Do Latinos Party All the Time? The Role of Shared Ethnic Group Identity on Political Choice

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University

2007
ABSTRACT

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Abstract

The overarching question of this dissertation is do Latinos prefer co-ethnic candidates and if so, to what degree? I examine how Latinos evaluate co-ethnic candidates—both those who share one’s partisanship and who do not. In addressing the former, is the evaluation higher of a candidate who not only shares one’s partisanship but also ethnicity or is the double in-group status redundant?

I then address a more complex question, how do Latinos evaluate Latino candidates who do not share their partisan identity. The dilemma of having contradictory social group identities places a voter at an electoral fork in the road. To understand which road the voter ultimately takes I consider individual ethnic social group identification and the substantive meanings of ethnic group categories. I look at how different dimensions of Latino group identity influence the ultimate evaluation of a co-ethnic candidate. More specifically, I consider how and when a Latino social group identity influences political choice.

I begin addressing the questions of when and how a Latino ethnic group identity can influence a political choice through an analysis of extant survey data. I also make use of original survey experiments that allow me to determine if there is a causal relationship and to probe the dimensions of Latino group identity.

The results indicate that there is an in-group candidate preference. In some instances, an ethnic in-group match by itself predicts political choice, but not for all Latinos and not all the time. More substantive measures of Latino group identity serve to differentiate who among Latinos are most likely to prefer an ethnic in-group candidate. I
find that substantive measures moderate a preference and in some instances a distancing from the Latino candidate. In general, Latinos with higher levels of Latino group identification are those most likely to support a Latino candidate. However, the preference for a Latino candidate depends on whom that Latino candidate is—Republican or Democrat. In short, Latino preferences for co-ethnic candidates are variegated, but significantly and substantively influenced by the individual’s level of ethnic identification and the type of Latino candidate choice at hand.
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1. Introduction: Latino Ethnic Group Identity and Political Choice

There’s a hunger, a starvation, for one of our own to score a major victory; for our community to begin asserting ourselves at the polls and finally dispel the old stereotype that we don’t vote…This is an ethnic pride thing. (Tatcho Mindiola, Director, University of Houston Center for Mexican-American Studies) ¹

1.1 Introduction

In the Houston mayoral race of 2001 Orlando Sanchez garnered 72% of the Latino² vote. At first blush, a Latino receiving electoral support from his co-ethnics does not seem extraordinary. However, this Cuban-American candidate ran on the Republican ticket in a city whose Latino population is overwhelmingly of Mexican descent and Democratic allegiances (Vaca 2004). In the Houston electoral outcome partisanship was a weak explanatory factor among Latinos, while ethnicity was a primary consideration³ (Vaca 2004; Barreto 2005). Sanchez, through his co-ethnic surname and Latino targeted campaign, successfully conveyed his Latino ethnicity while downplaying his party identification to mobilize the Latino electorate.

¹ Quoted in Rodriguez 2001.

² I use “Latino” as an umbrella under which both Latino pan-ethnicity and the more specific sub-groups are covered.

³ Moreover, the strength or “pull” of pan-ethnicity is highlighted given that a candidate of Cuban descent was able to attract the support of Mexican-Americans.
Sanchez’s success among the Latino electorate was based on shared ethnic group identification. In other words, Sanchez earned a substantial percentage of Latino votes across party lines. Yet at the same time, close to a third of Latinos that turned out did not cast their ballot for the co-ethnic candidate thereby suggesting that the presence of a co-ethnic Latino candidate does not necessarily translate into blind support from the Latino electorate. This electoral outcome suggests that ethnic group identification is important independent of partisanship, but not a uniform predictor of vote choice. This dissertation project examines whether there is a systematic preference for co-ethnic candidates among Latino voters. More specifically I examine what accounts for the variability in the predictive power of a Latino ethnic social group identity in the evaluation of Latino candidates. I argue that strong cognitive and affective attachment to Latinos as a group influences an individual Latino’s preference for a co-ethnic candidate. Whereas research by some scholars has yielded evidence of this behavior at the precinct level in several elections across the nation (Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001; Manzano and Vega 2005; Barreto 2005), this dissertation investigates and documents the deeper micro-level foundations of these aggregate behavioral patterns within the Latino electorate. In short, to understand Latino electoral choice at the aggregate level, the micro-foundations of Latino ethnic group identity must first be understood.
1.1.1 Extant Work

Prior to 2000, only one study, by Cain and Kiewiet (1984) examined the preferences of Latino voters in response to a co-ethnic, Latino candidate. Ethnicity was found to exert a significant but indirect effect on vote choice in a 1982 Los Angeles County congressional race. In their analysis, ethnic group identity exerted its influence via partisanship. In the context of the 1996 Texas Senate race, Graves and Lee (2000) revisited the question of ethnic voting among Latinos. Building on Cain and Kieweit, they sought to determine the effect of ethnicity in the preference for a Latino candidate. Graves and Lee also found ethnicity to exert a significant, but indirect effect on vote choice and also candidate evaluation. That is, ethnicity directly influenced partisan identification and issue positions which in turn influenced vote choice and candidate evaluation.

In both of the above analyses the partisanship of the Latino candidate was congruent with the dominant partisan identification of the Latino community in the candidate’s district/state. In both cases the candidates were Democratic Mexicans running in areas with high population concentrations of Mexican-American Democrats. The evaluation of co-ethnic partisan candidates is a crucial component in understanding the overall nature of Latino ethnic voting and co-ethnic candidate evaluation. However, the evaluation of contra-partisan Latino candidates was not addressed in these earlier works. Because of the partisan and ethnic identity overlap in these studies the effect of these respective identities can not be effectively disentangled.

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4 Rodney Hero (1992) does treat the question of co-ethnic candidate preference in respect to the mayoral elections of Denver in the 1980s. However, in his work Hero does not provide an empirical analysis of the electoral preferences of Latino in response to a co-ethnic (Federico Peña).
The dearth of scholarship treating the electoral behavior of Latinos in response to co-ethnics is striking yet partly understandable for a number of reasons. First, the idea that partisanship can be “trumped” in the presence of ethnicity does not accord with the classic American vote choice model where partisanship is the primary predictor of vote choice. Second, until recently the sub-field of Latino politics has held that the role of ethnicity is secondary to that of partisanship and will not exert a separate, direct effect (Cain and Kieweit 1984; Graves and Lee 2000; de la Garza and Cortina 2005; DeSipio 1996). Third, the growth of Latino elected officials has been slow and concentrated in traditional Latino destinations (National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) Yearbook 2005). Fourth, the partisan identity of the Latino candidate and that of his Latino electorate has generally been congruent—a Latino Democrat running in a Latino district that is largely Democratic. The congruence between candidate and Latino electorate signified that the dilemma of having contradictory partisan and ethnic identities was a non-issue. A final reason for the inattention to ethnicity as a predictor of political choice is as a result of Latino politics being positioned within an assimilationist model such as that posited by Louis DeSipio. “In sum immigrants are moving toward American political life at a rapid clip…This is not fertile ground for an ethnic political movement” (1996, 197). The weakness here is that an analysis of Latino politics within a framework of assimilation (or pluralism) does not take into account the individual level variance in the process of assimilation of Latinos.

5 An important exception is Ambrecht and Pachon 1974 who recognize the larger assimilationsit framework from which Latino ethnicity is made but call for more research before arriving at such a conclusion.
The growth of Latino elected officials has grown over 70% in just one decade, from 1996 to 2006 (NALEO 2005). This figure, of course, does not account for the growing number of Latino candidates who have run but have been defeated. As a result of the growth of Latino candidates and the growth of the Latino population, the lack of attention to the evaluation of co-ethnic candidates by Latinos is no longer tenable.

Moreover, the traditional partisan congruence between candidates and voters is no longer the exception that confirms the rule. For example, cities including Miami, Houston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Antonio, among other places have been host to elections where a substantial percentage of the Latino electorate voted for a Latino candidate that did not share their partisanship.

In these electoral contests ethnic bloc voting has taken place. The preference of a co-ethnic, but contra-partisan candidate has led to the consideration of whether ethnic in-group status “trumps” partisan in-group status (Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001; Barreto 2005; Manzano and Vega 2005). However, while these results are suggestive of an ethnic identity driven political choice they ultimately are vulnerable to problems related to ecological inference. Simply because Latinos in precincts vote for the co-ethnic candidate does not provide sufficient evidence that ethnicity is the primary causal factor at work. Moreover, to fully understand the role of ethnic identity in political choice, the substantive meaning of identity, or group consciousness must be addressed.

---

6 These electoral outcomes have taken place in a context in which party polarization has significantly increased, which would make ethnicity “trumping” partisanship an even rarer occurrence than otherwise expected (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2002).
1.1.2 Questions

The overarching question of this dissertation is do Latinos prefer co-ethnic candidates and if so, to what degree? With the recent advent and increase in Latino candidates will we also see ethnic voting, where ethnic identity rather than partisanship serves as a main predictor of electoral choice? Will the ethnic in-group match be sufficient in determining vote choice? I examine how Latinos evaluate co-ethnic candidates—both those who share one’s partisanship and who do not. In addressing the former, is the evaluation higher of a candidate who not only shares one’s partisanship but also ethnicity or is the double in-group status redundant?

I then address a more complex question, how do Latinos evaluate Latino candidates who do not share their partisan identity. If I am a Latino Republican and there is a Latino Democrat on the ballot, will I rely on my partisan or ethnic in-group? In other words, how will voters negotiate ethnic and partisan identities so as to evaluate a Latino candidate? The dilemma of having contradictory social group identities places a voter at an electoral fork in the road. To understand which road the voter ultimately takes I consider individual ethnic social group identification and the substantive meanings of ethnic group categories. I look at how different dimensions of Latino group identity, together and in isolation, influence the ultimate evaluation of a co-ethnic candidate. More specifically, I consider how and when a Latino social group identity influences political choice.

Following this introduction I will provide a brief outline of the research that serves as the intellectual context for the project. I will then introduce the theoretical frameworks that I will develop. Next, I discuss the methodological approaches that I
have employed and the contributions that this project makes both theoretically and methodologically. To conclude this introduction chapter I present an outline for the remaining chapters.

1.2 Intellectual Context

1.2.1 Partisan Group Identification

As a social group identity, partisanship has proven to be one of the most salient political identities in American politics. According to Donald Green and his colleagues, partisanship represents an assemblage of groups that is most salient to the question of “what group represents me in regards to politics?” (2002, p.8). Partisanship is an undeniably powerful predictor of vote choice and candidate evaluation (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Lau 1986; Rahn 1990). However, the predictive power of partisanship does not rest in partisan affiliations per se, it is the antecedent of partisanship, social group identity that invests partisanship with the force to influence political behavior.

Partisanship is simply one manifestation of the more general category, social group identification (Campbell, Miller, and Stokes 1960).

Social identification involves comparing a judgment about oneself with one’s perception of a social group. As people reflect on whether they are Democrats or Republicans (or neither), they call to mind some mental image, or stereotype, of what these sorts of people are like and square these images with their own self-conceptions. In effect people ask themselves two questions: What kinds of social groups come to mind as I think Democrats, Republicans, and Independents? Which assemblage of groups (if any) best describes me?” (Green et al. 2002, p.8)

Partisanship is important because it is a summary measure that encapsulates other political opinions and behaviors. In other words, it is an efficient informational short-
According to the *American Voter* (Campbell, Miller, and Stokes 1960), partisanship is the most common result from the “funnel of causality.” This idea of partisanship as a “funnel” takes account of the importance of other group identities in addition to partisanship, such as occupation, religion, or ethnicity. These relevant group identities are temporally prior to the more direct output of partisanship. As a result of being “funneled” through partisanship, these other group identities are less immediately relevant to the vote and do not have a direct effect on political choice.

Partisanship has been the primary predictor of American vote choice. However, the role of partisanship as a predictor of vote choice was developed in reference to and subsequently tested on a white majority. When the first sets of American electoral behavior studies were conducted (Berelson et al 1954; Campbell et al. 1960) minority voting, either because of legal or demographic reasons, was not substantial and as a result not considered. However demographic shifts over the last several decades require a reconsideration of which social group identity results from the funnel of causality and in turn is the most proximate to political decisions and for whom.

### 1.2.2 Beyond Partisanship

Racial and ethnic minorities have also relied on partisan group identities for candidate evaluation and vote choice, but not to the exclusion of ethnic and racial identities. However, the employment of an ethnic and/or racial identity in evaluating candidates has frequently been overshadowed by the fact that partisan and ethnic and/or racial group identities are consistent. In other words, minority voters have usually not had to choose between partisan and ethnic loyalties because they are frequently one and the
same. This is not always the case and among Latinos in particular, the partisan identities of the population and the Latino candidate are increasingly incongruent (Barreto 2005).

The first study to look at how ethnic and partisan identities are negotiated in the voting booth was by Raymond Wolfinger. In this seminal article, he, examined how competing loyalties (ethnic and partisan) are negotiated when a voter is faced with either supporting a co-ethnic candidate or one’s party.

Wolfinger examined the intersection of partisanship and ethnicity based on the electoral results in New Haven, Connecticut from the 1940s - 1950s. During that time there were instances where an Italian-American candidate ran as a Republican. At that time, the vast majority of the Italian-American electorate was Democratic, nevertheless, Italian-American voters frequently relied on their ethnic rather than partisan identity and supported the Italian-American candidate. Wolfinger argued for the salience and relevance of ethnic group considerations for voting. At the same time, he did not make the claim that ethnic voting is a ubiquitous influence. He developed a mobilization theory of ethnic voting where ethnicity is latent, but once called forth is a potent political identity. Ethnic electoral contexts, specifically the presence of a fellow-ethnics name, are the trigger for calling forth ethnic group identity.

The strength of ethnic voting depends on both the intensity of ethnic identification and the level of ethnic relevance in the election. The most powerful and visible sign of ethnic political relevance is a fellow-ethnic’s name at the head of the ticket, evident to everyone who enters the voting booth. (905)

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7 For example, the black population is overwhelmingly Democratic and the majority of black officials have been Democrats, thus the majority of black voters do not have to “choose” between their partisan and racial identities in their vote choice.
In this dissertation project, 40 years removed from Wolfinger’s study, I revisit his question of how social group identities are negotiated and consider candidate evaluation in light of both partisan and ethnic considerations. I extend Wolfinger’s work by developing an in-depth understanding of group identity. Specifically, I consider the cognitive and affective dimensions of identity and how this information is processed. I look closely at the content of Latino social group identity to understand how Latinos negotiate multiple in-group identities in evaluating a Latino candidate.

Throughout this dissertation I will return to Campbell et al.’s idea of the funnel of causality. However, I allow it more flexibility in reference to Latinos and their evaluation of co-ethnic candidates. The effect of ethnic group identification on Latino political behavior was initially seen as indirect (e.g. Cain and Kiewet 1984; DeSipio 1996; Graves and Lee 2000). Recently ethnicity has been considered to exert a more direct effect (Barreto 2005; Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001; Manzano and Vega 2006). In the following chapters I seek to resolve this apparent contradiction by allowing for causal heterogeneity (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). I argue that there are systematic differences in evaluation based on the weight given to group identity. These considerations, or differing “intensity levels” in the words of Wolfinger, should in turn influence which identity results from the funnel of causality and becomes the identity most proximate to a political choice or behavior.
1.3 Theoretical Frameworks

An analysis of differing intensity levels of an ethnic group identity presupposes measurement beyond that of a binary variable. Drawing on research from the field of social psychology I consider the nature of Latino ethnic group identity beyond categorization as an in-group or out-group. I rely on Leonnie Huddy’s elaboration of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; Huddy 2003) to appreciate the variance in identity and its application to the political world. With this improved measure of Latino group identity I can better appreciate the multi-dimensional nature of ethnicity. Specifically, I consider how ethnicity measured substantively influences the relationship between the presence of an ethnic candidate and a political choice.

1.3.1 Social Group Identity

Social group identity is shared with a group of others who have (or are believed to have) some characteristics in common. This association is psychological in nature and does not necessarily denote a face-to-face relationship. Finally, and most importantly, a social group identity is a subjective claim or acceptance by the person whose identity is at stake. Individuals have numerous social group identities, but the strength or dominance of a particular identity will depend on what identity is made contextually salient and the chronic level of identification with a given group (e.g. Brewer 1981; Conover 1988; Kinket and Verkuyten 1997; Huddy 2003).

As noted above, social identity results from a person’s group memberships. Partisanship, ethnicity, and race are all examples of social group identities, moreover these are examples of politically relevant social identities (Green et al. 2003; Popkin
1994; McClain and Stewart 2006; Conover 1988). Identities provide us with a sense of who we are. At the most basic level, individuals can determine whether they are in an in-group or out-group in reference to a target individual or group. This determination of group membership, or in/out-group status, provides reference points for choices and behavior. The field of social psychology has established an extensive literature treating the nature of social group identity and how individuals cognitively and affectively rely on identities for the processing of information. I rely on Henri Tajfel’s social identity framework and its more recent iterations to guide my analysis of Latino social group identity. The more refined the social identity measure I can establish, the better I will be able to understand how a social group identity influences political choice.

1.3.2 Social Identity Theory (SIT)

I draw from Henri Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory (SIT), the theory of self-categorization as developed by John C. Turner and his colleagues, and Leonnie Huddy’s re-conceptualization of the motivational component of social identities in reference to political identities. More specifically, I divide the examination of social groups into the two component parts stipulated by SIT: categorization and motivation.

The first and most basic aspect of a social group identity is that of categorization. Determining whether one is a member of an in-group or an out-group. Categorization is one of the most basic components of human perception. Our minds are constantly categorizing—objects, situations, persons. Categorization of our inter-group realities allows us to simplify the world and at the same time define our own identity through the categorical memberships we come to claim.
Categorization is a necessary condition for the establishment of a group identity. However an identity is not simply a matter of in-group/out-group categorization. A purely categorical account of identity is of little use in the world where identities are meaningful and variable. The motivational, or substantive, component of identity can enter once basic categorization has taken place. It is this substantive component, the meaning or weight of an identity that allows an individual to make a decision based on a social group identity.

In chapter two I elaborate on the different categories I utilize to measure the substantive component of Latino identity. The four substantive dimensions of identity that I consider are: 1.) Centrality 2.) Evaluation 3.) Linked Fate 4.) Behavioral Involvement. It is important to allow for their variation, rather than assume their similarity, because the different dimensions may have different implications for political behavior. Different measures are often times complimentary, but not always. For example, an individual may be proficient in Spanish, implicating a high level of behavioral involvement in an ethnic group. However that same individual may feel stigmatized by her group membership or simply not attach importance to that group identity (García-Bedolla 2005).

Social group identity is a dynamic, fluid, and multidimensional construct that is responsive to shifting contexts (Turner et al. 1987; Oakes 1987; Ethier and Deaux 1994). The relevance of an identity upon thinking or behavior depends on which identity is made salient by the contextual environment (e.g. Brewer 1981; Conover 1988; Kinket and Verkuyten 1997; Huddy 2003). This is not to say that only the most immediate cued group identities will influence thinking. However, contextual environments bring forth
relevant in-groups and out-groups to take into consideration (Brewer 1981; Haslam et al. 1992). The ultimate influence of a cued group identity will depend on the evaluation and weight of that group, or the substantive component of that identity. In this dissertation project, the introduction of a Latino cue will provide for an environment where Latino ethnicity is made salient.

1.3.3 Social Groups and Political Decisions

In general, individuals demonstrate an evaluative bias in favor of in-group members. Greater attention is paid to stimuli relevant to the in-group, where information is processed more carefully for in-group members (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Dovidio 1992). Henri Tajfel argued for a minimal basis for in-group favoritism. The mere recognition of falling within the boundary of a group, often just a group label, provided for in-group preference (see Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992 for a meta-analysis). This line of research has also shown that categorization heightens the perception of intra-group similarity and inter-group difference. A further implication of in-group categorization is that membership and behavior tend to be positively correlated (Turner and Tajfel, 1979). However, the connection between group membership and behavior is not automatic.

In-group status is propitious to a cognitive and evaluative bias in favor of the in-group. But, initial in-group bias does not take into consideration the nature of the substantive feelings that may be associated with an in-group identity. Leonie Huddy (2001) elaborates at length on the theoretical weakness of only focusing on the categorical component of identity. This is especially the case outside of the laboratory setting where identity is more than an assigned experimental treatment. Huddy argues for
the need to incorporate the substantive meaning of identities for a complete understanding. To do this, the origin, stability, intensity, and variability of an identity’s substantive component must accompany the categorical component. The title of Huddy’s 2001 article, “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory” is an apt summary for the purpose of my analysis of Latino social group identity and its role in co-ethnic candidate evaluation. I rely on Huddy’s framework that explicitly focuses on the substantive component of identity, while at the same time considering the prior role of categorization.

1.3.4 Summary

The clarity and salience of a social group cue determines if it will ultimately come to bear upon one’s political thinking. Once a social group is made salient its position as either an in-group or out-group will largely determine how the social group influences political thinking. Group consciousness and pro-group preferences are facilitated when the cued group is an in-group. However an account of the substantive component of identity ultimately allows for the confirmation and understanding of this bias.

I put forth an information processing model that focuses on social group identity to evaluate Latino candidates. For Latinos, the Latino electoral context may function as a cue that can draw out in-group ethnic identifications and/or bolster present levels of identification. As discussed earlier, in-group identifications facilitate the use of one’s group identification in subsequent political decisions. However, in-group identifications are not uniform. As a result, the variance in Latino (in-group) identification will be given in-depth consideration in the following data analyses. I will test the influence, and more
specifically, the moderating\textsuperscript{8} effect of the substantive component of Latino identity. An in-group candidate match may suffice, but in light of the existence of other meaningful group identities, in particular partisanship, getting from “social to political” identities is likely to take more than an identity match.

\textbf{1.4 Methodological Approach}

To address the general question of how Latinos evaluate co-ethnic candidates I employ a triangulated theoretical and empirical approach. I make use of large N surveys and two survey experiments. Through the employment of these methodologies I seek to build on the strengths of each of these methods, which will in turn compensate for the weaknesses of each respective method. A triangulated approach allows me to determine the robustness of the fundamental pattern of political behavior of interest, the role of ethnic group identity. On the side of internal validity, my experiments allow me to trace the psychological mechanism that underpins the influence of ethnicity. They also allow me to more carefully conceptualize and measure the core concept of Latino ethnic identity. On the side of external validity, the existing surveys employed here increase my confidence in my results because they allow me to consider Latino political behavior using state as well as national survey data, thereby lending further support to this project through the generalizability of the pattern of results garnered in the experiments.

I begin addressing the questions of \textit{when} and \textit{how} a Latino ethnic group identity can influence a political choice through an analysis of extant survey data.

\textsuperscript{8} A relationship between two factors is moderated when it becomes stronger if a person is in one group, compared to another (Baron and Kenny 1986). With respect to ethnic identity I will later develop how I hypothesize that the effect of an ethnic prime should become stronger for individuals with higher levels of substantive Latino group identity.
Here, I garner information on the patterns of individual level behavior. The first set of data that I will present comes from the 2004 Pew National Survey of Latinos. This survey provides some of the most recent data on Latinos and consists of a representative sample of Latino adults in the United States. More importantly, this survey provides representative samples of sub-ethnic Latino groups (e.g. Cubans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans). The second set of survey data that I examine is from the Latino Issues Forum 2000, which was conducted among a random sample of registered California voters. While this survey is only limited to Latinos in California, the survey instrument provides valuable questions that most closely operationalize the variables of interest for this project.

I then turn to experiments. Through this methodology I am able to determine if there is a causal relationship between preference for the ethnic candidate and the presence of a co-ethnic candidate in an electoral context. Very little research has been done that examines the evaluation of co-ethnic candidates by Latinos, and the work that has been done has not been able to arrive at a consensus. Through an experimental design I will be able to establish causal inference. However, as stated above, I argue that the more interesting question regarding the evaluation of co-ethnic candidates lies in the influence of Latino group identity. The experiments that I conducted were survey experiments that probed the dimensions of Latino group identity. With these measures I can determine whether and how a Latino group identity influences the preference of a co-ethnic candidate within an ethnic electoral contest.
Experiments provide for admittedly abstract results. However at this initial stage of research in the area of Latino candidate evaluation and its relation to Latino group identity it is crucial to first understand the basic relationship among the variables by isolating causal relationships. Once this step is taken, the model can be complicated experimentally with the addition of treatments or the design of a field experiment.

1.5 Contributions

The first question this dissertation sets out to resolve is whether the preference of Latinos for an ethnic in-group candidate is systematic or spurious. I argue that a co-ethnic candidate choice is not simply one of finding an in-group match. The substantive meaning of identity at the individual level must be considered in conjunction with an electoral contest, here my interest being in the presence of a Latino candidate.

The role of ethnicity is recognized as an important factor in Latino political behavior (García and Arce 1988; García 2004; Rodríguez-Alves 2004; Pérez-Monforti 2004; Barreto 2005; Pantoja and Segura 2004). But, heretofore the operationalization of ethnicity has been problematic because of a focus on only one dimension of group identity, behavioral involvement. Examples of behavioral involvement measures include language usage or generation. The problem with these measures is that the researcher ultimately imputes higher levels of ethnic identification, for example assuming that a 4th generation Latina identifies less with her ethnic identity than a recent immigrant. This is

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9 In the experiments I designed participants are presented with a candidate match-up which varies the ethnicity and partisanship of the candidates. While this is an abstraction of reality it is not too far of stretch to imagine a voter walking into a voting booth and having no information about the candidates except for the name and partisan cues presented on the ballot.
a strong assumption to make and one which requires a more subjective measure of the individual’s ethnicity. To remedy the problems with these measures I consider four dimensions. In short, by measuring ethnic identity in a variety of forms, I can decrease measurement error.

Inroads have been made in considering the nexus between Latino identification and political behavior (Barreto 2005; García 2004; Pérez-Monforti 2004). Nevertheless, the micro-foundations of Latino group identity remain underdeveloped and as a result so does the understanding of the relationship between Latino group identity and political behavior. Until recently, Latino ethnicity has been treated at the aggregate level within an assimilationist paradigm (DeSipio 1996). As a result, individual levels of ethnicity have not been given close attention. In this project I allow level of assimilation, or attachment to ethnic group identity, to vary. The disaggregation of ethnicity will contribute to a larger understanding of how Latino immigrants and the descendents of Latino immigrants adopt, abandon, and/or negotiate ethnic identities in the political arena.

In this project I provide for an understanding of the content, contours, and variation of Latino group identity. In this dissertation I will contribute to the field of American politics and Latino politics in particular through an examination of the underpinnings of Latino ethnic group identity and how social groups enter and influence political thinking. By improving the quality of a key independent variable in Latino political behavior, ethnicity, the relationship of ethnicity and political behavior in general will be strengthened.
This study also extends some of the literature on the effect of group identity in American politics. The influence of social groups, namely subjective identification with a group, upon political thinking is a key facet for understanding individual level behavior. The identification one has with a collective is then manifested in the voting booth, on the streets, or in other forms of mobilization or issue preference. Black social group identity and the social identity of women are two areas that have been considered at length (e.g. Dawson 1994; Tate 1994; Conover 1988). An examination of Latino group identity allows another test case for the consideration of the larger concept of group identity upon individual level political behavior.

Today an account of American political behavior is incomplete without an understanding of Latino politics. The presence of Latinos at the polls and on ballots is no longer a phenomenon limited to large multi-racial metropolitan areas or rare exceptions. Latinos are a youthful population (Census 2006) and one that is also growing as a result of immigration from Latin America. Within the upcoming decades young Latino citizens and naturalized immigrants will become eligible to vote, transforming the landscape of American voters. Latinos are voting and fielding candidates from Los Angeles, California to Carborro, North Carolina. The Latino vote is still small in comparison to the rest of the population, however as we saw in the 2004 presidential election, it is a vote that may prove crucial for a margin of victory.

Lastly, in this project I make a methodological contribution to the field of Latino politics. With the exception of the work on turnout by Melissa Michelson and her colleagues, no other work in this sub-field has employed an experimental methodology. To be sure, experimentation has its drawbacks. However, in conjunction with
observational data I seek to put forth a study that not only introduces a new methodological approach, but pursues scientific inquiry via triangulation.

1.6 Chapter Outline

Chapter two will establish the theoretical framework for this project. Here, I begin by considering how social group identities serve as informational short-cuts that allow individuals to undertake judgmental tasks such as candidate evaluation and/or vote choice. I focus on the content of group identities through an examination of their substantive meaning. Specifically, I delineate four dimensions upon which I measure Latino group identity.

Chapter three is the first of three data analysis chapters. In particular, this chapter examines two surveys. The first set of survey results I present is from the 2004 National Survey of Latinos, conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center. This survey provides some of the most recent data available on the Latino population. It provides a nationally representative sample of Latino adults in the United States. The survey samples both citizens and non-citizens. I will focus on Latino citizens because the dependent variable of interest, candidate evaluation, is only asked of this group. In this survey there is a question presenting a hypothetical candidate match-up between a Latino and non-Latino candidate. I consider how the responses to this question vary as a function of Latino group identity measures I identified in the survey. In this analysis there is initial evidence for in-group favoritism, however this support is not automatic, but is predicted by substantive measures of Latino group identity.
The second observational data set I use is the 2000 Latino Issues Forum Survey. This survey provides a random sample of registered Latino voters in California. With this data I can start to get at the preference for a co-ethnic, but contra-partisan candidate. This survey also presents a hypothetical candidate match-up. However, unlike the Pew survey, the match-up is not only based on an ethnic identity match, but also includes partisanship. With this design I examine candidate choice in the face of competing in-group identities. In addition, I examine the influence of components of a Latino group identity on this choice.

The fourth chapter presents the results from a pilot survey experiment I conducted in the Fall of 2005 at the University of Arizona. Through the survey component I was able to measure ethnic group identity through a battery of measures tapping the dimensions of importance, evaluation/affect, linked fate, and behavioral involvement. The experiment itself focuses on the preference of a Latino candidate in the face of contradictory partisan and ethnic in-groups. Put simply, does ethnicity trump partisanship with regards to candidate evaluation or vote choice intention? This was a simple post-test only control group experiment where the sample was randomly split in half. The control read a brief candidate platform presenting two candidates with non-Latino surnames. Those in the treatment were presented with a candidate with a Latino surname who did not match their partisanship. The results from the experiment indicate that the preference for an ethnic in-group candidate is dually moderated by ethnic identity and partisanship.

Chapter 5 presents the results from a second survey experiment I conducted. The second experiment, given the larger sample size, included more treatment cells. This
survey was conducted in September of 2006 by Polimetrix, an internet survey firm. The survey experiment considers how Latinos evaluate both partisan and contra-partisan co-ethnic candidates. In addition to considering the evaluation of the candidates I also look at vote choice intention. This experiment builds on the first experiment discussed in chapter 4 by addressing how Latinos evaluate and choose partisan and contra-partisan Latino candidates.

The final chapter will briefly summarize the main questions and theoretical frameworks of the dissertation. I then review the evidence for my argument that preference for a co-ethnic candidate is moderated by Latino group identity. Specifically I will review the empirical results in reference to key hypotheses. I will then turn to a discussion of some of the limitations of this dissertation project. One of the principal limitations being that the testable implications of the hypotheses were not tested in an actual electoral contest. However, in acknowledging this weakness I focus on the knowledge that this project has garnered in terms of the individual level preferences of Latinos and the micro-foundations for the role of ethnicity in political behavior. With this small, but solid step I conclude by looking forward to avenues for future research.
2. Behind Partisanship: The Role of Shared Group Identity on Political Choice

“Es que la sangre jala” (“there are simply blood ties that pull,” Sam Herrera)

2.1 Introduction

The quote at the top of this page is from Sam Herrerra, a Republican Latino. In it he explains why he would have crossed party lines and voted for John Kerry if Bill Richardson, the Latino governor from New Mexico, would have been chosen as his running mate. This quote provides an interesting insight into how ethnic identity can influence candidate evaluations: “Es que la sangre jala” (there are simply blood ties that pull). Sam Herrera’s words suggest that ethnicity is a compelling political identity that serves to guide political judgment. In other words, ethnicity may serve as an informative and/or influential political cue.

Partisanship generally serves as the primary political identity in American politics (e.g. Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Rahn 1993; Lodge and Hamill 1986). However, I argue in this dissertation project that among certain segments of the Latino population, ethnicity can serve as a primary political identity. Over 40 years ago Raymond Wolfinger developed a mobilization theory of ethnic politics considering how ethnic group affiliations aside from partisan identification influence political decisions. I build on Wolfinger’s work by assessing when and how a Latino ethnic group identity can shape political choice.
My general dependent variable in this dissertation project is political choice. More specifically, I concentrate on the evaluation of Latino candidates. I also consider the intention of voting for a Latino candidate. The key explanatory variables of this project are: 1.) an ethnic electoral cue, in the form of a Latino candidate; and 2.) Latino group identity. The first explanatory variable will entail a very simple operationalization. I do this in order to concretely establish whether the ethnic relevance in an electoral context has a direct effect on candidate evaluation and/or vote choice intention. For Latino group identity, I develop a nuanced theoretical framework to consider the cognitive and affective dimensions that influence political choice. I then operationalize identity as a multi-dimensional construct that can encapsulate the multiple components of identity. In better understanding the nature of Latino group identity I will in turn be able to provide a thorough treatment of the relationship between ethnic group identity and political choice.

Before turning to my theoretical framework where I develop my measures of Latino group identity, I first review the role of partisan identification. Partisanship has been and continues to be the primary predictor of candidate evaluation and vote choice in the United States. To consider how as a group identity enters political choice I start with the basics, partisanship. I then look behind partisanship and examine its role in a more abstract sense as a social group identity. I consider how in addition to partisanship racial and ethnic social groups have also been evidenced to influence political behavior. I focus on Latino ethnicity, leading into the final portion of this chapter where I develop the theoretical framework to examine the components of Latino group identity. I conclude with the delineation of the core hypothesis for this dissertation. With this, I can turn to an
exploration of the relationship between an ethnic electoral cue and Latino group identity upon political choice in the empirical chapters to follow.

2.2 Parties

In the *American Voter* (1960), Angus Campbell and his colleagues posited that partisanship is a category membership that is acquired early on in life, through socialization processes. This explanation is a social psychological explanation that is based on the identification with social groups and social categorization. Partisan identification is an affective orientation. It is not responsive to new, especially contra-partisan information. More specifically, in this model, information that is not consistent with one’s partisan identification is not incorporated, but rather deflected through a perceptual screen. As a result of the perceptual screen-guard voters are in theory largely inattentive to politics.

Over the years, this view, known as the classical conceptualization of partisanship, has been contested by a revisionist theory (Fiorina 1981). This alternative view holds that partisanship is more elastic than static and that partisanship is in fact responsive to policy. Issue policy positions and candidate evaluations are seen as “running tallies” that, when added up, determine partisan preference. Partisanship is instead a fluid choice based on rational calculations. Parties are vehicles for the rational summary measures of policies and candidates. In this view, partisanship itself has no meaning attached to it.

The classical and revisionist theories of partisanship anchor two extremes of the spectrum. Over the years there have been elaborations of both, for example Chris
Achen’s utility maximization theory (1992) where partisan choice is considered through a framework of Bayesian updating. More toward the behavioral end, Lodge and Hamill (1986) provide a social psychological explanation of partisanship rooted in cognition and schema theory.

In recent work, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) put forth a theory of partisanship that presents a more balanced theory of partisanship that accounts for the cognitive and affective components of partisan identification, or as the title of the book aptly states, *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. This framework recognizes the psychological underpinnings of partisanship as a core social group identity. Partisanship is seen as a meaningful and fundamental identity in American politics, similar to how one would think of a religious affiliation (Green et al. 2002).

While recognizing the general stability of a social group identity, a theory of rational learning allows for new information and experiences to be incorporated. Specifically, incoming information is incorporated rather than deflected as the classical model held. The consideration of this information does not result in party switching but rather differing evaluations regarding party competence, candidates, or issues. “Evaluations of party capabilities are distinct from partisan identities, both conceptually and empirically. People may assimilate new information about the parties and change their perceptions of the parties without changing the team for which they cheer” (9).

In short, partisans do assimilate information, contrary to the classical view, but the manifestation of this assimilation is less drastic than a constant switching or updating of partisan attachment as the revisionist view would have. Partisan identification is
relatively stable over time. New experiences or information may be inconsistent with one’s partisan identity. However, the incorporation of this information is manifested through changes in evaluation more so than in attachments.

2.3 Political Choice: Candidate Evaluation and Vote Choice

Partisanship is a key explanatory variable driving candidate evaluation (Campbell, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Lau 1989; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Rahn 1993; Rahn et al 1990). In turn, candidate evaluation and partisanship are primary vote choice predictors. In general, parties are the most relevant and salient political group for American political choice. Partisanship is a summary measure that encapsulates political opinions and behaviors, and in turn provides for an efficient informational short-cut (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Popkin 1994).

A democratic system rests on the ability of citizens to choose their elected representatives. While this choice is of critical importance, we know that in general minimal time and effort go into this choice. Voters do not have much incentive to gather information about politics solely in order to improve their voting choices because of the extremely low likelihood that any single vote will influence the outcome of a given election (Downs 1957). Voting is a low cost and a low expected benefit activity (Aldrich 1993).

Voters will therefore look to informational short-cuts, or heuristics to make sense of their political surroundings. Heuristics simplify complex judgmental tasks by
optimizing one’s decision using minimal amounts of attention and cognitive effort.¹ In American politics partisan identification has been and continues to be a primary heuristic in electoral decisions.

2.3.1 Partisan Stereotypes

In her research, Wendy Rahn (1993) examines the information processing role that partisanship as a social group identity plays. She finds that individuals rely on and prefer partisan guided information when evaluating candidates. In her work, partisanship is considered within a schematic framework, where partisanship is an organized cognitive structure that guides perceptions and expectations of persons based on their category (partisan) membership (Rahn 1993; Dovidio et al. 1992; Fiske and Taylor 1991). Rahn’s findings are supportive of a stable and resilient view of partisan identity. Voters draw on partisan based heuristics. It is not the only form of information processing in the political arena, but it is evidenced as the most relied upon when available (Rahn 1993).

Rahn compares candidate evaluation in the presence of a partisan cue versus a scenario absent a partisan cue, but where relevant policy information is present. She is essentially comparing and contrasting two information processing strategies: theory and data driven modes. Within a theory driven mode previous information structures are brought to bear, for example a partisan heuristic can be employed. In a data driven mode judgments are made based on the present information—the available data. Frequently, theory driven and data driven processing will lead to the same evaluation. However, Rahn finds that in cases where theory and data are contradictory (e.g. a Democratic

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¹Heuristics will not always improve the quality of the decisional output. Just as there are good heuristics, there are bad heuristics. There has to be a match between the heuristic and the task that the heuristic is being used (Lau and Redlawsk 2001).
candidate who supports small government) theory driven processing in the form of candidate stereotypes will overpower data-driven processing.

In Rahn’s account, candidate evaluation is theory driven. In particular, it is based on partisan stereotypes. “Voters are predominantly theory-driven processors if given the opportunity. Even extreme information inconsistency did not prompt voters to forgo a heuristic-based judgment strategy” (487). In sum, individuals will rely on theory-driven modes of processing when available. Heuristic based processing is the preferred route, even if the heuristic is presented alongside contradictory data. The significance of partisan identity rests in its role as an enduring and meaningful identity that allows for information relevant to political choices to be efficiently processed but not to the exclusion of other information.

In her concluding remarks, Rahn addresses the partisanship debate and discusses how her results are supportive of Campbell et al.’s classical interpretation of partisanship. But, she also finds that individuals will pay attention to policy, or data in the absence of a partisan stereotype, which is in accordance with Fiorina’s work. Rahn’s findings fit in well with Green et al.’s rational learning theory, where new information can be evaluated, however the influence of partisanship as an identity remains influential.

2.4 Behind Partisanship

Based on her findings, Wendy Rahn states that partisanship is the most “powerful cue provided by the political environment” (1993, 473) [emphasis added]. She goes on to explain that the strength of this cue is based in its simplicity and directness. However,
the bottom line in Rahn’s work is that partisanship matters because it is made salient in
the political environment and it is a meaningful social group identity.

Partisanship is an undeniably powerful predictor of vote choice, however, the
predictive power of partisanship does not rest in partisan affiliations per se. It is the
antecedent of partisanship, social group identity that invests partisanship with the force to
influence political behavior. More specifically, social groups aside from partisanship can
and have mattered for political behavior (e.g. Wolfinger 1965; Dawson 1994; Tate 1994;
Barreto 2005; Collet 2005). The social group identity of partisanship has resulted as the
most powerful heuristic because of the American political context.

To be overly simplistic, there is no hard-wiring in our brains that makes a partisan
heuristic inevitable. Different cognitive structures (schemas) and combinations there of
can be brought to bear on political decisions.

We start with the assumption that there is no single, overarching ‘schema about
politics’—that in all likelihood there are many distinct ways to think about
government and politics and oneself as a citizen…One could-apparently some
people do-think about politics as race against race, or, like Marx, see policy
disputes as the expression of class conflicts. (Lodge and Hamill 1986)

In short, there is no overarching political schema (e.g. partisanship) there are instead
many ways to conceptualize politics, which then lead to the employment of different
group based heuristics.

Samuel Popkin describes partisan group identity as a default value that “kicks in”
when no other relevant information is available (1994). In American politics partisan
identification has been a primary heuristic in electoral decisions because in addition to
being meaningful it is made available. In American politics, partisan identities are the
In most electoral races campaigns are indeed framed in partisan terms. Even many non-partisan elections are for practical purposes discussed as partisan contests.

In American politics parties and partisanship are key components of political choice and in turn the structure of government. Partisan identification has been a primary heuristic in electoral decisions. As seen in Rahn’s work, the predictive power of partisanship is even seen in the face of contradictory information. However, a partisan heuristic is just one of many informational shortcuts potentially available to voters (Popkin 1994). There are other identities that may serve as an equally or even more powerful heuristic than partisanship. I argue that racial and ethnic identities, among other social group identities can, in the words of Rahn, provide a “simple and direct cue” that is consequential in shaping the perceptions and evaluations of candidates.

African-American partisanship provides an example of how partisanship may not be the group that best represents one’s interests. The relevance of partisan identity for blacks is complicated because race and partisan group identities have overlapped for virtually all blacks since 1964 (Barker, Jones, and Tate 1999). Partisanship and race line-up almost perfectly providing for an endogenous relationship that problematizes the measurement of these concepts. As a result, determining whether partisanship is the most appropriate answer for which group best represents one’s interests is inconclusive.
There is a possibility that a similar endogenous relationship may develop for Latinos in reference to ethnicity and partisanship.² At this point, it is too early to settle upon what the dynamic between partisan and ethnic identities is for Latinos. In other words, political choices informed by an intersection of ethnicity and partisanship must allow for causal heterogeneity. With the evidence garnered in this dissertation, together with the growing body of Latino politics we will be able to answer the question of what group Latinos see as best representing their political interests.

Recognition that partisanship is only one relevant social group identity for any given political choice allows for causal heterogeneity. Partisan identity is the most appropriate answer, for most Americans, to the question of "what group represents me in regards to politics?" (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). But, partisanship is not always the most appropriate answer for all Americans to "what group represents me in regards to politics?" Causal homogeneity among voters can not be assumed in decision making (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Specifically, differences in evaluation can appear based on two factors. First, the application of a social group identity depends on the environment, what group identities are made relevant in a context. Second, once an identity is made salient the weight given to group identity must be taken into consideration.

² Some have suggested that the Pete Wilson administration in California may have served as a galvanizing force among Latinos, similar to that of Barry Goldwater for blacks (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Michelson 2006).
2.5 Beyond Partisanship

The role of partisanship as a predictor of American vote choice was developed in reference to and subsequently tested on the white majority. Just as early vote choice models looked within American white society to determine what factors are most relevant to participation, the study of minority politics has looked within minority groups to determine what factors are most relevant to minority participation. In the study of black politics, race through its role as a group utility heuristic (Dawson 1994), has been established as a critical component of black vote choice models and political behavior more generally. White ethnics, Asians, and Latinos have also demonstrated reliance on their ethnic group identity, rather than their partisan group identity to guide their political behavior (e.g. Wolfinger 1965; Hero 1992; Collet 2005; Barreto 2005).

In the following sections I will review how racial and ethnic group identities have informed political choice. I first consider the role of race. I then turn to ethnicity, which while sharing similarities with the implications of racial group identity faces important differences. Finally I focus on the role of Latino ethnic group identity for political behavior and recent research probing its implications for political behavior. To conclude this section, and lead into my core theoretical framework, I discuss the development of a measurement framework for Latino identity. Such a framework will inform extant work on Latino political behavior, but specifically it will allow me to address my main question of how ethnic group identity influences Latino candidate evaluations.
2.5.1 Beyond Partisanship: Race

Extant work in race and ethnic politics demonstrates how social groups in addition to parties have mattered for political behavior (e.g. Wolfinger 1965; Dawson 1994; Tate 1994; Barreto 2005; Collet 2005; Lien et al. 2004). Race, in particular, is considered a fundamental social group identity in reference to politics (Dawson 1994; McClain and García 1993; Green et al. 2002). For black Americans, race has been and continues to be the most influential group identity in political, social, and economic arenas (Shingles 1981; Gurin et al. 1989; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Dawson 1994, 2001; Tate 1994).

The United States, since its inception, has been a racialized society. Race as a salient social group identity has been a constant for blacks in this country (Davis 1991). Racial classification is inseparable from the history of the United States. Beliefs about black difference and inferiority were codified in the founding document of this country and were subsequently extended in more explicit terms through the one-drop rule, anti-miscegenation laws, and census classifications, (Nobles 2000; Haney Lopez 1996).

Race has stood as a ubiquitous influence in the lives of black Americans. The shapes of racial boundaries have changed during the course of American history. However, the significance of race for blacks continues to be the most salient political identity in American politics.

This is still America, so, for the great majority of ideologues, activists, and grassroots blacks, these identities were and are racialized. One sees oneself as a black worker, black feminist, black Marxist… and even black conservatives put themselves in the middle of black-centered discourses. The great majority of

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3 Here I will limit my focus to ethnic, partisan, and racial identities. However, in later work I will incorporate additional identities, such as gender.
blacks continue, my previous and current work shows, to see their fate linked to that of the race… (Dawson 2001, xii)

The influence of racial group identity can be seen as informing other fundamental group identities, such as partisanship or gender. Race is not as sensitive to the cuing of identities in a context. It is an identity that while not readily applicable to a context when race is not explicitly cued, informs other more contextually relevant group identities, for example partisanship.

The social identity of race is fundamentally based on an in-group verses out-group dynamic where the interest of blacks as a group is a proxy for the good of the individual. Referred to as a black utility heuristic, linked fate serves as an informational short-cut in the evaluation of political choices (Dawson 1994). More than a notion of group consciousness, linked fate has tangible political implications because of how it directs the evaluations and votes of blacks.

William Julius Wilson posited that at the end of the 20th century race had fallen into the foreground and had been eclipsed by class membership. However, the work of Lawrence Bobo and Michael Dawson, among others, indicates that the significance of race indeed persists. In specific regards to politics, racial group membership not only predicts choice (e.g. for policy or candidates) as does partisanship for the general white electorate, but race also influences the overall levels of group participation among black Americans. For example, black consciousness is the “missing link” (Verba and Nie 1972; Shingles 1981; Gurin et al. 1989; Miller et al. 1981; Bobo and Gilliam 1990) to the finding that once SES is controlled blacks participate in politics more.
2.5.2 Beyond Partisanship: Ethnicity

Questions of ethnicity were first treated in regards to Europeans who immigrated in large numbers to the United States at the turn of the 19th century. A diverse set of approaches to the study of ethnicity were generated. On one end, scholars viewed ethnic group identity as temporary boundaries. However, the reasons for the impermanence differed. Scholars such as Robert Dahl, (1961) envisioned a linear process from ethnic pluralism, to acculturation, to assimilation. Glazer and Moynihan (1963) also saw the significance of ethnicity as diminishing. They posited the loss of ethnicity to the American melting pot as a functional response to the diminished role of ethnic groups as interest groups.

A middle-ground approach was advocated by another set of scholars. While it was recognized that acculturation was a likely occurrence by the second generation, this did not equate with assimilation (Eisenstadt 1964; Gordon 1964; Parenti 1967). Ethnicity was posed as an internalized and consequently a permanent group identity where even in the midst of acculturation, ethnicity persists (Wolfinger 1965; Parenti 1967; Greely 1971). More specifically, group identities are not seen as mutually exclusive especially vis-à-vis an “American” identity.

Michael Parenti asserted the persistence and importance of ethnicity long after the immigration experience. However, he elaborated on the distinction between the ubiquitous nature of race and the more variable nature of ethnicity. Parenti argued that there is more variance in how ethnic group identification can influence behavior. Ethnicity is not as ubiquitous as race is in society and politics. Parenti attributes this
differentiation to historical factors of group treatment and the resultant valuation of racial and ethnic groups in American society.

For groups enjoying some measure of acceptance ethnicity plays an intermittent rather than constant role in self-identity, whereas for those groups which have experienced maximum hostility and oppression, for instance the Negro American, the question of ethnic identity takes on a ubiquitous quality, there being few instances when, for real or imagined reasons, race does not define, shape or intrude upon both the ordinary business of living and the extraordinary business of politics. (723)

Raymond Wolfinger (1965) was the first to examine how ethnic group identities are negotiated in the electoral arena (1965). He examined the intersection of partisanship and ethnicity based on the electoral results in New Haven, Connecticut from the 1940s - 1950s. At that time, the majority of the Italian-American electorate was Democratic. Nevertheless, Italian-American voters frequently relied on ethnic rather than partisan heuristics to support a co-ethnic Republican candidate. Wolfinger argued for the salience and relevance of ethnic group considerations for voting.

However, he did not make the claim that ethnic voting is a ubiquitous influence. Like Parenti, Wolfinger conceived of ethnicity as a social group identity that has the potential to influence political behavior, because it is an intermittent rather than a constant social identity (Parenti 1967). As a result, Wolfinger developed a mobilization theory of ethnic voting where ethnicity is latent, but once cued in the political environment is a potentially powerful political heuristic.

Electoral contexts, specifically campaign mobilization, are the trigger for calling forth ethnic group identity. Wolfinger implicitly notes that an ethnic electoral cue is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the application of an ethnic group identity to a political choice. “The strength of ethnic voting depends on both the intensity of ethnic
identification and the level of ethnic relevance in the election” (905). The intensity of an identity should ultimately determine whether the cued ethnic group identity will be acted upon.

Wolfinger’s findings are puzzling in light of the traditional American vote choice model where partisanship is the most important predictor. However, the support of Italian-American voters to a co-ethnic rather than a partisan is better understood by considering that there is no overarching political schema, or organized cognitive structure, (e.g. partisanship). Instead, there are many applicable stereotypes which then lead to the employment of different group based heuristics. In New Haven, Italian-American voters were simply choosing to employ a non-partisan schema, ethnicity. Drawing on Wolfinger, I argue that Latino ethnicity can be an equally or even more powerful heuristic than partisanship. For some individuals, some of the time, their interests may be best represented by ethnic based groups.

Individuals who closely identify with an ethnic group identity should be more likely to apply that group identity in electoral choices. It is for these people that like Rahn, in reference to partisanship, I argue that the cue provided by an ethnic label, is also a “simple and direct cue” that can shape the perceptions and evaluations of candidates. To understand the nature of a Latino ethnic group identity and how it comes to influence political choice I examine the intensity of the identity within a context that makes Latino ethnicity relevant. Based on this examination I develop a model outlining how a Latino group identity, specifically how the substantive component of that identity, can influence the electoral choices of Latino voters.
2.6 Latino Ethnicity

2.6.1 Pan-Ethnicity

Before turning to a specific discussion of Latinos, I will first explain my choice to examine Latinos at the pan-ethnic rather than sub-ethnic level. Pan-ethnicity is a collective term that encompasses persons of Latin American descent without differentiating them based on their or their ancestor’s country of origin. Sub-ethnic identities are those based on the country of origin of an individual or of her ancestor’s – hyphenated Latin Americans (e.g. Mexican-American, Peruvian-American).

I rely on a broad definition of Latino which is, those individuals with a common Latin American origin (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002), regardless of race. This definition is the same as that employed by the United States Census Bureau. With such a broad definition, this category provides for a simultaneously similar and diverse group. There are important similarities, such as language, albeit equally important differences such as country of origin, generation, and race.

Within Latin America a pan-ethnic notion is virtually non-existent. Latino identity is “made in the USA” (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002; Fox 1997; Dávila 2002). Latinidad is almost as American a notion as baseball or apple pie. What has happened is that in the United States larger political and economic forces have made for the relevance of a broad Latino identity. I do not mean to suggest that sub-ethnic identities are unimportant or secondary to pan-ethnic identities. There is no reason for sub-ethnic identities to be in opposition to pan-ethnic identities. They are not mutually exclusive. Pan-ethnicity is a super ordinate identity that by definition encompasses sub-ethnic identities.
Individuals have multiple identities and the application of a particular identity is largely dependent on context (e.g. Brewer 1981; Conover 1988; Kinket and Verkuyten 1997; Huddy 2003). However, in the United States the identity that is contextually most relevant in political and economic realms is at the pan-ethnic level (Dávila 2002; Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002; Torres-Salliant; García 2004). “Because all major federal agencies have chosen to employ the broader pan-ethnic terminology and because of a powerful bureaucratic and market driven impulse to standardize and homogenize… subgroup labels are generally quite secondary to the pan-ethnic construct” (Suarez-Orozco and Páez 2002, 6).

The term “Latino” is the identity that confers political recognition at the national level. As a result of recent demographic trends the pan-ethnic term only promises to gain more relevance. With the growth of the Latino population and their expansion to all areas of the United States, the sub-ethnic homogeneity that was previously characteristic (e.g. Mexican-Americans in the Southwest, Puerto Ricans in the Northeast, and Cuban-Americans in Florida) is no longer the case (McClain and Stewart 2006).

While recognizing sub-ethnic identification differences and their potentially important implications for political choice, I examine the evaluation of pan-ethnically defined candidates. In other words, no sub-ethnic group specification is provided for the Latino candidates under consideration. In the following stages of my work I will consider whether a differentiation based on sub-ethnic identity affects how a candidate is evaluated. But, for now I will focus on the contextually more relevant and common pan-ethnic categorization of Latino.
2.6.2 Relevance in Political Behavior

Qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrate that Latino ethnic identity is indeed a significant predictor of political behavior. The first large scale Latino survey, the 1989 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS), and its subsequent analyses (e.g. de la Garza et al. 1992; de la Garza and DeSipio 1992; DeSipio 1996) empirically established the political relevance of Latino identity for political participation. Variables related to ethnicity (e.g. language, citizenship, length, country of origin) have also figured prominently in studies of Latino political behavior. With regards to turnout, studies have built on the traditional models by incorporating variables more specifically related to Latino turnout (see for example Antunes and Gaitz 1975; Arvizu and García 1996; Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; DeSipio 1996; Díaz 1996; García and Arce 1988; Jackson 2003; Johnson, Stein and Wrinkle 2003; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Lien 1994; Uhlamer, Cain and Kiewiet 1989). Studies of Latino partisanship (Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003; Cain et al. 1991) have also found ethnicity to play an integral part in the formation of partisanship.

Now that the patterns of Latino participation (both at a pan-ethnic and sub-group level) have been established, recent work has probed the nature of Latino identification so as to understand the nexus between Latino identity and political behavior (e.g. García 2004; Rodriguez-Alves 2004; Pérez-Monforti 2004; Barreto and Masouka; Pantoja and Segura 2004; Barreto 2005). Scholarly attention has turned to the implications of group identity upon political participation. In other words, attention has now turned to how
Latino identity matters for political behavior. This research has looked to the black politics literature, specifically that of linked fate and its political manifestations.

Recently, there has been a focus on a Latino group consciousness and more specifically, determining its behavioral implications. This line of research is extremely important, but it has skipped intermediate steps in arriving at the analysis of a group consciousness-political behavior linkage (for an important exception, see García 2004 and Sanchez 2005). Group consciousness is both distinct and more involved than a group membership. Membership is an objective designation of being part of a group. Group identification is a more psychologically engaged concept of identity. It is a subjective awareness of belonging to a group (Conover 1988; Miller et al. 1981). However, neither membership, nor the more involved state of awareness, identification, implies group consciousness. In the theoretical framework I present below I set out to measure the existence and levels of group consciousness.

2.7 In Search of Latino Group Identity

In the following sections I put forth a framework of group identity measurement to properly operationalize whether identity can be measured as a more meaningful entity than a binary category choice. I seek to measure the ethnic identity intensity of Latinos. The key explanatory variables in this dissertation project are the presence of a Latino cue, in the form of a candidate with an ethnic surname, and Latino social group identity. I revisit Raymond Wolfinger’s ethnic mobilization theory by considering whether the “intensity” of an individual’s Latino ethnic group identity, in the face of an ethnic electoral cue, influences the political choice.
I have drawn from social psychology to generate fine grained measures of ethnicity. I operationalize and incorporate the concept of ethnic identity as a multidimensional construct in the empirical examination of Latino candidate evaluation. In particular, I seek to gauge the various contours of ethnic group identity, how it is primed, and its effect on voting behavior. I look at how different dimensions of Latino group identity, together and in isolation, influence the ultimate evaluation of a co-ethnic candidate.

The type of electoral context and voting scenario this project examines is one where the voter has no information about a candidate before entering the voting booth. A political choice based only on cued candidate group identities, specifically partisanship and ethnicity. This is a simplification of a choice that is generally complicated by a number of contextual factors. However, this simplification allows for the development of a baseline understanding of how individuals process information regarding candidates based on shared ethnic group identification. Moreover, this will allow for an understanding of how competing identities are negotiated. Once the baseline effect of ethnic group identity is established, situational factors (e.g. stronger ethnic electoral primes) can then be incorporated into the analysis.

I posit that the nature of an ethnic social group identity is an important factor in understanding individual political decisions. A political decision based on an identity is not simply one of finding an in-group match. Specifically, the substantive meaning of identities at the individual level must be measured. To understand individual level electoral behavior through a group identity framework, these identities must be thoroughly measured at the individual level.
2.8 Group Identities

I rely on Henri Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Leonie Huddy’s re-conceptualization of SIT as a basis for the examination of the influence of social group identities upon political choice. In treating social group identity I use Henri Tajfel’s (1981) definition of group. “Group denotes a cognitive entity that is meaningful to the individual at a particular point in time and must be distinguished from the way in which the term ‘group’ is used when it denotes a face-to-face relationship between a number of people” (254). This definition focuses on the cognitive rather than the physical concept of group. It is a construct that is the product of the simplifications of our environment resulting in the categorizations of our social realities. However, a key aspect of group categorizations, as opposed to object categorizations, for example, is the inclusion of affective components, a “meaningful” entity that compliments the purely cognitive entity. This definition also highlights the situational relevance of a group. In other words, the salience of group identities is relevant depending on particular contexts.

Building on this broad definition of group, I focus on it being a meaningful entity. Ultimately I will show how an identity’s meaning has tangible political choice outcomes. But here, I will first develop the notion of the recognition or acceptance of an identity that reinforces the subjective acceptance of an identity. The explicit recognition of meaning is termed, collective identity.

Collective identity is a term that reinforces the internal, or subjective nature of identity. Like the more basic definition of group, collective identification is also a psychological construct that resides in the individual but is meaningful because of the
existence of a collective. “It is a place in the social world” (Simon and Klandermans 2001, 320).

… first and foremost a statement about categorical membership. A collective identity is one that is shared with a group of others who have (or are believed to have) some characteristic(s) in common. This shared position does not require direct contact or interchange with all others who share category membership; rather the positioning is psychological in nature. Finally, collective identity is defined here in terms of a *subjective* claim or acceptance by the person whose identity is at stake. (2004, 81)

Individuals hold multiple collective identities, many of which are nested within superordinate collective identities. To offer a concrete example, the collective identity of a Cuban-American could be nested within a larger Latino identity, which could in turn be nested in another broader identity. The relevance of an identity upon thinking or behavior largely depends on which identity is made salient by the contextual environment (e.g. Brewer 1981; Conover 1988; Kinket and Verkuyten 1997; Huddy 2003). Identity is a dynamic, fluid, and multidimensional construct that is responsive to shifting contexts (Turner et al. 1987; Oakes 1987; Ethier and Deaux 1994). However, the ultimate influence of an identity made salient within a given context depends on the psychological weight attached to the collective identity in question. In short, every individual has multiple social identities and relies on different identities as a result of: 1.) subjective strength and meaning of an identity and 2.) contexts that prime the salience of a particular identity.

In this dissertation project I use a more specific definition of collective identity, termed social identity. Social identity, in addition to the features of collective identity, is a concept that explicitly contends with the comparative nature of identity— resulting from the constant cognitive process of categorization. Like collective identities, social
identities result from a person’s subjective claim to group memberships (e.g. religion, party, race, and ethnicity). The difference, however, rests in the focus upon the substantive aspects of a group that social group identity places both in regards to intensity and direction, which I will elaborate on below.

**2.8.1 Social Identity Theory**

Social Identity Theory holds that as a result of comparisons, evaluative and emotional components are introduced into the cognitive component of identity. Specifically, Tajfel states, “Social identity will be understood as the *part* of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (1981, 255). The core premise here is that social group comparisons are not neutral. The introduction of these values then has consequences for how judgmental heuristics are informed by a group identity.

Social Identity Theory posits that social identities are made up of two general component parts. The first and most basic aspect of social identities is that of categorization, determining whether one is a member of an in-group or an out-group. The focus here is on the delineation of group boundaries and recognizing who falls inside and outside those boundaries. Beyond the cognitive act of categorizing, the substantive meaning of belonging to a group must be considered. In other words, the categorical conception of groups is of little use if there is no meaning infused in the category. The substantive meaning of a category is the second component of SIT, which is referred to as a motivational factor. In short, this is where the meaning of an identity is found.
Tajfel’s development and elaboration of Social Identity Theory followed mainly from experiments conducted in lab settings. As a result, this theoretical framework was not very sensitive to the endurance of certain politically and socially salient identities across space and time. SIT holds that identities are highly fluid. Empirically, this has been established through numerous experiments, however, this concept of identity fails to take real world contexts into consideration where some identities are more resilient, or chronically more salient in given societal and or political contexts.

In order to consider political identities in less clinical contexts I have drawn from the work of Leonie Huddy and Pamela Johnston Conover who have developed a fuller treatment of motivational factors with regards to the political environment. In particular, I will focus on the nature of the substantive component and its different dimensions. These motivational components together with the pure cognitive act of categorization provide for a generalizable definition of social identity that can then be applied to political thinking and political behavior. In the following two sections I will review the first and necessary pre-condition for social group identity, categorization and then discuss the second, motivational component. In the rest of this project I refer to the motivational component as the substantive component of identity.

2.8.2 Categorization

Categorization is one of the most basic components of human perception. Our environment, either in the form of objects or people, is categorized so as to simplify the complex environments we are confronted with (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Principles

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4 John Turner and his colleagues elaborated upon SIT’s categorization component and developed a theory of self-categorization. Self-categorization much more strongly advocates for the situational nature of context.
governing the categorization of everyday objects are applicable to the categorization of individuals. Just as humans categorize what is a chair versus what is not a chair, humans categorize which groups they are a member of (an in-group) and which they are not (out-groups).

Categorization of our inter-group realities allows us to simplify the world and at the same time define our own identity through the categorical memberships we come to claim. Social categorization provides “category congruent self-definitions that constitutes an element of the self-concept” (Hogg 1996, p.68 ). As simple as it may sound, self-categorization measures a social identity by the answer to: “who am I?” Social categories can be seen as a system of orientation that helps create the individual’s place in society (Tajfel 1981). This answer, however, may largely depend on the context an individual is in.

According to Social Identity Theory, a byproduct of the categorization process is that inter-group differences are maximized, while intra-group differences are minimized. Specifically, an in-group bias accompanies social categorization. An in-group bias is a cognitive consequence of social categorization. The most fundamental type of categorization is that of “us versus them” (Fiske and Taylor 1991), or in-group/out-group. Because of the centrality of the self-concept in all perception, the self and its in-group are positioned in contrast to non-members, or out-groups. In-group biases, or preferences, are further facilitated because once categorized out-group members are cognitively perceived as more homogenous. Attraction to the in-group, and the attribution of more

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5 Gordon Allport’s classic work, *The Nature of Prejudice*, (1954) describes five aspects of the cognitive act of categorization which provide a broad, but useful summary of the cognitive component of inter-group categorization.
positive and consistent behaviors, also provide for differential processing of in- versus out-groups, where information is processed more carefully for in-group members (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Dovidio et al. 1992).

In his SIT, Tajfel argued a minimal basis for in-group favoritism; often just a group label provided for the in-group preference. Tajfel’s assertion for a minimal basis for in-group favoritism was established through a series of laboratory experiments where subjects where randomly assigned to groups and had no contact with other members. The experiment participants had no contact or opportunity to develop a personal bond with fellow group members. In addition, the assignment to the treatments was not only random, but meaningless, for example a group that overestimated dots versus one that underestimated dots in a picture. However, in the experiments which asked participants to assign payoffs to different individuals (who were either in the in-group or out-group), a clear in-group bias was evidenced. The development of an in-group bias stemmed from the mere assignment to a meaningless group, establishing minimal conditions for in-group favoritism.6

The cognitive process of categorization automatically facilitates an in-group preference. The phenomenon of in-group bias, even under minimal group conditions was first established by Tajfel, and over the years has been supported by numerous other studies (see Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992 for a meta-analysis). Ample evidence exists to argue that an in-group membership does produce a preference for a cued in-group.

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6 These results were also used to establish the existence of out-group bias. I do not treat the role of out-group bias here, but in other work, I do not take the position that out-group bias exists a priori. Rather, I posit that it is one possible reaction to an out-group.
However, the in-group bias resulting from categorization is void of substantive information.

The social category is only a label with a cognitive bias toward attraction to the in-group social category. Self categorization is a necessary condition for the development of all other dimensions of collective identity (Phinney 1995). Subsequent evaluations can develop once the initial categorization has taken place. An in-group attraction may suffice for decisional tasks such as Tajfel’s experiments, but other tasks may require more substantive information. Below I will discuss the substantive components, which provide for a more complete account of social identity.

2.8.3 Substantive Group Meanings

Under a purely categorical explanation of social identity, there is no way to differentiate between in-groups. Theoretically all social group identities made salient by a context are equal. A purely categorical account of social identities fails to account for the nature, variance, and ultimate influence of identities. For example, if I am both Republican and Latino and both of these identities are cued in a context but my categories do not have a substantive component I would not be able to decide which in-group to apply to my vote choice decision.

A discussion of a group identity without a consideration of the substantive component is far too removed form social and political realities that exist outside of laboratory settings. According to Social Identity Theory all identities are essentially equal. One’s identity as a student should be equivalent to one’s religious identity if they are cued under separate circumstances. This is an exaggeration, and one that Tajfel tried to remedy with the addition of the motivational component. To account for the
differential meanings groups hold for individuals Tajfel added a motivational component to his original cognitively based model. Tajfel’s motivational component was based on the need for members of high status groups to differentiate themselves from others and as a result possess a strong sense of in-group favoritism.

While an improvement over a purely categorical account of identity the motivational component of SIT is problematic for two main reasons. First, it is unable to account for a multidimensional operationalization of motivation (beyond positive distinctiveness). Second, The original conception of Tajfel’s motivational component is incomplete and non reflective of real world situations where social identities are played out. The strength and endurance of certain identities across space and time was not effectively addressed, “Each of us has many potential identities derived from diverse group memberships, but relatively few of these identities develop or become politically consequential” (Huddy 2001, 137).

Leonie Huddy (2001) addresses the original weaknesses of Social Identity Theory and provides an approach to motivational components that remedies Tajfel’s SIT weaknesses. Huddy also develops these components with the explicit intent to develop quantifiable measures of social groups to apply to the study of political behavior. These factors provide the content that will ultimately allow an individual to make a decision based on their social group identity, based on the substantive meaning contained within a group category. Huddy focuses on the subjective meaning that individuals attach to an identity. For example, rather than assume that all in-groups have a blanket positive feeling toward their in-group, Huddy argues that the nature of those feelings will have important implications for political behavior. The argument she makes is one of causal
heterogeneity—being able to differentiate the meaning of an identity at the individual level will then provide for more precise meanings of political outputs.

In American politics, racial and ethnic divides are at the forefront of the list of meaningful identities (McClain and García 1993; McClain and Stewart 2006). In line with Huddy I argue that certain identities will consistently prove to be more meaningful across space and time. I posit that racial and ethnic identities are of particular salience in the American political context and that special attention must be afforded to the multiple dimensions of these identities. In particular, ethnic group identities, like partisan identities, can be highly salient identities within the political arena and can influence electoral decisions.

The crux of my dissertation question lies in which social group identity will be employed for an electoral choice. More specifically, which identity will be employed if contradictory ethnic and partisan identities are cued. To answer this question I look to the substantive meaning of the identities. In other words, the influence of an identity on a decision will depend on the strength and substance of the salient group identities. Below I will discuss four dimensions of the substantive component of social group identity that together I will term group consciousness. These dimensions infuse meaning into a social group identity, allowing an identity to in turn have a greater influence on political decisions.

To measure the meaning of social group identities once basic categorization is established I look at four identity components: importance, evaluation, interdependence of fate, and behavioral involvement. I term the first three dimensions as direct indicators of group consciousness. I do this because in these types of measures the individual is
asked, point blank how they evaluate a group, the importance they attach to it, and their sense of interdependence of fate. I term the last dimension, behavioral involvement, as an indirect indicator of group consciousness. While behavioral involvement expresses the identity, it is not necessarily an unambiguous measure of social group identity. These types of measures are an expression of identity, but the meaning of an identity is imputed by the researcher. While some measures may be more direct than others and/or more applicable, all of these measures are imperfect measures of a group identity which is unobservable. However, through the use of multiple measures from multiple dimensions I will be able to ameliorate the measurement error inherent in this concept.

**Importance**

Importance measures the psychological centrality of an identity, “the individual’s conscious appraisal of how central a particular self-definition is to the person’s overall self-concept” (Ashmore et al. 2004, 88). This dimension may correlate with evaluation, but it is conceptually distinct.

**Evaluation**

For in-groups it cannot be assumed that a positive association is automatic. The direction (positive or negative) and intensity of an evaluation needs to be accounted for. “…a person might acknowledge an identity as being centrally important to the definition of self (e.g. a compulsive gambler or a smoker) without putting an entirely positive face on the identity” (Ashmore et al. 2004, 86). For racial and ethnic minority groups, the possibility of a negative group evaluation is not unlikely. Lisa García Bedolla (2005) advances the idea that stigma is a crucial consideration for minority group identities. Parallel to the above example, a minority can be aware of her ethnicity and/or race, but
not view this membership positively because of negative experiences related to this group membership.

**Interdependence of Fate**

In the original formulation of SIT, Tajfel put forth the notion of interdependence of fate. This refers to the intersectionality of interests of a person and a group. This results when awareness develops that one’s group membership may significantly dictate how one is treated as an individual. Also, the degree to which group interests are synonymous or interchangeable with personal interests is an important indication of the linkage between oneself and a given group. Simply put, “is what’s good for the group, what’s good for me.” Shared economic, political, and religious interests are just a few examples of where personal interests can be one and the same with a specific group.

The dimension of interdependence of fate has received the most attention in political science. Within race and ethnic politics, Michael Dawson (1994), drawing on Tajfel’s SIT, developed and examined the political implications of this dimension for black Americans. Dawson’s work and other studies have established the existence and political influence of a sense of interdependence of fate, or linked fate, among segments of the black population which then translates into increased political participation and political preferences. In the following analysis I extend Dawson and Tajfel’s work in considering the nature and political implications of interdependence of fate among Latinos.

**Behavioral Involvement**

Measures of behavioral involvement are the most straightforward measures of identity. This is both a strength and a weakness. The clear advantage of behavioral
involvement is the ease with which it can be measured. Taking part in cultural practices is one example of behavioral involvement (Phinney 1992; de la Garza, Newcomb, and Myers 1995). The celebration of ethnic holidays and speaking a language are two ways that behavioral involvement in an ethnic group could be measured. Social embeddedness is another indicator of behavioral involvement. What can be measured here is the extent to which one’s identities are implicated in social networks.

Latinos who continue to use Spanish, maintain ethnically “dense” social contacts with fellow Latinos, and participate in cultural events and practices are living their Latino-ness. The whole spectrum of being Latino or Cubano or Dominicano lies in the daily routine. How one communicates, the composition and content of one’s interactions, lifestyle preferences and behaviors, and extent of affinity toward persons of similar ancestry contribute to the definition of who one is and its relevance to one’s life. (García 2004, 8)

The drawback of behavioral involvement measures is that ultimately, the meaning of the identity (the evaluation, centrality, feelings of interdependence of fate) is imputed by the researcher. Direct and indirect measures may be highly correlated (de la Garza et al 1995), but this is not necessarily the case.

Indirect measures, such as the respondent’s language use or generation are important measures but require the researcher to impute ethnic identification which in turn is likely to lead to measurement error. Traditionally, Spanish speakers and persons closer to the immigration experience are considered to have higher levels of ethnic identification. However, under this rubric a monolingual English speaking Latino could score lower on ethnic identification than a Spanish speaker, even though the former may feel a great deal of Latino ethnic pride or sense of linked fate. Indirect measures are

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7 Behavioral measures of social group identity require a consideration of the opportunity structures provided by the setting (Ashmore et al. 2004).
proxies and can aid in the consideration of ethnic identification, however they should complement direct measures. At the same time, direct measures should be complimented with expressions of identity, measures that gauge an individual’s behavioral involvement in a group.

Above, I have considered the composition of the substantive component of social group identity. I did this because understanding the substantive meaning of identity will facilitate my discussion and empirical analysis of how Latino group identity enters political thinking. The cognitive structure of social identity is based on categorizing in-groups and out-groups. This is a key piece of information, because how information about a cued group is processed depends on which general category one falls into, with information regarding the in-group being processed more carefully. The categorical component of social identity is complimented by a substantive component. To get beyond the cognitive result of having an in-group bias, the substantive meaning of identity must be operationalized and measured.

2.9 From Social Group Identity to Political Choice

2.9.1 Model

Social groups provide organized frames of reference from which to make decisions, political choices not being an exception. The clarity and salience of a social group cue determines *when* a social group identity is likely to influence a political choice. For the purposes of this project, the group cue that is of interest is a Latino group cue.

Social identity is cued and becomes salient as a result of a political contextual environment (e.g. Brewer 1981; Conover 1988; Kinket and Verkuyten 1997; Huddy
2003), such as an ethnic surname on a ballot. The role of context can be thought of as the trigger for the domino effect that ends in the inclusion of ethnic considerations in political decisions. An ethnic cue makes ethnicity relevant. In turn, ethnicity can become cognitively and affectively accessible, lending greater weight to ethnic considerations upon subsequent decisions.

Once a social group is made salient its position as either an in-group or out-group will largely determine how the social group influences political thinking. Group consciousness and pro-group preferences are facilitated when the cued group is an in-group. Greater attention is paid to stimuli relevant to the in-group. A bias arises that favors the in-group in perceptions. The ultimate influence of a social group identity on an electoral choice may depend on the attached meaning. Social identity matters because it determines how information is processed (e.g. in-group information being given more attention) and what weight that information is given.

For Latinos, the role of Latino ethnic group identification, once cued, can influence vote choice depending on one’s ethnic identification intensity level, or the strength and nature of one’s group consciousness in relation to the cued in-group (s). I argue that individuals who closely identify with Latinos as a group, measured on the four dimensions described above, should be more likely to rely on the cued ethnic identity for voting behavior. In my measures I go beyond dichotomous operationalization of identity (present/absent) in order to gain finer grained measures of identity.

Drawing from Social Identity Theory, I set forth a model of Latino electoral choice (see figure 1). A social group identity provides the content for a judgmental heuristic to be applied to a political choice. I posit that a Latino heuristic is applicable
when a Latino cue is introduced to an electoral context. According to the original formulation of SIT, merely priming group identities causes in-group favoritism. In particular, Tajfel argued a minimal basis for in-group favoritism. Based on this I begin with a basic hypothesis that the presence of a Latino candidate will cue in-group preferences leading to the reliance of ethnic group identities in addition to partisanship.

The substantive meaning of in-group identifications is not uniform. As a result, the variance of different dimensions of an identity must be examined. In the figure below I outline the four substantive dimensions I utilize to measure identity. I refer to these four components collectively as, Latino group identity. Importance, evaluation, and interdependence of fate are direct measures of group consciousness. These dimensions all are indicated by full arrows. The last dimension is behavioral involvement. I use a dashed line for this dimension to reinforce that it is an indirect measure of identity. To understand the mechanism linking identity to political choice, measures for all of these dimensions are needed. These dimensions can be correlated, but this must not be an *a priori* assumption. Identity is a multidimensional construct and as a result it must be measured as such.

### 2.9.2 Hypotheses

Based on the classic American vote choice model I put forth a hypothesis that partisan group identity will serve as the main vote choice predictor. Partisanship should have a similar effect for the political choice of candidate evaluations.

$H_0$: Partisanship will be the strongest predictor of vote choice and/or candidate evaluation.
The purpose of this dissertation project is to consider an alternative to the above hypothesis. In particular, examining whether ethnicity has a direct influence on political choice, similar to that of partisanship. I consider the role of ethnicity as a predictor of political choice under two circumstances. The first circumstance is when the partisanship of the Latino candidate is the same as the voter’s; here I hypothesize that the evaluation of this double in-group candidate should be higher than if only one in-group were shared. The second circumstance is if the in-group identities are contradictory. Here I hypothesize that an ethnic in-group bias will lead to the support of the co-ethnic candidate instead of the partisan non-Latino candidate. In short, an ethnic in-group match may be sufficient to affect a political choice.

**H$_1$:** A Latino ethnic group identity, if cued will be an influential predictor of vote choice in addition to partisanship.

**H$_2$:** Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates.

**H$_{2A}$:** If the partisanship of the co-ethnic candidate is opposite of the voter’s an ethnic in-group bias will outweigh partisanship.

A purely categorical account of social identities fails to account for the nature, variance, and ultimate influence of identities. The most basic aspect of social identities is that of categorization, determining whether one is a member of an in-group or an out-group. Beyond the cognitive act of categorizing, the substantive meaning of belonging to a group must be considered. In other words, the categorical conception of group is of little use if there is no meaning infused in the category, however, categorization is a necessary pre-condition for an identity to possess a substantive meaning. The substantive meaning of a category is the second component of SIT, which is necessary for
understanding how an identity comes to influence political choices. The substantive meaning of identities is of particular importance when an individual is faced with a choice among competing in-group identities. The in-group favoritism that an individual will ultimately act on should be a function of the content of the substantive meaning of these identities.

H₃: The greater the substantive component of one’s Latino group identity, the greater the likelihood that that identity will influence a political choice.⁸

Looking at the substantive components I hypothesize that actions do not necessarily speak louder than words. As a result I hypothesize that more direct measures of identity will serve as stronger predictors than measures of behavioral involvement.

H₄: Direct measures of identity are the strongest predictors of group consciousness (in comparison to indirect measures).

In this chapter I have developed a model for examining a Latino group identity. In taking account of the presence or absence of an ethnic cue, I provide for an understanding of when a Latino group heuristic will be employed to evaluate a Latino candidate. I specifically provide for an understanding of how the substantive component of group identity will inform and moderate the employment of this heuristic. Latino social group identity, like any social group identity is one that consists of multiple dimensions. A failure to take these dimensions into account will render an incomplete account of how group identities come to influence political choices. I have presented four dimensions that I will use to measure Latino group identity. In the following

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⁸ At this stage of my work I could only focus on probing in-depth measures of ethnic identity, but in the following stage of my research I will measure partisan group identity in a similar fashion to that of ethnic group identity.
chapters I will empirically and experimentally test the hypotheses I have set out above, with special attention to the operationalization of the four identity components discussed above.

Figure 1: Influence of a Latino Cue on Political Choice
3. Getting to Know the Sleeping Giant: Patterns of Electoral Choice

3.1 Introduction

Latinos are commonly referred to as “The Sleeping Giant.” This reference is rooted in the relatively low political participation rates of Latinos as a whole (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; DeSipio 1996; García 2004; McClain and Stewart 2006) and at the same time the group’s population growth and future growth projections. As enumerated in the 2000 Census, Latinos surpassed blacks as the largest minority group, now accounting for 13% of the population.¹ Latinas also have the highest birth rates, which coupled with immigration makes for the fastest growing population. The growth of the Latino population is not just taking place in large metropolitan areas or traditional destinations such as the Southwest. Latinos are migrating to and settling in non-traditional destinations such as Knoxville, TN and Durham, NC. Finally, the census projects that Latinos will make up 21% of the population by 2020 (U.S. Census Bureau). The sheer population growth of Latinos leads to a reconsideration of Latino political participation and a reconsideration of American politics more generally. The sleeping giant has not jumped out of bed, but there have been audible political rumblings.

Voter registration and turnout rates have been slowly, though steadily increasing (García 2004). In response to the politization of the immigration debate in the mid 1990s

¹ This does not include the Hispanics enumerated in Puerto Rico.
in California, turnout among Latinos has seen a significant and substantive increase (Pantoja, Ramírez, and Segura 2001). In addition to increased participation rates in the electorate there has also been an increase in Latino candidates. Just 30 years ago, the first Latino was elected to the United States House of Representatives. As of 2005, there are 23 members of congress, 2 United States senators and over 5000 elected officials across the nation (NALEO 2005).

Informal modes of political participation in the form of grassroots mobilization have been at the core of Latino political mobilization (e.g. Montejano 1999). Given the inability of a substantial portion of the Latino community to vote because of citizenship restrictions, grassroots mobilization has been and continues to be a primary participatory vehicle (DeSipio 1996). Through both formal and informal channels Latino political participation is moving forward, but not at the same pace, as the group’s rapid population growth. Latinos as a group are gaining a foothold in the American political system. However, their participation in the electoral arena is still far from its numerical potential, leading to a continued unfolding of the Latino political participation story.

3.1.1 Disaggregating the Giant

While catchy, the popular metaphor of the “giant” is misleading in that it too easily suggests that Latinos are a homogenous entity. Latinos do indeed share important characteristics such as language, the immigrant experience, shared minority status, and a colonial influence (Barreto 2005; McClain and García 1993; Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002). However these similarities must be seen as a backdrop for a consideration of...

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2 The recent mobilization of the Latino community in response to the immigration reform is a case in point.

3 With the important exception of Brazilians.
individual level variability. A common ethnic group identity is accessible to Latinos, but an assumption cannot be made that this identity is salient for all. Moreover, the intensity or level of salience is also variable both because of individual level differences and because of differing contextual factors that highlight ethnicity in different forms and intensities.4

To refresh, the general question of this dissertation project is when and how a Latino ethnic group identity can influence a political choice. To address this question I first turn to extant survey data that provides information on the patterns of individual level behavior. These surveys provide representative samples and as a result allow for the generalizability of the results. These results indicate that ethnic in-group identity is a predictor of political choice among Latinos. Moreover, beyond an in-group categorization, more substantive components of identity are key predictors of Latino candidate evaluation.

The first set of data that I will present comes from the 2004 Pew National Survey of Latinos. This survey provides some of the most recent data on Latinos and consists of a representative sample of Latino adults in the United States. This survey allows me to address the basic question of whether Latinos are more likely to vote for a Latino candidate. This analysis sets forth an important baseline from which to later consider how Latinos evaluate co-ethnic candidates in light of competing in-group affiliations or differing campaign contexts. To preview the results, support for a co-ethnic candidate is not automatic. In other words, a co-ethnic preference is not as simple as determining

4 In this dissertation I focus on individual levels of ethnic identity intensity holding the ethnic context constant. However in the extension of this project I will incorporate contextual considerations so as to simultaneously model both individual and contextual variability.
whether the target is an in-group or out-group member. Instead I find that the support for the Latino candidate is best predicted by more substantive components of Latino identity.

The second set of survey data that I examine is from the Latino Issues Forum 2000, which was conducted among a random sample of registered California voters prior to the November election. A number of questions in the survey ask about vote choice intention. Two of these questions are hypothetical and through a comparison of the two I can start to shed light on the role of a Latino ethnic context. Absent any Latino ethnic cue, partisanship is the main predictor of intended vote choice. However when ethnicity is made salient the predictive power of partisanship virtually disappears. With this survey I also further examine the influence of in-group identity on Latino candidate evaluation. More specifically, I can model the preference of a co-ethnic candidate when partisan and ethnic in-group memberships are cued.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Latino political behavior within a framework of causal heterogeneity. Through an examination of the multi-dimensional nature of Latino identity I can get past rhetorical and even analytical constructs that homogenize a group and its behavior. This chapter is the first of three empirical chapters that pursue the task of understanding causal heterogeneity in the political decision making of Latinos. Both of the data sets examined in this chapter are observational studies and as a result do not provide for a determination of causality between an ethnic context and candidate evaluation. However, these results, seen in conjunction with the survey experiments to follow, provide for an internally and externally valid analysis of Latino political behavior.
Following this introduction I will present the findings from the 2004 Pew National Survey of Latinos. Next, I examine two sets of models from the Latino Issues Forum data. The first set will address the role of an ethnic context and the second focuses on how multiple in-groups are negotiated to arrive at an evaluation of an ethnic candidate. To conclude this chapter I will review the findings from both surveys and discuss how the results relate to the hypotheses set out in chapter two.

3.2 2004 Pew National Survey of Latinos

3.2.1 Data, Models, and Measures

The 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Participation was sponsored by the Pew Hispanic Center and Kaiser Family Foundation. This was a telephone survey conducted between April 21, 2004 and June 9, 2004 among a nationally representative sample of Latinos. The total survey sample size is 2,228. The question that I use for the dependent variable was only asked of half the sample. That sample was once again split in half, because a key explanatory variable (Latino Culture Maintenance) was only asked of half the sample, leaving 532 respondents.

With this data I can test H2, which states that Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates. I will also examine the testable implication of H3 that states that the substantive, not just categorical component of identity is influential in a political choice. Lastly, I can also address H4 – determining whether direct or indirect measures of group consciousness are the strongest predictor. The political choice, or dependent variable, I examine is candidate evaluation. In the models below, I analyze whether there is support for the co-ethnic candidate and if there is what types of measures predict this support. I
then turn to an analysis of the magnitude of the effects\(^5\) to understand the relative influence of the different measures.

The basic model I seek to test takes the following form:

\[
\hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1 X + b_2 Z + b_3 W + e
\]

where \(X\) is the set of Latino identity measures, \(Z\) partisan identification, and \(W\) the set of demographic controls.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable measures how strongly the respondent agrees with the statement: “I am more likely to vote for a Hispanic/Latino candidate instead of a non-Hispanic/Latino running for the same office if they have the same qualifications.” The response categories range from one (strongly disagree) to four (strongly agree). The distribution of responses among the four categories is: 19.5%, 17.5%, 23%, and 37% respectively (see figure 2). A plurality of the respondents strongly agrees while a majority agrees, either somewhat or strongly.

From an inspection of the response distribution there is some initial evidence for ethnic in-group favoritism. However, 40% of the respondents disagreed that they were more likely to support a co-ethnic candidate. This distribution seems to suggest that if H2, Latinos support co-ethnic candidates, holds it must be qualified by who will support Latino candidates. The interesting question here is not a yes/no answer—do Latinos support co-ethnics. In the analysis below, I will start to address who among the

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\(^5\) The magnitude of the effect of a variable is most commonly referred to as the substantive effect. I do not use this terminology because of the possible confusion with one of my core theoretical concepts, the substantive component of identity.
respondents is more likely to support a Latino candidate. In the following multi-variate analysis I will be able to determine how identity, measured beyond a simple binary category accounts for co-ethnic candidate preferences.

![Figure 2: Distribution of Responses for Agreeing to Support Co-Ethnic Candidate](image)

**Figure 2: Distribution of Responses for Agreeing to Support Co-Ethnic Candidate**

**Independent Variables**

I will first discuss the measures of Latino ethnic identity, the key variables of interest for this analysis (see table 1). I utilize three measures for gauging the extent of a respondent’s Latino ethnic identification. All of the ethnic identity measures are coded such that higher values indicate higher levels of Latino group identification.
### Table 1: Distribution of Latino Identity Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latino Identity Measure</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Cultural Maintenance</td>
<td>.642</td>
<td>.479</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td>.438</td>
<td>.496</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Language Usage</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.941</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Foreign Born* and *Spanish Language Usage* are traditional measures of ethnicity used in extant research in Latino politics. These measures are indicators of the behavioral involvement dimension. These measures are indirect measures of Latino identity given that the level of identity is imputed from location of birth and language usage. *Foreign Born* is coded where a one indicates the individual was born outside of the United States. The expectation here being that the closer an individual is to the immigration experience the more resilient the ethnic identification.

*Spanish Language Usage* is the second variable used to measure Latino ethnicity, with a positive sign expected. *Spanish Language Usage* is the sum of four items. The scale has an alpha of .85 and an inter-item covariance of .95, thus serving as a reliable indicator of Spanish language usage. The questions used in this scale ask the frequency with which Spanish is spoken at home and at work; the frequency that Spanish television media is attended to; and overall language proficiency. The purpose of this variable is to measure the extent of language usage. I posit that the greater the reliance on Spanish, the larger its effect on identity.

The last ethnic identity measure is a direct or subjective measure of identity, where the question inquires about the importance of Latino culture. *Latino Culture*
**Maintenance** is a dummy variable where a one signifies that the respondent thinks that it is very important for Latinos to maintain their distinct culture. I utilize this measure as a proxy for the centrality dimension of identity.

All three of the identity measures are theoretically related in that they are probing levels of ethnic identification. However, I have hypothesized that there is a distinction between the identity measures based on the different dimensions set out in the previous chapter (centrality, evaluation, linked fate, and behavioral involvement). With the Pew data I can only consider the importance and behavioral involvement dimensions. As a first cut, I ran a Spearman’s rank correlation among all of the identity variables to ascertain their relationship (see table 2). The highest correlation is between the two behavioral involvement measures ($r=.5$). Correlations between other sets are much lower ($r=.25$). These correlations provide very initial support that the three measures, while not totally unrelated, are best grouped into the two categories I have set forth, behavioral involvement and importance.

**Table 2: Latino Identity Correlation Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spanish Language Usage</th>
<th>Non-U.S. Born</th>
<th>Latino Culture Maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Language Usage</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-U.S. Born</td>
<td>.543</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Culture</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls
Given the wording of the question I use for the dependent variable, only a Latino ethnic group identity is made salient. Nevertheless, I included controls for partisan identification and basic demographic characteristics. I do not have expectations about the effect and direction of these variables. I include these variables for exploratory purposes.

I created dummy variables for whether the respondent identifies as a Democrat, Democrat Leaner, Republican, or Republican Leaner. The baseline for partisan identification is no party or independent. I also included education and income controls. I split education into four categories: no high school, high school, some college, college graduate. Income, at the household unit, is also measured by four categories: <$30,000, $30,000-$50,000, >$50,000, income missing. Race is accounted for with the variable white. Males are coded one and females zero. Finally, I generated three variables to account for respondents of Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican origin. The excluded sub-ethnic category includes all other individuals of Latino descent. All of the variables are coded such that a positive effect is expected on the likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate. I do not include a citizenship variable, because the question used for the dependent variable was only asked of citizens.

Before turning to the estimation of the models, I will briefly discuss some of the demographic characteristics of the respondents. A plurality of the respondents identify with the Democratic Party, 41%, 10% consider themselves Democratic leaners. Republican identifiers make up 29% of the sample followed by 8% who are Republican identifiers.

---

6 I utilized various encodings of these controls. For both income and education I also used scales. The key explanatory variables, however, where robust against the various encodings of these controls.

7 The remaining number of respondents was not large enough from anyone group to further categorize by country of origin to then include in the models.
leaners. Non-partisan respondents either identify as Independents, other, or as “don’t know.” For those reporting their household income, the mode income category, consisting of 38% of the sample, is more than $50,000. Roughly half of the respondents were born outside of the United States and a majority has completed high school. Persons of Mexican descent make up the largest group, representing 42% of the sub-sample. Persons of Cuban and Puerto Rican descent follow, 21% and 18%, respectively. The percentage of Latinos identifying as white is 47%.

3.2.2 Results

I estimated three models using ordered logistic regression, presented in table 3. The first model is a baseline model with just the partisan and demographic controls. The intent here is to determine if the inclusion of Latino identity variables in fact improve the predictive power of the model. The second model is the behavioral involvement measures model. The last model, the full model includes the subjective measure of identity, *Latino Cultural Maintenance*, which is used to measure the importance dimension.

To refresh, the dependent variable is how strongly the respondent agrees with the statement: “I am more likely to vote for a Hispanic/Latino candidate instead of a non-Hispanic/Latino running for the same office if they have the same qualifications”, where

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8 I recognize that combining these two groups together is not ideal (Hajnal and Lee 2004). However because of the exploratory nature of the analysis and to not further break down the category I proceed with this broader categorization.

9 The model does not violate the proportional odds assumption. The null hypothesis is that there are proportional odds across the response categories, thus making ordered logit theoretically and empirically the most appropriate model.
a positive coefficient is expected on all ethnic identity measures. In other words, higher levels of identification with Latino ethnic identity should predict the respondent “strongly agreeing” that she would vote for the Latino candidate.  

Since I converted income, education, race, ethnicity, and partisanship into dummy variables, I use College, $30,000 plus, non-white, no party, and other Latino as the baseline categories.

In the first model, the first column of results in table 3, all partisans, with the exception of Republican leaners are more likely to agree to vote for a co-ethnic candidate. Males are significantly less likely to support a co-ethnic candidate. Education, income, race, and sub-ethnic group are not significant predictors in this baseline model specification.

The second model includes the two behavioral involvement measures, or indirect measures of group consciousness. Of these, only Spanish Language Usage is significant (p<.001). The same variables from the baseline are significant. Now, high school and <$30,000 are also significant, both having negative coefficients. In this model, Cubans and Puerto Ricans are significantly less likely to support a co-ethnic candidate, with the latter having a significance level just outside of p<.10. While only Spanish Language Usage is significant, the model fit is significantly improved, passing a likelihood ratio test at p<.001.

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10 I also ran models where I collapsed strongly and somewhat agree/disagree response categories. Results where consistent across the different operationalizations of the dependent variable.

11 What happens is that foreign born is washed out by the additional Latino identity variables. When included by itself it is both significant and positive.
Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression for Latino Candidate Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1. Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2. Indirect</th>
<th>Model 3. Direct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>.444*** (.113)</td>
<td>.375*** (.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Born</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-.023 (.210)</td>
<td>-.034 (.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Maintenance</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>.667*** (.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>.563** (.269)</td>
<td>.570** (.272)</td>
<td>.577** (.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Leaner</td>
<td>.587* (.347)</td>
<td>.669** (.352)</td>
<td>.629* (.352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.476* (.300)</td>
<td>.535* (.299)</td>
<td>.552* (.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Leaner</td>
<td>-.377 (.356)</td>
<td>-.248 (.363)</td>
<td>-.123 (.367)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No High School</td>
<td>-.011 (.248)</td>
<td>-.270 (.256)</td>
<td>-.330 (.257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>-.247 (.228)</td>
<td>-.394* (.232)</td>
<td>-.354* (.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>-.262 (.220)</td>
<td>-.291 (.222)</td>
<td>-.252 (.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$30,000</td>
<td>-.203 (.213)</td>
<td>-.406* (.219)</td>
<td>-.465** (.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000-$50,000</td>
<td>.058 (.215)</td>
<td>-.051 (.219)</td>
<td>-.078 (.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Missing</td>
<td>.087 (.306)</td>
<td>-.053 (.312)</td>
<td>-.020 (.313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.155 (.175)</td>
<td>.073 (.177)</td>
<td>.177 (.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-.328** (.165)</td>
<td>-.328** (.231)</td>
<td>-.350** (.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>.165 (.222)</td>
<td>.060 (.231)</td>
<td>.108 (.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>-.064 (.280)</td>
<td>-.514* (.301)</td>
<td>-.560* (.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>-.184 (.264)</td>
<td>-.403^ (.270)</td>
<td>-.416^ (.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 1</td>
<td>-.120</td>
<td>-.751</td>
<td>-.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 2</td>
<td>-.264</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut point 3</td>
<td>.731</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Squared</td>
<td>26.07**</td>
<td>45.03***</td>
<td>58.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Test</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>18.96***</td>
<td>14.17***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Significant p<.01 ** significant p<.05 *significant p<.10 ^significant p<.10 (one-tailed).
The last model incorporates the measure of *Latino Cultural Maintenance*. This serves as a direct measure of identity, tapping the centrality dimension. This variable is highly significant and positive. The same variables remain significant from model 2. With the inclusion of this one variable, measuring the importance dimension of identity, the model fit improves upon the second model, passing a Likelihood Ratio Test at \( p<.001 \).

The basic hypothesis that Latinos will support a co-ethnic candidate had mixed evidence in the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable. In the following section, where I present the predicted probabilities of the model results I will return to hypothesis 2 to better understand *who* among Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates. With the results from the proceeding analysis I can address the more specific hypotheses that consider what measures of Latino identity predict support for a Latino candidate.

From the results of models two and three, there is evidence in support of H3, that the substantive component of an identity must be considered. If the substantive component was not influential and the categorical recognition of being Latino was sufficient then there should not have been an improvement in model fit by models 2 and 3 upon the baseline model. All individuals in this survey are self-identified Latinos and as a result categorically identify with this group membership. However, I do find that the inclusion of substantive measures of identity, here measured along the importance and behavioral involvement dimensions, better predicts support for a co-ethnic candidate.

---

12 At the beginning of the survey, individuals were asked: “Are you, yourself of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Central or South American, Caribbean or some other Latin American background?” If the answer was no or refused, the interview was terminated.
H4 posits that direct measures of identity, are the most influential components of group consciousness and as a result will be the strongest indicators of political choice. There is initial evidence for this hypothesis in that there was an improvement in the model upon the inclusion of the measure of *Latino Cultural Maintenance*, which is a direct measure of the substantive component of group identity. However, in order to fully consider this result I need to consider the magnitude of the effects. With this information I can also determine which dimension of the substantive component of identity has a greater influence.

### 3.2.3 Magnitude of Effects

Given that the coefficients from ordered logistic regression are not readily interpretable, I calculated first differences for the variables of interest and predicted probabilities for different individuals based on model 3 using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001). An examination of the magnitude of the effects will indicate the relative explanatory strength of the variables and will allow me to more directly address my hypotheses. The data column of table 4 presents the first differences for the ethnic identity measures moving from 0, or the minimum value of the variable, to its maximum value. With the exception of *Spanish Language Usage*, the identity measures are dummy variables and move from zero to one. The other variables in the model were set to their mode: a white, male, Mexican Democrat with less than a college education, and a household income above $30,000.

**First Differences**

By far, the largest effect is that of *Spanish language usage*, where moving from the minimum to the maximum value of language increases the probability of strongly
agreeing that one would vote for the Latino candidate by 29%. The next highest substantive effect is that of *Latino Cultural Maintenance*, at 12%. The remaining identity measure, *foreign born*, was very small (1%), and negative. These results indicate that both types of measures, direct and indirect measures have more than a negligible effect. More specifically, the behavioral involvement measure of language exerts the strongest effect. With both identity measures being not only statistically significant, but also substantively significant there is evidence in favor of H3, that the categorical component of identity is not sufficient. However, H4 did not receive support. *Spanish language*, an indirect measure of Latino identity, was the most influential identity predictor. The measure of centrality, *Latino Cultural Maintenance*, also exerted an effect on the choice to support a co-ethnic candidate, but not to the extent that the behavioral involvement measure of language did.

**Table 4: First Differences from Model 3**
(Moving From Minimum to Maximum Value of the Latino Identity Variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Measure</th>
<th>Strongly Agree to Vote for Latino Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Language Usage</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-U.S. Born</td>
<td>-.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Culture Maintenance</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bolded values are significant at the .05 level

**Predicted Probabilities**

To further consider hypotheses 2-3 I look at the predicted probabilities of supporting a co-ethnic candidate. In regards to the present analysis, support for a co-ethnic should be influenced by shared in-group status, here cued or made relevant by the survey question. This is essentially H2, that Latinos support co-ethnic candidates. This
is a bit of a straw man argument, however one that takes Tajfel’s minimal group
distinctiveness theory outside of the laboratory. H3 posits that the political choices of
Latinos’ will be influenced by the substantive component of ethnicity in addition to the
categorical portion, when cued.

I computed the predicted probabilities of agreeing to vote for a Latino candidate
holding all Latino identity measures at their minimum. This scenario comes closest to a
choice based on only shared category status (see figure 3). I then maximized *Spanish
Language Usage* and *Latino Cultural Maintenance*, the significant identity measures
from model 3 (see figure 4) to consider how responses differed in light of the effect of
identity measures and by the sub-ethnic group of the respondent. A narrow, all-or-none,
interpretation of hypothesis two is that if the hypothesis were to hold true, there would be
minimal difference between the likelihood of agreeing to vote for the Latino candidate
regardless of one’s level of group identity. This is clearly not the case. Moreover, the
likelihood of disagreeing when all identity measures are at their minimum is well above
50% for all groups. The probability of Cubans disagreeing is highest, coming close to
75%. All sub-ethnic groups are significantly more likely to strongly agree to support a
co-ethnic candidate when identity measures are maximized (with Mexicans exhibiting the
highest likelihood across the board). Interestingly, figures 3 and 4 are virtually mirror
images of each other. This result provides further evidence against a narrow
interpretation of H2. In other words, co-ethnic candidate support is not automatic.
Figure 3: Probability of Supporting Latino Candidate when Latino ID at Min

Figure 4: Probability of Supporting Latino Candidate when Latino ID at Max
The predicted probabilities in both of these figures indicate that agreeing to support a co-ethnic candidate not only varies in direction, but also in intensity. For example, the probability of agreeing to support a Latino candidate when all identity measures are maximized for the modal individual (used to compute the first differences) is 22%, but the probability of strongly agreeing is 55%. When all identity measures are held at their minimum the difference in intensity is evidenced most clearly between the “disagree” categories, with 36% strongly disagreeing and 23% disagreeing. Finally, sub-ethnic group differences are present. Cubans are consistently less likely to strongly support the co-ethnic candidate in comparison to their Mexican counterparts who are consistently the group most likely to strongly support a Latino candidate. Puerto Rican respondents tend to fall between Cubans and Mexicans.

In the following two figures I consider the isolated effects of *Latino Cultural Maintenance* and *Spanish Language Usage*. In figure 5 the behavioral identity measure of language is minimized, and I move *Latino Cultural Maintenance* from its minimum to maximum value. The black bars represent the effect of thinking *Latino Cultural Maintenance* is not very important. Under this case, the probability of strongly disagreeing to support a co-ethnic candidate is the most likely response. The predicted probability of disagreeing, either strongly or somewhat is 58%. This further suggests that Latinos will not automatically support the ethnic in-group candidate. Once I maximize the value of the identity measure of importance, the gray bars, the probability of supporting co-ethnic increases. Now the predicted probability of agreeing to support a co-ethnic candidate is above 50%.
Figure 5: Effect of Latino Cultural Maintenance (from min to max)

Turning to the isolated effect of the *Spanish Language Scale*, a similar pattern results. In figure 6 the identity measure of language is moved from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, while *Latino Cultural Maintenance* is held at its minimum value. Lower measures of language usage, the black bars, are related to a lower likelihood of supporting the co-ethnic candidate. Higher values of *Spanish Language Usage*, indicated by the gray bars, evidence an increase in that likelihood. At one standard deviation above the mean of the language scale, the likelihood of agreeing to support the Latino candidate is above 60%.
Figure 6: Effect of Language Scale (one standard deviation below and above mean)

3.2.4 Discussion

The hypothesis that Latinos will automatically support an in-group candidate did not receive much support in this analysis. However, once Latino identity measures are taken into consideration, the likelihood of strongly agreeing to support a Latino candidate significantly increases.

In this analysis I focused on two dimensions of substantive identity: behavioral involvement and importance. This was based on the argument that given the multidimensional nature of identity, multidimensional measures are also required to provide for a fuller account of identity. Spanish Language Usage is by far the strongest identity variable. This conforms to previous research conducted by Maria Felix-Ortiz de la Garza and her colleagues (1995) where language scales were the strongest and most
significant predictors of one’s cultural group identity, beyond that of a number of other indicators. The more subjective measure of *Latino Cultural Maintenance*, however also exerts a strong effect on the likelihood of supporting a co-ethnic candidate. What these results suggest is that while language is a necessary identity measure, by itself it is not a sufficient measure of Latino ethnic identity.

A number of the demographic control variables are significant, where individuals with less education and lower household incomes are less likely to agree to support the Latino candidate. This finding runs parallel to that of Michael Dawson who finds that persons with higher income and education are the most likely to feel a sense of linked fate among their black racial group. Gender is also significant. I am not clear about this result, but in future work will pursue an examination of how ethnic and gender identity intersectionalities (e.g. female Latinas with a high Latino identity) influence political choices. Race was the last demographic control that I included, but it is insignificant. Here again, I will further consider the implications of this result. One possible explanation may be that race is a less salient category for Latinos *when* their ethnicity is cued.

Partisanship, both for Republicans and Democrats has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of agreeing to vote for the Latino candidate. I did not set out any expectations regarding the effect of partisanship. The dependent variable made no mention of partisanship and as a result, the analysis focused more on the degree to which Latino identity predicted Latino candidate support. This was not a test of battling identities (e.g. Latino versus party). The question I pursue in the following survey data analysis is what happens when partisan identity is cued. At that point do Democrats and
Republicans have significantly different preferences? In the experimental chapters I will explicitly consider if partisanship serves as a moderator in the evaluation of a co-ethnic candidate.

The result that a Republican or Democratic identification predicts support for a Latino candidate while no partisan identification does not is interesting and warrants further consideration of how partisans versus non-partisans employ ethnic social group identities in their political decisions. This is an especially important consideration given the growing number of Latinos who do not identify with either of the major parties (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). This result could perhaps suggest that the use of an ethnic group identity is not a default—an identity employed because one does not identify with a party. In short, there is a need to understand when individuals will turn to one of many social group identities in their repertoire to guide a political choice.

3.3 Latino Issues Forum (LIF) 2000

3.3.1 The Introduction of a Latino Group Cue

Hypothesis 0 in this project is that partisanship is the main predictor of vote choice and/or candidate evaluation. The first alternative hypothesis I posited in the previous chapter was that a cued Latino ethnic group identity would also be an influential predictor of vote choice in addition to partisanship. In order to test H1 I need to compare the choices of Latinos in two distinct states of the world where the only thing that varies is the introduction of the Latino cue.

I cannot compare two real situations that are identical in every aspect except for the presence/absence of a Latino cue. The closest I can come to this is through
experimentation. I will undertake this comparison via experimentation in the following two chapters. Here, using an extant observational study I examine data so as to provide a rough sketch of what a comparison between a context absent a Latino cue and one present would garner. I utilize a 2000 survey conducted by the Latino Issues Forum (LIF). This was a telephone survey conducted in February 2000 by the Godbe Research and Analysis firm in Half Moon Bay, California.\textsuperscript{13} The survey contains 750 Latino registered voters in California.

This survey was conducted prior to the November 2000 presidential election. As a result there are a number of questions regarding vote choice intention and candidate evaluation. Among these questions, there are two that make no reference to a real candidate and as a result context is maintained constant. The first, asks whether the respondent intends to vote for a Democratic or Republican candidate for the United States Congress in November.\textsuperscript{14} The second question is hypothetical and prefaced with two brief candidate platforms that are rotated throughout the survey:

A.) Hernandez says state and local governments have too much power to regulate individuals and community life for Latinos in California. Hernandez believes in traditional family values, reducing taxes and increasing job opportunities and reducing crime.

B.) Smith says state and local governments can do a great deal to improve the quality of life for Latinos in California. Smith believes in HMO reforms, improving public education, and providing more affordable housing.

\textsuperscript{13} For more information, see: \url{http://www.lif.org/civic/vote_2000.html}.

\textsuperscript{14} I recognize that there could be some contextual influence based on the reference point of one’s district. However, given that the survey was taken in February of 2000 and the question made no reference to one’s own district I define this as a context-free case.
Respondents are then asked if Smith or Hernandez comes closest to representing their views. The first platform is for a candidate with the Latino surname of Hernandez.\textsuperscript{15} The presentation of this Latino ethnic cue may serve as a prime, making a Latino ethnic group identity an additionally salient group identity in evaluating the candidates. The candidate platforms do not mention partisanship, but the issues presented are very suggestive of Smith being a Democrat and Hernandez a Republican. Wendy Rahn’s partisan stereotype research finds that voters in the absence of partisan cues can process information in a bottom-up form and arrive at a choice that is supportive of one’s partisanship. As a result, the absence of a partisan cue should not preclude respondents from gathering the data they need from the platforms and arriving at a choice that reflects their partisan identity (Rahn 1993).

There are a number of differences between the two questions. The principal one is that the first asks about vote choice intention and the second about candidate views. Next, the first question provides a level of office, while the second does not. Lastly, the question with the hypothetical candidate platforms provides ideological information on the candidates. The comparison between the two questions is an admitted stretch, however one that I will undertake since I will use it for exploratory rather than for confirmatory purposes.

In light of all of these differences, a comparison between both political choice questions will provide at least an idea of whether partisanship is a consistent predictor. This rough comparison will provide insight as to whether a Latino ethnic group identity,

\textsuperscript{15} According to the 1996 U.S. Census surname report, Hernandez is the fifth most common Latino surname in the United States.
if cued will be an influential predictor of vote choice in addition to partisanship (H1). The fictional candidate question can be likened to the introduction of an ethnic cue. The two questions present abstract and virtually context free scenarios from which to make a choice. In the analysis below I will simply look at how partisanship and demographic characteristics predict the responses to the two questions. Again, the intention of this analysis is not for definitively rejecting or accepting hypotheses. Rather it is to provide an idea of what happens at the introduction of an ethnic cue.

Under the null hypothesis that partisanship is the main vote choice predictor partisanship should remain significant across both scenarios, even when ethnicity is made salient in the second. Because partisanship was not made explicit (but is strongly implied by the candidate issue platforms) in the candidate match-up, partisanship may not be as significant as in the first question. However, partisanship should at least be marginally significant. Ideology would be an ideal predictor for both questions and especially for the second question where a more conservative ideology is pitted against a more liberal ideology. Regrettably the LIF survey did not include a question about ideology. Instead, I will include several issues as proxies for ideology.

3.3.2 Variables and Model

I will compare the results from two broadly defined vote-choice models. Given the explanatory variables I have at my disposal I specify the following model:

\[ \hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1 X + b_2 Z + b_3 W + e \]

where X is partisan identification, Z the set of issues that will serve as a proxy for ideology, and W the set of demographic controls.
Dependent Variables

The first dependent variable is whether the respondent intended to vote for a Republican in the national congressional election in November. The vast majority of respondents answered that they intended to vote for the Democratic candidate (see figure 7). The variable is coded such that a one indicates an intended vote for the Republican candidate, and zero a vote for the Democratic candidate. The second dependent variable asks which of two hypothetical candidates, Smith or Hernandez, whose policy platforms were previously read to survey respondents, comes closest to representing one’s views. Please see the previous section for a detailed description of the question wording. The distribution for this answer category is not as skewed as the previous dependent variable. From figure 8 one can see that close to a majority of the sample believes Hernandez comes closest to representing their views. The second dependent variable is coded such that a one indicates an intended vote for Hernandez (the Republican-seeming candidate) and zero a vote for Smith (the Democratic-seeming candidate).

---

16 A small number of respondents answered that they would vote for someone else 3%, 12% answered “don’t know”. These respondents were dropped. I collapsed the definitely and probably categories. I do this because of the skewed nature of the Republican responses and for ease of comparison with the second model.

17 Respondent’s who answered: they would vote for neither candidate, a combination, or did not know, were dropped.
Figure 7: Distribution of Vote Choice Intention for Member of Congress

Figure 8: Distribution of Preference for Smith versus Hernandez
Independent Variables

I created dummy variables for whether the respondent identified as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent. In this survey a majority of the respondents (64%) identify as Democrats, not too surprising given that the sample is drawn from California (see figure 9). I also include four general issue variables from traditional vote choice models as controls. Abortion, gun control, public housing, and environment are all coded to indicate a more conservative position on the issue. Income is coded such that higher values indicate that one falls into a higher income bracket. Howe owner is a dummy variable where a one indicates the individual is a homeowner and a zero, otherwise. All of the variables are coded such that a positive effect is expected on the likelihood of voting for the Republican or Republican-seeming candidate, Hernandez in the second set. I also generated a dummy variable, Mexican, to distinguish respondents of Mexican origin. I do not have a clear expectation on the direction of this variable. However, I want to control for whether a sub-group identity has an influence on behavior and more specifically in regards to the Latino candidate model, whether Mexicans in comparison to other Latinos are more or less likely to support a candidate whose sub-ethnic background is not stipulated.

Before turning to the estimation of the models, I will briefly discuss some of the demographic characteristics of the respondents. The vast majority of the respondents identify with the Democratic Party. The mode income category is $30,001-$40,000, and 60% of the individuals in the sample are homeowners. Over three-quarters of the

---

18 Missing values or don’t know were coded to the mean for following variables: abortion, gun, and environment. The results are similar to analyses with all missing and don’t know values dropped.
respondents are of Mexican descent. For a distribution of the issue variables please see table 5.

![Survey Respondent Partisan Identification](image)

**Figure 9: Survey Respondent Partisan Identification**

**Table 5: Distribution of Issue Position Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Measure</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Control</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.3 Results

Latino Context-Free Model

For the estimation of both of the models I ran binary logistic regression. For the first model the dependent variable is a vote for the Republican candidate. Since I converted nation of origin, partisanship, and homeowner status into dummy variables I use non-Mexicans, Independents, and persons who do not own their home as the baseline categories.

This first model is an analysis of Latino vote choice absent any Latino context, where the choice is between a Republican and a Democratic candidate. In other words, no information on the candidate’s racial and/or ethnic background is provided. Many of the control variables are significant and in the expected direction. More specifically, partisanship is significant at p<.001, with being a Democrat decreasing the likelihood of voting for a Republican and being Republican increasing the likelihood of voting for a Republican member of congress. Those who oppose abortion and gun control, and do not think the protection of the environment is a priority were significantly more likely to vote for a Republican candidate. Mexicans were significantly less likely (p<.05) to intend to vote for a Republican. Overall, the model performs fairly well in that 88% of the cases are correctly classified.
### Table 6: Binary Logistic Regression for Candidate Choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1:</th>
<th>Model 2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of Congress</td>
<td>Smith versus Hernandez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>1.61***</td>
<td>.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.350)</td>
<td>(.321)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-1.22***</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.342)</td>
<td>(.253)</td>
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<td>Affordable Housing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.269)</td>
<td>(.213)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>.170**</td>
<td>.135**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.059)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
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<td>.237**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.134)</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
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<td>Gun Control</td>
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<td>.082</td>
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<td>(.091)</td>
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<td>Income</td>
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<td>(.051)</td>
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<td>Home Owner</td>
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<td>.338*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.286)</td>
<td>(.210)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>-.593**</td>
<td>.379*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-.749*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.573)</td>
<td>(.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Squared</td>
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<td>23.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Significant p<.01  ** significant p<.05  *significant p<.10 ^significant p<.10 (one-tailed).

**Latino Context Model**

Here, the dependent variable is again dichotomous and a one represents a vote for Hernandez, the Republican-seeming candidate, see table 6, column 3. With the exception of the dependent variable, all of the variables are identical to the previous model. As a whole, the model does not do a very good job of predicting a vote for Hernandez; only 66% of the cases are correctly classified. In contrast to the previous model, partisanship
is far from significant. Individuals supporting less restrictive environmental policies and more restrictions on abortion are more likely to support Hernandez, as are Mexicans. A positive and significant coefficient on homeowner indicates that this group is also more likely to support the candidate with the Republican platform.

These results suggest that when a Latino candidate is running, when Latino ethnicity is made salient, partisanship is no longer the primary vote choice predictor. The results from these models need to be taken with many grains of salt. That being said, the result that partisanship is not significant at all is an indication that another identity, namely a Latino identity may be at work. While partisan identification was not significant, some of the issue variables were significant and in a direction consistent with the ideological/partisan platforms espoused by the candidates. A more concrete economic interest, home ownership, was also evidenced as predicting support for a Republican-seeming candidate. I am not sure why Mexicans were significantly more likely to support Hernandez. One possibility is that since the majority of Latinos in California are of Mexican descent the reference point for the respondents of this survey was Mexican. As a result, these respondents in comparison to non-Mexicans may be more likely to support a sub-group in-group candidate.

3.3.4 Discussion

Latinos do party, as evidenced in the results from the first model. However, they do not party all the time, as later seen in model 2. The model that simply inquired about vote choice intention produced results that were not surprising in the least. Republicans would support the Republican congressional candidate while Democrats would oppose the candidate. The issue variables that were significant were consistent with more
conservative individuals supporting the Republican candidate. Interestingly, neither income nor homeownership was significant.

In the second model, where a Latino Republican-seeming candidate was matched against a non-Latino Democrat-seeming candidate, partisanship was nowhere close to significant. However, a number of the issue variables were significant or close to significant. The direction of these issue variables indicated that more conservative Latinos were more likely to support the Republican-seeming candidate, which is to be expected. What is noteworthy from this model, in to reference the classic American vote choice model, is that Democrats were not less likely to support Hernandez. Equally interesting is that Republicans were not significantly more likely to support the Latino candidate, who was also closest to the Republican platform.

A very tentative conclusion that I draw based on the comparison of both models is that upon the introduction of a Latino cue, in the form of a co-ethnic candidate, partisan group identity is not the most salient predictor. At least, it is not the most salient group identity for all Latinos. In other words, there is tentative support for H1 that when ethnicity is cued partisan identity will not be the most influential predictor of vote choice. This in turn suggests that ethnicity may be the most salient identity for the candidate evaluation. In the following chapters I address the limitations of this crude comparison through random assignment to a treatment and control group that only varies the presence/absence of a Latino ethnic cue in the form of a candidate’s ethnic surname. Before turning the experimental evidence of this dissertation project I will look at Latino political choice in light of multiple group identities that are made salient. More specifically, I examine how competing ethnic and partisan group identities are negotiated.
3.4 Multiple Salient Identities

In the *American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) the concept of a funnel of causality was developed in reference to how different identities and issues come to bear on a political choice. Partisanship serves as a summary measure of other identities and/or political beliefs. Ethnic considerations factor into a political choice, but do so having been funneled through a partisan identity. In other words, partisanship tends to be the most immediately relevant identity.

In this project I do not argue against partisanship as the most common output from the funnel of causality. As a social group identity partisanship indeed serves as a heuristic that allows individuals to effectively and efficiently process political information (e.g. Rahn 1993; Lau 1986). However, recent electoral results suggest that ethnicity may not necessarily be as far removed from a political decision for all Americans as held by a classic interpretation of the funnel of causality. The general question of this dissertation is what is the role of Latino ethnicity in vote choice and/or candidate evaluation? In terms of the framework of the funnel of causality, when is an ethnic identity the output of the funnel of causality?

A more specific question of this dissertation is what is the relative weight of a Latino ethnic group identity, vis-à-vis partisanship (H2A)? Put simply, when both partisan and group identities are made salient and they are not congruent, which identity will “win”? If I am a Latino Republican and there is a Latino Democrat on the ballot, will I rely on my partisan or ethnic in-group? How will voters negotiate ethnic and partisan identities so as to ultimately evaluate a Latino candidate? The dilemma of having contradictory social group identities places a voter at an electoral fork in the road.
To understand which road the voter ultimately takes I consider the substantive meanings of ethnic group categories. I look at how different dimensions of Latino group identity, together and in isolation, influence the ultimate evaluation of a co-ethnic candidate.

Hypothesis 2A posits that an ethnic in-group bias trumps partisanship. In the following analysis I consider if partisanship is not the primary predictor of candidate evaluation and ethnicity is, who turns to a Latino political heuristic. H3 states that the greater the substantive component of one’s ethnic group identity, the greater the likelihood that identity will influence a political choice. As a result, I examine the different dimensions of the substantive component of Latino group identity (H4) to better understand how an ethnic group identity comes to influence the evaluation of a Latino target.

3.4.1 Latino Issues Forum, a Second Cut

I return to an analysis of the question examined above, where respondents are asked if Smith or Hernandez comes closest to representing their views. With this question I can start to consider the preference for a co-ethnic, but contra-partisan candidate. The question wording allows for an examination of candidate choice in the face of competing partisan and ethnic in-group identities. To refresh, close to a majority of the respondents indicated that Hernandez, the Republican-seeming candidate came closest to representing their views. Smith, the Democratic-seeming candidate, followed with one-quarter of the sample choosing him. Sixteen percent of the sample felt that a combination of both candidates represented their views, while the remaining respondents did not know or stated that neither candidate represented their views (see figure 8).
As discussed above, in the LIF a majority of the respondents identify as Democrats (see figure 9). According to the classic American vote choice model, one would expect to see Democrats tending to support the candidate with the more Democratic platform, and Republicans, the same with their candidate. With regards to the support for Smith and Hernandez one would expect Democrats to support Smith and Republicans to support Hernandez. In figure 10 I plot the partisan distribution of the sample in conjunction with the response to the candidate evaluation question. One would expect to see the first two bars, Smith and Democrat partisan identification, and the last two bars, Hernandez and Republican partisan identification, to be more or less even. So in this data one would expect around 60% of the respondents to support Smith. This is clearly not the case. Rather, almost a majority of the respondents support the candidate with the more Republican platform, Hernandez.
Because of the survey design I can only consider trumping, or the preference for the co-ethnic, contra-partisan candidate among Democrats. Democratic respondents are the group faced with the choice between competing in-group identities (see table 7). There are a total of 474 Democrats in the sample. Of those, 218, or 46%, chose Hernandez while only 26% of Democrats chose Smith. Democrats were almost twice as likely to choose Hernandez over Smith. While not as surprising, the remaining cells indicate that Republicans and non-partisans were also more likely to state that Hernandez best represented their views.
The support for Hernandez among the sample is supportive of a preference for an ethnic in-group candidate (H2). The support for Hernandez among Democrats in particular is suggestive of the possibility of ethnicity trumping partisanship as a primary influence in candidate choice (H2A). However, without a randomized experiment the effect of a Latino group cue upon vote choice and/or candidate evaluation cannot be determined. For now, based on the response distributions there is initial evidence of an ethnic in-group bias, or at the least, party defection.

Now I turn to a consideration of the influence of the substantive component on identity (H3 and H4) on the likelihood of “party-switching.” Is party-switching most likely to take place the greater the substantive component of Latino identity (H3)? More specifically, are direct measures of group consciousness more powerful predictors of party switching (H4)?

### 3.4.2 Model and Measures

The basic model I seek to test takes the following form:
\[ \hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1X + b_2Z + b_3W + e \]

where \( Y \) is coded one if Hernandez comes closest to one’s views, and zero otherwise. \( X \) is the set of Latino identity measures, \( Z \) the set of issue positions, and \( W \) the set of demographic controls. I do not include partisanship because the sample is constrained to just Democratic identifiers. The intent of this model is to better explain party switching.

**Latino Identity Measures**

The LIF survey allows me to measure the substantive portion of identity along two dimensions, centrality and behavioral involvement. These were the two dimensions I was also able to use in examining the Pew 2004 data. To consider the centrality dimension I use two questions. The first question asks: “Would you be more or less likely to vote in an election where issues important to Latinos had been discussed in depth over the course of the election?” I refer to this measure as *Latino Issues* and the response categories ranged from somewhat less likely (1) to much more likely (4). The second measure of importance I label *Latino Endorsement*. The question wording is, “Would knowing a candidate is endorsed by a Latino organization or group influence your vote choice”, with a four point response scale ranging from definitely yes to definitely no.

To measure behavioral involvement I also use two measures. Like in the Pew models, I include a measure of Spanish language usage. I created a variable, *Spanish*, for whether the respondent primarily spoke Spanish in the home. The second behavioral involvement variable, *Spanish Media*, is a measure of whether one first hears about
campaigns and elections through Spanish or English language media. See table 8 for the
distribution of the identity measures. The correlation among each dimension
approximates $r=0.35$. However, the inter-item correlations across dimensions is well
below $r=0.25$ (see table 9). Not surprisingly, these four items are related, but the
correlation is strongest within dimension measures rather than across in support of the
theoretical distinctions I have set forth. A positive sign is expected on the coefficients for
all of the identity measures.

Table 8: Distribution of Latino Identity Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latino Identity Measures</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Issues</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Endorsement</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Media</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Latino Identity Correlation Measures among Democrats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latino Issues</th>
<th>Latino Endorsement</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Spanish Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Issues</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Endorsement</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Media</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Controls

I attempt to control for the two things that would most likely compete with a pure ethnic social group identity story, income and ideology. Income and the issue positions (abortion, gun control, affordable housing, and environment) are coded the same as in the previous models using the LIF data. Homeowner is also included as a proxy for socio-economic status. A positive sign is expected on the controls. Those with more income, and a more conservative ideology should be more likely to support a Republican-seeming candidate, Hernandez. I also include a sub-ethnic group control, Mexican.

3.4.3 Results

I estimated a model using a logit regression to determine whom among the Democrats in the sample is most likely to cross party lines for a co-ethnic candidate (see table 10). Of the identity measures, Latino Issues and Spanish have positive and significant coefficients. Latino Issues is highly significant while Spanish is only significant at a 95% confidence interval. The remaining two Latino identity measures have no effect. Of the issue positions, those who do not think issues of affordable housing and the environment are important are more likely to choose Hernandez. Opposition or support to abortion has no effect. Neither income nor owning a home has an effect. Finally, Mexicans are significantly more likely to see Hernandez as best representing their views.
Table 10: Binary Logistic Regression for “Switching”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Issues</td>
<td>.354***</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Endorsement</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>.482**</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Media</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable Housing</td>
<td>.429*</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>.222*</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Control</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Owner</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>.643***</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.60***</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>444</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Squared</td>
<td>32.42***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Significant p<.01 ** significant p<.05 *significant p<.10 ^significant p<.10 (one-tailed).

First Differences

The data column of table 11 presents the first differences for the ethnic identity measures moving from 0, or the minimum value of the variable to its maximum value. Both behavioral involvement measures are dummy variables and move from zero to one. The variables were set to their mean and the dummies to their mode: a Mexican homeowner who supports public housing.

Table 11: First Differences from “Switcher Model” (from min to max value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hernández Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Endorsement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The largest effect is that of *Latino Issues*, one of the two centrality dimension measures. Moving from the minimum to the maximum value increases the probability that a Democrat would indicate that the co-ethnic but contra-partisan candidate best represented one’s views by 29%. The next largest effect is that of *Spanish*, where those who speak primarily Spanish in the home are 11% more likely to support Hernandez in comparison to non-Spanish speakers. The remaining identity measures, which are not significant, are also not large; both measures are below 4%. These results indicate that measures from both the importance and behavioral involvement dimensions exert a modest to strong effect on the likelihood of party switching among Democrats. With both identity measures being not only statistically significant, but also substantively significant there is evidence in favor of H3, that the categorical component of identity is not sufficient. Hypothesis 4 also received support in that a direct measure of identity was the strongest predictor of switching.

Predicted Probabilities

Based on the baseline individual I used to compute the first differences I now compute the predicted probability of supporting Hernandez. In figure 11 I consider the effect of both *Latino Issues* and *Spanish* at different levels. Along the X-axis are the different values of the *Latino Issues* variable where a four represents one is much more likely to turnout if Latino issues are discussed in the election. The gray bars represent those who speak mainly Spanish in the home. The black bars represent those not speaking mainly Spanish.
As belief in importance of *Latino Issues* in a campaign increases (moving from left to right on the X axis) so does the probability of choosing Hernandez. More specifically, the probability of supporting Hernandez among Spanish speakers is consistently higher. The predicted probability of choosing Hernandez as the candidate that best represents one’s views is only 30% among non-Spanish speakers for whom Latino issues in a campaign are not important. At the other extreme the probability of supporting Hernandez is over 60% among Spanish speakers for whom the treatment of Latino issues within a campaign is important. *Latino Issues* at its maximum value increases from 61% to 71% depending on whether the respondent primarily speaks Spanish.
3.4.4 Discussion

With this model I have further established that a Latino group identity can serve as a significant predictor of Latino candidate support. More specifically, this analysis indicates that among Democrat partisan identifiers in California the support for a co-ethnic, contra-partisan candidate is significantly predicted by more substantive components of Latino identity. Identity measured both along the importance and behavioral involvement dimension contributes to an explanation of among whom ethnicity can trump partisanship as a primary predictor of candidate evaluation.

The overwhelming support Hernandez received from the survey respondents is evidence in favor of H2, that Latinos will support a co-ethnic candidate. More specifically, party switching by the part of Democrats is supportive of H2A. Support of the Latino ethnic in-group candidate as opposed to the partisan in-group is what Wolfinger observed close to 40 years ago and termed, the Mobilization Theory of Ethnic Politics. Beyond observing support for Hernandez, I was also able to determine how the substantive components of identity influence the evaluation of a co-ethnic, contra-partisan candidate. Among Latinos who spoke Spanish and saw Latino issues as important, the likelihood of supporting Hernandez is greatest. In other words, among those Latinos for whom identity measured along these two dimensions is highest so is the likelihood that they employ their ethnic in-group identity in political decision making.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

The idea of a “sleeping giant” conjures a vision of Latinos as one large homogenous entity. The results from this chapter and ongoing work in Latino political
behavior demonstrates that there is definitely no giant hiding in the shadows. Put bluntly, all Latinos do not love *all* Latinos nor are *no* Latinos influenced by group identities in addition to partisanship. A rhetoric of absolutes is easy to fall into, but harmful in the false dichotomies it creates. Evidence garnered in this chapter sees heterogeneity both in what identity is a principal influence of choice and in the intensity of identity at the substantive level.

Based on the results presented in this chapter I have been able to address hypotheses one-four. Hypothesis one states that a cued ethnic group identity will be an influential predictor of vote choice in addition to partisanship. In the first set of Latino Issues Forum data I examined, there is indirect evidence for H1. When ethnicity was cued in the hypothetical candidate match-up partisanship was no longer a significant predictor as it was earlier in the Latino context-free election. I cannot conclude that an ethnic heuristic takes the place of a partisan heuristic. However, evidence from the Pew survey and the LIF survey make this not an unrealistic possibility.

The next hypothesis is a very broad statement, Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates. The Pew 2004 survey provides measures that come the closest to testing this hypothesis that is only based on ethnicity. From the distribution of the responses to whether “I am more likely to vote for a Hispanic/Latino candidate instead of a non-Hispanic/Latino running for the same office if they have the same qualifications,” this hypothesis, based on Henri Tajfel’s minimal group distinctiveness theory, is refuted. However, the rejection, of this hypothesis leads to the more fruitful endeavor of determining who among Latinos is more likely to be influenced by shared ethnic in-group status with a candidate.
This leads me to a consideration of hypotheses three-four that consider how Latino ethnicity measured beyond a binary in-group/out-group categorization influences political choice. Both surveys provided evidence that indicated that the greater the substantive component of one’s ethnic group identity the greater the likelihood that identity will influence candidate evaluation in favor of the ethnic in-group candidate. Through these results I was also able to determine that the traditional measures of behavioral identity, termed indirect measures, are important but not to the exclusion of more direct measures such as those measuring how an individual evaluates the importance of one’s identity. In other words more direct and indirect measures of identity complement each other as seen in both the models and the predicted probabilities, which better demonstrate the magnitude of the effects.

Hypothesis 2A, like hypothesis 2, deals with an ethnic in-group preference. However, H2A specifically posits that an in-group bias may trump a partisan in-group preference. Based on the last set of models from the LIF data, there is evidence that party switching is significantly predicted by substantive components of Latino group identity. The analysis of the Democratic sub-sample indicates that party switching is not a general phenomenon. Put differently, there is not an automatic ethnic in-group bias; instead an in-group bias is determined by the level of substantive in-group identification.

In sum, this chapter has garnered evidence in favor of the existence and employment of a Latino group heuristic. Its application varies among Latinos. Moreover, its influence depends on substantive levels of identity and the type of political choice at hand. As a whole, the results from this chapter reinforce the argument that while Latinos do party, they do not party all the time. Ethnicity is not automatically
subsumed, into a partisan identity. In the presence of a relevant Latino cue ethnicity may serve as a principal judgmental heuristic for political choices.

The limitations of the preceding analysis stem from two principal factors. The first is that I cannot provide for a determination of causality between the presence of an ethnic cue and political choice. This is a limitation that is inherent to observational data itself. With the data from this chapter I cannot definitively establish if the party-switching outcome is due to a systematic ethnic in-group identification effect or to chance alone. The second limitation is that I was able to only roughly operationalize my concepts and variables of interest. In particular I was only able to measure the substantive component of identity along only two of the four dimensions. In reference to the analysis of party switching I was only able to consider this question with regards to Democrats.

Because of these reasons I turn to an experimental methodology in the following chapters. There I will be able to provide internally valid results. Additionally, I was able to design my own survey instrument to gauge all four of the identity dimensions. The analysis from this chapter has provided important insights into the use of an ethnic group identity in candidate evaluation. Ethnic identity, measured beyond a binary variable and at a substantive level, was seen to provide greater explanatory leverage with regards to the political choices of Latinos in the presence of a Latino electoral context. In the experiments I will further probe these relationships and provide additional tests for the hypotheses tested here.
4. What’s in a Name? Cued Ethnic Identity and Candidate Evaluation

4.1 Introduction

At the beginning of this dissertation project I noted a number of recent electoral outcomes where Latino voters chose a Latino candidate opposite of their party (e.g. San Francisco, Miami, and Houston). In the survey data analysis of the last chapter a similar pattern was seen in a preference for the ethnic in-group candidate. These survey results and electoral outcomes where ethnicity “trumps” partisanship are suggestive of a causal relationship. In other words, the preference for a co-ethnic candidate seems to result from an ethnic electoral context, in the form of a Latino candidate, making for an assumed causal relationship not much of a stretch.

That ethnicity and not partisanship serves as the primary predictor of vote choice and candidate evaluation for Latinos is a very strong assumption to make in light of the classic American vote choice model. There are also a number of recent elections where partisanship has stood its ground in the face of ethnicity. One example is the loss of Rich Rodriguez to Calvin Dooley in a race for California’s 20th Congressional District seat in 2000 (Michelson 2005).¹ This district is a majority Latino district, where the majority of

¹ Another notable example is Texas’ 23rd U.S. congressional district, encompassing El Paso and its adjoining areas. Henry Bonilla, a Mexican-American represented this majority Latino district from 1992 to 2006. However, Henry Bonilla is a Republican and had never been able to attract more than 20% of the Latino vote in his district (Flores 2004).
the Latino electorate is Mexican-American and Democratic. Rich Rodriguez is also Mexican-American, however he ran as the Republican candidate. His opponent, Dooley is a white Democrat. In this election, ethnicity did not trump partisanship. Dooley, the candidate who shared the partisanship of the majority of the Latino electorate won that election.

In the Rodriguez-Dooley contest the assumption can be made that, in accordance with the classic American vote choice model, partisanship was the main vote choice predictor and that only the (R) or (D) beside the candidates’ names were of relevance. This may be the case, but there were a number of observable (and of course, unobservable) factors in this electoral contest that prevents the establishment of a valid causal inference. First, Dooley was a long time incumbent, and the advantage of incumbency is a well documented finding in political science. A second factor that confounds the relationship between choice of in-group and application to vote choice is the larger political climate of California in reference to Latinos. Michelson discusses how following Governor Pete Wilson’s administration of the 1990s a “Wilson hangover” in California set in. Former Governor Wilson was a proponent and key actor in putting in place anti-Latino legislation (e.g. Proposition 187). As a result, Michelson acknowledges that the reticence of Latinos in the 20th Congressional District to vote for a co-ethnic may have been influenced by a pre-disposition to consider the partisan identification of the candidate that was opposite that of Pete Wilson.

4.1.1 All Extremes are Bad…

The loss of Rodriguez may have been a result of the Wilson hangover. However the same electoral result may have occurred if Wilson had never existed. What I have
sought to illustrate is that just as a causal assumption that a cued ethnic identity will
trump partisanship, the opposite assumption—that ethnicity does not trump
partisanship—is not scientifically valid until tested experimentally. Both assumptions are
potentially wrong. As of late the Latino politics literature has found evidence supporting
each side of the debate of whether ethnicity can trump partisanship (e.g. de la Garza and
Cortina 2005; Graves et al. 2000; Barreto 2005; Manzano and Vega 2006). The problem
is that this evidence only examines patterns of voting. Heretofore there has not been a
test of causality. The only manner to shed light on the competing assumptions is through
experimentation. When both partisanship and ethnicity are made salient which is the
primary group identity that influences candidate evaluation and/or vote choice?

In this chapter I examine the results from an experiment I designed with the sole
intent of disentangling the effects of partisan and ethnic group identity on political
choice. This will allow me to determine if a cued Latino group identity causes the
preference for the ethnic in-group candidate, even at the cost of preferring a contra-
partisan. More specifically I have hypothesized that the answer to this question of which
group identity is at work in guiding political choice—partisan or ethnic identity—is not a
mutually exclusive, dichotomous choice set. It is not a matter of black or white or that
Latinos party all the time or that they all stay home. What is of interest is the gray area in
between. Which Latinos will rely on their ethnicity, which will not and when?

To examine the “gray area” in between the two extremes of only relying on a
partisan or ethnic in-group identity I specify models that allow for a differentiation of
preference based on levels of ethnic identity. This allows for causal heterogeneity—the
possibility that Latino ethnicity does serve as a primary predictor of political choice but
only among one segment or segments of the Latino population. I examine the influence of ethnicity on the choice or rejection of an ethnic in-group candidate. I consider if ethnic group identification, *moderates* the effect of a Latino cue.

Hypothesis 2A specifically addresses the situation of contradictory group identities, such as those faced by Democratic Mexican-American voters in the Rodriguez-Dooley contest. The experiment presented below focuses on the candidate evaluation of Latinos for a co-ethnic but contra-partisan candidate. In examining the influence of ethnicity I will also be able to address hypotheses 3 and more specific hypotheses regarding the moderating role of Latino identity. In short, through the analysis of the experiment results I will be able to determine if a direct effect exists and/or if the relationship between a cued ethnic identity and political choice is moderated by different dimensions of ethnic group identity.

Before turning to the experiments, the next section will provide a brief methodological discussion. In particular, I will consider the nature of a causal explanation; inquiry via the introduction of an intervention. The third section of the chapter will present the design, procedure, and measures of the experiment. Following this section I will discuss the moderating role of ethnic group identity. Next, I present the experiment results. I present two sets of models for candidate evaluation. The first set is based on results from a question regarding candidate preference while the second set is based on candidate feeling thermometer scores. Within each set is a direct effects model and then a model where the treatment is moderated by identity. I conclude with a discussion of the experiment results in light of the hypotheses that I posited.
4.2 Experimental Methods

4.2.1 Causal Inference

At the root of this dissertation project is an inquiry about how a change in one variable leads to a change in another variable. How does the introduction of a Latino cue influence a subsequent political choice? Simply put, what is the cause and effect? To determine this relationship both the cause and effect must be isolated and accurately measured. In measuring cause and effect within an experimental framework I arrive at a parameter estimate that governs this relationship. I also obtain a measure that is internally valid.

Experiments provide a procedure for valid causal inference; providing a procedure for determining exogeneity. Through random assignment to a treatment or control group, where all observations have the same probability of being assigned to the treatment, exogeneity can be determined. Randomization guarantees that the effect of the intervention introduced is the only factor that is responsible for the correlation evidenced. Moreover, because the intervention is introduced by the researcher the direction of the correlation is also known.

Random assignment balances the unobservable and observable characteristics of subjects. In other words, through a procedure of random assignment alternative reasons for a causal relationship are definitively ruled out. The key here is that unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for because of randomization.\(^2\) However, assignment to a treatment or control group on a random schedule is a necessary but not sufficient

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\(^2\) There are instances when data that has been generated through a random procedure is not balanced as evidenced by a difference of means test. While not desirable, this does not indicate that randomization failed.
condition for internal validity. There are threats to internal validity which may occur (for example the contamination of the post-test by a pre-test that is not fielded with enough time in between) and must be taken into consideration so as to conclude that one’s causal inferences are valid (e.g. Campbell and Stanley 1963; Cook and Campbell 1979).

4.2.2 Methodological Synergy

The strength of an experimental method lies in its ability to isolate cause and effect measures which then provides for the ability to measure the resultant relationship. Experiments, as a result of randomization, are one of the most efficient methods that provide for a valid causal inference. In short, there are no model assumptions to be made, because the relationship is testable and alternative causal factors are neutralized through random assignment.

The strength of experimentation, in being able to isolate cause and effect measures, is also one of the experiment’s greatest weaknesses. The exercise of determining causality is one that requires a narrow focus where only a few interventions, or variables, can be assessed at a time. This translates into an inability to address the big, sexy questions of social scientific inquiry (Green and Gerber 2002).

A second weakness of the classical experiment is its lack of external validity. External validity is the generalizability of the experiment findings. Because a sample is not randomly generated (not to be confused with random assignment) the findings are not representative of a larger population. However, to determine the success of a non-

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3 However, both internal and external validity can be attained if an experiment randomly assigns a representative random sample to a treatment and control. Another form of experimentation that also provides for external validity is field experimentation (e.g. Green and Gerber 2000b).
experimental causal estimation based on a representative sample, it must be judged
against an experiment.

Non-experimental analysis, after all, is only informative to the extent that nature
performs a convenient randomization on our behalf or that statistical
correctives enable us to approximate the characteristics of an actual
experiment. Ironically, whether non-experimental research succeeds in any
particular application is difficult to discern empirically without a true
experiment against which to compare it. (Green and Gerber 2002, 808)

Specifically, a baseline of internal validity is necessary so as to further the examination of
more generalized findings. Experimental and non-experimental work, if designed to
reinforce each other, can provide a rich methodological base for social scientific inquiry.

At the beginning of this chapter I highlighted the nascent debate in the Latino
politics literature regarding whether a cued ethnic group identity could serve as a primary
predictor of political choice. Persuasive evidence exists on both sides of the debate.
However, data analysis that is internally valid has yet to be carried out. What this means
is that while extant data analysis (including my own) has controlled for important
observable characteristics there is still the possibility that we are not accounting for
unobservable heterogeneity.

In the experiments I conduct I seek to provide a methodological baseline from
which to consider the results of large N observational studies. Survey analysis provides
for the crucial element of external validity. My purpose in this dissertation is to provide
for a valid causal inference that is of use to the specific question of determining the effect
of a Latino ethnic cue on political choice. My more general purpose is to lay the
groundwork for a methodological synergy between experimental and non-experimental
work. In providing internal validity to questions of interest, survey work can then pursue
these questions and attain generalizable, externally valid results. In sum, the strengths and weaknesses of different methodological approaches offset one another. In establishing an internally valid causal relationship, the causal estimation of subsequent non-experimental work can be carried out more accurately and confidently.

4.3 Experiment Design

In chapter two I set out a number of hypotheses concerning the relationship between a cued ethnic group identity and the political preferences of Latinos. In the analysis below, I focus on H2A: If the partisanship of the co-ethnic candidate is opposite of the voter’s an ethnic in-group bias may “trump” partisanship. By doing this I first seek to determine if there is a direct relationship.

As discussed in my theoretical chapter, I hypothesize that the effect of a Latino ethnic cue will not exert a uniform effect. As a result, I stipulated hypothesis 3 that considers the role of ethnic group identity as an additionally relevant factor. Building on these hypotheses, I put forth an additional hypothesis that considers the moderating role of ethnic identity. The results that will be presented below are from a survey experiment designed to test whether the relationship between a cued Latino identity and political preference is direct, moderated, or just plain non-existent.4

The scope of the experiment presented in this chapter is limited to the evaluation of a co-ethnic, contra-partisan candidate. Latino participants in the treatment were presented with a Latino candidate opposite of one’s partisanship. For example, if I am a

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4 At this stage I was not able to determine if the relationship is also mediated through ethnic identification. To do this I would have had to provide the treatment prior to the identity questions to determine if the treatment (independent variable) affected the mediator.
Latino Republican, I was presented a candidate match-up where the candidate with a Latino cue (ethnic surname) is a Democrat. The intent here is to disentangle the effects of partisanship vis-à-vis ethnicity. Specifically, I am interested in how competing ethnic and partisan group identities are negotiated and which one ultimately comes to influence a decision. The experiment manipulated the salience of ethnicity, in the form of an ethnic candidate and the post-test measured candidate evaluation. To refresh, the expectation is that those in the treatment group, where ethnic identity is made salient, will be significantly more likely to prefer the Latino contra-partisan candidate.

4.3.1 Design and Procedures

I designed a 1 X 2 post-test only control group experiment. The experiment operationalizes a Latino ethnic electoral context, in presenting a candidate with a Latino candidate surname. The treatment presents a co-ethnic, contra-partisan candidate, see table 12. Participants in the treatment were presented with a choice of competing in-groups—a Latino contra-partisan candidate matched against a non-Latino partisan. Latino respondents in the control group were presented with two non-Latino candidates, one a Democrat, the other a Republican.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contra-Partisan Treatment</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Experiment Participants</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to present the participants with a contra-partisan candidate I first had to determine their partisan identity. I was able to do this through a survey pre-test conducted one month prior to the experiment. In this survey pre-test I also included a battery of ethnic identification questions that will serve as the measures for determining if ethnicity moderates the effect of the treatment.

4.3.2 Location, Timing, and Participants

The participants were University of Arizona students in one of six Mexican-American Studies department courses. The pre-tests were administered in mid October 2005 and the experiment and post-test was administered one month later in November. The cover story for this survey experiment was that this was a survey on current events and the political attitudes of young people. So as to not cue ethnicity in either the pre-test or experimental phase no mention was made that this was a Latino targeted survey or that only courses in Mexican American Studies were being sampled. Also, all students (Latinos and non-Latinos6) were surveyed so as to further ensure that ethnicity was not cued. Students were compensated with snacks and entrance into a raffle for one of five $25 gift certificates to the university bookstore.

Ninety-nine Latino students completed the pre-test. These students were then randomly assigned to either the treatment or control group, all having the same probability of getting the treatment. The list of participants was randomized using a

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5 For those participants who were neither partisans nor leaners, they were assigned the survey version based on their ideology, with more conservative individuals being presented with a Democratic Latino if one was assigned to the treatment. There were three people for whom this was done. There were two individuals who did not indicate a partisan preference and who were ideologically moderate, the survey version was thus randomly assigned based on a random number generator.

6 In addition to not cuing ethnicity, non-Latino students were surveyed so that at a later date I can examine how ethnic out-group voters evaluate Latino candidates.
random number generator. Of the 99 pre-test respondents, 87 completed the post-test, with 45 participants in the control group and the remaining 42 in the treatment. Before turning to a discussion of the experiment measures I will briefly describe the general characteristics of the student sample. Students enrolled in these courses were mainly college sophomores and juniors. However other undergraduate and graduate level students were sometimes enrolled in these courses. Almost two-thirds of the participants were Latinas. The average respondent was born in 1982, with the modal year being 1984. Only 5% of the sample is married and a majority (72%) is Catholic.

Table A1 in the appendix breaks down the pre-test sample by group status (control or treatment) and compares their observable average characteristics. The top half of the table displays the demographic attributes of the sample. With the exception of ideology, none of the observable characteristics are significantly different among those in the treatment and control. This is an especially curious result given that the distribution of partisans is not significantly different between the two groups. While this outcome is not desirable it is the result of a completely randomized procedure. The bottom half of the table displays the ethnic identity scores. Here again, none of the observable ethnic identity measures are significantly different between groups. A comparison of means among the sub-sample (N=87) that completed both the pre-test and the post-test and the original pre-test group (N=99) is the same in terms of only ideology being significantly different between the groups. All other observable characteristics are statistically equivalent across treatment and control groups.

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7 I did not ask for the respondent’s exact year of schooling. In the survey I only asked for the last grade or class completed in school. The instructors of the courses informed me of the general enrollment characteristics of the students.
4.3.3 Measures

Treatment

The treatment was presented as a brief candidate platform embedded in a very short survey. The treatment was modeled on the candidate platform used in the 2000 Latino Issues Forum survey. The main change that I made was explicitly stating the partisan identity of the candidates.\(^8\) The treatment is the presence of a Latino contrapartisan candidate (Victor Hernández),\(^9\) making ethnicity salient through a Latino surname, matched against a non-Latino partisan (Andrew Simmons). The control group is simply presented with two non-Latino candidates, one a Democrat, the other a Republican (Simmons and Root). Candidate Andrew Simmons always shares the partisanship of the participant, both in the treatment and control group.

I modeled the treatments based on the LIF candidate platforms for two reasons. The first reason is that I wanted to use a basic treatment so as to have a baseline measure of the effect of an ethnic context. This is an admittedly subtle treatment. But the intention here is to later develop richer and more “realistic” cues of ethnicity. In the following stages I will incrementally increase the strength of the cue to determine the contextual threshold at which a direct or moderated effect materializes. For example, a stronger and more realistic cue that I will utilize in the future is a television advertisement that emphasizes the Latino background of the candidate. The intent of the present treatment was to see if an ethnic surname alone would be a strong enough prime to make

\(^8\) I also spelled Hernández with an accent. In the Latino issues forum the Hernandez was spelled without an accent.

Latino ethnicity salient. I decided against an extreme effect because this experiment is the first step in a larger long-term research program. Eventually I will work up to consider an extreme effect, but in the meantime I will work my way through subtle to moderate effects.

Table 13: Treatment and Control Platform Scripts

**Contra-Partisan Treatment**
(the treatment version a Democratic Latino would read)

Democratic candidate Andrew Simmons says state and local governments can do a great deal to improve the quality of life for individuals. Simmons believes in HMO reforms, improving public education and providing more affordable housing.

Republican candidate Victor Hernández says state and local governments have too much power to regulate individuals and community life. Hernández believes in traditional family values, reducing taxes and increasing job opportunities.

**Control**

Democratic candidate Andrew Simmons says state and local governments can do a great deal to improve the quality of life for individuals. Hernández believes in HMO reforms, improving public education and providing more affordable housing.

Republican candidate Peter Root says state and local governments have too much power to regulate individuals and community life. Root believes in traditional family values, reducing taxes and increasing job opportunities.

The second reason I based my treatment on the LIF platform is that this will provide a comparison, albeit very rough, with the survey results from chapter 3. The LIF survey design allowed me to consider the preference of Latino Democrats for a Latino Republican-seeming candidate. However, because survey respondents were not

---

10 Non-Latino candidates can also make Latino identity salient in an electoral context. For example, George W. Bush in highlighting the Latino heritage of his nephew. Alternatively, Latino candidates can have non-Latino surnames. For example, New Mexico’s Governor, Bill Richardson. I will account for these electoral contexts in the development of future treatments.
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups the causal estimation of the candidate
evaluation of Latinos for a co-ethnic, contra-partisan is problematic. In the present
analysis I will provide for internal validity and will compare and contrast the
experimental and non-experimental results in the concluding chapter.

4.4 Moderation

4.4.1 Domains of Maximal Effectiveness

To refresh, hypotheses 3 posited that individual levels of ethnic identity will
influence how a Latino cue is processed and ultimately evaluated.

H3: The greater the substantive component, or group consciousness, of one’s
group identity, the greater the likelihood that that identity will influence a
political choice.

In this chapter I will put forth a more specific variant of H3, through which I can consider
the moderating influence of ethnic identity. Moderators affect the relationship between a
dependent variable and an explanatory variable. “…the moderator function of third
variables, partitions a focal independent variable into subgroups that establish its domains
of maximal effectiveness in regard to a given dependent variable” (Baron and Kenny
1986, 1173).

In the analysis below I am interested in determining whether identity moderates
the relation between political choice and the ethnic candidate treatment. A basic model
of moderation contains three components: a predictor, a moderator, and an interaction
between the two (see figure 12). The parameter of interest is the interaction, the bolded
line. A significant coefficient indicates that the relationship is indeed moderated. The
significance of the remaining coefficients is not theoretically relevant to determining moderation (Baron and Kenny 1986).

**Figure 12: Moderation Model**

I designed the survey experiment, described above, with the purpose of considering how the causal relation between a Latino cue and a political choice changes as a function of ethnic identity. In other words, based on differences in ethnic identity among what group or groups is the treatment’s domain of maximal effectiveness? I formally state this hypothesis 5.

H5: The effect of a Latino cue on a political choice will be moderated by one’s Latino ethnic identity.

A final moderating consideration that I must include is the role of partisanship. The treatments are designed to assess the effect of a presentation of a *contra-partisan* Latino candidate. My interest here is not specific to examining Republican Latinos or Democratic Latinos, but that of a partisan out-group. However, just as I consider how an
ethnic in-group identity moderates political choice, I must also consider the role of a partisan group identity. In the following models I consider the possibility that the vote choice intention and candidate evaluation of the participants is dually moderated by ethnicity and partisanship. I do not have clear expectations about the effect of partisanship, namely whether Democrats or Republicans are more likely to prefer a contra-partisan. As a result, I simply put forth a hypothesis where I consider the moderational role of partisanship.

H6: Partisan group identity will significantly moderate the effect of a Latino cue on political choice.

Ideally I would have measured partisan group identity in a similar fashion to that of ethnic group identity. However, at this stage of my work I could only focus on measures of ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{11}

4.4.2 Measures of Moderation

In the survey pre-test that I fielded in October 2005 I asked a battery of questions to measure Latino ethnic group identity. The types of identity questions asked fell under one of four categories: importance, evaluation, linked fate, and behavioral involvement. These four categories, or what I term components, of identity were discussed at length in chapter 2. To refresh, the last component—behavioral involvement—is an indirect measure of identity since the meaning of an identity is imputed by the researcher, for example those speaking more Spanish identify more with their Latino ethnic background. The remaining three categories are more direct measures of ethnic identity.

\textsuperscript{11} The partisan identification question does ask about identity intensity. However given my sample size I could not include this measure along with the necessary interaction terms.
Latino ethnicity is an intangible and as a result, elusive construct. To the extent that it exists, there are various ways to measure it. For instance I can gauge a respondent’s Latino ethnicity by asking them how often they feel pride in the accomplishments of Latinos. Yet at the same time, I can also measure a respondent’s identification with Latinos by assessing how much he or she believes their individual fate is tied to the fortunes of Latinos in general. Both of these measures arguably get at the construct of interest in an imperfect way. But, neither does so without error. My objective then is to measure Latino ethnicity in a reliable fashion that minimizes error in my measurement of this construct.

There are various ways to measure identity and while social identity measures have a long history in social psychology to date they have not been used to consider the role of Latino identity on political behavior. As a result, for this first survey experiment I wanted to include as many identity measures as possible and err on the side of including more rather than less questions. Given the battery of identity-related questions embedded within this survey, I can make progress toward reliably measuring the construct of Latino ethnic identity.

Drawing on established ethnic identity research in the area of social psychology I employ various measures to tap the four components which fall under the two broader direct and indirect identity dimensions. The findings of a meta-analysis on identity conducted by Richard Ashmore and his colleagues (2004), guided my decision of which particular questions to make use of. I also relied on the research of Jean Phinney who has extensively researched racial and ethnic minority identities (1992; 1996; 2003). In all, I included 25 questions probing ethnic identification (see survey in appendix). Roughly
one quarter of these were each directed at a specific identity dimension. From these measures, I constructed four factors based on the identity components discussed in chapter two (importance, evaluation, linked fate, and behavioral involvement). In the moderation models I will make use of these four factors as moderators.

### 4.5 Candidate Preference

#### 4.5.1 Candidate Preference Measures

Immediately following the candidate platforms, the participants were presented with a posttest to measure their preference for the candidates (see appendix for post-test). The first question asked, “Does Simmons or Hernández come closest to representing your views?” The choices provided were: Simmons, Hernández (or Root if in the control group), neither, or a combination (see figure 13).

At the end of the post-test I included two questions as a manipulation check. No participant indicated that the purpose of this study was to consider the relationship between a cued Latino identity and political choice. Also, no one had, “heard any details of the survey before their participation today.”

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12 There were also questions probing ethnocentrism. These measures will be used in the second stage of this project where I consider how non-Latinos (ethnic out-group) evaluate Latinos candidates.
There is initial evidence in support of the partisan hypothesis, that individuals will prefer a partisan candidate, even if that candidate is an ethnic out-group. The distribution of the response categories to the question asking which candidate comes closest to one’s views shows that a plurality of the participants think that Simmons comes closest to representing their views (42%). However, almost the same number of participants indicated that a combination of both Simmons and the contra-partisan candidate best represent their views. At this point, it can not be determined if the choice of the combination category is significantly higher (or lower) for those exposed to the treatment. This will be addressed in the regression analysis below.
4.5.2 Direct Effects

I first test for a direct contra-partisan effect. Here I test the possibility that Latinos, regardless of their partisan identity and substantive ethnic identification are only influenced by the Latino cue. Simply put, I consider if Latinos exposed to the ethnic candidate are more likely to “switch” and prefer the contra-partisan than those in the control where no ethnic cue is made salient. The basic model specification is:

\[ \hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1X + e \]

The X term represents the treatment. None of the experiment participants refused to participate in the study. As a result I do not have a failure-to-treat problem and can proceed with the above model specification.

The candidate preference question asked which candidate came closest to representing one’s views. Respondents could choose the partisan candidate (Simmons) the contra-partisan candidate (Hernández in the treatment/Root in the control), a combination, or neither. I dummied out these answer categories and modeled the likelihood of the participants choosing each of these options one at a time. In other words, I regress the treatment on four dependent variables. I used Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Given that we have relatively less knowledge and confidence about how MLE performs in small samples I am more cautious in the interpretation of these results.

Table 14 presents the logit results for the candidate preference measures. The treatment has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of indicating that the contra-partisan comes closest to representing one’s views. Those exposed to the Latino cue are significantly more likely to see the contra-partisan as representing one’s views. None of the other models evidence a significant effect, where those in the treatment are
neither more nor less likely to support the partisan candidate, a combination of both candidates, or neither.

Table 14: Binary Logit Direct Treatment Effect Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Partisan</th>
<th>Model 2 Contra-Partisan</th>
<th>Model 3 Combination</th>
<th>Model 4 Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>-.365 (.440)</td>
<td>1.19* (.715)</td>
<td>.013 (.442)</td>
<td>-.668 (.894)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.223 (.300)</td>
<td>-2.64** (.598)</td>
<td>-.499* (.307)</td>
<td>-2.32** (.524)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant p<.05 (two-tailed); *significant p<.10

4.5.3 Moderation

One of the key arguments in this dissertation has been for causal heterogeneity. Sweeping generalizations about the individual preferences of group members cannot be made without first examining their individual level preferences. It is not unrealistic to suppose that for some Latinos an ethnic candidate cue may influence one’s political choice, while for another it may not. More specifically, I have hypothesized that the likelihood of choosing a candidate based on one’s ethnic rather than partisan in-group will be influenced by the nature and level of one’s ethnic group identification. Additionally, I have hypothesized that partisan identity may further moderate this relationship.

To determine if and how ethnic and partisan identities moderate the effect of the treatment I specified models with 3-way interactions.

\[
\hat{Y} = b_1X + b_2Z + b_3W + b_4XZ + b_5XW + b_6ZW + b_7XZW + b_0
\]
In this model X is the treatment, Z is the set of ethnic identity measures, and W is partisan identification. I ran each model with only one factor measure of ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{13} Given my sample size I could not include more than one ethnic factor measure as a moderator at a time. However in the following chapter I can include more moderators at a time because the total sample size is N=655.

The three-way interaction allows me to determine if partisan identity in fact moderates how the treatment is moderated by the ethnic identity variable. To preview the results below, I find that the three-way interaction is significant thus demonstrating the need for this model specification. Specifically, if b4 were significant and b7 were not, then I would have evidence that the treatment is only moderated by ethnicity or if b5 were significant and b7 were not, then I would have evidence that the treatment is only moderated by partisanship. Instead I find that the effect of the treatment on candidate evaluation and vote choice intention is dually moderated by partisan and ethnic group identity.

The total sample size in the present experiment is N=87. This is a small sample, but moreover, I am placing significant demands on the data with a three-way interaction specification. Indeed most of the logit models could not converge. However, I was able to successfully estimate the preference for the partisan candidate, Simmons. The binary dependent variable is coded 1 for choosing Simmons, the partisan candidate, and 0 otherwise.

\textsuperscript{13} I also ran each model with an individual measure of identity (e.g. “Do you think what happens generally to your ethnic group in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life). The results are consistent with those for models using the factor scores. However, I rely on the factor measures as moderators for theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, ethnic identity is a latent measure that requires multiple imperfect measures to recover the unobserved variables. Empirically, the results for the factor scores are more robust.
I would have especially liked to consider how the contra-partisan candidate was evaluated in this question that asked, “which views come closest to your own.” I am not able to do this; nevertheless, a consideration of the evaluation of the partisan candidate, in light of the introduction of a Latino candidate, is as important a consideration as the evaluation of the Latino candidate himself. This is particularly important in reference to the partisan hypothesis, where partisanship is the principal predictor of vote choice and as a result the partisan candidate should always be the preferred choice, regardless of their ethnicity.

The Latino contra-partisan treatment is significant when moderated by two components of Latino identity—behavioral involvement and linked fate (see table 15). Given that logistic coefficients are not readily interpretable and triple interactions less so; in Table 16 I present the substantive effect of the treatment on preference for the partisan candidate (Simmons), holding ethnic identity and partisanship at different values.

The results indicate that Latino ethnic identity indeed moderates the effect of the treatment (H5). The treatment is also moderated by partisanship (H6), indicating that the effect of the treatment is not uniform in light of partisan and ethnic identification differences. Republicans scoring low on the behavioral involvement factor are 65% more likely to vote for Republican candidate Simmons, moving from control to treatment (see Table 16). The effect of the treatment was strongest among this group. What is suggested is the acceptance of an ethnic out-group candidate by those members with a low measure of ethnicity as measured by behavioral involvement. Put differently, those with lower levels of Latino ethnic identity are those least likely to make a choice based
on their ethnicity, supporting the ethnic in-group candidate, and by extension those most likely to support a non-Latino.

Table 15: Binary Logit Moderational Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5 Behavioral Involvement</th>
<th>Model 6 Linked Fate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Contra-Partisan</td>
<td>-.341 (1.28)</td>
<td>.572 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.804 (.769)</td>
<td>1.03 (.776)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Factor</td>
<td>-.133 (.783)</td>
<td>.779 (1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican*Identity</td>
<td>-.314 (.898)</td>
<td>-1.10 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment*Identity</td>
<td>-3.12 (2.17)</td>
<td>-5.23* (2.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment*Identity</td>
<td>4.41** (2.29)</td>
<td>5.26* (2.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor*Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.975 (.678)</td>
<td>-.965 (.692)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant p<.05 (two-tailed); *significant p<.10

Turning to Democrats, among those scoring low on the behavioral involvement and linked fate factors, the effect of the treatment leads to a decreased probability of preferring the partisan, but non-Latino candidate—Simmons. Specifically, those Democrats scoring on the lower end of the linked fate and behavioral involvement factor measures are 37% and 31%, respectively, less likely to prefer Simmons when moving from control to treatment.
Table 16: Substantive Effect of Treatment on Preference for Partisan Candidate (Simmons), Holding Ethnic Identity and Partisanship at Different Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Ethnic Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate Factor Scale</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>-.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Involvement Sale</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnic Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate Factor Scale</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Involvement Sale</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bolded values are significant at p<.10

4.5.4 Discussion

A direct treatment effect was only seen in model 2, the contra-partisan preference model. Exposure to the Latino cue had a positive effect on the likelihood of indicating that the contra-partisan candidate came closest to representing one’s views. Aside from this direct effect, the only other treatment effects were seen in the moderated models for partisan preference. Given the data limitations and model demands this was the only dependent variable for which a full set of results could be garnered.

The effect of the Latino cue was moderated in the partisan preference model. However, the moderation was only seen at the lower levels of the factors of linked fate and behavioral involvement. The strongest treatment effect was seen as moderated by the behavioral involvement factor, a result that was not anticipated in accordance with H4 which expected more subjective than objective measures to function as stronger moderators.
The effect of the treatment is dually moderated by ethnic identity and partisan identity. This result provides support for the general moderating hypotheses H5 and H6. Republican Latinos with lower levels of Latino identity, measured by behavioral involvement, were more likely to support the partisan non-Latino candidate. In contrast, their Democratic counterparts were less likely to support the partisan candidate. The partisan candidate then received support from Republicans and by extension it is then possible that these same Republicans would have been less likely to support the Latino contra-partisan candidate. The effect of the treatment among Democrats with lower linked fate and behavioral involvement scores, leads to a lower likelihood of preferring the partisan candidate. Again, an extension of this could be that these same individuals are more likely to support the Latino contra-partisan candidate.

In short, the above results indicate a difference between how Republican and Democratic Latino respondents prefer partisan candidates. Republicans, and in particular those with lower levels of Latino identity measured by behavioral identity were seen to prefer Simmons as a result of the introduction of the Latino cue. The opposite result occurred among Democrats and leads to a consideration of how different components of Latino identity do not have a uniform moderating effect across Latinos.

### 4.6 Candidate Feeling Thermometers

#### 4.6.1 Candidate Feeling Thermometer Measures

Following the candidate preference question the survey experiment participants were asked to evaluate both candidates using feeling thermometers. Participants were presented with a feeling thermometer set asking them to rate how favorable one felt
toward the candidate on a 10-point scale from (0) Not Favorable at All to (10) Very Favorable. The mean score for the partisan candidate is 6.32. In other words, a score slightly right of the neutral mid-point, indicating a greater feeling of favorability for this candidate. The contra-partisan thermometer score was also to the right of the neutral midpoint, but less so, the mean score being, 5.56.

Table 17: Distribution of Candidate Evaluation Thermometer Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra-Partisan</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6.2 Direct Effects

I first test for a direct effect. Here I test the possibility that Latinos, regardless of their partisan identity and substantive ethnic identification are only influenced by the Latino cue (H2A). Simply put, I consider if Latinos exposed to the ethnic candidate cue are more likely to indicate a more positive evaluation of the Latino contra-partisan candidate than those in the control where no ethnic cue is made salient. I also consider if the presentation of a Latino cue causes a change in the evaluation of the partisan candidate. The basic model specification is:

\[
\hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1 X + e
\]

The X term represents the treatment. None of the experiment participants refused to participate in the study. As a result I do not have a failure-to-treat problem and can proceed with the above model specification.
I estimated these models using Ordinary Least Squares regression. Higher values represent a more positive evaluation of the candidate under consideration (partisan or contra-partisan). I also created a thermometer difference score where I subtract the score of the partisan from the contra-partisan thermometer score. Each individual then has a thermometer difference score where higher values indicate one’s preference for the contra-partisan candidate vis-à-vis the partisan candidate and higher scores represent a more favorable rating of the contra-partisan candidate. The results from the thermometer difference scores are consistent with the results for the partisan and contra-partisan thermometer scores individually, and simply provide an additional angle from which to consider the results. Table 18 presents the results and from here it is evident that the treatment did not have an effect. Exposure to the Latino cue neither increased nor decreased the evaluation of the candidates along the thermometer measures.

Table 18: Ordinary Least Squares Direct Treatment Effect Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 7 Contra-Partisan Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 8 Partisan Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 9 Thermometer Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Contra-Partisan Treatment</td>
<td>.062 (.390)</td>
<td>.483 (.430)</td>
<td>-.421 (.614)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.53** (.271)</td>
<td>6.09** (.299)</td>
<td>-.555 (.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant p<.05 (two-tailed); *significant p<.10

4.6.3 Moderation

To further test the moderation hypotheses (H5-H6) I need to specify a model where I allow for the possibility that the effect of the Latino contra-partisan treatment is
moderated either by ethnicity or partisanship, or both. Similar to the candidate preference analysis, to determine if and how ethnic and partisan identities moderate the effect of the treatment I specified models with 3-way interactions.

\[
\hat{Y} = b_1X + b_2Z + b_3W + b_4XZ + b_5ZW + b_6XW + b_7XZW + b_0
\]

In this model \(X\) is the treatment, \(Z\) is the set of ethnic identity measures, and \(W\) is partisan identification. I ran each model with only one factor measure of ethnic identity\(^{14}\) and I included only one ethnic moderator variable at a time.

To refresh, the expectation is that exposure to the Latino contra-partisan treatment will increase the likelihood that Latinos will prefer the ethnic in-group candidate, allotting this candidate a higher evaluation score than the non-Latino contra-partisan (H2, H2A). More specifically, I expect that the effect of the treatment will not be uniform. Based on the moderation hypotheses I expect the effect of the treatment on the preference for both the partisan and contra-partisan candidate to be moderated by the level of one’s Latino ethnic identity. I did not hypothesize as to the direction of the effects because of the newness of these questions. However, short of stating a directional hypothesis, I do expect those Latinos who have higher levels of Latino identity, measured by any of the four factors, to be more likely to more positively evaluate their fellow ethnic in-group candidate. By extension, those same Latinos should be less likely to more positively evaluate the ethnic out-group candidate.

\(^{14}\) I also ran each model with an individual measure of identity (e.g. “Do you think what happens generally to your ethnic group in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life). The results are consistent with those for models using the factor scores. However, I rely on the factor measures as moderators for theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, ethnic identity is a latent measure that requires multiple imperfect measures to recover the unobserved variables. Empirically, the results for the factor scores are more robust.
The effect of the treatment, moderated by ethnic identity and partisanship is not uniform. To begin, the moderating effect of ethnicity varies across partisan groups. Among Republicans I find the effect of the treatment moderated by two of the factor scores, importance and behavioral involvement. Among Democrats the treatment is only moderated by behavioral involvement and for only one of the dependent variables, the contra-partisan candidate thermometer.

Below, I will first present the thermometer models moderated by the importance factor, followed by the set of models moderated by behavioral involvement. Given the difficulty in interpreting the coefficients of triple interactions I will graphically display the results and discuss the direction and significance of the effects following the presentation of the tables.

Table 19 indicates that a number of the interactions are significant. Double interaction terms alone can not be interpreted in the presence of significant triple interactions. In all three thermometer models, the triple interactions are significant, meaning that the effect of the Latino contra-partisan treatment is dually moderated by partisanship and ethnic identity. In other words, levels of Latino identity have a different moderating role on the treatment among Latinos based on their partisan identification.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 10 Contra-Partisan Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 11 Partisan Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 12 Thermometer Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Contra-Partisan Treatment</td>
<td>-.664 (.776)</td>
<td>-3.79 (3.01)</td>
<td>-.281 (1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-1.07* (.623)</td>
<td>1.72 (2.46)</td>
<td>-.851 (.956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance Factor</td>
<td>.644 (.484)</td>
<td>1.00* (.613)</td>
<td>-.157 (.742)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment*Republican</td>
<td>.975 (.901)</td>
<td>6.12* (.359)</td>
<td>-.057 (1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment*Importance Factor</td>
<td>-1.57* (.825)</td>
<td>1.24 (1.903)</td>
<td>-3.01** (1.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican*Importance Factor</td>
<td>-1.08* (.592)</td>
<td>-.556 (.760)</td>
<td>-.146 (.908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment<em>Republican</em>Importance Factor</td>
<td>1.71* (.972)</td>
<td>-1.84* (1.10)</td>
<td>3.21** (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.40** (.537)</td>
<td>3.00 (2.03)</td>
<td>.287 (.824)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant p<.05 (two-tailed); *significant p<.10**

I computed the coefficients and the standard errors for the triple interactions. This allowed me to determine that the effect of the treatment is seen only among Republicans. Among Republicans scoring high in the importance dimension the treatment variable is significant. That is, compared to the control group, those who were high in the importance factor score were significantly less likely to support the co-ethnic, contra-partisan candidate. After computing the standard errors for the partisan thermometer model it became apparent that the treatment was not significant in moderating this dependent variable. However, the thermometer difference model is significant and exhibits a similar pattern to the contra-partisan thermometer. Figures 14-15 graph the
moderating effect of the importance factor scale, going from control to treatment (left to right on the x-axis).

To present the results from the three-way interaction OLS models I follow the presentation format suggested by Aiken and West (1991), where I graph the regression of Y on X (treatment) at levels of Z (ethnic identity), with graphs created at different values of W (partisan identity). I present graphs for the models where ethnicity significantly moderated the effect of the treatment. The graph shows the effect of the Latino candidate treatment by ethnic identity level. Within each graph there are two lines, the gray line representing those with low levels of ethnic identity along the ethnic identity factor measure at hand. The black line represents higher levels of ethnic identification. “Low /High” ethnicity is only in reference to the specific ethnic identity measure that serves as a moderator within a model. In other words, it is not a composite score for each individual. A dashed line signifies at which point, or among who in the sample, the interaction is significant at the p<.10 level.

Republicans high in the importance factor of Latino ethnicity are significantly less likely to prefer the contra-partisan candidate when exposed to the Latino cue. More specifically, in moving from the control to the treatment the evaluation of the contra-partisan candidate decreases by approximately two points. The same patterns is evidenced with the thermometer difference model. For the thermometer difference measure, in the control group there is not much of a difference in the preference of the partisan over the contra-partisan candidate based on level of ethnic identity. However, in moving to the treatment a divergence in scores readily appears. There is a preference for the partisan non-Latino candidate over the co-ethnic, contra-partisan candidate by four
thermometer points. What these results indicates is that for Latinos for whom their ethnic identity is of high importance, the preference for a co-ethnic contra-partisan decreases. There appears to be a rejection or distancing from the Latino candidate by those in Latino contra-partisan treatment in contrast to those in the control where the contra-partisan is non-Latino.

![Figure 14: Effect of Treatment on Contra-Partisan Thermometer (for Republicans Moderated by Importance Measures)](image_url)

**Figure 14: Effect of Treatment on Contra-Partisan Thermometer (for Republicans Moderated by Importance Measures)**
Next, I look at the moderating effect from the behavioral involvement factor (see table 16). Similar to the previous set of models, a number of the double interactions are significant. For example in all three models the effect of partisanship is moderated by the behavioral involvement factor. The treatment is also moderated by the behavioral involvement factor in models 14 and 15. However, in light of the significant triple interactions I must consider the dual moderation of both identities on the treatment. I computed the coefficient and standard errors for the triple interactions in all three models.
Table 20: Ordinary Least Squares Moderational Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 13 Contra-Partisan Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 14 Partisan Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 15 Thermometer Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Contra-Partisan Treatment</td>
<td>-2.50 (2.19)</td>
<td>4.69* (2.44)</td>
<td>-7.20** (3.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-1.53 (1.63)</td>
<td>1.97 (1.82)</td>
<td>-3.50 (2.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Involvement Factor</td>
<td>.007 (.802)</td>
<td>.260 (.891)</td>
<td>-.253 (1.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment*Republican</td>
<td>5.53** (2.51)</td>
<td>-4.99* (2.79)</td>
<td>10.52** (3.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment*BI Factor</td>
<td>.877 (1.24)</td>
<td>-2.63* (1.38)</td>
<td>3.50* (1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican*BI Factor</td>
<td>.192 (.911)</td>
<td>-1.27 (1.01)</td>
<td>1.46 (1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment<em>Republican</em>BI Factor</td>
<td>-2.40* (1.41)</td>
<td>3.16** (1.57)</td>
<td>-5.56** (2.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.44** (1.44)</td>
<td>5.75** (1.60)</td>
<td>.700 (2.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant p<.05 (two-tailed); *significant p<.10

Unlike the models moderated by the importance factor, here the treatment is seen among both Republicans and Democrats, however the effect being more robust among the former. Latino Republicans scoring lower on this dimension are more likely to support the partisan candidate, less likely to support a contra-partisan Latino candidate, and also less likely to support the contra-partisan vis-à-vis the partisan in the thermometer difference model moving from control to treatment (see figures 16-18). The treatment effect is seen among those low in ethnicity. In short, the effect of the Latino contra-partisan treatment among Republicans results in a distancing from the co-ethnic.
Figure 16: Effect of Treatment on Contra-Partisan Thermometer (for Republicans Moderated by Behavioral Involvement Measure)

Figure 17: Effect of Treatment on Partisan Thermometer
Among Democrats the treatment was only significant for one of the behavioral involvement moderation models, for model 13, the Contra-partisan thermometer. In contrast to their Republican counterparts with lower behavioral involvement factor scores, the treatment has a positive effect in the evaluation of the contra-partisan. Moving from the control to the treatment, the contra-partisan thermometer score increased from slightly above the mid-point to a score of 6.7 for those with lower scores of behavioral involvement (see figure 19).
4.6.4 Discussion

As seen in the direct effects models, the treatment does not have an effect on the evaluation of the candidates along the thermometer measures. An in-group match by itself does not lead to a change in the evaluation of either the contra-partisan or partisan candidate. Hypothesis 2A does not receive support, however, the moderation hypothesis (H5) does. The treatment was moderated by ethnic identity, and had an effect principally among Republicans. However, I find a rejection of the co-ethnic candidate. I had not explicitly hypothesized this, but it is a very interesting finding and further supports the contention that it can not be assumed that “all Latinos love all Latinos.”

Republicans high in ethnicity along the importance dimension are significantly less likely to prefer the contra-partisan candidate over the partisan candidate moving from
control to treatment. A similar pattern is found in the models where behavioral involvement is the moderating factor. In contrast to the models moderated by the importance factor, the rejection or distancing of the contra-partisan candidate is now seen among those Latinos with lower levels of identity, measured by behavioral involvement. Republicans that score low on the behavioral involvement dimension factor are less likely to prefer the contra-partisan candidate over the partisan candidate, moving from control to treatment. In short, among Republicans there is a clear preference for the partisan candidate vis-à-vis the contra-partisan candidate as a result of exposure to a Latino cue and when this treatment is moderated by ethnicity. The effect of the treatment among Republicans differs by level of identity indicating the need to consider the differing effects, moderational roles of identity components that while they are tapping the same underlying construct may have differing effects when broken apart.

Finally Democratic Latinos are only influenced by the treatment in the evaluation of the contra-partisan candidate and when the effect is moderated by the behavioral involvement factor. In contrast to Republicans, the effect of the treatment is positive, meaning that exposure to the Latino cue leads to a higher evaluation of the contra-partisan candidate. Based on these results, it seems the effect of a Latino cue on candidate evaluation leads to ethnicity “trumping” partisan identity among Democrats, lending support to H2A.

While the contra-partisan thermometer score was influenced by the treatment among a segment of Democrats this was the only significant model. In other words, the moderated treatment effect had a limited effect among Democrats. At the same time, there is not a clear distancing or “rejection” evidenced by Democrats toward the non-
Latino, partisan candidate. These non-results are suggestive of Rodolfo de la Garza’s argument that Democratic Latinos “dance with the one that brought them” (the title of his 2005 American Political Science Association conference paper with Jeronimo Cortina) and that they will not abandon their partisanship just for a “pretty Latino name.”

4.7 General Results Discussion

The results from the above models indicate that there is not a sweeping direct or moderated treatment effect. Instead there are more subtle, yet suggestive findings that provide initial evidence for the question of how Latinos evaluate Latino and non-Latino candidates. This first experiment suggests a rejection and/or indifference of the co-ethnic contra-partisan that arises among particular segments of Latinos.

Looking just at the frequencies for the candidate preference question there is a suggestion that there is support for the partisan hypothesis. A plurality of the respondents did indicate that the partisan candidate as the most preferred, but 51% also indicated that the contra-partisan candidate or a combination of the partisan and contra-partisan candidates were their preferred choice. In the direct effects analysis the Latino contra-partisan treatment did have a positive and significant effect on the preference for the contra-partisan candidate. This result provides preliminary evidence for H2A, the hypothesis that posits that ethnicity rather than partisanship can serve as a primary predictor of vote choice when a Latino ethnic cue is presented. However, because of the sample size I could not further consider the moderational effects of ethnicity with this dependent variable.
In the moderational models there is a differentiation in results by partisanship. These findings are supportive of H7 that posited the effect of the treatment would be moderated by partisan identification. I did not stipulate the direction of the effect by party, but simply that the effect of the treatment would be different between Democrats and Republicans.

Among Republicans there is a preference for the partisan candidate vis-à-vis the contra-partisan Latino candidate. The same patterns evidenced in the thermometer difference models are largely consistent with the logit models. Republicans seem to further dig in their partisan heels. This does not support the key hypothesis predicting that ethnic in-group identification would trump partisanship. Moreover, not only is there no effect, but there is a rejection of the Latino candidate.

The direction of the treatment effect also differs by the moderating ethnic factor. This discrepancy provides initial evidence for the need to differentiate between dimensions and not assume a uniform effect. The different dimensions of identity are measuring different facets of a social group identity and as a result, one must allow for the possibility that these different dimensions exert varying moderational roles on the relationship between the treatment and candidate evaluation.

Looking at the effect of the treatment according to the dimensions of moderation, interesting differences emerge and reinforce the need to consider the multi-dimensional nature of Latino social group identity. With the candidate evaluation thermometer scores, the directional effect of the treatment is different between the importance and behavioral involvement dimensions among Republicans. Along the first dimension we see the effect of the treatment decreasing the evaluation of the co-ethnic contra-partisan
for those with higher levels of ethnic identity. When the treatment is moderated by the behavioral involvement dimension it is among those with lower levels of identity that an effect is seen.

Looking purely at the size of the treatment effects as moderated by the ethnic identity measures, H4 receives mixed support. H4 posited that more subjective (direct) measures of ethnic identity (importance, evaluation, and linked fate) would have a greater influence that the indirect measures of behavioral involvement. With indirect measures, such as Spanish language usage, the meaning and intensity of the identity is imputed by the researcher where more ethnic activity is assumed to represent a reflection of one’s own feelings toward a given identity. In the partisan preference moderation model the strongest treatment effect was seen with the behavioral involvement factor. The thermometer score models evidenced an approximately equal substantive effect for the treatments moderated both by the importance factor and the behavioral involvement factor.

4.8 Conclusion

To refresh, earlier in the results section, a direct effect on candidate preference was evidenced. Those individuals receiving the treatment were significantly more likely to choose the contra-partisan candidate. This result tentatively supported hypothesis 2A which stated that in the presence of a Latino, contra-partisan candidate, a Latino voter may choose a candidate or vote based on their ethnic rather than partisan in-group. I say tentative support because this direct result did not take into consideration the partisan and ethnic differences of the individual. The Latino candidate treatment did have an
effect. However, the results from the moderational models indicate that preference for an ethnic in-group candidate is not a one size fits all conclusion. Differences result both among partisan and ethnic group measures.

The results from this survey experiment allow me to begin to weigh into the question of which group identity is at work for Latinos in the voting booth. More specifically, I have set out to understand the preference for a co-ethnic candidate in light of an ethnic electoral context. The answer is not a simple yes—Latinos party all the time—or no—Latinos don’t party all the time—answer. Instead the answer is found when the group is disaggregated. This may not be as satisfying an answer as that of an all or none finding. However, through experimentation I have been able to find that there is generally not a direct Latino candidate effect, at least with the minimal treatment at hand. A treatment effect does emerge, but only once it is dually moderated by the group identities that are also made relevant in basic electoral contexts.

4.8.1 Limitations

There were a number of limitations in this experiment. The principal limitations fall under two categories: treatment and sample size. The treatment that I employed is a subtle one. It could be argued that the reason I did not see stronger direct effects was because of the subtleness of the treatment. This is a very real and valid possibility and one that I will test in the next stage of my work. However as stated earlier, at this point I have established that with a treatment that relies on a minimal operationalization of a Latino candidate cue, only a Latino surname, there is some effect when the moderational role of ethnic and partisan group identity is taken into consideration.
The second shortcoming of the treatment in this experiment is that I only provided a contra-partisan treatment. I did not consider the effect of a partisan co-ethnic treatment. Do candidates that are both partisan and ethnic in-groups benefit from higher evaluations? On the other hand, is the double in-group effect redundant or possibly pernicious based on one’s level of ethnic identification? These are the questions that I will address in the following chapter. In the second experiment that I present in the next chapter I use the same treatment, but I also include versions that allow me to look at the preference for co-ethnic candidates.

The third principal limitation of this study dealt with the small sample size. I am not seeking externally valid results at this point. However, given that I am interested in how co-ethnic candidate evaluation is moderated both by partisan and ethnic identity I require a demanding model. Moreover, since many of my response categories of my questions of interest are binary or categorical I must use MLE which is not as reliable in small samples. Another difficulty that I faced is in understanding the moderating role of ethnic identity differentiating by dimensions. Ideally I would have liked to consider the different dimensions simultaneously. For example, it may be that when measures from all four dimensions are included one or two dimensions dominate. To adequately consider how the different dimensions together moderate the effect of a Latino candidate treatment on electoral choice I will need a multivariate model with a moderately large sample size. In the next experiment the sample is much larger, 655 participants. With this larger sample size I will be able to address the limitations from the present experiment.
Given the limitations discussed above there is still much more to undertake.

There was only a direct effect on the preference for the contra-partisan candidate, but given that partisan group identity was not differentiated this result is only suggestive.

While limited, these results are instructive in that they evidence that the treatment did have an indirect effect that. The effect though subtle however, indicates that once a group identity is taken into consideration ethnic cues may exert an effect.
5. Partisanship With Accents: The Role of Ethnic Group Heuristics

“I figure my best bet is with the accents” – Latina that sat next to me on a flight.

5.1 Introduction

The quote at the top of this page is from a Latina I met on a flight. In the above statement she explains how she comes to choose a candidate when faced with choosing between an ethnic in-group candidate or a partisan in-group candidate. A candidate whose name is spelled with an accent, making reference to the commonality of accented Latino ethnic surname spellings, in her view is associated with her best interest. In “going with the accents” she relies on an ethnic heuristic, preferring Latino candidates, even if that means voting against her party.

To be sure, ethnic and partisan in-group affiliations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the above example, my fellow passenger was referring to a situation where they were separate. But in a political context with rapidly growing rates of Latinos running and winning races, the diversity of the partisanship of Latino elected officials is on the rise (NALEO 2005). The growth of Latinos in the electoral arena which ushers in the increased likelihood of seeing both Democrats and Republicans leads to the question of not only how ethnic in-group contra-partisans will be evaluated, but also how ethnic in-group partisans will be evaluated. In this chapter I consider more broadly how the
intersectionality of ethnic and partisan identities comes to weigh on the political choices of Latinos.

Ethnic and racial identities have been shown to be compelling political identities. However ethnic and racial identities rarely appear in isolation or to the exclusion of other meaningful identities. A Latino identity can be cued through an ethnic surname suggesting a minimal, albeit clear role for a Latino ethnic context. In the previous two chapters I have considered the electoral preferences of Latinos in just such a context where ethnicity is cued via an ethnic surname. In this last chapter I continue to rely on this operationalization of an ethnic context but here bring together diverse pieces of evidence that heretofore I have considered in isolation. More specifically, in the following analysis I consider both candidate evaluation and vote choice intention.

Following this introduction I will discuss the survey experiment design and the data. I will then present the results for the models assessing candidate evaluation and then vote choice intention. For each dependent variable I will provide a set of results that first presents the direct effect of the treatments and then the effect of the treatments moderated by partisan identification and Latino ethnic identity. To conclude, I will discuss the results and how the analysis provides for a more nuanced understanding of Latino electoral preferences in light of Latino electoral contexts.

5.2 Experiment Design

The survey experiment that I conducted for this chapter considers how Latinos evaluate both partisan and contra-partisan co-ethnic candidates. In addition to considering the evaluation of the candidates I also look at vote choice intention. This
experiment builds on the first experiment discussed in the previous chapter by addressing how Latinos evaluate and choose partisan and contra-partisan Latino candidates. As a result, the design of this experiment allows me to address all of the hypotheses that I have stipulated both in chapter two and chapter four.

5.2.1 Design and Procedures

I designed a 2 X 3 post-test only control group experiment (see table 21) where participants were randomly assigned to the treatment or control cells. Like the previous experiment design, this experiment operationalizes a Latino ethnic electoral context, in presenting a candidate with a Latino surname. The treatment is presented as a set of brief candidate platforms embedded in a very short survey. In the control the participants read two short candidate platforms, one from a Republican (Peter Root), one from a Democrat (Andrew Simmons), both with non-Latino surnames. In the treatments, participants were presented with a candidate match-up between a Latino and non-Latino candidate.

Those assigned to the Republican Latino treatment read the same two platforms as those in the control but now the Republican candidate was Victor Hernández, while in the Democratic Latino treatment, Victor Hernández was the Democrat. This research design allows me to determine the effect of a Latino candidate cue among Latinos, but more specifically among partisans and contra-partisans. I will also be able to determine the moderating role of partisanship, for example, on average do Democrats assess a Republican contra-partisan differently rather than there being a general evaluation of Latino candidates among all Latinos?

From my hypotheses, the expectation is that Latinos will offer more favorable evaluations of co-ethnic candidates and a greater likelihood of voting for these
candidates. This general expectation draws from Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory that expects an in-group bias to result from an in-group match that in turn influences subsequent behavior. Put simply, the expectation is that Víctor Hernández will be the most preferred candidate among Latinos. However, this is a broad generalization that does not take the moderating effect of ethnicity into consideration but which in the analysis below will do so to consider the nature of the support for a co-ethnic candidate.

Table 21: Experiment Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Republican Latino Treatment</th>
<th>Democratic Latino Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Identity Questions (Beginning)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So as to account for possible order effects where the presentation of the Latino identity questions could contaminate the treatment I randomly split the sample in half to control for this. Half of the sample was presented with the Latino identity questions at the beginning of the survey and the treatment and post-test at the end and for the remaining half this order was reversed. In between the presentation of the Latino identity questions and the treatment and post-test I included filler questions regarding media coverage and usage and quality of life questions. Neither set of questions dealt with
issues of politics or identity. There were a total of 43 filler questions which took approximately 12 minutes to complete.

Given the presence of the filler questions I did not expect to see order effects. Upon analysis of the data this was in fact the case and as a result I was able to collapse the experiment design rows so that in effect I have a 1X3 design (see table 22).\(^1\) In the data analysis below I will specify the treatments and results in reference to table 22.

### Table 22: Collapsed Experiment Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Republican Latino Treatment</th>
<th>Democratic Latino Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>110 Republicans</td>
<td>107 Republicans</td>
<td>109 Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113 Democrats</td>
<td>109 Democrats</td>
<td>107 Democrats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5.2.2 Recruitment, Timing, and Participants

The data for this survey experiment was collected by Polimetrix, a non-partisan survey research firm that specializes in web-based technology.\(^2\) The survey experiment participants were drawn from Polling Point, a panel owned by Polimetrix. Individuals are recruited through a variety of methods such as banner advertisements and recruitment campaigns.\(^3\) The information provided by the survey respondent is confidential and

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\(^1\) See appendix for results.

\(^2\) For more information visit: www.polimetrix.com

\(^3\) Alvarez, Sherman, and VanBeselaere (2003) have shown that for internet panels relationships among variables are similar across recruitment methods.
voluntary. No one individual is invited to take more than six surveys in a year and regardless of the sponsor, an individual can immediately opt-out of a survey. Monetary compensation was not provided in this survey.

A total of 655 Latino adults completed the survey experiment. Approximately half were Democrats, with the remaining half consisting of Republicans. I limited my sample to partisans for this phase of the project. While the political preferences of non-partisan Latinos are of equal importance the intent here was to first understand partisan and contra-partisan preferences. As a result I restricted my sample to Democrats and Republicans. This was a web-based experiment and it was in the field from September 8-19, 2006.

Participants were randomly assigned to either the Republican Latino treatment, the Democratic Latino treatment, or the control. Table A2 in the appendix breaks down the respondents by group status (control or treatment) and compares their observable average characteristics. The top half of the table displays the demographic attributes of the sample. None of the observable characteristics are significantly different among those in the treatment and control. The bottom half of the table displays the ethnic identity scores. Here again, none of the observable ethnic identity measures are significantly different between groups.

An inspection of the demographic characteristics reveals a group of Latino adults whose average age is 45. A plurality of the respondents have completed a four-year university degree and a majority of the respondents have at least some education past high school. The female to male ratio is approximately equal with 45% of the sample consisting of Latinas and as a whole, 63% of the sample is married (see table A2).
Finally, Close to a majority of the respondents are of Mexican descent (49%). Polimetrix does not inquire about an individual’s legal status and as a result I do not know the breakdown of documented and undocumented respondents. See appendix for the complete survey questionnaire.

Table 23: Participant Background Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Variables</th>
<th>Percent of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No High School Degree</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Degree</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate’s Degree</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate Degree</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 24: Distribution of Participant Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.3 Measures

Treatment

As in the experiment from chapter four, the treatment was presented as a brief candidate platform embedded in a survey. The principal difference is that the treatments are differentiated by partisanship rather than the more general partisan/contra-partisan differentiation. In each of the treatments ethnicity is made salient through a Latino surname, which then corresponds to either a Democratic candidate (Democratic Latino treatment) or a Republican candidate (Republican Latino treatment). The control does not present a Latino ethnic surname for either candidate (see table 25).
Table 25: Treatments

**Republican Treatment**

Democratic candidate Andrew Simmons says state and local governments can do a great deal to improve the quality of life for individuals. Simmons believes in HMO reforms, improving public education and providing more affordable housing.

Republican candidate Victor Hernández says state and local governments have too much power to regulate individuals and community life. Hernández believes in traditional family values, reducing taxes and increasing job opportunities.

**Democratic Treatment**

Democratic candidate Victor Hernández says state and local governments can do a great deal to improve the quality of life for individuals. Hernández believes in HMO reforms, improving public education and providing more affordable housing.

Republican candidate Andrew Simmons says state and local governments have too much power to regulate individuals and community life. Simmons believes in traditional family values, reducing taxes and increasing job opportunities.

**Control**

Democratic candidate Andrew Simmons says state and local governments can do a great deal to improve the quality of life for individuals. Simmons believes in HMO reforms, improving public education and providing more affordable housing.

Republican candidate Peter Root says state and local governments have too much power to regulate individuals and community life. Root believes in traditional family values, reducing taxes and increasing job opportunities.

**Measures of Moderation**

In the survey component of the survey experiment I included 12 questions probing Latino ethnic identity. All items have been recoded so that higher values represent greater and more positive identification and/or participation in one’s Latino ethnic identity. Table 26 presents the mean scores for the individual questions. The
mean response for all of the questions falls slightly above the question response midpoint. In other words, the mean Latino respondent felt more rather than less identification with his or her ethnic identity.

**Table 26: Distribution of Latino Identity Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latino Identity Measures</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Ethnicity</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity as Most Important</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Attachment</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride in Group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Success Linked to Group</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends Growing up Latino</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Speaking Ability</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language of News Programs</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to Latinos Outside of Sub-Ethnic Group</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to Latinos Within Sub-Ethnic Group</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these items, I constructed two composite measures through factor analysis (see Table 27). The first composite measure gauges subjective Latino identity (importance, evaluation, and linked fate). The second composite measure taps into the behavioral components of Latino identity. I include both of these measures in the moderation models where I will be able to consider how both facets of identity may simultaneously moderate the effect of a Latino ethnic cue on political choice. In the moderation models I will make use of these measures as moderators.
Table 27: Distribution of Latino Identity Dimension Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latino Identity</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Measure</td>
<td>1.24e-09</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Measure</td>
<td>-2.96e-10</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3 Candidate Evaluation

5.3.1 Candidate Evaluation Thermometer Measures

Immediately following the candidate platforms, the participants were presented with a post-test to measure their support for the candidates and their vote choice intention. Participants were presented with a feeling thermometer set asking them to rate how favorable one felt toward the Democratic and Republican candidate on a 10-point scale from (0) Not Favorable at All to (10) Very Favorable. The distribution of the responses is presented in table 28.

Table 28: Frequency of Response Distribution for Candidate Feeling Thermometers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Thermometer</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Thermometer</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The mean thermometer score for the Republican candidate was 5.2 and slightly higher, at 5.3 for the Democrat. The range of responses for both candidates ran the full spectrum, from 0-10; however the standard deviation for the Democratic candidate is slightly lower. The higher score and lower variance for the Democratic score is not surprising given the historical affiliation of the majority of the Latino population to the Democratic party (de la Garza et al. 1992; DeSipio 1996; García 2003). However, at this point it can not be determined if the evaluation of these candidates was influenced by the treatments. In the following section I will examine the main effects of the treatment in addition to the moderational effects of Latino identity on the effect of the treatments on candidate evaluation.

5.3.2 Direct Effects

I first test for a direct treatment effect. Here I test the possibility that Latinos, regardless of their substantive ethnic identification are only influenced by the ethnic cue. First, I consider whether Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates (H2). I then test the more specific hypothesis of whether the co-ethnic preference trumps partisanship, based on whether a co-ethnic but contra-partisan candidate is given a higher evaluation (H2A). The basic model specifications for the respective hypotheses tests are:

\[
\hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1 X + e
\]

\[
\hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1 X + b_2 Z + b_3 XZ + e
\]

The treatment is represented by \(X\) and \(Z\) represents the individual’s partisan identification which I need because my hypotheses concern the evaluation both of partisans, and contra-partisans. I regress the treatment on the thermometer measures. In addition to the Republican and Democratic thermometer scores I also look at the thermometer difference
score which subtracts the Democratic from the Republican score with higher scores indicating a more favorable feeling toward the Republican candidate vis-à-vis the Democratic candidate. I utilize Ordinary Least Squares for this analysis. Tables 29 presents the results for the set of candidate evaluation measures. The column headings indicate the dependent variable under consideration.

Table 29: Ordinary Least Squares Direct Effect Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1A Democrat Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 2A Republican Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 3A Thermometer Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R_treat</td>
<td>-.322 (.308)</td>
<td>.450^ (.312)</td>
<td>.785^ (.463)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_treat</td>
<td>-.043 (.308)</td>
<td>.190 (.312)</td>
<td>.215 (.563)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.42** (.219)</td>
<td>4.98** (.221)</td>
<td>-.424 (.401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Statistic</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.10 one-tailed test

The first set of models is only looking at the treatment effect. Given the directional nature of the hypotheses, the effect of the treatment in models 2A and 3A reveals that exposure to the Republican Latino treatment has an effect on candidate evaluation. Exposure to the Latino Republican treatment resulted in a higher evaluation of the Republican Latino candidate and the higher evaluation of the Republican vis-à-vis
the Democratic candidate in the thermometer difference model. In contrast, the Democratic Latino treatment does not have any effect in any of the models.

Table 30: Ordinary Least Squares Partisan Moderational Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1B Democrat Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 2B Republican Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 3B Thermometer Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R_treat</td>
<td>-.431^ (.322)</td>
<td>.502^ (.335)</td>
<td>.886* (.544)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_treat</td>
<td>.084 (.324)</td>
<td>.160 (.337)</td>
<td>-0.000 (.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-.33** (.330)</td>
<td>4.28** (.337)</td>
<td>8.54** (.555)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_treat*Rep</td>
<td>.429 (.463)</td>
<td>-.223 (.476)</td>
<td>-.614 (.778)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_treat*Rep</td>
<td>.016 (.463)</td>
<td>-.140 (.476)</td>
<td>-.105 (.779)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.47** (.227)</td>
<td>2.89** (.235)</td>
<td>-4.50** (.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Statistic</td>
<td>98.84**</td>
<td>92.17**</td>
<td>137.68**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.437</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.10 one-tailed test

In the second set of models I consider the Latino candidate treatment effects in light of partisan and contra-partisan status (table 30). The results are similar to the previous results except that now the Republican Latino treatment is marginally significant in the Democratic Thermometer model. Exposure to the Republican treatment leads to a less positive evaluation of the Democratic (non-Latino) candidate.

What is especially interesting here is that the effect of the treatment is not moderated by partisanship. Partisan identification does have a very strong and significant effect, however, the likelihood of evaluating the Latino candidate more positively is seen across the board for both Democrats and Republicans. Democrats are not resisting a
contra-partisan and at the same time among Republicans there is not a double in-group
effect where if a candidate is both of one’s party and one’s ethnicity then the evaluation
of him (or her) is greater than if partisanship were just shared.

The thermometer score for the Democratic candidate is presented in model 1B. Those individuals exposed to the Republican Latino treatment were less likely to
positively evaluate the non-Latino Democratic candidate as a result of exposure to the Republican Latino treatment. This result is suggestive of a rejection or distancing of a non-Latino candidate in light of the presence of a Latino candidate.

For the Republican thermometer score, model 2B, those Latino participants exposed to the Republican Latino treatment were significantly more likely to rate the Latino Republican candidate as more favorable. A similar result is evidenced in model 3B, exposure to the Republican Latino candidate treatment—or reading about Republican candidate, Victor Hernández—brought about a significantly more positive evaluation of the Republican candidate vis-à-vis the Democratic candidate.

An equally interesting result, or rather, non-result, is the insignificance of the Democratic Latino Treatment. Democrats were not more likely to more positively evaluate the partisan when he was Latino, nor where Republicans more likely to evaluate a Democratic candidate more positively simply in response to a Latino name. Finally, in looking at the magnitude of the treatment effect, the marginal effect of the Republican Latino candidate treatment is slightly more pronounced in model 2B, the Republican Thermometer, than in model 1B. The size of the effect indicates that the Republican Latino treatment effect is most effective in garnering positive evaluations of the candidate presented than in detracting from the non-Latino Democratic candidate.
From these results, H2 receives partial support. Latinos do support co-ethnic candidates, but there is a qualification as to which co-ethnic candidates are supported. From the above analysis it is evidenced that Latinos will support a co-ethnic Republican candidate. The results from the second set of models also speaks to the issue of whether ethnicity can trump partisanship as a predictor of candidate evaluation (H2A). Given the higher evaluation of the Republican candidate across all Latino respondents, the presence of a Latino candidate does “trump” partisanship but only among the Democratic segment of the population. Among Republican identifiers the support of a Republican candidate is not surprising. However the insignificance of the partisan and Republican treatment interaction indicates that the presence of an additional in-group match in the form of an ethnicity does not lead to a higher evaluation of a partisan candidate.

5.3.3 Moderational Models

In this project I am not just interested in establishing if there is a systematic preference for a Latino candidate as a result of the introduction of a Latino context. The last set of results indicated that sometimes an in-group match is sufficient to drive a preference, but I am also interested in considering how an individual’s ethnic identity influences the effect of an in-group match (H3-H4). More specifically, I am interested in how Latino ethnic identity will moderate the effect of the Latino candidate treatment on political choice (H5). To determine how ethnic and partisan identities moderate the effect of the treatment I specified models with 3-way interactions.

\[ \hat{Y} = b_1X + b_2Z + b_3W + b_4XZ + b_5ZW + b_6ZWX + b_7XZW + b_0 \]
In this model X is the treatment, Z is the set of ethnic identity measures, and W is partisan identification. I include the direct and indirect Latino identity factor scores, from the identify measures discussed above. By including both of these measures simultaneously I can better determine how these different dimensions influence and then moderate political choices. Identity is a multidimensional construct and as a result must be measured as such to accurately capture its effect. I interact the ethnic identity measures with the treatments, but also with the treatment-partisan interactions to determine if the moderating role of ethnicity if present is on average the same among Republicans and Democrats.⁴

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⁴ I also specified the set of models including demographic controls for age, education, and gender. The treatment effect remained the same. The principal difference is that education is highly significant. In the Democrat Thermometer model the effect of education is positive and in the Republican and Thermometer Difference models the effect of education is negative.
Table 31: Ordinary Least Squares Moderational Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1C D-Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 2C R-Thermometer</th>
<th>Model 3C Thermometer Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat</td>
<td>-.604* (.356)</td>
<td>.072 (.371)</td>
<td>.688 (.602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat</td>
<td>-.121 (.367)</td>
<td>-.071 (.382)</td>
<td>.002 (.620)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-4.29** (.370)</td>
<td>3.95** (.376)</td>
<td>8.17** (.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Latino ID</td>
<td>-.190 (.279)</td>
<td>-.164 (.294)</td>
<td>.127 (.478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Latino ID</td>
<td>.109 (.323)</td>
<td>.286 (.336)</td>
<td>.157 (.545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat*Rep</td>
<td>.508 (.507)</td>
<td>.449 (.523)</td>
<td>-.040 (.854)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat*Rep</td>
<td>.229 (.518)</td>
<td>.166 (.534)</td>
<td>.002 (.872)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat*Direct ID</td>
<td>.418 (.403)</td>
<td>.795* (.422)</td>
<td>.212 (.685)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat*Direct ID</td>
<td>.616 (.418)</td>
<td>.056 (.436)</td>
<td>-.659 (.708)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican*Direct ID</td>
<td>.621* (.376)</td>
<td>-.271 (.388)</td>
<td>-.934^ (.637)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat<em>Rep</em>Direct ID</td>
<td>-.366 (.540)</td>
<td>.372 (.915)</td>
<td>.372 (.915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat<em>Rep</em>Direct ID</td>
<td>-.264 (.559)</td>
<td>.231 (.943)</td>
<td>.231 (.943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat*Indirect ID</td>
<td>-.487 (.452)</td>
<td>.916 (.766)</td>
<td>.916 (.766)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat*Indirect ID</td>
<td>-.273 (.450)</td>
<td>.294 (.765)</td>
<td>.294 (.764)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican*Indirect ID</td>
<td>-.252 (.456)</td>
<td>.046 (.767)</td>
<td>.046 (.767)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat<em>Rep</em>Indirect ID</td>
<td>.636 (.628)</td>
<td>-1.06 (1.06)</td>
<td>-1.06 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat<em>Rep</em>Indirect ID</td>
<td>-.148 (.633)</td>
<td>.666 (1.07)</td>
<td>.666 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.58** (.257)</td>
<td>3.07** (.266)</td>
<td>-4.46** (.433)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Statistic</td>
<td>31.73**</td>
<td>42.59**</td>
<td>42.59**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>.546</td>
<td>.559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.10 one-tailed test
The results from model 1C, the Democratic Thermometer model, are similar to the corresponding model 1B where partisanship and the Republican treatment remain significant and negative. The Republican treatment effect is not moderated by either partisanship or Latino group identity. In other words, the effect of the treatment is constant across all Latinos in the sample, regardless of their partisan identification or levels of ethnic identity. The introduction of a Latino cue in the form of Republican candidate Victor Hernández, leads to a lower evaluation of the non-Latino Democratic candidate. The effects are not huge, but they nevertheless are present (see figure 20).

Figure 20: Republican Treatment Effect – Moving From Control to Treatment
An equally interesting non-finding is the lack of effect of the Democratic treatment. The Democratic treatment does not influence the evaluation of candidates either directly or indirectly through partisanship or ethnic identity. The moderational hypotheses (H6-H7) then, do not receive support for the Democratic Thermometer model.

An unexpected result from this model is that the direct dimension of Latino group identity does in fact serve as a moderator, but upon partisanship. Latino Republican partisan identifiers with higher levels of direct Latino identity are significantly more likely to evaluate the Democratic Latino candidate less negatively. These results indicate the moderational role of ethnic identity, but with the important distinction that only the direct dimension served to moderate the effect of partisanship upon candidate evaluation. The effect of partisanship, moderated by identity, is significant along the entire range of the measure.\(^5\) In the control condition, moving from the minimum to the maximum value of direct Latino identity sees Republican Latinos evaluating the Democratic candidate by one and half thermometer points more (see figure 21).

---

\(^5\) The slope and standard errors for the interaction terms in this and the following analyses were computed based on the guidelines set out in Brambor, Roberts Clark, and Golder 2005.
Model 2C, presents the results for the Republican candidate feeling thermometer. Partisanship again has a very large and significant effect. The principal difference between this model and the previous ones is that neither of the treatments have a direct effect on the evaluation of the candidate. Instead, the effect of the Republican candidate treatment is moderated by the direct measure of Latino identity. This outcome provides support for the moderational hypothesis of ethnic group identity and in particular H5.

The interaction was only significant at the highest levels of direct Latino identity. The Republican treatment is only moderated when the level of direct Latino identity is close to its maximum. The interaction is not significant across the entire range of
identity. This result then indicates that those Latinos with very strong Latino group identity, measured along the direct dimension, are those most likely to more positively evaluate a co-ethnic candidate (see figure 22). Partisanship by itself also does not serve as a moderator on the effect of the treatment. Finally, none of the triple interactions are significant, indicating that the effect of the Republican treatment is seen among both Republican and Democratic Latinos with higher levels of direct Latino identity.

Figure 22: Effect of Treatment on Republican Candidate Feeling Thermometer with Change in Direct Latino Identity Measure

The final model, the thermometer difference model, does not evidence any treatment effect – either direct of moderated. To refresh, the dependent variable here is the preference for the Republican candidate vis-à-vis the Democratic candidate with
higher scores representing a higher evaluation of the Republican candidate. Partisanship is highly significant and in the expected direction, with Republicans having a more positive preference of their partisan candidate vis-à-vis the Democratic candidate. Like in model 1C, partisanship is moderated by the direct Latino identity measure. As a Republican Latino’s level of direct Latino identity increases, there is less of a discrepancy in preference of the Republican over the Democrat. In other words, the closer the individual’s score is to zero the less of a disparity in evaluation between the Republican and Democratic candidates. For example, looking at the control condition, the thermometer difference score for Republican Latinos with a minimum level of direct Latino identity is 5.3. Maximizing the direct Latino identity measure sees a drop in the thermometer difference score by close to two points (see figure 23).
5.3.4 Discussion

Results from both the direct and moderated models indicate the presence of an effect from the Republican Latino candidate treatment. Across the models, exposure to this treatment led to a significantly lower evaluation of the non-Latino Democratic candidate and a higher evaluation of the Latino Republican candidate. This result supports the hypothesis that Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates (H2); in the case of Democrats where they provide a higher evaluation of the Republican Latino candidate, there is partial evidence that ethnicity can trump partisan considerations (H2A). In contrast, the Democratic Latino treatment had no effect on the evaluations of either the
Democratic or Republican candidates. There was neither a direct nor moderated effect of the Democratic Latino treatment via partisanship or Latino ethnic group identity.

The results for the Democratic candidate feeling thermometer, in the moderated models evidence a direct treatment effect. Individuals exposed to the Republican Latino candidate treatment—who read about Republican candidate Victor Hernández—were significantly less likely to rate the Democrat candidate higher on the feeling thermometer. The magnitude of the effect being larger in the ethnicity moderated model, with a marginal effect of -.6, than in the direct model at -.4. The effect of the Latino Republican treatment supports the more general hypotheses of H2 and H2a, that Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates; the expectation of moderation (H6), however is not supported.

Models 2B and 3B both predict the Republican feeling thermometer scores, but their results are slightly different. In model 2B the Republican Latino candidate treatment has a positive and direct effect. The treatment in model 3B is still positive and significant, but only at high levels of direct Latino identity. In other words, the effect of the Republican treatment is moderated by Latino identity. The effect of the Republican Latino treatment results in support for H6 that Latino ethnic group identity moderates the effect of the treatment. The treatment is moderated by Latino ethnic group identity, but only by the direct dimension.

This result while supportive of the general moderational hypothesis does not support H3 that expected both dimensions to contribute to the moderation of a Latino context treatment. While H3 expected both dimensions to simultaneously moderate the role of the context, H4a receives support, which expected the direct dimension to play the strongest role, given the *subjective* nature of this measure.
Partisanship does not moderate the effect of the treatment either by itself or in conjunction with the Latino identity measures. The lack of partisan moderation presents a rejection of H6. Across the models partisanship has a large effect and is highly significant, with Republicans being significantly less likely to positively evaluate the contra-partisan candidate and partisans being significantly more likely to positively evaluate a Republican candidate. However, the effect of partisanship on the feeling thermometers is moderated by ethnicity in models 3A and 3C. In the results for the Democratic feeling thermometer and the thermometer difference model Republicans with higher levels of direct Latino group identity are more likely to support the Democratic candidate. This result holds across the range of direct Latino identity values.

Partisan identification does not moderate either of the treatments in any of the models. This result may seem surprising given that we might expect partisans to process the Latino cues differently depending on the partisanship of the candidate. However, given the recency of the analysis of Latino electoral behavior and the limited research on Latino partisanship (with the important exceptions of Cain et al. & Alvarez and García Bedolla 2001), there is still much to understand. One possibility is that a Republican Latino is a novelty in comparison to a Democrat and as a result, this cue is more effective in triggering a response from Latinos writ large. I will consider this and other possible explanations in the concluding chapter of this work so as to then draw out future lines of research to address theses questions.

In short, the primary hypothesis of this dissertation, H1: A Latino ethnic group identity, if cued will be an influential predictor of electoral choice in addition to partisanship, receives support from this analysis. The preference for a Latino candidate
as a result of a Latino candidate context is not uniform. The effect of the treatment was only seen when the Latino candidate was a Republican. This result indicates the importance of considering the nature of the co-ethnic candidate, or the type of ethnic electoral context at work. In addition to context, the individual level construct of Latino ethnic identity also provides for an explanation of Latino electoral preferences.

5.4 Vote Choice

In the previous section I examined the evaluation of candidates as a result of the introduction of a Latino candidate cue. This analysis was based on feeling thermometer scores where individuals could indicate how favorably they felt toward a candidate on a scale from 0 to 10. The results present a consistent preference for the Republican Latino candidate and a rejection, or distancing, of the Democratic candidate. However, for the purposes of better understanding Latino electoral behavior, one must go beyond evaluations and consider how these evaluations translate into a vote.

5.4.1 Vote Choice Intention

Following the candidate thermometer questions the survey experiment participants were asked: “if the election were held tomorrow, which candidate would you vote for?” Their response choices consisted of only the two candidates they read about in the platforms, Hernández and Simmons for the treatments or Simmons and Root for the control. Of the 631 individuals who answered the vote choice intention question 322 (51%) indicated that they would have voted for the Democratic candidate. The remaining 309 Latino respondents, (49%), would have voted for the Republican.
Broken down by party, the descriptives are not too surprising in light of the classic American vote choice model—partisanship matters. Ninety-two percent of Democrats would have voted for the Democrat while 91% of Republicans would have voted for the Republican (see table 32). Table 33 further breaks down the partisanship-vote choice tabulation by treatment and control.

Table 32: Vote for Democratic Candidate by Partisan Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>293 (92%)</td>
<td>25 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>29 (9%)</td>
<td>284 (91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>322 (51%)</td>
<td>309 (49%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 33: Vote for Democratic Candidate by PID and Treatment Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rtre</td>
<td>Dtre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.4.2 Direct Effects

Similar to the candidate evaluation analysis, I first test for a direct treatment effect. With this model specification I can test Hypotheses 2. I then proceed to test the “trumping” hypothesis, H2A, by accounting for partisanship. The basic model specifications are:

\[ \hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1X + e \]

\[ \hat{Y} = b_0 + b_1X + b_2Z + b_3XZ + e \]

The treatment is represented by X and Z represents the individual’s partisan identification. I regress the treatment on vote choice, where choosing the Democratic candidate is coded as 1 and 0 for the Republican candidate. I utilize binary logistic regression for this analysis. The results are presented in table 34.

Table 34: Binary Logistic Regression for Vote Choice Intention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R_treat</td>
<td>-.322* (.195)</td>
<td>-1.0** (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_treat</td>
<td>-.178 (.195)</td>
<td>.10 (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-4.7*** (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_treat*Rep</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.14 (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_treat*Rep</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.52 (.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.206* (.137)</td>
<td>2.9*** (.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Squared</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>516.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Correctly Predicted</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.10 one-tailed test
Model 4 indicates that the Republican Latino treatment has a significant effect on vote choice intention. Exposure to the Republican Latino treatment leads to a lower likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate. The Democratic Latino treatment has no effect. As in the candidate evaluation models, H2 receives partial support in that a Latino candidate context will lead to support of the co-ethnic candidate only in the case of the Republican Latino ethnic context.

The next model, including partisan identification, exhibits a similar pattern. The Republican Treatment is also significant, but now more so, at the p<.05 level. The sign on the treatment is negative, meaning that those exposed to the Republican Treatment, that is, those presented with Republican Victor Hernández, were significantly less likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. In other words, there is a preference for a Republican Latino.

Partisanship is highly significant and in the expected direction where Republicans are less likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. What is especially interesting here is that the effect of the treatment is not moderated by partisanship. The likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate is seen across the board for both Democrats and Republicans. Democrats are not resisting a contra-partisan and at the same time, among Republicans there is not evidence of a double in-group effect. Republican Latinos are not more likely to support a partisan candidate because he is also Latino.

An equally interesting result, or rather, non-result, is the insignificance of the Democratic Latino Treatment. Democrats were not more likely to vote for the partisan when he was Latino, nor were Republicans more likely to cross party lines simply in response to a name. Given that the coefficients from logistic regression are not readily
interpretable, below I present the predicted probability of voting for the Democratic
candidate as a result of exposure to the Republican Latino treatment (see figure 24).

**Figure 24: Probability of Voting for the Democrat**

This figure displays the predicted probabilities of voting for a Democrat for both
Republicans and Democrats, moving from the Control condition to the Republican Latino
Treatment. The gray bar represents the likelihood of voting for those in the control,
while the black bars represent the likelihood of voting for those in the Republican Latino
candidate treatment. The likelihood of Democrats in the control treatment voting for a
Democrat is 95%. However, that probability drops down to 87% for those exposed to the
Republican Latino treatment, rendering a difference of 8%. For Republicans in the
control the likelihood of voting for a contra-partisan is 13%. Moving to the Republican Latino condition that probability goes down to 5%. Exposure to a Latino context, in the form of the Republican Latino treatment causes the likelihood of a vote for the Democratic candidate to decrease among both Republicans and Democrats. This is striking given that the only difference between the control and the treatment was a name: Victor Hernández versus Peter Root.

The results from the direct vote choice models are similar to those of candidate evaluation. To begin, the Republican treatment is a significant predictor of support for the Republican Latino candidate. This then lends partial support to H2 and H2A which respectively posit that Latinos will support a co-ethnic candidate and more specifically that this support would even come at the cost of voting against one’s party. The crossing of party lines to vote or more highly evaluate a candidate is only seen among Democrats, however.

5.4.3 Moderational Model

In order to consider the moderating role of ethnicity on the Latino treatments upon the choice of a partisan or contra-partisan candidate (H5) I had to specify a three-way interaction model. I interacted the ethnic identity measures both with the treatments, and with the treatment-partisan interactions to determine if the moderating role of ethnicity, if present, is on average the same among Republicans and Democrats.

\[ \hat{Y} = b_1X + b_2Z + b_3W + b_4XZ + b_5XW + b_6ZW + b_7XZW + b_0 \]

The model specification is the same as the one presented above for the candidate evaluation models, where X is the treatment, Z is the set of ethnic identity measures, and
W is partisan identification, the only difference being in the dependent variable now being vote choice.  

Table 35: Binary Logistic Regression for Vote Choice Intention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Latino Treatment</td>
<td>-1.25*</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Latino Treatment</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-5.21***</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Latino Identity</td>
<td>-.75</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Latino Identity</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat*Republican</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat*Republican</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat*Direct Latino ID</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat*Direct Latino ID</td>
<td>2.27**</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep*Direct Latino ID</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat<em>Rep</em>Direct Latino ID</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat<em>Rep</em>Direct Latino ID</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat*Indirect Latino ID</td>
<td>-.78</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat*Indirect Latino ID</td>
<td>-.92</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep*Indirect Latino ID</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtreat<em>Rep</em>Indirect Latino ID</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dtreat<em>Rep</em>Indirect Latino ID</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>631</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Squared</td>
<td>517.8**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Correctly Predicted</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.10 one-tailed test

Partisanship and the Republican treatment remain significant and negative.

Republican Latinos in addition to participants exposed to the Republican Latino

---

6 I also specified the set of models including demographic controls for age, education, gender, and ethnic sub-group. The treatment effect remained the same. The principal difference is that education is highly significant. In the Democrat Thermometer model the effect of education is positive and in the Republican and Thermometer Difference models the effect of education is negative. These results can be found in the appendix.
treatment were significantly less likely to intend to vote for the Democratic candidate. The results from this model, seen in table 35, are similar to the previous two models, further reinforcing the robustness of the effect of the Republican Latino treatment on the evaluation of candidates. However, the difference is that the Democratic Latino Treatment and Direct Latino Identity measure interaction is significant. This result indicates that the Democratic treatment has an effect when moderated by Latino Identity and provides initial support for H5, the moderational hypothesis.

I computed the slope and standard errors for this interaction holding the direct identity measure at different points and the indirect measure of identity, which was insignificant at its mean. This computation indicates that the moderational role of the direct Latino identity dimension is not constant. Instead, the moderational role of direct Latino identity is seen at the measure’s extremes, at its minimum and maximum values. Below I will discuss these results through a consideration of the predicted probability of voting for the Democratic candidate.

I first turn to the likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate among Republicans (see figure 25). The gray bars represent the likelihood of voting for those in the control, while the black bars represent the likelihood of voting for those in the Democratic Latino candidate treatment. The first set of bars represents the effect of the Democratic Latino treatment when the direct measure of ethnicity is held at its minimum value. For those in the control group, the likelihood of voting for the Democrat is 6%, and for those in the treatment it is 2%. What emerges here is suggestive of an ethnic candidate rejection. The likelihood of voting for the contra-partisan is higher when he is non-Latino. At first sight, this may seem odd, but this rejection can be better understood
by considering what a minimum value of Latino identity represents. It represents not feeling one’s Latino ethnic identity is important; not feeling good or prideful about one’s ethnic Identity; and not feeling any sense of linked fate.

**Figure 25: Probability of Voting for a Democrat (Among Republicans), Moving from Control to Democratic Treatment at Different Levels of Direct Latino Identity**

This same pattern, of ethnic candidate rejection, moving from control to the Democratic Latino treatment is evidenced at the mean value of the direct Latino identity measure, however at this point the interaction is not significant. The effect of the treatment is only significant at the extremes of the Latino Direct Identity measure. This pattern is reversed at the maximum of the Latino Direct Identity measure. At this point the likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate increases when moving from the
control condition to the Democratic Latino Candidate Treatment. The likelihood of voting for the contra-partisan candidate increases approximately 10% as a result of the introduction of a Latino candidate surname among those with the highest levels of direct Latino ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{7}

In the next figure I consider the substantive effect of the Democratic treatment moderated by direct Latino identity among Democrats. I again computed the predicted probabilities of voting for the Democratic candidate, but now among partisans, Democratic individuals. A similar pattern, to that of the Republicans is evidenced, however across the range of the direct Latino identity measure the probabilities are initially much higher. The effect of the Democratic Latino Candidate Treatment is only positive among those Latinos with the highest levels of direct ethnic identity. At the mean there is virtually no difference in moving from the control to the treatment. However at the lowest level of Direct Latino Identity again there is a rejection of the Latino candidate.

\textsuperscript{7} As a side-note, those with higher levels direct Latino ethnic identity are less likely to vote for their partisan in-group from the get-go, as can be seen by this orange bar. At this point I can not definitively say that there is a partisan – ethnic identity trade-off, but this is a lead that I will be following in the next stages of my work.
5.4.4 Discussion

In the main effects vote choice model only one of the two treatments, the Latino Republican treatment, has an effect. Individuals exposed to the Republican Latino treatment were significantly less likely to vote for the non-Latino Democratic challenger. This result garners support, albeit indirect, for H2 that posits that Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates. In this case, it appears that Latinos will reject candidates that are not of their ethnic in-group. This result holds across the sample, for both Republican and Democratic identifiers. The rejection of the partisan non-Latino in favor of the contra-partisan Latino among Democratic identifiers also supports H2A that holds that ethnicity may in some cases trump the effect of partisanship. The Democratic Latino treatment did
not have an effect and as a result, H2 and H2A receive their support from the Republican Latino treatment by itself for candidate evaluation.

In the ethnicity moderational model, the same results from the main effects model are evidenced. The principal difference is that the Democratic Latino treatment is now significant when moderated by the direct dimension of Latino identity. As a result, the general moderational hypothesis receives partial support since the Republican Latino treatment continues to exert a direct, unmoderated effect. The results demonstrate that the greater an individual’s level(s) of Latino ethnic identity the greater the likelihood of a cued ethnic context being maximally effective among this group of people in influencing a choice in favor of the co-ethnic candidate; at the same time, the lower an individual’s level(s) of Latino ethnic identity the lower the likelihood of a cued ethnic context being maximally effective among this group of people in influencing a choice in favor of the co-ethnic candidate. The likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate for those Latinos scoring low along the direct dimension of Latino identity is not only lower than those with higher levels but there appears to be an outright rejection of the co-ethnic candidate.

The Democratic Latino treatment is only moderated by one of the two ethnic identity dimensions, the direct dimension. This result is supportive of H4 that posited the greater strength of the subjective measure vis-à-vis indirect measure, which is prone to greater measurement error. While the expectation was that the direct measure would prove the stronger moderator of the two, I had also posited that both dimensions would serve to moderate this relationship. The effect of both treatments however, is not
moderated by partisanship, leading to a rejection of H6 that posited that partisan in-group affiliations would effectively moderate how candidates are chosen.

Both vote choice models demonstrate a robust Republican Latino treatment effect. In other words Latinos when presented with a Latino context in the form of a Republican Latino candidate are significantly more likely to support the ethnic in-group. A similar pattern is seen in the candidate evaluation models. Exposure to the Republican Latino treatment led to higher feeling thermometer scores for the Republican candidate and lower scores for the Democratic candidate. The similarity between both sets of models leads to the conclusion that when individuals are “forced” to make a mutually exclusive choice and go beyond individual evaluations, the influence of the Republican Latino treatment remains resilient.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter was able to address all of the hypotheses put forth in this dissertation project. As a result of the sample size and the experiment design I could address the general question, of the preferences of Latinos for co-ethnic candidates. I was also able to address the more specific questions regarding how ethnic group identity moderates a preference (or rejection) for the ethnic in-group candidate.

A clear Republican Latino candidate treatment was seen both in regards to candidate evaluation and vote choice. With one exception, this effect was direct. It was only moderated for the Republican Candidate Thermometer model. Exposure to the Republican Latino treatment led to a less positive evaluation of the Democratic candidate as measured by the thermometer score. For the Republican Thermometer model,
exposure to the Republican treatment saw an increase in the positive evaluation of this partisan candidate. However, this effect was only seen for individuals at the highest levels of their direct Latino identity. In the final vote choice model, the robustness of the Republican Latino treatment is once again reinforced by its significant and negative effect on the likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate. The effect of the Republican treatment while moderated by ethnic identity in the Republican Thermometer model was not moderated by partisanship in any model.

In contrast, the Democratic Latino Candidate treatment had no direct effect. The Democratic Latino treatment, however, did have an effect on vote choice when moderated by direct Latino identity. There is a rejection of the Democratic candidate at the lowest levels of direct Latino identity. This result reverses in moving to the maximum of direct Latino identity. Now, there is an increased likelihood in supporting this candidate as a result of the exposure to the Democratic Latino treatment.

In the evaluation models partisanship was moderated by direct Latino identity. The primary interest in these models was in the effect of the treatments, either direct or moderated, however the moderation of partisan identity is very interesting and points to the pressing need to further understand Latino partisanship. An interesting result regarding partisanship was that it did not moderate the treatments. As I mentioned earlier, this may have to do with Latino partisan identity itself. Another possibility is that respondents where presented with such a subtle political context that partisanship did not enter the respondents’ evaluations. I will be able to consider both of these possibilities in future work and in the concluding chapter I will discuss how I will pursue this future research avenue.
The experiment presented in this chapter evidenced a clear treatment effect. While the Democratic Latino treatment did have an effect once moderated, the more robust treatment effect is that of the Republican Latino treatment. Throughout the models the political preferences of the Latino survey experiment respondents were influenced by the introduction of a Latino candidate treatment. The political choices and evaluations of the respondents were clearly differentiated by the different treatments. As a very rough summation of the reaction of the survey respondents to the Latino candidate treatments, a Latino candidate, is not a Latino candidate, is not a Latino candidate.
6. Conclusion: Contours of Ethnic In-Group Candidate Preference

6.1 Project Overview

6.1 Puzzle

The puzzle which sparked this dissertation project was based on recent electoral outcomes across the country and at various levels of government where Latinos seemed to be abandoning their partisanship and voting for the contra-partisan Latino candidate. Latinos were casting ballots for Latinos. This in and of itself was not surprising. What was surprising was that in many instances, Latinos were supporting co-ethnic contra-partisans, rather than partisans as is predicted by the classic American vote choice model. In short, the core question prompting this dissertation was, does ethnicity trump partisanship?

This phenomenon challenges much academic and conventional wisdom regarding Latino political behavior. In the political realm, there was an expectation and hope among Republicans that Latino or Latino-friendly candidates (e.g. George W. Bush) could attract Democrats based on ethnicity (Leal et al. 2005). In political science a set of research based on aggregate level voting patterns began to find support for the role of ethnicity as the primary predictor of vote choice, rather than partisanship. At the same time, another group of scholars found evidence in the wake of Latino party-switching that highlighted the partisan based choices of Latinos. This line of research asserted that
party-switching by Latinos in favor of a co-ethnic candidate was more of an exception that confirms the “party rule.”

An explanation for the basis of the electoral outcomes where ethnicity trumped partisanship was complicated for a number of reasons. First, in the past, the partisanship of the Latino candidate was the same as that of the Latino electorate, rendering the question of ethnicity trumping partisanship a moot point. Second, the extant data from the recent electoral outcomes is at the aggregate level, thus leading to issues of ecological inference. Simply because Latinos in precincts vote for the co-ethnic candidate (or Latinos not voting for the co-ethnic candidate) does not provide sufficient evidence that ethnicity is (or is not) the primary causal factor at work.

To effectively weigh in on the growing debate of whether ethnicity does trump partisanship a micro-level analysis was needed. More specifically, an analysis was needed that could isolate the causal factors of group identity on political choice—a task that, by necessity, had to delve into the psychology of the Latino voter. This dissertation project set out to understand the role of Latino ethnicity in the political choices of this population. In particular I have begun to address this question with an emphasis on the individual and the causal mechanisms at work. To do this I made use of survey experiments and observational studies.

6.1.2 Questions and Answers

The core question of this project is, do Latinos prefer co-ethnic candidates? First, what is the preference of Latinos for fellow Latino partisans? Second, what is the preference of Latinos for Latino candidates who do not share their partisanship? This latter instance places an individual at an electoral fork in the road in deciding which
social group identity is most relevant to the political choice at hand. That is, to what extent is an ethnic in-group match sufficient to influence an evaluation or vote?

In order to consider how ethnicity enters the political processing of Latinos I needed to consider ethnic group identification at the individual level. In particular I probed the meaning, or substantive component, of Latino ethnicity. Latino ethnicity cannot be sufficiently considered under a dichotomous operationalization. Information on the nature and weight of an identity allows for an understanding of whether and to what extent an identity exerts an influence on a political choice. To analyze the role of the substantive component of an identity, I operationalized identity as a multi-dimensional construct. I investigated how different dimensions of Latino group identity, together and in isolation, influence the evaluation of a co-ethnic candidate. This nuanced analysis of Latino ethnic identity, in turn, allows for a more complete understanding of Latino political behavior by training the spotlight on the psychology of Latino voters—an uncharted domain, up to this point.

To begin, I consider if and when a Latino social group identity influences political choice. I then build on this analysis and consider how this social group identity influences political choice. The concept of causal heterogeneity is the driving theoretical force in this dissertation. I have posited that recognition of the varying effects of an ethnic electoral context and individual levels of ethnic group identity will contribute to an understanding of Latino political choice. Specifically, I have hypothesized that the answer to the question of which group identity is at work in guiding political choice—partisan or ethnic—is not a mutually exclusive, dichotomous choice. It is not a matter of partisanship or ethnicity, but rather, an understanding of those conditions under which
one or the other—or a combination of the two—operate in Latino voting behavior. What is of interest is the gray area in between: Which Latinos will rely on their ethnicity, which will not, and when?

The main dependent variable in this dissertation project is electoral choice. The operationalization of this variable took the form of candidate evaluations and vote choice intention. The key explanatory variables are: 1) an ethnic electoral cue, in the form of a Latino candidate; and 2.) Latino group identity. Latino group identity was operationalized as a multi-dimensional construct, consisting of a general direct (subjective) and indirect (objective) dimension which in turn are made up of more specific components. I employed a framework, based on Social Identity Theory, to then consider the mechanism linking identity to behavior.

Analyses from both the quantitative and experimental chapters indicate that there is an in-group candidate preference. In some instances, an ethnic in-group match by itself predicts political choice, but not for all Latinos and not all the time. More substantive measures of Latino group identity serve to differentiate who among Latinos are most likely to prefer an ethnic in-group candidate. In particular, I find that substantive measures moderate a preference and in some instances a distancing from the Latino candidate. In general, Latinos with higher levels of Latino group identification are those most likely to support a Latino candidate. However, here a further differentiation must be made in that the preference for a Latino candidate depends on whom that Latino candidate is—Republican or Democrat. Below I will review these results in further detail. In short, Latino preferences for co-ethnic candidates are variegated, but
significantly and substantively influenced by the individual’s level of ethnic identification and the type of Latino candidate choice at hand.

In the remainder of this conclusion I will briefly review the theoretical framework of this project and the resultant hypotheses. I will then review the results from each of the empirical chapters in light of these hypotheses. In the following section I will discuss the results as a whole so as to develop a broader picture of the results. Based on this discussion I will situate these results in the larger context of the literature and consider the contributions of this project. Finally, I will address the limitations of the present project and how my future work will address these.

6.2 Theoretical Framework

To examine the political choices of Latinos, I begin with the classic American vote choice model as developed by Campbell, Miller, and Stokes (1960). This model, together with decades of research, asserts that partisanship is the strongest predictor of vote choice and electoral preferences more generally. However, the predictive power of partisanship, as stated by Campbell and his colleagues, does not reside in partisan affiliations per se. The antecedent of partisanship, social group identity, invests partisanship with the force to influence political behavior. Social group identities are efficient informational short-cuts that can be applied to decisions.

With respect to political decisions, partisanship has resulted as the most powerful heuristic for most Americans because of the political context. This result, though, is not inevitable. To be overly simplistic, there is no hard-wiring in our brains that make a partisan heuristic the only option. Different cognitive structures and combinations can be
brought to bear on political decisions. Raymond Wolfinger (1965) was the first person to document the application of ethnic social group identities to political choice. In his analysis of electoral outcomes in New Haven Connecticut from the 1940s-1950s, he found that Italian-American voters frequently relied on their ethnic group identity rather than their partisan identity to support a co-ethnic candidate, even when the candidate did not share the same partisan label with these voters.

My theoretical base, building on Campbell et al.’s work, incorporates Wolfinger’s Mobilization Theory of Ethnic Voting. Ethnicity is latent, but once cued in a political environment, is a potentially powerful political heuristic. An ethnic electoral cue is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the application of an ethnic group identity to a political choice. The intensity of an identity should ultimately determine whether the cued ethnic group identity will be acted upon. In referring to identity intensity, Wolfinger notes that varying levels of identity will have different political outcomes. However, he does not operationalize intensity or further develop the concept.

In this project, I build on the Mobilization Theory of Ethnic Voting by explicitly measuring the intensity of ethnic group identity through different identity dimensions. To do this I turned to Social Identity Theory (SIT) and its recent elaborations (Huddy 2001; Conover 1988) which guided the development of my theoretical framework of how social groups come to influence political decisions. Based on the original formulation of SIT, I expect to see in-group favoritism manifesting itself in political choices. I also incorporate the substantive meaning of identities beyond that of a pure in-group match. In particular, I consider four substantive components of identity: importance, evaluation, linked fate, and behavioral involvement. The first three components make up a direct
The direct dimension provides a subjective assessment of one’s ethnic group identification. Measures of behavioral involvement make-up the indirect dimension, given that these types of measures are an expression of identity and the meaning is ultimately imputed by the researcher. All of these measures of Latino ethnic identity are unobservable. However, through the use of multiple measures from these two dimensions I will be able to ameliorate the measurement error inherent in this concept.

In sum, the clarity and salience of a social group cue determines if it will ultimately come to bear upon one’s political thinking. In the present case, the cue of interest is that of a Latino candidate. Once a social group is made salient its position as either an in-group or out-group will largely determine how the social group influences political thinking. Pro-group preferences are facilitated when the cued group is an in-group. However, an account of the substantive component of identity ultimately allows for the confirmation and understanding of this bias. A consideration of how both an in-group match and the substantive meaning of that identity match translate into political choices thus leads me to the following hypotheses.
### Table 36: Summary of Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 0:</th>
<th>Partisanship will be the strongest predictor of vote choice and/or candidate evaluation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1:</strong></td>
<td>A Latino ethnic group identity, if cued will be an influential predictor of vote choice in addition to partisanship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2:</strong></td>
<td>Latinos will support co-ethnic candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2A:</strong></td>
<td>If the partisanship of the co-ethnic candidate is opposite of the voter’s, an ethnic in-group bias will outweigh partisanship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 3:</strong></td>
<td>The greater the substantive component of one’s Latino group identity, the greater the likelihood that that identity will influence a political Choice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 4:</strong></td>
<td>Direct measures of identity are the strongest predictors of political choice (in comparison to indirect measures).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 5:</strong></td>
<td>The effect of a Latino cue on a political choice will be moderated by one’s Latino ethnic identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 6:</strong></td>
<td>Partisan group identity will significantly moderate the effect of a Latino cue on political choice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.3 Results Re-Cap
6.3.1 Observational Studies

The results from chapter three are based on two extant surveys: the 2004 Pew National Survey of Latinos and the 2000 Latino Issues Forum. I find that preference for a co-ethnic candidate is not only about determining whether the target is an in-group or out-group member. Instead I find that the support for the Latino candidate is best predicted by more substantive components of identity.

In the Pew survey participants were asked how much they agreed to whether “I am more likely to vote for a Hispanic/Latino candidate instead of a non-Hispanic/Latino running for the same office if they have the same qualifications.” There was agreement with this statement but not among all. Agreement, either strong or moderate, was only seen among close to a majority of the respondents. Upon the incorporation of substantive identity measures I was then able to better determine for whom among this group there is an in-group candidate preference. Measures of importance and behavioral involvement both influenced the greater likelihood of agreement with stating support for the Latino candidate, in turn sig.

With this analysis I was able to address hypothesis 2, 3, and 4. Hypothesis 2 receives partial support and H3 garners strong support. Contrary to the expectation of H4, the indirect dimension of behavioral involvement had the strongest effect on the evaluation of the Latino candidate. The measure of importance, while more moderate, also had a significant and substantive effect.

The Latino Issues Form survey allows me to first consider how upon the introduction of a Latino cue, partisanship is no longer the only relevant political group identity for a political choice. Respondents where asked a set of vote choice intention
questions that were roughly similar with the exception that the second question regarded a candidate with a Latino surname. Upon the introduction of the Latino cue, the role of partisanship as a primary vote choice predictor decreased dramatically. This result in turn, provides support to H1.

I undertook a second set of analyses using the LIF. The survey posed a hypothetical candidate match-up between a Republican-seeming Latino candidate and a Democratic-seeming candidate. Here I explicitly addressed H2A, which considers whether ethnicity trumps partisanship, however I could only do this among Democrats. I found that there is not an automatic ethnic in-group bias leading Latinos to “jump” the partisan ship. Instead, the preference for the Latino contra-partisan candidate by Democrats is influenced by the level of substantive in-group identification (H3). In particular, I found that direct measures of identity exerted the strongest effect on the likelihood of supporting the Latino contra-partisan.

6.3.2 Pilot Survey Experiment

Chapter 4 presents the results from a pilot experiment I designed to explicitly test H2A. With this experiment and the following experiment, presented in chapter 5, I am also able to address the moderational hypotheses. The scope of the experiment is limited to the evaluation of a co-ethnic, contra-partisan candidate. Latino participants in the treatment were presented with a Latino candidate opposite of one’s partisanship. The experiment manipulated the salience of ethnicity in the form of an ethnic candidate and substantive identity measures where collected through an earlier survey pre-test.

The Latino candidate treatment did not have a direct effect on the candidate feeling thermometers. The only direct effect of the treatment is in evaluating whose
views come closest to one’s own and here I find that those Latinos exposed to the treatment were significantly more likely to indicate a preference for the contra-partisan candidate. I then go on to specify models where ethnicity and partisanship moderate the effect of the treatment. I find that the effect of the treatment on measures of candidate evaluation is dually moderated by ethnic identity and partisan identity, providing support for H5 and H6. Again, I find that measures from both dimensions of substantive identity, direct and indirect, moderate the effect of the treatment, H3.

Given that this was a pilot experiment with a small number of subjects, and that I employed demanding models of three-way interactions, the results from this analysis need to be seen against this backdrop. The general finding from this experiment is that ethnicity indeed serves a moderating role. With the exception of the preference for the views of the contra-partisan candidate the treatment did *not* have a direct effect. In other words, an in-group match was not sufficient to influence candidate evaluations.

### 6.3.3 Survey Experiment

In chapter 5, I examine the experiment results from a large N survey-experiment I designed. In this experiment I am able to address all of the hypotheses derived from my theory. The survey experiment considers how Latinos evaluate both partisan and contra-partisan candidates. I am also able to look at vote choice intention. The basic design of the experiment is the same as the one in chapter 4. Now, given the increased sample size I included additional cells and now have two treatments: a Latino Republican treatment and a Latino Democratic treatment.

The results from the candidate evaluation models and the vote choice intention models are fairly parallel. In the direct effect models exposure to the Republican Latino
candidate increased the likelihood of supporting (or intending to vote) for the Republican candidate. At the same time, exposure to the Latino Republican treatment led to a distancing from the Democratic candidate as indicated on a feeling thermometer. I find partial support for H2 in that Latinos do support a co-ethnic candidate, but only the Republican and not the Democratic candidate received support. I also find partial support for H2A because ethnicity only trumps partisanship among Democrats.

Moving on to the moderational models, the Republican Latino candidate treatment continued to have a negative direct effect on Democratic thermometer scores. In contrast, the effect of the Republican Latino candidate treatment upon the Republican thermometer score is moderated by the direct dimension of identity. Those Latinos with higher levels of direct Latino identity where the most likely to positively evaluate the Republican Latino candidate. To reiterate, this effect was seen both among Republicans and Democrats.

In the vote choice intention moderational model, the Republican Latino treatment continues to be significant, but now the Democratic Latino treatment is significant when moderated by the direct dimension of ethnic identity. The treatment is significant at the extremes of the direct identity measure. At the lowest levels of identity there is a rejection of the Latino Democratic candidate among those exposed to the Latino candidate treatment; at the highest levels this pattern is reversed and there is now a preference. This result garners support for hypotheses 3-5. Hypothesis 6 does not receive support. The moderational models do not indicate that partisan identity serves to moderate the effect of the treatment. In other words there is no difference in how the treatment affected Latino Republicans or Latino Democrats.
6.3.4 Results Summary

In the remainder of this section I will discuss the overall pattern of results. I will focus on the results from chapters 3 and 5. To refresh, in chapter 3 I examined data from representative random samples of Latinos, providing for externally valid results. In chapter 5 I present results from a large N survey experiment I conducted. This was a randomized post-test only control group experiment and provides a complimentary measure of internal validity.

Chapter 4 presented the results from a pilot experiment. The sample size for this experiment was small and the model specification demanding. As a result, I was only able to examine a very limited set of results. The clear contribution of chapter 4 lays in its general moderational finding. The models that I estimated indicate that ethnicity and partisan identity moderate the effect of the Latino contra-partisan treatment. In the next experiment, I again found a clear pattern of ethnic identity moderation. Partisan identity did not serve as a moderating identity in the full experiment as it did in chapter 4. This discrepancy may be due to the limitations of the data from the pilot survey. However, this result indicates the importance of considering the possibility that partisanship also serves as a moderator.

The Pew 2004 study was based on a random representative sample of Latinos in the United States. The results from this survey indicate that Latinos tend to prefer a Latino candidate. The phrasing of the question made no mention of the Latino candidates’ partisan affiliation. The preference for the co-ethnic candidate is not seen among all respondents, but a close to a majority does state this preference. The preference
for the Latino candidate increases upon the inclusion of substantive measures of ethnic
group identity.

The results from chapter 5 evidence that the introduction of a Latino group cue
does lead to a co-ethnic candidate preference. More specifically, through a moderational
analysis I was able to determine that this causal mechanism depends on they type of
Latino cue and the individual’s level of ethnic group identity. Taking into consideration
the different operationalization of the variables, the results from chapter 5 and the Pew
analysis are parallel. This is important because the Pew survey is a national
representative random sample of Latinos. As a result, the pattern of results from chapter
5 that are generally mirrored in chapter 3 allow for a cautious prediction that the causal
mechanisms observed in the experiment are also likely seen in the larger population.

The first set of analyses from the Latino Issues Forum, a representative random
sample of registered Latino voters in California, evidenced that upon the introduction of a
Latino cue partisanship was no longer the primary predictor of political choice. To
refresh, this analysis was based on a comparison between a context with and without a
Latino cue. In other words, I was roughly considering the effect of a Latino intervention.
In this analysis there was a Latino “treatment effect” in that the preferences of the
respondents changed from one scenario to the other with a preference for the Latino
candidate emerging when that option was made available. This same pattern of results is
seen in the experiment from chapter 5.1 In the randomized experiment, the hint of
causality seen in chapter 3 is born out.

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1 The Latino candidate treatment platforms in the experiments were modeled after a question in the LIF, as
a result allowing the results from both chapters to be more readily compared and contrasted.
Finally, the last set of analyses in chapter 3 dealt with the specific question of whether ethnicity can trump partisanship. Given the question wording I was only able to consider this among Democratic Latinos and their likelihood of preferring a Republican-seeming candidate. Partisan cross-over voting was evidenced. Moreover the likelihood of preferring an ethnic in-group, but contra-partisan candidate was predicted by substantive measures of Latino group identity.

In the experiment I return to an analysis of party switching as a result of a Latino cue. In support of the results from chapter 3, Democrats in the experiment are likely to “switch” when presented with a Latino cue. Among Republicans the likelihood of crossing over is only seen in the vote choice intention model and among those highest in Latino ethnic identity. In both the LIF survey and the survey experiment Democratic Latinos are seen to prefer the ethnic in-group albeit contra-partisan candidate. In particular, there is support for the Republican candidate. In chapter 5 there is support for party-switching if favor of the Democratic candidate, a question I could not consider with the Latino Issues Forum data. However, as seen in chapter 5, the support for the Democratic candidate is moderated by direct ethnic identity.

Taken as a whole, the externally valid results from the observational studies are similar to the results from the internally valid experiment. Both sets of results indicate that there is a preference for the ethnic in-group candidate when that option is made available. This preference, however, must be seen in light of causal heterogeneity. The likelihood, or strength of a Latino candidate preference (or rejection), beyond an in-group match is also driven by substantive levels of ethnic identity and the partisanship of the Latino candidate.


6.4 Contributions

The focus of this dissertation has been on the political preferences of Latinos. While the scope of the project was limited to this population, the fundamental intent was to contribute to the larger field of political science. The massive and rapid population growth among Latinos has led to the need to expand our theoretical and empirical knowledge basis to explicitly account for this group and for larger inter-group dynamics within the American political system. In February 2007 Bill Richardson, the Latino governor from New Mexico, announced he was seeking the Democratic presidential nomination. Which candidate will eventually win that nomination and whether they can capture the executive office is unknown. Nevertheless, the fact that there is even a possibility that a Latino can occupy the White House all the more underscores how a complete understanding of American politics requires an understanding of Latinos.

A primary concern in this project was to accurately measure Latino ethnic group identity. Heretofore, the micro-foundations of Latino group identity were underdeveloped. As a result, an understanding of the relationship between Latino group identity and political behavior was also underdeveloped. Latino ethnicity is an intangible and as a result, elusive construct. To the extent that it exists, there are various ways to measure it.

Drawing on research from social psychology, I developed a multi-dimensional operationalization of Latino identity. Heretofore, a binary, in-group/out-group, operationalization of Latino identity was commonplace. This is an important start, given that categorical recognition is a necessary condition for the development of more substantive components of an identity. When substantive components of identity were
employed they were limited to measures of behavioral involvement. These measures are an important dimension of identity but because they are objective rather than subjective measures, where the meaning of an identity is ultimately imputed by the researcher. In this project I have incorporated subjective measures of identity to be used in conjunction with more traditional behavioral involvement measures. Through a multi-dimensional operationalization of identity I have been able to provide for an improved measure that can then be applied to understanding the influence of Latino group identity in turnout, public opinion, and political participation in general.

The final contribution this project has made, specifically within the field of Latino politics, is methodological. Experimental methods (with the exception of Michelson’s field experiments) have not been employed. I made use of experiments because they allowed me to determine if the hypothesized causal mechanisms at work in the observational and aggregate data were systematic or spurious. Additionally, in the survey component of the survey experiment I was able to include questions that probed the multi-dimensional nature of Latino group identity that were then applied in the moderational models. The experimental results clearly evidenced that “Latinos don’t party all the time” when presented with the choice to support a co-ethnic candidate. However, just as importantly, the consideration of the influence of ethnic group identity demonstrates that the preference to party or not to party is not always one of an in-group ethnic match. Differing levels of ethnic group intensity are a crucial component to understanding how a Latino cue comes to influence a political choice.

In the experiments I provided a methodological baseline from which to consider the results of large N observational studies. In this dissertation I provided for a valid
causal inference that is of use to the specific question of determining the effect of a
Latino ethnic cue on political choice. My more general contribution has been to lay the
groundwork for a methodological synergy between experimental and non-experimental
work. In establishing an internally valid causal relationship, the causal estimation of
subsequent non-experimental work can be carried out more accurately and confidently.

6.5 Future Work

Earlier in the dissertation I discussed my choice to use a very simple and subtle
operationalization of a Latino ethnic group cue—a Latino ethnic surname. The purpose
was to see if an ethnic surname alone would be a strong enough prime to make Latino
ethnicity salient. Consistent with Tajfel’s minimal in-group bias paradigm, I found that
such a subtle treatment did have an effect. The next stage of this project will seek to
enhance this original treatment and better understand how different ethnic contexts affect
political choices. Will stronger Latino electoral cues elicit stronger preferences for
Latino candidates? Or is an in-group candidate preference unresponsive to more
elaborate contexts once a baseline Latino cue has been presented?

In the next stage I will develop ethnic contextual treatments that approximate
actual electoral campaigns where Latino identity is made salient. In particular I will
follow a similar approach to that of Wendy Rahn and develop professional
advertisements with varying levels of Latino cues. In starting with the subtle
operationalization I did, this allows me the freedom to further elaborate on ethnic
electoral contexts in future work. One elaboration that I will pursue is varying the salience
of different issue areas. Does an ethnic electoral cue have the same effect regardless of
the issues that are raised? Alternatively does ethnicity not exert a separate in-group pull in light of certain issues (e.g. abortion)?

Just as I measured Latino ethnic group identity at a substantive level I will do so with additional identities. The immediate extension of this work will be to measure partisanship through a multi-dimensional framework. The traditional seven-point scale of partisan intensity ultimately does not consider the meaning embodied in a partisan identity. Moreover, the seven point scale glosses over the identity of Independents. This is a group that shares a bond in that they are partisan out-groups. However, drawing linkages beyond that requires strong assumptions. I am especially interested in the identity of Latino Independents given that over the years an increasing percentage of the Latino population has come to identify as that (Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003).

An additional extension of this work, related to the analysis of partisanship, is to better understand the determinants of Latino partisanship. Within Latino politics this is one of the most underdeveloped areas in comparison to other research areas. How is this principal political identity influenced or informed by another fundamental political and social group identity – Latinidad? This question leads me into the consideration of additional identity intersectionalities. How are ethnic, gender, and racial identities negotiated when all are made politically relevant. This is a large question to tackle, but one that begins with better measurements which I have sought to establish a framework for here.

The study of Latino politics should not be limited to Latinos. It is just as important to understand how non-Latinos react to Latinos in the political arena. Over the last several decades the United States has grown in racial and ethnic diversity, to the
point where many areas (e.g. Texas) are now majority minority. As a result, how non-Latinos feel about ethnic out-group members is important for a complete picture of American politics. Arguably it is of vital importance given that non-Latino whites still hold the highest rates of political participation. To consider the evaluations of non-Latinos I will make use of the identity measures I have used in this project in addition to more explicit ethnocentrism measures that more directly probe out-group sentiment.

An immediate extension of this dissertation project will be to develop a randomized survey experiment consisting of a representative random sample of Latinos. The data which was examined in chapter 5 can be statistically manipulated through a process of sample matching (Rivers 2006) to approximate a representative random sample. This is a new technique and one which I will apply to the present data while at the same time developing a purely representative random survey experiment.

All of the above noted future avenues of research in turn point to additional avenues. The field of Latino politics, just as the population itself, is rapidly growing. The numerous questions that have yet to be addressed seem daunting at times. However, this wide expanse provides for the development of an exciting and rich research agenda to develop and evolve both within the sub-field of Latino politics and American politics more generally.
APPENDIX
Table A1: Pilot Experiment Summary Statistics for Control and Treatment Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>23.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Female</td>
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<td>.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent with Some College</td>
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<td>.64</td>
<td>-.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Married</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Catholic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent with Household Income</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Less than $40K</td>
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<td>.31</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Mexican</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>-.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Democrat/Democrat Leaner</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology (7-point scale)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Sophistication Score</td>
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<td><strong>Ethnic Identity Scores</strong></td>
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<td>Importance Dimension</td>
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<td>Group Membership Importance</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group Membership Most Important</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>-.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity Importance</td>
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<td><strong>Evaluative/Affective Dimension</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Happy with Ethnicity</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>.33</td>
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<td>Feeling that I Belong</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pride in my Group</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong Attachment</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel Good about Group</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others Respect my Group</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like my Ethnic Background</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linked Fate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino Discrimination</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate – My Success</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linked Fate – Community</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioral Involvement</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Foreign Born</td>
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<td>Latino Friends Growing Up</td>
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<td>Latino Friends Now</td>
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<td>Spanish Language Ability</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>Ethnic Club Membership</td>
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<td>.36</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sample Size</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
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Table A2: Experiment Summary Statistics for Control and Treatment Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Republican Treatment</th>
<th>Democratic Treatment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Female</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with Some College</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Married</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Mexican</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Ethnic Identity Scores</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Latino ID</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino ID as most important</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attachment to Latinos</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pride in Latinos as a group</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
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<td>Latino Linked Fate-General</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino Linked Fate-Success</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Closeness to Latinos</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Closeness to Latino sub-group</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table A4: Demographic Controls: Vote Choice Model

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+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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<th>Full Model</th>
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* + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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<td>R-squared</td>
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+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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<th>Full Model</th>
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<td><strong>R treatment</strong></td>
<td>1.226 (0.789)</td>
<td>1.308* (0.667)</td>
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<td>-0.868 (0.778)</td>
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+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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<th>PID Moderating Model</th>
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<td>-0.576*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td>(0.780)</td>
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<td><strong>D treatment</strong></td>
<td>-0.291 (0.281)</td>
<td>-0.294 (0.867)</td>
<td>-0.464 (1.767)</td>
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<td><strong>ID first</strong></td>
<td>-0.464+ (0.277)</td>
<td>-1.527* (0.739)</td>
<td>-1.951 (1.306)</td>
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<td><strong>Idfirst*Rtreatment</strong></td>
<td>0.496 (0.392)</td>
<td>1.329+ (0.793)</td>
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<td>-6.016** (1.368)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Idfirst*Republican</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Direct ID</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1.469 (2.197)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.372 (1.202)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
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<td>3.860** (0.728)</td>
<td>4.606** (1.301)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
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<td>631</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Pilot Survey Experiment Survey Experiment Questionnaire

Pre-test
Thank you for filling out this survey on politics, society, and popular opinion. Your answers to the survey will be kept confidential. Please go through the packet in the order it is presented, don't flip back and forth. Just answer each question with your first, natural response.

Questionnaire

1) What year were you born? ______

2) What is your gender?
   a.) Male
   b.) Female

3) What is your state of residence? _____________

4) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?
   a.) Republican
   b.) Democrat
   c.) Independent
   d.) Something else
   e.) Don’t Know

   • If for Question 4 you answered c-e (Independent, Something else, or Don’t Know, answer Question 5)
   • If for Question 4 you answered a or b (Republican or Democrat), answer Question 6

5) Do you consider yourself closer to the Republican party or the Democratic party?
   a.) Closer to the Republican party
   b.) Closer to the Democratic party
   c.) Neither
   d.) Other
   e.) Don’t Know

6) Strength of Partisanship (If you answered either Republican or Democrat in Question 4)?
a.) Strong
b.) Not very strong

7) We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Please circle where you place yourself on this scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extremely Liberal</td>
<td>Slightly Liberal</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Slightly Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Extremely Conservative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8) What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?

a.) High school grad
b.) GED
c.) Business, technical, or vocational school after high school
d.) Some college, no 4-year degree
e.) College graduate
f.) Post-graduate training/professional schooling after college

9) Are you currently married, living with a partner, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?

a.) Married
b.) Never been married
c.) Living with a partner
d.) Divorced
e.) Separated
f.) Widowed

10) Do you or anyone in your household belong to a labor union?

a.) Yes
b.) No

11) What is your religious preference?

a.) Protestant
b.) Catholic
c.) Jewish
d.) Some other religion
e.) No religion
12) Do you consider yourself an evangelical or born again Christian?

   a.) Yes
   b.) No

13) Have you or someone in your immediate family served in the military?

   a.) Yes
   b.) No

14) Please circle the letter of the income group that includes the income of **ALL** members of your household in 2004 before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. If you are unsure what would be your best guess?

   a.) $10,000 or less
   b.) $10,001-20,000
   c.) $20,001-$40,000
   d.) $40,001-$60,000
   e.) $60,001-$80,000
   f.) $80,001-$100,000
   g.) More than $100,000

Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge. If you do not know the answer please make your best guess.

15) What office or position does Dick Cheney hold?

   ______________________________________

16) What party hold the majority in the United States House?

   ______________________________

17.) What office or position does Tony Blair hold? ________________________________

18) People may think of themselves in many different ways. In response to the question **“Who am I?”** what are 3 things you would say?

   1. ______________________________________
   2. ______________________________________
   3. ______________________________________
19) What one thing would you tell a stranger about yourself?  
______________________

20) People may come from different cultures and there are many different words to describe the different backgrounds or ethnic groups that people come from. Think about the group (or groups) that best describe you. How do you describe yourself? You can circle more than one.

a.) White (Caucasian/non-Hispanic)  
b.) African American  
c.) Latino  
d.) American Indian or Alaska Native  
e.) Asian American  
f.) Other (please write in) __________________

21) If you circled more than one group, which do you consider your primary ethnic group?

a.) White (Caucasian/non-Hispanic)  
b.) African American  
c.) Latino  
d.) American Indian or Alaska Native  
e.) Asian American  
f.) Other (please write in) _________________

The following questions ask about your PRIMARY ETHNIC GROUP that you selected above in Question 20 or 21.

22) I am happy that I am a member of my ethnic group.  

Strongly Agree   Somewhat Agree   Somewhat Disagree   Strongly Disagree

23) I sometimes feel it would be better if different ethnic groups didn’t try to mix together.  

Strongly Agree   Somewhat Agree   Somewhat Disagree   Strongly Disagree

24) I have a strong sense of belonging to my own group.  

Strongly Agree   Somewhat Agree   Somewhat Disagree   Strongly Disagree

25) I have a lot of pride in my ethnic group and its accomplishments.

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26) I do not feel a strong attachment towards my own ethnic group.

27) Sometimes I wish I was not from my ethnic group.

28) Being a member of my group is an important part of who I am.

29) My ethnicity is the most important part of who I am.

30) I feel strongly attached to my ethnic group.

31) I enjoy being around people from ethnic groups other than my own.

32) I feel good about my cultural and ethnic background.

33) Circle how important your **PRIMARY ETHNIC GROUP IDENTITY** is to you in your life in general on a 10-point scale from 0 meaning *not important at all* to 10 meaning *very important*. Please circle where you place yourself on this scale.

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</tbody>
</table>

**Not important at all** | **Moderate** | **Very Important**

Thinking about your own **PRIMARY ETHNIC GROUP IDENTITY** please consider the following questions
34) In general, others respect people from my group?

   Strongly Agree  Somewhat Agree  Somewhat Disagree  Strongly Disagree

35) Do you think most people would treat you as Black, Latino, White, or something else?

   a.) Black
   b.) Latino
   c.) White
   d.) Something else (please specify)___________________

36) As far as you know, which of these people in your family was born outside the United States (U.S.)? (Mark all that apply)

   a)You
   b)Your Mother
   c)Your Father
   d)All of your grandparents
   e)Some of your grandparents
   f)None of these people were born outside the U.S.

37) Do you think what happens generally to your ethnic group in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?

   Strongly Agree  Somewhat Agree  Somewhat Disagree  Strongly Disagree

38) How important is it to your personal success that others of your ethnicity are successful?

   a.) Very important
   b.) Somewhat important
   c.) Not important

39) Do you think that your personal success will help your ethnic community?

   a.) Yes, definitely
   b.) Probably
   c.) Probably Not
   d.) Definitely not

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40) I like to identify myself as a member of my ethnic group.

   a.) not at all
   b.) very little or not very often
   c.) moderately
   d.) much or very much
   e.) extremely often or almost always

42) I like to identify myself as an American.

   a.) not at all
   b.) very little or not very often
   c.) moderately
   d.) much or very much
   e.) extremely often or almost always

42) My friends, while I was growing up, were of my ethnic group background.

   a.) not at all
   b.) very little or not very often
   c.) moderately
   d.) much or very much
   e.) extremely often or almost always

43) My friends now are of my ethnic group background.

   a.) not at all
   b.) very little or not very often
   c.) moderately
   d.) much or very much
   e.) extremely often or almost always

44) Do you belong to any clubs or organizations that include mostly members of your ethnic group?

   a.) Yes
   b.) No

45) If you answered yes to Question 44, please list up to 3 of the groups that include mostly members of your ethnic group that you consider most important.

   a.)_____________________________________
   b.)_____________________________________
46) Have you ever been discriminated against because of your ethnicity?

   a.) not at all
   b.) very little or not very often
   c.) moderately
   d.) much or very much
   e.) extremely often or almost always

If you indicated **Latino** as your primary ethnic group please complete the last four questions. If you did not indicate Latino, then you are done with this survey. Thank you very much for your participation.
47) Here you will be asked about you and your family’s ancestry. Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country?

a.) Mexican  
b.) Puerto Rican  
c.) Cuban  
d.) Dominican  
e.) Salvadoran  
f.) Other Central American country (please specify)_________________  
g.) Other South American country (please specify)_________________  
h.) Other (please specify) __________________

48) Circle how close you feel to Latinos outside of your specific ancestry group (for example if you are Cuban how do you feel toward non-Cuban Latinos), on a 10-point scale where a 0 means Not Close at All and a 10 means Very Close.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Close at All</th>
<th>Somewhat Close</th>
<th>Very Close</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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49) Circle how close you feel to Latinos from your specific ancestry group on a 10-point scale where a 0 means Not Close at All and a 10 means Very Close.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Close at All</th>
<th>Somewhat Close</th>
<th>Very Close</th>
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<td>10</td>
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</table>

50) How often do you…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>A Lot</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Speak English?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Speak English with your friends?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Speak Spanish?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Speak Spanish with your friends?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Watch television in English?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Watch television in Spanish?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Listen to music or the radio in English?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
h. Listen to music or the radio in Spanish?

Post-test

7. If the election were held tomorrow, which candidate would you vote for?
   
   a.) Hernández
   b.) Simmons

8. If the election were held tomorrow, would you turnout and vote for either one of these candidates?
   
   e.) Yes, definitely
   f.) Probably
   g.) Probably Not
   h.) Definitely not

9. Did you hear any details of this survey before your participation today? If so, what did you hear?

10. What do you think is the purpose of this survey?
Survey Questionnaire

1.) Circle how important your Latino group identity is to you in your life in general, on a 10-point scale from 0 meaning *not important at all* to 10 meaning *very important*. Please circle where you place yourself on this scale.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>10</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Very Important</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.) My Latino ethnicity is the most important part of who I am.

   Strongly Agree   Somewhat Agree   Somewhat Disagree   Strongly Disagree

3.) In general, I feel strongly attached to Latinos as a group.

   Strongly Agree   Somewhat Agree   Somewhat Disagree   Strongly Disagree

4.) In general, I have a lot of pride in Latinos as a group and their accomplishments.

   Strongly Agree   Somewhat Agree   Somewhat Disagree   Strongly Disagree

5.) Do you think what happens generally to Latinos in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?

   Strongly Agree   Somewhat Agree   Somewhat Disagree   Strongly Disagree

6.) How important is it to your personal success that other Latinos are successful?

   1. Extremely important
   2. Very important
   3. Moderately important
   4. Not very important
   5. Not important at all

7.) As far as you know, which of these people in your family was born outside the United States (U.S.)? (Mark all that apply)

   a) You
b) Your Mother  
c) Your Father  
d) All of your grandparents  
e) Some of your grandparents  
f) None of these people were born outside the U.S.

8.) My friends, while I was growing up, were Latinos.

f.) not at all  
g.) some  
h.) almost all

9.) Would you say you can carry on a conversation in Spanish, both understanding and speaking-- very well, pretty well, just a little, or not at all?

1    Very well  
2    Pretty well  
3    Just a little  
4    Not at all

10.). In what language are the news programs you usually watch on TV or listen to on the radio? Only Spanish, more Spanish than English, both equally, more English than Spanish, or only English?

1    Only Spanish  
2    More Spanish than English  
3    Both equally  
4    More English than Spanish  
5    Only English  
6    Do not watch TV or listen to Radio

11.) Here you will be asked about you and your family’s ancestry. Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country?

i.) Mexican  
j.) Puerto Rican  
k.) Cuban  
l.) Dominican  
m.) Salvadoran  
n.) Other Central American country (please specify)_________________  
o.) Other South American country (please specify)_________________  
p.) Other (please specify) ___________________
12) Circle how close you feel to Latinos outside of your specific ancestry group (those not in the group you chose in the last question), on a 10-point scale where a 0 means *Not Close at All* and a 10 means *Very Close*.

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13) Circle how close you feel to Latinos from your **specific** ancestry group on a 10-point scale where a 0 means *Not Close at All* and a 10 means *Very Close*.

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Works Cited


Http://gking.harvard.edu


United States Bureau of the Census. 2005. “National estimates of the total population, with a breakdown for age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin.”  


Biography

Victoria Maria DeFrancesco Soto was born on April 28, 1978 in Fort Huachuca, AZ. DeFrancesco Soto was raised in Sierra Vista, AZ and attended college at the University of Arizona where she received her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Latin American Studies (*Summa Cum Laude*) in the Spring of 2000. In the Fall of 2000 DeFrancesco Soto began the Doctoral Studies program in Political Science at Duke with a Duke University Endowment Fellowship University. In 2003 she received her Master of Arts in Political Science. Her primary field being American Politics and her secondary field, Comparative Politics.