Will the CORDS Snap?
Testing the Widely Accepted Assumption that Inter-Agency Single Management Improves Policy-Implementation

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University

2018
ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the US Government’s difficulties in implementing policies requiring integrated responses from multiple agencies have led to a number of calls to reform USG inter-agency policy-implementation; similar to how the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act improved the “jointness” of the various military services. All of these major studies and reports, most prominent being the 2008 “Project on National Security Reform”, similarly recommended adopting a Unity of Command approach that authorizes a single manager to synchronize the operations of all departments and agencies in time, space, and purpose. All of these studies directly or indirectly base their recommendations off a single case study from the Vietnam War that implemented the policy of pacification (counter-insurgency)- CORDS (Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support). However, the causal relationship between single management and effective pacification has never been established as a fact; it is a rather a widely-held, but untested, assumption. This project will supplement archival research from the US and Communist perspectives with current qualitative and quantitative research on counter-insurgency (COIN) and CORDS in Vietnam to test the assumption that single management made CORDS effective. By generating a detailed list of alternative explanations for improved pacification in Vietnam in addition to CORDS, it will use three different political science methods (comparative, congruence, and process-tracing)
to eliminate the infeasible hypotheses and rank order the remaining feasible hypotheses.

The triangulation of this research question shows that, while the causal connection
between single management and effective pacification in Vietnam is not an absolute fact,
it is an extremely strong and likely assumption.
Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ iv

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. xii

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. xiv

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1
  1.1 CORDS—a Unique Interagency Organization ................................................................. 3
  1.2 Key Terms in the Interagency Reform Debates ................................................................. 11
  1.3 Constitutional Impediments to Interagency Operations .................................................. 13
  1.4 Current Strategic Challenges Requires Interagency Solutions ....................................... 16
  1.5 Interagency Strategic Solutions Require National Security Reform .............................. 19
  1.6 National Security Reform Proposals Are Based on the CORDS Program ................. 21
  1.7 Research Design Testing the Effectiveness of CORDS .................................................. 24
  1.7.1 Literature Review of Pacification in Vietnam .............................................................. 24
  1.7.2 Research Problem and Objective ............................................................................... 31
  1.7.3 Research Question and Hypothesis ............................................................................ 32
  1.7.4 Inferential Strategy ........................................................................................................ 34
  1.7.5 Case Selection and Methodologies ............................................................................. 35
  1.7.6 Contribution .................................................................................................................. 38
  1.8 Way Ahead ............................................................................................................................ 39

2 Relevance of CORDS to the Current Policy Debate on Interagency Reform .................... 41
  2.1 History of Defense Reform: Integrating the Four “M” Agencies in DIME ................... 42
2.2 Informative Pseudo Interagency Reform from World War II.........................60
2.3 History That Rhymes: Integrating All National Security DIME Agencies.......65
2.4 The Influence of CORDS and/or 1986 GNA on Current Interagency Reform Proposals..................................................................................................................76
2.5 Insights from Comparing “M” & “DIME” Reform........................................90
2.6 Summary......................................................................................................93
3 Comparative Analysis of Pacification Programs in Vietnam............................94
  3.1 Contribution..............................................................................................94
  3.2 Research Design........................................................................................94
    3.2.1 Case Selection and Unit of Analysis....................................................94
    3.2.2 Design and Methodology.....................................................................95
    3.2.3 Outcome Variable (Control over time).................................................98
    3.2.4 Explanatory Variables for Improved Control over Time......................105
  3.3 The Empirical Data- Trends in Control......................................................113
    3.3.1 History of the Major Communist Decisions and Actions......................115
      3.3.1.1 Prelude to the 1959 Communist Insurgency.................................115
      3.3.1.2 Description of Dau Tranh: the Vietnamese Communist Doctrine for Insurgency.................................................................123
      3.3.1.3 Losing Control from 1959 to 1964 .................................................130
      3.3.1.4 Neither Winning nor Losing from 1965 to 1967............................136
      3.3.1.5 Gaining Control from 1967 to 1972 ..............................................141
      3.3.1.6 Losing the War from 1972 to 1975 ..............................................146
  3.4 Quantitative USG Assessments....................................................................148
3.5 Trends in Control over Time in South Vietnam ......................................................... 151
3.6 Pacification in Vietnam Data Set .................................................................................. 154
3.7 Comparative Analysis ................................................................................................. 156
  3.7.1 Summary of Data Set ............................................................................................. 156
  3.7.2 “Before-After” Analysis ....................................................................................... 157
  3.7.3 Observations and Way Ahead .............................................................................. 163
4 Congruence Analysis of Pacification Programs in Vietnam ........................................... 165
  4.1 Contribution .............................................................................................................. 165
  4.2 Overall Strategy for Congruence Analysis ................................................................. 165
    4.2.1 Framework to Compare Explanatory Variables ................................................. 166
    4.2.2 Outcome Variable- COIN Wins vs Changing Control ..................................... 169
    4.2.3 Explanatory Variables- COIN literature vs. Pacification in Vietnam ............. 170
  4.3 Integration and Extension of Existing Statistical Research Explaining COIN Outcomes .............................................................................................................. 171
    4.3.1 Weakness in Statistical Analysis of COIN ......................................................... 172
    4.3.2 Data Sources: Existing Large-n COIN Research Projects ............................... 175
      4.3.2.1 Jason Lyall and Isiah Wilson on Mechanization ........................................... 175
      4.3.2.2 Jeffrey Friedman and Boots on the Ground (BOG) ..................................... 177
      4.3.2.3 Goran Peic and Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs) .......................................... 179
      4.3.2.4 Christopher Paul and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) .......... 180
      4.3.2.5 Stephen Watts and Nature of the Host Nation Government ....................... 182
      4.3.2.6 Patrick Johnston and Targeting/Leadership Decapitation ......................... 184
4.3.3 Methodology of Integration and Extension Project.............................. 185
4.3.4 Robustness of Results ...................................................................... 188
4.3.5 Results............................................................................................. 189

4.4 COIN Research Using Comparative/Historical Analysis...................... 192

4.4.1 Historical Analysis of BOG Ratios.................................................. 192
4.4.2 Police-to-Civilian Population Ratio................................................... 194
4.4.3 Selective Violence, Surrender, and Indiscriminate Violence .......... 196
4.4.4 Land Reform .................................................................................. 202

4.5 Synthesizing Three Forms of Congruence Analysis............................ 204

4.6 Congruence Analysis ........................................................................ 205

4.6.1 Summary of Results........................................................................ 205

4.6.1.1 Primary Scenario: CORDS Increasing Control in Late 1967......... 206
4.6.1.2 Alternate Scenario #1: OCO Increasing Control in early 1967 ...... 208
4.6.1.3 Alternate Scenario #2: Tet Increasing Control in late 1968........... 210
4.6.1.4 Alternate Scenario #3: COSVN Decision Increased Control in late 1969 214

4.6.2 Observations and Way Ahead............................................................. 216

5 Process-tracing Analysis of Pacification Programs in Vietnam................ 219

5.1 Contribution ...................................................................................... 219

5.2 Overall Research Design for Process-tracing Analysis ....................... 221

5.2.1 Methodology................................................................................... 221
5.2.2 Theory of Single Management for Interagency Operations.............. 227
5.2.3 Testable Hypotheses for Single Management for COIN .............................................. 232
5.3 Process-tracing Analysis of Single Management .......................................................... 241
  5.3.1 President Johnson Selects New Mandate for Pacification ....................................... 241
  5.3.2 President Johnson Designates General Westmoreland as the Single Manager for Pacification .............................................................................................................. 248
  5.3.3 General Westmoreland Establishes a Subordinate Agency to Implement Pacification ................................................................................................................................. 250
  5.3.4 The New Agency (CORDS) Takes Measures to Internally Improve ......................... 252
  5.3.5 CORDS Modifies the Pacification Programs It Supervises ........................................ 256
  5.3.6 MAC-V and CORDS Conduct Integrated Pacification Planning .............................. 267
  5.3.7 Control Is Improved .................................................................................................. 272
  5.3.8 Control Improves Collaboration, Which Improves Control .................................... 286
  5.3.9 Summary of Process-tracing Analysis of Single Management .................................. 292
5.4 Process-tracing Analysis .............................................................................................. 292
  5.4.1 Primary Scenario: CORDS in late 1967 ................................................................. 294
  5.4.2 Alternate Scenario #1: OCO in early 1967 .............................................................. 296
  5.4.3 Alternate Scenario #2: Tet in late 1968 ................................................................. 299
  5.4.4 Alternate Scenario #3: COSVN in late 1969 ........................................................... 303
5.5 Final Observations and Way Ahead ............................................................................. 306
6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 307
  6.1 Summary of Strategy of Inference .............................................................................. 308
  6.2 Summary of the Findings ........................................................................................... 309
  6.3 The Efficacy of Single Management: Fact or Fiction? ................................................. 313
6.4 Limitations and Caveats in the Findings ................................................................. 314
6.5 Comparing CORDS’ Causal Mechanisms ............................................................... 319
6.6 Alternate Organizational Options ........................................................................... 328
   6.6.1 Phoenix Program: Unity of Command Within Unity of Effort ......................... 332
   6.6.2 Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) ....................................................... 335
   6.6.3 Task Force for Military Stabilization in Bosnia ............................................... 337
   6.6.4 High-value Targeting Cells ............................................................................. 341
   6.6.5 Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South): a Hybrid ......................... 344
   6.6.6 Summary of Unity of Effort Cases ................................................................. 350
6.7 Final Summary ....................................................................................................... 356

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 359
Biography ...................................................................................................................... 389
List of Tables

Table 1-1. Pacification Theme for Each Function by Contributing Agency ...................... 6
Table 1-2. Analytic Goals and Descriptions of Each Methodology ................................. 36
Table 2-1. Summary of Proposals Calling for Unity of Command ................................. 89
Table 2-2. Comparative Analysis Between M and DIME Reform ................................. 90
Table 3-1 Communist Military Units and Role in Dau Tranh ........................................ 125
Table 3-2. Overview of Communist Political and Military Doctrine of Dau Tranh ........... 127
Table 3-3. Comparison of Dau Tranh to Pacification Forces ........................................ 145
Table 3-4. Comparison of Dau Tranh to Pacification Actions ........................................ 146
Table 3-5 Summary of EV-OV Co-variance by Changes in Control ............................ 157
Table 3-6. Explanations for Stalemate, late 1965 ......................................................... 158
Table 3-7. Primary Scenario for Increasing Control, late 1967 (CORDS) ..................... 159
Table 3-8. Alternative Scenario #1 for Increasing Control, early 1967 (OCO) .............. 160
Table 3-9. Alternative Scenario #2 for Increasing Control, late 1968 (Post-Tet) .......... 161
Table 3-10. Alternative Scenario #3 for Increasing Control, late 1969 (COSVN) ........ 162
Table 3-11 Number of EVs for further analysis by scenario ......................................... 164
Table 4-1 Framework to rank-order feasible Explanatory Variables ............................ 168
Table 4-2. Civilian Defense Forces and COIN Outcomes ............................................ 180
Table 4-3. “Prime TTPs and COIN Win/Lose Outcomes” ........................................... 181
Table 4-4. “Unity of Command on COIN Win/Lose Outcomes” ............................... 182
Table 4-5. Nature of Host Nation Government and COIN Outcomes ........................ 184
Table 4-6 Strength of Relationship between Single Explanatory Variables and Outcome Variable Based on Marginal Effects and Causal Significance ............................................. 190

Table 4-7 Strength of Relationship between Multiple Explanatory Variables and Outcome Variable Based on Marginal Effect ........................................................................... 191

Table 4-8 Framework to rank-order feasible Explanatory Variables .................................................. 205

Table 4-9 Summary of EV Congruence with Changes in Control ......................................................... 206

Table 4-10 CORDS Increasing Control in late 1967 ............................................................................. 207

Table 4-11 OCO Increasing Control in 1967/1” .................................................................................. 209

Table 4-12 Analysis for Post-Tet Increasing Control in late 1968 ......................................................... 210

Table 4-13 COSN Decision led to increased control in late 1969 ......................................................... 215

Table 4-14 Number of EVs for further analysis by scenario ................................................................. 217

Table 5-1. Overview of 22 Changes Implemented by CORDS Leadership ........................................... 258

Table 5-2. Results and Costs of Chieur Hoi (Open Arms) Program over Time .................................. 289

Table 5-3 Summary of EV Congruence with Changes in Control ......................................................... 293

Table 5-4. Updating Explanations for Increasing Control in Late 1967 ................................................. 294

Table 5-5. Robustness Check: Increasing Control in Early 1967 .......................................................... 296

Table 5-6. What if Control Actually Increased in Late 1968? Tet Scenario ........................................ 300

Table 5-7. What if Control Actually Increased in Late 1969? COSVN Scenario ................................. 303

Table 6-1 Eliminating the Infeasible Explanations for Increased Control ........................................... 310

Table 6-2 Rank Ordering the Feasible Explains for Increased Control ............................................... 312

Table 6-3. Summary of Alternative Organizational Options ............................................................... 351

Table 6-4. Degree of Interagency Integration Based on Scope and Interdependence ..... 355
List of Figures

Figure 3-1 Theoretical (Doctrinal) Plan to Defeat an Insurgency........................................ 107

Figure 3-2 Achievements in Population and Hamlet Control, 1971........................................ 149

Figure 3-3 Change in Territorial Control over Time by Province.......................................... 150

Figure 3-4 Trends in Control over Time (1959-1972) ............................................................... 151

Figure 3-5 . Pacification in Vietnam Data Set, 1959–1972......................................................... 155

Figure 4-1 Conditional Effect of Mechanization on Probability of Incumbent Win, 1918-2005 ........................................................................................................................................ 176

Figure 4-2 Manpower and Success. From Friedman with BOG ratios of 7.5 (pre-40,000
troop request), 9.1 (post-40,000 troop request), and 20: 1,000 (doctrinal ratio) added.... 178

Figure 4-3 Historical Distribution of COIN Outcomes by BOG Ratio, n=171 ....................... 194

Figure 4-5. “Predicted Pattern of Selective Violence, Defection, and Denunciation” ..... 197

Figure 5-1. Bayesian Approach to Process Tracing (Illustrative Graphic)............................. 225

Figure 5-2 Causal Linkages between Single Management and Improved Control........ 233

Figure 6-1. Number of Programs and Factors Affecting Pacification................................. 321
1 Introduction

Max Weber observed that states adopt specialized bureaucracies to face and address increasingly complex challenges.\(^1\) However, when a state faces a problem that requires more than one element of the government to resolve, these benefits could become liabilities as each agency independently “does its own thing” and “stove-pipes” their actions when an integrated, whole of government response is required.

The United States Government (USG) faced this problem when its’ policy goal to defeat (pacify) the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam in the 1960s required the integrated efforts from more than five separate independent agencies. After repeatedly failing to get the USG agencies to orchestrate their efforts on their own to break the stalemate against the Communist insurgency, the President decided to re-organize the various USG elements that were independently implementing their portion of pacification into a single, hybrid civilian-military organization: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Establishing a single director with authority over all pacification programs is widely credited as improving control of the

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rural areas to break the stalemate against, and eventually defeat, the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam.

This widely-held belief in the relationship between single management for inter-agency policy-implementation undergirds every major proposal to reform how the USG organizes itself to “provide for the national defense.”

Alarmingly, carte blanche adoption of a unified management approach could actually increase the risk to USG policy goals because, despite being widely cited, the effectiveness of CORDS single management approach has never been tested and confirmed. Given the amount of time, effort, money, and personnel the US would expend in establishing unified management, the veracity of this critical, commonly-held should be examined.

Although this dissertation examines a historical case study about an interagency organization that was conducting pacification (counterinsurgency-COIN) during the Vietnam War, the main purpose of this research is to neither conduct a historical analysis on fighting the Communist insurgency in Vietnam nor conduct a security/military analysis on what comprises the best pacification programs. Instead, its primary focus is to examine whether the manner in which the various agencies operate together affected

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2 US Constitution, Preamble, 1787.
3 The three methodological chapters are exclusively about the historical case study, while the introductory and concluding chapters put the historical case study into the broader policy context. Pacification is currently referred to as counterinsurgency (COIN) and will include the use of counterterrorism (CT) in support of COIN. In modern terminology, the pacification organization is a COIN/CT organization.
the effectiveness of USG interagency operations—specifically whether the adoption of single management improved control in Vietnam.

The findings from this research will contribute to the debate on how to overcome the stovepipes that inhibit and prevent the USG from smartly applying all elements of its national power to address the country’s challenges. In scholastic terms, this dissertation is studying *interagency organizational structures for policy implementation.*

While this work could broadly apply to any governmental policy and executive branch reform, this case is motivated by the “smart power” debate on improving the implementation of national security and foreign policy.⁴

### 1.1 CORDS—a Unique Interagency Organization⁵

Strategic and military operational planners view war/conflicts as comprised of one or more campaigns: “a series of related major operations aimed at achieving

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⁴ See upcoming sections for discussion of smart power and interagency policy implementation.

⁵ Unless otherwise noted, all material for this section comes from the authoritative source on the creation of CORDS and its organizational structure—Thomas Scoville. The following comes from his biography on page 330 of his dissertation: Of his fifteen months in Vietnam from 1967–1968, he served as assistant field evaluator for CORDS for seven months. He then worked in the CMH until 1972, where he researched and wrote the Army’s official (but never published) history of pacification by assembling a major collection of official and unofficial documents, which included making two trips to Vietnam to gather more research materials and official papers. He used his work as the source for his Massachusetts Institute of Technology dissertation, Thomas Welch Scoville, “United States Organization for Pacification Advice and Support in Vietnam, 1954–1968” (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976), http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/72698/03032786.pdf?sequence=1, which he later republished in a condensed form as a monograph in the CMH’s Vietnam studies series. Thomas W. Scoville, *Reorganizing for Pacification Support*, vol. CMH Pub 90-27, *Vietnam Studies* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History (CMH), 1982).
strategic and operational objectives within a given space and time.” With that definition, the Vietnam War has been described as being comprised of four separate campaigns: a pacification and nation-building campaign against the South Vietnamese–based Communist insurgency; a conventional campaign against the main/conventional forces of the North Vietnamese Peoples’ Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and South Vietnamese Peoples Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF); an air campaign against North Vietnam; and a diplomatic campaign to pressure North Vietnam to cease aggression against South Vietnam. Of these four campaigns, the pacification and conventional force campaigns are the most inextricably linked and could be viewed as the “two different sides of the same coin” of the Vietnamese civil war because they are both occurring at the same time at essentially the same places. Although it affects, and is affected by, the conventional war, this project is focused on the pacification campaign to defeat the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam.

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8 Civil wars can be classified by the technologies (and tactics) that they use as conventional, guerilla (insurgency), or symmetric nonconventional. Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 03 (2010), p. 415. In other words, the Vietnam War can be classified simultaneously as a conventionally fought civil war between North and South Vietnam and also a guerilla war between South Vietnamese non-Communists and Communists.
Comprised of a large mix of programs and activities that vary over time and space, pacification:

In general, is comprised two broad types of activities. These are designed, on the one hand, to establish and maintain a significant degree of physical security for the population and, on the other hand, to increase communication and the ties between the government and the people through a variety of selected nonmilitary programs (bold added for emphasis).

Before the establishment of CORDS, several USG agencies implemented one or more separate pacification programs. (See Table below) However, each agency “did its own thing” by implementing their programs in time and space where they thought was best (or easiest), regardless of how their programs positively or negatively affected other agencies programs. It was not unheard of for a USG agency to build a school in an area, but could not get hire any teachers because that area was not secure from the Communist insurgents; or for another program to support economic development by assisting in increasing crop production, but the farmers could not get the food to market because there was not a transportation network.

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Table 1-1. Pacification Theme for Each Function by Contributing Agency\textsuperscript{10}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>Civic Action/Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Public Safety (police)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{Chieu Hoii} (Open Arms)</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Life Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>\textit{Phung Hoang} (Phoenix)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Census-Grievance (CG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary Development (RD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>Psychological/Information Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>(PSYOPS/IO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Johnson established, and designated a single manager [Ambassador
Robert Komer] to lead, CORDS on May 8, 1967 to advise and assist the RVN military
and GVN officials to defeat the rural Communist insurgency. A Joint Interagency Task
Force (JIATF) in modern parlance, it was organized as a headquarters that could plan,
direct, and supervise the pacification programs of its subordinate elements from the
various military and civilian agencies.\textsuperscript{11} Borrowing many organizational concepts from
the Civil Affairs/Military Government (CA/MG) operations from World War II\textsuperscript{12} and

\textsuperscript{10} While the four main contributing agencies were (in decreasing size) Defense, USAID, CIA, and then USIA,
CORDS also had a small number of personnel from State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Health, Education and
Welfare. This is only a list of some of the major programs; there were a large number of smaller programs as
well. The three broad categories of pacification affects (or themes) used in CORDS campaign planning
documents later in the war. William Egan Colby and James McCargar, \textit{Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of
\textsuperscript{11} CORDS was “joint” because it was comprised of personnel and units from more than one military service
(although predominately Army); interagency” because it included at least one civilian agency (State, USIA,
USAID, CIA, Treasury, Agriculture, and Health, Education and Welfare); and a task force because the
headquarters had the authority to direct pacification operations. If it had had authority to direct the
pacification operations of Vietnamese personnel and units (or from any other nation), it would have also
been “combined” (CJIATF), but it existed to advise and assist the RVN forces, not lead.
\textsuperscript{12} See Section 2.2 Informative Pseudo-Interagency Reform from World War II
comprised of fewer than ten thousand US civilian and military personnel, CORDS advised and assisted approximately 50 percent of the RVN military (about two hundred fifty thousand personnel) and 100 percent of RVN paramilitary (about seven hundred thousand personnel).

The first borrowed CA/MG concept was to place all pacification efforts underneath control of the military from the operational to tactical levels. Like CA/MG operations underneath the Theater Commands in Europe and Asia, CORDS was established as a subordinate component to MAC-V because only the military had the capacity to meet the scale of security, logistical, administrative, transportation, and other support requirements needed for pacification, especially in an uncertain/unsafe security environment. In order to properly synchronize the wide scope of political, economic, social, and security programs needed to defeat the insurgency, CORDS’ single management gave it the authority to direct and supervise all of its subordinate elements, regardless of which agency from which that CORDS element came. This authority was not just limited to the CORDS headquarters at the national level but was replicated at the subordinate CORDS headquarters at the four military regions, forty-four provinces, and two hundred thirty-four districts of South Vietnam.

While the number of personnel at each layer of CORDS headquarters varied from the national down to the district levels, the number and types of programs that
they supervised did not. Using USG personnel from at least four different agencies, each level of CORDS headquarters generally performed ten broad civilian and military pacification functions as they advised and assisted the GVN’s implementation of over twenty specific programs.¹³ In a higher-level headquarters, a CORDS officer might be responsible for one function but for several functions at lower levels.

To implement these varied pacification programs, and similar to the CA/MG detachments in World War II, CORDS required a wide variety of technical expertise that was not found in the military personnel system. Despite appearing to have vastly different manning solutions by using 100 percent military during World War II versus a mixed civilian/military manning, the two organizations in fact used the same de facto personnel solution. Instead of trying to internally grow the technical expertise needed to implement the various political, economic, and social programs, both CA/MG and CORDS leadership hired those technical experts from already existing civilian agencies by either drafting and commissioning them as specialty officers in World War II or borrowing them as temporary hires during the Vietnam War. In all cases, incorporating

¹³ The number of pacification programs grew over time to ten broad areas. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., pp. 44, 59, 67. See Chart 4, “Organization of Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS,” on p. 59 for a display of the CORDS headquarters at the national level that shows the original six main pacification functions/programs along with four other administration and evaluation functions. A list of the more than twenty specific GVN programs can be found in Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam., pp. 296-297, 386-397, Appendix B, “Pacification Programs in Vietnam.”
civilians for their contributions to a CA/MG or pacification mission effectively
civilianized the military organization instead of militarizing the civilian technical
experts—even the ones commissioned into the military as specialty officers.

While being commissioned into the military obviously made those CA/MG
civilian officers de jure responsible to follow orders in addition to giving them the legal
authority to issue orders, civilian and military members of CORDS faced the same de
facto situation. As a result of the presidential directive to the civilian deputy commander
of MAC-V for pacification/CORDS director to “direct, coordinate, and supervise” all
pacification efforts, every level of CORDS leadership gained operational, budgetary, and
(limited) administrative authority over all of their subordinates – regardless of the
parent agency.14

While civilians comprised less than 30 percent of CORDS personnel, they
“punched above their weight” by filling 50 percent of the leadership positions and
almost 100 percent of the critical strategic/operational positions at the national level and
the four regions.15 Appointed by the president with the rank of ambassador (equivalent

14 These authorities gave CORDS leaders the ability to direct where and when a certain pacification program
would or would not occur (operations); increase, decrease, or cancel expenditures (budget); and write the
performance evaluation reports of their subordinate (limited administrative). In other words, a USAID
officer who served as a leader in CORDS would evaluate the performance of his or her DoD, USAID, USIA,
and CIA subordinates. President Johnson provided additional guidance in NSAM 362 to agencies to
promote their support for CORDS: “I count on all concerned to pull together to make this work” and
“charge all US departments and agencies with meeting these requirements promptly and effectively.”
15 This high percentage of civilian leadership could explain the “civilianization” of CORDS observation.
to a four-star general), the two CORDS commanders were Robert Komer\textsuperscript{16} from the NSC, followed by the future director of the CIA, William Colby.\textsuperscript{17} The CORDS director was placed in the MAC-V military chain of command as the deputy commander for pacification (DEPCORDS) and was only outranked by the MAC-V commander.\textsuperscript{18}

Selection of the operational/tactical CORDS leadership at the forty-four provinces and two hundred thirty-four districts followed a few flexible guidelines rather than fixed rules. First and foremost was that the “right guy”—regardless of what agency to which he or she was assigned—would be selected to address the specific challenges and situation facing each respective province or district. Second, acknowledging that pacification was a combination of military and civilian efforts, each region, province and district had a CORDS leadership team of a civilian and military CORDS officer, with the


\textsuperscript{17} To read Ambassador Colby’s recollections of pacification in general and CORDS specifically, see Colby and McCargar, \textit{Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam}.

\textsuperscript{18} Scoville, \textit{Reorganizing for Pacification Support.}, p. 65. General Westmoreland, the MAC-V Commander, insisted that Komer be designated as DEPCORDS to ensure that his military mandate only extended to CORDS as opposed to Westmoreland’s military deputy (General Abrams; DEPUSMACV), whose mandate covered all of MAC-V’s activities. As a result, only DEPUSMACV could command MAC-V in the absence of Westmoreland himself; Komer, as deputy (only) for pacification could not. As a member of MAC-V, the DEPCORDS/ambassador had no legal requirement to report to the US ambassador to Vietnam, but he did maintain close relations with him.
threat level in each location determining who served as the CORDS director (and, consequently, who would be the deputy). Changes in the security and pacification situation could and would change leadership assignments.19

Because it has never been repeated, the unique authority of CORDS leadership to synchronize the vast breadth and depth of military and civilian pacification programs in a multi-layered organization is rightly considered the pinnacle of inter-agency policy-implementation.

1.2 Key Terms in the Interagency Reform Debates

Although the Executive Branch of the USG is comprised of hundreds of entities subordinate to the President of the United States using a panoply of names (departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, commissions, councils, offices, etc.)20, this dissertation will simply refer to each of those various elements of the USG as an agency.21

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19 As with the DEPCORDS and CORDS director, the CORDS leadership was also dual-hatted. Within the CORDS organization, they served as directors and deputy directors because those positions had legal authority to direct and supervise operations. Within the larger MAC-V structure, they served as the province and district senior advisor and deputy province/district senior advisor.


21 The USG definition of agency is as follows: “The term ‘agency’ includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States.” Department is defined as “one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of Title 5.” U.S. Congress, Department and Agency Defined, 18 USC 6 (1948).
As such, the term *interagency* will describe anytime two or more agencies (should) interact with each other to any degree in time, space, or purpose.\(^2^2\)

Agencies interact for two related but different purposes: *policymaking* and *policy implementation*. Where *policymaking* is the process in which various agencies work together to determine what the country’s policy goals should be,\(^2^3\) *policy implementation* is the process by which those agencies work together to achieve those goals. While *policymaking* is relevant and related to *policy implementation*, this research will measure and assess changes in the effectiveness of *policy implementation* over time as its outcome variable.

How the multiple agencies interact with each other to implement policy makes up the *organizational structure*. While there are several combinations and forms that the agencies can take to do this (including doing nothing), they can be broadly defined as: *orchestration* via *Unity of Effort*\(^2^4\) and *synchronization* via *Unity of Command* (also referred

\(^2^2\) Some of the academic literature also refers to *interagency* as *interorganizational*. Agencies need to interact under one or more of the following conditions: 1) time: their functions and operations run sequentially (“A” before “B”); 2) space: their operations occur in the same geographic area; and 3) purpose: both of their operations are working toward the same policy goal.

\(^2^3\) Although not the first researcher on interagency policymaking, this work is arguably the most well-known: Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

\(^2^4\) Orchestrate: “to arrange or combine so as to achieve a desired or maximum effect” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/synchronize); Unity of Effort: “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action” (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/).
to as *unified* or *single management*).\textsuperscript{25} These structures and approaches will be the explanatory variable of interest for the CORDS hypothesis of this study.

This project will test whether changes in *interagency organizational structures* affect the effectiveness of *policy implementation*; pacification in Vietnam is merely the test case. Or, in other words, the project asks whether changing how the multiple USG agencies interacted with each other to implement pacification in Vietnam improved its effectiveness.

### 1.3 Constitutional Impediments to Interagency Operations

The competing concepts of synchronization versus orchestration—Unity of Command versus Unity of Effort—are institutional constructs of the US Constitution. As a document designed to limit and constrain power,\textsuperscript{26} the Constitution grants the authority to synchronize all of the various elements of the Executive Branch only to the President under Article II. This is seen in the President’s explicitly and implicitly constitutionally defined roles as a leader,\textsuperscript{27} authority to select (and relieve) subordinate

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\textsuperscript{25} Synchronize: “to cause (things) to agree in time or to make (things) happen at the same time and speed” ([http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/orchestrat](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/orchestrat)); Unity of Command: “the operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose” ([http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/)).

\textsuperscript{26} Under the Tenth Amendment, “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution... are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

\textsuperscript{27} Constitutionally designated leadership roles in Article II, Sections 1, 2, and 3: “Executive Power vested in a President,” “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy... and the Militia,” “to make Treaties,” “shall receive Ambassadors,” and “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
civilian and military officers, and ability compel those subordinates to report to him. Further, each department head also has the authority to synchronize and direct the efforts of their own department/agency.

The Constitution grants the President authority of Unity of Command over the entire Executive Branch and to each of the department/agency heads over their respective agencies. However, in the absence of a Presidential order synchronizing them, because the Constitution does not grant department heads the authority to direct other departments, they are only able to voluntarily orchestrate their efforts with the other agencies—Unity of Effort. This suggests that resolving issues with interagency operations might be as simple as the President deciding and selecting policy goals and then directing that the departments work together to implement them.

28 Appoint subordinates in Article II, Sections 2 and 3: “… shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls… and all other Officers of the United States” and “… shall Commission all Officers of the United States.”
29 To compel subordinates to report to the president in Article II, Section 2: “He may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective offices.”
30 Authority of department heads in Article II, Section 2: “Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they [Congress] think proper… in the Heads of the Departments,” and “[the president] may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective offices.”
31 This conclusion was deductively reached using disjunctive syllogism. In formal notation: “A” or “B,” if “not A,” then “B.” In other words, when there are only two approaches to interagency operations (Unity of Command versus Unity of Effort), if the department heads cannot use “A” (Unity of Command), they logically can only use “B” (Unity of Effort).
While correct within the National Security Council for the actual act of *policymaking* itself, it is not feasible when it comes to implementing policies that require multiple agencies to integrate and coordinate their efforts at multiple levels in time, space, and purpose. To paraphrase the maxim on sending and receiving email, policy made does not mean policy implemented.

It is difficult to implement policy requiring the integration and coordination of multiple agencies’ actions because their differing cultures, priorities, and time horizons create a natural friction between them at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. At each of those levels requiring multiagency interaction, unless the various agencies voluntarily to come to a consensus with each other on their respective roles in carrying out policy, there will be unresolvable disagreements. Merely calling for Unity of Effort cannot resolve problems because no agency can compel another agency when, how, or even whether to take action. While these problems are theoretically easy to resolve with the president/commander in chief using his or her constitutional authority to synchronize all of the elements of the Executive Branch, the reality is that the president will not because only a very small percentage of interagency problems are of enough importance to go through the staffing process to get to the presidential desk for decision.

This results in the interagency policy implementation conundrum that the actor with the institutional authority to synchronize the agencies lacks the bureaucratic
capacity (time and knowledge) to do so; on the other hand, the agency actors implementing the policy on the ground at least have an idea about how to possibly integrate the various agencies but lack the institutional authority to do so. This results in a bureaucratic “anarchic state of nature” that the USG, even when faced with strategic challenges requiring multiple USG agencies, naturally utilizes a unity-of-effort approach and relies on the numerous actors with differing and competing cultures, priorities, and time horizons to voluntarily orchestrate their efforts.

1.4 Current Strategic Challenges Requires Interagency Solutions

The strategic study literature examines and evaluates how a state faces its challenges by looking at the interplay of the state’s “ends” (goals), “ways” (manner of using a state’s power), and “means” (resources to be expended). For many years, and possibly due to the Cold War, power, the “ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not … the ability to change the behavior of others,”32 was considered to be either “hard” or “soft.”

However, with the strategic environment of near absolute war between the USSR and the US shifting to a wide variety of challenges in which small issues such as

32 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990), pp. 154-156. “Hard” elements of power are military force, geography, population, and raw materials; “soft” factors of power are technology, education, and economy.
counterproliferation, counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, nation building and economic development could be prevented from becoming major (military) issues with the combination of hard and soft power. As described by Joseph Nye, “Hard military power will play a vital role... but not all current challenges... can be met with military power alone. That is why it is so essential that Americans—and others—better understand and apply smart power. Smart power is neither hard nor soft. It is [the skillful combination of] both.”

These emerging strategic challenges that require a strategist to “smartly” employ all elements of national power (whether referred to as DIME, DIMEC, or DIMEFIL) highlight an organizational problem that relates back to the Weberian problem of governmental specialization when faced with cross-cutting complex issues. While a strategist may call for various combinations of a state’s diplomatic, informational, military, and/or economic power to achieve its national goals, these elements of power are not represented by a single agency inside of the government. Instead, because many

elements of national power can be exercised by two or more agencies, and many of these agencies can exert power in more than one element of DIMEFIL at the same time, integrating and coordinating the “fractured and compartmentalized… and stove-piped” foreign policy institutions requires a degree of planning is all but impossible.\textsuperscript{35}

This challenge coordinating the many agencies affecting national security was highlighted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In her 2010 \textit{Foreign Affairs} article, she argued that the alliterative elements of national power—defense, development, and diplomacy\textsuperscript{36}—must be “coordinated, complementary and mutually reinforcing” in order to address “impoverished, corrupt, lawless, or mired in recurring cycles of conflict… drug cartels, criminal gangs funded by illicit exploitation of natural resources.”\textsuperscript{37} While those conditions do not create terrorism or other conflicts, they do create the conditions that allow terrorism to grow, flourish, and spread.\textsuperscript{38}

To address these lower-level challenges that can morph in future security problems, the USG requires the efforts and abilities of a host of USG departments and agencies that have traditionally only worked domestically within the United States.

\textsuperscript{35} Armitage and Nye Jr, \textit{Csis Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America}.
\textsuperscript{36} A more well-known acronym is DIME or DIMEFIL: diplomacy, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement. All three are simply mnemonics to remind policymakers of the various elements on national power that may be used. If diplomacy is subdivided into traditional diplomacy as well as public diplomacy (information), then D-D-D is the same as DIME.
\textsuperscript{37} Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Leading through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development,” \textit{Foreign affairs} 89, no. 6 (November/December 2010), pp. 14, 23.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 23.
Clinton specifically cited that six agencies implement the Global Health Initiative; sixteen are involved with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, twenty-two agencies participate in the US-India dialogue, and more than thirty agencies participate in the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.\(^3^9\) However, Clinton cautioned and concluded that the USG will be unable to “coordinate, complement and mutually reinforce” the three D’s (defense, diplomacy, and development) if it cannot move beyond agency “stovepiping.”\(^4^0\)

### 1.5 Interagency Strategic Solutions Require National Security Reform

In a scathing article published by the Arthur D. Simmons Center for Interagency Cooperation,\(^4^1\) Representatives Geoffrey Davis and John F. Tierney, while agreeing with the need to better employ the elements of US power, indirectly argued that the Booz Allen Hamilton\(^4^2\) recommendations of improving interagency awareness would not

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\(^3^9\) Ibid., pp. 15, 20, 22. Examples of some of the agencies are: Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Treasury; United States Agency for International Development; Millennial Challenge Corporation; Overseas Private Investment Corporation; Export-Import Bank; Peace Corps; and many more.

\(^4^0\) Ibid., pp. 14, 20.


overcome the “hamstrung and broken… national security interagency process [caused by] regulatory, budgetary, legislative, bureaucratic and cultural impediments to effective interagency operations.” Their analysis began by relating that the more than sixty-year-old national security system was the product of a strategic context almost exclusively focused on major/high-intensity combat operations and nuclear deterrence that were almost completely the responsibility of the Department of Defense (DoD).

They then observed that although the end of the Cold War changed the strategic context from low-probability/high-severity threats to high-probability/low-severity threats, the national security structure did not change.

To illustrate the danger of failing to change security structures to meet the changed strategic context, the authors cited a number of examples of the US stabilization efforts in Iraq to illustrate their assessment that “executing the national security strategy can be dangerous and produce erratic outcomes when agencies and departments fail to collaborate.” They also argued that in order to have an “integrated interagency process

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43 Davis et al., "The Need for Interagency Reform: Congressional Perspective and Efforts.", p. 3. Representative Davis (R-KY4) served on the Ways and Means Committee, and Representative Tierney (D-MA6) served on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee and was the ranking member of the National Security Oversight Committee.

44 Ibid., pp. 3-4. Low-probability/high-severity operations are comprised of major combat operations and nuclear war implemented by the DoD. High-probability/low-severity operations include COIN, terrorism, proliferation, nation building, natural disasters, etc., implemented by multiple agencies.

45 Ibid., pp. 4-7. The following are some examples from Iraq stabilization: 1) The US military learned that Ambassador Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi military, which was the cornerstone of the military stabilization plans, through a cable news report, pg. 4; 2) Likewise, National Security Council staffs
[that] will empower the US to more effectively deploy or non-military instruments of power abroad… [and] allow the US to more successfully fulfill its interests while reserving the use of lethal military force as a last resort,“ Congress must act to direct and force reform inside of the Executive Branch—similar to how the 1986 GNA reformed the DoD.46

1.6 National Security Reform Proposals Are Based on the CORDS Program

Similar to the DoD reform movement47 of the early/mid-1980s that culminated in the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols Act [GNA]), there have been at least seven major reports and research projects sponsored by the USG or nongovernmental organization think tanks on how to reform various aspects of national security interagency policy-implementation since 1999.48 All

learned of Ambassador Bremer’s orders over the Coalition Provisional Government’s (CPA) web page, pg. 5; 3) Although directed by the president, the CPA was only manned at two-thirds’ strength because the relevant agencies would/could not deploy personnel, pg. 4; . 4) In order to avoid being slowed by bureaucracy, Ambassador Bremer instructed CPA personnel to not answer Requests for Information from Washington, DC, resulting in State Department employees seconded to CPA using Hotmail (or other personal) email accounts for communication, pg. 5; 5. Although the Department of the Treasury developed a banking system solution to allow Iraqi soldiers to directly deposit their paychecks into a bank account instead of taking several days off each month to do it in person, the Treasury lacked the authorities to operate outside of the US; p. 5.

46 Ibid., pp. 5, 7.
of these studies and reports advocate adopting the organizational approach of unified (or single) management for national security policy implementation—an indirect reliance on the CORDS program because that organizational an approach has only been used in the CORDS program.

The most prominent of these reports, (written under the leadership of the architect of the GNA, James Locher) the 2008 congressionally mandated study Project on National Security Reform specifically stated that the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program for pacification (counterinsurgency, or COIN)
in Vietnam “exemplifie[d] inter-agency integration” and was a “good example of an innovative and effective inter-agency program.” Where the other studies implicitly rely on CORDS because it is the only case study of single management, the PNSR explicitly bases its recommendation on the example of the organizational approach used in CORDS.

By 2010, in addition to those major think tank reports, there were more than two hundred fifty other books, articles, and studies as well as a think tank devoted to studying and providing solutions to the USG’s interagency policy implementation difficulties. All of these think tank reports, as well as a vast majority of the other works, also advocated adopting some form of single/unified management (Unity of Command) to improve interagency policy-implementation for national security, with many directly or indirectly recommending adopting a CORDS-like approach.

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50 Lamb and Marks, *Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration*, p. 31, note 11. A quick review of this topic on Google Scholar shows that there are now far more than two hundred fifty works on this topic. "Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation." Funded by a grant from H. Ross Perot in 2010, the mission of the Simmons Center is to “seek a better understanding of the many organizational, cultural, and material factors that promote or impede interagency cooperation, and champions the investigation of issues impacting interagency cooperation.” By 2016, the Simmons Center had published: eighteen quarterly interagency journals, each with multiple articles; seventeen interagency papers; fourteen interagency essays; five interagency studies; and two interagency reports.
All of these studies accepted the premise that CORDS’ unified management improved implementing the policy of pacification—without reservation or verification. Because the general premise that single management improves inter-agency policy-implementation (or the specific premise that CORDS’ single management improved control against the Communist insurgency in Vietnam) is not tested in any of the plethora of studies, reports, or papers, it is the untested but widely accepted assumption that undergirds all of these proposals for National Security reform.

1.7 Research Design Testing the Effectiveness of CORDS

1.7.1 Literature Review of Pacification in Vietnam

The policy proposals’ reliance on the premise that unified management improves policy implementation is not supported in the scholarly literature. While existing scholarly works do document variation in both the explanatory variable (organizational structure) and outcome variable (pacification), there is no corresponding work supporting the causal claims that CORDS’ adoption of single management caused that improvement in the policy of pacification. In other words, the current policy proposals are based on correlation, not causation.

Among the major think tank reports about improving interagency policy-implementation, the accepted belief that CORDS improved pacification as the result of improved synchronization falls within the revisionist camp of historical analysis of the
Vietnam War. However, while the CORDS literature shares the same focus on the later years of the conflict as other revisionist works, it differs from those writings regarding their scope and breadth of study. Where the body of revisionist scholars addressed the war in its totality and argued that the Vietnam War could have been won, the advocates for adopting a CORDS-like approach to improve interagency policy implementation focused on a much narrower aspect of the war—the rural COIN campaign against the Communist political cadre and local guerrilla forces.

Filtering the large body of revisionist literature on the Vietnam War to find research on providing security/control (activity) in rural Vietnam (geography) for pacification (campaign) identified two independent, but mutually reinforcing, pieces of research from 2012 and 2015. Using statistical and historical analyses on similar but not identical sources, Rex Douglas and Martin Clemis independently concluded that

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52 Moyar states that the majority of the orthodox history of Vietnam primarily focus on the time period from 1954 (division of Vietnam) to 1968 (Tet Offensive), while the revisionist historians include the period from 1969 (Communist decision to shift from main force fighting) to 1975 (fall of South Vietnam).
“territorial control shifted decidedly in the government’s favor from 1967 to 1972” and “increased government authority to unprecedented levels after Tet [January 1968].” Both scholars narrowly concluded that the GVN with its allies (principally the US) improved control in order to achieve the necessary condition of control for pacification success, and neither claimed that the GVN was able to develop support from its population as part of the pacification campaign. Their work played a critical role in establishing the variation in the outcome variable as defined by control/security.

Given that CORDS encompassed all pacification efforts ongoing from 1968 to 1972 (the time period of their research), Douglas’ and Clemis’ works also support the single-paragraph claim by the esteemed Vietnam War scholar Douglas Pike that the pacification program (CORDS) defeated the Communist insurgency, which is also

54 There is literature explaining, detailing, and analyzing why the GVN failed to generate support from its own population. While interesting and of value to policymakers, planners, and practitioners of COIN, it does not fall within the scope of this study, which examines the role CORDS played in establishing the control aspect of pacification.
55 Douglas Pike, *Pavn: People’s Army of Vietnam* (Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1986), p. 246. Pike claimed that the “counter strategy against armed *dau tranh* proved successful and met the challenge through the long years of warfare.” A leading historian and scholar on the Vietnam War, Pike served as a foreign service officer in Asia, spent fifteen years as an analyst for the State Department, and wrote treatises on: PAVN, PLAF, Vietnamese Communism, and the NLF organization.
echoed by the US Army’s “semi-official” history of pacification. However, as will be shown later in this and other chapters, the CORDS program was comprised of many programs and organizations performing many pacification functions. Even though the existing literature only supports the claim that CORDS in its totality improved pacification, there are a large number of sources claiming that CORDS’ single management was the causal explanation for improved pacification (control).

However, the only existing scholarly work on CORDS’ single management merely shows that CORDS utilized the organizational approach of single management and describes the history and bureaucratic politics that went behind it doing so. Because of its holistic approach in summarizing how the USG organized for pacification

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57 In addition to the think tank reports (see section 2.4) along with numerous individual articles and monographs, the claim that single management improved pacification was found in: Scoville, “United States Organization for Pacification Advice and Support in Vietnam, 1954-1968.”; Scoville, *Reorganizing for Pacification Support*. Several parts of the *US Army in the Vietnam War* series, published by the CMH, have one to two sentences that repeat that assertion in their more than four hundred pages. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds*.

58 Thomas Scoville wrote his PhD dissertation and subsequent monograph for the CMH based on his experience in CORDS from December 1967 to June 1968 and as a historian in the CMH from 1969 to 1972. Scoville, “United States Organization for Pacification Advice and Support in Vietnam, 1954-1968.”; Scoville, *Reorganizing for Pacification Support*. While focusing primarily on CORDS, his work traced the various forms of interagency structures to implement policy over time. Although he used the term *single management*, he never used the term *Unity of Effort*. But he did provide enough description to code any organizational structure as adopting Unity of Effort or command.
over time, this work will be key in showing variation in the explanatory variable
(organizational structure for interagency policy implementation) from Unity of Effort to
Unity of Command. However, there is no work demonstrating that CORDS’ single
management was the cause for that success.

Tracing the citations of the articles and reports that accepted the premise that
CORDS’ unified management improved policy implementation (specifically
pacification) led to one of four pieces of literature in 1970, 1972, and 1985. Those four
pieces were written, edited, and/or contributed to by the same author, who was also the
originator of the unified management concept as well as the first director
(“commander”) of CORDS: Ambassador Robert Komer.59 These works can be separated
into two related clusters.

Published in 1970, the first two interrelated works provided a well-rounded
assessment of the effectiveness of CORDS that suggested that unified management may
have improved the performance of the USG pacification efforts in South Vietnam. Based
on three days of transcribed interviews with Ambassador Komer in November 1969,

59 Robert W. Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program (1970),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documents/2006/D20104.pdf; Robert W. Komer, "Impact of
Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam" (paper presented at the American Political Science
Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on Us-Gvn Performance in Vietnam
(RAND, 1972), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0770405; Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at
supplemented with additional analysis by him, the more than two-hundred-fifty-page Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program report served as the basis for Komer’s twenty-plus-page paper, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam, which he presented to the American Political Science Association’s 66th Annual Meeting in September 1970. In these works, although Komer acknowledged that although he had a “parochial view,” he was positive that “pacification [CORDS] probably played a role versus the insurgency.” However, he also recognized that it is still premature to attempt more than an interim assessment… [because] no adequate basis for inference is yet available… It is difficult to sort out the relative impact of pacification [CORDS] from that of many other factors.60…. Beside, exogenous factors may so cloud the ultimate outcome in Vietnam to make it impossible in the end to sort out the impact of pacification [CORDS].61

Although he primarily focused on CORDS, Komer acknowledged there was a great amount of uncertainty in his conclusion about CORDS effectiveness because there were several other plausible explanations for the success of pacification. From his statements, it is logical to infer that he would say that they all needed to be tested at a later time. However, while the next two pieces of his literature still argued that CORDS’

60 Komer specifically identified four possible alternative explanations. 1) the “shield” provided by big units; 2) that Tet may have exhausted the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army; 3) the VC tactics of coercion and terror alienated the South Vietnamese; or. 4) the reduction of North Vietnamese support to the southern insurgency.
unified management impacted pacification efforts, they no longer mentioned the other possible explanations or the associated uncertainty about unified management.

In 1972, the RAND Corporation commissioned three studies under the sponsorship of DoD’s Advanced Research Projects Agency that focused solely on studying organizational management for policy implementation of pacification (COIN)—two of which were researched and written by Komer. All three reports concluded that unified management contributed to successful pacification.62 If Komer conducted analysis to eliminate the alternative explanations or uncertainty from his 1970 literature, he never showed his work in either his 1972 Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam or the 1985 commercially published version, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict. These two documents claimed that unified management was the sole causal explanation for successful/improved interagency policy implementation in pacification.

While Komer’s 1970 works inductively argued that unified management was one of several reasons that might have improved pacification, his 1972/1985 works implied that unified management improved policy implementation was a deductive fact. Because he never showed his work, his 1972/1985 argument was really only inductive, one that now suffered from the fallacy of making hasty generalizations because it disregarded the alternative explanations that he previously identified.63

1.7.2 Research Problem and Objective

The current policy literature directly or indirectly citing CORDS are based on Komer’s 1972 and 1985 works that claim that unified management increased the effectiveness of pacification. In other words, the central problem for this research is that current policy recommendations to shift to unified/single management to improve interagency policy implementation are based on an untested hypothesis rather than an established fact (or at least a reasonable assumption). Therefore, the major research objective of this project will be to test the critical assumption undergirding these policy

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63 An inductive argument by plausibility offers evidence in support of a thesis. Its conclusions are “strong” or “weak” as opposed to deductive conclusions, which are “supported” or “falsified.” An argument by plausibility suffers from the fallacy of hasty generalization when it comes to a conclusion without taking into account alternative explanations or all data.
recommendations. It will do so by testing the theory of unified management in the only instance it has occurred—with CORDS in Vietnam.

1.7.3 Research Question and Hypothesis

Building off existing research that established both that interorganizational structures shifted from Unity of Effort to Unity of Command and that pacification improved from 1967 to 1972, this research will focus on answering the specific research question, did unified/single management cause pacification (especially control) to improve in Vietnam? The main hypothesis of interest for this research is:

Changing to unified management under the CORDS program improved pacification (control) in Vietnam because it improved synchronization among the various USG agencies.

To avoid omitted variable bias, the project will also test a wide range of alternative hypotheses building off Ambassador Komer’s firsthand observations in

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64 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton University Press, 1994); Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 1997); Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E Brady and David Collier, 2nd ed. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). KKV described “inadequately confirmed hypotheses and evaluate unquestioned assumptions”, p. 17; Van Evera laid out policy evaluation and theory-testing dissertations, and one of his eleven suggestions for case selection was “for previously omitted types of tests”; pp. 87, 90-91; Brady and Collier terminology is: theory testing and disciplined configurative (for historically important case) approaches; p. 75.
66 Except for Locher’s PNSR report, all papers advocating for single management cite the ability to synchronize interagency operations as the causal factor. The PNSR also specifically mentions innovation as another causal mechanism.
67 This fallacy is also referred to as omitted variable bias, bifurcation, fallacy of false choice, and several other terms. An example of bifurcation would be if “A” or “B” were identified as possible explanatory variables.
1970 on possible alternative explanations supplemented with additional explanations based on theoretical/doctrinal writings on COIN. The 41 alternative explanations (that are all theoretically-feasible and operationally relevant) will examine what improved pacification from the US/GVN as well as Communist points of view at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Optimally, the research will find that a single EV explains improved control—which would deductively confirm or falsify the hypothesis (assumption) that unified/single management led to better interagency policy implementation.

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68 Komer specifically identified four possible alternative explanations: 1) the shield provided by big units, 2) that Tet may have exhausted the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, 3) the VC tactics of coercion and terror that alienated the South Vietnamese, 4) the reduction of North Vietnamese support to the southern insurgency. Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program., p. 226; Komer, "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam.", pp. 12-14.

69 From the “Ivory Tower-Beltway” Bridging the Gap literature, analysis should only include those EVs that affect the OV. Alexander L. George, "The Two Cultures of Academia and Policy-Making: Bridging the Gap," Political Psychology (1994), pp. 154,168. “Academics need to find the knowledge that affects actions” and “scholars should include... variables over which policy-makers have leverage.” Christopher H. Achen, "Let’s Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong," Conflict Management and Peace Science 22, no. 4 (2005), p. 337. Achen argues against including variables that do not theoretically affect the outcome—in essence, scholars must justify the inclusion of the variable of avoid “garbage-can” regression analysis. This is not arguing that environmental conditions do not have an effect; it is just that they do not represent operational decisions. The exception would be if an insurgent commander decided to re-locate to a specific location for its environmental benefit (i.e. mountainous, forest, etc).

70 Carl von Clausewitz, On War [Vom Krieg] (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976; repr., 1984). In Book 1, Section 1, Chapter 2, he equates war to a “wrestling match” or “duel” on a large scale between opponents. As an interactive affair, both participants affect the outcome.
Realistically, due to the large number of competing explanations for improved pacification, quality of data, and limitations in methodologies, it is more likely that there will be several EVs that can explain improved control with varying degrees of confidence.

### 1.7.4 Inferential Strategy

This project will use two complementary inferential approaches to test the 41 theoretically-feasible and operationally-relevant explanations. First, it will test the various possible EVs for improved pacification in Vietnam in order to eliminate the unsupportable arguments. (Of note, the elimination of an EV only mean that it does not explain improved control in this case; it does not mean that it has no effect on pacification/COIN writ large.) Unless that deductive test eliminates all hypotheses except one, the second inferential approach will inductively rank the order the remaining explanations for pacification vis-à-vis each other. It is very possible that there could be multiple supportable explanations for improved pacification, each with varying levels of confidence based on the strength of their argument.

In the end, if there is more than one feasible explanation for improved control in South Vietnam in addition to single management, single management can only be a strong, moderate, or weak assumption- not the fact that it is believed to be.
1.7.5 Case Selection and Methodologies

If the study used a focused case study approach (constrained to studying pacification during the CORDS program from 1967 to 1972), the lack of variation in the explanatory variable would be unable to gain insights into the effect on pacification from switching from Unity of Effort to Unity of Command. To maximize the chance in observing variation in the outcome variable (OV) and the nearly forty possible explanatory variables (EVs), the project will examine USG support of South Vietnamese pacification from 1954 until 1972. To address problems associated with the combination of using imperfect methods on incomplete data, the project will utilize three different political science approaches to triangulate (increase the certainty of) its findings. Below summarizes of each method’s analytic goal and process in tabular form and then narrative form. While not used in this project, the focused case study is also included in the table as a frame of reference.

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71 In 1954 the US assumed responsibility of supporting South Vietnam after the French withdrawal; in 1972 the US essentially withdrew (almost) all from RVN and disestablished CORDS.
Table 1-2. Analytic Goals and Descriptions of Each Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Analytic Goal Description</th>
<th>Form of Logic</th>
<th>Fallacy</th>
<th>Strategy to reduce fallacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focused Case</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plausibility</td>
<td>No causal test</td>
<td>Expand to get variation in EV and OV triangulation — multiple methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSSD</td>
<td>ID possible correlation</td>
<td>Disjunctive syllogism</td>
<td>Bifurcation</td>
<td>Examine multiple explanations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern matching</td>
<td>Degree of correlation</td>
<td>Analogy</td>
<td>False analogy</td>
<td>Validity of EV and OV Use large-n comparisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process tracing</td>
<td>Causal mechanisms</td>
<td>Plausibility and analogy</td>
<td>Hasty generalization</td>
<td>Multiple indicators of causality Look for disaffirming evidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By eliminating the possible EVs that do not vary with the OV, Chapter 3’s most similar systems design (MSSD) serves as a feasibility, or screening, test of the possible explanations for pacification’s improvement. It will eliminate possible EVs that do not co-vary with the OV. Unless there is only one feasible explanation, the remaining EVs are merely temporally correlated with improved pacification to an unknown degree and with no insights into possible causality.

While still not addressing or testing for causality, Chapter 4’s pattern-matching test will first eliminate those EVs whose predicted effects on the OV do not match the actual variation in the OV (negative correlation). It will then rank order the remaining positively correlated EVs based on the strength or weakness of the correlations as compared to other pacification/COIN campaigns. When possible, this project will leverage the emerging COIN literature that uses large-n statistical analysis to
quantitatively measure the strength of the relationship between various EVs and COIN outcomes.\textsuperscript{73}

Where pattern matching looked at external cases to evaluate the strength of the correlation between feasible EVs and the OV, Chapter 5’s process-tracing test will look internally to the Vietnam/CORDS example for indicators (or lack thereof) of the causal mechanisms linking the change in the EV to that in the OV. This step will eliminate possible EVs that are actually intervening variables (IntVs)\textsuperscript{74} from other Explanatory Variables (EVs). The remaining possible EVs will be ranked by a qualitative assessment of how well they explain how variation in the EV changed the OV.

\begin{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{74} King, Keohane, and Verba, \textit{Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.}, pp. 168, 169, note 8; pp. 172, 173, 182, 183. If a variable is not related to the OV, it can be omitted. Even if it does influence the OV, it can still be omitted if it does not vary during the period of observation (these are designated as CVs). If it varies with both the EV and OV and process tracing shows that its variance was a result of a change in the EV, it can also be omitted (these are designated as IntVs).
\end{flushleft}
By repeatedly eliminating infeasible EVs while rank-ordering the feasible EVs, the commonly accepted “fact” (untested hypothesis) about the positive effect of Unity of Command on policy implementation will either be confirmed, denied, or changed to a strong/weak assumption.

1.7.6 Contribution

These findings will influence several fields of literature. Most importantly, they will either support or weaken the policy recommendations advocating the adoption of unified management for interagency operations. Relatedly, this work will contribute to the official US Army literature on Vietnam about what caused improved pacification because, although CORDS is not cited often, those citations tend to repeat the untested assumption about unified management and pacification. Next, this investigation will broaden the interorganizational policy implementation literature by providing the first case of large-scale pooled interdependence for a national security policy. Last, if the findings support the hypothesis, it could serve as an impetus for a new civilian-military research program exploring the skills, knowledge, and attributes that civilian and

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75 The *US Army in the Vietnam War* series is published by the US Army CMH; it is comprised of nine four-hundred- to four-hundred-fifty-page tomes on a variety of topics. Written by teams of historians using extensive archival material, this series constitutes the official history of Vietnam for the US Army—which was the supporting service for MAC-V. [http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/usavn.html](http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/usavn.html)

76 Most examples from this literature deal with domestic polices at the federal and state levels.
military national security professionals will require to succeed in future hybrid organizations.\textsuperscript{77}

1.8 Way Ahead

The overall project is comprised of six chapters. To further solidify the importance and effect of this topic to policy-makers and practitioners, the next chapter will build on Chapter One and place CORDS within the much larger context of military (interagency "M") and national security ("DIME") reform. Chapters Three through Five will empirically test the competing explanations for what caused control to improve in Vietnam by repeatedly eliminating the infeasible and then rank ordering the remaining feasible hypotheses. After summarizing the findings, specifically whether CORDS' single management explains how control improved in Vietnam (as well as highlighting the limitations of those findings), Chapter 6 will provide insights to policy-makers and practitioners about CORDS as well as some more recent inter-agency organizations that were effective while using a Unity of Effort approach.

In the end, the project will infer whether single management is either the gold, silver, or bronze standard for interagency organization for policy implementation or really just a false assumption (a house built on sand) that changes the debate on national security reform.

78 The idea of gold (fact), silver (strong assumption), or bronze (weak assumption) standard, or house built on sand” (i.e., false premise), stemmed from a conversation with General Martin Dempsey in spring 2016.
2 Relevance of CORDS to the Current Policy Debate on Interagency Reform

While not advancing this project with any empirical testing of the hypotheses, this Chapter is important to the overall project for two separate, but related, reasons. First, while Chapter One already demonstrated that the study of an obscure case study from the 1960s is relevant to current policy debates—specifically National Security Reform—this chapter will place current National Security Reform proposals within a much larger context of Executive Branch reforms that have been going on since circa 1900. For the rest of this paper, Department of Defense reform will be referred to in shorthand as “M” reform while National Security reform will be “DIME” reform.

Secondly, this chapter will also show why policy-makers and practitioners so easily accept, or where influenced by, the ability of Unity of Command/single management to improve interagency operations. Further, the section on Civil Affairs/Military Government is also included of it similarity to pacification/COIN as well as the influence that it had on future NSC Staffer for Pacification in Vietnam and Director of CORDS—Ambassador Robert Komer.
2.1 History of Defense Reform: Integrating the Four “M” Agencies in DIME

As counterintuitive as it may seem because all of the involved agencies are branches of the military, from the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1902 to the creation of the DoD in 1947 with its reform in 1986, integrating the different military services is arguably the USG’s first successful case of interagency reform. An understanding of how and why the DoD transformed from an orchestration/Unity of Effort to a synchronization/Unity of Command approach, along with a look at some of the key actors that pushed that reform, is critical to understanding the growth of the national security interagency reform movement.

Although there is no constitutional provision for anyone other than the president to exercise Unity of Command over the separate branches of the military, the secretary

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2 The adage “history does not repeat itself, but does rhyme” appropriately describes DoD (M) reform and interagency (DIME/DIMEFIL/DDD) reform.
of defense and regional combatant commanders currently have the legal authority to synchronize and direct the actions of all four military agencies. Each iteration of organizational change (from ad hoc Unity of Effort to first informal and then formal Unity of Effort to codified Unity of Command) addressed an actual operational/tactical shortfall in interagency policy implementation between the four services—M agencies.

Although the US has been implementing “joint” operations since its founding, defense reform to improve how military services work together did not begin until the country established itself as a world power after the Spanish-American War. Defense reform follows an arc with deficiencies in actual joint operations causing corresponding changes in interagency “M” organizational structures. The military services orchestrated the minor organizational reforms to address deficiencies from circa 1900 through the 1980s with marginal reforms coming from the president and/or Congress. However,

3 The Constitution created the Army and Navy as two separate departments, each headed by its own secretary who independently reported to the president—who had the sole authority to command both services. Article I, Section 8, paragraphs 12 and 13, “to raise and support and Army” and “to provide and maintain a Navy” demonstrate that the Army and Navy are constitutionally different departments. Under Article II, Section 2, paragraph 1, while the president “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,” he or she appoints a department head over each one that reports to him or her: “…may require the Opinion… of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.” However, the secretary of defense now possesses that authority. See U.S. Congress, Combatant Commands; Assigned Forces; Chain of Command, 10 USC 162 (1986). Paragraph (b) states “CHAIN OF COMMAND—Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command runs—(1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

4 Joint: “connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more military departments participate.” http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.
because maintaining service independence precluded them from orchestrating the major reforms needed to address the post–Vietnam War deficiencies, civilian leadership outside of the military had to synchronize and direct the services to make drastic changes to the organizational structures to implement joint operations.

Since the Revolutionary War, joint warfare has played an important part in the history of the US. General Washington and Admiral de Grasse’s victory at Yorktown directly led to US independence from Britain in the Revolutionary War. In the War of 1812, the second war of independence, Admiral MacDonough’s and Brigadier General Macomb’s victory at the Battle of Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain defeated a joint British invasion and maintained the territorial integrity of the US. The coordination and cooperation between General Grant and Admiral Porter at the 1863 Vicksburg

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6 This is also an example of combined, or multinational, warfare. Without the French fleet to prevent the maritime evacuation or resupply of the British army, General Cornwallis was forced to surrender when the Continental Army under General Washington trapped him at Yorktown.
7 Admiral MacDonough coordinated with Brigadier General Macomb to successfully defend Plattsburgh, NY, from a joint British Army-Navy invasion from Canada. After Admiral MacDonough defeated the British naval forces, the British Army commander was forced to retreat because he was unable to be supplied anymore. This victory was important because it strengthened the position of the US representatives at the ongoing negotiations—they were able to get the British to agree to give up all of the US territory they had occupied during the war.
Campaign led to decisive battle and turning point in the Civil War.\(^8\) However, these critical joint operations were the exceptions and not the rule for military operations. In these time periods, the Army and Navy were fairly autonomous and essentially fought their own wars. The small role of joint operations did not require any organizational changes to improve interservice cooperation and were temporary, ad hoc Unity of Effort approaches.

This changed with the 1898 Spanish-American War. The combination of technological advances and increased overseas involvement by the US required greater cooperation and coordination between the Army and Navy—which failed to materialize. As a result of the poor joint operations in the war, the Secretaries of War (Army) and Navy decided to establish the Joint Army and Navy Board. While it was intended to be a standing body to conduct joint planning and serve as a forum to resolve interservice issues, it not only lacked the directive authority to enforce actions and decisions from joint planning sessions but also was limited to recommending solutions on only the issues about which both the Secretaries agreed to discuss.\(^9\) Interestingly, the services’ motivation to voluntarily cooperate with each other was “to allow the two

\(^8\) This campaign entailed eleven distinct land battles and numerous naval engagements and operations in which an Army success would create the conditions for a naval success that would allow an Army success. Neither service would have succeeded without the other.

services to continue to operate autonomously in all major essentials” (bold added) because eliminating major issues would prevent external (presidential or congressional) mandates.10

After World War I, the Joint Army and Navy Board increased slightly in size and authority. The two services created a Joint Planning Committee (JPC) comprised of Army and Navy officers from their respective plans divisions that, unlike the 1903 Joint Board, was authorized to initiate joint plans on its own initiative.11 However, both the Joint Army and Navy Board and the JPC lacked directive authority to enforce decisions or actions based on those plans. Implementation and interservice cooperation remained at the discretion of the individual services—with the chief of staff of the Army (CSA) and Navy chief of naval operations (CNO) responsible for directing the worldwide operations of all of their soldiers and sailors, respectively.12

11 The most famous planning products were the plans that the US had for twenty-three continental and worldwide contingencies called the Rainbow plans, with the joint plans to fight Germany and Japan known as Black and Orange, respectively. Dr. Mark E. Grotelueschen, "Joint Planning for Global Warfare: The Development of the Rainbow Plans in the United States, 1938-1941," Army History PB 20-15-4, no. 97 (Fall 2015), http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH97(W).pdf. See p. 23 for the list of all twenty-three Rainbow plans. Interestingly, some Rainbow plans went to war with countries that would become US allies in World War II as well for domestic unrest (White). Raines and Campbell, The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the Us Armed Forces, 1942-1985., Chapter 1, “Intellectual and Institutional Roots of Reform, 1903-1941.”
The beginning of World War II and the existential risk posed by the Axis powers, especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, highlighted the problems of relying on mutual cooperation (Unity of Effort). This served as the impetus for President Roosevelt to direct the services to make two major organizational changes using his synchronization authority as commander-in-chief. First, instead of each service chief (CSA and CNO) independently planning and supervising worldwide operations for their services from Washington, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delegated his authority to exercise Unity of Command to three theater (regional) commanders along the lines of the British organizational model. Although not always in practice, the theater commander imperfectly directed all of the forces within their theater as opposed to their parent service.\(^\text{13}\)

To foster an effective Anglo-American military relationship, President Roosevelt also directed the formation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) to serve as a counterpart to the already existing British Joint Chiefs and provide him with planning and policy advice. Although the president directed the JSC’s formation using his authority as the

commander-in-chief, because he did not delegate Unity of Command to one of the four JCS flag officers (two Army generals and two Navy admirals), all decisions required unanimity, giving each flag officer a veto on any and all measures. This meant that due to bitter interservice rivalries, “decisions… proved to be impossible” on many occasions and about many issues.14

In a series of laws over an eleven-year period after World War II, from 1947 to 1958, Congress codified and modified the interagency organizational structures that President Roosevelt created to improve, including military advice to the president; strategic planning and direction for the military, as well as joint operations “in the field” (i.e., in the geographic theaters).15 At first glance, these measures created the façade of overcoming the inter-(military) agency problems of World War II by shifting to a Unity of Command approach with a chairman of the JCS (CJCS), a Joint Staff, with a “clear and direct line of command [from the president and secretary of defense] to theater

14 A British liaison officer to the JCS described the “whole organization [belonging] in the day of George Washington,” and the British Air Marshall Sir John Slessor observed that “the violence of inter-service rivalry in the United States had to be seen to be believed and was an appreciable handicap to their war effort.” Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon., pp. 20-21. Footnote quotes from British officers also from pp. 20-21, notes 30 and 34. Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (Simon and Schuster, 1988)., pp. 17, 105, respectively.
commanders who exercised “full operational command” over the forces in their theater.\textsuperscript{16}

However, the de facto approach for interagency presidential advice, planning, and operations remained a service-centric of Unity of Effort approach.\textsuperscript{17} Because the collective JCS were designated as the principal military advisor (as opposed to a single general/flag officer) to the president, advice had to be consensual and unanimous amongst all of the service chiefs. And because the JSC staff worked for the collective JCS, the theoretically top-down strategic planning and guidance that they developed was actually the result of bottom-up service consensus. Operationally, although the regional commanders (combatant commands) had “full operational command” over all forces in their respective area of operations as in World War II, the services retained—and fully utilized—the legal authority to “exercise supervision” over all of their forces

\textsuperscript{16} The year 1947 saw the creation of the National Military Establishment, secretary of defense, JSC and its staff, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Council, and USAF. In 1949, the NME was renamed as the DoD, a nonvoting CJCS was established, and the three service secretaries were removed from the Cabinet. 1953 placed the service secretaries in the chain of command, and 1958 made the CJCS a voting member of the JCS, codified the existence of the theater commands, and declared that the theater commanders exercised “full operational control” over all forces in their theater while the services were only responsible to “train, man, equip, supply, and deploy forces” in support of the regional commands. Raines and Campbell, \textit{The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the Us Armed Forces, 1942-1985}; Chapter 3, “The Creation of a Single Military Establishment”; Chapter 4, “Creating a Department of Defense,1947-1950,”; Chapter 5, “Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953”; and Chapter 6, “The 1958 Amendments.”

\textsuperscript{17} Locher III, \textit{Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon.}, p. 29.
worldwide. Additionally, the politically and organizationally sensitive decisions on how to allocate roles, missions, and functions between the services were orchestrated by the Services working together rather than directed by the commander-in-chief or even the CJCS.

As a result of reliance on a de jure and de facto Unity of Effort approach as codified in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, strategic, operational, and tactical-level deficiencies in operations over twenty years harmed national security and increased the risk to mission success and personnel safety. Strategically, the reliance on consensus amongst the services resulted in poor presidential advice for the short-lived 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion as well as the massive investment in the Vietnam War.

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18 Congress, "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958." Section 4, sub-paragraphs a-d, granted the senior military officer in each service (chief of staff of the Army, chief of naval operations, commandant of the Marine Corps, and chief of staff of the Air Force) the authority to “exercise supervision over such members and organizations.”

19 Although President Truman initially designated the roles and missions of each service in The White House, Executive Order 9877- Functions of the Armed Forces, July 26, 1947, by Harry S. Truman (Washington, DC, 1947), he rescinded his EO less than a month later and tasked the secretary of defense to issue a “Statement of function of the Armed Forces”—that was “drawn up by you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Department of Defense, Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Key West Agreement), by James Secretary of Defense Forrestal (1948). Roles and mission of Army and Air Force assets (close air support, weight, rotary wing-helicopter) were settled by Army-Air Force agreements in 1952 and 1966 at the secretary and chief of staff levels, respectively: Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, Pace-Finletter Mou 1952, by Frank SECARMY and SECAF Thomas Finletter Pace (1952); Department of Army and Department of Air Force, The Johnson-Mcconnell Agreement (1966), by Harold K. CSA and and CSAF John P. McConnell Johnson (1966). More information on the development of the roles and missions of the services can be found in Eilon and Lyon, "Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components” (White Paper."
throughout the 1960s. Operationally, the multiple, competing, and overlapping chains of command that existed under a Unity of Effort approach negatively affected both the long-term campaign of the Vietnam War and the episodic events of the 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo by the North Korean Navy, the April 1975 evacuation of the US embassy in Vietnam, and the May 1975 rescue mission of the crew of the SS Mayaguez, which had been seized by naval elements of the Khmer Rouge from Cambodia. In addition to the confusion and friction caused by various chains of command, the war games in Europe to rehearse fighting a Soviet invasion and the 1980 Operation Eagle Claw mission to rescue US hostages in Iran both clearly showed there was also a negative tactical effect.

20 Within three months of becoming the commander-in-chief, President Kennedy—a former naval officer—became disillusioned by the poor quality of advice that he received from the Navy on the amphibious invasion for the CIA’s Bay of Pigs operation into Cuba. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon., p. 29. The dysfunction in making and poor quality of advice to the president is covered in Herbert R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, Mcnamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (Perennial, 1998).

21 Although one element of the USG had intelligence that the North Korean were going to attack the USS Pueblo, the unarmed surveillance ship was deployed off the coast of North Korea without any naval or air escorts for protection because of information “stovepipes.” Despite the appearance of a single chain of command from PACOM to MAC-V, each service essentially conducted its own Vietnam War. The evacuation of the US embassy in April 1975, Operation Frequent Wind, was split between a land and sea command; the dual commands created confusion and delays to the largest helicopter evacuation in US military history when they each established different “H-Hours” to begin operations. Poor communications, ad hoc organization, and hasty planning between the US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps elements that were attempting to rescue of the crew of the SS Mayaguez (civilian commercial vessel) resulted in the loss of forty-one service-members, who are considered the last casualties of the Vietnam War. There were four “commanders” on the ground in Iran who could not identify or even communicate with each other for Operation Eagle Claw. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon., pp. 30, 45-48 (Eagle Claw to rescue hostages in Iran), 204-208 (Pueblo), 279 (Mayaguez). A short summary of the overlapping and conflicting command relationships developed under a Unity of Effort approach is also seen in Cole, The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993., pp. 1-7.
caused by the lack of equipment interoperability—the failure of equipment from one service to work with another due to service-centric procurement programs. The fact that these twenty-plus years in interagency (joint) deficiencies did not result in any further organizational changes past the Defense Reorganization Act suggests that the pinnacle of what bottom-up, service-centric (Unity of Effort) reforms had been reached.

This is what the CJCS, General David Jones (United States Air Force [USAF]), concluded toward the end of his service; he also believed further organizational reforms should shift from being service-driven to externally driven by Congress. While testifying to Congress on budgetary issues on February 3, 1982, the military’s senior but authority-less officer changed the process of interagency reform by requesting “committee hearings… and some legislation” because “we do not have an adequate organizational structure today” [bold added]. In that testimony along with a series of articles that he published in February, March, and November 1982, General Jones

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22 War games in Europe showed that Army and Air Force radios were unable to communicate with each other, which precluded critical air-ground coordination and the fact that Navy and Air Force refueling equipment and tankers could not fuel fighters from the other service. In addition to the ad hoc multiservice organization of the rescue force, they encountered a number of equipment interoperability issues that affected the mission. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon., pp. 30-31.

23 While the organizational reforms during World War II initiated by the president as commander-in-chief seemed to be major changes, service inertia and push-back made them in reality minor changes on their preferred method of Unity of Effort.


25 General Jones made the same basic criticisms and recommendations in similar articles beginning in February 1982: David C. Jones, ”"Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change”," Boards & Directors 6, no. 3
defined the problem in the Unity of Effort approach that was currently codified into law and provided a series of recommendations that would shift the DoD to a Unity of Command approach. His testimony also began what would become an almost five-year process in which Congress learned enough about the issue to pass, and convince the president to support, a law that directed how the DoD would reorganize to improve interagency military (joint) advice, planning, and operations.26

General Jones’ argument began by claiming that as a superpower in the modern world, the United States needed “to be able to fight in today’s environment… [which] will require the concerted efforts of all four services. The services can’t operate alone.”27 He then attributed the root problem to the National Security Act of 1947, which established that if the JCS could not reach unanimous agreement on issues and problems (Unity of effort), then they would have to refer problems to the secretary of defense and president. This made the JCS “basically a committee system… [which is] notoriously


26 Raines and Campbell, The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the Us Armed Forces, 1942-1985., Chapter 10, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Reform in the 1980s.”

27 While this paper is focusing on Unity of Command for operations, the 1986 GNA was intended to address a number of issues, to include planning.
poor in trying to run things.” As a result, the JCS provided the president with the least common denominator, as opposed to “best,” professional military advice (PMA) and that service parochialism and de facto veto power hamstrung joint planning and operations. General Jones’ concluded his argument with five recommendations that would increase the authority of the joint officers (CJCS, regional combatant commanders, and JCS vis-à-vis the service chiefs and service staffs (Unity of Command).

Although General Jones’ efforts successfully resulted in both houses of Congress holding a series of hearings in 1983, neither house passed a bill on defense (military interagency) reform. In October 1983, almost one-and-a-half years after General Jones began his campaign to reorganize the DoD, two operational events in October 1983 highlighted already identified organizational deficiencies in how the various military agencies operated together. Analysis of the October 23 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the October 25 invasion of Grenada identified issues with how the various

28 Recommendations: 1) Strengthen the “role of the chairman”; 2) services only provide inputs (information) to joint planning—they no longer participate; 3) the JCS only receive advice on joint issues from the joint staff, not their own service staffs; 4) increase the authority of the commanders in the field (regional combatant commanders); and 5) enhance the rewards and preparation for officers serving in joint duty. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon., pp. 34-38, Chapter 2, “Jones Breaks Ranks,” pp. 33-58, summarizes General Jones’ efforts. Jones, ”Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change”.; Jones, ”Why the Joint Chiefs Must Change.”; Jones, ”What’s Wrong with Our Defense Establishment.”
military agencies operated together from the strategic to tactical levels.\textsuperscript{29} However, despite the timely organizational analysis of Beirut and Grenada as well as the hours of testimony from scores of civilian and military security experts from both sides of the reform debate, there was not enough information to overcome the inherent complexity of the issue or to convince enough Congressmen to vote to override the bureaucratic resistance of the services and their congressional allies.\textsuperscript{30}

Instead of marking the end of the debate on defense reform, the absence of congressional action due to lack of information on the issue merely shifted it to the academic university and think tank world.\textsuperscript{31} The information and analysis provided by those nongovernmental groups became the intellectual starting point for USG studies, which then served as the foundation of the 1986 GNA, reforming how the four military agencies interacted. Of the seven think-tank and university studies, the most influential

\textsuperscript{29} Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon., pp. 127-136, in Chapter 6, “Misfire in the Senate,” for short summary of the events and summary of organizational issues. The barracks bombing “placed a spotlight on command relationships within EUCOM [the theater command in charge of the Beirut mission]”—specifically, that EUCOM had limited de facto authority while the coexisting Navy and Marine chains of command created “dysfunctional barriers.” See Chapter 7, “Beirut,” pp. 141-163, for more context and history. Risk to mission success and personnel safety was increased in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada when the Army’s airborne assault was delayed from the night to the day in order to allow the Marines play a role in the operation by conducting a daytime amphibious assault. Once on the ground, the Army and Marine forces fought under separate chains of command. Tactically, the different services had trouble communicating with each other for air and naval gunfire support and other forms of support.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., pp. 59-140; see Chapter 3, “The House Fires the Short”; Chapter 4, “Texas Politics”; Chapter 5, “Unfinished Business”; and Chapter 6, “Misfire in the Senate.”

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., Chapter 8, “Scholars and Soldiers.”
was the two-hundred-fifty-page (with sixty-page summary) *Toward a More Effective Defense* by the CSIS. Taking 24 months to produce, it was eventually endorsed by six of the seven living secretaries of defense.\(^{32}\) Informed by the research, analysis, and conclusions of the CSIS study, both the Executive Branch and Congress conducted their own analysis on how to reform the military agencies; with the most well-known being the six-hundred-fifty-page Locher report written and directed by Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Professional Staff Member (PSM) James Locher.\(^{33}\) Although the authors of these major studies had overlapping but slightly different research questions and findings, they agreed on a number of recommendations to improve Unity of Command at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.


In light of the deficiencies in Beirut and Grenada that were highlighted three years earlier, and with the benefit of the research, analysis, and recommendations from the think tank and USG (Executive and legislative) reports, Congress reconvened a series of hearings, received the support of the president, and then passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986.  

To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes (underlines added to denote key goals).

While never explicitly using these phrases, all of the law’s elements shifted from Unity of effort to Unity of Command in varying degrees. This is seen in the measures


35 Unity of effort: “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization.”

36 Unity of command: “the operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose.”
that strengthened joint (military interagency) positions and roles while concurrently weakening the role of the individual services, especially at the strategic and operational levels.\textsuperscript{37}

Ten years later, the autumn 1996 issue of *Joint Forces Quarterly*—a leading professional military journal of the DoD—focused on assessing the GNA ten years later and proposing future implications.\textsuperscript{38} Establishing a standard that would continue at the fifteen-, twenty-, and thirty-year reviews, James Locher argued that the 1989 Panama and 1991 Kuwait/Iraq operations demonstrated that the Unity of Command approach used by the 1986 GNA (imperfectly) improved five of the nine goals established in the first paragraph of the law.\textsuperscript{39} In the same issue, both the former CJCS who oversaw both

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[37] Strategy/policy: PMA shifts from the corporate JCS to just the CJCS; 10 US Code (USC) § 151. “Composition and function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” para b(1). Operational: The theater commanders remain in the chain of command from the president and secretary of defense; 10 USC 164(b). Further, the theater commanders now had explicit and enumerated “command” over the forces assigned to them and could exercise “authority, direction, and control”; 10 USC 164(c). To avoid the ambiguity of the 1958 Reorganization Act that enabled services to retain operational supervision of their forces, the services were narrowly limited to the “train, man, equip, and deploy” functions; 10 USC 3013 (Army), 5013 (Navy), 8013 (Air Force).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
of those operations, General Colin Powell, and the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee who presided over the passage of the law, Senator Sam Nunn, provided very similar but not identical assessments as well as identifying areas of defense reform still in need of improvement.40

However, whereas the articles by PSM Locher and CJCS Colin Powell provided examples of how the 1986 GNA improved the DoD, the real purpose and effect of Senator Nunn’s article was to begin the calls to reform how the multitude of civilian and military agencies that implement the various elements of national power interact (i.e., national security [DIME[FIL] or DDD] reform).41

Combining the conceptual assessment that the end of the Cold War had a major impact on the strategic environment with the empirics of interagency problems in operations in Iraq (1991) and Haiti (1994), Nunn began by acknowledging that the old days of the Pentagon doing the entire mission are gone for good… that nonmilitary instruments play even larger roles … [which] requires integrating the activities of many departments and agencies, some not traditionally viewed as contributors to national security.42

42 Ibid., pp. 65-66. A National Defense University report on the 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti identified several interagency problems and lessons learned in Tables 4 and 5, respectively, dealing with
Senator Nunn concluded his article by arguing that the success in using legislation to reform how the military service interacted in the strategic context in the Cold War meant that the post–Cold War context would also require a legislative “Goldwater-Nichols II” to reform how the various agencies affecting national security also interacted. In other words, one of the architects in using Unity of Command to reform the military’s joint operations wanted to apply Unity of Command to the variety of agencies involved in national security (from “M” reform for “DIME” reform).43

2.2 Informative Pseudo Interagency Reform from World War II

Pre-dating the modern interagency era that began with the creation of the NSC in 1947,44 the US CA/MG operations to “secure, occupy, govern and rehabilitate” liberated and conquered territory during World War II was an example of the successful integration and synchronization of DIME programs within the M agency.45


44 Congress, ”National Security Act of 1947.”

45 Harry Lewis Coles and Albert Katz Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, vol. CMH Pub 11-3, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
During the planning stages for the invasions of North Africa, Europe, and Asia, there was friction between the military (mostly Army) and Department of State about which agency would assume responsibility of the liberated and occupied countries of the Axis powers.\(^46\) Although the president supported the State Department’s desire for the development and governance mission because it possessed the technical abilities necessary,\(^47\) the military believed that only it had the capacity to actually accomplish the mission (while possibly simultaneously fighting a guerrilla war against remnants of the security forces and/or a hostile civilian population). In anticipation of assuming that responsibility, the military was gaining that technical ability to do so by commissioning the Army, 1964).\(^{174}\)

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\(^{174}\) This book is not only a summary and analysis of the US Army’s role in CA/MG during World War II; it also reproduces all of the primary documents—completely or edited. The phrase CA/MG is used extensively to denote that it required personnel with the same (civilian) skills using the same method of “indirect control” of working with existing governments. The difference was the status of the country: The US performed CA on countries liberated from the Axis powers that granted and exercised sovereignty (almost) immediately (i.e., France, Netherlands, etc.), whereas the US military performed MG operations in occupied Axis countries in which the US retained sovereignty (Germany, Italy, Japan, etc.). Nadia Schadlow addressed World War II CA/MG operations in: Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory* (Georgetown University Press, 2017), Chapter 3, pp. 93-172; based on her dissertation: Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance: The Us Army’s Conduct of Governance Operations from the Mexican War to Panama” (The Johns Hopkins University, 2005); which expanded on a journal article: Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/03autumn/schadlow.pdf.

\(^{46}\) Although the US would assist the governments in liberated countries in exercising their sovereignty “on the first day of liberation” and actually govern the defeated Axis countries, both approaches used “indirect control” by working through the existing governments.

\(^{47}\) Examples of required skills for governance and development include public works, utilities, communications, fiscals legal, economics, public safety, public health, public welfare, religion, and education.
officers directly from other USG agencies and academia, the business world, and state and local governments.\textsuperscript{48}

Ultimately, due to the State Department’s lack of capacity (personnel, logistics, transportation, etc.), the president assigned the governance and development mission to the military (mostly US Army) in addition to the security mission that it already had for defeating the conventional forces and being prepared to defeat any “stay-behind” insurgency/guerrilla war.\textsuperscript{49} While CA/MG operations were technically implemented by only the military, it was pseudo-interagency because the military had gained the required civilian skills by directly commissioning civilians as “specialty officers” to gain those needed nonmilitary skills—allowing the M to plan and implement D\_I\_E programs as well.

Because military organizations were simultaneously implementing security, governance, and development (D\_I\_E, or DDD) programs, military historians captured a

\textsuperscript{48} Colonel Joseph P. Harris, “Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers,” \textit{Public Opinion Quarterly} 7, no. 4 (1943).

large number of interagency insights and lessons learned from analyzing CA/MG operations during World War II. The most influential region in developing and improving CA/MG operations was the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) because it was the “laboratory” in which CA/MG doctrine was first applied, assessed, and modified before being applied to other theaters around the world.\textsuperscript{50} From CA/MG operations in North Africa, southern France, Sicily, Italy, southern Austria, and portions of the Balkans, the MTO applied, assessed, and then modified CA/MG doctrine for simultaneously implementing security, governance, and (political and economic) development based on “testing” it against every major CA/MG scenario.\textsuperscript{51} The MTO’s observations and lessons learned affected CA/MG operations in every other region: mainland Europe and Asia.

Military historians drew from the MTO the lessons that the complexities, scope, and scale of trying to simultaneously implement security, governance, and (political and economic) development required the need to integrate all personnel into a single/unified chain of command within the structure of the military because only the military had the

\textsuperscript{50} In addition to the MTO, the US performed CA/MG operations in: mainland Europe, Korea, and Japan. \textsuperscript{51} Major forms of CA/MG are: 1) almost complete delegation to civilian agencies (in French North Africa); 2) direct military government in Sicily; 3) combination of military government with armistice control in mainland Italy; 4) primary reliance on indigenous authorities in southern France; 5) assumption of civil affairs authority for relief and rehabilitation in the Balkans; and 5) quadripartite control in Austria. Captain Robert W. Komer, \textit{Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater} (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1948)., pp. i-iii.
required capacity to accomplish it. However, because the scope of the policy required a wide variety of skills that are not traditionally found in uniformed service members, the military needed to specially hire officers with those nonmilitary/civilian skills. Culturally, instead of becoming militarized, those specialty officers commissioned for their civilian G&D skills effectively “civilianized” the military CA/MG units and detachments.52 Lastly, because of the high degree of coordination necessary to be successful, the various CA/MG headquarters and detachments at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels required the ability to synchronize the efforts of all CA/MG elements in time, space, and purpose—they needed to exercise Unity of Command, or single management. The MTO military historian who documented and analyzed CA/MG operations was the future proponent of single management in 1966 and “commander” of CORDS in 1967—Captain Robert Komer.53

52 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors. Introduction.
53 Kommer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater. Captain Kommer was an Intelligence officer assigned to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army historical detachment. Many references on Kommer mention that he served in World War II as an Intelligence and/or military historian, but only one source made the connection to his work on CA/MG operations, and those lessons learned trace directly into his concepts for single management for pacification. Jones, Blowtorch: Robert Kommer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy. The major tome on CA/MG operations, Coles and Weinberg (Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors), acknowledged the major contribution that Captain Kommer made to their work. Only small excerpts of Kommer’s study can be found digitally; the Army Center for Military History has the only known hard copy version in its entirety.
2.3 History That Rhymes: Integrating All National Security DIME Agencies

The history of National Security (“DIME”) reforms begins after World II with the National Security Act of 1947. Although they do not have identical legislative endings, the history of defense (M, or joint) reform and the current debate on national security (DIME, or interagency)\textsuperscript{54} reform have followed remarkably similar but not identical arcs. However, unlike defense reform, there has been no Goldwater-Nichols II legislative act for national security interagency reform.

The first security-related interagency operations (with associated deficiencies) occurred during the Greek and Turkish Civil Wars at the nexus of the end of World War II, the Truman Doctrine to push back against Communism, and the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe.\textsuperscript{55} To assist the Greek and Turkish governments to simultaneously re-establish their governments, conduct economic redevelopment, and fight a Communist insurgency, the USG maintained three independent missions in both countries: a

\[\text{Incomplete text}\]

\textsuperscript{54} Interagency: “the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective.” \url{http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/}.

diplomatic effort by the State Department in the embassy, a military mission to provide advisors and military with material support, and an economic aid mission run by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Each mission was led by its own mission chief from its respective agency with no requirement to coordinate their efforts with each other. As a result, at one point the State Department was aggressively supporting the political party that was in power in Greece while the ECA was providing assistance and support to the opposition party.56

These coordination miscues resulted in agency-level (informal) attempts to improve Unity of effort at both the strategic and country levels. At the strategic level, in 1950 the four agencies involved with the DIME efforts in post-war operations agreed to designate personnel to work together to “properly coordinate” all questions and issues related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, economic assistance, and military assistance.57 Two months later, the three agencies that maintained independent missions

57 The Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury and the ECA agreed to establish a Committee on International Security Affairs (ISAC) and appoint senior representatives to it. It would be chaired by the State Department’s director of international security and assistance affairs with participation from with DoD’s assistant secretary of defense international security affairs and equivalents from Treasury and ECA. Treasury State, Defense, and the Economic Cooperation Administration, Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration: Organizational Arrangements within the U.S. Government for Policy Formulation and Implementation with Respect to International Security Arrangements and Military and Economic Assistance for Mutual Defense (December 19, 1950) (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1950).
in countries agreed to combine their efforts into a “team under the leadership of the Ambassador… who [was] responsible for coordination, general direction, and leadership of the entire effort.” While this appeared to create Unity of Command with the US ambassador wielding the authority to synchronize all USG efforts, the reality was that the ambassador could only “refer… all matters they are unable to resolve… to appropriate regional or Washington agencies” instead of directing actions. It was really informal Unity of Effort.58

Three years later that informal Unity of Effort became formal by Executive Order (EO) of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. At first glance, President Eisenhower appeared to delegate his authority to synchronize multiple USG agencies to the ambassador by granting him the authority to “exercise general direction and leadership” as well as “recommend a course of action… [that] shall be followed… if agreement cannot be reached.” However, because the president also granted every agency the authority to “request that the issue be referred to the Secretary of State and the United States agencies concerned for decision,” every agency still had de facto veto power over

the ambassador’s directives.\textsuperscript{59} If all Country Team–level disagreements went to the
president for resolution using his synchronization authority, the ambassador would at
least exercise quasi-Unity of Command because he could ensure that every
disagreement would get resolved—just not by him. But because disagreements were to
be resolved between the various bureaucratically equal departments, but not by the
president, it remained Unity of Effort in which agencies had to participate due to
presidential order.\textsuperscript{60} In other words, EO 10575 established formal Unity of Effort by
directing all agencies to attempt to coordinate their efforts.

Although there are numerous cases studies of interagency policymaking since
the creation of the National Security Council (NSC), during the Cold War there was only
one other major case of a long-term interagency operation that simultaneously
implemented security, governance, and development.\textsuperscript{61} This example began the same
year that President Eisenhower issued EO 10575, formalizing the Country Team
concept—the twenty years of US support to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).\textsuperscript{62}

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\textsuperscript{59} Executive Order (Eo) 10575 “Administration of Foreign -Aid Functions”, by Dwight Eisenhower (1954).
\textsuperscript{60} In military terminology, coordinating authority is the “commander or individual who has the authority to
require consultation between the specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services,
joint force components, or forces of the same Service or agencies, but does not have the authority to compel
agreement.” In this case, the president granted the US ambassador coordinating authority over all USG
agencies in a country with EO 10575. \url{http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/}
\textsuperscript{61} Implementing security, governance, and development requires the efforts of multiple USG agencies,
colloquially known as DIME, DIMEFIL, or DDD: “Diplomacy, Development, and Defense.”
\textsuperscript{62} Also referred to as South Vietnam due to relative location to North Vietnam; officially known as the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).
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Interestingly, this case differed from the normal arc of (defense and national security) interagency reform but was similar to the temporary Unity of Command the regional commanders had during World War II—in two ways. First, it achieved true Unity of Command solely by presidential order. Second, it was a temporary, not permanent, change in interagency operations in that it lasted only until the end of the Vietnam War. All of the other examples of defense and national security reform ended up being irrevocable steps in the direction of Unity of Command from informal Unity of Effort.

Beginning in 1954, Unity of Effort best describes the management of the interagency effort to support South Vietnam’s fight against a Communist insurgency while also supporting its political and economic development. Despite a massive increase in the scope (involvement of more USG agencies) and scale (more personnel and materiel) of support over time, the various agencies continued to independently implement their pacification programs even as the Communist control of the countryside continually increased. Over the course of a year in 1966–1967, President Lyndon Johnson established de jure and de facto Unity of Command at the strategic (policymaking) level as well as at the operational/tactical (policy implementation) level by delegating his authority to synchronize all elements to a single person—Robert

63 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., pp. iii, iv, and 3-15, Chapter 1, “Prelude to Change.”
When the US support of pacification and the Vietnam War ended, so did these presidential orders that established Unity of Command. The default approach for all inter-agency operations was Unity of Effort.

Although the end of the war marked the last major example of integrating the spectrum of USG DIME agencies for a single policy (pacification), the end of the Cold War reintroduced the importance of and traditional impediments to effective interagency policy implementation to national security practitioners in addressing higher-probability/lower-severity threats (vis-à-vis the Cold War). Reminiscent of the multiple USG missions to Greece and Turkey at the beginning of the Cold War, the three USG missions (each comprised of one or more USG agencies) in Panama also pursued different and sometimes contradictory policies and goals in the years leading up to the 1989 invasion of Panama in addition to post-invasion operations.

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65 John T. Fischel, The Interagency in Panama 1986-1990, The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2008 Military History Symposium (2008), pp. 66-75. The three missions were: the US embassy with a large number of USG agencies operating out of it; US Southern Command, a joint military headquarters; and the Panama Canal Commission to administer the Panama Canal. Each of the missions and agencies within the Embassy mission stovepiped information and orders to their parent agency in Washington, DC Examples: After President Noriega was indicted in a US court (which none of the three missions knew about until after it
Hope in Somalia (1992–1993) highlighted the lack of capacity of civilian agencies to deploy personnel in the field when Army Civil Affairs units had to assume those tasks.66 In Operation Uphold Democracy, even though the military had been planning a forcible entry (invasion) for over a year, its penchant for close-hold planning isolated from all other agencies prevented it from making critical coordination with the seven other USG agencies already planning and/or implementing policies in Haiti.67 The 2001 terror attacks on September 11, 2001, highlighted systemic interagency deficiencies within and between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.68 While these examples of shortfalls in post–Cold War interagency policy implementation were for relatively short missions (one to a few years), the same problems with capacity, coordination, and planning occurred, the CIA kept working with Noriega in support of their efforts against Nicaragua and Central American Communism while the Drug Enforcement Agency worked for his removal. Post-invasion, there was a capability shortfall in training the Panamanian police as it transitioned from the US military using activated reservists who were full-time police officers who spoke Spanish to the Department of Justice (see pp. 73-74).

66 The Department of State and USAID lacked the personnel to deploy “to the field” to negotiate with the numerous factions and tribes. Kevin D Stringer, “Interagency Command and Control at the Operational Level: A Challenge Stability Operations,” Military Review (2010), p. 56.

67 Ibid., p. 57. Other USG agencies that were involved were State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, Transportation, and the CIA. One post-invasion interagency issue was that the Department of Justice had agreed to train a new Haitian police force in the earlier pol-mil plan but then said it lacked the capacity to do so (note 29.)

continue to exist in the much longer duration post-9/11 examples of Afghanistan and Iraq.\textsuperscript{69}

In line with the arc of development, to address those post–Cold War, 9/11, and post-9/11 shortfalls, there were two more presidential-level efforts to improve interagency policy implementation for “complex contingency operations” in 1997 and “reconstruction and stability operations” in 2005 that in reality established formal Unity of Effort.\textsuperscript{70} These efforts were analogous to President Eisenhower’s EO 10575 in that the president appeared to delegate his synchronization authority to a representative to “coordinate and lead integrated United States government efforts.” In 1954 this authority went to the ambassador in a country, and in 1997/2005 it went to the secretary of state. However, as with EO 10575, the secretary of state lacked the authority to compel any of the agencies they are leading to comply; further, the agencies are only specifically required to “coordinate with” the Department of State.\textsuperscript{71} In the end, by using their synchronization authority to merely compel their subordinate agencies to talk with each

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\textsuperscript{71} National Security Presidential Directive/Nspd-44. “This Directive is not intended to, and does not: (1) affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or command relationships for the Armed Forces; (2) … the DNI’s or D/CIA’s authorities…; (3) the authority of the … Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.”
other, the presidents codified the environment in which only they could resolve each and every issue between agencies from the strategic to the tactical levels—the same scenario created by the 1947 National Security Act.

Following the same arc of development as defense reform, after observing the inability of formalized Unity of Effort (directed by the president) efforts to resolve problems in interagency policy implementation, the key leader overseeing all of the DIME agencies called for a transformation of how they worked together. The interesting difference is that although CJCS General Jones declared, “We do not have an adequate organizational structure today” to preface his call to reform the DoD, he lacked both de jure or de facto authority over those services despite being the senior ranking military officer for all of the armed services. On the other hand, the lowest member of the Executive Branch who has oversight over all of the USG agencies that can call for national security interagency reform, the president, actually has the constitutional authority to synchronize and direct those agencies but has not used that authority to do so.


Interestingly, although the president has the authority to direct organizational change (within the constraints of existing statutes), he lacks the required detailed information needed to be able to direct that reorganizational reform. Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 123-127. This is a version of the “principal-agent” or “expert diagnosis” theoretic game with a consumer (principal) relying on the diagnosis of the expert (agent) on how to solve a problem. The principal has an information deficit vis-à-vis the agencies on how to reorganize them.
Because the 1986 GNA requires the president to describe, discuss, and evaluate “the capabilities of all elements of national power… to support the implementation of the [annual] national security strategy,” a review of the sixteen National Security Strategies (NSS) published beginning in 1987 shows a fairly consistent presidential view on reforming the DIME agencies, with two post-9/11 exceptions.

Although Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and Obama faced very different strategic contexts (bipolar Cold War; unipolar post–Cold War; and uni-multi-polar post-9/11), they had fairly uniform views on the importance of interagency operations as well of how to implement them. Simply put, they seemed to share a presidential Unity of Effort approach between the various USG agencies by concurring that national security required USG agencies to better integrate and coordinate policy implementation but did not describe or direct how the various agencies would do so. While the three presidents faced different strategic challenges from each other, their individual challenges remained fairly consistent during their tenures.

On the other hand, despite both Presidents George H.W. and George W. Bush observing major shifts in the strategic environment while in office, they proposed very different organizational changes to meet those changes. President George H.W. Bush’s three NSSs focused on improving cooperation between countries (alliances, coalitions, and trade) in light of the paradigmatic shifts in the strategic environment that he oversaw.\textsuperscript{77} However, after 9/11 changed his strategic reality, President George W. Bush noted that “the major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements… [and in light of that]… they must be transformed” in his 2002 and 2006 NSSs.\textsuperscript{78} These repeated calls for organizational reform follow the same arc of defense reform in the early to mid-1980s, with the head of the organization calling for reform that could be inferred as a request for research and analysis from external people and/or organizations to research the problem and develop solutions.\textsuperscript{79}

Similar to the 1982 call for reform by CJCS General Jones, the 2002 call also generated a cottage industry of research on national security reform from individuals,

\textsuperscript{77} President George H.W. Bush’s term oversaw the end of the Cold War (represented by the fall of the Berlin Wall), shift to lower-intensity (in scope and scale) operations (Panama, Iraq, and Somalia), and dissolution of the Soviet Union.
\textsuperscript{78} 2002: p. 29; 2006: pp. 43, 45.
\textsuperscript{79} This call for reform is possibly constrained when the 2005 NSS cited the 2006 formation of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization—an example of formalized Unity of Effort as opposed to Unity of Command/single management; 2005: p. 45.
nongovernmental think tanks, and governmental studies. However, while the 1982 call to reform the M agencies resulted in a law directing organizational changes to improve policy implementation just four years later, there has been no corresponding Goldwater-Nichols II for national security reform after fifteen years.80

2.4 The Influence of CORDS and/or 1986 GNA on Current Interagency Reform Proposals

The critical role of CORDS and/or the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) in informing the debate on reforming interagency policy implementation for national security policy is illustrated by its influence in the recommendations for organizational reform at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The various commissions and reports recommend adopting varying degrees of Unity of Command (or single/unified management) at the national, regional, area, and/or country levels on either a permanent or temporary basis.81 A chronological review of the reports prepared by governmental and private think tanks/commissions (supplemented with specific writings by key practitioners) will show that all of the major recommendations for some form of Unity of

80 This research is not exploring the interesting question of why there has been no statutory change mandating DIME reform. Some possible reasons could be that it is too difficult/complex, there is bureaucratic resistance in the Executive Branch and/or Congress, or other possible reasons.

81 Permanent implementation would occur at the: 1) grand strategic level at NSC and department/agency, 2) theater-strategic level at an organization akin to the military’s geographic combatant commands, and/or 3) the operational/tactical level from US embassies. Temporary interagency task forces could also employ single management to implement policy within an area that ranges from within a country to encompassing several countries.
Command have had direct or indirect intellectual ties to CORDS. While explicit citations of CORDS or Komer demonstrate a direct linkage, indirect linkages are seen in two ways: when a report’s author cited the effectiveness of CORDS (or Komer) in another forum and when James Locher participated in the study because he believed that CORDS effectiveness was the result of its unified management/Unity of Command approach.

Published before the attacks on 9/11 and President Bush’s call for organizational reform (but after the ten-year anniversary of the GNA reforming the DoD), the first major report suggesting national security reform was actually comprised of three volumes published between 1999 and 2001. Chartered by Congress, the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (USCNS/21) Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change report provided fifty suggestions to reform national

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82 While not within the scope of this paper, performing a network-style analysis on the body of literature that looks at the authors, projects/reports, main points, and citations for the entire body of literature could be informative on how the concept of single management spread.
83 Lieutenant General Danial Christman, interview by Patrick Howell, 4 August, 2015. Serving with Locher in the 2007 (PNSR, Christman stated that Locher firmly believed that CORDS success was the result of its unified management/Unity of Command approach.
84 The bipartisan USNCS/21 was cochaired by Senators Hart and Rudman. They were assisted by twelve other commissioners and over twenty-six study group members comprised of politicians, policymakers, practitioners, and academics/scholars. The phase I report (1999) described the future strategic setting and challenges the US would face; phase II (2000) discussed the commission’s proposed interests and objectives that the US should pursue; and phase III (2001) provided measures to reform its national security institutions. United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Gary Hart, and Warren B. Rudman, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase Iii Report (US Commission on National Security, 2001).
security institutions—one of the most significant being to permanently change the State Department’s functional and country-level focus to a regional orientation. Creating a similar structure to the existing military geographic combatant commands would improve diplomatic, defense, and development coordination. While never citing CORDS or Komer, the study did rely on the organizational concepts of the 1986 GNA and had the GNA’s architect, James Locher, as a participant.

Just as CSIS published the first report after the CJCS (i.e., General Jones) called for major defense reform, CSIS’s March 2004 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N) was the first major published report after President Bush called for national security reform and provided over sixty specific recommendations. Because of weaknesses in the lead federal agency approach, which was really nothing more than formalized Unity of Effort (coordinating authority), and in order to get the various national security agencies to

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85 Ibid., pp. 124-129, provides a short bulleted paragraph summary of all fifty suggestions; pp. 54-58, on the major recommendation of the State Department. The USNCS/21 recommended creating six undersecretaries of states, each of whom would direct and synchronize all diplomatic and development aspects (and coordinate with regional DoD defense efforts) of political, security, and economic affairs. Five areas would be Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-Americas, and Near East/South Asia. The sixth would be global affairs.

86 Ibid., pp. 8, 65, note 55, on using GNA organizational concepts; p. 138 shows James Locher as one of the twenty-six study group members. Newt Gingrich was one of the commissioners and also played a role in the 1986 GNA.

87 Similar to the USNCS/21, BG-N was published in three phases: The first focused on re-reviewing DoD reform but branched into interagency national security reform; the second focused primarily in interagency reform with some parts on DoD; and the third was on the Reserves. Murdock et al., Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era. (phase I report); and Murdock, Flournoy, and Bollman, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Us Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report. Phase II, Chapter 13, pp. 131-139, provides a bulleted list of all more than sixty recommendations.
“row together, in both planning and execution,” the CSIS investigators recommended organizational changes at both the strategic and operational levels.\textsuperscript{88}

At the national or strategic level, CSIS recommended the designation of a deputy assistant to the president (or senior director) on the (NSC with a designated office and staff for strategic planning responsible for “integrating agency strategy and plans and ensuring greater Unity of Effort among agencies during execution.” And once contingency operations began, CSIS continued, the president should establish an interagency task force (IATF) and appoint a special representative to the president (SRP) with the authority to “lead interagency operations on the ground once major combat operations have ceased.”\textsuperscript{89} In addition to having James Locher as a study group member and explicitly referencing 1986 GNA concepts, BG-N also had two significant indirect ties to the concepts from pacification and CORDS.\textsuperscript{90}

First, the concept of presidential appointees leading strategic planning as well as implementing policy at the operational/tactical levels is almost identical to the two


\textsuperscript{89} Murdock et al., \textit{Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era.}, phase I, pp. 10, 63, 64, 76; Murdock, Flournoy, and Bollman, \textit{Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Us Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report.}, pp. 45-49, 51, 52.

\textsuperscript{90} Under leadership of coinvestigators Michele Flournoy and Clark Murdock, the BG-N team had more than two hundred twenty civilian and military members organized into seven working groups (WGs); dissertation advisor Peter Feaver was on WG1. “Civilian, Joint Staff, and Service Balance” with James Locher in Murdock et al., \textit{Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era.}, p. 4.
positions that Robert Komer held regarding pacification in Vietnam. As the special assistant to the president in the NSC for “non-military programs for peaceful reconstruction [pacification] in Vietnam,” Komer was responsible for ensuring that “adequate plans are [sic] prepared and coordinated”\textsuperscript{91}—similar to CSIS’ deputy assistant to the president. For policy implementation, CSIS’ SRP to lead the IATF is also almost identical President Johnson’s designation of Komer as the “single manager... as the COMACV Deputy for Pacification... with personal rank of ambassador... to integrate the civilian agencies [State Department, US Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency, CIA, Department of Agriculture].”\textsuperscript{92}

Secondly, one of the two CSIS lead investigators, Michele Flournoy, knew about CORDS and believed that it was an example of a successful IATF even though neither it nor Komer was never cited in the BG-N phase I or II reports. In a post-BG-N/CSIS “echo chamber” journal article as well as a book chapter on nation building, Flournoy continued to extoll the importance of “active coordination of planning as well as more vigilant oversight of operations” as well as “establishing regional security councils (sound like regional military commanders?).” She also specifically claimed that “the

\textsuperscript{91} This is conceptually identical to the deputy assistant/senior director for strategic planning proposed by CSIS. Johnson, National Security Action Memorandum 343 ‘Appointment of Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam’.

\textsuperscript{92} Johnson, National Security Action Message 362 ‘Responsibility for Us Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)’.
development of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) teams… is an impressive example of effective wartime innovation that made a strategic difference in the counterinsurgency campaign." While not directly cited in the BG-N reports, the belief in the effectiveness of CORDS implementing pacification influenced the suggestion to establish IATFs.

Published in June 2004, almost three years after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and months after the CSIS BG-N, in addition to describing the events, errors, problems, and issues before and after the attack, the 9/11 Commission Report concluded with recommendations on how to reform the USG. The commission eschewed the idea of informal or formal cooperative Unity of Effort for the organizational concepts of Unity of Command (integrated/single management) from the 1986 GNA in recommending “a new institution: a civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism.” In fact, it quoted Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s observation that the Executive Branch is “stove-piped much like the four services were

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nearly 20 years ago…. [Likewise, the agencies should] give up existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient… joint effort.”

Published in December 2004, another government-sponsored study was tasked to provide recommendations given that “stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations typically last 5 to 8 years, significantly longer than typical combat operations… [and] the United States has initiated one every 18 to 24 months.” After conducting research and receiving briefings from multiple experts, including Flournoy from BG-N, the Defense Science Board (DSB) came to similar conclusions as CSIS.

To overcome the weakness in relying solely on Unity of Effort cooperation and to get closer to Unity of Command as practiced by the DoD “with someone in charge,” the DSB recommended that the USG establish a dedicated interagency planning cell in the NSC to improve strategic planning, create temporary joint IATFs (JIATFs) with senior civilian and military leaders to ensure cooperation and integration in S&R operations in the field, and put together standing planning and execution cells for S&R operations at every RCC. While the organizational concepts from the GNA of Unity of Command were never explicitly cited, it is a logical assumption that those concepts influenced the

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95 See ibid., pp. 399-404, for summary of 1986 GNA organizational concepts supporting CT reform.
96 Office of Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities., pp. v, vi, 8, 27, 32, 34, 166, 171, 185.
study given that one of the DSB co-chairmen (Phillip Odeen) also chaired the 1984 CSIS study that led to the GNA.\textsuperscript{97}

Noting that “pre-war inattention to post-war requirements… left the United States ill-equipped to address public security, governance, and economic demands in the immediate aftermath of the conflict… giving early impetus to the insurgency,” the report by a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)–sponsored independent task force provided almost thirty recommendations (many focused on institutional reform) to improve the US’ ability to implement multiagency S&R operations.\textsuperscript{98} Similar to the 1985 CSIS report on defense reform, the CFR task force drew the same negative conclusion about the efficacy of Unity of Effort and stated that “Unity of Command is desperately needed” for national security operations to overcome duplication, lack of coherence in setting priorities, and poor allocation of resources.\textsuperscript{99}

Despite that similarity, the task force proposed slightly more modest institutional changes than the 1985 CSIS with the creation of a senior director with associated


\textsuperscript{98} Nash et al., \textit{In the Wake of War: Improving Us Post-Conflict Capabilities.}, pp. xiii, 4-5. Because the CFR “takes no institutional position on policy issues,” it sponsors independent task forces (ITFs) when (1) critical foreign policy issues arise that (2) a group of diverse in backgrounds and perspectives might nonetheless reach a meaningful consensus over the course of three to five meetings over a short period of time. Chaired by two former national security advisors (Sandy Berger and Brent Scowcroft), the more than thirty members of this ITF met four times and had backgrounds in USG civilian and military, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations/businesses, and academics.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., pp. 19-20.
staff/directorate in the NSC to integrate and coordinate all civilian and military planning for stability and reconstruction. Further, it recommended that the president designate and empower the State Department to “be the single civilian agency to set priorities...assemble and deploy capabilities... [and] manage and oversee implementation” of the S&R contributions by all USG civilian agencies. In other words, this proposal would integrate the DIME agencies at the strategic level but only combine the multicivilian agencies (DI_E) at the operational level underneath the State Department.

Similar to the DSB report that had no explicit references to CORDS or even the GNA (defense reform), both are nonetheless indirectly linked. A NSC senior director integrating all elements of DIME for stability and reconstruction between the military (M) and a multicivilian agency (DI_E) task force led by the State Department is almost the identical organizational construct that Komer had when he was the special assistant for pacification on the NSC working with the operational-level Military Advisory Command-Vietnam (MAC-V; M) and Office of Civil Operations (OCO; DI_E) in Vietnam from late 1966 to May 1967. Additionally, given that one of the task force members (John Hamre) worked side by side with James Locher as PSMs on the SASC

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100 Ibid., pp. 11, 19-21. Note 4 on p. 19 lists the main USG civilian agencies that contribute to S&R operations: State, Treasury, Commerce, USAID, Agriculture, HHS (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), and Justice.
analyzing and recommending DoD reform, it is also logical to assume that concepts from the GNA influenced the CFR task force’s findings.

Continuing to parallel the arc of defense reform, the collection of similar but not identical studies and reports from government bodies and private organizations became the research and analytic foundation for a congressional study on national security interagency reform. However, while the DoD (the M agencies) fall under the oversight of a single committee in the House and Senate, there is no single committee that oversees all agencies that contribute to national security. As a result, the PSMs on the SASC conducted the congressional study on defense reform, whereas Congress funded a “independent, non-profit, non-partisan organization” to conduct a study on national security reform—with James Locher serving as the lead investigator/executive director for both projects in the 1980s and 2000s.101

After analyzing about 120 cases of interagency national security policy implementation, the PNSR provided twenty-eight recommendations to address the source and reasons for current problems with interagency policymaking as well as

policy implementation to “improve collaboration on security matters.” The PNSR concluded that anything less than a Unity of Command approach created a “systemic imbalance between strong individual organizations and weak integrating mechanisms [that did not] enable the integration of America’s hard and soft power to achieve policy goals.” The PNSR’s recommendations reflected the conclusions from the already existing studies that were very similar to the organizational concepts from defense reform. It also extolled the CORDS program from Vietnam as “[exemplifying] an interagency structure that effectively integrated elements of national power.” At the strategic level, standing interagency teams comprised of full-time representatives from all of the national security agencies will be given directive authority over all of the efforts across the various agencies related to make policy decisions, develop plans, integrate efforts, and issue guidance to the rest of the USG. For policy implementation at the operational and tactical levels, the president would direct the establishment of temporary interagency crisis task forces that also have the authority to direct and compel action by all participating agencies.

102 There were twenty-four guiding members and more than three hundred other contributors that represented over one hundred twenty different organizations—they were organized into ten WGs.

Although the two studies into how the embassies (ambassadors) could direct the various USG agencies operating within a country appear to be minor monographs or articles, because those researchers participated in and continued to coordinate with the PNSR, they are more accurately described as PNSR “spin-off” or “deep-dive” projects into how to use embassy-level chief of mission (COM) authority to achieve Unity of Command. Both teams agreed that although the US ambassador already had de jure authority over all agencies operating within a country,\textsuperscript{104} by custom it was really a formal Unity of Effort—which created the normal problems for effective policy implementation. Citing CORDS as a specific example of successful use of Unity of Command, the teams describes techniques used by the program that current US ambassadors could use in order to direct, integrate, and supervise the US mission in a country.\textsuperscript{105} Lastly, the 2007 article identified an organizational integration gap in that

\textsuperscript{104} US ambassadors (1) “shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for Voice of America correspondent on official assignment and employees under the command of a United States area military commander); and (2) shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country... all Executive Branch employees...comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.” U.S. Congress, \textit{Foreign Service Act of 1980}, vol. Public Law 96-465 (1980). Section 207; codified as 22 USC 3927, “Chief of Mission.”

\textsuperscript{105} Techniques used by CORDS: 1) The chain of command evaluated all of their subordinates, regardless of parent agencies. In other words, a USAID officer could rate a CIA officer who could rate a military officer. 2) Budget reprogramming: The CORDS chain of command could move between many programs and agencies for the overall pacification mission.
there was no regional COM providing regional/theater strategic analysis and guidance parallel with the military’s RCCs.\textsuperscript{106}

Published in 2014, the last major private think tank report built off the 1999 USCNS/21 report as well as other policy-prescriptive articles advocated shifting from only the military implementing regional strategy to the USG implementing a whole-of-government approach using all elements of national power (DIME).\textsuperscript{107} This Atlantic Council report found that there was no mechanism to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate the efforts by civilian agencies across a region—and that country/embassy efforts to do so were fruitless due to the Unity of Effort approach used by ambassadors. Directly citing the GNA, the investigators called for legislative reform “that directed the military services to work together” to improve efficiencies and policy effectiveness as well as providing several possible organizational constructs for a regional DIME headquarters.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{106} Oakley and Casey Jr, \textit{The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement.}, pp. 1-3,9-10; Lamb and Marks, \textit{Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration.}, pp. 1, 2, 5-8, 11-12, 14, 27-28. The Oakley and Casey article identified the need for regional “chiefs of mission.”


\textsuperscript{108} Council, \textit{All Elements of National Power: Moving toward a New Interagency Balance for Us Global Engagement.}, pp. 1, 3, 6, 9-11.
The organizational concept of Unity of Command (single/unified management) is critical to all of these studies’ recommendations on reforming national security interagency policy implementation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.\textsuperscript{109}

Table 2-1. Summary of Proposals Calling for Unity of Command

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Study & Strategic/Policy & Regional & Country/Embassy & Area/Task Force \\
\hline
1999 USCNC/21 & & X & & \\
2004 BG-N II & X & & & X \\
2004 9/11 & & & & X \\
2004 DSB & X & X & & \\
2005 CFR & X & & & X \\
2008 PNSR & X & & & X \\
2007/2010 INSS & X (1) & X (2) & & \\
2014 Atlantic & X & & & \\
\hline
Total & 4 & 4 & 2 & 5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The reports that directly or indirectly cited CORDS and the reports that only cited the GNA relied on the CORDS program for their claims, but in different ways. The reports citing CORDS accepted the untested hypothesis that unified management caused improved pacification. On the other hand, the studies citing only the GNA needed to empirically test the linkages between single management of multiple DIME

\textsuperscript{109} Although not summarized, scores of individual articles and monographs not affiliated with think tanks also cite Unity of Command in general and CORDS single management specifically as leading to improved pacification. Interestingly, General William Westmoreland, the MAC-V commander for whom Ambassador Komer worked as the director for CORDS, also called for unified/single management at the regional/theater-strategic level in his memoirs. Instead of five “commanders” reporting to the president from Southeast Asia, he believed there should have been a presidential appointee who integrated and synchronized the efforts and resources for PACOM, MAV-C, and the US ambassador/embassies in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. William Childs Westmoreland, \textit{A Soldier Reports} (New York, NY: Dell Publishing Company, 1989), p. 543.
agencies and policy effectiveness using the only major example of a JIATF: the CORDS program in Vietnam from 1967 to 1972.

2.5 Insights from Comparing “M” & “DIME” Reform

The almost identical arcs of development between Defense (“M”) and National Security (“DIME”) clearly demonstrates why reform advocates believe that shifting to a Unity of Command approach will improve policy implementation. (see Table 2-2 below). Interestingly, both branches of reform not only have a case of temporary Presidentially-directed Unity of Command (the 1942 Unified Command Plan and 1968 CORDS program), those outliers occurred at the same point-between formal POTUS-directed Unity of Effort and Congressionally-directed Unity of Effort.

Table 2-2. Comparative Analysis Between M and DIME Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptor/Variable</th>
<th>Defense Reform</th>
<th>National Security Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agencies</td>
<td>Four M agencies</td>
<td>Numerous DIME agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad hoc Unity of Effort(UE)</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events (deficiencies)</td>
<td>1898 Spanish-American War</td>
<td>1946 Greek Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1917 World War I</td>
<td>1946 Turkish Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1947 Cold War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

110 Using MSSD: For two cases with different OVs but almost identical EVs, researchers infer that the different outcome(s) is/are the result of the one/few differing EVs. The research searching for and testing those causal mechanisms would be in the fields of American and congressional politics. Defense reform case study, coupled with feedback at ten, fifteen, and twenty years, shows that Unity of Command improved joint operations. The similarity between the arc of development between defense and national security reform predicts that Unity of Command will improve DIME operations. And the fact that DIME reform lacks a single oversight committee in Congress whereas defense reform did (HASC and SASC) offers a reason why there has not been successful reform.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptor/Variable</th>
<th>Defense Reform</th>
<th>National Security Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Events (deficiencies)</td>
<td>1941 Pearl Harbor 1941 World War II 1947 Cold War</td>
<td>1954 support to Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal UE (POTUS)</td>
<td>1942 Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>1954 EO 10575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Unity of Command (POTUS directed)</td>
<td>1942 Unified Command Plan</td>
<td>1966 NSAM 343 1967 NSAM 362 (CORDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Unity of Effort (informal and formal - POTUS)</td>
<td>1948 Key West Agreement 1952 Pace-Finletter MOU 1966 Johnson-McConnell Agreement</td>
<td>1997 PDD 56 2005 NSPD 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for reform</td>
<td>1982 CJCS Jones</td>
<td>2001 POTUS Bush 2005 POTUS Bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal UC (Congress)</td>
<td>1986 GNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional oversight</td>
<td>HASC and SASC</td>
<td>Numerous committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time from:</td>
<td></td>
<td>As of 2017:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptor/Variable</td>
<td>Defense Reform</td>
<td>National Security Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Informal UE to UC</td>
<td>• 83 years</td>
<td>• 57 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Call for reform to UC</td>
<td>• 4 years</td>
<td>• 15 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The theoretical argument that it takes time for the principal (president or Congress) to gather enough information/research to overcome the objections of the agents (agencies) to reform is empirically supported by the four years (and numerous major studies) between the call for reform by CJCS Jones and the 1986 GNA for defense reform and the fifteen years (and growing) and numerous studies following President Bush’s call for reform.

At first glance, the 1942 Unified Command Plan giving the geographic commanders Unity of Command over all military forces in their region and the 1967 National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) giving the director of CORDS (Ambassador Robert Komer) single management over USG agencies’ pacification efforts appear to be outliers to those time and information expectations. The reality is that, in addition to occurring in a time of war, in both cases the agent (president) did have enough indirect information to direct temporary organizational reform. President Roosevelt based his 1942 decision to adopt a unified command for RCCs on observing that British forces had been utilizing Unity of Command for years, while President Johnson’s 1966/1967 advisor (NSC staffer Robert Komer) was informed by British
pacification operations in Malaysia as well as by a quasi-interagency pacification organization used by the US during and after World War II: civil affairs/military government (CA/MG) operations.

2.6 Summary

This chapter has done nothing to support or falsify, in whole or in part, the widely held belief that adopting single management enabled the CORDS program to break the stalemate against, and then eventually defeat, the Communist insurgency. However, to better understand the current policy debates on DIME reform requires an understanding of the development of M and DIME reform and CA/MG operations from World War II. Lastly, by showing the pervasive (direct or indirect) influence of CORDS and/or the 1986 GNA on almost every current proposal for organizational reform, it suggests why Komer’s untested claims from his 1972/1985 works were so readily accepted as facts.
3 Comparative Analysis of Pacification Programs in Vietnam

3.1 Contribution

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the 41 theoretically possible Explanatory Variables (EVs) in order to eliminate the ones that are infeasible.¹ It will conduct a comparative analysis (specifically Most Similar Systems Design- MSSD) to eliminate the EVs that do not temporally co-vary with changes in the OV. Because this methodology can only determine whether or not there is EV-OV co-variation, it will not be able to evaluate and rank the strength of the feasible EVs. These EVs will then be further analyzed using pattern-matching in the following Chapter.

3.2 Research Design

3.2.1 Case Selection and Unit of Analysis

This case is first scoped as covering South Vietnam for the duration of US support to GVN from 1954 to 1972. Because the Communist insurrection did not begin

¹ George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences., pp. 74-75. Using George and Bennett’s descriptions of six types of research objectives, while the research objective is “theory testing” the “crucial case” of interagency organizational structures for policy implementation (CORDS in Vietnam), this chapter is specifically doing a “plausibility probe” by determining which of the theoretically and empirically supported theories will receive more intensive testing in subsequent chapters (Chapter 4, congruence/pattern-matching, and Chapter 5, process tracing).
until 1959, the scope is further narrowed to USG support to the GVN’s pacification campaign from 1959 to 1972.

Combining the fact that most pacification programs, polices, campaign plans, and even pacification-related GVN laws were implemented or took effect on or around January or July, along with the observation that many programs took more than 2-3 months to establish once they had been approved, the unit of analysis is semi-annual control in South Vietnam.

3.2.2 Design and Methodology

This project will employ an interrupted time-series most similar systems design (MSSD), (“before-after” comparison) to test the 41 theories explaining improved control

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2 Interestingly, up until 1971, the GVN issued its annual campaign plans on January 1 in conjunction with the calendar year used by the US. However, this created the oddity that the GVN would not undertake any action on those plans for the first four to six weeks because the tempo of Vietnamese life operated under the Lunar Year, which began in February shortly after the Tet celebration.

3 Implementation example: Even under the authority of a direct order by President Lyndon Johnson, it took over four months to establish the Office of Civil Operations (OCO)—the “DI_E” predecessor to CORDS that exercised single management over all civilian pacification programs. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., pp. 31-42, Chapter 2, “The Second Reorganization.”

4 The MSSD aims to compare two cases that are identical except for the OV and one EV. This method was introduced in: Henry Teune and Adam Przeworski, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, New York, Joh Wiley & Sons (1970),., pp. 34-37. It is based on John Stuart Mills' historic method of difference: John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: 1, vol. 1 (Parker, 1856),., pp. 256-259. MSSD(and its companion, MDSD, based on Mill’s method of agreement) caused a debate within the methodological community; for a summary of that debate, see: Theodore W. Meckstroth, "I. “Most Different Systems” and “Most Similar Systems” a Study in the Logic of Comparative Inquiry," Comparative Political Studies 8, no. 2 (1975); David Collier, "The Comparative Method," Political Science : The State of Discipline II, Ada W. Finifter, ed., American Political Science Association (1993); David Collier, "Comparative Method in the 1990s," American Political Science Association—Comparative 9, no. 1 (1998). Because it examines the effect on pacification after the application of a “treatment” (i.e., CORDS), it can also be called an interrupted time-series analysis, before-
in Vietnam from 1967 to 1972. Using a time-series comparison decreases the likelihood of omitted variable bias because Vietnam at time period “X” is all but identical to Vietnam in time period “X+1” than to any other possible case. Selecting time-series cases that are “interrupted” by variation in the OV allow the researcher to test which EVs could explain that change. Because the “friction” of war can cause a lag between an EV changing and its effect on the OV, an EV will be considered as a temporally feasible explanation if it varies in the same, or preceding, 6-month time period as the OV.

Expanding the time-window of possible EV-OV co-variation poses a minimal risk to the design because any EV that “passes” this chapter’s comparative analysis will still have its feasibility and strength of correlation assessed two more times in the next after design, or quasi-experiment; see: Donald Thomas Campbell, Julian C. Stanley, and Nathaniel Lees Gage, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Houghton Mifflin Boston, 1963), pp. 34-37.

5 More popularly known as comparing apples to oranges. The design is able to continue solely using operational variables because the design assumes that the scores to hundreds of environmental variables (that are not operational decisions but may influence operations in some way) are identical.

6 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences., pp. 80-81, 166-167. George and Bennet argue that “single case using within case variation… is the strongest version of MSSD… because it control [sic] for many factors.” In other words, the Vietnam of 1967 is closer to being identical to the Vietnam of 1966 or 1968 than any other case that can be found.

7 Clausewitz, “On War.”, p. 119. Book 1, Chapter 7 describes one of the factors that makes war nonlinear before even engaging with the enemy: “friction… the force that makes the apparently easy difficult.” Because an army is comprised of thousands of imperfect individuals and imperfect pieces of equipment, friction is the cumulative effect of the possibility of something going wrong with each of those people or equipment and can also account for the time difference between decisions and operational implementation.
chapters. On the other hand, narrowing the window of EV-OV co-variation poses a critical risk to the design because it could eliminate the actual explanation if it has a time-lag in affecting the OV. In other words, to reduce the chance of accidentally eliminating the actual EV, this project will conduct additional analyses on possible EVs that may end up not effecting the OV; while the subsequent pattern-matching and process-tracing analyses offer two more chances to eliminate infeasible EVs, they cannot “bring back” EVs that were eliminated in a preceding chapter.

Those subsequent methodologies will also address the two major limitations of using MSSD, especially when analyzing a large number of possible EVs. When an EV temporally co-varies with the outcome variable, MSSD suggests that that EV could possibly explain variation in the OV. Secondly, when comparative analysis (MSSD) finds multiple feasible explanations, it also assumes that they are independent of each other when they might actually by interactive with each other or are the resultant of

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8 Type I (false positive) error: occurs when the null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected. Widening the time window of analysis around the OV “interruption” provides more opportunities for variables that do not affect OV to vary—suggesting they might vary with/before the OV.

9 Type II (false negative) error: occurs when the null hypothesis is not rejected but should have been. In this case, if EV A truly explains variation in the OV but its effects take a long time to be observed, then an EV varies with OV MSSD analysis would reject it as a possible explanation.

10 Fallacy of questionable causes. Non causa pro causa: more commonly known as mistaking correlation for causation. This can occur if an EV varies with the OV (cum hoc, ergo propter hoc) or the EV varies before the OV (post hoc, ergo propter hoc).
other variables. Triangulating this chapter’s results with the next two methodologies will address and minimize these limitations in MSSD.

3.2.3 Outcome Variable (Control over time)

“The most significant empirical challenge [in insurgencies] is the measurement of control.”

—Stathis N. Kalyvas

As part of the broader and generalizable dialogue on national security reform, the outcome variable (OV) measures whether interagency policy implementation improves over time at the conceptual level. While the specific policy being evaluated in this case study is pacification, it is a broad concept because it:

in general, is comprised of two broad types of activities. These are designed, on the one hand, to establish and maintain a significant degree of physical security for the population and, on the other hand, to increase communication and the ties between the government and the people through a variety of selected nonmilitary programs (bold added for emphasis).

This dissertation will focus on measuring the physical security provided for the population because it is a necessary but insufficient condition for a successful

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11 The MSSD assumes that the EVs are independent of each other and that none of them are actually intervening variables (variation in EV#1 actually causes variation in EV#2) or interactive variables.
13 These are often short-handedly referred to as security and development or even military efforts versus civilian efforts. Development has political, social and economic facets. Cooper et al., An Overview of Pacification., p. 1.
pacification campaign; in other words, although providing security will not lead to success, not establishing it will lead to failure.\textsuperscript{14} The aspect of pacification regarding the relationship and ties between the population and their government will not be measured because, although the US provided advice and support to the government of Vietnam (GVN),\textsuperscript{15} ultimately only the South Vietnamese government could gain support from its own population for itself. Consequently, measuring the change in population security is a better measure of the effectiveness of USG interagency policy implementation than how much popular support the GVN could generate from its own population. For ease of reference and to remain in line with current academic literature that studies pacification in Vietnam,\textsuperscript{16} this paper will use the more common term of \textit{control} instead of \textit{physical security of the population}.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} The idea that control (security) of the population is a necessary condition for gaining support from the population can also be found in: Kalyvas, \textit{The Logic of Violence in Civil War.}, Section 5.4, pp. 124-132; Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model," \textit{Terrorism and Political Violence} 24, no. 4 (2012), pp. 660-661. Also found in Vietnam-era analysis; see Cooper et al., \textit{An Overview of Pacification.}, p. xv.

\textsuperscript{15} The US providing advice and support to the GVN is an example of a civil affairs operation; if the US had conquered/occupied the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and was establishing and leading a government, that would be a military government operation and this project would need to include support for the (military) government. Coles and Weinberg, \textit{Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors}.

\textsuperscript{16} Control was the term used by the USG in Vietnam and subsequently adopted in academic literature; see Kalyvas, \textit{The Logic of Violence in Civil War.}, pp. 196, 211-213. Kalyvas’ definition of five zones of control is based on the USG definition from the Vietnam War.

\textsuperscript{17} Control is “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations [such as establishing political and economic development to gain support from the population].” US Army, \textit{Adrp 1-02 “Terms and Military Symbols”}, by Department of the Army Headquarters (Washington, DC: US GPO, 2016).
Although control in a COIN campaign is traditionally measured as a five-stage ordered variable, because it is measured at the level of the smallest political unit in a country, the challenge is in aggregating the multitude of localities (each at one of five levels of control), through higher and higher political units to ultimately determine the level of control exercised by pacification forces at the national level. In the case of Vietnam, the USG and GVN were fighting the Communist insurgency in “a war of 15,000 fronts.” Assuming that the degree of control could be accurately measured as an ordered variable for every hamlet, for any one month the aggregation of those hamlet/village/district/province/regional-level ratings would not be anywhere as accurate or precise at the national level.

However, while the monthly national aggregation of control is an imperfect measurement, due to the law of averages it becomes a better indicator for trends in control over longer periods of time. In other words, a general positive trend in national control over a two-year period is more accurate than a two-month downward tick.

18 Evaluating control in a conventional conflict has far better construct and measurement validity than pacification. In a conventional conflict, control is simply a ratio variable of the amount of terrain a force possesses divided by the total terrain. It is a simply binary/dichotomous assessment for every piece of terrain whether or not a force controls it. On the other hand, because every hamlet, village, district, etc., is a separate population center, pacification (in Vietnam) was a war of approximately fifteen thousand fronts. Total control is a count variable of the assessment of control in every hamlet and village. However, hamlet control was an ordered variable that was operationalized based on various security, political, economic, and social factors.

19 With four regions, approximately 45 provinces, 250 districts, 2,000+ villages, and 12,000+ hamlets.
Coupling this with the realization that the measurement of control at the hamlet level is also not perfect for any one month (but also becomes increasingly accurate as a measurement of trends over time), the OV of control at the national level will be measured as general trends over time instead of as a monthly data-point.

In a figurative version of “looking for forest [trend in control] and not the trees [control at a specific point in time],” the project will examine indicators of control to identify the fewest number of inflection points measuring trends in control over long(ish) period of time. Assuming they are equally distributed, the fewer the inflection points, the greater the accuracy of the OV (trends in control).

Due to the combination of the long duration of the Vietnam War, the inherent difficulty in recognizing inflection points in pacification & insurgency campaigns²⁰, and concerns about the quality (and even truthfulness) of US metrics²¹, the project will use a

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²⁰ Even General Giap—the intellectual father of the Vietnamese model of the people’s war” (insurgency)—remarked, “It is very difficult to say at what date we switched from guerilla [phase II] to mobile [phase III] warfare, since there is no mechanical demarcation.” While Giap’s statement was about the First Indochina War, he gave this statement as PLAF forces were beginning to transition from phase II (guerrilla) to phase III (conventional war) in 1964, as seen by the increasing number of battalion-sized (more than five hundred thousand soldiers) conducting larger conventional operations (deliberate attacks and defenses). Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, vol. 7, Studies in International Communism (Cambridge, Massachussetts: MIT Press, 1966), p. 38 and note 2 (Radio Hanoi on May 15, 1964).

two-pronged assessment strategy to identify the inflection points in control. Assuming that the Communists had an incentive to “get it right” because they were fighting a total war to unify all of Vietnam, the first cut will use Communist assessments and strategic decisions about the war to identify the broad contours of the trends in control. Because the Communists followed a very developed doctrine of insurgency with operational changes closely linked to the strategic and operational situation on the ground, observing “how” they fought will also provide insights into how they assessed trends in control.

The second cut will first compare USG data on trends in control to the trend lines defined by Communist strategic decisions and actions. Assuming the USG data corresponds to the trends, it will then use that data to identify the specific inflections where the trend in control shifted. Because this project is not trying to determine what actions prevented the collapse of GVN in 1964-1965, it will use the commonly accepted view that the war turned into a stalemate in late 1965 with the influx of US forces. Due


the already mentioned concerns in discerning inflection points, the project will identify and test other alternative inflection points in control as robustness checks. The inflection points for the robustness checks will be referred to “alternative scenarios” that ask “what if” control actually changed in a different time period than suggested by the USG data.

To corroborate the broad trends in control defined by the Communists and to identify the specific time period for increased control, the project will use a series of five assessment tools\(^\text{24}\) developed by the USG and GVN between the early 1960s and 1971 that had good consistency between them.\(^\text{25}\) However, due to major issues with construct

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\(^{24}\) Assessments ranged from completely informal and subjective to a very rigorous survey design. From 1959 until 1964, “control” was a purely subjective assessment based on the reporting officer’s/headquarters’ impressions and synthesis of various reports and activities. In May 1964, the US and GVN developed the population control survey that looked at specific indicators at the district level as well as (beginning in mid-1965) in hamlets. Begun in January 1967, USG fielded the HES HAMLA files that required the district senior advisor (US military officer) to subjectively grade each Hamlet in eighteen pacification-related areas between A (best) and E (worst) (nine on security and nine on development issues). The July 1969 HES70 increased the survey to and provided objective evaluation criteria for 139 questions for each village as well as its associated hamlets. The January 1971 HES71 survey increased the number of village/hamlet questions to 165, placed different weights on different questions, and added Bayesian analysis. The HES71 was transferred to the GVN when CORDS was disestablished in 1972 and was then used by GVN until North Vietnam invaded in 1975. The best descriptions come from the most recent dissertations based on the HES: Douglass, “Why Not Divide and Conquer? Targeted Bargaining and Violence in Civil War.,” pp. 25-26, Section 2.3.2, “Efforts to Measure Control”; Clemis, “The Control War: Communist Revolutionary Warfare, Pacification, and the Struggle for South Vietnam, 1968 - 1975.,” pp. 94-104, especially 94-95. Older works include Thomas C. Thayer, *A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War 1965-1972. Volume 9: Population Security* (Washington, DC: OASD(SA)RP Southeast Asia Intelligence Division, 1975), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a039316.pdf. pp 32-44; from the de facto CORDS/pacification historian from the US Army CMH: Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds.,* pp. 95-96.

validity and errors in measurement, the accuracy of assessments decreased the more narrow it was in time and space was (i.e., Hamlet “A” in Month “B”); conversely, accuracy increased as it measured larger areas in time and space (i.e. South Vietnam over two years). But a variety of robustness checks by both scholars/researchers and


27 Douglass, "Why Not Divide and Conquer? Targeted Bargaining and Violence in Civil War.”, pp. 31-32, Section 2.3.5, “Measurement Error and Bias,” and pp. 26-28, Section 2.3.3, “The Raters.” The average district senior advisor (DSA) was evaluating about sixty hamlets in about ten villages every month (with some as high as one hundred hamlets in sixteen villages); for HES71’s 165-question survey of security, economic, political, and social indicators, this would require the DSA to answer about nine thousand nine hundred questions per month. The issue of the ability to accurately measure the scope and scale of questions (and consequent negative effect on accuracy) is addressed in: Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring Us Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War., pp. 118-122, “Measuring the Progress of Pacification.” Although the primary focus of Daddis’ work is the conventional fight between the US Army and the PAVN and PLAF conventional forces, he addresses the related pacification campaign in Chapter 5, “We are Winning Slowly but Steadily”; William G. Prince and John H. Adkins, Analysis of Vietnamization: Hamlet Evaluation System Revisions (Bendix Corporation, 1973), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a005359.pdf., pp. iv-4, 5 lists more sources of measurement error.

28 Fallacy of over precision. Also: over precision, fake precision, or spurious accuracy. Believing very precise assessments are accurate even though they have a high degree of uncertainty (i.e., an 83 percent level of control is very precise, but it is not accurate if it has a +/- 15 percent band of uncertainty due to measurement (construct) validity and measurement error. While lack of precision might be an unavoidable fact, the fallacy of false/over precision can be avoided by acknowledging the lack of precision and presence of uncertainty and using the data accordingly.

key practitioners demonstrated that the surveys (HES) were both reliable and accurate in showing both positive and negative countrywide trends over time.

3.2.4 Explanatory Variables for Improved Control over Time

Because the OV is being measured as trends in control over time demarcated by specific inflection points in control, the 41 theoretically-feasible and operationally relevant EVs will also be measured as trends as defined by major decisions or changes in those 41 variables. To put those 41 variables that could affect control into context, a brief conceptual discussion (based on an illustrative graphic developed by a senior COIN practitioner- General Stanley McChrystal) is below that is immediately followed by a more detailed narrative briefly describing how pacification programs can improve control. Of note, the detailed literature review of those pacification programs and

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31 Concept of operations sketch used by the commander, International Security Assistance Forces (General McChrystal) to brief his vision and intent for implementing COIN to his subordinate commanders in Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom in winter 2009/2010. Author’s personal notes.
attributes that are grounded in the current COIN literature (either as small, medium, or large-n studies) will be covered in the subsequent pattern-matching chapter which will evaluate the strength of correlations between EVs and the OV.

While difficult in reality, pacification is conceptually simple. Occurring in two broad, overlapping phases, the government first establishes control over the population (i.e., securing it from the insurgent) in order to then build and develop support for the government from the same population. In the short and possibly even medium-term, the COIN practitioner aims to, at best, greatly reduce and weaken the insurgency. In line with the adage of “not pleasing some of the people all of the time”, there will always be disgruntled members within a state. The practitioner’s goal is to minimize the effect those few have on the rest of the population.

Although it does not encapsulate the strategic level variables of ends (goals), ways (strategic/operational approach), means (resources), and strategic-level organizational approach for the US, North Vietnam, and their allies in South Vietnam, the simple graphic below (Error! Reference source not found.), comprised of three arrows and two circles, can be used to broadly explain how pacification works while providing a framework to describe the numerous specific programs.
Figure 3-1 Theoretical (Doctrinal) Plan to Defeat an Insurgency

In the figure above, the largest circle represents the country’s population, while the smaller circle represents the insurgency—with the degree of overlap representing the amount of control that the latter exerts over the former. The division of the insurgency circle represents the two main categories of insurgent: “irreconcilables” and “fighters.” More dedicated and committed to the insurgency, the irreconcilables generally fill the key leadership, cadre, intelligence, and support positions that run the insurgency and are less likely to accept some variation of the status quo. On the other
hand, while the fighters can still be dedicated to and fight hard for the insurgent movement, they are more amenable to accepting the status quo.

The insurgency leadership aims to enlarge the circle by recruiting more insurgents and supporters and to “increase the overlap” by establishing greater amounts of control over a greater proportion of the population. On the other hand, the government wants to both “make the insurgent circle smaller” by reducing the number of insurgents and their supporters as well as to “push out” the insurgent circle to separate it from the population. In terms of the graphic sketch, the policy of pacification (control) improves when the insurgent circle becomes smaller and/or decreases its overlap with the population. By increasing the amount of control it has over the population, the government is then better able to obtain support from the people.

The three arrows represent the broad groupings of various security, governance, and economic and social development programs and operations to improve control. The “Targeting” and “Surrender” arrows represent attempts to decrease the size of the insurgency by removing its key leadership and cadre while convincing the rank-and-file members to abandon it. The “Operations & Programs” arrow attempts to separate the insurgent away from the population using a variety of DIME programs.
Detailed theoretical description. In the broadest sense, rather than fighting to control a piece of territory, pacification is a population-centric campaign in which the counterinsurgent is competing against the insurgent to influence a rational, value-maximizing population. The government’s initial aim is to convince the population to acquiesce to, if not (preferably) support, the government’s efforts to establish control over it and provide security against the insurgent. The type of support at this point can be short-lived, transactional, and merely be indicative of the people supporting the winning side and/or the side that provides more benefits. But establishing that control and separating the population from the insurgent merely provides the government with the time and space to develop long-term, deeply held support in its people that will prevent the resurgence of a major insurgent threat in the future. The government may employ a variety of DIME programs for the following three purposes to achieve its short- and long-term goals.

The first category of effort aims to reduce the insurgency’s effectiveness by targeting the movement’s key leadership and cadre (intelligence, logistics, etc.). While

32 “Detailed” is a relative term and could be a misnomer. The descriptions below are more detailed than the short narrative that accompanied the graphic of two circles and three arrows. These descriptions will be far less than what is covered in the pattern-matching chapter when the literature review of each of the COIN theories that have been developed in small to large-n datasets is explained.

33 Targeting entails capturing, killing, or neutralizing insurgent leaders and cadre. Neutralizing is not a euphemism for killing; rather, it is a method of discrediting an insurgent leader/cadre in the eyes of the insurgent movement so that he or she is cut out of insurgent plans and operations (e.g., successfully planting a rumor that an insurgent leader has been co-opted by the government).
this process removes a very small number of insurgents from the war, their removal has an outsized effect because of the critical roles they play in running the insurgency. The repeated, successful targeting of leaders, key supporters, and cadre degrades the effectiveness of the insurgency, possibly causing it to shift from being a proactive to a reactive actor and demoralizes its members. It also suggests to the population and lower-level insurgent fighters that the government is more likely to win.

Where targeting aims to weaken the insurgency by using force against its leadership and key support personnel, the surrender program has the same goal but achieves it by convincing large numbers of the rank-and-file fighters to surrender to the government. On one end of the spectrum, fighters could decide to surrender merely based on the difficulty of living as an insurgent and/or observing the repeated, successful, targeted removal of their leaders. If augmented with a reintegration and reconciliation program that offers fighters (conditional) clemency/amnesty for voluntarily deserting the insurgency and surrendering to the government, the surrender program creates a much stronger inducement that further weakens the insurgency. And as (if) that program gains more success, it may cause a draconian backlash by the insurgency’s leadership to prevent or reduce the surrendering—further alienating more fighters.
While targeting (leaders and cadre) and surrendering (fighters) programs weaken the insurgency (i.e., making the circle smaller), this alone does not automatically result in a counterinsurgent victory because the insurgent is still operating in and among the population—preventing the necessary condition of control that the government needs to attempt to build support. To gain (in varying degrees) support from the population, the government will lastly use counterinsurgent forces and programs to push the insurgent circle away from the population. While various military and security programs physically separate (clear)\(^{34}\) — and keep separated (hold)\(^{35}\) — the insurgent away from the population, the political, economic, and social programs psychologically separate them by convincing the population that supporting the government has a greater cost-benefit ratio than supporting the insurgents.

Even implementing all the right security, political, economic, and social pacification programs can be wrong if they are not coordinated, mutually supporting, and synchronized with each other in time, space, and purpose.\(^{36}\) In fact, poor integration

\(^{34}\) Clear: “a task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.” ADRP 1-02.

\(^{35}\) While there is no specific doctrinal definition of hold, it is described by the doctrinal terms retain and secure. Retain: “a task in which the commander ensures that a terrain feature already controlled by a friendly force remain free of enemy occupation or use”; secure: “a task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action.” ADRP 1-02.

\(^{36}\) For example, conducting an economic program to improve farm (rice) production without having a safe, working transportation network to carry the rice to market does not gain population support for the government. On the other hand, instead of implementing ten different programs at ten different locations simultaneously and seeing no improvement in control, if the government concentrates those ten programs
and implementation by the government can actually degrade the population’s view of it by making it look uncommitted and incompetent. And even if the government synergistically implements the pacification programs, it may still not be operating optimally. Because every program cannot be implemented everywhere simultaneously, unless the counterinsurgent is prioritizing its pacification efforts to the most important locations, aggressively trying to implement pacification programs everywhere might be as useful as not trying any programs. Instead, the pacification commander should prioritize their efforts and resources.

Thirdly, even if the government is synergistically implementing the “right” pacification programs at the most important locations first, the methods by which the counterinsurgent forces in the field actually implement the programs and interact with the local population could derail or degrade the effectiveness of pacification. Most recently known as “McChrystal’s COIN Math [10-2=12]”, he noted that if killing/capturing insurgents also caused innocent deaths, injuries, and damage, the COIN practitioner could actually increase the number of fighters by killing fighters because the insurgent had brothers, cousins, and friends that are now motivated to

in a few locations, it is far more likely to see control improve there that can spill over to or attract other locations.

37 For example, if the government only had the capability to focus all of its pacification efforts in one location at a certain time, it would have a greater impact by pacifying a key population/economic/transportation center than it would in a location with no strategic value in the middle of nowhere.
fight. The same result could be seen by; disrespecting social and cultural norms; or just looking like outsiders could be enough to raise resentment against the government and inadvertently increase support for the antigovernment insurgent.

3.3 The Empirical Data- Trends in Control

Because measuring performance in the Vietnam War remains a controversial topic with researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers holding a wide variety of strongly held views, and because the inflection point in control from a rough stalemate to increasing is critical for testing the hypotheses examining why control increased, over the next 30 pages this section will go into a great amount of detail to explain and justify how the Outcome Variable was coded. As previously mentioned, the coding was made after a two-phased assessment. First, a historical review of the strategic decisions and actions taken by the Communists would define the broad contours of changing trends in control over time. Secondly, USG quantitative assessment data would both serve as a secondary check on the broad trends from the historical analysis as well be used to define the specific inflections of control.

38 General Stanley McChrystal, "Gen. Mcchrystal’s Speech on Afghanistan” Real Clear Politics (October 1 2009), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/10/01/gen_mccrystals_address_on_afghanistan_98537.html. As the Lead Planner in the ISAF Future Operations Section (CJ35) working for General McChrystal, author drafted a majority of directives from McChrystal affecting “how” ISAF/NATO forces fought in order to avoid the COIN math of 10-2=12. Topics included: driving, night operations, use of air power, use of indirect (artillery and mortar) fire, etc.
Solely relying on archival records and other research about Communist strategic decision-making and assessments could be flawed because any government, especially a Communist one, might be tempted to only release data that supports their messaging and narratives. This risk will be mitigated by comparing the actions taken by Communists forces to their own doctrine because “actions speak louder than words.”

While critics of using the USG quantitative assessment offer many legitimate critiques with its accuracy and use at the USG strategic/national level to “sell” the Vietnam War, they are arguably fighting a straw man at the operational level. The CORDS leadership in South Vietnam merely saw these assessments as “indicators of trends” and were only one of many indicators they considered when making campaign decisions.39

One last major area of question could be that, in light of the US losing the Vietnam War when its RVN ally surrendered in 1975, how could pacification be called successful? Given that pacification was but one campaign within a larger war, it is possible that to win a battle or campaign, but still lose the war.40 Relatedly, the RVN government surrendered to a massive and modern North Vietnamese conventional

39 See Section 3.2.3 “Outcome Variable (Control over time) for detailed footnotes on how academics/researchers, as well as practitioners, evaluated and used the quantitative assessments.

40 Japan won the “Battle of Pearl Harbor” and the original eastward island-hopping campaign, but lost the war.
army that invaded South Vietnam in 1975, it was not overthrown by Communist guerrillas.

3.3.1 History of the Major Communist Decisions and Actions

A review of Communist strategic decision-making and actions will show that control by GVN in South Vietnam decreased from 1959 until sometime in 1964/1965 when it changed to a rough stalemate through at least 1966. Sometime after that the GVN began asserting greater degrees of control over the rural population and countryside.

3.3.1.1 Prelude to the 1959 Communist Insurgency

While every war (to include insurgencies) is unique, there are similarities between them. This holds true for the history of Vietnamese insurgencies; as such, understanding those revolutionary themes is important to assessing efforts to counter the insurgency.

Although Vietnam has fought insurgencies against foreign powers for over two thousand years, the roots of the 30-Years War from 1946 to 1975 can be traced to the 1880s when France wrested control from the kingdom of Vietnam and established
French Indochina, which was comprised of five separate political entities. Similar to the Vietnamese resistance to (mostly) Chinese occupiers through history, the concept of nationalism drove resistance to French rule (riots, protests, conspiracies, etc.—but no revolution) from the 1880s through the 1920s. However, unlike the broad-based and unified resistance to the Chinese, these measures were primarily limited to urban elites in a plethora of organizations and parties that incessantly engaged in internecine bickering and disagreements.

Although they did not attract a majority or even a good plurality of dissident thinkers, the concepts that a disciplined party could organize a successful rural (agrarian)-based revolution motivated by class warfare instead of nationalism began developing after World War. By 1929, various Marxist and Leninist thinkers and

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42 France exercised varying degrees of control over the protectorates of the kingdom of Laos, the kingdom of Cambodia, Tonkin (the northern “rice basket” based on the Red River), and the kingdom of Annam (the north-south running “pole”) and established Cochin China (the southern “rice basket” based on the Mekong River) as a direct colony of France.

43 Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam,* pp. 5-14, describes the early resistance to the French. See page 7 for the two features of these efforts (urban elite and internecine conflict). Duiker traces this shift to ineffective resistance/insurgency to the cultural and societal changes brought about by France’s effective shift of the political elites from a Chinese-Confucian mindset to a French bureaucratic culture.

factions united to form the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) underneath the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. This quickly led to the first open revolt (the uprising of the Nghệ-Tĩnh soviets in 1930–1931, or Uprising) against French rule, which, despite being a well-organized worker and peasant movement motivated by class/economic issues, never attracted a national/broad-based support and was consequently brutally crushed by the French.45

After its defeat in June 1940 by Germany, and after being instructed to by its Nazi conqueror, Vichy France requested Japanese forces to help secure Vietnam against the Allies. In response, Communist Party leadership at the 8th Plenum Conference led by Ho Chi Minh decided to revolt against the Vichy French and the new foreign occupier (Japan). Learning from the failure of the Uprising to gain broad-based support, Ho Chi Minh advocated for the creation of a front organization that focused on the traditional motivations of Vietnamese nationalism and anti-imperialism instead of Communist ideology and class warfare. As a result, although it was invisibly controlled by the Communist Party, the League for Independence of Vietnam (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, or, more popularly, the Viet Minh) gained the support of: intellectuals,

middle peasants, petty bourgeoisies, and various nationalist and religious groups. Consequently, under the command of General Giap, the military arm of the Vietminh (the National Salvation Army) waged guerrilla warfare against the French & Japanese government and forces from 1941-1945, and even received critical operational and logistical support from the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) from 1944-1945. This effort culminated in the “August Revolution” in 1945 when Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam’s independence from France and the establishment of the DRV.

In November 1946, after months of negotiation between France and Vietnam over the transition status of the various elements of French Indochina (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin), France went to war in what became known as the First Indochina War to defeat Ho’s Viet Minh/DRV and retain control of Vietnam. Where France assumed they would see a quick victory and did quickly seize and control the cities due to their superior firepower and logistics, the Viet Minh’s National Salvation Army under General Giap returned to the Vietnamese version of guerrilla warfare (including land

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48 Ibid., pp. 7-8. In his speech, Ho Chi Minh even quoted the US Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident. That all men are created equal.” Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam., p. 103.
49 The First Indochina War consisted of five main phases: 1) “Beach Head Elimination” from 1945 to 1946 to prevent the return of French forces; 2) “retreat to the hills” to then begin armed and political dau tranh from 1947 to 1950; 3) failed G0 in 1951; 4) “strategically defensive phase” from 1952 to 1953; and 5) “successful general counteroffensive” from 1953 to 1954. Pike, Pavn: People’s Army of Vietnam., pp. 39-40.
reform measures) almost as quickly controlled the rural areas and the majority of the population. Despite the United States providing military as well as economic and technical assistance beginning in 1950 that quickly grew to subsidize 40 percent of France’s war costs, after losing the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the French granted independence to the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia as well as total independence for all of Vietnam.\(^{51}\)

Unlike Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam was divided into two “regroupement zones” divided along the 17th Parallel (about halfway along the north-south running “pole” between Vietnam’s “two rice baskets”), with the Viet Minh administering the northern half and the French-backed Emperor Bảo Đại (who was in nominal charge of the Annam Kingdom, “the pole”) administering the southern “Free Vietnam.” The two contingents were to begin negotiations in 1955 in order to have a general election in 1956 for unified Vietnam.\(^{52}\) However, when disagreements between the two sides made the

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\(^{50}\) As part of the concept of *dau tranh* (struggle)—the Vietnamese version of Mao’s doctrine of guerrilla warfare—the Viet Minh forces would grant ownership of farm lands to the farmers who worked the land and cancelled/abrogated the rights of the vacant landlords (who often lived in the cities). Land reform is specifically mentioned because it was still a factor in the Second Indochina War.


\(^{52}\) Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam.*
partition permanent in fall 1955, with the establishment of the northern DRV and the southern RVN, there was a massive flow of almost nine hundred thousand Catholic refugees from north to south and a smaller flow of fifty thousand to ninety thousand Communist party members from south. However, almost no Catholics stayed in the north, and approximately ten to fifteen thousand members of the Communist Party stayed in the south.53

After partition, the RVN prime minister (Ngô Đình Diệm, an ardent Catholic and anti-Communist) first consolidated control of the country by suppressing the various criminal gangs and religious sects that had their own armies. He then initiated the Tổng Công ("Denounce the Communists") campaign. Prime Minister Diem made two critical decisions at the rural (village and hamlet) level as part of that campaign and built support from elite groups within RVN. He returned the farmland liberated by the Viet Minh back to the (normally absentee) landlords and used the military to assist in collecting the unpaid rents from the years of the First Indochina War. Prime Minister Diem also eliminated the traditional autonomy of the Vietnamese village by replacing the village heads—traditionally democratically chosen from among the population of

53 Ibid., pp. 182-183. Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam., p. 381. The Prime Minister appointed by the Emperor Bảo Đại, Ngô Đình Diệm, 1) declared that the elections would not take place, 2) deposed and replaced Emperor Bảo Đại as the chief of state, and 3) declared the establishment of the Republic of Vietnam.
that village—with political appointees from Saigon. By 1959, the anti-Communist campaign had all but eliminated the political and military forces of the southern Communists. 54

During this time period, US support to France and then the RVN had a minimal boots on the ground footprint overseeing a large logistical support effort. Formal support began in late 1950 when advisers arrived to oversee the delivery of logistical and material support to French forces and, after France’s defeat, directly to the RVN. 55 During this time period, while the military advisory mission was fairly small, it was at least working with a government that was fairly stable and had almost completely destroyed any domestic/insurgent threat. Based on the low insurgent threat level and the recent experiences of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the US military advisory mission assisted in building, training, and equipping a conventional military force to defend against an invasion from North Vietnam. 56 The US planners had

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54 Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam., pp. 183-196. See p. 193 about Diem’s actions on countering Viet Minh land reform and reducing autonomy of the villages. Tổng Công also outlawed the Communist Party, as opposed to just “outing” them. By 1959, there were fewer than one to two thousand Communist Party members; over 90 percent of the Communist fighting forces (self-defense militias, armed propaganda teams, etc.) and the Party apparatus had been completely eliminated in a number of districts (to include the capital, Saigon). At this time the Communist gained the nickname of Viet Cong—a derogatory name for Vietnamese Communists.


assumed that the DRV would receive as much support from the USSR and/or China as North Korea had received.

Although logical, it was an incorrect assumption. After the 1955 partition, because the DRV did not receive massive amounts of support (as in the US-RVN relationship), the Communist Party in the north began the “arduous task of advancing towards socialism” by itself—a complex task in an underdeveloped country like North Vietnam. After being in almost continuous conflict since 1941, and despite receiving reports of the successful anti-Communist campaign in the south, the Communist Party directed human and natural resources solely to building the nation of the DRV. By 1957 the DRV had enough socioeconomic development to allocate material and manpower resources to modernize its armed forces, including the PAVN. After a senior party member witnessed the “darkest hour” of the southern Communist Party in 1958 as a result of the anti-Communist campaign, in a series of meetings and decisions in 1959–1960, the DRV decided to support the southern movement to defend itself against as well as to “liberate from the ruling power of the imperialists and feudalist forces” by employing the “August model [of 1945]”—the Vietnamese version of guerrilla warfare that was used against the Japanese and then the French: the dau tranh (“struggle”).

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Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*, pp. 182-209. Especially: p. 182, focus on nation building; p. 192, expand PAVN; p. 196, “darkest hour”; p. 199, inspection of south by Le Duan and decision to support self-defense; and pp. 207-209 on the decision to “liberate” the south and implement guerrilla
3.3.1.2 Description of Dau Tranh: the Vietnamese Communist Doctrine for Insurgency

The Vietnamese way, that is, by partial insurrections, the formation of revolutionary bases, launching guerrilla war and then culminating in a general insurrection, mainly through the use of political forces combined with armed forces to seize power for the people. — Le Duan, “South firster” in Politburo

General Giap, the commanding general of the PAVN, developed the doctrine of "dau tranh"—the Vietnamese adaptation of Chinese Communist guerrilla warfare—from empirically testing theoretical studies of insurgencies. Building off of the political tenets of Marxism and Leninism, General Giap based the theoretical foundation of "dau tranh" warfare. Strengthening National Defence and Building up the People’s Armed Forces’, by Vo Nguyen Giap, Vol. 3 (1957), pp. 48-54. For a detailed description of how Hanoi (DRV) went from providing general to specific guidance to the southern Communists as they went from a political struggle to armed revolt, see King C. Chen, "Hanoi’s Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War," Political Science Quarterly 90, no. 2 (1975), pp. 243-248 on the May 1959 decision by the 15th Central Committee to provide support to the southern Communists to defend themselves; pp. 248-251 for the September 1960 decision by the Third Party Congress to: 1) liberate South Vietnam, 2) establish a united front organization, and 3) utilize "dau tranh"—guerrilla warfare. See also the summary in Table 1 (p. 57), “Frequency of Major Themes of Hanoi’s Decisions on South Vietnam, 1958-1963.” For more details on the politics (within DRV and between DRV and PRC and USSR), see Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, "The War Politburo: North Vietnam’s Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive," Journal of Vietnamese Studies 1, no. 1-2 (2006), pp. 7-11 on 1959/1960 decisions and pp. 12-19 on the 1963 decision to escalate.

This section is a distillation of the Vietnamese doctrine of people’s war ("dau tranh," or “struggle”) based on reading: Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.; Douglas Pike, The Viet-Cong Strategy of Terror (United States Mission, Viet-Nam, 1970); Pike, Pavn: People’s Army of Vietnam.

58 Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam., p. 206. This quote was from the Communist leader Le Daun. He was within the “South first” camp of the Politburo in that he advocated for the earlier versus later support to the southern communists. Notable “north-firsters” were Ho Chi Minh and General Giap. Both factions agreed to the 1959–1960 decisions to support defensive and then liberation war in the south—they disagreed on later decisions in 1963 (to escalate conventional forces) and 1967/1968 (the Tet Offensive).

60 From Marxism came the idea of class conflict and grievances to motivate the movement. From Leninism came the idea of the critical and key role of a disciplined party leading the revolution.
on the writings and observations of the guerrilla war experiences of Napoleon, the British actions in World War I, and Mao Tse-tung. He then tested and adapted his theoretical doctrine based on empirical observations of the Chinese Civil War, the Vietnamese revolution against the Japanese and Vichy France from 1941 to 1945, and the First Indochina War against France from 1947 to 1954. He distilled his theoretical and empirical work into a doctrine that combines both rigidity in discipline and flexibility in implementation that is exercised by two types of actors operating in three phases.

Although dau tranh’s organizational structure and operational concepts are rigid and rely on ironlike organizational discipline, they are applied flexibly. From the national headquarters to the lowest village and hamlet leadership, there is a single chain of command directing, implementing, and controlling all of the civilian (i.e., political, economic, psychological) and military operations within their tactical areas, with the military headquarters subordinate to the civilian leadership at every level. The Viet

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61 Napoleon (unsuccesfully) fought against guerrillas in his Peninsular Campaign in Spain as well as in Russia. The British fought a successful insurgency/guerrilla campaign against the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East; see TE Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt (Ft. Leavenworth Kans.: Csi, 1990),” A reprint of article originally published in the British Army Quarterly and Defense Journal (1920). Mao Tse-tung led a successful insurrection against the Japanese during World War II and against the Nationalist forces after World War II; see Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare.

62 Pike, Pawn: People’s Army of Vietnam. Chapter 9, “Armed Dau Tranh,” and Chapter 10, “Political Dau Tranh.” To match the ideas of armed and political dau tranh to the concepts of pacification: Armed dau tranh is about establishing control over population and territory, and political dau tranh aims to gain support from the population. By claiming that the pacification efforts defeated the armed insurgency but not the political elements, Pike implies that the RVN/FWMF (including the US) established control but did not gain support; p. 246.
Cong Infrastructure (VCI)—the civilian Communist political cadre—exercises overall leadership at every organizational level and implements the political, economic, and psychological efforts and programs for *dau tranh*. The Communist armed/military cadre lead the three types of military forces (conventional, guerrilla, and militia). Those political and military forces simultaneously implement one to three phases of military operations at every level of the organization.\(^d\)

**Table 3-1 Communist Military Units and Role in *Dau Tranh*\(^e\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Type of Military Unit</th>
<th>Manpower Source</th>
<th>Size of Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Full-time Conventional</td>
<td>DRV PAVN RVN PLAF</td>
<td>Division (~10,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regiment (~2,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Full-time Guerrilla</td>
<td>Regional PLAF</td>
<td>Battalion (~500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Company (~100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Part-time Militia</td>
<td>Local PLAF</td>
<td>Platoon (~30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Squad (~10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While General Giap defined *dau tranh* as occurring in three phases beginning with political cadres identifying grievances and ending with a general uprising and general offensive (GU/GO), that progression was neither temporally nor spatially linear nor irreversible. Rather, every one of the more than fourteen thousand political entities

\(^d\) While the three phases were to be implemented in a large majority of the country—the rural farmlands—the Communists would only engage in phase I (political) action in the urban cities and phases II and III (military action) in the scarcely populated highlands (which were essentially 100 percent Montagnard).

\(^e\) The numbers are very approximate and non-rigid. This chart reflects only Communist military forces, not political cadre (VCI). However, it’s important to note the pre-eminent role of Phase I political cadre/forces (VCI). Operating in groups of up to forty to sixty VCI, they would engage in the critical warfare to “win over” a village/hamlet by following the guidance of the three “withs”: eat with, work with, and live with the local population.
(region, province, district, village, and hamlet) was a separate battlefield for political and military efforts, with each entity following its own progression/regression based on the local conditions. While there was a constant “churn” as some areas progressed while others regressed, General Giap envisioned overall constant positive progress as more areas came underneath Communist control. Although optimally every political entity would simultaneously carry out all three phases of the people’s war, the minimal goal was to have phase I “Organize and Prepare” continuously ongoing—but sometime phases II or III (military) could occur before phase I (political).

More than fourteen thousand political entities: approximately twelve thousand hamlets and approximately two thousand villages as well as districts, provinces, and regions.
Table 3-2. Overview of Communist Political and Military Doctrine of Dau Tranh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Begins</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Successful when</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I “Organize and Prepare”</td>
<td>Infiltrate VCI into village/hamlet</td>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>Politically motivated population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Identify grievances</td>
<td>1. Locally elected Communist leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Propaganda/informational</td>
<td>2. Numerous overlapping front groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Build cells/groups/militia</td>
<td>3. Collect taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Political (hold elections)</td>
<td>4. Provide manpower for PLAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Economic (land reform)</td>
<td>5. Provide support for PLAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Social (front groups)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Militia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Defend VCI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Selective violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II “Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare”</td>
<td>Infiltrate/form PLAF guerrilla in province/district</td>
<td>VCI Encourage ARVN to defect/desert</td>
<td>Clear all RVN/FMF forces from area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PLAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Screen VCI from RVN/FMF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Selective violence for VCI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Ambush</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Raid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III “Conventional War”</td>
<td>Infiltrate/form PLAF/PAVN conventional in region</td>
<td>VCI Sow defeat/dissension in civilians</td>
<td>GU/GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAVN/PLAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Screen VCI from RVN/FMF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Screen Phase II PLAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Seize key terrain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Defeat/destroy RVN/FMF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phase I, “Organize and Prepare,” began when political cadre (the Viet Cong infrastructure in RVN/US parlance), preferably with historic or family ties to that

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While it could be simplified that political and military dau tranh shared a focus at the village/hamlet (phase I) with the VCI targeting the political message at the villagers that they were simultaneously trying to physically secure/control, they differ for phase II and III activities. Phase II, military operations, aimed to drive out the local (province/district) military forces, while phase II, political, is attempting to get those soldiers to defect to the Communist side (optimally) or at least desert. The ultimate goal of phase III, military forces, was to defeat the government’s military to conquer South Vietnam. Phase III political cadres were trying to sow defeat, dissension, and disloyalty among the civilian population so that they (optimally) initiated/contributed to the GU, or at least reduced support for the government.
village/hamlet, infiltrated and began to collect information on the major grievances in that area. Following the Chinese method of “living with, eating with, and working with [sic]” the peasants, they would then propagandize the population by highlighting those grievances and denigrating the GVN as well as highlighting the traditional Vietnamese motivations of nationalism and anti-imperialism to promote the National Liberation Front (NLF; the front group for the Communist party). As they gained more followers and support, they formed more front groups, started to implement measures to gain support of the people (land reform and local elections), and possibly engaged in selective violence against particularly corrupt or efficient GVN officials or other local leaders to further sway public opinion. By the “end” of never-ending phase I, the village/hamlet was politically motivated and had popularly elected their own officials (albeit possibly not knowing they were Communists); created numerous interlocking and overlapping social, economic, and political front groups; payed taxes to the NLF;

\footnote{From Prime Minister Diem’s action in the mid- to late 1950s, land reform and loss of village-level political sovereignty were almost universal.}
\footnote{Duiker, \textit{The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam.}, p. 232. The VCI cadre tended to generally avoid addressing or promoting class warfare and Communist ideology. In ethnic minority areas (Montagnards in the highlands), the VCI placed less emphasis on economic reform and more on social/political autonomy.}
\footnote{There were generally six main/common liberation associations established in every village to further “lock in” support from the population: Farmers, Women’s, Workers, Youth, Students, and Cultural. Pike, \textit{Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.}, pp. 166-193, Chapter 10, “The Functional Liberation Associations.”}
and contributed manpower and other support to the PLAF (i.e., guerrilla and conventional forces).

Phase II, “Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare,” began when a PLAF guerrilla force was either infiltrated into the province/district or established by manpower from the villages and hamlets in the area. These PLAF companies and battalions conducted guerrilla/”hit and run” raids and ambushes against RVN/FWMF (Free World Military Forces) to screen the village/hamlet VCI from interference by the RVN/FMF forces so the Communist political cadre could continue to carry out phase I operations. Phase II PLAF forces also assisted phase I VCI/militia forces in carrying out selective violence against the more corrupt and/or efficient GVN representatives. Phase II was “complete” when there were no RVN/FWMF forces in the area. While the phase II military goal was

70 If the PLAF guerrilla forces infiltrated into an area, this would be an example of phase II occurring first in order to enable phase I to occur. If the PLAF forces were established by the villages/hamlets in the area, this was an example of phase I proceeding phase II. See Pike, The Viet-Cong Strategy of Terror., pp. 8-9, which provides examples of types of violence; pp. 17-18 list fifteen types of people/groups targeted for violence; and pp. 19-20 list the three broad objectives of using selective violence: 1) weaken enemy forces; 2) sustain/improve Communist guerrilla morale; and 3) isolate/disorient individuals in targeted villages/hamlets (phase I).

71 Over forty countries provided support to the Vietnam War, with six non-US South East Asia Treaty Organization countries deploying combat forces. Lieutenant General Stanley Robert Larsen Brigadier General James L. Collins, Allied Participation in Vietnam, vol. CMH Pub 90-5-1, Vietnam Studies (US Army Center for Military History (CMH), 1975). Chapter 2, Thailand; Chapter 3, Philippines; Chapter 4, Australia and New Zealand, Chapter 5, Republic of China; and Chapter 6, Republic of Korea.

72 Examples of selective violence included intimidation, harassment, “midnight letters,” beatings, kidnapping, and even assassination.
to destroy or push out the RVN/FWMF forces, phase II political cadre also attempted to weaken the enemy military forces by encouraging them to defect or desert.

Similar to phase II, phase III, “Conventional War,” began when a PLAF or PAVN conventional/main force was either infiltrated into the nation or region or established by manpower from the provinces and districts in the area. These PAVN/PLAF divisions and regiments conducted conventional/maneuver operations to seize, occupy, and defend key terrain as well as engage, defeat, and destroy conventional RVN/FMF forces in order to screen the phase II PLAF and, more importantly, the phase I VCI/militia forces—allowing the village-level political war to continue unabated. Phase III concluded when the combination of phase I (political) and phases II and III (military) efforts along with phase III political cadres’ efforts to demoralize the enemy population caused a GU from the (majority of the) population against the government, which phase III PLAF/PAVN conventional forces then augmented by launching the GO.73

### 3.3.1.3 Losing Control from 1959 to 1964

From 1959 to 1964, the Vietnamese government lost control over a large portion of the rural countryside and population as the Communist insurgency gained strength. As a result of the anti-Communist campaign from the 1950s that had decimated the

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73 The term GU/GO is frequently used to denote the apex of the *dau tranh* movement coupling the general uprising and general offensive.
Communist political cadres and military forces (militias), the GVN controlled almost 100 percent of the country. However, by 1964, the Communists’ military and political forces (PLAF and VCI) had gained control of a large enough portion of the countryside that they thought the conditions that would launch the GU/GO were imminent.

The strategic decisions made in 1959 and 1960 to launch a people’s War against the Republic of Vietnam in order to reunite the country manifested in four major operational plans and actions. The 1959 decision authorizing the southern Communists to conduct “self-defense” and “political agitation” operations led to the establishment of Group 559 to construct an infiltration route through Laos and Cambodia to infiltrate supplies and personnel into South Vietnam—the Ho Chi Minh trail. Additionally, “regroupees”—Communist party members who had fled from the south in 1955—were infiltrated back into the south in groups of forty to sixty. These returned to their historic/family districts as political cadres (VCI) to engage in phase I dau tranh operations and/or serve as armed/military cadres to form and lead PLAF forces. The

24 Chen, “Hanoi’s Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.” See Table 1, p. 257, for a summary of major strategic decisions made by the DRV from 1958 to 1963.
26 Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam., pp. 203, 228. The infiltration of “regroupees” went on for years; they would comprise almost 100 percent of the VCI but less than 20 percent of the PLAF (however, they predominately served as officers/leaders of the PLAF). When in the north, the regroupees went through
1960 decision to shift to armed struggle to liberate the south also had two operational effects. First, remembering the failed 1931 revolt and successful echoing the war against the Japanese and Vichy France, the Communist leadership directed the southern revolutionaries to establish and lead a broad-based front group, the NLF, to hide any connection to the DRV specifically or Communism generally. Second, the north began shipping modern weapons and equipment to improve the combat effectiveness of the PLAF.

The infusion of highly trained regroupees, modern weapons, and other logistical support from the Ho Chi Minh trail, along with increased political support from the broad-based NLF group, had rapid effects on the Communist insurgency. The military forces grew from the “darkest hour” of only two thousand fighters in 1959 to over ten thousand by 1961 and continued to do so rapidly for years. Over roughly the same time period, selective violence (i.e., assassinations) against GVN officials grew from seven hundred to over twenty-five hundred per year, and the PLAF started progressing from

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political and military courses to prepare them for their eventual return to the south; Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975., p. 83. The unit number was based on the month and year it was established: May 1959 = 559. The Ho Chi Minh trail had a number of major branches that infiltrated in South Vietnam at five different major locations.


78 Standardizing the haphazard PLAF inventory of fighting arms with rifles (the AK-47), machine guns using a common caliber round (7.62 mm) that was supplied by the north, rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-7), and various recoilless rifles.
easier hit-and-run attacks and ambushes to more tactically difficult deliberate attacks against villages loyal to the GVN as well as isolated RVN units. By the beginning of 1963, the PLAF progressed to battalion-level (around five hundred soldiers) operations and were able to hold the battlefield against larger RVN units for a single day; by the end of 1964 the PLAF conducted its first division-level operation and held the battlefield for four days against larger RVN forces.

Building off of the mid-1950s decisions by Prime Minister Diem to reinstate absentee landlords and abolish village-level sovereignty, the government of South Vietnam continued to be the “ideal enemy” for the Communists from 1959 to 1964. Although there were theoretically and empirically sound pacification measures, inept

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79 Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. Selective violence is a tool of high-end phase I (political) and low-end phase II (guerrilla) operations. Shifting from hit-and-run to deliberate attacks against small targets indicates a shift from low-end to high-end phase II (guerrilla) operations that are on the cusp of progressing to phase III.

80 The Battle of Ấp Bắc occurred on January 2, 1963, after the PLAF seized a strategic hamlet. The approximately three hundred fifty PLAF soldiers soundly defeated fifteen hundred ARVN soldiers (supported by helicopters and armored personnel carriers). The US military adviser to the ARVN unit was John Paul Vann, who later became a well-known critic of how the US was fighting in Vietnam. He later returned to Vietnam as a civilian United States Agency for International Development officer and then joined CORDS. The battle is detailed in Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam,, pp. 201-266, “Book III: Battle of Ấp Bác”; Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975., pp. 109-110.

and corrupt implementation of the 1959 “agroville” and 1962 “strategic hamlet” programs generally alienated more of the rural population.82 In addition to demonstrating tactical/military weaknesses and deficiencies, the GVN also showed political weakness when Prime Minister Diem was assassinated during a military coup in late 1963 (a few weeks before the Battle of Ấp Bắc). He was succeeded by a revolving door of various military factions throughout 1964 (prior to the Battle of Binh Gia).83

While still modest in light of the eventual mission to Vietnam, the time period of 1961 to 1964 marked the change in the scope and scale of US support to South Vietnam.84 Not only did the number of military advisers drastically grow from three thousand in December 1961 to more than nine thousand one year later (and would grow to 23,300 by 1964), but their mission also grew as they shifted from focusing on training and fielding new equipment for RVN forces to advising and assisting actual combat operations.85 The

82 Based on successful implementation in the British pacification efforts in Malay, both programs intended but failed to combine military and political measures to: control and protect the population, separate them from the PLAF/VCI, and gain popular support. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. See pp. 84-85, on “agroville,” and pp. 110-112, on “strategic hamlets.” Also see Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, pp. 203, on “agroville,” and 218, on “strategic hamlets.”
83 Herring, America’s Longest War; The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975., pp. 126-133, “The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem.” The Battle of Ấp Bắc was the first PLAF battalion-sized operation, and one year later, the Battle of Binh Gia was the first PLAF division-level operation.
85 Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975., pp. 105-108, 143. Indicative of the change in scope of the mission from training and equipment fielding to advising and assisting operations was the creation of the headquarters MAC-V to supplant the Military Assistance Advisory Group. Established on February 8, 1962, as an operational headquarters, MAC-V had the authority to command troops in combat. Disestablished in March 29, 1973, MAC-V was commanded by Generals Harkins (1962-1964), Westmoreland (1964-1968), Abrams (1968-1972), and Weyand (1972-1973)—none of these officers was
growth of military advisers was paralleled by an increased number of advisers from various civilian agencies, which, similar to the relationship between the military and US ambassador, independently reported back to their respective agencies in Washington.\(^86\)

The combination of the improving military and political gains by the PLAF and VCI cadres with the increased political instability caused by the turbulence in GVN leadership due to Prime Minister Diem’s and President John Kennedy’s assassination three weeks later, the Communist leadership decided to switch from a defensive (focusing on phases I and II) to an offensive (focusing on phase III) strategy and provide “maximum efforts” to achieve its goal of liberating and reuniting with the South. The operational effects of this strategic decision were, in addition to facilitating the return of southern regroupees, to increase the amount of logistical and material support to the southern revolution and deploy conventional/main force elements of the PAVN down

\(^86\) Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., p. 5. This monograph is a condensed version of Scoville’s dissertation on the formation of CORDS. Both works are based on Scoville’s experiences in CORDS from 1967-1968 and work as historian in the CMH from 1969 to 1972. The main advisory agencies were State, CIA, USAID, and USIA. The White House, Nsam 273 "Presidential Guidance Stemming from Honolulu Conference Re: Us Policy in South Vietnam", by President Lyndon B. Johnson (Washington, DC, 1963); minor advisory agencies were Agriculture, Treasury, and Health, Education and Welfare. Johnson, National Security Action Memorandum 343 'Appointment of Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam’. This NSAM lists all of the agencies that were undertaking pacification measures that would be placed underneath CORDS.
the Ho Chi Minh trail to support the (what was expected to be) imminent GU/GO.\textsuperscript{87} PAVN forces would begin arriving in RVN approximately one year later in late 1964.

### 3.3.1.4 Neither Winning nor Losing from 1965 to 1967

Although the major decisions by the Communist leadership and the United States for this time period were made in 1964 and early 1965, the effects of those decisions would not be seen until late-1965 to 1967 due to the time required to deploy the massive increase of forces on both sides. Although neither side won or lost during the simultaneous pacification/nation-building and conventional/main force campaigns,\textsuperscript{88} the lack of progress in “the other war [pacification]” set the stage for the establishment of CORDS in May 1967 from the US side.\textsuperscript{89} While the Communists did make gains, these were minimal compared to the successes of 1959 to 1964 due to the reallocation of regroupement cadres from armed to political *dau tranh*\textsuperscript{90} and the deployment of major combat units from the US.


\textsuperscript{88} The pacification campaign was against the phase I (VCI political cadre and PLAF local militia) and lower-end phase II (platoon-company-sized PLAF regional guerrilla); the conventional force campaign was against the higher-end phase II (battalion-sized PLAF regional guerrillas) and phase III (division- and regiment-sized PAVN and PLAF main force units).

\textsuperscript{89} Johnson, *National Security Action Message 362 ‘Responsibility for Us Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)’*.

\textsuperscript{90} From 1959 to 1963, approximately 90 percent of the cadre who reinfiltrated from the DRV back to their home districts and villages engaged in phase I “political mobilization,” and only 10 percent toward PLAF
The combination of poor tactical performance in the field by ARVN units, reports of PAVN main force units infiltrating into the South, and the Tonkin Gulf incident combined to serve as the catalyst for a massive increase in the number of US forces in a very short time period, in addition to the launching of the air campaign against North Vietnam: Rolling Thunder. Where from the end of 1960 to the end of 1964 US forces increased from fewer than one thousand to slightly more than twenty-three thousand, by the end of 1965 that number rapidly grew to about sixty thousand six months later (June 1965) and then to 184,000. In addition to just over seventy-one thousand non-US allied forces (FWMF), that number again doubled to 385,000 by the end of 1966. Once in the country, after establishing their bases and logistics, from 1965 to 1967 these forces fought a series of major and scores of minor conventional unit battles along the borders

phase II (guerrilla or main force), with a large majority serving in leadership roles or as officers. In 1965 that ratio changed to 60 percent political and 40 percent PLAF. See Pike, *Pavn: People’s Army of Vietnam*, pp. 228-229, and Table, “Cadre Assignments to Political and Armed Dau Tranh.”

* Herring, *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, pp. 186-187; Collins, *Allied Participation in Vietnam*, p. 23, Table 1, “Strength of Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).” From largest to smallest by approximate peak strength: Republic of Korea (fifty thousand); Thailand (eleven thousand); Australia (eight thousand); Philippines (two thousand); New Zealand (five hundred); Republic of China (50); and Spain (fifteen).

and highlands of Vietnam against PAVN and PLAF conventional/main force units as well as some of the larger PLAF guerrilla units. 93

During this period, the US was heavily involved with three of the four campaigns that comprised the Vietnam War. The diplomatic efforts to press the DRV from its aggression against RVN were supported by the air campaign against the north, Rolling Thunder. In the south, the RVN/FWMF forces conducted “search and destroy” operations against the PAVN/PLAF phase III conventional forces and some of the higher-end (battalion-sized) PLAF guerrilla forces. 94 However, unlike the other three campaigns, there was no concerted effort to plan, synchronize, or even augment the forces conducting pacification/nation building—“the other war.”

Although the main focus of the USG was the three very visible diplomatic, air, and main force campaigns, the relatively miniscule pacification effort (vis-à-vis the other campaigns) was not forgotten. Late 1965 informal discussions in Washington led to a major internal USG conference in January 1966 on how to organize the US effort to support pacification in Vietnam. 95 That conference led to a combined presidential-level

95 Scoville, _Reorganizing for Pacification Support_, pp. 16-20, on the late 1965 discussions among the Vietnam Coordinating Committee and the January 1965 Warrenton Conference.
US-RVN conference in February 1966, during which the US ambassador to Vietnam (Henry Cabot Lodge) acknowledged the importance of pacification/nation building to ending the war by stating:\textsuperscript{96}

We can beat up the North Vietnamese regiments in the high plateau for the next twenty years and it will not end the war—unless we… are able to build simple but solid political institutions under which proper police can function and a climate be created in which economic and social revolution, in freedom, are possible.

These strategic level meetings resulted in strategic and operational-level decisions that ultimately ended with the creation of CORDS. First, shortly after the February 1966 presidential-level US-GVN conference, President Lyndon Johnson appointed a presidential-focal point for “the direction, coordination, and supervision in Washington of US non-military programs … relating to Vietnam”: the special assistant to the president for pacification, Robert Komer. \textsuperscript{97} At the end of 1966, a little over six months after he had established single management for civilian pacification policy efforts at the strategic level, President Johnson then issued the direction that a single manager should supervise the implementation of all civilian pacification programs “in

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., pp. 22-24, on Honolulu conference between President Johnson and Prime Minister Diem.

\textsuperscript{97} Johnson, \textit{National Security Action Memorandum 343 ‘Appointment of Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam’}. Signed on March 28, this NSAM was sent to all agencies that had a role in pacification: DoD, State, USAID, CIA, Treasury, Agriculture, USIA, and Health, Education and Welfare.
the field” in Vietnam. Six months after directing single management for civilian pacification efforts at the operational level, President Johnson then directed “an unprecedented melding of civilian and military [pacification] authorities” by appointing a single manager (with the rank of Ambassador) to direct and supervise all USG pacification programs in Vietnam: Ambassador Robert Komer.

Captain Komer observed the Unity of Command approach that CA/MG headquarters/detachments employed to direct, synchronize, and supervise military and civilian programs in the Mediterranean Theater during World War II (see section 2.2 Pseudo Interagency Reform from World War II). He then “sold” the benefits of single management at the strategic and operational levels for civilian and military pacification efforts to President Johnson. Ambassador Komer became the first “commander” of the USG’s first integrated civilian-military organization to implement policy: the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, program.

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98 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., pp. 39-42, on the OCO, which was located in the US embassy.
99 Johnson, National Security Action Message 362 ‘Responsibility for Us Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)’; Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., pp. 49-55, on the creation of CORDS.
100 In USG legalistic terms, command has very specific legal definitions and authorities. Civilians can direct, monitor, synchronize, and supervise people and operations—they just cannot legally command.
101 CORDS’ second “commander, future CIA Director William Colby, changed the full organizational name to Civil Operations and Rural (instead of Revolutionary) Development Support (CORDS).
3.3.1.5 Gaining Control from 1967 to 1972

Although there was a tremendous amount of churn and variation at the individual hamlet and village levels, from CORDS inception in May 1967 until its disestablishment almost six years later in February 1973, control over the rural population and villages/hamlets erratically but generally increased to the point that the Communist insurrection was defeated and possibly destroyed (but not cleared). The only major exception to this positive trend in the GVN’s establishment of control was short-term backsliding that occurred after major, phase III conventional force offensives by the Communists in 1968, 1969, and 1972.

General Giap’s doctrine of dau tranh envisioned that the cumulative effects of implementing its political and armed phases I, II, and III efforts would result in a GU by the population that was reinforced by a GO by the military forces—the GU/GO. Based on the political and strategic situation in South Vietnam in 1963, the DRV leadership believed that the GU was imminent and decided to infiltrate PAVN conventional forces

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102 Doctrinal definitions—by increasing degree of difficulty: Defeat = “When the enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight… unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action… can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of the friendly forces”; Destroy = “Physically render an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted”; and Clear = “Removes all enemy forces and eliminates organized resistance within an assigned area.” http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/misc/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/adrp/adrp1_02.pdf
103 RVN military failure by rapidly losing control of the countryside and political weakness with the assassination of Prime Minister Diem and rapid turnover of other various ruling factions.
to be ready to assist with the GO. The US’s response of deploying large numbers of conventional forces that launched a series of major and scores of minor conventional search-and-destroy (S&D) operations prevented Communist victory from 1965 to 1967.

However, in a series of high-level Communist meetings in the south and north from January 1967 to early January 1968, the concept of initiating a GO in order to serve as a catalyst for a GU by the civilian population developed. This decision was based on the Communists’ assessment that in the strategic situation during those years, neither side was winning or losing. While RVN/FWMF/the US could not win, they could expand and prolong the war, making it even more costly to the Communists. On the other hand, the Communists could not lose because they could withstand the US pressure, but they were also unable to win because they could not prolong the war indefinitely because of the US/FWMF presence. Therefore, the Communist leadership decided to launch a massive GO to 1) influence the US presidential election; 2) inspire the population to begin the GU; 3) cause the collapse of the RVN government; and 4) convince the US to accept defeat and leave Vietnam.

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106 This is an adaptation of dau tranh as conceived by General Giap in which the GO was not launched until after the GU because the latter indicated that the political conditions had been met.
107 Guan, "Decision-Making Leading to the Tet Offensive (1968)-the Vietnamese Communist Perspective.", p. 345 on strategic analysis of “neither win or lose,” and pp. 347-352 on how the decision developed over
The January 1968 Tet Offensive\textsuperscript{108} had mixed military and political results. While it failed to collapse the RVN government, it did cause President Johnson to not run for reelection—which led to President Richard Nixon’s “Vietnamization” policy that eventually redeployed all US forces by 1973. The offensive also resulted in the end of the air bombing campaign against the north because that was a precondition for beginning diplomatic talks. However, it was a military disaster for Communists forces that depleted the PLAF phases II (guerrilla) and III (conventional) units in the south for gains (in urban and rural areas) that were lost within days to weeks.\textsuperscript{109} Contrary to the Communists goals in the short term, US manpower actually increased after Tet from over 485,000 to its peak fourteen months later of 543,000 in April 1969. However, at that point the policy of Vietnamization started drawing down US forces to twenty-four thousand by the end of 1972 and less two hundred fifty total in 1973.\textsuperscript{110} In light of their

\textsuperscript{108}The Tet Offensive actually occurred in three waves: in January 1968, where it was the most well-known, followed the second wave in May 1968 and the third wave in August 1968. The latter two were also part of the original plan.

\textsuperscript{109}Some PAVN forces participated in Tet, but a majority was held in reserve to reinforce PLAF successes that never materialized. Pike, \textit{Pavn: People’s Army of Vietnam.}, p. 47, on effect of Tet on PLAF. There was also a “mini-Tet” one year later in January 1969 that had had minor and quick negative effects on control.

\textsuperscript{110}Herring, \textit{America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975.}, p. 188, Table, “Total US Military Personnel in South Vietnam.”
losses in Tet and the increased US military presence, by late 1969 the Communists decided to revert back to protracted war—emphasizing phases I and II political and armed efforts.111

Tet also detrimentally affected the phase I political cadre (VCI) because they “came out of the shadows” to set up Communist infrastructure after the PLAF cleared the RVN’s presence from the rural districts, villages, and hamlets. By May 1968, the GVN’s level of rural control had returned to the pre-Tet level and, led by Ambassador Komer’s belief that the combination of a greatly weakened PLAF and exposed political cadre was an opportunity for CORDS to launch the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). Synchronizing and coordinating all civilian and military pacification programs using a “Clear, Hold, and Build” approach,112 the three-month-long APC and annual

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111 The Communists envisioned three results for Tet: 1) Obtain complete success by seizing Saigon (and other cities and rural areas) and collapsing the GVN; 2) Gain some success by seizing and holding several cities and rural areas that probably would collapse the GVN or make it sue for peace; or 3) achieve limited success with few/no cities and some rural areas. This would not be enough to cause the GVN to collapse or sue for peace or the US to depart Vietnam. If this option occurred, the conflict would shift from phase III, conventional force/decisive battle, to predominately a phases I and II protracted insurgency. See Guan, "Decision-Making Leading to the Tet Offensive (1968)-the Vietnamese Communist Perspective.", p. 351. For the decision to revert to protracted war (phases I and II), see Giap, “The Party’s Military Line Is the Ever Victorious Banner of People’s War,” cited in Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam., pp. 304-306, note 14.

112 This was a major change from the 1965–1967 focus on the S&D technique by conventional forces that was ineffectively used against phases II (guerrilla) and III (conventional forces). Robert W. Komer, "Clear, Hold and Rebuild," Army 20 (1970).
follow-on pacification campaigns made inexorable gains in control that eventually made
the political cadre (phase I) and PLAF (phases II and III) ineffective.\textsuperscript{113}

In addition to gaining control over more of the population and rural areas,
CORDS also added additional pacification functions that made it more effective in
fighting the insurgency. By 1970, the better manned and resourced pacification forces,
functions, and messages (almost completely) mimicked and overmatched the
Communist insurgency.

Table 3-3. Comparison of \textit{Dau Tranh} to Pacification Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>\textit{Dau Tranh}</th>
<th>Pacification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Region/Nation</td>
<td>Brigade/Division</td>
<td>PAVN</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PLAF</td>
<td>FWMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Company/Battalion</td>
<td>PLAF (Guerrilla)</td>
<td>Regional Force (RF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Platoon/Company</td>
<td></td>
<td>Popular Force (PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Hamlet/Village</td>
<td>Squad/Platoon</td>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>Peoples Self-defense Force (PSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40–60 personnel</td>
<td>Political cadre</td>
<td>Revolutionary Development (RD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where Table 3-3 above shows that, by the late 1960s, pacification forces had adopted the
same organizational structures that the Communist insurgent forces had been using
since 1959–1960, Table 1-8 below shows that those pacification forces were performing
(almost) all of the same actions as the Communist forces in order to control and gain the
support of the population.

\textsuperscript{113} Hunt, \textit{Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds.}, pp. 156-159, “Getting the South Vietnamese on Board.”
3.3.1.6 Losing the War from 1972 to 1975

The last two major offensives that the Communists launched were fundamentally different from all previous Communist operations. Instead of being light infantry–centric maneuvers by PAVN conventional forces that had infiltrated into South Vietnam, augmented with PLAF conventional and guerrilla forces and assisted by local militia and political cadres, the 1972 and 1975 offensives were conventional force invasions equipped with modern weapons and equipment from North Vietnam that had minimal participation or support by South Vietnamese insurgents (political cadres, PLAF guerrillas, or PLAF conventional forces).

Table 3-4. Comparison of *Dau Tranh* to Pacification Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Dau Tranh</th>
<th>Pacification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Exercises Unity of Command/single management</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifies and addresses local grievances</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote local sovereignty by holding local elections</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Take actions addressing corrupt/inept officials</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotes nationalism and anti-imperialism</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political cadre/revolutionary development “work with, eat with, live with” locals</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Transfers land to the farmers (land reform)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotes economic growth and development</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Establishes front groups/private organizations</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotes improvements in health and education</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Uses selective violence against opposition leadership</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encourages opposition forces to desert or defect</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employs part-time civilian militia in villages/hamlets</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improves regional forces (trains and equips)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employs small-units of local soldiers to screen villages/hamlets</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employs large conventional units to screen small-units and villages/hamlets</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the end of March 1972, almost two hundred thousand PAVN soldiers—organized into thirteen divisions employing tanks, armored vehicles, long-range artillery, and heat-seeking air defense artillery missiles—invaded South Vietnam along four widely separated approaches in the Easter Offensive. The vast preponderance of the force to fight the invasion were ARVN forces because there were fewer than eighty thousand US forces remaining in Vietnam—with only one ground combat brigade and a limited number of US advisers with ARVN forces. Despite initial gains and successes by Communists, the ARVN forces were able to defeat and push back the PAVN invasion, aided by massive amounts of US air (bombing) and logistical support. Pacification was naturally set back in the area through which the PAVN units traversed and occupied, but even those Communist gains were 75 percent less than their gains in the 1968 Tet Offensive. Additionally, as in Tet, the decrease in control was mostly temporary.\textsuperscript{115}

What began as a limited probing attack in December 1974 became a major offensive based on the weakness of the RVN response. The 1975 Spring Offensive (also

\textsuperscript{114} A humorous indicator of the lack of phases I and II forces to assist the invasion were reports from PAVN prisoners that, unlike in the 1968 Tet Offensive, their units got lost and wandered around because they lacked local guides. Ibid., p. 257, note 22. Local militia and lower-end PLAF guerrilla should have performed this function.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., pp. 255-258, “Pacification Derailed: The 1972 Easter Offensive.” Since 1971, the Communists had reallocated approximately 45 percent of their cadres to armed \textit{dau tranh} (most would be officers in leaders in the PLAF) and only 55 percent to political. Even with this emphasis on armed action, PLAF personnel comprised less than 10 percent of the overall manpower, and the units that did exist were heavily augmented by PAVN reinforcements. Pike, \textit{Pavv: People’s Army of Vietnam}., p. 47, on PLAF less than 10 percent of combat capability and p. 229, on the allocation of cadres to armed or political \textit{dau tranh}.}
called the Ho Chi Minh Offensive) was similar to the 1973 Easter Offensive but had some critical differences. Although PAVN forces had almost one hundred thousand more soldiers than in 1973, they were similarly armed and equipped with modern weapons and utilized the same invasion routes as before. As in 1973, there was minimal augmentation by PLAF guerrilla forces or support by local militia/political cadres. However, due to US domestic politics, instead of providing massive airpower (bombing) and logistical support as in 1973, the US provided no appreciable support to South Vietnam. On April 30, 1975, the Republic of Vietnam surrendered to the invading conventional/main forces from the DRV—it was not toppled or replaced by an insurgency.  

3.4 Quantitative USG Assessments

The quantitative data (Hamlet Evaluation Survey -HES) agrees with the broad trends that control shifted from rough stalemate and generally increased in last years of the Vietnam War (1967-1972). It further finds that that improvement began in the last half of 1967. A visual review of countrywide HES charts developed by CORDS’

\[\text{\textsuperscript{116}Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam., pp. 348-355. Ironically, when the DRV initiated a people’s war (insurgency) in 1959–1960, the US was preparing RVN to fight a conventional war. And after RVN, with US support, defeated the Communist insurgency, the DRV successfully launched a conventional invasion of it; p. 355.}\]

evaluation branch shows the percentage of hamlet-level control by category of hamlet generally increased over time—with the January 1968 Tet Offensive being a noticeable but short-lived divergence.

Figure 3-2 Achievements in Population and Hamlet Control, 1971

A recent quantitative/statistical analysis of the HES developed a measurement of the aggregation of all five levels of control into a single ratio measurement – the “mean level of control.” Looking at this indicator at the province-level further suggests that

Of note, the noticeable “breaks” between 1969 and 1970 correspond to transitioning from HAMLA to HES70 and then HES70 to HES71.
control generally increased from 1967 through 1972, with a short-lived downturn after the 1968 Tet Offensive (marked by the red vertical line).\footnote{Douglass, "Why Not Divide and Conquer? Targeted Bargaining and Violence in Civil War.", p. 74, Figure 2.17, “Change in Territorial Control over Time by Province” (forty-four provinces). This chart shows every month from January 1967 to December 1972. The red line indicates the Tet Offensive in January 1968.}
3.5 Trends in Control over Time in South Vietnam

Graphically displaying below the synthesis of the Communist decisions and actions with USG assessments shows that control decreased until 1965, then shifted to a stalemate until sometime after 1966 and then increased until 1972.\textsuperscript{119}

\textbf{Figure 3-4 Trends in Control over Time (1959-1972)}

The four black circles with white numbers represent major Communist decisions that define the broad contours of trends of control. (#1) In 1959, because the Communists Party in South Vietnam was almost completely eradicated and was facing its “darkest hour,” the GVN exerted almost total control over the population. This led the Communist leadership in the north to begin the phased approach of *dau tranh* in South Vietnam to grow the insurgency. (#2) They were so successful, they believed they were facing the imminent collapse of GVN. To prepare for the expected GU (General Uprising), the northern leadership then deployed PAVN main forces to South Vietnam; which caused an US counter-reaction with a massive deployment of US and allied forces in 1965 to stave off defeat/collapse.

(#3) By late 1966, the Communist leadership believed that, as things were, the US could neither win nor lose. Over the course of 1967, they planned and prepared for the 1968 Tet Offensive to break the stalemate. However, sometime after 1966, the GVN/US were able to increasingly gain more control that by 1969, (#4) the Communists decided to stop Phase III (conventional/main force) and revert back to Phase I (political) and Phase II (guerilla warfare operations only. (#5) By 1971, the Communist leadership concluded that only a conventional invasion would successfully defeat the GVN.120

The grey circles with black letters represent the inflection points based off USG assessments. By late 1965, the massive deployment of US and Allied forces staved off a likely collapse and, possibly by weight of numbers, were able to achieve a rough stalemate against the insurgency (“S”). Because USG data (the Hamlet Evaluation Survey) measured control as increasing the second half of 1967, this is marked as the primary inflection point (“P”) for the study. Due to the difficulty in precisely identifying inflection points in a “war of 15,000 fronts” and concerns with USG data assessments, the project will also test other possible inflection points in “alternative scenarios” of: (#1) Office of Civil Operations in early 1967\textsuperscript{121}; (#2) Post-Tet/Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) in late 1968\textsuperscript{122}; and (#3) COSVN [Central Office for South Vietnam] decision to revert to Phases I & II only in late-1969.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{121} Although the HES was not considered “live” until June 1967, it did show increasing control beginning in January 1967. Douglass, “Why Not Divide and Conquer? Targeted Bargaining and Violence in Civil War.”, p. 74. This roughly coincides with the establishment of the OCO—the DI_E single management predecessor to CORDS.


\textsuperscript{123} While Douglas found that control began increasing in January 1967, he also noted that it “really took off” after the COSVN Resolution that reverted the operational orientation from a GO to phase I and II warfare, emphasizing the use of selective violence and terror and disengagement of PLAF phase III forces to conserve manpower; Douglass, "Why Not Divide and Conquer? Targeted Bargaining and Violence in Civil War.”, p. 11.
3.6 Pacification in Vietnam Data Set

This project created a unique qualitative data set on pacification in Vietnam from 1959 to 1972 that was used to identify correlations between pacification programs and control. This data set has twenty-eight distinct, six-month time periods; in addition to coding the OV of trends based on the two main inflections points as well as for the three alternative scenarios, it qualitatively codes the forty-one EVs based on major changes to their respective factor affecting pacification.

The data set is portrayed graphically below to visually show researchers when EVs vary with or before changes in the OV with the x-axis showing time and the y-axis listing the various EV that might affect pacification. While it appears to show four different outcomes, there is only one primary OV being measured (late 1968 with the establishment of CORDS, highlighted in grey); the other three outcomes are the alternative scenarios that are serving as robustness checks by asking “what if” control actually changed in a different time period. The inflection point shifting from losing control to rough stalemate is the same for four outcomes (primary plus three alternative) because the project is focused on understanding how control shifted from stalemate to increasing.
**Figure 3-5 . Pacification in Vietnam Data Set, 1959–1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Liberation of South Vietnam</th>
<th>Unification with Socialist Democratic Republic of Vietnam</th>
<th>United States (Military Support)</th>
<th>South Vietnam (Military Support)</th>
<th>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</th>
<th>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>Liberation from the United States</td>
<td>U.S. Military Advisors</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Forces</td>
<td>Destruction of Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>Social Revolution or Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.7 Comparative Analysis

3.7.1 Summary of Data Set

Coding the forty-one theoretical EVs as trends in programs and decisions generated one hundred ten observations. Each EV had between one and six (with an average of 2.7) distinct observations/coding decisions. Ten of the forty-one theoretically feasible EVs did not appreciably vary over the duration of the data set and are coded as constants. The five other theoretical explanations that did vary between 1959 and 1972, but never with any of the inflection points for changes in control, are also coded as constants. In any specific test of the five inflection points (late 1965 plus the four possible points for increasing control), any of the twenty-six EVs that do not co-vary will be designated as a control variable. The below table summarizes the number of EV that co-vary with a change in control- the primary inflection point of late 1968 (which corresponds with CORDS establishment) is in RED BOLD.

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124 If the data-set had been coded monthly, it would have generated 1,148 datapoints.
125 The median and mode of coding decisions was two per EV. Count of number of distinct observations:
1=10; 2=13; 3=6; 4=5; 5=5; 6=2.
Table 3-5 Summary of EV-OV Co-variance by Changes in Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Late 1965 Stalemate</th>
<th>Early 1967 OCO</th>
<th>Late 1967 CORDS</th>
<th>Late 1968 Tet</th>
<th>Late 1969 COSVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control/Constant</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.7.2 “Before-After” Analysis

The following charts identify the EVs that co-vary with change in control; as feasible explanations they will be re-analyzed in the next chapter using pattern-matching. Unless there is a single EV that co-varies with the OV, then this methodology is limited to finding that each of the EV may explain changes in control. Because there are two more iterations of feasibility/screening as well as evaluation testing, there will not be a narrative for each chart. However, whether or not any particular scenario affected the main hypothesis that CORDS’s single management led to increased control will be addressed each table. Variables describing organizational approaches will be in red and bolded. The stalemate and primary (CORDS) scenarios will be presented first followed by the three alternative scenarios in chronological order.
Table 3-6. Explanations for Stalemate, late 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>32 Control Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Means</td>
<td>Limited (VCI and PLAF)</td>
<td>Major increase (VCI/PLAF/PAVN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Means</td>
<td>Limited to Advise and Assist (~20,000 troops)</td>
<td>Americanization of War (from ~20,000 to over 200,000 in 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG in Vietnam</td>
<td>Formal Unity of Effort (Mission Council)</td>
<td>Formal Unity of Effort + Unity of Command for “I” (Mission Council + JUSPAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Forces Mission</td>
<td>ARVN: Clear and S&amp;A</td>
<td>US/GVN: Clear and S&amp;A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutralize VCI</td>
<td>Increased resources -but stove-piped</td>
<td>USG-sponsored PIOCCs: Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender Program</td>
<td>Low GVN priority</td>
<td>Upgraded GVN priority (separate Ministry) and USG support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, and Equip Phase I cadre</td>
<td>&gt;25 separate Phase I political cadre programs sponsored by GVN and/or USG</td>
<td>Merged into single Phase I political cadre program established underneath the Ministry of Revolutionary Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-GVN “in the field”</td>
<td>Advise + Minimal Combined (SF/CIDG in Highlands)</td>
<td>Advise + Limited Combined Operations (mostly USMC CAP program in Military Region 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While this scenario technically falsifies the CORDS hypothesis, a more accurate description would be that it does not apply because control is shifting to a stalemate and not increasing. Of interest, there was a shift to Unity of Command for the Informational element of national power in late 1965 when the USG placed all of the Public Affairs, Information Warfare, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) elements underneath the
leadership United States Information Agency and called the Information Task Force JUSPAO (Joint United States Public Affairs Organization).\textsuperscript{126}

Table 3-7. Primary Scenario for Increasing Control, late 1967 (CORDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>35 Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG in Vietnam</td>
<td>Formal Unity of Effort + Unity of Command for “I” (Mission Council + JUSPOA)</td>
<td>Unity of Command for “DIME” down to Districts (CORDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender Program</td>
<td>Upgraded GVN priority (separate Ministry) and USG support</td>
<td>Major priority (Chieu Hoi offices down to every village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Reform</td>
<td>GVN appoints Village/Hamlet Chief Villagers elect Council</td>
<td>Villagers elect Village/Hamlet Chiefs Chiefs exercised some authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action</td>
<td>Cadre + ARVN + ad hoc US/FWMAF</td>
<td>Cadre + ARVN + US + ad hoc FWMAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence of Local Officials</td>
<td>No program (OJT only)</td>
<td>GVN Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, and Equip</td>
<td>Incorporated in ARVN and expanded</td>
<td>Addition of US Advisors (from 5 to over 1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Forces (PhII)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This most likely time period (based on HES reporting) does not falsify the main hypothesis of CORDS.

\textsuperscript{126} This research did not further pursue JUSPAO, but it could be a research idea for someone with an interest in Information Operations.
Table 3-8. Alternative Scenario #1 for Increasing Control, early 1967 (OCO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>36 Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG in Washington</td>
<td>Formal Unity of Effort</td>
<td>Unity of Command for “DI_E” (Special Assistant Komer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify Grievances</td>
<td>USG pilot program</td>
<td>GVN program incorporated into RD Cadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action</td>
<td>Cadre + ARVN</td>
<td>Cadre + ARVN + ad hoc US/FWMAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG in Vietnam</td>
<td>Formal Unity of Effort + Unity of Command for “I” (Mission Council + JUSPOA)</td>
<td>Unity of Command for “DI_E” down to Districts: (Office Civil Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender Program</td>
<td>Upgraded GVN priority (separate Ministry) and USG support</td>
<td>Major priority (Chieu Hoi offices down to every village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If control actually shifted from a stalemate to increasing in early 1967, then the CORDS hypothesis is falsified (CORDS had not even been established yet). However, while the CORDS hypothesis is falsified, the concept of single management/Unity of Command is not with both the USG strategic level and USG in Vietnam shifting to single management for all civilian (“DI_E”) pacification program. This was when Komer served as the Pacification “czar” on the National Security Council; and was able to convince President Johnson that single management for all civilian and military pacification programs would work.
Table 3-9. Alternative Scenario #2 for Increasing Control, late 1968 (Post-Tet)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>26 Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Operational Orientation</td>
<td>Progress General Uprising (GU)</td>
<td>Launch General Offensive (GO) to spark GU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN Organizational Structure</td>
<td>Formal Unity of Effort down to District</td>
<td>Unity of Command for “DIME” down to District: (Central Pacification Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase I Cadre mission</td>
<td>“Build” from Best to Worst</td>
<td>“Build” from Worst to Best</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutralize VCI</td>
<td>USG-sponsored PIOCCs Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers</td>
<td>GVN-sponsored DIOCCs: District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, and Equip CDF/LDF</td>
<td>Authorized by not supported</td>
<td>Nationally mandated (~200,000 members in 1968/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform/Influence Population</td>
<td>Anti-Communists GVN provides</td>
<td>Anti-Communists GVN provides Northern invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Reform</td>
<td>No program</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, &amp; Equip Territorial Forces (PhII)</td>
<td>Addition of US Advisors (from 5 to over 1,000)</td>
<td>US Advisors + Expand + Combined Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, and Equip National Police</td>
<td>Station down to Province</td>
<td>Station down to Villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-GVN in the Field</td>
<td>Influence + limited Combined operations</td>
<td>Influence + significant Combined Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous Forces</td>
<td>Decreasing (40% to 25%)</td>
<td>Increasing (25% to 63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Restrained ROE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanization</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to the Office of Civil Operations (OCO, early 1967), the CORDS hypothesis is falsified if control did begin to improve until the latter half of 1968 in
conjunction with the post-Tet pacification counter-offensive- the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). Also similar is the fact that single management is not falsified as seen by the GVN- with much prodding by CORDS leadership, especially “Blowtorch” Bob Komer- adopting single management for all of their civilian and military pacification programs.

Table 3-10. Alternative Scenario #3 for Increasing Control, late 1969 (COSVN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>37 Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of Pacification</td>
<td>~12 Hamlets (pacify in place)</td>
<td>~2K+ Villages (pacify in place)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Means</td>
<td>Americanization</td>
<td>Vietnamization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Operational</td>
<td>Launch General Offensive (GO) to spark GU</td>
<td>Revert to Phase I/II (emphasize terrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Reform</td>
<td>Villagers elect Village/Hamlet Chiefs</td>
<td>Villagers elect Village/Hamlet Chiefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chiefs exercise some authority</td>
<td>Chiefs exercise full authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with alternative scenarios #1 and #2, if control did not begin to improve until late 1969 when the Communist leadership in the South (COSVN) decided to revert from Phase III (conventional forces) to only do Phase I & II (political and guerilla) operations, then the CORDS hypothesis is also falsified. And as with the others, single management/Unity of Command is not falsified; albeit in a different form. In late 1969, the GVN completed restoring the traditional role of village leadership that the GVN had
stripped away in the mid-1950s. As part of that devolution of power, the Village Chief was given Unity of Command/single management over every GVN pacification program operating within his village: police, Territorial Forces (Phase II counter-guerillas), Revolutionary Development (Phase I political), Armed Propaganda Teams (Phase I Information), oversaw & directed all developmental projects, etc.

3.7.3 Observations and Way Ahead

Altogether, this chapter has made a major contribution to advancing the research question. To avoid omitted variable bias in its design, the project looked at 41 theoretically-possible explanations for improved control. While thorough, it raises the concern of indeterminacy with so many variables and so few observations. Using an interrupted time-series most similar systems design (MSSD) allowed the project to “screen out” the vast majority of possible EVs and identity the far smaller number that are temporally feasible; these will be further analyzed using pattern-matching in the next chapter. See Table below. The late 1965 stalemate scenario will not be carried forward because it is not applicable to the main research question.
### Table 3-11 Number of EVs for further analysis by scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Early 1967 OCO</th>
<th>Late 1967 CORDS</th>
<th>Late 1968 Tet</th>
<th>Late 1969 COSVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remaining</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropped</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsifies CORDS hypothesis?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsifies Unity of Command hypothesis?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, in addition to the possibility that CORDS’ adoption of single management in mid-1967 caused control to improve in late-1967, it is also possible in every scenario that some form of single management resulted in improving control.

The next chapter will use congruence (pattern-matching) analysis to eliminate those EVs that are not positively correlated with increased control and to identify which of the EVs are most correlated with increased control.
4 Congruence Analysis of Pacification Programs in Vietnam

4.1 Contribution

After the last chapter eliminated a vast majority of the 41 theoretically-possible explanations for increased control in Vietnam due to lack of co-variation, this chapter will continue to eliminate more infeasible EVs as well as then rank ordering the remaining feasible EVs. It will use pattern-matching (congruence) analysis to eliminate those EVs that do not logically explain increases in control and then rank the remaining based on the strength of their marginal effect. To do that ranking, this study will leverage the developing field of COIN literature, especially the even more recent work using statistical analysis on large-n data-sets. All of the positively correlated EVs will be further analyzed in the next chapter using process-tracing.

4.2 Overall Strategy for Congruence Analysis

While eliminating EVs using pattern-matching is fairly straightforward because a variable is considered infeasible if the predicted and actual EV-OV relationship do not match, ranking feasible EVs can be far more complex. If every EV was: used in the same large-n sample of external cases; had the same predictive (or lack thereof) strength as each other; and did not require any antecedent conditions, then they could be rank-ordered by their marginal effect on the OV. Because the EVs in this study do not meet
these criteria, this section will use those differing factors to develop a framework to organize the different feasible EVs so they may be compared and ranked.

The following sub-section will develop this analytic framework while, after reviewing a sampling of the current COIN literature, a later section will populate it by placing all of the reviewed variables of interest into one of the table’s nine boxes. After that, this framework will then be applied to the EVs that the comparative analysis found to be correlated with increased control in Vietnam.

4.2.1 Framework to Compare Explanatory Variables

Based on the type of analysis and the nature of the insights from that analysis on the Explanatory Variables, the project will develop a simple 3 x 3 table to organize the EVs studied in the COIN literature. This framework is critical for the project’s second inferential approach of inductively ranking the feasible EVs.

While not referred in this manner in the literature, congruence analysis can be ordered into three broad categories based on the type of analysis (with associated sample size) the EV is being pattern-matched against: theoretical analysis within the case itself; comparative/historical analysis of small to large sample set; or statistical analysis with a large-n dataset. Only requiring the existing empirical data and a theoretical linkage between the EV and OV, theoretic within-case congruence analysis eliminates an
EV if the empirically measured and theoretically predicted EV-OV relationships differ. ¹

While requiring no additional resources or research, this easily performed congruence analysis has problems with replicability ², causality ³, and [lack of] comparability to other EVs because it is not compared against any other (external) cases. Researchers mitigate these problems and increase congruence analysis' inferential strength by increasing the number external empirical cases ⁴ which allows either comparative/historical or statistical analysis. This attribute of the framework will be divided into: statistical analysis (using

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¹ “Within case” congruence analysis; see George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences., pp. 181-182. Also referred to as “Congruence procedure type 2: multiple within case comparisons”; see, Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science., pp. 61-63. Van Evera explains that slight differences between his and George and Bennett’s are how to do congruence analysis and not what it can provide the researcher; and those difference in application were on scale than scope. Both researchers simply identify the “matches and mismatches” between the actual OV and the OV predicted by causal theory associated with the EV that had variation.

² The inability to run a repeated test of the phenomena raises the “fundamental problem of causal inference” and that the single within-case test between predicted and actual OVs can neither confirm or falsify the general theory. George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.; King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research., p. 91. If EV “X”, and only EV “X,” varied before/with the OV but “X”’s theory predicted Outcome “Y” but Outcome “~Y” occurred instead, while EV “X” and the OV still co-vary, it is not for the causal connection that had been posited.

³ Although within-case can show if there is a possible causal linkage between EV and OV, actual relevance (significance) of that relation could be negatively affected by: 1) spuriousness: Variable Z causes EV as well as OV; 2) causal priority: Variable Z causes EV, which causes OV, making EV an intervening variable; and 3) causal depth: Variable Z can cause either EV or Variable X, either of which cause the OV equifinality. None of these threats to causal significance can be tested by a single within-case test. George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences., pp. 185-186.

⁴ George and Bennet never used the phrase external case congruence analysis, but this phrase best describes how they recommend mitigating the problem of a single-test in within-case analysis. Ibid., pp. 188-189. Van Evera describes it as “Congruence procedure 1: Comparison to typical values.” Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science., pp. 58-61. The essence of this technique is replication in that for every similar EV-OV example the researcher can find outside of the case, the probability/strength that the theoretical causal argument is correct increases, while the chance of the relationship being spurious or lacking causal priority or depth decreases.
large-n datasets); comparative/historic analysis (using small to large datasets); and theoretic analysis (using a data set of one- the case itself).

The type of insights a variable provides can also be ranked into three categories. The most insightful variables have some degree of predictive power; the presence of that variable alone can affect the outcome. At the other end of the spectrum are those variables that can only have a marginal effect when another variable is present—they require an antecedent condition. The last group are those variables that have a marginal effect on the OV but, in of themselves, have no predictive strength.

Table 4-1 Framework to rank-order feasible Explanatory Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Variable</th>
<th>Form of Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requires Antecedent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this framework to organize the various EVs affecting pacification/COIN, higher rows demonstrate a stronger effect on the OV while the there is greater certainty in the findings in the leftward columns. In other words, a variable that has some degree

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5 Predictive power can be visually observed using ROC plots or separation plots. Contingency tables measuring whether a variable is a necessary or sufficient condition can also provide this insight. A variable with a high probability for sufficiency is a good predictor for the outcome when it is present while a variable with a high probability for being necessary is a good predictor for the outcome not occurring when it is absent.

6 The variables that describe the antecedent condition may be called a Condition Variable (CV). Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science.*, pg 9, 11.
of predictive strength based on a large-n statistical analysis will be ranked as being a better explanation for the OV of improved control than a variable solely based on a theoretical argument that is only an antecedent condition.

4.2.2 Outcome Variable- COIN Wins vs Changing Control

The first condition for using congruence testing is that the OV for the case being studied is equivalent to or has a logical relationship with the OV of the external cases. While this pacification case study and current COIN literature both measure control as an ordered variable, there is a temporally based difference in that coding. This project codes the OV based on the trend of governmental control over time for any distinct time periods (decreasing control, stalemate, and increasing control), whereas the COIN literature codes cases in terms of the amount of control at the end of the conflict (Win, Draw, and Lose).7

7 Wins, Draws, and Losses are conceptually defined on a continuum ranging from no concessions from the state to complete concessions. On that continuum, the government (incumbent) makes no, or almost no, concessions in a Win and either defeats the insurgency militarily and destroys its political organization, or the war simply ends (i.e., runs out of gas). In a COIN Loss, the incumbent concedes to all, or almost all, of the insurgent’s demands. A COIN Draw lies somewhere between the range of no or few concessions (Win) to complete or all but complete concessions (Lose) with neither side obtaining maximal gains. Example of COIN Win: the Second Boer War (1899-1902) or crushing the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines (1946-1951). COIN Loss: granting of independence or deposition of current leaders; UK versus nationalist insurgents in Aden (19639-67) or Nationalist Chinese vs the Communists (1945-1949). COIN Draw: voluntary disarmament for greater political participation or granting regional autonomy instead of independence; Colombia versus M-19. Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.", pp. 71-72. Many of the other large-n statistical works on COIN outcome explicitly use the Lyall-Wilson dataset. Lyall is a security-focused academic, and Colonel Isiah Wilson is a career Army officer who was also a professor of American politics at the United States Military Academy.
Comparing the coding differences of the amount of concessions granted by the government (or taken by the rebels) with the degree of control, a government has a COIN Win when it achieves 90 to 100 percent control at the end of the conflict but 0 to 10 percent control in a COIN Loss. Because COIN Draws encompass such a wide range of control in the literature,\(^8\) this project will equate “increasing control” only with “COIN Wins” on the Win/Draw/Lose continuum. Consequently, an increase of the probability of a COIN Win by X percent will be accepted as increasing the probability of increasing control by X percent as well.\(^9\)

4.2.3 Exploratory Variables- COIN literature vs. Pacification in Vietnam

Equivalence, or a logical relationship, between the EVs of the case study and external cases is the second requisite condition for congruence testing. A cursory reading of current COIN literature shows that the academic and practitioner communities have rigorously researched far fewer COIN EVs in medium- or large-n studies than the

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\(^8\) An 80 percent Draw is a far stronger position, and inherently different, for the government from a 20 percent Draw.

\(^9\) For additional insights into the EVs from two RAND studies that coded COIN outcomes binarily, “increasing control” will also be equated with a “COIN Win” or “Acceptable Outcome” (greater than 50.1 percent control) that, in the ordered scale, would be classified as a “COIN Win + strong Draw (50.1% to 90% control).” RAND variables are: Unity of Command, Tactics/Techniques/Procedures (TTPs), Host Nation Government Capacity, and Inclusiveness. See Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Counterinsurgency.; Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding Us Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context.
number utilized in the comparative analysis. As a result, the EVs that do not have external cases will only have within-case congruence analysis done on them comparing the predicted and actual OV values to test whether the theoretical causal connection is possible.

For the case study variables that do have external cases from the COIN literature to be pattern-matched against, about half of them are immediately applicable based on the EV of interest’s subject. The remaining variables from COIN literature will require some degree of explanation to justify their inclusion.

4.3 Integration and Extension of Existing Statistical Research Explaining COIN Outcomes

While the recent growth of methodologically rigorous and policy-relevant COIN literature since 2009 is encouraging, in addition to not speaking to each other, those works have a number of individual as well as systemic issues that preclude them from being used as-is for this project. Integrating and extending these existing works addresses those issues and maximizes the insights of the large-n external-case

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10 i.e., Vietnamese militia, the People’s Self-Defense Force, PSDF, equates to civilian/local defense forces.
11 Similar to the deliberate decision in the comparative analysis to increase the probability of finding more type I (false-positive) errors to avoid the critical deficiency of making a type II (false-negative) error, the chapter will deliberately include EVs from the large-n COIN literature that are exactly identical to the EVs, as well as those that have some logical relationship to the study to maximize the amount of insights.
congruence analysis into improving pacification in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{12} For the fourteen EVs that can be tested against the large-n data set, the strength of their causal explanation for changes in control will be based on each variable’s marginal substantive effect, degree of uncertainty, predictive power, and causal relevance (whether necessary and/or sufficient).

4.3.1 \textbf{Weakness in Statistical Analysis of COIN}

Due to the fact that even large-n COIN datasets are actually based on a fairly small sample of cases, any statistical analysis of COIN has five major issues that, while not precluding using the findings, constrain how the findings are used and must at least be acknowledged: fallacy of false analogy, endogeneity, omitted variable bias, reference class problem, and causal inference.

Because the existing COIN studies measure outcome by final level of control as opposed to looking for variation of control during a COIN campaign, the research design for these studies calculates the marginal effect (treatment effect) of various COIN measures by comparing cases that did not implement a specific COIN practice against those that did. This increases the risk of making a false analogy because, even when

\textsuperscript{12} This section adapted from: Patrick Howell, “Bridging the Gap in Counter-Insurgency (Coin): Integrating and Extending Research on the Factors Affecting Coin Outcomes” (Doctoral Preliminary Paper & Examination, Duke, 2016). Variants of this paper were also presented at the 58th Annual Conference for International Studies Association in 2017 and the National Defense University’s Security Studies and Special Operations Forces 2017 conference.
adding some number of control variables, COIN campaign “A” can be very different from campaign “B.” These studies mitigated that risk by increasing the sample size.

Even if the researcher was able to develop a before-after design\textsuperscript{13} to measure the treatment effect of implementing a specific COIN measure within a COIN campaign, the project faces problems with endogeneity. With national (government) survival at stake, the COIN practices adopted by the government are the exact opposite of being exogenously or independently selected. In fact, most of the pacification programs adopted by the US/government of Vietnam (GVN) were deliberately selected for nationwide implementation after having already proven their success in “pilot” programs in one/few districts and/or provinces.\textsuperscript{14}

As seen by the difference between the fourteen EVs researched in the recent COIN literature and the forty-one theoretically plausible EVs from the comparative analysis, the results of large-n statistical studies might be biased due to omitting key operational variables from their regressions. While mitigating this bias by adding

\textsuperscript{13} Campbell, Stanley, and Gage, \textit{Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research}.

\textsuperscript{14} In the CIA Official History, two chapters’ titles specifically refer to how programs were developed and tested on small scales before going national. Thomas Ahern, \textit{Vietnam Declassified: The Cia and Counterinsurgency} (University Press of Kentucky, 2009), pp. 111-126, Chapter 6, “Experiments in the Low Lands” and pp. 127-148, Chapter 7, “The Kien Hoa Incubator.” A majority of the successful CIA pacification programs were developed and implemented in the province of Kian Hoa. In that province, Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Army Officer Lieutenant Colonel Tran Ngoc Chau developed key pacification programs (Census-Grievance, Advanced Political Action [cadre] and Counter-Terror Team [selective violence]) and then “sold” them his CIA advisers to get funding and support. Based on the successes of these “experiments,” the CIA supported and “pushed” for them becoming national-level pacification programs.
additional EVs may not only overspecify the model, it also introduces the very intertwined problems of reference class problems and causal inference.

Because pacification/counterinsurgency is not a single program but an aggregation of many DIME programs implemented simultaneously to improve security and development, attempts to measure the marginal effect of a variation of a single variable ignores the (possibly) interactive and/or cumulative effect of all of the other programs also being implemented. This creates the problem of creating a multiple reference classes (one for each variable studied) for a single COIN campaign. The reference class problem makes it hard to attribute changes in the outcome to a single variable.\textsuperscript{15} This problem also leads to challenges in causal inference for the same reason; if it is difficult to attribute the probability and proportion of OV change to an EV, then it is correspondingly difficult to identify which casual mechanism, or mechanisms, describe how the change occurred.

\textsuperscript{15} Although a time-interrupted MSSD/before-after/quasi-experiment design allows for the researcher to hold all of the other EVs constant while the EV of interest changes, it still assumes that the entire marginal effect of change it attributed to the EV of interest as opposed being affected by various interactions with the other variables.
4.3.2 Data Sources: Existing Large-n COIN Research Projects

When integrated and extended, the following six research projects provide for robust congruence analysis with insights into fourteen EVs affecting COIN outcomes. As a group, they share the attribute of being either the first or one of the first to shift the empirical testing of these concepts from small samples using qualitative methodologies to using large-n quantitative analysis. This section will briefly summarize their work and highlight their contribution to the COIN outcome literature.

4.3.2.1 Jason Lyall and Isiah Wilson on Mechanization

Because three of the five subsequent projects explicitly used their database, Lyall and Wilson arguably began the research program of using large-n statistical analysis of COIN campaigns in 2009. As well as developing the currently accepted definition of COIN campaigns and COIN Wins, Draws, and Losses, they developed a dataset of 286 insurgencies from 1800 to 2005. Utilizing a mixed-method approach of quantitative statistical regression and qualitative comparison between two COIN units (with

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16 One PhD dissertation, two RAND studies by research teams, and three peer-reviewed journal articles by one or two researchers.
17 Three of the five papers this research is directly integrating used the Lyall-Wilson data set to varying degrees: Friedman on boots-on-the-ground ratios, Peic on CDFs, and (partially) Johnston on Targeting. Friedman and Peic used portions of the Lyall-Wilson data set (171 cases and seventy cases, respectively). Although Johnston used Lyall-Wilson’s criteria of political motivation and guerrilla method, he did not use the battle casualty threshold for intensity. For that reason, only twenty-nine of Johnston’s cases are in the Lyall-Wilson data set.
different levels of mechanization), they found empirical support for their argument that greater mechanization increased the probability of COIN defeat due to the decreased amount of tactical-level intelligence that COIN forces obtain because they were “not walking the beat.”

Figure 4-1 Conditional Effect of Mechanization on Probability of Incumbent Win, 1918-2005

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18 Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars."; p. 67 defines the data set, pp. 72-80 explains the causal logic for mechanization; p. 84 explains the coding; p. 90, Table 3 cited below; and p. 102 conclusion. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, *Rage against the Machines Data-Set* (2009).
4.3.2.2 Jeffrey Friedman and Boots on the Ground (BOG)

The four phases\(^{19}\) of empirically testing how varying numbers of forces affect COIN outcomes culminated with Jeffrey Friedman’s work: enemy-focused,\(^{20}\) small-n comparative based on population,\(^{21}\) large-n ordinary least squares regression based on population,\(^{22}\) and large-n binary logit regression based on population.\(^{23}\) Sub-setting the Lyall-Wilson data set down to 171 insurgencies since 1914, he added coding for the EV of interest (BOG ratio) and four other variables.\(^{24}\) Using a binary logit regression, he


\(^{20}\) The 10:1 COIN force-to-insurgent ratio: “The government must expend ten times as much as the insurgents in their effort to contain the insurgency.” Theodore C. Mataxis, *The Afghan Insurgency and the Reagan Doctrine* (1994). Brigadier General Mataxis served multiple tours in several Southeast Asia countries fighting and advising other countries how to fight various Communist insurgencies.


\(^{22}\) R. Royce Kniece Jr et al., *Force Sizing for Stability Operations (Main Report)* (Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), 2010). This analysis was based on medium sample of twenty-seven successful COIN cases. If the population is < 2.2 million: COIN forces = 0.0355*(population) + 18,950; if population is > 2.2 million: COIN forces = 0.022* population + 48,480.

\(^{23}\) Friedman, "Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine." Binary logit regression (Win, not Win) on 171-case data set, comprised of ordered data (Win, Draw, Lose).

\(^{24}\) Friedman used these as control variables (Percentage Indigenous, Identity War, Economic Growth and External Support). In his regression, he set them to their mean or median but did not test the effect of changing their values.
found that increasing the BOG ratio was statistically significant but had negligible substantive significance (see Figure 3-2).²⁵

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Figure 4-2 Manpower and Success. From Friedman with BOG ratios of 7.5 (pre-40,000 troop request), 9.1 (post-40,000 troop request), and 20:1,000 (doctrinal ratio) added

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²⁵ Increasing the BOG ratio by 1:1,000 increased the probability of a COIN Win by less than 1 percent. To serve as a frame of reference, in the 2009 Afghanistan case study, the COIN practitioner (General Stanley McChrystal) wanted to increase the BOG ratio by 1.6:1,000 (from 7.5 to 9.1:1,000—marked in red dashed lines) with forty thousand troops. That manpower increase would improve probability of a COIN Win by less than 1 percent to about approximately 39 percent. Friedman’s analysis provides no support for increasing the number of COIN forces in Afghanistan; “just adding more troops” to get to the doctrinal 50 percent chance of success cut-point does not occur until 50:1,000, a politically and realistically infeasible number. Jeffrey A. Friedman, *Manpower and Counterinsurgency Data-Set* (2011). Sources for all data coding are located in the Excel spreadsheet. Friedman, "Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine.", pp. 568, 572-573, and Figure 1, “Manpower and Success.”
4.3.2.3 Goran Peic and Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs)

The six qualitative studies\(^{26}\) and one quantitative dissertation\(^{27}\) in this research program consistently found that civilian (or local) defense forces (CDFs/LDFs) have positive substantive effects on COIN outcomes. Subsetting the Lyall-Wilson data set while augmenting with cases from the Kalyvas-Balcells data set, his regression of eighty-six cases found that although the probability of a COIN Win increases slightly when a CDF is implemented, the likelihood for a COIN Draw almost doubles while the likelihood of COIN Loss drops by about 50\%.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{27}\) Goran Peic, “Civilian Defense Forces, Tribal Groups, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes” (Emory University, 2013). This was his dissertation that he turned into an article in 2014.

\(^{28}\) Peic, "Civilian Defense Forces, State Capacity, and Government Victory in Counterinsurgency Wars.”, pp. 168, 171, and Table 1, “CDF and COIN Outcomes.”
Table 4-2. Civilian Defense Forces and COIN Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lose</th>
<th>Draw</th>
<th>Win</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No CDF</td>
<td>37.7% (20)</td>
<td>15.1% (8)</td>
<td>47.2% (25)</td>
<td>61.6% (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDFs</td>
<td>18.2% (6)</td>
<td>33.3% (11)</td>
<td>48.5% (16)</td>
<td>38.3% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases</td>
<td>30.2% (26)</td>
<td>22.0% (19)</td>
<td>47.6% (41%)</td>
<td>100% (86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: CDF = civilian defense forces; COIN = counterinsurgency.

4.3.2.4 Christopher Paul and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

“Advice for the counterinsurgent is… voluminous and contentious… often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence.”

Christopher Paul, RAND lead investigator, 2013

Similar to research into other COIN practices, the empirical testing of how to fight COIN has increased in rigor over three stages: historical analysis of n = 1 to few cases; historical and comparative analysis of small-n to medium-n cases; and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of medium-n to large-n cases. Coding over

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29 In doctrinal terms, “how” a force fights is an aggregation of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).
30 This period began in 1903. Charles Edward Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (HM Stationery Office, 1903). A review of this 1903 more-than-five-hundred-page treatise on COIN shows that almost every section that has a COIN theory and TTP is accompanied by an historical example. Major General Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing (London: MacMillan, 1934). This more-than-four-hundred-thirty-page work has less than thirty pages on COIN theory and the remaining more than four hundred pages devoted to laying out twelve 30-to-40-page case studies of specific COIN campaign from which to learn.
31 Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," Military Review (2005), pp. 8-10, Charts 1 and 2. Sepp identified the twelve most successful COIN practices and nine most unsuccessful practices for COIN practitioners to implement and avoid, respectively.
32 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Counterinsurgency.; Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013). This 2013 project of a sample of fifty-nine additional cases was a continuation of a 2010 project using QCA on a sample of thirty insurgencies. Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010); Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth
three hundred specific COIN practices in every phase of seventy-one insurgencies provided within-case variation of EVs for the RAND research team. Based on a binary OV (Win/Lose), the RAND team used QCA to identify the four “prime” TTPs necessary and sufficient to achieve a COIN Win; these factors perfectly differentiated between COIN Wins and Losses.

Table 4-3. “Prime TTPs and COIN Win/Lose Outcomes”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>COIN Lose</th>
<th>COIN Win</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed prime TTPs</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not employ prime TTPs</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
<td>0 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31 (53%)</td>
<td>28 (47%)</td>
<td>59 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010).

33 From World War II until 2010. These more than three hundred practices were then grouped into twenty-four broad COIN approaches; the RAND team developed a methodology (factor stacking) to code whether or not one of those broad COIN approaches was used based on the number of specific practices used in any phase of the campaigns.

34 In terms of control, Win = 50.1 to 100 percent control and Lose = 0 to 49.9 percent control. In terms of the Lyall-Wilson data set, a RAND Win is the same as a Win/Strong Draw.


36 The “four” practices identified by the RAND team was actually five or six. Three practices HAD to occur, and the “fourth” practice was present when at least two of the remaining three were there also.

37 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Counterinsurgency, pp. 149-150. Detailed descriptions of these TTPs are found in the report on pp. 98-99, 106-107, 128-136. Those necessary factors are: 1) commitment and motivation; 2) tangible reduction of support to the insurgents; 3) flexibility and adaptability; and two of the three: 4a) Unity of Command; 4b) initiative; and 4c) intelligence. Most are broad and conceptual, while two (reduction of support and Unity of Command) are more specific. Every COIN Win had all four TTPs, and every COIN Loss did not have all four. While these TTPs appear be both necessary and sufficient because of the 100 percent differentiation, the reductionist QCA methodology only identifies necessary conditions; it does not provide insights into what other specific COIN measures should/can be used.
One of those specific COIN approaches that comprised the “prime” set was defined by a single measure, Unity of Command.\textsuperscript{38} Coding outcomes in terms of Win (>50 percent control) and Loss (<50 percent control), 82 percent of all Unity of Command cases were Wins and 87 percent of all Unity of Effort cases were Losses. When switching from the Win-Lose to Win-Draw-Loss coding, about 52 percent of Unity of Command cases ended up winning (>90 percent control). Eighty-four percent did not lose (ending in a Win or Draw), and about 84 percent of Unity of Effort cases did not win (ending in Draw or Loss).

Table 4-4. “Unity of Command on COIN Win/Lose Outcomes”\textsuperscript{39}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>COIN Lose &lt;50% control</th>
<th>COIN Win &gt;50% control</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Command</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>24 (85%)</td>
<td>29 (49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>26 (86%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>30 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31 (53%)</td>
<td>28 (47%)</td>
<td>59 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.2.5 Stephen Watts and Nature of the Host Nation Government

“Due to severe fiscal limitations, decision-makers are striving to place American defense policy on a more sustainable footing. Central to this effort is a commitment to work through partner nations.”

Stephen Watts, lead investigator\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} Some of the other TTPs were very subjective, such as commitment and motivation, flexibility, and adaptability, initiative, and intelligence. Only reduction of support is somewhat objective.

\textsuperscript{39} Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Counterinsurgency., pp. 98-99.

\textsuperscript{40} Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding Us Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context., p. xiii.
While similar to the other projects in which the large-n quantitative analysis built on and agreed with the small-n qualitative analysis, this RAND project studied the problems of working with imperfect partner nations rather than a specific measure that COIN forces could employ—but these traits of partner governments could become policy goals for the US government (USG) to try to change. Based on a data set of seventy-two post–Cold War insurgencies, the RAND team found that political inclusivity and governmental capacity have a dramatic effect on the probability of the COIN outcome being acceptable (Win, >50 percent control) or not acceptable (Lose, <50 percent control). They specifically found that inclusive and capable governments almost always Win (88 percent), and non-inclusive and low-capability governments generally (60 percent) Lose. They additionally noted that most (56 percent) of the studied insurgencies occurred in countries with low political inclusivity and low capacity.

42 Watts et al., *Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding Us Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context*, p. 5.
43 Similar to the other RAND study on TTPs (*Path to Victory*), Watts’ study defines COIN outcomes as a binary variable (Acceptable or Not) using the 50 percent concessions as the demarcation line. As with the other RAND study, all RAND Acceptable were Win or Draw in Lyall-Wilson/Kalyvas-Balcells, and all Not Acceptable were Draws or Losses.
4.3.2.6 Patrick Johnston and Targeting/Leadership Decapitation

Contrary to the previous works, in which every iteration of research used more rigorous methodologies and larger data sets to reinforce earlier research, Patrick Johnston disputes and critiques the research designs and findings of earlier large-n and medium-n projects that argued that leadership decapitation is not an effective COIN measure.\(^4^4\) Loosening some of the Lyall-Wilson data set criteria on battle deaths,\(^4^5\) for the 39 percent (forty-six of 118) of successful decapitation attempts in ninety insurgencies,

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\(^{4^5}\) Had Johnston kept the Lyall-Wilson one-thousand-casualty criteria, he would have had only twenty-nine cases.

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Table 4-5. Nature of Host Nation Government and COIN Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Inclusivity</th>
<th>Governmental Capacity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>8 cases (11% of data)</td>
<td>10 cases (14% of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88% (7) Acceptable</td>
<td>50% (5) Acceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13% (1) Unacceptable</td>
<td>50% (5) Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>14 cases (19% of data)</td>
<td>40 cases (56% of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50% (7) Acceptable</td>
<td>40% (16) Acceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50% (7) Unacceptable</td>
<td>60% (24) Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22 cases (31% of data)</td>
<td>50 cases (69% of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64% (14) Acceptable</td>
<td>42% (21) Acceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36% (8) Unacceptable</td>
<td>58% (29) Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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184
regression analysis found the probability increased by 32 percent that the government would win the war and the intensity and frequency of subsequent militant attacks would be reduced. While an interesting topic, it exerts minimal leverage because it integrates only twenty-nine cases into the larger project and does not measure the effect of targeting the low- and middle-ranked leaders and cadre in the insurgent networks.

4.3.3 Methodology of Integration and Extension Project

Integrating the above data sets and their associated variables created a master dataset of 171 COIN campaigns with thirteen operationally-relevant EVs. Using two continuous variables (BOG ratio and Percentage Indigenous) and eleven binary/ordered variables, the project’s extension of the existing large-n work provides greater insights

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47 Ibid., p. 54, note 24. Austin Long, "Whack-a-Mole or Coup De Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan," *Security Studies* 23, no. 3 (2014), p. 471. Long’s research in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates that targeting has a larger effect on poorly institutionalized groups than well-organized groups because they lack the ability to reorganize, adjust, and regenerate leadership and forces.
48 Due to limits of data in existing data sets, not every cell was filled in. Four variables were in all 171 campaigns; there were another ten variables that were in 165, 132, seventy, fifty-seven, fifty-three, or twenty-nine COIN campaigns.
50 Most of the binary/ordered EVs were simply used as control variables in other studies; the researchers never studied the effect on COIN outcomes if they varied. Coding operational EVs as binary/ordered allows a researcher to see the marginal effect of turning the COIN approach “on or off.”
into the relative strength of the various causal connections of the EVs for the congruence
(pattern-matching) analysis than a simple within-case congruence analysis provides.

Marginal effects of COIN measure(s). The project calculates the marginal effect of
implementing one, two, or multiple COIN measures simultaneously using ordered
logistics regression. When testing more than one measure (i.e., continuous BOG ratio
plus one or more others), the analysis calculates the marginal effect as a percentage by
contrasting the probability of COIN outcomes before and after implementing any
specific COIN program.\(^{51}\)

The above tests of marginal effect essentially replicate the original research;
because the below tests were not conducted by the original researcher(s), this project is
extending those projects to provide additional insights for the congruence analysis.

Associated uncertainty. A statistical simulation of one thousand runs calculates
the degree of substantive uncertainty surrounding the COIN outcome.\(^ {52}\) These results
can be graphically displayed and numerically calculated as “plus or minus X percent”
around the “after implementation” probability of outcome.

Unlike the previous two tests, the next two tests focus on a single EV at a time.

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\(^{51}\) This test suffers from the reference class problem in that it associates all marginal change to a single EV
when the marginal change might be the result of the effect of the EV of interest interacting with variables
omitted from that model.

\(^{52}\) The simulation randomly selects a coefficient from a normal distribution of two standard deviations
around the coefficients calculated by the regression.
Predictive value. A visual check of a separation plot provides a quick assessment of the possible predictive power of the EV of interest. The results will simply describe the possible predictive power as strong, moderate/mild, or none. Separation plots also provide insights into an EV possibly being Necessary and/or Sufficient.

Causal significance. Providing some overlap with the separation plots, contingency tables can show whether or not any given EV is possibly Necessary and/or Sufficient for the OV in and of itself based on the sample of cases. While a contingency table cannot check for causal priority (i.e., if the EV is actually just an intervening variable), it can suggest possible spuriousness and/or causal depth/equifinality that will be tested using process tracing in the next chapter. Variables that have a higher calculated probability of being necessary and/or sufficient are more likely to have causal significance. While probabilities less than 100 percent fail to meet the criteria for Necessary and/or Sufficient, the higher probabilities do indicate a stronger relationship between the EV and OV.

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54 Necessary condition: In a separation plot of a subset of the IV = 0, the p(Win) should be low, and there should be no actual Win cases. Sufficient condition: In a separation plot of a subset of IV = 1, the p(Lose) should be low with no actual Lose cases.
55 Based on the contingency table and given data, an EV is a possibly a Necessary condition if the probability of EV for any Win = 100% [or (p(EV|Win) = 100%]. To possibly be a Sufficient condition, for any EV, the probability of Win = 100%. [or p(Win|EV) = 100%].
56 Possible spuriousness, equifinality, or causal depth when EV = 0 but Wins are greater than 0. [p(W|~EV)>0).
4.3.4 Robustness of Results

An extensive set of robustness checks confirms, with a high degree of certainty, that there is a high degree of uncertainty inherent in COIN. Model diagnostics demonstrated that the ordered logistics regression model was appropriate to use for this data.57 The minimal (<1 percent) substantive significance of increasing the BOG ratio by one COIN “soldier” per one thousand civilians was found repeatedly in over thirty different specifications run on this data set. Lastly, repeatedly subsetting the data (randomly,58 by value of the EV,59 by OV coding team,60 and by outliers61) reinforces the “certainty of the uncertainty.”

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57 The ordered logit regressions’ proportional odds assumption and the ordinality assumption were checked using “R.” Based on the visual output of the R function, all of the regression models met, or very closely met, the parallel lines test with the dotted lines (expected values of the predictor) closely overlapping the actual mean of the predictor for each outcome value: Win, Draw, Lose. This plot is useful for assessing the ordinality assumption for $Y$ separately for each $X$ and for assessing the proportional odds assumption in a simple univariable way: `plot.xmean.ordinaly(form, data=d_coin, lwd=2)`.

58 Finding approximately similar coefficient estimates from running regressions on random subsets of the data suggests that the main regressions were capturing the trends in the data and not “some middle ground.” This was done for the entirety of the data set as well as for subsets of the various EVs.

59 Every EV subset (i.e., the Peic CDF/LDF data was seventy cases) was further subset by EV value (EV = 1 and EV = 0). Ordered logit regressions on those subsets confirmed the marginal effects of a COIN treatment (EV = 1 subsets were generally the same as the treated/after EV model and EV = 0 the same as untreated/before EV model). Separation plots of those subsets also confirmed the predictive (or lack thereof) strength of the various EVs.

60 The OV was coded by two different “teams” of researchers: Lyall and Wilson and Kalyvas and Balcells. Of the 171 cases, they had only eighteen coding differences. (Only one major difference: Win vs Lose and seventeen minor differences: Win vs Draw and Draw vs Lose.) The substantive difference in $p$(COIN Win) between the different OV codings was less than 5 percent.

61 While 75 percent of all of the cases had a BOG ratio of less than fifty COIN forces per one thousand civilians, the remaining 25 percent of cases ranged to over one thousand COIN forces per one thousand civilians (Western Sahara case, three times). To see if those outliers skewed the results, the data was
4.3.5 Results

Despite the various EVs being generally statistically significant, the substantive and causal significance analysis shows that only two EVs (TTPs and Unity of Command/single management) have any predictive strength. Those EVs will be categorized as predictive EVs based on statistical analysis while the remaining will general EVs based on statistical analysis. Within each of those blocks, the EVs are ranked by their marginal substantive effect. See below table.

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The project ran ordered logit regressions on seventeen specifications that regressed either BOG only or BOG + one EV. BOG was significant (at 0.1, .05, .01 levels) for six of the seventeen models. The non-BOG EV was significant in eight specifications and not statistically significant in four EVs (Targeting, Indigenous Forces, Overall Government, and Governmental Capacity). For every specification except Government Capacity, the coefficient signs matched the theoretical predictions.

Every EV’s substantive significance matched theoretical expectations except for increasing Governmental Capacity — by itself, this actually reduces the probability of success. While it’s positive, increasing the BOG ratio has negligible substantive significance. Increasing the BOG ratio by +1:1,000 has far less than a 1 percent positive substantive effect. This negligible effect was robust over a total of thirty-two specifications.

Only three of thirteen EVs have a greater than 30 percent “treatment” effect on a COIN campaign (TTPs, Unity of Command, and Eliminate External Support), with every variable having +/- 7 to 22 percent uncertainty.

The first column re-phrases the EV as an operational decision. The “Sample” column shows the size of the data set that measured the EV and what proportion that dataset is to the “population” of 171 COIN campaigns; the validity of the findings increase as that percentage approaches 100%. The “Probability of COIN Win” column shows the estimated marginal substantive effect of implementing the EV, along with the degree of statistical uncertainty. The “Possible Causal Significance” shows the probability that the EV is a necessary and/or sufficient variable while the last sub-column is based on a visual assessment of the EV’s separation plot.
Because a COIN practitioner never makes just one operational decision, the below tables capture the marginal substantive effect of making multiple effective operational decisions. While this data will not be used in this chapter’s congruence analysis, it may provide insights in process-tracing or as part of the concluding triangulation. See below table.
Table 4-7 Strength of Relationship between Multiple Explanatory Variables and Outcome Variable Based on Marginal Effect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Sample #</th>
<th>Probability of COIN Win</th>
<th>Probability of COIN Win</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marginal effect</td>
<td>Final % +/ -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Operational decisions made by COIN practitioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF + Base 5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Command + Base 5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP + Identity</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP + Base 5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive/High Government + Base 5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Inclusive + Base 5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Command + Identity</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF + Support + Economy</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive/High Government + Mechanization + Identity</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base 5 (Indigenous + Mechanization + Support + Economy + Identity)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Government Capacity + Mechanization + Support + Identity</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Government Capacity + Base 5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting + Base 5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Inclusive + Identity</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous + Support</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the probability of a COIN Win increases as the practitioner makes better operational decisions, what is not shown on the table is that probability of a COIN Not Losing (COIN Win or COIN Draw) is over 90 percent for every scenario except two (which are in the high 80 percent). In other words, the incumbent should be able to at least reach a draw when they do many things right.

66 This table has two types of specifications: 1) BOG + Base 5 (100 percent Indigenous + Minimal Mechanization + Eliminate External Support + convince population it is not an identity war) + one other major EV (CDF, TTP, Unity of Command, Inclusiveness, Capacity, Targeting); and 2) using only the statistically significant variables from each of the above specifications. Of interest, while Identity only has as 12 percent substantive effect, it is statistically significant in the most specifications (five).
4.4 COIN Research Using Comparative/Historical Analysis

While integrating and extending the existing large-n, statistical COIN research filled in part of the congruence analysis framework, not every EV in this project can be pattern-matched against that large-n work. While the following research conducts comparative or historical analysis on small, medium, and large datasets to provide insights into other EVs of interest.

4.4.1 Historical Analysis of BOG Ratios\(^67\)

Because of the negligible substantive significance of increasing the BOG ratio by one COIN “soldier” (from ~0.01 to ~0.6 percent) was extremely robust, it conversely follows that reducing the BOG ratio to minimal manning is about as likely to win as a heavily manned force. While statistically supported, it is intuitively wrong to say a COIN force with a BOG ratio of 5:1,000 is just as likely to win as 40:1,000.

However, quantitative historical analysis\(^68\) provides a context to understand BOG ratios in terms of COIN outcomes by providing descriptive—not predictive—

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\(^{67}\) With a n=171, this is technically not a small or medium-n analysis. However, it is not performing statistical analysis. It is merely visually depicting the cumulative COIN outcomes on a graph.

\(^{68}\) A military historian and operational research/systems analysis researcher, Colonel Trevor Dupuy, pioneered the use of quantitative historical analysis in the Army in the 1950s to analyze and provide insights about tactical and operational military problems. One topic that he studied had a tremendous amount of overlap with civilian strategists and was debated in leading academic journals. This was the 3:1 combat ratio for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe. Trevor N. Dupuy, "Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule," *International Security* 14, no. 1 (1989); John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance:
probabilities. For any given BOG ratio, it tells the COIN policy-maker or practitioner the probability for success based on historical comparisons. For example, a BOG ratio of ~7:1,000 has historically won 15 percent of the time, while a ratio of ~9:1,000 has a 30 percent historical success rate.\footnote{These were the BOG ratios in Afghanistan in summer 2009 before and after the approximately forty thousand troop increase (thirty thousand from the US and approximately ten thousand from other International Security Assistance Force partners). Matthew C. Col (USAF) Brand, \textit{Resourcing General McChrystal’s Counterinsurgency Campaign: The 2009 “Troop to Task” Planning Effort to Determine the Right Force Package Necessary to Defeat the Insurgency in Afghanistan} (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2013).}

Below figure shows the cumulative distribution of the COIN Wins, Draws, Losses, and total cases for BOG ratios from one to fifty per 1,000 civilians. Showing 75 percent of the 171 COIN campaigns from the Lyall-Wilson data set, the miniscule differences between the different coding teams are seen in the solid versus dashed lines.
While the EV of changing BOG ratios remain in the general/large-n category, it will be ranked by the change in marginal effect based on the historical probability of success instead of statistical. This marginal effect will be used for both strategic (means) decisions and operational “train, man, and equip” decisions.

### 4.4.2 Police-to-Civilian Population Ratio

In addition to providing force ratios for conventional force conflict (NATO versus USSR in Europe), quantitative historical analysis has also developed various
force ratios for counterinsurgencies of 10–20:1,000, 20–25:1,000 and 14:1,000. While these force ratios have served as the starting point for more advanced analysis using larger-n data sets for COIN force sizing, these early works also provided force ratios for a particular subset of COIN forces that has not had large-n statistical analysis: the police.

Even in the absence of an insurgency, a government needs to “train, man, and equip” a police force to enforce law and order. This key governance function requires a certain number of police per civilian population. The very similar but not identical small-n comparative analyses roughly agree with a statistical analysis done by the US Army’s Concept Analysis Agency (CAA) that finds that a government needs at least three police officers per one thousand civilians to maintain law and order.

The congruence analysis will use this when the “train, man, and equip” police variable co-varies with changes in control. Based on common policing that requires a ratio of at least 3:1,000, Police manning is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for

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70 Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations.”, p. 61.
72 McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations., p. 106
73 Based on small-n comparisons (n = 10, 8, and 20). These researchers had partial overlap in the cases they selected. Already cited in this section: Quinlivan, McGrath, and Dobbins. 1–4:1,000, 4.1:1,000, 3–4:1,000.
74 Based on selected n = 42 subset of CAA’s Irregular War dataset. Steven M. Goode, A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency (DTIC Document, 2010)., pp. 53, 56. Goode sums up the comparative analysis as 3–4 and then shows CAA’s equation for force sizing that lists 2.8:1,000 as a constant (police).
COIN Win and is predictive only when the police are under-manned. When the police are manned to at least 3:1,000, then it is just a general EV.

4.4.3 Selective Violence, Surrender, and Indiscriminate Violence

In his 2006 book, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars, Kalyvas’ main research problem was to understand the choice by both incumbents and insurgents to adopt the strategy of selective violence against civilians in a civil war. After developing a theoretic model, Kalyvas found empirical support for his testable hypotheses by first conducting macro-comparative plausibility tests against a range of civil wars over time and space and then doing micro-comparative hypotheses testing using quantitative and qualitative methods on a data set of every village and town in a single prefecture during the 1946–1949 Greek Civil War. In addition to providing large-n-supported insights for the congruence analysis on the relationship between the OV (control) and the EV of selective violence (Targeting), his work provides the same insights into the effect of

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operational orientation of conventional forces, surrender/defection programs, non-military pacification programs, and indiscriminate violence.

Kalyvas found an interactive relationship between large deployments of COIN forces (military, police, etc.) and control and between control and the choice to defect (surrender), use selective violence, and/or use indiscriminate violence.77

Figure 4-4. “Predicted Pattern of Selective Violence, Defection, and Denunciation”

Unless the incumbent (COIN force) or insurgent is strong enough to sufficiently garrison, administer, and defend every political unit (village, hamlet, etc.), then the level

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77 Ibid., pp. 287, 388. figure from p. 205, Figure 7.7.
of control for each of those political entities is primarily determined by the tactical decision to concentrate a portion of each side’s limited number of forces there to establish control.\textsuperscript{78} While the population will increasingly defect to\textsuperscript{79} or collaborate with the side that exerts greater amounts of control,\textsuperscript{80} because of stay-behind cadre, supporters, and/or sympathizers, the side deploying forces can achieve only predominant control (zones 2 and 4), not exclusive. Combining their advantage from being on the ground along with receiving information from the increasing number of defectors, the side exerting control will adopt the strategy of selective violence to target (capture, kill, neutralize) the remaining cadre and supporters, which, over time, shifts control from predominant (zone 2 or 4) to exclusive (zone 1 or 5) control. As that shift occurs, selective violence goes down because there is no one left to target.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 412, Section B.5, “Control,” describes the protocol to define control on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 = Exclusive/Total incumbent control; 2 = predominant incumbent control; 3 = rough parity; 4 = predominant insurgent control; and 5 = exclusive/total insurgent control. The protocols provide a more detailed qualitative description for coding. On p. 213: “Shifts in control are primarily a function of tactical military decisions”; p. 278: “Use of concentrated military force trumps the strategic use of violence [indiscriminate or selective] by the other”; pp. 213-218, Section 8.2, “How Control Shifts.”

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 105, Table 4.1, “Types of Defection.” Individual and groups “defect” from side “A” to side “B” by acts of noncompliance to “A” dictates; providing information to “B” [could be used for later selective violence]; and physically switching sides by joining “B” or surrendering from “A”’s forces to “B.”

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., pp. 124-132, Section 5.4, “Causal paths from control to collaboration.” Kalyvas identified six mechanisms that translate control into collaboration: 1) Deters opposition by coercion/force; 2) reduces cost of collaborating with the side in control; 3) produces “mechanical ascription” over time due to socialization; 4) signals credibility that controller able to provide short (during war) and long-term (after war) sanctions and benefits; 5) can provide benefits to generate loyalty (i.e., “winning hearts & minds”); 6) facilitates direct monitoring and population control; and 7) creates self-reinforcing dynamic.

\textsuperscript{81} This theoretical relationship (peak selective violence in Zones 2 and 4) was empirically-supported not only for the Greek Civil War but also in Vietnam. Stathis N Kalyvas, “Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging
While either side can attempt selective violence in the zone of parity (3) or in the other side’s zones of control (1 and 2 or 4 and 5), the inability to get “walking the beat” tactical intelligence and information from defectors and collaborators dramatically reduces the ability to carry out acts of selective violence. However, in the face of that dearth of information, actors may choose to adopt the strategy of indiscriminate violence to try to influence the population to defect.

Contradicting popularly held beliefs on the value of this strategy, Kalyvas found that indiscriminate violence can paradoxically influence a population to support the side inflicting the violence, but only in the rare instances where the inflictor wields an overwhelming preponderance of power in the defender’s zone of control that the defender is unable to stop or reduce. However, when an actor commits indiscriminate violence on civilians in areas (zones) that they already control, that does cause the anticipated loss of support. Most of the time, a strategy of indiscriminate violence causes a backlash that costs the perpetrator even more support.82

82 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War., pp. 146-172, Chapter 6, “A Logic of Indiscriminate Violence”; pp. 171-172, Section 6.7, “Conclusion”; p. 167, Figure 6.1, “Civilian Behavior as a Function of Indiscriminate Violence and Protection” shows the simple game tree in which the civilian population would switch to supporting the side that was actually inflicting indiscriminate violence on them; pp. 166-171, Section 6.6, “Accounting for the Puzzle.” If “A” commits indiscriminate violence on the population, but “B” is unable to protect (stop, reduce, mitigate) that violence, then the population makes the value-maximizing (pain-
Kalyvas’ work provides several insights into the relationship of several EVs and control, insights than can be (pattern-)matched to pacification in Vietnam. For the congruence analysis, there are three main patterns of control that directly flow from deploying forces to a political entity (village, etc.). For the purpose of this chapter, these options will be described from the incumbent/COIN point of view. Firstly, deploying COIN forces into areas of parity or under the control of the insurgent (zones 3, 4, and 5) will increase incumbent control (to zone 2) over those areas. While not stated by Kalyvas, a logical extension of that premise is that interposing COIN forces between the population and insurgent forces (the shield effect) prevents the insurgent from forcing a shift in control of the population under control of the incumbent or parity (zones 1, 2, or 3) to insurgent domination deploying guerrilla forces. Lastly, and also an unstated but logical extension, if the incumbent deploys COIN forces to areas already under incumbent control (“the reinforcement effect”), there is no real change in the countrywide aggregation of control.

83 Ibid., pp. 124-132, Section 5.4, “Causal paths from control to collaboration.” Kalyvas identified six mechanisms that translate control into collaboration.
While the other pacification measures of selective violence (Targeting), defection/surrender programs, and other programs to “win the hearts and minds”\textsuperscript{84} co-vary with control, their effectiveness is contingent upon the degree of existing control. When the incumbent controls an area (zone 1 or 2), employing these programs further increases the incumbent’s control by gaining more support from the population. However, employing these same programs in the areas under insurgent control will have minimal to no effect. In other words, these variables are conditioned by and interact with the OV of control.

For the purpose of this chapter’s contribution to the research into explaining gains in control, positive variation in these EVs that co-vary with increased control will be considered congruent. However, when the various EVs congruent with but contingent upon increased control are evaluated, they will be ranked lower because they are not the primary/driving reason. In other words, using COIN forces to seize, clear, and secure is a COIN approach that generally works, whereas selective violence, surrender, and other “winning hearts and minds” (WHAM) programs rely on the

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p. 128. The ability to provide tangible benefits (economic development, civic action, land reform, etc.) is the fifth of seven causal linkages between establishing control over the population and gaining support from the population. “Land reform” in Vietnam was specifically cited by Kalyvas; to implement land reform and gain support for the population for implementing it, the implementing side must first control the land itself.
antecedent condition of already existing control and only work when implemented in areas of some degree of incumbent control.\textsuperscript{85}

\subsection*{4.4.4 Land Reform}

"[A] government can… significantly affects the conditions in the countryside so as to reduce the propensity of peasants to revolt… No social group is more conservative than a landowning peasantry, and none is more revolutionary than a peasantry that owns too little land or pays too high a rental."\textsuperscript{86}

Samuel Huntington, 1968

Interestingly, reviewing the literature on land reform finds that while “land to the tillers” programs are merely general EV for ending an insurgency, they appear to be a predictive variable for agriculturally based democracies in addition to avoiding or greatly delaying renewed civil war in the future.\textsuperscript{87} While analysts have noted the inverse relationship between economic inequality and political stability since the age of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{85} "Heuristic": generally true with certain exceptions; “rule of thumb”: a soft generalization that is not strictly accurate or reliable in every situation. \\
\textsuperscript{86} Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New York: Yale University Press, 1968)., p. 375. \\
\textsuperscript{87} While not part of the scope of this project’s examination of pacification programs that increased/decreased control over time, these results matter greatly to COIN practitioners. Based on a statistical analysis of data set of thirty-four negotiated peace agreements between 1989 and 2012, including land reform into the post-conflict agreement increases the duration of peace by 67 percent and reduces the probability of renewed conflict by 477 percent. Eric Keels and T. David Mason, “Seeds of Peace? Land Reform and Civil War Recurrence Following Negotiated Settlements” (paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA), Baltimore2017), http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/Baltimore%202017-s/Archive/68c6dce8-6a71-4067-a7ec-17702a702df8..pdf., pp. 1, 13, 14, 19.
\end{flushright}
Greeks\textsuperscript{88} to the American Revolution,\textsuperscript{89} scholarship utilizing small-n to medium-n sample focusing on land ownership inequality is far more recent.

Beginning in the 1960s, scholars found a possible relationship between greater inequality in land distribution and a country’s political instability\textsuperscript{90} as well as the likelihood of civil war initiation.\textsuperscript{91} This research found that land reform was a necessary condition for stable, agriculturally based democracies, but not a sufficient condition by itself.\textsuperscript{92} At best, resistance by elite classes hinders or delays land reform implementation; at worst those classes increase the probability of conflict.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{88}Quote by Theseus in scene 1 of Euripides, \textit{The Suppliants}, trans., E. P. Coleridge (The Internet Classics Archive, 422 BCE). “For there are three ranks of citizens; the rich, a useless set, that ever crave for more; the poor and destitute, fearful folk, that cherish envy more than is right, and shoot out grievous stings against the men who have aught, beguiled as they are by the eloquence of vicious leaders; while the class that is midmost of the three preserveth cities, observing such order as the state ordains.”

\textsuperscript{89}Alexis de Tocqueville, \textit{Democracy in America}, ed. Phillips Bradley, Vintage ed. (1954). p. 266. “You will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom. Either the poor have attempted to plunder the rich, or the rich to enslave the poor. If, then, a state of society can ever be founded in which every man shall have something to keep and little to take from others, much will have been done for the peace of the world.”

\textsuperscript{90}Bruce M. Russett, “Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics,” \textit{World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations} (1964). p. 453. Russet performed a comparative and contingency table analysis of forty-seven countries based on level of land inequality (Gini index) and nature of regime (stable or unstable democracies and dictatorship).

\textsuperscript{91}Huntington, \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies}, p. 375. Huntington built off Russet’s work and added in relationship to probability of civil war.

\textsuperscript{92}T. David Mason, “’Take Two Acres and Call Me in the Morning’: Is Land Reform a Prescription for Peasant Unrest?,” \textit{The Journal of Politics} 60, no. 1 (1998)., pp. 199-200. From studying the insurgencies in Peru and El Salvador, Mason found that the fighting continued for a number of years despite the completion of land reform because other COIN measures exasperated the conflict.

4.5 Synthesizing Three Forms of Congruence Analysis

Based on reviewing the existing statistical, comparative, and historical analyses of COIN, the project will now develop the framework to evaluate and inductively rank order Explanatory Variables that co-varied with increased control from the comparative analysis chapter. (To save space and because the COIN literature review did not find any purely theoretic EV, the third column was removed for space). This framework will only categorize the variables that were researched in the COIN literature;\textsuperscript{94} the main EV of interest, Unity of Command/single management, is in bold red as a statistically supported, predictive EV.


\textsuperscript{91} Pattern-matching between the framework’s EVs and the operational EV for CORDS will occur in the analysis section.
Table 4-8 Framework to rank-order feasible Explanatory Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Variable</th>
<th>Form of Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictive</td>
<td>Employ TTPs (+63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adopt Unity of Command (+38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Eliminate External Support (+33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce Mechanization (+22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase % Indigenous Forces (+22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employ Civil Defense Forces (+18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct successful Info Operations (+12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase BOG by 1:1,000 (+.62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antecedent95</td>
<td>Make Government Inclusive (+24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use Selective Violence/Targeting (+23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase Government Capacity (+17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote Economic Growth (+12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6 Congruence Analysis

4.6.1 Summary of Results

For the 20 EVs that co-varied with increased control in the four scenarios (the primary “CORDS” scenario and three alternate scenarios) from the previous chapter, congruence analysis eliminated two EVs because the predicted and empirical relationships with the OV did not match. Using the framework developed in the previous section to compare the strength of correlations based on the COIN literature, the EV with the greatest explanatory power in each scenario was some form of Unity of

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95 The fifth causal path between control of and collaboration/support from the population notes that control is a necessary requirement for “softer” pacification measures to achieve effects. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War., p. 128. This was a key insight from Kalyvas that was able separate the statistical EVs into three groups.
Command/single management. The only exception is the Alternative Scenario #3 which also list “COSVN”, rationale will be explain in following sub-section. See below chart.96

Table 4-9 Summary of EV Congruence with Changes in Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Early 1967 OCO</th>
<th>Late 1967 CORDS</th>
<th>Late 1968 Tet</th>
<th>Late 1969 COSVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tested from MSSD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Congruent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congruent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongest</td>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>CPDC</td>
<td>Village Chief COSVN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following sections will summarize the congruence analysis for each scenario in tabular and narrative form. As pattern-matching/congruence analysis, the narrative will only describe the strength of the individual EVs’ ability to explain variation in the OV; it will not address any interactive or intervening effects from other EVs or control variables (which will be done in the process-tracing chapter).

4.6.1.1 Primary Scenario: CORDS Increasing Control in Late 1967

As the explicit or implicit basis for current policy recommendations regarding organizational changes to improve interagency policy-implementation, the CORDS scenario addresses the critical research question of whether Unity of Command (single

96 The horizontal axis lists the four scenarios of increased control, with the main scenario of interest (CORDS) in red. The vertical columns lists: the number of EV brought forward from the comparative analysis; the number of EVs that failed congruence analysis; the number of EVs that were congruent; and lastly, which EV had the greatest explanatory power.
management) improved pacification in Vietnam. Of the six EVs that co-varied with control, one was predictive, one had general effects, and four were dependent on control to have any effect.

Table 4-10 CORDS Increasing Control in late 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congruence</th>
<th>Predictive</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Antecedent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Supported  | CORDS USG in Vietnam (+38%) | Train, Man, and Equip Territorial Forces (+10%) | Local Political Reform (+<24%) 
Surrender Program
Civic Action
GVN Official Competence |
| Not        |                 |                                              |                                                 |

While this analysis does not eliminate any possible EVs, the USG’s adoption of Unity of Command for all DIME efforts at the operational level (CORDS) has more than 38 percent marginal effect and is also moderately predictive. USG/GVN also improved two aspects of the “train, man, and equip” of the phase II Territorial Forces variable: training and manning. The USG improved the competence of the Territorial Forces by increasing the number of military advisors and trainers from five to over one thousand. Increasing the manpower by more than thirty thousand troops (increasing the BOG ratio by more than 2:1,000) had an approximately 10 percent marginal effect when compared to historical cases.

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97 Only two variables had any predictive power as seen by separation plot test: TTPs and unity of command. Of the fifty-seven cases that measured unity of command vs effort, unity of command (n = 25) and unity of effort (n = 32). Seventy-two percent (thirteen of eighteen) of all Wins utilized unity of command, and 52 percent (thirteen of twenty-five) of all unity of command cases won. Of note, the other 36 percent were Draws and 12 percent were Losses (nine and three of twenty-five, respectively).
If implemented in conjunction with areas of some degree of control, four pacification programs also improved control. The Surrender program became a major GVN priority as it established Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) offices in all (the majority) of the more than twenty-five hundred villages. Local political reform occurred within those villages under GVN control with the first elections for village and hamlet chiefs since 1956, in which the chiefs were able to exercise limited autonomy. Even if this measure was full political inclusivity (more than 24 percent marginal effect), it has no predictive power. To improve GVN officials’ competence at the hamlet through province levels, the GVN initiated a training course that constantly ran classes for new and current GVN officials. Lastly, the USG (particularly Military Advisory Command-Vietnam [MAC-V] military) established formal and functioning mechanisms to implement various civic action projects\(^8\) to provide benefits to the civilian population.

4.6.1.2 Alternate Scenario #1: OCO Increasing Control in early 1967

The first alternative scenario asks what if control had actually increased in early 1967 instead of in late 1967 (CORDS scenario). Of the five possible variables in the OCO scenario, one is predictive, one has general effects, and two can only be effective in areas where control is already established.

\(^8\) For example: ENCAP (engineer civic action projects) would build roads, schools, etc. MEDCAP (medical CAP), DENTCAP (dental CAP), and VETCAP (veterinarian CAP) would perform vaccinations, checkups, and various medical services on the civilian population and their livestock.
Table 4-11 OCO Increasing Control in 1967/1''

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congruence</th>
<th>Predictive</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Antecedent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>USG in DC</td>
<td>Surrender Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USG in Vietnam</td>
<td>(+38%)</td>
<td>Civic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID Grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>USG in DC</td>
<td>Surrender Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USG in Vietnam</td>
<td>(+38%)</td>
<td>Civic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID Grievances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The USG’s organizational approach shifted in both Washington, DC, and Vietnam°° from a DIME Unity of Effort approach to a DI_E Unity of Command approach. Although the single manager had directive authority over all civilian operations in DC (spring 1966) and Vietnam (December 1966/January 1967), the USG still utilized Unity of Effort to coordinate M and DI_E agencies.

Of the three variables contingent upon control, one was an organizational change, and two were in the field. Organizationally, the CIA-sponsored Census Grievance program (Identify Grievance variable) was shifted to and incorporated within the GVN-sponsored phase I armed political cadre (revolutionary development) program instead of being a standalone program. The Surrender program became a major GVN priority as it established Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) offices in all of the more than twenty-five hundred villages. Lastly, the MAC-V encouraged and allowed but did not direct military units to find and implement various civic action projects.

°° The USG operational-level organization (USG in Vietnam) was Unity of Effort, but with JUSPAO exercising Unity of Command for public affairs/information operations.
4.6.1.3 Alternate Scenario #2: Tet Increasing Control in late 1968

The second alternative scenario asks what if control did not increase until late 1968 as a result of the Communist (mostly PLAF) losses in the January 1968 Tet Offensive and May 1968 mini-Tet. With only one of the fifteen possible EVs (two to three times more than any other scenario) eliminated, the challenge in evaluating and ranking these explanations is simplified by the fact that only one EV is predictive.

Table 4-12 Analysis for Post-Tet Increasing Control in late 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congruence</th>
<th>Predictive</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Antecedent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>CPDC GVN in Vietnam (+38%)</td>
<td>Losses from Communist Opnl Orient</td>
<td>Neutralize VCI (+23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase I CDF/LDF mission (+18%)</td>
<td>Land Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inform/Influence Population (+12%)</td>
<td>ROE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Train, Man, and Equip (BOG) (+10%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ph I CDF/LDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ph II Territorial Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ph I Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanization (+6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% Indigenous (+3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase I mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase III forces mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US-GVN in the field</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communist Operational Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the Communists intended to decrease GVN control of South Vietnam by launching a general offensive (GO) to be the catalyst for the general uprising (GU), the severe Communist (primarily PLAF) losses could actually support increased GVN control due lack of manpower to counter the GVN. Before independently examining the various US/GVN pacification measures, this scenario overall could be best compared to the large-n study that shows a very large marginal positive effect of doing many things...
right.\textsuperscript{100} Approximately one year after the US established CORDS, and to manage the late 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), the GVN’s establishment of the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) to exercise Unity of Command over every GVN ministry involved with pacification from the national down to the district levels had a substantial marginal effect (more than 38 percent) with moderate predictive power.

Coupled with the single management approach were a modest increase of conventional forces along with a substantial increase in pacification forces and important changes to those forces’ missions. While the overall BOG ratio increased by more than twenty-three COIN forces per one thousand civilians to over one hundred per one thousand civilians (which had only a 2 to 3 percent marginal effect), increased pacification forces comprised nineteen of those twenty-three per one thousand—which had a more than 10 percent marginal effect on winning based solely on pacification forces\textsuperscript{101}. In addition to increasing manpower, the establishment of a CDF with the

\textsuperscript{100} See Section 4.3.5 Results
\textsuperscript{101} Total force strength went from ~1.32 million to ~1.71 million; conventional forces grew from ~885,000 to 961,000 (US forces grew by about fifty thousand, from ~485,000 to ~536,000; FWMAF grew by more than six thousand, from about fifty-nine thousand to sixty-five thousand; and ARVN grew by 20,000, from ~340,000 to ~360,000). Pacification forces grew by ~315,000, from ~435,000 to ~750,000. Increase to pacification forces were: more than one hundred thousand for Territorial Forces, more than six thousand for National Police, more than six thousand for Armed Political Cadre (Revolutionary Development Cadre), and more than two hundred thousand for PDSF CDF/LDF grew from zero to two hundred thousand. In terms of BOG ratio alone, pacification forces increased BOG ratio by ~19:1,000, of which ~11:1,000 were from establishing the PSDF (CDF/LDF) and 6:1,000 were from increasing the Territorial Forces.
mission of providing a permanent security force at the village/hamlet level (phase I security mission) also had a more than 18 percent marginal effect. A change in another phase I mission was the GVN’s process of selecting which hamlets to pacify: from reinforcing hamlets over which the GVN already had a predominance of control first (best to worst) to purposefully conducting pacification programs in hamlets and villages under Communist control (worst to best). The last change in mission orientation was with phase III conventional forces as the US shifted the preponderance of its forces to supporting pacification along with the ARVN conventional force, leaving the FWMAF predominately performing search-and-attack operations against PAVN/PLAF conventional forces.102

These changes in missions and manpower also saw an effect at the tactical level in the field. As the US forces shifted to supporting pacification, not only did they serve as the shields against Communist forces, they also dramatically increased conducting combined operations with the Territorial Forces against the PLAF phase II guerrillas and phase I militia forces. Another positive change for forces performing the phase I governance/security mission was the shift of the national police from merely being at

102 At a minimum, a large portion of US conventional forces served as the shield to prevent PAVN/PLAF conventional forces and larger-unit PLAF guerrilla forces from influencing and attempting to assert control over villages and hamlets. This allowed the Territorial Forces to provide the shield against small-unit PLAF guerrillas down to the village level and the PSDF to protect against PLAF phase I militias.
major cities and province capitals to establishing a permanent presence at the village level. Additionally, the massive growth of local pacification forces increased the percentage of Indigenous Forces (+3 percent) and decreased the level of mechanization (+6 percent). Lastly, as North Vietnam deployed more PAVN forces to serve as independent phase III conventional forces, augment PLAF phase III conventional forces, and augment PLAF phase II guerilla forces, the GVN (with the USG’s JUSPAO) capitalized on Vietnamese regionalism and pushed the narrative that the war shifted from a southern insurgency against US forces/FWMAF to a northern invasion of the south. Portraying the Communists as ethnic outsiders would have a more than 12 percent marginal effect.

The last three pacification measures implemented post-Tet during the late 1968 APC were contingent upon existing control. Foremost and most (in)famous was the program Phung Hoang (All-seeing Bird, or “Phoenix”) to neutralize the VCI (Selective Violence or Targeting). It shifted from USG-sponsored Province-level Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (PIOCCs) to GVN-sponsored District-level Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCs). When successfully neutralizing a key

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103 Territorial Forces = province-level Regional Forces, district-level Popular Forces, and village-/hamlet-level PSDF.
104 As fusion and coordination centers, the PIOCCs and DIOCCs exercised de jure Unity of Effort; they exercised a de facto Unity of Command because of the transactional benefits that the participating intelligence agencies and operational units’ agencies obtained. A similar relationship will be discussed in the

213
VCI leader at the village, district, and province levels, the program could have up to a more than 23 percent marginal effect in that area. Additionally, the GVN began elementary land reform measures, and the US and ARVN forces adopted more restrictive rules of engagement to avoid indiscriminate violence in areas that were under some degree of GVN control.

4.6.1.4 Alternate Scenario #3: COSVN Decision Increased Control in late 1969

The last alternative scenario asks what if control did not increase until late 1969 as a result of the COSVN decision to revert back to phase I (political) and phase II (guerrilla) warfare, with an emphasis on the use of terror. With congruence analysis supporting only three of four EVs and two of those three being dependent on control to have an effect, if control did not increase until late 1969, then there is a very strong argument that it was the result of Communist decision-making. However, this answer is also caveated because as part of the Local Political Reform, the Village Chief was restored to his traditional central and key role in the village. As part of this devolution, the Village Chief exercised de facto single management over all GVN forces, activities, and operations occurring within the village.

105 Because there is no comprehensive study on the effect of targeting lower-level leaders, cadre, and supporters, this project assumes that they will have some positive benefit, not to exceed targeting the national movement leader.
Table 4-13 COSN Decision led to increased control in late 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congruence</th>
<th>Predictive</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Antecedent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Village Chief</td>
<td>Communist Operational</td>
<td>Unit of pacification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity of Command (+38%)</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Local Political Reform (+23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>US Means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because decreasing USG support to South Vietnam should theoretically have decreased the ability to exert control, but control actually increased, the variable of USG strategic means is eliminated as a possible cause. With no predictive EVs at face value, the only general EV is the operational orientation of the Communist forces reverting from simultaneously implementing phase I (political), phase II (guerrilla), and phase III (conventional) warfare to instigate a GU/GO, to merely phases I and II (political and guerrilla). While implementing phases I and II at face value still attempted to gain control (see rural Vietnam from 1959 to 1964), doing so in the face of far larger numbers of ARVN and US forces/FWMAF that were serving as shields and/or supporting pacification in varying degrees essentially conceded control to the GVN. Further, coupling decreased Communist control with increasingly indiscriminate Communist violence further alienated the population.

With decreased Communist control, the two interrelated EVs dependent on control would have been able to have a dramatic marginal effect. First was the GVN’s changing of the unit of pacification from the hamlet to the village—the traditional
political unit for the history of Vietnam. Along with emphasizing the village as the unit for pacification based on its historical important role was the emphasis on actually reestabishing the village as the key political unit. At this time, the GVN fully restored the central political role of the village chief and, to a lesser degree, the hamlet chiefs. Not only were they democratically elected by their own village/hamlet, they also had the authority to pass and enforce internal laws, rules, and measures to include budgets and taxes. To further solidify the position of the village, the village chief exercised operational authority over all GVN military, police, and cadre assets operating within the village—essentially delegating Unity of Command to the village level.

4.6.2 Observations and Way Ahead

At face value, the chapter’s congruence analysis made minimal headway in its deductive approach because it only eliminated two Explanatory Variables. However, by leveraging the burgeoning literature on COIN, this chapter was able to inductively

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106 Coupling changing the unit of pacification to the village with the switch to “from worst to best” prioritization, the GVN/U.S. pacification campaign planners would select the most important villages to pacify based on their population importance, economic importance, and vicinity to key transportation sites and routes. Once selected, the pacification forces would go to the “worst” hamlets in that village to forcibly increase the control there by driving out the Communists while putting minimal pacification forces in the “better” hamlets to secure them.

107 A village chief exercised authority over the National Police detachment assigned to his village; any Territorial Force (typically a platoon-sized [thirty soldiers]) element from the district-level Popular Force; the fifty- to sixty-member Revolutionary Development Cadre team, while operating in that Village; and the Village/Hamlet PSDF. The village chief also provided input to the Phung Huang (Phoenix) DIOCC for neutralizing VCI (phase I political cadre).
evaluate and rank every feasible EV based on their explanatory strength. While there are still a number of EVs remaining, unlike MSSD, not every EV is equally informative. The below chart horizontally lists every scenario, with the main scenario of interest (CORDS) in red.

![Table 4-14 Number of EVs for further analysis by scenario](image)

While the CORDS hypothesis is falsified in the three alternate scenarios of increased control, it is not falsified in the time window when it was established. The broader hypothesis of the effect of single management in general is not falsified in three of the four scenarios; and in that scenario (COSVN, late 1969), it might only be falsified.

---

While the CORDS hypothesis is falsified in the three alternate scenarios of increased control, it is not falsified in the time window when it was established. The broader hypothesis of the effect of single management in general is not falsified in three of the four scenarios; and in that scenario (COSVN, late 1969), it might only be falsified.

---

For every scenario, it vertically lists: the number of EVs that co-varied in comparative analysis; how many EVs were congruent (positively correlated); the breakdown of those EVs by predicted, general, and antecedent; identifies the strongest EV; and then asks if the results from that scenario falsifies the main hypothesis that CORDS’ single management led to improved control as well as the broader hypothesis that Unity of Command/single management led to improved control.
The next chapter will use process tracing to look for empirical evidence of the causal chain connecting these likely explanations to increased control. It will also seek to eliminate more possible Explanatory Variables and identify the most compelling ones.
5 Process-tracing Analysis of Pacification Programs in Vietnam

5.1 Contribution

The third empirical chapter of this dissertation will continue the inferential strategy of eliminating infeasible possible Explanatory Variables and then rank ordering the remaining feasible EVs to inductively identify the strongest explanation for increased control in Vietnam. Where the previous empirical chapters looked for correlation (comparative analysis) and then strength of correlation (congruence analysis) between the various EVs and the Outcome Variable, this chapter will use process-tracing to identify and follow the causal linkages that explain how and why CORDS’ adoption of single management (the main hypothesis of this project) caused control to improve. Like the other chapters, it will eliminate possible Explanatory Variables if process-tracing demonstrates they are actually Intervening Variables.¹

Complementing the comparative analysis’ test for EV/OV co-variation and the congruence analysis’ measurement of the strength of those correlations, this chapter’s unique analytic contribution to the project is its focus on searching for evidence of the causal mechanisms that explain how and why variation in an EV leads to variation in control. This focus on causal mechanisms will reduce the indeterminate design by identifying (and removing) those EVs whose variation is the consequence of another variable. First, EVs that are correlated with the OV but related to another EV or that lack any evidence of actually causing variation in the OV will be eliminated. Then the remaining EVs will be assessed and rank-ordered, which will further reduce or eliminate the issues of equifinality and indeterminacy.


3 King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Chapter 5, “Understanding What to Avoid,” p. 173: “We should not control for an explanatory variable that is in part a consequence of our key causal variable.” Those EVs will be reclassified as intervening variables; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 207: “Process tracing reduce[s] the problem of indeterminacy… [by identifying] intervening variables that are part of the causal process”; p. 217: “Consider the possibility of alternate processes [and] alternate hypotheses.”
5.2 Overall Research Design for Process-tracing Analysis

5.2.1 Methodology

Using the methodology of process-tracing analysis, this chapter will evaluate the strength (or lack thereof) of the causal mechanisms linking the various empirically supported EVs from Chapter 3 (comparative analysis) that are correlated with increased control. Employing the inductive logic of plausible reasoning, the reasonableness that variation in the EV led to variation in the OV is affected by the quantity and quality of evidence demonstrating how and why the EV caused the OV. After conducting process tracing on the effect of changing from Unity of Effort to Unity of Command at the operational level (CORDS)—the EV that not only had the strongest correlation to the OV as well as being of the greatest policy-relevance—this chapter will then compare that analysis against the alternative explanations provided by other EVs that are also correlated with the OV.

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5 From Chapter 3 (congruence/pattern-matching analysis) and coding outcomes in terms of Win (>90% control), Draw (90%>x>10% control), and Loss (>10% control), switching from Unity of Effort has a +38% marginal effect on winning; p(Unity Command | Win) = 72% (necessary check); p(Win | Unity of Command) = 72% (sufficiency check); and mildly predictive (separation plot). Recoding the outcomes as Win (>50% control) and Loss (< 50% control) has p(Unity of Command | Win) = 85%; p(Win | Unity of Command) = 82%; and strongly predictive (separation plot).

6 Chapter 1 reviewed the various commission and think tank reports that directly or indirectly credited CORDS’ single management as improving interagency policy implementation.
While the essence of process tracing is a narrative and graphical depiction that explains the temporal unfolding of the linked and interacting events that allows researchers to draw causal inferences on what are “ultimately unobservable… processes,” there are several varieties of process-tracing analysis, ranging from case-specific to broadly generalizable. As a “Bridging the Gap” research project, this chapter will utilize macro-level process tracing based on existing, generalizable theories to answer the broad, policy-relevant research question, Does single management/Unity of Command improve interagency policy implementation?

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7 Blatter and Blume, "In Search of Co-Variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies.", p. 319, “Table 1: Different ways to draw inferences.”
9 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 137: “unobservable”; 10-211: “Varieties in Process-Tracing.” George and Bennett list four forms of process tracing; only the least generalizable is listed in this note. The “detailed narrative” is the simplest form and the closest to historical analysis. Without using theories, it merely provides a close narrative describing how an event unfolded and, therefore, has minimal value to generalize. This form of process tracing frequently examines individual-level decision makers. For ease of reference for this project, this form will be referred to as micro-level process tracing, as opposed to macro-level process tracing, which leverages general theories.
10 Although this method is almost identical to congruence/pattern-matching analysis, the findings are very different. Where congruence analysis determines the “strength of correlation” between an EV and the OV, process tracing determines the “plausibility/strength of causation” by matching theoretical EVs, intervening variables, and the OV along with associated causal process observations to the actual case.
11 Using general theories as the basis for process tracing allows the answer to the case-specific research question “Did CORDS’ adoption of single management improve control (pacification) in Vietnam?” to be generalizable to the policy question of interagency policy implementation. George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pp. 263-285, Chapter 12, “Case Studies and Policy-Relevant Theory,” specifically p. 274: “Policymakers need knowledge that identifies the causal processes and causal mechanisms.”
Applying a theoretically and empirically supported theory that explains how and why interagency structures affect policy implementation effectiveness, researchers develop as many testable hypotheses as possible about the causal path linking single management to improved policy implementation. The researcher will then test those hypotheses by searching for supporting or disaffirming evidence (data set observations [DSOs] and/or causal process observations [CPOs]) from within the case itself. As the number of matches between the theoretical EVs, intervening variables (IntVs), and OV and associated CPOs increase, the strength of the plausibility of causation increases.

12 King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, pp. 217-229, Section 6.3, “Making Many Observations from Few.” The authors argue that especially when dealing with a single/small-n research project, “while not as valuable as the strategy of increasing the number of observations [i.e., congruence/pattern-matching],” process tracing is invaluable because it “increases the number of theoretically relevant observations.” See pp. 226-227, Section 6.3.2, “Same Units, New Measures,” and Section 6.3.3, “New Measures, New Units.” However, they only argue for searching for DSOs; not CPOs, which are ultimately unmeasurable and can lead to infinitely regressing analysis that keeps searching for more and more micro-level explanations.

13 David Collier, Henry Brady, and Jason Seawright, "A Sea Change in Political Methodology," in *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), p. 24. DSOs are used in quantitative studies and collected as scores (e.g., ratio, ordered, nominal variable), whereas CPOs describe the “context, methods, and/or mechanisms” that affect a DSO.

14 In addition to using only DSOs (but not CPOs), the logic of inference is the major difference between the statistically grounded King, Keohane, and Verba work on process tracing versus the qualitatively grounded process tracing. The authors’ process tracing is still based on the same logic as congruence/pattern matching: argument by analogy with stronger/weaker correlations between the EV and OV and more observations mitigating indeterminate research designs. King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, p. 119, Section 4.1.1, “More inferences than observations,” and p. 227. On the other hand, the logic of qualitative process tracing is based on argument by plausible reasoning, or the attempts to understand the strength of the causal relationship between an EV and OV. All things (observations) being equal, a causal chain with ten affirming observations is inductively stronger than one with five observations.
While the argument for an EV-OV causal connection strengthens or weakens as the researcher finds (or does not find) more evidence of CPOs and DSOs, not every match or mismatch equally affects the overall argument; in other words, the plausibility of a causal connection is a factor of both the quantity and quality of the evidence that can be found. In addition to identifying testable hypotheses, researchers also use existing theories to evaluate how much every observation affects the plausibility (likelihood) that the theoretical causal chain from an EV to the OV is correct. Based on the concept of Bayesian updating, Figure 5-1 graphically shows how posterior beliefs about the plausibility of causality are affected by prior beliefs, passing/failing of tests of varying


16 The idea of graphical depiction to show these interrelationships came from: Macartan Humphreys and Alan M. Jacobs, Mixing Methods: A Bayesian Approach (2014), p. 56, Figure 5 (citation from unpublished manuscript posted online); the shorter version was published in American Political Science Review 109, no.4 [2015]). This article promotes the R package that can perform Bayesian integration of qualitative and quantitative data (BIQQ). Stan Development Team, Rstan: The R Interface to Stan, Version 2.5.0” (2014).
degrees of necessary and/or sufficiency, and the combining of unmeasurable CPOs with measurable DSOs.\textsuperscript{17}

![Figure 5-1. Bayesian Approach to Process Tracing (Illustrative Graphic)\textsuperscript{18}](image)

\textsuperscript{17} Nathaniel Beck, "Causal Process “Observation”: Oxymoron or (Fine) Old Wine," *Political Analysis* 18, no. 4 (2010), pp. 499-504. Beck makes a valid point that CPOs and DSOs cannot be compared to each other because they are inherently different (measurable versus immeasurable observation), and, therefore, a statistical regression would not be appropriate. However, for process-tracing analysis of the causal chains connecting the EV to the OV, the probative value of any DSO is affected by CPOs. The presence of a DSO that affirms the theory but lacks any explanation about the “context, mechanisms, or processes” that caused the DSO to change provides marginal support to the plausibility argument. If the CPO explains the “context, conditions, mechanisms, or processes” of DSO variation, then that observation provides greater strength to the argument for the causal mechanism.

\textsuperscript{18} This graphic visually shows several key concepts about a Bayesian approach to process tracing: 1) The researcher’s initial belief in the plausibility matters; 2) observations of different qualities have different effects based on the prior belief; 3) a large quantity of marginal strengthening/weakening observations (i.e., “circumstantial evidence”) can affect the conclusion; 4) as arguments become very strong or weak (i.e., 15 percent or 85 percent plausible), they become very “sticky” and hard to change in the absence of many observations or true necessary (“hoop”) or sufficient (“smoking gun”) tests. Researchers begin with a prior
While this macro-level process tracing utilizes a Bayesian approach for determining and revising the plausibility for any causal chain, those changes will be couched as in ordered terms (effect: strengthen or weaken; magnitude: strongly/moderately/marginally) instead of in ratio terms (i.e., 75 percent confident).\(^1\)

Instead of calculating a number (%), this project’s process-tracing analysis will make its causal inference simply based on summarizing how each piece of diagnostic evidence affected the causal plausibility. The next two subsections will first describe the empirically supported theories linking interagency single management to policy implementation effectiveness and then develop the generic narrative with supporting testable hypotheses (and the associated probative value for each test) that will be applied to the case study on pacification in Vietnam.

After process tracing the switch from Unity of Effort to Unity of Command, the chapter will then update the results from comparative and congruence analysis\(^2\) by removing possible EVs that were found to actually be IntVs.\(^3\) After (possibly) reducing belief based on objective or subjective evaluations and then “plug and chug” each piece of supporting or weakening evidence until they arrive at a conclusion about the plausibility of the causal claim.

\(^1\) The BIQQ data calculates an exact level of plausibility in the likelihood that a causal chain is correct (i.e., 75 percent). However, when combining the great deal of subjectivity in determining the strongly/moderately/marginally strengthening/weakening curves with lack of ability to measure uncertainty, it can easily suffer from the fallacy of false precision.

\(^2\) Chapter 2 (comparative analysis/MSSD) and 3 (congruence/pattern matching).

the problem of indeterminacy, the chapter will then conduct process tracing on the (fewer) remaining alternative explanations for improved control in Vietnam.

5.2.2 Theory of Single Management for Interagency Operations

“Governmental programs are normally implemented by organizations, so it may be useful to conceptualize implementation as an organizational problem.”

Scholars in this field of public administration have found that policy failures, challenges, or difficulties are almost equally the result of bad policies as they are of bad implementation due to organizational structural issues.

One external basis for those problems and challenges that policy implementers face come from the fact they are trying to address “wicked”/complex problems. Due to the complexity of the problem, policy implementation solutions will almost never be developed in a single iteration or ever be right or wrong; rather, they will be better or

173: “We should not control for an explanatory variable that is in part a consequence of our key causal variable.”

22 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. From Chapter 10, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” p. 207: “The fact that the intervening variables, if truly part of the causal process, should be connected in particular ways is what allows process-tracing to reduce the problem of indeterminacy.”


24 Ibid., p. 465, note 1: The authors drew this conclusion from a literature review of eight public administration studies in 1968, 1972, 1973, 1976, and 1975 and 1977 (two each during those years); p. 467: The authors studied fifty-eight relevant cases of policy implementation and found thirty-five cases with impact (program) problems and forty-four cases of organizational problems. See p. 469, Figure 2, “Distribution of Cases: Implementation Results.”

227
worse, satisfying or not, or perhaps merely good enough. This implies that policy implementers will modify their organizations and associated programs to better adapt to the ever-changing problem(s) they face because there will almost never be a good or good enough policy solution as is. They will do so by reallocating organizational resources (personnel, budgets, material) as well as modifying the scope, scale, and authority of the programs themselves.

Because the implementation of a large majority of policies requires efforts and contributions from multiple agencies, public administration scholars developed the subfield of interagency policy implementation. While the interagency literature


26 Montjoy and O'Toole, "Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: An Organizational Perspective.", pp. 466: "slack resources within agency… [or] from external source"; p. 470: "trial and error implementation"; p. 471: “[Over time] action was in the appropriate direction”; and p. 474: “Organizations divert sufficient amounts of their own resources.”

acknowledges three methods to induce different agencies to work together, it describes only two techniques to establish “mandated interdependence” between agencies. Interestingly, although the interagency organizational literatures recognizes the “authority [command]” method of inducing cooperation between agencies, it rarely describes the corresponding organizational structure to exercise that authority.

Because the challenges of intra-agency communication control and authority-expertise that are found in every organization are amplified in an interagency organization spanning multiple agencies, the literature assumes that a mandate to exercise directive authority/single management will not occur. This assumption is

"Leading through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development.", pp. 15, 20, 22. Former Secretary of State Clinton frames the need for interagency with four examples: 1) six agencies with Global Health Initiative; 2) sixteen agencies in the Office of the Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan; 3) twenty-two agencies in US-India dialogue; and 4) over thirty agencies in the US-China strategic and economic dialogue.

O'Toole Jr. and Montjoy, "Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective.", p. 492. The authors list the inducements and, on pp 493-496, they list the techniques. See Figure 1, “Types of Interdependence.” In “pooled interdependence,” each agency “does its own thing” to work on its part of the policy. There is nothing to induce them to exert the time and effort to cooperate, coordinate, or integrate with each other than appealing to the “common interest.” In “sequential interdependence” and “reciprocal operating interdependence,” because an agency’s role in policy implementation is dependent on the output of one or more other agencies, it allocates scarce resources (personnel, money, etc.) to coordinate with another agency as a transactional, or “exchange,” inducement.

Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, vol. RAND Paper-2963 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1967)., p. 6: “… assumes that leaders in organizations are imperfectly informed because information is costly because it takes time and effort to collect”; pp. 7-8: “higher up have the authority to direct the organization, but lack the information and expertise”, this leads to the “message-distortion problem” (pp. 9-14) as information flows upward and the “directive-distortion problem” (pp. 14-18).

O'Toole Jr. and Montjoy, "Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective." p. 492: “Impediments to implementation continue to apply and are multiplied by the number of organizations involved”; p. 495: “Mandate specificity will be absent or lost and monitoring will be weak”; pp. 495-497, figure (unnamed and unnumbered). This conclusion is supported by the authors’ study of 191 cases
consistent across the policy implementation literature over time,\textsuperscript{31} as well as within its organizational variants of matrix organizations,\textsuperscript{32} cross-functional teams,\textsuperscript{33} and networks.\textsuperscript{34} However, if a mandate for single management over multiple agencies is given, it is analogous to issuing a new policy mandate to an existing agency, that it is a de facto intra-agency (not interagency) policy implementation problem.\textsuperscript{35}

The intra-agency policy implementation literature found that if an existing agency is assigned a specific mandate and provided resources (personnel, material, and budget), then it will generally, slowly, and imperfectly improve implementing policy to randomly selected from Government Accountability Office reports that found “loss of mandate specificity/monitoring” to be a common problem in interagency policy implementation.\textsuperscript{36} In a 1986 literature review of more than one hundred studies, all of them assumed there would not be a mandate for exercising command authority in an interagency organization. O’Toole, “Policy Recommendations for Multi-Actor Implementation: An Assessment of the Field.”, pp. 183-189, Table 1, “Variables viewed as most important in the implementation literature,” with the same results in a 1995 literature review (Richard E Matland, “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy Implementation,” \textit{Journal of public administration research and theory} 5, no. 2 (1995), p. 156) and repeated in a 2000 survey of the field of policy implementation (Laurence J. O’Toole, “Research on Policy Implementation: Assessment and Prospects,” \textit{Journal of public administration research and theory} 10, no. 2 (2000), pp. 264-265). This study also remarked that although the field peaked in early 1990s, it “never seemed to have solved the implementation puzzle.” This observation appears to be the academic parallel to the policy literature warning “whom the gods would destroy, they first make interested in grand interagency reform.” Peter D. Feaver, “Interagency Perspective- 10 Lessons,” in \textit{Unrestricted Warfare Symposia}, ed. R.R. Luman, L.D. Simmons, and T. Keaney (Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, 2008), p. 65.\textsuperscript{37} Kenneth Knight, "Matrix Organization: A Review," \texti{Journal of Management Studies} 13, no. 2 (1976); Harvey F. Kolodny, "Evolution to a Matrix Organization," \texti{Academy of Management Review} 4, no. 4 (1979).\textsuperscript{38} Robert C. Ford and W Alan Randolph, "Cross-Functional Structures: A Review and Integration of Matrix Organization and Project Management," \texti{Journal of Management} 18, no. 2 (1992).\textsuperscript{39} Laurence J. O’Toole Jr, "Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-Based Agendas in Public Administration," \texti{Public Administration Review} (1997).\textsuperscript{40} O’Toole Jr. and Montjoy, “Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective.”, p. 499: “Intra-organizational [agency] literature suggests that the best way to implement a new policy is to create a new organization with a specific mandate and resources” instead of trying to get multiple agencies to work together.

230
address its assigned “wicked” problem.\textsuperscript{36} Optimally, the new mandate will be assigned to organization well-suited for the task because of its existing capacity and/or similar (enough) goals, world views, and routines. While retaining overall responsibility for the new policy, that organization then most likely will delegate the implementation of the activities specifically related to the new mandate to a separate sub-unit that it establishes and then allocates those new resources to it. This allows the parent organization to merely integrate and synchronize the effects of the sub-unit with the parent organization as a whole without requiring the parent unit to actually implement the new policy itself.\textsuperscript{37}

After taking the time and effort toward getting established with little progress toward policy accomplishment, the new sub-unit will then begin the iterative process of: developing and/or modifying the specific programs that is it implementing, adjusting its organizational structure, and shifting resources.\textsuperscript{38} Internally, it will also continue to

\textsuperscript{36} This finding is based on a typological study of fifty-eight cases that found that mandates (specific or not) and resources (provided or not) define four categories with distinct characteristics. Type B is defined by a specific mandate and provided resources. Montjoy and O’Toole, “Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: An Organizational Perspective.”, p. 466, Figure 1, “Characteristics of Mandates Descriptions of Expected Activities”; p. 467, this page describes the methodology; pp. 469-471: “startup difficulties,” “trial and error implementation,” and “action was in the appropriate direction.”

\textsuperscript{37} A key assumption in intra-agency policy implementation literature is that agencies are populated with people of similar backgrounds, beliefs, preferences, and world views. Adding a new mandate that is outside the core capabilities agency, “A,” is problematic because of the lack of experience and skills of personnel within A. Adding personnel (resources) to A from various agencies allows A to implement a new mandate despite its not having the organic capability to do so. Ibid., pp. 466, 469.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., pp. 470-471: “… will experience delays and other startup costs.”
develop and improve administrative procedures to enhance and establish a de facto new organization (personnel policies, awards, evaluations, budgets, etc.).

5.2.3 Testable Hypotheses for Single Management for COIN

Examining a generic COIN scenario in light of theories of policy implementation, this section develops the hypotheses tracing the processes connecting shifting to single management to improved pacification. After a graphical presentation of the causal path, this section will then present the chain of hypotheses linking the EVs through IntVs to the OV.

Generally, an empirical change in a DSO that matches theoretical predictions but lacks evidence explaining how or why that variation occurred will only marginally increase the plausibility of causality. Evidence of the context, mechanisms, or processes (CPOs) explaining how and why a DSO varied will either have a moderately or strongly positive effect on the plausibility of causality (with passing a sufficient condition/“smoking gun” test associated with strong effects). The same logic applies to

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39 Ibid., p. 470: “Since agencies are rarely afforded the luxury of research and development time, the results tends to be a trial and error implementation which may make the organization appear ineffective.”
40 To improve the quality of process tracing, Waldner recommends a graphical depiction tracing the linkages from the EV through the IntVs and to the OV. Doing this ensures that the researcher has met the “completeness standard” and “continuity criterion” for process tracing, Waldner, “What Makes Process Tracing Good? Causal Mechanisms, Causal Inference, and the Completeness Standard in Comparative Politics,” in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, pp. 128-131.
41 This is similar to Van Evera’s congruence type 2 (or within-case pattern matching) for comparative analysis in which he tests whether an EV-OV co-variation was theoretically predicted. If so, then it marginally strengthens the argument. Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, p. 62.
failing tests except that it takes failing a necessary condition/“hoop” test to have strong negative effects.\textsuperscript{42}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5-2}
\caption{Causal Linkages between Single Management and Improved Control}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{42} Defining how passing/failing tests affects the plausibility of causality is similar to defining COIN outcomes as ordered variables; each has two narrowly defined endpoints and one very large center condition (Win = 100%-90% control with no, almost no concessions; Lose = 10%-0% control with complete or almost complete concessions; and Draw from 90%-10% control ranging from almost no concessions to almost complete concessions). While DSOs without any CPOs have only a marginal effect and “smoking gun”/sufficient or “hoop”/necessary have strong effects, the effect of different moderate tests (DSO and CPO) on plausibility can have a great deal of variation. This project will not attempt to differentiate between different levels of moderate evidence. A researcher utilizing the BIQQ methodology has to justify degree or sharpness of the arc used for each piece of evidence.
Bounded by the first and necessary aspect of pacification—control, this section lays out the full theoretical causal chain to full pacification. Using the above figure to trace the causal chain connecting a switch to single management to improved control, provides for eight broad process-tracing hypotheses. For each hypothesis, DSOs serve as the EV and OV with the CPOs serving as the causal mechanisms connecting the DSOs.

*If there is a new mandate (policy), then the authorized authority will designate a single manager.*

The narrative begins with the first necessary condition, the delegation of single management for a new mandate. As a “hoop” test/necessary condition, failing this eliminates single management as an EV for improved pacification because there was no single management. A passing DSO marginally supports the causal chain with evidence that the authorizing authority provided a mandate, delegation of authority, and

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43 See Chapter 3, “Outcome Variable.” The decision to limit the research to control is based on two reasons: 1) control (physical security of the population), which is a necessary but insufficient condition for gaining support of the population; and 2) the fact that because USG support to RVN was essentially a civil affairs, not military government, mission, gaining support from its own population was ultimately the responsibility of the government of South Vietnam.

44 In his human development dissertation, the author interviewed 448 military and civilian national security professionals on how to improve the effectiveness of Unity of Effort for national security. He lists the four most important factors for improving Unity of Effort by triangulating the Delphic interviews (content analysis, analysis of variance, and principle component analysis). Paul Michael Severance, “Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort in the Interagency National Security Policy Process” (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2005), p. i, summary of methodology, and p. 150, a list of factors; the second is “unambiguous command and control—who is in charge.” A similar six-year research program at the Naval Post Graduate School also used series of surveys, modelling, simulations, and audits to find factors that would improve interagency collaboration. It also found similar key factors (which each had several sub-factors); final report: Susan Page Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas,
resources (personnel, material, budget, etc.) to agency “X.” The CPO that highlights that the chosen agency was selected because it was “already well-suited” (due to existing routines, goals, world-views, capacity, etc.) to overseeing the new mandate moderately strengthens the causal chain. Based on theories of policy implementation, of the three variations that meet this “hoop” test, the most likely is that the existing agency tasked with the new mandate will create a subordinate element.

*If an agency is tasked with a new mandate, assigned resources, and granted unified management, then it will create a new sub-unit to handle that mission.*

As long as single management was delegated to the parent agency, failing this test has only a marginal negative effect because it is not a necessary condition in and of itself. CPOs that explain why the parent agency decided to establish a subordinate element will moderately strengthen the plausibility of a causal chain. Because the new sub-agency is receiving resources from other agencies, CPOs of support from them to

"Inter-Organizational Collaborative Capacity (Icc) Assessment," (2012), p. 4-5: “Purpose and strategy of the combined effort.”


46 1) Create a new agency specifically for the new mandate, 2) assign the new mandate to an existing agency that then creates a new subordinate element to handle the mandate, or 3) assign the mandate to an existing agency that does not create a new subordinate unit.

47 This is most likely because the new mandate was distinct and different from the agency’s existing mandate.
the newly created sub-agency’s mandate further support the causal claim. While it will take time and effort to set up the new agency—during which it will have minimal effectiveness—the sub-organization will then iteratively make internal and external changes to improve its ability to implement the policy.

*If a sub-unit is established, then it will modify the programs that it supervises.*

Because it is possible but very unlikely that all of the programs addressing the “wicked” problem are good as is, failing this test will have a moderate negative effect on the plausibility of causality. For the same reason, any changes to programs supervised by the agency will marginally support the argument because they were theoretically predicted and assumed to have been made to improve policy implementation. CPOs showing that the organization (i.e., organization’s leadership) modified programs with the specific intent to improve pacification moderately strengthen the causal claim. In addition to modifying the programs that it implements among the population to improve pacification (external modifications), it takes internal measures to make itself a more effective organization—which also improves policy implementation.

*If a sub-unit is established, then it will modify its internal procedures and processes.*

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48 Severance, "Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort in the Interagency National Security Policy Process.", p. 150: “Senior leaders from parent organizations must make visible commitments to the organizational mission and the importance of that mission.”
Because the authority to make internal adaptations might be withheld by the parent organization, failing this test has only a marginal negative effect. An organization can take a wide-variety of internal measures (i.e., personnel policies, budget mechanisms, operating procedures, etc.) to improve the agency that have nothing to do with the programs that it supervises.\(^\text{49}\) While the researcher may assume that these non-external modifications are all intended to enhance the organization, only CPOs explicitly making that reasoning provide moderate support to the causal chain. During and after the initial establishment of the subordinate agency and its iterative internal and externally-focused changes, it will develop plans to implement the policy of counterinsurgency (COIN).

*If a sub-unit is established, then it will develop a plan to synchronize all of the COIN programs.*

While this is not specifically mentioned in policy implementation theories, this is a necessary condition/”hoop” test to differentiate between single management (Unity of Command) and the interagency concept of achieving mandated interdependence by establishing reciprocal operating interdependence (ROI) relationships.\(^\text{50}\) By the nature of

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 150: “Build strong interagency organizational identity…. Interagency leaders must develop polices to enhance the organization”; Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas, "Inter-Organizational Collaborative Capacity (Icc) Assessment.", pp. 4-5: Interagency leaders must develop “structures of roles and relationships [for interagency policy implementation]… incentives and rewards… lateral mechanisms for communication… and people.”

\(^{50}\) O’Toole Jr. and Montjoy, "Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective.", pp. 494-496. In an ROI scenario, none of the agencies can simply implement its aspect of the policy. A system was established in which every agency was dependent on one or more other agencies before it could implement
single management/Unity of Command, a single person/office is directing subordinate elements in order to synchronize, integrate, and coordinate their efforts in time, space, and purpose. For an organization of any size, that will require some form of planning. If an organization can achieve those effects without planning, then it does not need a single manager—rather, it is highly likely that there was an ROI (Unity of Effort) relationship. This is the only DSO in which the existence of some form of plan is evidence that some form of planning took place. However, because “plans are nothing, planning is everything,” passing this hypothesis only marginally strengthens the plausibility of the causal mechanisms.51 The subordinate agency then implements those plans to improve the first element of pacification: control.

*If a COIN plan is implemented, then control of the population will improve.*

Failing to improve control over time strongly weakens the argument that single management improves policy implementation. Because the OV for this project is attempting to measure the effect of the policy on the insurgents—as opposed to 

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51 This quote is credited to President and former Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower and often cited in the project management literature. It reflects the fact that plans addressing “wicked” problems will never be correct; as such, the plans will need to be iteratively changed and modified to greater and lesser degrees. For that reason, Eisenhower valued having good planners who could do good planning and would constantly adapt and modify the plan. This dictum has been supported by project management research. See study based on analysis of 448 projects: Dov Dvir and Thomas Lechler, “Plans Are Nothing, Changing Plans Is Everything: The Impact of Changes on Project Success,” *Research policy* 33, no. 1 (2004).
measuring United States (US)/Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF)/Republic of Vietnam (RVN) actions—not only is this the most difficult DSO to measure (see Chapter Three, “Outcome Variable: Trends in Control”), but so are the CPOs. While the insurgents are an excellent judge of how effective individual COIN programs are against them, they provide less insight into whether those efforts were synchronized, integrated, or coordinated. CPOs from the insurgents specifically crediting the integrated and synchronized COIN efforts for decreased insurgent control strongly support the plausibility of causality as a sufficient condition/”smoking gun” test. However, CPOs of the insurgents crediting the effectiveness of a specific pacification program and/or CPOs from US/FWMAF/RVN perspectives highlighting the causal mechanisms will only moderately strengthen the causal chain. Changes in levels of control are inextricably linked to the degree of collaboration of the population with the government.

If control increases, then collaboration will increase, which then increases control.

While they could be presented as a single box in the causal diagram, control and collaboration are graphically separated to highlight their interactive relationship as well.

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53 These claims would be considered sufficient conditions, or “smoking gun” tests.

54 While all of the elements of this causal chain are ultimately interactive (for example, in response to changes in levels of control, the COIN agency could/should lead to the COIN agency changing its programs and internal processes and procedures, or its COIN plan), the decision to make those changes are made by the leadership of the COIN organization. The effect of control of the population on collaboration by the population is not made by the government.
as the fact that the effectiveness of COIN programs contingent on control can also increase control by increasing collaboration. The easiest and most dramatic evidence for the DSO of collaboration is the act of switching sides or defecting. Eventually, high levels of control and collaboration over time lead to the ultimate goal of pacification: the population’s support of the government.

If control is sustained, then the population will support the government.

Measuring the level of support from the population toward its government is as challenging as measuring control over the population—both are trying to assess the effectiveness of COIN programs vis-à-vis the population. Interestingly, the same causal mechanisms that connect control to collaboration may possibly, over time, lead to support for the government. In other words, as the government maintains control, the value-maximizing decision to provide short-term, transactional support for the

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55 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War., p. 128. The author found that programs intended to “win the hearts and minds” (WHAM) were successful only in areas in which that side already exerted a high level of control (hegemonic but not complete control). WHAM programs (i.e., civic action programs [CAPs]: engineer CAP [ENCAP], medical civic action program [MEDCAP], veterinarian CAP [VETCAP], etc.), land reform, and political reform implemented in areas not under firm control of the implementer had no effect and did not increase collaboration.

56 There are three main forms of collaboration: 1) noncompliance by the vast majority of the population—with opposition (non-betrayal); 2) informing by a small number of individuals within the population on the opposition; and 3) switching sides or defecting by individuals and/or units/groups from the opposition. Ibid., pp. 104-106, Section 4.4, “Forms of Collaboration and Defection,” and Table 4.1, “Types of Defection.”

57 In planning terms, actions that an individual/agency implemented are called measures of performance (MOP) and are relatively easy to quantify but hard to know whether they worked. On the other hand, measures of effectiveness (MOE) are hard to measure, but if they can be, they provide excellent insight into how well a program was implemented.
government (collaboration) can become a habit and turn into full-fledged, ideational support. However, and similar to measuring support itself, these CPOs are likely to be found in surveys and interviews of large numbers of the population and are also beyond the scope of this project.

5.3 Process-tracing Analysis of Single Management

This section finds that it is very likely that CORDS’ use of single management led to improved control beginning in the latter half of 1967. Although the new mandate identified not only what programs the US-government of Vietnam (GVN) would implement but also how the US would encourage the GVN to adopt those measures, the fact that it took more than three years to implement or adapt twenty-two major pacification programs raises another interesting puzzle.

5.3.1 President Johnson Selects New Mandate for Pacification

Switching from the broad strategic-level mandate for pacification that had been adopted in 1961, President Johnson and his special assistant for pacification envisioned very specific and dramatic organizational and programmatic changes in pacification at the operational level. Their vision included detailing what to do as well as how US

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government (USG) officials should do it. This switch from a broad, strategic-level approach to a detailed, operational-level approach constituted a de facto new mandate for the USG to implement.

When the RVN was established in 1956, the US adopted the strategic policy goal of supporting and defending a free and democratic Vietnam. In 1961, two years after the Communists initiated the People’s War (insurgency) in South Vietnam, the US changed its strategic ways from preparing to defend against a Communist invasion (such as the Korean War) to COIN. With that strategic guidance, numerous USG

59 Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 7-8. An interesting dilemma in bureaucracies is that the person (leader) who has the power to give detailed directions to the entire organization lacks the information to be able to do so. Being the exception to that rule makes studying the May 1967 pacification mandate an interesting case.

60 “The consequences of the loss [to Communism] are just incalculable to the free world” (Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Domino Theory Principle, the President’s News Conference, 7th April,” (1954), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10202). “The U.S. objective and concept of operations stated in report are approved: to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam; to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society....” (John F. President Kennedy, National Security Action Memorandum 52 ‘Approval of Steps to Strengthen South Vietnam’ (The White House, 1961), https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc99.htm); “It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy” (Nsam 273 “Presidential Guidance Stemming from Honolulu Conference Re: Us Policy in South Vietnam”).

61 Shortly after assuming the presidency, Kennedy sent the recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Taylor to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission with the guidance that “the social, political, and economic problems deserved the same amount of attention as military ones.” Maxwell Taylor, Swords into Plowshares (New York: WW Norton, 1972), pp. 225-226; Taylor’s trip influenced an ad hoc interagency recommendation to adopt a COIN approach (Defense Departments of State, Central Intelligence Agency, International Cooperation Administration, United States Information Agency, A Program of Action for South Vietnam (8 May 1961), by Interdepartmental Task Force (1961).), which became US policy three days later on May 11 (Kennedy, National Security Action Memorandum 52 ‘Approval of Steps to Strengthen South Vietnam’). and was operationalized by the deployment of four hundred US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) to Vietnam that month to train COIN techniques for fighting the Communist insurgents. See also for analysis:
agencies began supporting or increased their support to various pacification programs in Vietnam related to their department’s expertise and skills. However, because the seven primary agencies implementing pacification “each did their own thing... [with] no one in charge,” by January 1966 the president concluded that “pacification has gone backwards” and the US would be unable to extricate itself from Vietnam until the GVN was able to successfully conduct pacification by itself.62

To reinvigorate “the other war,” President Johnson appointed National Security Council staffer Robert Komer as his special assistant to the president for pacification in late March 1966 to “direct, coordinate, and supervise [pacification] in Washington... with direct access to me[Johnson] at all times.”63 Although not a Vietnam (or even an Asian) expert, Komer did have expertise in military government/civil affairs (MG/CA) operations from World War II,64 organizational design from the Harvard Business

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64 From MG/CA operations, Komer observed 1) that only the military has the capacity to handle the missions of this scale; 2) the importance of a single chain of command; and 3) that non-military personnel to provide civilian skills/capacity can work inside a military chain of command. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater. The authors of the US Army’s official history on MG/CA operations
School, and pacification from an Army assessment and recommendation report on Vietnam that was published nearly simultaneously with his appointment. In August 1966, after supplementing that knowledge with several in-country visits, Komer proposed that the US and GVN should adopt a single management approach and radically change how they conducted pacification—an almost perfect copy of the proposals in the Army study (PROSVN). After a trial period of integrating the civilian pacification efforts from December 1966 to spring 1967, President Johnson adopted Komer’s PROSVN-inspired proposal to integrate all military and civilian pacification programs to more aggressively conduct “the other war.”

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state that Komer’s history of MG/CA operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations was “of great help.” Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors.

65 Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (Army), A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (Prosvn), Volume I (Washington, DC: US Army, 1966), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=AD0377743. Composed of ten officers who had expertise in political science, history, economics, cultural anthropology, and developmental aid as well as military operations, intelligence, and psychological warfare, by direction of Chief of Staff of the Army Johnson, the study began in June 1965 and was published in March 1966. Komer reviewed the PROSVN report and became an enthusiastic supporter, and one of the PROSVN officers joined Komer’s staff in the White House. It provide 140 separate and specific recommendations organized into nine “thrusts” (now called lines of effort, or LOEs). The first LOE/thrust had fifty-nine specific recommendations on how USG officials could and should influence GVN counterparts. See pp. 14-27 for all 140, broken down by LOE/thrust. Lewis Sorley, “To Change a War: General Harold K. Johnson and the Provn Study,” Parameters 28, no. 1 (1998).

66 R.W. Komer, Giving a New Thrust to Pacification: Analysis, Concept, and Management (The White House, 1966); Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program., p. 32: “[The] PROSVN report, written by people with plenty of field experience, did have a real impact on me…. [It was] the source of a lot of ideas that I carried out.”

As proposed by Komer, President Johnson envisioned the US-GVN pacification efforts would first establish the necessary condition of enduring control (security) of the population to then achieve the sufficient condition of gaining their support. To achieve those objectives, the US and GVN would employ single management to plan, direct, and supervise a variety of programs. The US-GVN would increase local security by shifting the main focus of conventional forces from search and attack to serving as the “shield” against the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)/People’s Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam (PLAF) conventional (phase III forces), increasing the size and ability of Territorial Forces working in provinces and districts to “clear and hold” specific areas, and standing up a militia to protect villages and hamlets.

A combination of killing or capturing the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI; predominately the phase I cadre) and encouraging other Communist supporters and fighters to surrender would reduce the size and effectiveness of the Communist insurgency. By promoting various political, social, and economic growth and reforms (to include land reform), the population would slowly shift from collaborating with to supporting the GVN over time. In other words, the new mandate for pacification was

essentially the counterinsurgent version of the Communists’ doctrine for a People’s War (insurgency).  

The new mandate also had a clear vision of how the USG would work with the GVN to implement specific pacification programs. Overall, US advisers would “advise, not command; suggest, not direct; and support, not displace, local Vietnamese leadership.” But in order to “influence any Vietnamese leader, at any political level, and within any organizational structure to contribute to a responsive government,” the USG would provide “selective support to the existing government at points of US choosing rather than unqualified support for any government” and/or “pushing when necessary, and going it alone when required” (emphasis in original.) The USG could use these carrot-and-stick processes through the mechanisms of providing or withholding support (money, military resources, manpower, etc.) along with US officials’ reports and assessment on GVN officials and programs.

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68 This point was made in Daniel Ellsberg, Revolutionary Judo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970). See Section 1.2.4.
69 USG advisers’ actual techniques to influence their GVN counterparts closely matched the PROSVN recommendations; see Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds., pp. 121-132. See Chapter 8, “Leverage: CORDS’s quest for Better Performance.”
70 Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam., p. 263.
71 In the PROSVN study, fifty-nine of the 140 specific recommendations deal with increasing USG leverage over the GVN. (Army), A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (Prosven), Volume I., pp. 2:18- 43: “Civilian-Military Scaffolding Concept” details how the USG would influence the GVN. See p. 2:19 for the source of quotes and p. 2:41-42 for examples of specific “tools” for leverage. Also see the summary of the PROSVN’s 140 suggestions, pp. 14-18, for the “Increasing Leverage Thrust,” particularly items 2, “use US resources”; 6, “retain custody of US resources”; and 10, “efficiency reports on
Despite USG officials having a very clear vision of how to convince their GVN counterparts to accept twenty-two major programmatic and organizational changes (and many more numerous small changes), it took approximately three-and-a-half years for those changes to be adopted. Accepting that variation in one or more CPOs (processes, mechanisms, and/or context) leads to variation in a DSO, if the processes and mechanisms remain constant, changes in the DSO may be inferred to be the result of variations in context. In other words, if the USG had been consistently recommending for several years to adopt certain pacification programs with little reaction over along period of time, if the GVN decides to agree to those changes “out of the blue”, then its likely something changed in the context to RVN.

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GVN.” This “heavy-handed” approach is in line with the tone set by President Johnson at his meeting with the GVN’s president, prime minister, and key ministers in February 1966 at the Honolulu Conference.) U.S.-Vietnam Relations: 1945-1967 (USVNR), IV.C.8, pp. 36, 38, 41-42; Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., pp. 23-24; General Westmoreland’s description of how he used “subtle leverage” matches PROSVN recommendations. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports., pp. 315-316; Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program., pp. 144-157, Chapter IX, “The Use of Leverage.”

72 See Chapter 2 (comparative analysis-MSSD).

73 Brady, "Refocusing the Discussion of Methodology," in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards., p. 24. CPOs are “about context, process, and mechanisms.” In this case, the processes are the dual carrot-and-stick track of selectively supporting or pushing; the mechanisms are the use of US support and evaluations of GVN officials and programs by USG officials.
5.3.2 President Johnson Designates General Westmoreland as the Single Manager for Pacification

After a series of conferences, fact-finding trips, and organizational changes over the next sixteen months to get “the other war” back on track,74 in spring 1967 President Johnson directed that the Department of Defense—specifically the commander, US military assistance command-Vietnam (MAC-V; General Westmoreland) — should assume responsibility for integrating all “civilian and military aspects of pacification.” He explained his choice for the military assuming the lead in pacification as “the bulk of the people and resources are military”; pacification was “too large and complex for civilian agencies”; and local security, which only the military could provide, was a necessary condition for success. Commensurate with that mandate, President Johnson delegated directive authority to General Westmoreland as the “single manager” for pacification as well as transferring all pacification “functions and personnel” from civilian agencies to “become… part of MAC-V.” The president also authorized General Westmoreland to “call on these agencies… for all resources needed… [and stated that those agencies would] meet these requirements promptly and efficiently.”75

74 A concise summary of this time period can be found in: Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., pp. 3-43, Chapter 1, “Prelude to Change”; Chapter 2, “First Reorganization”; and Chapter 3, “Second Reorganization.”

75 Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are from: Johnson, National Security Action Message 362 ’Responsibility for Us Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)’; notes on lack of and importance of local security in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968.; summary of reasons for decision to assign the task to MAC-
As a further resource for Westmoreland and to ensure that his mandate was implemented, Johnson also reassigned Special Assistant to the President for Pacification Komer\textsuperscript{76} to become Westmoreland’s “deputy for pacification… with personal rank of ambassador… [to assist] carrying out these responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{77} In addition to bringing in the person with most comprehensive view of the challenges and issues with pacification, the decision to assign the “President’s man”—who maintained direct ties to the White House—as Westmoreland’s deputy would also ensure that the military would faithfully and seriously implement the pacification mandate.\textsuperscript{78}

Combining President Johnson’s clear mandate, delegation of authority, and allocation of resources with his rationale for doing so supports this section’s hypothesis and moderately strengthens the causal chain connecting single management to improved control.

\textsuperscript{76} Komer was appointed to this position in March 1966; see Johnson, \textit{National Security Action Memorandum 343 ‘Appointment of Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam’}.

\textsuperscript{77} Johnson, \textit{National Security Action Message 362 ‘Responsibility for Us Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)’}.

\textsuperscript{78} Westmoreland, \textit{A Soldier Reports}., p. 282. Some in the MAC-V staff referred to Komer as “a political commissar.”
5.3.3 General Westmoreland Establishes a Subordinate Agency to Implement Pacification

Ostensibly in anticipation of a possible future merger with all civilian pacification programs, MAC-V had already created a directorate to supervise pacification programs in November 1966. However, that directorate was only manned and organized to oversee the various military civic action programs and miniscule advisor support to the Territorial Forces. The addition of almost ten major and many more minor civilian pacification programs (which had spent the previous five months being integrated into the Office of Civil Operations [OCO]) was beyond the military’s experience and expertise. After coordination and planning between General Westmoreland and Special Assistant to the President Komer in March and April 1967, Westmoreland merged the personnel and programs from the military’s Revolutionary Development Support (RDS) directorate and the US Embassy’s OCO together to

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79 Westmoreland established the Revolutionary Development Support directorate of MAC-V on November 7, 1966, at around the same time the US Embassy was establishing the Office of Civil Operations—an effort to integrate the civilian pacification programs. He saw “this step as temporary, a move to prepare for complete assumption of responsibility” for all pacification programs. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., p. 42; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports., pp. 275-277. In fall 1966, Secretary McNamara “told me he thought it was inevitable that I would eventually be made responsible for pacification.”

80 i.e., MEDCAP, ENCAP, VETCAP, DENTCAP, etc.

81 Political development, economic development, refugees, psychological operations, defectors, etc.


establish CORDS to integrate pacification under single managers from Saigon down to the district level.\textsuperscript{84}

Even though Komer, as a deputy commander, formally wielded no direct authority, General Westmoreland made Ambassador Komer the de facto commander for CORDS when he charged him with “supervising the formulation and execution of the plans and policies” for all pacification programs—civilian and military.\textsuperscript{85} With Komer’s staff directorate at MAC-V exercising “technical supervision” over the parallel staff directorates at the four military regions, who in turn were supervising the pacification advisory teams at the almost fifty provinces and 250 districts, MAC-V created CORDS as a subordinate operating agency.\textsuperscript{86}


\textsuperscript{85} While deputies do not exert command authority in and of themselves, General Westmoreland allowed Komer to exert “technical control” over all pacification programs and units by charging him to “[supervise] the formulation and execution of all plans, policies, and programs, military and civilian” which supported pacification. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., p. 52: “permission to maintain a direct channel of technical supervision to the corps [military regions] and their subordinate at province level,” and p. 66. Komer’s mandate was in: Mac-V Directive 10-12 “Organization and Functions for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support”, Dtd May 28, 1967.

\textsuperscript{86} At first glance, CORDS appeared to be merely a new and separate staff section (alongside personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics), with CORDS sections found in the national and four military regions (Corps) headquarters. However, unlike staff sections that cannot issues directives or orders, an operating agency such as CORDS did issue orders and directives to all pacification elements within its area of operations (regions, provinces, Districts).
Recognizing that CORDS leveraged the five months that it took the US Embassy to form the OCO (while MAC-V was simultaneously forming its RDS directorate) at the national, regional, provincial, and district levels further matches the predictions from policy implementation theory on startup costs.\textsuperscript{87} This section supports the hypothesis and moderately strengthens the connection between single management and increased control.

5.3.4 The New Agency (CORDS) Takes Measures to Internally Improve

Acknowledging that the original ad hoc design was “by no means perfect... an interim scheme,”\textsuperscript{88} the CORDS’ leadership (Komer) undertook measures in three broad areas to develop an organizational identity\textsuperscript{89} and function better: personnel ratings, organizational structure, and budget.

While established at the inception of CORDS, the unique use of personnel evaluations was critical in overcoming agency-centric parochial viewpoints and interests. In typical interagency environments, parent agencies’ write the personnel evaluations...

\textsuperscript{87} Montjoy and O'Toole, "Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: An Organizational Perspective.,” pp. 470-471: “... will experience delays and other start-up costs as agencies develop new routines.”
\textsuperscript{88} Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program., p. 188.
\textsuperscript{89} An organizational esprit de corps goal would be for unit members to switch from perceiving themselves as members of an agency working for CORDS to being members of CORDS who came from and had expertise in a certain agency. In other words, members saw themselves as contributing to pacification as members of CORDS by providing experience and expertise related to the home agency. A popular example comes from a NASA janitor who told President Kennedy that he was “helping put a man on the moon” by keeping the facilities clean and working. Janice R. Lachance, “Public Service Motivation: Lessons from Nasa’s Janitor,” Public Administration Review 77, no. 4 (2017), p. 542.
evaluation of their officers, ensuring that officers protect and safeguard their parent agency’s equities. By insisting that the CORDS chain of command write the personnel evaluations of all CORDS personnel, Komer further helped create an organizational identify by shifting the focus of CORDS officers from protecting their parent agency to improving pacification.90

In typical interagency organizations, the various participating agencies come to consensus and then figuratively carve into stone the specific positions they will fill, regardless of the strengths or weaknesses of the actual person. On the other hand, while the number of billets in CORDS remained fairly constant, the guiding concept was to assign the best capable person. After that person left Vietnam, the slot would then be refilled by the person who best fit the requirements—regardless of their parent agency. While the CORDS director and deputy billets at MAC-V and the four regions were always civilian and military, respectively, the key leadership billets at the provinces and districts (senior advisor and deputy advisor) were roughly half-military and half-civilian—with the senior advisor changing as the threat and security levels changed.91

* Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program., pp. 61-62: “It is very important who writes the efficiency reports. If you’re going to write a guy’s efficiency report that helps determine his promotability, then he is going to be loyal.” Theoretically and in humorous terms, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) “tree hugger” could rate a CIA “spook” who rated a “knuckle dragger” military service member. Komer continued a practice that began with OCO. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., p. 46.

* In high-threat/low-security areas, the military officer was the senior advisor due to the necessity of establishing control. As control increased, the military officer switched to being the deputy advisor, and a
When General Westmoreland established CORDS in May 1967, the GVN’s organizational structure for pacification mirrored the USG’s structure pre-OCO/pre-CORDS with “numerous civilian agencies... all involved in pacification but with little unity or focus to their programs.” Despite using all of the forms of leverage available to him, “Blowtorch” Komer\(^92\) was unable to overcome the GVN’s resistance to also adopting single management—until the Tet offensive.\(^93\)

Conceived within a few days after the January Tet Offensive, in early February 1968 the USG and GVN launched Project Recovery to deal with the need to undertake massive rebuilding and refugee resettlement efforts caused by the surprise attack. After MAC-V directed CORDS to lead and coordinate the USG efforts, the GVN created the

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\(^92\) Because dealing with Komer was like “having a blowtorch aimed at the seat of one’s pants,” the US ambassador to Vietnam in 1996 and 1967 (Henry Cabot Lodge) gave Komer the “blowtorch” moniker from his performance as the special assistant to the president for pacification. Jones, “Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy.” The commander of MAC-V (Westmoreland) agreed that “Lord knows that the president handed me a volatile character.... The nickname was all too apt.... At the start abrasion was in order, and Komer worked overtime on that.” Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 281-282; Westmoreland’s Deputy and then successor (General Creighton Abrams) agreed that “he antagonizes the hell out of everybody.” Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam*, p. 62. Likewise, Komer’s deputy and future replacement (William Colby, future director of the CIA) described Komer as “no shrinking violet.... [He] used his position in the most activist fashion possible... by immediate reference to [President] Johnson to apply the appropriate tongue-lashing;” Colby and McCargar, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam*, p. 206.

Central Recovery Committee (CRC), an ad hoc, presidential-level single management agency to work with CORDS.\textsuperscript{94} Building off the success of single management for refugee/resettlement recovery, and in response to General Westmoreland’s and Ambassador Komer’s exhortations to the GVN to launch a counteroffensive, the GVN also adopted a single management approach for pacification in November 1968—the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC).\textsuperscript{95}

The last area of innovation that CORDS leadership adopted to improve its effectiveness was funding of operations. In a typical interagency effort, each agency funds its efforts that they are supervising and implementing. Because those parent agencies “were unhappy about contributing any funds to programs not under its control,” after the president transferred those programs to CORDS, those agencies could obstruct CORDS programs by delaying funds.\textsuperscript{96} To prevent possible delays while also

\textsuperscript{94} Chaired by the RVN president with the RVN prime minister as its director, the Central Recovery Committee (CRC) supervised and directed the Ministries of the Interior, refugees, Defense, RDS, health, economics, prisoners of war, and information as well as the directorate of national police. For a description of Project Recovery, see Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds., pp. 114-148, “Project Recovery”; Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program., pp. 82-86.\textsuperscript{95} Like the CRC, the CPDC was chaired by the president and directed by the prime minister. Like CORDS, there were CPDC councilmen at the four military regions, almost fifty provinces, and almost 250 districts—each with directive authority over all pacification efforts in their assigned area. See Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam., p. 260; Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds., pp. 150, “counteroffensive,” and 196 “CPDC”; Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., p. 80.

\textsuperscript{96} “Civilian components [in CORDS] will continue to be supported with funds, personnel, and other requirements by the civil agencies involved…. I hereby charge all US departments and agencies with meeting those requirements promptly and effectively.” Johnson, National Security Action Message 362
complying with the legal restrictions on funding projects,\textsuperscript{97} MAC-V adopted the innovative practice of immediately funding all military and civilian CORDS programs with MAC-V (military) funds; the Department of Defense (DoD) would later obtain reimbursement from the parent agencies back in Washington to meet legal fiscal constraints.

While none of these initiatives directly affected policy implementation, these measures made CORDS a more effective and efficient organization—indirectly contributing to pacification. The internal organizational changes and the reasons for those changes support this section’s hypothesis and moderately strengthens the causal argument of single management.

5.3.5 CORDS Modifies the Pacification Programs It Supervises

After General Westmoreland established CORDS as the pacification operating agency for MAC-V, Komer and his deputy (and later successor, William Colby) used their leverage with the GVN and within MAC-V itself to make twenty-two PROSVN-

\textsuperscript{‘Responsibility for Us Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)’; Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., p. 75: “Civilian agency was unhappy.” \textsuperscript{97} Based on Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution and 31 USC 1301, “appropriations shall be applied only to object for which appropriation was made.” In other words, DoD money cannot be spent on USAID projects. However, the USAID reimbursing the DoD for funding a USAID project meets the law’s intent.}
related\textsuperscript{98} programmatic or organizational\textsuperscript{99} changes to improve pacification over the next three-and-a-half years.

The matrix below categorizes those twenty-two measures to improve pacification according to their purpose and timing. Thematically, about one-fifth of the measures were organizational changes, one-third were for increasing control, and one-half were measures that were contingent upon existing control. Timewise, approximately one-fifth occurred in the context of establishing CORDS in 1967 and another fifth appeared during or after the Communists’ 1969 decision to revert to phase I (political/terror) and II (guerilla) conflict and the US switch to “Vietnamization.” The remaining three-fifths occurred in the context of the 1968 Tet Offensive, with 50 percent (eleven of twenty-two) of all of the changes occurring between July and December 1968.

\textsuperscript{98} Most of the major as well as minor programmatic and organizational changes can be directly traced to the PROSVN. The other changes are reasonable variations of PROSVN recommendations. (Army), \textit{A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (Prosvn), Volume I.}, pp. 10-12 show the PROSVN chart graphically depicting the relationship between problems, facts, actions, thrusts, and objectives; pp. 13-27 list the 140 separate tasks separated by the nine “thrusts.” The “Catalogue of Actions” cross-references to the page numbers for the description and rationale of the 140 actions.

\textsuperscript{99} Process tracing for the three organizational changes is in Section 5.3.4 but included here for perspective.
Table 5-1. Overview of 22 Changes Implemented by CORDS Leadership\textsuperscript{100}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>“Other War”</th>
<th>Tet Offensive (General Offensive)</th>
<th>COSVN Decision and Vietnamization</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measures to improve Management</td>
<td>US-CORDS</td>
<td>GVN-CRC</td>
<td>GVN-CFDC</td>
<td>Unit of pacification (from Hamlets to Villages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to establish Control</td>
<td>Increase # of advisors for Territorial Forces</td>
<td>Ph I mission (Worst-Best)</td>
<td>Ph III mission (Shield)</td>
<td>Establish CDF Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures dependent on Control</td>
<td>Political Reform</td>
<td>Miracle rice</td>
<td>Neutralize VC</td>
<td>Land Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total by Time-Period</td>
<td>5 / 22%</td>
<td>2 / 9%</td>
<td>11 / 50%</td>
<td>1 / 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total by Context</td>
<td>5 / 22%</td>
<td>13 / 60%</td>
<td>4 / 20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counting Westmoreland’s decision to establish CORDS, the five major changes in the second half of 1967 occurred within the context of the military taking the initiative against the PLAF/PAVN Main Forces (phase III/conventional forces)\textsuperscript{101} along with President Johnson’s personal involvement and emphasis on “the other war.” Although Ambassador Komer worked for him, General Westmoreland was very aware that his subordinate: developed and sold the president on the specifics for the new pacification

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\textsuperscript{100} These twenty-two coding decisions over three-and-a-half years comprise approximately 20 percent of the almost 110 “major” coding decisions for this thirteen-year case study from 1959 to 1972.

\textsuperscript{101} Beginning in 1965, the drastic military expansion almost exclusively focused on fighting the PAVN/PLAF phase III conventional forces with virtually no effort against the phase I (political) and phase II (guerrilla) forces. The first phase of the buildup aimed to “check” the Communist threat; see Carland, Combat Operations- Stemming the Tide: May 1965 to October 1966. The second phase would “push back” the conventional/main force threat; see MacGarrigle, Combat Operations- Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967.
mandate; was “the president’s man”; was directly appointed by the president to be Westmoreland’s Deputy; and maintained a direct line of communication back to the White House. Both MAC-V and GVN pacification programs were affected by this context.

Considering them contrary to MAC-V preferences and practices, many key leaders within MAV-C opposed Ambassador Komer’s immediate recommendations to increase the number of military advisors training the Territorial Forces by more than 2,000 percent as well as to establish a separate military-civilian intelligence network dedicated to identifying and neutralizing the VCI (phase I political cadre and supporters). To the surprise of many, General Westmoreland “gave CORDS my full

102 Even though the responsibility to train, man, and equip the Territorial Forces shifted from USAID (police effort) to MAC-V (military-effort) in 1961, the military practically ignored the small-unit, defense-oriented Territorial Forces (phase II forces) to concentrate on the large-unit, offensive-oriented conventional forces (phase III). Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds*, p. 108, Table 7.1. “Increases in Advisors for CORDS.” Province-level military advisors grew by 266 personnel or 24 percent from 1,088 (about four to five more per province); district-level military advisors grew by 42 percent, from 1,118 to 1,590 (about one to two more per district). Advisors/trainers for the Territorial Forces/Popular Forces) grew by 2,076 percent, from 108 to 2,243. The new MAC-V emphasis on Territorial Forces then let the CORDS leadership successfully press the RVN military to appoint a vice chief of staff to oversee military pacification and the Territorial Forces. Scoville, *Reorganizing for Pacification Support*, p. 78.

103 As a military force, MAC-V preferred to focus on the Communist military threat—mostly conventional but some larger-scale guerrilla—and ignore the political threat posed by the phase I VCI. This was an ongoing debate between the MAC-V and CIA for most of the war at the national level. For example, see: Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Department of State, *Memorandum of Conversation, Did May 3, 1968*, by Paul V. Deputy Director for Economic Research Walsh, 220, Vol. VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1968). Westmoreland’s decision to support a separate military-civilian intelligence effort was significant because military assets (personnel) were allocated against something the military did not organizationally view as a threat (phase I political cadre).
support, on occasion surprising some of my military colleagues by overruling them on some matter involving resources, people, or responsibility”\(^{104}\) by “turning to the chief of staff, in the presence of all the generals, and [saying], ‘The Ambassador is right...I think we ought to do it his way.’”\(^{105}\)

When CORDS was established in May 1967—over a year after agreeing to President Johnson’s demand that they implement reforms along the lines of his Great Society program\(^{106}\)—the GVN leadership could not answer Johnson’s question “How have you built democracy in the rural areas?” because they had failed to implement any political reform. Within months after Komer’s arrival and his pressing of this issue, the GVN repealed the 1956 law that had authorized the GVN to directly select local leadership and began holding elections to democratically elect village and hamlet chiefs—but only in areas underneath GVN control.\(^{107}\) To complement this limited political reform, the GVN established its first training courses to improve the leadership,

\(^{104}\) Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports., pp. 282-283.

\(^{105}\) Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program., p. 60.; Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., p. 79.


\(^{107}\) These chiefs and the villages had limited executive, legislative, and judicial authorities.
ethics, and technical competence of those newly elected chiefs, village councilmen, and district- and province-level GVN bureaucrats.

However, due to domestic political considerations, the GVN did not always completely follow USG recommendations as a sovereign state. To balance the urban elites’ political concerns while demonstrating progress to their USG partners, the GVN promulgated prime ministerial decrees that authorized but did not direct full political reform, land reform, mass mobilization, local militias, and VCI targeting/neutralization programs. Only laws or decrees signed by the president required the GVN to take action. By the end of 1967 the war had been fought almost exclusively in the rural countryside, not in the major cities and towns where that urban elite lived.

(Nearly) simultaneously striking almost every major cities and urban centers across Vietnam in January 1968, the Communist General Offensive (Tet Offensive) changed that context. For the first time, the urban elite—which had opposed a number of the USG pacification recommendations because they negatively affected the elites’

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110 The general offensive occurred in three phases. The first, largest, and most-known occurred in January 1968, the second “mini-Tet” happened in May, and the final was in August.
power—personally witnessed and experienced the hazards of war.\textsuperscript{111} As a result, over the course of five months between February and July, the GVN changed those nonbinding prime ministerial decrees into laws and/or presidential decrees that enacted a number of PROSVN-based USG recommendations.

The National Assembly’s mass mobilization bill greatly expanded the military manpower pool; it purposefully and dramatically enlarged the Territorial Forces and created a civilian defense force—called the Peoples’ Self-Defense Force (PSDF).\textsuperscript{112} After much lobbying by MAC-V/CORDS leadership over the course of spring 1968 that the “infrastructure [VCI] is just \textit{vital}, absolutely \textit{critical}, to the success of the [Viet Cong],” the president signed a decree (that had been written by Deputy CORDS Director William Colby) establishing a national program targeting the VCI (phase I cadre): the Phoenix, or \textit{Phung Hoang}. To supplement the Phoenix program, the operational decision was made to establish permanent police presence down to every village.\textsuperscript{113} The MAC-V

\textsuperscript{111} In addition to the destruction and deaths caused by the general offensive itself, the urban population also saw or learned about the massacres of civilians at Hue (and other cities) and the massive refugee crisis caused by dislocated people.

\textsuperscript{112} The General Mobilization Law of June 1968. Sorley, \textit{A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam.}, pp. 14-15.; Hunt, \textit{Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds.}, pp. 152-154, “A Stronger Base.” The bill required all males between ages 16 and 50 to serve in the regular forces, Territorial Forces, or village/hamlet militia—the PSDF. It increased the draft-eligible age by twelve years from ages 21 to 28 to ages 19 to 38. If men ages 31 to 38 were drafted, they had the ability to choose to serve in their local Territorial Forces (phase II) instead of the main ARVN forces (phase III) — and frequently did.

CORD leadership also leveraged the shock of Tet on the GVN to shift the priority of pacification efforts from reinforcing and protecting already secure hamlets to aggressively targeting and deploying forces into weakly controlled/Communist-controlled hamlets.\footnote{Hunt, \textit{Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds.}, pp. 154-159: “Moving Towards Expansion” and “Getting the South Vietnamese on Board.” Komer argued to Abrams to shift pacification priorities from “best to worse” to “worst to best” with, “Should we concentrate on improving our hold over what we have or on expanding our presently unsatisfactory hold?” p. 155, note 50; Komer recommended to GVN president, “Instead of measured consolidation… raise the security rating of … contested hamlets”; p. 156. Changing the prioritization of pacification to “from worst to best… or worst first” is in line with Kalyvas’ findings that only the deployment of incumbent forces in zones 3, 4, or 5 could change the level of control. Kalyvas, \textit{The Logic of Violence in Civil War}.} While the Tet Offensive changed the context for the Vietnamese urban elites, the massive Communist losses of conventional/main forces also affected how MAC-V viewed the war.

Despite the absence of “the [lame duck] President’s man,” the replacement of General Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer in the first half of 1968 was more of form than substance because General Abrams and Ambassador Colby fully supported the PROSVN-based pacification mandate.\footnote{General Abrams served as the deputy commander for MAC-V from May 1967 until June 1968, when he replaced Westmoreland as the commander. Colby served as the deputy director for CORDS from early 1968 until summer 1968, when he replaced Komer. More important, as the Army vice chief of staff in 1966, Abrams had reviewed and approved the PROSVN report for dissemination. Sorley, \textit{A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam.}, pp. 6-7. As a previous CIA station chief in Saigon, Colby encouraged and supported many of the pacification programs as “pilot,” or test, programs in select provinces or districts that the PROSVN study recommended for countrywide emulation.} Combining his support for the PROSVN recommendations with his personal observations, General Abrams stated:
Things I do think important are that we preempt or defeat the enemy’s major military operations and eliminate or render ineffective the major portion of his guerrillas and his infrastructure—the political, administrative and para-military structure on which his whole movement depends... It is far more significant that we neutralize one thousand of these guerrillas and infrastructure than kill 10,000 North Vietnamese soldiers.\textsuperscript{116}

Abrams made three major changes to how the non-pacification forces of MAC-V would support pacification. First, in light of the decreased threat by PLAF phase III forces due to their massive losses during Tet, Abrams changed the primary mission of US conventional forces from conducting “search and attack” against Communist main forces to primarily serving as the “shield,” with Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) main forces in combined operations to protect local pacification efforts from PLAF/PAVN phase III conventional forces.\textsuperscript{117} To fight the PLAF guerrilla (phase II) and militia (phase I) forces, he also directed that more US conventional forces revert to small-unit tactics and conduct combined operations with the small-unit, defensive-oriented Territorial Forces. Lastly, recognizing that his emphasis on US forces conducting local security operations increased the risk of civilian casualties/damage and observing the negative effects of friendly fire (artillery, air strikes), he ordered that “no matter how

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\textsuperscript{117} Prior to this, the US and other FWMAF conducted “search and attack” oriented on conventional/main force units, and ARVN split their forces between “search and attack” and pacification support. After this decision, only FWMAF (most notably the Republic of Korea) remained almost exclusively oriented on fighting large, conventional units.
\end{flushright}
frustrating… restraint will and must govern virtually all of our activities… We cannot apply the full firepower capabilities of our military… would endanger the lives and property… of the very people we are all fighting to protect.”\textsuperscript{118}

Improving local security (control) by switching to a “clearing and holding” approach set the conditions for the GVN to “build”\textsuperscript{119} support for itself by finally completing the political and economic reform that it had promised in spring 1966 at the Honolulu Conference. In the latter half of 1969, the prime minister’s declaration that “the President and I are creating a democratic society in which locally elected leaders will hold real authority and responsibility” signaled the return of the village to its traditional, autonomous, and critical role in rural Vietnam.\textsuperscript{120} The village and hamlet chiefs transitioned from being locally elected (in late 1967) with little authority to being locally elected with legislative, budgetary, executive, etc., authorities.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{118} Sorley, \textit{A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam.}, pp. 27-29. After the damage caused by Tet to the city of Saigon, Abrams wryly noted that the military could save Saigon only six more times before it was totally destroyed. Restrained ROE was also a PROSVN suggestion.  
\textsuperscript{119} While not fully enacted until Abrams and Colby, the “Clear, Hold, and Build” concept was suggested by Komer and based on PROSVN recommendations. Komer, \textit{“Clear, Hold and Rebuild.”}, pp. 16-24.  
\textsuperscript{120} Colby and McCargar, \textit{Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam.}, p. 274. From a conversation with province chiefs losing the authority to preapprove any village project; the rest of the quote includes, “If they steal the funds, the Province Chief should punish them. But if their decision merely turns out to be unwise, it is up their community to choose someone better.”  
\textsuperscript{121} The village chiefs exercised command or control over any GVN efforts (other than conventional forces) that took place within and around their villages: Territorial Forces, village-level police detachment, PSDF militia, and Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC). The village chief, in conjunction with the locally elected village council, could pass, enforce, and judge local laws as well as raise local taxes to pay for local projects. They also had a role to play in the Phoenix program targeting VCI and the \textit{Chieu Hoi} program for ralliers. Ibid., p. 279.
Around the same time that full political reform at the village level was occurring, the Communist leadership in the South changed the operational approach from emphasizing phase III (escalation of conventional forces to lead to the general offensive/general uprising [GO/GU] of dau tranh) to reverting to phase I (political war and terrorism) and phase II (guerrilla warfare). While this directive was not issued until July 1, 1969, it reflected the reality of the Communists’ severe losses from the 1968 GOs (January/Tet, May, and August 1968).

Full economic reform followed one year later when the GVN implemented the “Land to the Tillers” program that transferred ownership of agricultural land from landlords (normally elites living in Saigon and other major cities and towns) to the family that farmed it. When GVN implemented these PROSVN-based programs pushed by the US, it reversed the two major grievances exploited by the Communist insurgency beginning in 1956: eliminating the traditional role of the village and

122 Cosvn Resolution 9, vol. Folder 18 (Texas Tech University The Vietnam Center and Archive, 1 July 1969). Key points: need to preserve PLAF strength to protract war; phase III forces to break down into small units and employ guerrilla tactics; increase political agitation and proselytizing, and directly attack RVN pacification forces. Excellent short summary in Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam., p. 156, and Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds., pp. 218-219.

123 The GVN compensated the landlords with GVN bonds and did not require farmers to pay any money for their land. Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam., p. 279.
overturning the land reform measures taken during the First Indochina War by reverting back to the landlord-tenant farming system.

Each of the many changes to pacification programs (DSOs) is congruent with the organizational literature on implementing a new mandate for a “wicked” problem. Because the CPOs explain why, how, and when those DSO changes occurred, the causal linkage between single management and improved pacification is moderately strengthened.124

5.3.6 MAC-V and CORDS Conduct Integrated Pacification Planning

Taking advantage of the US Embassy establishing and manning the OCO and the MAC-V establishing and manning RDS directorates125 over the previous six months, the MAC-V and CORDS leadership immediately began conducting integrated pacification planning in May 1967. The timing of CORDS’ establishment in May and the semiannual publication of military and civilian plans provides an opportunity to conduct a before-

124 Because the mechanisms and processes explaining how and why the US altered or initiated pacification programs remained fairly constant during the existence of CORDS, changes in operational and organizational contexts explain when those changes were implemented.

125 Both the OCO and RSD existed at every level from the national to province level. Only MAC-V’s RDS extended down to the approximately 245 districts. The OCO exercised single management over all civilian pacification programs, and the RDS did so over all military pacification programs. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., pp. 40–42, 57, “Chart 2: Structure of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) within the US Mission: Dec 66 – Apr 67.”
after analysis between Unity of Effort and Unity of Command to test whether single
management led to integrated planning.

Before CORDS’ establishment, the various USG and GVN military and civilian
agencies fell within the Unity of Effort organizational structure of the Mission Council
(USG) and the Joint Council (USG and GVN). Despite sharing Unity of Effort, the
various “subordinate” agencies failed to develop coordinated and integrated plans with
each other. MAC-V and ARVN produced a combined military campaign plan to
integrate and synchronize their operations against the PAVN/PLAF conventional forces
(phase III). The only mention of pacification was that some portion of ARVN forces
would support it and that US and other FWMAF would conduct civic action projects
(CAPs). Likewise, the OCO and the various GVN ministries also developed a
nonbinding plan that essentially agreed that they would coordinate and work together,
but it lacked any specific goals or objectives. Neither plan addressed how or even if the
military and civilian efforts would work together.127

126 Ibid., p. 10.
plan was mostly from the Ministry of Revolutionary Development with minimal input from the other
ministries; the 1966 and 1967 combined military campaign plans focused US/ARVN forces against
PAVN/PLAF Division and Regiments (phase III conventional forces) and offered no guidance on
combating the PLAF guerrillas (phase II) or cadre/militia (Phase I). Chester L. Cooper et al., *History of
pp. 241-242, 251; clarifying that ARVN would dedicate a portion of their conventional (phase III) forces to
support pacification (which was not defined); see Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports.*, p. 331; Jeffrey Johnstone
Four days after President Johnson designated him as the single manager for pacification and two days after he decided to establish CORDS, General Westmoreland convened a Commanders’ Conference on May 13, 1967, to focus almost exclusively on pacification. Meeting with his senior MAC-V staff as well as the leadership of the four military regions (corps commanders), Westmoreland explained that MAC-V would integrate all of the civilian and military programs under his deputy for pacification: Ambassador Komer.

Because the ongoing implementation of the 1967 military and civilian campaign plans precluded major changes, Ambassador Komer briefed the senior commanders and staff on eight measures that MAC-V either would unilaterally implement within US forces or suggest to the GVN to improve pacification. Emphasizing that improved pacification required “a comprehensive package” of integrated programs instead of a single “golden bullet” program, the first and foremost objective for Project Take-Off was to improve integrated pacification planning for the next major campaign plan. After the conference, Komer oversaw the establishment of civilian-military planning team to

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128 Johnson, National Security Action Message 362 'Responsibility for Us Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)’. With Ambassador Komer as his deputy for pacification, Westmoreland was “charged with this responsibility in Vietnam,” in line with the idea of civilian control, he was “under the overall authority of the Ambassador [Bunker].” Bunker would be the primary interface with the GVN government, and Westmoreland would interface with the ARVN and supervise the actual implementation of programs.

oversee the pacification plans of the various GVN ministries and the military to meet that objective.\textsuperscript{130}

Beginning with the July-December update to the 1967 “Combined Campaign Plan,”\textsuperscript{131} every subsequent MAC-V/ARVN (military) plan\textsuperscript{132} shifted from exclusively focusing on military tasks and objectives (fighting the PAVN/PLAF conventional forces) to integrated civilian-military pacification. Despite varying in the details, these plans were conceptually the same. The orders would identify a number of major, broad objectives (the vast majority were directly or indirectly related to pacification) and provide quantifiable goals for all of the military and civilian pacification programs—most notably, the number of villages or hamlets to bring under GVN control. These

\textsuperscript{130} The eight objectives were: 1) improve pacification planning; 2) accelerate Chieu Hoi (Open Arms); 3) attack the VCI; 4) expand the ARVN’s support to pacification; 5) expand the RDC program; 6) increase capability to support refugees; 7) revamp the police; and 8) press for land reform. Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program., p. 66-70; Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds., pp. 100-101.

\textsuperscript{131} A change to an existing order is referred to as a FRAGO (for fragmentary order). In this case, the annual campaign plan published in January is the base order that is updated during the summer with a FRAGO. Planning Guidance for Senior Commanders for the Period 1 Nov 67 - 30 Apri 68 (U), by MAC-V, Vol. Planning Directive 9-67 (SAigon, RVN, 1967).

\textsuperscript{132} While the campaign remained a product of the military’s planning effort, its name changed as it became a whole-of-government plan: 1967 = “Combined Campaign Plan”; 1968 and 1969= “Pacification & Development Plan”; and 1970-1972 = “Community Defense & Local Development.” An interesting indicator showing “Vietnamization” is the date the plan was published. Every plan up until 1970 was published and went into effect on January 1—the first day of the Western year. In 1971, it was published on March 1—the first day of the Vietnamese Lunar Year. Tran, Pacification., pp. 75-88, Chapter IV, “RVN-US Cooperation and Coordination in Pacification”; Cooper et al., History of Pacification., pp. 289, 301, 304, 320.; Graham A. Cosmas, Macv: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal 1968-1973, vol. CMH Pub 91-7-1, Us Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center of Military History (CMH), 2005)., pp. 130-131.
plans would also define the roles and responsibilities for the various types of forces to include specifying how they supported and interacted with each other. Additionally, each GVN ministry included its plan explaining how its resources and personnel supported the campaign plan and were attached as annexes.

The MAC-V’s plan would then provide its four subordinate military regions: specific, quantifiable goals for every pacification program; military and civilian resources from the US and/or GVN; and guidance on how efforts and resources would be prioritized by MAC-V between regions as well as how to prioritize pacification efforts within each region. Based on their specific goals, objectives, resources, and prioritization, each region would do the same planning process with its provinces, which repeated the process for their respective districts. At each organizational level of MAC-V, there was a CORDS section to participate in the planning and then directing and supervising the implementation of those pacification programs.

The ability to conduct a before-after test comparing integrated planning utilizing Unity of Effort (Mission Council) to Unity of Command (CORDS) conclusively finds that

133 For roles and missions of the various military and civilian pacification forces, see Appendix 2 (Concept Use of Forces) to Annex B (Military Support for Pacification) to Combined Campaign Plan (Ke-Hoach Hon-Hop Quan Su), by General William Childs (COMUSMACV) Vien Westmoreland, General Cao Van Vien (Chief JGS RVNAF), , Vol. AB 143 (Saigon, RVN, 1968).
135 Combined Campaign Plan (Ke-Hoach Hon-Hop Quan Su), p. 27, paragraph 5.
integrated management led to improved planning and synchronized plans. Pacification in Vietnam shifted from a multitude of individual pacification plans to a single plan for a multitude of agencies to implement.” 136 As a hoop test/necessary condition, supporting the hypothesis that single management improves planning only marginally increases the likelihood that single management improves policy implementation. In line with the military adages of “no plan survives contact with the enemy” and “the best plan poorly executed is poor,” developing a synchronized plan does not guarantee that its implementation will actually be synchronized.

5.3.7 Control Is Improved

Even if it is perfectly implemented, there is no guarantee that a synchronized plan will achieve the desired effect or outcome.137 Although MAC-V’s synchronized implementation of the “comprehensive package” of civilian and military pacification


137 From the organizational and management literature, there is tension between measuring performance (MOPs) and measuring effectiveness (MOEs). Relatively, MOPs are far easier to objectively evaluate than MOEs but are far less important. In other words, implementing pacification programs correctly or according to plan is irrelevant if nothing is successfully pacified. Jean-Francois Henri, "Performance Measurement and Organizational Effectiveness: Bridging the Gap," Managerial Finance 30, no. 6 (2004), http://www.fsa.ulaval.ca/HTML/fileadmin/pdf/Ecole_comptabilite/Publications/2003-04-3.pdf.
programs\textsuperscript{138} co-varied with generally increasing control from mid-1967 to 1972,\textsuperscript{139} the causal inference is weakened because the US/GVN were assessing their own effectiveness. The best judge of the effectiveness of pacification programs—the leadership of the Communist insurgency—did assess the US/GVN pacification program as effective. As with integrated planning, a before-after analysis of implementation confirms this hypothesis.\textsuperscript{140}

Ineffective anarchy generally describes overall pacification before CORDS.\textsuperscript{141}

Throughout the provinces and districts of South Vietnam, a multitude of USG and GVN

\textsuperscript{138}At the May 13, 1967 Commanders’ Conference, “Ambassador Bunker and Westmoreland stressed that pacification was a single program constituting a part of a larger combined civil-military effort”; Komer highlighted that pacification was many unified programs. Scoville, \textit{Reorganizing for Pacification Support.}, pp 61-62.

\textsuperscript{139}See Chapter 3 “Outcome Variable (Trends in Control).” Although the data shows that control increased in the second half of 1967, because of the lack of precision in the data, three alternate “inflection points” in control will also be examined.

\textsuperscript{140}This idea leverages the 1971 dissertation work by James McCollum, who used a single qualitative method to narrowly study just the organizational structures for interagency operations without comparing the effects of other possible EVs or using multiple methods. McCollum’s work combines his personal observations from serving in pacification efforts in 1965 to 1966 (pre-CORDS) and 1970 to 1971 (during CORDS) with in-country interviews with CORDS officers—especially Team 90 from Tây Ninh province. James Kenneth McCollum, \textit{Cords: Pacification Success through Modern Management} (1971), pp. 6-7: “no connection between military and civilian efforts… ineffective because not coordinated, integrated effort,” and p. 84: “The big difference has been in the integration of the programs.” McCollum elaborated on his dissertation’s findings on organizational structures (matrix organization) in increasingly rigorous journals beginning with a monthly periodical in 1982 (\textit{Army Magazine}), a military professional journal in 1983 (\textit{Armed Forces Journal}), and an academic peer-reviewed journal in 1984 (\textit{International Journal of Public Administration}).

\textsuperscript{141}This describes pacification operations in general. There were examples of success, and the lessons learned from those examples became adopted nationwide later. The best example is the province of Kiến Hòa under the leadership of RVN Lieutenant Colonel Trần Ngọc Châu—a former officer in the Viet Minh who had applied \textit{dau tranh} to the French in the First Indochina War. The tactics he developed to fight PLAF \textit{dau tranh} in conjunction with US CIA and military advisors essentially became the pacification approach used under CORDS. The Army’s PROSVN study and CIA considered Hòa a model of a “successful pacification program”; Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (Army), \textit{A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term...
advisors were competing with each other to gain the attention of and provide advice and direction to the single GVN province/district chief. Those advisors received their guidance and direction directly from a multitude of agencies in DC or Saigon, with no one coordinating or directing them (other than the president). Each of those agencies implemented its portion of pacification at times and places independent of and normally without coordinating with other agencies. Even if their programs could actually support other programs/ministries if they had made some effort to coordinate, “agencies tended to do [their] own thing and run [their] own projects… [with] no one in charge.”

The various ad hoc attempts to coordinate the various military and civilian pacification programs generally failed. To provide security for pacification operations in villages, some military operations oriented solely against the Communist conventional forces (phase III) “in the field/jungle” but did nothing to stop the phase II


142 The citation covers the entire paragraph and is a summary of many very similar but not identical observations. Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam., pp. 191-192, for quote at end; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports., p. 275: “All agencies were competing for resources and scarce South Vietnamese manpower. Each agency still had its own chain of command extending down to the provinces [and some districts] and its separate contact with its parent organization in Washington where no one other than the President was putting it together”; Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support., p. vi and Chapter 1, “Prelude to Change”; Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975., p. 202.

143 Except where noted, representative anecdotes for this paragraph are from Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds., pp. 45-63, Chapter 4, “Not by Force Alone: the US Army in Pacification.”
(guerrilla) and phase I (political/militia) from infiltrating into and operating in the villages. In other areas, programs to build support from the population would either only have security for a few days and/or the project was not “handed over” to a GVN ministry to operate it. Attempts to integrate military and civilian programs frequently had shortfalls in personnel and/or material resources due to late, or poor, coordination. Some US military operations that were intended to support pacification actually weakened the position of the GVN due to battle damages or intentionally creating refugees. The efforts to neutralize the VCI (phase I political cadre and

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144 Over several months of operations in 1966 in the province of Hậu Nghĩa, to the west of Saigon, the guerrillas moved into the villages. And when the US attacked them there, there were high degrees of civilian casualties—further alienating the population; p. 50.

145 Numerous “County Fair operations” provided security for three to five days and then departed, leaving lightly armed RDC (phase I paramilitary) to fight off guerrilla or conventional forces (phases II or III); pp. 47-48.

146 After the rapid buildup of US forces in 1965, the forces essential for establishing bases became available for CAPs. Aggressively performing ENCAPs (engineer), MEDCAPs (medical), dental CAPs (DENTCAPs), and VETCAPs (veterinarian), the units would accomplish projects to build goodwill but were unable to hand over the project to the GVN (e.g., building a schoolhouse with no teachers or books; medical exams to identify problems but no follow-up to resolve them). P. 47: “Military civic action projects undertaken without consulting knowledgeable officials and soundness of the project… instances of USAID schools being built but no teachers… and if the [Viet Cong were] destroyed, no one cared because it was not ‘their’ school.” McCollum, Cords: Pacification Success through Modern Management, pp. 6-7.

147 Less than one month before military operations were to begin in Long An province in fall 1966, the military commander requested far more RDC support teams than were available in that short amount of time; p. 52. For military operations in the village of Long Hưu (situated along a key river for trade) in March 1967, the military commander coordinated in time to have personnel from the GVN ministries available, but they lacked the requisite materials/resources to provide support, p. 54.

148 In January 1967, the plan for Operation Cedar Falls, conducted by large elements of the US Army, intentionally created refugees (to remove them from large-unit fighting) but did not inform the GVN ministries that were responsible for handling refugees until after the operation began, pp. 56-59; MacGarrigle, Combat Operations- Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967., pp. 97, 102, 104-107 (refugees).
supporters) were hamstrung by multiple operational elements and intelligence networks independently collecting but not disseminating information.\textsuperscript{149}

While limited at first, the switch to single management generally improved the coordination and synchronization of pacification programs in increasingly greater degrees over time.\textsuperscript{150} Although pacification planning did not substantially improve during the five months of the OCO,\textsuperscript{151} from December 1966 to April 1967, the simple act of physically co-locating the various pacification advisors (primarily the USAID, CIA, and USIS) in offices at the national, regional, provincial, and (some) district levels increased the advisors' awareness of each other’s programs. Additionally, coordination between advisors and programs became dramatically easier because it required only talking to an officemate. When there were differences on how to integrate various pacification efforts, the single manager would direct a solution. Lastly, speaking with

\textsuperscript{149}Beginning in December 1966, during Operation Fairfax in Gia Định province (adjacent to Saigon) that specifically targeted the VCI, the GVN had five separate intelligence networks and the US had almost as many. But there was no unified plan to collect and disseminate information. Operationally, the CIA-sponsored provincial reconnaissance unit (PRU) refused to disclose where they were operating to the American units, pp. 55-56.

\textsuperscript{150}Similar to pacification efforts before CORDS, this describes the trend, not the rule, in pacification operations. There were plenty of examples of poor pacification efforts after single management, but as time progressed, they increasingly became the exception. For example, Operation Russell Beach/Bold Mariner in early 1969 in the province of Quảng Ngãi (the village of Mỹ Lai is in this province) used forced location of civilians similar to Operation Cedar Falls in January 1967. See Hunt, \textit{Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds.}, pp. 227-232: “A Step Backwards: Operation RUSSEL BEACH/BOLD MARINER.”

\textsuperscript{151}Single management of civilian pacification programs (see Section 5.3.6).
one voice also improved the OCO’s ability to coordinate with MAC-V as well as their GVN counterpart (who now only had two advisers: one military and one civilian).\textsuperscript{152}

After the merging of the civilian OCO and military RDS directorate to form CORDS in May 1967, GVN leaders from the national to district levels then had only one USG counterpart providing advice and guidance for planning and implementing pacification. As with the OCO, co-locating all military and civilian pacification program managers in the same office under a single manager at every level improved awareness, coordination, and synchronization. Doing the same with the CORDS directorate with MAC-V and military regions headquarters had the same effect on planning, implementing, and monitoring pacification with the conventional military operations.\textsuperscript{153}

After the semiannual top-down planning guidance that provided objectives, goals, resources, and prioritizations came down the chain of command from the national level to the districts (see Section 5.3.6), “bottom-up” operational/implementation


\textsuperscript{153} In Vietnam, the smallest units that permanently controlled “battle space” were corps (commanded by lieutenant generals, or three-star generals) in military regions I through IV. The lower units (divisions, brigades, etc.) temporarily controlled the battle space they occupied at the time, but they could be moved around the military region or even around the country. Similar to corps/regions, the provinces and districts were permanent battle spaces, and the province and district commanders controlled their respective Territorial Forces (regional forces in provinces and popular forces in districts). With both tactical divisions and pacification provinces under their command, the corps/military region had the authority to synchronize conventional and pacification operations.
planning then occurred from the districts back to the national level.\textsuperscript{154} Beginning with the district and based on the “top-down” guidance, the single managers developed their plan to synchronize all military and civilian pacification programs in time, space, and purpose within their assigned area to meet their assigned objectives. The next higher chain of command then reviewed and synchronized all of their subordinates’ plans in time, space, and purpose to meet the higher level’s assigned objectives and “[modified the lower-level plan] if it was too cautious or did not fit well with the plans of the neighboring District [or province or region].”\textsuperscript{155}

While the timing and location (space) for pacification varied, the way in which, or “how,” pacification occurred generally followed the Clear, Hold, and Build model.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{154} While there are different types of plans serving different purposes, they are all called plans. For simplicity, this paper refers to the “top-down” campaign plans as planning guidances because they told subordinate echelons what needed to be achieved and are described in the planning section (Section 5.3.6). Because the “bottom-up” operational/implementation plans described how the subordinate elements would achieve the goals, they are included in this section (5.3.7). For discussion on different types of plans, see Kevin Marcus, “Random Thoughts on Practical Planning,” (January 30 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/random-thoughts-practical-planning-kevin-marcus., section “Know why you’re planning.”

\textsuperscript{155} Assuming a uniform distribution of political geography for illustrative purposes of bottom-up operational planning, each province would synchronize five to six districts, and then each region would synchronize ten to eleven provinces, and finally, the theater-/national-level would synchronize the four regions. See Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam., pp. 259-290, Chapter 16, “Pacification on the Offense,” especially p. 261 on the process of bottom-up reviewing of operational plans.; Tran, Pacification., pp. 78, 81. Both authors were firsthand witnesses of this process: Ambassador Colby as CORDS director and Brigadier General Tho in the RVN joint general staff’s plans section.

\textsuperscript{156} This is a generic description based on several sources who were pacification leaders. Although this was a simultaneous, not sequential, process, the emphasis of the pacification forces varied over time as conditions changed. Initial efforts were mostly “clear” with some “hold” and “build.” Over time, the majority of the effort would be “build [support],” some “hold,” and minimal “clear.” Komer, “Clear, Hold and Rebuild.”; Tran, Pacification. In multiple sections describing various programs and initiative, Komer would explain
After the headquarters selected an area for pacification, conventional and territorial military forces would “clear” the immediate areas of PAVN/PLAF conventional forces (phase III) as well as PLAF guerrilla forces (phase II). At the same time, the Phoenix (Phung Huong) and Open Arms (Chiu Hoi) “cleared” the village-level Communist forces (VCI; phase I political cadre and supporters) by killing, capturing, neutralizing, or co-opting them. The combination of the national police element with the newly manned, trained, and equipped local village militia (PSDF) would provide the enduring, persistent security presence in the villages and hamlets to “hold” against future Communist phase I incursions and infiltration.

Concurrent with the “clear” and “hold,” the GVN RDC and other GVN ministries would enter the hamlet/village and implement various pacification programs what was done in areas being pacified and what (minimally) occurred in areas not being pacified; Colby and McCargar, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam*, pp. 264-266.

157 Pacification targets could be a village, groups of villages, or a portion of or even an entire district. The selection was normally based on a combination of population size, economic importance (agriculture, industry, fishing, etc.), and/or vicinity to other important areas. Before Tet, in an area selected for pacification, the US/GVN would reinforce the hamlets already under some degree of government control to protect them while trying to encourage Communist-controlled hamlets to switch. After Tet, the US/GVN would pacify the hamlets under Communist control first.

158 Conventional forces would initially (if required) conduct large-unit operations if Communist phase III forces were present to “push them out” of the area. They would then or simultaneously break down for small-unit operations and conduct combined operations with the Territorial Forces to go after the Communist guerrillas. After offensively clearing out the Communist phase II and III forces, the conventional and territorial forces then switched to the defensive, or “shield,” mission to protect the village-level pacification operations.

159 The PSDF were manned, trained, and equipped by a combination of the paramilitary RDC and MAC-V/ARVN military training teams.
to start “building” support (or at least collaboration) for the GVN. Once certain security, political, economic, and social criteria were met, the RDC would run village- and hamlet-level elections for the village/hamlet chiefs and councils. Once additional political, social, economic, and security criteria were met after the elections, then the RDC and GVN would implement major economic reforms by instituting land reform and introducing “miracle”/“Honda” rice (along with funding for other economic development projects) to dramatically improve the economy of that area. In sharp contrast to the multitude of programs being anarchically implemented at multiple differing times and places pre-CORDS, single management generally prioritized and synchronized all efforts in pacification operations at specific locations and times.

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160 The RDC (phase I political) conducted census-grievance, social activities, information/influence, low-level civic action projects, political reform, etc., operations and raised and trained local militia, etc. While not an RDC mission, an element of the national police established a police station in the village. Additionally, select US/FWMAF forces augmented the village operations—mostly civic actions unit (ENCAP, MEDCAP, DENTCAP, VETCAP, civil affairs).

161 Trained, manned, equipped, and effective PSDF/militia; established and functioning police department; education and training on democracy and governance; re-establishment of the traditional Vietnamese social organizations; and Phoenix (Phung Huong) and Open Arms (Chieu Hoi) councils and offices were effectively functioning and meeting goals.

162 Technically called IR-8 rice. This hybrid rice strain was developed in the Philippines as part of the Green Revolution. Not only did it produce substantially more rice per hectare than the rice native to Vietnam, it also grew much faster. This allowed rice farmers to have three, instead of two, rice harvests per year. It was called “miracle” rice for those technical reasons and “Honda” rice for economic reasons—farmers made enough money from this rice that they could purchase a Honda scooter. Martin Clemis, “Agrowar in the Year of the Goat: Rice, Irregular Warfare, and the Search for Peace in South Vietnam, 1967” (paper presented at the 1967: The Search for Peace, Texas Tech University Vietnam Center & Archive 2017).
With the combination of “fog” and “friction” with an interactive, adaptive enemy, single managers needed to continue to monitor and supervise ongoing pacification efforts because no operation went exactly according to plan. Regardless of their level (theater down to district), single managers at all levels were authorized and encouraged to continuously synchronize and reallocate military and civilian manpower, material, and funding in time, space, and purpose to “put them where they [would] do the most good in helping to ensure success.”

However, this argument is based on the USG’s twin perceptions and beliefs that its operations were synchronized and control (as measured by the USG) improved. While compelling, the causal inference is weakened, because it is based on how the USG/GVN believed it affected the Communist insurgency, not how it actually affected it. In other words, USG/GVN perception of their performance only moderately

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164 Assets could be reallocated from successful areas to 1) reinforce/assist areas that were having greater difficulties than anticipated or 2) capitalize on an unexpected opportunity. In planning terminology, those are “branch plans” to deal with when something goes wrong and “sequel plans” for opportunities. Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam*, p. 66; Colby and McCargar, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam*, p. 259, 264, 266, 295.

165 This reflects the planning concern of MOPs versus MOEs. MOPs are easier to measure but have less construct validity, whereas MOEs have better construct validity but are harder to measure.
strengthens the plausibility of the causal chain, but similar assessments by the leadership of the Communist insurgency had a strong effect.

Because of the critical role of the VCI (phase I political cadre and supporters) in the doctrine of *dau tranh*, the Communist leadership attested to the effectiveness of specific “clear” and “hold” pacification programs that targeted the VCI (phase I) and low-level guerrillas (phases I and II) in official histories, interviews, and other communications. First, foremost, and most (in)famous was the Phoenix (*Phuong Hoang*) program that targeted the phase I political cadre as well as administrative and logistical supporters by capturing, killing, or neutralizing/compromising them. If Phoenix

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166 In offensive conventional military operations against an enemy whose location is unknown, commanders may implement a “reconnaissance pull” operation in which they base their main maneuver on the feedback from their reconnaissance elements that tell them where the enemy is and is not. In an offensive political operation (insurgency, or *dau tranh*), the VCI are equivalent to the reconnaissance element in that where they achieve phase I political success, they will then follow with phase II (guerrilla) and then phase III (conventional) operations. Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam*, pp. 59, 68, 104, General Abrams’ assessment: “That infrastructure is just vitally, absolutely critical, to the success of either the VC military or this political campaign…. They just have to have it,” “The VCI permits the main force to operate,” and “The best thing to do is to get out and beat the hell out of the cadre and local forces… so that the ability of the big units... is militarily impractical”; p. 60: A National Security Council study found that “the enemy’s main forces lose sources of food, recruitment, intelligence and concealment.” In a post-war assessment, the ARVN commanding general (Van Vien Cao) remarked in General Van Vien Cao and Lieutenant General Van Khuyen Dong, *Reflections on the Vietnam War*, vol. CMH Pub 92, *Indochina Monographs* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1980), pp. 60,“As long as the VCI continued to exist, total victory could not be achieved,” and on p. 149, “It was the VCI, not the guerrillas or local forces, which was the foundation of insurgency…. Death of the VCI therefore was the primary condition of security.”

directly reduced the VCI, the Open Arms (Chieu Hoi) program indirectly reduced the effect of the political cadre’s agitprop\textsuperscript{168} and recruiting efforts by inducing (mostly) low-level Communist political, logistical, and military supporters to “rally” (surrender) back to the GVN.\textsuperscript{169} Lastly, where Phoenix and Open Arms offensively “cleared” the village of phase I cadre, the PSDF defensively “held” the villages and hamlets and was a “source of concern to Hanoi…. The Party was concerned about the program and was anxious to undermine it.”\textsuperscript{170}

While specifically citing these three programs as particularly effective, the Communist leadership perceived them as elements of a larger integrated and coordinated pacification program. The Communist government’s official history\textsuperscript{171}


\textsuperscript{168} A Communist term combining \textit{agitation} with \textit{propaganda} performed by specially trained VCI cadre. “Agitation” activities focused on very specific issues and grievances in great detail to mobilize people, while “propaganda” was much broader and shallower.

\textsuperscript{169} The effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi program was one of the reasons for the 1969 decision to revert from phase III \textit{dau tranh} to phases I (political) and II (guerrilla) warfare; as such, its personnel and offices were specifically targeted for attack. “Cosvn Resolution 9.”, p. 15, part II, paragraph 2d, “rally and surrender program,” and p. 20, part II, paragraph 2d, “pacification plans and control at infrastructure level”; Jeanette A. Koch, \textit{The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971}, vol. R-1172-ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973), p. v: “The Viet Cong has reacted vigorously against Chieu Hoi… causing doubts about the ability of the VC to liberate the South… attesting to its effectiveness.”

\textsuperscript{170} Based on reviewing a number of documents in Communist archives. Duiker, \textit{The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam.}, p. 317. The reasons given for concern about the PSDF (loss/reduction of the recruit, intelligence, and support to the insurgency with the ability to fight the insurgency) closely matches with the theoretical explanation in Peic, “Civilian Defense Forces, State Capacity, and Government Victory in Counterinsurgency Wars.”, p. 163.

\textsuperscript{171} Formerly Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the war and Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the war.
remarked that the pacification program “combined political, economic, and cultural schemes with espionage warfare to eliminate the infrastructure of the revolution and build the infrastructure of neo-colonialism.” On CORDS’ shift in operational approach, the official history of the People’s Army (PAVN) observed that “we did not fully appreciate the enemy’s scheme and new strength of his ‘clear and hold’ strategy…. Our main forces suffered vicious combat and losses and their combat strength declined.” The description of the situation in a 1971 operational directive shows that the Communist operational-level leadership also recognized they faced a pacification program that integrated many elements:

They strengthened the puppet forces, consolidated the puppet government, and established an outpost network and espionage and Peoples’ Self-Defense Force organizations in many hamlets and villages. They provided more technical equipment for, and increased the mobility of, puppet forces, established blocking lines, and created new defensive and oppressive system in densely populated rural areas.


The effect of the integrated various political, economic, and security pacification programs “caused many difficulties to and inflicted losses on friendly [Communist] forces.”

The USG’s and Communists’ independent but complementary evaluations strongly strengthen the plausibility that single management improved control in Vietnam. The USG’s before-after perception that its integrated pacification program had increased control in the rural countryside was matched by the Communists’ assessment that those programs were effective. Likewise, the Communists’ observation that they faced a single pacification program comprised of many integrated sub-programs was confirmed by the USG’s intentional efforts to improve coordination, integration, and synchronization.

At face value the similar assessments on the effectiveness of the CORDS program by both the US/GVN and Communists makes this a compelling argument; a counter-argument could be the US/GVN successes had nothing to do with better and synchronized pacification implementation but was the result of the devastating losses the Communists suffered from Tet. “Credit[ing]” the US with better pacification could gloss over that strategic decision.

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175 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
5.3.8 Control Improves Collaboration, Which Improves Control

Covering the spectrum of measures that fall below full-fledged, enduring support for the government,\textsuperscript{176} COIN theory predicts that as the government increases its control, the population will increasingly collaborate with the government—which further increases control.\textsuperscript{177} This theoretical prediction is supported by empirical findings that measured increasing control led to increased lack of support to the Communists, defections from the Communists, and active support for the GVN.

Until late 1964, the VCI cadre did not face many difficulties in recruiting volunteers to join the PLAF guerrilla and/or conventional forces or obtaining supply donations. As raising manpower and materials became increasingly more difficult as the war escalated with the infusion of US forces and FWMAF in 1965, the VCI increasingly relied on drafting local villagers for fighters and taxing the villages for needed logistics.\textsuperscript{178} By summer 1967, due to lack of support for the insurgency in the face of the escalated conflict, the VCI had to draft more than 50 percent of the PLAF recruits, which

\textsuperscript{176} There are three main forms of collaboration: 1) noncompliance by the vast majority of the population with the opposition (non-betrayal); 2) informing by small number of individuals within the population on the opposition; and 3) switching sides or defecting by individuals and/or units/groups from the opposition. Kalyvas, \textit{The Logic of Violence in Civil War}. pp. 104-106, Section 4.4, “Forms of Collaboration and Defection,” and Table 4.1, “Types of Defection.”

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., pp. 287, 388, figure from p. 205, Figure 7.7. Kalyvas found that programs that do not independently establish control in an area require control to be effective.

In trying to understand the ever-decreasing recruitment and ever-increasing desertions, the Communist leadership found:

Fear of hardships and protracted war, lack of confidence in local [PLAF] force’s capabilities, and fear of being killed… scared by the fierceness of the war and the prospect of enemy troops building posts in the area. They also displayed a negative outlook and favored personal interests and their families.\(^\text{180}\)

The composition and missions of Communist forces of the 1972 Easter Offensive support those assessments that increased control led to decreased support—the minimalist form of collaboration. Unlike the 1968 Tet Offensive in which PLAF (southern Communists) comprised a majority of the light infantry-centric conventional forces and undertook the large preponderance of the operations, the Easter Offensive was almost exclusively undertaken by mechanized PAVN (northern Communist) forces,\(^\text{181}\) and "there [was] very little assistance being provided to the enemy… by the local forces and the enemy’s infrastructure [phase I VCI] [played] hardly any role at all,"\(^\text{182}\) This indicates that the Vietnam War had transitioned from a southern-based


\(^{181}\) Over 120,000 PAVN soldiers in ten divisions using armored (tanks) and mechanized vehicles, artillery, and air-defense systems. Truong, The Easter Offensive of 1972., pp. 1, 9-14.,

insurgency receiving support from North Vietnam to an conventional, offensive war waged by the North against the South because of lack of support by southerners.

Beginning in 1963, an increasing number of Communists availed themselves of the GVN’s surrender, reconciliation, and reintegration program—Chieu Hoi, or Open Arms. Table 5-2 below displays the number and percentage of the 192,000 “ralliers” by phases and years of Chieu Hoi—which correspond with changes in control and the nature of the program. In 1963 to 1964 when control was decreasing, the Chieu Hoi program was a low GVN priority for manpower, materials, and money. After much US advice and suggestions, the GVN upgraded its importance by making it a standalone ministry in 1965—when the massive US deployment stopped the loss of control. Corresponding with increased control in 1967, the GVN invested more manpower, materials, and money into Chieu Hoi and established program offices in every village under GVN control.

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Table 5-2. Results and Costs of Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program over Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th># of ralliers (1,000s)</th>
<th>Cost per Person</th>
<th>Percentage (%) by Phase</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of ralliers (1,000s)</th>
<th>Percentage by Year (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per Year</td>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>Reallier</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>PLAF/PAVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Priority (1963-1964)</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>$229,600</td>
<td>$14</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgraded (1965-1966)</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>$405,000</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Effort (1967-1971)</td>
<td>145.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>$54,200,000</td>
<td>$350</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>192.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>$55,744,000</td>
<td>$289</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the table above shows a strong correlation between trends in control and collaboration (defined by defections) and fits the belief that “if you clobber the local force unit, the local guerrilla will chieu hoi,” it does not explain why individuals deserted the Communists, why the number of “ralliers” increased over time (from eleven thousand in 1963 to 20,400 in 1971), or whether collaboration/defection is

184 Adapted from Koch, The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971, p. 11, Figure 4, “Break down of Hoi Chanh by Category.” While corruption and ineptness was found in every GVN program, the Chieu Hoi program was a fairly formal, and drawn out process in which the Hoi Chanh (“rallier”) had to interact with a number of GVN ministries at a number of locations (with US advisers present as well)- making it harder for the GVN to “cook the books” and make-up numbers. One scheme that was uncovered was repeat “ralliers” — they would go through the process of rallying for benefits and then move to a different art of the country and “rally” under a different name.

185 III Corps (US) Commander and Senior Advisor to GVN Military Region III Commander, Lieutenant General Ewell. LTG Ewell was a pacification-skeptic but was “converted” by General Abrams. Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, p. 61.
contingent upon control. After interviewing over twenty-four hundred ralliers, the RAND Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project found a multitude of reasons to desert, as the increasing levels of GVN control directly or indirectly affected all of the ralliers. In fact, after deserting the Communist movement, some ralliers increased their level of collaboration by joining the GVN (or supporting the US forces/FWMAF) in a paramilitary or military role. While defecting (collaboration) indirectly increased control, some level of control was a necessary condition for it to occur.

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186 Samples varied by type of involvement (cadre: political, psychological operations, administrative, logistical, or fighters: militia, guerrilla, main force fighters), locations, time periods, type of units, sample size, etc.

187 The RAND project is composed of more than forty studies that range in length from forty to four hundred pages. It was not the increased level of GVN control by itself; rather, it was the effect of that control. The two most prominent effects were 1) increasing the chance of personally getting killed or wounded and 2) preventing the ralliers from being able to see their family in GVN-controlled villages. Some select citations from the study include: Joseph M. and Charles Thomson Carrier, The Special Case of Chieu Hoi, vol. RM-4830-2-IA/ARPA, Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1966), pp. x-xi; Leon Gouré, Inducements and Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors, vol. RM-5522-1-ISA/ARPA, Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1968), pp. x, 46, 47; ibid., pp. 32-39.

188 In a 1965 report, Pye recommended that the higher-quality (i.e., intelligence, skills, experience) ralliers—Quy Chanh—be used in a variety of units to fight their former Communist compatriots. Lucian Pye, Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program, vol. RM-4864-1-ARPA, Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1969), pp. 19-25, Section 3, “Activist Quay Chan.” Quy Chanh could serve in paramilitary units (authorized, armed civilians) in armed propaganda teams (APTs; three-man teams similar to Communist agitprop teams), police (particularly the PRUs, which targeted VCI or interrogators for Phoenix), RDC, or local militia (PSDF). Military positions could be in Territorial Forces, in main forces, or even working as scouts for the US forces/FWMAF. See also Koch, The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971, pp. x, 91-106, Chapter VII, “Exploitation and Utilization,” for work with GVN. For work with US/FWMAF (e.g., Australia, Thai, Republic of Korea) under the “Kit Carson” program that employed several thousand ralliers, see Tal Tovy, “From Foe to Friend the Kit Carson Scout Program in the Vietnam War,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 1 (2006).

189 In his dissertation chapter titled “Why not just bribe the rebels? The determinants of rebel defection in the Vietnam War,” Rex Douglas performed a statistical analysis of Viet Cong defections at province-month level for eight years and found “the government induced defection by expanding into previously rebel held areas.
While a small percentage of ralliers increased their level of collaboration by actively supporting the GVN military or paramilitary forces against their former comrades, a much larger percentage of the South Vietnam civilian population did so as well. As part of the PROSVN-inspired “Clear, Hold, and Build” operational approach, US/ARVN military and pacification forces trained, manned, and equipped the voluntary, unpaid, part-time civilian militia (the PSDF) behind the shield of main (phase III) and territorial (phase II) forces. The PSDF grew from two hundred thousand unpaid (but trained) volunteers in 1968 to over four hundred fifty thousand in 1972 along with almost 1 million to 1.5 million non-fighting auxiliary members.

Whether they were not supporting the, defecting from, or fighting against the Communist insurgency, the rural population increasingly collaborated with the GVN over time. This amplified partnership did not simply occur with increased control—it's increase was contingent upon it. Because this test was based on COIN, not organizational, theory, while it moderately supports the claim that single management improves implementing pacification, it only marginally supports the claim that single management improves policy implementation in general.

5.3.9 Summary of Process-tracing Analysis of Single Management

By comparing this case to generalized theories (organizational policy implementation theory applied to the “wicked” problem of fighting an insurgency), macro-level process tracing finds it very plausible that single management caused increased control over time. The influence of the US Army’s PROSVN study on key leaders in MAC-V and CORDS shows researchers what specific pacification programs the USG wanted the GVN to implement (DSOs) as well as the mechanisms and processes (CPOs) that the USG would use to leverage/convince the GVN to do so. The analysis found empirical support for every predicted DSO and CPO without any disaffirming evidence. With the desired goals/programs (DSOs) as well as mechanisms and processes (CPOs) being fairly constant, this analysis also highlights the importance of the last form of CPOs: changing context (especially the 1968 Tet Offensive).

5.4 Process-tracing Analysis

For the 18 EVs that were congruent with increased control in the four scenarios from the previous chapter, by identifying which congruent EVs were actually Intervening Variables (IntVs) process-tracing tracing eliminated all but one in the first

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190 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research., Chapter 5, “Understanding What to Avoid” p. 173: “We should not control for an explanatory variable that is in part a consequence of our key causal variable.” Those EVs will be reclassified as IntVs; George and Bennett, Case
two scenarios and all but two in the last two scenarios. In other words, accepting the
limitations of the methods and data used, there is only one possible explanation
deductively arrived at for increased control. For the last two alternative scenarios, there
are only two possible explanations for increased control.\textsuperscript{191}

Table 5-3 Summary of EV Congruence with Changes in Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Early 1967 OCO</th>
<th>Late 1967 CORDS</th>
<th>Late 1968 Tet</th>
<th>Late 1969 COSVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congruent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plausible EV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not EV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Tet</td>
<td>Tet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the organizational work to establish the civilian pacification offices
underneath a single manager would have been the same regardless if it was for OCO or
CORDS, the OCO scenario can be considered a “pre-Intervening Variable” to CORDS.
As a result, if control increased at any time in 1967, then it was the result of CORDS’
adoption of single management. Because the 1969 COSVN decision to revert back to
Phase I (political warfare) and Phase II (guerrilla warfare) was actually a branch plan

\textit{Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.}, p. 207: “Process tracing reduce[s] the problem of indeterminancy... [by identifying] intervening variables that are part of the causal process.”
\textsuperscript{191} George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.}, p. 217: “Consider the possibility of alternate processes [and] alternate hypotheses.” Failing to compare competing process tracing argument is analogous to omitted variable bias.
(“what if General Offensive/General Uprising fails?”) to the Tet Offensive, it was actually a Intervening Variable to Tet. As a result, if control improved in late 1968 or late 1969, it was due to CORDS, Tet, or a combination/interaction of the two.

5.4.1 Primary Scenario: CORDS in late 1967

The analysis from Chapter 4 identified six congruent EVs for the shift from stalemated to generally increasing control, a period co-related with the establishment of the CORDS program and its use of single management. Identifying and “eliminating” the IntVs and contingent variables reduces this list to only one feasible explanation: CORDS.

Table 5-4. Updating Explanations for Increasing Control in Late 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
<th>IntV</th>
<th>f(control)</th>
<th>Final EV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USG in Vietnam</td>
<td>OCO down to Provinces &amp; sel. Districts</td>
<td>CORDS down to Districts</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, Equip Terr. Forces</td>
<td>Incorporated into ARVN &amp; expanded</td>
<td>Massive increase in US advisers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Reform</td>
<td>GVW appoint Chiefs</td>
<td>Villages elect Chiefs (with lim. authority)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action</td>
<td>RDC + ARVN + ad hoc US/FWMAF</td>
<td>RDC + ARVN + US + ad hoc FWMAF</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence of Local Officials</td>
<td>No training program (QIT only)</td>
<td>GVN Training Center</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender Program</td>
<td>Designated as Ministry + more resources</td>
<td>Major priority (Village offices)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Contingent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Chapter 5, “Understanding What to Avoid” p. 173: “We should not control for an explanatory variable that is in part a consequence of our key causal variable.” Those EVs will be reclassified as IntVs; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 207: “Process tracing reduce[s] the problem of indeterminacy... [by identifying] intervening variables that are part of the causal process.”
The combination of being the “President’s man” with a Presidential mandate to implement changes in pacification, and being able to take advantage of OCO months of organizational preparation, CORDS quickly gained authority over and began directing pacification programs. In addition to enlarging and synchronizing pacification programs underneath CORDS to improve control (advisers for Territorial Forces) and enhance support for the GVN (political reform and competence), Ambassador Komer was also able to shift MAC-V’s planning and operations to provide the shield against main and guerrilla forces to allow village-level pacification operations.

Although Chieu Hoi became a CORDS program in May 1967, because the initiative to expand Chieu Hoi offices down to every village began several months earlier in winter 1966/1967, it remains an alternative explanation for this time period. Because “surrender programs” require some degree of control to exist before they can be effective in getting Communists to collaborate with the GVN by “rallying,” they are eliminated as an explanation for changing the trend in control.

In light of no competing theories for increased control, there is a very strong argument that the causal chain linking single management to improved control is correct.
5.4.2  Alternate Scenario #1: OCO in early 1967

If control increased in the first half of 1967, some degree of single management would still be the most plausible explanation—although not necessarily the full “DIME” (diplomatic, informational, military, economic) version used by CORDS. Chapter 4’s analysis identified five congruent explanations for improved control in this period. Removing the three explanations that are contingent upon control to be effective leaves two organizational explanations: “DI_E” (multicivilian agency) single management at the strategic and operational levels.

Table 5-5. Robustness Check: Increasing Control in Early 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
<th>IntV</th>
<th>ff(control)</th>
<th>Final Ev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USG in Washington</td>
<td>Formal Unity of Eff.</td>
<td>Unity of Command for “DI_E” (Komer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strat Single Mng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG in Vietnam</td>
<td>Mission Council + IUSPAC</td>
<td>OCO down to Provinces &amp; sel. Districts</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Opnl Single Mng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify Grievances</td>
<td>USG pilot program</td>
<td>GVN program incorporated into RDC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action</td>
<td>RDC + ARVN</td>
<td>RDC + ARVN + ad hoc US/FWMAF</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender Program</td>
<td>Designated as Ministry + more resources</td>
<td>Major priority (Village offices)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arguably, the two contingent variables to build support\(^{193}\) (identifying grievances and the various forms of civic action) and the one contingent variable to encourage collaboration (surrender program—Chieu Hoi) could explain improved control if they built on the control established during the rough stalemate from 1965 to

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\(^{193}\) Sometime referred to as *winning hearts and minds*, or WHAM.
1966. However, that argument does not take into account the nature of the stalemate. The USG/GVN stopped the loss of control with a massive deployment of forces that inflicted significant losses on the PAVN/PLAF conventional/main (phase III) and larger PLAF guerrilla (phase II) forces in the jungles, mountains, plains of Vietnam—but not in the villages where the smaller PLAF guerrillas (phase II) and phase I (VCI political cadre and militia) operated. Without village-level control, those programs would not be effective. Secondly, they could only strengthen control in the few areas that already were under some degree of GVN control during the 1965–1966 stalemate—they would not affect control in Communist-controlled areas.

It would also be erroneous to eliminate the two remaining (organizational) explanations that utilized single management over DI_E programs at the strategic (Washington, DC) and operational (Saigon down to Provinces) levels because they did not supervise programs to increase control. While exerting no direct influence over programs that increased security, the DI_E single manager exerted indirect influence on security operations because “the civilians spoke with one voice at all administrative levels [DC, Saigon, military region, provinces, and select districts], which made their

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394 General Westmoreland used the “bully boys with crowbars and termites” analogy to describe the twin threats of PAVN/PLAF and VCI. The military formations were the “bully boys with crowbars” that could tear down your house today, while the VCI were the termites that could destroy it eventually over time from the inside. Dale Andrade, "General William C. Westmoreland Was Right," HistoryNet.com (March 22 2009), accessed August 23, 2017, http://www.historynet.com/gen-william-c-westmoreland-was-right.htm.
case stronger, and coordination with the military, especially for pacification, was facilitated.” While the formal planning processes and documents for the top-down guidance and bottom-up implementation do not reflect coordination, integration or integration occurring, the single manager concept simplified coordinating civilian programs with military at multiple levels.

Although he was the single manager at the strategic level, Special Assistant Robert Komer had been supervising “the other war” from DC since spring 1966. His work entailed integrating the strategic ways (pacification programs) and means (manpower and material resources) of the various agencies, not how they were being implemented operationally in the field. While OCO had theoretically synchronized the various civilian pacification programs in time and space as the operational headquarters, it spent most of its time from December 1966 to March 1967 establishing and manning itself as predicted by organizational theory.

This section strengthens the CORDS argument in two ways. First, it decreases the likelihood that control began to improve in early 1967 because the five EVs would have had minimal to zero effect on changing the trend in control with three contingent and two organizational EVs. Secondly, if control did start to increase even slightly, the only

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variables that feasibly explain improved control are the DI_E single managers from DC to select districts coordinating with and indirectly influencing military pacification programs.

5.4.3 Alternate Scenario #2: Tet in late 1968

At first glance, the most popularly known alternative explanation for increased control in late 1968 appears to be unsolvable due its indeterminate design of fifteen possible EVs. Updating that list by identifying IntVs reduces the possible EVs to two: the effect of the Tet Offensive on the Communist forces and the CORDS program. Further updating using process tracing finds that these are interactive, not independent, EVs—with the Tet Offensive being the contextual change that led to the fourteen changes in military and civilian pacification program managed by CORDS.
Table 5-6. What if Control Actually Increased in Late 1968? Tet Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
<th>IntV</th>
<th>[control]</th>
<th>Final EV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist Opn/Orientation</td>
<td>Phase III waiting for GU</td>
<td>Launch GC to spark GU</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tet Offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN Organizational Structure</td>
<td>Formal Unity of Effort to District</td>
<td>&quot;DIME&quot; Unity of Command (CPOC)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, Equip Terr. Forces</td>
<td>Massive increase in US advisers</td>
<td>More advisers + enlarge + Combined Ops</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-GVN &quot;in the field&quot;</td>
<td>Advise + Limited Combined Operations</td>
<td>Advise + significant Combined Ops</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of Engagement &quot;ROE&quot;</td>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Restrained ROE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous Forces</td>
<td>Decreasing (40% to 25%)</td>
<td>Increasing (25% to 63%)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>CORDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanization</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, Equip CDF/LDF</td>
<td>Authorized but not supported</td>
<td>Nationally mandated (&quot;200K in 1968&quot;)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train, Man, Equip Nat Police</td>
<td>Station down to Province</td>
<td>Station down to Village</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutralize VCI</td>
<td>USG-sponsored PIOCs</td>
<td>BVN-sponsored DIOCCs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase I (Cdre mission)</td>
<td>&quot;Build&quot; from best to worst</td>
<td>&quot;Build&quot; from worst to best</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Reform</td>
<td>No program</td>
<td>Limited preparations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform/Influence Operations</td>
<td>Anti-Communists</td>
<td>Anti-Communist + Northern Invasion</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1968 General Offensive(s)\(^{196}\) failed to achieve the Communists’ goals of sparking a GU among the population and militarily defeating the USG and GVN forces/FWMAF. In doctrinal terms,\(^{197}\) the PLAF conventional/main (phase III) and guerrilla (phase II) forces were destroyed,\(^{198}\) while the PAVN main/conventional (phase

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\(^{196}\) The GO was actually comprised of three different offensive operations: the most well-known and largest January Tet offensive; the smaller “mini-Tet” in May; and lastly the much smaller August offensive. Although involving PAVN (northern) and PLAF (southern), the January and May offensives were primarily undertaken by the PLAF with some PAVN support, but the August offensive was almost exclusively PAVN. 

\(^{197}\) All doctrinal terms from: *Adrp 1-02 “Terms and Military Symbols”*. Interestingly related to interagency issues- specifically intra-“M” interagency (Joint), Joint doctrine does not define these terms; but the Joint community uses the Army’s (as the largest service) definitions. Non-Army service members pseudo-jokingly say “you can’t spell Joint without Army.”

\(^{198}\) *Destroy* – A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. p. 1-29. The PLAF conventional and guerrilla forces required a large number of northern PAVN soldiers to reconstitute their formations to the degree that many PLAF units were mostly comprised of PAVN soldiers. This lead to the perception that the war was no longer a southern insurgency.
III) forces as well as the VCI political cadre (phase I) were defeated. The combination of these prevented the Communists from attempting another GO and severely degraded their ability to conduct phase III conventional operations.

Because all of the fourteen possible EVs are directly or indirectly based on the PROSVN study that heavily influenced General Abrams and Ambassadors Komer and Colby, they are all IntVs from the establishment of single management of pacification. About half of those IntVs directly increased control, and the remaining required some degree of control before they could be effective. While MAC-V leadership had been unsuccessfully using the processes and mechanisms from the PROSVN study to enact these programmatic changes since May 1967, the Tet Offensive changed the context of the war for the GVN and MAC-V. In other words, without the Tet Offensive, there would have been fewer pacification programs, and they would have changed at a lesser degree of change and at a slower rate.

The destruction of the PLAF and defeat of the PAVN created the opportunity for MAC-V to reorient its forces to serve as the phases II and III shield against the remaining Communist guerrilla and conventional forces and further improve the Territorial Forces.

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199 **Defeat** – A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has *temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight*. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use or threat of force, p. 1-26.
The shock of the GO allowed the GVN to institute and adopt programs to which the Vietnamese urban elite had been consistently opposed (e.g., targeting, political reform, and land/economic reform).

Although the CORDS and Tet (losses) variables appear to interact with each other, a quick counter-factual analysis can test which of two is a greater influence. This counter-factual asks what if the Communists suffered massive losses from the Tet Offensive, but the USG/GVN did not launch any new pacification programs. At the historical data point of the Communists “darkest hour” in 1959, the Communists had far fewer members than they did in 1968; but they were able to grow the insurgency within 3-4 years to to transition to Phase III (conventional force) operations because the GVN was not undertaking any type of Phase I (political) or Phase II (counter-guerilla) operations at that time. However, because the GVN was doing so in 1968, even if GVN/USG did not adopt any new programs, the Communists would prevented or delayed.

This what-if scenario further strengthens the robustness of the effectiveness of single management. Process tracing shows that this is not a bifurcated “either-or” decision between the effect of the Tet Offensive on the Communist forces and the effect of single management. Rather, it highlights how single management adapted to a major change in the strategic context of the insurgency.
5.4.4 Alternate Scenario #3: COSVN in late 1969

The last robustness check tests “what if control did not start increasing until the latter half of 1969, after the Communists changed their operational orientation from phase III (conventional operations to lead to the GU/GO) to revert back to *dau tranh’s* phase I (political action and terrorism) and phase II (guerrilla operations). The least “indeterministic” scenario with only four possible EVs identified in the comparative analysis, updating that list based on process tracing finds that improved control is still the interaction between the effect of the Tet Offensive and the CORDS program.

Table 5-7. What if Control Actually Increased in Late 1969? COSVN Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
<th>IntV</th>
<th>f(control)</th>
<th>Final EV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist opnl orientation</td>
<td>Launch GO to spark GU</td>
<td>Revert to Phase I &amp; II</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Means</td>
<td>Americanization/escalate</td>
<td>Vietnamization (draw-down)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Reform</td>
<td>Villagers elect Chiefs (with lim. authority)</td>
<td>Villagers elect Chiefs with full authority</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units of Pacification</td>
<td>~12K Hamlets (pacify in place)</td>
<td>~2K+ Villages (pacify in place)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decision to revert to phases I and II of *dau tranh* is an IntV from the decision to launch the 1968 GO because it had always been a branch plan\(^{200}\) to that decision. In other words, the Communist leadership in 1967 decided to return to political

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\(^{200}\) A branch plan to a base plan covers what-if scenarios (i.e., if a planning assumption turned out to be incorrect, or operations did not turn out as expected). In other words, a comprehensive plan has already thought through what to do if it fails.
warfare/terrorism and guerrilla warfare and avoid conventional warfare if the 1968 GO
failed to meet its goals. The 1969 decision by the southern Communist leadership201
merely codified the branch plan and confirmed that Tet was a tactical defeat.

While Vietnamization (the drawdown of US forces in Vietnam) was an American
decision made by President Richard Nixon,202 it is arguably an IntV of the Tet Offensive
because it affected the president’s decision. Even if Vietnamization is not an IntV of Tet,
it would not increase control because it describes reducing forces that provide the shield
against guerrilla and conventional forces.

Of the two IntVs from CORDS, while one describes a shift in the unit of analysis
for pacification planning and the other is contingent upon control, both relate to re-
establishing the village to the traditional political, social, and economic significance that
it enjoyed until the GVN’s 1956 decision to select, not elect, village/hamlet chiefs. By
shifting the primary unit of pacification from the hamlet to the village, the village chiefs
became key players in planning and implementing pacification. Before this decision and
using the worst-to-best model, once-prioritized areas were selected for pacification,
US/GVN efforts would pacify the “worst” (Communist control) hamlets first. After this

201 “Cosvn Resolution 9.”
decision, pacification forces would go to the village chiefs in the prioritized areas to help identify and rank the worst hamlets in their villages.

The second change further restored the central role of the village by granting the elected chief and council authority over almost every aspect of village life (taxes, local laws, local projects, law enforcement and punishment, etc.). Additionally, the GVN made village chiefs the de facto single manager for pacification: The police detachment and militia (PSDF) were under their command; all GVN military (Territorial Forces and conventional forces) and paramilitary (RDC and APTs) were under their operational control while they were stationed in their village; and the village chiefs participated in the district-level Phoenix and Chieu Hoi boards that selected the VCI to be targeted and to which GVN program to send a rallier and his family. By restoring the traditional role of the village, the GVN eliminated one of the earliest and most major political grievances that the VCI had leveraged to create support for the insurgency.203

Because the change in Communist operational orientation to stop conducting phase III (conventional) operations did not surrender the fight for village-level (phase I) control to the GVN, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Resolution 9 decision to stop conducting phase III conventional operations did not improve control.

203 Implementing land reform one year later would eliminate the other major (economic) grievance as well — almost fourteen years after creating the grievance for the VCI to utilize.
Likewise, as a variable requiring an antecedent condition (control), the program to implement political reform could not be the reason why control changed—it could only amplify existing control. For these reasons, it is unlikely that control did not begin to increase until late 1969, but if it did, it would be the result of the context of Tet affecting the implementation of single management.

5.5 Final Observations and Way Ahead

While this chapter failed to falsify the project’s main hypothesis that CORDS’ single management improved implementing the policy of pacification, it did falsify all competing theories for the primary and alternate #1 scenarios (OCO and CORDS). This allows the study to claim that if control did increase anytime in 1967, then that was the result of CORDS’ adoption of single management. By falsifying all competing explanations for increased control in late 1968 or late 1969 except for CORDS or Tet, and then by finding the interaction between those two; if control did not increase until late 1968 or late 1969, then it was the combination of CORDS’ adoption of single management and the massive losses suffered by the Communist forces.

The next and concluding chapter will finish testing the main research question of whether CORDS’ single management improved control by triangulating the findings from the three empirical chapters.
6 Conclusion

This project tested a commonly held assumption about a single case study from 1967 to 1972. While the case is over forty years old, this assumption undergirds a number of current recommendations to reform US national security structures. To examine that assumption, this research project tested whether the US government’s (USG) adoption of the organizational approach of single management improved interagency policy implementation of pacification (counterinsurgency [COIN]) to fight the Communist insurgency in Vietnam.

Interestingly, the single and self-admittedly parochial source for that “fact” cited in the national security reform literature—Robert Komer—made the more guarded claim that CORDS “probably played a role versus the insurgency” in addition to identifying several alternative explanations. In other words, current interagency reform proposals are based on an untested assumption instead of a proven fact.

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2 As the assistant to the president for pacification on the National Security Council (NSC), NSC Staffer Robert Komer “sold” the idea of single management to President Lyndon Johnson. After being granted the rank of ambassador, Komer then served as the first director (“commander”) of CORDS.

3 See Section 1.2.1, “Literature Review of Pacification in Vietnam.”
6.1 Summary of Strategy of Inference

To avoid omitted variable bias on this important national security topic, this project combined Komer’s insights on possible explanations for improved control with recent academic work on the topic of COIN as well strategic and operational planning literature to develop a detailed list of forty-one possible explanations. To draw meaningful insights from the large number of explanations for a single case study, this project iteratively followed a two-pronged inferential strategy: eliminate the infeasible and then rank the feasible.4

In each of the iterations, the design would eliminate the possible EVs that failed to meet the criteria of that iteration’s methodology. If every possible EV except one was eliminated, then the project could deductively conclude that the remaining EV was the explanation.5 Consequently, if there was more than one EV remaining, the design would then inductively rank order the remaining based on how plausibly they could explain improved control.

Because of the large number of possible EVs, the three iterations of process of elimination built on each other, with the second iteration only testing EVs that were

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4 This article extolls the use of “triangulating” the methodologies of comparative analysis, pattern-matching/congruence analysis, and process-tracing analysis because they offer analysis perspectives. Blatter and Blume, “In Search of Co-Variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies.”

5 Logic of deductive syllogism.
feasible from the first iteration, and the third iteration only testing EVs that were feasible in the second. On the other hand, the different iterations of rank ordering the plausibility of feasible EVs were independent from each other. If the different methods drew similar inductive inferences, then triangulating them in the conclusion increases the confidence they are correct.

In a case-selection version of avoiding omitted variable bias, because the actual date in which the “war of 15,000 fronts” actually changed from a rough stalemate to generally increasing control can never be known absolutely, this iterative strategy of eliminating and ranking will be applied to four different time periods: the primary hypothesis of CORDS and three alternative scenarios identified by Vietnam and/or COIN scholars.

6.2 Summary of the Findings

Within the caveats and limitations of this research design, data, and methodologies, the process of elimination failed to falsify the main hypothesis of interest that CORDS’ single management improved control. In fact, if control in the “war of 15,000 fronts” increased in 1967 that hypothesis is “all but” a fact. If control shifted from a stalemate after 1967, then that increase might be explained by CORDS, by the Tet Offensive, or some combination of the two. See the table below that lists the number of feasible EVs by methodological iteration.
Table 6-1 Eliminating the Infeasible Explanations for Increased Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Analysis</th>
<th>Early 1967 OCO</th>
<th>Late 1967 CORDS</th>
<th>Late 1968 Tet</th>
<th>Late 1969 COSVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congruence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process-Tracing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>CORDS Tet</td>
<td>CORDS Tet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsifies CORDS hypothesis?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports CORDS hypothesis?</td>
<td>Fact</td>
<td>Fact</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still within the caveats and limitations of the data and methods used, by triangulating the comparable findings of the congruence and process-tracing analyses of the explanations for increased control only strengthens the inferential strategy’s results. As the only predictive Explanatory Variable in this design, Unity of Command affects increased control in all four scenarios. If control increased at any time in 1967, the congruence analysis further strengthens the confidence that single management/Unity of Command led to increased control. If control improved in either the Tet (late 1968) or COSVN scenarios (late 1969), the change was the result of the interaction between the Communists massive losses (mostly PLAF) during the Tet Offensive and the pacification counter-offensives that were planned, implemented, and overseen by the leadership of CORDS (with Ambassadors Komer and then Colby as the directors).
While it was an interaction between the two factors, the process-tracing analysis suggested that CORDS’ single management provided a greater marginal effect for two reasons. First, the General Offensive was the context changer that resulted in the GVN finally agreeing to adopt pacification programs their US advisers had recommending for years. Secondly, it also created an opportunity (massive PLAF losses) that the USG/GVN through CORDS & CPDC (Central Pacification & Development Council, the GVN’s equivalent to CORDS) chose to take advantage of with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). Overlaying the congruence analysis’ only predictive EV of single management/Unity of Command in this time period further strengthens the likelihood that CORDS provided a greater influence. See table below.

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6 The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was the name given to the pacification counteroffensive response to the Communist GO. A summary of the APC and its context can be found in: Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds.*, specifically Chapter 10, “What Next?” Chapter 11, “Abrams in Command: Military Support of the APC,” and Chapter 12, “The Impact of the APC.” The APC is mentioned in many studies of pacification and, as an example of operational COIN campaigning, has been the topic of many monographs at the US military’s campaign planning schools.
The major intellectual gap in this project asks two “what-ifs?”. What if control did not shift from a rough stalemate in 1967 while CORDS (and its predecessor OCO) were being established using the single management approach and what if the Communists never launched the General Offensive in early 1968? That would mean that the adoption of single management and a small number of pacification programs in 1967 were not increasing control; and if there was no Communist offensive causing massive PLAF losses, then there would be no changing “context” to cause the GVN to agree to adopt more pacification programs and there would be no opportunities for a pacification counter-offensive. We do not know whether, in the absence of a Tet Offensive and no shift in control in 1967, control would have eventually improved or not.
6.3 The Efficacy of Single Management: Fact or Fiction?

Based on the findings from the inferential strategy of triangulating strategies of elimination and ranking, this research finds that the National Security reform investigators have made one very small error regarding confidence levels and one major act of omission error regarding causal mechanisms. The commonly held “fact” was that:

*Single management improved control in Vietnam through better synchronization.*

The very minor error was that this commonly-held knowledge was not a fact, but it is a very strong assumption with a high probability of being correct. Strategic and military planners that constantly make assumptions in planning would love to have an assumption this strong for planning purposes. But in the end, it is not a fact and planners must acknowledge and take that into account when developing plans and policies so they can have a back-up plan (“branch plan” in military parlance) in case their assumption is wrong.

The major error made by National Security reform scholars and practitioners is omitting one of the two key causal mechanisms- innovation. The current literature’s constrained view on why single management worked is limited to thinking better synchronization, integration, and coordination will improve inter-agency policy-implementation. If National Security practitioners are not expecting or looking for innovation to be part of solutions to improve policy-implementation, at best they could
ignore it; at worst, they could discourage or suppress it. Either reaction would negatively affect inter-agency policy-implementation. Based on this research, policy-makers, practitioners, and academics can make the following very strong assumption:

*Single management for inter-agency operations is very likely to improve policy-implementation as the result of better synchronization and innovation.*

6.4 Limitations and Caveats in the Findings

Even if the analysis concluded that a single EV explained increased control in all four scenarios, a deductive finding of fact would really only be a very strong/likely assumption because the project’s research design, methodologies, and data preclude making truly deductive findings. For a project built around examining untested assumptions (caveat and limitations), those inherent in the research design and methodologies should be justified—or at least identified.

Starting with the deductive element of the project’s inferential strategy, to avoid the fallacy of omitted variable bias, disjunctive syllogism requires an exhaustive list of all possible explanations to be tested. Difficult enough for simple, short-duration problems, it is even more so for a case of the scope, scale, and duration as the Communist insurgency in Vietnam. Based on Delphic/first-hand observation (Robert Komer), COIN academic literature, and strategic and operational planning literature, the research design assumes that its list of more than forty possible EVs is comprehensive enough to ensure that “actual” EVs are part of the list.
If the deductive process of elimination approaches were unable to reduce the number of feasible EVs to only one, the design’s inductive inferential strategy of plausible reasoning will be only able to develop a probabilistic ranking of the EVs’ relative explanatory power. However, if three different methodologies arrive at similar conclusions about which EV best explains variation in the OV, the research design assumes that, while still only probabilistic, the triangulated finding is more accurate and certain than a finding from a single method.

To avoid the massive noise-to-signal problem found in measuring control over a long duration, predominately in rural COIN, the project examined the OV in six-month blocks to determine when the macro-level/national aggregate trend in control changed over time. Because of the difficulty in identifying the exact date (or month) that the trend in control changed for more than twelve thousand hamlets and villages, the research design assumes that it can accurately capture the inflection point in control within a six-month period. To mitigate the risk that the inflection point in trends in

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7 Evaluating the degree of control for over twelve thousand hamlets and villages over twelve years on a monthly basis generates more than 1,728,000 distinct data points; if the more than twelve thousand levels of local control are aggregated at the national level, that still generates 144 data points; further aggregating time periods from months to six-month/semiannual periods results in twenty-four data points.

8 In this example of seeing the forest through the trees, control was coded as decreasing, to stalemate, to increasing over time.
control were wrong, the project identified three alternate inflection points in control for testing based on Delphic and scholarly observation.\textsuperscript{9}

Because the EVs also have a high noise-to-signal ratio, (although not to the same degree as the OV), they also be measured as trends as delimited by major changes in the various EVs within six-month periods.\textsuperscript{10} Making the same assumption that it did with the OV, the design assumes that the inflection point in trends for the EVs are correct within a six-month window. Unlike the OV, which inferred changes in the trend of control by aggregating over twelve thousand assessments, variations in the EV were directly observable. Recognizing there might be some lag time between the variation in a pacification program and its effect on control, the design assumed that if an EV changed in one six-month window, it would affect the OV in that same window in time or the next six months.

Using large-n analysis to calculate the conditional probabilities, marginal effects, degree of uncertainty, and predictive strength of the EVs found that Unity of Command was the strongest explanation in the pattern-matching analysis. However, because not every EV had a large-n dataset of research on it, this was an apples-to-oranges

\textsuperscript{9} The primary scenario was late 1967 “CORDS”; alternate scenarios were: early 1967 “OCO”; late 1968 “Tet”; and late 1969 “COSVN.”

\textsuperscript{10} Coding the forty-one EVs on a monthly basis for twelve years provides 5,904 data points. Reducing them to the same six-month periods of observations provides 984 data points. Coding the EVs based on major changes has about sixty-three variations; some EVs did not vary over time, and some had several variations.
comparison. The project assumes that none of the EVs that lacked large-n statistical analysis would have had any predictive power, leaving Unity of Command as the sole predictive EV.

With single management being used at every level from the national through the four regions, approximately forty-five provinces, and about two hundred fifty districts for almost six years, the third and final method of process tracing also faced a noise-to-signal problem regarding its analysis of single management’s causal mechanisms.\(^\text{11}\) With most region/province/district senior advisors (RSAs/PSAs/DSAs) serving six to twelve months and relying solely on those advisors’ end-of-tour reports for analysis, the classic narrative form of process tracing would have had two main issues beside the sheer volume of examining over sixteen hundred reports. First, although the each of the RSAs/PSAs/DSAs could provide firsthand observations on their ability to synchronize the interagency effort within their respective areas, because very few of them would have been involved with adapting/adopting pacification programs,\(^\text{12}\) evidence of that causal mechanism could have been dwarfed by the evidence for synchronization and coordination. Second, and more important, while providing a strong explanation on

\(^{11}\) 1) Improved synchronization, integration, and coordination; 2) adopting new programs and adapting existing programs; and 3) taking internal measures to the organization to improve the organization’s efficiency and/or effectiveness.

\(^{12}\) Adapting and adopting pacification programs were down at the national and regional levels.
why CORDS improved control, a narrative process tracing is not generalizable, which is a critical flaw because the case of CORDS has been generalized by the national security reform literature.

To avoid those problems, the project used the form of process tracing that essentially pattern-matches evidence in the case study against theoretically and empirically supported models of causal mechanisms linking EVs to OVs. While the public administration literature developed a model for single management based on a variety of interagency policy implementation case studies, none of those cases dealt with implementing military or security policies. Despite that omission, because this model was based on a heterogeneous sampling of cases, the design assumes that the model is also applicable for the case of CORDS implementing pacification.

Even for the late 1967 CORDS scenario that eliminated every possible EV except for single management, the number of assumptions built into the research design precludes researchers from making a deterministic finding about whether pacification improved under CORDS. However, because those assumptions were justified and supported, the popularly held view that CORDS’ use of single management caused

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13 See Chapter Five. In her book on CA/MG operations based on n=15 CA/MG cases, NSC Staffer Nadia Schadlow did observe that the Army would generally create a new, ad hoc organization when it needed to plan and implement CA/MG operations. Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory.*, pg. 5.
control to improve remains a strong, highly probabilistic assumption. Consequently, current policymakers, practitioners, and planners can be confident that adopting the organizational structure of single management is very likely to improve interagency policy implementation.

6.5 Comparing CORDS’ Causal Mechanisms

Because this project’s research question tested whether CORDS improved pacification, evaluating the relative effects of the various causal mechanisms and their variation over time is technically beyond the scope of this project. However, as it was a policy-focused project designed to help policymakers and practitioners, this section will perform a preliminary analysis using this project’s existing research about the effect of single management to at least provide an informed assumption about how and why single management is (very likely) effective. A count-based graphical analysis (Figure 6-1) with an accompanying narrative will provide some good guesses into how quickly policy implementation might improve as well as the amount of flexibility the IATF leadership needs to be given to adjust programs and resources.

14 The focus of the project was to evaluate whether CORDS was effective in improving pacification. See Section 1.2.2, “Research Problem and Objective.”
Broken into six-month units ranging from 1965 to 1970, the x-axis includes the years in which control changed from decreasing to stalemate to increasing. The y-axis is a count of the variations of the EVs affecting control/pacification as coded in Chapter 2’s comparative analysis. The count is not reflective of all of the existing pacification efforts at any one point in time; it merely captures the number of changes in (or additions to) those existing programs. It also does not reflect marginal effect of the EVs on the OV. These counts are separated into four categories: major Communist actions, forms of single management over pacification programs, pacification programs and decisions to improve security by gaining and increasing control, and pacification programs and decisions that increase control by gaining the support of the population (i.e., WHAM). Lastly, the five possible inflection points of control are marked by lines signposted with numbers: 0 for the decrease to stalemate in late 1965 and 2 for the most likely time period in which control began to increase: late 1967, the CORDS scenario.

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15 See Section 2.2.5, “Case Selection and Unit of Analysis.” This explains the reason for six-month units.
16 See Section 2.3.3, “Pacification in Vietnam Data Set.”
17 See Section 3.3.4, “Results,” and Table 3-5, “Strength of Relationship Between Single Explanatory Variables and Outcome Variable Based on Marginal Effects and Causal Significance,” for those EVs that have large-n statistical analysis. Not every EV had a large-n analysis.
18 See Section 3.5, “Synthesizing Three Forms of Congruence Analysis,” and Table 3-7, “Congruence Analysis Based on Type and Qualification of Findings.” Unity of Command was generally correct with some predictive power but could have exceptions (heuristic). EVs to gain security were neither completely accurate nor reliable (Rule of Thumb [RoT]). And EVs to gain support were not only completely accurate or reliable, they were also dependent on control already existing (soft RoT).
19 The other three markers are the alternate (and less likely) scenarios: 1: early 1967 “OCO” scenario 3: late 1968 “Tet” scenarios, and 4, late 1969 “COSVN” scenario.
In early 1965, control was continuing to decrease as the Communists conducted a massive buildup of Communist phase III conventional forces by both establishing more PLAF units in South Vietnam as well as deploying People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units from North to South Vietnam as part of its transition to the third phase of guerrilla warfare (*dau tranh*). At the same time, the US/GVN made three changes to their security and WHAM pacification efforts.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{20}\) Security: 1) The Territorial Forces (TF) were moved from the Ministry of Interior to become a part of the ARVN; this allowed MAC-V to legally provide the TF with various forms of support; and 2) pacification planning switched to focusing on prioritizing areas by population/industry/etc. instead of trying to pacify everywhere. WHAM: The GVN phase I political cadre included re-establishing the social networks and customs as part of their operations.
In late 1965, control shifted from losing to a rough stalemate by changing one security variable: the “Americanization” of the war by a massive deployment of US forces (see signpost #0). In addition to two WHAM changes, the USG established its first Unity of Command approach by consolidating all public affairs/information services from all USG elements in Vietnam under a single manager: the JUSPAO.

From late 1965 to the first possible (but not most likely) inflection point of increased control in early 1967 (signpost #1), there were three WHAM changes and two single management changes. In early 1966, as the newly appointed special assistant to the president for pacification, Robert Komer became the single manager for all civilian (DI_E”; WHAM) pacification efforts in Washington, DC, at the USG strategic level. Almost a year later the USG adopted single management for all DI_E (WHAM) pacification programs at the operational level when it established the OCO. If the trend in overall control did increase in early 1967, that would suggest that the change was the

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21 The GVN merged about thirty various phase I political cadre into a single organization for training and operations. The Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) and Chieu Hoi (or Open Arms; surrender program) were established as an independent ministry with the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) serving as its USG advising element.

22 1) The GVN adopted the Census-Grievance (C-G) program; 2) the USG/MAC-V began implementing the various civic action programs (CAPs; engineer CAPs [ENCAPs], medical CAPs [MEDCAPs], veterinarian CAPs [VETCAP], dental CAPs [DENCAPs], etc.); and 3) the Ministry of Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) opened offices down to the village level.

23 Operational-level pacification leaders conducted the COIN campaign by synchronizing all pacification programs and resources in time, space, and purpose at the (GVN) national level and in four military regions, about forty-five provinces, and approximately two hundred fifty districts.
effect of improved synchronization of DL_E (WHAM). Given that WHAM efforts can only amplify existing control and not create it by themselves, it is not likely that control began to increase in early 1967.

Almost six months later in late 1967 (signpost #2, the most likely inflection point of increased control), the USG adopted single management at the operational level for all USG military and civilian (DIME) pacification programs when it established CORDS. Almost immediately after its establishment and as a result of the advice and encouragement by the CORDS leadership,24 MAC-V adapted an existing security pacification program and the GVN adopted two new WHAM programs.25 If control did actually increase in this time period (and the research suggests that this period was the most likely inflection point), some of that effect can be attributed to adapting and adopting pacification programs. However, the ability to synchronize all DIME pacification efforts in time, space, and purpose in accordance with a prioritized list for the first time in the war was critical.

24 Given that Ambassador Komer’s moniker was “Blowtorch Bob,” this also included hectoring of US and GVN civilian and military officials.

25 MAC-V exponentially increased the number of advisers training the phase II forces—the Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF)—and the GVN began a training school for leaders, managers, and bureaucrats from the province to hamlet levels as well as conducting limited and constrained local (village and hamlet) elections.
In the year following the establishment of CORDS and before the launch of the APC in late 1968 (signpost #3), only two EVs had variation that possibly affected control. First was the successful economic transition that changed South Vietnam from a rice importer to a rice exporter due to “miracle/Honda rice.” Much more well-known was the Tet Offensive, which brought a large part of South Vietnam under temporary Communist control at the cost of the PLAF’s destruction.26

If the loss of personnel was the first-order consequence of Tet, the second- and third-order consequences were the “awakening” of southern elites to the Communist threats and their decision to agree to adopt/adapt the plethora of US-/CORDS-recommended changes to pacification programs (single management, security, and WHAM27). Further, the trend toward greater single management increased as the GVN, with the US’/CORDS’ encouragement, adopted single management for all GVN DIME pacification programs down to the approximately two hundred fifty districts. If control did not begin to increase until late 1968 (signpost #3) but CORDS leadership had been synchronizing and coordinating all programs since mid-1967, then the causal

26 Destruction in military terminology does not mean the annihilation of the entire enemy (that is the meaning of clear). It means that the unit has suffered so many losses that it is unable to continue operations without being reconstituted. In this case, most of the PLAF phase II (guerrilla) and phase III (conventional) forces required an infusion of PAVN/northern personnel as “fillers” to resume operations.

27 Some of the major changes were expansion of the draft that allowed for the growth in the TF (phase II) and the development of the People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF; phase I militia), combined MAC-V and TF operations, the Phoenix program and deployment of police forces (phase I militia) down to the village level.
mechanism of adapting/adopting a large number of pacification programs appears to be the stronger explanation of increased control with the massive Communist/PLAF personnel losses from Tet being a necessary element.28

Occurring about six months after the completion of the late 1969 APC, the late 1969 COSVN scenario is the least likely inflection point of increased control (signpost #4). If control did not increase until this time period in spite of the plethora of synchronized security and WHAM programs during the previous six to nine months, then it was the result of variation in only three EVs: organizational, WHAM, and Communist. Structurally, single management/Unity of Command was delegated down to the center of Vietnamese rural life: the village.29 This organizational change coincided with the WHAM program of holding full democratic elections to select the village and hamlet chiefs (and their corresponding councils). Lastly was the Communists’ decision to reverse their 1964 strategic ways/operational decision to escalate to phase III

28 Overall, the Communists’ strength was exponentially smaller in absolute and relative terms than that of the GVN forces than what the Communists had faced in 1959 and 1960 when the insurrection began, but they successfully grew because the GVN was not fighting the political fight in the hamlets and villages. However, Communist losses alone could not make the GVN successful—but the situation created the conditions for the GVN on which to capitalize.
29 The village chief exercised direct and continuous control over the pacification efforts assigned to his village—police and PSDF. He also exercised operational control over GVN elements while they operated within his village performing pacification missions: the TF (normally a PF platoon), RDC, and armed propaganda teams (APTs). He also provided final approval for all WHAM projects (schools, farming, development, etc.) and Targeting (Phoenix program) capture/kill missions against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI; phase I political cadre). This was Unity of Command at the tactical level because the chief was synchronizing pacification units and projects rather than pacification operations/programs in time, space, and purpose (which was the operational level from districts to the GVN/national level).
(conventional) to precipitate the general uprising (GU)/GO and revert back to phases I (political) and II (guerrilla) dau tranh.

In essence, by late 1969 the northern-backed and -directed Communist insurgency was using phases I and II forces to implement dau tranh against the phase I, phase II, and phase III GVN/US forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) COIN/pacification forces. While the late 1969 COSVN scenario reflects the least likely point in which control changed because this is when the Communists de facto acknowledged the defeat of the insurgency, it does solidly indicate that the GVN had increasingly established control by late 1969.

Both of the major causal mechanisms that link single management with improved control are present in every one of the four possible inflection points of increased control—albeit in varying degrees. With one to three pacification programs being adapted or adopted in conjunction with the implementation of some form of single management in 1967, the single manager’s ability to synchronize, integrate, and

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30 Doctrinally, defeat occurs when a force has lost the means and/or will to resist or continue fighting. The Communists made this decision when they realized that they would not be able to win while the US forces and FWMAF were assisting the GVN; the new goal was to hold on and survive until the US departed.
31 Interestingly, after the Communists’ decision to revert to phases I and II only, the USG ended strategic Unity of Command when Komer’s initial position, assistant to the president for pacification, was disestablished in early 1970. Further, the last major pacification program (that was listed in the PROSVN study and promoted by CORDS leadership) occurred in late 1970: —full land reform, “Land to the Tillers.”
32 Early 1967: adopting single management at the operational level for DI_E (WHAM) programs along with expanding the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) (returnee) program down to the village levels (where GVN had control). Late 1967: adapting operational-level single management for all DIME programs (WHAM and
coordinate the various programs under their purview appears to be the predominant causal mechanism. The next two scenarios, Tet Offensive and COSVN’s decision to revert to phases I and II only, introduce another causal mechanism: the enemy’s (Communists’) actions. But that mechanism is not the only one present in either of those actions. While both cases adopted some form of single management, the late 1968 Tet Offensive also saw the adoption and adaption of many security and WHAM pacification programs, while the late 1969 COSVN scenario witnessed only the adoption of full elections down to the village and hamlet levels.

Of the four scenarios, the only one in which single management’s causal mechanism of adopting and adapting pacification programs appears to provide a strong but not exclusive explanation for improved control is the late 1968 Tet Offensive scenario. On the other hand, Unity of Command led to improved control in all four scenarios due to the combination and interaction of several causal mechanisms, including the single manager’s ability to synchronize the various pacification programs.

security) along with dramatically increasing the number of MAC-V advisers for the TF, beginning a training program for rural GVN elected officials and bureaucrats, and beginning limited local elections.  
30 In late 1968, the GVN adopted operational-level single management as it established a GVN counterpart to CORDS: the CPDC. Later the following year, the GVN espoused tactical-level Unity of Command by placing all pacification forces and projects in a village under the direction and control of the democratically elected village chief.
6.6 Alternate Organizational Options

This raises an interesting puzzle: if single management was so effective for CORDS, why has CORDS been the only real example of it? Although the research question of why and how CORDS was formed (and IATFs in general) was not within the scope of this paper, based on the tremendous degree of bureaucratic resistance and inertia that President Johnson faced from all of the agencies, forming an IATF can be a herculean task.

Combining the bureaucrat challenges in forming an IATF with the imperative for national security reform, this begs the question of whether policymakers and practitioners can replicate Unity of Command’s causal mechanisms of synchronization and innovation (in whole or in part) to improve policy-implementation without having a single manager? The possibility of achieving CORDS-like benefits in implementing

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34 This is a game-theoretic question addressed in a game theory core requirement for Duke University’s PhD in political science program. The president and his secretaries (defined broadly to include independent directors, such as for the CIA) were playing a version of the “principal-agent” game. While the president (principal) had the authority to direct single management, he faced the resistance of the secretaries (agents) who had better information about their agencies that he did, and all used their greater expertise to recommend against adopting Unity of Command. Patrick V Howell, *The President Vs the Secretaries: Creating Inter-Organizational Policy-Implementation Structures, a Game of Imperfect Information* (Duke, 2014).


36 See Chapters One and Two.

37 This is an example of equifinality, or multiple paths to a single end-state.
policies without having to pay CORDS-like costs in bureaucratic effort would offer another option to policy-makers.

A series of National Defense University (NDU) reports on successful Unity of Effort inter-agency organizations offers the opportunity to see whether IATFs can synchronize and innovate in the absence of a single manager.38 This section will not be the definitive work on effective Unity of Effort IATFs, is merely examining whether it is possible to promote synchronization and innovation without a single manager by looking inside “of the black box” of these cases to see how they worked.39

This nested project will use seven variables to describe how these successful IATFs were organized.40 “Approach” broadly describes broadly whether the organization used a Unity of Command or Unity of Effort approach while recognizing that there are variations on each one. “Scope” defines the number of issues and topics that the organization focuses along with how it addresses them while “scale” is the number of participating agencies and how widespread was the organization was within

38 This is one of the few designs in which it is not wrong to select case based on the EV and DV. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research., pp. 128-132 and pp. 142-146 “selecting both on the Explanatory and Dependent Variable.”
39 This section could serve as a plausibility study for future interagency researchers who switch the research focus from testing whether a specific organizational approach improves policy implementation (CORDS and pacification in Vietnam) to how to structure the organization to induce synchronization and innovation (which then lead to improved policy results).
the USG (unique, plurality, or ubiquitous). The “key leader” variable identifies whether or not a person was credited with being instrumental in the organization’s establishment and/or success while “mandate” identifies the source of the IATF’s authority: executive or legislative. “Resources” denotes whether or not the IATF was dependent on other (parent) organizations or independent for resourcing while “years” is how long it took the organization to become effective.

Based on those seven variables describing the organization, the next four will try to understand “why” that organization was successful. The first variable, “motivation,” will assess why the various contributing agencies cooperate: did a legal authority compel them; do they have some common interests; and it is merely a transactional relationship? (Sometimes, but not always) related to why (motivation) the agencies interact, the four types of “structure” define how they interact.

“Integration” measures the degree to which the interagency structure can affect policy decisions that the various member agencies select and/or follow. The lowest level

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41 A _unique_ organization exists at a single level within the USG, a _plurality_ organization occurs at several but not all levels of the USG, and a _ubiquitous_ organization is replicated at all levels of the USG.

42 1) _Single management_ describes Unity of Command in which the leader has the legal authority to give authoritative guidance and direction; 2) _A and B pool their interdependence_ when they independently provide their contribution to the outcome; 3) when A asymmetrically depends on B’s output (but not the reverse), that is _sequential interdependence_; and 4) _reciprocal operating interdependence_ (ROI), when A depends on B’s contribution and B likewise depends on A’s.
of integration is *information sharing*; in this level, the information that A and B share with each other only influences which options from a menu of policy options they *do not* choose. At a *cooperative* level of integration, A’s actions and information affect B in choosing its policy option from among its menu of already acceptable policy choices. In *collaborative* integration, A voluntarily chooses to adopt a policy option that is harmful/not optimal to the agency because it understands how it serves a larger purpose. That choice goes away at the next and highest level of interagency integration; a leader with the authority to *synchronize* subordinate agencies is able to direct and override a subordinate agency to implement any policy—even ones that are not optimal for the agency.\(^43\) Lastly, “innovation” describes whether or not the IATF was able to develop ideas to improve policy implementation that were unforeseen with the IATF’s formation.

For additional insights, the section will also analyze CORDS and a hybrid Unity of Command/Unity of Effort organization that existed within CORDS: the Phoenix program. While it will be in the summary matrix, CORDS will not be described in a sub-section, but because Phoenix was only cursorily described in the dissertation, it will have a narrative section. The narratives for the case studies are not intended to provide a

\(^{43}\) Synchronization is found only under single management, which can exist only when the interagency leadership has been granted authority over the other agencies.
complete historical description or organizational analysis; these Unity of Effort IATFs will be compared to the only real Unity of Command IATF (CORDS) in the summary matrix at the end of the section.

6.6.1 Phoenix Program: Unity of Command Within Unity of Effort

The next example is a hybrid case that occurred during the Vietnam War as a part of CORDS with a small Unity of Command organization operating within a larger Unity of Effort enterprise: the Phoenix (Phong Huong) program. Phoenix resembled CORDS with its ubiquitous presence in nearly every province and district. However, the Phoenix program’s single, narrow goal of targeting (i.e., capturing or killing) Communist phase I political cadre (the VCI) was very dissimilar. Because the targeting process (referred to as F3EA [find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze] in current parlance) used by Phoenix was similar to other historical and current targeting processes, it deserves a short description.

F3EA’s find uses intelligence networks and sources to gain information that a target is in a certain rough area at a rough time. A more active form of intelligence is then used to fix the target by locating and maintaining surveillance on the target itself. Once fixed, a military or paramilitary combat finish force then (preferably) captures or kills the target. The information obtained by the finish force along with any provided by the captured target during questioning and interrogation is exploited by intelligence
analysts to transform it into useful, actionable intelligence. Intelligence analysts and operational planners then analyze that information to select the next target to go through the F3EA process.44

Although the USG (i.e., CIA) had been advising the GVN to target the VCI since the early 1960s, it was not until approximately seven years later in 1968 that it established by a combination of GVN presidential decree and legislative law. Bringing together every intelligence analyst and operations planner (police as well as military) who narrowly focused on the VCI, a single manager ran each province intelligence operations coordination center (PIOCC) and its district counterpart (DIOCC), prioritized the analysis of the captured data, and made the final decision on who would be targeted next. However, except for the relatively small finish force (provincial reconnaissance unit [PRU]) at every PIOCC, the Phoenix single managers exercised Unity of Command over the (limited) finish-exploit-analyze portion of the F3EA cycle.

While they were not formally a part of the intelligence operations coordination center (IOCC; Phoenix) program, there were several other USG and GVN agencies that,

while unable to fully dedicate all of their time and effort to the task, shared the desire to capture or kill the VCI. Combining the fact that a multitude of agencies were seeking the removal of the VCI, which impeded their pacification efforts, with the circumstance that no agency could independently carry out the full F3EA cycle by itself created an interdependent, collaborative Unity of Effort F3EA structure in which every participating agency benefitted—and benefitted from—other agencies in varying degrees.

For the Phoenix program, innovation accompanied collaboration. Borrowing from the CIA’s “tradecraft” concept of “burning/false flagging” an enemy source, IOCC planners broadened the finish phase to include compromising (in addition to capturing and killing) the VCI. By taking actions to make the Communists think that a certain VCI was already working for the GVN and/or was corrupt, the PLAF would either cut out that VCI from the rest of the network or use its own phase I militia or phase II guerrilla force to capture/kill them. Additionally, the USIA (JUSPAO) chose to station elements of its own paramilitary force that normally supported the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program—APTs—at PIOCCs and DIOCCs. The presence of former members of the PLAF now working for the GVN would elicit information from captured VCI faster than normal as well as provide the APTs with more information to use in their information/propaganda operations against the Communists.
6.6.2 Active Measures Working Group (AMWG)

“Our friends in Moscow call it ‘dezinformatsia.’ Our enemies in America call it ‘active measures,’ and I, dear friends, call it ‘my favorite pastime.’”

—Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth, East German foreign intelligence

In disagreement with the foreign and security policy establishment about the efficacy of Soviet disinformation operations, with a minimal financial and personnel commitment, President Ronald Reagan established the group in 1981 to counter Soviet disinformation. By dramatically increasing the figurative and literal costs of disinformation campaigns to the point that the Soviet leadership considered their own efforts ineffective, this Unity of Effort interagency organization had a disproportionate impact.

While the Russian definition of active measures—aktivnyye meropriatia—at the time was very broad and entailed a large number of actions that were intended to influence foreign audiences, the AMWG narrowly focused on exposing Soviet

46 One of the most well-known cases of disinformation that was intentionally spread by the USSR was the claim that AIDS was created by the US military and released as a weapon. Originally published in a pro-Soviet in India in 1983 and then reprinted in more than forty other pro-Soviet news outlets, by 1987 that story had been published in eighty countries and in thirty languages. After AMWG published a report exposing the Soviet campaign, Premier Mikhail Gorbachev angrily confronted Secretary of State Shultz about it. Ibid., p. 6.
47 Text box 1, “A Historic Example of Active Measures,” ibid., p. 9. Briefly describes the long history of active measures (covert subversion, information manipulation, influence operations, disinformation, etc.) used by imperial Russia against domestic and foreign enemies in the nineteenth century.
disinformation using only unclassified information and intelligence. With a presidential
political appointee to the State Department the only permanent member and a State
Department conference room that was borrowed for a few hours every couple of weeks,
the AMWG was quite small. Other than the fact that President Reagan favored
countering disinformation and there was a congressional requirement for the Executive
Branch to report on Soviet disinformation, the AMWG leader lacked any authority to
compel any USG agency to participate.

Over the AMWG’s eleven-year existence, despite always having a degree of
“churn” with some agencies participating intermittently and/or the specific
representatives from agencies changing over time, fifteen to twenty representatives from
a number of agencies consistently attended the meeting chaired by the presidential
appointee. The group members would study reports (prepared by the various member
agencies) to ascertain patterns and methods of disinformation over time and then,
ultimately, prepare reports. While the members came from a variety of agencies, they
had four main attributes in common: They all had expertise in a wide variety of

48 The Chair of the AMWG during the highpoint of its work in mid-1980s was Dr Kathleen Bailey.
49 Department of State, Department of Defense, CIA, FBI, USIA, DIA, other intelligence agencies, Arms
Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), National Security Council, etc.
50 One of the most famous, and was related to de-bunking the claim that AIS was created by the USG was:
“Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major
disciplines, with those being related to information; were Russia/Soviet experts; had an interest in countering Soviet disinformation; and were voluntarily participating. In other words, instead of these fifteen to twenty experts in information operations and Soviet behavior working separately at their parent agencies to independently combat USSR disinformation, they chose to pool their knowledge, expertise, and assets with each other for their shared goal. By bringing together a number of information operation specialists did not seem to foster innovation in the AMWG, but it did improve the quality of their work.

6.6.3 Task Force for Military Stabilization in Bosnia

Established in 1995 as part of the Dayton Peace Accords to end the ethnic and nationalistic cleansing in Bosnia, President William Clinton charged the Task Force for Military Stabilization in the Balkans (TFMSB; more popularly known as the Bosnia Train and Equip Program) to train and equip the Bosnian Federation Army to be roughly equal in capabilities with the Bosnia Serbian forces, rid Bosnia of extremists (Islamic), and develop and strengthen a pro-Western orientation in Bosnia’s federal institutions. Despite being successful and having a very narrow scope like all of the non-single

\[51\] i.e., Public affairs, strategic communications, public diplomacy, psychological operations, information operations, propaganda, etc.
management cases in this section, the TFMSB was uniquely different from them for two main reasons.

First, instead of taking several years before becoming effective, the TFMSB effectively accomplished its training and equipment goals within two years. In addition to becoming effective far sooner than the other cases, is the task force was different from the other examples for not performing a “unique” mission. While the USG developed those other Unity of Effort organizational structures to accomplish an interagency task outside the scope of any one agency, a long history (along with established procedures, processes, and specialized sub-organizations) of the DoD and State Department working together for implementing security assistance already existed. However, because the US bureaucracy (as well as a large portion of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and European Union [EU] counterparts) favored arms reduction to promote peace in Bosnia as opposed to training and equipping/security assistance, the TFMSB was unique because it accomplished a task (i.e., security assistance) that other agencies were supposed to but did not want to implement.

53 Although the TFMSB would continue until circa 2004, it had mostly achieved President Clinton’s goals by 1998.
54 Simplified as “training and equipping” a foreign state’s military and security forces, security assistance is a complex mix of diplomacy, development, and security/defense. The DoD established the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to train security assistance officers to lead and oversee this process.
Like Robert Komer, in addition to being armed with a presidential mandate that was frequently and successfully wielded as a bureaucratic club, Jim Pardew was appointed as an ambassador and was known for his “every day is a workday” ethic. Unlike Komer, who directed and supervised an organization of approximately eight to nine thousand USG military and civilian personnel (as well as local nationals from Vietnam and Third Country Nationals), Pardew’s team never comprised more than ten military and civilians from the State Department, DoD, and CIA. While studying how Pardew led his small team is interesting in and of itself, researching how he was able to influence the various USG agencies to support a policy with which they were not in line is more relevant to interagency policy implementation effectiveness.

Several factors helped Pardew convince unsupportive USG agencies to actively take measures to support the “Train, Man, and Equip” mission as well as ensuring that they could not subvert the TFMSB by merely failing to act. While Congress also legislatively supported the task force’s mandate, because “[Bosnia] is the highest foreign policy initiative from the Clinton administration, and you’re not going to help?” it was President Clinton’s personal involvement and support that gave Pardew the ability to

induce cooperation from other agencies.\textsuperscript{56} Pardew and the TFMSB’s closeness to the president was reinforced by its location in the bureaucracy and the fact that it merely informed, rather than reported to, the NSC’s Deputy Committee (DC).\textsuperscript{57}

Despite its ability to strongly encourage other agencies to undertake actions in support of the task force, because the TFSMB did not have a separate budget authorized by Congress and was dependent on external funding, those agencies could “slow roll”/passively resist the task force by failing to provide budgetary support. This bureaucratic weak spot was avoided with the more than $400 million of support\textsuperscript{58} provided by donor states under the TFMSB’s direct control. In addition to the financial independence provided by the donor countries’ contributions, the TFMSB worked with several other USG departments to find innovative ways to relatively increase their funding.\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 62.  
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 61.  
\textsuperscript{58} This support came in the form of cash, equipment, training, and technical support. See Table 2, “Train and Equip Program Donated Resources as of January 1997,” ibid., pp. 25-26.  
\textsuperscript{59} The following are three examples of the TFMSB’s innovativeness: 1) To address the donor countries’ concern that corruption in the Bosnian government would “siphon off” their money, the TFMSB worked with the Departments of State and Justice and the Treasury Department to create a common-law trust to hold all of the funds. When the Bosnia government identified a “train, man, and equip” funding requirement (as defined by TFMSB and its contractor, MPRI), it formally requested the funds via a diplomatic note through the USG to the donor countries for approval. Once the loan was approved, the USG transferred the funds directly to the appropriate entity—bypassing the Bosnian government; ibid., pp. 26-28, “Establishing Legal Regimes for Managing Funds”; 2) the TFMSB increased the $400 million in donor funds by $4 million by convincing the Treasury Department to put the funds in an interest-earning trust account; ibid., p. 62; and 3) the TFSMB convinced the DoD to designate select materials as “excess defense articles,”
\end{flushleft}
6.6.4 High-value Targeting Cells

If one accepts the finding that the 2007 Surge successfully reduced the level of violence in Iraq, this case study introduces another possible causal factor into the vigorous debate on why and how violence decreased: high-value target (HVT) cross-functional teams (CFT) led by Special Operations Forces (SOF). This NDU study makes the more modest claim that HVT CFTs (hereafter referred to as CFTs) contributed to the decrease in violence by exponentially increasing the effectiveness of the SOF unit (the “task force”) selected to target HVTs.

Early in the Global War on Terrorism, despite becoming very good at conducting direct action (i.e., capture or kill) on HVTs, the military-centric task force was conducting only a few operations per month due to the lack of readily available (actionable) intelligence. After imperfectly and unevenly adopting the interagency CFT

which could be provided to the Bosnia military at no cost; ibid., p. 28, note 149, “Finding Trainers,” and pp. 30-35, “Obtaining Weapons.”


Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?,” International Security 37, no. 1 (2012). These scholars tested several causal explanations (with “surge,” “Awakening,” “cleansing,” and “synergy” just a few of several) among thirty-eight “areas of operation,” and while each hypothesis had some support, the authors found the synergy of multiple factors to be the strongest; pp. 36-40, “Conclusion.” Of similar interest, the second author (Jeffrey Friedman) is the leading (i.e., first) scholar on a large-n quantitative analysis into the boots-on-the-ground (BOG) ratio in COIN. The BOG ratio analysis is the foundation for the surge hypothesis. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine.”

structure beginning in 2004 that brought every interested and/or relevant USG agency into a single intelligence operations center rather than their remaining in bureaucratic stovepipes, the operational tempo of the IATF exponentially increased by more than 3,000 percent as it went from six to eight missions per month to six to eight missions per night. To put this into terms from the F3EA methodology, the IATF changed from a military finish force to an interagency find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze force when it adopted the interagency CFT structure.63 The cumulative effect of continuously and repeatedly removing key terrorists (leaders, supporters, and enablers) for over two years from 2005 to 2007 contributed to the surge’s overall success.64

The study of CFTs is very similar but not identical to the Phoenix program in Vietnam. Both programs had very narrow mandates: to capture or kill leaders and key cadre of the insurgency/guerrilla movement. In both cases, there were a multitude of bureaucratically stovepiped intelligence and security agencies that wanted to achieve that outcome65 that began to rapidly communicate and coordinate with each other after

63 Faint, “F3ead: Ops/Intel Fusion “Feeds” the Sof Targeting Process.”
64 To see how targeting of an insurgency’s leadership and cadre can affect success in COIN, see Section 2.2.2, “Theoretical Explanation for Improved Control over Time,” and Figure 2-1, “Theoretical (Doctrinal) Plan to Defeat an Insurgency.” By itself, targeting provides little additive effect, but when done in conjunction with COIN measures, it creates a multiplicative effect. Interestingly, the first leader whom the author saw draw Figure 2-1 was the commander of the task force in Iraq and Afghanistan and had developed the interagency CFT: then-Lieutenant General McChrystal.
65 There was a general agreement on the why (get the enemy leaders, thereby reducing their ability to intimidate and create the room for governance to grow); instead, the debates were about when and where to
being co-located. Because no single agency could collect and analyze all of the intelligence in order to plan and carry out the targeting mission, all of the agencies depended on and were willing to collaborate and innovate/experiment (in varying degrees) with each other to accomplish their shared goal. And as the CFT construct expanded to conventional forces as well as SOF, the degree of cooperation and innovation between those two different types of forces also increased.

The CFTs differed from Phoenix in two interrelated ways that highlight the importance of future studies into the qualities of successful Unity of Effort interagency leaders. Combining mandates from the GVN and CORDS to establish integrated PIOCCs and DIOCCs with the voluntary decision by a number of intelligence and security agencies choosing to work together to target the VCI (phase I political cadre), Phoenix was a hybrid Unity of Command/Unity of Effort interagency organization that implemented all elements of the F3EA targeting process. On the other hand, because

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66 A short list of agency-unique contributions: The CIA obtained intelligence using spycraft with sensors and performed analysis; the FBI could pull forensic information from targets and devices; the Treasury Department tracked funds and funding; the National Security Agency (NSA) provided signals intelligence (SIGINT); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) assisted with geotracking; and the Joint (military) Task Force actually conducted the direct action missions to capture and/or kill. A common paraphrased quote from one member of the task force was, “The closer to the battlefield, the more immediate the physical threat, the less departmental differences mattered”; p. 38.

67 An example is the following dissertation from the field of human development on the characteristics of successful interagency leaders. Severance, “Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort in the Interagency National Security Policy Process.”

68 Find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze.
there was no official mandate or directive to establish the interagency CFTs’ intelligence operations centers, the CFTs were purely F3EA Unity of Effort organizations established by Task Force Commander-Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal. By building off of the USG agencies’ shared mutual interest in targeting insurgent leadership with his ability to convince other USG agencies to participate in CFTs and sharing his incredibly well-resourced budget, General McChrystal was able to get all SOF forces and some conventional forces to choose to participate in the CFTs’ F3EA process.69

6.6.5 Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIAF-South): a Hybrid

Other than CORDS, the last case study in this section is the most well-known and most often cited in the interagency reform literature; it has been described as the “gold standard… the model for whole-of-government problem-solving.”70 Originally organized as a military-centric joint task force in 1986 as part of the war on drugs (that was fairly ineffective),71 it evolved into a highly effective interagency organization

69 Lamb and Munsing, Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation., pp. 8-14: review of the development of CFTs in Afghanistan and (pp. 19-34) Iraq.
71 Using the DoD for the war on drugs raised issues with the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), which states, “Anyone who uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus, or otherwise to execute the laws, not expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, shall be fined and/or imprisoned for no
comprised of five branches of the US military, nine USG agencies, and eleven partner nations and is responsible for interdicting drugs and transiting air and maritime routes over 42 million square miles from South America over the Atlantic (including the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico) and Pacific oceans. In 2009 alone, 40 percent of all of the cocaine interdicted in the world was interdicted by JIATF-South (and this made up 84 percent of all USG interdictions); over the previous twenty years it had arrested 4,700 traffickers, captured more than one thousand vessels, and seized over $190 billion in drug profits.

However, the current scholarship incorrectly describes JIATF-South as a Unity of Command interagency organization. Except for the fact that there were almost three hundred Phoenix PIOCCs/DIOCCs (each operating within a few hundred square miles)

more than two years” (18 USC 1385 “Posse Comitatus”). Congress granted the president the authority to use the military for policing in two scenarios (10 USC 252 “Rebellions” and 10 USC 253 “Insurrection”). Congress’ legislative fix differentiated between indirect participation (with certain checks and balances) and direct participation (arrest, search, seizure, intelligence collection for law enforcement; 10 USC 275 “Restrictions”) with much higher levels of checks and balances. Munsing and Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*, p. 7.

72 Commanded by a US Coast Guard (USCG) admiral with a Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) vice (deputy) commander, JIATF-South with four law enforcement (CBP, Drug Enforcement Agency, FBI, Department of Homeland Security) agencies and five USG intelligence agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, NSA, NGA, National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]). JIATF-South also partners with eleven countries: Argentina, El Salvador, Brazil, Canada, France, United Kingdom, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Netherlands, Dominican Republic, Peru, Ecuador, Spain, Honduras, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago; ibid., p. 5.

73 These are measures of performance (MOPs) that measure and quantify what the JIATF-South did; they are not indicators of how the JIATF-South is affecting the war on drugs—they would be measures of effectiveness (MOE). In other words, while the JIATF-South is very good at what it does, these metrics do not assess whether its actions are making a difference; ibid., p. 3.
and there is a single JIATF-South headquarters (operating within 42 million square miles), the Phoenix program’s hybrid Unity of Command/Unity of Effort model is a more accurate description. Both have very narrow mandates—targeting of a singular threat (the VCI in Vietnam and drug runner planes/boats in the US)—that use the F3EA targeting methodology. To successfully carry out the F3EA cycle, both organizations simultaneously utilized Unity of Command (single management) for intelligence analysis and operational planning along with Unity of Effort over all of the other organizations that chose to collaborate in the targeting process. In this case, the JIATF-South successfully implements the entire F3EA cycle due to the voluntary collaboration between various USG law enforcement agencies, USG intelligence agencies, and foreign partners (intelligence, police, and military).

While the JIATF-South follows the F3EA conceptual methodology, it uses the law enforcement–centric phraseology of cueing, detection, monitoring, interdiction, arrest, and prosecution. In other words, the Phoenix program and JIATF-South exercised Unity of Command for planning fix and finish and conducting exploitation and analysis as well as also exercising Unity of Effort for find, implementing fix and finish, and collaborating with Phoenix/JIATF-South for exploit-analyze.

An actual example showing this degree of cooperation is as follows. British (military or police) intelligence learns that a drug trafficker will be sailing across a certain transit corridor in the Caribbean during a certain time window (find). The JIATF-South (a military headquarters performing a law enforcement function) under the command of a USCG admiral then directs a law enforcement aviation detection asset from CBP to the rough area—where it is able to establish and maintain visual control of the vessel (fix). The task force then directs the nearest naval/law enforcement vessel (from the French Navy) to intercept, board, and, if required, arrest the traffickers (finish). Regardless whether the French prosecute the traffickers themselves or hand them over to the USG, the intelligence gained from the boarding and arrest is shared with all partners to generate new leads (exploit and analyze), allowing the F3EA cycle to continue.
The JIATF-South effectively induces cooperation from USG agencies and foreign partners through an interactive combination of executive and legislative mandates and resourcing that provide presidential-level guidance and establish mutual dependencies.

Beginning with President Reagan’s (and continued by Presidents Bush and Clinton) declaration that drugs constituted a “national security threat,” the president also authorized the secretary of defense to actively support civilian law enforcement (CLE) counterdrug efforts with military assets.77 While these acts clearly articulated the president’s intent, at best they promoted (but did not direct or compel) information sharing and simple cooperation.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress then took three acts, the cumulative effect of which increased the incentive for various agencies to collaborate together. By de facto amending the PCA, Congress allowed the DoD to provide more active support to counterdrug operations.78 While not directly inducing cooperation between USG agencies by itself, Congress created and supported an interest in conducting

77 Munsing and Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, p. 7.
78 The PCA itself was not amended; rather, Congress expanded on a provision within the act that allows the use of the military for law enforcement functions only if specifically “authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress” (18 USC 1385 “Posse Comitatus”). As long as it does not adversely affect military preparedness (10 USC 276 “Preparedness”), the secretary of defense may provide support to CLE with equipment (10 USC 272 “Supplies”), training and advising (10 USC 273 “Train”), operation and maintenance of equipment (10 USC 274 “Equipment”), and information (10 USC 271(a) “Information”). Interestingly, the only scenario in which Congress mandated that the secretary of defense must provide support to CLE is the sharing of information related to drug interdiction (10 USC 271(c)).
counternarcotic operations by the USG and state and local law enforcement agencies as well as for the DoD and USCG by providing funding that could only be used for those efforts. Lastly and most important, Congress statutorily created dependencies between USG military and civilian agencies by designating the DoD as the USG lead for “detection and monitoring of drug trafficking,” while the USCG was the USG lead for “interdicting and arresting” drug traffickers. This organizational seam was fixed when President Clinton created a new organization combining the DoD and USCG along with their associated statutory authorities with his 1994 National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICC): the JIATF. Because no single USG military, police, and intelligence agency interested in drug trafficking could implement every facet of the F3EA cycle, those agencies now had an incentive to voluntarily collaborate and work together.

While other countries (particularly the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands) possess the technical and financial capabilities to establish their own entity similar to the JIATF-South to fight drug trafficking, they instead chose to allow a US headquarters to synchronize and direct their assets for a common purpose. In other

79 Munsing and Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, pp. 7-22.
80 In military terms, the JIATF-South exercises tactical control (TA CON) over the military/police (primarily) naval assets of the French, United Kingdom, and Netherlands that those countries choose to place under the task force for countertrafficking. TACON entails “direction over movement and location.” This allows a
words, where Congress mandated mutual dependencies between USG agencies, providing a key resource for free (information on the location of drug traffickers by JIATF-South) has the same effect in promoting voluntary collaboration.

As with most of the other successful cases of interagency operations, there are a number of examples of creativity contributing to the JIATF-South’s success. To resolve the PCA prohibitions, the USCG deploys law enforcement detachments that perform the actual interdiction and arrest while aboard US Naval vessels that “detect and monitor.”81 These same USCG teams deploy onboard Naval and Coast Guard vessels from partner countries that want the US to handle the actual prosecution and detention. Although the JIATF-South has the legal authority to direct and supervise all USG interdiction efforts, it actually has very few assets dedicated to it on a daily basis. As a result of the JIATF-South selling the fact it offers a “tactical live environment test bed... [with low threat] but highly mobile dark asymmetric threats,” the NSA, NRO, NGA, and CIA and other elements of the DoD have placed “current and emerging technology” assets into the area of operations underneath the JIATF-South’s control.82

headquarters to tell subordinates only where to go, not what they can do. It helps that this term is defined in NATO doctrine and that these three nations are all part of NATO.

81 USCG tactical law enforcement teams (TACLETs) are comprised of six to eleven personnel. Before a US Naval vessel moves to interdict a suspected drug-trafficking vessel, it will raise the USCG ensign (flag) denoting that it is operating underneath USCG authority and direction. Munsing and Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, pp. 39-41.
82 USCG TACLETs have deployed primarily on French, United Kingdom, and Netherlands vessels but have also deployed aboard Canadian and Belgium craft.
6.6.6 Summary of Unity of Effort Cases

This survey demonstrates that it is possible for certain forms of Unity of Effort interagency organizations to have the same causal mechanisms as CORDS’ single management (see Error! Reference source not found. below). Whether a single manager is synchronizing an agency or voluntarily collaborating with other agencies, adjusting the where and when of an individual agency’s operations to better support the overall interagency effort generally has a positive substantive effect on policy implementation. Using the results of this feasibility analysis to understand the why, how, and how interdependent of these cases will provide policymakers and practitioners with suggestive and probabilistic insights on how to establish and organize future interagency organizations. Additionally, academics can use this typological analysis to generate ideas for continued research and empirical testing of various forms of Unity of Effort organizational structures.

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83 See Section 1.1, “Current Need for National Security Interagency Reform.”
Table 6-3. Summary of Alternative Organizational Options

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Agreement among the various agencies on the why/overall purpose for Unity of Effort organization appears to be a necessary condition for any degree of interagency integration. However, if those agencies disagree on how they should accomplish their overall purpose, their integration is minimal and probably limited to merely information sharing. An example of this scenario is the TFMSB. Although the USG bureaucracy (as well as NATO/EU allies) agreed with President Clinton’s desire for stability in Bosnia,

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84 Information sharing while disagreeing on how is likely to have only a minimal influence on where and when an agency carries out operations, most likely in eliminating infeasible or poor options.
they vehemently disagreed that security assistance (training and equipping) was the proper approach to take.

When agencies agree on how they should accomplish the purpose of their interagency organization but can independently pursue that goal, their efforts will probably be limited to cooperating with each other. The AMWG is an example of this combination in that its participating agencies agreed that they should counter Soviet disinformation by publishing open-source reports. However, instead of the representatives from each agency independently researching and reporting on their Soviet disinformation topic of choice, the group collectively decided on which topics would be researched and reported on. The members chose to do together as a group what they would have been otherwise doing independently by themselves.

Collaboration—Unity of Effort’s equivalent to single management’s synchronization—occurred only when the participating agencies were also mutually dependent on each other to accomplish their common goal. Unlike a cooperative relationship in which each agency ultimately selects where and when to implement their plans and policies to meet the interagency goal (see the AMWG example above), because agencies in a collaborative relationship are dependent on other agencies to accomplish

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85 In a cooperative relationship, the actions of agency A would assist agency B to select which, where, and when actions it implemented from the list of “n”—possible actions that it had already developed.
their shared goal, they will voluntarily alter the time and place (when and where) of their operations to best support the interagency organization rather than themselves. Because every agency is dependent on other agencies to implement F3EA targeting methodology, the three cases of Phoenix, HVT CFTs, and JIATF-South saw a large number of (USG and foreign) agencies choosing to collaborate and adjust their behavior to best support the group’s goal.

In addition to inferring the importance of mutual dependency leading to collaboration, studying these cases provides several other major insights and planning factors in establishing interagency organizations. Creating IATFs is not a quick fix for what is inherently a complex, or “wicked,” problem. Except for the TFMSB, it took at least five years for every IATF to start being effective. Interestingly and counterintuitively, the scope of an IATF, more than the number of participating agencies, affects its effectiveness. Even though there are fourteen USG agencies (five military, four law enforcement, and five intelligence) and eleven partner nations, the scope of the JIATF-South is far narrower than CORDS—which was mostly comprised of personnel from five agencies.

Because the president is the first common supervisor to the multiple participating agencies, he or she should provide direction and guidance and select which agencies will comprise an IATF. Unless the IATF’s charter creates mutual
dependencies (either by a presidential/executive mandate or legislative/statutory requirement) and/or one (lead) member produces transactional/resource dependencies that lead to collaboration, they are more likely to result in only lower levels of interagency integration: information sharing and/or cooperation.

Phoenix and the JIATF-South are examples of mutual dependencies established by executive and/or legislative mandates. In the absence of those de jure dependencies, interagency leaders and organizations can make de facto dependencies by providing resources to other agencies that they would not otherwise have. Examples of these transactional/resource dependencies are the HVT CFTs case in which the SOF task force provided budgetary, logistical, administrative, etc., resources to other USG agencies and the JIATF-South providing information to foreign governments.

Lastly, most effective interagency organizations were dependent on a key leader to make them as such. In the cases of CORDS and HVT CFTs, a study of Ambassador Komer and Lieutenant General McChrystal provides insights into establishing and running an IATF. Those two IATF leaders provide an interesting contrast because “Blowtorch” Komer frequently used his presidential mandate as a bureaucratic cudgel,

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The ultimate form of de jure dependency is single management/Unity of Command. In this form, the president has delegated his authority as chief executive to authoritatively direct USG agencies to a single manager who can compel actions. See Section 1.1.2, “Constitutional Impediments to Interagency Operations.”
while, because he did not have any mandate to form the HVT CFTs, McChrystal convinced agencies to participate over the course of several years (assisted by the transactional dependency of supplying resources). The very strong executive and legislative mandates that established mutual dependencies could explain the JIATF-South’s lack of an indispensable leader.

Assuming that agencies agree on the why for future IATFs, a two-by-two matrix of the scope (i.e., the how) of the IATFs and the degree of mutual dependency can predict the level of interagency integration and when single management might be required to be effective. The how question reflects whether or not the participating agencies agree on the methods they should employ to achieve their common goal, while the “how dependent” question is either mutually independent or dependent.

Table 6-4. Degree of Interagency Integration Based on Scope and Interdependence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“How Interdependent?”</th>
<th>Scope/“How” to Accomplish Goal?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Disagree</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutually Independent</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TFMSB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Synchronization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CORDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutually Dependent</td>
<td>No successful examples in NDU’s literature</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>
By enabling the single managers to synchronize the where and when of the various contributing and participating agencies’ operations, CORDS overcame the problem of independent agencies disagreeing on the scope (i.e., how) of their operations to support pacification. While the literature on successful Unity of Effort interagency organizations does not include any cases in which of a number of agencies were mutually dependent on each other but disagreed on the scope of their efforts (i.e., how they would achieve their common goal). If mutually dependent but disagreeing agencies are not effective, these findings also suggest that single management would probably overcome this problem.

6.7 Final Summary

There is a logical difference between the dissertation’s research question and its driving motivation. Rigorously testing the research question of whether CORDS’ single management improved pacification in Vietnam accomplished the research objective of testing a critical, untested assumption that addressed the central problem that current national security reform proposals are based on unproven “facts.” However, this project was never initiated to falsify the popularly held “fact” of single management’s effectiveness or evaluate how strong of an assumption it is. Rather, those research problems, objectives, and questions became apparent only while reviewing the current literature addressing the policy-relevant issue of national security reform.
While the research did conclude that CORDS’ adoption of single management was very likely (but not conclusively) the reason why the policy of pacification defeated the Communist insurgency in Vietnam, it provides limited value to current policymakers and practitioners because bureaucratic challenges make establishing interagency Unity of Command extremely rare (it has happened only for CORDS). Instead, the USG has repeatedly chosen to adopt various Unity of Effort approaches to implement policy. Assuming that single management’s success was really the result of the causal mechanisms of synchronization and innovation, the project’s conclusion tested several successful Unity of Effort cases to see if those organizational structures could share the traits of collaboration and innovation. The limited research suggests that policymakers and practitioners can establish effective Unity of Effort interagency organizations when all of the contributing agencies agree on their collective operational approach (i.e., how) and are mutually dependent on each other.

Barring new material or methods, this project’s narrow scope effectively culminates the research program investigating whether CORDS was successful as a result of single management. However, because the research used macro-level process tracing\(^7\) to identify the causal mechanisms that made CORDS successful, researchers

\(^7\) See Section 5.2.1, “Methodology.”
from the disciplines of organizational effectiveness, public administration, and leadership could study the micro-level data to attempt to identify the specific skills, knowledge, and attributes that make an (in)effective interagency/national security single manager. Their results would inform the professional education programs for national security professionals.88

The concluding chapter’s preliminary feasibility analysis also opens the door for further research. A future researcher could easily extend this work by including unsuccessful Unity of Effort cases so it no longer “selects on the DV.” Related to this extension would be the inclusion of cases of mutually dependent but disagreeing agencies. Lastly and similarly to single management, researchers from other disciplines could study the skills, knowledge, and attributes of successful and unsuccessful Unity of Effort managers to better inform current national security policymakers and practitioners.

88 Aside from the military’s professional military education, there is not a developed professional national security education program at this time.
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Biography

Patrick Howell was born in Wiesbaden, Germany in 1970. After graduating from the United States Military Academy at West Point with a Bachelor of Science in International Relations in 1992, he was commissioned as officer in the United States Army. In his over 25 years of service, he served in a wide variety of leadership and staff positions as an Engineer and Strategic/Operational Planner in conventional and Special Operations forces as well as an Instructor/Assistant Professor of International Relations at West Point. During that time, he also earned a Master of Arts in Law & Diplomacy (MALD) from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy in 2002 and a Master of Military Arts & Sciences (MMAS) from the School of Advanced Military Studies in 2008. While teaching at the United States Military Academy, he was awarded the Murdy Award for Teaching Excellence and was selected as a Chief of Staff of the Army’s Advanced Strategic Planning & Policy Program (ASP3) Fellow in 2014. Matriculating at Duke in the Summer of 2014, he completed a Master of Arts (MA) in Political Science and became a Doctoral candidate in Winter 2016/2017. He returned to the Army in the Fall of 2017 as a Strategic Planner while continuing his doctoral dissertation.