MULTICULTURAL COLD WAR: LIBERAL ANTI-TOTALITARIANISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 1935-1971

by

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Date: April 24, 2007
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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University

2007
ABSTRACT

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In Cold War North America, liberal intellectuals constructed the Canadian and American national identities in contrast to totalitarianism. Theorists of totalitarianism described Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as monolithic societies marked by absolutism and intolerance toward societal differences. In response, many intellectuals imagined Canada and the United States as pluralistic nations that valued diversity. The ways in which Canadians and Americans imagined their respective national identities also varied with epistemological trends that were based on the ideas of totalitarianism and its correlate, anti-totalitarianism. These trends emphasized particularity and diversity. Using archival sources, interviews with policy-makers, and analysis of key texts, Multicultural Cold War outlines the history of theories of totalitarianism, related trends in epistemology, the genealogy of the social sciences, and the works of Canadian and American proponents of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. It centers attention on Canada and the United States where the unreflective ideology of anti-totalitarianism was widespread and the postwar enthusiasm for ethnicity and cultural pluralism became
especially pronounced. In the U.S.A. this enthusiasm found expression among public intellectuals who defined cultural pluralism in their scholarship and social criticism. In Canada, discourses of multiculturalism originated in the hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the political thought of Pierre Elliot Trudeau. This dissertation shows that enthusiasm for sub-national group particularity, pluralism, and diversity was a transnational North American trend.
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Preface

In the early morning hours on June 3, 2006 Canadian police arrested seventeen young Canadian Muslims in Toronto. They were accused of being members of a “homegrown” terrorist cell inspired by al-Qaeda and faced accusations of plotting attacks on several Canadian targets. According to the police, they had planned to attack the Canadian Parliament, take the Prime Minister hostage, and behead him if he did not order the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan. For days the arrests were the subject of sensational headlines in Canada and the United States. The fact that the accused were born in Canada or were long-term Canadian residents was especially disconcerting to commentators. Editorialists began to question whether Canada’s policy of multiculturalism was responsible for fostering the attitudes of the Toronto jihadists. The National Post, for instance, ominously declared that the problems of Canadian multiculturalism go “well beyond the encouragement of Muslim extremism.” The Ottawa Citizen implored Canadians to “abandon the
Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister of Canada, took a different view. On the day of the arrests he ventured that it was precisely Canadian diversity that was the object of jihadist hatred. “We are a target,” he said, “because of who we are and how we live, our society, our diversity and our values.” Two weeks later, Harper made the arrests and diversity the central theme of a major speech he delivered to the United Nations World Urban Forum in Vancouver. The Prime Minister issued a ringing defense of cultural diversity, Canadian multiculturalism and immigration. He categorically rejected the argument that Canada’s cultural policies had made Canadians more vulnerable to terrorism. “I believe the exact opposite is true,” he declared. “Canada’s diversity, properly nurtured, is its greatest strength.” Harper offered the international audience an


assessment of Islamist terrorism. Jihadists, he said, misused the symbols of
culture and faith to justify crimes; and they were motivated by a hatred for
diverse and democratic societies like Canada because their objective was exactly
the opposite: a closed, homogeneous and dogmatic society.³

Whether he realized it or not, Prime Minister Harper was echoing ideas
about the value of cultural diversity that had been developed by North American
social theorists in the mid-twentieth century. Then the rhetoric of diversity and
pluralism had been directed against Nazi and Stalinist totalitarianism. Canadians
and Americans first came to value diversity and to re-imagine Canada and the
United States as democratic nations characterized by diversity in reaction to
twentieth century totalitarianism. Recently, Islamist fundamentalism has come to
replace Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism as the enemy to which many North
Americans contrast themselves.⁴ Then, and now, a putatively closed,


⁴ President George W. Bush has referred to Islamist terrorism as “totalitarian” on
many occasions. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University, he explicitly linked
Cold War totalitarianism to Islamist totalitarianism. [T]oday’s war on terror,” he
said, “is like the Cold War. It is an ideological struggle with an enemy that
despises freedom and pursues totalitarian aims.”
homogenous, and dogmatic enemy has provided the alterity - “Other”- through which Canadian and American identity has been constructed.

This dissertation is a history of how North Americans came to value diversity in the twentieth century. Canadians and Americans may have understood diversity to mean different things; but for all its various meanings, multiple forms, and ambiguities, diversity came to be regarded as a social ideal. The kinds of diversity they valued included ethnic and ‘racial’ diversity, political and cultural pluralism, multiculturalism, religious tolerance, regional diversity, and the ideal of political and social institutions reflecting society in its inherent differences. The rise of diversity was a widespread phenomenon that could be seen in many aspects of Canadian and American life: in art, education, business, government, organized religion, medicine, and popular social movements. The 1982 Canadian constitution reflected this enthusiasm for diversity. It guaranteed that the basic law of Canada “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the

preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”

In the United States, presidents from FDR to Clinton have celebrated the diversity of the United States in their speeches.

For the last sixty years, Canadians and Americans have idealized diversity to the extent that Canadian and American national identities have been transformed. The intensity and scope of this enthusiasm has led to a situation in which many North Americans have re-imagined their national identity as inherently plural or multicultural.

I do not want to exaggerate the diversity phenomenon. There was no ‘zero-sum game’ where a trend that stressed ethnic or other differences necessarily displaced one that treated the nation as homogenous or humanity as universal. After all, an identity based on the idea of diversity is itself a unifying


6For example, in an address to the Daughters of the American Revolution, President Roosevelt reminded those assembled that they were “descended from immigrants” (The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 259 (1941)); In his Second Inaugural Speech, January 20, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton said: “Our rich texture of racial, religious and political diversity will be a Godsend in the 21st century.”
ideal. Furthermore, in recent years numerous voices have disavowed the ideal of
ethnic diversity in both Canada and the United States. These include the critics
who see multiculturalism as a stimulus to Islamist extremism, cultural warriors
such as Lynne Cheney and Neil Bissoondath, and critical intellectuals like David
Hollinger and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. who have made universalist or national
unity counter-arguments to multiculturalism.7 Besides, contradictory viewpoints
can co-exist, sometimes in tension, sometimes in unreflective harmony within
society and within individuals. Nevertheless, the enlargement of discourses of
diversity is an “event” worthy of historical assessment. It is, in fact, a
transnational phenomenon of historical significance.8 In this dissertation I ask
what it was in the dynamics of the postwar period that brought about this
transformation in the identity of many North Americans. I take up the challenge

7Neil Bissondath, Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada
(Toronto: Penguin, 1994); David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond
Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The

8David A. Hollinger makes a similar point in “How Wide the Circle of “We”? 
American Intellectuals and the Problem of the Ethnos since World War II,” The
of providing a historical assessment of the rise of discourses of diversity in a transnational comparison.

The task is an enormous one. Even the straightforward exposition of the multiple facets of the North American idealization of diversity defies comprehensive treatment. I cannot hope to describe, let alone interpret historically, all of the various types of diversity, or the associated artistic expressions, pedagogical practices, academic disciplines and theories, business fads, political developments, and the social and religious movements. There is too much to chronicle within the confines of a single study.

From an interpretive point of view, the job is no less daunting. A serious and all-encompassing discussion of the enlargement of discourses of diversity in North America during the post-WWII period must take account of an array of weighty historical issues. The role of instrumental reason rooted in Enlightenment thought is central to the construction of modern identity, including North American identities. The consequents of Herderian romanticism, nationalism, racism and racialism; the fracturing of the unitary self in modernity; postmodernism; and the impact of twentieth century world wars
and genocide on meaning are historically relevant to the construction of collective identities. The legacy of cultures and modes of thought that migrated to or developed indigenously in North America, such as Puritanism, Judaism, Catholicism, Victorianism, scientism, pragmatism, republicanism, monarchism, and then mingled with each other and were transposed into various formulations are also germane. And I have yet to mention economic, legal and institutional changes in society that reflected or precipitated transformations in identities.

Whether this history is to be practical exposition, a straightforward chronicle of events, or a hermeneutic of the rise of diversity, I had to make radical and risky intellectual choices. The danger is that the evidence, facts, data, events, institutions, and people I choose to write about may appear to have been selected arbitrarily to fit my hypotheses. Likewise, it might seem that I am deploying any number of theories to explain any datum. I hope that my examiners and readers will agree that this is an acceptable risk. All historians must take such risks. Philosophers of history from R.G. Collingwood to Joan Wallach Scott have written that the status of evidence is ambiguous for
historians. Facts determine the narrative just as the narrative determines the facts. The grounds of knowledge in history forever shift. They are especially unstable when it comes to the study of modern identity.

The stories I tell in this dissertation and the facts related in them are but a slice of the whole story and of the events related to the rise of diversity in North America in the second half of the twentieth century. It is precisely upon the grounds of knowledge that I cast my historical attention. I focus on the epistemology behind the thought of a few intellectuals, social scientific trends, governmental policies, and popular social movements. I am referring to the theories of knowledge of North American intellectuals, politicians and activists that were conditioned by the concepts of totalitarianism and anti-totalitarianism. It is my view people whose thought was conditioned by these epistemological trends brought about the late-twentieth century enthusiasm for diversity.

The attempt to explain the phenomenon of diversity is ambitious, but it

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cannot be comprehensive. At the very least, if I cannot offer a thoroughly convincing narrative of diachronic causation for the rise of the ideal of diversity, I hope to show why many North Americans have been drawn to embrace diversity. I want to show its appeal, and to explore why Canadians and Americans invested in it as a vision of the good and as a guarantee of liberty against contemporary totalitarianism. Whether my story and my evidence cohere and whether my explanation is “adequate as to meaning” is for the reader to decide.¹⁰

1. Introduction

On March 6th 1953 the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) convened a conference on totalitarianism. The most prominent historians, philosophers, and social scientists of the day gathered for the event. It was less than twenty-four hours after that prototype of totalitarianism, Joseph Stalin, had died. The news of Stalin’s death did not diminish the fervor with which the conference participants grappled with their problem. For the Academy, totalitarianism was “such an extraordinary and all-pervading phenomenon of our time that the best scholarly and scientific efforts should be marshaled, and the necessary funds provided, for a comparative and interdisciplinary exploration of the basic issues involved.”¹ The speakers described the two principal totalitarian systems - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - and they warned of incipient totalitarianism in Western societies. Totalitarianism could appear anywhere in the world. It could even present itself as morbidity within individual personalities. A considerable portion of the conference considered

anti-totalitarian strategies and sought to define healthy societies and healthy individuals in contrast to totalitarianism.

Erik H. Erikson, the famous psychoanalyst, concluded his paper at the conference with the following observation: “To have the courage of one’s diversity,” the author of *Childhood and Society* said, “is a sign of wholeness, in individuals and in civilizations.”  

In his presentation, George F. Kennan, the theorist of America’s Cold War policy of containment, imagined totalitarian society and a vigorous anti-totalitarian alternative:

[A] neurotic sense of tidiness in political arrangements can be a great danger to any society. Too great an urge for symmetry and order, too strong an insistence on uniformity and conformity, too little tolerance for the atypical and minority phenomenon: these are all things that can grease the path by which nations slide into totalitarianism. Lucky, in this respect, are countries like Great Britain, with its bizarre pattern of nationalities and dialects, its far-flung bonds of blood and interest, and its picturesque ceremonies and traditions; lucky is Switzerland, with mountain barriers, its unique historical path, and its multilingual balance. Lucky, even, we Americans have been up to this time, with our sectional diversities, our checks and balances, and our deference to the vital interests of

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competing minorities. Woe to any of us, if these things begin to yield to the leveling influences of the perfectionist, to utopian dreams of progress and equality, to the glorification of conformity in tongue or outlook that have been embraced in the concept of romantic nationalism and have gone before the disasters of totalitarian triumph.

Kennan echoed Erikson in his straightforward anti-totalitarian prescription: “Diversity,” he offered, “in all the glorious disorder of nature, is the best defense of healthy societies.”

When Kennan and Erikson delivered their papers, the Korean War and McCarthyism were still raging. Memories of the Second World War, Nazism, and Fascism were fresh. The AAAS conference testified to the urgency with which many people in North America turned to the problem of totalitarianism and related issues such as the dangers of “mass society.” Totalitarianism was the major source of anxiety and a recurrent theme for numerous intellectuals, bureaucrats, politicians, and artists.

The specter of totalitarianism had first arisen as a source of dread for North American intellectuals in the 1930s when Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism

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were in ascendancy, and social critics started to theorize what these systems had in common. World War II and the Cold War ensured that it became a matter of concern beyond intellectual and political circles. By the early 1950s concern over totalitarianism reached a crescendo. People began to imagine anti-totalitarian remedies and alternatives. For Kennan, Erikson, and a significant number of intellectuals, the solution to the problem of totalitarianism lay in the celebration of diversity within society. Because totalitarian systems were seen as monolithic and totalitarianism was viewed as philosophically monistic, they chose a pluralistic society and pluralism as a philosophy as the anti-totalitarian ideals.

The period from the mid-1930s to the early 1970s was a time of concerted and prolonged effort on the part of countless individuals to describe totalitarianism and to imagine alternatives. Many North Americans not only viewed Communist states and international politics through the prism of totalitarianism, but they looked at their own societies and themselves as personalities through this prism too. Social, economic and political models were informed by the fear of totalitarianism, as were psychological theories. Moreover, it can be argued that the social and natural sciences generally were affected by the concept of totalitarianism because the concern about totalitarianism permeated the assumptions underlying how people thought. A central feature of totalitarian systems, as North
Americans described them, was that they were “ideological,” and ideology was, according to the prevailing analysis, rooted in idealism.\textsuperscript{4} In contrast, anti-totalitarian societies and individuals were imagined as free from ideology and idealism in politics, economics, social thought, and in thought-processes. Even the rules of scientific inquiry were implicated. The grounds of knowledge shifted. Totalitarianism and anti-totalitarianism determined what could and could not be said, what was and what was not accepted as knowledge, truth, and reality.

This dissertation examines the intersections between Cold War epistemology and the enthusiasm for ethnic diversity during the period 1935-1971 in Canada and the United States. It is neither a complete history of the theory of totalitarianism, nor does it encompass all anti-totalitarian imaginings. Not all aspects of the epistemologies inspired by the totalitarian/anti-totalitarian dichotomy are discussed in this study. And the project does not describe or interpret all of the multitudinous expressions of ethnicity or diversity in this period. Any one of these topics would be too expansive for a single dissertation. Rather it is an attempt to show how the idea of totalitarianism affected how

\textsuperscript{4} For example, in the assessment of the sociologist and authority on ideology, Edward Shils, ideology is concerned with the ideal, sacred, or transcendent, see Edward Shils, \textit{The Constitution of Society}, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972) [1982]. p.29.
people thought, and how such ways of thinking transformed national identity in Canada and the U.S.A. The central hypothesis is that the ways in which Canadians and Americans imagined their respective national identities varied with epistemological trends based on the Cold War ideas of totalitarianism and its correlate, anti-totalitarianism. The dissertation does not follow the precepts of conventional intellectual history by simply asking how the idea of totalitarianism influenced the ideas of cultural pluralism or multiculturalism, nor does it treat totalitarianism, liberalism or pluralism as entities, per se. Instead it traces the evolution of some of the modes of argumentation that permeated Cold War thought. The views of totalitarianism - how it was described and imagined - structured knowledge production in North America from the 1930s until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The dissertation focuses on the first four of these decades and explores how the idea of totalitarianism privileged certain epistemological tendencies, and how these tendencies structured the ways that Canadians and Americans imagined their national identities.

**Multicultural Cold War** centers attention on Canada and the United States because they are countries where the unreflective ideology of anti-totalitarianism was widespread and the postwar enthusiasm for ethnicity and cultural pluralism became especially pronounced. There is an additional reason for focusing on
these two countries. Canadians almost universally believe that a multicultural ethos distinguishes Canadians from Americans. A recent survey found that eighty-one percent of Canadians agreed that multiculturalism has contributed positively to the Canadian identity.\textsuperscript{5} To Canadians, multiculturalism – usually expressed by a metaphor of Canadian society as a “mosaic” - is a distinctly Canadian virtue: they contrast this to a fixed image they have of the United States as a monolithic “melting pot.” Meanwhile, many Americans (happily ignorant of this Canadian certainty) have made the concept of the United States as a “nation of immigrants” a catechism of their civic religion. In similar fashion, but without any explicit comparison to Canada, many Americans believe that diversity is the distinguishing American feature. This dissertation will show that enthusiasm for sub-national group particularity or for pluralism and diversity was a transnational North American trend.

By beginning in the nineteen-thirties, ostensibly before the Cold War started, this study complicates our notions of the Cold War and totalitarianism. It demonstrates that many of the arguments and patterns of thought attributed to

the postwar period had earlier roots. The mid-1930s was a time of growing intellectual and popular fear of totalitarianism. In 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact seemed to realize the anti-totalitarian thesis of the equivalence of Nazism and Stalinism. It was in this decade that many prominent intellectuals first raised the alarm about the threat of totalitarianism to democracy. The end date of 1971 is when Canada became the first country in the world to officially adopt a policy of multiculturalism. From a strictly practical point of view, 1971 is sufficiently distant in time from the present to allow a historian access to government documents that had been sealed for thirty years under regulations governing their public release.

Multicultural Cold War is divided into three parts. Part I, “Totalitarianism and Anti-totalitarianism”, begins with a chapter on the theory of totalitarianism, followed by one on anti-totalitarian epistemology. To understand Cold War liberalism and pluralism, or any philosophy for that matter, we cannot consider it purely from within itself, but need to know what its specific rhetoric was directed against.⁶ To understand this continuity of heterogeneous and divergent

tensions, this continuity of change that I call, “Liberal Anti-Totalitarianism,” I identify the moment of negation within it: what it was directed against. Thus the first chapter, “All about Totalitarianism”, provides a brief history of the central problem of the Cold War. In this section I outline the etymology of totalitarianism, and provide a historical sketch of the problem of totalitarianism as it evolved under effects of historical events and different theorists. I concentrate on epistemological issues. Here, I consider the contributions to the theory/description of totalitarianism of theorists/observers such as Hannah Arendt, Carl J. Friedrich, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. I also outline the history of terms such as ideology and mass society that are related to the problem of totalitarianism. The chapter follows the contours of the major debates among public intellectuals on the sources and characteristics of totalitarianism. I emphasize the centrality of the issues of the individual and community within theories of totalitarianism. Many theorists believed that the phenomenon of totalitarianism stemmed from the breakdown of traditional community and the consequent deracination of the individual, who was then susceptible to the allure of totalitarianism. Totalitarianism itself was portrayed as excessive or the wrong kind of community – too much unity or uniformity and too little individualism. The challenge for anti-totalitarian liberals was to come up with formulae that
balanced individualism (difference) with community (identity). This was, of course, a replay of an old problem of liberalism within the new context of Cold War. The solution for many liberals lay in schemes such as “Unity in Diversity.” My goal is to flesh out the philosophical issues associated with the term community and thereby shed some light on Cold War thinking about the nation (national community) and diversity.

I call Chapter 2 “The Spell.” The problem of totalitarianism cast a spell on Cold War liberals. Holding the high-minded doctrines of idealism directly responsible for totalitarianism and its horrors, many liberals in North America viewed particulars as prior and superior to universals in the production of knowledge. As a consequence of the denigration of metaphysics and the shift in epistemology that resulted from the preoccupation with the problem of totalitarianism during the Cold War, nonconceptuality, individuality, and particularity were in ascendancy at this time. Facts were essential. “Just the facts, Ma’am,” as Sergeant Friday used to say on the popular television series Dragnet, was a characteristic expression of Cold War views of knowledge.

Nonconceptuality, individuality, and particularity, things in which traditional philosophy had previously showed little interest and that had been dismissed as transitory and insignificant since Plato, now became real. For Cold War liberals these things counted. In fact they counted them literally by reinforcing quantification as an acceptable instrument, on its own, of knowledge production and by using statistics as a means of representing the nation. The epistemological tendency of liberal anti-totalitarians, under the spell of the theory of totalitarianism, was to hold what Hegel called ‘Lazy Existenze’ as prior and superior to conceptuality and universalism. Reality, the English pragmatist Canning Schiller once said, was that which was evaluated as important, and in Cold War North America particulars were important, and therefore real. Cold War liberals were suspicious of universals (including abstracted totalities, identities, and unities) in their anthropology, sociology and historiography. These epistemological trends helped to establish conventions of representation of the nation based on description and quantification of the nation in its particularity. This led to a paradoxical situation. Particulars came to be idealized

8Ibid., p. 8.
as particularity or diversity (the conceptualization of particulars). In this shift, North Americans elevated the particular to the level of the concept of \textit{particularity} or \textit{diversity}, that is, to the level of an ideal or a universal claim. This new ideal became the new national idea in Canada and the United States, a new basis for national identity in both countries.

Part II, “Canada and the United States”, examines the interrelationship between Cold War epistemology and developments concerning ethnicity and the nation in Canada and the United States. In the postwar period, cultural pluralism reached its widest vogue in both countries, but had notably different forms of expression in each. In Canada the issue of multiculturalism was closely connected to government policy. Until 1946, when the Canadian Citizenship Act was enacted, there was no such thing as Canadian citizenship in law. Large-scale post-Second World War immigration and the newly created concept of Canadian citizenship prompted Canadian bureaucrats and politicians to undertake initiatives to define Canadian citizenship and to “integrate” immigrants and “old” Canadians as citizens. The citizenship and integration debates in Canada took place within a Cold War context of concern with totalitarian versus anti-totalitarian models of ethnic relations. Then in 1962 the question of multiculturalism exploded on the Canadian national scene when the Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Bilingualism and Biculturalism addressed the perceived inequities between English and French-Canadians in the Canadian confederation. The Royal Commission wrapped up its work in 1969. Many of its important recommendations on language and cultural policy were subsequently translated into law. Even before it started its public hearings, ethnic groups challenged the premise of the Royal Commission that Canada was only bilingual and bicultural, “an equal partnership between the two founding races.” It was in response to the last report of the Royal Commission that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced an official policy of multiculturalism for Canada in 1971. To a certain extent, the rise of a multicultural national identity in Canada must be seen within the context of what appear to be the historical “contingencies” of the late development of the concept of Canadian citizenship, the creation of the Royal Commission, and of Trudeau’s election in 1968.

In the United States cultural pluralism also achieved its widest popularity after World War II. Here, however, cultural pluralism was not as closely

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associated with federal public policy as it was in Canada. There were, of course, important developments in terms of race and ethnic relations, the most prominent being the rise of the Civil Rights movement, federal civil rights legislation, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions on civil rights matters. The most significant expressions of cultural pluralism, however, did not appear in the United States as major policy pronouncements, legislation or constitutional amendments. Instead, U.S. public intellectuals defined cultural pluralism in their scholarship and social criticism. Thus “American Social Science”, the first chapter of Part II, looks at the effects of anti-totalitarianism on the social sciences in the United States. Among other texts, the chapter considers the influential book by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*[^10]. Glazer and Moynihan are often credited with signaling the end of assimilationist paradigms in American ethnic history and sociology[^11]. This chapter also discusses the enduring influence and post-war popularity of the work of Horace M. Kallen. A


student of the American pragmatist William James, Kallen was the professional philosopher who coined the term and elaborated the philosophy of “cultural pluralism.” He wrote extensively on American identity and ethnicity throughout his long and prolific life. This chapter develops the argument that within liberal anti-totalitarianism, some variants of pragmatism persisted or emerged and moved throughout the Cold War, thereby being transformed into something different.

Chapter 4, “Canada’s Policy of Official Multiculturalism” outlines the history of the Canadian Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, briefs submitted to it by community activists, and the thought of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who responded to the Commission’s recommendations by announcing a policy of multiculturalism for Canada in 1971. Activists from ethnic communities, in particular Ukrainian Canadians, played a pivotal role in the history of multiculturalism in Canada, demanding that provincial and federal cultural, language, broadcasting, and educational policies reflect Canadian social ‘reality.’ They also provided an enthusiastic social basis for the policy of multiculturalism and thereby helped to make the policy politically viable.
The single chapter in Part III, Chapter 5, “Canada and the United States in Comparative Perspective”, considers identity and difference between the historical epistemology in the two countries in the context of the Cold War. I conclude that in terms of historical epistemology, there were many points of identity between the two countries during the Cold War, but that these similarities were transposed onto different political cultures and the consequences were thus different.

In the “Conclusion” I comment on the relationship between the construction of collective identities, conventions of representation and epistemology. The Cold War preoccupation with totalitarianism brought about epistemological trends in social science that described the nation in its particularity and limited the ways national community could be imagined in its totality. This chapter includes some remarks about the relationship between epistemology, artistic modernism, and the enthusiasm for ethnicity in post-WWII North America. The end of the Cold War, because it signaled an apparent end to the preoccupation with totalitarianism and thus the end of anti-totalitarian particularistic epistemology does not bode the End of History but the advent of an historical age.
Multicultural Cold War overlaps with five scholarly projects currently under way across a number of academic disciplines: 1) studies of the Cold War, 2) intellectual history, 3) North American studies, 4) ethnic studies, and 5) the relatively new field of historical epistemology. In terms of Cold War studies, it engages specifically with those works that inquire into the connections between domestic culture and the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. It also concerns the sub-field of Cold War studies that concentrates on the academy. This dissertation expands upon the interconnections between Cold War epistemologies and the genealogy of the social sciences. Thus it


13 Examples from this sub-field include the essays in Schiffrin, André, ed., The Cold War and the University: Toward and Intellectual History of the Postwar Years (New York: New Press, 1997).
participates in the broad scholarly project that traces the development of modern social sciences. One of the aims of Multicultural Cold War is to deepen our understanding of Cold War conventions of representing the nation. The dissertation puts forward the argument that there was more to it than hyperbolic rhetoric and propaganda, the constructions of security and intelligence services, and stereotypes of contending social, political and economic models. The way a nation is represented is also structured by the thought processes of people and theories of knowledge.

The second general area of scholarship to which Multicultural Cold War is affiliated is intellectual history, including studies of Cold War liberalism, pluralism, and political and social thought generally. Two studies, in particular, inform this dissertation: Robert Booth Fowler’s Believing Skeptics: American Political Intellectuals, 1945-1964 and Edward Purcell’s The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value.¹⁴ Both books provide valuable insight into mid-twentieth century North American epistemology. My

aim is to further explore the impact of epistemology on ethnicity and how the nation was represented.

In the broader field of American intellectual history this dissertation seeks to challenge Louis Menand’s contention in The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America, that American pragmatism was totally eclipsed by the Cold War.\(^\text{15}\) Menand argues that while the great pragmatists Oliver Wendell Holmes, William James and John Dewey dominated American intellectual life for the first half of the twentieth century, they and their ideas disappeared from the intellectual landscape for the next forty years. “A movement of thought that had grown out of the experience of the Civil War appeared to reach an end with the Cold War,” writes Menand.\(^\text{16}\) I disagree. This point of disagreement is important because pragmatism and pluralism, including cultural pluralism are closely related. If pragmatism was eclipsed by the Cold War, as Menand claims, then why did various types of pluralisms thrive in Cold War North America? Menand argues that the Cold War changed everything about American intellectual life, 


\(^\text{16}\)Ibid., p. 438.
and that values and priorities shifted. He points out that the value at the bottom
of the thought of Holmes, James, Pierce, and Dewey is tolerance. The American
Civil War had taught them that violence is hidden in abstractions, ideas and
principles. Pragmatism was designed to make it harder for people to be driven to
violence by their beliefs. To Menand, the Cold War was a war over principles,
and the notion that the values of the free society for which the Cold War was
waged were contingent, relative, fallible constructions, good for some purposes
and not so good for others was not a notion compatible with the moral
imperatives of the age. Menand is wrong about the Cold War. Of course, Holmes
and James were dead by the time of the Cold War, but Dewey was prolific and
influential into the early years of the Cold War. In fact, John Dewey penned an
original thesis of anti-totalitarianism – Freedom and Culture.17 Horace Kallan and
Sidney Hook, disciples of James and Dewey, may not have had the stature of
their mentors, but Menand understates the influence of these two very
prominent public intellectuals, both of them active Cold Warriors, throughout
the second half of the twentieth century. Contrary to Menand’s argument, the

central concern of pragmatism - the fear of violence stemming from abstractions, ideas and principles - is entirely consistent with the Cold War ideology of anti-totalitarianism, which held that totalitarian systems are idealistic and that totalitarian violence is rooted in abstraction, ideas and principles. Pragmatism did not disappear but was transposed into an essential foundation of anti-totalitarianism. Cold War liberals, in fact, celebrated the contingent, the relative and the fallible. Tychism - the doctrine that objective account must be taken of the element of chance in reasoning - was characteristic of Cold War liberal epistemology. The theories of cultural relativism actually reached their widest vogue in the post-war period. And fallibility, a common feature of Cold War social science and historiography, was celebrated in contrast to the infallibility of the totalitarians. In these forms, pragmatism persisted throughout the Cold War.

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18 For example, in the forties and fifties, the Cambridge historian Lord Acton enjoyed a period of revival. Gertrude Himmelfarb’s biography is one example of the interest in Acton: Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics. (London: Routledge & Kegan. Paul, 1952). Aside from his historical work, his aphorisms, and his role as the principal opponent to the Papal Doctrine of Infallibility at the First Vatican Council, Acton was revived for his essay on “Nationality” that viewed multiple nationalities within one state as a guarantee of liberty.
Third, *Multicultural Cold War* contributes to comparative Canada - U.S. studies and to the field of North American studies. As is the case with Cold War studies, North American studies also contain a subfield focused on identities: principally national, regional, ethnic, and borderlands identities. In keeping with the comparative imperative of North American studies, it rejects the basic principle of the school of historiography that holds that historical events are in some sense unique or particular and resistant to generalization. *Multicultural Cold War* provides a nuanced elaboration to the widely held and oft-repeated argument that the political genesis of the Canada and the United States has determined once and for all the political culture of these societies. This “revolution/counter-revolution” argument is most closely associated with Seymour Martin Lipset. Lipset portrays Canada as a counter-revolutionary, monarchical, Tory society and the United States as a Whig society born of republican revolution. According to Lipset, “American universalism - the desire

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to incorporate diverse groups into a culturally unified whole - is inherent in the country’s founding ideology.” Similarly, “Canadian particularism - the preservation of sub-national group loyalties, as well as the strength of the provinces vis-à-vis the federal government - is rooted in the decision of the Francophone clerical elite to remain loyal to the British monarchy as protection against Puritanism and democratic populism across the border.”

John Herd Thompson and Stephen Randall emphatically disagree with Lipset’s assessment of Canada as a Tory society and the United States as a Whig society. They argue instead that Canada-U.S. divergence should be located much more recently, and that a “more convincing explanation for U.S.-Canadian differences in these regards is the huge contingency of the cold war and the massive emotional and fiscal resources the United States expended to fight it.”

This dissertation argues that a status quo conservatism and social meliorism similar to Toryism inhere in pluralism, that cultural pluralism is consistent with what Lipset calls Canadian

\[21\text{Ibid. p.172; Tamara Palmer Seiler is but one of many scholars who wholeheartedly agree in “Melting Pot and Mosaic: Images and Realities,” David M. Thomas, ed., Canada and the United States: Differences that Count, Second Edition (Broadview Press, 2000).}\]

particularism, but that particularism and pluralism and status quo conservatism were in ascendancy in both Canada and the United States in the post-World War II period. The Cold War is more convincing as an explanation of points of identity between Canadian and American political culture than differences.

Fourth, this dissertation overlaps with ethnic studies, particularly the place of ethnicity, race, immigration, sub-national group particularity, diversity and pluralism in the ways Canadians and Americans imagine their nations. In this regard, it builds on the scholarship of John Higham and Philip Gleason. Both scholars have pointed out the important effects of the fear of totalitarianism on ethnic relations in the United States. Higham touches on the mixed effects of the Cold War on ethnicity in the United States in Send These to Me. In his view totalitarianism “convinc[ed] Americans that religious and racial division constituted the last, the most vulnerable, and the most vicious cleavages in a beleaguered society that was otherwise knit together by a sturdy web of ideals.” He notes that it would be reasonable to suppose that the resultant strong commitment to national unity would have also sustained an assimilationist approach to ethnic problems, but according to Higham, this was not the case. While assimilation or integration remained the goal of most American intellectuals for African Americans, on a more general conceptual level,
totalitarianism had the opposite effect: it stimulated appreciation for cultural pluralism. According to Higham, democracy was widely redefined along the lines sketched by the theoretician of cultural pluralism, Horace Kallen, so that an equation between democracy and diversity became a fundamental premise of political and social thought. It was during this time, Higham writes, that an explicitly pluralist theory of group relations attained its widest popularity. Why did this happen? In Higham’s opinion, it was because the self-image of Americans during the Cold War was strongly conditioned by their polar opposition to an enemy that was supposedly monolithic. If the enemy were totalitarian, America would have to be pluralistic.\textsuperscript{23}  

\textit{Multicultural Cold War} adds to this observation by arguing that the image of the enemy had an epistemological aspect. If the enemy thought one way, if the enemy’s knowledge practices were totalitarian, then Americans would think in another way, and would subscribe to a democratic theory of knowledge. This democratic epistemology would recognize no dogmas, no preconceptions, and would be characterized by open inquiry and free debate. This democratic epistemology structured knowledge production and in turn people used this knowledge to manage their interrelations.

Philip Gleason’s *Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America* informs this dissertation by tracing the changes in meaning over time of words and concepts such as *pluralism* and *assimilation*. Like Higham, Gleason attributes the postwar appeal of cultural pluralism to totalitarianism noting the rising postwar concern for the evils of “mass society, the great revival of democratic ideology in World War II, and the critique of conformity.” 24 An important feature of Gleason’s work is that it elucidates some of the assimilationist assumptions and impulses of cultural pluralists. 25 Gleason’s work hints at an important philosophical point: there can be no meaningful difference without unity and no meaningful unity without difference. They are two sides of the same medal. Various kinds of cultural pluralism implied or assumed different degrees or kinds of assimilation or integration or national unity just as assimilation or integration or unity assumed certain kinds of diversity. *Multicultural Cold War* explores how epistemological units, such as “theory” or “fact” affected or were reflected in debates about the nation and ethnicity, and how the debates about the nation and ethnicity were a new formulation of the ancient metaphysical and cognitive problem known as the problem of the One and


25Ibid., pp.49&57.
the Many. The dissertation explores the idea of reciprocity, the interrelatedness of the universal (unity, identity, ideas, concepts, theories, the ideational sphere) and the particular (diversity, difference, matter, facts, data, the sphere of that which is the case) as it was transposed in debates about the nation and pluralism in mid-twentieth century North America.

The fifth and final scholarly project to which Multicultural Cold War contributes, and to which it has close affinity is the new field of historical epistemology. Lorraine Datson calls historical epistemology “a history of the categories of facticity, evidence, objectivity, and so forth.” Historical epistemology investigates how the valuation of epistemological units determined what could be known at any given time, as well as how this knowledge could be used. It is, therefore, a study of determinations and effects. Mary Poovey, author of *A History of the Modern Fact*, writes that this field, in studying epistemological units such as the modern fact, can reveal the organizational principles that inhere in the kinds of knowledge by which subjects of the modern

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27 Poovey, p.7.
world manage relationships with each other and with society.\textsuperscript{28} I refashion Poovey’s purely epistemological question: “how knowledge was understood so that it seemed to consist of both apparently non-interpretive numerical descriptions of particulars and systemic claims that were somehow derived from those particularized descriptions?” in several ways. How, I ask, was knowledge understood in Cold War North America? To what extent did it consist of apparently non-interpretive particulars and systemic claims that were somehow derived from those particularized descriptions? Did the prevailing epistemological orientation of Cold War North America underlie debates about the nation and pluralism? Subsidiary questions include: did this way of thinking condition how people imagined the nation as consisting of irreducible groups? And was democracy conceived as a systemic claim deriving from particularized descriptions of groups?

The method I use in Multicultural Cold War is straightforward. I explore a series of events and texts that articulate the thoughts of a group of North American philosophers, sociologists, bureaucrats, politicians, and community

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p.xv.
activists on matters of ethnicity, the nation and pluralism from the period 1935-1971. The point is not to reproduce or summarize the content of these texts, but to foreground the epistemological assumptions and practices and modes of argumentation in them. I then examine how these assumptions, practices and modes of argumentation relate to the ostensible purpose of the text and compare them to the epistemological trends prevalent in Cold War North America. I ask what underlying epistemological assumptions in this material connect with the idea of totalitarianism. To do so it is necessary to elaborate what I mean by prevalent epistemological trends. The dissertation thus begins with a discussion of the theory of totalitarianism followed by an outline of epistemology as it relates to this central Cold War problem. A potential weakness in this method is in the attempt to characterize systematically and comprehensively Cold War epistemology. This involves searching for common denominators, and it runs the risk of becoming a reductive maneuver. Two caveats are thus in order. This dissertation makes no claim to be comprehensive. Obviously, not all modes of thought and not all epistemologies from this period fit the bill. The breadth of my sources, however, will make clear that the problem of totalitarianism reverberated within many diverse intellectual and artistic movements. Furthermore, my investigations suggest that there was no one central logic of the
Cold War, only a few abutting events. And here too, the dissertation does not pretend to encompass all of these events.

This dissertation is but one possible history of liberal anti-totalitarianism in Cold War North America. I have selected the texts on the nation and ethnicity on the basis of their explanatory power. While I defend the particular choices I have made in constructing this narrative, these are (of course) not the only texts or authors I could have included in this study. The selected texts and their authors were, however, central to the history of the construction of pluralistic national identities in Canada and the United States.

Because my narrative does not develop in a linear fashion, the texts on the nation and ethnicity might appear to have been selected arbitrarily. Whereas many histories chronicle a series of closely connected sequential events or the development of a single well-defined idea over time, *Multicultural Cold War* first examines trends within the epistemology of Cold War North America and then foregrounds the epistemological assumptions of selected texts pertaining to questions of ethnicity and the nation. Sometimes the connections are explicit. In other cases, the links are less apparent and the authors of the texts are either unreflective or try to naturalize their politics and modes of argumentation. Each text does not necessarily flow from the preceding one in a self-conscious way:
they do not form some kind of obvious, linear or sequential historical contiguity, unity, or narrative. The motif of pluralism plus the epistemological and cognitive orientations of the texts, however, provide the links between them. The articulation of the texts can be seen as historical events. The events are contiguous, so to speak, at the point of their underlying epistemological assumptions, and these assumptions were conditioned by the anxieties stimulated by totalitarianism. The dissertation will show that Cold War epistemology established the conventions that governed how the nation was represented while eliding the philosophy that underpinned such a representation.
Chapter 1: All About Totalitarianism

In Cold War North America, liberals responded to the problem of totalitarianism by celebrating diversity. Even when they did not explicitly contrast pluralism or diversity with totalitarianism, liberals privileged diversity by stressing certain themes in their criticism. I begin this chapter with an overview of North American responses to totalitarianism. I then survey explicit contrasts of cultural pluralism with totalitarianism before turning to the key themes in liberal criticism of totalitarianism that made diversity normative. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the philosophical issues at stake in this history.

The word totalitarianism has had a controversial career. Italian liberal leader Giovanni Amendola coined the term totalitarianismo in 1923 to describe the Fascist attack on representative democracy in Italy.¹ This pejorative use of totalitarianismo did not deter Amendola’s Fascist opponents from appropriating the term.

word to describe their movement and their ideal state. For Mussolini and the self-styled philosopher of Fascism, Giovanni Gentile, *totalitarismo* signified the Fascist ideal of the ethical state as the unity of the whole nation’s thought and action in which the state and the individual are inseparable. In Fascist theory the state is prior and superior to the individual, and an individual can attain freedom only in and through the totalitarian state. Thus, Mussolini proclaimed, “all is in the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state.”

Political scientist Henry R. Spencer offered one of the early discussions of *totalitarianism* in English in February 1929. In an essay on Italian politics, Spencer noted the inadequacy of the English political vocabulary to describe developments in Europe, and decided to “boldly transliterate [sic] ... ‘totalitarianism’” from the Italian. For Spencer, totalitarianism was “chauvinist absolutism.” “Totalitarianism,” he wrote, “will be understood to mean an all-inclusive hundred-percentness.” Spencer further explained what was meant by


totalitarianism by citing Mussolini. Italy, Il Duce had said, was “monolithic… all of one piece.”

I suspect that the adjective totalitarian was first used in English to designate Fascism and Bolshevism as essentially similar in The Times of London in November 1929. Before this date, a few observers noted similarities between them but did not use a single word to designate what they had in common. For instance, in 1926 the Harvard political scientist William Y. Elliot concluded that “[w]hatever the ends of Fascism may be, there is general agreement that its methods are precisely those of Bolshevism.” In 1927 the American philosopher John Dewey grouped the disciples of Lenin and Mussolini with the “captains of capitalist society,” and criticized them for “endeavoring to bring about a formation of dispositions and ideas which will conduce to a preconceived goal.”

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4 Henry R. Spencer, “Political Developments in Italy,” American Political Science Review, vol. 23, no. 1 (Feb. 1929), pp. 139-145; p. 139. In inter-war American politics One-Hundred Percentism also referred to the anti-immigrant, racist, and nativist American political movement and disposition.

5 The Times of London, Nov. 2, 1929, p. 7.

6 William Y. Elliot, as cited in Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory, p. 124.
All three, Dewey believed, used an “absolutistic logic” contrary to experimentalism and pragmatism.7

One of the first scholars to develop the concept of totalitarianism as a form of government common to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was Duke University Professor Calvin B. Hoover. Hoover wrote early studies of the Soviet and Nazi economies.8 He then wrote a comparative analysis of Communism and Nazism. In Dictators and Democracies (1937), Hoover assessed that “the principle of totalitarianism” was at the core of both systems. Two years before the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Duke economist predicted that the Nazis and Soviets could arrive at a “modus vivendi” despite their apparent differences, for no “unbridgeable gulf any longer separates the National Socialist and Soviet ideologies.” 9


In Canada, Queen’s University Principal W.H. Fyfe identified Fascist and Communist dictatorships as totalitarian and defined totalitarianism as based on the theory that the individual exists for the good of the state and can therefore claim no right to follow his conscience or to develop his personality. It was opposed to the essence of democracy, in which the *raison d’être* of government was to secure for the governed an equal distribution of the maximum of freedom. Essential to this purpose, was intellectual and individual freedom based on free discussion and free will. The purpose of social unity, the law, and the state was to secure personal freedom. To Fyfe, liberty meant, as in John Stuart Mill, “individual vigour and manifold diversity.”

In 1938 the Columbia University historian Carleton J.H. Hayes wrote an influential essay on totalitarianism. It highlighted some of the themes that came to dominate postwar theories. For Hayes, totalitarianism was the polar opposite of cultural pluralism; its origins lay in deracinated “masses”; ideology was its

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intellectual pattern”; and totalitarians saw themselves and their system as infallible.\textsuperscript{11}

The most important interwar study of totalitarianism was John Dewey’s \textit{Freedom and Culture}. Both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were totalitarian regimes in Dewey’s assessment. Totalitarianism, he wrote, was a product of German idealism and was marked by Utopian thinking. The key to understanding it was its relation to the social scientific viewpoint that social conditions are the results of “forces.” For Dewey, totalitarianism was an example of the “monistic block-universe theory of social causation.”\textsuperscript{12} This analysis found favor among a large number of American public intellectuals. Echoing \textit{Freedom and Culture}, a group of them gathered in an organization called the Committee for Cultural Freedom and issued a “Manifesto” in the May 27, 1939 edition of


The Nation that called for active opposition to totalitarianism because it threatened freedom of thought.\textsuperscript{13}

To many North Americans, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1939 validated the thesis of the essential similarity of Nazism and Stalinism. The invasion of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union in September reinforced their conclusion, as did the intensive propaganda campaign against the “imperialist war” launched by the Communist Party in Canada and the United States.\textsuperscript{14} The declarations of war on Germany by Great Britain, France, and Canada gave a sense of renewed urgency to efforts to describe and interpret the Fascist, Nazi, and Communist phenomena and the threat they posed to liberal democracy. As international tensions mounted, scholars, politicians, journalists, and spokespeople for voluntary associations and


\textsuperscript{14} For example, a May 1, 1941 Communist Party pamphlet demanded that Canada “exit from the war.” “\textit{Travnevii manifesto do Kanadskoho narody!” (\textit{“May Manifesto to the Canadian People”}), National Archives of Canada, (NAC) RG 26, Vol. 1, File, 22-2, Part 1 “Relating to Communism.”
labor unions in North America frequently portrayed the conflict as a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism.15

This dichotomous view of the world was apparent at contemporary scholarly conferences where totalitarianism was presented as the pressing problem of the times. Most North American academics agreed that liberal democracy was antithetical to totalitarianism. The origins and characteristics of totalitarianism were, however, debated with vehemence. Indeed, a controversy over the roots of totalitarianism at the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in New York City in September, 1940 turned into a battle in an ongoing academic war between Catholic intellectuals and their allies on one hand and naturalist social scientists on the other.

Mortimer Adler, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, fired the opening salvo at the Conference. Alluding to John Dewey and his adherents, Adler said that American academics were guilty of being skeptical positivists who rejected all ideals. They were the ones responsible for the political crisis in

the world. “[W]e have more to fear from our own professors,” declared Adler, “than from Hitler.”16 Philosopher Sidney Hook, one of Dewey’s students and the principal organizer of the Committee for Cultural Freedom, responded to Adler in kind. Whether he knew it or not, Hook said, Adler was advancing “a justification of religious intolerance.” Hook denied that he thought there was any such thing as a philosophical fifth column. “[B]ut,” he nevertheless added, “if there were anything that could possibly be regarded as such, then…it would be not positivism but the views of Mr. Adler.”17 Both sides in this kulturkampf considered totalitarianism to be the vital issue of the day, and each side accused the other of being responsible for generating the conditions that created it. The naturalists saw in Catholicism, Communism, and Fascism the common ground of idealism and absolutism. The philosophical rationalists, on the other side, accused the naturalists of a moral cynicism and skepticism that greased the skids for totalitarianism.18


18 Purcell, pp. 3-5.
The rift created by the Adler-Hook confrontation ran deep. The Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion continued to meet during the war to address the problem of totalitarianism and into the postwar years. The subsequent meetings, however, took place without the participation of many prominent naturalists and pragmatists. Sidney Hook, Horace Kallen, John Dewey, Jerome Nathanson, Mark May, and other committed secularists, walked out after the 1940 meeting and established the rival Conferences on The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith. This group met in 1944 when their theme was “The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith,” then in 1945 for “The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education,” and finally in 1946 for “Science for Democracy.” For both sides the ways in which people thought and their attitudes toward metaphysics, ethics, religion, and knowledge, were bound up with the prospects for totalitarianism, democracy, and American identity.

Two wartime publications generated additional controversy over the origins of totalitarianism: Friedrich von Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) and Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945). Von Hayek stated his

thesis bluntly. “[T]he socialist element,” he wrote, “produced totalitarianism.”  
In his view, socialist planning in particular was the source of totalitarianism. Like von Hayek, to whom he acknowledged indebtedness, Popper also denounced planning and “Utopian engineering.” The central target of Popper’s book, however, was not totalitarianism per se but what he called “historicism.” Historicism, in Popper’s definition, was the belief that historical change occurs in accordance with laws. This was the source of totalitarianism. According to Popper, Plato, Hegel, and Marx were proto-totalitarians who adhered to historicist principles.

Toward the end of the war the concept of totalitarianism became an international literary sensation when George Orwell’s Animal Farm, an allegory of totalitarianism in the USSR, was published. Reviewing Animal Farm in The New York Times, historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called it an example of the

20 Von Hayek, p.9.


obsessive theme of the literature of the time: the “tragedy of idealism.” Animal Farm was one of several books that reshaped the literary landscape of the postwar years. Some of the best-selling and most influential books of this time had anti-totalitarian, anti-Utopian themes. These included Arthur Koestler’s psychological novel of the Moscow show trials, Darkness at Noon, and Orwell’s Nineteen-Eighty-Four. The New York Times called Nineteen-Eighty-Four, “the most contemporary novel” of 1949.

With the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the identification of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as totalitarian became a recurrent theme in the rhetoric of western leaders. In 1946-47 Churchill and Truman, for example, warned that the Soviet Union was at then in the same position in which Germany had been in 1935. In the heyday of the Cold War, scholarly interest in totalitarianism reached its peak. Among the proliferation of studies of totalitarianism, the most important were Hannah Arendt’s The Origins


of Totalitarianism (1951) and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski’s Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956). Both books stressed the importance of the concept of “mass society” as the basis of totalitarianism; its eschatological features, that is, Utopianism and millenarianism; the contempt for facts as a technique of totalitarian rule; and the centrality of ideological thinking in totalitarian systems.

Studies of totalitarianism in the 1950s also underpinned the growth industry in the sociology of mass society, conformity, and community in North America. Scholars in Canada and the United States theorized that the problem of totalitarianism was at the source of “modern mass man’s” impulse for conformity. Among the more important studies of conformity in the postwar period were the 1950 best seller, The Lonely Crowd by David Reisman, and his co-authors Reuel Denney and Nathan Glazer; and William H. Whyte’s The Organization Man (1956). Oscar Handlin’s The Uprooted (1951), the Pulitzer Prize winning history of the United States as the history of immigration, was also

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closely related to the academic preoccupation with conformity. In Canada, the discourse on conformity found expression in academic and government policy debates on the relative merits of integration as opposed to assimilation in citizenship policy. Canadian bureaucrats and scholars explicitly associated ethnic and immigrant assimilation and conformity with totalitarianism and advocated instead the proto-multicultural citizenship policy of ‘integration’ that was said to reject “assimilation but turns toward a goal that welcomes diversity.”

In the aftermath of the Cold War, totalitarianism remains a keyword in political discourse, but it is now frequently used in paradigms different from the one which originally generated it. It has become an important term in postmodern theory. The meanings of totalitarianism at issue here, however, are


those developed by North American liberals who located totalitarianism principally in the Stalin and Hitler regimes, associated it with idealism, saw it as a Utopian or millenarian faith, and contrasted it with pluralism.

In the mid-twentieth century, direct contrasts between totalitarianism and various types of pluralism and diversity were common. Carleton J.H. Hayes, for instance, portrayed cultural pluralism as the opposite of totalitarianism and as the guarantor of democracy in his 1938 essay. Hayes cited the Reverend J. Elliot Ross, one of the founders of the National Conference of Christians and Jews: “American democracy implies freedom, and where there is freedom, there will inevitably be difference and variety. To make America safe for differences is to preserve democracy. To enforce identity, whether by civil law or by the extra-legal pressure of one group upon another, is to destroy democracy.” The answer to the totalitarian threat, whether Fascist or Communist, Hayes concluded, was to “continue on our way, cherishing a cultural pluralism among us, and, while learning to respect one another’s peculiarities, learning otherwise to cooperate in the responsible and difficult tasks of American citizenship.”

29 Hayes, p. 25, 26.
By the time of the Second World War, liberals widely held cultural pluralism to be the solution to the problem of totalitarianism. In the January 1941 issue of *Ethics*, for example, Henry Magid wrote that “A theory of unity on the basis of universal agreement on one end for the whole of the community is comparatively simple. Such is the unity of the totalitarian states…It is in the multiplicity of interrelated interests and the plurality of overlapping groups that the unity of a peaceful democratic community must be found.” For the City College philosopher, the community was “the matrix in which groups operate.” The ideal condition of freedom, he theorized, is “the existence of a multiplicity of competing groups.” “The situation that democracy recognizes as the setting of its problems is what has been called cultural pluralism – the existence of diverse ways of life practiced by various groups in the same community. Democracy solves this problem of freedom by recognizing and permitting the existence of this cultural pluralism, restricting its regulative function solely to those actions of groups which raise communal problems.” “General unity,” wrote Magid, “is neither the condition nor aim of democracies.” Many other intellectuals expressed similar views.

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In addition to cultural pluralism, the “pluralism of sovereignties,” that is, the limitation of state power by federalism and constitutionalism, was envisioned as an alternative to totalitarianism.\textsuperscript{32} C.H. McIlwain, writing in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Politics in May of 1941, expressed this view. “Totalitarianism,” he wrote, “rests on the assumption that some men or some races are by nature so much better than all others that the good of the whole requires that these men or these races alone shall rule and shall regulate the lives of all the rest as slaves.” What Canadians were fighting for was the “limitation of despotic will, to secure our freedom as individuals in all those things in which this freedom does not encroach on that of others.” In other words they were fighting for “the principles of constitutional government.”\textsuperscript{33} In a paper entitled “The Meaning of Fascism,” L.E. Law imagined a Fascist Canada as the end of the


Canadian constitution where federalism gives way to unitary government, local
governments are centralized, and the independent judiciary is eliminated.34

Historian H. Noel Fieldhouse of the University of Manitoba specifically
distinguished between “liberty” and “democracy” in contrast with
totalitarianism. To Fieldhouse, democracy was “simply a matter of numbers.” It
meant government by the mass of people as a whole. Fascism and Nazism were,
in his view, democratic but not liberal. Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini were
“brutalitarians” who came from the people, from mass democracy. What had
actually happened in Germany, Fieldhouse wrote, was “that dictatorship was
accomplished by popular will.” The war was not between dictatorship and
democracy, but between mass dictatorship issued from mass democracy and
countries in which democracy was tempered by liberal constitutionalism.35

One of the most influential theorists of pluralism of the era was Catholic
theologian Jacques Maritain who from 1932 taught annually at the University of
Toronto and was a visiting professor at Princeton and Columbia during the war.

34 L.E. Law, “The Meaning of Fascism,” Queen’s Quarterly, Spring 1943, pp. 47-
48.

XLVII, Summer 1940, pp. 161-164, 173-175.
His doctrines of “personalism,” “solidarism,” and “pluralism” were developed specifically in response to totalitarianism and in contradistinction from liberal individualism. These doctrines became very influential among Catholic hierarchs and intellectuals in North America. For instance, Canadian Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent (term of office 1948-1957) acknowledged the influence of Maritain on his views of totalitarianism and pluralism. In a 1992 symposium, Pierre Trudeau (Prime Minister of Canada 1968-1984) said that Maritain informed his conception of atomized society and pluralism.36 The doctrine of “personalism,” was Maritain’s alternative to liberal individualism. The latter, he believed, bred atomization, the necessary condition for totalitarianism. Personalism included political rights as one aspect of the dignity of the “human person.” This was an innovation for Catholicism. The doctrine of “solidarism” was conceived as the Christian alternative to Communist and Fascist totalitarianism. It implied that coordination in society and the body politic was to be achieved by acquiescence on the part of groups and individuals on the basis of a mutual recognition of human interdependence. In both of these doctrines, Maritain stressed that the person is

prior to the social order and the social order proceeds from the person. Finally, the doctrine of “pluralism” maintained that persons are not isolated from other persons, nor should they function as automatons under an all-powerful state, but as members of certain natural groups: the family, the profession, the commune, the region.\footnote{Jacques Maritain, “The Person and the Common Good,” \textit{Review of Politics}, Vol. 8, pp. 425, (1946); and \textit{Les Droits de L’ Homme et la Loi Naturelle}, (New York: \textit{Editions de la Maison Française}, 1942), pp.34-35.} Maritain’s doctrines represented an unprecedented accommodation between Catholicism and liberal democratic pluralism.

Hannah Arendt, Carl J. Friedrich, and Zbigniew Brzezinski also made direct contrasts between totalitarianism and pluralism in their authoritative studies. Arendt wrote that totalitarianism holds people “so tightly together that it is as though their plurality had disappeared into One Man of gigantic proportions.” Totalitarian terror, she concluded, “destroys the plurality of men and makes out of the many the One.”\footnote{Arendt, pp. 465-466.} In Friedrich and Brzezinski’s view, totalitarian systems were marked by the alleged ideological infallibility of their dogma which was the source of the “violent passion for assent, for unanimity” in totalitarianism. Pluralism, or as they put it, “the presence of organized groups


\footnote{Arendt, pp. 465-466.}
that criticize the powers-that-be publicly and continually,” was the clearest indication of the non-existence of totalitarianism.39

Among the numerous direct contrasts between totalitarianism and pluralism or diversity, two are exemplary. In The Vital Center (1949), a book that was hailed as having “suddenly and clearly announced the spirit of the age,” Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote that cultural pluralism could restore meaning to democracy in the face of totalitarianism.40 Communism and fascism, he later elaborated, were a threat to American culture; the chief hope for survival was the capacity of the American government and the strength of American society. What was the source of this strength? It was, according to Schlesinger, based on “the affirmation of America, not as a uniform society, but as a various and pluralistic society, made up of many groups with diverse interests.” Maintaining and enlarging cultural pluralism was the best defense of American culture

39 Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 171.

against totalitarianism.  

Canadian Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent made a similar point in a major speech in March 1950. St-Laurent explained the international situation bluntly. “In a nutshell,” he told the Canadian Club, “the Cold War is a conflict between totalitarianism and liberty.” The Prime Minister outlined Canada’s extensive military contributions to the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but concluded by offering “another more intangible way” for Canadians “to help win the Cold War.” Beyond military rearmament, Canada had “to strengthen all these institutions, which, in contrast to the monotony and uniformity of the totalitarian State, bring wealth and variety to the life of a free nation.” Canada brought a unique weapon to the struggle with totalitarianism: its cultural diversity. “[T]wo races and two cultures,” French and English, and other citizens welcomed “from most of the countries of the world,” had overcome “ethnic differences, linguistic differences, and cultural differences” to become “a united people.” Canada’s greatest contribution to winning the Cold War, St. Laurent concluded, would be “this

special political harmony that we have achieved at home and the spirit of unity that drives us.\textsuperscript{42}

By differentiating themselves from a putatively monolithic totalitarianism, many Canadians and Americans constructed their national identities upon the ideals of pluralism and diversity. Not all of the criticism, however, contrasted totalitarianism directly with diversity. Yet even when “diversity” or “pluralism” was not invoked explicitly, the preponderant effect of liberal theories of totalitarianism made diversity normative in Canadian and American society nonetheless. In these discourses of totalitarianism lies the deeper story of the way Canadians and Americans enshrined diversity as a value. The criticism of totalitarianism brought about significant changes in the metaphysics, eschatology, and epistemology of North Americans; and these changes in turn helped to establish diversity as an ideal that became a basis for Canadian and American national identity. The case for diversity, cultural pluralism, and multiculturalism was advanced in criticism of totalitarianism as “Utopian,” “millenarian,” “metaphysical,” “idealist,” “ideological,” “stringently logical,”

and as hostile to “freedom of the mind” and “the scientific attitude of mind.” In a vast process of socialization, the values of being “scientific,” “open-minded,” “anti-Utopian,” “anti-metaphysical,” and of rejecting millenarian eschatology and “stringent logicality” were transmitted to North Americans. These values had definite pluralistic implications. What follows is a discussion of some of the key themes in liberal criticism of totalitarianism that had the effect of making diversity normative in North America.

The first such theme is the link between idealism and totalitarianism. This connection goes back to the rise of the Fascist regime in Italy. The Fascist usage of totalitarismo was linked to idealism and absolutism because some leading Fascists claimed to be propagating Fascist variations of Hegelian idealism. Gentile called his philosophy “actual idealism,” or “actualism.” Thus from the earliest days of the Mussolini regime, the problem of totalitarianism was superimposed onto the problem of idealism; and in the process, the problem of totalitarianism transformed it.

John Dewey was one of the critics who believed that totalitarianism was a product of idealism. Dewey had started his career with intensive studies of Hegel; and he assessed that the problem of freedom in totalitarianism, as in Hegel, was connected to rationality or reason, in contradistinction to the way
freedom was conceptualized in Britain and the United States as connected to the individual. In the European tradition, law was the parent of reason and freedom. Totalitarianism, Dewey wrote, was an outcome of the thought that law precedes freedom, not that free institutions determine law. It bore the stamp of the idea that subjection to universal law brings higher freedom. The problem of totalitarianism, he wrote, was rooted in the idealistic social scientific viewpoint that social conditions are the results of “forces.” The belief in “bald single forces,” wrote Dewey, “whether they are thought of as intrinsically psychological or sociological,” contributed to totalitarianism. The Marxist variant of totalitarianism, in Dewey’s assessment, “combines the romantic idealism of earlier social revolutionaries with what purports to be a thoroughly “objective” scientific analysis, expressed in a formulation of a single all-embracing “law”.” This was the law of class warfare that Marx derived not from the study of historical events but, according to Dewey, from Hegelian idealism. For Dewey, all absolutisms, including Marxism, tend to assume a theological form. Marxist doctrine was “monolithic” and speculative. It was an abstract theory, and only exegetical ingenuity accommodated this dogma to what actually happened historically. Marxism, according to Dewey, was characterized by “necessity” and a search for a “single” all-comprehensive law. The idea that all sets of events are
linked together into a single whole by one causal law was extra-scientific
metaphysical nonsense for Dewey. Marxism, Dewey declared, was the
quintessential illustration of the monistic block-universe theory of social
 causation; but he noted that *laissez-faire* individualism indulged in the same kind
of sweeping generalization. Monistic theories of this sort were accompanied in
practical execution by control of the press, schools, radio, theatre and every
means of mass communications, and restrictions on private gatherings and
conversations; and they generated fanaticism. Totalitarianism, in Dewey’s
assessment, was based on absolute principles, and absolute principles are
intolerant of dissent, for dissent from “the Truth” is more than intellectual error:
it is proof of an evil and dangerous will. For Dewey, organic idealistic
philosophy formed the theoretical background and justification of
totalitarianism. He cautioned, however, that the “moral is not unintelligent
glorification of empirical, pluralistic, and pragmatic method” because
“thoughtless empiricism provides opportunities for secret manipulation behind
the visible scene.” The “experimental method of science” was the answer. Dewey
believed that totalitarianism “can happen here.” “The serious threat to our
democracy,” he wrote, “is not the existence of foreign totalitarian states. It is the
existence within our own personal attitude and within our own institutions of
conditions similar to those which have given a victory to external authority, discipline, uniformity and dependence upon the leader in foreign countries. The battlefield is also, accordingly, here – within ourselves and our institutions.”

Idealism also came under fire in Karl Popper’s attack on historicism as the source of totalitarianism in The Open Society and Its Enemies. Popper singled out Plato, Hegel, and Marx for their proto-totalitarian idealism. The overriding motif of The Open Society is a rejection of determinism, of both the theistic prophetic kind and the historical materialistic variety. Historical prophesies and historical laws were, according to Popper, entirely beyond the scope of scientific method.44

Related to the association between idealism and totalitarianism was the question of ideology. Ideology was often used as a synonym of idealism. In a restricted sense, it referred to the philosophy or the intellectual pattern of totalitarianism. Carleton J. H. Hayes, for example, wrote that: “When we turn from the actual political functioning of the totalitarian state to the philosophy of totalitarianism – to its ideology, as we nowadays like to describe it – many of us


are apt to be confused by the apparent differences between Communism and Fascism and to imagine that there is no similarity of thought or ultimate goal among the variously designated brands of totalitarianism.” Hayes acknowledged that there were great differences between the Communist dictatorship that made much of Marxian socialism, the Nazis who emphasized Aryan racialism, and the Fascists who, in his opinion, were integral nationalists. But behind these “seemingly diverse ideologies,” Hayes emphasized, “there is in reality an intellectual pattern for all totalitarianism.” Hayes stressed that a feature of this pattern was a belittling of the individual and of minority groups, a passion for making everything conform to the will and thought of the governing party and the dictator.45

For Hannah Arendt, totalitarianism was characterized by fanaticism in ideology. Ideologies, she wrote, can explain everything to their adherents by deducing it from a single premise. For Arendt, an ideology is what its name indicates: it is the logic of an idea. Its subject matter is history, to which the “idea” is applied. The result of this application is not a body of statements about something that is, but the unfolding of a process which is in constant change. The

45 Hayes, pp. 21-22.
ideology treats the course of events as though it followed the same “law” as the logical exposition of its “idea.” Ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process – the secrets of the past, intricacies of the present, and the uncertainties of the future – because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas. This means that in an ideology, history is something that can be calculated by an idea: whatever happens happens according to the logic of one idea and the only possible movement in the realm of logic is the process of deduction from a premise. In Arendt’s view, dialectical logic is in principle this kind of movement. In such cognitive processes, factual contradiction can be explained away as stages of one identical consistent movement. “Ideologies,” Arendt wrote, “always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise, and that no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction.”

A key point in all of Arendt’s work is that it is not the content of the ideology of Nazism or Communism that is at issue, but the organization and power that inhere in the logicality of totalitarianism. She noted that the two

46 Arendt, pp. 325, 468, 469, 170.
movements she considered totalitarian, Nazism and Stalinism, did not invent their ideologies. The ideologies of racism and socialism preceded these movements. Not the content of their ideologies, but “the simple-minded, single-minded purposefulness with which they choose those elements from existing ideologies which are best fitted to become the fundaments of another, entirely fictitious world,” distinguishes the totalitarians. Effectively, “the rules of a fictitious world” govern the actions and reactions of members of society. No individual is ever responsible for their own actions: there is total identification with the movement and total justification of all acts in the goal of the movement. Furthermore ideological thinking is independent of all experience. It insists on a “truer” reality concealed behind all perceptible things. The totalitarian elites are possessed of “supreme contempt for all facts and all reality.” “Factuality itself,” Arendt concluded, “depends for its continued existence upon the existence of the nontotalitarian world.” Ideological thinking orders facts into an absolutely logical procedure which starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality. The deducing may proceed logically or dialectically. In either case it involves a consistent process of argumentation which, because it thinks in terms of a process, is supposed to be able to comprehend the movement
of the suprahuman, natural or historical, processes. Comprehension is achieved by the mind’s imitating either logically or dialectically the laws of “scientifically” established movements with which through the process of imitation it becomes integrated. The key point is that “stringent logicality as a guide to action permeates the whole structure of totalitarian movements and governments.” For Arendt, totalitarianism is a form of government “whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking.”

Arendt expanded her views on the logicality of totalitarianism in the 1966 revised edition of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* with a new concluding chapter devoted to this topic. She highlighted the epistemological orientation of totalitarianism. Totalitarianism, she wrote, “claims to obey strictly and unequivocally those laws of Nature or of History from which all positive laws always have been supposed to spring.” Like Dewey, she wrote that totalitarianism is based on the belief in universal laws (of nature or history) that explain all. Knowledge of these laws allow for the control of all people and events. This knowledge is the source of all authority, and it is external to all individuals. Individuals are sacrificed to it. It is an attitude of lawfulness defying

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legality and pretending to establish the direct reign of justice on earth. Arendt contrasted this vision of lawfulness (the universal law of Nature in Nazism and the laws of history in Marxism) with the notion in Cicero that consensus iuris constitutes a people. Totalitarianism abrogates this agreement in law as a point of identity of a people and replaces it with universal law that does not require consent. Everyone is inevitably bound to it. Both the laws of nature and the laws of history move in an infinitely progressing direction. “In the interpretation of totalitarianism, all laws,” wrote Arendt, “have become laws of movement.” Both Nazism and Stalinism reflect the “refusal to view or accept anything “as it is” and the consistent interpretation of everything as being only a stage of some further development.” “Terror, as the execution of a law of movement whose ultimate goal is not the welfare of men or the interest of one man but the fabrication of mankind,” Arendt concluded, “eliminates individuals for the sake of the species, sacrifices the “parts” for the sake of the whole.”

Ideology is also a key characteristic of totalitarianism identified by Friedrich and Brzezinski. For the authors of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, the “really the specific difference, the innovation of totalitarian

48 Ibid., pp. 461, 462, 463, 465.
regimes, is the organization and methods developed and employed with the aid of modern technical devices in an effort to resuscitate such total control in the service of an ideologically motivated movement, dedicated to the total destruction and reconstruction of a mass society.” Friedrich and Brzezinski identified six basic features common to all totalitarian dictatorships: ideology, a single party led by one man, a terroristic police, a communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally directed economy. While the authors addressed each point separately, it is clear that the first point of ideology underpinned the other features of totalitarianism. By ideology, Friedrich and Brzezinski meant an official body of doctrine covering all aspects of life to which everyone is supposed to adhere. It is characteristically focused and projected toward a perfect final state of mankind, that is, it contains a chiliastic claim based upon a radical rejection of existing society with conquest of the world for the new one. Totalitarian ideology, they wrote, “contains strongly utopian elements, some kind of notion of paradise on earth. This utopian and chiliastic outlook of totalitarian ideologies gives them a pseudo-religious quality.”

49 Friedrich and Brzezinski, pp. 17, 22, 26, 88-89, 102-103, 105, 162, 171.
Liberal critics frequently stressed the Utopian or millenarian features of totalitarianism. These characteristics of Fascism, Nazism and Communism were in many respects self-evident. Mussolini was, after all, obsessed with reconstituting the millennial glory of ancient Rome. The official Nazi designation for Germany -“The Third Reich”- reflected the chiliastic fantasy of the Nazis as they imagined themselves succeeding the Holy Roman Empire (The First Reich, 800 to 1806) and the German Empire (The Second Reich, 1871 to 1918) and ruling for a thousand years. Communism too had a millenarian flavor in its vision of the coming final stage of historical development that would succeed Capitalism and Socialism at the end of history. Critics highlighted the self-evident Utopian and millenarian features of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism and went further by situating totalitarianism within a broader problematic of eschatology.

One element of eschatological criticism was that totalitarianism was a product of the deracination of “modern mass man” due to the breakdown of traditional community in industrial society. Mass man was said to be a lonely, atomized individual who consequently yearned for a perfected state of community to overcome his isolation. Among the first theorists to advance this interpretation was Carleton J.H. Hayes. He stressed that totalitarianism was very seductive to “the masses of people in industrial nations … without roots.” These
were the people whom “[t]he French call déracinés, uprooted from ancestral soil, from tradition, from personal responsibility.”\textsuperscript{50} They were the atomized masses who were susceptible to totalitarian propaganda and were prepared to accept totalitarian dictatorship. The maintenance of democracy as well as the continuation of civilization demanded, according to Hayes, that Americans be shaken into a renewed sense of personal and group responsibility and dignity to overcome atomization and totalitarianism. Personal and group responsibility and dignity, he suggested, could be sought in the religious diversity of the United States. Such diversity, Hayes argued, was essential for the maintenance of American democracy.

John Dewey also noted that totalitarian social philosophies were Utopian. He observed that both Nazism and Marxism anticipated the existence of some ultimate and final social state, different from the original “natural” freedom and from present subordination. The totalitarians, Dewey wrote, were idealists who yearned for fusion and uniformity where provincial, religious, class, and political loyalties were broken down. They promoted their visions of unity by reference to the presence, real or alleged, of some hostile group. The eschatological vision of

\textsuperscript{50} Hayes, p. 24.
the totalitarians explained their hostility to minorities and their demand for total unity.51

At a November1939 symposium organized by the American Philosophical Society on “The Totalitarian State,” political scientist Fritz Morstein Marx expanded on the relationship between mass society and totalitarianism. The age of reason, he said, laid the foundation for modern technology but at the same time undermined the position of the church. Without the church to provide guidance, modern man was lost in his quest for community and suffered from psychoses of insecurity so severe as to undermine constitutional political order. He became “mass man,” inclined to substitute the millennial order of totalitarian ideology for that of the chaos he perceived around him. Individual deviation was not liberty to the totalitarians but license. Totalitarianism was, Morstein Marx asserted, bent upon securing the universality of its absolutes as in a sacred mission.52

Criticism of the eschatological vision in totalitarianism abounded. Von Hayek, for instance, situated his case against socialist planning within criticism

51 Dewey., pp. 36-39, p. 78.

of what he called “The Great Utopia” and the quest for unanimity. Similarly
Popper’s attack on historicism was effectively directed against historical
prophesizing, both of the theistic and secular kind. The criticism of the messianic
character of Communism featured prominently in Bertrand Russell’s 1945
bestseller A History of Western Philosophy which included a glossary that
equated the Communist Commonwealth with the Millenium. Marx’s
eschatology, Russell argued, would be credible to Christians and Jews.
Sociologist Daniel Bell was one of many intellectuals who shared this opinion. In
his view, “[s]ocialism is an eschatological movement; it is sure of its destiny,
because ‘History’ leads it to its goal.”

Eschatological criticism was also at the heart of Hannah Arendt’s The
Origins of Totalitarianism. She emphasized the unprecedented rootlessness of
the masses that made totalitarianism possible. Modern masses were
distinguished, Arendt wrote, from people in previous centuries, by their loss of

53 Von Hayek, pp. 24, 55.

54 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with
Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day

55 Bell as cited in Job Dittberner, The End of Ideology and American Social
faith in a Last Judgment: the worst having lost their fear and the best having lost their hope. In her assessment, totalitarianism attracted modern masses with “a man-made fabrication of the Paradise they had longed for and of the Hell they had feared.” The popularized feature of Marx’s classless society, Arendt wrote, has a queer resemblance to the Messianic Age just as the concentration camp resembles medieval pictures of Hell. Totalitarian governments rested on mass support, she argued, and masses were held together not by a consciousness of common interest or class articulateness which was expressed in determined, limited, and obtainable goals. Rather the term masses applied only in reference to people who, either because of sheer numbers or indifference or a combination of both, cannot be integrated into any organization based on common interest, into political parties or municipal governments or professional organizations or trade unions. Thus, Arendt argued, people who were integrated into such organizations could not be atomized and could not therefore constitute totalitarian movements. Arendt argued pluralistically that “[d]emocratic freedoms...acquire their meaning and function organically only where the
citizens belong to and are represented by groups or form a social and political hierarchy.”56

Arendt took issue with the prophetic aspects of totalitarianism. She noted that totalitarian systems constantly menaced all those who would not abide by Nazi teaching on the laws of nature and life or get aboard the Communist “train of history.” Totalitarian terror was closely bound up with the “scientific” assertions of the totalitarians. The “scientificality of totalitarian propaganda,” Arendt wrote, “is characterized by its almost exclusive insistence on scientific prophesy as distinguished from the more old-fashioned appeal to the past.” In other words, totalitarian “science” foretold future events. All individuals and people were measured against the movement toward the future. This scientificality was deterministic. Arendt cited de Tocqueville in describing the appeal to the masses in “absolutist systems which represent all the events of history as depending upon the great first causes linked by the chain of fatality, and which, as it were, suppress men from the history of the human race.”57

56 Arendt, pp. vii, ix, 446, xxiv, 311, 323, 312.

57 Arendt, p. 345-346.
The deterministic scientificality of totalitarianism was also the source of the notion of the infallibility of the totalitarian leader. According to Arendt, the chief qualification of the mass leader was his “unending infallibility; he can never admit an error.” Not superior intelligence, but insight into the forces of nature or history gave the leader his infallibility. Neither defeat nor ruin could prove him wrong because the laws of nature or history were bound to assert themselves in the long run. Totalitarian leaders repeatedly announced their political intentions in the form of prophesy while posing as mere interpreting agents of predictable forces. Hitler would actually say: “I want today once again to make a prophecy.” Similarly, deterministic scientificality was the source of the totalitarian’s “extreme contempt for facts as such.” “What convinces masses are not facts, and not even invented facts, but only the consistency of the system of which they are presumably part.” The prophetic scientificality of totalitarianism thus dispensed with contingency. In Arendt’s words, “[w]hat the masses refuse to recognize is the fortuitousness that pervades reality. They are predisposed to all ideologies because they explain facts as mere examples of laws and eliminate coincidences by inventing an all-embracing omnipotence that is supposed to be at the root of every accident. Totalitarian propaganda thrives on this escape from reality into fiction, from coincidence into consistency.” Totalitarian
movements conjure up a lying world of consistency that is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than to reality. Through sheer imagination, uprooted masses feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks that real life and real experiences deal to human beings and their expectations. The language of prophetic scientificality, Arendt argued, replaced the lost home of the deracinated masses by reintegrating them into eternal, all-dominating forces that would carry them to the shores of safety. The concentration camp, the secret police and world conquest were the totalitarian means of ensuring that this fictitious world was shielded from “the impact of factuality.” The totalitarian contempt for reality and facts extended to totalitarian drive for total domination of every individual. The ultimate purposes of totalitarianism disregard individuality and all human differences, including nationality. “Totalitarian domination … aims at abolishing freedom, even at eliminating human spontaneity,” Arendt wrote. “Total domination, which strives to organize the infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings as if all of humanity were just one individual, is possible only if each and every person can be reduced to a never-changing identity of reactions, so that each of these bundles of reactions

58 Ibid., p. 349, 350, 351, 352, 353.
can be exchanged at random for any other.” The preservation and enhancement of that which totalitarianism seeks to extinguish is the best defense against totalitarianism. Thus for Arendt, “[s]pontaneity as such, with its incalculability, is the greatest of all obstacles to total domination over man;” and “individuality, anything indeed that distinguishes one man from another, is intolerable” to totalitarianism.59

By the 1950s Utopianism and millenarianism were so closely associated with totalitarianism that liberals saw them as threats to the democratic order. Indeed any conceptualization of perfected or final states of community came to be regarded as dangerous. Consequently, liberals repudiated the idea of a perfectly united nation. Theologian Reinhold Neibuhr was one many social critics in the 1950s who warned Americans about their millenarian tendencies. From “the earliest days of its history to the present moment,” Neibuhr wrote, “there is a deep layer of Messianic consciousness in the mind of America.”60

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. voiced the opinion of numerous intellectuals of his generation when he implored Americans to “grow up now and forsake the


millennial dream.”61 The Cold War attitude to eschatological vision was expressed well by sociologist Daniel Bell who cautioned that no particular embodiment of community should be accepted as final.62 From this position flowed the view that the total identification of an individual in a single community was undesirable. Sociologists and historians, including Bell and Oscar Handlin, began to advance the proposition that alienation reflected not a weakness but strength in democratic societies. Alienation, Bell wrote, had the sense of ‘double consciousness’ that allowed for a detached orientation that prevented the individual from surrendering himself wholly to a cause.

“Alienation is not nihilism,” he said, “but a positive role, a detachment which guards against being submerged in any cause or accepting any embodiment of community as final.”63 For Bell, alienation was the most significant political stance the Jewish intellectual could take in the modern world.64 Previously,

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62 Bell as cited in Job Dittberner, p. 151.

conventional wisdom among American sociologists and social workers held that immigrants and their descendents who were alienated or “marginal” were a problem for democracy. With final ends and total identities in disrepute due to their association with totalitarianism, the multiple identities held by immigrants could now be seen as a guarantee of democracy.

Through the 1950s, political theorists struggled with the problem of community in the context of the critique of totalitarian eschatology. Sociologist Robert A. Nisbet’s *The Quest for Community* (1953) took as its subject the prevailing “frustration, alienation, anxiety, and insecurity” of modern man and the consequent preoccupation with “community, integration, membership, identification, status, and group.” Nisbet, following the lead of Hayes and Morstein Marx, situated modern man’s quest for community in the historical context of the decline of the family, the small local community, and other traditional relationships. With the loss of these traditional communities came the overwhelming lure of reliance upon the totalitarian monistic state. Nisbet saw a solution in the revitalization of diverse associative relationships of family, local community, and religion. Multiple associations, he believed, protected society.
against the absolute political community of totalitarianism. For Nisbet, “the sole possibility of personal freedom and cultural autonomy lies in the maintenance of a plurality of authorities in any society.”65

The quest for democratic community in light of the problem of totalitarianism culminated in a 1959 academic conference on this theme.66 “As the twentieth century unfolded,” Carl Friedrich said in the opening presentation, “the limitations and dangers of an exaggeration of nations and cultures became increasingly evident.” A few philosophers, however, provided guidance. Friedrich noted that Aristotle made it clear that community is not a total unity: “It is rather a unity in diversity, so that some things are shared while others are not.” He recalled that St. Augustine’s Civitas called “citizens out of all nations…not scrupling about diversities…” Friedrich also cited Aquinas to the effect that “[i]t was evidently wrong to say… that it is best for a civitas to be as nearly one (maxima una) as possible.” Others, however, viewed the nation as the primary community and conceived it as an organic, personalized whole. Such were the views of Rousseau, and the Jacobins, as well as their antagonists Hegel


and Burke. Friedrich, himself, agreed with the sociologist Robert MacIver, that the community was “a social unity whose members recognize as common a sufficiency of interests to allow of the interactivities of social life.”

Many of the participants at the conference echoed the general condemnation of totalitarian systems as Utopian and millenarian. Legal scholar Huntington Cairns was the first to raise the question of eschatology and community by observing that “[u]ltimate ends are in disrepute in certain circles and the case against them has been advanced with vigor.” In his view, ultimate ends could not be avoided because a community was, inherently, a “hierarchical unity of lesser unities (the family, the village, the city, the nation) mortised by common values and subject to a general system of law whose origin and end is the community itself.” Political theorist Dante Germino commented on the widespread insecurity, alienation, and cultural disintegration pervading modern

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society. The problem at hand, Germino said was how to organize community
without at the same time burying the individual in totalitarianism.69

In theologian Jacob Taubes’ view, totalitarianism had attempted to create
consecrated community through revolutionary transformations of society; but
the chiliasm of the twentieth century yielded instead “the killing yoke of
totalitarian bureaucracy.” Terror, Taubes declared, was what stood at the end of
the journey into the latest millennium; and western society would survive “only
if an end is put to apocalyptic futurism.”70 Benjamin Nelson picked up where
Taubes left off. For Nelson too, totalitarianism was characterized by myths of
apocalypse, Utopia and transfiguration: dreams of a final and perfect rebirth. The
challenge, Nelson declared, was to find an intermediate way for varying balances
of individuality and community. “Mankind,” he said, “must cease to dream of
building a utopian society which will transcend the bonds of time, the taint of


place, and the limits of political society…and learn to accept that there never has been and never will be an undivided, wholly consecrated community."71

The association between totalitarianism, idealism, and millenarianism was consequential for the way people thought about diversity. According to the prevailing analysis, totalitarianism presupposed final states of perfected community. Thus totalitarianism postulated ultimate ends in a double sense: in the sense of time and in the sense of community. Both time and community have a universal aspect. Critics accused the totalitarians of having subordinated everything to the totalitarian end. Totalitarians, according to the criticism, saw their ends as absolute and as determining the course of particular events and exerting total mastery over all individuals. In this chapter we have seen how critics portrayed totalitarianism as apocalyptic, absolutist, idealistic, infallible, Utopian, and millenarian. Critics also identified planning, dialectical thought, and stringent logicality as important elements in totalitarianism. All of these points are, in effect, criticism of the universalism inherent in totalitarianism. The criticism implied that totalitarian metaphysics held the abstract law or the

universal as prior and superior to the mere fact, the particular, or the individual; and totalitarians acted as if the universal exists by itself and for itself. When ultimate ends fell into disrepute in Cold War North America, liberals tilted the other way. They tended to believe that particulars in the sense of immediacy in time and space and as individual difference existed by themselves and for themselves.

Eschatology, the philosopher of history R.G. Collingwood once said, is always an intrusive element in history. And as Cairns pointed out, it is also an intrusive element in conceptions of community. North American intellectuals, in widely and incisively criticizing the Utopian and chiliastic aspects of totalitarianism, brought ultimate ends into disrepute. This affected how history and community were conceived. With respect to history, anti-totalitarianism had the effect of bringing into question the notion of the eschaton, the divinely ordained climax of history, as well as its secular counterparts such as communism as the final stage of history. For history or any narrative to have a beginning and a past, it must have some notion of the future: an end or at least an

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73 Ibid.
implicit end. The notions of past, present, and future allow people to think of time as homogenous and make possible the unity of history. The movement through time from beginning to end also implicates the notion of progress. If you shear off the universal or ideal part of the historical process, all you are left with is the particular or the extant. When ultimate ends were implicated in totalitarianism and repudiated in Cold War North America, people started to deprecate the future and to idealize that which is: facticity. As people were encouraged, in the framework of anti-totalitarianism, to disregard the future, they were thrown back onto particularity: their essential givenness, immediacy, and difference. This is one reason why universal history went into further decline in the mid-twentieth century, and why there arose ever narrower (geographically, temporally, and topically) conceptions of history. The rejection of ultimate ends in social thought also explains the socially melioristic conservative temper of Cold War North America. As the notion of progress was undermined due to the deprecation of ultimate ends, the extant was idealized. It was a situation of “ethical positivism”: the ‘is’ as ‘ought.’74 In the dichotomous worldview of Cold War liberalism the existing political arrangements in Canada

and the United States were good and therefore had to be democratic and liberal.

The historian Daniel Boorstin exemplified this attitude. In his view, the American’s special “genius” was his tough-minded ability to live without ideology and ultimate answers.\textsuperscript{75} Boorstin went so far as to convert the contemporary disdain for ultimate ends into a theory of history. In “America,” he famously wrote, “the ‘is’ became the yardstick of the ‘ought.’”\textsuperscript{76} In an atmosphere where the status quo was considered good in contrast to the totalitarian Other, the difference from what was would not be conceived.

The postwar predilection for dystopian literature as exemplified by Orwell can also be interpreted in light of the disrepute in which ultimate ends were held in the anti-totalitarian atmosphere of the Cold War. The whole genre of dystopia is a warning against positive conceptions of the future. When positive visions of the future fell out of favor, the future, if it was imagined at all, was conceived of negatively as a pessimistic tale of what should be avoided. Whereas Utopianism proceeds by way of affirmations, dystopianism proceeds by way of


negations. It does not posit what truth, perfection, unity, the ideal, identity, or the universal are; only what they are not. In Orwell’s dystopian vision there is no truth in the future or in community. Truth manifests itself only in the free and personal experience of the individual. This implies there is no criteria of truth external to the individual and that the individual is the ultimate moral arbiter: the person is a beginning and an end in themselves. Neither Providence nor the laws of nature nor history nor community have any validity; truth is personal and experiential (empirical), non-conceptual, and thus necessarily plural. When the literary landscape was dystopian, the nation could be not imagined as a perfected community of the future. Indeed, it was not imagined in a positive way at all. The nation was imagined negatively, that is, in terms of difference.

Like history, the quest for community can be considered a quest for meaning or intelligibility; and this can be seen in light of the criticism of totalitarianism. Community is analogous to the historical process in that it too is a single reality consisting of a universal and particulars. It can be understood as consisting of two elements: people and an idea. A community consists of individuals united by an idea that constitutes their unity or identity across their differences. A community is the abstracted identity of different individuals. The idea itself may be based on anything: another idea, a sentiment, a system of
beliefs or values or cultural attributes, or language, or a material thing. The
identity or unity of the community is, however, necessarily noetic because it
involves the perceptual or cognitive act of abstracting the commonality.
Community is always a question of individuals and an idea (the abstracted
identity of the individuals), and as such it is always a matter of the individual
and the common, or of difference and similarity. It is a problem of the one and
the many. Communities may also consist of communities and not just individual
people, that is, as a unity of unities or an identity of identities, as when
households in contiguous residence form a village, villages in a circumscribed
area form a township, or states (or provinces) form a nation. This too replicates
the problem of the one and the many. As John Dewey pointed out, in the mid-
twentieth century United States, it was almost a commonplace of writers on
sociology, for groups to occupy much of the same place that was occupied earlier
by individuals.77 Thus, cultural pluralism based on a matrix of sub-national
groups was the twentieth century analogue of earlier liberal individualism. All
conceptions of community involve an eschatological dimension. The abstracted

63. Canadian sociology was heavily influenced by American approaches at this
time.
identity of individuals, that is, community is an urge. It sets the standards and norms for behavior. Unity (the abstracted identity) serves as an ideal, and it is compelling. It is an ideal because it must be valued in the first instance for it to be abstracted. Otherwise, there can be no notion of any community. It has the power of heteronomy in communal norms, law, and scientific and religious authority. In short, it sets standards outside the self and thus exerts a mastery over individuals. It suggests supremacy or pre-eminence in respect of excellence as far as the community in question is concerned. In other words, such unity is the locus of sovereignty: it is powerful. An ideal, whether secular or spiritual, religiously millenarian or secularly chiliastic or liberally pluralistic, involves an ascent or progress toward the unity-ideal: the good. Historically, such unities have been conceived religiously as God or as a heavenly kingdom, or secularly as an earthly paradise or Utopia, or in more tempered visions as the good society or the common good or Common Weal or some such formulation. In liberal pluralistic formulations they have involved acceptance of the ideals of diversity and individuality and the dispersal of sovereignty.

The eschatological aspects of history and community are intertwined because history is an ingredient in community. History serves as one of the possible points of abstracted identity in community: the notion of a shared
history. The story of shared identity is also the leading organizing principle of history. Histories of communities, especially national histories, are frequently presented as stories of genesis, progress, (often with plenty of sacrifices on the way), through to redemption or restoration in the good society or freedom or whatever form the end takes. Eschatology is also evident in Hegelian historiography in the dialectical process culminating in the self-understanding of the absolute, which is, according to most interpreters of Hegel, the totality of everything which exists. When critics declared totalitarianism was chiliastic and repudiated ultimate ends, they also decreed the end of history and the fracturing of community.

The view that totalitarianism was chiliastic gave rise to a powerful skepticism among anti-totalitarians. The skepticism extended not only to totalitarian ideas, ideals, and ends, but also to progressive political programs, and more generally to total political unities and total identities, that is, to perfect or final communities. Differentiation is the method of skepticism. Inevitably it leads to individualism or solipsism: the belief that all that exists is the self and its states. The total, perfected, or completely united community was considered undesirable by North American critics of totalitarianism, while those things that
were different from the unity, that is, the individual and the differences of sub-
national groups were idealized as guarantees against totalitarianism.

Cognition, like community and history, is also a quest for meaning. In
history, a moment, event, or individual is completely unintelligible if considered
in isolation from others. Only when historians abstract similarities between
different moments, events, or individuals do they impart any meaning to history.
Similarly, individuals form a community or a collective identity only when their
identity is abstracted across their differences. Community is meaningless, devoid
of the abstracted identity or the different individuals. Cognition is also a matter
of the universal and particulars, identification and differentiation. Indeed, this
has been a recurrent theme for philosophers throughout the ages. To think is to
identify. It is to abstract identities or unities from multiplicity. Kant referred to
cognition itself as “unity in diversity;” and, as has been pointed out before, there
is much in common between Kant’s cognition and Aristotle’s conception of the
relationship of concept to individual existent, or in his terms, of form to matter.78

Exactly the same idea appears in Plato, in the dialogue *Parmenides*, where he
advances the thesis that the One exists only as the unity of the Many, and that

University Press, 2001) p. 34
the Many exist only as a manifold of units. Kantian cognition, Aristotle’s relationship between form and matter, and Plato’s problem of the One and the Many were transposed in the modern history of philosophy into the notion of the ordering subject through which unity is produced. All have their origins in ontology. That is, these philosophical insights stem from the fact that unity is supposed to be the unity of being itself, which is prior to all the particular and individual things from which being is composed.79

For much of the history of philosophy the higher reality was the One (the unity, the universal, the form or the Idea). Reciprocity between the two spheres of unity and diversity was, however, not unknown among the great philosophers. After all, identification implies differentiation. To think is to identify and differentiate. For a unity to be a unity it must be a unity of two or more things; and for a difference to be meaningful it must be a difference between two or more things that otherwise have an identity. There is no meaningful identity without difference and no intelligible difference without unity. Nonetheless, in much of history, philosophers have regarded the unity as in ascendance over diversity. This problem is at the heart of dialectics: the

79 Ibid.
unfolding of the difference between the particular and the universal dictated by the universal, or as Hegel had it, “the identity of identity and non-identity.” The relationship between the two has, however, fluctuated historically. This is a history of one such fluctuation. In Cold War North America, criticism of totalitarianism tipped the balance away from the One in favor of the Many.

When North American critics of totalitarianism declared that mankind must cease to dream of building a utopian society which will transcend the bonds of time, the taint of place, and the limits of political society, they categorically rejected the universal and hypostatized the particular. In the backlash against the apocalyptic futurism of totalitarianism they rejected ultimate ends and espoused the view that only the subjective purposes of individuals and different groups matter since there was no such thing as an objective plan in history or nature. For them, the particular existed by itself and for itself; the individual or the sub-national group was a beginning and an end in itself. Yet in that isolation (and this is a nuanced point), they conceived of the particular as valuable and important. In so doing they rendered it into the ideals of

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particularity, individuality, difference, and diversity. These ended up serving as universals and became the basis (the abstracted identity) for community in Canada and the United States.

Epistemological trends in Cold War North America reflected the anti-metaphysical, anti-chiliastic idealization of diversity and particularity. Liberal criticism of totalitarianism put another nail in the coffin of science limited to deterministic cause and effect, great first causes and chains of fatality. It gave further impetus to an advancing positivistic social science that treated things as *sui generis*, considered contingency (which can be understood as unintelligible or under-conceptualized occurrences) as an engine of history, viewed the nation as diverse, and focused on the immediacy and givenness of things, gesturing, as it were, at the world.
3. Chapter 2: The Spell

What then was this new epistemology, this new theory of knowledge espoused by North American liberals in the middle of the twentieth century? And what became of the American and the Canadian? How were their identities affected?

Sidney Hook had this to say about epistemology and the philosophy of democracy in 1949. Democracy, he wrote, “requires a set of rules analogous to the rules we recognize in determining issues of truth in any empirical inquiry.” Hook was one John Dewey’s students and a prominent American pragmatist in his own right. In the 1950s he became a leading activist of the anti-Communist Congress for Cultural Freedom. For Hook, democracy did not identify unity with uniformity. It welcomed all differences except those differences which in practice denied the right of difference to others, and except those differences which denied the equality of all differences that accept a common method of negotiating differences. Hook stressed the “rules of the game” and “critical debate” as keys to democracy. The danger to democracy lay in making absolutes of doctrines, tastes, or principles as preconditions of the democratic process. Hook’s comparison of the rules of democracy with the rules of “empirical
inquiry” gives us the full flavor of the pluralism that permeated North America social thought on both democracy and science during the Cold War. Democracy, Hook concluded, was staked “on the reasonableness of the empirical temper, on the potentialities of democratic process, and the viability of cultural pluralism.”

Another view of the link between democracy and epistemology was expressed by the sociologist Robert MacIver who had taught at the universities of Toronto and Columbia. Freedom, MacIver wrote, “signifies an immediate datum, something that cannot be analyzed into components or reduced to simpler statements.” Freedom, in other words resided in an epistemological unit: freedom was a fact.

Before getting further into a discussion of Cold War epistemology in North America, a caveat is in order. It is important to note that the epistemology of which I write is not a single theory of knowledge. It does, however, have a unifying factor. The epistemology or epistemologies in question rejected ultimate


ends. The anti-totalitarian writings of philosophers such as Hook, Dewey, Popper and Arendt delivered heavy blows to the belief that human history and knowledge in general are governed by large-scale laws and absolutism. In this, they were carrying on the tradition of Enlightenment philosophers. For them, as for the eighteenth century Glaswegian Francis Hutcheson, the world had neither a beginning nor an end with respect to human observation. The mid-twentieth century anti-totalitarian repudiation of ultimate ends in cognition, history, community and science, and the associated rejection of ontological and metaphysical references, necessarily meant that there would be many ways to whatever ends people refused to predetermine. What united otherwise different epistemologies of the period is their negativity toward absolutes. As in the characteristic dystopian literature of the era, the epistemologies in question refused to imagine positive ends in science and politics. As Robert Booth-Fowler pointed out in his intellectual history of this period, the epistemology characteristic of Cold War North America was skeptical. And it was agnostic. In metaphysical terms, the Cold War in North America was an ontic rather than an ontological age.

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3 Robert Booth-Fowler, Believing Skeptics.
The program of anti-totalitarian liberals for a democratic culture that was open-minded, and free from prejudice and absolutism was advanced in the name of science. Totalitarianism, North American critics said, was not “scientific.” They argued that it was in the thrall of pre-scientific cravings for great first causes, chains of fatality, and ultimate ends. It was idealistic and chiliastic, and liberals strongly repudiated such thinking. Instead, liberal anti-totalitarians validated theories of knowledge based on what they called “scientific method.” Scientific method was, in their view, closely related to “democratic method;” and both were said to be pluralistic. Science and democracy were seen having common procedural rules. These included civility, empiricism, experimentalism, the willingness to follow evidence wherever it leads, the respect for different points of view, and the view that ideas should be regarded as hypotheses not as absolute principles.

Despite the self-conscious social agenda, this conception of scientific method did not provide much room for transformative purposive or prescriptive social, political, or economic endeavors. With universalism struck as a relic of metaphysical and totalitarian superstition, liberals consolidated facts as the only
thing to be known and therefore to be accepted.\textsuperscript{4} Liberal anti-totalitarianism had made idealism suspect to such an extent that a number of North American intellectuals denied the very possibility of normative theory. Acceptable theories were empirical and descriptive. Ideas that promised transformative social change were paralyzed. They were disparaged as Utopian and therefore potentially totalitarian.\textsuperscript{5} Science, the critics said, has no \textit{telos}, nature has no purposes.\textsuperscript{6} Facts were sovereign. Such an understanding of what constituted knowledge reverberated across a number of social scientific disciplines and practices. Social scientific inquiry was thus conceived as the study of society as it was, not as it should be. One consequence of this scientific attitude was the foregrounding of social diversity as social scientists described society in its existing particularity. This attitude was accompanied by ethical positivism: the \textit{is} was held as what ought to be. For most of the period in question, philosophers generally considered epistemology close to ethics when it asks whether knowledge is

\textsuperscript{4} Adorno, \textit{Negative Dialectics}, pp. 319-320.


identical with justified true belief. When facts were considered true, they therefore assumed a normative role. Many intellectuals, notably the sociologists who figured in the “End-of-Ideology” discourse of the fifties and sixties, endorsed the existing course of North American social and political development as they celebrated western liberal democracies as real democracies in contrast to totalitarian regimes. In this context, the existence of a social group and its interactions with other groups in Canada or the United States became, by the mere fact of its observation, an argument for its preservation as a constituent part of genuine functioning democracy and a guarantee against totalitarianism.

In this chapter I explore the connections between anti-totalitarian theory, epistemological trends, and the vogue for diversity and multiculturalism in Cold War North America. I begin with a discussion of what being “scientific” meant to anti-totalitarian liberals. Then I examine the equation of scientific and democratic method, their purported basis in pluralism, and how social scientists made diversity an ideal.7

7 The history of epistemology and science is, of course, a vast topic; and even circumscribed by the adjectives “Cold War,” “North American,” and “liberal” my treatment of it cannot be comprehensive. Nonetheless, a pattern of trends enshrining diversity as a value in preponderant theories of knowledge can be discerned among anti-totalitarian liberals in Canada and the United States in the
Several historians have noted the connection between mid-twentieth century North American epistemology and cultural identities. According to Edward A. Purcell, the pluralism that dominated American social thought for two decades after World War II was the product of a combination of scientific naturalism, a commitment to democracy, and a belief in the practical superiority of the United States. The American naturalistic tradition, he argued, rejected all absolutes. Naturalism formed the basis of pluralism. In the Cold War confrontation with totalitarianism, pluralism linked its “naturalistic epistemology” to national politics. American pluralism held that all political ideas that did not incorporate the truths of “science” represented some form of absolutism. It called such false ideas “ideology.” American intellectuals believed that just as metaphysics distorted science, ideology disrupted politics. Only “science” fostered tolerance and compromise. Pluralism assumed that science and ideology were polar opposites and were developed from and made for different types of societies. American intellectuals made a direct analogy between ideas and cultures. Their pluralism equated “science” with social mid-twentieth century. Moreover, the term “science” had such a prominent place in rhetoric of anti-totalitarian liberals that an understanding of its usage is essential to any interpretation of mid-twentieth century American and Canadian identities.
diversity, competition, and freedom; while “ideology” was linked to social rigidity, conformity, and authoritarianism. Pluralism, Purcell asserted, identified the United States with diversity and freedom and held that American political processes were congruent with, and therefore rationally justified by, the logic and method of science. In Believing Skeptics, Robert Booth-Fowler observed something similar. In his assessment, the dominant mood of American intellectuals in the twenty years following World War II was one of skepticism. They were skeptical of values in politics and of absolute claims in theories of knowledge. This was a direct response to twin totalitarian dangers of Nazism and Communism that these intellectuals perceived as ideological and absolutistic. The effects on epistemology and social science were clear: American intellectuals turned away from deduction, *a priori* truths, and final ends. They turned toward “pragmatic realism,” and empirical science: what historian Peter Gay lauded as the realm of “facts” over the foolishness of fancy. Historian David Hollinger has also commented on the connection between science and culture in

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this period. He points out that following World War II, American cosmopolitan intellectuals who saw themselves as opponents of a generalized totalitarianism developed a program of secular culture based of the core values of science.\(^{10}\) In the Canadian historiography, L.B. Kuffert has written about the link between science and Canadian culture.\(^{11}\) Kuffert noted that science and democracy were viewed as the polar opposites of totalitarianism in wartime Canada. Philosophers have also studied the links between epistemology and culture. Harvard’s Morton White wrote a defense of American pragmatism noting that Dewey and great intellectuals of his generation like Thorstein Veblen, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Charles Beard, and James Harvey Robinson were all anti-formalists who opposed excessive deduction. According to White, Dewey incessantly advocated that political discussion be conducted in the spirit of science, and that science served as the basis of American democratic culture.\(^{12}\) Philosopher John Irving


wrote that Dewey’s most important contribution to American liberalism was the insight derived from Charles Pierce that the scientific method involves a certain set of moral principles and a community of free inquirers: “the open society.”

Science, in other words, was the foundation of the culture of liberalism.

Philosopher John J. McDermott summed up my position when he ventured that it was “perfectly legitimate and instructive to draw a relationship between the pluralism of a pragmatic epistemology and the cultural pluralism of James, Royce, and Dewey.” And latter day pragmatist Richard Rorty has written that one side of American pragmatism was scientific, and it spent its time holding up the experimental scientist as a model to the rest of culture.

As with “democracy” and “liberty,” Canadian and American liberals constructed “science” in contrast with “totalitarianism” in mid-twentieth century North America. The first contrasts between science and totalitarianism on the

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other date back to the period between the two World Wars. Through the 1930s, critics such as Carleton J.H. Hays and the members of the Committee for Cultural Freedom were signaling the dire threat posed by totalitarianism to “free inquiry” and “freedom of thought,” essential components of scientific method as it was then widely understood. The most detailed prewar analysis of the connection between science and democracy was undertaken in 1939 by John Dewey, the dean of scientific naturalism and American pragmatism.

Science permeates Dewey’s Freedom and Culture. Dewey identified science as the tool for the job of saving democracy and liberty from the totalitarian dangers of Nazism and Marxism. “The future of democracy,” he declared, “is allied with the spread of the scientific attitude.” Dewey advanced a complex argument that runs along the following lines. Social science, he wrote, was lagging behind natural science. He challenged social scientists to abandon one-sided monistic theories such as Marxism that, in his view, deduced particular events from preconceived premises. This was the way of totalitarian thinking that misled political action. Instead, he proposed that social events be

studied as interactions of the components of ever-changing human nature on one side with cultural conditions on the other. In a nod to Boas and Herder before him, Dewey regarded human nature as marked by a “high degree of plasticity.” He wrote that neither freedom nor any other cultural attribute inhere in humanity. In Dewey’s anthropology, acquired nature is stronger than original nature. Culture, in Dewey’s view, is an expansive concept that encompasses the multitude of human associations; and it reacts back into human nature, shaping it into new forms. Dewey viewed the problems of human nature and culture within a Darwinian paradigm. “All we can safely say,” he wrote, “is that human nature, like other forms of life, tends to differentiation and this moves in the direction of the distinctively individual, and that it also tends toward combination, association.” This perspective had direct political implications. Liberal political theories based on the existence of a universal human nature were not tenable. Previously, the problem of liberty was viewed in terms of the relationship of the individual to the social but in light of the new anthropological and sociological thinking about human nature being conditioned by culture and culture dependent upon individual associations, the problem was transformed. Science, Dewey wrote, had to be used to observe human nature and the interactions that constituted culture and the individual self to identify the kind of
social relations that were conductive to democracy.\textsuperscript{17} The key to a democratic society was to develop each tendency, “personal initiative” and “cooperation/fraternity.” Modern science was the tool to state the problem and to inquire into solutions.

According to Dewey, democracy as a way of life and science shared several habits or virtues. Foremost among them were the experimental habits of inquiry that consisted of fallibilism rather than dogmatism, an insistence to follow the evidence wherever it leads rather than to cling to preconceived ideas. For Dewey, experimentalism also meant a willingness to entertain novel hypotheses and the personal flexibility to try out unaccustomed modes of action. The wide dissemination of the results of inquiry was another habit common to both the scientific and democratic ethos.

For Dewey, neither the individual human nor environmental conditions were solely determinative of social change. Persons-in-culture was what had to be observed; and observation was key, not theory in the abstract. Necessity and all-embracing laws no longer had any place in modern science. Social scientists

\textsuperscript{17} The concept of interaction was very important in Dewey’s social thought (and of course in George Herbert Mead and the sociological school of symbolic interactionism). Interactionism held that the mind and the self are not innate but constructions of the social individual derived from experience.
had to abandon speculating about social forces. Probability and pluralism, Dewey wrote, were now “characteristic of the present state of science.”

Generalizations could still be sought but not single explanations. Dewey stressed “the need for continued resort to observation, and the continual revision of generalizations in their office of working hypotheses.” No general theory, certainly not Marxism, was self-translating in application to particular events. Within both scientific and political method, absolute principles and overarching self-translating theories had to be rejected in favor of tolerance of divergent opinions, a commitment to the hypotheticality of generalizations, and an acknowledgement of the fallibility of ideas. Dewey did not reject ideas outright and cautioned against simple-minded empiricism. The lesson to be learned was the importance of ideas, and of a plurality of ideas employed in experimental activity as working hypotheses. For Dewey, “the experimental method of science [was] the exemplification of empirical method when experience has reached maturity.” There were no final truths. All science was tentative and marked by incertitude. “It is the nature of science,” Dewey wrote, “not so much to tolerate as to welcome diversity of opinion, while it insists that inquiry brings the evidence of observed facts to bear to effect a consensus of conclusions – and even then to hold the conclusions subject to what is ascertained and made public in
further new inquiries.” In this, science was analogous to democracy: “[f]reedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in democratic as in the scientific method.’” Generalizations about events should grow out of observation and not be theoretically predetermined. In other words, observation of facts precedes theory. Thus Dewey’s scientific method merges with and inductivist view of generalization. So does his democratic theory: democracy follows from the observation of interactions. It is not a self-translating theory.¹⁸

For Dewey, scientific attitude was a weighty part of culture, and through the medium of culture it could shape human desires and purposes. Thus, science had an intrinsic moral potentiality. On this point, Dewey was at odds with his contemporaries who saw no normative role for science. Science, in Dewey’s

₁⁸ Aside from self-consciously welcoming diversity in scientific as in democratic method, Dewey’s approach implicitly raised the philosophical “problem of induction,” which also had a pluralistic aspect to it. The problem of induction is that it is impossible to infer general knowledge from particulars since one cannot know in advance of observation that all instances of a single phenomenon will be more alike than different. Many things and their interrelations cannot be reduced to a single generalization prior to observation.
view, operates as part of a peoples’ folklore. It was a method, a process, part of a way of life. It was not to be considered a body of conclusions.

The scientific method, for Dewey, consisted of five points of “disinterestedness”: holding belief in suspense, doubting until the evidence was obtained, going where the evidence pointed instead of putting first a personally preferred conclusion, holding ideas in solution and using them as hypotheses to be tested instead of as dogmas to be asserted, and enjoying new fields for inquiry of new problems. Included in this method were the principles of incertitude, empiricism, and pluralism. Unlike some of the philosophers who came to prominence in the 1950s, Dewey’s complex consideration of human desire made clear that science had a role in determining moral issues; but it did not predetermine ends.\(^{19}\) Although he maintained that science could be used to make decisions concerning values, Dewey used the word “moral” reluctantly and meant by it what he called “kindly relations among individuals.” In writing of

\(^{19}\) For instance, Hans Reichenbach argued in The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951) that scientists and philosophers could not validate moral claims, that almost every issue of public concern was empirical not moral, and that the scientific spirit could serve as a foundation of culture. David Hollinger (“Science as a Weapon in Kulturkampfe in the United States during and after World War II,” Isis, Vol. 86, Issue 3 (September 1995), p.447) evaluates Reichenbach’s position as characteristic of the cultural program of scientifically-oriented secular liberal intellectuals in the postwar United States.
“the intrinsic moral potentiality” of social science, Dewey meant that scientific method could be applied to help understand what kind of society is characterized by kindly relations between people. The method of achieving a desirable state of social relations, had to adhere to scientific and democratic standards. “An American democracy,” Dewey concluded, “can serve the world only as it demonstrates in the conduct of its own life the efficiency of plural, partial and experimental methods in securing and maintaining an ever-increasing release of the powers of human nature in service of a freedom which is co-operative and a co-operation which is voluntary.”

Dewey’s views on science and democracy were shared by many Americans. He inspired and led the members of the Committee for Cultural Freedom whose manifesto appeared in The Nation in 1939, as well as the participants of the Conferences on The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith.

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20 For Dewey, philosophies, including epistemologies, were concerned primarily with the defense or criticism of a certain ways of life, belief, and action in the culture of which they are a part. Thus plural, partial, and experimental method in Dewey’s scientific epistemology translates into a plural, partial and experimental American culture. The citations in the preceding sections are from John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, pp. 148, 43, 75, 7-8, 112, 21, 22, 77, 84, 87, 91, 95, 96, 102, 118, 145, 163, 171, 176.
In an essay in the August 1944 issue of *Fortune*, he recapitulated his views. “The very heart of political democracy,” he wrote, “is adjudication of social differences by discussion and exchange of views. This method provides a rough approximation to the method of effecting change by means of experimental inquiry and test: the scientific method. The very foundation of democratic procedure is dependence upon experimental production of social change; an experimentation directed by working principles that are tested and developed in the very process of being tried out in action.”

By the time of the Second World War science and democracy were widely held to be expressions of each other, and both were enlisted in the Allied war effort in Canada and the United States. Social scientist Stuart A. Queen laid out the imperative for sociologists in the struggle with totalitarianism and in the process captured the mood of wartime attitudes concerning the interrelatedness

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21 This organization met three times. Their 1944 meeting was organized around the theme “The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith.” In 1945 they met for “The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education,” and in 1946 for “Science for Democracy.” See chapter 1.

22 John Dewey, *Fortune*, XXX No. 2, August, 1944, p. 188.

of democracy and inductive science. “If the democratic way of life means anything in contrast to totalitarian systems, its distinctive character must rest on the opportunity and the ability of our citizens to distinguish fact from fiction and to reason logically from concrete facts to sound generalizations.”

Like their American counterparts, liberally-minded Canadian intellectuals also extolled the virtues of science for democracy in the face of totalitarianism. W.C. Keirsted stressed that “discussion” and “criticism” had an essential role in both democracy and in science. Freedom of discussion and dissent were not tolerated in totalitarian states that pursued manifest unity. They were, however, the hallmarks of democracy and science. It was the function of thinking itself, wrote Keirsted, to discuss, or literally “to shake apart,” to analyze into elements. Science, he ventured, provided the tool not only to solve complex problems but also to develop a technique for exact thinking of this sort. “In a democracy,” Keirsted wrote, “scientific processes are reacting into the experiences of the people and are producing more critical discussions.” This was exactly what the

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totalitarians were trying to prevent. Thus science, by developing a technique for exact thinking that bred discussion reinforced democracy. The editors of Canadian Forum went even further in linking science and democracy. The hope of democracy, they wrote in a July 1940 editorial, lay in science and rational inquiry: “Societies in which science rules are societies which must preserve room for experiment and dissent.”

In the United States the program to advance a democratic culture on the basis of scientific method found expression in the polemics of The Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith. A 1943 issue of Partisan Review captures their position very well. In his contribution, Sidney Hook railed against what he perceived to be a revival in Christian supernaturalism with its metaphysical and theological dogmas all the while keeping an eye on the larger frame of reference: Nazism. “Fundamentalism,” he wrote, “is no longer beyond the pale; it has donned a top hat and gone high church.” This trend, Hook warned, was implacably hostile to scientific method. The theological revivalists were linking scientific method to moral relativism and Hitlerism. This was


getting things backwards, according to Hook. Rather, the bankruptcy of
civilization testified to the bankruptcy of their metaphysics. For Hook, the
Catholic Church demanded “as great a control over social and political life as
any totalitarian party.” Religious supernaturalism, Hook concluded, was based
on unwarranted hopes and unfounded beliefs that pretended to be knowledge
but were not knowledge. Real knowledge was, of course, rooted in scientific
method.27 John Dewey’s essay in this issue similarly attacked “dogmatic
supernaturalism,” and called for the application of scientific method to the whole
field of human and social subject matter for the sake of democracy. Having
thoroughly criticized anti-naturalism, Dewey made the historical argument that
the time when religious groups lived in isolation with static social customs had
passed. The problem at hand was “attaining mutual understanding and a
reasonable degree of amicable cooperation among different peoples, races,
classes.” This problem was bound up with the problem of reaching by peaceful
and democratic means some workable adjustment of the values, standards, and
ends in conflict. “Dependence upon the absolutist and totalitarian element
involved in every form of anti-naturalism,” Dewey wrote, “adds to the difficulty

of this already difficult undertaking.” Following the path of scientific method, therefore, would lead to cultural pluralism.28

The high-water mark of the identification of science and democracy was the 1944 meeting of anti-totalitarian naturalists at the conference, “The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith.” Mark A May, the director of the Yale Institute of Human Relations, was one of several speakers who carried forward Dewey’s argument about the moral potentiality of science. The morality of science, May said, could serve as the basis for a democratic culture whereby all citizens would live by the code of the scientist: honesty, free inquiry, critical, interactive, evidence-based, anti-authoritarian, and hence, “scientific” conduct.29 In his presentation, the philosopher Horace M. Kallen declared that “[i]f the phrases ‘The Scientific Spirit’ and ‘The Democratic Faith’ are two, the disposition of mind and heart which they signify is one.” For Kallen, both phrases conveyed an identical attitude in different but interacting undertakings of the human enterprise. “They are,” he ventured, “diverse flowerings from a common root,


and so related inwardly that where one sickens, the other cannot remain in health, where one grows strong, the other cannot remain weak...they survive together and perish together. For the scientific spirit is living according to the democratic faith in the world of ideas, and the democratic faith is the extension of the ethics of scientific method from the world of ideas to all the other human undertakings and institutions.” And for Kallen, the democratic faith was nothing other than “the right to be different.”

In the 1945 publication of the proceedings of The Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith titled The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education, the problem was stated in this way by Jerome Nathanson: “Is there mind enough in the world to realize some of the possibilities for freer and more democratic living inherent in scientific progress?” Democracy and free scientific inquiry, Nathanson wrote, are as inseparable as print and the page upon which it appears. Rejecting dogmatism, these intellectuals believed that all truths, whatever their origin, were established by scientific method.


Dewey contributed to these proceedings with his “Democratic Faith and Education.” (In addition to being the leading American philosopher, Dewey was also the leading educational reformer of the first half of the twentieth century in the United States). In this essay, he indicted contemporary trends in education that promoted natural law theory, which he called medievalism; and he again stressed the importance of scientific method in all areas of human endeavor, including understanding human relationships in the service of democracy.32

A particularly clear and characteristic expression of the way North American intellectuals constructed science in opposition to totalitarianism is Joseph S. Roucek’s essay “A History of the Concept of Ideology” (1944). In Roucek’s view, the general method of science is to collect with the guidance of hypotheses as many relevant data as possible to discover what uniformities they present. Ideology, in contrast, holds theories as articles of faith. The ideologist’s “is the a priori theological temperament,” he wrote. Science was based on fact, ideology on illusions. The latter was pervaded with values. “Science,” however, “explains what “is” and says nothing about what “ought to be. It recognizes only

facts which are brute and “indifferent.” The subjective evaluation, the “value-judgment” is left to the ideologist.”

During the war years, a host of North American intellectuals advanced the idea that science and democracy were closely related. One of the more prominent was the American sociologist Robert K. Merton. In 1942 he published “A Note on Science and Democracy” in the Journal of Legal and Political Sociology. For Merton, democracy and science were expressions of one and other, and both were imperiled by totalitarianism. According to Merton, “[i]n modern totalitarian society, anti-rationalism and the centralization of institutional control both serve to limit the scope provided for scientific activity.” On the other hand, science was afforded opportunity for development in a democratic order which is integrated with the “ethos of science.” Merton defined this ethos as the complex of values and norms held by the scientist. In Merton’s view, the ethos of democracy and the ethos of science had common principles.

33 Joseph S. Roucek “A History of the Concept of Ideology,” that appeared in the Journal of the History of Ideas, /vol. 5, No. 4, October, 1944, pp. 480, 481

By the end of the war, the identification of science with democracy had become so widespread that sociologist Richard McKeon undertook a critical assessment of the validity of this linkage. McKeon concluded that all the evidence that bears on the dependence of science on democracy is ambiguous, as was the influence of science on democracy. He acknowledged, however, the “Copernican revolution” in contemporary understandings of science undertaken by pragmatists such as Dewey wherein society would become the center of science. The key principle of contemporary science was, he wrote, incertitude. McKeon quoted Einstein to the effect that “[a]s far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.” For Dewey and his followers the quest for certainty was, McKeon wrote, a symptom of man, society, and the times to be explained not by the nature of the subject matter or the form of the sciences but by a psychological sense of insecurity, from which scientists and philosophers suffer. For McKeon, incertitude was the linchpin between democracy and science. “Democracy,” he wrote, “may become more scientific if science involves no pretense to certainty (since the quest for certainty has no foundation except the insecurity of the scientist), or if democracy involves no pretense to abstract standards of value (since the development of science and democracy is determined by the practical
ends of the community.)” Neither science nor democracy subscribed to predetermined or a priori standards. Such validation of indeterminism was inherently pluralistic. In both scientific and democratic community, participation did not depend upon the maintenance of identical views. Indeed, a plurality of views defined both types of community. In McKeon’s view, the relationship between science and democracy was not one of identity but of close association and mutual support: “[t]he fate of scientific method is closely associated, as an instrument to be employed and as an end to be achieved, with that of democracy; but the one can continue to be a support to the other only so long as the relation is not made an identity, for the privilege of differing in doctrine which is essential to free inquiry can be preserved only if the community of interests represented by the state is not itself made in each action a matter of doctrinal demonstration and individual conviction.” McKeon concluded his essay on a pluralistic note: “if the democratic conviction that diversity of opinion and creed is not only tolerable in a community but essential

to its preservation and development is to be made broadly operative, members of communities, must cultivate some insight into, as well as concern with, what they believe and some understanding of the beliefs of others. Smaller communities – churches, schools, parties, and associations – may be based on agreement about doctrine, but such communities can be exclusive and still function consistently with democratic practices only in the framework of a larger democratic community in which no doctrinal adherence is enforced and in which more judgments are respected for their consequence, despite possible differences concerning their bases, since democratic procedures for coming to agreement provided only for the possibility of concurrence in action without the preliminary necessity of shared religion, moral conviction or political programs."

North American intellectuals continued to link science and democracy after the war and into the Cold War, but once Stalinism replaced Nazism as the principal totalitarian threat, they contrasted scientific and democratic method to

a more generalized totalitarianism. The faith in science and democracy found expression in Harvard University’s influential 1945 “Red Book,” officially titled General Education in a Free Society. This document advanced the ideal of creating and sustaining a democratic community of free but mutually obligated individuals in what it referred to as “cooperation without uniformity.” It explicitly identified “science’ as the foundation of democratic citizenship and declared that democracy needed citizens with the habit of forming objective, disinterested judgments based upon exact evidence. Both democracy and science opposed the arbitrariness of authority and first principles in preference for “the direct and continuing appeal to things as they are.” Society, the Red Book maintained, needed both tradition and innovation, both tolerance and conviction. The way to achieve democracy was to apply “the scientific attitude” as outlined by the great American pragmatists William James and John Dewey. In accordance with Dewey’s principles, the Red Book made clear that all conclusions must be held tentatively, that full truth is not known, and that people must be forever led by the facts to revise approximations of it.37 Invoking

Harvard’s own philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, the Red Book characterized modern science as a revolt against abstract reasoning and a respect for unique fact. Its first impulse was “antirational or, better, antitheoretical, in the sense that it was a reaction” against scholasticism. The modern mind, in the view of the Red Book’s authors, was bent on empiricism and observation. They conceived of democracy as a community of free men neither overly united nor too chaotic. The upshot of the Red Book’s discussion of science and democracy was that “as Americans, “we are necessarily both one and many.” This “flat and truistic” double fact was said to be the foundation of the Harvard report. By this statement, the authors of the Red Book meant that though common aims must bind together the educational system, there exists no one body of knowledge, no single system of instruction equally valid for every part of it. General Education in a Free Society was, in effect, a testament to pluralism. According to historian David Hollinger, the Red Book defined the terms of American higher education.

from 1945 through the 1960s during which time American universities grew at an unprecedented rate and cultural pluralism was in ascendancy.\textsuperscript{38} 

In 1947 James B. Conant, the president of Harvard University, expanded on some of the themes of the Red Book in his popular booklet \textit{On Understanding Science}. Conant was a nationally known chemist and science administrator when he wrote this tract. Later he became US High Commissioner in Germany (1953), then US Ambassador to West Germany; and he served as co-chair of the anti-communist lobby group, The Committee on the Present Danger. \textit{On Understanding Science} made plain his argument that Americans needed a widespread understanding of science so that it could be “assimilated into our secular cultural pattern.” Only this would help achieve the goal of a culture suitable for a democracy. For Conant, science was based on experiments and observation leading to new experiments and observations - always moving ahead. It was, he wrote, vital that policy-makers understand science. This type of faith in science as a foundation of democratic culture was characteristic of the liberal scientific intellectual class in the United States during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} Hollinger, p. 161.
The effort to establish empirical, experimental science as the foundation of American democratic culture was also taken up by two prominent American historians, Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, in 1955. They proposed the “morality of science” as the basis for a renewed American culture in their book *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*. Science, they argued, with its values of tolerance and honesty, publicity, testifiability, universalism, and disinterestedness was exactly the antidote that the United States needed to counteract the toxic effects of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s witch hunts for Communists. Scientifically-minded anti-Communist liberals, like Hofstadter and Metzger, viewed McCarthyism as a species of incipient domestic totalitarianism. The morality of science, the historians argued, would serve not only to protect academic freedom but also the entire American way of life.40

What were the consequences the anti-totalitarian epistemology for American social scientific perceptions of Canada and the United States of

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America? By the late 1950s, efforts to promote “the scientific attitude” as the basis of democratic culture had reached a level of what historian David Hollinger calls “social scientific triumphalism.” The effects of this mood were myriad. American philosophers social scientists moved beyond the melting pot, declared the end of ideology, and theorized that the whole world should modernize in the same way the United States had, and they reasserted cultural pluralism as the democratic ideal. Canadian social scientists identified cultural assimilation with totalitarianism and idealized the “mosaic” and unity in diversity as social and cultural ideals.

There is one more point to be made about Cold War epistemology and culture, and it concerns the scientific and democratic rule of civility. “Civility” has received considerable attention from historians of science. The historical epistemologist Mary Poovey has written that a vital aspect of the social agenda of seventeenth century English experimentalists was the founding of an amicable society in which differences did not foment sectarian dissent. According to Poovey, the members of the Royal Society staked their political claim on an


42 Mary Poovey, The History of the Modern Fact, p.111.
appeal to nature: if nature and not the philosopher was the ultimate arbiter of truth, then whatever political or religious beliefs individual philosophers held would be rendered irrelevant by orderly investigations of natural phenomena. For these early modern scientists, the facts of nature were beyond dispute and the rules of “civility” and “moral neutrality” were scientific and social imperatives that stabilized facts and ensured that they remained beyond dispute. Cold War liberals, such as Dewey, Hook, and Merton, referred to such moral neutrality as “disinterestedness.” In Cold War North America the social agenda of the founding of a culturally plural society underwrote social scientific enterprises, including the sociology and history of ethnicity, American and Canadian history in general, end-of-ideology sociology, and political science as represented by the New Democratic Theory associated with Robert Dahl. Specifically the treatment of ethnicity, languages, interest groups and other elements in the schemata of various cultural pluralisms in Canada and the United States in extracted census and survey data had a peculiar and compelling quality that made these features of society look simply descriptive as explicitly theoretical works are not. Data on such groups, especially numerical data presented in tables, had the quality of appearing non-rhetorical (or as the motto of the Royal Society has it: *nullius in verba*: on the word of no person), of seeming
moral neutrality, devoid of any obvious attempt to persuade. In the presentation of social scientific data on different groups, the rule of civility, had the effect of stabilizing these “facts,” moving them beyond dispute, and effectively transposing ethnocultural languages, mores, norms, values or habits into ethnocultural facts that could be described but not evaluated or judged. Such data had to be accepted as scientific fact. If they were to be valued at all, it was only in their aspects as constituent elements in functioning democracies.

Looking at history from this epistemological vantage point allows us to see not the positionality or identity of specific ethnic groups or their agency in the history of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism but the assumptions and conventions that constitute the epistemological field that made the category of ethnic identity salient during the second half of the twentieth century in North America. Ethnicity became visible at this time because academic and state institutions formalized and divided knowledge in such a way as to make the data on ethnicity “true.” What happened is that tensions between different groups were neutralized by the representational techniques used to pursue societal reform. The techniques were meant to ensure that civility governed the reformist agenda by emphasizing “fact-finding.” Facts, once deemed as such, were placed beyond dispute. In Canada the fact-finding imperative of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism drew its prestige from the authority granted certain social scientific practices which were, in the prevailing contemporary theory, distinct from moral and political philosophical endeavors. The use of “experts” to gather and analyze the “facts” using the most up-to-date social scientific techniques had the effect of foregrounding social differences and establishing them as factual. The knowledge obtained through these techniques as exemplified by the Royal Commission’s four reports claimed that its conclusions were derived from empirical observations and thus were scientifically objective and politically disinterested. The academic studies of American social scientists had the same effect. Diversity became a fact of life and ipso facto a unifying ideal.
4. Chapter 3: American Social Science

American pluralism has always been deceptive because glacier-like, it has rested on miles of submerged conviction.¹ That conviction is rooted in American pragmatism, and both pluralism and pragmatism were reinforced by the Cold War. Identity is formed in alterity, that is, in contrast to that which is presumed different. To identify is to differentiate. During World War II and the Cold War, totalitarianism provided that difference for many Americans. If the totalitarian regimes were monolithic and steeped in dogmatic monism, Americans would value diversity and pragmatic pluralism. As we have seen, Americans made explicit comparisons between American democracy and the varieties totalitarianism. These comparisons carried with them complex philosophical implications. In addition, the widespread anxiety induced by totalitarianism affected the social sciences in America in several ways that tended to make diversity normative. Specifically, trends in ethnic and immigrant history, the ironic turn in American historiography, end-of-ideology sociology, and interest group theory in political science helped make Americans imagine themselves as

¹ Louis Hartz: “American pragmatism has always been deceptive because glacier-like, it has rested on miles of submerged conviction.” The Liberal Imagination in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1955) p. 59.

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culturally plural. These developments in the genealogy of the social sciences were reinforced by the influential ideas of the philosopher of cultural pluralism, Horace Meyer Kallen.

By the start of the Cold War, liberals in the United States had come to regard American democracy as the good society. And cultural pluralism characterized the good society. Modern Americans were said to live in a “multi-group society” and among the many groups to which they were attached were ethnic groups. The reason that so many social scientists and liberal intellectuals came to esteem diversity and difference can be traced to the anxiety induced by totalitarianism whether in the hard forms of Hitlerism, Stalinism, and racism; or in the soft domestic versions of “atomized mass society,” and “conformity.” Robert MacIver’s influential 1947 book *The Web of Government* reflected the thinking of a broad section of the American social scientific community. Its entire thrust was directed against “totalitarians” both outside and within the United States “who would restore the myth of the uni-group society…make the all-inclusive state the sufficient focus of our moral and spiritual beings…[and]
ruthlessly co-ordinate out of existence our cultural heterogeneity.” Twenty years later, the sociologist Nathan Glazer confirmed the primacy of this attitude, when he wrote that “cultural pluralism seems to have won out at least temporarily as the preferred model for responding to the reality of a multiracial and multiethnic society.” Diversity had arrived.

A central figure in the history of the construction of a pluralistic American identity is Horace Kallen. He was the single most important theoretician of American cultural pluralism. As John Higham, the historian of American identity, has noted, the fear of totalitarianism during the Cold War had the effect of stimulating appreciation for cultural pluralism in America, and it was during this time that democracy was widely redefined along the lines sketched by Kallen, so that an equation between democracy and diversity became a fundamental premise of political and social thought. The Cold War was actually


the time when an explicitly pluralist theory of group relations attained its widest popularity.⁴

Horace Kallen had a long and prolific career as a philosopher, academic organizer, and a public intellectual. He was the principal theoretician of cultural pluralism and an expert on William James. He was a prominent scientific naturalist who contributed many entries to the influential multivolume Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences in the 1920s and 30s and thus helped to define the social sciences in America. He co-founded the New School for Social Research in New York. He was an outstanding pedagogical thinker and a consumer rights advocate. And together with John Dewey, he was a leading defender of academic freedom.

Kallen’s ideas about the nature of American democracy were formed while he was a student at Harvard University at the beginning of the twentieth century. There Kallen was profoundly influenced by his English professor Barrett Wendell and the philosophers George Santayana and William James. Wendell, a biographer of Cotton Mather, had an interest in the Old Testament influence on

the Puritans and believed that they were descendent from the Jews.\textsuperscript{5} Prior to his undergraduate years, the German-born Kallen had rebelled against his orthodox Jewish father, a rabbi, and did not identify himself as a Jew but singularly as an American. Wendell persuaded Kallen that both “the America Idea” and that secular Jewish heritage (what Kallen called “Hebraism”) were compatible. They shared, in his view, the common precepts of the Old Testament prophets and social and spiritual ideals. According to Kallen, Hebraism was what “Israel has stood for in history, the life of the Jews, their unique achievement – not as individuals, but as a well defined ethnic group.”\textsuperscript{6} He then abandoned what had been an assimilationist trajectory, and embraced a dual identity as an ethnic (secular) Jew and an American. It was in such duality that Kallen located democracy. Indeed, Kallen elevated the maintenance of ethnic identity into the defining characteristic of Americanism and democracy.

In 1911, Kallen happened to be present as a Rhodes Scholar at Manchester College, Oxford when William James delivered his famous Hibbert Lecture “A

\textsuperscript{5} Menand, p. 389.
Pluralistic Universe.” With Kallen in the audience was the first African American Rhodes Scholar, Alain Locke. “Things are ‘with’ one another in many ways, James declared, “but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything.

The word “and” trails along after every sentence. Something always escapes” …The pluralistic world is …more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected, however much may report itself as present at any effective centre of consciousness or action, something else is self-governed and absent and unreduced to unity.”

According to the historian of American pragmatism, Louis Menand, the remark that the pluralistic universe was “more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom” was probably a figure of speech used by an Irish-American to tweak his British audience. Kallen and Locke, however, took it to heart and used it as an inspiration in their conceptions of pluralism.

In his essay, “Democracy Versus the Melting-Pot,” written in 1915, Kallen noted not only the persistence of ethnicity in the USA but its centrality to America. “Americanization has not repressed nationality,” he wrote.

“Americanization has liberated nationality.” A proper democracy, he wrote


8 Menand, p. 379.
borrowing James’s figure of speech, “is that of a Federated republic, its substance a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously in the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to their kind.” 9 Thus

American civilization” may come to mean the perfection of “European civilization,” the waste, the squalor, and the distress of Europe being eliminated – a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind. As in an orchestra, every type of instrument has its specific tonality, founded in substance and form; as every type has its appropriate them and melody in the whole symphony, so in society each ethnic group is the natural instrument, its spirit and culture are its theme and melody, and the harmony and dissonances and discords of them all make the symphony of civilization, with this difference: a musical symphony is written before it is played; in the symphony of civilization the playing is the writing.10

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10 Ibid., p. 220. Kallen’s Eurocentric vision of America is telling. Throughout his long and prolific career, Kallen tended to elide the African American dimension in American inter-group relations. The ethnic groups in Kallen’s pluralistic vision were all European. After Locke’s death, Kallen claimed that the phrase “cultural pluralism” originated in conversations he had with Locke at Harvard. Locke, however, credited British colonials at Oxford with influencing his (Locke’s) theories of pluralism. On a personal level, Kallen’s relationship with Locke was complicated: Kallen made a point of showing solidarity with Locke in the face of discriminatory treatment Locke faced at Oxford, but Kallen’s correspondence also reveals that he harbored racist prejudices against African Americans, including Alain Locke. See Menand, pp. 390-391.
Later, in response to John Dewey’s criticism, Kallen moderated this formulation of democracy as a federated republic of nationalities and started using the term “cultural pluralism.” ¹¹ Both phrases, however, are rooted firmly in the discourses of fin-de-siècle American pragmatism. ¹² Kallen remained a lifelong disciple of James in dismissing a monistic metaphysics. Pragmatism, he wrote, is the philosophical explication of Darwinism in secular and empirical terms. By this he meant that in the period after the spike of the religious opposition to The Origin of the Species (roughly from around 1890 until 1914) philosophers noticed differentiation, mutation, innovation, actualities of struggle, fitness and survival, and effects over causes. This was a time when history was seen as “genuine change,” he wrote, when every event was regarded

¹¹ Moses Rischin, “The Jews and Pluralism: Toward an American Freedom Symphony,” paper presented at the bicentennial conference sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, cited in Goren, p. 118. Dewey, in a essay entitled “The Principles of Nationality,” The Menorah, Journal 3, No. 4, Oct 1917, p. 204 stated his position in favor of recognizing “the cultural rights and privileges of each nationality – its right to its own language, its own literature, its own ideals, its moral and spiritual outlook on the world, its complete religious freedom – and such political autonomy as may be consistent with the maintenance of general social unity.”

¹² When James was near death, he asked Kallen to prepare for publication material on metaphysics. James died in 1910 and the book came out in 1911 as Some Problems in Philosophy. Kallen then compiled the most important pragmatist anthology of the period: Creative Intelligence (1917).
as "a new birth and a struggle for survival of novelties," and not as "a repetition of identicals." This worldview was consistent with the paramount value of Jamesian philosophy, which in Kallen’s assessment was “that freedom for which the word in other contexts is chance, contingency, plurality, novelty, with Reason derivative, operational, a working tool.” “The universe,” Kallen wrote, “in a word, is tychistic.” Ideas or pure reason, in other words, did not have a particularly exalted status with Kallen. The Darwinian influence on American philosophy was such as to thrust the Many into ascendance over the One. Kallen credited Darwin with having had a great influence on his thinking and that of all the pragmatists. Here Kallen’s metaphysics merges with his epistemology,


cultural anthropology and his anti-totalitarian political theory. In a 1935 essay about contemporary American philosophy, Kallen wrote

[w]hether existence started as One or as Many, it is now Many; and its history as evolutionary science tells us is a continuous differentiation of the One into the Many. When mankind began, the world was already an endlessly diversified manifold, and there has been no cessation of increase in the variety and number of natures whose aggregation it is. If the deliverances of history and the sciences are valid, then the human passion for unity, with its compensatory aspirations after one substance, one necessity, one law, in the sciences; an eternal God and an immortal soul in religion; one church, one state, and one economy in social life, is unnatural.

“The totalitarianism of Communists and Fascists,” he concluded, “is in effect a war upon nature.”17 Kallen was an anti-determinist in his philosophy and his anthropology. Change and pluralism were his watchwords. The significance of Kallen is not only that he directly contrasted cultural pluralism and pragmatism with totalitarianism, but also that he transposed Darwinian evolutionary biology to philosophy, the social sciences, and a culturally pluralistic politics at a time when anxieties over totalitarianism made a wider American public highly receptive to such ideas.

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17 Kallen, “Philosophy Today and Tomorrow,” p. 270.
It is important to remember that the early expressions of concern with the varieties of human culture expressed by James, Kallen, and Locke were made in specific historical contexts. For James the suppression of the Philippine independence movement in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War and then reports of lynchings of African Americans in the South caused him to become a political activist, and he may have come to think of his pragmatism and pluralism as philosophical expressions of anti-imperialism and antiracism.\textsuperscript{18} The period between 1901 and 1910 saw 8,795,386 immigrants arrive in the United States (mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe). At this time of massive immigration, there was widespread anxiety among people who defined American nationality racially and who feared that immigration would lead to national degeneration. Kallen, in “Democracy Versus the Melting Pot,” was polemicizing with both racist nativists such as Edward A. Ross who feared immigration, and proponents of racial miscegenation such as Israel Zangwill who favored it. Ross was a well-known public intellectual in his day who supported the labor movement and was also a eugenicist and opponent of immigration on the ground that races were unequal. In 1914 both Ross and

\textsuperscript{18} Menand, p. 379.
Kallen were on the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, when Ross published a series of racist anti-immigration pieces, including “The Old World in the New.” Kallen explicitly targeted his colleague, Ross, in “Democracy Versus the Melting Pot.” The presence of various nationalities in the United States was, itself, the stuff of democracy, Kallen argued contra-Ross. And assimilation was not an option. The maintenance of various national cultures protected American society against the negative effects of mass culture to which deracinated people assimilated. It also was a defense against the violence of cultural imperialism exhibited by Germany and Russia which were continually trying to absorb the nations of Central Europe, a form of violence that had engulfed the whole world in war.

Kallen was also taking aim the idea of the melting pot. The metaphor of America as a melting pot in which different people combine to form a new nation had recently been popularized by Israel Zangwill’s 1908 play The Melting Pot, winning the enthusiastic praise of President Theodore Roosevelt, to whom it was


20 Ibid., p. 393.
The play itself is chock-full of millenarian imagery. Kallen, the
naturalist, was in effect making a strong statement against the tradition of
representing America with eschatological imagery and as a religiously inspired
conception of perfected community. Such ideals of perfect unity were
dangerously authoritarian.

In a 1947 festschrift for Kallen, Alain Locke wrote that “[e]ver since
William James’s ardent and creative advocacy of it, pluralism has involved,

published 1908). The chiliastic imagery includes descriptions of immigrants
being in a fallen state, “sins of fathers,” and “easter” in America. In the play,
New York is the “shining city.” America, the play prophesized, would be where
people would “unite to build the Republic of Man and the Kingdom of God.” It
was the promised land “where all races and nations come to Labor and look
forward.” America would surpass “the glory of Rome and Jerusalem.” The
melting pot itself is an apocalyptic symbol: that of a holocaust or sacrifice by
consumption or scourging by fire.

22 Long before Zangwill’s play there were other statements redolent with
allusions to the redemptive power of America that professed the vision of the
United States as a composite of different peoples. The most famous of these was
Crevecoeur’s 1782 portrait of America as a land where “individuals of all nations
are melted into a new race of men.” Americans, he wrote, are the western
pilgrims.” Other millenarian images of the United States include the American
colonial mission to set up a “City on the Hill” as a beacon and example to
unregenerate Europe of the Reformation’s ideal of holy commonwealth; America
as “Eden,” and Manifest Destiny. The motto E Pluribus Unum also suggests an
ascent to unity.
explicitly or by implication, an antiauthoritarian principle.”23 It is clear that even though James’s and Kallen’s initial theory of pluralism predate twentieth century totalitarianisms, they were explicitly anti-imperialistic and antiauthoritarian in origin. Once totalitarianism in the forms of Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism became the paradigmatic authoritarianism during the interwar period these theories were arrayed against it. Starting in the 1930s, Kallen frequently (and anachronistically) referred to earlier authoritarianisms as totalitarian. What were these authoritarianisms?

Enforced cultural and racial homogeneity as envisioned by American nativists was one type of authoritarianism to which Kallen opposed his pluralistic philosophy. In “Democracy Versus the Melting Pot,” Kallen tried to disprove the possibility of the universalization of a putatively homogenous old Anglo-American life among immigrants. Such assimilation, he wrote, was remote as a matter of fact. Kallen derided Anglo-American nostalgia. The “older America,” he declared, “is gone beyond recall.” Kallen’s method in this essay is to demonstrate “the practical fact of ethnic dissimilarity” empirically, and then to

show that this fact is consistent with American democracy. 24 Thus Kallen joined naturalism with pluralism by welcoming ethnic diversity as scientific fact and then by linking pluralism with democracy.

Not only were unison and homogeneity in cultural matters a source of authoritarianism for Kallen, but he regarded oneness and unity generally as pernicious in social schemes and in philosophy. Oneness is the source of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Kallen was opposed to classical conceptions of philosophy that linked each thing with everything else by unbreakable logical or material links. He termed such thinking “rationalism.” Spinoza’s *Ethica*, was a treatise that Kallen placed in this category. He saw it as “a stupendous totalitarian web.” 25 Such philosophies were dogmatic. In the political and social realm, rationalism and dogmatism found expression after World War I in an “epidemic of nationalism, sectarianism, racialism, and xenophobia.” The stigmata of these rationalisms in the United States were, according to Kallen, “red hysteria, jingoism, [Christian] fundamentalism, and the


“Ku Klux Klan.”26 “The alternative before Americans, Kallen wrote in Culture and Democracy in the United States, “is Kultur Klux Klan or Cultural Pluralism.”27 For Kallen, Marxism was another rationalistic and dogmatic system that was totalitarian. Indeed, in his historical interpretation it bred reactionary totalitarianisms in turn: “[t]hus the totalitarianism of the Marxist system,” he wrote, “gave rise to counter-totalitarianisms, like 100 per cent Americanism, Fascism, Nazism, each imposing on the individual unquestioning faith and submission.” Theses totalitarianisms were responsible for obliterating the ideal of “Live and Let Live.”28 Kallen, like other mid-twentieth century anti-totalitarians, linked modern totalitarianism to ancient philosophy. Whatever the exact architecture of German Nazism or Italian Fascism or Soviet Communism, they all suggested “the figure of a victorious One, reconciling subordinating, harmonizing the centrifugal Many.” “The equivalents of Plato’s Republic generated by these times,” he wrote in 1934 “are prevailingly Communism and

26 Ibid., p. 261.


28 H.M. Kallen, “Philosophy Today and Tomorrow,” p. 262.
Fascism.” Kallen was unambiguously opposed to idealistic and rationalistic philosophies and dogmatic social schemes based on overarching unity. They were totalitarian. Although elaborated during the First World War and then reiterated in the 1920s, Kallen’s philosophy of cultural pluralism had to await the society-wide preoccupation with totalitarianism during the Cold War to attain its widest influence.

In 1956 Kallen updated his theory of cultural pluralism. For Kallen, cultural pluralism was the very definition of American democracy and freedom, and it was the basis of American identity. The American Idea, Kallen wrote, was based on an identity that was “neither authoritarian nor totalitarian,” but which invited, preserved and encouraged diversity. An individual’s freedom depended on the diversity of the individual’s society. The more groups an individual can join or leave, the more varied their forms and functions, the more abundant and freer is likely to be the individual. Kallen:

It is the variety and range of his participation which does in fact distinguish a civilized man from an uncivilized man, a man of faith from


an unreasoning fanatic, a democrat from a totalitarian, a man of culture from a barbarian. Such a man obviously orchestrates a growing pluralism of associations into the wholeness of his individuality.31

In a particularly revealing maneuver, Kallen positioned all opponents of cultural pluralism as totalitarians. The legerdemain was more than merely rhetorical. Kallen was, in effect, defining what was, and what was not, a legitimate way of producing knowledge. Cultural Pluralism, he wrote, was from the beginning a controversial expression. The opposition to the concept, he stated categorically, always took the forms of scientific or creedal disputation and rejection or both together. To Kallen, “the creedal modes project some species of totalitarianism – racial, sacerdotal, communist, fascist or other.” The scientific modes of opposition postulate “some sort of monistic sociological theory employing concepts of organism and other models frequent among social scientists.”

According to Kallen the scientific could transpose the creedal opposition and vice versa, whenever a working hypothesis, subject to revision according to the testimony of time, is transvalued into a doctrinal system always and everywhere the same. Thus Kallen aligned cultural pluralism with the experimental method

of science and opposed both to the monism of doctrinal pseudo-science and totalitarianism.\textsuperscript{32} During the Cold War, cultural pluralism became socially and scientifically acceptable not only because of the way Kallen positioned it against the totalitarian regimes themselves, but also because he aligned it against totalitarian modes of thought such as racialism, sacredotal thought, and monistic social science.

In 1948, the Harvard historian Oscar Handlin wrote a book called Race and Nationality in American Life. Handlin would go on to win the Pulitzer Prize in 1952 for his book The Uprooted, which inaugurated the field of immigration history with its much quoted opening lines “Once I thought to write a history of immigrants in America. Then I discovered that the immigrants were American history.”\textsuperscript{33} In the earlier work Handlin revealed what had inspired his ideas

\textsuperscript{32} H.M. Kallen, “Concerning Varieties of Pluralism,” in Kallen, Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea: An Essay in Social Philosophy, p.46. John Dewey put forward a similar argument: “The problem of attaining mutual understanding and a reasonable degree of amicable cooperation among different peoples, races, classes, is bound up with the problem of reaching by peaceful and democratic means some workable adjustment of values, standards, and ends which are now in a state of conflict. Dependence upon the absolutist and totalitarian element involved in every form of anti-naturalism adds to the difficulty of this already difficult undertaking.” John Dewey, Anti-Naturalism in Extremis, The Partisan Review, 1943, p.36.
about race, ethnicity, and immigrants in America. He had been shocked, he wrote, by the tragic, indecent “holocausts” of the first half of the twentieth century: the Turkish massacre of Greeks in Smyrna in 1922, Stalin’s “systematic extermination of millions” in Ukraine in the early thirties, and the Nazi extermination camps. Handlin’s Race and Nationality reveals a lot about the directions American social science was taking at the start of the Cold War. The book foreshadowed the preoccupation of American intellectuals with varieties of soft totalitarianism in the forms of conformity, ideology, and racism at home while America was engaged in a worldwide struggle with hard Communist totalitarianism abroad. Handlin was among the first to link domestic and foreign totalitarianism. Race and Nationality is centrally concerned with the problem of racism against “Negroes” in America, which Handlin saw as a form of totalitarianism that undermined the United States in its confrontation with hard totalitarian Communism around the world. He described the United States, however, as a place where racist views that had been held so widely had been overcome as modern social science discredited racism.

33 Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: p. 3

34 Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life, (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1957, first copyright 1948, p. xi.)
It was Handlin’s position that by 1947 there had already transpired a far-reaching revolution in the practice, the politics, and the theory of group life in America. He accounted for this purported change by enumerating eight internal and external trends. First there was the negative example of Europe and the disastrous goal toward which race theory led: the Nazi extermination camps. Second the “actual diversities of American life” and “manifest differences that actually divided the population gave the lie to every effort to create or perpetuate a myth of American peoplehood in the sense of common descent.” This was nod to the facticity of ethnic difference. Next he singled out the revival in the consciousness of the ideals of equality and liberty along with the philosophy of pluralism developed by William James and John Dewey. He also mentioned the humanitarian ideals associated with the New Deal. Handlin’s fifth trend was the remarkable awakening of the political consciousness among the minorities themselves.35 These minorities were able to take organized action.

35In a significant bit of etymology, Handlin notes that the term “minority” gained widespread usage in American English only after the First World War peace treaties delineated “minority rights” for peoples such as the Ukrainians in Poland. p.170. I believe that the interwar discourses about minority rights in Europe were consequential for the development of multiculturalism in North America. Members of the diasporic Ukrainian communities in Canada and the United States came to see the Ukrainians in Poland, as a minority group with
because American institutions left substantial areas of social life (churches, benevolent and fraternal associations, self-defense associations) free from state interference. Group life had also been transformed by the general economic prosperity that started during World War II then eased competition in employment and led to anti-discrimination measures. Finally, Handlin attributes the radical change in American society to developments in science and popular views of science. Programs for easing intergroup hostility and for intercultural education were, Handlin wrote, the practical manifestations of important changes in genetics, in psychology, in anthropology, in psychology, in sociology and in the historical interpretation of the American past. According to the Harvard historian, contemporary science had demolished the idea of race as a concept. Therefore it followed “that the only meaningful basis upon which one can compare social and cultural traits is in terms of the ethnic group, which preserves its continuity to the extent that its culture passes from generation to

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legally entrenched rights, and frequently made representations on their behalf to the Canadian and American governments and at international fora. They then started to see themselves, the Ukrainians in Canada and the United States in the same light: as minorities whose minority rights should be recognized and entrenched in fundamental law. See Chapter 4.
generation through a common social environment.”36 The proper object of social scientific inquiry was thus the effects of persisting cultural differences upon American society, particularly the place within it of the numerous ethnic groups.37 The need to study ethnic groups was given further impetus by Handlin because ethnic groups supplied the “emotional and personal needs of the individual in such a manner that he will not be tempted to lose himself in blind identification with a total state or mythical race” and because “[i]n a free society such as the United States, the groups which devoted themselves to such non-governmental functions tended to follow an ethnic pattern.”38 According to Handlin, “[a]s the Cold War became more intense,

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36 Ibid. p. 191.

37 Ibid. p. 192. The cultural pluralism of theorists such as Kallen and Handlin elided racial differences in American society. The reasons for this neglect include the disrepute into which racial and racist topologies had fallen after World War II in addition to a latent racism that could not accept a distinct African American collectivity as part of the idealized multi-group society being envisioned by the theorists.

38 Ibid. pp. 218 & 217. In 1975 the leading sociologist of ethnicity in America, Nathan Glazer continued to argue that “[i]n mass society there is the need in the individual for some kind of identity – smaller than the State, larger than the family” and that ethnic identity fulfilled this role. “Universalization of Ethnicity,” Encounter, No. 2 1975, p. 16.
concern deepened for the immigrants were now either its victims or drawn from among the potential allies in the struggle against totalitarianism. Such considerations altered the American attitude toward immigration despite the fact the legislations and official policy continued to express the views of an earlier decade.”

The threat of totalitarianism was immediate, Handlin argued. In response to it and in the worldwide “struggle for allies against a shrewd and ruthless enemy,” Americans had to renounce racial segregation and to recognize the creative and constructive role that “free ethnic groups” play in contributing to “the value for all men of the American experiment.” In effect, ethnic group membership had become the ultimate guarantee against totalitarianism in the United States. “Multiple loyalties,” Handlin wrote, “were no problem; all Americans held them to some degree for their conception of nationality was not totalitarian and did not dictate that they must love only the United States.” In turn the ethnic group member gave the United States government a bridge to political engagement in the immigrants’ mother countries. The properly Americanized emigrants (Greeks, Italians, etc.) could return to their homelands

39 Ibid., pp. 230-231.

40 Ibid. pp. 221, 222.

41 Ibid. p. 250.
and demonstrate that there “is an alternative to the despair in which communism breeds.” Immigrants would thus save America and their homelands from totalitarianism. The changes in science noted by Handlin that found practical manifestations in programs for easing intergroup hostility and for intercultural education were central to the rise of diversity as a societal value during the Cold War, but their effects ran deeper than the Harvard historian suggested.

Other historians were less triumphalist that Handlin in comparing foreign and domestic varieties of totalitarianism. To them, this linkage would become known as the “ironic” turn in American historiography. “The irony of American history,” as Reinhold Niebuhr put it in 1952 was the situation in which “[t]he evils against which we contend [Soviet totalitarianism] are frequently the fruit of illusions which are similar to our own.” The following year C. Vann Woodward adopted this idiom in “The Irony of Southern History.” “Our opposite numbers in the world crisis,” Woodward wrote, “are bred on illusions of innocence and virtue that parallel our own with ironic fidelity, even though they are of very different origin and have been used to disguise (perhaps even from themselves)

42 Ibid., p. 272.

what seems to us much greater guilt of oppression and cruelty.”44 In either Handlin’s overly optimistic assessment of the resolution of race conflict in the United States or in Woodward’s critical interpretation, their mutual concern with totalitarianisms, foreign and domestic, tended to validate diversity and pluralism.

As we have already seen, there were many instances where American social scientists advanced cultural pluralism as a philosophy or as a factual description of democracy that was diametrically opposed to foreign and domestic totalitarianism. The less direct effects of the Cold War on American social science were at least equally important. Cold War epistemology was also consequential for the way American identity was constructed by American social scientists and historians. By definition, epistemologies structure what is considered knowable. The prevailing anti-totalitarian theory of knowledge in postwar America privileged facts and differences while downgrading theory, ideals, and values. This shift in emphasis from the universal to the particular dramatically transformed contemporary American sociology, history, political

science, and philosophy. Empiricism and functionalism were in; normative theory was out. The inescapable effect was to foreground diversity. The epistemology itself and its effect on these disciplines changed how many Americans imagined their nation. The critical theorist Theodore Adorno noted this trend in 1966. “Today”, he wrote, “with theory paralyzed and disparaged by the all-governing bustle, its mere existence, however impotent, bears witness against the bustle.”45 Indeed, facts were so central in postwar American epistemology that many social scientists denied the very possibility of normative theory since it was not about facts. Theory, such as it was, was empirical and descriptive. It attempted to describe social reality as it existed.46 Historian Mark C. Smith surveyed the effects of the anti-totalitarian climate on social science in postwar America in his book Social Change in the Crucible. During the Cold

45 Negative Dialectics. p. 144.

46 Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski was characteristic of the approach to social scientific studies in this period. They made a point of writing that their study was a “general descriptive theory” of totalitarianism, and that their model of this novel form of government was based on “generally known and acknowledged factual data.” Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Second Edition, revised by Carl J. Friedrich, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. xi.
War, Smith concluded, there was a decisive turn away from normative theory towards facts and description, or “descriptive theory.”

According to Smith, the objectivist social science and empirical theory that dominated Cold War America were important manifestations of the end-of-ideology movement of postwar American social thought. Smith takes a broad perspective on the end-of-ideology movement. He includes in it not only the sociologists such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset who were closely identified with the “end-of-ideology” thesis, but also the consensus school in American historiography, and the “new democratic theory” associated with political scientists Robert Dahl and Gabriel Almond.47 For Smith, the end-of-ideology movement was characterized by a commitment to the existing American system as a positive good. It drew its appeal from widespread public abhorrence of the terrors of fascism and Stalinism, and it accepted the status quo in America because the USA was an example of a functioning democracy in contrast to the totalitarian regimes. Implicit in the thought of the end-of-ideology social scientists, was the idea that the USA was as good as the good society could get.

The “end-of-ideology” in American social thought is a vast subject. It ranges from demotic debates to sophisticated philosophy. The central theme of the movement was that ideologies had been rendered obsolete in modernized western countries by the 1950s due to the growth of knowledge and by a new political culture responsive to knowledge made accessible by modern science. According to the end-of-ideology proponents, a new, knowledge-based culture had displaced ideological politics in postwar America. The debates over the end-of-ideology raged across the academy throughout the 1960s and even reached the White House. President John F. Kennedy repeated many of the end-of-ideology postulates in his speeches declaring “ideological approaches” irrelevant to contemporary problems. Kennedy, like the sociologists who led the movement, maintained that most of the remaining problems in the United States were technical, not political problems.48

The mood among American intellectuals that culminated in the end-of-ideology discourse was already evident in the Partisan Review symposium “Our _______________________

Country, Our Culture” in 1952. At this gathering of intellectuals, critic Philip Rahv said that the exposure of the “Soviet myth” and the consequent resolve to be done with Utopian illusions had made American democracy look like the real thing to American intellectuals. “[F]or all its distortions and contradictions,” he said, “it actually exits.” It was “not a mere theory or a deduction from some textbook of world-salvation,” he said reflecting the widespread disrepute in to which theory and deduction had fallen.49 Previously, American writers, artists and intellectuals had been known for their alienation from American culture. Totalitarianism had changed this attitude. The PR editors declared, that “there is a recognition that the kind of democracy which exists in America has an intrinsic and positive value: it is not merely a capitalist myth but a reality which must be defended against Russian totalitarianism.”50 Philosopher Sidney Hook, in his characteristically blunt fashion, said that he “cannot understand why American intellectuals should be apologetic about the fact that they are limited in their effective historical choice between endorsing a system of total terror and critically supporting our own imperfect democratic culture with all its promises


50 Editorial Statement, ibid., p. 284
and dangers.” 51 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. agreed that the attitude of most American intellectuals to their country had changed and added that “Communism appears to carry an even more implacable threat to culture than fascism.” The only answer to the threat to culture posed by Communism and “mass culture,” was “the affirmation of America, not as a uniform society, but as a various and pluralistic society, made up of many groups with diverse interests.” The immediate problem, according to Schlesinger was to conserve cultural pluralism in America, and above all this depended on preserving an atmosphere congenial to free inquiry. 52 The only dissident voice at the symposium was that of sociologist C. Wright Mills who nonetheless conceded that the prevailing mood among American intellectuals had indeed changed. He noted that a “token of the shift is available to those who try to imagine “the old PR” running the title “Our Country” in 1939: they would have cringed. Mills criticized the new attitude, however, saying that it amounted only to a “shrinking defence of the status quo;

51 Sidney Hook, ibid., p. 569.

52 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., p591-592.
often to a soft and anxious compliance, and always a synthetic, feeble search to justify this intellectual conduct, without searching for alternatives.”53

The genesis of the phrase “end-of-ideology” is closely connected with the history of the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF), an international organization of anti-Communist intellectuals. The CCF published the journals Encounter in Britain, Preuves in France, and Der Monat in West Germany with contributions from writers and social critics such as George Orwell, Hannah Arendt, T.S. Elliot, Thomas Mann, Arthur Koestler, Raymond Aron, Ignazio Silone, Saul Bellow, Nathan Glazer, and Milovan Djilas. The Congress staged anti-communist meetings of intellectuals and artists, including “Science and Freedom” (Hamburg, 1953) and “The Future of Freedom” (Milan, 1955). In 1967 a major scandal fatally undermined the Congress when the fact that the CCF had been organized and funded covertly by the Central Intelligence Agency became widely known. The CIA’s objective in sponsoring the Congress was to diminish the appeal of Soviet Communism among intellectuals and artists around the world by promoting the “non-communist left.”54

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53 C. Wright Mills, p. 446.
The end-of-ideology was thematic in the CCF from its birth in 1950 even if the phrase itself had not yet been coined. In 1953 the French philosopher Raymond Aron supplied the catch-phrase and elaborated the idea. At the time, Aron was a member of the seminars planning committee of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) along with the American sociologists Edward Shils, Daniel Bell, the British Labour politician C.A.R. Crosland, and the Anglo-Hungarian scientist and philosopher Michael Polanyi. It was in the discussions of the seminars planning committee that Aron, Shils, and Bell first theorized the


56 The Congress of Cultural Freedom was organized in West Berlin in 1950. The American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF) was re-launched in 1950 by Sidney Hook who sought to reactivate the dormant Committee for Cultural Freedom that he had founded with John Dewey in 1939. The ACCF was revived in 1950 to protest what Hook saw as a pro-Soviet peace conference at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York. Given the many new members, the name was changed to the Ad Hoc Committee for Intellectual Freedom and subsequently back to Committee for Cultural Freedom in 1951. The American Committee for Cultural Freedom was an independent affiliate of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. See Sidney Hook: Out of Step: An Unquiet Life, (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) p. 385
end-of-ideology.\textsuperscript{57} Aron’s hypothesis was that the strength of an ideology, say communism, varies in relation to the level of economic development in the county in which it is found.\textsuperscript{58} He suggested that ideologies were in decline and that fanaticism in political belief was a passing phenomenon. Sharp, distinct, and explicit idea systems were passé, he said. The best response to ideology was skepticism. “Indifference will not harm us,” he wrote. “If tolerance is born of doubt, let us teach everyone to doubt all the models and utopias, to challenge all the prophets of redemption and the heralds of catastrophe...If they alone can abolish fanaticism, let us pray for the advent of the skeptics.” For Aron, the end of ideology meant pragmatism and planning based on empirical social science.\textsuperscript{59}

At the 1955 meeting of the CCF in Milan on “The Future of Freedom,” the participants debated the question of whether ideologies were waning. The American delegation included Daniel Bell, John K. Galbraith, Sidney Hook, Edward Shils, and Seymour Martin Lipset. The conference essentially agreed

\textsuperscript{57} Bell attributes these discussions to inspiring his essays collected in his book, \textit{The End of Ideology}, see p. 408.

\textsuperscript{58} Raymond Aron, “The Diffusion of Ideologies,” \textit{Confluence II} (March 1953), 3-12.

with Aron and concluded that ideologies were indeed in a state of decline, that passionate adherence to them was no longer relevant, and that the decline was due to increasing affluence in Western countries. In addition to the empirical evidence of the decline, the participants noted that ideologies had been discredited by the “close identities” between the extremes of right and left over the past thirty years.60

The next milestone in the history of the end-of-ideology movement was the 1958 essay, “Ideology and Civility,” by American sociologist Edward Shils. Before the war, Shils had gained renown as one of the English language translators (with Louis Wirth) of Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia.61 During World War II he served, along with so many prominent American intellectuals, in the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA’s predecessor. In the 1950s he was a leading sociologist at the University of Chicago. Shils, like Aron, was engaging the idea put forward by the German political scientist and erstwhile Nazi Carl Schmitt that liberalism with its neutralized or depoliticized


61 Some of the postwar end-of-ideology issues can be traced back to this book. Mannheim believed that Utopianism was in decline even before the Second World War and the “matter-of-factness” was in ascendancy.
zones was doomed.62 For Shils, not liberalism but the age of ideology was over.

“Marxism is decomposing,” he wrote, and “nationalism has lost its doctrinal

grip...the asperities of the debate between socialism and capitalism seem to be

fading.” Ideological politics still held sway in new states outside the West, he

acknowledged, but in the West they were history.63 Working from a sociology of

knowledge perspective, Shils saw ideology as a historical phenomenon to be

explained sociologically. Ideology was concerned with the sacred. It was a

transient entity such as an ideal, and this put it in conflict with liberal politics.

Liberal, non-ideological, politics was characterized by “civility” for Shils. Civility

was the practice of excluding certain things from debate, that is, to neutralize or

depoliticize them. Liberalism entailed recognizing these exclusions and the limits

of politics.64 Ideological politics did not recognize such limits. They were

totalizing and the result of such politics was totalitarianism. Recognition of limits

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(July 1999 pp. 125-145, pp. 138-139.

nationalism as an ideology indicates that nationalism too was in disrepute
among anti-totalitarian liberals.

64 Stephen Turner, “The Significance of Shils,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 17, No.2,
July 1999, p. 138
was a matter of consensus. Keenly aware of the metaphysical pitfall of a “non-ideological” politics being covertly ideological, Shils ventured that civility was a tradition. In invoking tradition, he joined in the ongoing discourse already engaged by Michael Polanyi (1946), Michael Oakeshott (1947), Karl Popper (1949), and T.S. Elliot (1940) and on the role of tradition in science, knowledge, culture, and democracy. 65

In effect, Shils was restating and updating the scientific rule of civility postulated by seventeenth century English experimentalists and extending it to the realm of 20th century politics and culture. The main consequence of civility for Shils, was that it “inhibits the extension of politics and the politicization of other spheres, eg., the economic, the ecclesiastical, the academic, and the domestic.” By excluding cultural and religious differences from politics, it became possible for more people to participate in the restricted zone of the political. The existence of limits to the political in turn allowed the traditions of

each sphere to continue and to flourish. Distinct spheres were thus mutually reinforcing and pluralism was both a precondition and consequence of liberal civility. An earlier, clear expression of the connection between cultural pluralism and civility was made by Alain Locke, the philosopher of cultural pluralism, in 1947. Differences between people should not be eradicated, he argued, but people should school themselves not to make so much of the differences. “These differences,” he wrote, “since they are as real and hard as “facts” should be accepted as unemotionally and objectively as we accept fact.” The pluralism inherent in such an approach to difference was, incidentally, the only way to face the “world crisis,” as Locke referred to the Cold War stand-off with the Soviet Union. By categorizing differences between people as factual and insisting that they be regarded dispassionately just as scientists regarded fact, Locke and Shils linked human differences (and cultural pluralism) to science at a time when science was widely esteemed.

66 Edward Shils, as cited in Turner, p.141.

The next major event in the history of the end-of-ideology movement was the publication of Seymour Martin Lipset’s 1959 bestseller Political Man. A central theme of Political Man, with its epilogue “The End of Ideology,” is the comparison of “the good society itself” to Communist totalitarianism. In the book, Lipset controversially declared, “democracy is not only or even primarily a means through with different groups can attain their ends or seek the good society; it is the good society itself in operation.” Thus Lipset directly and inextricably linked democracy with the presence of different groups and concluded that it/they were the ideal. The multi-group society was democracy. Lipset wrote in no uncertain terms that western political life had changed and that this change reflected “the fact that the fundamental problems of the industrial revolution have been solved.”

The following year Daniel Bell published his collection of essays entitled The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 1950s. In Bell’s

68 Lipset, who wrote his doctoral dissertation about the Canadian Commonwealth Federation, mediated the end-of-ideology discourse to a Canadian audience by writing a letter discussing the 1955 Congress for Cultural Freedom meeting in Milan. Canadian Forum 35 Nov 1955 pp. 170-171. This letter was incorporated in a postscript in Political Man.
view, Marxism and Nazism were ideologies, and they were new versions of old chiliastic ideas. In his anti-millenarian perspective, Bell was deeply influenced by another CCF member, Reinhold Niebuhr. Bell, like Niebuhr, insisted that no particular embodiment of community be accepted as final. This anti-millenarianism informed his pluralism. Bell saw three categories of reasons that marked the end-of-ideology. The first category consisted of social changes, including modifications in capitalism, the welfare state, the spread of education, expanding opportunities of employment for intellectuals, an appreciation of pluralism, and belief in the mixed economy. The second category was one of catastrophes. Among these he listed the Depression, class struggles, Fascism, Naziism, the Stalinist show trials, the Nazi-Soviet pact, war, concentration camps, death chambers, and suppression of the Hungarian workers in 1956. The last category consisted of intellectual currents such as the decline of rationalistic beliefs, Freud, Tillich, Niebuhr, Jaspers, and existentialism. Like the historian Daniel Boorstin, Bell argued that the genius of American politics was its pragmatism. For Bell “[d]emocratic politics is bargaining and consensus because

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the historic contribution of liberalism was to separate law from morality.” It was
given philosophical form by Kant “who, separating legality from morality,
defined the former as the ‘rules of the game’ so to speak; law dealt with
procedural not substantive issues.”\textsuperscript{70} For Bell, end-of-ideology values were the
acceptance of a welfare state and mixed economy, the desirability of
decentralized power, and political pluralism. These values were anti-
systematizing and anti-conformity.\textsuperscript{71} As Bell put it, the end-of-ideology was, in
effect, an outcome of the “functionalization of thought”. For both Lipset and Bell,
pluralism and interest group politics were the opposite of ideological politics;
and any remaining political problems could be resolved by recourse to
knowledge.\textsuperscript{72}

Years later, Daniel Bell outlined the genesis of his ideas about the end-of-
ideology in an interview with the historian Job Dittberner. He said that his
discussions with his friend the historian Richard Hofstadter had helped form his
ideas as had the “Communist and Nazi experience.” These experiences had

\textsuperscript{70} Dittberner, pp. 151,169, 178. 192, 203-204

\textsuperscript{71} Bell, p. 402.

\textsuperscript{72} Dittberner, p. 206, 250.
taught Bell the value of what he called “alienation.” This was for Bell a kind of “double-consciousness” that allowed him and like-minded people to become involved yet never completely involved and to maintain a degree detachment from events. “What is fundamental in this argument,” Bell said, is that, “you want to become involved, but at the same time there’s a great need for detachment, summed up in one place where I say: “The claims of doubt take precedence over the claims of certainty.”” The impact of the war and the Holocaust had shaken Bell’s view of a utopian or progressive or optimistic view of human nature and society, and he named two sources for the end-of-ideology: Niebuhr and Dewey. As he told Dittberner, “[w]hat it meant and what it reflects – and it’s much more explicit if you understand the Niebuhrian background of some of this – is an attack on apocalyptic thinking. It’s an attack on governments that become all or none in their way of viewing the world and in the commitment they demand of people. And the point of view behind it is explicitly Niebuhrian in the sense that there is a tendency toward idolatry, an idolatry of progress, or setting up man and his senses as the idol. It’s also Deweyian in its emphasis on proportionality of means and ends.” The over-riding element in terms of understanding the end-of-ideology, Bell told Dittberner, was that after World War II the feeling arose that the major enemy before society was
Stalinism. Bell believed the reports from people like David Dallin and Boris Nicolaievsky that there were fifteen million people in Soviet concentration camps. According to Bell, such information captured the focus and attention of the intellectual community’s ideas. The central fact accounting for the end-of-ideology position, Bell concluded, was “the increasing, if not complete, absorption and preoccupation of the New York intellectual world, or the Old Left intellectual world, with Stalinism.”

For the intellectual historian David Hollinger, Robert E. Lane’s 1966 essay, “The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society,” represents the purest and least ambivalent rendition of the end-of-ideology thesis. In this essay, Lane, a Yale sociologist, argued that America had become a “knowledgeable society” with distinct epistemological characteristics. This change in American “thoughtways” had led to a change in policy-making procedures. There was, Lane wrote, an increased application of scientific criteria for policy determination and a decline in political and ideological thinking.

73 Dittberner, pp. 315-316, 333-335.

Lane laid out the “thoughtways” that constituted the epistemology of the American “knowledgeable society” he was describing. The first thoughtway was that of “Anthropomorphic and analogical thinking.” In this first stage of thought people label things. They assign things to classes. The first classes of things were classes of “men,” into which they were integrated. It was because people were grouped, and thought of themselves in the form of groups, that in their ideas they grouped other things, and in the beginning the two modes of grouping were merged to the point of being indistinct. In Lane’s knowledgeable society, this way of thinking was still operative. A member of the knowledgeable society thus thinks in terms of groups. Another thoughtway characteristic of the modern American knowledgeable society was “tolerance of dissonance and ambiguity.” For Lane, members of a knowledgeable society are endowed with the capacity to tolerate ambiguity, conflict and dissonance. They are comfortable with doubts. They can hold opposing viewpoints simultaneously. In other words, the citizen of such a society is not a monist but a pluralist.\textsuperscript{75} The operation of the

\textsuperscript{75} Lane, pp. 653-654. The other thoughtways were “Differentiation of ego from inner world and from environment,” “Imagining situations contrary to fact or
knowledgeable society could be seen most clearly for Lane in policy-making where knowledge produced by social scientists was guiding policy-makers to solve social problems which were increasingly becoming technical problems of knowledge rather than political problems of value. The evidence of this was the proliferation of new scientifically-minded councils, offices, commissions, and other governmental apparatus on the federal level that informed policy-making.

The end-of-ideology thesis provoked a widespread backlash both in intellectual and student circles in the 1960s starting with C. Wright Mills’s “Letter to the New Left.” He and numerous other critics, while admitting that there had indeed been a decline in ideology, regretted its demise and questioned whether this was a desirable state of affairs. They saw a continued need for Utopian thought and rejected the end-of-ideology as a self-serving ideology of the status quo. Mills astutely identified the interplay between the epistemology and ethics of the end-of-ideology thesis. “In brief, fact and idea are isolated so the real questions are not even raised, analysis of the meanings of facts has not even

beyond experience,” “Holding simultaneously in mind various aspects of a situation,” “The reflective abstraction of common properties and the formation of hierarchic concepts,” “Employment of Objective truth criteria,” “Changed views of metaphysics and religion,” Changed philosophy of knowledge,” “From symptomatology to taxonomy to explanation,” “the contribution of the philosophy of science.”
begun.” According to Mills, academically and journalistically the end-of-ideology thesis rested on a “fetishism of empiricism and upon a cultural gossip in which ‘answers’ to the vital and pivotal issues are merely assumed.” “Thus political bias masquerades as epistemological excellence, and there are no orienting theories.”76 Mills was correct in his criticism. The end-of-ideology was the apotheosis of a non-committed scientism, or what amounted to pragmatism leached of all its passion for meaningful social reform. It was, in effect, an unthinking apologia for whatever is: a *wertlos* positivism.77

The end-of-ideology movement affected the way American identity was re-imagined as culturally plural. As we have seen, the sociologist and leading end-of-ideology thinker, Seymour Martin Lipset, defined American democracy as a multi-group society. He also drew a straight line between the end-of-ideology


ideology thesis and tolerance, a keystone of cultural pluralism. “Greater economic productivity,” he wrote, “is associated with a more equitable distribution of consumption goods and education- factors that contribute to a reduction of intra-societal tensions. As the wealth of nations increases, the status gap inherent in poor countries…is reduced. As differences in style of life are reduced, so are the tensions of stratification. And increased education enhances the propensity of different groups to “tolerate” each other, to accept the complex idea that truth and error are not necessarily on one side.”78 Toleration was an aspect of the end-of-ideology movement from its genesis in the CCF. The CCF Manifesto declared that “[f]reedom is based on the toleration of divergent opinions. The principle of toleration does not logically permit the practice of intolerance.” 79 Furthermore, one of the central tenets of the end-of-ideology was that a democrat, like a scientist, is neutral or disinterested or non-committed in their approach to problems. In fact, the anti-Communist liberals associated with the end-of-ideology movement frequently held up the scientist as a model for all


citizens in a democracy. Democratic citizens, like scientists, were free from any 
chiliastic visions of transformation. Thus the end-of-ideology proponents rejected 
the idea of a perfected final state of community and advocated the application of 
civility to social and cultural differences. A functioning democracy, such as the 
United States, with all its tensions and differences, was what amounted to the 
good society. For end-of-ideology liberals, democracy was a constellation of 
interest groups, including ethnic groups that were peacefully engaged in an 
ongoing competition while all respected the same rules of the game. The modern 
politician esteemed by the likes of Bell and Lipset was a non-committed 
individual skilled in the art of compromise between groups. The interplay 
between groups was itself the stuff of democracy.

This brings us to the developments in political science and history. The 
history of the evolution of historiography and political science theory in postwar 
America is a complex story itself. The points of interest here are where 
developments in historiography, sociology, and political science overlapped and 
were mutually influenced by the prevailing epistemological trends of the Cold 
War. The end-of-ideology movement in American sociology was but the 
disciplinary variant for what went by the name of consensus history among 
historians and “new democratic theory” among political scientists.
Until World War II, the prevailing paradigm in American historiography was progressivism in the tradition of the historians Charles and Mary Beard. After the WWII, historians abandoned progressivism and the major stream, insofar as there was one, flowed from the well of consensus. According to David Montgomery in his introduction to The Cold War and the University, Daniel Bell’s End of Ideology (1961) pitted not social classes against one another but elites with cosmopolitan outlooks against parochially-minded “publics.” This conceptual framework, Montgomery writes, was quickly adapted to the past by historians on the intellectual cutting-edge who replaced the Beardian quest for economic motives with the study of “ethno-cultural” antagonisms.80

As Dorothy Ross pointed out in her essay “Grand Narrative in American Historical Writing,” in the decade after World War II, when the country was experiencing “the American Moment” of the “American Century,” the defining characteristic of foreign evil was totalitarianism. Liberal American social

scientists were not only writing about “hard” foreign totalitarianism but were also raising alarms about “soft” domestic variants such as atomized mass society and conformity. While the United States was regarded as the polar opposite of foreign totalitarianism, the liberals’ concern for the domestic variant gave rise to the literature on the paradoxical situation wherein the United States confronted a foreign evil, was said to be its opposite, and yet that evil looked unsettlingly similar to what was going on in the United States: the irony of American history. In Ross’s view, the realization America too had a dark side that threatened a monolithic (that is totalitarian) social order created an “irony deep enough to dash romantic hopes” among American historians and left them disoriented. One token of this disorientation was the demotion of grand narrative in historical writing. In its place came analytical history. Ross astutely points out that analytical history also expressed the uncertainties of epistemological skepticism that was prevalent at the time. Subsequently, in a backlash against consensus historiography, a new form of historical writing arose in the 1960s. Social-cultural historians inspired by the New Left sought to articulate the history of the inarticulate: the working class, racial and ethnic minorities, and women. While the democratic ethos of the social-cultural historians was very much in opposition to the elitist anti-populism of the consensus school, the two groups of
antagonists shared a common preoccupation. The historians of both groups were transfixed by the totalitarian potential of American society. The social-cultural historians, however, targeted the monolithic (it was only putatively pluralistic) liberal society constructed by the consensus historians. The difference between the two turned on a question of authenticity: was the pluralism idealized within the consensus authentic or was it a false ideology? For both generations of historians, the preoccupation with totalitarianism brought forth historical writing that centered societal difference either in its liberal pluralistic form or as radical social-cultural diversity. The opposing schools thus both valued diversity even if they differed on what this meant precisely.

Notwithstanding the speculation of the political scientist Robert Dahl that with upward mobility ethnicity as a factor in American political behavior would decline after a peak and would be eventually replaced by socioeconomic interest, Dahl’s “new democratic theory” privileged the ethnic group because his method was steeped in empiricism and aimed for an accurate description political operations in the United States.81 Dahl’s approach to political science was entirely consistent with the epistemological temper of the times: he claimed to be simply

investigating “the actual facts of political life” by means of the “methods, theories, and criteria of proof ...of modern empirical science.”82 His descriptive theory centered the manifest political pluralism in the activities of interests groups, including ethnic groups, and established them as essential components of a functioning democracy. The pluralist interpretation of American politics became a corollary of the historiographical consensus and sociological end-of-ideology schools. According to the new democratic theory of American politics, within the basic non-ideological consensus of American politics, the only conflicts that could take place, were the relatively minor ones among interest groups over their marginal share of the economic pie.83 Whereas the pluralists among the political scientists of the Progressive Era, such as Arthur Bentley, implicitly criticized the interest groups of American politics, the post-WWII pluralists shifted from exposing the evils of the American system and its groups


to celebrating its virtues. Being a member of an interest group such as an ethnic
group thus became a democratic virtue.

The publication of the 1963 bestseller, Beyond the Melting Pot, by the
sociologists Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan signaled the end of the
reign of assimilationist paradigms in ethnic history and sociology in the United
States. The intense and unprecedented mixture of ethnic and religious groups
in American life and their blending into a homogenous end product, they wrote,
has “outlived its usefulness, and also its credibility.” Glazer and Moynihan
declared their epistemological orientation in the first few lines of their preface.
The melting pot, they wrote, was a “notion.” It was, in other words, nothing
more than an idea or an abstraction. In contrast to this notion, they advanced
“the persisting facts of ethnicity.” These facts “demand attention, understanding,
and accommodation.” Glazer and Moynihan wrote that the point about the
melting pot was “that it did not happen.” It was not factual. In highlighting “the
facts of ethnicity” while denying the validity of the merely notional melting pot,
Glazer and Moynihan had to conclude that New York City, the locus of their

84 By 1997 between 300000 and 400000 copies of Beyond the Melting Pot had
been sold. Herbert J. Gans, “Best-Sellers by Sociologists,” An Exploratory
Study, Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 26., No. 2 March 1997, pp. 131-135,
research, was characterized by differences. Thus when they wrote that “the essential fact of New York” is “a merchant metropolis with an extraordinarily heterogeneous population” they elided that which united New Yorkers and stressed that which differentiated them without providing a rationale for evaluating the differences as more significant than the identities.\(^85\) The city as a whole cannot be described, the sociologists wrote, “except by reference to its ethnic groups.”\(^86\) The parts determined the whole, while the whole did not generate the parts. Glazer and Moynihan acknowledged that immigrants to New York and their descendants were subject to assimilatory pressure. Language and culture, for instance, were very largely lost in the first and second generations. This was, however, not very consequential in their view. New Yorkers thought of themselves and were thought of by others as members of ethnic groups no matter how changed these groups might be from the cultures in the old country or earlier groups of immigrants. This was the basis of their claim that “[t]he ethnic group in American society became not a survival from the age of mass

\(^85\) Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1963), p. 1. Although the book dealt only with New York City, many people applied its observations and conclusions to the whole country.

\(^86\) Ibid., pp. 4-5.
immigration but a new social form.” Remarkably, the sociologists concluded that the word “American” lost its identifying power in social terms. It was not a “matter-of-course, concrete social description of a person.” “The ‘American,’ they stated, “in abstract does not exist.” As Glazer and Moynihan set out “to describe and to analyze this aspect of American reality,” they gave preference to markers of difference over synthetic judgments, and did not bother to try to gauge whether ethnic identification or differentiation was declining or growing.

As with the melting pot, the theory of the “ethnic cycle” developed by University of Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park before the Second World War was also challenged by “scientifically” oriented, anti-totalitarian academics. Park had written that “[i]n relations of race there is a cycle of events which tends everywhere to repeat itself,” consisting of stages of competition, conflict, accommodation, and ultimately assimilation. Anti-totalitarian criticism had brought ultimate ends and social scientific interpretations of phenomena as “stages” of some further development or movement of history into disrepute. The “Ethnic Cycle” theory postulated both stages and movement of history.


After 1950 some sociologists subjected the “ethnic cycle” theory to scathing critiques as a pure speculation that did not stand up to the tests of empirical sociology and the fact of cultural pluralism in the United States.89

Horace Kallen, Alain Locke, Oscar Handlin, the end-of-ideology sociologists, the consensus historians, and new democratic political theorists are linked by the motif of pluralism plus the epistemological and cognitive orientations of their ideas. The articulation of these ideas constituted historical events. The events are contiguous, so to speak, at the point of their underlying epistemological assumptions, and these assumptions were conditioned by the anxieties stimulated by totalitarianism. The cultural pluralism advanced by these public intellectual enjoyed unprecedented popularity because they contrasted it explicitly with domestic and foreign totalitarianism at a time when American society was preoccupied with the threats of hard Soviet totalitarianism abroad.

and racism at home combined with sublimated fears of totalitarianism in the soft form of conformity at home. Moreover, these individuals tied cultural pluralism to experimental science. They also positioned human difference as morally neutral fact beyond politics and their opponents as anti-scientific totalitarians. In other words, the widespread vogue among liberal Americans for cultural pluralism was underwritten by the anxieties of the Cold War and the triumphant prestige of modern science.
5. Chapter 4: Canada’s Policy of Official Multiculturalism

The Prime Minister rose in an unusually decorous House of Commons. It was 11:00 in the morning on Friday, October 8th, 1971. Maybe it was the presence of a foreign dignitary, the Malaysian leader Tun Abdul Razak, in the gallery that inspired the civility of the members of parliament that day. Or perhaps the atmosphere in the House had been conditioned by the unanimous support of all the parties for the Government’s anticipated policy announcement on Canadian culture, the house leaders having worked out the details of the proceedings beforehand. In retrospect the all-party support and the decorum is surprising.

The political and cultural climate in the country had been tempestuous. Throughout the 1960s and 70s the Canadian identity was the subject of heated intellectual and demotic debates. Even the continued existence of Canada was in question with the separatist threat in Quebec in rising.

In 1971 Pierre Elliot Trudeau was nearing the end of his first, eventful mandate as Prime Minister. He had been the dark horse candidate for the leadership of the Liberal party in 1968. Many people considered him to be arrogant, and he had the reputation of a left-wing radical. He was also a political novice. He was first elected as a member of parliament only in 1965 and had
been Justice Minister for a scant year in Mike Pearson’s cabinet when, presumptuously, he ran for the party leadership. It was a difficult and unlikely victory: Trudeau won on the fourth ballot. After the leadership race, he called an election. In the ensuing election campaign “Trudeamania” swept the land. The media and enthusiastic crowds treated him like a rock star. On the eve of the election, Trudeau won the praise of Canadian federalists for defiantly remaining on the reviewing stand at the annual St-Jean Baptiste parade in Montreal after a riot broke out and Québécois nationalists bombarded it with rocks and bottles.1 Having won the election, Trudeau promised to stem the rising tide of Quebec separatism and turn Canada into a unified, bilingual country.

During his first mandate, Trudeau pursued three major initiatives to counter Quebec separatism: official languages, constitutional reform and multiculturalism. In 1969 his government, responded to the main report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by passing the Official Languages Act. The Commission had been set up by Prime Minister Pearson in 1963 to address the rising concerns and militancy of French Canadians for recognition in Canada. It held hearings across the country and undertook a

1 The St-Jean Baptiste holiday was the national holiday of French Canadians.
massive research program on language and culture in Canada. Its main report concerned official languages, that is, French and English. Under the Official Languages Act, the French and English languages were given equal status in all federal institutions, and all federal government agencies were required to provide their services in English or French to Canadian citizens across the country. Although supported by all federal parties, the law proved to be very controversial in parts of the country where many people saw it as an unwarranted concession to French Canadian nationalism and as a discriminatory imposition on English-speakers.

The following year the country was rocked by the October Crisis when Front de la Liberation du Québec terrorists kidnapped the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal and the Quebec provincial cabinet minister Pierre Laporte. Trudeau, at the invitation of the provincial government, responded by invoking the War Measures Act - martial law – in Quebec with its extraordinary powers of arrest, detention, and censorship. The FLQ’s discreditable actions and the government’s overwhelming response effectively ended a decade-long terrorist campaign by Quebec separatists, but not before Pierre Laporte was murdered by the terrorists.
In the aftermath of the crisis, in June of 1971, Trudeau sought to bring in a new Canadian constitutional charter guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms, English and French language rights, income security for Canadians, and a constitutional amending formula at a federal-provincial meeting at Victoria, British Columbia. After a promising series of negotiations, the constitutional initiative failed.

This was the context in which Trudeau was announcing his most important cultural policy in October 1971. He began by informing the House that the Government had accepted all the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which were contained in Book IV of its reports on “The Cultural Contributions of the Other Ethnic Groups” directed to federal departments and agencies.\(^2\) Trudeau then stated that the government agreed with the Royal Commission that “although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other.”

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\(^2\) Strictly speaking this was not accurate. Trudeau’s policy statement in the house radically redirected the main thrust of Volume IV from a basic view of Canada as fundamentally bicultural to a multicultural perspective. Furthermore recommendations aimed at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Canadian Radio and Television Commission and the National Film Board for increasingly multicultural and multilingual programming were largely unheeded by the federal government.
The royal commission, however, had said nothing of the sort. Indeed, the Commission had affirmed the “fundamental duality,” that is the bicultural and binational French and English duality of Canada. Immigrants to Canada, the commissioners recommended, “should know that Canada recognizes two official languages and that it possesses two predominant cultures that have produced two societies – Francophone and Anglophone – which form two distinct communities within an overall Canadian context. Trudeau was invoking the prestige of the “fact-finding” Royal Commission and its extensive research program by claiming that his policy announcement was consistent with the commission’s report while he was actually announcing something completely different. He was effectively redefining Canada. Canada was not a country of two founding races or nations. There were no predominant cultures. “A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of

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3 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism Book IV: The Cultural Contributions of the Other Ethnic Groups. p.5
Canadians,” he declared.⁴ This, the Prime Minister announced, would be the foundation of Canadian national unity.⁵

The Leader of the Opposition, the Honourable Robert L. Stanfield, wholeheartedly endorsed the government’s policy. “What we want,” he said, “is justice for all Canadians, and recognition of the cultural diversity of this country.”⁶ Similarly the leader of the New Democratic Party, David Lewis endorsed the policy and declared Parliament “united in its belated determination

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⁴ House of Commons Debates, Official Report. Third – Session Twenty-Eighth Parliament  Volume VIII 1971, pp 8545-8554. In a May 6 2002 interview, Bernard Ostry, the Assistant Undersecretary of State in 1971 who wrote the Memorandum to Cabinet on the Multiculturalism policy said that Trudeau personally added “cultural freedom” as the goal of the multiculturalism policy to the statement. Although the term “cultural freedom” is consonant with the rhetoric of Cold War liberal groups such as the American Congress for Cultural Freedom, Ostry could not recollect its provenance in Trudeau’s usage.⁵

⁵ Indeed, the specific ways in which the government proposed to implement this policy were at least as integrationist as it was pluralist in orientation. In implementing a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, the government committed itself to four measures: first to “assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance;” second to “assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society;” third to “promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity;” and fourth to “assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada’s official languages.” Ibid., p. 8545.

⁶ Ibid. p., 8546.
to recognize the value of the many culture in our country. Even the leader of the marginal fourth party, the Créditistes, Réal Caouette agreed that there was only one Canadian nation with a “multiplicity of cultures.” The members of parliament then went on to discuss other matters. Conservative MP Steve Paproski, a future Minister of State for Multiculturalism, rose to ask Trudeau whether he would tell the House what views he would express to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin during his upcoming visit Canada on behalf of minority groups in the USSR. As Trudeau announced his multiculturalism policy, the Kosygin visit and Ukrainian Canadians were very much on his mind.

Trudeau was scheduled to address the 10th Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) the next day. Since Louis St-Laurent’s term in office in the 1950s, it had become de rigueur for Canadian prime ministers to address this triennial forum.

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7 Ibid., pp. 8547-8548. The only Canadian political party to oppose the multiculturalism policy was the Communist Party of Canada. Basing its position on Soviet nationalities policy, the CPC declared Canada to be a country of “two nations,” and urged the Quebec to apply the Leninist solution to the nationality problem in terms of an unlimited “right to national self-determination, including separation.” The CPC position is reflected in the submission to the B & B Commission by the Association of United Ukrainian Canadian (June 1964). See Bohdan Bociurkiw, “The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian Canadian Community,” in Manoly Lupul, ed., Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1978) p.106.
In the Fall of 1971 Trudeau had some big problems with the Ukrainian Canadian community. Throughout the summer Ukrainian Canadian pressure on the federal and provincial governments for multiculturalism policies had reached new heights. Over the previous decade, organizations affiliated with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (an umbrella group) taken the lead among Canadian ethnic groups in making representations to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism challenging the description of Canada as bicultural and bilingual. They campaigned for the federal and provincial governments to recognize the “Ukrainian fact” in Canada and the “multicultural reality” of the country. In 1971 their efforts were starting to pay-off as provincial governments in Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario were showing signs of moving toward adopting multicultural policies. At the same time anti-Soviet human right activism among Ukrainian Canadians was especially high. And on this file too, Trudeau was a target of their political activism. The Prime Minister had sparked unprecedented outrage among anti-Soviet émigrés in Canada during his visit to the Soviet Union in May. On that trip, Trudeau had compared the USSR to Canada’s federal system, and he refused to intervene on behalf of jailed dissidents with the Soviet authorities despite Ukrainian Canadian requests to do so. At the time, the Soviets under Brezhnev were in the midst of a neo-Stalinist
crack-down on dissidents, especially in Ukraine. Then during an interview with the CBC, Trudeau created a political firestorm when he said, “[m]y position in the Soviet Union or Canada is that anyone who breaks the law to assert his nationalism doesn’t get too much sympathy from me. I don’t particularly feel like bringing up cases which would have caused Mr. Brezhnev or Mr. Kosygin to say: “Well you know, why did you put in jail certain FLQ leaders? After all they think they are only fighting for the independence of Quebec. Our people say they are fighting for the independence of the Ukraine. Why should you put your revolutionaries in jail and we shouldn’t put ours?”

The Memorandum to Cabinet that proposed the multiculturalism policy explicitly states that one of the public relations considerations surrounding the

\[\text{\footnotesize\copyright\footnotesize\textsuperscript{8}}\] Trudeau as cited in Manoly Lupul, The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoire, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2005), p.162.

\[\text{\footnotesize\copyright\footnotescript{9}}\] In the event, the Kosygin visit was marked by unusual violence. In Ottawa mounted police charged and trampled anti-Soviet demonstrators, and while Kosygin was walking on Parliament Hill, a Hungarian Canadian lunged at him with a knife, narrowly missing his target.
policy was the Prime Minister’s scheduled address to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) in Winnipeg the next day. It was important, the Memorandum advised, that the Prime Minister become identified with cultural groups across Canada. The document also noted that Ukrainian Canadians were dissatisfied with the Royal Commission’s recommendations and that in their view the ultimate intent of the Commission was the assimilation of minority groups to either an Anglophone or Francophone melting pot. There was, in addition, extremely strong dissatisfaction registered by the Ukrainian Canadians to the fact that the Commission did not recommend federal financial support for the teaching of languages other than French and English.  

No doubt the Prime Minister and his advisors hoped that by announcing the policy at the UCC event, they could defuse or deflect the Soviet dissident issue by satisfying Ukrainian Canadian demands for a national multiculturalism policy. This was the immediate political context in which the multiculturalism policy was announced.

The origins of the policy, however, were much more complicated.

There was absolutely nothing inevitable in the declaration of the multicultural policy. In fact, there was a great deal of serendipity involved. The

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Federal Government had no obligation to respond to Book IV of the Royal Commission. Indeed, it was not at all uncommon for Canadian governments to ignore the reports of Royal Commissions if they were inconvenient. The government had already acted upon the Commission’s earlier reports when Book IV was published in October 1969. Outside certain groups of multicultural activists, mostly from the Ukrainian Canadian community, it had been forgotten by the time Trudeau responded to it two years later. Moreover, the Royal Commissioners had not even planned to issue Book IV, the Report of the Royal Commission on the Cultural Contributions of the Other Ethnic Groups. And the planned final report of the Commission on the constitutional implications of bilingualism and biculturalism never appeared as the commissioners could not come to terms. According to sociologist Jean Burnet, the principal Royal Commission researcher on ethnicity, a lot of what came to be regarded as “the holy writ of the B & B Commission happened almost by accident.”


12 Interview with Dr. Jean Burnet 2 March 2002, Toronto
Aside from the Polish Canadian Paul Wyczynski and Ukrainian Canadian J.B. Rudnickyj, most of the other commissioners were not even remotely interested in “the other ethnic groups.” Now and then, the Montreal lawyer and poet F.R. Scott, although somnolent at many hearings, would occasionally demonstrate interest and awake if the words “Chinese” or “Doukhobor”\(^\text{13}\) were mentioned.\(^\text{14}\) Commissioner Royce Frith openly stated that he was not interested in ethnicity.\(^\text{15}\) The Royal Commission’s Director of Research Michael Oliver was adamantly against the idea of policy of multiculturalism.\(^\text{16}\) Léon Dion, the Commission’s special consultant on research simply did not believe that multiculturalism, in any sense, was an important.\(^\text{17}\) Burnet reported that she enjoyed a great deal of freedom in her work on ethnicity for the Commission

\(^\text{13}\) Doukhobors are a dissident Russian Christian religious sect about two thirds of whom emigrated to Canada at the end of the nineteenth century. Clashes between a radical sub-sect and the authorities made the Doukhobors a \textit{cause célèbre} for Canadian rights activists such as Scott.

\(^\text{14}\) Interview with Dr. Jean Burnet 20 March 2002, Toronto. Sociologist Jean Burnet was the principal research of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism’s Book IV.

\(^\text{15}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{16}\) Ibid. and Interview with Dr. Michael K. Oliver, 6 November 2003, Montreal.

\(^\text{17}\) Interview with Dr. Jean Burnet 20 March 2002, Toronto.
precisely because of the disinterest of the Commissioners. Aside from Wyczynski and Rudnickij, the commissioners simply did not care. Book IV was essentially an afterthought.

There were two narratives that intersected in 1971 and resulted in the Canadian Government’s declaration that Canada was a multicultural country. First, there was the story of Ukrainian Canadian activism for multiculturalism. Then there was Pierre Elliot Trudeau, his views on the state and nationalism, and his life’s trajectory. On multiculturalism Ukrainian Canadians and Trudeau would, for a time, become unlikely allies. Trudeau hated nationalism, and for the most part the Ukrainian Canadian multicultural activists were anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists. The Ukrainian Canadians in turn despised Trudeau’s indifference to Soviet dissidents and nationality rights in the USSR. Their ability to come together on the issue of multiculturalism was facilitated by their common languages of anti-totalitarian liberal pluralism and rights-talk even when their political targets were different. In short, Trudeau advocated multiculturalism because he saw it as a way of divorcing the state from the nation and thereby undermining Quebecois nationalism which he deemed totalitarian and thereby building a liberal, united Canada. Ukrainian Canadians, with a long tradition of minority rights advocacy in North America and Europe,
joined the Canadian cultural debates to reclaim lost historical rights to Ukrainian language education in Canada, to demand recognition, and to preserve Ukrainian language and culture in Canada at a time when they were perceived to be existentially threatened in the Soviet Union. In a nutshell, Trudeau wanted multiculturalism to combat Quebecois nationalism, and Ukrainian Canadians gave him a social basis on which to establish the policy. The serendipity of these events should not, however, be confused with mere chance or contingency.

In interviews, two of the key figures in the history of the multiculturalism policy insisted that the policy was the outcome of “historical accident.” Sociologist Jean Burnet, the lead Royal Commission researcher on ethnicity and the Assistant Undersecretary of State Bernard Ostry, a historian by training, insisted that there was no “logic” or necessary connection between events leading up to the policy announcement. This is an unsatisfactory interpretation of the events. It essentially places the issue beyond historical consideration or denies any meaning to it. Burnet’s and Ostry’s interpretation says more about their view of history that it does about the history of multiculturalism in Canada. Paradoxically, it is a legacy of Cold War epistemology, of the unprecedented

18 Jean Burnet (March 2, 2002) and Bernard Ostry (May 6, 2002), both in Toronto.
mastery of empirical science, of “fact” over theory and a prioristic thought, and the refusal to judge the facts, that history can only be the history of external events or facts, contingent or unintelligible, and not the history of the thought out of which these events grew. This is reminiscent of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics in that they too viewed sensible matter as fortuitous or contingent. But for Plato and Aristotle, as for later idealists, matter was considered inferior to the regularity of form. The Cold War that gave us reinvigorated empiricism and positivism and deemed matter prior and superior to form thus helped to construct contingency as an explanation of historical change. Unfortunately, the recourse to contingency stultifies our consciousness and suppresses awareness of the highly specific philosophical bases of so much of that which is taken as granted within our culture. Burnet and Ostry were great pluralists and empiricists. Their empiricism informed their pluralism. But it also prevented them from seeing the ideological basis of multiculturalism, and predisposed

\[19\] On the legacy of positivism, see Collingwood, p. 132.

\[20\] Adorno, p. 53.
them to see its history as accidental. The policy of multiculturalism may have been unlikely, but there was certain logic, or at least a common idiom, in the stories that led to its declaration. It was the logic and language of the Cold War, in which Oneness and homogeneity were said to be totalitarian while diversity and cultural pluralism were aligned with democracy and freedom.

In 1961 roughly half a million Canadians declared themselves to be of Ukrainian “ethnic origin” on the census. Ukrainians from the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires had started emigrating to Canada at the end of the nineteenth century, mostly to settle as pioneer farmers in the Prairie West. Many originally settled in blocs where the Ukrainian language and culture were retained longer than in other, urban environments in North America. By the 1960s the Ukrainian pioneer experience on the Canadian Prairies was beginning to be mythologized in works such as Illia Kyriiak’s *Sons of the Soil*. Based on the pioneer experience, many Ukrainian Canadians were beginning to see themselves as having a role in the founding of the Prairie West. After the Second World War the Ukrainian Canadian community was reinvigorated by the arrival of tens of thousands of “Displaced Persons,” that is refugees from the Soviet

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21 Census of Canada, 1961, Cat. 92-545.
Union and Nazi Germany. This group tended to be highly politicized, anti-Soviet, and organized.

During the Cold War, the organized Ukrainian community in Canada was divided between a pro-Soviet faction grouped around the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians and a number of anti-Soviet organizations united within the framework of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. The Ukrainian Canadian Committee had been formed in 1940 at the urging of the Canadian federal government. Soon after Canada declared war on Germany, the “Nationalities Branch” of the federal Department of National War Services (DNWS), brought together several non-Communist Ukrainian organizations and encouraged them to unite for the express purposes of countering the influence of the Communist Party, then opposed to the “imperialist war.” The Nationalities Branch worked among Ukrainians and other ethnic groups in Canada to promote the Canadian war effort through enlistment and the sale of war bonds in the communities. The Canadian Polish Congress was also established with the help of the Nationalities Branch. Following several governmental reorganizations, the Nationalities Branch of the DNWS would eventually be transformed into the Multiculturalism Directorate of Heritage Canada. The institutional history of the multiculturalism bureaucracy with its origins in the Nationalities Branch and its wartime activities
to counter-Communism and enlist ethnics to fight the Nazis is consonant with the view that the history of multiculturalism is intimately linked with anti-totalitarianism.\textsuperscript{23}

Following the war, the UCC enjoyed good relations with successive federal governments as its anti-Soviet, and anti-Communist orientation fit together with the Cold War policies of the state. In terms of citizenship policy, the UCC and the government were also largely in harmony. From the end of the war and into the 1960s, the federal government promoted a policy of “integration” for new Canadians. Canadian officials in the Citizenship Branch contrasted the policy of integration with “totalitarian” methods of managing inter-group relations, and with what they saw as American-style assimilation. Canadian integration, they said “rejects assimilation but turns toward a goal that

welcomes diversity.”24 The Citizenship Branch was charged with the general goal of promoting citizenship development. Among ethnic communities it did this through immigrant reception activities, maintaining contacts with ethnic leaders, subsiding language training, monitoring the ethnic press, and by maintaining a (black) list of extreme right-wing and left-wing organizations for the purpose of limiting government and political contacts with these groups. During the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the Citizenship Branch helped to arrange public meetings, encouraged ethnic organizations to present briefs, and it provided the Commission with advice on the background and status of different groups.

Throughout the period of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism the Ukrainian Canadian community played a singular role. Had it not been for the numerous interventions of individuals and groups affiliated with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee there would have been very little debate about multiculturalism during the Commission hearings and few challenges to the view of Canada as a bicultural country with two founding

nations. There simply were no other groups as interested in advancing various multicultural issues before the Commission, and provincial and federal governments as the Ukrainian Canadians. UCC concern with multiculturalism predated the Royal Commission, and for that matter the start of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, when the 6th Ukrainian Canadian Committee Congress in 1959 passed a resolution on multiculturalism. During the 1960s, Ukrainian Canadian leaders, such as Senator Paul Yuzyk, styled the roughly one third of Canadian who were of neither British nor French heritage as the “Third Force,” and they repeatedly challenged the notion that there were two founding races or nations in Canada. In the spring of 1963, just before the election that he would lose to the Liberal Mike Pearson, Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker had appointed Paul Yuzyk to the Canadian Senate. Yuzyk was a graduate of the University of Minnesota. There he had done his dissertation in emerging field of ethnic history on the Ukrainians in Manitoba. Diefenbaker appointed Yuzyk to the Senate for the express purpose of defending the “just rights of the ethnic groups.”

Yuzyk’s maiden speech to the Senate “Canada: A Multicultural Nation” was the first detailed exposition of the argument that

multiculturalism was a demographic reality in Canada, that ethnic diversity was stable and not transient, and that this diversity should be reflected in government policy. By the time Yuzyk was delivering his first speech in the Canadian Parliament, the Royal Commission had already been convened by Pearson. In Yuzyk’s view, its focus on English-French relations with an afterthought acknowledgement of the existence of other ethnic groups threatened to seriously divide the country because it “relegated a large section of the population to second-class citizenship. All the other ethnic groups formed nearly one-third of the population and this “Third Element of Force,” as he called them, had to be officially recognized as equal partners with the British and the French. The concept of multiculturalism, Yuzyk was the first to argue, preserved the dignity of the individual and maintained “unity in continuing diversity.”

Yuzyk’s method was entirely consistent with the social scientific time. He based his argument on 1961 census statistics on the ethnic composition of the Canadian population and maintained that empirically, Canada was a country of minorities and that this “fact should not be ignored.” Although the Royal Commission officially rejected the notion that there was a Third Force, the Ukrainian

26 Ibid. 11. Yuzyk delivered his speech in English, French and Ukrainian.
Canadians ultimately succeeded in having several provinces and the federal
government officially recognize the ethnic diversity as a defining characteristic of
Canadian society.27 The political activism of several Ukrainian Canadian
community leaders in the development and dissemination of the ideas and
policy demands that eventually led to the adoption of the policy of
multiculturalism was unparalleled.28 Political scientist Bohdan Bociurkiw,
himself a leading activist for multiculturalism, attributed the leadership of the
UCC in promoting multiculturalism in Canada to several characteristics:

- the Ukrainians historical aversion to assimilation
- political causes underlying much of the Ukrainian emigration from
  Europe

27 Book IV, p. 10. (In July 1971 Ukrainian Canadians active in the provincial
election campaign succeed in having Alberta’s Social Credit government
announce a multiculturalism policy. Specifically Peter Savaryn, a key Progressive
Conservative organizer in the province had persuaded the PCs under Peter
Lougheed of the merits of a multiculturalism policy, and the Social Credit
government of Harry Strom attempted to coopt the idea to shore up its flagging
fortunes.

28 Among these community leaders were Senator Paul Yuzyk (PhD, University of
Minnesota), Political Scientist Bohdan Bociurkiw (PhD, University of Chicago),
Professor of Education Manoly Lupul (PhD, Harvard), and lawyers John Decore
and Peter Savaryn.
- a strong sense of collective ‘s ethnocultural values in Canada while these values were being suppressed in the Soviet Union
- the lasting commitment of Ukrainian churches to preserve the national cultural – linguistic heritage
- The group’s highly developed capacity for grass-roots organization
- The bloc settlement pattern of Ukrainian Canadian residence in the Prairie provinces.

To this list, I would add that many Ukrainian Canadians were familiar with European discourses of national minority rights that originated with the First World War peace treaties. Ukrainian Canadians were immigrants to Canada from the Austrian Hungarian and Russian Empires or their descendants or post-war refugees. In the Hapsburg Empire, intellectuals among the immigrants were schooled in the cultural and linguistic politics of the Hapsburg Empire, and

29 The Ukrainian Catholic Church maintained a distinct Byzantine liturgy, the use of vernacular, and the possibility of marriage for its clergy in a special “unity through diversity” arrangement with the Vatican and resisted pressures to conform with the Latin Church. The Ukrainian Church served as a model during Vatican II discussions that transformed the rest of the Church. In the 1960s, the Church was “in the catacombs” in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party having proscribed it through a forced merger with the Russian Orthodox Church.
Polish – Ukrainian battles for status and recognition within the empire. Some of these debates bore similarities to developments in Canada. The elevation of French and English Canadians as founding and principal nations resembled the Ausgleich movement in the Austria that saw the transformation of the Austrian Empire into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The prohibitions on the use of the Ukrainian language in the Russian Empire (Ems Ukaz 1876) also informed the views of Ukrainian Canadians on language and cultural rights in Canada. This prohibition was cited in memoranda to the Royal Commission. Ukrainian Canadians were also closely attuned to the post-First World War peace settlement that heralded national self-determination as a right but in which Ukrainians found themselves denied this right and stateless. They were, however, guaranteed national minority rights under the Versailles Treaty in the new Polish and Czechoslovak states. The discourses about minority rights in Europe and the growth of interwar Ukrainian nationalism were consequential for the development of multiculturalism in North America. Members of the Ukrainian communities in Canada and the United States came to see the Ukrainians in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union as minority groups with legally entrenched rights, and they made representations on their behalf to the Canadian and American governments and at international fora. The
Ukrainians in Canada also saw themselves, in the same light: as minorities whose minority rights should be recognized and entrenched in fundamental law. J.B. Rudnickyj, the Ukrainian Canadian member of the Royal Commission, wrote that non-sovereign nations or nationalities were the subjects of international law and argued that nations that lack the three element of sovereign statehood, that is, territory, people and power, could still be recognized as subjects of law if they possessed institutions that could represent them such as national committees.31 J.B Rudnickyj, who was born in Austria-Hungary, also developed the concept of “linguicide” while he was a member of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. He drew a parallel between some Canadian measures to restrict non-English language use, such as the Manitoba Act of 1890 abolishing the French – English bilingual legislature in that province, the subsequent abolition of bilingual (English-French, English-Ukrainian, and English-Polish) public schools in Manitoba in 1916 and the Russian imperial prohibition of the Ukrainian language in 1876.32


32 J. B. Rucnyckyj, *Linguicide*, 3rd edition, (Winnipeg: Ukrainina Technological University, 1976). In addition to being a member of the Royal Commission and on the faculty of the University of Manitoba, Rudnicky was an official of the
concentrations of Ukrainian Canadians there had existed publicly funded Ukrainian-English bilingual schools in the period 1897 to 1916. This was the result of the Laurier-Greenway Compromise of 1897, an agreement between the federal and provincial governments to restore some of the religious and language rights of French Canadian Catholics in the province after the abolition of separate schools in 1890. The agreement permitted instruction in a language other than English in schools where there were 10 children who spoke that language. Ukrainians in Manitoba took advantage of this provision to create Ukrainian English bilingual schools.)

As a Royal Commissioner, Rudnickyj issued a dissent from the Commission’s first report on official bilingualism, calling for instead for Canada to enact legislation recognizing Canada’s multilingual reality. He included detailed socio-linguistic maps of language groups in Canada based on census data in his “Separate Statement.” Rudnickyj had perfected the skill of making such maps in inter-war Poland while challenging the Pilsudski regime’s claims of Polish ethnic homogeneity in eastern Poland, where large concentrations of

“Ukrainian National Republic Government in Exile.” The Ukrainian – English bilingual public schools in Manitoba existed in the period 1894 to 1916 when the Laurier-Greenway Compromise was in effect.

33 Rudnickyj, A Separate Statement.
Ukrainians and Jews lived. In the Memorandum to Cabinet that supported the declaration of the multiculturalism policy, Trudeau’s close confidant Secretary of State Gerard Pelletier agreed with a March 16, 1971 letter to the Prime Minister from Rudnickyj that protested that “the legal and factual status of ‘the other ethnic languages and culture’ in Canada was an outstanding problem. In Pelletier’s opinion, “this problem was neither solved satisfactorily by the Official Languages Act of 1969, nor helped out by the delayed implementation of the recommendations of Volume IV” of the Royal Commission. The Government, therefore, had to articulate a policy that would establish the relationship of the various Canadian cultures to one another. The memorandum clearly indicates that the Government heard the Ukrainian Canadian groups that had intervened at the Royal Commission hearing to protest that a policy of biculturalism relegated non-French and non-British groups to the status of second-class citizens.34

The Ukrainian Canadian movement for the recognition of the “multicultural reality” of Canada rose in the context of the wider national debate about the nature of Canadian society. This movement was more or less

contemporaneous with the remarkable period of transformation in Quebec that would come to be known as the Quiet Revolution. Quebec society was rapidly becoming modernized and secularized, and the state in the shape of the provincial government was rapidly expanding. In the empirical idiom of the day, French Canadian nationalists were calling for the federal government to recognize the “French fact” – “le fait français” in Canada. Then in March 1963 a small group of Quebec nationalists, taking their inspiration from events in revolutionary Algeria, founded the Front de la Libération du Québec. That year the FLQ started its terrorist campaign by setting off three bombs in the affluent English Montreal neighborhood of Westmount. The bombings shocked the nationalist editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Le Devoir*. “These attacks,” he wrote in an editorial, “are claimed in the name of French Canadian nationalism: they are in fact doing the utmost to dishonor it.” To Laurendeau’s surprise the federal government of Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to address the concerns of French Canadians and appointed Laurendeau and Davidson Dunton, a former head of the CBC, as co-chairs.

The start of the Royal Commission was not auspicious. When the Royal Commission was first established by Order-In-Council, its terms of reference were to inquire into “the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races.” The mandate provoked immediate outrage. By 1963 the term “race” was already out-of-date and widely discredited in reference to national or ethnocultural groups. Jewish Canadian organizations protested the terms of reference and their phrasing. Furthermore, the terms of reference seem to delimit the possible recommendations of the Commission. To the Ukrainian Canadian Committee the terms of reference were “biased” and threaten[ed] a infringement on the democratic rights of large sections of the Canadian population.” Nor did they take account of the “Ukrainian fact” in Canada.36 The inclusion in the terms of reference of the mandate to take “into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution” smacked of tokenism. The appointment of the Polish Canadian Paul Wyzynski and Ukrainian Canadian JB.

36 UCC, Winnipeg Branch Brief to the Royal Commission, 1964.
Rudnickyj to the Commission was, however, viewed favorably by the UCC. The mandate did, however, give the UCC the opening to argue that Canada was in fact multicultural and multilingual not bicultural and bilingual at hearings designed to document “cultural contributions.”

As soon as it started to hold public hearings the Commission was inundated by briefs from Ukrainian Canadian organizations. These briefs described Canada as empirically “multicultural.” Aside from Ukrainian Canadian groups, there was surprisingly little interest from among other ethnic groups in challenging the view of Canada as fundamentally bicultural or binational. For example, in a brief to the Commission a Greek Canadian organization “recognize[d] the basic bilingual and bicultural character of the Confederation.” A Belorusian spokesperson declared that “it is an accepted fact that in Canada there are two main cultures, English and French.” The Canadian Hungarian Federation declared before the Royal Commission, that the “overwhelming majority of Hungarians in Canada do not consider themselves

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37 UCC Headquarter Brief to the RCBB October 1, 1964.
38 Brief to the R.C.B.B. of the Hellenic Canadian Society of University Graduates, 740-264
39 Brief to the RCBB by A Hrycuk, 750-506.
competent to intervene in the controversies between English and French Canadians.” The Polish Alliance of Canada, the National Japanese Canadian Citizen’s Association, and Mennonite organizations did, however, urge the Royal Commission to recognize the ethnic diversity of Canada. The Canadian Jewish Congress expressed its views about the Royal Commission in a number of fora but never submitted a formal brief because it disagreed with the Commission’s approach and mandate. The exclusion of “Indians and Eskimos,” as First Nations were then called, from the terms of reference and the activities of the Commission elicited only muted comments from a few individuals.

Ukrainian Canadian groups led the opposition to the Royal Commission’s terms of reference and to the idea that Canada was bilingual and bicultural. They submitted thirty-seven briefs to the Commission, the largest number from any

40 Brief to the RCBB Canadian Hungarian Federation 6 75-528.
41 Briefs to the RCBB, Polish Alliance of Canada, 75-472; The National Japanese Canadian Citizen’s Association, March 1965 75-534; Mennonite Society for the Promotion of the German Language in Canada 760-604.

42 John Jaworsky, A Case Study of the Canadian Federal Government’s Multicultural Policy. MA thesis, Carleton University 1979, p. 49. In a May 6 2002 interview, Bernard Ostry, the Undersecretary of State in 1971 who wrote the Memorandum to Cabinet on the Multiculturalism policy, said that the CJC was opposed to the policy in 1971, and that it took Ostry’s personal intervention and reassurance to the CJC to convince the group to acquiesce to the policy.
non-English, non-French community. Some of the common points in these representations were:

- Empirically ("actually," "in fact," "in reality") Canada is multicultural not bicultural and multilingual not bilingual in that other than English and French are spoken. These arguments were based on census data.
- Cultural pluralism guarantees freedom and democracy while homogeneous systems are totalitarian.
- In a united Canada, Canadians should enjoy equality in political and socio-economic rights regardless of their ethnic origin, religion, mother tongue.
- All ethnic groups contribute to the Canadian cultural mosaic and their cultural activities should be given moral and material support by the state in proportion to the group’s willingness to survive.
- Within the linguistic provisions of the Canadian constitution, English should be the *lingua franca* of all Canadians but the teaching and social use of other languages, including Ukrainian, should be encouraged and supported from public funds wherever there is effective demand from Canadian citizens.
• Publicly supported media should devote appropriate time and resources to ethnic language programs and to the culture and art of minority groups.

• All levels of government should actively combat discrimination and prejudice directed against minorities.

• Many briefs referred to the role of Ukrainian settlers on the prairies as pioneers who were just as much “founders” of Canada as the British or the French.43

Co-chair Andre Laurendeau was said to have been profoundly disturbed by the Ukrainian Canadian submissions to the Royal Commission.44 Some groups insisted on making their presentations in Ukrainian with simultaneous translation. Sessions were stormy. Laurendeau had simply not expected to encounter large numbers of articulate, forceful Canadians, frequently lawyers and academics, demanding recognition and legal rights for groups other than the French. What made the Ukrainian Canadian interventions problematic for those who conceived of Canada as consisting of two nations, was that they were

43 Bociurkiw, p. 102-103.

44 Interview with Jean Burnet March 20, 2002.
delivered in the liberal pluralistic and social scientific idiom of the day. Given the prevalent Cold War episteme, this made them very difficult to counter.

A good example of the anti-totalitarian pluralistic language used in the Ukrainian Canadian submissions to the Royal Commission can be found in the document prepared by the Edmonton Branch of the UCC and presented to the Commission on December 7, 1965. The brief argued that the principal questions before the Commission concerned “human relations in a free society, and involve[d] civil liberties and fundamental human freedoms.” The UCC also sought to ensure the preservation of “equality of opportunity” irrespective of racial origin, cultural background, mother tongue, or time of arrival in Canada. The surest way to attain these goals and to maintain Canadian unity was to ensure that Canadian society was based on “democratic pluralism.” The pluralism envisioned by the Ukrainian group entailed official recognition of the

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45 The brief was originally outlined by Bohdan Bociurkiw (1925-1998), a political scientist with a PhD from the University of Chicago who specialized in Soviet Religious and Nationalities policy, human rights and dissent in the USSR. During the Second World War he was imprisoned and tortured by the Gestapo for his activities in the Ukrainian national liberation movement and was sent to the Flossenburg concentration camp in Germany. He served as founding director of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies. I was his research assistant in the summer of 1989. The final brief was developed by Bociurkiw, Manoly Lupul, Peter Savaryn, and Michael Luchkovich, See Lupul, p. 5156
presence of Ukrainians in Canada, public funding for Ukrainian Canadian
cultural and artistic programming and institutions, Ukrainian language
instruction in public schools whenever requested by parents and numbers
warranted, Ukrainian language and Ukrainian studies programs in universities,
Ukrainian teacher training programs, the inclusion of multicultural materials in
school texts, and multicultural public broadcasting. The brief repeated objections
to the Commission’s terms of reference, saying that they reduced Canadians who
were not of British or French heritage to the status of second-class citizens. The
document stressed “the fact of multiculturalism,” and relied heavily on census
statistics. The UCC acknowledged that the British and French had “historical
rights” in Canada, but argued that these had to be balanced against universal
democratic rights of all citizens to recognition and equality. The UCC then
grounded its position in contemporary North American anti-totalitarian liberal
terms. The brief provides a good example of the contemporary rhetorical and
epistemological tendency to equate cultural pluralism with “facts” or “reality”
and to contrast these with cultural monism and totalitarianism. “Some
individuals,” the brief argued, were “wedded to the traditional West European
model of a culturally homogenous nation-state tend to deplore the multi-cultural
features of our country as detrimental to national unity and power.”

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Their resentment apparently stems from and unrealistic attempt to project automatically the continental modes (whose alleged cultural homogeneity is frequently an ideological construct rather than verifiable reality) to a rather different situation of a “nation of immigrants and their descendants. Cultural pluralism and Canadian unity are not antagonistic goals as long as both are conceived in the context of democratic freedoms which, it deserves to be emphasized must also include cultural freedom. To be sure, a monolithic, homogenous, single-loyalty social system may be aspired to and indeed has been attempted by some modern totalitarian regimes. Indeed such regimes have at least created a façade of monolithic internal unity and through regimentation have on occasion maximized their political power. But it must be remembered that these achievements have been bought at the price of cultural strangulation and suppression of fundamental democratic freedoms and human rights. To these methods of attaining national unity and power we counterpoise the type of unity that comes through partnership in the enjoyment of freedom and fundamental equality, and power grows from the solidarity of free men and groups appreciative of the political, legal and social guarantees which allow them to develop their potentialities freely, to worship, and to create, to participate in the common weal as citizens showing not only equal duties but also equal rights under a democratically elected government in common allegiance to law.

The UCC also raised the possibility of, but rejected, affirmative action as a remedy to redress the absence of Ukrainian Canadians on various boards, including the boards of governors at Canadian universities. The brief referred to Oscar Handlin’s history of immigration to the United States and concluded that the government should promote “unity in diversity” through programs of integration that would ensure the freedom of individuals for cultural expression.
while allowing for full participation in society and the dissipation of inter-group antagonism.\textsuperscript{46}

A Ukrainian Catholic teachers’ organization argued that Ukrainian was, in fact, a Canadian language, and that the Laurier-Greenway Agreement of 1897 established a precedent for Ukrainian-English public schools. They maintained that the existence of Ukrainian speakers falsified the idea that all Canadians could be categorized into English or French-speaking groups. This, they argued, simply did not correspond with the facts. In their view, such “false categorization” smacked of “totalitarianism and of subtle, non-violent genocide.” The group opposed what it saw as the establishment of French and English “master races” in Canada.\textsuperscript{47}

The brief from the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada challenged a Royal Commission working paper which counted members of ethnic groups in Canada on the basis of mother-tongue instead of ethnic origin. Using the census figures for “ethnic origin” the League accused the Royal Commission of undercounting ethnics and concluded that “the fact remains that there are a

\textsuperscript{46} UCC Edmonton Branch Brief to the RCBB Box 18 780-818, July 1964.
\textsuperscript{47} Markian Sashkevich Society of Ukrainian Catholic Teachers Brief to the RCBB, August 24, 1964, 760-631.
significant number of people in Canada who feel themselves completely
Canadian but do not want to and see no reason why they should try and pass
themselves off as English or French.” The Canadian “reality” could only be
described as “multi-cultural.” The insistence upon an equal partnership between
only the English and French in Canada without equal recognition of other
groups was contrary to the principles of equality and constitutional democracy.
The state was not entitled to impose its concept of the good life or culture on
citizens. In a democracy citizens were free to choose their own ideals and culture.
Imposing any other cultural dicta such as assimilation to the English or French
groups was, according to the Self-Reliance League, a move from democracy to
authoritarianism. The group would, however, acquiesce in recognizing official
status for the English and French languages.48

Some groups maintained that cultural pluralism would distinguish
Canada internationally and meet foreign threats. The Ukrainian Canadian
Veterans’ Association, for instance, argued that the plurality of languages and
cultures in Canada was a great asset to Canada in the two world wars and that
cultural pluralism could be expanded and exploited in advancing Canada’s

48 Dominion Executive of the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada Brief to
the RCBB, August 1 1965 750-546

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interests in international affairs. The Shevchenko Scientific Society suggested that government support for Ukrainian cultural activities would enhance Canada’s international image as a dynamic, modern democracy without discrimination. It would also help displace subversive Soviet programs designed to appeal to diasporic communities in Canada. The promotion of Ukrainian culture and studies in Canada would be an effective response to Communist subversion. The Ukrainian Orthodox St. John’s Institute in Edmonton, on the other hand, argued that multiculturalism would “decelerate the process of the Americanization of Canadian culture.” The Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Club of Regina compared the “two founding nations” concept of Canada to the Soviet nationalities policy wherein the Russians were elevated to the status of “elder brothers.”

There were two other events in the genesis of the multiculturalism policy in which Ukrainian Canadians played an important role. In 1968, Senator Yuzyk

49 Ukrainian Canadian Veterans’ Association Brief to the RCBB 740-290 1964
50 Shevchenko Scientific Society Brief to the RCBB 740-229
51 St. John’s Institute Brief to the RCBB, 780-810
52 Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Club of Regina Brief to the RCBB, 77—704 July 15 1964.
organized a “Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights.” The Toronto conference “unequivocally rejected the concept of biculturalism” as incompatible with the ideal of the “just society” then being promoted by Trudeau and called for the government’s “official recognition of the multicultural character of Canada.” For the conference, the Ukrainian Canadian organizers brought in nineteen prominent leaders of other ethnocultural groups. Then in 1970 the Ukrainian Canadian Students Union mounted a concerted campaign to mobilize grassroots support for a federal policy of multiculturalism, especially targeting second and third generation Ukrainian Canadians. With funding from the federal government’s Department of Secretary of State, the group hired field workers and animators in different communities across Canada and organized a series of multicultural conferences on university campuses that helped focus public attention on the demand for governmental recognition of ethnic groups and their cultural and linguistic rights.

The Ukrainian Canadian interventions before the Royal Commission were well-crafted, steeped in census-based empiricism, founded on Canadian

53 Bociurkiw, p. 104.
54 Ibid. p. 108.
immigration and legal history, and cogently argued in terms of theories of democracy and pluralism. It was hard to argue with them on their own terms. But they were easy to ignore. So too were the resolutions of the Thinkers’ Conference and the agitation of the Ukrainian Canadian students. And for the most part, the Royal Commission and most politicians either ignored or dismissed the Ukrainian Canadian interventions. Thus Book IV of the Royal Commission affirmed the “fundamental duality of Canada” and dismissively reported that the ‘third force’ “does not exist in Canada in any political sense.”

The advocates for a multicultural Canada needed a powerful ally, and they found one in Trudeau.

Long before he entered electoral politics, Pierre Elliot Trudeau was an supporter of multiculturalism. This can be seen in his social criticism on the pages of the leading Cité Libre, the journal he founded in 1950. Trudeau’s political philosophy was profoundly influenced by his extensive travels around the world and especially by his postgraduate studies at Harvard and the London School of Economics, and by the personalism of the French Catholic intellectuals

55 Book IV, p. 10.
Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain. In his graduate studies and travels he imbibed the prevailing trends in social science and theory of the late 1940s, and these trends are clearly reflected in his social thought on the nation-state, nationalism, “polyethnicity” and multiculturalism in Cité Libre and in his Government’s policies. Trudeau’s thought is but one example, albeit an especially important example, of how the social scientific and theoretical trends of the Cold War period were directly implicated in the post war enlargement of ethnos-centred discourse and the rise of multiculturalism.

Before entering electoral politics, Trudeau wrote about the imperative of making Canada “a truly pluralistic and polyethnic society.” He was, in the ideas he expressed in his essays, a quintessential Cold War intellectual. This image might strike some people as implausible. Trudeau, after all, is better

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56Trudeau obtained a Masters degree in Political Economy at Harvard (1944-1946). There he studied with some of the greatest social theorists of the day, including the constitutional scholar and theorist of totalitarianism, Carl J. Friedrich, the Sovietologist Merle Fainsod, and the economists Joseph A. Schumpeter and Wassily Leontief. Subsequently, Trudeau attended the Ecole des Sciences Politiques and the Sorbonne in Paris, and then studied under the direct tutelage of Harold Laski at the LSE.

57Pierre Elliot Trudeau,”La nouvelle trahison des cleris [sic],” Cité Libre, XIIe année, No. 46, April, 1962, p. 11.
remembered in the context of the Cold War for his early and controversial travels to the Soviet Union and the Peoples’ Republic of China. He established diplomatic relations with Communist China before Nixon did. He was accused of being a communist by conservatives and clerics in Quebec and was, for a time blacklisted from entering the United States. As Prime Minister he like to quote Khrushchev and Lenin and professed a warm friendship with Castro. These things hardly seem to qualify him as any kind of Cold Warrior. But by calling him a quintessential Cold War intellectual, I am referring to his social thought, lucidly spelled out in his essays in *Cité Libre* and other journals. These essays reflected the anti-totalitarian, empiricist social science typical of North American Cold War intellectuals of the late 1940s and 1950s.

To understand Trudeau’s multiculturalism, we must identify the moment of negation within it. We need to know what it was directed against. In the foreword to his collection of essays entitled *Federalism and the French Canadians*, Trudeau struck the keynotes of Cold War end-of-ideology social theory. “I realized early,” he wrote, “that ideological systems are the true enemies of

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58 Adorno, p. 51.
freedom.” Speaking in Winnipeg in 1968, Trudeau declared himself to be “a pragmatist.” “I try to find the solution for the present situation,” he said, “and I do not feel myself bound by any doctrines or any rigid approaches to any of these problems.” In these statements Trudeau reflected the antipathy of his Harvard instructors Friedrich and Schumpeter for ideology and doctrinaire thinking, the political bogies of the early Cold War. This was not a newly adopted position of someone stumping in the political center. It was entirely consistent with Trudeau’s educational experiences in the late 1940s, his earliest writings in *Cité Libre*, and his research into Communist subversion as a young civil servant at the Privy Council Office (PCO) in Ottawa.

Trudeau spent the years 1944-46 as a graduate student at Harvard. There he took courses with the theorist of totalitarianism Carl Friedrich and the economist Joseph Schumpeter. Friedrich’s ideas about constitutional


democracy, totalitarianism, and the need for liberal democracies to retain emergency powers to counter threat to the security of the state profoundly influenced Trudeau when as a civil servant at the PCO in the early 1950s, he examined the question of whether the Communist Party of Canada should be banned. The limits of democratic constitutionalism were again on his mind in 1970 when he declared martial law in Quebec during the FLQ Crisis. After obtaining a masters degree at Harvard, Trudeau traveled to France where he studied at the Sorbonne. In Paris he and his close friend and political ally Gerard Pelletier met Emmanuel Mounier the left-Catholic editor of the journal Esprit. Mournier and the theologian Jacques Maritain were both at the time advancing the anti-totalitarian doctrines of personalism and pluralism in a Catholic context.

62 The National Archives of Canada file C-22-1 “Communism – Handling of Communists, 1951 in RG 2 Vol. 139 contains drafts of a manuscript in Trudeau’s hand and a typescript on a “Possible Statement on communism in Canada that reviews Communist “subversion” and the threat to Canadian security posed by Communism. Trudeau, echoing Carl Friedrich’s views, muses on the possibility of curtailing basic liberties in times of temporary and extreme danger to the nation, including the use of censorship and internment, but comes out ultimately against the option of outlawing the Communist Party in Canada because it is impossible as a practical measure to make illegal a state of mind and because it would drive the party underground making it harder to deal with.
The journal that Trudeau would found a few years later in Montreal, *Cité Libre* was said to be the Canadian *Esprit*.63

From France Trudeau went to study at the London School of Economics under the personal tutelage of Harold Laks. Of Laski, Trudeau said that he had the most stimulating and powerful influence on him.64 It was at the LSE that he first became enthused with the British writer, Lord Acton. According to the historian and Trudeau confidant, Ramsay Cook, Trudeau had become by 1965 a proponent of Actonian ethnic pluralism as the soundest basis for a liberal democracy. In his essay “Nationality,” Acton had written that “Liberty provokes diversity and diversity preserves liberty by supplying the means of organization...[t]he co-existence of several nations under the same state is a test as well as the best security of its freedom.”65 Nationalism based on ethnic homogeneity was its antithesis for Trudeau. It was negative and bound to stifle


64 Sommerville, p. 28.

all social reform. Trudeau’s ideal was a state in which ethnic distinctions balanced one another and were accepted as positive virtues. “It was not the idea of nation that is retrograde,” Trudeau once said, “it is the idea that the nation must necessarily be sovereign.” This ideal stood at the heart of Trudeau’s political ideas and was the basis for his vision of Canada.66

In 1950, in the first issue of the journal, Trudeau’s essay entitled “Politique fonctionnelle” presented an anti-totalitarian, empiricist worldview that would underpin his polemical writing and his style of government until the early 1970s. “From inception, no position should be considered as given, our principles should be interpreted carefully before each new fact,” he wrote in the essay.67 In the second installment of the piece, Trudeau demonstrated the skepticism typical of Cold War intellectuals when he wrote that “Can we understand in the end that

66 Ramsay Cook, “I never thought I could be so proud : The Trudeau –Levesque Debate,” in Cook, Canada , Quebec and the Uses of Nationalism, (Toronto:McClelland & Stewart, 1995,” pp. 147; Trudeau as cited by Cook, Ibid., p. 137. In my assessment, the Cold War revival of Acton with Gertrude Himmelfarb’s 1952 biography (Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952) was consonant with the anti-absolutist, anti-totalitarian temper of the times.
a functional politics must in the first instance abolish preconceived ideas.”68
Specifically, Trudeau wanted “to submit to systematic skepticism our
[Quebecers’] first article of faith: provincial autonomy.”69 Later he was to write
that provincial autonomy “had been magnified into an absolute” by the
government and public opinion in Quebec, and like all Cold War intellectuals,
Trudeau despised absolutist thinking.70 Trudeau’s empiricism and insistence on
induction is also seen in his essay “Quebec and the Constitutional Problem,” in
which he declared “the first law of politics is to start from given facts.”71 He
would return to the theme of political functionalism repeatedly in his career as a
writer and a politician, forming a ‘Committee for Political Functionalism’ in 1964
and issuing a manifesto in Cité Libre in that year (“Manifest pour une politique
fonctionnelle”), and then, once in government, having Michael Pitfield, his Clerk
of the Privy Council, organize Privy Council seminars on the meaning of

68 Pierre Elliot Trudeau “Politique fonctionnelle - II,” Cité Libre, Volume 1, number 2,
69 Ibid.
70 Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, p. xix.
71 Ibid. p. 8.
In essence, political functionalism for Trudeau referred to an insistence on empiricism in politics, the rejection of dogma or ideology, and a predisposition to address each problem on the basis of the facts pertinent to the case. Trudeau also adopted another social scientific catchword of the Cold War: “realism.” Realism or “objective analyses of reality” was contrasted with “racial appeals” and “nationalist ideologies.”

It was in his fierce polemics with Quebec nationalists that Trudeau’s empiricist, anti-ideological, anti-totalitarian worldview was most pronounced. One essay in particular, “La nouvelle trahison des clercs” (“The New Treason of the Intellectuals”), stands out. Taking the title from Julien Benda’s 1921 polemic against the crass nationalism of French and German intellectuals, Trudeau took aim at the concept of the nation-state, that is, the idea that the nation in a sociological or ethnological sense, which he accepted as factual, must be


74Pierre Elliot Trudeau, “La nouvelle trahison des clercs [sic],” Cité Libre, XIIe année, No. 46, April, 1962.
sovereign. For Trudeau the nation-state as opposed to the nation had never been an empirical reality. To prove this, he went to great lengths to point out the factual polyethnicity of several newly independent states that emerged from colonial status in the postwar period. For him, the nation-state was “a concept that corrupts all,” and he evoked memories of the war and totalitarian horrors to press his point: “in peace time the intellectuals become propagandists for the nation and the propaganda is a lie; in war time the democracies slither toward dictatorship and the dictatorships herd us into concentration camps; and finally after the massacres of Ethiopia come those of London and Hamburg, then of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and perhaps more and more until the final massacre.” He referred to the territorial ambitions of Hitler and Mussolini in order to raise the prospect of Québécois irredentism having designs upon French Canadian populated territories in Ontario, New Brunswick, Labrador and New England. Trudeau disparaged the “Separatists of 1962” writing that he has “almost always been astounded by the totalitarian spirit of some, the

76 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, “*La nouvelle trahison des clers* [sic],” *Cité Libre*, XIIe année, No. 46, April, 1962. p.6.
77 Ibid. p. 6.
antisemitism of others...”78 Summing up, he wrote that “the nationalists - even those on the left - are politically reactionary because, in attaching such importance to the idea of nation, they are infallibly led to a definition of the common good as a function of an ethnic group, rather than of all citizens, regardless of characteristics. This is why a nationalist government is by nature intolerant, discriminatory and in the final analysis totalitarian.”79 Equating nationalism with totalitarianism was not merely a rhetorical device for Trudeau. He believed, from the core of his philosophy, that nationalism was a species of totalitarian ideology that must be opposed by systematic skepticism, recourse to the facts, functional politics and realism. Trudeau’s answer to the problem of preserving the values of French Canadians without resorting to the “absurd and retrograde idea of national sovereignty” was to “divorce the concepts of state and nation and to make of Canada a truly pluralistic and polyethnic society.”80 Multiculturalism was the answer to the threat of totalitarianism. If French and English Canadians “collaborate in the hub of a truly pluralistic state, Canada

78Ibid. p.10.
79Ibid. p.11.
80Ibid. p.15.
could become the envied seat of a form of federalism that belongs to tomorrow’s world. Better than the American melting-pot, Canada could offer an example to all those new Asian and African states...it could become a brilliant prototype for the moulding of tomorrow’s civilization.”

While Trudeau remained a public intellectual, these views went largely unnoticed outside the hard-core of Quebec nationalists. It took Trudeau’s ascent to the pinnacle of political power in Canada and the fortuitous opportunity to respond to the Royal Commission report on ethnic groups, and the existence of a social base among Ukrainian Canadians for an official policy of multiculturalism to bring the vision of Canada as a multicultural society to the center of Canadian identity politics. Toward the end of his life, Trudeau reflected upon his years as prime minister and disputed the notion that the multiculturalism policy was a ploy merely to undermine the two nations view of Canada or a way of getting the immigrant vote or an instrument for collective rights. Rather, he described it

81Ibid. pp.15-16.
as one of the keys to social tolerance, democratic pluralism and personal growth.\textsuperscript{82}

Ultimately, the Multiculturalism Policy was enshrined in the Canadian Constitution in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 and then in the Multiculturalism Act of 1988 brought in by the Government of Brian Mulroney. The policy and the subsequently the administration of the Act, however, remained extremely controversial, including among putative supporters. Among the problems was the sumptuary fashion in which the policy was administered over the years. In the first instance the billions of dollars allocated to French and English language programs and minority groups dwarfed the money available for “multicultural” groups. In terms of funding rather than in declaratory terms, the country was certainly still not only officially bilingual but bicultural. And within the multicultural bureaucracy, the assessment criteria used over the years to determine who got money essentially constituted a sumptuary regime under which initiatives that satisfied internally set priorities were allocated funds. According to officials of the Program, scarce resources necessitated prioritization. The administration of the Multiculturalism Program in effect evoked a state that

\textsuperscript{82} Pierre Elliot Trudeau, avec la collaboration de Ron Graham, \textit{Trudeau: L’essentiel de sa pensée politique} (Montreal: Le Jour, 1998).
may be characterized as Baconian or technological in contradistinction to a state characterized by rule of law. This kind of state is understood as an association of enterprising personae joined in the pursuit of a common substantive purpose for the well-being of those bound by association in the state and where the office of its government is a technocracy which sees itself as the ‘enlightened’ custodian and director of this enterprise. In such a state the laws are viewed as the authorization of practices and as instruments for determining priorities and perhaps for distributing the product of the enterprise. Such a state is also know as a Leistungstaat or more generally as a Polizeistaat. The Polizeistaat is rationally regulated, not devoid of law, but ruled by a sumptuary policy devised and enforced by administrators, agencies and regulatory commissions.\footnote{Michael Oakshott, “The Rule of Law,” in Oakshott, \textit{On History} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 153.} The Multiculturalism Program as an office of the Government of Canada should have been a manifestation of a different kind of state - the state characterized by rule of law, in which the dominant concern should not have been narrowly sumptuary but guided by law, the authority of which lies in justice. And justice should not be mistaken for ‘fairness’ in the distribution of scarce resources as
Rawls or Ackerman have it, but as the obligation of all those governed by law to observe in their conduct the moral and procedural conditions (that is non-instrumental conditions) prescribed by Parliament. In one and apparently only one concession to the rule of law, the Multiculturalism Program has had as one of its four Program Objectives the objective of encouraging and assisting in the development of inclusive policies, programs, and practices within federal departments and agencies so that they may meet their obligations under the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. Elsewhere the Program is silent on the legal obligations imposed by the Act and the multiculturalism policy. The power to enforce subscription to the obligations under the Multiculturalism Act lies ultimately and entirely in the disposition of those persons under the law to observe them, not in sanctions but strictly in the recognition of the law and Parliament by individuals. The point is that after all that trouble, the efforts of Ukrainian Canadian activists, the whole Royal Commission episode, the political theory and policy of Pierre Trudeau, the great efforts to have multiculturalism enshrined in the Constitution and to have the Multiculturalism Act passed, the policy and the law have been and continue to be ignored by the state.
All identities are formed through differentiation. During the Cold War, an imagined totalitarianism, with the Soviet Union as the principal totalitarian system, served as the alterity against which Canadians and American imagined their nations. Canadians and Americans constructed their identities in contrast to a common enemy. The identities thus created were similar. There was a rapprochement in the ways Canadians and Americans thought about the good society: in both countries, cultural pluralism and diversity came to be valued as they were contrasted to the putative homogeneity of totalitarianism. Soft versions of domestic totalitarianism, such as mass society and conformity, similarly prompted intellectuals in both countries to idealize diversity and pluralism, including immigrants and ethnic groups. The epistemological trends associated with anti-totalitarianism, such the move from normative to descriptive theory in the social sciences and the fetishization of fact also had the effect of foregrounding societal difference. In this context, responses to the anxieties over totalitarianism in both countries represent a point of identity: Canada and the
United States were each imagined as inherently plural and diverse; and diversity thus came to be a basis for national identity in each country.

There is a relationship between broad epistemological and social scientific genealogical trends and the ways in which people construct collective identities. In examining the period of the Cold War, it is very difficult to parse what were distinctly Canadian versus distinctly American trends in these regards. Much of the literature on totalitarianism that was influential in both countries, such as works by Arendt, Freidrich, Orwell, Popper, von Hayek, was produced by Europeans and consumed by both Canadians and Americans. Canadian intellectuals who engaged with either the problem of totalitarianism or ethnicity were frequently graduates of American universities, and at least one of the leading American theoreticians of totalitarianism, Brzezinski, was a graduate of a Canadian university.¹ In effect, the continuity of divergent and heterogeneous

¹ For example, Pierre Elliot Trudeau (Harvard); Jean Burnet, the sociologist specializing in ethnicity for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (University of Chicago); Senator Paul Yuzyk (University of Minnesota); Manoly Lupul, a leading figure in the Ukrainian Canadian Committee submission to the Royal Commission and the movement to include multiculturalism in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (Harvard); Bohdan Bociukiw (University of Chicago). Zbigniew Bzrezinski is a graduate of McGill University. Lupul cited John Dewey as a profound influence on his thinking about education and Oscar Handlin as an influence on his views of immigration
tensions that I designate liberal anti-totalitarianism was a continuity that spanned North America. In both countries the idealization of diversity and varieties of cultural pluralism were in ascendancy in the late 1960s. The Canadian the federal government adopted an official policy of multiculturalism in 1971. In the United States, as the sociologist Nathan Glazer wrote, by the late 1960s no one questioned that cultural pluralism was the correct path.\textsuperscript{2} The similarities between the two countries are also based on the fact that in each country there were certain individuals who professed ideas about national unity (identity) that presupposed diversity and people who advocated ideas about cultural pluralism and diversity that presupposed certain levels of unity. There were assimilationist or integrationist impulses among the cultural pluralists and acceptable types of diversity among assimilationists.\textsuperscript{3} People can value diversity and ethnicity. Jacques Maritain taught in both countries. So did the sociologist and theoretician of pluralism Robert MacIver.


\textsuperscript{3} Once you move from an understanding, in a Kantian sense, of society as diverse, plural or multicultural to the reasoning that society is diverse, plural or multicultural, you establish a goal or teleos that society is this, and diversity, pluralism or multiculturalism cease to be purely descriptive understandings and become rationalistic policies or ideologies. In other words the Many become the
or unity or both at the same time. For instance, two senior bureaucrats charged with implementing the Canadian multiculturalism policy saw it principally as an instrument of promoting national unity and the integration of Canadians and immigrants to a cohesive Canadian citizenship. If Canada and the United States had similar experiences during the Cold War, what then distinguished Canada and the United States of America in terms of national identities?

One. An analogous situation obtains when for example atheism is not merely half to be an empirical understanding of the world or a skeptical attitude toward religious belief but becomes a doctrine of belief itself: a belief in non-belief. When diversity, which in the first instance was an empirical understanding of difference, is transposed into a belief in an ideal society, it assumes a radically different character as a rationalistic program. It is a shift from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought’. This is the character of political and cultural history of the Cold War in North America. Anti-totalitarianism, the ideas of Nazi Germany and the USSR led North American intellectuals to understand their society as plural, diverse and multicultural, and antithetical to the totalitarian systems. But implicit in this view was the reasoning that democratic societies should be understood this way. The extent to which the reasoning superseded the understanding or the ideal of diversity superseded the description of diversity was the extent to which anti-ideology, anti-rationalism become themselves ideological and rationalistic. This history, not often perceived or understood, accounts for the broad appeal of the policies of multiculturalism or diversity. They can appeal to positivists, empiricists, or idealists. They can appeal to conservatives or liberals. They can appeal to people who want to preserve cultural differences or to those who see one nation indivisible with no differences.

There is one statistic that could conceivably help to explain the institutionalization of multiculturalism in Canada and the absence of a comparable development on the federal level in the United States. From the 1950s to the mid 1970s, measured in absolute numbers, roughly half as many immigrants came to Canada as to the United States, even though Canada’s population was only a tenth of that of the United States. Since 1951 the proportion of immigrants relative to Canada’s population has been about 16% while in the USA the figure has been about 4.7%. The significant differences, however, can be located not simply in whether one or the other country had more or less immigrants, but in how liberal anti-totalitarianism and the very similar epistemological, social scientific trends were transposed or refracted in differing institutional, political, intellectual, and cultural contexts.

Pre-existing differences between Canada and the United States persisted or, more precisely, were transformed in the Cold War period. That Canada is a monarchy with responsible government and that the United States is a republic mattered to the popular reception and the institutionalization of

5 Tamara Palmer Seiler, Melting Pot and Mosaic: Images and Realities, in David M. Thomas, Canada and the United States: Differences that Count (Broadview Press, 2000), seventh page.
multiculturalism on the federal and provincial levels in Canada and the absence of a similar development in American public policy. The existence of royal commissions in Canada mattered. The history of French – English relations in Canada mattered and the contemporaneous national debate about the recognition of French Canadian in Canada mattered. Religious differences between Canada and the United States mattered. The legacy of African slavery and the Civil Rights movement in the United States mattered. The history of the construction of Canadian identity in contrast (alterity) to the United States mattered. In this chapter, I present an interpretive essay that explores some of these differences and how they affected the reception of pan-North American liberal anti-totalitarianism. The self-images discussed here are neither validated nor disputed. They are, however, germane to the ways in which Canada and the United States have been imagined.

In *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada*, the American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, examined the organizing principles, basic beliefs about authority and values, and the
conceptions Canadians and Americans have of themselves. In this chapter I elaborate on the widely held and oft-repeated argument advanced by Lipset that the political genesis of the Canada and the United States determined once and for all the political culture of these societies. Using a “revolution/counter-revolution” dichotomy, Lipset portrays Canada as a counter-revolutionary, monarchical, Tory society and the United States as a Whig society born of republican revolution. According to Lipset, “American universalism - the desire to incorporate diverse groups into a culturally unified whole - is inherent in the country’s founding ideology.” Similarly, “Canadian particularism - the preservation of sub-national group loyalties, as well as the strength of the provinces vis-à-vis the federal government - is rooted in the decision of the Francophone clerical elite to remain loyal to the British monarchy as protection against Puritanism and democratic populism across the border.” Lipset raises

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7 Lipset, p. xiii.

8Ibid., p.172; Tamara Palmer Seiler is but one of many scholars who wholeheartedly agree in “Melting Pot and Mosaic: Images and Realities,” David 245
many insightful comparisons between the two countries’ culture’s in terms of their self-images, political ideas and institutions, legal and religious tradition, and economic behaviors. I maintain that a status quo conservatism and social meliorism similar to Toryism inhere in pluralism, and that cultural pluralism is consistent with what Lipset calls Canadian particularism. Particularism and pluralism and status quo conservatism were, however, in ascendancy in both Canada and the United States in the post-World War II period as a result of the rejection of utopian thought with in the Cold War episteme. Thus the Cold War is more convincing as an explanation of points of identity between Canadian and American political culture than differences.


9 The chapter on the “Mosaic and Melting Pot” is, however, seriously marred by many errors of fact Lipset erroneously refer to the “1971 Multiculturalism Act.” (p. 179). There was no such statute until 1988. He writes that multiculturalism stemmed from the need to conciliate French Canadians. Neither the activists who promoted multiculturalism nor Trudeau sought to conciliate French Canadians with multiculturalism. Quebecois nationalists hated the policy and saw it as a strategy to undermine the idea of Quebec as a nation, and it was rejected by Canadians who viewed Canada a compact between two founding nations.
Collective identities are, in part, constructed on the basis of organizing principles, beliefs about sovereignty and its source, values, and ideas about the nature of the collectivity in question. Lipset described the United States as “the country of the Revolution, elaborated on the populist and meritocratic themes subsumed in stating the objectives of the good society as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”” In Canada on the other hand, “the founding fathers of the counter-revolutionary nation defined their rationale as “peace, order, and good government.””

Canada, Lipset argued, was a continuation of the ancient English monarchy where power was concentrated in the executive (cabinet) with no limits on the authority of the state other than those derived from a division of jurisdictions between provinces and the federal government. The United States, in contrast, is described as a revolutionary republic suspicious of state authority that adopted a power-constraining bill of rights with emphasis on due process and a balance of power between branches of government. In these descriptions, Lipset is provocatively reductionist (its not as if there was no judicial system in Canada or constitution that limited the power of the state in Canada; and the

10 Ibid., p. xiii.
state did expand considerably in the United States in the twentieth century), but he does raise some very important points.

A major difference between the countries is the statist tradition in Canada at the federal and the provincial levels as opposed to the generally greater antipathy to an expanded role for the state in the economy, social welfare, health, and culture in the USA. The role of the state in Canada has been much more central in Canadian history than in American history, especially in the realms of social welfare, health care, and culture. In 1932, Graham Spry, the founder of public radio broadcasting in Canada, outlined his views on the role of the state in cultural production in a pithy rhetorical question: “The question is, the State or the United States?”11 Many Canadians concerned with Canadian culture have thought in this way ever since. Bernard Ostry, a senior Canadian civil servant in the Trudeau government who helped develop the multiculturalism policy, wrote that only the Canadian federal government had the power and the resources to intervene and ensure the survival of alternative cultural products on the national scale in an environment where the sheer volume of mass persuasion and mass

culture and uniformity that results from the competition for mass markets threatened the “cultural freedom” of Canadians. The recourse to state intervention in the production of Canadian cultural products is a major point of difference with American approaches to culture. Ostry added that it follows that government support to the arts in the interests of pluralism is nearly always support to the preference of minorities. The generation of cultural products in the United States, in so far as they are geared to mass markets, do not encourage difference, whereas in Canada government policy and funding has been designed specifically to encourage the production of diverse products and this has tended to support minority groups, including ethnic groups.”

The state has indeed at times has become a focal point in the ways identities in Canada have been imagined. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, in elaborating his *politique fonctionelle* that was said to reject all preconceived ideas, specifically included laissez-fair anti-state liberalism as a preconceived idea. Lucien Bouchard, the premier of Quebec, for example, tied the Quebecois identity to the *modele Quebecoise*, that is, the statist tradition in Quebec since the Quiet Revolution. He argued that reducing the role of the state threatened the identity of the Quebecois. Thus there has been

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little reluctance in Canada at the federal or provincial levels for the state to engage in cultural production directly, let alone to set cultural policy and engage in debates on the nature of Canada and the Canadian identity. Thus there have been many state (royal) commissions inquiring into the nature of Canada or Canadian culture, and aimed at guiding state cultural activities in recent Canadian history.

Lipset points out that a foundational difference between the two countries is that the United States at its inception overthrew an oppressive state and that consequently Americans have feared the power of the government. This, perhaps, can account for the Cold War covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in subsidizing cultural activities designed to appeal to the “non-Communist left.” In other countries with a stronger tradition of state involvement in cultural activities, such a program would have been undertaken less covertly by ministries of culture, as in fact the Canadian government did when it subsidized the artistic and cultural programs of non-Communist groups.\(^{13}\) In the United States the populist suspicion of a strong state, the rejection of privilege, and the idealization of equality of opportunity and respect were

reflected in the early development of the common school system, and the tendency to try to redress wrongs against minorities through the promotion of individual civil rights.

Canadians, in contrast to Americans, have not feared unlimited government power as much as they have feared uninhibited popular sovereignty, such as that manifested in the American and French revolutions. Here is how the orator of Canadian Confederation, Thomas D’Arcy McGee, expressed this concern on two days before Confederation:

I don’t deny that democratic rule may be good in some respects; but our representative system, founded upon the recognition of the right of all classes, acknowledging the claims of minorities to protection from the tyrannies of majorities...is the highest system of free government yet instituted among men. In established representative institutions we are doing true service to the people of the United States, we are teaching them the advantage of our form of government over theirs. If there are among our neighbours’ minorities, religious, political or social, borne down by the weight of the mere majority, they have only to look across the St. Lawrence to find a place of asylum where they can obtain that security denied them at home.14

14 As cited in the Globe and Mail newspaper July 1, 2002. McGee (1825-1868) was an early advocate of Canadian Confederation. As an Irish immigrant in Boston, McGee called for the annexation of Canada by the United States and was a fighter for Irish independence and activist in the cause for the betterment of social conditions for the Irish in America. After moving to Montreal he became a prominent politician in British North America, a leader in the movement for
McGee’s statement was typical of nineteenth century Canadian critics of American “mobocracy.” According to Lipset, Canadians have argued that the presumed greater political intolerance in the United States is a consequence of the Revolution, and that repression of minority opinion must occur in a society with unlimited popular rule. Conversely, the British and American Tories have been portrayed as having fought for the protection of the rule of law and traditional values, including the rights of dissidents, eccentrics and cranks.\textsuperscript{15} McGee’s statement reflects the deeply held self-image of Canadians that they are more tolerant than Americans, that minorities have more rights in Canada than in the United States, and that in general, the Canadian political system is superior to the American. During World War II, Canadian historian H. Noel Fieldhouse also projected this sentiment when he ventured that totalitarianism was rooted in popular sovereignty. Fieldhouse, in arguing that Fascism and Nazism were democratic but not liberal; that Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini were “brutalitarians” who came from the people, from mass democracy; and that “dictatorship was accomplished by popular will,” was implicitly and explicitly

\textsuperscript{15} Lipset, p. 14.
(in reference to lynchings of African Americans) attacking the United States as a totalitarian society based on tyrannical majority rule and lauding the Canadian system of government and British justice.\textsuperscript{16} In Canada, there has been less reluctance than in the United States to discuss and entrench language rights and the collective rights of minorities in law and the constitution than in the United States. Lipset cites de Tocqueville to the effect that America is exceptional because of its origin in popular sovereignty and its regard for individualism. Canada in contrast is distinctive because of free institutions within a strong monarchical state.\textsuperscript{17}

The Canadian writer Robertson Davies once said that “America has developed myths and Canada has developed none...Canadians tend to be great deprecators, especially of themselves.” Lipset added that Canada has no heroes, no ideologists, no political theorists.\textsuperscript{18} This may be true, but Canadians have certainly idealized this self-image, thus making it the stuff of ideology, political theory, and heroism. The self-image, however, does suggest a certain tradition of


\textsuperscript{17} Lipset, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{18} Davies as cited in Lipset, p. 1. Ibid., p. 2.
skepticism among Canadians. In their political theory, Canadians will, to a
greater extent than Americans, be prone to elide theory and naturalize their
political positions. Canadians, including loyalists who took refuge in Canada
were the great skeptics of the American Revolution. Lipset describes Canada as
conservative, Tory, and traditional. These characteristics are consonant with
skepticism of the rationalism Canadians perceived in the political theory of the
American Revolution, and skepticism of the millenarian streak in American
thought that portrayed the United States as a beacon and example to
unregenerate Europe (and unregenerate Canada) of the Reformation’s ideal of
holy commonwealth. This traditional Canadian skepticism facilitated the
intellectual and popular reception of anti-chiliastic thought associated with Cold
War anti-totalitarian liberalism.

The traditional skepticism of Canadians also accounts for the lower levels
of religious believers in Canada than in the United States. In Canada the
tradition-bound Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox churches are predominate
along with the United Church among Christian denominations. In contrast, the
dissenting protestant churches are more important in the USA. What the
Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox churches have in common is a greater
predisposition to liturgical tradition and theological apophatism (negative
theology) compared to the dissident Protestant churches. The Canadian United Church that regrouped Methodists, Congregationalists and the Evangelical Brethren and most Presbyterians is an example of ecumenical tolerance that is unparalleled in the United States. According to the sociologist of religion Reginald Bibby, in the United States, the pursuit of truth means that religious groups are allowed to compete for truth whereas in Canada they are expected to co-exist. In short, the scope for multiple religious truths was greater in Canadian society than in American society, and so was the opportunity for the unhampered co-existence of multiple secular truths. Whereas in the United States, politics have often reflected moral concerns; in Canada there has been a more pervasive sense of the permanent imperfection of humanity that inhibits any impulses to address political problems and international disputes in moral terms. Consequently, Canadians were more receptive to end-of-ideology sociology than Americans even if the end-of-ideologists, Lipset among them,

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19 Apophaticism holds that God is unknowable and cannot be conceived of positively. It is impossible to say what is divine or true. God can only be defined by what is not godlike.

20 As cited in Lipset, p. 79.

21 Lipset 79.
were almost all Americans. When anti-totalitarianism repudiated millenarianism
and the pursuit of final perfected states of community, Canadians were already
there.

Both Lipset and the Canadian historian W.L. Morton have emphasized
that major differences between Canada and the United States stem from the fact
the one is a constitutional monarchy and the other is a democratic republic. In
the United States the belief that expressions of popular sovereignty are
inherently valid is more widely held than in Canada. In Canada, political
sovereignty is an inordinately complex thing. Formally located in the Crown
which is represented in Canada by governors general and lieutenant governors
(on the provincial level), it is exercised by an executives conditioned by
Constitutional limits and is in divided between the federal and provincial levels.
Suffice it to say that sovereignty is more complicated notion in Canada than in
the United States and that it is also more divided. Consequently the notion of
national community is more complicated and divided in Canada than in the
United States. For W.L. Morton, the Kingdom of Canada subsumed a
heterogeneous and conservative society governed in freedom under law upheld
by the monarch with allegiance at the top and maximum diversity at the bottom;
whereas the American republic tended to level diversities and encouraged
uniformity by breaking down groups into individuals who were indeed free but bound by social conformity and regimented by an inherent social intolerance in a covenant-like union at the bottom. According to Morton, monarchical allegiance allowed a diversity of customs and rights under law in a way the rationale scheme and abstract principle of republican democracy did not. True or not, this is a recurrent theme in Canadian political theory and historiography and in the popular imagination in Canada. According to Morton, there was in Canada an instinctive feeling for this difference between Canada and the United States and in Quebec an articulate perception.²²

In a practical way, the divided sovereignty between provincial and federal governments allowed multicultural activists to pursue lobbying campaigns at the federal and provincial levels, especially in Alberta and Ontario; and the federal provincial dynamics meant that each level of government to wanted to be seen as in the lead in terms of satisfying public demands for multiculturalism policies. At a symbolic level events involving Canadian vice-regents and King George VI and Queen Elizabeth II have repeatedly served as pageants for the symbolic and

ritualistic representation of ethnic, First Nations and regional Canadian cultural differences in the form of Canadian-style durbars.

Lipset views Canada as a society in which “diffuseness” and elitism inhibited populist movements. This is, of course, not to say that there have not been any populist movements in Canada. Indeed, there has been cross-border cross-pollination of populist movements, especially in the Canadian and American West(s). For Lipset, however, the predisposition for elitism in Canada limited the appeal of movements like McCarthyism and the Ku Klux Klan.23

According to Kenneth McNaught, the greater elitism north of the border meant that Canadians have enjoyed greater freedom than Americans because in non-populist societies such as Canada, “confidence in the social order minimizes the resort to witch-hunting.” In such conservative societies there is less of a requirement for ideological conformity than in those in which the power of government is forever suspect.24 While the Klan did have a large presence in Saskatchewan, a comparison of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and McCarthyism with the in camera proceedings of the Canadian Royal

23 Lipset, p. 15.

24 McNaught as cited by Lipset, p. 15.
Commission (Kellock-Taschereau) of 1946 that inquired into Soviet espionage in Canada suggests significant political cultural differences between the two countries. Fact-finding and civility were more characteristic of the Canadian inquiry than they were of the highly politicized, populist congressional proceedings. Anti-communism in Canada found expression in government surveillance of suspected Soviet agents and Communist subversive, but that surveillance was, for the most part, outside the purview of public knowledge: it was done secretly. Another notable difference was in the continuing legality of the Communist Party of Canada, as opposed to the banning of the party in the United States under the Communist Control Act of 1954. Canadians were less threatened by Communism as an ideology because ideological conformity has been less important in the construction of Canadian identity. As Richard Hofstadter put it, Americans were fated as a nation “not to have ideologies but to be one.” Or as Emerson had it, becoming an American was a religious act. In Leon Samson’s view, “Americanism …is a doctrine – what socialism is to a socialist…a system of ideas…to which the American adheres rationalistically

25 U.S. Statutes at Large, Public Law 637, Chp. 886, p. 775-780.

26 Hofstadter as cited in Lipset, p. 19
much as a socialist adhere to his socialism.”\textsuperscript{27} For the American socialist Michael Harrington, “[I]t was America’s receptivity to utopia, not its hostility that was a major factor inhibiting the development of a socialist movement in the United States.”\textsuperscript{28} Thus Communism in the United States was more than misguided politics, it was heretical.

On the basis of these views of the differences between Canada and the United States, it can be said that Canadians have often imagined themselves, their institutions, and their political ideas in negative terms, while Americans have had positive views of themselves and the United States. It is precisely the willingness of Americans to imagine themselves in millenarian terms, to aspire to a positively conceived redemptive ideal of democracy that predisposed some Americans to view the apocalyptic imagery of melting pot with favor. The melting pot is a positive image of a future state of perfected community. Canadians have been traditionally reluctant to conceive of any perfected state of community. They have sought their political truths in the negative. Canadians have not defined political truth by what it is, but rather by what it is not. In their

\textsuperscript{27} Samson as cited in Lipset, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{28} Harrington as cited in Lipset, p. 27.
skepticism of the American Revolution, Canadians rejected America and American republicanism. America was not the answer. In my opinion, any political projects that dare to spell out in positive terms what Canada is or should be are doomed to failure. The vision of Canada as bi-national or bicultural was rejected. The constitutional deals known as the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Agreement in which Quebec was (vaguely) identified as a “distinct society” were rejected. Indeed, any positive definition of the country is subject to falsification. Canadians have had a greater negative capability than Americans, a greater comfort with the uncertainties and doubts attendant to living without a clear and dominant ideology. Indeed, they have a preference for such a situation. Canadians have made accommodations living in a perpetual state of uncertainty due to the existential anxieties induced by the threat of separatism in Quebec. In the Cold War context in which, it must be stressed, Americans were encouraged to drop their millenarian self-image and to reject ideology and to accommodate themselves to uncertainty and contingency, the pre-existing differences in the Canadian and American cultures made Canadians more receptive to these trends and confirmed to them the superiority of their ways of knowing and their self-image.
Cold War liberal anti-totalitarianism had the effect of moving Americans (at least for the duration of the Cold War) beyond the melting-pot in America and to a certain popular and intellectual acceptance of cultural pluralism. In Canada liberal anti-totalitarianism confirmed the validity of negative knowledge. Thus in Canada, the key phrase of the multiculturalism policy statement made by Trudeau is that in Canada “there is no official culture.” This was a remarkable yet characteristically Canadian definition of the country’s culture. It does not say what Canada is or should be only that there is no such definition. Another such negative approach to Canadian identity can be found in the “Limited Identities” thesis in Canadian historiography. In 1967 the Canadian historian Ramsay Cook complained about subsidies for additional studies contemplating “the Canadian navel,” and wondered whether such books on “the great Canadian problem – our lack of unity and identity would achieve anything.” Cook suggested that instead of constantly deploring the lack of identity, Canadians should attempt to understand and explain the regional, ethnic, and class identities they do have. “It might just be,” he ventured, that it is in these limited identities that ‘Canadianism’ is found.”

29 Ramsay Cook, Canadian Centennial Cerebrations,” *International Journal* XXII, 262
the term in his 1969 article “Limited Identities in Canada.” Cook returned to this theme the following year and concluded that it is “heterogeneous pluralism itself that is the Canadian identity.” Canada was, he said, not characterized by nationalism that tends strongly to centralism and uniformity. It was rather, “by nature federal, sectional and pluralist.” The reluctance to identify with a positive conception of the nation, whether based on a political theory, or a single culture of any single point of abstracted identity due to a pervasive skepticism of singular truths necessarily leads to negative approaches to imagining the nation, the rejection of an official culture and a necessary recourse to multiple, limited, plural identities. The Cold War anti-totalitarian liberalism that repudiated among other things, enforced conformity, stringent logicality, and utopianism, was more closely aligned with the differences, uncertainties, and ambiguities that seemed to characterize the Canadian self-image than the American self-


32 Ibid., p. 213.
image which reflected far greater consensus on a clear and positive founding ideology or creed and widely agreed upon core values.

Lipset presents the New Deal and the increased focus on ethnic, racial and gender rights in the 1960s and beyond as contradictions of American ideology. I would point out that while the growth of the state in the USA did run counter to some anti-statist tendencies in American political culture, the “increased focus on ethnic, racial, and gender rights,” did not amount to any federal legislative measures, constitutional amendments or significant institutional changes, unlike in Canada. The discourses of cultural pluralism remained on intellectual, scholarly level, and found artistic expression. There were, of course, important civil rights decisions rendered by the US Supreme Court and civil rights legislation. US Supreme Court decisions and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 1965 Immigration Act that eliminated racial and ethnic quotas. These, however, were consistent with American ideology in their emphasis in individuals’ rights, not on groups. As sociologist Nathan Glazer wrote, there is in America a peculiar social compact in that on one hand “publicly, formally and legally” only individuals are recognized whereas groups are not recognized - whether racial, or religious or
ethnic; while the groups, as he put it “exist in actual social fact.” The exception to this was the introduction of affirmative action quotas under President Richard Nixon in 1969. According to Lipset, these “implicitly assume the Euro-Canadian emphasis on group rights and the socialist concern for equality of results.”

A major difference, perhaps the greatest difference between Canada and the United States in the realm of inter-group relations, is the historical legacy of African slavery in the United States. Canadian mythology tends to obscure any history of slavery in Canada and to celebrate the role of British North America as a refuge for escaped slaves. While there were African slaves in New France and British North America prior to the abolition of slavery in the Empire in 1833, and there has been racist prejudice against Canadians of African descent; there was no comparable scale of African slavery in Canada.

Both the cultural pluralism of the Horace Kallen variety and the multiculturalism of Pierre Trudeau as it was originally formulated, elided the issue race and racism. In Canada, the elision was politically sustainable for a


34 Lipset, p. 39.
longer period of time than in the USA. In the United States inter-group urban race conflict between the “white ethnics” and African Americans in the 1960s and 1970s brought the issue of race and racism to the center of the history of white ethnic identities and discourses of cultural diversity. The non-fulfillment of theories that African Americans could or should emulate the putative patterns of immigrant integration to American society and the conflicts tended exposed the idea of American cultural pluralism to serious criticism. While early (1960s) Canadian multiculturalism elided the issues of racism against Canadians of African, Asian, and First Nations heritage, there were no contemporary race conflicts comparable to those taking place in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Few people perceived the English-French conflict in Canada in analogous terms. Thus it was not until the policy of multiculturalism was well-established that the issues associated with racial discrimination in Canada were addressed by activists for the elimination of discrimination and government officials.³⁵

David Hollinger, in Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism, laments that in America, “[b]odily shapes and colors...are often taken as

³⁵ Some did. For example, The FLQ’s Pierre Vallieres who wrote Nègres blancs d’Amérique. (1968).
indicators of a person’s culture.”

Although the book covers the multiculturalism movement in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, that is, beyond the temporal parameters of this dissertation, some of his observations can be applied to the preceding decades. Hollinger notes the prominence of what he terms the American ethno-racial pentagon in Americans discourses of multiculturalism. The pentagon is the practice whereby residents of the United States are routinely asked to identity themselves and their contemporaries within one of the five presumably involuntary categories of descent: African American, Asian American, Euro American, Indigenous, Latino. In efforts to overcome racism, the ethno-racial pentagon became a convenient basis on which the 1980s American multicultural movement organized and promoted cultural diversity. Part of Hollinger’s postethnic project is to overcome the artificial boundaries which suffuse ‘culture’ with the ethno-racial categories of the pentagon. The relevance of the ethno-racial pentagon to the current discussion is that, despite the efforts of Boas and his disciples, despite the efforts of Dewey and symbolic interactionists who believed that human interactions constituted culture and the

individual self; race was and is the principal category of American thinking about sub-national groups, and it was the principal basis on which Americans classed people. Thus the prospect of popularizing the view of society in culturally plural terms was limited. It is not that Canadians were better Boasians or interactionists than Americans, it is just that discourses of race (while certainly very important in Canadian history) never assumed the same prominence in questions of national and sub-national identity as they did in the United States. In the United States, relations between whites and people of color were frequently framed by a racial-caste hierarchy based on biological rather than cultural differences. In Canada the more important markers of difference (at least for those not affected by racism) have been language and ethnicity in a cultural sense. As Tamara Seiler Palmer wrote, fundamentally the debate about diversity in Canada has centered around culture while in the United States the debate has been focused on race.


38 Seiler Palmer, sixteenth page.
In terms of differences in legal cultures, in Canada the emphasis has been on the security and well-being of communities as distinct from the rights of the individual in American law. The difference is reflected in the American goals of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” as compared to the Canadian goal of “peace, order and good government.” The Canadian phrase suggests a predisposition to acquiescence and mutual accommodation, while the American goal suggests a positive vision. It is in the insistence on acquiescence in the law, that the Canadian tolerance for dissensus can be located. Acquiescence is fundamentally linked to pluralism. It is the opposite of agreement in consensus.\(^39\)

One need not agree to acquiesce. Regard for acquiescence in law allows for disagreement on other matters, including matter of cultural identity. This unity in acquiescence and insistence on order helps explain why, generally, there has been relatively little public protest over the violations of the rights of Canadian citizens due to government surveillance, imprisonment, and censorship during the wars or after martial law was imposed in Quebec in 1970. Quite simply, the federal government’s recourse to the sledge-hammer of martial law in response to a terrorism crisis did not elicit much outrage in the country. This not only

\(^{39}\) Nicholas Rescher, *Pluralism.*
reflects the particularistic versus individualistic difference between Canada and the United States, but it also reflects Canadian value pluralism: while individual rights are usually protected in Canada, they are not supreme in all contexts. The Burkean ideal of social order first and individual rights second applies to Canada. And no single truth always prevails. The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, while enshrining individual rights and liberties does so explicitly on the basis of “order” and also deals with the language rights of groups, and guarantees the interpretation of the charter in accordance with the multicultural heritage of Canadians (section 27).

An institutional difference between Canada and the United States is the prevalence in Canadian political history of (Royal) Commissions in which the appointment of disinterested but respected individuals is designed to ensure that the bodies function as fact-finding institutions where the principle of civility is maintained. In theory, the recommendations of royal commissions are supposed to be politically disinterested. In the United States, comparable commissions of inquiry are frequently composed of either active or retired politicians and the inquiries tend to be more overtly politicized than in Canada. The consequence is that the findings of Canadian inquires appear to be disinterested and factually based. They have an aura of objectivity about them. Thus the Royal Commission
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism’s reports were widely regarded as objective social science. Royal Commissions could, of course, ignore inconvenient facts and produce knowledge products, reports, and make recommendations induced from arbitrarily selected facts, and recommendations have not necessarily corresponded to the facts. Nonetheless, royal commission have been seen as impartial and steeped in fact. Thus Trudeau, in invoking the prestige of the Royal Commission when he declared his multiculturalism policy, despite the fact that the Commission actually endorsed a very different two-nation vision of Canada, made his policy appear to be based on the thoroughly studied, scientifically valid, factually based work of the Royal Commission. This, of course, enhanced it appeal. Many people, including reputable scholars, mistakenly attribute Canada’s multiculturalism policy to the Royal Commission’s report.40

In conclusion, there were several reasons why Canadians institutionalized a policy of multiculturalism while Americans did not at a time when both were subject to the same trends of anti-totalitarian liberalism and when both were

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40 For example, Tamara Palmer Seiler, Melting Pot and Mosaic: Images and Realities, in David M. Thomas, Canada and the United States: Differences that Count (Broadview Press, 2000).
constructing their identities in contrast to totalitarianism. In the first instance, the differences in original organizing principles and basic beliefs about authority and values, made Canadians more receptive to the recognition of groups rather than individuals as subjects of law and policy. Canada was indeed more particularistic and the United States more universalistic, and Cold War trends tended to reinforce Canadian particularism. The tradition of Canadian statism allowed Canadian governments to act in matters of culture. Finally, the tendency to class people into categories of race in the United States and the practice of classing people into cultural groups in Canada enlarged the prospects of state action in advancing a multiculturalism policy in Canada but not in the United States.
7. Chapter 6 Conclusion

From the mid-1930s until the early 1970s, liberal intellectuals in North America were preoccupied with the problem of totalitarianism. They made countless efforts to describe it and to imagine alternatives to it. Many North Americans not only viewed Communist states and international politics through the prism of totalitarianism, but they looked at their own societies and themselves through this prism too. The fear of totalitarianism informed their social, economic and political models and their psychological theories. The concept of totalitarianism affected the social and natural sciences generally because the liberals’ concern about totalitarianism permeated the assumptions underlying how people thought. A central feature of totalitarian systems, as North Americans described them, was that they were “ideological,” and ideology was, according to the prevailing analysis, rooted in idealism. In contrast, anti-totalitarian societies and individuals were imagined as free from ideology and idealism in politics, economics, social thought, and in thought-processes. Even the rules of scientific inquiry were implicated. Totalitarianism and anti-totalitarianism determined what could and could not be said, what was and what was not accepted as knowledge, truth, and reality.
In Canada and the United States the unreflective ideology of anti-totalitarianism became especially widespread, as did the consequent enthusiasm for ethnicity and cultural pluralism. Theorists identified monism, homogeneity, conformity, mass society, ideology, and chiliasm as elements in totalitarianism. The anti-totalitarian ideal was theorized to be characterized by pluralism, diversity, and an acceptance of unperfected community.

Anti-totalitarian liberalism also affected the epistemology of Cold War North America. Absolutist ways of thinking and dogmatism were associated with totalitarianism, giving rise to validating theories of knowledge based on “scientific method.” Scientific method was, in the view of leading theorists, closely related to “democratic method,” and both were said to be pluralistic. Science and democracy were seen having common procedural rules. These included civility, empiricism, experimentalism, the willingness to follow evidence wherever it led, the respect for different points of view, and the view that ideas should be regarded as hypotheses not as absolute principles. Ethnicity became increasingly visible at this time because academic and state institutions formalized and divided knowledge in such a way as to make the data on ethnicity “true.” Ethnicity came to be seen a politically disinterested, morally neutral fact. When the ethical conditions of the Cold War dictated that there was
no distance between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ the fact of ethnicity and diversity became values, and then served as the basis for national identity.

In the United States the philosophy of cultural pluralism was first developed by Horace M. Kallen. After Nazism and Stalinism became the paradigmatic forms of twentieth century authoritarianism, Kallen adapted his theory by contrasting it totalitarianism. By the start of the Cold War, liberals in the United States had come to regard American democracy as the good society. And cultural pluralism as outlined by Kallen came to characterize that good society. Trends in the social science in America, namely the end-of-ideology thesis in sociology, consensus historiography, and the interest group theory in political science reinforced the imagination of the United States as a pluralistic, culturally diverse society.

In Canada, Ukrainian Canadians used discourses of multiculturalism in their interventions before the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to argue that Canada was in “fact” multicultural and multilingual, and that the principles of justice and equality required government recognition and policies that reflected this fact. Their arguments were frequently based on contrasts to totalitarian systems and implied that the cultural and language policies based on one or two cultures were tainted by totalitarianism. Their
interventions would have, in all likelihood, been ignored by the federal

government, had it not been for the personal interest in the subject of

multiculturalism by Prime Minister Trudeau. He was a proponent of Actonian

ethnic pluralism as the soundest basis for a liberal democracy. Nationalism for

Trudeau, and French Canadian nationalism in particular, was intolerant,

discriminatory, and in the final analysis “totalitarian.” Organizing the state along

polyethnic lines thus guaranteed liberty. For Trudeau, multiculturalism

answered the threat of totalitarianism.

During the Cold War, Canadians and Americans constructed their

collective identities in contrast to an imagined totalitarianism. In both countries

diversity and cultural pluralism came to be valued when compared to the

homogeneity demanded by totalitarianism. The identities thus created were

similar. In Canada, however, the federal government made a policy of

multiculturalism an official state policy. This policy was eventually reflected in

the 1982 Canadian constitution and written into law as the 1988 Multiculturalism

Act. No such comparable development took place in the United States. Several

reasons account for this different historical path. In the first instance, the

differences in original organizing principles and basic beliefs about authority and

values, made Canadians more receptive to the recognition of groups rather than
individuals as the subjects of law and policy. Canada had been from its founding more particularistic and the United States more universalistic. Cold War trends reinforced Canadian particularism. Particularism was reinforced in the United States too, but could not displace long-standing deeply-held universalistic constructions of American identity. The tradition of Canadian statism allowed Canadian governments to act in matters of culture. Finally, the tendency to categorize people by in the United States and the practice of categorizing people into cultural groups in Canada enlarged the prospects of state action in advancing a multiculturalism policy in Canada but not in the United States.

There is an additional point I would like to make about the enlargement of ethnos-centered discourses in Cold War North America. The point does not concern ethnicity or diversity per se or the theories of national unity based on cultural pluralism. The point concerns the relativity of ethnicity or particularity and national identity. The liberal pluralistic societies that arose in Cold War North America did not so much center ethnicity or particularity, nor did they center unity or identity as much as they centered the relationship between the two. What has been said of modernism in art can be said of the ethnic phenomenon of Cold War North America: its characteristic epistemological location was the middle ground. Sometimes deliberately, sometimes
inadvertently, the focus of postwar inquiries into society fell neither on subject nor object but on the act of human observation of a reality presumed but not proved to be external to the observer. There was no more “ethnicity” during the Cold War than at other times in North American history. But in this period people came to be fascinated with observing and measuring ethnicity. Thus what was in question was neither the agency of ethnic activists, nor artistic expression, nor the theories of diversity; but the larger society’s interest in observing these and participating in them. The spectacle of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism or the representations of ethnic difference at the 1967 international exposition in Montreal “Man and His World,” and the explosion of U.S. scholarship about ethnicity is more characteristic of the times than “ethnics” themselves or theories of pluralism. The act of observing society with its ethnicity or diversity and the relative position of the observer was central. Artistic modernists, however, were more self-aware than observers of ethnicity. But whether we are talking about modernism in art, or the postwar critique of totalitarian conformity and the consequent celebration of diversity, single-point perspectives were rejected while ambiguities were centered. Both trends were pluralistic. And whether we are talking about modernism in art or
the fascination with ethnicity, both share a concern with how things are represented, not merely what is being represented.¹

Cold War North American liberals believed that if truth was not absolute then liberty was the condition of truth. When people believed that absolute truth was unobtainable and only relative, proximate, or provisional; this assured liberty and toleration.² Thus for the liberals, the skepticism, rejection of dogma and doctrine, and the experimental method of science that attended the criticism of totalitarianism was believed to widen the scope of liberty. The limits to liberty came, however, with the transformation of this anti-totalitarianism liberalism into a positive belief, a belief that could become dogmatic and inflexible.

The end of the Cold War does not signal the end of history. Rather it represents the advent of a historical age, when history can become a self-knowing process; not only a self-knowledge of mind, but an age of wisdom

１According to Daniel Joseph Singal (“Toward a Definition of American Modernism,” American Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 1 Special Issue: Modernist Culture in American Spring 1987, 7-26), with the universe characterized by incessant flux, and uncertainty characterizing human knowledge, the goal of perfect integration must always remain unattainable. Singal names William James and John Dewey as key figures in the process of importing modernist culture to America, and writes that in embracing pluralism James became the firm important American modernist intellectual.

２Inspired by Lord Acton.
where historians can gauge when continuity and change, theory and fact, and the
One and the Many may have been over determined. We can now try to hold each
in reciprocal relation in the hope that our histories and visions might cohere.
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Biography

Gregory Smolynec was born in Montreal, Canada on February 18, 1966. He received a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in History from McGill University (Montreal) in 1988, and a Master of Arts in Central, East European and Russian Area Studies from Carleton University (Ottawa) in 1993. While at Carleton University, he held a Krysa Masters Fellowship from the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) at the University of Alberta; and his thesis, The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, 1914-1918, received a Pass with Distinction. During his doctoral studies, Gregory Smolynec was the recipient of the multi-year Department of History Fellowship, a Helen Darcovich Memorial Doctoral Fellowship from the CIUS, and two Boone Fellowships from the Center for North American Studies at Duke University.