NEITHER PEDDLERS NOR WAR: unraveling 180 years of historical literature on Pernambuco’s “Peddlers’ War,” 1710-1711

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SUMMARY: This historiographical “tour” essay examines the many meanings that have been ascribed to Pernambuco’s “Peddlers’ War” (1710-1711) in nearly 200 years of historical literature. Looking across generations and intellectual paradigms (Marxist, liberal, Brazilian nationalist, and Pernambucan regionalist), it shows that 1710-1711 has stood for a nativist and perhaps a republican movement against the Portuguese, a fracturing between the mercantile bourgeoisie and planter class, or as a symbol of Pernambuco’s historic rebelliousness in the wake of oppression by outsiders. Focusing primarily on Pernambucan debates, it also examines the seasoned, if brief, reflections on the event by colonial historians beyond Brazil—including an unpublished 1957 US dissertation—that suggests how much the discussion of the events of 1710-1711 has to tell us about shifting currents of intellectual and political life in Pernambuco.

KEYWORDS: Peddlers’ War; Mascates; Recife; Pernambuco; Colonial Brazil.

Nem mascates nem guerra: desvendando 180 anos de literatura histórica sobre a “Guerra dos Mascates” de Pernambuco, 1710-1711

RESUMO: Este ‘tour’ historiográfico aborda os múltiplos significados atribuídos à “Guerra dos Mascates” (1710-1711) de Pernambuco em quase 200 anos de literatura histórica. A observação de variadas gerações e paradigmas intelectuais (seja marxista, liberal, nacionalista brasileiro ou regionalista pernambucano), mostra que os anos de 1710-1711 tem representado um movimento nativista e talvez republicano contra os portugueses, uma fratura entre a burguesia mercantil e a elite agrária ou como um símbolo da rebeldia histórica de Pernambuco em vista da opressão de forasteiros. Abordando principalmente debates pernambucanos, este trabalho também analisa as observações experientes, ainda que breves, de historiadores do mundo colonial fora do Brasil, inclusive uma tese inédita norte-americana, de 1957, que revelam o quanto aprendemos sobre Pernambuco e sua vida intelectual e política através de debate sobre os eventos de 1710-1711.

PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Guerra dos Mascates; Mascates; Recife; Pernambuco; Brasil colonial.

Ni buhoneros ni guerra: desenredando 180 años de literatura historic a sobre la “Guerra de los Buhoneros” de Pernambuco, 1710-1711

RESUMEN: Este ‘tour’ historiográfico aborda los múltiples significados atribuidos a la ‘Guerra de los Buhoneros’ (1710-1711) de Pernambuco en casi 200 años de literatura histórica. Un recorrido a través de generaciones y paradigmas intelectuales (sean marxistas, liberales, nacionalistas brasileños o regionalistas pernambucanos), demuestra que el período 1710-1711 representó un movimiento nativista y quizás republicano contra los portugueses, una fractura entre la burguesía mercantil y la elite agraria, o como un símbolo de la rebeldía histórica de Pernambuco en vista de la opresión de forasteros. En el presente trabajo se analizan las observaciones veteranas de los historiadores del mundo colonial fuera del Brasil, incluso una tesis inédita norteamericana, de 1957, revelando cuánto podemos aprender sobre Pernambuco y su vida intelectual y política a través de debates sobre los eventos de 1710-1711.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Guerra de los Buhoneros; Buhoneros; Recife; Pernambuco; Brasil colonial.

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It is the unhappiest of all, the most discussed, the most denied and contested, the least able to increase in Pernambucan pomp.
—Barbosa Lima Sobrinho (1897-2000)\(^1\)

On November 9, 1710, between 1,000 and 2,000\(^2\) Pernambucans invaded the thriving mercantile port of Recife, “annulling the obnoxious privileges” that had been awarded to the city of 8,000 souls.\(^3\) It had been elevated to the status of a village (villa) the previous year, a designation carrying all the entitlements as presented in the regal charter of November 19, 1709. Opponents in the neighboring city of Olinda, wealthy sugar planters and their partisans, toppled Recife’s pillory (pelourinho) and freed opponents of the captaincy’s governor, Sebastião Castro e Caldas.\(^4\) The royally appointed administrator narrowly escaped the crowds, having fled to Bahia in a small boat.

Recife’s religious figures led a procession of children, mamelucos (persons of indigenous and European descent), blacks, and most prominently, Pernambuco’s filhos da terra (“sons of the soil,” or colonial subjects born in the captaincy). Many of the sugar planters and lesser filhos were armed with swords, pikes, spears, and muskets, and they wore feathers on their hats, proudly displaying their status as nobles of the land.\(^5\) Steady drumming gave the occasion a festive air. As they proceeded through the city the procession bellowed, “Long live the king, Dom João V, and long live the people.” Although the manifestation was generally peaceable, participants did not hesitate to seize documents from Recife’s new municipal government, including large swaths of commercial documents, which were promptly burned. Moreover, the insurgents forced Recife’s elected officials out of office and required them to surrender their royal insignia under the penalty of death.\(^6\)

Sugar planters and municipal officials in Olinda attempted to subdue the sprawling port city of merchants, sailors, and artisans, making Recife an appendage of its smaller but historically significant neighbor. However, the political and symbolic subordination of Recife to Olinda was short-lived. The port revolted in 1711, leading to a dramatic clash between the two cities that concluded when a new governor arrived from Portugal.

Nearly a year of conflict signaled a violent escalation in longstanding animosities between
merchants and businessmen, overwhelmingly Portuguese and residents of Recife, and Brazilian-born planters who clustered around (but rarely inhabited) the capital of Olinda. Until the novelist José de Alencar (1829-1877) popularized the idea of a “Peddlers’ War” (Guerra dos Mascates) in a two-volume work of historical fiction, published in 1873 and 1874, the conflict of 1710-1711 had been known by many different names. It was designated, at various points in time, a revolt, revolution, calamidade (calamity), agitação (agitation), alteração (alteration), uprising, conspiracy, civil war, and sedição (sedition). If one finds much instability in what to call the “Peddlers’ War,” dividing the conflict into its rival factions is challenging, as extant historical documents mobilize historical insults in a moment of open conflict. Rather than encountering Portuguese merchants or Brazilian-born planters, we find marinheiros (sailors), pés-rapados (barefoot people), and pés de chumbo (lead feet, or as Caio Prado Júnior suggests, something akin to “blockheads”). In fact, the idea of the “Peddlers’ War” mobilizes a historical pejorative term for merchants, whose enemies characterized them not as powerful businessmen but mere hawkers or hucksters (mascates). At the most basic level, however, the scope and immediate repercussions of the Peddlers’ War also remain uncertain. For example, estimates on the loss of life have varied widely—from a mere three to some 727 souls—presenting the odd distinction of being “bitter but not particularly bloody.”

Beginning with the commentary of the historian Robert Southey (1774-1843), this essay examines the space that the Peddlers’ War has occupied in nearly 180 years of historical literature both among professional historians and learned writers of history. Of primary interest is what the conflict has meant to successive generations of academic and nonacademic writers who have ascribed a shifting variety of “big” meanings to 1710-1711. The eighteenth-century struggle has stood for a nativist and perhaps a republican movement against the Portuguese, a fracturing between the mercantile bourgeoisie and planter class, or as a symbol of Pernambuco’s historic rebelliousness in the wake of oppression by outsiders, be they the monarchy, the Brazilian Empire, or the Republic.

This short historiographical roadmap breaks new ground by plotting points of agreement and overlap among trained historians and writers of history. In doing so, it puts commentators into conversation, often for the very first time. It also calls attention to a forgotten student of 1710-1711, George W. Starling, whose 1957 doctoral dissertation arguably remains the most
complete study of the Peddlers’ War in the English language.\(^\text{15}\) Placing Starling’s work into a conversation with the most recent, serious study of the Peddlers’ War, written by the major historian of colonial Pernambuco, Evaldo Cabral de Mello (b. 1936), shows that interpretations and conclusions drawn from 1710-1711 have developed raggedly for two centuries. However, a close examination of citation practices shows that many scholars have independently reached similar conclusions and that their concerns might be shared with others despite distinctions of time period or language. Tracing unintentional interchanges in addition to purposeful, and even impassioned, ones is a useful exercise for two reasons. First, it encourages researchers to form new questions. Second, this essential task reminds us that the study of the past is a consistent barometer of contemporary politics.

The works that inform this essay were selected for their scholarly variety and to offer some account of how attempts at gleaning the “essence” of the Peddlers’ War have changed over time. To this end, it draws on the interventions of two foreign primogenitors of Brazilian historiography (Southey and Varnhagen); representatives of two generations of Marxian historians (Prado and Viotti); three North American scholars of empire in the Lusophone world (Boxer, Russell-Wood, and Starling); and two generations of Pernambucan (also Recifense) historians (Cabral and Quintas). Given its matching interest in understanding learned commentators’ non-academic yet carefully researched studies of 1710-1711, this essay also includes the findings of a Brazilian diplomat (Ferrer) and public men of letters (Barbosa Lima and Melo).\(^\text{16}\)

**Eighteenth Century Stirrings of Republican Separatism, in the Nineteenth Century**

The earliest references to the Peddlers’ War as an expression of republican separatism surfaced in the works of two important primogenitors of Brazilian history. Both the English poet Robert Southey (1774-1843) and the Brazilian diplomat and historian Adolfo Varnhagen (1816-1878) based their nineteenth-century accounts on the administrative documents of Portuguese empire. Perhaps most famously, in what Ernst Pijning calls the first comprehensive history of Brazil, Southey copied official correspondence sent from Brazil to the Overseas Council in Lisbon.\(^\text{17}\) In his two-volume *History of Brazil*, Southey found in the previous century’s struggle between Olinda and Recife the “natural tendency of all colonies toward republicanism.”\(^\text{18}\)
Southey’s recovery of the Peddlers’ War was decisive for Pernambucan intellectuals-statesmen. In the aftermath of the more unambiguously separatist revolts of 1817, 1824 (the Confederation of the Equator), 1848-1849 (the Praieira revolt), Pernambuco’s homens públicos (public men) not only found in 1710-1711 the DNA of independence but also a validation of Pernambucan exceptionalism. That is, they combined a positivist narrative of historical progression with a longstanding tradition of regionalist identification. One year after the 1889 declaration of the Republic, Major José Domingues Codeceira (1820-1904) declared before a session of the Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano (IAHGP) that Pernambuco, given its deep history of resistance that extended back to wars against the Dutch in 1654, was the “the first province that planted the sovereign tree of Brazilian independence, watering it with the precious and generous blood of its sons.”

Local writers of history (hardly professional historians) included the Peddlers’ War’s beneath Pernambuco’s “saintly ark of glorious revolts” based on sketchy reports that Olindenses (mainly planters and their partisans) debated breaking with the crown during the first stages of the conflict. During a clandestine meeting held in November 1710, Bernardo Vieira de Melo, a sugar mill owner and hero of the wars against the Dutch, purportedly delivered a grito da liberdade (cry of freedom), proposing that the ad hoc assembly establish an autonomous republic “like that of the Venetians.” As the English historian C. R. Boxer would later warn, so “much hard lying is involved in this conflict of evidence, that the exact truth is probably unascertainable, nor does it greatly matter.” The lack of solid evidence did not prevent an imagined radical assembly from assuming a life of its own, and much debate, academic and otherwise, swirls around the existence of Vieira’s “cry of freedom.” If such a proposition was made, Pernambuco would seem to have declared independence several decades before the United States (1776) and the Inconfidência Mineira (1789).

A Tale of Creditors and Debtors: An Early Economic Account of 1710-1711

Representing the Peddlers’ War as an early example of “nativist republicanism” remained unchallenged until the throes of the First World War, when a Brazilian consul to Lisbon published a polemical, but mostly forgotten, indictment of his forbearers. In Guerra dos Mascates (Olinda e Recife), Vicente Ferrer de Barros Wanderley Araújo (1857-1915) challenged several canonical assumptions about the conflict that he implied were based on
big leap speculation. In particular, he complained that 1710-1711 had “been studied beneath a perspective unfavorable to the people of Recife, giving the nobility of Olinda an eminently patriotic position, one which they neither had nor could have had.” Reassessing the conflict in financial terms, he concluded that planters’ initial revolt of 1710 and the ensuing melee centered on their perennial inability (or their unwillingness) to repay debts to their merchant creditors, a situation that he argued closely mirrored planters’ 1654 revolt against the Dutch.

While perhaps the most important of Ferrer’s interventions is a focus on the financial bonds that linked merchant and planter, creditor and debtor, he also rebuked his learned colleagues for “limiting themselves to copying old and erroneous opinions” not reflected in the extant historical documents. Referring to an 1890 legislative decree commemorating Bernardo Vieira de Melo’s declaration of independence, Ferrer vigorously condemned what he called a “legalized lie” about the “cry of freedom” allegedly given on November 10, 1710. He argued that no written evidence supported the holding of a secret meeting in Olinda, and even if an insurgent had voiced their support for a república, talk of a “republic” in the early eighteenth century would have referred quite broadly to any form of rule, certainly not the sort of republicanism espoused by learned men of the nineteenth century.

At the same time, Ferrer determined that Pernambuco’s “sons of the soil” had no reason to demand political autonomy because “their only ideal was to govern the captaincy … [by] barrning the inhabitants of Recife … from jobs and posts but with a complete and humbling submission to the king.” Anticipating the conclusions of English-speaking professional historians in the mid-twentieth century, as we will see below, Ferrer determined that Pernambucan planters had no incentive to break with the crown but rather to check the economic dominance—and growing political influence—of Recife’s mercantile elite.

Vicente Ferrer’s 1915 monograph is also noteworthy for its positive assessment of Pernambuco’s (largely Portuguese) merchant community and mercantile capitalism more broadly. In contrast to planters, whom he describes as decadent, opportunistic, and reactionary, merchants emerge as the vital “plasma of the state that, for the first time, presented itself as cohesive and gregarious … being the practical base of commerce and industry that would interest modern countries.” Indeed, Ferrer contends that Recife’s incipient mercantile bourgeoisie was a harbinger of progress due to its deep cosmopolitanism.
and enterprising spirit. From an even wider angle, he argues that merchants were important beneficiaries of Dutch rule in Pernambuco (1630-1654), a “golden age” and the “true discovery” of Brazil, when “rational administration” led to much scientific and literary progress.\(^{31}\)

**Challenging a Legacy of Underdevelopment through Eighteenth-Century Anticolonialism**

With few exceptions, the later generation of Brazilian scholars either ignored the work of Vicente Ferrer or, in the case of Pernambucan intellectuals, strongly denied his conclusions as if they were assaults on their personal honor.\(^ {32}\) However, the magnitude of his intervention is revealed in the later tendency to discuss the Peddlers’ War in economic, if nationalistic, terms. In the 1930s and 1940s, Brazilian historiography underwent a major shift as colonial economic systems were debated in terms of Brazil’s enduring legacy of underdevelopment.\(^ {33}\)

Although he did not mention the conflict by name in his path-breaking 1942 work *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo*, the Marxian historian and political economist Caio Prado Júnior (1907-1999) used an antagonism between merchants and planters to unpack the deeply engrained contradictions (or “vices”) of the colonial system. He argued that Portuguese (and immigrant) merchants succeeded in monopolizing Luso-Brazilian trade, consequently starving Brazilian-born protagonists, like planters, of their livelihood.\(^ {34}\)

In the capital of Recife, public men of substance also latched on to economic explanations to comprehend the dwindling of Pernambuco’s sugar industry and the economic downgrading of the traditional planter class. Mário Melo (1884-1959), a son of Pernambuco’s sugar aristocracy and a prolific attorney, journalist, historian, and politician, did not disguise his contempt for what he called the exploitative practices of Recife’s unscrupulous merchants. In *Afirmações nacionalistas: a Guerra dos Mascates* (1942), he characterized the mercantile community as an abusive proxy of Portuguese empire that caused planters to “fall into the hands of usury.”\(^ {35}\)

Drawing on the same documents that Ferrer used to disprove the idea 28 years earlier, Melo identified a number of passages that “proved” that Pernambucan planters intended to form a republic independent of the Portuguese crown.\(^ {36}\) However, he did not seem to recognize that the body of letters used to support the idea of an independent republic conveyed mistakably
pro-merchant attitudes, as Ferrer had concluded in 1915.37

Former federal deputy and governor of Pernambuco, Barbosa Lima Sobrinho (1897-2000), too, offered a sympathetic assessment of Olinda’s planters given the enormous precarity of their financial situation. In a 1962 booklet commemorating the 250th anniversary of the “revolution” of 1710, he showed that Pernambuco’s “sons of the soil” struggled to satisfy their accounts with Recife’s merchants, those “demanding creditors, men who always gained from the production of sugar” and simultaneously remained “free from all risks of this production.”38 Lima also attacked Vicente Ferrer’s 47-year-old interpretation of the Peddlers’ War. Above all, he discredited Ferrer for being a “polemist [that] discussed past facts as if he could still influence them.” Perhaps most damningly, he had “deny[ed] everything to the Olindenses … reducing the revolt to a type of protest of lazy and proud debtors.”39

Professional Historians Weigh In: From What the Peddlers’ War Was to What it Was Not

While Barbosa Lima Sobrinho aggressively defended (and even identified with) Pernambuco’s “sons of the soil,” other Brazilian scholars urged caution when studying the events of 1710-1711. The historian Amaro Soares Quintas (1911-1998) offered a conciliatory position for thinking about the Peddlers’ War. He reminded the IAHGP in 1967 that colonial liberation movements were hardly the popular democratic undertakings that some homens públicos, like Lima Sobrinho and Mário Melo, imagined them to be. Rather, 1710-1711 was the calculated “expression of a dominant elite whose socioeconomic interests would be fulfilled following their independence from royal oppression.”40 However, from Brazil’s evolutionary position, Quintas suggested that the “victory of the planters, paradoxically, would be more convenient and significant for national interests.”41

While there is no evidence indicating a foreign readership for his work, Amaro Quintas’ restrained approach to studying the events of 1710-1711 paralleled English-language treatment of the topic in the late 1950s and into the sixties. Two major scholars of colonial empires and the Luso-Brazilian world, C. R. Boxer (1904-2000) and A. J. R. Russell-Wood (1940-2010), cited the conflict by name in their sweeping monographs. Yet the relative leanness of their remarks on the Peddlers’ War suggests that their goal was not to describe what 1710-1711 was, but rather what it was not. Nevertheless, George W. Starling’s ignored 1957 dissertation, a comprehensive chronology and analysis of the conflict, remains only one of its kind in the
English language.  

Each of these historians stepped outside established analytical frameworks that they considered “uncritical, nationalistic, and [abundant] in hypotheses without sufficient documentation.” Like Ferrer four decades earlier (although only Starling cites his work), Boxer and Starling criticized their Brazilian colleagues for allowing dogmatic fantasies to distort the social and political realities of the eighteenth century. Starling, for instance, criticized Mário Melo’s _Afirmações nacionalistas_ (1942), a work he found “well-documented but chauvinistic” and contradictory because its author could not draw objective conclusions from his evidence. Like Russell-Wood, Starling and Boxer also determined that at no point did Olinindenses seek to dissolve the umbilical cord linking colony and metropole. “Be as it may,” Boxer inferred, “the majority were not yet ready for such a dramatic break with the mother country.” Russell-Wood even blamed the “nationalist fervor” of Brazilians and clumsy English translations for scholars’ larger mischaracterization of the eighteenth century as a string of wars and revolts. Pointing not only to 1710-1711 but also the War of the Emboabas (1706-1707; 1708-1709) and the “Minas Conspiracy” (1789), he contended that various “revolts,” “wars,” and “disturbances” sought to uphold the economic and social status quo rather than throwing off the yoke of Portuguese rule.

Despite their aforementioned criticisms, Boxer, Starling, and Russell-Wood also recognized the legitimacy of the debates so central to their Brazilian counterparts. Unlike Vicente Ferrer, each acceded to the possibility that there was “loose” talk of separating from Portugal. However, the fact that there was no guiding plan for such a break—in addition to the presumed minority position of a separatist faction—made such a proposition untenable and indeed undesirable. Moreover, English-speaking historians did not divest 1710-1711 of its “revolutionary” meaning. Rather, they contended that its proper significance could only be revealed when illuminated through the separatist revolts of the nineteenth century. Starling, for example, hypothesized that the so-called Peddlers’ War left an important “residue of colonial bitterness which lingered until Brazil’s independence.” Stated differently by Boxer, it kindled a requisite “national consciousness” needed for successful movements against the crown in the nineteenth century. In short, the demand for independence was an iterative process, as Amaro Quintas had also proposed, requiring the deepening of animosities and the passage of time to be successful a full century later, most outstandingly during the Pernambucan revolt of 1817.
While it shares Boxer’s and Russell-Wood’s interest in understanding tectonic shifts in Portuguese imperial history, one must not overlook the uniqueness of George W. Starling’s contribution. While most early works in English reserved a comparatively small number of pages for 1710-1711, his 450-page dissertation examines the conflict in granular detail while also situating it in the colonial metropole’s “broad developmental program” for Brazil. Starling shows how mounting financial and diplomatic pressures in the final third of the seventeenth century had far-reaching consequences in the colony. More often than not, the Overseas Council intensified its involvement in colonial affairs to finance costly wars in Europe (such as the War of Spanish Succession) or to collect revenue for royal court costs. Coupled with rising costs of slaves and falling prices of sugarcane, he concludes that the crown’s hyper-extractive policies were especially burdensome for Pernambuco’s planter class. It should be noted that although Vicente Ferrer was aware of the systemic pressures that encumbered planters, he was curiously silent on the matter, relating the planter-merchant relationship in unequivocally moral terms, as we have seen. Starling, however, reads the issue of planter indebtedness as an outcome of imperial financial policy, which tended to benefit the “industrious European born, or oriented, Portuguese commercial class.” Thus, in Starling’s assessment the Peddlers’ War was symptomatic of a major class conflict. And while the volatile social and economic situation was fueled by adverse economic changes (for planters), Recife and Olinda exploded into open conflict for political reasons (i.e., the elevation of Recife to a village or borough).

Starling’s forgotten 1957 dissertation anticipated future directions for the study of 1710-1711, especially in terms of tackling the deep entanglements of the local and the global. However, several blind spots remain. For example, the author is unable to explain how and why non-elite protagonists entered the confrontation alongside—or perhaps on behalf of—their social superiors. The remarkable exploits of Sebastião Pinheiro Camarão immediately come to mind. An indigenous chief and partisan of Recife’s merchants, Camarão captured and imprisoned planter militiamen. While Camarão makes an appearance in Starling’s account, it remains to be fully understood how and why indigenous and black militias, like the local Henriques, became involved in a dispute among elites. The author matter-of-factly proposes that merchants paid large sums of money to—or even forgave outstanding debts for—what might be called mercenaries. However, a small observation made by C. R. Boxer reveals the
limits of Starling’s economically focused framework while simultaneously unsettles the shallow, but age-old, dichotomy of planter versus merchant. He cites the case of Dom Francisco de Sousa, a wealthy planter who happened to be an ally of Recife’s merchants. According to Boxer, Sousa compelled indigenous and black auxiliaries to fight on behalf of the Recifenses by citing his “influence.”

Certainly, socioeconomic pressures in the abstract cannot explain the large numbers of protagonists drawn into the Peddlers’ War, many subalterns, much less the heterogeneity of its participants. Striking indeed is Boxer’s depiction of recruitment and mobilization in extra-financial terms. By refusing to afford financial considerations an overly determinative role, he implies that there is something to be learned about the particular nature of eighteenth-century interpersonal ties in the Luso-Brazilian world. Starling himself struggles to understand the volatility of alliances among vast swaths of historical actors, on the one hand, and the seemingly arbitrary, even contradictory, maneuvering of royally appointed officials, on the other. For example, he mistakes the political posturing of Dom Manuel Álvares da Costa, the bishop who succeeded Castro e Caldas as governor, for ineptitude or even feebleness. Starling assesses that the bishop-governor was “too easily swayed” because he “listened attentively, if not sympathetically, to the grievances of the Mascates, but once back in the capital [Olinda] he was unable to resist the influence, if not the domination” of the planters.

Taken as a whole, the main limitation of George Starling’s approach is its inability to answer what made 1710-1711 a deeply personal affair. As we will see, a detailed understanding of eighteenth-century interpersonal norms is needed to locate the missing piece of the puzzle Former diplomat and major historian of colonial Brazil Evaldo Cabral de Mello (b. 1936)—to whom we turn momentarily—examines the multithreaded links between planters and merchants, town and country albeit in eighteenth-century Pernambuco. However, he shows that the intertwining of both is characterized by an unusual degree of fragility, which is as much a consequence of Old Regime society and politics as the exceptional aspects of early Pernambucan history. Even by eighteenth-century standards, the enduring row between planters and merchants in Olinda and Recife was unusually violent not to mention remarkably far-reaching, even inclusive. As we will see below, the events of 1710-1711 succeeded in galvanizing a remarkable cross-section of colonial society, including wealthy senhores de engenho, merchants, enslaved persons, sharecroppers, clerics, and legionnaires. The conflict...
also unfolded far beyond the physical boundaries of Recife and Olinda. Cabral’s sophisticated intervention—which arguably remains the most authoritative study of the conflict in Portuguese—is nearly 25 years old, however scholars have not yet tapped into its larger significance for the study of Pernambuco and colonial Brazil.

From Statement of Autonomy to Elite Vendetta in “Old Regime” Pernambuco

_A fronda dos mazombos_ uses the so-called Peddlers’ War, together with the fifty years preceding it, to elucidate the sociopolitical contours of the early eighteenth-century Luso-Brazilian world and the historical distinctiveness of Pernambuco. Cabral’s panoramic survey draws on a noteworthy body of administrative documents in Portugal, most notably the Coleção Conde dos Arcos (housed in the Arquivo da Universidade de Coimbra), an important source of correspondence between governors, governors-general, and the crown.62 As Cabral reveals, this rich cache of material helps us understand a broad succession of disputes that made Pernambuco an important flashpoint in Portugal’s overseas empire. Cabral’s 1995 work (revised in 2003) joins a primarily Rio de Janeiro-based circle of historians in calling for a serious reappraisal of the relationship between the metropole and its colonial outposts.63 In this vein of thinking, the Peddlers’ War, like other eighteenth-century uprisings in Brazil, actually exposes the weakness of the crown, which was unable to impose itself until at least the second half of the century.64 In fact, Cabral maintains that the limited reach and general weakness of the Portuguese monarchy between 1666 and 1711 paralleled to a surprising extent the situation in France, where elite-driven civil wars (the Fronde) raged between 1648 and 1653.65

Like his predecessors, Cabral credits an overarching “hegemonic” antagonism between plantation and shop with prefiguring a sequence of disputes that culminated with 1710-1711 in Pernambuco. However, he suggests that the “true” nature of the conflict—that is, a power struggle between urban creditors and rural debtors—remained hidden behind a “disingenuous local façade,” namely the struggle over Recife’s elevation to a village.66 While this base antagonism was an important driver of social and political conflict in Portuguese America, Cabral argues that its manifestation in Pernambuco was singularly explosive. Even no-nonsense Russell-Wood did not deny the distinctiveness of the captaincy in this regard. He wrote that in Salvador, a major port city where mercantile and agricultural interests converge through the “enterprising individual,” never attained an equivalent degree of animosity between planters and
merchants. As Cabral explains it, Pernambuco’s 24-year occupation and recolonization by the Dutch raised the stakes of, even inflamed, the dichotomy that found less volatile expressions elsewhere in Brazil.

Evaldo Cabral reminds us that in Pernambuco the Dutch bifurcated the sugar industry into two national halves. The Portuguese (or foreigners) managed finance and lending while production remained in the hands of (largely Brazilian-born) planters. Instead of “arrang[ing] an urban center that integrated the sugar aristocracy and mercantile activity,” the flamagedos (as the Dutch were called) improved, fortified, and expanded the port (Recife) while Olinda, set ablaze by the Dutch in 1631, remained an urban “façade” for rural producers who only periodically ventured from their plantations.

The Recife-Olinda complex, a Dutch social and productive division, was a singularity in Portuguese America. In terms of its consequences for merchant-planter relations, Cabral argues that it set into motion a permanent “divorce between urban and rural” life in the captaincy. Geographic distance corresponded with social segregation. While port cities like Rio de Janeiro and Salvador integrated the rural aristocracy and merchants through a shared urban center—perhaps an eighteenth-century example of Viotti’s notion of urban “conciliation”—Recife and Olinda developed a distinctive “neighborly rancor,” the byproduct of birth and class animosities.

While Stuart Schwartz finds that ties of blood alleviated hostilities between merchants and planters, who were also bound by business interests, Cabral argues that the situation was quite different in Pernambuco. He argues that both groups practiced forms of “social apartheid,” though for different reasons, ranging from general endogamy to rigid hierarchies of specialization and status imposed by their respective religious orders. Thus, in Pernambuco “exogamy would only partially triumph over class exclusivism” on the eve of 1710-1711. Said social, spatial, and productive forms of “apartheid,” of course, can be understood as the logical outcomes of Dutch rule. However, Pernambucan-born planters incubated aristocratic pretensions after leading wars against the Dutch, finally expelling them in 1654. Cabral shows that these pró-homens (or illustrious men, as Cabral calls them) invoked customary privilege as descendants of the old heroes of the Pernambucan Insurrection (Insurreição Pernambucana).

As we have seen in the opening to this essay, Pernambucans (partisans of Olinda) behaved as “nobles of the soil” during the invasion of Recife in November 1710, sporting aristocratic insignia and feathered hats (also a performance of the “noble savage”). Cabral also shows that
planters’ magnanimous status justified their overthrow of Jerônimo de Mendonça Furtado (also known as “Xumbergas”), the fourth governor of Pernambuco since the expulsion of the Dutch.\(^2\)

This well-rehearsed strategy, of course, would be repeated in 1710, when Governor Sebastião de Castro e Caldas was driven out of the captaincy. From a wider angle, planters maintained their prerogative to control local political institutions like the câmara. Hardly defending the bravado of pró-homens, Cabral finds a certain repugnance in the “inaction and complicity” of Pernambuco’s câmaras and judges, who rarely punished offenders because they were often friends and relatives of the accused.\(^3\) Yet in addition to inciting a certain rebellious attitude among planters, the Dutch occupation of Pernambuco also gave Recife’s class of merchants its first taste of administrative autonomy. Indeed, the port was granted a separate câmara under the auspices of the Dutch West India Company (WIC), plausibly whetting its appetite for local self-government.\(^4\)

The argument that Pernambuco’s “illustrious” sons tried to prevent merchants from amassing political power by citing customary privilege is not new. However, Evaldo Cabral’s attention to the conventions that oversaw local rule sheds new light on the stakes of 1710-1711.\(^5\) He reminds us that the planter-dominated legislature of Olinda not only served as a coffer for royal funds, as George Starling concluded, but also a coveted node in a complex system of patronage.\(^6\) In a political world in which “governing means appointing” (governar é nomear), elites’ access to political power was derived from controlling the mechanisms of distributing favors. The elevation of Recife to a village or borough meant that planters no longer controlled the key wellspring for dispensing appointments and favors to partisans.\(^7\)

Far from being relevant only to the controlling the legislature, Cabral advises that the preponderance of patron-client ties also explains the wide range of social groups that were drawn in to the conflict. As we have seen, indigenous leaders, black regiments, enslaved persons, administrators from other captaincies, hawkers, and petty planters, among others, involved themselves in the elite or seigniorial dispute.\(^8\) That the conflict assumed a “popular” dimension reveals the vastness of bonds between patrons and clients. Cabral reminds his readers that in Old Regime societies—certainly not the bourgeois ones we are familiar with today—conflicts were expressed in terms of familial honor as opposed to abstract categories of debt or property, to provide two examples.\(^9\) Said honor was also articulated through notions of extended kinship. Thus, a conflict between two parties—such as the enduring row between
debtor planters and creditor merchants—succeeded in rousing large segments of the captaincy and beyond through seemingly infinite chains of patron-client obligations. Father Antônio Gonçalvez Leitão, an historical observer of the conflict, wrote that “One of the things that the devil learned most about the plots to continue the hate and wars in Pernambuco” was the division that divided all the people of this land into two factions. Both the one that followed the part of Recife and the other of the nobility aroused the spirits of everyone, so that parents and children, husbands and wives, brothers, in short, friends and relatives, and likewise whites and blacks, the big and small, men and women all had differing opinions and found that they could not agree.80

In a social world regulated by vendettas and what Cabral terms “clan-based justice” (justiça clânica), it comes as no surprise that the Peddlers’ War attained violent proportions and whose grasp extended far beyond the sister cities of Recife and Olinda.81 Indeed, Cabral insightfully surmises that the mobilization of distant rural parishes (freguesias) and militias had much less to do with actors’ personal sympathies than bonds of “domestic and clientelist solidarity.”82 In his 1957 dissertation, George W. Starling came close to understanding the importance of patronage in 1710-1711 and the early eighteenth-century world writ large. Nevertheless, his socioeconomic focus, mediated through liberal understandings of social norms made available to him, could not adequately explain the partiality and arbitrariness of eighteenth-century actors, on the one hand, and the enlisting of black regiments, who were purportedly “bribed” (or otherwise coerced) by the merchants or planters, on the other.83

Conclusion

If neither a “war” waged by (or against) “peddlers,” neither an antimonarchical nor anti-imperial uprising, what do we make of Pernambuco’s hallowed but mostly forgotten “Peddlers’ War”? Our assessment of the extant historical literature—which does not discriminate between professional and learned (nonacademic) history-writing—shows that 1710-1711 has been the focus of significant contestation and mythmaking. The variety of “big” meanings extrapolated from the conflict—including stirrings of nationalist and separatist sentiment, the ascendancy of urban and maritime commercial interests over the rural, among others—recalls the adage that the study of history is “present politics past.” As we have seen, nineteenth-century observers assigned importance to a sequence of explicitly separatist revolts (most notably 1817 and 1824,
but also 1848-1849) by invoking the myth of a “Pernambuco teimoso,” the captaincy (and later province) whose native sons fiercely resisted the subjugation of outsiders, be they the Dutch or the Portuguese. The idea of a “Peddlers’ War”—in addition to the abovementioned insurrections—also lent itself to various projects of regionalist mythmaking following the proclamation of the Republic in 1889. In the middle of the twentieth century, we also find local (i.e., Recife-based) statesmen and intellectuals invoking 1710-1711 to explain the demise of Pernambuco’s ancient sugar industry and the growth in economic importance of Brazil’s Southeast (namely Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo).

Apart from a handful of English-speaking historians, research and debate about the “Peddlers’ War” has been homegrown, elite-driven, and mostly untouched by the academy. It may well be that a self-consciously aristocratic conflict is of greatest interest to the traditional intelligentsia (generally not university-based), which has long recounted the exploits of, and carefully charted the genealogy of, Pernambuco’s noble families (also their ancestors). In striking contrast, the “Pernambucan revolution” of 1817 has garnered a broader kind of attention. As a “popular,” democratic foil to 1710-1711, it has inspired an exciting proliferation of artworks, monographs, graphic novels, and didactic materials. Yet the small sampling of works examined here reminds us that 1817, 1824, and 1848-1849 cannot be understood apart from eighteenth-century conspiracies, insubordinations, uprisings, and civil wars, if for the sole reason that these Old Regime struggles legitimized liberally inspired ones during the nineteenth century.

It has also been my goal to call greater attention to the conflict that Barbosa Lima Sobrinho so regretfully describes in the epigraph to this essay. Central to his remarks is a troubling awareness that the Peddlers’ War cannot easily lend itself to quasi-mythical odes to “Pernambuco teimoso,” the headstrong “Lion of the North” that expelled its Dutch colonizers and even formed a provisional government independent of the Portuguese crown during the Pernambucan Revolt of 1817. In terms of developments in the historical literature over the past four decades, the Peddlers’ War has been eclipsed by 1817 and to a similar extent, the Praieira revolt (1848-1849). The publication of no fewer than three major monographs (not to mention a deluge of master’s theses, doctoral dissertations, and journal articles) preceded the bicentennial of Pernambuco’s independence in 2017. Nevertheless, our picture of the Peddlers’ War is far from a complete one. Perhaps not a burst of democratic revolutionary
fervor, as Barbosa Lima Sobrinho recognized, 1710-1711 has much to tell us about colonial Brazil’s most important captaincy (and later province) and a broader succession of popularly inspired revolts, both Pernambucan and otherwise, that extended well into the twentieth century.\(^8\)

From a still wider angle, this essay has argued that the multiplicity of labels ascribed to 1710-1711 is symptomatic of the event’s embeddedness in not a liberal or modern sociopolitical order, but rather a monarchical and decidedly aristocratic one. And while the interventions spotlighted here underline the advantages of using well-studied and emblematic events or theories to deduce the meaning of more remote incidents, they also remind us that mismatched points of reference can be disfiguring. To be sure, because of incompatible analogies, nearly 180 years of scholarship on the Peddlers’ War has struggled to understand Pernambuco’s early modern past on its own terms. It has shown that neither the nationalist-regionalist fantasies of noted public figures (homens públicos) nor trained historians’ narratives of class conflict and outside oppression came close to understanding the intricate contours of empire and colonialism in the early eighteenth-century world. In this regard, Evaldo Cabral de Mello’s proposed analogy of Fronde-era politics in late seventeenth-century France is especially appropriate, as it is a crucial step towards unraveling the complexities of the “Old Regime” in the tropics.

**Notas**

Note: All translations from Portuguese to English were produced by the author (unless otherwise noted). He accepts responsibility for inadvertent errors or omissions.


2. There is wide disagreement over how many Olindenses invaded Recife. The early historian of Brazil, Robert Southey, suggests that approximately 20,000 persons marched on the city, while statesman-scholar Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, channeling the work of historian and statesman Manuel de Oliveira Lima, speculates that only around 1,000 invaded Recife. George W. Starling suggests that 10,000 persons marched to Recife on November 5 or 6, 1710.


4. Pillories (pelourinhos, typically large sculpted stone columns) were political, administrative, and legally significant symbols. They bore insignia of the Portuguese crown and represented municipal autonomy. They also served as sites of public punishment. See CHAVES, Luis. *Pelourinhos do Ultramar Português*. Lisboa: Divisão de Publicações e Biblioteca, Agência Geral das Colônias, 1948.
Scholarship on the myth of the noble savage is vast. For an excellent study of the multivalence of “Indianness” in Brazil from the sixteenth century to the present, see GUZMÁN, Tracy Devine. Native and National in Brazil: Indigeneity After Independence. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013.

For English-language chronologies of the first uprising in 1710, see STARLING, 84-7 and SOUTHEY, 92-3 in footnote number seven. For remarks on why planters used the figure of the índio (Indian), see GUERRA, Flávio. Decadência de uma fidalguia açucareira. Recife: Prefeitura da Cidade do Recife, Secretaria de Educação e Cultura, Departamento de Cultura Cidade do Recife, 1981, p. 82.

Planters generally lived on remote estates and traveled to Olinda to take care of official business.

Russell-Wood blames the “nationalist fervor on the part of Brazilian writers and loose translations by English-speaking scholars” for reproducing the erroneous assumption that the eighteenth century was characterized by wars and revolts, when in reality disturbances were actually in response to a “change or challenge to the accepted social and economic status quo.” See RUSSELL-WOOD, A. J. R. From Colony to Nation: Essays on the Independence of Brazil. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 26.


Pé rapado” refers to a low-class individual “sem reputação.” In his Dicionário da Terra e da Gente do Brasil (1910), Bernardino José de Souza associates the expression with the Peddlers’ War. The Portuguese ostensibly used this term to refer to individuals who lived in (or were otherwise associated with) Olinda. Conversely, the term “marinheiro” (literally “sailor”) was thought to have been used from the colonial period through the early twentieth-century to refer to the Portuguese and other white foreigners. See entries in CABRAL, Tomé. Dicionário de termos e expressões populares. Fortaleza: Instituto Cultural do Cariri, 1972. Four contemporary but highly partisan accounts of the conflict exist, two of which were written by clerics: one Padre Luiz Correa, who expressed much disdain for the Pernambucan planter class, and Padre Antônio Gonçalvez Leitão, who favored the nobility. The fourth account was written by Manoel dos Santos, a surgeon who favored the mascates. Accounts of the conflict published in the nineteenth century drew upon the above figures, in addition to municipal documents, such as legislative records. One especially important work is José Bernardo Fernández Gama’s massive Memórias Históricas da Província de Pernambuco (em dois volumes e quatro tomos) (Recife: Arquivo Público Estadual, 1977), which offers vivid narrative of 1710/11. His Memórias históricas also includes transcriptions of pieces of official correspondence.

While the account of Padre Martins suggests that 727 died between the counter-revolt of the “mascates” and the arrival of Félix Machado to assume the governorship. Boxer places the figure at a significantly smaller number (three). We only have one estimate for various damages to plantations: 253 contos de réis


This author has been unable to locate additional information about George W. Starling. It is unlikely that he pursued an academic career after defending his dissertation at UC-Berkeley.

It is also interesting to note that neither Cabral nor Boxer is an “academic” historian. Remarkably, Boxer wrote nearly a dozen monographs and held a string of chairs in Portuguese and maritime studies in the United States and the United Kingdom without having a university degree. For a detailed account of the life and work of this important historian, see NEWITT, M. D. D. “Charles Ralph Boxer, 1904-2000.” In Proceedings of the British Academy v. 115,
Neither War nor Peddlers: Unraveling 180 Years of Historical Literature on Pernambuco’s “Peddlers’ War”, 1710-1711

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18 SOUTHLEY, p. 94.

19 Founded as the Instituto Arqueológico e Geográfico de Pernambuco in 1862, the entity has been known as the Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano since 1863. CODECEIRA, Major José Domingues. “Exposição de fatos históricos que comprovam a prioridade de Pernambuco, na independência e liberdade nacional.” *Revista do Instituto Archaeologico e Geographico de Pernambuco*, n. 37, p. 53, 1890. Henceforth, this journal will be identified using its acronym (RIAGHB).


21 See also CODECEIRA, José Domingues. “O primeiro grito da república.” *RIGHB*, n. 43, p. 3-20, 1893.


23 Piñning reminds us that many nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historians were diplomats who visited foreign archives to obtain documentation to interpret Brazil’s past. Interestingly, as we will see below, the historian Evaldo Cabral de Mello (b. 1936), the younger brother of poet João Cabral de Melo Neto (1920-1999) and cousin of Gilberto Freyre, was a diplomat in the early 1960s. See PIJNING, p. 76.


25 ARAÚJO, p. 80. “Nas duas grandes commoções, porque passou Pernambuco, em 1654 e 1710, a nobreza sempre procedeu por motivos subalternos e até despraisorosos, sendo e ambas o principal: não pagar aos credores.”

26 ARAÚJO, p. 163-4.


28 Ferrer correctly surmised that the idea of the república only became associated with republicanism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading intellectuals in this period to see early manifestations of republican sentiment in the events of 1710/11. Robert Nelson Anderson suggests that a “revisionist view crept into the elite discourse” on the quilombo of Palmares. Late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century intellectuals characterized the confederation of fortified settlements as an orderly ‘republic,’ using the idea of a república found in seventeenth-century documents to mean an elected form of government familiar to Euro-Brazilian scholars in the nineteenth-century. See ANDERSON, Robert Nelson. “The Quilombo of Palmares: A New Overview of a Maroon State in Seventeenth-Century Brazil.” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, v. 28, n. 3, p. 545-56, 1996.

29 ARAÚJO, p. 164. “O seu ideal, unico, era governar a capitania como entendessem, excluindo os habitantes do Recife, mesmo Pernambucanos, dos cargos e postos, mas com inteira e até humilhante sujeição ao rei.”

30 ARAÚJO, p. 99. “o plasma do estado que, pela primeira vez, manifestava a coda cohesa e gregaria, com aspiração comum, tendo a base utilitaria do comercio e da industria, que alicerá os paizes modernos.”

31 ARAÚJO, p. 64.
An important exception is a piece by Methódio Maranhão, who concludes that there were no concrete ideas of independence in 1710 but the conflict was important for the idea of freedom one century later. See MARANHÃO, Methodio. “Guerra dos Mascates.” *RIAHGP*, v. XXV, p. 243-63, 1923.


34 PRADO, p. 426-7.

35 MELO, p. 624. This reading is representative of a wider structural interpretation of pre-modern Brazil that was popular from the 1960s to 1980s and, Stuart Schwartz advises, “provided a coherent interpretation of the Brazilian past that elided the vagaries of political chronologies . . . and placed the continuing problems of economic dependency, class, and race at the heart of Brazilian history.” See SCHWARTZ, Stuart. “The Historiography of Early Modern Brazil.” In: MOYA, Jose C., org. *The Oxford Handbook of Latin American History.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 100.

36 MELO, p. 618; 637-43.

37 MELO, p. 644. Ferrer correctly reasoned that pro-merchant documents naturally sought to exaggerate and condemn the actions of their opponents.


39 LIMA SOBRINHO, p. 6. Barbosa Lima was a journalist and served as president of the Associação Brasileira de Imprensa (API) and had the distinction of being a member of the Academia Brasileira de Letras beginning in 1937. Lima served as president of the Instituto do Açúcar de do Álcool during which time he supported small producers of sugarcane, to the disadvantage of usineiros. See bibliographical dictionary of the Fundação Getulio Vargas – Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (FGV – CPDOC). It is interesting to think about the conflict between small growers (lavradores) and the owners of large industrial centers (usinas) as analogous to the historical conflict between planters and merchants.


41 QUINTAS, p. 6.


44 Starling cites an abridged version of Ferrer’s work that was published in the *RIHGB*. “Although partial to the Portuguese merchants,” he writes of Ferrer’s article, it “the most accurate concerning the War of the Mascates.” Starling, 235. Boxer’s chapter devoted to the Peddlers’ War does not mention Vicente Ferrer.

45 STARLING, p. 237.

46 BOXER, p. 112-3 and STARLING, p. 211. See Also RUSSELL-WOOD, *From Colony to Nation*, p. 26.


49 STARLING, p. 0. (This is the unnumbered first page of Starling’s dissertation.)

50 BOXER, p. 124-5. Unlike Vicente Ferrer, Boxer acknowledged “there probably was some loose talk among the planters of separating from the mother country in 1710-1711,” but individuals who voiced this opinion nevertheless were a minority faction and, following the bishop’s assumption of power, “there was no question of a decisive break with the mother country, only a determination to secure some political and economic concessions from the Crown.” Russell-Wood, too, points to the Peddlers’ War as an indicator of “emerging nationalism.” See RUSSELL-WOOD, p. 31-2.


52 STARLING, p. 30.

53 ARAÚJO, p. 64.

54 STARLING, p. 211-12.
STARLING, p. 211.
56 Starling draws the reader’s attention to Camarão’s major role as a commander in the backlands once the conflict spilled into the countryside. Many enemies of the mascates were captured thanks to Camarão’s support.
57 STARLING, p. 110-113 and p. 163-175. In terms of debt forgiveness, the author cites the case of Christovão Paes Barreto, a captain-major.
58 BOXER, p. 118.
59 As noted in the introductory vignette to this essay, many different people invaded the newly promoted vila of Recife in 1710, including blacks, children, wealthy planters, the city’s poor, and religionists. This one episode establishes many of the players in the Peddlers’ War. See STARLING, p. 84-7. In his treatment of the invasion of Recife, Starling draws on the works of Ferrer, Southey, Gama, and Padre Dias.
60 STARLING, p. 104. In another example, the author invokes a vague notion of “political stratagem” to understand the conciliatory and subsequently “indiscreet, headstrong, and vindictive” moves of Félix Machado, who became governor after Manuel Álvares da Costa. Like others, Starling does not dismiss the idea that the new governor was bribed by the mascates. STARLING, p. 196.
61 Evaldo Cabral belongs to an illustrious lineage of intellectuals. His cousin, Gilberto de Mello Freyre (1900-1987), remains Pernambuco’s most famous intellectual. Scholar of Dutch Pernambuco and the first director of the Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, José Antônio Gonçalves de Mello (1916-2002), was also a cousin. Finally, the poet, translator, and literary critic Manuel Bandeira (1886-1968) is another distinguished relative on his father’s side.
62 The Coleção Conde dos Arcos in the Arquivo da Universidade de Coimbra is an important source of correspondence between governors, governors-general, and the crown. Cabral notes that D. Marcos de Noronha e Brito (1746-49), the sixth Count of Arcos, ordered papers stored by the secretary of the captaincy of Pernambuco since the restoration to be copied and sent to Portugal. See Cabral, 17. Vicente Ferrer very well might have used the same archival documents as Cabral, but Ferrer does not identify many of his sources.
64 MELLO, p. 211.
65 The Fronde refers to the series of civil wars in France between 1648 and 1653 that were divided into two parts: the Fronde of the Parlement (1648-49), when court officials revolted when the crown attempted to lower salaries, and the Fronde of the Princes (1650-53), which was a rebellion of aristocrats against Cardinal Mazarin. Cabral’s characterization of 1710-1711 as a Pernambucan Fronde is an insightful one. Sharon Kettering’s findings about the extensiveness of clan-based justice in seventeenth century France also speaks to the overlapping (and sometimes contradictory) alliances part and parcel of elite-driven revolts. See KETTERING, Sharon. “Patronage and Politics during the Fronde.” French Historical Studies, v. 14, n. 3, p. 430, 1986.
66 MELLO, p. 141.
67 RUSSELL-WOOD, p. 224.
68 Like Vicente Ferrer and Mário Melo, among others, Cabral accepts the argument that the flamengos (as the Dutch were called) transformed Recife into the “metropole of Dutch dominion in Brazil.” MELLO, p. 162 and 168.
69 MELLO, p. 150-1 and 167. As in other points in his monograph, Cabral juxtaposes historical characteristics of Pernambuco with Bahia.
70 MELLO, p. 148.
72 MELLO, p. 21.
73 MELLO, p. 110.
74 MELLO, p. 171. The author argues that the merchants experienced social mobility as a result of joining religious orders in Recife.
Cabral contends that a segment of sugar planters took part in a perennial struggle to “limit the exercise of royal power in the captaincy and the access of Recife’s royal merchants to local power, above all else exemplified by the Câmara of Olinda.” See MELLO, p. 15.

STARLING, p. 43.

MELLO, p. 33 and 79.


The original in Portuguese: “uma das coisas em que o demônio apurou mais os ardis enredos para continuarem os ódios e as guerras em Pernambuco foi a divisão em que duas parcialidades deixaram toda a gente desta terra. Tanto a que seguiu a parte do Recife como a outra da nobreza moveram para isto os ânimos de todos, de tal sorte que pais e filhos, maridos e mulheres, irmãos, enfim amigos e parentes, e do mesmo modo brancos e pretos, grandes e pequenos, machos e fêmeas eram nas opiniões por uma e outra parte tão diversos e encontrados que se não dava meio de poderem concordar.”

MELLO, p. 104. The author draws a distinction between Catholic and Protestant traditions of “justice.” While “clan justice” existed in southern Europe, the duel was more compatible with the “individualistic ethic” of northern Europe.

STARLING, p. 196. In The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil, Caio Prado Júnior describes the complexities of allegiances albeit in the nineteenth century, although the gestalt of his comments are equally applicable to the eighteenth-century world: “we find proprietors and free individuals from the lower classes joining forces against the merchants; at the same time, we find all three categories uniting against the slaves. We find the lower classes banding together against proprietors and merchants who were their overlords, and the latter driven together as the privileged against the impoverished. We find whites fighting side by side with blacks and mulattos against color prejudice in the Bahian conspiracy; mulattos, blacks, and whites joining together to uphold the same prejudice. And the next moment they have all changed their respective positions, and the moment after that, that they are all back where they started in some other volte-face. … The apparent lack of logic is naively explained away by making generalizations from particular cases which are in themselves significant, generalizations on the basis of individual or moral issues—idealism, incoherence—whatever happens to suit the taste or preference of the individual observer. The truth is that all men are merely the pawns of events that move them across the board of history, for the most part hardly aware of what they are doing or of what is taking place around them.” See PRADO JÚNIOR, p. 429-30.

Of the Pernambucan intellectuals examined here, only Amaro Soares Quintas (1911-1998) was associated with the university. The others were primarily politicians or political appointees (including diplomatic personnel).


A deep history of Lusophobia is a promising area of future research, especially as it relates to the early twentieth century. In his four-part memoirs, communist intellectual Paulo Cavalcanti (1915-1995) recalls anti-Portuguese riots in Recife in the 1920s and 1930s. Cavalcanti links the defacing of Portuguese businesses to the Peddlers’ War. See CAVALCANTI, Paulo. O caso eu conto como o caso foi: memórias políticas. 4 vol. Recife: Cepe, 2008.

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