works of art which are often mistakenly hypostatized as intrinsic values. But there are also quasi-personal entities such as colonies sent out by a mother country which are embryonal personal forms capable of developing into genuine Persons.50

As a unity-in-multiplicity every Person includes parts which are co-bearers (Mittrager) and partial emanations (Teilstrahle) of its unique intrinsic value. We have already designated them as radiative values. Through its many partial manifestations in radiative values the intrinsic value of a Person is not broken up into parts but only represented as a whole with different emphases. In every radiative value, therefore, two aspects may be distinguished. In so far as its partial character is emphasized it is participation value (Anteilswert); in so far as it is regarded as representative of the unitary intrinsic value of a Person it is symbolic value.51

Participation values are exemplified by the health, disposition, intelligence and work, of an individual person, by the arrangement

50Stern, Person und Sache, vol.111, pp.100ff.  51Ibid., pp.126f.
of his home, etc. Each of these derives its value only from the fact that it constitutes an essential aspect of the indivisible intrinsic unity of some personality. Similarly various phases of culture, periods of historical development or types of occupation represent values participating in the intrinsic value of humanity or a people. Because of their difference from intrinsic values, participation values are often confused with purely extrinsic values, and, as a matter of fact, the same entity may possess both types of value, but they can always be distinguished. Thus a Gothic cathedral possesses religious, aesthetic, and cultural values, all of which are participation values, and at the same time it serves a useful function as a church building and as a means of developing ecclesiastical power.

Symbolic values are those values which attach to an entity in virtue of the fact that they signify and reveal the intrinsic value of some other entity. Thus a flag, a ritual act, a painting, or a spoken word are not in themselves intrinsic values because they, as symbols, are distinct from that which they symbolize. These radiative values do, however, possess more that the merely instrumental value of an arbitrary symptom which could be replaced by any other. Their relation to the intrinsic value which they symbolize is so close that it may be described as "a kind of metaphysical identity." And yet this identity is only an identity of meaning, not of existence. This double character of symbolic values eludes rational explanation and can be grasped only by

52 Stern, op. cit., pp.127f.  
53 Ibid., p.128.
Since the psycho-physically neutral Person manifests itself both outwardly in objective appearances and inwardly in psychical phenomena, there is a corresponding classification of radiative values into objective and subjective or psychical types. (Ausdruckswerte and Psychische Werte). The former include: the expressive value of various physical characteristics for the human individual; language, customs, and political organization for a people; and the existence of culture for humanity as a whole. Similarly the objective forms of subhuman Persons is revelatory of their nature and their place in the personal hierarchy.\textsuperscript{55}

The significance of conscious phenomena has already been discussed in this chapter. These phenomena were found to have not only instrumental but also expressive or radiative value since they serve to reveal to the person characteristics of himself and of the world. Experience, through its subjectivating and objectivating functions, was found to give rise to knowledge. The radiative value of the content of knowledge lies in its truth, i.e., the adequacy with which it represents its objects; while the radiative value of the act of knowing consists of its revelation of the nature and circumstances of its subject. Truth is, therefore, neither an intrinsic value as abstract idealism would have us believe, nor, versus pragmatism is it merely instrumental; but it is intermediate between the two—a radiative value.\textsuperscript{56}

It is possible also to classify radiative values into those

\textsuperscript{54}Stern, op. cit., pp.129f.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., Chapter VII.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., pp.227ff.
which are expressions of the personal tendency toward self-preservation and those which manifest the Person's striving for self-development. The former may be called conservative the latter progressive values.\textsuperscript{57} Conservative values characterize all such phenomena as memory, habit, and heredity which are phases of the Person's endeavor to maintain its existence, its unique qualitative character, and whatever degree of successful adaptation to its environment it may have achieved.\textsuperscript{58} Progressive values attach to all phases, whether physical or psychical, of the increased realization of the potentialities of any Person on any level of the personal hierarchy. Hence here are included the values of: physical growth for individual plants, animals and men; phylogenetical development of intelligence in biological species; the numerical, cultural or technical advances of a people or of humanity, and countless others.\textsuperscript{59}

The values of history also are radiative for they represent a synthesis of the conservative and progressive values of a superindividual human Person. The history of any such Person is necessarily a manifestation of its self-maintenance and its self-development alike. Those peoples which merely maintain themselves at a definite level have no history; and if it were possible for any people to exhibit only self-development, the resultant perpetual succession of different phases would likewise fail to constitute a true history. Genuine history, and thereby genuine historical value, arises only when a Person is able both to

\textsuperscript{57}Stern, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.140f.
\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., pp.248ff.
\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., pp.256ff.
incorporate into its own being and to maintain the gains resulting from its self-developmental strivings.  

The chief task of personalistic value theory in respect to instrumental values is to assign them their proper place in the total system of values. Here it must be pointed out that the theoretical classification of values as intrinsic, radiative or instrumental does not imply that the actual value (significance) of every entity can be unambiguously and exhaustively placed in some one of these conceptual categories. This classification is rather to be regarded as a methodological device whose rigid and thoroughgoing application in the manner indicated inevitably results in an over-simplification of the objective value situation. Objective values, as distinct from value categories, form a bi-polar meaning series with an infinite number of gradations ranging from absolute intrinsic to absolute extrinsic or instrumental value.

Anything possesses instrumental value in so far as it is characterized by the potentiality for serving the ends of some entity other than itself. Thus wealth, recreation, techniques, food, clothing, buildings, etc., possess predominantly instrumental value because their significance lies primarily in the service they are capable of rendering toward the achievement of the goals of human individuals or communities. The ends for which

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60Stern, op. cit., Chapter II, especially p. 275.

61Ibid., pp. 303ff and 307ff; Autobiography, pp. 384f.


instrumental values are serviceable are not to be identified, however, with human ends alone, for, though these possess the greatest practical interest for the value philosopher, it must be recognized that the ends of any Person at any level of the hierarchy may constitute the objects in reference to which some other entity may be said to possess instrumental value.

Even Persons may possess instrumental value in addition to their intrinsic significance. This is especially clear in the case of sub-human Persons, e.g., animals or plants, out it is likewise true of human individuals and super-individual human Persons such as a family or a state. In so far as these are regarded from the point of view of the service they are capable of rendering they are valued as instruments, i.e., as Things rather than as intrinsically valuable Persons. This attitude has previously been described as ipsification.

The practical applicability of Critical Personalism's value theory is demonstrated by its implications for a theory of living in accordance with values. Personalistic ethics takes its origin from and is formulated in terms of the concept of introception. As a task that is never fully accomplished introception "is always seeking fulfilment. Thus it becomes normative for the formation of human life." The ethical imperative cannot be understood individualistically: "Live out thy life," for this ipsification would ignore the objective values. The imperative cannot be stated simply universalistically: "Subject thyself to the general

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64 Stern, op. cit., pp.315, 88.
65 See above, Chapter IV, pp.94, 95.
ethical law," for that would be de-ipsification, denial of the uniqueness and therewith of the unique task of every personality. "It can only be: 'Introcept!' or: 'Mould thy ego microcosmically into a personality, in that thou raisest all service to the non-ego values to essential traits of thy individual intrinsic value.'" 66

This recognition of introception as a demand made upon the individual and not merely a factual process is the indispensable condition of all morality. 67 But the moral life is not to be taken in a narrow sense as equated with practical and objectively observable conduct. Since introception includes loving and understanding, aesthetic appreciation and worshipping as well as practical activity in relation to values, 68 an ethical imperative based upon it does not confine its demands to matters of overt conduct alone but also includes these non-practical attitudes in relation to objective values. Hence for the Kantian categorical imperative: "Act in such a manner that . . .," we must substitute the demand: "So live that . . .," or: "Organize your life so that . . .." 69 In this form, however, introception presents a purely formal demand. It can receive the necessary unique and concrete content for every individual person only from the individual's unique 'metaphysical situation' as the center of his own value cosmos. Each person has a unique station in life in accordance with which the demands made upon him to incorporate

68 Ibid., Chapter XIV.
69 Ibid., pp.411, 412.
objective values into his private system of values assume a particularized form. "Thus the content-giving imperative is: 'Live up to thy vocation.'"  

The sections of morality, therefore, cannot be derived either from the nature of the individual alone nor only from the general system of values objective to him. The possibility of a unique system of duties for each individual depends both upon the peculiar structure of the world of values centered about the individual and upon his abilities to realize and to assimilate these values into his own personality. Only those tasks become duties for an individual which are at once presented to him by his environment and for the performance of which he possess the appropriate abilities.  

71 Moral living demands the voluntary acceptance of abilities for the realization of values as moral tasks (Gaben sind Aufgaben). Moral tasks are, therefore, externally imposed but nevertheless not alien and arbitrary demands. Their fulfillment serves both the best interests of the individual as a total personality and those of the world in which he lives.

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Chapter V
KOHNSTAMM'S BIBLICAL PERSONALISM
PHILOSOPHICALLY STATED

As has been already indicated in our introductory chapter Professor Kohnstamm has expressed the intention of publishing further volumes devoted to special fields of philosophy in which he will expound his views more technically and in more detail than he has done in the works he has so far published. Already, however, he has deliberately adopted the designation "Biblical Personalism" and in his writings so far available, the fundamentals of his philosophy are expressed, though frequently in a popular rather than in a technical form. His interest is predominantly in stating and defending a particular philosophy of life, which he considers to be the Christian view, in contrast with proposed alternatives. In spite of his verbose and rather didactic and propagandist literary style his endeavour is to give a genuinely philosophical exposition.

The great diversity of world-views is obvious to the student of the history of philosophy. Kohnstamm considers it to be almost equally obvious that this diversity of world-views is not due to
different thinkers employing different logics. It is precisely their agreement as to logical validity which has made comparison, criticism, and indeed, all communication between philosophers possible. The diversity of their systems arises because they reason similarly from different starting points.

"There is more than one logically incompatible, scientifically irrefragable world-view. The degree of scientific character of a world view depends only on the severity with which one or the other series of judgments is completely axiomatized, that is, on the extent to which the coherence of the propositions with each other and with the fundamental axioms is impeccably formulated. The acceptance of a basis, i.e., the choice of one axiom set from the many which include no contradictions and are therefore logically tenable, is not a matter of logical but of supra-logical character. Through argumentation I can persuade no one to forsake his basis, though I may bring him to relinquish a proposition which does not logically agree with this basis."¹

In every branch of knowledge there is both that which is demonstrable and that which is undemonstrable. Mathematics is the usual model for demonstrable truth because it is regarded as concerned with constructions of the human mind. It is contrasted with the empirical sciences which depend on given facts. Even mathematics, as for example the non-Euclidean geometries, proceeds from axioms, i.e., from undemonstrable propositions. What is necessarily true or demonstrable in mathematics is only the argument or superstructure built upon the undemonstrable axiomatic basis. Essentially the same situation prevails in sciences other than mathematics. Only the ratio of undemonstrable to demonstrable truth differs; the former is greater, the latter less.

¹Philipp Kohnstamm, Schepper en Scheppen (Creator and Creation), vol.11, Persoonlijkheid in Wordings (The Development of Personality), Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink and Zoon, 1929.
The degree of demonstrability of a science depends upon the degree of its axiomatization; the more thoroughly it is axiomatized, the more technical and "formally-logical" and therefore the more demonstrable it becomes or rather the more it includes demonstrable regions. This applies also to philosophy as a branch of knowledge. "Exactly the same thing is true of the field of philosophy and religion, of world-and-life view and of all matters related to these. Also there one meets with regions of demonstrable truth, and there too they are the more numerous and extensive the more the field in question is scientifically elaborated, the more it is axiomatized."  

Every set of axioms basic to a world-view is an hypothesis, i.e., it is not self-evident (except to the philosopher who accepts it) but is supra-logical in character. Its truth is not capable of purely logical refutation. All that can be done is to question the adequacy or the completeness of the axiomatization of any world-view, and the compatibility of its various axioms. It might be shown that a given world-view is based on axioms besides those explicitly acknowledged and formulated. It might also in some instances be shown that if one (or more) axioms of the set be accepted, one or more of the other axioms of the set must be rejected: that is, they are not consistent among themselves. But when we speak of the conscious formulation of a set of axioms, as over against the subconscious choice of individual axioms merely felt to belong together, we are no longer dealing with the basis

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of a world-view but with the superstructure which has been erected upon it. This superstructure is subject to logical examination to discover its consonance with the set of axioms upon which it is based, as well as to determine its internal coherence.

The grounds on which a particular set of axioms basic to a world-view is accepted are a-theoretical, dependent upon fundamental personal attitudes and evaluations, a matter of faith. Different people react in uniquely different ways to the same facts. "Imagine two persons, of which the one greets every opposition and every difficulty as an opportunity to unfold his activity and show his power. While the other one is, by the same outward circumstances, filled with terror or grief. It is plain that the one must arrive at an extremely optimistic, the other at an equally pessimistic world-view . . ." In these matters of "life-attitude" argumentation is of no avail. "A change in world-view in the sense of a change of axiomatic basis is always the result of experiences which strike the personality much deeper (than does argumentation), which so alter the life-experiences that the old theory proves no longer to fit with the new facts of the emotional life . . ." 

The knowledge embodied in such axioms is intuitive, a matter of direct experience; it is knowledge by acquaintance not knowledge

3 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.11, p.xiii.

4 Ibid., vol.1, p.91.

5 The words within the parenthesis are my own.

6 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.11, p.93.
by description. In contrast to abstract scientific knowledge it is inarticulate, only inadequately expressible in language.

"It is knowledge for which the appropriate form must still be found in order that it may become full, i.e., completed knowledge. And this appropriate form is the word. . . . Adequate knowledge, of which I can give an account to others, which I can defend against objections, which is proof against the refining fire of criticism, and hence can ever anew increase in certitude and also can convince others, authoritative knowledge therefore, demands as its form thought, i.e., the concept and the word." 

Though such intuitive knowledge is in itself incomplete, it is nevertheless a genuine constituent of adequate knowledge. "Intuitive knowledge is the necessary condition and presupposition of abstract knowledge. Abstract knowledge which is not based on intuition on 'perception' is not knowledge at all." It is true not only that percepts without concepts are blind, but also that concepts without percepts are empty. The intuitive knowledge on which a world-view is based is the content which in its developed form it seeks to express in appropriate conceptual and linguistic terms, though it can never do so without remainder.

The experiential ground and content of every world-view is supra-theoretical, i.e., inexpressible in theoretical terms, precisely because it is in the first place an experience of values. When we consider our experience of the highest values the question arises: "Is there not, in addition to the intuitive knowledge which has not yet attained to the level of language, also another

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7 Kohnstamm speaks of it as "kennen" as contrasted with "weten." Cf. the German "kennen" and "wissen."


9 Ibid., p.305.
which is above this level, at any rate beyond scientific language which expresses itself in judgment and in argument?"\textsuperscript{10} An affirmative answer to this question seems to be implied by such phenomena as the frequent recourse of Plato to myth and poetry when he is struggling to express his experience of the highest values. In this realm the artist possesses a more expressive language than does the man of science. "In beauty, in love, in conscience we encounter the ineffable as undeniable Truth."\textsuperscript{11} Man's attitudes to the Absolute, to the whole of reality, may be classified into four main types:\textsuperscript{12} as aesthetic, intellectual, ethical, or religious. Each is essentially an attitude of evaluation. Even where man's attitude is primarily intellectual it is motivated by an evaluation. The world is regarded as a dangerous or even hostile power, and an attempt is made "to break the dominance of the universe by means of the intrinsic power of thought."\textsuperscript{13}

As a result of the presence within every actual metaphysical system of both an intuitive valuational, and therefore supra-logical element, and also an element of formal abstract truth, the question as to the possibility of a scientific metaphysics has arisen. "The relation between theoretical and supra-theoretical value, between science and World-view,\textsuperscript{14} is a highly complicated one, and it need not surprise us that on the one hand it has been said to be the foremost task of philosophy to develop a scientific World-view, while on the other hand it has been

\textsuperscript{10}Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.320. \hfill \textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, p.323.
\hfill \textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, p.401.
\hfill \textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, p.405.
\textsuperscript{14}In the narrow sense of axiomatic basis.
maintained on apparently convincing grounds that a scientific World-view is a contradictio in terminis."¹⁵ "If one understands by a 'scientific World-view,' one which admits as valid only that which is demonstrable, then indeed this term has no meaning. For that would be the practice of science accompanied by the denial of the fundamental faith upon which all demonstrability is based."¹⁶ But if one understands by a scientific metaphysics one which is capable of defense provided its pre-theoretical ground is accepted, then this term not only is meaningful but both the possibility and even the fact of its actualization must be admitted.

Because of this provision which we were forced to make, it is plain that the possibility of metaphysics as absolute truth about reality is not guaranteed. For the crucial question arises as to the metaphysical significance or validity of the various intuitive and evaluational bases of the various metaphysical systems. The diversity of fundamental attitudes to the world has itself been explained in widely different ways. Positivism chooses the easiest way out of the difficulty. It simply declares all differences of attitude to reality to be matters of purely subjective opinion and to have no significance for objective truth which itself excludes all value judgments. Nevertheless, the data which positivism thus excludes from the realm of truth remain indubitable facts to the unprejudiced observer. "Positivism, which declares all these other convictions to be invalid because they include value judgments, forgets that its own judgment is

also based on a value judgment. This positivistic argument is therefore suicidal like the statement about the Cretan who always spoke falsely.  

If, then, we admit the conflict of fundamental attitudes to have some significance, it may be explained in at least four different ways:

1. Reality may be characterized as essentially divided against itself so that "the conflict of all against all" is grounded in the very nature of the universe. "On this supposition there is neither common human truth nor absolute Truth."

2. Conflict may be considered to be an "ethical category," characteristic of man's existence. Men are inevitably in conflict with each other, and only thus do they rise above the level of nature. "Every man has a definite duty, his duty; that duty brings him into conflict with others." There is no common human truth; whether or not there is absolute truth is unknown, but even if there is every man must approach it in his own way.

3. Conflict may be thought of as an illusion—as a veil of Maya. In reality there is only peace and unity. On this standpoint man's duty is to rid himself of the illusion of multiplicity and conflict, but this certainty is the limit of common human truth. Reality itself is beyond truth.

4. "Finally there is the possibility that conflict may not belong to the essence of the highest reality, while plurality does. The highest Being then is Harmony and Love, and conflict may come to an end without the loss of plurality. There is therefore both Absolute Harmony and Absolute Truth, there is a Plurality which has a center, which is ordered about a center. Then it remains very well possible that the limit of the system of truth of one finite subject is different from that of another, that differences in evaluation and in perception remain, but between these finite subjects there is not war but

17Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.92.

18Kohnstamm enumerates five but immediately rejects the first, mechanical determination, a rejection which is based on his elaborate argument against all such mechanical determination in a later chapter.

19Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.100.
peace. Conflict is by no means excluded, provided it is competitive conflict, provided no one desires to deprive the other of what is his own and provided the fact of private possession by the one is not in conflict with the fact of private possession by the other. Provided therefore that admiration rather than envy prevails. . . . Hence it is conceivable, even though this is fundamentally different from the empirical world, that there should be a realm in which Order and Harmony rule, and in which finite subjects can participate so that each one sees a part, but contradiction is nowhere found. Then there is absolute Truth, but it is not for finite subjects, for them there is partial truth, which is pluriform, different and unique for every individual subject."20

The position that reality is essentially divided against itself makes common human truth, and a fortiori absolute truth, impossible. The second position, viz., that conflict is characteristic of the human realm, denies the possibility of common human validity while it is agnostic as to absolute truth. Someone may be in possession of absolute truth about reality, but if so all other men are at variance with him about it, and hence it can never become generally recognized as absolute truth. This too makes metaphysics as a science impossible. The third view, that conflict of axiomatic basis is an illusion, also denies the possibility of metaphysics. Though there is a single reality we can say nothing about it, i.e., we have no knowledge of it. Kohnstamm maintains that the fourth view alone is finally satisfactory because it alone permits us to regard metaphysics as more than subjective construction, i.e., it alone makes genuine metaphysics possible. Our knowledge of reality in order to be genuine metaphysical knowledge must have not only common human validity but must be valid universally, i.e., absolutely true.

All these views, therefore, except the last are essentially self-contradictory, for they all make absolute metaphysical statements while denying the possibility of such statements. But since it is impossible to avoid making metaphysical statements, we should make only such metaphysical statements as are in harmony with the fact of their inevitability. Absolute metaphysical truth exists because in our very attempt to deny it, we affirm it. Yet there is no system of philosophy in which this absolute metaphysical truth is completely embodied even in outline. Every system of metaphysics embodies only a part or aspect of the truth about reality. Yet this part is a genuine part, and the various parts are to be regarded as supplementing each other. All are approximations from different directions. There is a "multitude of roads" to truth, each from a concrete personal situation. The system of truth is, therefore, not a monistic unity but a poly-unity.

As it has been maintained above, the pre-theoretical intuitive insights into the nature of the world are primarily value judgments. On the view that these judgments supplement each other and converge upon a single system of truth, there must be a system of such value judgments which is valid for all men.

"Even on this supposition contradiction between human conviction is excluded only if there be a Revelation of the highest Harmony of such a nature that every one who will listen and submit himself to the Authority of this Revelation will find the same source of knowledge. Just as in the realm of determinable truth one bows before the power of facts so also in the realm of norms one must bow before the authority of these norms. And these must have a structure

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21 Kohnstamm, "Types and Meanings of Personalism," The Person-
list, vol.18, no.2.
such that there is a final and highest Norm which in all cases of contradiction is decisive and before which all will finally bow."22

The important question arises as to the character of this final and authoritative norm. Because it has final authority it cannot be a "word-structure" or a "doctrine." For if it were this it would still be general and ambiguous, and would stand in need of interpretation by a higher authority; conflict would still be possible. "If there is to be a highest Norm, then, which speaks to all men in a language understandable to them, then this highest norm must be not a word or a thought or a doctrine, but a Reality . . . the highest Norm must itself be able to resolve all doubt, to take away all lack of clarity, it must be able to speak to each man in his own language, that is to say therefore: it must be a Person." "What He says to each, will then be interpreted by the different hearers each in his own language. All then mean the same, viz., to obey Him, but they all express themselves differently because they are different. But thereby they do not fall into contradictions or into conflicts among themselves. For their 'direct limit' is different for each (a different place in God), but all these limits are, as taken up in a God of Harmony and Love, not contradictory."23

Admittedly this conclusion raises problems of the greatest difficulty. It would seem that differences of time alone would render the idea of one and the same person speaking to all men

22Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.1, 102.

23Ibid., p.103.
with absolute authority an inconceivable one. Yet, if the foregoing argument is correct, the possibility of Absolute and common human truth stands or falls with this idea. One's point of view on this problem obviously depends upon one's view of God. Here it is sufficient to point out that according to Kohnstamm the very consideration of the nature of metaphysics suggests a definite position in metaphysics, viz., a theistic and personalistic one.

Typology of World-Views

Kohnstamm suggests that to deal scientifically with questions of world-view, we must in practice assume that there is not an unmanageable number of 'world-views,' but that all may be subsumed under a limited number of types. The natural scientist similarly assumes "as a conditio sine qua non of his science that he may neglect the individual differences between particular examples of the same class (whether this be a class of atoms, minerals, plants, or animals). In this sense every branch of philosophy, . . . proceeds by generalization, provided we understand by generalization not only the quantifying form which seeks to determine laws, but also the morphological form of scientific work which seeks to establish types." This task of the formulation of types was definitely taken up only in the twentieth century. It was not until the nineteenth century that there appeared any understanding of the multiplicity of systems appearing in history. Up to that time the history of philosophy was thought of only as an account of the curious

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aberrations of previous philosophers or an account of the way in which previous philosophy prepared the way for some particular modern philosopher's own system. The historical investigation of the nineteenth century taught men for the first time to occupy themselves with the thought of the past for the sake of its own inherent values.

The problem of the typology of world-views was first formulated and tentatively answered by Dilthey in the form of the question: "How many types of world-view must be distinguished in European philosophy since the Renaissance?" The problem was further elaborated by Dilthey and his school in a series of publications. Their surprisingly simple conclusion was that the great variety of technically and artistically expressed world-views could be classified into three types:

1. **Positivistic systems**—including those of Democritus, Epicurus, Hobbes, the Encyclopaedists, Comte, Mill and Spencer—which are all primarily intellectualistic in attitude.

2. **Objective idealistic systems**—including those of Heraclitus, the Stoics, Spinoza, Leibniz, Shaftesbury, Goethe, Schelling, Schleiermacher and Hegel—which are dominated by feeling.

3. **Subjective idealistic systems**—including those of Plato, the Church Fathers, the Scholastics, the Reformation thinkers, Kant, Fichte and Schiller—which are predominantly voluntaristic.\(^25\)

While admitting that Dilthey's typology opens up interesting perspectives as yet ignored by many philosophers, and though it embodies an element of truth, Kohnstamm considers it greatly in

\(^{25}\)Kohnstamm, *op. cit.*, pp. 94f.
need of refinement and elaboration. As it stands it places in the same class such fundamentally opposed views of the world as Christianity and Platonism or Christianity and the philosophy of Fichte. Certain philosophies, e.g., Schopenhauer's are unclassifiable in this scheme, for on the one hand Schopenhauer is a voluntarist belonging therefore with the subjective idealists, but on the other hand he takes also the radically different point of view characteristic of Indian thought. Indeed, in Dilthey's scheme there is no place for either Indian or Jewish spiritual life. But Kohnstamm considers Dilthey's disciple Spranger to have made a step backward rather than forward in his view of six "types of life" (Lebensformen)—the economic, social, political, scientific, aesthetic and religious. He maintains that these terms refer to realms of value having "meaning for every man and for every world-view." He raises the question of "the reciprocal relations of these ends, i.e., as to a higher point of view which will permit coordination."  

In a work entitled Herrschen und Lieben als Grundmotive der philosophischen Weltanschauungen, (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1925), Dr. A. A. Grünbaum took the position that the most fundamental distinguishing characteristic of a world-view is to be sought in the kind of relation in which it represents the ego to stand toward the whole of reality. The ego may see the world either as an object to be subjected to its will, or as an object of love and

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26 Kohnstamm, op. cit., pp.95ff.

service. Its attitude may be characterized either as a determination to dominate or as one of loving contemplation. This opposition of "domination" (Herrschen) and "love" (Lieben) is not to be confused with the distinction between the attitudes of science and religion. The fundamental attitudes described by Grünbaum determine one's position in every sphere of life. One may and does carry on scientific work from the standpoint of domination as well as from that of love, but with an important difference in the two cases. Those who carry on scientific work from the former standpoint impose the categories of the ego upon reality. Reality is conceived as amenable to scientific treatment without remainder. Anything in experience which resists such treatment is ruled out as unreal; only that which fits into the preconceived schema is admitted. But those who carry on scientific work from the standpoint of love, realize even in the search for truth that reality is infinitely greater than the ego. Their attitude is one of awe and admiration. There is an attempt to become aware of the infinite multiplicity and variety in reality without any attempt to reduce this in conformity with the ready-made categories of the ego. There is an appreciation of the irrational and the mysterious, and of the intrinsic limits of all science. Though scientific endeavour is possible from either standpoint, this is not true for religious life. The standpoint of domination is diametrically opposed to the religious attitude which is essentially one of awe and reverence. 28

28 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol. 11, pp. 96f.
The greater depth and power of Grünbaum's conception as compared with that of Dilthey lies in the fact that whereas Dilthey's typology is roughly coincident with a distinction of the psychical faculties; intellect, feeling and will, Grünbaum's distinction lies on the higher, peculiarly spiritual, level where the most fundamental distinctions of metaphysical attitudes should be sought. But in spite of the penetration and fruitfulness of Grünbaum's contribution, it, too, is inadequate as a comprehensive typology of world-views. The principal objection to be made against it is that it unjustifiably lumps together all attitudes which do not fall under domination into the single category of love. But this latter must be subdivided.

"Whether we love the world, or the All, or the deepest ground of all things as an impersonal or a superpersonal reality, in which we wish to lose ourselves completely, or whether we love it as a Person, i.e., as a center of will and consciousness, to which we can stand in the personal relation of love, is by no means an unimportant difference; indeed this difference is scarcely less essential than that between dominating and serving."29

"The Personalistic I-Thou attitude, which is characteristic of all recognition of a personal God, is essentially different from the desire of the ego definitely to lose its character as an ego, to be so completely absorbed in the great All that it is no longer recognizable as an ego, and to become one with this All. The former is the feeling of being a creature, the passionate longing of the creature to resume the normal relation, disturbed by sin, toward the Creator; the latter desires union with the Deity, a desire which judged from the former point of view, is sacrilegious."30

In this criticism, Kohnstamm suggests a typology of world-views in which three fundamentally distinct attitudes to the whole of reality are recognized: Domination, Absorption and Love. 31

30 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.11, p.97.
31 This criticism was accepted by Grünbaum, and the typology whose description follows is the work of Kohnstamm and Grünbaum jointly. (Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.11, p.98. "Paedagogiek," pp.212, 313.)
Kohnstamm represents them diagrammatically by an equilateral triangle whose angles, D, A, L, indicate the standpoints of Domination, Absorption, and Love respectively, in absolutely pure form.

As a matter of fact it is almost inconceivable that any one should be determined in his theory and practice by any single one of these fundamental attitudes. In every actual case it will be possible to point out the influence of one or both of the other fundamental attitudes in addition to the one which is predominant. In the diagram, every point, whether it lies on the side of the triangle or within it, represents a possible world-view. Those world-views in which two fundamental attitudes are recognizable will be represented by points lying on the side of the triangle, those in which all three fundamental attitudes are recognizable will be represented by points lying within the triangle. The distance of any point from a point at an angle represents its degree of approximation to a clear expression of the attitude represented by this angle-point. The points at the angles of the triangle are therefore coordinates by reference to which the position of all other points is to be fixed. Admittedly the diagram is unable to represent every individual nuance in any particular world-view. For it provides for only one type midway between A and L, while for a world-view it is of importance not only that L and A are

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This diagrammatic representation is purely descriptive, implicating no evaluation of the three fundamental attitudes involved.
both recognizable in it, but also ... in what sphere of the life of the soul one spiritual attitude or another appears most clearly." To portray such differences a plane figure is inadequate; one would have to choose a more complicated structure of more than two dimensions.

If we inquire now as to the place of Dilthey's three types in this schema, we find that the first of them—the positivistic-naturalistic systems—will be represented by the point D. They seek knowledge above all, but they seek it as a means toward power; there is no desire for the absorption and loss of the ego in the All, but rather for its intensification in self-consciousness and power. Neither will the ego, desirous of dominance humbly and lovingly acknowledge allegiance to a supreme Person. Objective idealism, the second of Dilthey's types, of which Goethe is taken by Kohnstamm as the fairest representative, cannot be represented by either point L or point A on the triangle. That Goethe's position is not to be represented by point L is obvious from his pantheism. "He knows 'the divine' ('Die Gottheit'), or better 'Nature' ('Die Al-Natur'), but not a Lord in the Biblical sense." Yet, on the other hand, Goethe's attitude is far from being a Buddhistic longing for Nirvana. He values the world of multiplicity and variety and he values above all human personality. Nevertheless, his attitude is characterized by 'reverence' ('Ehr-urcht') toward reality, rather than by a desire to dominate. Hence Goethe's objective idealism is best represented on the

33 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.11, p.29.
34 Ibid., p.100.
triangle by the mid-point G on the side AL. Spinoza being more monistic would have to be represented by a point on the same side of the triangle but nearer to A.

The third of Dilthey's types—subjective idealism—includes two radically different attitudes, viz., that of Christian philosophy and that of idealism proper. Christian philosophy moves away from the point G toward the point L which represents Christian philosophy in its pure form. Idealism proper, on the other hand, of which Fichte's philosophy is an excellent example, never regards man "as a sinful creature placed over against a Holy Creator, but as a finite spirit forming a part of the infinite All-Spirit." The idealist "regards Nature . . . not as a fellow creature over which he has only a limited power, in accordance with the Will of the Creator, but essentially as subjected to himself, in fact as his own product. The purpose of Nature is only to exist in order that the Spirit of which the 'ego' is a part, may thereby become self-conscious." Hence idealism of this type moves from G in the direction of D and may best be represented on the triangle as the point F on the line GD.

Summarizing this comparison of Dilthey's typology with the typology diagramatically represented by the triangles, we may say that in this triangle all three of Dilthey's types can roughly

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35 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.103. 36 Ibid., p.103.
be represented by the line GFD. Kohnstamm thus claims that his typology is more inclusive and more adequate than Dilthey's. Although it brings the types represented by D, A, and L into prominence, it is far from suggesting that these three types are exhaustive of all the types of philosophy which have actually appeared in the history of European philosophy. In fact, it calls attention to the types G and F as highly important for European culture, and thereby recognizes the task of a typology of world-views to be the attempt to comprehend ever more completely the nature of those types of philosophy with which we are actually confronted.

Leading Concepts of Biblical Personalism

It was maintained above that the formal logical development of all systems of philosophy is essentially the same and that the diversity of these systems arises only from differences of axiomatic bases. In view of this Kohnstamm considers it of the utmost importance that the axiomatic basis of every philosophy should be consciously formulated and exhibited. "The very first requirement of scientific accuracy which one should demand of a modern philosopher, is that he should give an account to himself and to his readers of the fundamental convictions from which he takes his point of departure, or, methodologically formulated, of the set of axioms on the basis of which he seeks to understand the world."37 Further, it must be made quite clear that the

exhibited set of axioms is in fact one's point of departure, i.e., that one's philosophical system is in reality logically based upon them and them alone. Only thus can we expect to introduce into philosophy some measure of the exactness and progress which characterizes the natural sciences.

The fundamental attitude to reality characteristic of Biblical Personalism has already been indicated in the typology of world-views described above, as the standpoint of love (Lieben), and some of the implications of this position have already been pointed out. Biblical Personalism may be designated alternatively as a theistic or as a personalistic system of philosophy. Kohnstamm regards neither term as wholly satisfactory. The former has become identified with the scholastic tradition in which Christian thought was forced into alien molds. By it Christian experience, reflecting an attitude to life and the world which is essentially that of love, was formulated in terms of a non-Christian, predominantly Greek, philosophy. The term 'personalism' is ambiguous since radically different world-views have been so described. Chief among these Kohnstamm mentions the romantic personalism of post-Renaissance Europe and the personalism of William Stern. The former, the cult of the tragic hero or genius engaged in a titanic struggle with the overpowering impersonal forces of the universe, is a standpoint intermediate between that of love and absorption, to be represented on the above triangle of world-views by a point on the line GFD.

33 Goethe's "Prometheus," and Nietzsche's Uebermensch.
In order to avoid any such ambiguities, Kohnstamm calls his philosophy "A System of Personalistic Philosophy on a Biblical Basis," or, simply, Biblical Personalism. It is implied that there is a single consistent view of life and the world to be found in the Bible, and that this "essential totality" is normative for Biblical Personalism. That must not be taken to suggest that any part of the Bible isolated from its context is to be accepted as authoritative. On the contrary, Kohnstamm fully recognizes and insists on the fallibility of any isolated part of Scripture. This is acknowledged by him above all because the revelation of God embodied in Scripture must be interpreted in the light of God's revelation in nature, i.e., in the light of modern scientific progress. Scripture is not a sourcebook of scientific facts; it gives us only fundamental principles whose application and interpretations is ever an unfinished task.

While personality is the central category of Biblical Person- sonalism, it is divine rather than human personality that is made central. Human personality derives its meaning and value only from its relation to divine personality. The concept of personality is non-rational; it defies exact definition through enumeration of qualities. Its essential nature may be indicated by saying that to be a person or to possess personality is to stand in the I-Thou relation. Human personality cannot be understood

39Subtitle of Creator and Creation.
40Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.11, Preface xiv, note 1; "Paedagogiek, p.236f.
41Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.111, p.75.
42Ibid., p.62.
"from the relation of man to man—let alone from man as isolated—but only from the relation of man to God. Only in this relation can we understand what man is and what he is not, what he ought to be and what he ought not to be." The I-Thou relation is one of complete obedience and submission to a personal God. It is, therefore, a bi-personal relation in which man, who was created in the image of God, but has wilfully marred this image through sin, seeks to be restored to the favor of God. True religion is possible on this basis alone. But Kohnstamm as a Christian contends that man is only dimly aware of his personal relation to God until he accepts the revelation of this relation "which has taken place in a Person, to whom again we stand in the I-Thou relation" viz., Jesus Christ.

In Biblical Personalism nature, including man, is regarded as the creation of God. Only as such can it be understood. As embodying the thoughts and plans of its Creator, nature is not an unstructured continuum but reveals the inexhaustible variety of God's thoughts in the variety of classes and individuals found within it. Neither can nature be a mechanism whose processes are of a purely repetitive or physical character, rather nature must be thought of as a drama which is continually unfolding itself in accordance with the will of its Creator.

44 Ibid., Preface p.xv.
45 Cf. the title of the whole work: Creator and Creation.
Chapter VI

EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY IN BIBLICAL PERSONALISM

Epistemology

According to Kohnstamm the task of epistemology is to formulate, as completely and as exactly as possible, the implications of the most fundamental of all epistemological assumptions—that truth exists, and to make explicit the presuppositions of every branch of knowledge including itself. Only after it has brought to consciousness the general presuppositions of all search for truth can it proceed to the more specialized problems as to the existence and nature of assumptions peculiar to special fields of knowledge, and to problems of scientific methodology. This task of epistemology is a genuinely critical one. Though the legitimacy and even the necessity of making assumptions is recognized, it is insisted that these assumptions must be brought to light for the purpose of criticism. We must investigate whether the assumptions implied in all our assertions are indeed necessary, indubitable and consistent with each other. This inquiry may be called a critical investigation of the nature of truth through an
examination of its foundations. In the course of this investigation problems as to the media of knowledge and the limits and tests of truth will inevitably arise for consideration.

The oldest definition of truth: "Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus," was formulated by Aristotle and considered satisfactory up to the time of Kant. Since Kant it has been regarded by most philosophers as the postulation of a problem rather than as a solution of one, the problem being: What is the nature of the correspondence between thought and its object? It is evident that we cannot mean by correspondence a faithful reproduction in thought of the object of thought, though this was the conception of the early Greek thinkers including Democritus and the Epicureans. In this crude form, the correspondence theory of truth stands condemned as involving a view of knowing as a mere multiplication of objects.

Any such copy-theory of truth, is logically committed to an identification of "thought and being, of intellect and reality, so that all that cannot be thought must be eliminated from reality as only 'appearance'." But even in the less extreme form in which we find it, e.g., in later Greek philosophy the correspondence notion of truth is likewise subject to the charge of intellectualism, a charge the seriousness of which becomes evident from its implications for one's entire philosophy of life. If the adequacy of thought is to be measured by the degree to which it faithfully

1 Cf. the title of vol.1 of Creator and Creation, Het Waarheids Probleem (The Problem of Truth) and its subtitle: Grondleggende Kritiek van het Christelijk Waarheids bewustzijn (Foundation-Laying Criticism of the Christian Consciousness of Truth).

2 Ibid., p.8.
duplicates reality, i.e., if thought is essentially to be identified with being, this cannot be true of thought only as reproducing external reality, but must be even more definitely so of thought as it applies to our inner reality—to ourselves. It is much more plausible to hold that our own thought faithfully reproduces our own inner being than that it is able to mirror things external to us. If thought is identical with being it follows that we can learn the nature of any man best from his thought. His theories must truly represent his true personality in its every phase, whether it be social, political or religious. His practices are not very instructive as to his nature, for we know of his practices only through sense perception. The senses give us no trustworthy knowledge of reality because their objects are not pure being but being in process of change, i.e., becoming. Pure thought alone is the royal highway to truth. From the same intellectualistic position it follows that the way to change man is to change his thought. Prisons can be emptied only through instruction in morality; sexual abnormalities, drunkenness, etc., are to be remedied by the proper precepts, and sinners are to be converted by providing them with a more correct theology.

The difficulties inherent in the correspondence notion of truth are not exhausted by the recital of its intellectualistic implications, which might be extended at will. It must also be urged that this theory makes the determination of truth about external things inexplicable, for there is no way in which we can directly compare an external thing with our thought of it. We can indeed compare an idea or mental image of an object with our perception of that object, but that is only to compare one mental
representation with another. Nor can we take for granted that in perception we have a reliable copy of the thing perceived. For the psychology of perception has made it clear that the intricacies of that process are so great that it is beyond all reason to hold that the final reaction-product or percept could be a faithful copy of the pattern of stimuli.

Such a pre-critical conception of the nature of truth must give way to a critical one. In the work of C. B. Spruyt, Kohnstamm finds a more adequate conception which serves as the point of departure for further discussion. Spruyt maintains that we must trust our awarenesses of our inner states and the expression we give to them in propositions. For, if we attempt to doubt the momentary content of our consciousness, we have every reason to doubt whether we are doubting it, and so on ad infinitum. The truth of the judgments we make concerning external objects on the basis of our inner (e.g., perceptual) states may indeed be doubted, because the object of our judgments in such cases is wholly different from the content of our perceptual state. But our assertions as to this content itself cannot be doubted. "We must accept such judgments as true, for if we do not, every standard of distinction between truth and falsity falls away." Spruyt says that this is essentially the same position as that taken by Descartes in his: Cogito ergo sum.

It has been objected that we cannot trust our awarenesses of

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3 Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte. (History of Philosophy), Haarlem: Vincent Loosjes, 1905.

our inner states because our awareness of them falsifies them or rather displaces them. When we attempt to study a state of anger, the latter gives way to a state of tension and expectation. We are no longer angry but observant. But "This criticism holds only against the consciously planned methodical inner awareness, not against that which is spontaneous and unconscious. The latter consists of the memory of that which is experienced, a memory which is not, to be sure, infallible, but which we may not hold to be always fallacious." The acknowledged fallibility of our memory of our inner states must be reconciled with the assertion that our judgments as to the content of our inner states must be accepted as trustworthy. Here Leibniz' distinction between perception and apperception is helpful. Perception is merely the occurrence in experience of some inner state; apperception is the awareness or consciousness of this occurrence. So long as there is only perception, the question of truth or falsity does not enter because no judgment is made. But apperception includes judgment, and it is therefore meaningful to speak of it in terms of truth and falsity. It is a condition of the possibility of all knowledge that we should trust our apperceptions of our inner states in as far as they are simple assertions as to the content of these states. Error enters in when we do not merely report but interpret the content of our consciousness, as, e.g., when we deduce from it judgments as to the kind of moral character which the occurrence of a particular inner state indicates. In such cases our memory is warped by the influence of self-esteem, so that our knowledge

of our inner states becomes untrustworthy.

From the argument thus far it seems that we are forced into the skeptical position that truth is beyond man's attainment. For on the assumption that the only standard of truth is the comparison of a mental representation with its object, the discovery that this comparison is possible neither in the case of the knowledge of external things nor in the case of our knowledge of our own inner being, seems to leave us no other alternative than to conclude that: Man is the measure of all things. Since an objective standard is unavailable, truth becomes subjective, a matter of individual opinion. But this conclusion is entirely unwarranted for even when a comparison of an idea with its object is impossible we still speak on good grounds of the truth or falsity of this idea. In all such cases our investigation of the truth of an idea consists of our attempt to fit it into the system of ideas we accept as true. The truth of a proposition depends upon its coherence with other propositions which we regard as indisputable. In this way we attain to an immanent conception of truth, such that our acceptance of any proposition as true is not a matter of caprice or of individual opinion but depends upon a standard external to this proposition and binding upon us.

On this immanent conception of truth, there is still, to be sure, the possibility that truth for one individual may differ from truth for another. But we can evaluate the truth of various individuals differently, depending upon the difference in scope of their respective systems of ideas. The determination of the truth of an idea depends upon its coherence with all available data. If it meets this test it is true, i.e., is beyond criticism. Hence,
against the position of skepticism Spruyt maintains that the search for truth is not futile. Further it is possible to make a transition from the immanent concept of truth to the concept of absolute truth which is involved in it.

According to Spruyt there are only three possible sources of human error:

1. Our observation is only fragmentary, with the result that we do not possess all the data we need to determine truth absolutely.

2. Our powers of retention and combination are weak, so that we often fall into error by failing to grasp all available data pertinent to the determination of the truth of an idea.

3. We often reason inaccurately, thus failing in the attempt to determine the consistency or inconsistency of an idea with the system of previously accepted ideas.

But, argues Spruyt, "If we conceive of a mind which encompasses everything; which comprehends all data simultaneously with perfect clarity, and which reasons infallibly, there would be no sources of error for this mind. The system of ideas possessed by such a mind would be absolute truth. Each part of it is not merely relatively true because it is in harmony with the others, but absolutely true, because in no way could disharmony subsequently arise."  

For man, on the contrary, absolute truth, as the complete and known correspondence of an idea with all data, can exist only as an ideal. "Because he is subject to the three kinds of error enumerated above, no man can ever know whether any one of his ideas is absolutely true ... It is possible and even probable, 

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that man has certain ideas which are absolutely true, but he can never be certain of it. On the other hand, absolute truth is the character of the ideas of an ideal mind free from human limitations. 7 "What we call reality is either identical with the content of the ideas of this ideal mind or something else completely corresponding to this." 8 But this distinction, though often made, is of no value, since we can never know reality apart from the content of ideas. Hereby we have made possible a restitution of Aristotle's concept of truth, though with a more exact specification of its terms. Truth, we may say, is the complete correspondence (in the sense of harmony or coherence) of an idea with reality, i.e., with the complete and fully coherent scheme of ideas of an ideal mind.

Kohnstamm examines critically and develops more fully the foregoing contribution of Spruyt. He says that Spruyt's contention, that we must trust the apperception of our inner states, must be accepted on the grounds he adduces. We can escape from a "bottomless" doubt which paralyzes at the very outset every attempt to know, only by making the decision to trust at least initially the judgments we make as to the content of that which is immediately given in our consciousness. This also involves placing trust in memory, in which in turn is implied a faith in personal identity, "for there is no memory in itself, memory is always the memory of an ego which remembers itself." 9 It must not be concluded, however, that the faith in memory which is a pre-condition of all knowledge

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7 and 8 Spruyt, op. cit., quoted by Kohnstamm in vol.1 of Creator and Creation, p.27.
9 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.1, p.32.
must be unqualified. In fact . . . "There may be every reason to doubt a particular testimony of memory, no matter how self-evident it appears subjectively, and even though it refers to a very recent impression." ¹⁰ "Self-evidence in this sense is never an absolute criterion of truth." ¹¹

The apparent antinomy between the necessity of trusting memory and the experienced impossibility of always doing so, may be resolved by the help of another valuable concept implied by Spruyt, viz., the concept of truth as a regulative idea in the Kantian sense, or as the limit of an infinite series of approximations. In the ever unfinished task of seeking truth we must necessarily take the trustworthiness of memory as the point of departure for thought. We must continue to hold to this until a contradiction arises in our thought, in which case we must critically examine the deliverances of memory. "There is, therefore, no conflict between the two propositions of the antinomy, for they refer to different stages of thought. 'Memory must be trusted' applies to its point of departure; 'Memory should not be trusted' applies to its final goal, and not only to the goal of thought but even to the determination of the simplest factual datum." ¹²

A similar apparent antinomy, this time concerning language, is implicit in Spruyt's argument, though he does not call attention to it. Every determination of fact presupposes an appropriate form of expression in language. We must make use of symbols with a

constant reference to definite elements in our thought, i.e.,
with a constant meaning. We may and do possess intuitive know-
ledge which is ineffable, but for that very reason it is not
scientific knowledge which is necessarily communicable. Hence,
"all our thinking . . . presupposes language; it is inextricably
bound up with the use of language, and it necessarily presupposes
that language correctly expresses and communicates its meaning."\(^\text{13}\)

But on the other hand we know that we must also thoroughly distrust
language as a fertile source of error and misunderstanding. We
neither have a perfect language nor use any language we have per-
fectly. Here again it is to be pointed out that we must decide
to trust language initially if we are to think at all, but that
in the course of our thinking we will often be betrayed by this
trust. Truth can be expressed perfectly only in a perfect language,
but we cannot form a perfect language until we possess all of truth.
The complete dependability of language is, therefore, an ideal.
"We may and must have faith that by means of the language with
which we begin, we approach truth, and that this approximation to
truth in turn improves the language."\(^\text{14}\)

The first result of this critical development of Spruyt's
views has been to confirm the position taken at the very outset
of this chapter as to the task of epistemology, viz., that it is
the formulation and criticism of the presuppositions of all know-
ledge. "The power which impels thought on its way to truth" is
doubt, not the skeptical "bottomless" doubt which paralyzes thought,
but the critical doubt which seeks in the interests of truth to

\(^{13}\) Kohnstamm, op. cit., p. 43. \(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 44.
distinguish those assumptions which are tenable and necessary from those which are not. This critical doubt is itself grounded in the faith that truth exists, that we can approach to it, and that it is our task to do so. "We may fairly say, therefore, that thinking is the synthesis... of doubt and faith, in which faith is primary and doubt secondary, because the doubt already presupposes faith in the possibility of an answer, but that both are indispensable for human thought." 15

This dialectic of faith and doubt, of decision and criticism, is different in an important respect from the Hegelian dialectical method.

"The doubt, which in Hegel causes the antithesis to be placed next to the thesis, does not flow from the nature of the situation—from our intuitive... insight into it; but it is a doubt born of method alone and therefore weak and without direction, and the progress of thinking is subjective and capricious being determined by Reason and not by Reality. But the restless doubt to which we refer does not proceed from a subjective will to doubt, but from the objective necessity demanded by the situation itself. We doubt, not because the method demands it, but because it is demanded by the outcome of another train of thought or by an intuitive insight, i.e., because the doubt has substantial ground." 16

Spruyt's dictum that the truth of a proposition may be tested by determining its coherence with a set of other propositions which we regard as indisputable, must be regarded as a true though incomplete account of critical epistemological procedure. Whether or not a particular proposition fits in with or is excluded by a set of other propositions is indeed determined in part by certain fundamental axioms and formal rules of connection formulated in Aristotle's logic. But the very existence of formal logic presupposes other forms of connection of propositions beyond those of

15 Kohnstamm, op. cit., 147.  
16 Ibid., p.97.
formal logic itself, connections which depend upon the transition from the realm of private judgments to that of judgments about external objects. For as long as we remain in the former realm there can be no question of contradiction. The possibility of logical contradiction first arises when our judgments no longer are taken to refer only to private impressions but are held to refer to external objects. The logical possibility of this transition depends upon the validity for all men of a common set of categories. Spruyt overlooked this whole problem when he attempted to show that on the immanent conception of truth one can in principle attain to incontrovertible if not to absolute truth, by subjecting every idea to the test of its coherence with all available data.

He makes the assumption, unwarranted on the immanent conception of truth, "that different people living in a world of like objects, can communicate concerning these objects, because the objects are the same for them." 17

The existence of categories of thought valid for all men must indeed be assumed since it is an indispensable pre-condition of the knowledge we actually have of objective reality. Our principle is the same as Kant's 'Möglichkeit der Erfahrung': "Every proposition which would vitiate the possibility of objective experience is false, and every proposition which is indispensable for the attainment of objective experience is true.," 18 We must, therefore, make the decision to trust the categorial forms of our thinking. Even in those of our assertions which express only an apperception of a state of our own consciousness, it is implied

17 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p. 69.  
18 Ibid., p. 118.
that our private ideational world is not chaotic but has relatively stable recognizable forms to which the terms of our assertions refer. But it is in those of our assertions which lay claim to expressing a fact about the external world, i.e., in synthetic a posteriori judgments, that the further claim is made "that the categorial forms of my consciousness are also valid for others." 19

The validity of a set of categories common to all men implies that there is truth objective to the individual and independent of him, that we can make assertions regarding the external world which must be accepted by all. Every branch of knowledge proceeds from such factual judgments as data to be accepted at least provisionally as true. Such synthetic a posteriori judgments may be called material axioms of scientific thinking in distinction from the formal axioms of logic. Every science tests the truth of its propositions not only by their consonance with the formal rules of deductive logic, but also by their consonance with the innumerable material axioms or factual judgments which are the data of science. This conclusion is of the utmost importance for our whole conception of the nature of truth and of our search for it. For "One of the most fundamental points of view," of Biblical Personalism, is "the insight into the multi-dimensional nature of the order of truth . . . It is impossible to represent any scientific system, much less a systematic World-view, by a line along which thought proceeds point by point through the whole." 20 And yet this uni-dimensional or linear conception of truth is the direct result of taking logical coherence to be the only test of truth.

"In the current conception of truth... truth is represented as a one-dimensional order; its development can therefore be portrayed by the figure of a (crooked or straight) line. The attempt of the searcher for truth should therefore be to find an absolutely certain and indisputable point of origin... From it he will have to proceed by absolutely certain steps. The validity of the result attained seems to depend alone on the point of origin and the incontestability of every connecting link... by means of which this result is reached from the point of origin."\(^{21}\)

Kohnstamm's reasons for criticizing this all too simple conception of truth have already been indicated. In this conception everything depends upon the starting point. "Were this to be chosen incorrectly this (error) would be irreparable."\(^{22}\) But, as Kohnstamm has contended, "no such absolutely true point of origin can be found."\(^{23}\) Even the most necessary formal presuppositions of knowledge are to be accepted as true only provisionally, and are subject to criticism. "Even if we were to admit one proposition as indubitable, we would immediately have a very large, perhaps an infinite, number with an equal claim,"\(^{24}\) so that we would be unable to make a choice. In point of fact "a scientific system of thought is never based upon a single indubitable foundational proposition, but upon a whole set of axioms."\(^{25}\)

Further, this conception of truth "takes no account of the difficulties involved in the function of language... It assumes without question that, at the outset of the inquiry, there is available a ready-made language in terms of which the inquiry can proceed and the initial proposition, upon whose correctness all that succeeds depends, can be formulated. But even this is not

\(^{21}\text{Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.107.}\)
\(^{22}\text{Ibid., p.64.}\)
\(^{23}\text{Ibid., p.65.}\)
\(^{24}\text{Ibid., p.103.}\)
\(^{25}\text{Ibid., p.108.}\)
correct... To begin the inquiry we need a dependable language an only the inquiry can yield this dependable language."^{26} On the linear conception "The structure of Truth becomes that of a chain, which is no stronger than its weakest link." But in all the positive sciences we find an entirely different situation. "Their dependability follows in a twofold sense from their complexity; viz., the multiplicity of indisputable axioms and the great complexity of the interrelationships of the propositions, so that not a chain but an extremely close and intertwined network of threads and connections arises."^{27}

Thus, taking its cue from the empirical sciences, philosophy also should recognize that the problem of truth is much more complex than it appears to be on the uni-dimensional conception. "Science and philosophy do not progress from absolute certainty to absolute certainty."^{28} Instead of going from one definitely solved problem to another, they are always returning to the same problems in new connections and are always re-subjecting them to criticism in the light of newly acquired insights. Our approach to truth may therefore be represented by an ascending spiral in which we always return to the same difficulty out each time on a higher level. It follows from an acceptance of the multi-dimensional view of truth that we must reject "any definitely decisive criterion of truth such as is sought in the uni-dimensional theory of truth... In the latter a proposition is regarded as true if it can be proved, i.e., if it can be deduced in an indubitable way from a first

^{26}Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.108.

^{27}Ibid., p.65.

^{28}Ibid., p.65.
proposition regarded as an indubitable foundation." But on the multi-dimensional theory "Primarily we can say only of a whole system of propositions whether it is 'true' or not. And it is only in a derivative sense that this predicate can be attributed to a proposition belonging to the system." It follows also "... that the investigation as to the truth of particular propositions is never completed, which naturally it is in the one dimensional theory." Hence "we must substitute the approachability for the attainability of truth." It is this character of approaching or approximation "which attaches to every science and to every philosophy which does not seek to be a construction of the subject, but a loving and reverent pluming of the depths of objective reality." If the argument so far has been cogent, the transition from the immanent or coherence view of truth to absolute truth would be justified were it not for two possibilities:

1. There might be two or more types of thinkers such that they had different 'organizations of the mind,' i.e., "that they apply different methods to form derived propositions from ultimate indubitable axioms."

2. It might be the case "that axioms which seem absolutely evident to the one lack all evidence for the other, and even seem evidently false." Other possibilities have already been dealt with in the previous chapter where it appeared that the first constitutes no real difficulty. It was shown that the facts of communicability and of demonstrable regions" in every branch of knowledge allow us to conclude that the differences in our conclusions are due rather to

31Ibid., Preface, p.xxi.  
32Ibid., p.72.  
33Ibid., p.72.
differences of axiomatic bases than to differences in the manner of reasoning from them. The second possibility presents much greater problems. It must be conceded that the existence of a universe which is at variance with itself is a possibility which cannot logically be excluded. On this view knowledge would indeed be possible, but metaphysics, in the sense of absolute knowledge about the whole of reality would be impossible. But it is equally possible to accept on faith the existence of a harmonious universe valid knowledge of which is possible for every man, and complete knowledge of which is the unattainable goal or limit of all these supplementary individual world-views.

Spruyt's final conclusion is that reality is either identical with the content of the ideas of an ideal mind or something else completely corresponding to this content, but that we cannot distinguish between these two alternatives. But this attempt to wipe out the distinction between objective idealism and philosophical realism is based on neglect of two important distinctions: 1) the distinction between the content of ideas and the object of ideas, and 2) the distinction between two different types of objects of ideas. "Reality is not 'content' of ideas but 'object' of mental representations."34 "But if one has made the distinction between the content of a mental representation (which is always psychical) and its object, one notices that besides physical and psychical objects, which together constitute all real objects, there is still a large class of objects which cannot be classified in this way."35 These are the ideal objects or mental constructions, e.g.,

34 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.87. 35 Ibid., p.38.
imaginary numbers. It is at this point that idealism and realism differ radically. According to objective idealism all objects are in fact ideal objects—products of a subject, though it be no empirical subject but a "Universal" Subject (überhaupt). But according to realism there are in addition to the ideal objects, which we have admitted, also objects which are not dependent for their existence on any subject whatsoever. This is true even of a theistic realism for though we may hold all empirical things to depend for their existence on a personal God, yet they do not depend on Him in His capacity as a subject of knowledge.

It follows from this admission of ideal objects that Spruyt's attempted restitution of Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth is indefensible. For it now appears that there are ideas which have no counterpart in reality to which they may either correspond or fail to correspond. In mathematics, e.g., we find that thought creates a realm of objects which conform only to the laws of thought itself and not to any laws of empirical reality. The realm of truth therefore is wider than that of reality, and the correspondence theory fails to account for this wider scope.

Ontology

One of the central problems of all philosophy is the question whether reality is chaotic and structureless so that all distinctions within it are artificially introduced or whether there are actual objective divisions in it, which we may discover rather than invent. In other words we may pose the question: Do the classifications we make within reality have ontological validity,
In the naive pre-scientific view of the world this question does not yet arise, and the former of the two alternatives is uncritically accepted as self-evident. Since thought and language have developed concurrently this unsophisticated conception has left obvious traces in language. But it is not possible, as Aristotle sought to do, to determine the actual categories of the common sense view of the world from the parts of speech of any language, for the structure of various languages differs greatly and all languages also embody contingent elements which obscure the world-views expressed in them.

Recognizing that the classification of world-views into naive or pre-scientific and scientific or sophisticated can be made only in the roughest and most general way, Kohnstamm enumerates the following list of categories as plainly embodied in common sense thought:

1. The category of class and members of the class. Changes in empirical things occur, but always within the boundaries of the class. Things do not change in essence though they may change in appearance.

2. The category of real and unreal things. Common sense recognizes as real things above all the objects of perception including inorganic objects (things proper) and living individuals. Among the latter human beings are held to constitute a class as distinct from animals as these in turn are distinct

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36 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.127 and passim.

37 By "thing" Kohnstamm here means anything concerning which an assertion can be made. Ibid., p.134.
from plants. But God, finite spirits, and some other entities which are never objects of sensory perception are also included among real things. Unreal things may be either appearances (or illusions) or unidentifiable things such as ideas, truths, influences, etc.

3. The category of whole and part.
The whole cannot exist without the parts, but yet the whole is more than a mere sum of its parts.

4. The category of a thing and its properties.
Properties themselves are classified into colors, smells, etc. A whole may possess properties which its parts cannot possess. Most importantly, however, there are recognized also to be "negative" properties designated, e.g., by adjectives with a prefix "un."
Such adjectives are used when an expectation is disappointed, i.e., they imply norms and standards. Hence among the unreals above should be included also the "ought." The concept of value finds an important place in pre-scientific thought.

5. The category of activity and passivity.
The former is to be subdivided into those activities which are spontaneous or consciously willed and those which are not. Only men, other personal beings, and animals are capable of spontaneous actions, and some spontaneous actions are specifically personal.
It is specifically human to feel a conscious relation to the world as an impersonal whole, and to a super-human power or powers influencing the world, i.e., to maintain a world-view which often is pre-dominantly religious.

This common sense world-view, in which the empirical world is considered to be essentially as we perceive it to be, prevailed
without serious question up to the time of the Renaissance, when Simultaneous with and perhaps due to the rediscovery of the teaching of Plato, the first great critical thinker, doubt as to the authority of Aristotle and the naive, pre-scientific, traditional view of the world began to occupy men's minds."38 This revival of critical thought and the accompanying unprecedented series of triumphs of natural science finally issued in a view of the world essentially at variance at nearly every point with the one we have just described. In accordance with one of its most characteristic features, it may be designated as the monistic view of the world. In contrast to the naive world view it maintained that all categories are teleological or subjective. "There are no 'unities' in the world, no individuals. There is only an appearance of pluriformity."39 Kohnstamm describes the world for this view as a "structureless" (homogeneous?) continuum. For it the ideal of scientific thought is to exhibit reality as such by "eradicating all essential lines of division and by showing all essential differences to be illusory."40 While this ideal has not been fully realized, the attempt has been successful to a remarkable degree.

The simplifications of the naive world-view introduced by the monistic world view may be summarized as follows:41

1. There is only one scientific method--the determination of natural laws, all of which are specifications of a single fundamental law. All specific natural laws arise from subjective points of view.

38Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.1, p.149.
2. There is only one science—physico-chemistry. Biology is only an application of this one science to particularly intricate fully deterministic systems. The difference between the organic and the inorganic is mere appearance.

3. The doctrine of evolution shows the difference between plants and animals including man to be unessential. Descent from common ancestors indicates essential similarity.

4. No thoroughgoing difference between animals and man can be substantiated. There are continuous transitions between the two; an idiot is more like an ape than like Goethe. Criminal anthropology shows that we cannot find the fundamentum divisionis in a sense of responsibility. This concept is indefensible, there being no difference between crime and mental aberration.

5. There is no real difference between man and woman. Steinach has shown that the apparent difference is due to the activity of certain glands which can be transplanted from one sex to another.

6. There is no difference between what "is" and what "ought" to be. Everything is determined. All value judgments are purely subjective.

7. All secondary qualities are subjective.

8. The world is purely phenomenal. Nothing transcendental or supernatural exists for science.

9. Nature consists of a large number of identical elements whose discreteness still presents a problem. But the problem of their plurality is in process of being solved.

10. According to the theory of relativity there is no essential difference between time and space.
All these monistic simplifications of the traditional worldview are introduced for the sake of "the comprehensibility of Nature." This postulate is understood to demand the abolition of all the categories of common sense thought and the substitution of a causality of purely functional relationship as the only form of scientific thought. In this purely functional relationship direction in time is ignored as irrelevant since functional dependence is a reversible relation which can be traced backwards as well as forwards. Nature is conceived to be a closed system in which everything is completely describable in terms of such functional relationships.

The comprehensibility of nature is regarded as being essentially the same as Kant's principle of the "Möglichkeit der Erfahrung." Just as Kant postulated the complete lawfulness of phenomena as the necessary presupposition of the "possibility of experience," so the monistic world-view postulates the same complete lawfulness as the necessary presupposition of the comprehensibility of nature. But the treatment of these as the same is far from being justified. For "the possibility of experience" is indeed an indubitable and indispensable axiom of scientific thought, but the complete comprehensibility of nature is at best only an ideal which can never be fully realized, and it may be incapable of being realized even in principle. The validity of Kant's argument depends, however, upon making the substitution in question. The complete lawfulness of phenomena is a necessary presupposition not of the possibility of experience but of the comprehensibility of nature. Kohnstamm maintains that complete comprehensibility of nature is not a necessary axiom of scientific
thought, and its presupposition of complete lawfulness need not be accepted.

"The possibility of experience" has, however, been accepted as a necessary axiom of scientific thought and its presuppositions must therefore also be accepted. Kant was entirely correct in his assertion that in a completely lawless chaotic world experience as we have it would be impossible. "But he did not consider that between complete irregularity or chaos and complete determinism a middle ground might be found, or rather a synthesis of necessity and freedom."⁴² The admission of irregularity or spontaneity within certain limits is not incompatible with the possibility of experience, though it is incompatible with the possibility of complete predictability. The proper application of Kant's transcendental method not only permits the recognition of freedom; it also demands this recognition. "For 'experience' is not a purely objective concept, it is one which presupposes the subjective as well as the objective since it includes a synthesis of the two. Now if we consider the subjective moment, while Kant in his argument considered only the objective, we arrive at the proof of the opposite (of his contention)⁴³ . . . 'The possibility of experience' teaches something about the object, viz., that it cannot be entirely lacking in lawfulness. But it also teaches something about the subject, viz., that it cannot be completely determined by natural causal law."⁴⁴

⁴²Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.159.
⁴³The words within parenthesis are my own.
⁴⁴Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.162f.
When applied to the subject of experience the doctrine of natural causality as a closed system leads to absurdity. The activities of the subject conform to laws other than those of natural causality; e.g., they are at least partially determined by logical and ethical "laws." "It is certain that the course of my thought in a demonstration is determined in part by the future—the proof sought, and that my overt activity is likewise determined in part by the future—the goal to be attained." If then we take causal law to determine everything completely we are confronted with the problem of a double determinism in human activity "whose harmony is a harmonia praestabilita infinitely more remarkable than the boldest phantasies ever expressed on this score by Geulinx, Leibniz or anyone else." The only possible solution therefore is to construe the determinism by the past in such a way that room is left for other factors.

It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that all causal determinism is to be denied. A correct evaluation of "closed natural causality" is furthered by a comparison of it with certain so-called non-Euclidean geometries. By substituting other axioms for some or all of the axioms of Euclidean geometry it is possible to arrive at perfectly consistent systems of thought which, however, "fail to apply to what is in the real meaning of the term 'space'—the general scheme of thought to which we refer our perceptions," and which, therefore, may be designated as "geometries" only by a generalization of this term. Such systems of thought


46 Ibid., p.340.

47 Ibid., p.166.
have often been called "pathological geometries." But they are pathological only when they pretend to do more than merely to derive all the consequences of a particular set of axioms. If this restriction is borne in mind they may prove to be of great scientific value.

"Likewise there are also 'pathological' philosophical systems, which arise from sets of axioms, certainly too narrow to bring about correspondence to 'reality.' Such 'pathological' systems are dubious only when they are considered to be 'genuine' philosophical systems and that therefore there must be correspondence between their contents and 'reality.' But when their origin is reckoned with it is useful for 'real' philosophy to develop them with the greatest possible consistency."

The doctrine of closed natural causality must be considered to be a pathological philosophy of this kind. Only by developing its implications, as we have done, could its shortcomings be sharply formulated and superseded.

The fundamental error of thoroughgoing causal determinism is its conception of natural laws as the objectively valid uniformities existing without exception in nature, some of which man has been able to discover and to formulate in exact terms. As a matter of fact there is perhaps no natural law which answers to this description. Every actual natural law is only an approximation which would be objectively valid were it not for the fact that nature is much more complex than any natural law represents it to be. Natural laws are therefore oversimplifications of the true state of affairs and have only a temporary value. "These

48 It is possible that there are a few such laws, e.g., the law of conservation of energy, which restrict but do not exclude spontaneity. Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.1, p.170.
'laws' are scaffolds, which we create to approach to 'reality,' and which must be broken down again when they have served their purpose."^49 Thus the physicist is not, as he is usually represented to be, in search of exact laws. Rather he is in search of the "next decimal." Whenever he comes to an apparently exact law he begins his experimentation anew "to determine where the errors lie, being thoroughly convinced that truth cannot be rigorously and exactly determined in any law whatsoever."^50 It follows, however, that the "previous decimal" must be determined before the search can continue. A natural law is a temporary stopping point at the nearest determined decimal. The determination of a natural law is, therefore, a decision made on logically insufficient grounds, to act as if something were determined which one knows very well is not determined.\(^51\)

On an adequate view of natural law, therefore, we can admit spontaneity in addition to lawfulness in nature. In "the stream of causality" there are divergent eddies, the recognition of whose existence is demanded by Kant's transcendental method as applied to the subjective side of experience. But thereby the monistic metaphysical conception of the empirical-world as a "structureless" continuum makes place for a dualism; for "In the world, which we experience as real, there is discreteness. There are kinds, real classes' of occurrences."^52 "There are essential differences in reality; differences which we humans do not make for our own purposes, but which we must simply recognize as constituting a

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^49Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.169.  
^50Ibid., p.172.  
^51Ibid., p.176.  
^52Ibid., p.181.
genuine feature of reality as it is given."53

The question whether we must recognize in reality any other division than that into regions of freedom and regions of determinism must also be answered in the affirmative. Modern physics and chemistry assure us that in inorganic nature the following structures can be recognized:54

1. Electromagnetic radiations or fields of force: which exhibit the most rudimentary type of structure—direction only.

2. Electrons and protons: which introduce the concepts of mass and of polarity.

3. Atoms: which exhibit radically new properties.

4. Combinations of atoms: including molecules and electrolytes.


6. Substances, compounds, and mixtures.

7. Patterns of molecular activity and structure: the former generating heat, etc., and giving rise to the usual distinctions between solid, liquid and gaseous states. The latter are the basis of distinctions between crystalline and amorphous bodies, etc.

8. Various states of equilibrium.

9. More complex inner structure: responsible for the difference between noisy and musical sounds.

This brief outline of the real and identifiable configurations within the inorganic realm whose recognition is a presupposition of the possibility of modern science teaches us "that the whole is something different and something more than the sum of its

53Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.183. 54Ibid., pp.186-196.
parts, that there is a regular ascent, which expresses itself in richer pluriformity, richer properties, greater possibility of differentiation. The fundamental idea of monism, the absence of structure in ultimate reality, is thus very definitely contradicted.

There are essential differences already present in inorganic nature, and every philosophy which wishes to know reality not as it wishes it to be but as empirical knowledge shows it to be, must respect this diversity as actually existing. 55

More important still is the fact that the classification which modern psychology makes of the various forms of sense perceptions is roughly analogous to the classification of inorganic structures presented above. For example, electromagnetic radiations are known through their effects on our sense of temperature, and through our ability to distinguish light from darkness; our sense of pressure acquaints us with mass; our sense of color gives us knowledge of the properties of atoms; our sense of taste enables us to distinguish between various types of combinations of atoms, and we are able to distinguish roughly between organic and inorganic compounds by means of our sense of smell.

In general we may say, therefore, that science has only confirmed, though it has made more precise, the distinctions and classifications found in reality by common sense on the basis of sensory perception. But in this conclusion it is implied that we can no longer think of secondary qualities as purely subjective, but must regard them as subjective-objective, the result of the cooperation of the subject and the object of knowledge. The

55 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.196.
The empirical or experienced world is therefore a theater in which metaphysical entities reveal themselves through their properties. The "thing-in-itself" (Ding-an-sich) is not known to us completely but we do know of it "that it is that which is identical with, corresponds to, is the basis of, or is an expression of . . . the power that forces us to synthesize its qualities in a definite way."56 "This X, this transcendent 'power,' or rather this power which from out of the transcendent metaphysical realm manifests itself in empirical reality, is the 'real thing' . . . the thing-in-itself, of which the appearance (Erscheinung) is not a causal or logical 'result' but . . . a revelatory emanation."57

Many of the categories of pre-scientific thought have now been vindicated against the attack of the monistic world-view of the 19th century, but one of the most important of these distinctions—that between the inorganic and the organic—remains to be considered.

"That life is 'something different' from death, this fundamental presupposition of all biology, cannot be demonstrated logically. It is also uncertain whether its peculiarity might not consist merely in peculiar structure but definitely demands for all life a different type of lawfulness, as vitalism contends. But with all the certainty obtainable in the empirical realm modern biology confirms, the undoubted prescientific assurance, that 'living' and 'lifeless' denote different types of entities."58

The most serious controversy in the philosophy of biology has centered about the question of mechanism vs. teleology. But the radical opposition of necessity and purposiveness or causality

56 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p. 204.
57 Ibid., p. 205.
58 Ibid., p. 235.
and finality is indefensible and misleading, for the concept of purposiveness is always derived from observation of human endeavor in which necessity or uniformity is inevitably presupposed. We could not plan without being able to depend on certain uniformities. The opposition of mechanism and teleology is, therefore, not to be identified with the opposition of uniformity and lack of uniformity. Neither can the difference between necessity and purposiveness be attributed to a time factor—for determination by a future goal may involve necessity as much as does determination by a past condition.

A real difference between the two, however, is the admission of the category of value as an explanatory principle by the teleologist and its denial by the mechanist. The teleologist seeks to explain processes in nature in terms of a "struggle" for the attainment of goals which are values lying in the future; the mechanist rejects this attempt as anthropomorphic. But this legitimate distinction is often obscured by the confusion of "the valuable" with "the meaningful," the erroneous conclusion being drawn that the non-teleological is meaningless and the meaningless necessary in the sense of mechanistic- causality. A further confusion is introduced when (since life is regarded as a value) the processes promoting the preservation and development of life are therefore termed teleological. But this conjunction of teleology and vitalism is unjustified. Mechanism and self-preservation are not incompatible, provided the initial set of conditions from which the lawful process began was not a chance constellation but a meaningful system or structure. Hence the opposition of mechanism and teleology is only a secondary one in
the philosophy of biology, the primary question being that of chance vs. essential unity, or structurelessness vs. structure.

The question of the existence of essential structures in the organic realm is logically prior to the question of the nature of the processes whereby they are preserved and regulated. That biology as a science presupposes structure in the organic realm is obvious from its very definition as the study of living beings. While every empirical science studies both the form and the matter of its objects, it is characteristic of biology, as opposed to the inorganic sciences generally, that it emphasizes the former above the latter. "To the biologist the most important consideration is not the matter which constitutes a 'specimen' but rather its 'typical form.'" He is interested in the laws which govern complicated structures, i.e., organisms. Were he interested in their matter he would do much better to study less complicated forms.

But individual organisms are not the only types of structure whose existence is necessarily assumed by biology. It is presupposed also by systematic biology that these individual organisms fall into fairly definite groups or species, which again may be subsumed under higher classes so that the organic realm constitutes a hierarchy of living things. So far from denying this discreteness, the theory of evolution definitely presupposes it, for "transmutation of species is possible only if species exist."

\[59\] Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.1, p.213.

\[60\] Ibid., p.217.

\[61\] Ibid., p.224.
root, along separate branching lines. The existence of such separate lines of development proves that "that which initially appears to be the same is not the same. If there were continuous transitions, if everything were possible in the realm of life, this would plead for a chaotic monism, we should be forced to conceive the world as structureless. Now that there are fixed inviolable lines of development . . . we can conceive it only as an ordered system or cosmos. Biology teaches us that not chance but order reigns, if not in the universe at large then at any rate in the Realm of Life. And this order has been present from the beginning of life." If in the line of morphological development anything appears, it must have been present at the beginning of this line of development, for it is not contingent external circumstances but the essential nature and structure of living things which determines the course of their development.

Biology teaches us further that besides their "spatial" discreteness living structures exhibit also temporal discreteness. The existence of individual organisms means "that there is no homogeneous filling of time, that each moment is not like every other. There are points of origination and of passing away, of birth and of death." Change in the organic realm is not mere periodic process, it has a definite direction; it is a dramatic development, a progression toward ever greater differentiation.

We must conclude that the fundamentum divisionis between the inorganic and the organic realms is to be sought primarily in their differences of structure which have been indicated above.

and not (as Driesch attempted to do) in a difference in the type
of lawfulness governing each realm. In the inorganic realm we
can scarcely speak in any significant sense of the existence of
individuals, much less of a hierarchy, and still less of lines
of development having a definite temporal direction, as we must
do in the case of living things.

Not only does an impartial interpretation of modern science
vindicate the pre-scientific distinction of the inorganic from
the organic, but it also vindicates the subdivisions of the latter
which common sense thought recognizes. In conformity with the pre-
scientific distinction between spontaneous and non-spontaneous
activities, modern animal psychology has shown that animal life
can be distinguished from plant life by the fact that, while the
activities of plants are confined to mere reactions to stimuli,
animals exhibit also spontaneous activity even on the level of
Protozoa. 64 Similarly Köhler's experimentation with chimpanzees
has definitely indicated an unbridgeable gulf between man and the
highest type of animal, 65 and psychoanalytic investigations,
particularly by Adler, have contributed much to the renewed recog¬
nition of a real difference between man and woman and of the
importance of sex. 66

The method employed by the empirical sciences throughout
this elaborate restitution of common sense categories has been
the experimental one. But "Experimentation no longer means what
it seemed quite generally to mean even a few decades ago: the

64 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p. 238.
65 Ibid., pp. 240ff.
66 Ibid., p. 264.
making of measurements to determine "laws," i.e., quantitative uniformities. The method of experiment is not one-dimensional, but at least three-dimensional."

We must distinguish:

1. Experimentation as measurement.

2. Morphological experimentation, characteristic, e.g., of experimental embryology and genetics, which is designed to determine typical individual structural and developmental forms (Gestalten).

3. Experimentation as "understanding" i.e., as an attempt to grasp meanings—applicable especially to human and animal behavior.

The necessity of recognizing three distinct forms of experimentation tends to confirm the results attained by them. If nature were a structureless continuum the application of various types of scientific method would be dictated by purely pragmatic considerations. But if nature is in fact a structured order scientific method would find itself compelled to adapt itself to this objective structure. That the latter is actually the case seems to be indicated by the fact that the three forms of experiment enumerated above—which correspond to the division of nature into the three fundamental classes: lifeless things, plants and animals—may with fairly good reason be held to constitute an exhaustive disjunction of all the fundamental types.

Thus Kohnstamm maintains that the results of the empirical sciences may fairly be held to substantiate the view that nature is throughout a structured order. Not only the secondary qualities

57 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p. 233.
but also those other properties by which we distinguish the organ-
ic from the inorganic are not purely subjective, but are appear-
ances (Erscheinungen) revelatory of a transcendent reality which,
as exercising restraint upon us, must be interpreted dynamically.
It remains now to show that the same is true of the objects of
the non-empirical sciences—the primary qualities—that, in
opposition to Kant, the forms of space and time also are not
merely ways in which the subject orders sensory data but that
these forms too have objective significance.

In reference to space this may be established by the follow-
 ing consideration: the sensory material that we order in a space-
scheme—

"is given to us as something objective. But every form of
order must conform to definite laws of order. It is true
that I can arbitrarily arrange any number of data to be
ordered in a one-two- or multi-dimensional scheme, but
this can be done only by sacrificing the continuity of
the order. If, for example, I should arrange the 'points'
of a two-dimensional manifold in a one-dimensional series
by placing them on a 'crooked line,' which fills the
'plane,' then the points, which in the plane lie immediately
next to each other come in the one-dimensional scheme to
be a great distance apart. In other words, while it is
possible for me to bring about a one-to-one correspondence
between the elements of the two manifolds, I thereby dis-
turb the relations existing between these elements. We can
conceive of . . . two-dimensional beings (i.e., beings
arranging elements in a two-dimensional scheme) living in a
three dimensional world. For these beings absolutely incom-
prehensible connections would be found; events separated
by a great distance would appear to be connected . . . in
an inexplicable way. And if, on the contrary, they arranged
four-dimensionally, next-to-next events would sometimes
causally affect each other and sometimes prove to stand in
no relation whatsoever to each other. That in the course
of our scientific investigation we have never stumbled upon
anything of this nature proves conclusively, that this kind
of lack of correspondence between our ordering-schema and
the 'manifold' of data to be ordered, does not exist."68

68Kohnstamm, op. cit., p. 282f.
The monistic world-view of the 19th century, following the Greek tradition, denied the significance of the temporal character of the empirical world. As expressed most adequately by Dubois Reymond it held that complete knowledge of the world at any moment would in principle yield complete knowledge of it any at any other moment past or future. Any moment includes reality in all its fulness; nothing essentially new ever appears; time therefore yields only an appearance of novelty. This point of view is definitely contradicted by the modern theory of relativity according to which time is as indispensable a dimension of reality as are the three dimensions of space. According to this theory the relations obtaining in the physical world can be expressed only in terms of the relations of four-dimensional world lines.

"But a world line is historical in character; for it time is equally constitutive with space; to understand a world line I must know not the conditions at any particular moment but the full course of a temporal expanse." Kohnstamm writes that: "Precisely the same thing is expressed by Whitehead when he says that 'events' constitute the elementary entities of physical empirical reality, and that time and space have no reality in themselves but only as abstractions from 'events.'" These results of the relativity theory are confirmed also by the quantum theory according to which there seem to be certain minimal temporal durations the neglect of which leads to the eradications of certain essential features of reality. Time is discrete, it has an objective

70Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.292. 71Ibid., p.292.
structure which we must take into account, and this structure is
genuine feature of the physical world.

Kohnstamm contends, however, that--

"this equality of Time and Space by no means implies the
identity of these concepts. . . . A dualism between the
two remains. In fact one ought not to speak of a four-
dimensional world-continuum, but one must make a distinc-
tion between the space-axes and the time-axis. One ought
therefore to speak of a three plus one dimensional field
because the space-axes are of like nature. In the concept
of world line this is expressed by the fact that in respect
of the time-axis they are 'monotonous,' i.e., that no max-
imum or minimum of time can appear, while a point of this
kind can appear any number of times with respect to the
other axes. For no world line can go back to points of
time where it has already once appeared, but there is no
reason why it should not return to places in timeless space
(length, breadth or height) where it has appeared before."^72

Hence, contrary to the opinion of many popularizers, the theory
of relativity substantiates common sense both when it asserts
the reality of time and when it distinguishes time from space
as a different type of dimension.

The point of view represented by the foregoing interpretation
of the results of recent scientific investigations may fairly
be said to be characteristic of a third period in the history of
European thought, distinct both from naive pre-scientific thought
and from the deterministic monism culminating in the 19th century.
Biblical Personalism as a metaphysical system finds itself in
agreement with and substantiated by these results as thus inter-
preted. For Biblical Personalism maintains nature to be the
creation of God who has therein revealed Himself. It is implied
in this position that nature must be an ordered system, that it

72Kohnstamm, op. cit., p. 295.
must possess an objective structure which is revelatory of God's thought. For were nature a structureless continuum in which order was introduced by the human subject of knowledge, nature would be essentially man's creation rather than God's. Equally implied in the view of nature as a revelation of God is a view of man as adapted to nature in such a way that he can know it. Hence it must be maintained that human categories of thought possess more than merely subjective significance. Man, as uniquely related to God in worship, must be admitted to be distinct in his nature from all other creatures and to be able to exercise freedom of choice.

This chapter has treated predominantly of Kohnstamm's view of the physical world, a view which he regards as scientifically authenticated and as consistent with his conception of it as created by a personal deity. His ideas concerning the nature of God and of man have been implied but not explicitly formulated. These ideas are of ontological significance, but are of such fundamental importance in Biblical Personalism that a separate chapter must be devoted to their consideration.
Chapter VII
PERSONALITY AND VALUE IN BIBLICAL PERSONALISM

Divine and Human Personality

Biblical Personalism holds the supreme category of philosophi-
cal explanation to be that of personality. An understanding of
personality is the key to an understanding of reality both because
the existence and nature of the universe as a whole is dependent
upon a personal being as its Creator and because the unique
nature of man, the most significant part of God's creation, is
explicable only in terms of his peculiar relation to God. It is
a fallacy incident to the one-dimensional or rationalistic con-
ception of truth to hold that personality can be defined adequately
by an enumeration of properties. But personality is a unique
entity which eludes classification and description in terms of
general concepts. Its nature can be grasped only intuitively;
and all definitions of it must be recognized to be only approxi-
mations toward a formulation of this intuitive insight. We cannot

1Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.111, De Heilige (The
oly One), pp.22, 53.
make even a significant approach to an understanding of personality when we employ only the general categories of thought applicable to the physical world. We can conceive of personality with some degree of adequacy only in terms of categories never applied on the subhuman level—the categories of ethics and of religion. These categories can be derived only from a knowledge of God and of the relation in which man stands to Him. Thus, in Kohnstamm's view an inquiry as to the nature of divine personality is logically prior to any consideration of human personality.2

One's answer to the question whether God can be known depends upon one's conception of knowledge. Two prevalent conceptions must be quite sharply distinguished: Kohnstamm considers knowledge in the Greek sense (gnosis) to mean, "Knowledge about," a cold, impassive and objective knowledge flowing from a desire to dominate its object. To the Hebrew, on the contrary, knowledge is practical and akin to love. It means: "to stand in an intimate vital connection with" its object. It is an understanding which includes a "reverence" for the nature of that which is known.3 Only in the second of these senses of the term can we be said to have knowledge of God. As a personal being, God can be known only through immediate experience, never through rationalistic speculation. True knowledge of God flows from love to Him. In turn it leads to increased love of Him. Theoretical knowledge has its place with reference to religion, only as an intermediate stage in which the intuitive experiential knowledge of God is clarified and

3Ibid., vol.111, pp.3ff.
systematized with a view toward increasing its depth and certainty.

The rejection of gnostic or autonomous knowledge, which may in general be identified with knowledge from the standpoint of domination, and the acceptance of knowledge from the standpoint of love, as the only means of access to God, implies the recognition of objective norms, of an external authority in knowing. It is not we who impose the categories of the ego upon reality, but reality itself imposes upon the subjects of knowledge conditions to which they must conform. Translated into religious terms this means that all knowledge of God is due not in the first place to human initiative but is dependent upon God's revelation of Himself, an activity to which human knowledge is only a response. Consequently it is an error to maintain, as Lessing did in his "Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts," that revelation is only a means of hastening a process which could have been accomplished without this agency through human reason alone.

Kohnstamm suggests that the traditional doctrine of the Trinity may be interpreted as meaning that there are "three different ways in which God reveals Himself." He does not consider it necessary to involve that God's being in itself is threefold. Such an ontological view of the Trinity is to be rejected in favor of a trinity of revelation. According to the latter it is maintained that: in creation God the Father speaks to man of His power, wisdom and greatness; in direct personal communion with Christ the Christian receives a revelation of God's forgiveness of sin; and

4 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.10.
5 Ibid., p.11.
6 Ibid., p.91.
in the guidance Christians receive as a result of prayer the Holy Spirit reveals God's will for the conduct of human life. According to Kohnstamm this reinterpretation preserves the value of the distinctions suggested by the doctrine of the Trinity without laying claim to a detailed knowledge of the ultimate nature of God. Such a claim is often rightly regarded as presumptuous and repelling, especially since there is no sufficient justification for it either in nature or in Scripture.\(^7\)

An acceptance of a Trinity of revelation would do justice also to the traditional distinction between general and special revelation, the former consisting of that knowledge of Himself which God imparts in varying degrees to all men, and the latter of the fuller knowledge of God resulting from an acceptance of Christ as the authoritative revealer of God and of His relations to man. In science, art and in conscience God's nature is revealed to all who attend to these phenomena; and even in those religions in which Christ's unique revelatory function is denied there is nevertheless no inconsiderable awareness of the character of man's relation to God.\(^8\) It is only through the experience of "meeting Christ," however, that the nature of this relationship is clearly revealed and that man's religious yearnings for knowledge of God are fully satisfied.\(^9\)

It is true that the decision to accept Christ as the final authority cannot be validated logically. It is an act of faith which is justified solely by its results for those who do make

\(^7\)Kohnstamm, op. cit., pp.25ff.
\(^8\)Ibid., p.41.
\(^9\)Ibid., pp.23, 168.
It is true also that we know this authority incompletely and, in part, also indirectly through ecclesiastical and Scriptural tradition. But we can know him also through the immediate experience of personal communion. This faith in Christ as the interpreter of God's relation to man yields far more than a sense of absolute human dependence and of divine transcendence. It leads to an overpowering conviction of man's guilt over against God and of God's willingness to effect a reconciliation through atonement for this guilt. Man feels himself to stand in a relation to God which can be described only in ethical terms and which thereby assures him that God must be conceived as a personal being. The Christian certainty of the existence and personality of God owes its origin neither to rationalistic cosmological and teleological arguments nor to a mystical "inner light," but to this faith in Christ's revelation that the Creator of the universe is at the same time the loving Father of men.

It is obvious from the foregoing that revelation is not to be understood as a mere communication of theoretical information but is to be conceived with Lessing as a progressive pedagogical process in which, through all His dealings with man, God seeks to raise human nature in all its aspects to a divine ideal. It follows from this pedagogical conception of revelation that man now falls short of God's ideal for him and also that in order to attain to this ideal human cooperation with God is indispensable. Hence the problem of evil and the related problem of man's freedom

10 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.19.
11 Ibid., p.18.
12 Ibid., pp.44f; 161f.
13 Ibid., pp.91ff.
must inevitably be faced.

In accordance with the teaching of Scripture Biblical Personalism regards the existence of evil not as an impersonal metaphysical fact but as a personal and ethical one. All evil is to be identified either with sin, i.e., man's deliberate opposition to the divine will, or with the results of sin. "Creation did not bring evil upon man but, on the contrary, man brought evil upon the earth."¹⁴ This view of the origin of evil as due to the opposition of human to divine will inevitably raises the notorious problem of the relation between God's omnipotence and His moral perfection. For either man's will is to be regarded as a factor beyond God's control, in which case God's absolute omnipotence cannot be maintained, or else God must be thought of as able to prevent man's choice of evil, in which case His failure to do so cannot be reconciled with His perfect goodness. In this impasse Biblical Personalism, like most philosophies based on religious experience, chooses the former alternative. But it does so with certain qualifications. The limitations of God's omnipotence are not to be regarded as externally imposed but as voluntarily accepted self-limitations. The only restrictions to which God must conform are the rational laws of His own being. He was unable, therefore, both to prevent the possibility of sin and yet to create beings free to choose between good and evil. It was God's choice of the latter alternative, dictated by His desire to receive the voluntary love of man, that brought about a limitation

¹⁴Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.80.
of His omnipotence. God can remove this limitation at will, but only by annihilating the creatures to whom He has given a measure of independence over against Himself. He chose, however, to retain this limitation and to win the love of man through His own suffering and sacrifice.

Because of this vital personal relation which God has assumed toward His creation and especially toward man, the scholastic tradition which speaks of God as the eternal and immutable 'first cause' of the universe, is to be repudiated as thoroughly misleading. Scripture speaks throughout of God as a purposing and striving being who, because His plans do not coincide with their fulfillment, is to be regarded like man as subject to the limitations of temporal order. The current theological 'attributes' of eternity and immutability are impersonal and negative concepts of Greek idealistic origin which are wholly inapplicable to the Scriptural conception of God as above all a completely personal being. In fact most of the prevalent conceptions of God's attributes are to be rejected as an application to divine personality of the categories of substance and properties, categories applicable only to non-personal things.

The contamination of the traditional Christian formulations of the nature of God by impersonalistic modes of thinking appears even more clearly in the failure to apply the truly personal

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15 Kohnstamm suggests, however, on one or two occasions that God's ability to create beings capable of partial self-determination may well be regarded as the supreme manifestation of His omnipotence.

16 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.111, pp.84ff.

17 Ibid., pp.34ff; 126f.
categories of intellect, feeling, will and striving in their full scope and significance to divine personality. An example of this is found wherever God's thinking is reduced, in accordance with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, to mere contemplation; when His will is identified with caprice; or when it is denied that God can experience suffering, sorrow or anger. All such theoretical restrictions upon the personality of God are out of harmony with the admittedly anthropomorphic Biblical conception of God upon which the possibility of true religion depends. To the extent that God is conceived as less than fully personal, as, e.g., in many oriental 'religions,' the I-Thou relation characteristic of genuine worship gives way to an attitude which is more properly described as philosophical than as truly religious.

To attribute personality in the full sense of the term to God is not merely to insist that He experiences the whole gamut of human emotions and exercises all essentially human functions. It means also that in God's personality we must distinguish, as in man's, between a relatively stable core or matrix of basic tendencies and the momentary expressions of these basic tendencies which may be either in harmony or in apparent contradiction with them. The recognition of this fact makes it possible to see that no contradiction is involved in maintaining that God is angry with those whom He loves when they oppose His will. In God's personality real love is a basic tendency of which anger is one momentary manifestation seemingly out of harmony but not in

18 Kohnstamm, op. cit., pp.130ff.
19 Ibid., pp.143ff. 20 Ibid., pp.126ff.
fact incompatible with it. For real love gives rise to a great number of expressions differing in accordance with the various particular situations which elicit them. True love, in distinction from sentimental or unwise love, seeks the welfare of its objects regardless of the suffering it may have to inflict upon them in order to attain its aim. Hence God’s love, too, necessarily includes anger, sternness and even severity as well as tenderness and sympathy.  

The most striking manifestation of God’s love for man is described in the Christian doctrine of the atonement. Traditionally Christianity has interpreted this doctrine in terms of the “satisfaction” theory of Anselm’s “Cur Deus Homo.” According to this theory man’s sin is to be regarded as a debt for which God’s justice demands full payment, with the result that unless an adequate substitute is offered man must suffer eternal punishment. The death of Christ on the cross is regarded as constituting a substitutionary payment which God has accepted, thus making the reconciliation between God and man possible for those who by an act of faith accept this vicarious suffering and death of Christ as a fact accomplished also for themselves individually.  

Biblical Personalism rejects this view of the atonement on the ground that it fails to do justice to the Biblical conception of God as a loving and fully personal being. The Anselmian theory makes of God an oriental monarch rather than a loving Father, and illegitimately substitutes a juridical for an ethical interpretation of the atonement. The inadequacy of the satisfaction theory  

21Kohnstamm, op. cit., pp.135ff; 139ff.  

22Ibid., pp.212ff.
takes its origin from an impersonalistic conception of God as incapable of suffering. Hence it becomes necessary to maintain that God can offer payment for sin through His own suffering only by becoming man. The Anselmian theory of the atonement demands, therefore, as its logical condition, the acceptance of a doctrine of the incarnation of God with all its attendant theoretical difficulties as to the relation between the divine and the human "natures" of Christ.  

In agreement with many Christian theologians, Kohnstamm admits that nothing is known of the relation between the two natures of Christ. He insists, however, that Christian religious experience testifies that Christ is in some inexplicable sense at once God and man, and that he has effected a reconciliation between God and man. Thus, in spite of its fundamental error, there are elements of value in Anselm's theory of the atonement. It is correct in holding that Christ's suffering brought about an objective difference in the moral relation between man and God and not merely a human consciousness of a forgiveness already granted. It is also correct in holding that Christ's suffering was vicarious and indispensable in the sense that no substitute for it was possible.

Biblical Personalism interprets the vicarious suffering of Christ after the analogy of a pedagogical act of punishment. Ideally an act of punishment is not a form of revenge nor even a matter of retributive justice but an act whereby the punisher symbolizes his moral disapproval of the conduct of the punished.

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24. Ibid., pp.168ff.
25. Ibid., pp.213f.
in a concrete and clearly observable act in order thus to arouse in the punished a sense of guilt and a desire for reconciliation. Wherever such punishment achieves its aim it is followed by forgiveness and the restoration of a relationship of mutual affection. In true punishment the pedagogue, because he is more keenly aware of the disturbed affectionate relationship, suffers more than the one upon whom punishment is inflicted. In fact the direct suffering occasioned to the recipient is ideally minimal since it is designed only to symbolize the fact that the wrongs committed have brought undeserved suffering to a loved one. The extreme is reached when the pedagogue himself undergoes also the direct suffering involved in the punishment of the guilty person. 26 This is typified in the Christian atonement where God Himself assumed the punishment man had merited. But this self-inflicted punishment is to be regarded neither as a payment of a debt nor as an indication that God's attitude to sin is one of forgiveness rather than of anger and indignation. On the contrary, its purpose is to effect a consciousness of God's displeasure and suffering as a result of sin—a consciousness which is the indispensable condition of forgiveness and reconciliation. 27

It has already been indicated that Biblical Personalism holds the ethical relationship between man and God to be the constitutive and distinguishing characteristic of human personality. It must now be pointed out that this relationship is dependent upon and follows directly from certain other distinctively human

26 Kohnstamm's conception of the function of pedagogical discipline is described in some detail in volume 11, pp. 368-283.
characteristics and potentialities which admit of arrangement into three levels: least distinctively human, since it may be questioned whether it does not also appear in rudimentary form among the higher animals, is the level of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness not only yields each person an insight into the individuality of his own experience but it is also the indispensable condition of true memory and deliberate planning—activities by means of which the individual is able to effect a relative unity and stability within his private experience. More important is the level of awarenesses of theoretical, ethical and aesthetic norms and of the ability to evaluate in terms of these norms. But most important and distinctive of all is the level of philosophic and religious experience, in which man consciously assumes and formulates an attitude not merely to some phase of reality or some sphere of value but to reality as a whole. This "absolute" experience presupposes both of the lower levels of distinctively human behavior, just as these in turn presuppose patterns of behavior which man shares with animals and even lower forms of existence. The highest and most distinctive of human activities is therefore to be regarded as the apex of a pyramidal arrangement of activities within creation, ranging from the most pervasive and simple—the inorganic processes—as a substructure, through increasingly more complex but also more restricted organic and psychical processes, to issue finally in fully developed philosophical and religious thinking. 28

The favored position which man undeniably occupies in reality,

28 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.11, pp.43ff.
because of the unique functions which he exercises, has, says Kohnstamm, been over-emphasized by those idealistic schools of philosophy which regard man as: "one with the creative power of the universe, in fact as the only true bearer of its deepest intentions." In contrast to this view, in which human personality is enthroned at the expense of minimizing divine personality or relinquishing it altogether, Biblical Personalism regards human personality as possessing only a derived value and significance. It holds man's position of supremacy in the universe to follow solely from the fact that in him there is reflected something of the character of divine personality not found in the subhuman world. On the other hand man's supreme position in creation is under-emphasized in romantic personalism where the distinctions which God has laid down in creation are neglected, the ideal for humanity being conceived as the achievement of a feeling of complete unity with all living things. Similarly, and even more grossly, man's distinctive position is denied by all forms of impersonalism, whether these be materialistic or idealistic.

Over against all such levelling points of view, Biblical Personalism "regards the distinctions which are manifested in creation as neither matters of chance nor of arbitrary wilfulness but as designed to bring about a richer harmony." Creation is a hierarchy in which, in virtue of his supreme position, man has a correspondingly unique and difficult task. He is called upon to cooperate with God in restoring the greatest possible order and happiness in a world whose original orderliness has been disturbed

as a result of man's sin. Man's cooperation with God is not, however, to be interpreted as a means toward reconciliation with God; it is rather the result and sign of a reconciliation already effected. Further, this human task is not an end in itself. It aims ultimately neither at the production of order in the subhuman world nor at a resolution of conflicts in individual human life or even within human society, but at peace with God through fulfillment of His will.  

Biblical Personalism definitely opposes the doctrine, held by many Christians, of universal individual immortality. It holds this doctrine to lack Scriptural substantiation either directly or by implication. Even, further, it regards the doctrine as involving consequences out of harmony with the Scriptural conception of man and of his place in creation. It is by no means self-evident that because man is conceived as God's creation his life should never come to an end. A God capable of giving life is likewise capable of annihilating it. All the current Christian arguments for human immortality are due to the influence of extra-Scriptural, chiefly Platonic, speculations based on unbiblical conceptions of the human "soul" as possessing permanent intrinsic value and dignity. Scripture definitely contradicts any appeal to the intrinsic value of man as an argument for his immortality. For it teaches that, because of his sinfulness, all good that man receives is a gift of God rather than a reward or an inherent right. Traditional Christianity itself often insists on human

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32 Ibid., pp. 60f.
33 Ibid., p. 363.
sinfulness to the point of describing it as "total depravity." But that view of human nature is in need of reinterpretation in order to make it conform both to Scripture and to human experience. It may be admitted that every act of man involves some imperfection either in its motives or in its consequences; and it may be admitted further that even in so far as an act is good, this goodness is not due to man alone but is made possible in part by factors beyond his control. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny completely man's ability to perform any good whatsoever without denying at the same time the cardinal Scriptural teaching of human responsibility.  

It is clearly a contradiction to insist on man's total depravity and yet to base one's hope for immortality explicitly or implicitly upon the intrinsic worth of the human soul.

The doctrine of the immortality of individual human souls, Kohnstamm regards as presupposing a crude conception of soul and body as distinct, because separable, entities whose relation to each other is to be described in terms either of psycho-physical parallelism or of interactionism. He considers both of these views of the psycho-physical problem as so full of insuperable difficulties that it is impossible even to state either of them precisely without making its absurdity manifest. Psycho-physical parallelism, by its denial of the teleological function of consciousness in the adaptation of man to his environment and by its general implication of a purposeless duplication of processes, is definitely out of harmony with a view of the world as

the creation of an intelligent deity. The theory represents an attempt to force psychical phenomena into the alien categories of a mechanistic view of the inorganic world. For if it is taken seriously as demanding a thoroughgoing one-to-one correlation of physical with psychical processes, psycho-physical parallelism leads to an elementaristic conception of psychical phenomena which is contradicted by the independently achieved results of modern psychological investigation.36 Similarly, interactionism if it is formulated in terms of exact causal relations between elementary physical and psychical processes cannot be substantiated; and if it asserts no more than the existence of vague and general causal relations between physical and psychical phenomena it cannot lay claim to the status of a scientific theory. It should candidly be admitted that our present knowledge of psychical phenomena is insufficient to justify our description of their relations to each other or to physical phenomena as causal. We are able only to determine roughly a relationship of functional dependence between physical and psychical phenomena such that for certain quantitative variations of the physical series there appear corresponding but primarily qualitative variations in the psychical series.37

According to Kohnstamm the difficulties inherent in both psycho-physical parallelism and interactionism may be obviated by a recognition that "the distinction between soul and body is a teleological, not an ontological, one."38 Soul and body are not

36 and 37 Kohnstamm, op. cit., pp. 159ff.

38 Ibid., p. 163.
actually separate or separable entities but only names for each of two different aspects of all human behavior. The concrete unit of human behavior is a psycho-physical act. Every act includes an inner or psychical aspect which may be described as "a purposeful striving for expression" and an outer or physical aspect consisting of the bodily expression of this striving. Hence soul and body cannot exist independently of each other because they represent mere abstractions from an underlying indivisible unity. If that be admitted, it follows that with the annihilation of the human body the soul also comes to an end. According to Biblical Personalism, this will be the fate of the vast majority of human individuals. Any doctrine of eternal punishment is to be rejected as incompatible with God's love, as well as with His holiness which demands that He should annihilate rather than perpetuate evil. Thus, finally, Kohnstamm appears to accept the view, which he regards as in accordance with Scriptural eschatology that immortality is not universal but is to be limited to a group of the descendants of the present human race and a select few who will be resurrected from the dead to live in a transformed creation.

Theory of Values

It has been seen that Biblical Personalism does not accredit permanent intrinsic value to human personality. Its general theory of values still awaits detailed and systematic development

in two further volumes to be added to the series: Creator and Creation, the first to deal with ethics, especially in its social aspects, and the second with problems of aesthetics. Hence it is impossible to do more here than to outline certain general features of the ethical theory implied in the criticisms directed by Biblical Personalism against the ethics of Kantian rationalism and of modern humanism; and to indicate his central attitude with reference to aesthetics.

Kohnstamm sums up the fundamental assumptions of the rationalistic ethics of Kant and his followers in four brief propositions:

1. "There are a number of fundamental ethical principles whose authority must be recognized by every rational being.

2. For every definite act it is possible for rational beings to determine absolutely whether or not it harmonizes with the system of fundamental principles.

3. It is possible to attain to this rational insight even before the act in question is performed.

4. The rational being who has achieved this insight possesses also the freedom to act in accordance with it."

Kohnstamm categorically denies the first of these propositions on the ground that no one set of ethical principles binding upon all men can be determined. He claims that it is possible to show on the contrary that there are different sets of ethical axioms upon the basis of which one can develop various systems of acts equally compatible with each other and with the axioms of the set. Moreover, the concept of rationality, since it is concerned only with the formal relations obtaining between propositions, and

41 Kohnstamm seeks here to formulate only those assumptions of Kantian ethics which are basic to its rationalistic conception of the practical determination of conduct.

42 Kohnstamm, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 327.
not with their content, does not necessitate the acceptance or rejection of any ethical principle whatsoever. It must also be denied that there are any definite ethical acts, for "there is no logical procedure by means of which it is possible to determine what occurrence is to be considered a unitary object of ethical judgment." Moral experience testifies that the object of an adequate ethical judgment is never an isolated act but always a larger whole including, in addition to the act itself, many of its antecedents as well as many of its actual and potential consequences. But due to the infinite complexity of the problem presented by the number and interrelations of the ethically relevant antecedents and consequences of any given act, it becomes impossible to determine rationally the limits of any "unitary object of ethical judgment." Likewise it must be insisted against the second and third of the above propositions that the determination of one's duty, i.e., the decision as to which act one is to perform in a given situation presents further problems of a complexity with which reason is unable to deal. This follows both from the character of ethical acts themselves and from the character of the world in which they must be performed.

Ethical acts are not the self-defined entities that rationalistic ethics assumes them to be, but are vague and indefinite in extent and therefore not amenable to neat classifications as consistent or inconsistent with any given set of ethical principles. Added to this is the fact that every ethical act is unique in a

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43 Kohnstamm, op. cit., vol.1, p.327ff.
44 Ibid., pp.330f.
In summary, our experiments have shown that when certain conditions are met, the system behaves as expected. This is particularly useful for applications where high accuracy and reliability are required. Additionally, the simplicity of the model makes it easier to implement in practical scenarios. Future work will focus on optimizing the parameters and expanding the range of applications.
sense far more important than that in which every entity whatsoever may be said to be unique. The latter consists only of a difference from every other entity in some respect which for practical purposes may often be neglected. But the uniqueness of an ethical act is all-important for its essential character and may be the determining factor in the practical decision as to whether or not it is in harmony with a set of general ethical principles. As a result we find that, so far as we can determine, it is true of every act that in part it "fits in with" a given set of ethical principles and in part it fails to do so. Thus, continues Kohnstamm: "even if in a rational world it were possible to make an unequivocal decision regarding a proposed act in finite time, it does not follow that this is possible also in our world which is irrational and sinful." "But in an irrational world . . . we do not always choose the closest possible approximation to truth . . . but must deviate from it in the interests of the matter at hand and of the hearer." He concludes, therefore, that "logically insoluble conflicts are of the very essence of all morality."47

Immediate decisions as to ethical problems must often be made and in practice are made. The "organ" by means of which we are able to make such decisions is variously called moral sensibility, ethical intuition, immediate awareness of moral values, etc. But it is best designated simply as 'conscience,' provided we do not interpret this term in the popular sense in which it is regarded as exercising only the negative function of warning

46 Kohnstamm, op. cit., pp.332ff.  
47 Ibid., p.334.
against moral error.\textsuperscript{48}

Since Biblical Personalism accepts with Kant that moral obligation implies the freedom to perform one's duty, the position implied in the foregoing argument may be summarized as follows:

"Moral action is not completely determined by the past alone (of ourselves plus the rest of the world) nor by logical lawfulness alone, nor by these two factors in conjunction . . . which are at best only co-determining circumstances. The essential and deciding factor is 'conscience' which can be reduced to neither of these types of lawfulness. . . . A Person's conscience cannot be forced either by changes in inner or outer natural factors nor by logical demonstration nor by both at once."\textsuperscript{49}

But it must not be concluded from the fact that the decisions of conscience are neither explicable in terms of psychological or other natural laws nor capable of determination by logical demonstration, that they are therefore to be regarded as purely arbitrary and incapable of being influenced in any way. On the contrary, though conscience can in no way be forced it can be trained in various directions, i.e., the ability to make certain socially approved moral judgments can be developed provided there is cooperation on the part of the subject. Such moral training depends upon the awakening of awe, reverence, and love for actual moral values as exhibited especially in divine and human personality.\textsuperscript{50}

Kohnstamm maintains that this presupposition of all education in morality is contradicted by Kant's conception of moral autonomy, which he takes as implying that the exercise of any influence

\textsuperscript{48} Kohnstamm, \textit{op. cit.}, vol.1, pp.334ff.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}, p.341.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.342ff.
upon a "practical" judgment destroys its autonomy and thereby its ethical character. "If by the autonomy of morality Kant had meant no more than the fact that morality is grounded in authority and not in force and that authority is always something that we must affirm as in harmony with our innermost being, no criticism of this term would be called for." But "Kant means by autonomy in ethics, that the will and moral judgment must develop apart from experience of reverence, without contact with those who cause us to experience reverence." That conception of moral autonomy, urges Kohnstamm, is pedagogically as well as psychologically untenable. 51

Humanistic theories of morality, however they may diverge in matters of detail, are essentially in agreement on the following basic viewpoints:

1. Moral evil is not a positive concept, but is to be interpreted as the inevitable failure of any person to achieve the perfect harmony of all his conduct with moral ideals, i.e., as a shortcoming.

2. These moral ideals and the laws of conduct which are based upon them are generated wholly within human societies, and their authority is dependent upon a recognition of their instrumentality toward furthering human welfare.

3. Conscience is the sufficient and infallible means of determining the consonance of any particular course of action with the claims of morality.

4. The ultimate moral ideal for the individual is the "resolution of inner conflict." 52

All four of these principles are indirect conflict with the view of morality which Biblical Personalism, in consistency with

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51 Kohnstamm, op. cit., p.345.

its fundamental assumptions, must inevitably adopt. It holds that moral evil is the positive and deliberate opposition of the will of human beings to the will of their Creator. This will of God is revealed to man both in an immanent or indirect and in a transcendent or direct form. The former finds expression in the gradual evolution of moral insights within human societies generally and in the moral laws in which these insights are formulated, while the latter is embodied in Scriptural and ecclesiastical tradition but especially in the immediate and concrete guidance for their conduct experienced by those who yield themselves to the direct influences of the divine will. Conscience, as a function confined to a susceptibility to the more general and indirect revelation of the divine will, cannot be regarded as either a sufficient or an infallible guide for conduct. It must be supplemented and on occasion corrected by the more direct and detailed revelation of God's will. The moral ideal for individuals is the resolution of all conflicts between their actual conduct and the will of God as thus revealed.53

Any ethical theory which describes the moral life only in terms of subjective attitudes may rightly be charged with abstraction. Completeness demands that it should also indicate what it considers to be the positive expressions of these attitudes in actual life. Hence Biblical Personalism, though as a specific form of Christian ethics it insists on the paramount importance of an attitude of love to God and to one's fellow men, is prepared to give an account of the concrete ways in which this

attitude must be manifested. Christian love is not to be interpreted as an effeminate and inactive sentimentality; it inevitably issues in an active life of strenuous service. But since it is universal in its scope it is not to be identified with altruism. The Christian moral ideal, contrary to a prevalent opinion, does not call for an expenditure of the life of the individual in the service of others alone, but recognizes a duty also to one's self. The law of God, as demanding that one should love one's neighbor as one's self, does not exclude self love. In fact devotion to one's own interests in addition to its justification as of importance in its own right, is demanded also as a means toward the offering of efficient and worthwhile service to others. Thus, even to seek power, wealth or high position is not in itself reprehensible; it is to be condemned only when it becomes either an end in itself or a means of personal aggrandizement. But the most effective service cannot result from the development of specific personal powers or instruments in isolation. What is of supreme importance is the integration of all of each individual's abilities into a unitary pattern under the domination of a comprehensive ideal for his life. This can be achieved only through sincerity, loyalty and steadfast devotion to this ideal.

Morality is, therefore, at least in part a matter of individual responsibility. It cannot be exhausted in mere obedience and submission to external authority, though this too, in so far as it is in harmony with the supreme authority of God's will as one has honestly and painstakingly interpreted it for one's self, is

enjoined by Christian ethics. Whenever political or social authority demands conduct not compatible with the revealed will of God submission must give way to open opposition, even though martyrdom be the result. Love to God and one's fellow men demands the cheerful acceptance of one's responsibilities, the bearing of suffering with patience and fortitude, the exercise of truthfulness, chastity and temperance. Though this ideal excludes all forms of hedonism as one-sided and inadequate, it equally contradicts the renunciation of pleasures except when this renunciation is necessary to the achievement of greater goods. Asceticism and especially celibacy are to be condemned as inadequate conceptions of the full scope of Christian morality or at best as of only temporary value in the historical development of this morality. A well-rounded view of Christian life demands acceptance and utilization of all the potentialities for good which God has placed in creation. Among these, potentialities for the realization of physical values occupy an important place. Hence bodily recreation, pleasures of sense, the beauties of nature, etc., are not to be despised but to be enjoyed and cultivated. 55

According to Biblical Personalism beauty and ugliness are objective features of reality; they cannot be reduced to mere subjective reactions nor can the one be interpreted as the absence of the other. Both are positive qualities of real things. 56

But while beauty is a permanent expression or reflection of an essential characteristic of God Himself, ugliness is an adventitious circumstance—a result of the disharmony in Creation

55 Kohnstamm, op. cit., pp.271ff and passim.
56 Ibid., vol.1, pp.346f.
occasioned by sin and destined to be annihilated. The capacity for the apprehension of beauty varies greatly from person to person. It depends upon the possession of a unique mode of awareness, distinct alike from conscience and from the intellect, which may well be designated as "empathic intuition" or with Spranger as "a peculiar organ for understanding the world." 57 Most human beings apprehend beauty only after it has been pointed out to them and fixed in a more easily available medium by those who possess the capacity for the apprehension of beauty to an unusually high degree—the poets and artists. "Artists are, therefore, 'the points of influx,' through which aesthetic value enters and is actualized in empirical reality, so that it now becomes accessible also to those who without this mediating function could not penetrate to the essence of beauty." 58

The basic principle of personalistic aesthetics is "that every truly great artist reveals not something general but something unique—that aspect of beauty which he alone can approach." 59 Between the various individual aesthetic insights there can be no genuine conflict; rather they supplement each other. Conflicts exist only between real and pretended insights; the latter will finally be eliminated by the judgment of history while the former alone will stand. A much more serious problem is involved in the conflicts between aesthetic and other types of value. Most of these result from a failure to recognize the relative autonomy of the various realms of revelation. No one gifted with a high

58 Ibid., pp. 350f.
59 Ibid., pp. 351.
degree of intellectual insight may for that reason alone presume
to speak with authority in matters of conscience, nor may the
artist dictate to the scientist. Nevertheless, the various modes
of apprehension of reality cannot be wholly separate since they
deal with various aspects of the same object, and are themselves
functions of a unitary subject. For this very reason conflicts
between intellectual, moral and aesthetic values cannot be regarded
as final, though complete harmony may never actually be attained. 60

Since Biblical Personalism regards personality as the key to
reality it considers those forms of art as highest in value which
are revelatory of the nature of man. Sculpture rises to its highest
level when it portrays the human body; aesthetics at its best
serves man's worship of God; painting is less characteristically
concerned with man but especially Italian paintings have reached
their highest point in the portrayal of human forms. The greatest
achievement in painting is found, in Kohnstamm's opinion, when the
entire history of a human life is represented as in the series of
Rembrandt's self-portraits. Music seeks to express human emotions;
while the highest form of all art—literature—employs human
language to give the fullest possible expression to the infinitely
varied aspects of human personality. 61


61 Ibid., pp.358ff.
Chapter VIII

COMPARISON AND CRITICAL CONSIDERATION OF CRITICAL AND BIBLICAL PERSONALISM

The obvious and important differences between the Critical Personalism of William Stern and the Biblical Personalism of Philipp Kohnstamm should not be allowed to obscure the fact that these two philosophies nevertheless exhibit many significant, though relatively general, points of similarity. Stern and Kohnstamm are fundamentally in agreement first of all in their conception of the task of philosophy as consisting primarily in the speculative construction of a comprehensive view of the world and of human life, i.e., a metaphysical system, and only secondarily in the critical examination of the assumptions and categories of the various sciences or the clarification of detailed philosophical problems. Both regard "critical philosophy," in the sense in which C. D. Broad distinguished it from "speculative philosophy," as subservient to the elaboration of a systematic scheme of thought in which all the phenomena of human experience may find a place and thereby an explanation..
Yet both Stern and Kohnstamm explicitly deny all claim not only to the completeness but also to the absolute validity of their respective systems of metaphysics. They agree not only that the development of a fully adequate view of the whole of reality is a task not as yet accomplished but also that this ideal is in the very nature of the case beyond human attainment. Kohnstamm explicitly indicates his agreement with Stern that every system of metaphysics is necessarily based on certain undemonstrable assumptions whose acceptance is a matter of faith, and that therefore every system of metaphysics is in part dogmatic.¹ They are in accord also in maintaining that when these a-theoretical presuppositions are openly acknowledged and formulated the dogmatism involved is no longer reprehensible.

Stern and Kohnstamm evince a common interest in the problem of a typology of philosophies and share the belief that a classification of this kind is of value in dialectically establishing their respective philosophical positions. It is plain that in the philosophy of Stern as well as in that of Kohnstamm there are to be found two separate typologies only one of which is in each case explicitly recognized as such. Thus in addition to Stern's openly avowed classification of world views into: Naive Personalism, Impersonalism, and Critical Personalism, there is also an implicit classification of philosophies of life as characterized by ipsification, de-ipsification, or introception, i.e., as manifesting egoism, altruism, or a synthesis of these two attitudes.

Similarly in Kohnstamm's thought there is to be found in addition to the typology of domination, absorption, and love, to which he calls attention and which is in spite of his protests to the contrary primarily a classification of philosophies of life, also an implicit typology of world-views including: common sense, deterministic monism, and the twentieth century view of the world as a structured whole admitting of a limited freedom and spontaneity.

There is an obvious parallelism between both of these classifications of world-views as also between both of these classifications of philosophies of life. For Naive Personalism corresponds closely to the common sense view of the world, and Impersonalism to deterministic monism, while Critical Personalism shows many resemblances to the third type of world-view described and accepted by Kohnstamm. Likewise Stern's dialectical triad: ipsification, de-ipsification and introception, is closely paralleled by Kohnstamm's three fundamental attitudes: domination, absorption, and love.

In the elaboration of their respective philosophies both Stern and Kohnstamm give evidence of an appreciation of the achievements of pre-scientific thought. Thus Stern in his dialectical establishment of Critical Personalism recognizes Naive Personalism, which is identical with the common sense or pre-scientific view of the world, as embodying many genuine philosophical insights which he wishes to preserve and to incorporate within his own system. Kohnstamm is even more emphatic in his insistence that the common sense view of the world is essentially correct, and that it is in need of refinement rather than radical correction.
Their common designation as personalistic philosophies naturally arouses the expectation that also in the content of these philosophies some fundamental similarities will be evident. This expectation is not wholly disappointed, for Critical Personalism and Biblical Personalism are in accord in their common opposition to impersonalism, which they agree in interpreting as any view which neglects or denies the objective existence of structures i.e., of discrete entities of various types within reality. Hence both engage in an extensive and detailed polemic against materialistic monism and abstract idealism.

Positively, therefore, Critical Personalism and Biblical Personalism are agreed that the world is to be regarded pluralistically since there must be recognized to exist within it a manifold of structurally unique entities possessing a real though limited independence of all other entities. Neither Critical Personalism nor Biblical Personalism may, however, be described as radically pluralistic for both seek to bring about a unification in their view of reality, Stern through his hierarchical monism and Kohnstamm through his view of the world as the creation of a personal deity.

There is a striking similarity in the views of Stern and Kohnstamm as to the psycho-physical problem. Both reject the traditional conception of body and soul as two separate but interacting entities or as independent but parallel series of processes, in favor of a view which regards physical and psychical processes as two different modes of functioning of an underlying reality.

In theory of knowledge the affinities of Critical and Biblical Personalism are apparent throughout. They agree that
scientific knowledge is never more than an approximation to an exhaustive comprehension of the full nature of its object. For Stern the transcendental object of knowledge is the "port" never reached by "endless voyages of discovery"; for Kohnstamm it is the unattainable "limit" of a series of approximations. Hence both criticize a strict correspondence or "copy" theory as incapable of furnishing a practicable criterion of truth. Closely connected with this is their common interpretation of sense data as appearances of underlying Dinge-an-Sich, rather than as actual unmodified constituents of material objects.

In Kohnstamm's writings there are various direct references to Stern's Critical Personalism in which he praises the systematic character of this philosophy and its successful polemic against impersonalism. Nevertheless he criticizes it in its positive development as an example of "romantic" personalism—"the greatest enemy" of Christian personalism. Kohnstamm rightly sees that the very similarity of Critical Personalism to his own philosophy in many important respects renders the possibility of the confusion of the fundamental issues on which they diverge all the greater. He agrees with the usual criticism of Stern's use of the term "Person" as doing violence to its general usage in a more restricted sense not only in everyday language but in philosophical terminology as well. He complains that this violation of language in which "centuries of experience" is embodied, has led to misunderstanding not only of Stern's own position but of personalism

generally. Pointing out that no other philosopher has so used the term Person; he asserts that Stern himself fails to use it consistently and is furthermore obliged to use the derivative term "personality" in a wholly different sense.  

The inadequacy of Stern's conception of the meaning of the term 'person' is evident from his very attempt to give it a formal definition. According to Kohnstamm the essential nature of personality cannot be defined, since all definition consists of an enumeration of general characteristics while the most important fact about every person is that it possesses an inexhaustible wealth of qualities which elude classification in a finite number of general categories. Hence if personality is to be comprehended at all this must take place in an immediate intuition. 

The validity of this criticism is open to doubt for the following two reasons. In the first place it implies too strict a conception of the nature of definition. Definition, according to Kohnstamm's own admission, need not necessarily consist of an exhaustive enumeration of the characteristics of its object; it suffices in many instances to enumerate only a number of these characteristics sufficient to distinguish the object to be defined unambiguously from all other objects. But more seriously, Kohnstamm seems to be confusing the definition of a particular person with the radically different question of the definition of the concept of 'person' generally. Even if the impossibility of the former be

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4 Ibid., vol.11, pp.73ff.

5 Ibid., vol.1, pp.373ff.

6 Ibid., vol.1, p.374.
granted, nothing is implied as to the possibility or impossibility of the latter.

Anything to which a definition applies must, Kohnstamm maintains, be vastly different from a person. In fact with only a slight modification Stern's definition of person does, in Kohnstamm's opinion, have an objective reference. But it applies to an individual generally, not to a person in the accepted sense of the term. An individual may be defined as: "an existent being, which in spite of the multiplicity of its parts, forms a real, unique and intrinsically valuable unity, and as such constitutes a concrete whole." This definition would include both living and lifeless individuals. The living individuals are distinguished by their "unitary goal-striving activity," and the spontaneous individuals among them by "self-activity." The word 'person' ought now to be reserved for a subclass of spontaneous individuals, namely those whose intrinsic value is ethical value. "Only those (individuals) to whom ethical predicates may be applied are 'persons.'" Hence personality essentially includes consciousness, will and responsibility. In this criticism, which in the main seems cogent, Kohnstamm is nevertheless guilty of an arbitrary restriction of individuality to intrinsically valuable and composite wholes. He states expressly that for him "person and individual are both axiological categories; presupposing value," and implies that there are no simple individuals. Here he seems to have been considerably influenced by Stern.

The most serious of all the criticisms that Kohnstamm directs

7Kohnstamm, op. cit., vol.1, p.372. 8Ibid., p.373.
9Ibid., pp.373f; Kohnstamm, "Types and Meanings of Personalism,"The Personalist, vol.18, no.2.
against Stern's use of the term Person is that this term and its correlative Thing (Sache) are so defined that they are not in fact mutually exclusive as Stern claims them to be. He points out there are entities which possess some of the characteristic features of both Persons and Things. This is true of all individuals which do not exhibit spontaneity, for these possess the Personal qualities of unity-in-multiplicity, uniqueness and intrinsic value and yet are Thing-like in that they do not achieve a "unitary goal-directed self-activity." As examples of such individuals Kohnstamm cites particular natural and artificial objects of aesthetic appreciation.

Finding Stern guilty of too wide an application of the term "Person," Kohnstamm is equally averse to his too restricted application of the term "personality" to human beings alone. The implicated denial of divine personality, is, in Kohnstamm's view, out of harmony with the fact of religious experience. Yet somewhat questionably Kohnstamm maintains that Stern's idea of God is not a logical derivative of the concept of Person, but the expression of an intuitive insight. The idea is rejected by Kohnstamm because it is incomplete rather than because it is positively erroneous. Stern's concept of God is inadequate principally because it is devoid of unique content. Expressed in theological terminology, he holds that Stern is correct in insisting on the immanence of God but wrong in denying His transcendence and thereby His differentiation from the world which He has created. Because of Stern's failure to recognize the personality of God

Kohnstamm describes Critical Personalism as "only semi-personalistic." Only in his philosophy of nature is Stern thoroughly personalistic. In his philosophy of religion he is impersonalistic because he fails to understand the peculiarly personal nature of its source—religious experience. Holding all true morality to be dependent upon a recognition of moral standards as expressing the will of a personal deity, he criticizes Stern's ethics too as impersonalistic. In fact he considers Stern's value theory to be impersonalistic throughout because its fundamental category—introception—is a relation between man and abstract ideas.

Kohnstamm finally asserts that Critical Personalism as a whole inevitably remains unconvincing to modern students of philosophy because of its inadequate development of certain entire regions of the system—notably its epistemology, its philosophical anthropology and its value theory. In regard to the epistemological foundation of Critical Personalism Kohnstamm claims that the few brief and dogmatic statements with which Stern contents himself, though in the main they are correct, cannot be expected to bring about a general acceptance of personalistic in place of the monistic and mechanical categories still widely prevalent in modern thought. Critical Personalism's doctrine of man and value theory are to be criticized as too abstract. They give general principles but fail to show how these apply in actual life.

15 Kohnstamm, "Types and Meanings of Personalism."
17 Ibid., pp.103f.
is open to question whether these criticisms of Critical Personalism really have much force. For Stern would readily admit that, as a pioneer giving only a preliminary outline sketch of a new system of thought, he must let large parts of his system await more detailed elaboration by specialists in each field. This is undoubtedly the explanation of the cursory attention that Stern gives to epistemology proper. Kohnstamm's criticism of Stern's anthropology and value-theory as abstract is misleading: Stern's work in these fields is as concrete as one could expect within the scope of his writings.

Besides these explicit criticisms there are many others contained in Kohnstamm's philosophy by way of implication. Thus Kohnstamm's conception of rival philosophies whether these be contemporary or successive as supplementary partial insights into the nature of objective reality involves a criticism of Stern's position that Critical Personalism by itself achieves a comprehensive and consistent explanation for the cultural phenomena of the present. Stern's philosophy, so Kohnstamm implies, has been indicated to be lacking in comprehensiveness because of its inability to account for Christian religious experience, and to be lacking in consistency as a result of its defective terminology.

Kohnstamm's detailed attempt to demonstrate that the newer scientific description of nature substantiates his theistic position implies a direct criticism of Stern's allegation that in so far as Naive Personalism takes account of the scientific

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18 Prefatory Remarks (Begleitwort) accompanying volumes 1, 11, and 111, of Person und Sache. In volume 1, pp.xi, xii. Cf. also Foreword to first edition of Vol.11, p.xi.
achievements of Impersonalism it does so at the expense of its own integrity and consistency. Kohnstamm considers his own philosophy to be a concrete refutation of any such polemic against Naive Personalism, and would consider Stern's criticism as applying only to the crudest forms of "fundamentalism." His account of the mind-body relation involves a criticism of Stern as ascribing to theism a dualistic view which it does not necessarily take. Since Kohnstamm regards the soul not as an entity separable from the body but only a name for the sum total of various complex modes of functioning of the person as a whole, he insists that theism is not, as Stern alleges, logically committed to an acceptance of the immortality of the soul. In fact he would maintain that even if the soul be conceived as a simple entity separable from the body it would not be necessary within the framework of theism to affirm its essential immortality.

Kohnstamm's primary concern in his description of the world as God's Creation is to exhibit its differentiation into many and widely variant classes of objects each consisting of individual entities exhibiting unique properties. Hence he would oppose the general tendency inherent in Stern's widening of the concept of Person to minimize the essential differences exhibited by the various types of entity which he includes under this term. He would insist that these differences, e.g., between the animate and the inanimate, between life and mind, and between conceptual or ideal and real objects, are objective data of greater significance than the general and in part artificial similarities which Stern professes to find throughout reality. Kohnstamm implicitly
suggests his agreement with an opinion expressed by H. Adolph\textsuperscript{19} that this undue tendency toward generalization follows from Stern's domination by a strongly biological point of view characteristic of 19th century thought. Taking the concept of a biological organism as central Stern sought to apply both to inorganic things and to social groups the peculiarly biological categories of unity-in-multiplicity, self-preservation and self-development. As a result he partially obliterated the essential difference from biological organisms, of Persons both above and below them in the hierarchy.\textsuperscript{20}

Kohnstamm's repeated hints at the existence of a tendency toward generalization in Stern's philosophy with a resulting neglect of essential distinctions in reality are undoubtedly well justified, as is also his contention that many of the objects Stern "hypostatized" as Persons are only conceptual wholes.\textsuperscript{21} And in substantiation of his view of the origin of this generalizing tendency in Stern's thought we may cite a relevant passage from Stern's own description of the genesis of his method. Discussing his point of departure in volume 1 of "Person und Sache" Stern wrote:

"In particular, it was the sphere of life-processes (that is to say, the sphere of biological problems in the widest sense) that served me as such an initial point. For this realm was in close relationship with the inorganic natural objects of physico-chemistry on the one hand; with human life, and thus with psychological and ethical matters, on the other; and, finally, with the super-individual life-processes of culture and history; and it was possible to

\textsuperscript{20} Kohnstamm, \textit{Creator and Creation}, vol.1, p.259.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.364ff.
begin simply with organic processes and gradually take in all other domains of the cosmos."

Stern admitted his "choice of the dichotomy of 'person' and 'thing'" itself to be an evidence of his biological motivation when he pointed out that "these two concepts originally took their color from that alternative which has dominated philosophy since the classical age: mechanism / teleology. The question at issue has always been, whether the living individual is to be taken as a mechanical complex of all its parts or as the bearer of a purposive immanent activity." But he contended that "the question had long since ceased to be confined within the bounds of the biological realm, and had become a problem of natural causality as such."23

Nevertheless there is much justification for the view that this theory of the derivation of Stern's fundamental procedure is in need of supplementation, especially in so far as it aims to serve as an explanation of his failure to be impressed by the significance of conscious phenomena as distinctive of a definite level of reality. The latter seems to be due equally to two other factors: the exaggerated fear of the naivete of anthropomorphism which prompted him to substitute for consciousness a psycho-physically neutral criterion of personality, and his speculative acceptance of panpsychism.

In regarding the world as the creation of an intelligent personal deity whose purposes it expresses in its static structure as well as in the course of its historical development, Kohnstamm clearly employs as his fundamental category of philosophical explanation the "intention teleology" which Stern rejected as

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22Stern, Autobiography, pp.373f.
naively anthropomorphic. Stern implicitly admitted that this category may be properly employed when it is limited to the explanation of certain types of human behavior and that its application to the world as a whole may leave room for immanent teleology as the product of the will of a divine Purposer and for mechanical uniformities as the fixed means adopted by the deity for the realization of His purposes. This admission is clearly regarded by Kohnstamm as robbing Stern's criticism of intention teleology of much of its force. The question at issue now becomes largely a matter of relative emphasis. Stern's universal application of the category of immanent teleology seems to Kohnstamm to be an exaggeration of the role of a principle of explanation of undoubted methodological value, and Stern's reduction of all mechanical lawfulness to by-products of this type of teleological functioning to be both unnecessary and artificial. Kohnstamm would regard Stern's rigid limitation of the scope of conscious teleology as due to his biological bias as well as to a failure to take into account the implications of religious experience.

As a result of their diverging conceptions of teleology Stern and Kohnstamm come into conflict also in their views regarding the problem of evil. Stern interprets evil as impersonal dysteleology—an epiphenomenon of a multiplicity of conflicting unconscious strivings for incompatible goals. This conception is definitely contradicted by Kohnstamm's express assertion that all evil is either identical with or the direct consequence of a deliberate opposition of human desires and volitions to the will.

of a personal deity. But even this opposition itself is not regarded by Kohnstamm as an accidental phenomenon, for though its actual occurrence was not willed by God, yet God consciously planned for its possibility by endowing human will with a limited degree of autonomy. Accordingly Kohnstamm would criticize Stern's conception of evil as purely naturalistic and as by its very nature incapable of taking into account the most significant aspect of the whole problem at issue, namely: What is the distinctive character of moral evil? For Kohnstamm would insist that the concept of moral evil demands a recognition of the supreme authority of a personal being to Whom man is responsible for his actions and Who is the source of all norms of morality. By its description of God as the totality of reality Whose personality is wholly unlike man's, Critical Personalism precludes the possibility of regarding this being as the object of man's responsibility and the source of moral law.

In spite of their mutual recognition of the occurrence of irreducible evil both philosophers agree on a fundamentally optimistic view of the world. Stern maintained that although the goals which Persons strive for are not always actually attained yet frustration is the exception rather than the rule. He revolted against "the doctrine of pessimism: that all life is merely a short episode in an otherwise lifeless, purely physical world," and accepted on faith that "life not only maintains itself but evolves higher and higher forms."24 Likewise Kohnstamm speaks of "harmony" as "the essential characteristic" of nature and

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"disharmony" as "an incidental circumstance . . . which does not fit with the plan upon which the whole is built." But in the grounds of their optimism Stern and Kohnstamm are profoundly at variance. Kohnstamm would regard any optimism as unjustified except as based on a conviction of the goodness and power of God and a consequent faith that the course of the universe will under His guidance lead to a desirable end. Hence Stern's optimism is in Kohnstamm's opinion unfounded and artificial since there is no guarantee that the goals attained by Stern's Persons are in conformity with the real interests of humanity.

Occasionally in his writings as well as in private conversation Stern expressed his belief that both his philosophy as a whole as also his views on particular philosophical problems were to a considerable extent original. He regarded his indebtedness to other philosophers to be only incidental to his independent development of a unique point of view in respect to the fundamental problem at issue in metaphysics and to his construction of a "new" system of philosophy on the basis of this unique formulation of the fundamental alternatives in philosophical explanation. In fact his reference to other philosophers is usually by way of criticism and reaction. He hoped to become the founder of a new school of philosophy distinct from all previous trends and traditions.

It must indeed be acknowledged that in Stern's philosophy there are original and suggestive insights, but it must be evident to readers of this dissertation that Stern's "new" fundamental problem in philosophy is not really new and that he has failed to

25 Kohnstamm, Creator and Creation, vol.1, p.84.
recognize the full extent of the influences upon him of the work of other thinkers in the detailed elaboration of his system. Stern's conception of the basic question at issue in one's interpretation of reality was anticipated by Aristotle who like Stern understood it as the alternative between conceiving reality in terms of teleological wholes or of goal-less accidental aggregates. Aristotle's polemic was directed against pre-Socratic cosmologists and Atomists but also against the abstractness of Platonism, in a manner very similar to Stern's indictment of various forms of Impersonalism. Anticipatory of Stern's Person concept was also Aristotle's biologist, his attempted reconciliation of unity with multiplicity in concrete organic individuals, his hierarchical view of the world, his antithesis of matter and form, of potentiality and actuality, etc. In fact Aristotle's concepts of form and matter are so closely analogous to Stern's concepts of Person and Thing that many detailed points of correspondence can be found throughout. To a lesser, but still significant degree there is apparent also the influence upon Stern's thinking of Leibniz' monadology, Spinoza's pantheism, and certain features of Nietzsche's philosophy, e.g., his conception of the role of consciousness, etc. Incidentally it may be questioned whether Stern's teacher Paulsen did not do far more than merely arouse in him an interest in philosophical speculation.

Modern philosophers will hardly be inclined to quarrel with Stern's contention that every metaphysics, considered as the speculative construction of a systematic and comprehensive view

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of the whole of reality, is always in part a matter of faith. It would be difficult to find a single modern philosopher who would seriously maintain the world-view which he has developed or accepted to be capable of rigid logical demonstration. On the contrary, the conviction is prevalent that a number of widely variant world-views are to be recognized as "respectable" or "tenable" provided only that their basic assumptions are explicitly indicated and the system based upon them is consistently carried through. There is widespread agreement also that all scientific endeavor necessarily involves making certain assumptions of a metaphysical character and that the proper task of philosophy consists at least in part in the explicit formulation and critical examination of these assumptions.

But while this general point of view seems justified by man's experience with scientific theories and especially with passing systems of speculative metaphysics, Stern's more specific view of metaphysical faith and of the consequent nature of metaphysics itself is open to serious objections. For Stern spoke of the faith upon which every world-view and every science rests as a "groundless" belief, and thus seems to have interpreted it as mere subjective opinion. If this statement were to be pressed one might well ask how Stern would then be justified in maintaining his own Critical Personalism to be more acceptable than the rival philosophies which he criticized.

But Stern himself made a distinction which points the way to a more satisfactory position. He pointed out that in addition

to the most general content of metaphysical faith—the belief in an objective transphenomenal world, every particular world-view depends also on the acceptance of a set of more specific metaphysical beliefs. He maintained that metaphysical faith determines the method, and the selection of categories as well as the fundamental principles of every particular metaphysics, but he failed to distinguish between the varying degrees of certainty which must be attributed to the more general and to the more specific content of metaphysical faith. In asserting the former to be the indispensable presupposition of all knowledge he has indicated it as being far from arbitrary, for thereby it may properly be held to have been established as self-evident, since it is implied in its very denial. Stern's denial of the status of knowledge to this belief is due to an arbitratily over-rigid definition of this term. It is far different in the case of the more specific metaphysical beliefs basic to particular world-views. These cannot all be accepted as necessary or as demonstrable since they are often in conflict, but the alternative is not to consider them to be purely arbitrary opinions. Some of them may reasonably be regarded as genuine though partial insights into the nature of reality; others as perversions of such insights.

From the fact that all knowledge of the world includes a subjective element Stern concluded that every world-view is to be regarded as only relatively true and as inevitably destined to be superseded by other world-views each seeking a closer approximation to an adequate mastery of reality. While it may

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To continue the reasoning. The example in the previous section shows how an improvement in one variable can lead to a decrease in another variable. Let us consider a hypothetical scenario where the demand for a product increases. If the supply remains constant, the price of the product will increase. This is because the quantity supplied is fixed, and the increase in demand leads to a shortage, driving up the price.

In contrast, if the supply of the product increases while the demand remains constant, the price of the product will decrease. This is because the quantity supplied exceeds the quantity demanded, leading to a surplus of the product, which drives down the price.

These examples illustrate the principles of supply and demand, which are fundamental to economics. Understanding these principles is crucial for making informed decisions in various economic contexts, such as pricing, production, and consumption.
be agreed that all philosophy must be progressive and aware of its limitations, Stern's assertion that "metaphysics . . . is not final and stable, but involved in endless flux" is obviously an overstatement which contradicts Stern's own insistence on certain unchanging a priori philosophical truths (e.g., in his doctrine of the categories). Likewise necessary because self-evident and independent of all fortuitous circumstances is the faith in a world transcendent to consciousness a faith which Stern designates as the "formal a priori" of all metaphysics. Hence judging by Stern's actual philosophizing rather than by his description of the nature of philosophy his position is not unqualifiedly relativistic. Not only does absolute truth constitute the ideal of his philosophical reflection but in his work there are included elements of abiding value as well as partial truths and downright errors which must give way to more adequate insights. We must therefore insist that on Stern's own admission the very possibility of knowledge and of metaphysical knowledge in particular demands a recognition of the existence of certain stable and absolute truths.

Though Stern anticipated and plausibly answered the most obvious objection to his concept of Person—that his radical widening of the term led to confusion in philosophy—he sought to lessen the discrepancy between his own and current usage of the term also by maintaining that they refer to two different phases of personal existence. He suggested that while every existent which manifests self-preservation is to be designated as a Person, only those which manifest also the higher function of self-development are

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designated as persons in the usual sense of the term. This attempted reconciliation of terminology is misleading. It is not true that every Person, in Stern's sense, which manifests self-development is a person in the ordinary sense of the word. The minimal criterion of personality in common usage is self-consciousness which may attend processes of self-preservation and of self-development alike. Consciousness is in common sense thought regarded as absent from even the self-developmental phases of nearly all the existents which Stern terms Persons. A more serious objection is that Stern's Person concept was illegitimately extended in its application even when understood as he defined it, for it may well be questioned whether many of the entities to which he applied the term Person actually manifest the characteristics which are included in its definition. Many of Stern's "Persons," e.g., atoms, solar systems, etc., are most fruitfully regarded as mere mechanical aggregates; others, e.g., certain social wholes, are in fact only groups of real Persons. The personal features of these quasi-Persons are such in only an analogical sense. But the remedy is not, as Stern suggested, to seek other examples, because the objection does not attach to particular examples but to whole realms of reality.

Stern's typology of world-views is highly unsatisfactory principally for two reasons. In the first place its basis of classification—the dichotomy of Person and Thing—is a dogmatic one; its justification depends upon the validity of Stern's own philosophical position as a whole upon which no general agreement can be expected. But even on the basis of general agreement with his general metaphysical position Stern's classification is so
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sweeping in its generalizations that he is unable, without doing serious violence to many of their important features, to fit into this scheme various types of philosophy which deserve serious consideration. Especially inadequate is the description of Naive Personalism. The arguments directed against this class of philosophies apply in their full scope only to those forms which would be rejected as uncritical and inconsistent also by those who have developed carefully formulated systematic presentations of the same general point of view, including theism and many forms of realistic philosophy. Stern is guilty here of setting up a straw man; he does not face the real difficulties involved in the opposition to his own system embodied in scientific forms of Naive Personalism. It is not true as Stern alleges that Theism is necessarily dualistic. Theism achieves a unification of all experience in terms of a single causal ground which is as significant as Stern's own hierarchical monism while it escapes many of the difficulties of the latter. And it is likewise untrue of realistic philosophy generally that it is open to the objection Stern raises against every form of Naive Personalism as failing to keep abreast of modern natural science. In spite of his claim of regard for common sense thought Stern departs far from its conception of the world. His Critical Personalism impresses the reader as an "armchair" philosophy in which a few principles of real but restricted value are exploited and pressed into service far beyond their legitimate sphere of application. Hence Stern's claim that he incorporated into his philosophy the valuable elements of Naive Personalism must be denied. But since Stern's polemic against at least one rival type of philosophy is unconvincing and further
since he failed to take up into his own philosophy most of its significant contributions, his attempted dialectical establishment of Critical Personalism cannot be held to have been successful.

Though one might be inclined to agree with Stern's relegation of epistemology to a place of secondary importance as compared with metaphysical construction it is not clear how these two can be sharply distinguished. The validity of the most significant part of Stern's own epistemology—its categorial theory—is vitiated by several dogmatic assumptions. Stern unjustifiably identified all unity and individuality with unity-in-multiplicity. There seems to be no valid reason to deny the existence of simple incomposite wholes. The fact that Stern does so can best be understood as an attempt to smooth the way for his hierarchical conception of reality. Likewise Stern's conception of all causality as limited to immanent teleological activity is a deduction from his system not based upon unprejudiced interpretation of experience. Experience seems clearly to indicate that most causal relations are transeunt, a fact which in no way militates against the possibility of their being teleological. Stern's doctrine of convergence, according to which Personal dispositions are acted upon by an environment, seems, however, to imply the existence of external causal relations. Accordingly Stern sought to reduce all such cases of apparent transeunt causality to immanent causality by means of a kind of Occasionalism. He answered the question: "Do I not act upon something external to myself, when I grasp a pen . . . and cover paper with marks (Striche)?", as follows:

"I, the Person as a whole who am writing, do not act directly upon the pen (for this is external to myself)
but upon my hand; but I act upon my hand in such a way that the causality of another Personal whole, of which my hand and the pen are common parts,—namely the All-Person—is set in motion in a definite way; the external causal connection between hand and pen is only the image (Spiegelbild) of the immanent causality which the All-Person exercises upon itself, i.e., upon its parts.31

But this reduction involves a serious difficulty for Stern's hierarchical solution of the problem of monism and pluralism. For unless the including Person is identical with its parts its action upon them is still exoteric activity; but if this identity is granted Stern's position is one of radical monism. Stern is therefore placed in this dilemma: he must either admit the existence of irreducible exoteric causal relations or he must give up all claim to the substantiability of individuals. In volume 11 of Person und Sache Stern decides in favor of the former alternative but he does so hesitatingly and never draws the necessary consequences for his philosophy as a whole.

Assuming with Stern the indispensability of the category of individual substance, we must nevertheless reject the criterion of individuation which Stern accepts as alone valid and capable of universal application. For self-preservation, in the sense in which Stern understands it, is possible only in the case of composite wholes because the unity which is preserved is a unity of goal amid a multiplicity of parts and of changing activities. In opposition to this view it must be insisted that the criterion by which individual substances are to be determined must be wide enough to permit also of recognizing simple individuals as substantial.

The hierarchical arrangement of Persons on the principle of inclusion raises serious problems for Critical Personalism, some of which Stern has recognized. Notable among these are the "antinomies" involved in the conception of both extremes of the hierarchy. The difficulties involved could hardly be more clearly stated than they have been by Stern himself, but he failed to draw the obvious conclusion that since his hierarchical scheme leads to self-contradictions it ought to be relinquished. Similarly Stern admitted the reflection cast upon the integrity of his system by the necessity of recognizing forms of existence intermediate between Persons and Things—the "Personoide Gebilde." The most damaging criticism of all is, however, that a hierarchy of inclusion implies conclusions radically contradictory to essential features of Critical Personalism's basic concept—the Person. Stern identifies the Person with individual substance. But a Person included in another Person higher in the hierarchy is so far determined by this higher Person that it virtually loses its independence and therefore becomes only a quasi-substance, or if the substantiality of the included Person is insisted on the including Person cannot be regarded as a true substance but only as an aggregate of substances. The concept of substance definitely excludes the relation of inherence or inclusion in some other substance.

The foregoing criticisms of Stern's view of causality and of his Personal hierarchy implies also that his formulation of teleo-mechanical parallelism must be rejected, since it represents an attempt to reduce all external connections to relations between a Person and those Persons immediately lower in the hierarchy which form its parts. By means of this procedure all uniform functioning
of Persons is explained in terms of the activities of an including Person, while its distinctive functioning is regarded as the imposition of a mode of lawfulness upon those Persons which it in turn includes. Hence the activities of Persons are explained with reference to other Persons rather than with reference to themselves. In Stern's hierarchy the significance of each Person is, therefore, not in the first place an intrinsic one, since it is largely exhausted in its reference to Persons above and below it in the hierarchy.

Stern's tendency toward dogmatic and rather pedantic speculative generalizations is evident in his doctrine of the two phases of Personal existence (self-development and self-preservation) and of their alternation (actualization and mechanization). It is obvious that human individuals and perhaps organic individuals generally exercise self-preservation and self-developmental functions, that the gains of the latter become the objects of the former, and that each gain thus becomes the point of departure for further gains. But this description applies in only an analogical sense to the activities of many of the entities which Stern termed Persons. For example the self-preservation and self-developmental activities of a nation are most reasonably interpreted as the activities of its individual citizens planned and organized by their leaders, and not as the activities of any entity above or beyond these individuals. In other instances the application of this doctrine lacks all justification whatsoever. Thus the relative identity maintained by atoms and solar systems as well as any increase in their extent or organization can hardly be attributed to self-preservation and self-developmental strivings on their part especially if the latter are held, in accordance with Stern's panpsychism, to be conscious processes.
Stern's opposition to the employment of conscious or intention teleology as an explanatory principle in metaphysics undoubtedly results from his conviction that consciousness is a phenomenon subsidiary in importance to unconscious teleology even in human life. According to Stern it is not found either in the purely self-preservative activities characteristic of biological processes or in the sphere of introception, but appears only when it is needed as a weapon in the conflict of the Person seeking to develop itself at the expense of its environment. But Stern does not succeed in clearly distinguishing self-preservative from self-developmental activity. The former is often a struggle so intense as to demand full consciousness, while the latter may under favorable circumstances proceed easily and without the need of conscious attention, e.g., in the case of physical growth.

It may well be held that the concept of conscious teleology is the source of Stern's concept of immanent teleology. We can know purposiveness only through introspective awareness of our own conscious purposes; all further application of this category is analogical. Hence Stern's immanent teleology is a weakened form of this concept, and his explanation of all processes in terms of it appears to be a compromise between a genuinely teleological and a mechanical interpretation of the world. The attempt to regard all teleology as dispositional seems to proceed from a biological bias in which behavior is regarded from an external point of view. It may be regarded as at least equally justified and moreover in harmony with Stern's panpsychism speculatively to extend the notion of conscious purpose downward and upward in the hierarchy of existence, as to extend the notion of dispositional teleology beyond the organism.
Stern's philosophy of man represents an interesting but unconvincing attempt to substitute for the almost universally accepted point of view, according to which its psychical side is regarded as the most distinctive and essential aspect of human nature, a view in which the psychical is reduced to a place of subordinate significance. The distinctive features of human personality have usually been held to be: its conscious experiences including knowing, willing and feeling; the conscious unification (through memory, imaginative anticipation and deliberate planning) of these varied experiences; the consequent conscious recognition of its own individuality; and its capacity for the achievement of values through rational choice. Because of his supreme interest in what he termed the psycho-physically neutral characteristics of man and his consequent minimization of the role which consciousness plays in human life, all of the above named features of human personality come on Stern's view to be regarded as of secondary importance compared to those which it shares with all other real existents. Consciousness becomes only an "internal rendering" of the essentially non-conscious teleological activities which constitute the real determinants of human life. Psychical phenomena become on this view only epi-phenomena mere appearances and by-products of wholly different features of reality.

In view of the fact that the type of teleology which Stern utilized as an explanatory principle is at best only an hypothesis while the phenomena of consciousness including conscious purposing are indisputable data of experience, it is difficult to see the justification of his procedure. He seeks to explain indubitably real experience in all its fulness in terms of a dubious abstraction
from this experience. Consequently his failure to account for the richness of human personality in terms of the category of immanent teleology is not surprising. But apart from this there are other difficulties inherent in Stern's view of the role of consciousness in human life. It is plain that Stern thought of consciousness first of all as a phenomenon arising on occasions of conflict between the person and its environment and serving the person as a weapon in this conflict. But it may be suggested that consciousness is not always the product of conflict but may also on occasion be the cause of conflict. Consciousness may precede and indicate the necessity of conflict by virtue of the fact that it yields an awareness of threats to the welfare of the Person. It is a matter of experience that conflicts are often anticipated in consciousness.

It would not be fair, however, to accuse Stern of a purely utilitarian conception of consciousness. In addition to its function as a weapon in the service of the Person he considered it also as possessing a value not dependent upon the service it renders to anything beyond itself. In Stern's own terminology it has radiative as well as instrumental value since it constitutes an expression of the nature of the person. But Stern's contention that its expressive value is confined to those aspects of the self which are in conflict seems arbitrary, for it may fairly be held that consciousness, e.g., in contemplation and revery, also mirrors the self which is at peace.

It is difficult to see, however, how the two functions which Stern ascribes to consciousness can be reconciled. If it is only an internal rendering of active forces and not itself efficacious
it can hardly serve as a weapon except in the sense in which information may be said to serve as a weapon, i.e., as a guide to the effective use of actual weapons. But on this interpretation either conscious (interpretative and planning) functions must be attributed to the psycho-physically neutral person who utilizes the information furnished by consciousness, or consciousness itself must be admitted to exert a guiding, and therefore active, influence in human life.

Stern maintained the impossibility of human immortality, in the sense of a future life, to be implied in his general philosophical position. His denial of this doctrine was a consequence of his view that for all Persons between the two extremes of the hierarchy origination and cessation are real, since their individuality must be reflected also in the limitation of their temporal extension. He maintained, however, that it is inconceivable that either the totality of all reality or any absolutely simple existent should originate or cease to be. Hence he postulated the eternity of the All-Person and admitted that if Naive Personalism were correct in considering the essence of human personality to consist of a simple entity—the soul—human immortality would have to be accepted. But in Stern's view there were no simple existents; hence he maintained that in accordance with the testimony of experience we must hold that human beings, like all other organisms, cease to exist at death. But as has already been pointed out Stern's denial of the existence of simple unities is a purely dogmatic assertion. The same must be said of his contention that, did these exist, the cessation of their existence would be inconceivable. The origination and the cessation of simple existents
It is evident that the community has not been fully engaged in the decision-making process, despite the efforts of the local government to involve the public. The lack of transparency and direct communication with community leaders has been a significant issue. Furthermore, the recent changes in public health protocols have not been effectively communicated to the community, leading to confusion and mistrust. The community leaders have expressed their concern about the potential long-term effects of these changes on public health and the economy. The current situation requires a collaborative approach to address the needs of the community and ensure a smooth transition to new public health protocols.
presents no greater problem than the origination and cessation of complex wholes or of modes of organization of these wholes. In opposition to Stern's view it is reasonable to hold to the possibility of either the temporal limitation or the eternity of both simple and complex existents. Human immortality, though it may be undemonstrable on metaphysical grounds, is likewise incapable of being ruled out as a definite impossibility.

Recognizing that the general metaphysical categories developed in the first volume of Person und Sache were not adequate to deal with all the aspects of human life, Stern sought in his treatment of human personality to remedy this deficiency by the introduction of the new concepts of convergence and introception. Both of these concepts may be regarded as representing undoubtedly sane but very ordinary points of view. This is especially true of the first. In view of the widespread agreement that human personality can be understood neither in terms of hereditary nor of environmental factors alone, one can hardly be expected to hail Stern's insistence on the necessity of recognizing both, as making a new and valuable contribution. Similarly it is difficult to see anything significantly new in the concept of introception in terms of which the ethics of Critical Personalism is formulated. The view that the development of personality demands the recognition and the synthesis of both private and social ends and values has become a commonplace. The practical difficulties involved in introception as a result of the occurrence of conflicting ends receive scanty recognition in Critical Personalism. But more seriously Stern, in his discussion of the illusions involved in the consciousness of motivation, implicitly contradicts his explicit statement that man's moral
task consists of the process of introception. For when he identified the representation of human motives as more egotistic or more altruistic than they actually are, with a representation of them as worse and as better respectively, he thereby implied the moral ideal to lie in the direction of increased altruism. As a practical injunction this may be justified since undoubtedly the tendency toward undue egotism is greater than the tendency toward excessive altruism. But for his ethical theory this part of Stern's description of human consciousness constitutes a definite difficulty.

Stern's theory of value is deservedly the best known and most highly esteemed part of his philosophy. Especially his recognition of radiative values as a class distinct alike from intrinsic and purely instrumental values may be regarded as a suggestion worthy of serious consideration. Likewise much of Stern's detailed analysis of valuing and of objective value situations must be admitted to be eminently worth while. Nevertheless it does not become quite clear how one is to reconcile Stern's position that the concept of value is an ultimate incapable of definition, with his description of it in terms of significance. This significance with which value is identified remains extremely vague particularly with reference to intrinsic values. One wonders what content can be given to the statement that intrinsic value is significance for self.

Stern's contention that "Only Persons have intrinsic value and all Persons have intrinsic value" cannot be substantiated. It is plain that many entities which Stern would designate as Things, e.g., products of human techniques as well as many natural objects may possess colors or shapes which are intrinsic aesthetic values. The reduction of these intrinsic values to radiative and
Alvarado de la Vega, 22. September 1848, 1848,

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instrumental values even though it were theoretically possible would constitute a forced mode of analysis. On the other hand it might be denied with reference to certain of Stern's Persons, e.g., species of plants or animals and particular atoms or molecules, that they possess intrinsic value at all.

The most objectionable feature of Stern's value theory is his view that the hierarchy of intrinsic values parallels the hierarchy of Persons. Thereby the standard of degree of intrinsic value is made to depend upon spatial and temporal extent. Every Person, including "lower" Persons as parts of itself, is for that reason regarded as of greater intrinsic value than the Persons included in it. By this criterion the values of human personality come to stand lower in the scale of intrinsic values than do the values of the earth or the solar system. But when axiological significance is made to depend upon spatial and temporal extension all qualitative distinctions seem to have been resolved into a matter of quantity. Stern's position here involves a relativism of the most reprehensible kind. Over against this standpoint it must be insisted that intrinsic values are in a sense eternal and not dependent for their rank upon the spatial extent of anything in which they "inhere."

In Stern's writings there is no mention of Kohnstamm's philosophy but his acquaintance with Kohnstamm's views in general may be inferred from the fact that it was at his suggestion that this comparison of his own type of personalism with that of Kohnstamm was undertaken. Furthermore, Kohnstamm makes reference to frequent social contacts with Stern.

Biblical Personalism would undoubtedly have been regarded by
Stern as a futile attempt to fuse a naive and distinctly emotional religious world-view with a body of scientific knowledge of the physical world, in order thus to achieve a unified system of metaphysics. Stern's obvious failure to be impressed by the significance of specifically religious experience as an approach to an understanding of reality implies that he would have little sympathy with a view which depends to so great an extent as does Kohnstamm's on drawing out the implications of this experience. He would have considered it to be an unscientific because uncritical procedure, resulting from an unrestrained mode of wishful thinking.

Kohnstamm's claim that Biblical Personalism represents absolute if partial knowledge of the nature of reality would therefore seem untenable to Stern since he considered it impossible even with all the safeguards of critical thought to achieve more than a relatively true conception of objective reality. Yet Stern spoke of "sympathetic introception" as "the maximal approximation to the intrinsic being of personalities," and admitted that this "cognitive principle" yields also the fullest knowledge of God.32 Here he might seem to have left open the possibility of ascribing great cognitive value to religious consciousness. But he considered this consciousness as one of "immediate dependence and immediate attachment" only in the sense of an awareness of "membership."33 The "religious" experience which he described thus is obviously far different from the thoroughly personal and ethical relationship which Kohnstamm takes as his point of departure, and it is therefore not surprising that the implications of each should be so

33 Ibid., p. 387.
It may indeed be questioned whether by means of so strong a reliance as we find in Kohnstamm's philosophy upon a mode of experience which is not universally accepted as valid, a system of philosophy can be built up which will seem well founded to philosophers generally. Nevertheless, Kohnstamm's approach has been shared by many important thinkers in the past and is still found in modern times. Theism remains one of a number of tenable philosophical position. Further, neither theism generally nor Kohnstamm's philosophy in particular rests exclusively upon immediate religious experience. It is possible to show that the data of other modes of experience fit into the religious view of the world as created and maintained by a personal Deity who is the source of all values.

Stern's claim that his typology of world-views is based upon a classification of the various attitudes taken to the most significant of modern metaphysical problems—the alternative between a conception of the world in terms of Persons or in terms of Things—implied a criticism of Kohnstamm's typology of fundamental world-views as bringing into prominence a problem of subsidiary importance. The validity of this criticism is open to serious doubt in view of the difficulties which have been shown to be involved in the concept of Person. Kohnstamm's typology is much the more suggestive and less sweeping in its generalizations. One may be inclined to doubt whether as much importance should be attached to these typologies as Stern and Kohnstamm evidently accord them.

It is obvious that Stern would have to classify Biblical
Personalism as a form of Naive Personalism and, therefore, in so far as it consistently holds to the fundamental principles of this type of philosophy, as subject to all the criticisms he directed against this class of world-views. Typical of Naive Personalism is what Stern would term Kohnstamm's crude anthropomorphism in conceiving of all personality on the analogy of human personality, as a consequence of which Kohnstamm uncritically ascribed to the deity the human functions of knowing, willing and feeling. From his own standpoint he would charge Kohnstamm with failure to recognize that the distinguishing mark of a Person is in fact the psycho-physically neutral characteristic of self-determination. He would criticize Kohnstamm's view of the world as the creation of God as involving a false, "exoteric" conception of causality or, as Stern also phrased it, a "causality of making." Such a standpoint according to Stern implicates a dualism in metaphysics, man being resolved into a personal part (the soul) and an impersonal part (the body) and reality as a whole likewise into a personal being (God) plus an impersonal world.

The implicit criticisms of Kohnstamm's theistic personalism invite the counter charge that Stern's own position is open to a similar but more serious objection. Anthropomorphism, in so far as it is crude and uncritical, is a falacy of illegitimate generalization in which the characteristics of some part of reality are unjustifiably ascribed to the whole. But we have found good reason to maintain that Stern is himself guilty of an unwarranted universal application of categories derived, according to his own statement, from a particular realm of reality. It seems at any rate equally justifiable to maintain in agreement with Kohnstamm
In an accident, the rehabilitation process can be very challenging, and it is essential to understand the steps involved. Often, patients may experience various physical and emotional injuries. It is important to be proactive and understand how to approach rehabilitation in a healthy way.

Often, patients may experience a lack of motivation and may feel discouraged. It is crucial to set realistic goals and work towards achieving them. A good rehabilitation plan should include both physical and mental exercises.

In conclusion, rehabilitation is a crucial part of the recovery process. It is important to stay motivated and work towards achieving your goals. With the right approach, rehabilitation can be a positive experience, leading to a better quality of life.
that personality is the clue to the nature of reality as to interpret the world on the analogy of biological organisms. And if it is correct to hold, as was suggested above, that the chief category of Critical Personalism—immanent teleology—is in fact an abstraction from human conscious purposing, it is itself an anthropomorphic concept. The validity of Stern's contention that Naive Personalism, and therefore also Biblical Personalism, is necessarily dualistic, depends upon his questionable conception of all unification in terms of inclusion.

It would be highly unfair to accuse Kohnstamm of the dogmatic positing of a particular world-view on the ground that it is the logical consequence of an immediate and therefore incontrovertible experience. Kohnstamm clearly recognizes the fact that religious experience, in so far as it is immediate, is inarticulate and therefore can lay no claim to the status of objective knowledge. He admits that every form of experience demands interpretation and that this interpretation is inevitably made in terms of one's basic assumptions, i.e., in terms of certain undemonstrable beliefs resulting from particular personal evaluative attitudes toward reality. Consequently he holds his own Biblical Personalism to share the hypothetical character of all philosophy.

But Kohnstamm argues that the existence of a great diversity of world-views, no one of which (including his own) can be demonstrated to be absolutely valid, does not justify the conclusion that the fundamental assumptions basic to all world-views are mere subjective opinions. He holds that we cannot consistently deny the existence of absolute metaphysical truth since this denial itself makes a claim to be absolutely valid knowledge of reality.
Granting this argument we must nevertheless deny the inference Kohnstamm apparently makes that therefore every set of axioms basic to a world-view must be held to embody absolute though partial truth concerning reality.

Kohnstamm's interpretation of the various world-views as a "multitude of roads to truth," involves him in serious difficulties with reference to the problem of error. He is forced to explain all oppositions of axiomatic bases in terms of emphases on different partial insights, the only error involved in any case being the assertion that the partial view of reality is the whole view. But there seems to be no reason to deny the possibility of points of departure in philosophy which are thoroughly erroneous in a positive sense. The difficulty cannot be obviated, as Kohnstamm evidently thinks it can, by an appeal to a Person who speaks authoritatively to all, for it might even then be held that some completely fail to comprehend Him. Kohnstamm could hardly argue that in those instances in which we must judge the assumptions of a particular philosophy to be erroneous, the assumptions actually made are inadequate or perverted expressions of true insights into the nature of reality. Such a view would be completely unverifiable and serve no useful purpose, since we must take the assumptions of any philosophy to be those which are actually expressed or implied rather than any hypothetical insights of a different nature.

The value of Kohnstamm's epistemology lies not so much in its originality as in the fact that it directs attention to important truths which are often neglected. Thus his view of the function of critical doubt is widely held, but the necessity of an
initial faith in the trustworthiness of the functions involved in knowing is frequently neglected. Criticism, as Kohnstamm observes, can never be our point of departure, for critical thought itself involves a faith in human knowing, and the critic is often guilty of extreme dogmatism. Kohnstamm is correct in maintaining that all scientific endeavor is in part a venture of faith, that it inevitably involves the making of "decisions" lacking full logical justification. Kohnstamm's analysis of knowing to determine the "decisions" involved in it, must not be considered to make any pretense to completeness. It is designed only to illustrate a method, and to demonstrate by particular instances the necessity of regarding thinking as "the synthesis of . . . doubt and faith," in which faith is logically prior to doubt. Likewise significant is Kohnstamm's renewed emphasis on the danger of vicious abstraction in philosophy resulting from a failure to employ a method sufficiently comprehensive to include all the data of experience. He criticizes especially in this regard the rationalistic method of deduction from self-evident axioms, but also the wholly different methods of intuitionism and romanticism as in themselves inadequate, and contends for a method in which every approach to truth will be given its due place. The insistence on unique modes of awareness for different types of data and of a plurality of methods for the empirical sciences represents a wholesome antagonism to the arrogance of forcing facts into any one pre-conceived mode of approach. Finally we must recognize as an element of value in Kohnstamm's epistemology, his rejection of the necessity of accepting any form of the principle of the complete uniformity of nature as the presupposition of the possibility of experience.
The possibility of experience, even of scientific experience, does not demand complete lawfulness but only intelligibility. Science is possible even if elements of spontaneity occur in nature.

Kohnstamm's argument against the correspondence theory of truth is obscure and unconvincing. He charges that a conception of truth as the correspondence of thought to its object implies an "identity" of thought and reality with the result that: 1) from the content of adequate thought the nature of reality can be determined, 2) that which cannot be thought is not real. Hence he concludes that the correspondence notion of truth is "intellectualistic" in the sense that it denies reality to anything which cannot be rationally formulated. But this conclusion is entirely unwarranted; for Kohnstamm here unduly narrows "thought" to mean rational or conceptual thought alone. The correspondence notion of truth must be interpreted much more liberally to hold truth to be the correspondence to reality of the content of human consciousness in the broadest sense. The correspondence theory of truth implies positively that adequate "thought" corresponds to some feature of reality, but does not deny that there may be many features of reality which are never represented in human consciousness.

Kohnstamm reiterates also the usual objection to the correspondence notion of truth, i.e., that it cannot serve as a criterion of truth since we can never directly compare a mental representation with its object. But this objection in no way affects the validity of defining truth as correspondence. In fact every criterion of truth presupposes the correctness of the correspondence theory. Thus the evidence for the truth of a proposition, involved
in its coherence with other propositions, depends upon the actuality of correspondence between the connections within thought and the connections within reality. Kohnstamm's argument against the correspondence theory of truth on the ground that it is unable to account for the truth of ideas of ideal objects (i.e., mental constructs)\textsuperscript{34} rests on his too narrow definition of reality. Since he rules out mental constructs as unreal, it follows that the truth of ideas concerning them cannot be described as correspondence with reality. But mental constructs must obviously be held to be real in some sense and therefore the truth of ideas concerning them can be described as correspondence with them.

Kohnstamm's philosophy of nature is an attempt to defend a common sense pluralistic view of the world against the criticisms of any type of thought which seeks to reduce the distinctions within nature to mere appearance. His argument may be analyzed into a negative and a positive stage. In the former Kohnstamm argues that the variety of things and processes found in the physical world must be accepted at face value as "ontologically valid" unless overwhelmingly good grounds are adduced why they should not be. Since pluralism appears to be true, the burden of proof falls upon the monist rather than upon the pluralist. Kohnstamm, as a scientist, selects mechanistic materialism as to him the most familiar representative of the monistic tendency which he opposes, and contends that it has failed to establish its case. Positively Kohnstamm argues that a pluralistic conception of nature is established as necessary by the Kantian transcendental method according to which

\textsuperscript{34}See Chapter VI pp.155-156.
we must accept as true whatever is a presupposition of the possibility of our experience. Modern science, so Kohnstamm contends, finds the postulation of a number of varied structures in the physical world to be indispensable.

In a general way the validity of this argument must be admitted. Speculative philosophy, in so far as it generalizes, is always in danger of abstracting from the fulness of experience. Though it may be questioned whether every one of the structures Kohnstamm accepts as irreducible is really such, that doubt does not invalidate his general approach. It must be pointed out, however, that Kohnstamm is at times satisfied with very slight scientific evidence in substantiation of a particular distinction between types of entities. His acceptance of the results of Köhler's experiments with chimpanzees as establishing a radical difference between man and animals, seems to be a case in point.

In spite of his insistence on the supreme importance of human personality what Kohnstamm has to say regarding man is rather meager and disappointing. It is evident that his interest in man is largely exhausted in an interest in him as a religious being. His view of human freedom as real though limited is perhaps the sanest and most defensible position in respect to this problem. Kohnstamm's sketchy account of the mind-body problem is not very illuminating. His argument against psycho-physical parallelism and interactionism points to some of the difficulties inherent in these views, but the view which he suggests as his own is so briefly and inadequately presented that its significance can scarcely be evaluated. It seems, however, to be a form of what is often referred to as "the double-aspect theory," and plainly
involves problems as great as those which Kohnstamm seeks to escape. Kohnstamm's argument against universal and individual immortality is strictly speaking not a philosophical but an exegetical one, since it is based upon an interpretation of the Bible.

Kohnstamm's account of values is as yet so undeveloped that it is perhaps unjustified to criticize it as his final view. A significant difference should be pointed out, however, between Kohnstamm's criticism of rationalistic and humanistic ethics. His rejection of a rationalistic approach to ethics is made primarily on empirical grounds. He seeks to show from an analysis of the nature of a moral act and of the manner in which moral decisions are made that moral problems cannot be solved by a rationalistic process of deduction from general self-evident moral axioms, but that some less complex and more immediate mode of determining conduct must be recognized as operative. This view is merely consistent with, not demanded by, his general philosophical position.

It is conceivable on a theistic view that the will of God for man's conduct might be revealed to him through his reason alone, and that where complete rational determination of conduct is impossible one's choice of action must be made on the purely arbitrary grounds of convention or convenience. On the other hand, Kohnstamm's repudiation of humanistic ethics is a necessary consequence of the fundamental assumptions of his entire world-view. He could not at once accept a theistic position in which moral standards are the expression of the will of a personal being transcendent to the world, and yet acquiesce in a view which holds morality to have only human significance.
A comparison of Critical and Biblical Personalism with the other contemporary philosophies described as personalist does not fall within the scope of this study. It may however be indicated that the systems discussed differ from most of these other personalisms in not being presented as forms of idealism. Yet, in many respects, Stern's philosophy is similar to what has been called objective idealism, though it differs in others. The movements generally called personalistic in modern philosophy originated and developed mainly in opposition to that type of idealism which was charged with failure to give a satisfactory account of personality. From their standpoint Stern's philosophy ought perhaps not to be called a personalism. Kohnstamm's philosophy, while not idealism, is manifestly in harmony with these modern personalist movements to a considerable extent, differing from them mainly in its realistic view of the physical world.
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Cornelius A. Plantinga, son of Andreas Plantinga and Tietje Hoekstra Plantinga, was born at Garyp, province of Friesland, the Netherlands, on February 13, 1908. He graduated from the Holland Christian High School at Holland, Michigan, in 1926 and entered Calvin College at Grand Rapids, Michigan, in the fall of the same year. His college studies were interrupted by a year (1927-'28) devoted to teaching. Upon his graduation from Calvin College in 1931 with an A.B. degree, he again engaged in teaching for one year. He entered the University of Michigan in the summer of 1932 and received the degree of A.M. in Philosophy from that institution in 1933. The academic years 1933-'34 and 1934-'35 were spent at part time graduate study at the same University.

In 1935-'36 he was Assistant in Philosophy at Duke University, and became a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy with Psychology as minor. After
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teaching during the year 1936-'37 and spending the first semester of 1937-'38 at Princeton, New Jersey, he was re-appointed as Assistant at Duke University in the second semester of 1937-'38, a position which he held also during 1938-'39. He continued at Duke University during 1939-'40 being engaged in completing his Ph.D. dissertation.
The Personalist Philosophies of William Stern
and Phillip Kohnstamm

by
Cornelius A. Plantinga