SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

for

FALL FROM GRACE: THE ROLE OF DOMINANCE AND PRESTIGE IN THE PUNISHMENT OF HIGH-STATUS ACTORS

Hemant Kakkar
Niro Sivanathan
London Business School

Matthias S. Gobel
University of California, Santa Barbara
Figure S3. Interaction effect of generalized dominance and status on punishment in Study 1 ...........26
Figure S4. Interaction effect of prestige and status on punishment in Study 1 .................................27
Figure S5. Schematic diagram of Study 2’s protocol ........................................................................28
Figure S6. Mediation Model in Study S3 ..........................................................................................29

APPENDIX ...................................................................................................................................... 30
Graphics used in Study S1 ................................................................................................................30
Figure S7. Picture of Lionel Messi used to screen participants with Soccer knowledge in Study S1 ....30
Figure S8. Newspaper Clippings showing Messi being accused of tax fraud in Study S1 ..................31
Figure S9. Newspaper Clippings showing Messi denying tax fraud used in Study S1 ..........................32

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 33
STUDY 3: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Results

Manipulation Check. A 2 (dominance: high vs. low) X 2 (prestige: high vs. low) ANOVA with status judgments as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of both dominance ($F(1,487) = 50.02, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$) and prestige ($F(1,487) = 59.94, p < .001, \eta^2 = .11$) and also a significant interaction effect ($F(1,487) = 6.08, p = .014, \eta^2 = .01$). Planned comparison of means revealed that the actor had significantly less status when both prestige and dominance were low ($M = 4.04, SD = 1.88$), compared to when prestige was low but dominance was high ($M = 5.44, SD = 1.44, t(244) = 6.56, p < .001$) or when prestige was high but dominance was low ($M = 5.36, SD = 1.50, t(244) = 6.09, p < .001$). Both in turn were significantly lower in status compared to when both prestige and dominance were high ($M = 6.07, SD = 1.19, p < .001$). Thus, the actor was afforded the highest status when both dominance and prestige were high and least when both were low, with intermediate status conferred when either of dominance or prestige was high. Overall, our manipulations worked to orthogonally manipulate dominance and prestige as two alternate forms of status.

Mediation analysis. To further test, whether high dominance leads to greater punishment in comparison to low dominance, via intentionality and moral credentials, we performed additional mediation analysis using bootstrap procedure. We coded high dominance as 1 and low as 0. We found a positive indirect effect of high dominance via intentionality on punishment, suggesting that high dominance leads to greater intentionality, which in turn predicts harsher punishment ($b = .33, SE = .09, p < .001, 95\% CI [.16, .52]$). A significant indirect effect was also observed via moral credentials on punishment, suggesting that high dominance leads to lower moral credentials ($b = .14, SE = .07, p = .046, 95\% CI [.01, .29]$) which in turn predicts more punishment. Overall, the total indirect effect via the two mediators was significant ($b = .14,$...
SE = .07, p = .046, 95% CI [.01, .29]), indicating that high dominance in comparison to low indirectly affects punishment via intentionality and moral credentials.

We also performed the same mediation analysis comparing high prestige with low to examine whether high prestige leads to lower sanctioning via intentionality and moral credentials. High prestige was coded as 1 and low as 0. Bootstrap mediation with 5000 iterations revealed a significant negative effect of prestige via intentionality on punishment (b = -.57, SE = .10, p < .001, 95% CI [-.75, -.38]), suggesting high prestige is associated with lower punishment in comparison to when prestige is low. Similarly, the indirect effect via moral credentials was also significant (b = -.41, SE = .08, p < .001, 95% CI [-.58, -.28]). Overall, the total indirect effect via the two mediators was also significant (b = -.98, SE = .14, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.25, -.71]), confirming that high prestige in comparison to low leads to lower sanctioning via intentionality and moral credentials.
STUDY S1: EVENT BASED SURVEY STUDY

The aim of this study was twofold. First, we wanted to directly measure the constructs of dominance and prestige. Second and more importantly, we wanted to test whether perceiving the high-status actor as more dominant or more prestigious would influence observers’ punishment recommendations and judgments of intentionality for an ambiguous transgression. We tested this possibility in the real-world context of a high-status soccer player involved in a tax fraud scandal for which his culpability was not yet established. Specifically, we presented participants with an actual news report of Lionel Messi being accused of tax embezzlement. However, his guilt was not clear as Lionel Messi repudiated the accusation. Furthermore, the courts had not reached a verdict, but had only agreed to pursue a legal case on the matter. Therefore, it was important for us to complete the study prior to the courts arriving at a verdict, to maintain ambiguity of guilt. This incident, in the summer of 2015, served as a naturally occurring event to test our predictions. Consistent with our theorizing, we hypothesized that observers’ judgment of the transgression would depend upon Lionel Messi being perceived as high on dominance or prestige.

Sample and Procedure

Participants. We recruited 94 participants for a 10-minute study from the behavioral lab of a European business school, in exchange for £2.00 (approximately US $3.00) participation payment. We removed one participant who mistakenly completed the study twice. The final sample consisted of 93 participants (46% female; \(M_{\text{age}} = 29.15\) years, \(SD = 9.95\)).

Procedure. Prior to the study, we screened participants for basic knowledge of soccer, to ensure study responses were not a result of guesses to a forced response scale. Participants were shown an image of Lionel Messi – arguably the most elite and recognizable soccer player in the
world\textsuperscript{1} – in a tuxedo to conceal his sports identity (see Figure S7). They were asked to identify the celebrity from six options; those who failed to identify the image correctly were not allowed to continue with the study. To limit the possibility that their first response was correct due to chance (1 in 6), we posed a second question where participants were asked to identify the soccer club he plays for. Those who failed the second screening question were not permitted to continue with the study. This ensured the likelihood that a participant advanced due to chance was less than 3%. Successful participants then rated Lionel Messi’s perceived levels of dominance and prestige. Next, they were shown the original clippings from popular news journals (e.g. BBC, Forbes, CNN, etc.) informing that Lionel Messi would be facing trial over an alleged £2.9 million (approx. US $4.38 million) tax fraud (see Figure S8). They were also shown clippings from similar news journals where Lionel Messi vehemently denied these allegations (see Figure S9). Taken together, these news clippings add ambiguity to the transgression. Following this, participants evaluated Lionel Messi’s transgression and reported their demographic information.

**Measures**

Responses were on a 7-point Likert scale with anchors 1=\textit{not at all} and 7=\textit{very much}.

**Dominance and prestige.** We assessed the perceived levels of dominance and prestige using a 13-item validated scale (Cheng et al., 2010)\textsuperscript{2}. A sample item for dominance is “He often tries to get his own way regardless of what others in the team may want”. A sample prestige item is “Other members of the team respect and admire him” ($\alpha_{\text{Dominance}} = .74$, $\alpha_{\text{Prestige}} = .68$).

\textsuperscript{1} When this study was designed, Messi had won the footballer of the year award – FIFA Ballon d’Or, a record four times and was ranked as the 4th highest paid sports athlete in the world by Forbes, ahead of other phenomenal athletes such as Kobe Bryant, Roger Federer, etc. In essence, he had various markers of a high status sports athlete.

\textsuperscript{2} We used a shorter version of the original 17-item scale, after running a pre-test on all items and incorporating only those that showed high factor scores. The original scale was designed to rate known others who are part of one’s group. Since this study involved an unknown third person, it was necessary to conduct a pre-test on the scale items.


**Intentionality.** We assessed participants’ ratings of the transgression due to an intentional act by responding to a single item, “How likely is it that this was a deliberate action by Messi”.

**Punishment.** Since this study involved an actual ongoing trial, we measured punishment using a proxy – perceptions of culpability. We asked participants “How likely is it that Lionel Messi engaged in tax fraud?” and “How likely is it that the court will find Messi guilty” ($\alpha=.71$). We reasoned that opinions about engaging or being found guilty of a transgression should result in corresponding punishment recommendations for such individuals.

**Control Variables.** We controlled for several factors that could influence our results, such as amount of time participants spent following European soccer, how much they liked Lionel Messi and the football club he represents. We also controlled for demographics of all participants as these variables might influence the time devoted to following soccer and thus impact participants’ transgression judgments. Please refer to Table S2 for descriptive statistics.

**Results**

-----Insert Table S2 and Table S3 here-----

Table S3 describes regression results. We found that dominance positively predicted participant’s punishment judgments ($b = .43, p = .002, Model 2$) even after controlling for a number of variables ($b = .54, p = .001, Model 3$) whereas prestige was marginally negatively correlated with participants’ punishment judgments without the control variables ($b = -.38, p = .055, Model 2$) and significantly after accounting for control variables ($b = -.51, p = .031, Model 3$). Similarly, we find dominance positively correlated with intentionality both with ($b = .53, p = .002, Model 6$) and without ($b = .53, p = .001, Model 5$) controls, whereas prestige was unrelated to intentionality. These set of results support our first two hypotheses that high status dominance actors are punished more harshly than high status prestige actors (H1). Additionally, we also
checked for the interaction effect of dominance and prestige on punishment and found no support for the interaction ($b = .008, p = .98$). Moreover, when Messi was considered high on dominance, the transgression was judged as more intentional (H2). To test hypothesis 3, we performed a mediation analysis using bootstrap procedure to assess the size of the indirect effect from dominance via intentionality (mediator) on punishment judgments. We also added prestige as a covariate. Confirming our hypothesis, the indirect effect was positive and significant ($b = .18, p = .018$) with 95% bias corrected confidence intervals not containing zero [.06, .35]. After accounting for the indirect effect, the direct effect of dominance on punishment was only marginally significant ($b = .25, p = .077$), thus supporting hypothesis 3. The indirect effect of dominance on punishment via intentionality was also significant even without controlling for prestige ($b = .19, p = .014, 95\% \text{ CI} [.07, .38]$).

**Discussion**

By utilizing a timely, relevant, naturally occurring real world event, we found further evidence in support of our hypotheses. The more participants perceived Lionel Messi as dominant, the more they judged the ambiguous tax fraud as intentional and recommended harsher punishment. In contrast, when participants perceived Lionel Messi as high on prestige, they were less likely to punish him. These results thus provide important evidence that the type of status strategy – dominance or prestige, that other infer one engages in, differentially colors third party judgments of high status actor’s moral transgressions. Despite being careful with our study design, all our data came from a single source thus making it susceptible to common source bias. Also, despite controlling for a number of factors, one cannot completely rule out preexisting knowledge of the income tax allegations against Messi among participants which
could potentially influence our results. To overcome these issues of causality, we manipulated both dominance and prestige in Study 2 and 3 (see main manuscript).
STUDY S2: RULING OUT LIKEABILITY

The aim of Study S2 was to replicate the findings from other studies in a controlled experiment while ruling out possible alternative accounts for our prior findings. To achieve this, we experimentally manipulated the actor’s level of dominance and prestige to establish the causal role of dominance versus prestige in punishing high status transgressors. Moreover, we orthogonally manipulated the actor’s warmth in order to rule out the possibility that liking the transgressing high status actor would moderate observers’ punishment judgments. Indeed, existing research using the dominance and prestige framework has shown that high-status prestige actors are liked more than high-status dominant actors (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) and because interpersonal liking has been shown to attenuate punishment judgments (Efran, 1974) and harsh interpersonal reactions (Epstein & Hornstein, 1969), we experimentally manipulated the actor’s level of warmth as a proximal indicator of interpersonal liking. This was done to meet the primary objective of demonstrating that dominance and prestige effects exist beyond attributions of likeability. It is important to note that not all high-status dominant actors are perceived as unlikeable, for instance high-status individuals who show their dominance via power are perceived as more warm than those lacking power (Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011). Anecdotally we know that certain CEOs despite showing autocratic tendencies are still liked. For instance Bill Gates was known to lead through control (Wallace & Erickson, 1993) but was regularly ranked within Fortune’s top 10 most admired business leaders. Hence, we do not expect warmth or likeability to influence punishment judgments, of high-status actors operating with dominance or prestige strategies.

We also measured participants’ perception of the actor’s competence to make sure that competence did not differ across the two conditions, as competence is often linked with high
status (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Bunderson, 2003). Finally, we also measured observers’ reports on how harshly the high-status transgressor should be punished. We expected that ambiguous transgressions committed by dominance- compared to prestige-based high-status actors would be judged more harshly. Further, we predicted that the level of the actor’s warmth would be unrelated to observers’ judgments of punishment severity. Finally, despite status and specifically dominance-based status being conceptually different from the construct of power (see Cheng et. al., 2013), we measured participants’ ratings of both power and status, to statistically rule out power as a potential alternative explanation.

**Method**

**Manipulation pretest.** We ran a pretest on 50 participants sampled from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) (44% female; $M$ age = 33.8 years, $SD = 7.66$) to ensure our manipulation mirrored the validated operationalization of dominance and prestige. Participants were randomly assigned to either a prestige-based ($n=25$) or a dominance-based status actor condition ($n=25$). In the prestige condition, they read about a high-status individual who was “respected, admired and held in high esteem”. In the dominance condition, the same high-status individual was described as having a “dominant personality who is forceful and controlling”. Participants then responded to the validated scale measures of dominance and prestige similar to Study 2 (see Cheng et al., 2010) and reported their perceived level of the actor’s power and status respectively. A one-way ANOVA demonstrated that participants in the prestige condition rated this individual significantly higher on prestige compared to those in the dominance condition ($F(1,48) = 24.16, p < .001, M_{Prestige} = 5.22, SD_{Prestige} = .81, M_{Dominance} = 3.89, SD_{Dominance} = 1.09, d = 1.38$). Similarly, participants assigned to the dominance condition, rated this person as significantly higher on dominance than participants in the prestige condition ($F(1,48) = 29.04, p < .001, M_{Prestige} = 4.02, SD_{Prestige} = 1.16, M_{Dominance} = 5.74, SD_{Dominance} = 1.10, d = 1.52$). Further,
there was no difference in the mean levels of perceived power ($F(1,48) = .24, p = .63$) and overall status ($F(1,48) = .31, p = .58$) ratings, ensuring our experimental paradigm successfully manipulated dominance and prestige, without impacting the related concept of power.

**Participants.** Study S2 used a more representative sample of participants from a different country. We sampled U.S. participants from AMT. We decided in advance to collect approximately 50 participants per cell and paid $0.50 for their participation. Our final sample consisted of 204 valid responses after removing 6 participants that failed attention checks (43% female; $M$ age = 34.24 years, $SD = 10.94$).

**Design and Procedure.** Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (status actor: dominance ($n=100$) versus prestige ($n=104$)) X 2 (actor warmth: high ($n=99$) versus low ($n=105$)) between-subject design. Participants read about a high status individual K Wallace, who was described as the CEO of a Fortune 500 company. In the dominance status condition, participants read that he was known to be dominant and controlling with his colleagues. In the prestige status condition, he was described as being respected and admired by his colleagues. In the high warmth condition, K Wallace was also described as caring and openhearted, whereas in the low warmth condition, he was additionally described as withdrawn and reserved. In line with recent findings that discussed warmth to consist of both social and ethical components (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014), we ensured that our manipulation of warmth was not conflated with the ethical component. We did this as theoretical explanation for our effects centered on judgments of morality via intentionality and moral credentials, and therefore it was important for our manipulation to be independent of this component of warmth. Following this, participants read about an ambiguous transgression K Wallace was accused of,

---

3 A pretest was done to ensure that items selected for the warmth manipulation displayed considerable discriminant validity with the prestige and dominance items.
however, due to lack of evidence, charges were not yet pressed against him. This scenario was directly adapted from the work of Fragale and colleagues (2009):

Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) accused K. Wallace of underpaying the federal government on his personal income taxes. Over the past few years, federal tax laws have become increasingly complex, and there are now more rules and regulations than ever before. Over this same period of time, the IRS has documented a substantial rise in improper tax returns. Some are a result of simple mistakes, while others are deliberate attempts to pay lower taxes. Although official charges have not been filed against K. Wallace, the IRS alleges that K. Wallace’s tax return understated the amount of money that he owed to the federal government.

Participants then responded to the following punishment items “How harshly would you punish K. Wallace for his behavior?” and “How strongly do you feel that tax authorities (IRS) should file a case against K. Wallace?” (α = .83). To ensure that differential competence perceptions of K. Wallace across conditions were not driving the results, we also measured competence using participants’ perception of the actor’s confidence and competence (Fiske et al., 2002) (α = .85). Finally, participants also responded to manipulation check items aimed at assessing their liking of K. Wallace (α = .88). All responses were made on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).

Results

Manipulation check. In line with past research (e.g. Cheng et al., 2010), a 2 (Status Actor Condition) x 2 (Actor Warmth Condition) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of status ($F(1, 200) = 44.24, p < .001$) and warmth manipulation ($F(1, 200) = 121.73, p < .001$). Participants reported greater liking for K. Wallace in the prestige status condition ($M = 4.51, SD = 1.21$) than in the dominance status condition ($M = 3.63, SD = 1.11, F(1,202) = 28.90, p < .001$). We also found that K. Wallace was judged as significantly more likeable in the high ($M = 4.82, SD = 1.03$) than low warmth condition ($M = 3.39, SD = 1.01, F(1,202) = 101.55, p < .001$), indicating that our experimental manipulation of warmth was successful. However, more
importantly we did not find any interaction effect of the two conditions on perceived warmth 
\( F(1, 200) = 0.31, p = .58 \).

**Punishment severity.** A 2 (Status Actor Condition) x 2 (Actor Warmth Condition) 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of status condition, \( F(1, 200) = 9.08, p = .003, d = .43 \), such that participants in the dominance status condition (\( M = 4.09, SD = 1.46 \)) were 
recommended harsher punishment for K. Wallace than participants in the prestige status 
condition (\( M = 3.49, SD = 1.36 \)). In contrast, there was no main effect of warmth on punishment 
severity (\( M_{\text{High Warmth}} = 3.67, SD = 1.44 \), and \( M_{\text{Low Warmth}} = 3.88, SD = 1.44 \) respectively), \( F(1, 200) = 1.05, p = .31 \), suggesting that liking did not change judgments of punishment severity. Further, 
we did not observe any interaction effect of the actor’s warmth and status on punishment 
severity, \( F(1, 200) = 0.00, p = .99 \). Neither participants’ age nor gender moderated their 
judgments of punishment severity (\( p > .10 \)).

**Perceived competence.** In line with the stereotype content model of warmth and 
competence as two primary dimensions of evaluations (Fiske et. al., 2002), we also measured 
participants’ competence perceptions for K Wallace to further rule this out as an alternate 
mechanism. We did not observe any difference in competence ratings across high (\( M = 5.44, SD 
= 0.95 \)) and low warmth actor conditions (\( M = 5.22, SD = 1.20 \)), \( F(1,200) = 2.12, p = .15 \); neither 
was there any difference in competence ratings across the prestige (\( M = 5.27, SD = 1.01 \)) and 
dominance status conditions (\( M = 5.39, SD = 1.17 \)), \( F(1,200) = 0.62, p = .43 \), nor was there any 
interaction between the two conditions, \( F(1,200) = 1.07, p = .30 \), confirming that participant’s 
judged K. Wallace equally competent across conditions.

**Discussion**
Study S2 replicated the findings from previous studies using an experimental design. More importantly, by experimentally manipulating dominance and prestige, Study S2 provided evidence for the causal role that dominance versus prestige-based status plays for judgments of transgressions and the severity of punishment. Study S2 also ruled out several alternate explanations, such as observers’ differential liking, ratings of competence, and perceived differences in power of the transgressor, that could have driven our findings. Finally, Study S2 directly captured participants’ recommendation of punishment severity and demonstrated that when accused of transgressing social norms, the CEO (high status actor) when high on dominance-based status was recommended harsher punishment compared to when his status was based on prestige.
STUDY S3: TESTING THE COMPLETE MODEL

Study S3 was performed to replicate the complete theoretical model i.e. our findings in Study 3, illustrating the psychological process that underlies observers’ punishment judgments. Specifically, we focused on the role of attributions of moral credentials (Polman, Pettit, & Wiesenfeld, 2013) and intentionality (Fragale, Rosen, Xu, & Merideth, 2009) as two separate psychological mechanisms driving third party judgments. We also wanted to rule out transgressor’s gender as an alternate mechanism driving our effects.

Method

Participants. As before, we decided in advance to collect 50 participants per condition. Our final sample consisted of 106 MTurk users, who were each paid $0.50 for their participation (38% female; $age = 33.53 years, $D = 11.25).

Design and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either a high status prestige ($ = 53) or high status dominance ($ = 53) condition. The manipulation and scenario were identical to Study 3, except that the transgressor in this study was a female – Ms. Wallace. This was done to generalize our previous results across gender. After reading the scenario, participants reported how severely the high status transgressor should be punished using the same items as in Study 3 ($ = .88). We measured participants’ attributions of intentionality, by asking how strongly they felt that Ms. Wallace deliberately underpaid federal government on her personal income taxes (cf. Fragale et al., 2009). Participants’ perception of Ms. Wallace’s moral credentials were measured using a composite of three items assessing how moral, wrong and unethical her behavior was ($ = .83) (cf. Polman et al., 2013). As power and status are closely related constructs, we also wanted to rule out any status and power differences across the two conditions. Therefore, participants reported how much status and power Ms. Wallace had.
Finally, participants responded to manipulation check items assessing the actor’s perceived levels of prestige and dominance. All responses were made along 7-point Likert scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

Results

Manipulation Check. A one-way ANOVA confirmed that our manipulation worked as expected. Participants assigned to the high-status prestige actor condition reported Ms. Wallace as being higher in prestige ($M = 5.52, SD = 1.44$) compared to the participants assigned to the high-status dominance condition ($M = 3.50, SD = 1.31, F(1,104) = 57.36, p < .001$). In contrast, participants assigned to the high-status dominance actor condition indicated Ms. Wallace to be higher in dominance ($M = 5.49, SD = 1.16$) than participants assigned to the high-status prestige condition ($M = 3.04, SD = 1.01, F(1,104) = 128.60, p < .001$).

Punishment severity. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant mean difference in punishment severity ($F(1, 104) = 10.29, p = .002, d = 0.62$), such that Ms. Wallace was punished more severely when described as a high-status dominant actor ($M = 3.69, SD = 1.45$) than when described as a high-status prestigious actor ($M = 2.80, SD = 1.40$), supporting hypothesis 1.

Intentionality. In support of hypothesis 2, Ms. Wallace’s behavior was judged as more intentional in the dominance-based status condition ($M = 4.40, SD = 1.74$) compared to the prestige-based status condition ($M = 2.76, SD = 1.51, F(1,104) = 27.05, p < .001, d = 1.01$).

Moral credentials. Ms. Wallace’s behavior was perceived as less unethical in the prestige-based status condition ($M = 4.19, SD = 1.40$) compared to the dominance-based status condition ($M = 3.39, SD = 1.20, F(1,104) = 10.01, p = .002, d = 0.61$). Thus, consistent with hypothesis 3, Ms. Wallace was afforded greater moral credentials when judged to be prestigious than dominant.
**Mediation analysis.** To check whether intentionality and moral credentials explained the relationship between status condition (dominance = 1, prestige = 0) and punishment, we performed bootstrap mediation analyses with intentionality and moral credentials as two parallel mediators and punishment as the dependent variable (see Figure S6). A significant indirect effect of dominance compared to prestige via intentionality on punishment was observed ($b = .62, p < .001$) with 95% confidence intervals not containing zero [.34, 1.02]. Further, in comparison to prestige, indirect effect of dominance on punishment via lack of moral credentials was also significant ($b = .37, p = .006, 95\% CI [.15, .68]$). Overall the total effect of dominance on punishment was significant in comparison to prestige ($b = 1.00, p < .001, 95\% CI [.55, 1.50]$), thus supporting Hypothesis 4 (see Figure S4). Overall, we replicated findings from Study 3 (see main manuscript) and found support for all the four hypotheses.

**Testing for the impact of participants’ age and gender.** We did not observe any main or interaction effects of gender or age on intentionality, moral credentials and punishment severity ($p > .10$).

**Testing for impact of perceived levels of status and power.** We also found no difference in status ($M_{\text{Prestige}} = 5.49, SD_{\text{Prestige}} = 1.34, M_{\text{Dominance}} = 5.10, SD_{\text{Dominance}} = 1.21, F(1,104) = 2.55, p = .11$) and power ($M_{\text{Prestige}} = 5.11, SD_{\text{Prestige}} = 1.45, M_{\text{Dominance}} = 5.55, SD_{\text{Dominance}} = 1.20, F(1,104) = 2.80, p = .10$) across the two experimental conditions.

**Discussion**

Overall, this study provided a complete test of our model. Specifically, we found that third party observers recommended harsher punishment for a CEO high on dominance than prestige in response to their ambiguous moral transgressions, replicating results from Studies 1, 2, 3, S1 and S2. Moreover, judgments of intentionality and moral credentials, as hypothesized, were found to explain the differential punishments meted out to dominance versus prestige-based.
high-status actors. Finally, this study also helped to rule out additional alternate mechanisms of power and transgressor’s gender that may influence the results.
### Table S1. Multilevel regression on punishment towards group leader in Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status Strategy (Dominance/Prestige)a</td>
<td>0.258*</td>
<td>0.316*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.253*</td>
<td>0.263*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0047)</td>
<td>(0.0046)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0074</td>
<td>-0.0181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0355)</td>
<td>(0.0350)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Group Members</td>
<td>-0.0204</td>
<td>-0.0634</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0636)</td>
<td>(0.0634)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.417***</td>
<td>1.603***</td>
<td>1.538***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.386)</td>
<td>(0.0844)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** *a* Categorical variable with 1 as Dominance and 0 as Prestige; Number of Groups=38; Standard errors in parentheses

* *p* < 0.05, ** *p* < 0.01, *** *p* < 0.001
Table S2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations for Study S1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Age</td>
<td>29.15</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Gender*</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Follow Soccer</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.4***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Favorite Sport</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Like &quot;Messi&quot;</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Favorite Soccer Club</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.61***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Prestige</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>0.4***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Dominance</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Intentional</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.3**</td>
<td>-0.26*</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Punishment</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N = 93; * Gender: 1 = Male, 2 = Female; 'p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01
Table S3: Results of OLS Regression in Study S1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>PUNISHMENT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>INTENTIONAL</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>Model 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige</td>
<td>-0.386(^\psi)</td>
<td>-0.514(^*)</td>
<td>-0.356</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>0.426(^**)</td>
<td>0.544(^***)</td>
<td>0.534(^***)</td>
<td>0.528(^**)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.009()</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.0151)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.290)</td>
<td>(0.327)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Soccer</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorite Sport</td>
<td>-0.073()</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like “Messi”</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.223(^*)</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorite Soccer Club</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>-0.196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.928(^***)</td>
<td>4.544(^***)</td>
<td>4.008(^*)</td>
<td>4.753(^***)</td>
<td>3.719(^*)</td>
<td>3.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.849)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
<td>(1.733)</td>
<td>(1.416)</td>
<td>(1.926)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta R^2a)</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(^\psi\) denotes \(p\) value = .055; \(^a\) Obtained after subtracting \(R^2\) from Model 1 \(R^2\); Standard errors in parentheses; \(^*\) \(p < 0.05\), \(^**\) \(p < 0.01\), \(^***\) \(p < 0.001\)
Figure S1. Mediation Model comparing high vs. low Dominance

Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients, Direct effect of IV on DV after accounting for the two indirect effects is included in parentheses.
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$;
Figure S2. Mediation Model comparing high vs. low Prestige

Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients, Direct effect of IV on DV after accounting for the two indirect effects is included in parentheses.
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$;
Figure S3. Interaction effect of generalized dominance and status on punishment in Study 1

Notes: Both slopes are significant (p<.05)
Figure S4. *Interaction effect of prestige and status on punishment in Study 1*

*Notes:* Only slope with high status is significant (p<.05)
Figure S5. Schematic diagram of Study 2’s protocol

First Stage

- Participants first performed Lost at Sea task individually
- They then performed the same Lost at Sea task as a group
- Filler task (Dot estimation)
  - Learned about the economic game between group leader and other participant

Second Stage

- Paired with group leader for the general ability task
  - Assigned hard questions to the group leader
  - Responded to manipulation check and demographic items
- Debriefed, paid and thanked for their participation
Figure S6. Mediation Model in Study S3

Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients, Direct effect of IV on DV after accounting for the two indirect effects is included in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001;
APPENDIX

Graphics used in Study S1

Figure S7. Picture of Lionel Messi used to screen participants with Soccer knowledge in Study S1
Figure S8. Newspaper Clippings showing Messi being accused of tax fraud in Study S1
Lionel Messi Tax Fraud Statement - 'I'm not a Tax Dodger'

By Dominic Gover

Soccer God Messi Denies Tax Fraud Allegations on Facebook

Figure S9. Newspaper Clippings showing Messi denying tax fraud used in Study S1


