Conservatism and Culture: The Transformation of the U.S. Army After Vietnam

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University

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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the revitalization of the U.S. army during the two decades following the Vietnam War. It questions how the army went from a nearly broken institution in the early 1970s to, arguably, one of the nation’s most respected institutions after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Through an examination of collections of articles published in the extensive military press of the period, collections of personal papers from both senior and lower ranking army officers, and historical files from the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, this dissertation shows that the army’s revitalization was fundamentally a transformation in the institution’s culture and conceptions of professionalism. After the Vietnam War, the army followed the nation in its conservative political turn. Particularly during the 1980s, members of the army appropriated much of the language and terms of the conservative political movement, and applied those terms to their understanding of military professionalism. The army’s cultural transformation was also about more than changes in military doctrine and schooling. The particular ways that members of the army came to understand warfare, the importance of the individual soldier, and so-called warrior values, all of which were formalized in the Airland Battle doctrine of the 1980s, also shaped how members of the army thought about social and cultural questions such as race, gender, and the institution’s values.
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Introduction: From the Jungle to the Desert

A worn-out old copy of Anton Myrer’s Once an Eagle lies in a place of honor on my bookshelf. Originally published in 1968, the novel has been reprinted several times over, and was adapted into a 1976 television mini-series. It is a monster at over eight hundred pages, and its plot spans from the First World War through the 1960s. Once an Eagle lacks nuance. Its characters are one-dimensional, and the novel conceptualizes war as if it were a clearly delineated struggle between good and evil. But, given that Myrer wrote the novel during the height of the U.S. Vietnam War, that simplicity has been part of the novel’s charm.

My copy of Once an Eagle is in dreadful shape and tired from use. Its pages are dog-eared and fading, and some of them hold to the binding with bits of super-glue and rusted staples. The cover has long since detached, and is now held in place with olive-drab duct tape. The book’s pages bear the crackly wavy water marks amassed from a hard life spent in the hands of careless readers and humid locations.

I purchased the book as a Lieutenant nearly two decades ago. Since then, my copy of Once an Eagle has ridden in rucksacks, made its way across oceans in footlockers, and rested at the bottom of duffel bags. It smells like old tent canvas, a stale-sweet-mildewy aroma that is both pungent and oddly comforting. Sand and dust from half of

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the United States and more than a few countries wears its pages. I often loaned *Once an Eagle* to those around me; other officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers.

During their breaks in reading, the casually splayed the book across stacks of radios in operations tents, or sometimes used it as a paperweight to hold fast the corners of a map. But they all read the book. My fellow soldiers read *Once an Eagle* partly because the story is good and partly because it offers a simple recipe for military life — “if it comes to a choice between being a good soldier and a good human being, try to be a good human being.”² The book remains a clear recipe for professionalism, sound leadership, and ethical behavior. Through my decades of military life, *Once an Eagle* is something I have always carried.

I am not alone. *Once an Eagle* has been on most of the army’s professional reading lists since the 1970s, read by countless American soldiers. The book was an instant classic among the membership – particularly the officer corps – of the army. The Command and General Staff Course curricula included the novel as required reading throughout the 1970s and 1980s. *Once an Eagle* is so well known to members of the army that it is featured in the titles of master’s degree theses, and its characters are shorthand for various types of officer personalities.³

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³ Thomas H. Rendell, “Warriors to Bureaucrats: Why Officers Start out to be Sam Damon and end up Courtney Massengale” (Army War College, 2000). The lasting relevance of *Once an Eagle* is evidenced by its inclusion on the 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army’s reading list, see “The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s
Once an Eagle follows the careers of two army officers from World War I through their service in Vietnam – referred to as “Khotiane” in the book. The protagonist, Sam Damon, is the quintessential stoic hero while the other, Courtney Massengale, is politically connected, career focused, and concerned only with power. Unlike Massengale’s blue-blooded West Point credentials, Damon was born into poverty on a small farm in Nebraska. He initially entered the army as a private, but received a battlefield commission during World War I due to his demonstrated bravery and intelligence. Damon is loyal. He is loyal to his family, his friends, and most of all the army and its soldiers. He is loyal to a fault, defending soldiers even when it is detrimental to himself and his career. Damon is also competent. Throughout the book, Damon is portrayed as a natural leader. He always takes the most difficult and most dangerous tasks regardless of how they might affect his career – preferring service with troops in combat to service as a staff officer. On the battlefield, Damon quickly grasps the situation, often saving his soldiers’ lives. He is not only an idealized military officer, but also embodies the individualist rags-to-riches American dream.

Throughout the book, the only aspect of military life in which Damon does not excel is the furthering of his own interests. In short, Damon is the model of what Morris

Janowitz, one of the founders of the field of military sociology, refers to as the “heroic leader.” Per Janowitz, “the heroic leader is a perpetuation of the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor.”

Courtney Massengale is the novel’s antagonist. In contrast to Damon, he is a master at furthering his career, and fits Janowitz’s description of the military manager, one who “reflects the scientific and pragmatic dimensions of war-making.” Massengale is polished and genteel almost to the point of effeminacy. Even Massengale’s feminized syllable-heavy name contrasts with Myrer’s idealized Damon. Massengale avoids combat service, and seeks only those positions which connect him with the army’s senior leadership. But most of all, Massengale has no loyalty and little virtue. Massengale always chooses himself and his career over the needs of his family, friends, and fellow soldiers, and the army’s bureaucracy rewards him for his behavior. Because of his connections and maneuvering, Massengale remains senior in rank and authority to Damon throughout the book.

In the final chapter of *Once an Eagle*, Massengale and Damon are again at odds. The men sit across from one another in a plush conference room in the fictional Southeast Asia nation of Khotiane. Massengale is the commander of the American military assistance headquarters, and Damon has been recalled from retirement on a

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5 Ibid.
fact-finding mission. Damon and Massengale, along with Massengale’s retinue of staff officers, are briefing an American Undersecretary of State. Massengale argues for an expansion of the American war effort in Khotiane, an expansion which would have swelled Massengale’s headquarters and relative importance. Damon, on the other hand, makes an impassioned argument against further American involvement in the Khotianese civil war. He argues that a war in Khotiane would be unwinnable, and that further involvement would sink the United States into an endless morass. “Sir,” Damon says to the Undersecretary, “it will be the greatest catastrophe our country has ever known.” As the meeting ends, Damon’s pleas fall on deaf ears. The reader is left with an image of faithful, loyal Damon losing once again to Massengale – losing in the face of careerism and selfish maneuvering with disastrous results for both the army and the nation. The novel’s ending suggests that the true professionals, men like Damon, were stabbed in the back not only by their government, as certain interpretations of the war hold, but also by careerists like Courtney Massengale.

Now, holding the book as a historian, I realize that it is as much a cultural artifact as it is a compelling story. Once an Eagle is the cultural epic of the post-Vietnam War U.S. army. It is a parable for the way that many members of the army imagined themselves following the lost war – as the loyal Damons who were betrayed by self-serving bureaucrats and careerists. I realized that I personally valued the book because

* Myrer, Once an Eagle, 1247.
of what it signified about my professional identity as a military officer. I imagined myself as Damon because that is what a life in the army’s culture had infused into me.

*Once an Eagle* suggests a particular definition of professionalism – Janowitz’s heroic leader. The army’s embrace of that definition was part of the institutional culture that members of the army created in the two decades after the Vietnam War. For both good and ill, that culture continues to dominate the institution.7

Testimonials to *Once an Eagle’s* significance abound. The U.S. Army War College reprinted the book in 1997 with a forward from General John Vessey, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was a Colonel when he won the Distinguished Service Cross for heroism in Vietnam. In his forward, Vessey suggested that *Once an Eagle* captured the heart and soul of the army’s officer corps and cast the book as “a perceptive study of the profession of arms.”8 Colonel David T. Zabecki, a Vietnam veteran and military historian who later retired as a Major General, reviewed *Once an Eagle* in a 1999 issue of *Military Review*, calling it one of the “most important military novels ever written.”9 Zabecki describes the character Damon as “the benchmark of what an American officer can and should be.”10 On the flyleaf of the 1997 War College edition of *Once an Eagle*, retired Major General Robert Scales, the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College when that institution republished the novel, wrote that it had

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8 Myrer, *Once an Eagle*, xvi.
10 Ibid., 94.
been a “moral compass” for him and his family of soldiers for two generations. Another Colonel, himself a battalion commander during Operation Desert Storm, claimed to have “never been without a copy [of Once an Eagle] since college.” Like my peers and I, these officers read and carried Once an Eagle because it said something about the type of soldier that they thought they should be.

The post-Vietnam army’s culture developed in reaction to the loss of the Vietnam War. It was also part of the institutional redefinition that took place in the all-volunteer army following the end of conscription in 1973. Members of the army also reacted to a changing American society, parts of which grew more conservative during the 1970s and 1980s. Soldiers so fondly remembered Once an Eagle during the 1990s because it became woven into the army’s predominant institutional culture during the preceding two decades. That culture, however, did not just emerge on its own, nor was its making simply a response to military concerns. Members of the army, primarily the officer corps, but soldiers throughout the institution created the culture that so valued Sam Damon between the end of the Vietnam War and the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

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11 Robert Scales, “O! The Damage ‘Once an Eagle’ Has Done to My Army - and Yes, It is Partly My Fault,” 2013, Foreign Policy.com, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/18/o-the-damage-once-an-eagle-has-done-to-my-army-and-yes-it-is-partly-my-fault/. Accessed on November 8, 2018 In this article Scales laments that one of the effects of Once an Eagle on the army has been to over-romanticize the combat commander over the staff officer. Scales reflections on Once an Eagle, separated by sixteen years, anticipate one of this dissertation’s conclusions that the army’s culture (of which Once an Eagle was a part) was ultimately limiting for the institution.

This dissertation examines the army’s institutional culture during this moment of cultural transformation. The army transformed from what soldiers called a management or managerial culture that dominated the institution throughout much of the twentieth century to a culture, what I alternatively term a leader or warrior culture that valued subjective individual values such as courage, leadership and honor, and what members of the army called termed warrior ethos or a warrior image. This dissertation describes a twenty year multi-faceted process that took place in the U.S. army following the loss of the Vietnam War. The army’s cultural transformation, this dissertation argues, was not a deliberate plan or a foregone conclusion, that is, it was not the product of any one group of soldiers, but was tightly intertwined with the changing cultural landscapes of 1970s and 1980s America. Social and cultural changes in American society profoundly shaped how members of the army understood their institution and their identities as military professionals. In turn, the army’s culture, at times, affirmed and strengthened specific ideas and trends within American society.

13 The term warrior ethos will be described in more detail in later chapters. It was a category used by many of the historical actors depicted in this dissertation. The definition was unstable, but connoted the type of soldier that Myer’s Sam Damon was modeled after, resolute, courageous, honorable, caring, and male. One document published by the army’s headquarters did attempt a definition of warrior spirit (which was assumed to be synonymous with warrior ethos), which stated that the warrior spirit was, “the state of mind and preparedness required of each officer which blends all the physical mental, moral, and psychological qualities for an officer to successfully lead the army in its mission of protecting the nation.” See James J. McLesky, III, “The U.S. Army Professional Development of Officers Study: A Critique” (U.S. Army War College, 1986), 11; Dandridge M. Malone, “Implementation of the Leadership Goal: A Summary,” Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal, 1, no. 1 (1985).
In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army was at one of its lowest points as an institution.\textsuperscript{14} The Vietnam War shook the army to its core, leaving its credibility questioned and its formations hollowed. The racism and racial unrest that marked American society during that period was also present in the army’s ranks. The abuse of illegal drugs and alcohol was rampant. By the end of the Vietnam War national polls showed that a career as a soldier ranked only slightly higher in prestige than that of garbage collector.\textsuperscript{15} Because of the army’s low standing in American society, the army’s leadership, its corps of officers and noncommissioned officers, faced the challenge of repairing the damage to the institution wrought by the Vietnam War, and doing so without the trust of the nation.\textsuperscript{16}

One officer, reflecting on the early years of the 1970s, later commented “people forget how unbearably screwed up the Army was in 1971, 1972, and 1973.”\textsuperscript{17} In addition to rebuilding the institution and regaining societal support and trust, members of the army were faced with the concern of justifying the institution’s importance to the

\textsuperscript{14} Institution is defined as a social group which is identified through its members. Symbols distinguish members of the institution from non-members and are the focal point for their identity. Institutions are characterized by interactions “amongst members, between these and nonmembers and collectively with other institutions, including the state.” Peter H Wilson, "Defining Military Culture,” *The Journal of Military History*, 72, no. 1 (2008): 16.


nation. If the U.S. army could not “win” in Vietnam, many citizens and political leaders asked, what could it do against the Soviet Union should that nation decide to invade Western Europe? In short, the army could no longer claim the revered status within national society that it enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Because of this whirlwind of change, the institutional culture that had previously shaped and guided the entire way of life of the corporate members of the army prior to the Vietnam War no longer reflected the social conditions within which the army existed in 1973. The army needed to change – and change fast.

In concert with this internal crisis, President Richard Nixon’s decision to end selective service by the end of 1973 profoundly changed the U.S. army. Bernard Rostker, a civil servant who was involved in the planning and implementation of America’s shift to an all-volunteer force, has suggested five reasons for the decision to

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19 By revered status, I am referring to the general sense that many Americans felt toward the U.S. military and the U.S. Army. This is of course difficult to measure. Lawrence Suid describes in the preface to Guts and Glory, “Until the early 1960s, most Americans perceived the nation’s armed services as an all-conquering and infallible force that could protect the United States from any threat and project the national interest to any corner of the world.” Suid describes change in perception through an analysis of the portrayal of the U.S. military in war films. Lawrence H. Suid, Guts & glory : the making of the American military image in film, Rev. and expanded ed., (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002), xi.

end conscription. First, it was the norm throughout U.S. history; prior to the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States had only used conscription in times of war and not in peacetime. Second, the draft was no longer universal; despite the increased troop levels of the Vietnam War, the U.S. military’s personnel needs were not sufficient to require drawing from all segments of society. A complex system of draft deferments arose that favored wealthy and middle-class men for exemptions. The third reason was the simple unpopularity of the Vietnam War by the early 1970s. Fourth, there were also a series of moral and economic arguments against conscription. Rostker argues that while there was a “rational intellectual basis for the volunteer force,” military service no longer seemed a moral obligation of citizenship. Furthermore, Libertarian economist Milton Friedman’s arguments dominated Pentagon studies of the conscription. He argued that the draft was an unfair tax, that it was antithetical to the ideal of freedom, and that it was an inefficient use of the nation’s labor force because it employed so many men below their economic potential. Finally, the army specifically lost confidence in the draft due to its inability to control the discipline problems of draftees.21

The end of conscription affected all branches of the military, but it affected the army the most because the army was the largest of the services and required the most volunteers. Although a volunteer force had been the norm through much of the nation’s

history, the volunteer “regular army” of the pre-World War II period was very small, less than 200,000 soldiers, a mere shadow of the size and relative global commitments of the army of the 1970s. The Vietnam War precipitated the end of conscription, and both the Vietnam War and the end of conscription shaped many of the changes to the army’s institutional culture which this dissertation examines. Those two events, the loss of an unpopular war, and a complete change in how the army perpetuated itself and filled its ranks, were the canvas upon which the army’s members created a new institutional culture as well as the catalyst for cultural change.  

The army completed its cultural transformation by the end of the 1980s. Arguably, the army moved beyond the Vietnam era with a “win” in the Iraqi desert during Operation Desert Storm during the winter of 1990 to 1991. There, the American-led coalition ousted the Iraqi Army from Kuwait in a short conflict, but unlike

22 Although army leaders did not resist the move to a volunteer force, support for the transition within the army was initially thin. There is some disagreement among historians to the degree to which the army supported the end of conscription. The most common interpretation is that army leadership opposed the ending of the draft, and only reluctantly complied. However, Scoville Curran’s 2015 dissertation shows that the army supported the move to a volunteer force, but also maintained bureaucratic concerns over the ability to raise enough soldiers to prosecute the war in Vietnam as well as meet the army’s other requirements. My research shows that while the army did not resist the move to a volunteer force there was much internal dissent over the VOLAR programs and the perceived lowering of standards of discipline. Beth Bailey argues that the army generally opposed the move to a volunteer force. Bailey, America’s Army; Dwight E. Phillips, “Reengineering Institutional Culture and the American Way of War in the post-Vietnam US Army, 1968-1989” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2014). For arguments that the army did support the end of the draft, see; Currin, “An Army of the Willing: Fayette’Nam, Soldier Dissent, and the Untold Story of the All-Volunteer Force.”; Robert K. Griffith, The U.S. Army’s transition to the all-volunteer force, 1968-1974, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997).

Vietnam, the American public perceived soldiers as morally upright, culturally diverse, and committed to serving the nation. Journalists claimed that it seemed “inappropriate to criticize the troops or their conduct.” Gone were concerns of soldiers’ alcohol and drug abuse, their racism, and their “quality.” In place of those concerns was an army that represented opportunity, equality, and above all, success – seemingly the best of America. In both its own and the nation’s imagination, the army had regained its “moral compass.” In Certain Victory, the army’s official history of Operation Desert Storm, Robert Scales describes the army’s transformation as moving “from disillusionment and anguish in Vietnam to confidence and certain victory.” Members of the army more than simply changed their institution; they reestablished their privileged place in American society. In their own minds, the officer corps also reestablished their professional autonomy.

The idea of professional autonomy was one of the most important motivators of change, particularly for the army’s officer corps. The type of autonomy envisioned by the army’s leaders, as well as many of the rank and file of the officer corps, resembled the condition of “objective civilian control” depicted by Samuel Huntington, one of the

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most prominent theorists of civil military relations, in his 1957 book *Soldier and the State.* Huntington described objective control as a form of civil control of the military whereby the military was imagined as a self-governing institution that remained free of substantive interference or control from civilian authorities. He argued that such freedom from civilian interference, and separation from the nation’s politics, maximized a military force’s professionalism. Huntington defined a professional military as inherently apolitical, and therefore would not usurp legitimate civilian control.  

Autonomy also meant that civilian leaders left the army’s leadership free to manage the institution’s internal affairs. Finally, autonomy meant that, once the army was directed towards achieving a national strategic objective by legitimate civilian authorities, it was free to pursue that objective in the manner that military leaders saw most fitting. In the context of Vietnam, military leaders interpreted the erosion of professional autonomy – defined as objective control, or more simply as the army’s ability to conduct military operations free from civilian interference – as causal to the loss of the war. Indeed, such a conception was the central thesis of the U.S. Army War College’s post-mortem of the Vietnam War, *On Strategy* (1982), written by Colonel Harry G. Summers.  

A major


component of the army’s revitalization during the 1970s and 1980s was its perceived reclamation of such functional autonomy.

At least in their rhetoric, members of the army did not seek to usurp civilian authority, and the basic premise of civilian control of the military was never explicitly questioned. The army’s leaders did, however, seek to establish clear boundaries between civilian and military spheres of activity, and those boundaries, to the extent they were created, limited the range of options available to the army’s civilian masters. Members of the army’s senior officer corps desired to maintain control over the army’s employment once the institution was committed to a strategic objective by political leaders. In peace time the army’s leaders desired control over the personnel management and equipping of the army, and perhaps most important, the structuring of the army in terms of personnel numbers and how those personnel were organized. However, in seeking such autonomy, members of the army inherently constrained the range of options available to the civilians, both elected officials and political appointees, who controlled the army. For example, structuring the army for a certain type of war, in this case large-scale mechanized warfare in Central Europe, limited the army’s effectiveness in other conflicts in other locations. Another famous example of gaining control without challenging the idea of civilian control of the military was the total army policy. In that policy, developed by Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Creighton Abrams, political leaders could not commit the active component of the army without
calling up certain sections of the army reserve. The army’s leaders believed that the failure to “call up” the reserves during the Vietnam War was a strategic mistake made for political reasons that cost the army dearly. The total army policy attempted to prevent such a situation in future conflicts. Cultivating the idea of military control in a well-defined sphere was an important part of the army’s cultural transformation, but a focus on the supposed military sphere without a similar institutional focus on strategy and national politics was one of the most glaring limitations of the army’s new culture.

There army’s cultural transformation also came at the cost of the army’s inclusion of women and persons of color. Most notable, and despite remarkable advances in women’s rights and equality, women were still excluded from “combat” assignments. During this period, the army cultivated what was often referred to as a warrior identity or warrior ethos. That identity was construed as male, and the army found it difficult to reconcile the warrior ideal with women soldiers. Although many women participated in combat in Iraq in 1991, whether driving trucks, flying helicopters, or serving in roles such as the military police, the army’s policies excluded them from so-called direct combat occupations in the infantry, in tanks, or in field artillery companies until 2014. Similar policies excluded gay and lesbian soldiers from openly serving. Although countless gay and lesbian soldiers quietly served with distinction, the army’s official position became “don’t ask don’t tell” with regards to sexual orientation until the late 2000s. The lower middle and working classes, of all
ethnic backgrounds, were over-represented in the army’s ranks. Persons of color – particularly women of color – continued to serve in the army in higher percentages than their proportion of society. Thus, much had changed in the army, but much remained the same. Sexual harassment and violence remained problems. Racism, though much reduced, still lingered and would flare again in the middle 1990s amidst a growing national white supremacy movement.\textsuperscript{29} The army’s cultural transformation, entwined as it was with images of warriors and so-called traditional American values, left many unanswered questions about how an army might look and function in an increasingly pluralistic society.

The professional autonomy so desired by the army’s officer corps also proved elusive as the U.S. army found itself increasingly committed in limited conflicts after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{30} These conflicts, such as Operation Gothic Serpent (1993) in Somalia and Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) deployed limited numbers of U.S. forces with often substantial civilian leader-imposed limitations on how those forces conducted the tasks assigned to them. In this instance, the army’s focus, on conventional military operations after the


Vietnam War left the institution ill-prepared for the kinds of small wars or military contingencies with which it was forced to contend after the fall of the Soviet Union. The political and military difficulties in places like Bosnia cracked the edifice that members of the army attempted to create during the 1970s and 1980s. The loss of control culminated in 2003 when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not heed military advice about the numbers of troops that would be required for stabilization efforts following the invasion of Iraq. Historian Andrew Bacevich has gone so far as to argue that the efforts of members of the army to rehabilitate their institution and reassert their professional autonomy “backfired and left the military in the present century bereft of meaningful influence on basic questions relating to the uses of U.S. military power.” 31 The army’s processes of cultural transformation depicted in this dissertation contributed to the current over-reliance on military force in U.S. foreign policy in part because the army was so successful in regaining its standing in American society by 1990

Despite these limitations and unintended consequences, the U.S. army emerged from the 1980s as a very capable military force. It was fully volunteer, and it was fully professionalized. Now, for the first time in its history, it considered both noncommissioned officers and, albeit to a lesser extent, enlisted soldiers as members of the profession of arms rather than citizen soldiers or “draftees.” Not only were these

professionals better educated than in any period in the army’s history, but they had state of the art military and technical equipment at their disposal. What explains such a profound change? Was it, as some historians suggest, the work of a small cohort of enlightened leaders? Were the improvements in the institution the result of revolutionary changes in the army’s doctrine, training practices, and educational systems? If, as some historians have suggested, the army’s culture changed, then how should we understand the process of cultural change in a military institution?

This dissertation makes three broad arguments about how the post-Vietnam War army transformed. First, the changes in the U.S. army during the two decades following the Vietnam War are best understood as a transformation in the institution’s culture. Next, this cultural transformation’s central idiom was professionalism, namely that a new language of professionalism and professional identity emerged that contrasted with the idea of the military manager that had been prevalent in the institution since World War II. This dissertation’s third argument is that members of the army appropriated the terms of their new professionalism language in large part from the conservative shift in American political culture.

The Vietnam War and the move to a volunteer force created the conditions in which a new cultural narrative could form and establish predominance among the institution’s members. Those two events caused a moment of break for the U.S. Army where previous cultural forms and structures of meaning lost much of their value in
expressing the identity and guiding the actions of the army’s members. What emerged was a new culture, soldiers and officers throughout the institution formed both residual and new elements of culture into new narratives and practices. New technologies such as smart weapons, sensors, and fighting vehicles were important to the post-Vietnam War army, but at its foundation the army’s transformation had more to do with how members of the army imagined themselves, their institution, and warfare in general. The change in the army’s predominant culture reshaped the mental framework of members of the army; it altered their professional identity, how they imagined battle and warfighting, and their perceived relationship with society. By 1990, the members of the institution identified themselves through new themes and narratives. It was these themes and narratives that shaped the interactions between the men and women in uniform and the technologies and equipment available to them.

But, the army’s culture did not transform solely in reaction to the loss of a war, nor from the ideas of any single group or personality within the institution. It was also an institutional reaction to a changing American society. As historian Daniel T. Rodgers has argued, the 1960s were a moment of break for the United States more broadly, and during the 1970s and 1980s Americans reimagined themselves as a society. Rodgers has described how American society fractured in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

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33 Ibid.
century as one began to hear more about “individuals, contingency, and choice.” The ways that Americans reimagined their society shaped the contours of the army’s emerging cultural narrative. American political culture became more conservative during the late 1970s and 1980s, and as it did so, that political culture shaped the army. It was certainly no direct transfer from civilian society to the military, those within the Army adapted the changing language and culture of American society to their own purposes, but it is clear that the ideas informing cultural change in the army were drawn as much from U.S. national society as they were from military necessity or military science.

National policy, the army’s traditions, and societal trends each shaped the daily social relations of the men and women in uniform and their relationship to the nation they served. The army’s cultural transformation was a multi-centered process of contestation and negotiation involving countless actors reacting to many layers of input. Separate communities emerged that centered upon important practices or notable problems such as doctrine, ethics and behavior, or race relations. Each community developed a conversation about its specific problem or practice, and the ideas emerging from each of those conversations shaped one another as the day to day interactions of members of the army brought those disparate ideas together. The ideas from one center of change spilled into others, ultimately forming a cohesive narrative about what the

34 Ibid., 5.
army’s identity and military professionalism. The social revolutions of the 1960s, the Vietnam War, and the end of conscription were all part of a moment of break for the U.S. army. Whether the military defeat in Vietnam, the perceived problems in soldier ethics, or the racial violence that nearly undid the institution, American societal narratives shaped how members of the army attempted to solve each problem.

In a military, culture is not only the official policy of military and civilian leaders, but also how members of the institution understand and develop social meaning from those policies. Historians and sociologists have argued that militaries resemble “total institutions” because of their ability to shape the entire worlds of military members.35 Without refuting this statement in its entirety, this dissertation shows that members of the army also shaped their institutional culture in ways that were not necessarily in line with the desires of the army’s leadership. This story shows how multiple arguments and ideas shaped the army’s evolving institutional culture, each vying for predominance within a changing institution.

Professionalism was the central idiom of the army’s cultural transformation, and each center of cultural change related in some way to definitions of military professionalism. Members of the army reimagined and redefined military professionalism in the wake of the Vietnam War, the end of selective service, and the

conservative turn in America’s political culture. Each facet of the army’s process of
cultural change informed the language and practices through which members of the
army enacted their identity.

Across the 1970s and 1980s, the army’s professionalism discourse increasingly
reflected the ways in which members of the army viewed their institution as a
conservative enclave within what many of them viewed as an increasingly permissive
American society. Professionalism concerned how the army conceptualized
warfighting, but also the terms through which members of the institution defined
themselves and the structure of their relationships with other members of the army,
American society, and political leaders. By the 1980s, members of the army defined
professionalism in terms of the values through which soldiers practiced their profession
rather than by the results they achieved, a clear repudiation of the so-called
management culture, and as a body of expertise within a narrowly defined military-
centric sphere of activity. With reference to the former, in 1986, one army pamphlet
described the ideal officer as, “professional, possessing a warrior spirit, and action
oriented leader with a broad general knowledge who were masters of the art and science
of war.”36 For the latter, battle, specifically what came to be known as the “operational”
level of war, gained a privileged place in the military’s thinking, separate from both the

36Department of the Army, “Report to the Officer Corps: Results of the Professional Development of Officer
realm of diplomacy and strategy on the one hand and the realm of logistics and bureaucratic management on the other.

This new discourse of professionalism – “the complex of assumptions, perceptions, expectations, and values” that members of the army held about their institution, war, and warriors – grew in opposition to what many members of the army, dubbed a management culture.\(^{37}\) Both members of the army and civilians who commented on the military used the term management culture to signify a certain valuation of quantifiable metrics of success over qualitative measures such as leadership, loyalty, and courage. David Segal, a military sociologist, has depicted management culture as, “substituting management for leadership, human resources for soldiers, regulations and contracts for traditions, and some would argue, cost effectiveness for combat effectiveness.”\(^{38}\)

Management culture also signified civilian encroachment into the military profession, and when members of the army decried management culture they implicitly critiqued Vietnam era civil-military relations. One of the realities of twentieth century warfare has been that as war became more technological, particularly as war became


\(^{38}\) David R. Segal, “Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis,” *Armed Forces & Society*, 12, no. 3 (1986): 352, 53. For military historians, one definition of management culture comes from Brian M. Linn, “managers seek to make war an organizational problem – the rational coordination of resources, both human and materiel.” “Managers,” as Linn and others describe them, were thought to focus too much on quantitative metrics and automation at the expense of the intangibles of military life such as unit cohesion and morale. Brian McAllister Linn, *The Echo of Battle*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 8.
associated with intercontinental atomic weapons after World War II, distinctions between military and civilian occupations eroded. Weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles removed the act of warfighting from the battlefield, thereby making the distinctions between the “warrior” and the ordinary citizen less distinct than they had been in previous centuries -- or even the beginning of the twentieth century. Members of the military, nestled safely in a bunker in the United States, could now push a button to launch a salvo of missiles powerful enough to obliterate an opponent without ever directly engaging with the opposing military. Technology made the individual or small group effort of fighting, the idealized infantryman in the trenches, seem less relevant, but it also caused a convergence between the military person and their civilian counterpart. On a late-twentieth century battlefield, the soldier monitoring a nuclear missile launch site is indistinguishable from the civilian monitoring a nuclear power plant. Management culture highlighted this convergence, seeking to cultivate the ideal military leader as indistinguishable from the leader of industry.

Members of the army scrutinized the managerial conception of professionalism in the wake of the Vietnam War because they saw it as causal to the army’s dismal performance. They sought instead to create a conception of modern military professionalism that highlighted how the military professional was different from their counterparts in civilian society, members of a small elite focused on the defense of the nation. Members of the army associated management culture with Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, a former corporate executive who led the Department of Defense during the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations and was known for instituting systems analysis and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Many officers believed that, due to this civilian management culture encroaching upon the army, other army leaders were in turn trying to run the army like a “corporation,” and that this was not only impossible but also antithetical to the army’s professional identity.³⁹ Perhaps most prominently, they associated management culture with the Vietnam War body count, which used the numbers of enemy dead to quantify success, the institution’s own lack of autonomy, and ultimately the loss of the Vietnam War. These same members of the army equated management with careerism, self-interest, and a lack of virtue.⁴⁰ In the minds of many officers, the army’s problems, including the disintegration of the army in Vietnam, were due to the real-life versions of Myrer’s Courtney Massengale. Each cultural process examined in this dissertation relates in varying degrees to how the army’s dominant culture transitioned from one that valued this so-called management culture to an institutional culture that valued intangible variables such as courage, competence, candor, and commitment to the

institution that were collectively grouped under the term “leadership” or alternatively “warrior.”

Finally, the army’s cultural transformation developed within the broader cultural context of the conservative shift in American political culture. The most recent American conservative movement began in the 1950s, and led to the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan. Broadly speaking, conservatism has continued to dominate American political culture to this date. This dissertation explores the intersection of the U.S. army and the conservative movement from the vantage point of intellectual history. It shows how the conservatism’s ideas and ideologies shaped the narratives within the army’s institutional culture. Ideas such as libertarian individualism, conceptions of a class-neutral American meritocracy, and allusions to evangelical Protestant models of Christianity litter the ways that members of the army described themselves and their institution. When viewed through this lens, the army was only one national institution within the broader U.S. society shaped by how the conservative movement reimagined society. Not only was strong national defense a central pillar within New Right conservatism, but in adopting many of the themes of the national conservative

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41 Brian M. Linn draws a similar distinction to management, what he terms heroes. Heroes, per Linn, “emphasized the human element, and defined warfare by personal intangibles such as military genius, experience, courage, morale, and discipline.” Linn Courage, Competence, Candor, and Commitment were published as “soldierly qualities” in the 1981 version of FM 100-1. They were the pre-curser to the seven army values that continue to frame portions of the army’s professional identity. Department of the Army, “FM 100-1: The Army,” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1981).

movement, the army, in turn, helped strengthen the appeal of conservatism. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the specific transformations depicted in this dissertation to have taken place except within the conservative wave of the 1970s and 1980s. This is because so many of the changes occurring in the army employed the language, themes, and ideologies that were part of the conservative movement’s platform.

Indeed, particularly after 1980, the revitalized army became an important symbol for conservative politicians as well as grassroots conservatives. 43 Not only did the army’s membership self-identify as either conservative or affiliated with the Republican party to a far greater degree than ever before, but the army and the Vietnam War were central to conservative narratives about how a liberal administration had failed the nation in Vietnam, and by extension how “liberalism” (a word with ever-shifting meaning and definition) had weakened it. 44

By 1990, the soldier represented a different type of idealized citizenship than it had previously. The civic-military language envisioning an egalitarian duty to serve in a conscripted military was replaced by a language casting the volunteer soldier as a sort of “super-citizen” and symbol of patriotism, a professional “elite” ready to sacrifice for the nation. During the 1970s, Americans began to associate citizenship more with rights owed to the individual by the state rather than the obligations which citizens owed to

the polity. In that setting, and alongside the conservative ascendancy of the last quarter of the twentieth century, soldiers became citizens who exercised their right of choice to voluntarily serve the state. In the short term, the associations between soldiers and conservative politicians, which were both cultural and political, were mutually beneficial. The army benefitted because conservatism’s espoused “norms” of American society were in line with the army’s developing leadership culture. Conservative politicians, and by extension the conservative social movement, benefitted through their association with the military. The relationship between conservatism and the army enabled conservatives to lay claim to the ideals of civic virtue and patriotism embodied by the volunteer soldier’s individual decision to serve.

II.

This dissertation positions itself at the intersection of three historiographies. First, it builds upon the body of literature examining the extensive changes that took place in the post-Vietnam U.S. army. Second, it adds to an ever-growing turn to modes of cultural analysis within military history. And third, this dissertation places the cultural change in the post-Vietnam army within the context of a changing U.S. society during the 1970s and 1980s. Historians are beginning to produce cultural histories of the

post-Vietnam War U.S. army; they have not fully explored the relationship between changes in American society and the institutional cultures of the nation’s military.\footnote{An important exception is Beth Bailey’s 2009 America’s Army, which examines the Army’s struggle with the shift from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force. Also, Jennifer Mittelstadt’s The Rise of the Military Welfare State, a superb study of the social welfare programs that were an important part of the volunteer military in the 1970s and 1980s. Other historians have of course investigated the links between U.S. society and its military for earlier periods.}

Many of the histories of the U.S. army of the 1970s and 1980s emphasize the triumphal aspects of this period in the army’s history. If the Vietnam War remains the army’s institutional nadir, the Persian Gulf War is considered one of the most successful episodes in the institution’s history. The U.S. army started to write its own history of institutional transformation following the Vietnam War during this period of change, and these narratives of triumph continue to influence the ways in which the institution describes itself. These early histories focus on the “heroes” of the period who consciously led the army out of the dark period of the Vietnam War. John Romjue’s From Active Defense to AirLand Battle (1984) and his later The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (1993) are indicative of this interpretation.\footnote{John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982, (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984). John L Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army, (ibid.: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993). Other examples of the “triumphal” interpretation of transformation in the U.S. Army during the 1970s and 1980s are, Walter E. Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011). Suzanne C Nielsen, ”An Army Transformed: The US Army’s Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations,” in The Letort Papers (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010).} These histories generally argue that, despite many challenges, the army got it “right.”
A series of books published in the wake of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 solidified the conception of the 1970s and 1980s U.S. Army as a story of enlightened leaders consciously guiding a beleaguered institution through a period of transformation. Robert Scales, then a Brigadier General, draws upon this narrative in the opening chapter of the Army’s official history of the Persian Gulf War, Certain Victory (1994). According to him, “a visionary cohort of soldiers who stayed with the institution [the U.S. Army] during the difficult years following the war in Vietnam was responsible for launching the Army on its path to reform.”

He then goes on to describe how this group of reformers created a smaller, more professional, army that was unprecedented in the history of the United States, and that this new army would “outthink rather than outslug its opponents.” The central theme of these early histories was doctrinal reform. Specifically, these histories argued that doctrine and training were the conceptual breakthroughs that drove all other processes of change.


Scales, Certain Victory: the U.S. Army in the Gulf War, 36.

Ibid.

The focus on doctrine and training is not by chance. Often, doctrinal statements are as much an official statement of culture as they are a statement of warfighting methodology. During this period, one of the most important studies of doctrinal change in military organizations was published, Barry Posen’s The
Beth Bailey examines the Army’s transition from a largely conscripted to an all-volunteer force in her 2009 book, *America’s Army*. While Bailey’s work is an institutional history, it is also a history of the relationship between the citizens of the United States and their army. She highlights how the army’s transformation efforts following the end of conscription were contested, and how the ultimate success of the all-volunteer force was highly contingent upon the army’s ability to adapt to a changing U.S. national society. Bailey’s work stands out in the literature on the 1970s and 1980s U.S. army because it is as much a story about a changing national society as it is one about the army itself. Her analysis is undergirded by an argument that America directly confronted the “legacies” of the social change movements of the 1960s in the army.

In the last decade, historians have begun to interpret this period in U.S. Army history as a process of consciously engineered changes in institutional culture. In his 2014 dissertation entitled *Reengineering Institutional Culture and the American Way of War in the Post-Vietnam U.S. Army 1968-1989*, Dwight Phillips has argued that the U.S. Army

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*Bailey, America’s Army, xi.*
“deliberately reengineered its institutional culture” in the decades after the Vietnam War. Phillips challenges the existing historiography by employing a cultural model of military transformation that acknowledges the role played by agents at the middle and lower echelons of the Army in transforming the institution. He makes two arguments about cultural change in the Army: first, “the Army’s career members reimagined their institutional culture, with the intention of refashioning themselves as a modern, ‘professional’ army;” and second, the Army deliberately instituted this newly conceived institutional culture by embedding it in the Army’s “concept carriers” – organizations, processes, and practices within the army that were able to disseminate the new “culture” to a wider audience.

Phillips’ arguments are based on a conception of culture derived from Isabell Hull’s *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (2005), and Peter Wilson’s important article on “Defining Military Culture” (2008). In combining the scholarship of Wilson and Hull, Phillips presupposes not only that the

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54 For a theoretical construct of the different models through which military innovation can be examined see Adam Grissom, “The future of military innovation studies,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29, no. 5 (2006). Although Grissom specifically uses the term “innovation” instead of change or transformation, I reject the term. Innovation implies a positive change. I argue that any broad changes in large institutions such as armies will inherently be both positive and negative, and for historians, those positive or negative attributes are dependent upon the historian’s analytical framework. However, Grissom’s article is an excellent overview of the ways in which other disciplines interpret the ways in which militaries change over time.
U.S. Army is an institution, but that it also produces an own military culture. Phillips further presupposes that military culture is not static, and that military culture is “not immune to social, political and economic changes” that occur outside of the military institution. Yet, despite this emphasis on the permeability of cultures, even military cultures, Phillips understates the connections between what he sees as a major transformation within the army and the equally monumental transformation in U.S. society.

The second historiography upon which this dissertation builds is the exciting work which joins military history with cultural methods of analysis. The study of the intersection of cultural and military history arguably begins with Russell Weigley’s *The American Way of War* (1973) and the ways in which that book precipitated the study of strategic culture. Weigley not only started a trend in the discipline of military history, but also set a precedent for a certain reductionist approach to culture, using culture as a means to explain the ‘illogical’ and ‘irrational’, and to add coherence to distinct and disparate historical experiences. *The American Way of War* casts the American experience with warfare into a binary construct of attrition and annihilation, arguing that the history of American strategic thought is characterized by a progression from early strategies of attrition to more recent strategies of annihilation. However encompassing

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and foundational it is, Weigley’s analysis has its limitations. His terms of annihilation and attrition are required to account for such a wide expanse of American military behavior that their definitions lack clarity, and at times mutate within Weigley’s prose. Still, Weigley’s book spurred an entire stream of scholarship termed as “strategic culture” or “national ways of war.”

The strategic culture literature presupposes a continuity in a nation state’s approach to warfare over long periods of time in many different contexts. By necessity, scholars must conceptualize culture in a way that accentuates continuity and stability if they are to isolate a mode of warfare that is both definable and specific to a social group, whether tribe, nation, or military institution. The strategic culture literature leaves little room for descriptions of contestation and adaption within a social group or institution and does not describe cultural change outside of monumental shifts, such as Weigley’s description of a shift in American military culture as a result of the Civil War experience.

60 Examples include, David French, The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000 (New York: Routledge, 2014); Richard W Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940, (Lawrence, Kans: University Press of Kansas, 2001). R.M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich, (Lawrence, Kans: University Press of Kansas, 2005). Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic culture and ways of war, (New York: Routledge, 2006). A slightly different take on strategic culture is Linn, The Echo of Battle. Linn describes the U.S. Army’s culture by isolating three trends; heroes, guardians, and managers, that characterize the Army’s officer corps. Linn’s book straddles a national or strategic culture analysis and a military culture analysis. There is much in common with the analysis of Strategic culture and the way that Linn analyzes the Army’s military culture. A variation on the strategic culture literature is the body of work that investigates the relationship between civilian policymakers, the military elite, and doctrine. These works include Jack L. Snyder, The ideology of the offensive: military decision making and the disasters of 1914, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Kier, “Culture and military doctrine: France between the wars.”
Military historians’ initial focus on culture’s continuity colors the histories that follow even as military historians have continued to learn from and adapt to the discipline of history’s cultural turn.

Military historians continue to build upon Weigley’s foundation and increasingly employ ideas and methods from the broader cultural turn within the overall discipline of history.61 Some recent military historians focus on exploring the ways in which “culture and contingency are not in conflict” as a way to break the mold of the strategic culture literature, to maintain in step with the cultural turn, but to also maintain a space for conscious human agency.62 Isabel V. Hull’s Absolute Destruction is one of the most influential books in this context. Hull argues that “culture consists of an interrelation between norms and actual behavior (practices) tested through time, both affecting each other. It is not simply an idea template that stamps out approved behavior.”63 Her level of analysis is smaller than the strategic culture literature, focusing on a particular military institution rather than the nation state, but she describes how there was only one definable military culture in the German army. There may have been dissent and improvisation, but for Hull, these were episodic instances.

61 For examples of the cultural turn see the edited collection, Beyond the cultural turn: new directions in the study of society and culture, ed. Richard Biernacki, Victoria E. Bonnell, and Lynn Hunt, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999).
63 Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany, 94.
Finally, this dissertation contextualizes the story of the post-Vietnam U.S. Army within the social and cultural changes that took place within the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. Daniel T. Rodgers has interpreted the 1970s and 1980s as a period during which Americans reimagined itself as a society. I expand upon that framework, showing how America’s army reimagined itself, along with and in similar ways to, the society which it served. To build upon the work of Rodgers and other historians of America’s transformations since 1970, I show the processes through which cultural change took place within one prominent American institution.

Viewing the army’s cultural transformation as part of a broader shift in American society connects it to the fundamental shift in the U.S. political economy during the 1970s and the conservative turn in American political culture. Although scholars use slightly different terms, such as post-Fordist, post-industrial, or post-modern, there is a general consensus that the regime of accumulation in the economies

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of the Atlantic world changed profoundly in the 1970s. Not only were rates of growth in the industrialized nations slowing, but inflation rates were rising, and the managed economies of the post-WWII liberal order were proving unable to arrest this growing “stagflation.” The recession was exacerbated by an oil embargo initiated by the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) against the western allies of Israel as a result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

The academic debate over this issue has moved beyond whether or not the economy of the U.S. changed, towards attempts to understand the degree of change, which specific aspects of the economies changed, and which stayed the same. This ever-growing literature has demonstrated how these economic changes affected not only functional relationships between people, their work, and their economic well-being, but also that changes in the regime of accumulation had broader cultural impacts. Flexible accumulation and neoliberalism were both changes in political economy that

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65 Different terms used in this debate are: Post Fordist, Postmodern, and Information Society. “Postindustrial” was famously theorized by the essayist Daniel Bell, see Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. “Post-Modern” has been the subject of a wide debate, and some of the most notable contributions are: Perry Anderson, *The Origins of Postmodernity*, (London: Verso, 1998); Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” “Post Fordist” is mobilized in the following works: Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern society : New Theories of the Contemporary World*; Vidal, "Fordism and the Golden Age of Atlantic Capitalism.”

reorganized wealth distribution, class composition, and social welfare in the United States. They were also crucial to the backlash against economic and social liberalism.

The 1970s also marked a growing rightward turn in the U.S. political landscape. Libertarian ideologies, a “backlash” against the social movements of the 1960s, and growing population of politically involved evangelical Christians were a key constituency of the “new right.” This movement reached its apogee with the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency, which changed the landscape of American national politics. Lisa McGirr’s *Suburban Warriors*, one of the seminal works on the conservative political movement, has conceptualized this phenomenon as a grassroots social movement that grew out of the suburbs of the Sunbelt. She has demonstrated that it was a product of migrations of southern whites to the West and North regions of the United States, as well as the spread of a politicized evangelical strain of Christianity.

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69 McGirr, *Suburban warriors : the origins of the new American Right*. 
Nancy MacLean’s *Democracy in Chains* has expanded our understanding of conservatism’s deep roots through an intellectual history that shows how the libertarian right has sought to control and shape the form of American political and economic discourse.\(^70\) Andrew Bacevich’s *The New American Militarism* has depicted the same political moment through the lens of militarism, demonstrating how the fascination with military power, and the conflating of the projection of U.S. Military power with utopian ends, was a byproduct of the shift in American political discourse away from the liberal center towards the extremes of both the left and right ends of the political spectrum.\(^71\)

III.

The military press was a site where the transfer and of languages and ideas from outside of the army into the institution took place. These journals and magazines were often published by various agencies within the army, but some were published by external lobbying groups -- such as the Association of the United States Army -- and still others were published through the nation’s university system, or through various think tanks and intellectual centers. This particular group of sources reads like a road map of a transforming culture. When reading these sources, I look to intellectual history, exploring how ideas are formed, reproduced, and transmitted, as well as how ideas


\(^{71}\) Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, 5.
develop into cultural elements and meaning. Many of these writings are contained in
the extensive military press that existed during this period.

The authors of these publications were a mix of current and retired service
personnel, interested private citizens, academics, and political leaders and their staffs.
The publications themselves were part of the army’s educational institutions, but also
found their way to the lounges and breakrooms of subgroups throughout the institution.
Circulation statistics are therefore less important for these publications because they
were part of the intellectual life of the army, particularly of the officer and
noncommissioned officer corps.

The various publications were directed at specific target audiences. For instance,
*Armor*, published by the U.S. Army Armor center at Fort Knox, primarily featured
articles about tactics, and was directed at a non-commissioned officer and junior officer
readership. In contrast, *Parameters*, published by the U.S. Army War College, featured
more articles about military strategy, and was directed towards a senior officer
readership. This dissertation draws from these journals to show a coherent and
developing body of thought across a period of nearly twenty years. This body of
thought was multi-faceted, meaning it engaged with a great number of issues within the
institution, but each facet drew upon similar themes.

The military press shows how ideas about what the army should be, how it
should operate, and how the institution should be defined were articulated by members
of the army as well as how those ideas mutated over a period of two decades. The military press illuminates specific trends in what ideas were accepted at a given time. In addition to the feature articles in these publications, the shorter editorial sections often provide feedback to earlier feature articles suggesting whether or not ideas were accepted by the broader readership. Because it was so extensive in this period, the military press provides the breadcrumbs marking the path along which the army’s institutional culture formed.

In addition to the military press, my arguments draw upon collections of personal papers of military professionals that served during this era. These include the papers of the Army Chiefs of Staff from the period between 1973 and 1990. I also consulted the papers of other military officers who served in influential positions within the army such as Generals William E. Depuy and Donn A. Starry. Finally, the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas contains records of the many studies on doctrine, force structure, and gender and cultural inclusion completed by the Army, and they were useful in determining how individuals on each of these committees felt about the issues they were researching.

IV.

This dissertation is organized thematically. Each chapter examines a different site or facet of the army’s cultural transformation, and how that piece of the
transformation contributed to a new professionalism discourse. Each process explored in this dissertation was interdependent, meaning that different conversations drew upon and strengthened one another. Each chapter shows, however, that the army’s culture generally transformed in ways that reflected the rightward shift in American society.

Chapters 1 through 3 each focus on how the army’s thinking about war developed through a conversation about doctrine and professionalism. In many ways this conversation about doctrine was the most important facet of the army’s transformation because it was at the core of the army’s purpose – to defend the nation. Because of its relative importance, ideas from this conversation often spilled into how members of the army thought about other issues. Chapters 4 through 6 show how this central narrative within the army’s cultural transformation shaped how the army thought about race, ethics, morality, and gender integration.

Chapter 1 explores doctrinal change during the army’s transition from the Vietnam War to the 1970s’ focus on defending Western Europe from invasion. From the formation of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 until the publication of the 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, General William E. Depuy transformed the army’s capstone doctrine. Many historians interpret the 1976 “Active Defense” doctrine as energizing the reforms in the Army and its culture during the 1970s and 1980s, and therefore view Depuy and the publication of the 1976 doctrine as the beginning of the army’s post-Vietnam war transformation. In contrast, I argue that
the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 as a doctrine did not align with the cultural landscape of 1970s America. The 1976 version of FM 100-5 represented World War II era thinking adapted to a more modern battlefield. The Active Defense doctrine was Fordist in character at a time when the United States and the world had moved beyond Fordism towards a new regime of accumulation and its associated cultural influence. Strikingly, there were strong affinities between the language used in the institutional rejection of Active Defense doctrine and the language of neoliberalism and the growing conservative movement.

Chapter 2 explores the reengineering of professional values and the creation of Airland Battle doctrine in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 as a replacement for Active Defense doctrine. Focusing largely on the work of General Donn Starry as the TRADOC Commander, this chapter argues that Starry placed as much of a focus on changing the army’s professional values as he did on changing the army’s doctrine. Covering a period from 1977, when Starry assumed command of TRADOC, until Airland Battle doctrine was published in 1982, this chapter shows how Airland Battle doctrine reflected an effort on the part of army leadership to change how members of the army defined professionalism and professional competence.

Airland Battle doctrine made significant changes to the methodology through which the U.S. army conceptualized and conducted battle. Foremost among these changes were the ways in which Airland Battle doctrine extended the battlefield in
depth and time, advocating for the synchronized engagement of multiple echelons of an opposing army, and Airland Battle doctrine’s articulation of the operational level of war – a level of war between strategy and tactics that focused on large unit operations and the linking together of multiple battles into a coherent campaign. But more important, Airland Battle doctrine reimagined the importance of the individual soldier and the intangible attributes – such as initiative, courage, and intelligence – intrinsic to those soldiers. Initiative, and most important leadership, were explicitly stated as fundamental to the execution of Airland Battle doctrine. Such a concept was in stark contrast to the more technological focus of Active Defense. Airland Battle, I argue, was a part of a new language of professionalism and professional values adopted by members of the army in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Chapter 3 examines how members of the army, particularly the officer corps, made meaning out of Airland Battle doctrine. After the publication of that doctrine in 1982 through the end of the decade, many members of the officer corps used the doctrine to interpret a new model of military professionalism, but did so in terms borrowed from German military history. I argue that an idealized and highly constructed image of the German military became a signifier for the ways in officers of the U.S. Army envisioned the future of their institution as autonomous from, though controlled by, civilian authorities, focusing on military operations, and insulated from civilian society. Through countless articles and books, a discourse about military
effectiveness and professionalism formed that used the German military as the ideal archetype of a military institution – despite the fact that the German army had lost the two world wars of the twentieth century. The reasons why the American army focused so much on Germany had to do with a long tradition of looking to Germany as the model for military professionalism, a German military historiography skewed by the conditions of the Cold War, and an idealized conception of civil-military relations. I argue that the language used to construct this cultural symbol reflected more how members of the army saw themselves amidst the conservative turn in U.S. society than it did German military history.

While it was perhaps in line with the army’s move to a culture that valued the heroic warrior, viewing military professionalism through the lens of the German model was ultimately limiting for the institution. The German army’s emphasis on short decisive battles was embraced by the U.S. army but arguably left the U.S. army ill-prepared for the peacekeeping missions, insurgencies, and conflict with non-state actors it would face in the 1990s and 2000s. Also like the Germans, the U.S. Army sought excellence at what it termed the operational level of war. Such a focus came at the expense of building an institutional expertise at the subtleties of military strategy. More so, the ways in which the U.S. Army described the operational level of war assumed that such a definable military-only sphere of activity existed. Members of the U.S. Army idealized a historicized German army because of that army’s perceived professional
autonomy from German society. But in failing to conceptualize how the German model could not directly map onto the American cultural and political landscape, the U.S. army did not realize that the autonomy which it sought was non-existent.

The final three chapters show how the army’s conversation about doctrine and professionalism, the move from a management culture to a leadership or warrior culture shaped the army’s conversation about race, ethical behavior, and gender. Chapter 4 examines racial diversity and racial turmoil in the post-Vietnam army. In the early 1970s, army leadership developed a robust equal opportunity program intent on addressing the concerns of racial and ethnic minorities with a particular focus on African American soldiers. I argue that these programs initially envisioned a culturally diverse army, and recognized the unique characteristics of the racial and ethnic subcultures within the army. But later, by the middle 1980s, these programs and their focus on diversity were drowned by an increased focus on a “colorblind” narrative of racial integration not unlike the colorblind narrative of New Right conservatism.

This chapter shows that the key to understanding the army’s narratives about race, racial equality, and diversity lies in examining the army’s social welfare programs in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The army’s “colorblind” language was largely successful because social welfare programs, such as subsidized healthcare, housing, and forced integration reduced or eliminated many of the socio-economic inequities between soldiers of different races. As historian Jennifer Mittelstadt has shown, the U.S. military
was one of the only institutions where conservative politicians and citizens accepted publicly-funded social welfare programs in the Reagan-era.\textsuperscript{72} Furthermore, unlike American society, military pay rates did not differ based on race or gender. By the end of the 1980s, the army was a model of racial diversity and racial unity, and as such was construed as a success story within conservative America. This popular narrative, which became visible during the first Persian Gulf War, silenced the ways in which social welfare programs were at the foundation of the army’s perceived success in racial integration and diversity.\textsuperscript{73} This sleight of hand allowed conservatives to point to the “multicultural” U.S. army to support their conceptions of the United States as a colorblind meritocracy.

Chapter 5 revisits the army’s system of professional values depicted in the second chapter, but focuses on how the army’s conception of ethics and morality echoed the themes and narratives of the evangelical movement that took place in U.S. society during those same decades. The Army acknowledged massive problems in its ethical foundation as the result of a 1970 study on the behavior of the officer corps during the Vietnam war. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there was a conscious effort to overcome the real and perceived “crisis” of professional ethics. Through countless articles and books, military and civilian writers argued for ways to remap the moral framework of

the Army. Prominent members of the army, including Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, developed strong ties with evangelical leaders and Christian evangelicals in Congress. Thus, many evangelicals saw the army of the middle 1980s as a national institution whose identity was informed by an evangelical conception of Christian values. Such a conception tied the army even closer to conservative politics and politicians as well as the segments of the American population who identified with the conservative movement.

The final chapter examines the intersection of the image of the American soldier, gender politics, and the post-conscription army. I argue that the greatest cultural challenge the U.S. Army faced during the 1970s and 1980s was not the inclusion of diverse mixtures of racial and ethnic groups, but rather the inclusion of women. That inclusion did not take place until 1978, and even then, women were only admitted to specified “non-combat” jobs. The inclusion of women forced a monumental shift in how the Army and the nation could define “soldier” and masculinity. This chapter explores how the Army made sense of this episode by examining the ways that women were described in the military press changed from the end of the Vietnam War to the Persian Gulf War. This chapter is a story of the cultural effects of the women’s movement as they were experienced by a reluctant male population, but also how conservative ideals of femininity and family undermined the achievements of the army’s first women soldiers.
The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as well as Phyllis Schlafly’s STOP ERA campaign figure prominently in this narrative. I argue that members of the army used the ERA as a bellwether for what the role of women would be within the institution. When the ERA seemed sure of passage, the army took rapid steps to integrate women into its formations. However, as the ERA stalled in the ratification process, so too did the army’s efforts to fully integrate women. By the 1980s, women were barred from some positions in which they had previously performed with noted success. Furthermore, the slowed process of women’s integration took place in spite of numerous internal studies, which showed that the inclusion of women was not detrimental to a military organization’s performance of its duties.

In total, these six chapters show that the army’s cultural transformation was not a planned transformation or a centrally controlled process. While the army ultimately recovered from the turmoil of the Vietnam era, this dissertation shows that the institutional culture produced in the army of the 1970s and 1980s was also limiting. This period in the army’s history is most often viewed in triumphal terms. Certainly, the army’s official history of the period has generally a story of how the army got it “right,” but many historians outside of the institution have also followed that logic. Those historians most often tell a story of doctrinal change or describe the army’s transformation in technical terms linking to a broader military revolution literature. Whether or not the two decades after the Vietnam War were a period of triumph for
members of the army and their institution depends upon the vantage point from which one explores this period. While the army certainly seemed triumphant in the wake of Desert Storm, in the words of President George H.W. Bush, “shaking off the Vietnam Syndrome,” that triumph did not last, as the forever wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East, which mark the twenty-first century illustrate.

The army’s culture has remained relatively unchanged in the opening years of the twenty-first century. The culture made in the 70s and 80s was at the core of the intellectual framework, the values, and social norms that the army took into Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001. The near singular focus on the operational level of war that developed in the army of the 1970s and 1980s limited its understanding of the intricacies of national strategy. The army’s focus on battlefield excellence undervalued those members of the institution that were talented staff officers but less inclined for the particular challenges of the command of combat troops. The army’s growing association with conservative politics during the 1980s precluded some possibilities that were open to the institution during the early 1970s: Despite the possibilities in the early years after the Vietnam War, the army did not become the culturally diverse institution that it might have, particularly with respect to gender integration and religious expression. Had the army not shifted to such conservative rhetoric, the army might have affirmed an increasingly diverse America rather than affirming such diversity’s socially conservative counterpart.
As one retired general suggested in 2013, the army’s institutional culture generated too many Sam Damons.\textsuperscript{74} Certainly, any army requires competent leaders – especially in combat – but what are the limits of a military culture that so values the heroic warrior?

\textsuperscript{74} Scales, “O! The Damage “Once an Eagle” Has Done to My Army - and Yes, It is Partly My Fault”. 52
Chapter 1: Active Defense Doctrine, Transitioning to a New Institutional Culture 1973 to 1978

A few moments after 1200 hours on June 8, 1966, 579 hats fluttered skyward above West Point’s Michie stadium. For the briefest of moments, each hat suspended weightless, unmoored from the world’s pull, flickering the sun’s light upon the crowd below. Each hat represented one of the cadets of the West Point class of 1966, the “men of ‘66” as they would be known. Each cadet, like their caps, stood momentarily unmoored from the concerns of their generation. For a brief moment, the cadets reveled in their new rank, freedom, and paychecks. They got married, bought cars, and dreamed excitedly at the prospects of new lives as army officers. But, like their hats that never quite escaped the pull of this world, the cadets had only a short reprieve from the strenuous life. Just a year later, many of the cadets standing on the plain that June day would be in Vietnam, and by the end of the war almost a decade later, thirty of their number would be dead, a number equal to the death tolls of any West Point class during World War II or the Korean conflict.¹

The West Point graduates of 1966 were not the only generation that fought the Vietnam War. The most senior of officers in Vietnam first saw combat in World War II, 

and many again in the Korean War. In 1966, Major General William E. Depuy, having previously served as the operations officer for General William C. Westmoreland the Commander of Military Assistance Command – Vietnam, returned to Vietnam to assume command of the 1st Infantry Division. Depuy, a commanding general, and the men of ’66, some of which were likely platoon leaders in Depuy’s division, came of age in very different Americas. Depuy saw America at its most powerful, a nation that emerged from economic depression to win the Second World War and then dominate world politics for multiple decades. The men of the class of 1966 came of age in a nation where those conceptions of American strength were in turmoil. The Vietnam War had yet to be decided, but the African American Civil Rights Movement, and the numerous individual rights movements which it spurred questioned America’s moral self-image. Moreover, America’s economic supremacy began to crack in the late 1960s, and those fissures would build into a recession by the early 1970s.

Ten years later, in 1976, both generations faced the task of rebuilding the army after the loss of the Vietnam War. Depuy, by then a four-star general, developed a plan to revitalize the army based upon his own experiences, experiences born of the Second World War and solidified during a period of American military and economic supremacy. A younger cohort of officers, such as the mid-career officers like the class of 1966, largely rejected Depuy’s offerings. The language of that rejection reflected the younger generation’s differing experience within American society. It also reflected
their different experience during the Vietnam War. This chapter tells both stories. It depicts Depuy’s attempt to remake the army’s doctrine, and the response to it by younger officers – some of which were “men of 66,” – who in rejecting Depuy’s doctrine helped to put on the army on an alternate path of revitalization.

Near the end of the Vietnam War, in 1973, General Depuy assumed command of the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Among other responsibilities, TRADOC was tasked with developing the army’s doctrine, and Depuy quickly initiated a revision of the army’s “capstone” warfighting doctrine. Capstone doctrine meant that what Depuy revised was the overarching concept which guided how members of the army prepared for and conducted war. The new doctrine, a product of three years’ work, was published in the 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5 “Operations,” and members of the army quickly dubbed it “Active Defense.”

Depuy, along with many other army leaders, believed that the army needed to change drastically in order to perform its role of as the defender of the nation. Depuy, in particular, tried to ignite that change by remaking the army’s doctrine and its training systems. Thus, he conceptualized Active Defense doctrine as an agent of change, a new

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concept that could refocus the army after a decade of war. He endeavored to develop the overarching ideology that could guide the army out of the Vietnam era.³

Depuy’s doctrine focused on tactics and conventional battle in Europe, perhaps the most contrasting type of warfare from counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam. The doctrine made little mention of military strategy, and it made no mention of the type of irregular or unconventional war in which the United States engaged in the Vietnam War. Active Defense doctrine portrayed a highly technologically battlefield where the U.S. army would be greatly outnumbered by opposing armies. Per Active Defense doctrine, the army’s only chance to emerge in anything short of total defeat, was through skilled used of terrain, the employment of precision munitions, and a carefully orchestrated program of defensive positions designed to maximize the outlay of firepower provided by American forces.⁴

Depuy designed active defense to maximize the firepower delivered from U.S. forces in a forward defense. A forward defense, which placed a maximum amount of forces in one defensive line, was politically necessary as the United States and its NATO allies did not have the luxury of defending in depth. On the border between Western and Eastern Germany, for instance, defending in depth would have meant ceding large

³ Herbert, Deciding what Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations, 7. For an interpretation of how the army’s doctrine has changed over time, in both substance and form, see Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine : From the American Revolution to the War on Terror.
portions of Western Europe to the Soviet Union and was therefore not politically feasible. Moreover, Active Defense doctrine depended upon the movement of mechanized friendly forces such that they could reinforce one another.\(^5\) That conception, where friendly forces can quickly move laterally behind the front line to counter enemy breakthroughs, presupposes a certain type of battlefield. Mechanized forces would not have had such freedom of movement in mountainous terrain, such as that in parts of the Republic of Korea. Nor would the rapid movement imagined by Active Defense doctrine be possible in areas with few improved roadways, such as the jungles of Southeast Asia or many parts of Central or South America. Active Defense doctrine imagined a technological war between the United States and the Soviet Union taking place in Central Europe, and the doctrine did not transfer easily to other parts of the world.

This chapter argues that Depuy conceived of Active Defense doctrine as a catalyst of both cultural and material change. However, Depuy’s ideas about how exactly to change the army and its doctrine focused not only on a potential war with the Soviet Union in Central Europe, but were also rooted in America’s past. Specifically, Depuy’s doctrine reflected America’s industrial Fordist past, a framework which dominated the army’s thinking for the majority of the twentieth century. Although many members of the army believed that change was needed to revitalize the army after

the Vietnam War, Depuy’s attempt at doctrine change was rejected. Those rejecting Depuy’s ideas were mid-career officers, captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels, who entered the army just prior to or during the Vietnam War, and in the 1970s, and their worldview began to dominate the institution as the World War II veterans, the men of Depuy’s generation, retired.

Thus, Active Defense doctrine is an instance where senior leaders sought to reshape the army’s institutional culture from the “top down,” but those efforts proved largely unsuccessful. Depuy hoped to dictate a new doctrinal concept to the members of the army, but a younger cohort of army officers rejected Depuy’s ideas. In their rejection of Depuy’s doctrine, these younger members of the army made a statement about their conception of professionalism, their cultural identity, and the society within which that identity formed.

Depuy’s doctrine reflected the thinking of his World War II era generation’s experience in America’s industrial society. In contrast, the younger officers that rejected Active Defense doctrine came of age during the Vietnam War, experienced both the loss of that war and America’s cultural upheaval, and by the 1970s realized that America’s industrial society was transforming into something new.6 Such contestation shows an

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institutional culture in transition. Depuy attempted to transform the army’s culture, younger officers rejected that attempt because the directed changes in practice, and the ideologies underpinning those changes, did not align with how younger members of the army perceived themselves, their society, and their institution. Those younger officers, and a group of civilian commentators loosely described as the “military reform movement,” touched off a cultural revolution that was not complete until the army concluded Operation Desert Storm, the multinational effort to oust Sadaam Hussein’s Iraq from Kuwait, after a mere one hundred hours of fighting.

This chapter depicts Depuy’s attempts to initiate a change in the army’s culture through an analysis of Depuy himself, and describes the mental frames through which he interpreted war and doctrine were products of the twentieth century American industrial society. When Depuy’s doctrine, dubbed Active Defense by members of the army, was published in 1976 it touched off a flurry of criticism from not only members of the army, but also from vocal civilian critics. The first and perhaps most vocal detractor of Active Defense doctrine was William S. Lind, a legislative aide for Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) and amateur military strategist. Lind’s ideas quickly spread

“Metanoic Organizations,” Box 3, Systems Thinking, D.M. “Mike” Malone Papers, Army Heritage and Education Center

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throughout the military press, and members of the army echoed Lind’s arguments in multiple articles and editorials.

Lind’s arguments centered on a supposed dichotomy between attrition and maneuver doctrines. Lind defined attrition doctrine as focused primarily on “bringing the maximum amount of firepower to bear on the opponent to cause attrition.” Lind further contrasted Depuy’s attrition doctrine with his idealized maneuver doctrine. Lind defined maneuver doctrine as one where maneuver itself was the tactical, operational, and strategic goal. Lind’s purpose for such maneuver was, “to break the spirit and will of the opposing high command by creating unexpected and unfavorable operational and strategic situations.” For Lind, and those officers who used his ideas, Active Defense was an attrition style doctrine that embodied the narrative of the army’s management culture that they were trying to change.

Attrition and maneuver doctrines were symbols which members of the army used in identity forming narratives, rather than definable and mutually exclusive types of military doctrine. Members of the army employed the terms attrition and maneuver as symbols in a debate about how the changing ways they understood their professional identity amidst a changing American society. Broad economic and political trends shaped the debate about Active Defense doctrine and the coding of the symbols within

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8 Ibid.
it. This chapter explores that debate about the army’s doctrine, showing how that debate was about more than military effectiveness or the mechanics of battle. The debate was about how members of the army understood themselves, their institution, and their relationship with American society in the wake of the loss of the Vietnam War. This chapter also depicts how ideas and images circulating within an American society which was also reimagining itself informed the ways that members of the army thought about their institution and their professional identity.

The debate about Active Defense doctrine was one of the first steps in the army’s cultural transformation. It was not so much that the debate renewed interest in doctrine and professional publication and reading. The debate did that, inciting more members of the army to think deeply about their profession, but the debate over the army’s doctrine in the late 1970s was a moment of instability where the ideas of the army’s senior leaders were challenged by new ideas emanating from outside the institution and from lower tiers of the army’s hierarchy, particularly the early and mid-career officers who began their military service as small unit leaders in Vietnam. The ideas that these officers brought to the debate about the army’s doctrine, and the terms through which they expressed their ideas eventually percolated throughout the institution, eventually affecting nearly all facets of the army’s institutional culture.

I.
Depuy commanded TRADOC from 1973 through 1977, and in that role he was charged with developing and implementing army doctrine. He took the task personally. Unlike previous editions of FM 100-5 *Operations*, which were authored by a team of officers assigned to the army’s Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the 1976 edition was largely Depuy’s product – composed by him and a small circle of advisors. Mostly because of Depuy’s personal involvement, Active Defense doctrine was a product of the generation of Army officers whose formative experience was World War II. That generation’s worldview formed within the industrial-Fordist culture, which was predominant in the United States from the 1930s through the early 1970s.

Depuy’s generation of senior officers generally entered the army in the late 1930s or at the beginning of the Second World War, and many of them, including Depuy himself, reached the rank of general just prior to the Vietnam War. The formative experiences in the lives of Depuy’s generation were the Great Depression, victory in World War II, and post-war American economic hegemony. Depuy’s cohort formed the

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9 Initially these advisors consisted of the chiefs of the army’s various branches. Eventually that team grew smaller and Depuy, Major General Donn Starry then Commander of the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Major General Paul Gorman Depuy’s deputy at TRADOC, and Major General Thomas M. Tarpley the Commander of the Infantry Center. These four senior officers were the principle authors of Active Defense doctrine, though all were selected by Depuy for their general agreement with his ideas. Herbert, *Deciding what Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations*, 84-90; Edwin T. Vernon Matthias A. Spruill, ed. *An Oral History of Donn A. Starry*, U.S. Army Military History Institute Senior Officer Oral History Program (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S Army War College, 1986), 244-48.

10 Other, and younger, officers authored sections of Active Defense doctrine. However, each section had to pass Depuy’s scrutiny and adhere to his way of thinking.
bulk of the general officers who led the army during the Vietnam War. Depuy himself served as General William Westmoreland’s operations officer and commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam, and as General Westmoreland’s operations officer he was “one of the principle architects of United States tactics and strategy” in the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{11}

Furthermore, the formative years of Depuy’s life were the height of the American industrial society. During the 1940s the United States produced much of the allied War material during World War II, and the decades after the war were a period of nearly uninterrupted economic growth that was predicated largely upon the industrial manufacturing sector. Depuy’s generation generally equated industrial management techniques with success. Fordism undergirded that industrial economy. Fordism refers to a regime of economic accumulation, as well as a social and cultural organization, which combines the mass production of standardized goods with a well-compensated and stable labor able to consume a larger portion of the goods produced. This socio-cultural formation was a predominant characteristic within the economies of the industrialized world during much of the twentieth century, particularly after World War II.\textsuperscript{12}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{12}] There is a large literature that interprets Fordism’s place in post-WWII U.S. and transnational history. This literature argues, in broad terms, that Fordism has its roots in the labor management procedures
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Active Defense doctrine was a product of that industrial society, and the new doctrine reflected Fordism’s principles of efficiency and standardization. Depuy’s doctrine imagined war as a problem of mass production. In other words, the doctrine implied that the efficient mass production of firepower was the best means for the U.S. army to combat the much larger Soviet army. Active Defense doctrine parsed the imagined battlefield into charts and graphs of weapons ranges and effectiveness, and it prescribed functions for the various levels of the army’s hierarchy. It was not conceptual. Formulations such as the principles of war were omitted from the doctrine. Previous doctrines defined the principles of war as concepts that applied to any military engagement or operation. Such principles were a part of many previous doctrines, and they would be included in the doctrine that replaced Active Defense. Yet, Active Defense doctrine dispensed with any such descriptions, favoring instead a quantitative approach based upon weapons data. Depuy conceived of the doctrine as a technical developed by Henry Ford at the Ford Motor Company. That these management procedures combined Taylorist production models, mass production, but most importantly mass consumption by a well-compensated and stable workforce. Fordism also required teamwork between labor and management. On a national level, a strong Fordist industrial sector was joined with Keynesian-style managed economies. However, as the literature suggests, this system cracked in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to inflation and economic recession. The SAGE handbook of the sociology of work and employment [electronic resource], ed. Stephen Edgell, Heidi Gottfried, and Edward Granter, (Los Angeles: SAGE Reference, 2016); Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The U.S. Experience, trans. David Fernbach, (London; New York: Verso, 1987); Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting; Beynon, “Beyond Fordism.”; Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class; Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change; Harvey, A brief history of neoliberalism; Kumar, From post-industrial to post-modern society : new theories of the contemporary world.

13 Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine : From the American Revolution to the War on Terror, 197-200.
manual for war, and that is how the doctrine reads, as one historian of U.S. army
manuals in form and content.”¹⁴

When Depuy took command of TRADOC at the end of the Vietnam War, the
predominant culture of the U.S. army was little different from the end of World War II.
From the reinstitution of a peacetime draft in 1948 through the end of the draft in 1973,
the U.S. army was a mobilization army consisting of a relatively small contingent of
career service officers and noncommissioned officers. This small contingent was
leavened by short duration conscripted soldiers. The conscription mobilization model of
military manpower was the norm for the United States for much of the twentieth
century. It originated in a series of reforms initiated by Elihu Root, the Secretary of War
from 1899 to 1904, but prior to the Cold War the draft was most prevalent during times
of war. Indeed, the conscription mobilization model provided the needed personnel for
both World War I and World War II.¹⁵

After 1945, however, the level of America’s global military commitments
required a peacetime draft to support a larger standing army. For instance, in the
aftermath of the First World War, army planers wanted an army of 288,000 active duty
soldiers and a mass reserve system similar, but the United States Congress quickly cut

¹⁴ Ibid., 197.
¹⁵ Linn, The Echo of Battle, 153.
the number of active duty troops to 130,000 and maintained only a minimal reserve and national guard, or militia, system. In contrast, after World War II, even in peacetime, the U.S. army never dropped below 500,000 active duty personnel until the middle 1990s.16 Frequently, such as during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the numbers of U.S. army active duty personnel exceeded 1,000,000. This made the army one of the nation’s largest employers and largest bureaucracies. Such large personnel needs meant that, just as it had in the Second World War, the army’s culture reflected the need to quickly turn masses of citizens into soldiers.

In short, in the early 1970s the Army’s culture was geared towards the mass production and management of standardized formations of soldiers. The only professional soldiers were the “regular army” officers – those long serving officers who were most often graduates of the United States Military Academy.17 This conscription-mobilization framework was not unlike the industrial sector’s mass production of material goods. Standardization, efficiency, and simplicity of training and execution were important considerations when producing short-term soldiers out of American citizens. Men like Depuy believed that the key to success in an army of mass-produced

17 Officers commissioned through Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS) most often received what were termed “Reserve Commissions.” In contrast, military academy graduates received Regular Army commissions. Reserve officers were assumed to serve on a shorter-term basis, and were often the first officers targeted for removal from active duty when the army downsized.
soldiers was the detailed management of how they trained, lived, and fought. Such management focus or culture reflected the army’s material conditions from World War II through 1973. It was a set of practices and values made possible by the conscription method of procuring personnel, necessitated by the army’s global commitments and personnel requirements, and that reflected the height of the American post-World War II industrial society. In short, the conscription mobilization framework, which created the conditions where practices that fostered standardized soldiers and military managers flourished, was a reflection of the United States at the height of its industrial and geopolitical power. That such a culture was so disparaged in the 1970s and 1980s was a result of the loss of the Vietnam War and the army’s need to understand and recover from that loss.

Members of the army believed that the alleged management culture, which they argued prioritized quantifiable results over values-based leadership, supposedly reached its apogee during the Vietnam War when Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara led the Department of Defense (DOD).\textsuperscript{18} The term management culture was wide spread throughout the army by the middle 1970s. Such a management culture was, however, less an actual cultural form than it was a form of scapegoating for the loss of the Vietnam War. The idea that so-called managers which were personified by

\textsuperscript{18} For a description of McNamara’s service as Secretary of Defense during the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations see, McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam.

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officers such as General George C. Marshall and General Dwight D. Eisenhower who played such a prominent role in America’s success during World War II, somehow derailed the army only a generation later remains questionable at best. Rather, the term management culture represented officers’ disdain for civilian encroachment into the military sphere during the Vietnam War, and that term’s usage expanded to an extent that members of the army heaped blame for many of the army’s shortcomings at the feet of their constructed image of the military manager. Despite its constructed nature, management culture became synonymous with the loss of the Vietnam War and the cause of the army’s ills during the 1970s. Members of the army rejected Active Defense, in part, because they believed that it was a part of the management culture they so disdained. The culture, in their minds, which caused the loss of the Vietnam War.

To illustrate how strong of an image the idea of management culture became, one retired army officer reflected in 1982 that, “by the time Robert S. McNamara became Secretary of Defense the individual military officer had become identified with the corporate executive to the point where the functions of command were perceived as identical to the functions of departmental management, military leadership, in the traditional sense, had become obsolete.” ¹⁹ Not only this, but President John F. Kennedy recruited McNamara to lead the DOD from his previous position as the Chief Executive Officer of Ford Motor Company, and was later viewed as the corporate antithesis to the

¹⁹ Ross Jackson, ”Where Have All the Leaders Gone,” Military Chaplain’s Review, no. Spring (1982).
military warrior. McNamara brought his experience in corporate management to the DOD and sought to map those methods directly on to the U.S. military. Management culture then, was not an official designation, but rather a term used by members of the army to describe their institution’s culture. The extent to which such a definable culture existed is debatable, but historical actors’ use of the term permeates how members of the army wrote and spoke about their institution during the 1970s.

The army’s narrative about management culture argued that such an institutional culture was already predominant when McNamara arrived at the Pentagon, but that McNamara’s leadership style further solidified the dominance of that cultural form. General Douglas Kinnard wrote in a 1980 Parameters article that “McNamara was most comfortable in dealing with a problem when he could view it in terms of figures, and he required, when possible, that papers submitted to him employ such a format.” Kinnard further argued that McNamara never worked out a

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21 A series of books which were all an attempt at a postmortem of the Vietnam War made this point. Each argued that the management culture which permeated the entire DOD by the end of the Vietnam War was, at least in part responsible for the perceived moral slippage in the army’s officer corps as well as the loss of the war itself. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare, 255, 56.
relationship of trust with military officers.\textsuperscript{22} From McNamara’s desire for “figures” and statistical analysis grew General Westmoreland’s use of the “body count” as the central measure of performance in the Vietnam War. Clear measures of performance, such as the well-defined front lines of the world wars, were unavailable in the Vietnam War, and statistical metrics such as the accrual of dead enemy soldiers became that war’s scorecard. Metrics such as the body count were so pervasive in the day to day life of the army and its soldiers during the 1960s and 1970s that they often became the measuring device which determined a successful or unsuccessful commander. Again, per Kinnard, when a brigade commander (an officer who generally holds the rank of Colonel) told a senior general that his brigade’s “body count” was low because the Vietcong were getting “harder to find,” the general simply responded, “well, brigade commanders aren’t.”\textsuperscript{23} The meaning was clear, the Colonel could either produce the metrics that higher commands expected or pay the consequences. It was the pursuit of positive metrics, the production goals which were a subcomponent of McNamara’s systems analysis methodology, that enticed many officers to breach the army’s code of ethics.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{24} The relationship between ethical transgression and the systemic importance of quantifiable metrics was one of the central findings of the 1970 Study on Military Professionalism. U.S. Army War College, ”Study on Military Professionalism.”
However, at its core, McNamara’s approach to warfare and leadership of the DOD was nothing more than a continued manifestation of scientific management practices. Such practices had been a part of the army since the days of Elihu Root -- the Secretary of War between 1899 and 1904. The “Root Reforms,” as they are known, professionalized and bureaucratized the War Department following the Spanish-American War. In his reform plans, Root specifically drew upon Frederick Taylor’s theories of scientific management. Thus, the army’s “management” culture of the twentieth century was not the work of sinister self-serving officers, it was a reflection of American industrial society. McNamara, Westmoreland, and the host of others that supposedly contributed to what members of the army later called management culture were not “building” that culture out of their own free will. Rather, they were individuals whose caste of mind was formed in the American twentieth century – their cultural programming both within the army and American society predisposed them to perceive problems through a particular cultural lens. This is not to imply that all members of the army understood their profession in the same way, but enough

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members of the institution valued scientific management type practices that the management culture was predominant.\textsuperscript{26}

It was the practices of the so-called management culture that informed Depuy’s attempts to transition the institution out of the morass of Vietnam. Even the process of doctrinal revision began with an attempt to reorganize the army for greater efficiency. Operation Steadfast, the code name for the 1973 program to reorganize the army’s structure, subdivided the Continental Army Command (CONARC) into Forces Command (FORSCOM) and TRADOC. FORSCOM would command all operational units located within the United States. TRADOC, would oversee all schools and individual training functions (except the United States Military Academy at West Point and the War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA). As part of this new organizational structure, TRADOC gained authority over the production of the Army’s myriad of doctrinal manuals.\textsuperscript{27} While serving as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army during the planning of Operation Steadfast in the early 1970s, Depuy was instrumental in conceptualizing and developing TRADOC – the institution at the center of the army’s post-Vietnam War revitalization.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26} Brian M. Linn makes a similar argument about the dominant culture in the army of this period, from roughly World War II through the end of the Vietnam War. Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}.
\textsuperscript{27} Kretchik, \textit{U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror}.
Commissioned from the South Dakota State University’s ROTC program in 1941, young Depuy was assigned to the 30th Infantry, participated in the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1940, and prepared for the eventual invasion of France with the 90th Infantry Division. World War II was foundational for Depuy, and the 90th was a particularly “hard luck” division. Of this experience, Depuy would later write, “In Normandy, the 90th Division was a killing machine – of our own troops.” Throughout his later writings, Depuy was always concerned how to most efficiently train and prepare American soldiers so as to avoid the high casualty rates that the 90th experienced in the mid-century battlefields of France and Germany. For Depuy, in deed if not always in his rhetoric, war was a management problem. He believed that the key to a victorious army was the flawless execution of the basic tasks of warfighting, and that such flawless execution was attained through well designed and efficiently controlled systems – systems of training, doctrine, and control of personnel during the battle.

Depuy’s writings of the 1950s explicate his approach to war. In 1954, he wrote two training pamphlets while in command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry in Germany. The pamphlets, entitled “The Guide to Competence” (1954) and “Mission Complete” (1954) focused, in minute detail, on how an infantry squad and platoon should move

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29 Ibid., 5-7.
30 Ibid., viii.
across the battlefield.\textsuperscript{31} In contrast to the army that was emerging from the Korean War, which was wrestling with a broader conceptual problem of how to remain relevant on the nuclear battlefield, Depuy was describing the exact spacing that should be present between the soldiers of an infantry squad.\textsuperscript{32} His writings show an approach to war which broke war’s complexity into its smallest of components, such as an infantry soldier walking across the battlefield. Once the task was isolated, Depuy then described the most efficient way to accomplish that task. In these pamphlets, Depuy asserted that once each soldier understood the very basics of movement and spacing, the squad would operate more automatically and could better act as one element during the ensuing battle. In short, efficiency and standardization equated to success.\textsuperscript{33}

The 1958 article, “11 Men 1 Mind,” further depicts the scientific management tendencies in Depuy’s thinking. In that article, Depuy described the infantry squad, one of the smallest elements of military organization, as “an idea that exists only when jointly held by its members.”\textsuperscript{34} This article had a lasting impact on the US Army.\textsuperscript{35} Clearly a culmination of his previous training pamphlets, Depuy describes the individual soldiers, and the squads and platoons they populate, in terms analogous to

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\textsuperscript{31} William E DePuy et al., \textit{Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy}, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 1-16.
\textsuperscript{32} For discussion on the Army of the 1950s see Brian McAllister Linn, \textit{Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield}, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016).
\textsuperscript{33} DePuy et al., \textit{Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy}, 9-16.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 17-24.
\end{flushright}
Taylor’s vision of a factory. The better trained and standardized the individual soldier and their leaders could be, the better they would perform in battle. The more a group of soldiers was able to function as one -- i.e. 11 men, 1 mind -- the more efficiently violence and firepower could be produced. Much of the latter sections of the article describe, in detail, the drill and movement of the squad. This approach reflected scientific management in industrial manufacturing, except Depuy’s focus was the management of soldiers and military organizations for the efficient production of violence. For Depuy, and for many others in the early 1970s, war was an industrial undertaking, a managerial problem.

In “11 Men 1 Mind” Depuy’s approach to training and doctrine is clear. Depuy conceived of the American Soldier being a “good man,” but not a person predestined for war, and this conception reflected his formative experience in the mobilization army of World War II. The average soldier, per Depuy, did not display individual initiative. Rather, the soldier required a system of training and drill that could instill soldierly behaviors to the point of instinct. Whether Depuy’s statement was or was not correct is not the purpose in highlighting it here. Rather, it demonstrates the ways in which Depuy was a product of a conscription and mobilization army as well as America’s Fordist industrial society. Depuy favored a warfighting methodology that could train

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37 DePuy et al., Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy, 22.
and manage masses of civilian soldiers, not one that celebrated the prowess and potential of individuals.

However, by the time Depuy was in the position to change the army’s capstone doctrine the army no longer followed the conscription mobilization model, and the United States was turning into a postindustrial society. Depuy’s 1950s statements stand in stark contrast to the direction of American society during the 1970s. By the middle of that decade, when Depuy was actively reformulating the army’s doctrine, American society thought more in terms of the individual than the collective. Depuy, conversely, upheld standardization and simplicity as guiding norms. Depuy applied his Cartesian approach to doctrine, training, and combat; he believed “any complex task could be reduced to a set of precise actions that could be identified and against which the performance of soldiers and units could be evaluated against a standard.”

Strikingly, while a four-star general and the commander of TRADOC, Depuy sent a memo in 1975 to the Commander of the Infantry School explaining in great detail how the Infantry school should teach the construction of fighting positions. The “Depuy Foxhole” was potentially a worthy undertaking, but a high ranking general displaying such a concern over the construction of fighting positions is noteworthy in an institution that only a few years later would pride itself above all else on flexibility, initiative, and decentralized

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38 Ibid., viii.
39 Ibid., 171-75. A fighting position is the “foxhole” that soldiers dig for cover and concealment against attacking armies.
execution. For Depuy, only through efficiency, standardized training, and centrally controlled combat operations could the Army hope to meet the threat of the much larger Soviet forces. Active Defense doctrine was an example of scientific management applied to warfighting on a grand scale.

II.

Nearly twenty years after its publication, historian and retired army general Robert Scales described Active Defense doctrine as a “wake up” call to the army. Scales referred to Active Defense doctrine’s catalyzing role in the army’s transformation in the wake of the Vietnam War. Many army leaders, but particularly Depuy, meant to refocus the Army on tactics and battle – the stuff of warfighting – as opposed to the myriad of problems plaguing the army during the early 1970s such as drug abuse, racism, a crisis of professional ethics, and the transition to the all-volunteer force.

In remaking doctrine, Depuy was not only reacting to these social and cultural problems, which themselves were inextricable linked to the army’s experience with the Vietnam War, he was also reacting to the nature of the Vietnam War. Light infantry tactics, small unit patrolling, and massed airpower characterized conflict in Vietnam. In contrast, any conflict against the Soviet Union in Central Europe would consist of large,

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destructive, and mechanized engagements between each nation’s sizable military force. Thus, many leaders believed that the army needed to refocus on mechanized warfare with a peer competitor, i.e. the Soviet Union.

The army’s reorientation from Vietnam to Central Europe was important to the institution for additional reasons. The first concerned the army’s roles and resources. Defense budgets were the targets of attack in the waning years of the Vietnam War, and the army bore the brunt of the public’s backlash against the loss of that war. That sentiment, coupled with the nation’s general antimilitary mood, meant that army leaders had to justify not only the institution’s funding, but also the institution’s broader role. In short, many political leaders questioned the utility of an army that proved unable to achieve victory against a seemingly small and weak nation such as Vietnam. Such uncertainty meant that the army needed to establish a narrative about its purpose to promise success and protect itself from declining funding and falling end strength. The answer, the narrative that army leaders developed about why America needed a strong army, was that the protection of vital national interests in Europe and Northeast Asia required an army that could successfully deter and counter aggression in those regions.41 Previous options for the army’s employment, particularly Flexible Response, the Kennedy era strategy requiring the army to deter a general war in Europe or Asia as

well as conduct limited war to combat the spread of communism worldwide, were no longer viable because of the nation’s war weariness after the Vietnam War. Thus, the army’s shift in emphasis to preventing, and if necessary controlling and terminating, a general war against the Soviet Union in Central Europe was the army’s only available mission. The army’s, and Active Defense doctrine’s, focus on a mechanized conventional war in Europe followed from the idea that in the 1970s deterring, and if needed containing, aggression by the Soviet Union in Central Europe was the only role and function available to the army.

Another reason that the reorientation to Europe was so important for the army had to do with identity. The army’s focus on the defense of Europe conjured images of World War II, the last “good” war. The army’s leaders during the early 1970s, not only Depuy, but even more important General Creighton Abrams the Army’s Chief of Staff, were all veterans of World War II. That war held a positive association for members of the army and for the public. America won in Europe as opposed to the loss of Vietnam, or the inconclusive ending of the Korean War. Moreover, in memory, World War II was the type of war that the army desired. For all its destruction and brutality, World War II was everything that Vietnam wasn’t. There was a front line in World War II. Enemy soldiers were clearly marked by their uniforms. Perhaps most of all, World War II had

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clearly defined objectives, and a clearly defined ending point. From this view, the army’s move to a focus on conventional warfare in Europe was not only necessary, but also desirable.

Active Defense doctrine assumed that the combined United States and NATO forces be outnumbered in the event of a Soviet attack, and also that new technologies had fundamentally changed warfare. Depuy based this assumption on a particular reading of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In that war, the combined armies of Egypt and Syria simultaneously attacked Israel, and the ensuing conflict was a short, intense, war. Total equipment losses of all the armies exceeded “the entire tank and artillery inventory of U.S. Army Europe.” The war was important to the U.S. army because the Israeli army was mostly armed with United States produced equipment whereas the Syrian and Egyptian armies sported equipment procured from Soviet bloc nations. It was also the first conflict where each warring side was armed with some of the most sophisticated ground warfare equipment available, such as the newest tanks and precision anti-tank guided missiles. Soviet produced equipment captured from the Egyptian and Syrian armies proved that the Soviet Union had surpassed the United States in terms of weapons and combat vehicle technology.

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43 This conflict is alternatively referred to as the October War, the Yom-Kippur War, or the Ramadan War.
44 Herbert, Deciding what Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations, 30. U.S. Army Europe was the designation for all army operational forces stationed in Europe, which, at that time, was two army corps.
45 Ibid.
General Abrams directed a fact-finding mission to Israel, named the Brady study after its leader Brigadier General Morris J. Brady. The mission examined the Arab-Israeli war to derive lessons for the U.S. army. Brady’s fact-finding group intended to derive specific lessons for the many agencies within the U.S. army, to disseminate those findings to each agency, and then prepare a final, comprehensive, report for the army as a whole. But Depuy took Brady’s initial report, derived his own conclusions, and submitted them directly General Abrams. As a result, Depuy’s conclusions became the army’s official “lessons learned” from the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Depuy’s conclusions also confirmed his own biases about the nature of technology, so-called modern warfare, and the best practices for fighting on such a battlefield. Thus, Active Defense doctrine reflected the contemporary lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, but at the same time the “lessons” that Depuy took from the war were informed by his predispositions.

For Depuy, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War showed that new technologies, which had made all types of weapons systems more effective due to their longer range and greater accuracy, would turn future wars into relatively short but violent affairs. He believed that these new technologies meant that if something could be seen on the battlefield it could be engaged and hit – a lesson drawn from the Arab-Israeli war’s large amount of destroyed equipment in such a short span of time. That assumption led to Depuy’s focus on protecting American troops and equipment, and the relative strength of

46 Ibid.
entrenched forward defenses. He also believed that the Arab-Israeli war affirmed the importance of well-trained crews, commanders, and individual soldiers. Depuy believed that more so than ever before, the U.S. army could not afford to be untrained or otherwise ill-prepared at the outset of future conflicts. Unlike previous American wars, where the U.S. army had a track record of performing poorly in the opening battles, Depuy believed that unless the army was well trained and ready when the first shots were fired, they would lose the first battle and likely the entire war. From Depuy’s assumptions about modern warfare and his cultural predispositions grew Active Defense’s focus on technology, its focus on winning the first battle, and the doctrine’s focus on the relative strength of the defense. An entire chapter of the new field manual was devoted to this concept of modern warfare, dubbed the “new lethality.” That chapter set the tone for the rest of the doctrine because of its focus on firepower and materiel. It is filled with charts and graphs meant to show the advancements in weapons technology since the 1950s.

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48 For the classic analysis on the army’s performance in the first battles of its wars, see Charles E. Heller and William A. Stoff, eds., America’s First Battles: 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986).  
49 There was, of course, a political component to the focus on the defense as well. U.S. forces in Europe could not initiate an attack into Warsaw Pact territory. Furthermore, relations with West Germany forced the United States into a forward defense because of the perceived need to defend West German territory. These political realities undoubtedly shaped the final outcome of Active Defense doctrine as well as Depuy’s personal and cultural influence.  
51 Ibid., 2-1, 2-32.
Using that data, Active Defense doctrine asserted that “today’s battlefield presents challenges beyond any the U.S. Army has ever faced.”\textsuperscript{52} It then explains how, across all the functions of an army, warfare was now “modern” because new weapons technology increased the effectiveness of weapons to unimagined levels. This assumption, presented as quantified data, was explicitly based upon the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war where, according to FM 100-5, “In clashes of armor such as the world had not witnessed for 30 years, both sides sustained devastating losses, approaching 50\% in less than two weeks.”\textsuperscript{53} Thus, it was not just that the Army would have to fight outnumbered, but that the Army would have to fight in a vastly different environment. Furthermore, if combatant forces could reasonably expect to lose 50\% of their forces in two weeks, wars would necessarily be quick and violent. If the U.S. Army had any hope of defending Western Europe, it would have to be ready – well trained, well equipped, and forward deployed – to defend on the first day of the war.

The resulting doctrine combined a focus on firepower and attrition with an increased emphasis on technology and tactics. Not just a focus on U.S. technology, but also the proliferation of technology that was now in the hands of every nation. Per the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, the way to “win” on this new battlefield was to efficiently deliver the maximum amount of firepower to the location where the opponent was

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 2-1.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
mounting their attack. This was done through the proper management and deployment of forces within well-placed and well-designed battle positions. Brigade and higher echelons were to cross-reinforce their formations within these battle positions by moving forces that were not in contact with their opponents to the point of attack so that increased firepower could be delivered at crucial points on the battlefield. 

Active Defense attempted to reduce war to a problem of mass production. The more efficient the delivery of firepower, the more likely outnumbered combatants were to win on the “modern” and “lethal” battlefield.

Although the doctrine’s focus on defensive tactics was to become one of the central critiques of the doctrine, the manual does not, as some contemporaries asserted, totally eschew offense. Like other doctrines, an entire chapter was dedicated to offensive techniques, and the manual acknowledged that the offensive is the only means by which to seize the initiative in warfare. Yet, for a manual so steeped in data, ratios, and the quantification of warfare, Active Defense doctrine has only this to say about the timing of an attack; “[a commander] should attack only if he expects the eventual outcome to result in decisively greater enemy losses than his own, or result in the capture of objectives crucial to the outcome of the larger battle.” Clearly this was ambiguous language. Moreover, when that ambiguity is compared to the more specific

54 Ibid., 5-1 to 5-14.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid. Chapter 4
56 Ibid.
way that the doctrine described defensive operations, it is little wonder that the primacy of a linear centrally controlled defense was the central lesson that many took from this doctrine.

Active Defense was an attempt to engender a new institutional culture within the Army, a culture focused on battle, preparedness, and the efficient use of military technologies. Depuy was purposeful in orienting the army’s capstone doctrine on battle and tactics rather than military strategy and deterrence. In fact, the first sentence of the new doctrine states that the “Army’s primary objective is to win the land battle [emphasis original].”57 In contrast, the previous edition of FM 100-5, published in 1968, stated that, “the fundamental purpose of U.S. military forces is to preserve, restore, or create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentalities of government can function effectively under a code of laws.”58 Quite simply, Active Defense doctrine repackaged Depuy’s ideas in “11 Men 1 Mind” about the merits of simplicity and standardization for a larger audience, and then added those ideas to a sense that new technologies had changed warfighting. Each level of command within the Army’s structure had a clearly defined purpose and role to play in the orchestrated battle. generals concentrated forces, colonels directed battles, and captains fought battles.59

Active Defense was not a conceptual document; rather, in Active Defense, the Army’s

57 Ibid., 1-1.
59 Department of the Army, "FM 100-5: Operations of Army Forces in the Field."
“job,” the squad’s “job,” and each soldier’s “job” was to win the land battle. Depuy attempted to remake the army’s culture by elevating the importance of battle and tactics.

The focus on the “first battle” became synonymous with Active Defense doctrine. Winning the first battle and the mantra “fight outnumbered and win” were central to Active Defense doctrine, but they were also a component of a new conception of professionalism. Active Defense doctrine reflected the army’s past, but it was also the beginning of a transition in the army’s culture because of the fact that it focused so much on the act of battle rather than the ways that previous doctrines focused more on the army’s place in overarching national strategy. Like the later Airland Battle doctrine, Active Defense doctrine focused more at the tactical level, the descriptions of how to perform in battle. The focus on battle also reflected the army’s post-conscription need to maintain a constant state of readiness. Without the institution of conscription to fall back upon, the army could ill-afford to lose the first battle. The territory ceded in such a loss, not to mention the personnel sacrificed, might never be recovered. A volunteer army had to be protected, and one of the ways to protect an army was to maintain it in a high state of readiness. Such a state of readiness was not only a deterrent to potential enemies, but also protected against the staggering losses that the American army had often suffered in the opening battles of a conflict. The past, a culture of scientific management, mass production of war materiel, and most of all the conscription and

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60 Ibid., i.
mobilization model, was not conducive with winning the first battle of a war. For one, the conscription-mobilization model required time to put large numbers of soldiers in field. Second, the idea that conscripted citizen soldiers, even if enough of them were present during the “first battle,” and even if they were well-trained, could win a battle when outnumbered by as much as ten to one was a stretch. Fighting at those long odds requires long serving, highly trained, professional soldiers and leaders. It was not only the soldiers, but also the officers that needed to change. One of the findings of the book America’s First Battles (1986); a survey history of the performance of the U.S. army in the first battles of wars from the American Revolution through the Vietnam War, was that even when men and materiel were correctly marshalled, the army’s senior leadership often failed to direct the first battle of a war to victory. Winning the first battle required a professionalized, stable, and long-serving group of enlisted soldiers. A body of soldiers that the army would not possess until well into the first decade of the all-volunteer force. Although it did not depart from the army’s reliance on mass production, war materiel, and scientific management, Depuy’s focus on winning the first battle and the tactical precision that Active Defense doctrine required was likely attainable only by professional soldiers. Depuy’s doctrine was a gesture to the post-

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61 Heller and Stofft, America’s First Battles: 1776-1965.
industrial and post-conscription future that did not quite break the intellectual moorings of the army’s conscription-mobilization past.

III.

Depuy envisioned the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 as a transformative concept for the entire post-Vietnam Army, but it was actually the debate over Active Defense that proved more influential. It was that debate that made doctrine a site of discourse where the army’s institutional culture was reimagined. When TRADOC published Active Defense doctrine it was almost immediately rejected by both a vocal group of civilian military analysts and members of the Army -- particularly younger and mid-career officers. These people did more than challenge the methodology of Depuy’s doctrine. They also challenged what Active Defense doctrine said about the army’s professional identity. Active Defense doctrine outlined a very prescribed and centralized methodology – at least that is how many members of the army interpreted it. Unlike later doctrines, Active Defense doctrine did not focus on the individual initiative of junior and mid-career officers and noncommissioned officers to creatively execute their assigned missions, nor did it focus on offensive operations.

Historians and military professionals have already emphasized the importance of the backlash against Active Defense to later institutional and doctrinal reform. They usually point to Active Defense doctrine’s shortcomings as the motivation for that
backlash.\textsuperscript{63} But conceptions of “military necessity” were not the sole or even primary motivator of change. Rather, members of the army employed prominent ideas and symbols from American society in the ways that they understood and made meaning out of the army’s doctrine. Specifically, the backlash against Active Defense doctrine was one part of a broader conservative shift in American political culture.

What is remarkable is how much the backlash against Active Defense is reminiscent of the neo-liberal ideologies surrounding the shift in the nation’s economy. Like many members of the army, neoliberal economists and Americans who supported a less regulated free-market economy promoted concepts such as individualism and unfettered labor and financial markets. By some, the breakdown of the Fordist economy was construed as a catalyst for a renewed individual initiative that would ignite the national economy.\textsuperscript{64} As Milton Friedman argued, “Never in history has the ordinary man had as large an increase in his standard of living as in America when unrestrained individualism was most rugged.”\textsuperscript{65} Beyond intellectuals, the editorial sections of many regional and small town newspapers were filled with optimism at the “renewed emphasis on individualism in our American society in recent years by our young

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 13-21.
people.” Critics of Active Defense adapted ideas that were circulating in American society and applied them to the realm of warfare. Instead of equating success with efficient production, many members of the army increasingly equated success with individual merit, initiative, and genius. In the backlash against active defense the ‘manager’ became subsumed by the ‘warrior’ as the ideal archetype of an American soldier and officer.

One of the most active, and early, critics of active defense was William S. Lind. Lind was a legislative aide for Senators Robert Taft Jr (R-OH) and Gary Hart (D-CO) when he published his first influential essay in Military Review. Additionally, Lind was a resident scholar at the Free Congress Foundation -- an arch conservative think tank. He continues to write as late as 2019, espousing such ideas as “fourth generation war,” and bemoaning what he terms “cultural Marxism” in generally right wing publications. Based upon his affiliation with the Free Congress Foundation and his work with Senators Hart and Taft, Lind was moving in the same circles as those who promoted libertarian economic theories and ideologies about the dangers of state

managed economies. Not only did he work for conservative or neoliberal members of congress, but the Free Congress Foundation was a think tank founded by beer magnate Joseph Coors and led by Paul Weyrich during the 1970s. Lind’s work on the military, and his ideas about American society were each components of the economically libertarian and culturally conservative shift in American politics. While there may not have been a causal relationship between Lind’s political ideology and his military theory, there is a clear affinity with the language Lind uses to describe military doctrine, and the libertarian anti-statist economic policies that would move to center stage in the 1980s.

In the same way that Depuy’s intellectual history was valuable in explicating how Active Defense doctrine reflected a specific cultural form, Lind’s intellectual trajectory illuminates the emerging American cultural landscape that would shape the Army’s institutional culture. Lind wrote The Maneuver Warfare Handbook (1985) which crystallized many of his thoughts on the subject of doctrine and, with Senator Hart, co-authored America Can Win (1986), an examination of reform in the U.S. military. The Maneuver Warfare Handbook in particular was a product of his critiques of Active Defense doctrine. Lind published extensively in military press publications such as the Military

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Review and *The Marine Corps Gazette*. Lind’s critiques are important because they blurred lines and assumed boundaries between the U.S. military and U.S. politics. Not only was he a part of the growing conservative movement, but his critiques of Active Defense did much to set the terms of the debate about the army’s doctrine.

Lind’s first critique of Active Defense doctrine was a 1977 article entitled, “Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army.” In that article, he critiqued the Army’s new doctrine in three ways. First, Lind questioned the doctrine’s basic assumption that new technology favored the defense. Second, Lind questioned the tactics for the defense laid out in the manual. Finally, Lind’s most forceful critique was that Active Defense favored “firepower” and “attrition” over maneuver.

Lind questioned the primacy of the defense as laid out in Active Defense because he thought it was based upon faulty conclusions drawn from the 1973 Arab-Israeli

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He questioned both the army’s and Depuy’s understanding that the “new lethality” of modern warfare inherently strengthened the defense. Like Depuy, Lind used examples from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. He argued that the Egyptian experience in that war demonstrated that many of the technological advances of so-called “modern warfare” favored the offensive. After questioning the superiority of the defense, Lind questioned two other key assumptions of Active Defense; that the United States must fight and win outnumbered against the Warsaw Pact enemy, and that the U.S. army had to focus on winning the first battle. “Winning the first battle” was one of the central mantras of Active Defense doctrine, and rested upon lessons drawn from the short duration and high-casualty characteristics of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. However, such a focus begs the question, what was the army’s doctrinal solution if there was a second or third battle? Lind’s answer, drawn from a response given during a TRADOC briefing on Active Defense was, “it is something of a Chinese fire drill at that point.”

Lind favored the U.S. Marine Corps over the army, describing them as “warriors,” for whom “nothing is more important than combat.” He described the U.S. Marines as a force that had not fallen into the “trap” of valuing things like engineering.

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74 Ibid., 57.
or “high technology.” In favoring so-called “warriors” against a military force (in this case the army) that valued engineering and high technology, Lind made an implicit connection between his idealized view of warfare and a conservative narrative that valued individual initiative and achievement over more collective societal achievements. Management, and a reliance on firepower and technology, per Lind’s critiques, favored the collective whole of the army over the individual warrior. Lind’s favoring of the individual warrior also aligned with a growing current of masculine and “warrior” culture in the United States following the Vietnam War, which became a key component of later stages of the army’s cultural transformation (and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). It further, at least implicitly, aligned with the neoliberal trend in American political economy that grew in prominence during the 1970s.

Lind personifies the connections between the Army’s emerging institutional culture and the changing political economy of the late 1970s. His theoretical approach to maneuver warfare was based on the writings of retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd. Boyd’s theories of warfare focus on outthinking one’s opponent through successive iterations of the “OODA” Loop, or Boyd’s Cycle. The OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) is a rapid decision-making cycle that enables a warrior or fighting organization to adapt to changing situations. Per Boyd and Lind, thinking faster and

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75 Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 2, 3.
more agilely than one’s opponent would induce confusion and disorder into the opponent’s system. Once this confusion was induced, that opponent would be easier to defeat even if they were quantitatively superior. Lind eschewed checklists and best practices for military organizations. He favored decentralized, agile, and free-thinking military commanders. Per Lind, “there can be no fixed schemes.” He continues, “Each scheme, every pattern is wrong. No two situations can be identical.” This sort of thinking is in near binary opposition to Active Defense doctrine which broke war into simple language and templates for each echelon within the army to follow. Lind, Boyd, and others promoted a new culture was developing that rejected the standardization and centralization of “industrial” warfare. The military officers and civilians that commented on Active Defense almost unanimously called for decentralized leadership and the flexibility to operate outside the strictures of any doctrinal system.

At first glance, military doctrine and political economy might seem too disparate to be parts of the same cultural form. However, the broader societal change in political economy influenced how members of the army thought about war and their institution. Rodgers shows in Age of Fracture how the language of free market economics permeated many sites and locations within American culture in the 1970s and 1980s. We should see the debate about doctrine during the 1970s as an example of the language of the market

77 Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 5-8. For details on Boyd’s military theory, see; Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot who Changed the Art of War, (London: Hachette 2002).
permeating America’s military – a societal language that shaped the contours and boundaries of the army’s internal debate.

The management culture, of which Depuy and Active Defense doctrine were supposedly representative, grew in tandem with the American industrial society and the American welfare state between the 1930s and the early 1970s. Likewise, as the American industrial society crumbled in the 1970s, the army’s management culture came under heavy critique. Depuy called for highly trained soldiers so they could better function as members of a highly orchestrated and centrally controlled team. Lind, in his critique of Active Defense doctrine, called for highly trained soldiers so that they might better perform as free-thinking individuals who could make on the moment decisions as part of what he called a “maneuver warfare” framework. One officer, building upon Lind’s work, described the so-called maneuver warfare framework was defined as “a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.” In contrast, the “firepower” or “attrition” sought “victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower and technology.” These are simply different ways of conceptualizing warfare.

78 G.S. Lauer, "Maneuver Warfare Theory: Creating a Tactically Unbalanced Fleet Marine Force" (Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff School, 1991). These definitions were taken from a Marine Corps Field Manual, but the cited source was produced during a U.S. Army professional education course. Although the term was the topic of much debate, maneuver warfare was never defined and incorporated into a U.S. army field manual.
Maneuver and firepower are, of course, not dichotomous in the way that the backlash against Active Defense doctrine presented them. But they were terms which came to symbolize the different cultural lenses through which Depuy and Lind viewed warfare. The fact that Lind’s critiques gained such prominence in the late 1970s demonstrated that the army’s culture was more receptive to the cultural ideas which Lind’s critique represented. The United States was in the midst of a cultural transition during the 1970s, and Depuy’s doctrine was not in line with that cultural, social, and economic change.

None of this is to say that Lind’s critique of Active Defense was ill-founded or unfair. What is interesting is the way that Lind chose to make his critique. Lind argued that the only available solution for the U.S. Army was to adopt a policy of, what he and others termed, “maneuver warfare.” The archetype of maneuver warfare was, for Lind, the German Army of World War II. According to him, “the Germans invented maneuver doctrine before and during World War II; the Soviets in many ways have adopted it.”79 Throughout the 1979 article in which this quote appeared, Lind contrasts his conception of the plodding, firepower-intensive doctrine of the U.S. Army with the swashbuckling “maneuver” warfare of the German Wehrmacht. Lind asserted that the primary objective in maneuver warfare is not to bring firepower to bear on an opponent, the “target servicing” that was so prevalent in Active Defense, but rather to “break the

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spirit and will of the opposing high command by creating unexpected and unfavorable operational or strategic situations.” Depuy conceptualized war as a problem of production, but for Lind warfare was a problem of quality, agility, and ingenuity. In Lind’s conception of war, information and ideas were the prized commodity as opposed to tanks, bombs, and other war materials.

Maneuver warfare, as outlined by Lind, requires flexibility and initiative at the lowest echelons of an army as well as professional soldiers with the skills to conduct this difficult type of warfare. For Lind and other advocates of maneuver warfare, maneuver doctrine was the way for the United States to qualitatively outmatch the Soviet Union and its allies’ quantitative advantages. Lind and other so-called “maneuverists” were concerned about the Army’s ability to train and develop soldiers and leaders able to carry out maneuver doctrine. By invoking the supposed German affinity for maneuver warfare, and aptly questioning many of the assumptions of Active Defense, Lind opened what became a heated debate.

The merits of Lind’s ideas are less important than the fact that they were the beginning of a broader argument against Active Defense doctrine which joined with existing arguments against the management culture within the army. Implicitly, Lind, like Depuy, called for a new definition of military professionalism. Both Depuy’s and

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80 Ibid., 58.
81 These other arguments were a series of books that each critiqued the army’s management culture, such as; Richard A. Gabriel, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army; Hauser, America’s Army in Crisis; a Study in Civil-Military Relations.
Lind’s conceptions of professionalism privileged conduct in battle as the core of military professionalism, but Lind also used terms such as maneuver, initiative, and flexibility that were more in line with the thinking of the army’s younger generation of officers. In so doing, Lind called for a culture that valued battle and warriors over managers – or, to use Anton Myrer’s literary characters as examples, Sam Damons over Courtney Massengales. Doctrine, maneuver warfare, and excellence at the activities of battle became central elements in the army’s new discourse of professionalism. Not only did this culture correspond with the end of conscription and the move to a smaller, more professionalized volunteer force, but it also coincided with the emergence of the postindustrial society and the American New Right. Lind did much to establish the terms for the debate about doctrine that continued throughout the 1980s, and those terms were an extension of his political ideologies – a cultural conservatism that only became more pronounced during the 1980s and 1990s.

Indeed, Lind’s articles had a wide influence on future doctrinal debate in the Army, leading one reader to comment – with perhaps too much enthusiasm – that the Lind article was “without question the most important article that has been published in Military Review in my memory.” Whether or not they agreed with him, dozens of members of the army referenced Lind’s ideas, or, as in the case of General Donn Starry who would succeed Depuy as the TRADOC Commander, at least rhetorically, dismissed

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Lind outright. In a 1976 letter to a fellow general, Starry thought it was best to ignore Lind’s ideas, and in a 1986 oral interview Starry suggested that Lind had little to no effect on the development of Airland Battle doctrine.83 Certainly, Lind did not directly contribute to the writing of the army’s doctrine, but his ideas were nonetheless central to the army’s internal debate and therefore shaped the doctrines that followed. Like Lind, others viewed Active Defense doctrine’s assumed superiority of the defense due to emerging technologies as questionable, often arguing that maneuver was still possible in a world of technological and precision guided munitions.84 Lind’s influence is further evidence by the fact that even Active Defense doctrine’s defenders, particularly Depuy, were forced to defend the doctrine using Lind’s terms and attrition maneuver construct.85

As the doctrinal debate gained steam, some thinkers, particularly those within the military, began to devise other methodologies that might allow the U.S. army to “win” against the Soviet Union despite its quantitative inferiority. Unlike Active

83 For Starry comments about Lind, see “Note from General Donn A. Starry to General George S. Patton, Jr. 11 November,” 1976, Box 6, Folder 1, Donn A. Starry Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center”; Matthias A. Spruill, An Oral History of Donn A. Starry, 241.
Defense doctrine, however, each different approach favored offensive operations. A few of these articles went so far as to construct a mythical U.S. Army organized in ways reminiscent of the guerilla tactics of the Vietnam war. Advocating for small, mobile, and highly trained teams of soldiers acting semi-independently was another way of arguing for the necessity of maneuver, initiative, and flexibility against what was thought to be the plodding, centralized structures of Active Defense. Mid-career officers’ penchant for offense and flexibility of action were echoed by the army’s Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, when he stated in a 1980 white paper, “The watchword [for the Army of the 1980s] will be flexibility.” In the next paragraph of this same white paper, Meyer called for “unprecedented flexibility, in tactical options, in strategic deployability, in our thinking, as well as in our force structure.” Thus, flexibility, compared with the implied centralization of Active Defense was, by 1980, the pervasive line of thinking at all levels of the Army.

Major Robert F. Helms argued that the offense had to be a “way of life for a victorious army.” Helms again drew upon the Israeli experience in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, where they fought a numerically superior adversary. In similar articles, the Israeli experience was used to show the efficacy of tactical offense within the context of a

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89 ibid.
strategic defense.⁹¹ In all examples where the offense was championed, the authors argued for its effectiveness because it enabled an army to gain and maintain the initiative in a battle. It was not the conceptual tie between offensive warfare and initiative that was new, rather it was the conceptual linkage between the individual and initiative that marked the shift in discourse. The conceptual joining of “individual” and “initiative” suggests a challenge to centralized control of battle. Initiative was increasingly coded as individual rational decision making, or the ability to influence a situation quickly and locally. Army officers were arguing against centralized control over the conduct of battle. Unbinding military leaders, like the market, was the new means of attaining efficiency in both the economy and war.⁹²

Perhaps one of the best indications of how the successful criticism of Active Defense was part of a shift in institutional culture was Depuy himself. After leaving TRADOC and retiring from the Army, Depuy continued to write in professional journals and defend the doctrine he was so instrumental in midwifing. Yet, he increasingly defended Active Defense by using the same images and language that others used to critique the doctrine. In a 1980 article, Depuy went so far as to defend Active Defense by describing its similarity to tactics used by German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, thus using the same symbol – the German military – which was so often

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used in critiques of Active Defense. Depuy continued to defend his ideas, but the terms of his argument changed in ways that reflected the values of the very officers which critiqued the doctrine in which he had invested so much of himself.

IV.

There was an affinity in both timing and language between how American society was changing and how members of the army re-imagined their institution. The process described in this chapter is an example of how, in the U.S. Army of the 1970s, a cultural formation that was once dominant lost its hegemony, and in its place, a new cultural formation began to emerge. Depuy exemplified the army’s management culture that had grown in tandem with the nation’s industrial society in the early twentieth century. Lind, and those who critiqued Depuy’s doctrine represented the changed cultural landscapes of 1970s United States.

This was a process of the reallocation of the values placed on different ideas and cultural elements. Isabel Hull has argued that some of the basic assumptions of the members of an institution “remain hidden from the actors.” She suggests that the cultural data which informs the thoughts and behavior of the actors within an institution sometimes functions at the subconscious level. In this case however, the cultural

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elements that shaped the activity of the Army were not the result of historical learning and knowledge that existed within the institution. Rather, members of the institution were responding to changing social conditions outside of the institution. The social conditions within U.S. society, many of which resulted from the changing political economy of the 1970s, were influencing members of the Army at the same subconscious level that Hull describes, or in the case of Lind and other civilian commentators, on the conscious level as well. In like manner, Depuy’s basic assumptions about efficiency and standardization were a product of the industrial society within which his consciousness was formed.

The process of cultural change in the 1970s U.S. army was not simply the product of improvisations and transgressions in the behavior of individual actors. The process of cultural change in the U.S. army was also not evolutionary. Critics of Active defense were not improvising upon established cultural elements. They were assigning increased value to some cultural elements: concepts of flexibility, initiative, and decentralization, and they were decreasing the value assigned to other cultural elements: such as standardization and centralization. As the socially assigned value spread

95 Theories of culture as practice, such as those outlined by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, describe how improvisations can, over time, overcome the structural bias of a cultural formation to remain unchanged, but conceptualizing cultural change as improvisations of practice does not explain how improvisations are transmitted throughout the social group so that they might change a complex system of values and meaning. For a theory of how culture changes through improvisational or transgressive practices see Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a theory of practice*, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). My critique of Bourdieu is informed by William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of history: social theory and social transformation*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
throughout the social group, in this case through the pages of *Military Review* and *Army*, an emerging cultural formation which conceptualized warfare in a different manner became the predominant way that the army thought about doctrine.

The backlash against Active Defense indicates a change in the Army’s institutional culture because the Army’s career members were using different signs, concepts, and ideas to express their individual and collective identity. I am not suggesting that terms like flexibility and initiative had not been a part of earlier doctrines or conversations about warfighting, but rather that these terms were being used differently in the cultural moment of the 1970s. The soldiers who published essays critiquing Active Defense in *Army, Military Review*, and other publications used these terms to reject what they thought was an overly defensive, overly centralized conception of warfighting.

Active Defense did not represent a conceptual shift in warfighting methodology - that conceptual shift would come with the Army’s next doctrinal revision “Airland Battle.” Active Defense doctrine was a leader-driven attempt to reorient the army’s culture towards a focus on tactics and battle in hopes of salvaging the institution from the experience of the Vietnam War. But, a younger cohort of officers rejected Active Defense doctrine because it did not align with their idealized professional identity, nor did Depuy’s focus on centralization align a broader cultural trend towards individualism and flexibility in American society.
Following the Vietnam War, the U.S. army experienced a moment of discontinuity, a break with the past, where the army’s social mores and values were questioned not only by U.S. society, but by the army itself. In the period of rupture that followed, the army could not draw solely upon its historical experience in the formation of a new discourse that would express its institutional culture. Members of the army recognized that the army needed to transform itself as it emerged from the Vietnam War. This moment of instability led Depuy to attempt change through new doctrine, but it also led to a second moment where younger members of the army rejected Depuy’s attempt.

As I will show in the next chapter, General Donn Starry, an officer who both assisted Depuy in the writing of Active Defense doctrine and who would succeed Depuy as the TRADOC commander, would be like a John the Baptist proclaiming the coming gospel of the Army’s new institutional culture. He would become the intellectual leader of the Army’s next doctrinal revision, but that one would represent a conceptual shift. AirLand Battle was to cement the postindustrial essence of the Army, and place the institution on a trajectory that it would follow into the next century. But AirLand battle was not the product of one mind or a small team of doctrine writers, it resulted in part from the debate over Active Defense doctrine. AirLand Battle was a doctrine that would be consonant with the cultural milieu of 1970s and 1980s America. The ideas that informed the doctrine originated, not only within the halls of the
Pentagon and the command posts of the Army, but in the industrial centers, media publications, universities, and social conditions of the nation.
Chapter 2: Calibrating Performance and Purpose, Airland Battle Doctrine, Values, and the New Professionalism

General Donn A. Starry succeeded General William E. Depuy as the commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in July 1977, and he served in that post through the summer of 1981. While no single person was responsible for the army’s transformation during the 1970s and 1980s, Starry was without question one of the most important agents in that process. Notably, Starry presided over the revision of Active Defense doctrine. He was also one of the central minds behind Active Defense doctrine’s replacement – the 1982 edition of Field Manual 100-5, known as Airland Battle doctrine. More importantly, as this chapter will show, prior to revising existing doctrine, Starry undertook an explicit project to remake that army’s culture. Airland Battle doctrine represented more than just Starry’s ideas about warfighting, it was also a vehicle through which Starry’s ideas about the army’s culture transmitted throughout the institution. Through the process of revising Airland Battle doctrine, General Starry initiated a new language and conception of professionalism that helped complete the army’s transition from a conscripted army to a fully professionalized volunteer military.

Existing histories of the post-Vietnam army show the progression of operational concepts that led from Active Defense to Airland Battle, but less understood is how Airland Battle doctrine was the embodiment of a deliberate process of cultural transformation. Certainly, Airland Battle doctrine was the first time the army defined the so-called operational level of war, and it provided an operational concept through which multiple army and joint force might integrate into a single extended battle. But as this chapter shows, interpretations which portray Airland Battle doctrine as a military breakthrough are only one part of the story.

This new language of professionalism centered on instilling and developing the individual values which army leaders, such as Starry and the army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer, deemed most important for soldiers during the conduct of battle. Unlike Depuy’s conceptions, which focused on output metrics such as performance in training exercises measured against quantified standards, Starry’s conception focused on input metrics, defined as the traits, attributes, and mental frames through which members of the army understood themselves or their tasks. The army’s values, as imagined by Generals Starry and Meyer, were the basis of the institution’s new cultural narrative: they were perceived to mediate, or shape, how members of the institution viewed themselves as soldiers, their duties as soldiers, and the information flowing through the institution.
Chapter 1 showed that Depuy thought that a revamping doctrine and new training methodologies could be the catalyst of the army’s revitalization following the Vietnam War; yet the changes he sought, while important, only altered the mechanics of how the army trained and fought, and not the army’s fundamental conception of professionalism. In other words, Depuy’s doctrinal reforms had not addressed the army’s culture. They were imagined within the army’s existing cultural paradigm, while at the same time, the societal culture in which the army functioned was in the middle of a fundamental change. In contrast to Depuy, Starry and Meyer proposed new ideas that altered the institution’s values, organizational processes, and defining terms. Their ideas about the importance of values, where values were conceived of as individual behaviors and virtues, also helped bring the army’s culture in line with the conservative turn in American political culture.

The revitalized U.S. army of the 1980s flowed from Starry’s efforts to initiate cultural change in the late 1970s. The 1980s army resulted from a series of transformations: the expansion and redefinition of professionalism, the increased focus on soldier optimization to achieve a qualitative advantage over opposing armed forces, and the definition of the operational level of war as a core element of the army’s definition of professionalism. These transformations completed the Army’s move away

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2 Army of Excellence was an official descriptor used by army leadership to describe the changes happening in the institution. See, John L. Romjue, “The Army of Excellence. The Development of the 1980s Army,” (Fort Monroe, VA: Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993).
from the “conscription-mobilization” framework. In that framework, dependent upon the draft and dominant throughout the twentieth century, a small core of long serving officers and noncommissioned officers comprised the regular army, and in times of national emergency, that core was then leavened by citizen soldiers conscripted for short periods of service, generally during times of conflict. But, because the draft ended after 1973, Starry imagined a smaller, more professionalized, institution, and his efforts were instrumental in bringing such a force into existence by the 1980s. Starry initiated this process through deliberate changes to the army’s culture. In many speeches, he referred to the army’s framework or system, and then described how that system needed to change so that it reflected the social changes taking place within American society. The changes to which Starry referred were the societal shift from and industrial to a post-industrial society. However, in his descriptions of an American societal shift, Starry drew upon the “wave” metaphor depicted in futurist Alvin Toffler’s in *The Third Wave* (1980). In that book, Toffler describes the industrial society as a second wave society, and America’s shift as moving to a third wave society. Per Toffler, a third wave society was organized around information, and such an organization challenged the second wave societal ordering around work, standardization, and industrial efficiency. Starry

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worked to change the army’s culture so that it might better perform in a third wave society.4

This chapter argues that the changes which took place in the 1980s U.S. army are best understood as the active production of a new institutional culture which centered upon idealized individual values and behaviors. Moreover, prior to revising Active Defense doctrine, Starry actively sought ways and developed narratives that would change the institution’s structures of values and social relationships. The result was a new conception of professionalism whereby individual values were central to the army’s professional identity. In Starry’s estimation, without values a member of the army could not be a professional regardless of what that soldier produced. Values, which Starry defined broadly as “things important,” were central to this conception of professionalism because Starry came to believe that values calibrated the actions and perceptions of the institution’s members. At various points, Starry explicitly equated his conception of the army’s values, which he defined as courage, competence, candor, and commitment, with how the army could be expected to perform in battle.

Airland Battle doctrine and Starry’s conversation about values were, in part, a result of the backlash against Active Defense doctrine. Even where the two conversations did not align, they were part of the same cultural stream through which the institution moved away from management culture. The backlash against Active

Defense doctrine was driven by a group of mid-career officers and civilian reformers reacting to what they viewed was an ill-advised doctrine. Airland Battle doctrine and the new language of professionalism were top-down driven. Both processes, the rejection of Active Defense doctrine and the development of a new language of professionalism reflected a growing disdain among the army’s membership for centralized management and quantified measures of performance.

Two of the central ideas, or terms, within this process of transformation were management culture and leadership culture. Management culture was a term used by members of the 1970s and 1980s army, and leadership culture is a term I use to describe the cultural form to which the army moved towards during the 1980s. Management culture referred, as noted in the introduction, to the institution’s valuation of quantifiable metrics of performance over more subjective behaviors such as leadership, loyalty, or courage. Depuy’s Active Defense doctrine, in many ways, reflected the ideas so often associated with management culture and was, in part, why so many members of the army rejected that doctrine. Leadership or values culture is what Starry and his team advocated, what Airland Battle doctrine reflected, and the institutional culture that the army, at least in words, espoused by the middle 1980s. Leadership culture defined

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5 The prominent military sociologist David R. Segal depicted management culture as, “substituting management for leadership, human resources for soldiers, regulations and contracts for traditions, and some would argue, cost effectiveness for combat effectiveness.” Segal, "Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis," 352, 53.
professionalism more by the values and behaviors through which members of the army practiced their profession rather than the specific results achieved.

Both terms, leadership culture and management culture, were terms that members of the army used after the Vietnam War to describe what they often conceived of as mutually exclusive conceptions of professionalism. To a certain degree, the terms were also analytically and materially distinct things. Management culture and the leadership culture that followed valued certain ideals and behaviors differently, but such differences did not warrant that the sharp dichotomy described by many members of the army. Generally, however, the terms symbolized the actual or desired identity of members of the army themselves. Certainly, no modern army, or any large bureaucracy, could function without elements of both management and leadership. Like maneuver warfare and attrition warfare depicted in Chapter 1, management and leadership were terms used by members of the army to describe seemingly binary identities. Such constructions; whether they were leader, manager, maneuver, or attrition, omitted many of the army’s complexities, but they were none the less important in how the army transformed in the wake of the Vietnam War.

This chapter reconstructs the ways in which some influential army leaders deliberately reengineered the foundational values and narratives of the army’s culture. Like Chapter 1, this Chapter depicts a mode of transformation initiated from the army’s leadership, but unlike Depuy, Starry deliberately orchestrated changes in the
institution's culture. Starry first employed a small dedicated group of reformers, named Task Force Delta and led by Colonel D.M. Malone, to research his ideas and build them into a transferrable concept. He then carefully built a consensus for his ideas, including both his ideas about values and the contents which would become Airland Battle doctrine, and finally embedded those ideas in the key documents which guided members of the army – namely FM 100-5, the army’s capstone doctrine.

I.

When Starry took command of TRADOC in 1977, he knew that Active Defense doctrine required revision, but he did not know exactly what changes were needed. He only knew that Active Defense’s mantras of “win the first battle” and “fight outnumbered and win” were incomplete. What about the second or even third battles? What about those enemy reinforcements that would doubtlessly arrive during the first battle? Any revision to Active Defense would have to solve the problem of how to defeat follow-on echelons of Soviet forces. Furthermore, Active Defense doctrine did not visualize battles conducted by larger than division size forces. The doctrine explained tactics in great detail, but gave virtually no guidance for linking multiple

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6 Guardia, Crusader: General Donn Starry and the Army of his Times, 150.
battles into a campaign. At best, Active Defense doctrine was a means to fight Soviet forces to a “draw” rather than a means through which to seize the initiative, attack, and “win.” Starry searched for an operational concept upon which TRADOC could base a revision of FM 100-5. In a later interview with historian Ingo Trauschweizer, Starry noted that he considered Active Defense doctrine a “false start in the process of rebuilding the army,” because of its flaws as an operational concept which he viewed as the sole reason for that doctrine’s rejection.

Active Defense doctrine remained in effect until 1982, when TRADOC published a new edition of FM 100-5, dubbed Airland Battle doctrine, marking the end of a four-year revision process. Airland Battle doctrine was the culmination of a series of operational concepts developed by Starry and others between the years 1978 and 1981. The concepts leading up to Airland Battle doctrine included Central Duel, Central Battle, Corps Battle, Integrated Battle, and finally Extended Battle. Each successive concept built upon the previous, and each integrated more U.S. army and joint force systems such as: long-range missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, or U.S. Air Force attack aircraft. Each successive concept also extended the battle area farther forward of friendly forces, calling for army organizations to engage opposing armies prior to their direct

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8 Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine : From the American Revolution to the War on Terror*, 201.
engagement with U.S. or allied armies. The general idea was that interdicting enemy armies before they came in direct contact with friendly armies would offset U.S. numerical disadvantages.

As the TRADOC commander, Starry briefed each operational concept multiple times, and either he or his staff updated each concept based upon questions and comments from briefing audiences. Starry used a four-year period as an opportunity to build consensus for new doctrine throughout the army. Not only did Starry brief each successive concept to multiple audiences, but he or his staff also wrote articles about each concept for the military press. Furthermore, unlike Depuy, Starry did not attempt to write the new doctrine at TRADOC headquarters, instead returning to an older method of assigning the actual writing of new doctrine to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Such a move was important because it gave the appearance of releasing control of doctrine writing from the TRADOC headquarters, affirmed the language of decentralized command which gained popularity during the backlash against Active Defense, and marked a departure from the Depuy’s methods.

“Extended Battle” was the final operational concept prior to the publication of Airland Battle doctrine, and that concept was Starry’s answer to Active Defense

13 Matthias A. Spruill, An Oral History of Donn A. Starry, 305.
doctrine’s deficiencies. He argued that the concept would enable the United States to win a conventional battle against Warsaw pact forces rather than just “not losing.”

Extended Battle synthesized the earlier concepts into a coherent methodology for how a mechanized army corps might defend against a quantitatively superior opponent. One historian has referred to the extended battlefield concept as “the crystallization of a new paradigm” – that new paradigm was the synchronization of army forces and technologies at multiple locations on the battlefield to create a qualitative advantage to match the Soviet army’s strength in numbers.

Each successive concept placed greater emphasis on the interdependence of new technologies, imagining how those technologies could function as a complex system on the battlefield where the new technologies working in concert could be greater than the sum of their parts – thus building a qualitative advantage for the United States. Starry designed the extended battlefield concept with the intention that it would serve as “the unifying idea which pulled all emerging technological and information capabilities together.” The idea that one “umbrella” concept could pull the army’s multiple activities; such as training, technology development, and doctrine, together was not

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14 Starry, "Extending the Battlefield."); ibid. Extending the Battlefield was also foundational to “Army 86.” The Army’s concept for continued improvement in personnel and materiel. See William R. Richardson, “Winning on the Extended Battlefield,” Army 36, no. 6 (1981).
16 Donn A. Starry, “Extended Battlefield Briefing Remarks,” 1981, Box 37, Folder 1, Donn A. Starry Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
17 Starry, "Extending the Battlefield," 33.
unlike Depuy’s motivations with Active Defense. The difference between the two leaders’ approaches lay in how Starry took great care to disseminate ideas and build consensus throughout the army prior to their publication, and how Starry combined the efforts to build consensus around doctrine with efforts to build consensus for a new institutional culture.

Airland Battle doctrine was published just after Starry’s tenure at TRADOC ended, and it included two major shifts in the army’s proposed methodology for waging war. First, it explicated the notion of the operational level of war and made it central to the U.S. Army’s doctrine. Second, Airland Battle doctrine called for synchronized battles at both the traditionally conceived “front line” – the converging space of opposing armies – as well as behind the enemy’s front line so that follow-on echelons of opposing forces might be interdicted and destroyed prior to their coming into contact with U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{18} The first of these shifts, the talk about the operational level of war, was the most important for the army’s cultural transformation. The operational level of war tied the new doctrine to the army’s emerging language of professionalism, because it defined, for members of the army, a realm of specialized professional knowledge.

But, Airland Battle doctrine represented more than the culmination of a series of operational concepts and the outlining of the operational level of war. Even before

\textsuperscript{18} Department of the Army, ”Field Manual 100-5: Operations,” (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1982).
Airland Battle doctrine was in the developmental stages, Starry worked to reengineer the army’s culture to produce more effective organizations, and Airland Battle doctrine reflected those efforts. The new doctrine’s focus on the individual values and traits of soldiers as being central to warfighting were part of what made the new doctrine seem revolutionary. Airland Battle doctrine outlined an idealized professional identity for the army’s leaders and its soldiers. In short, the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 was the culmination of both an evolution of operational concepts and the making of a new conception of military professionalism and institutional culture.\(^{19}\)

Airland Battle doctrine was both a cultural and a military statement because, prior to beginning a revision of Airland Battle doctrine, General Starry initiated a deliberate effort to revise the army’s culture. In as much as Starry identified the need to revise Active Defense doctrine, he knew that if the army’s effectiveness were to be increased, there were broader and more entrenched problems that needed to be addressed. In a 1978 memorandum to Lieutenant General John R. Thurman, the Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and one of Starry’s principle deputies, Starry noted that training and technology alone could not make the U.S. army competitive with its much larger Soviet counterpart. What was needed, Starry hypothesized, were more “effective” organizations, because it was only when

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\(^{19}\) One exception to this trend is Lock-Pullan, "How to Rethink War: Conceptual Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine." Lock-Pullan identifies that a cultural change took place and he cites the transition from a conscription to a volunteer force as a catalyst for the change, but he aligns his argument with the “way of war” literature mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation.
well-trained soldiers, using advanced equipment, were in highly effective organizations that their actual performance neared its potential. The effectiveness to which Starry referred was more than the sum of equipment, training, doctrine, and personnel. Effectiveness referred to how those components functioned as a system. For Starry, the army was a living organism. Metaphorically speaking, he was less interested in the physical bones, muscles, and organs of body than he was the connective sinews, ligaments, and neural pathways that made the organism function. Starry’s 1978 memorandum was the start of a concerted effort to not only imagine, but also to propagate throughout the army, an institutional culture that could help improve the effectiveness of army organizations.

One of Starry’s first initiatives in the pursuit of building more effective organizations within the army was the creation of Task Force (TF) Delta. Starry created TF Delta as a think tank within the TRADOC Headquarters in 1978, and tapped Colonel D.M. Malone to lead the group. Malone held a master’s degree in Social Psychology, and he was one of the army’s experts on the study of military leadership. Malone had also served on the faculty at the U.S. Army War College, and was most famous as the chief architect of the 1970 “Study on Military Professionalism.” That study found that there were glaring discrepancies between the U.S. army officer corps espoused ethic of

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“duty, honor, country” and the actual performance of many career officers. Malone argued in the professionalism study that many of the problems of the Vietnam era army were due to career minded officers who, often serving in command positions for only a short period of time, were more interested in getting through the command without any problems, or negative comments on their officer efficiency reports, than they were in bettering the organizations they commanded. Malone, perhaps more than any other officer, sought to change the army’s cultural values as a means of increasing the institution’s effectiveness. The new task force’s directive was to determine how to “reduce the difference between actual and potential force readiness with a primary focus on producing well-trained crews in well-trained units,” a direct reference to Starry’s earlier memo to Thurman. This new organization was also freed from the bureaucracy and reported directly to General Starry, further suggesting its importance.

TF Delta created a link between multiple communities of reformers. Several communities of reform minded officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian analysts coalesced in the wake of the Vietnam War. However, these communities generally focused on one discrete issue, and their efforts were seldom linked. For instance, the doctrine community, centered generally on the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, included commentators such as Lind, but also the members of the

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army engaged in critiquing or attempting to improve Active Defense doctrine. A second community, of which Malone was associated, focused on leadership and organizational climate, and was generally located at the U.S. Army War College. A third community advocated for training reforms, including the national training center at Fort Irwin where units went to participate in large force-on-force war games, and was located within TRADOC. Each group focused on their own field of practice, and though each community was working towards a similar goal of improving the army, they rarely communicated or cross-pollinated ideas. TF Delta changed this. Malone drew individuals together from across the army. These individuals did not co-locate or move geographically, but rather communicated through an early form of electronic messaging and convened quarterly or semi-annually. Thus, ideas could be quickly shared throughout the institution. For the first time, through Starry and Meyer’s efforts as well as through TF Delta, a forum existed to combine the efforts of the multiple reform currents running throughout the army.

Task Force Delta, later known as Excel Net, was a most interesting military organization. It was only active from the summer of 1978 through the middle 1980s, and the organization consisted of between 45 and 60 members which were a mix of officers, noncommissioned officers, and members of the army’s civilian workforce. Malone

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designed the team to maximize fast, bureaucracy free, communication. The team’s hallmark was that captains were free to critique colonels, meaning that the organization intentionally flattened the army’s traditional hierarchy in order to speed communication and creativity. What mattered to the members of TF Delta were ideas that might improve the army. Furthermore, at its inception TF Delta enjoyed the full support of two of the highest ranking and most influential senior leaders – General Starry and the army Chief of Staff General Meyer. Many of the ideas which originated in Task Force Delta were rapidly incorporated into Starry’s speeches, and many of TF Delta’s concept papers made their way into doctrine and were referenced by other officers in the military press. Not surprisingly, three TF Delta members later attained the rank of four-star general – suggesting the level of talent participating in the group.

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25 Specifically, Malone designed the organization as a “parallel organization.” For all but a select few including Malone, TF Delta was a secondary appointment. The idea behind a parallel organization is to create a team that can solve a specified problem with input from across the institution, thus getting the perspective of the organization’s rank and file without that perspective being mediated by multiple layers of bureaucracy. Dandridge M. Malone, "The Trailwatcher: A Collection of Colonel Mike Malone’s Writings,” (Fort Eustis, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 1982), ii. "The Parallel Organization Structure at General Motors: An Interview with Howard C. Carlson," Personnel, 55, no. 4 (1978). This article is contained at U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, D. M. “Mike” Malone Papers, Box 21. Some of the language from this article made it into other writings, particularly Malone’s characterization of the contrast between the type of decision-making happening in TF Delta and the function of traditional hierarchical organizations. See, Malone, "The Force.”


According to Malone and Starry, the first and most important task TF Delta was to find a solution for “x,” with “x” being the “factor or set of factors” that would bring the actual performance of the U.S. Army closer to its potential. They reasoned that there was a difference, a delta, between the potential performance of any army and its actual performance. Potential performance was the total of all men, equipment, internal processes, and systems working flawlessly and at 100 percent of their capacity. In contrast, actual performance referred to the level of performance an army could muster on any given day under conditions of stress, broken equipment, poor systems, and inefficient processes. Starry and Malone were convinced that increasing performance through doctrine and training alone, as Depuy had attempted, could only improve the army’s actual performance in small increments, and any improvement beyond that level required fundamentally reengineering the army’s organizations and individual soldiers.

Heritage and Education Center; Donn A. Starry, “Remarks by General Donn A. Starry to U.S. Army Armor Conference,” 1980, Box 36, Folder 5, Donn A. Starry Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

Near the end of its life, however, the organization’s influence diminished. TF Delta lost much of its top-level support when Starry left TRADOC and Meyer left the Chief of Staff position. The decreased levels of support for such a radical organization further suggests that in the late 1970s and early 1980s the army was open to new ideas, but the institution became resistant to radical change as the army gained confidence after Airland Battle doctrine’s publication and the perceived positive changes in the institution’s culture. Nonetheless, TF Delta was at the epicenter of the army’s cultural transformation during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but has received little to no attention by historians.; Phillips, "Reengineering Institutional Culture and the American Way of War in the post-Vietnam US Army, 1968-1989,” 101, 06.; See also “Memorandum from Mike Malone to OE Community,” Box 7, Folder Delta Force Demise, D.M. Mike Malone Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center


Starry and Malone believed that “x,” defined as the difference between the potential and the actual performance of a military organization, had something to do with how organizations functioned. Since the actual performance of the army was the result of all the interactions, resources, activities, and processes that the organization was exposed to on a daily basis, it stood to reason that optimizing those social relationships would improve the army’s performance more than new equipment or simply “more” people.\textsuperscript{31} This notion differed from the task efficiency that Depuy sought in the organization and production of violence. Starry and Malone sought to remap the sinews and thought-processes of the institution rather than simplify and hone existing processes. In other words, Depuy’s solution had been the product of an industrial society. In contrast, Starry and Malone were attuned to the fact that the United States was in the process of transitioning from an industrial to a postindustrial society – their solution was not more efficient production, but rather the optimization of information flows and people.\textsuperscript{32}

Thus, before Starry set the revision of FM 100-5 in motion he initiated a process to make the U.S. army more effective at the individual and organizational levels.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32} Though he often did not use the exact term, Malone noted in various places that American society was in the midst of change. A notion that he seems to have derived from his reading of Alvin Toffler’s work. See Malone, "The Force."; Furthermore, the idea that the American society was in transition during the 1970s was part of the U.S. Army War College curriculum. See "Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice," 2-4.
Starry and Malone assumed that the way to achieve superiority, or at least parity, with the Soviet army was to reengineer the army to maximize the performance of the army’s component organizations through the application of organizational effectiveness techniques. The sequence of events, from Starry’s memorandum noting that the army needed more than new doctrine and equipment to outperform its opponents through the creation of TF Delta, suggests that Starry was interested in more than doctrine. Doctrine was a secondary consideration for him and that his primary objective was to change the army’s institutional culture. His objective was not just well-trained soldiers and crews, but also to place those crews in well-trained and high performing organizations. However, high performing organizations were not simply the products of training. As Starry described them, they were “well integrated teams – no fumbles at scrimmage, everyone understands and does his job, and part of the next fellow’s. Soldiers are motivated to fight – for their fellow soldiers, their outfit, their army, their country. Soldiers give a damn, and are given a damn about – as they perceive it.”

Starry believed that for the army to be “effective” soldiers and leaders needed to work together. More importantly soldiers had to be motivated to “fight,” meaning that soldiers had to care about something, whether nation, self, or colleague. The individual soldier also needed to believe that she or he was cared for and about. What Starry

described were the stuff of perceptions and subjective values, the very antithesis of management culture as members of the army during the 1970s and 1980s described it.

Starry’s definition of high performing teams was about culture. He invoked terms of individual behavior like motivation, cohesion, and “giving a damn,” all of which are intangible. Starry’s terms are more properly conceived of as symbols. Words or phrases such motivation or “giving a damn” signify a behavior or set of behaviors. Those signified behaviors are not self-evident, rather their definitions derive from a common understanding held between members of the institution. Such a common understanding is only developed through countless interactions between the institution's members. Once the signifier, in this case “giving a damn,” is joined with the signified, in this example a set of mutually accepted set of behaviors which members of the army corporately feel align with the concept of “giving a damn,” they became a cultural symbol. While all symbols have meaning to the members of the institution, only some are culturally valuable, that is, are instrumental in marking and replicating desired behaviors from the institution’s members. The creation of TF Delta to “solve for x” was the process of reengineering institutional culture. TF Delta was a means to determine which cultural symbols and behaviors should be valuable to a highly effective army as well as disseminate those symbols throughout the institution so that the desired symbols might be incorporated into the institution’s culture.
Task Force Delta’s method for engineering and disseminating new ideas about the army’s culture was through the development of concept papers. A concept paper could be authored by any member of the TF Delta network. Once authored, concept papers were sent to each member of the team for comments and suggestions. Some concept papers never went farther than this first round. Some concept papers, however, either influenced doctrine or were published in compendiums of TF Delta’s work.\(^{35}\)

Often, writers in the military press cited TF Delta’s work, or members of TF Delta revised their concept papers into journal articles.

Malone wrote one of the first and most influential of these concept papers, entitled “X=H.”\(^ {36}\) Malone’s solution for “x” was information, and he argued that improving the quality and throughput of information throughout the institution was the means through which to improve army’s effectiveness. Malone drew the importance of information in part from the idea that the world was passing from an industrial to a postindustrial society, and he asserted that the importance of information – its collection, quality, and flow throughout the institution – would only increase as world society moved deeper into a postindustrial age.\(^ {37}\) Malone argued that the means to achieve such

\(^{35}\) Such as "Excel Net Concept Papers: Volume I."

\(^{36}\) The significance behind this rather curious title is that “H” in theoretical physics stands for information. The title was a clever way of saying that information is the means to improve the effectiveness of the army.

a goal was better leadership, and he further defined leadership as the process of turning information into action. 38 Malone theorized that in order to be more effective the army needed better leadership that could more effectively turn information into action. 39

But, the question remained, how to enhance the management of information throughout the institution? Malone provided several methods for improving the quality of the army’s leadership and information flows – but one in particular stuck with Starry. The most lasting of Malone’s solutions, the one that would be reflected in published doctrine and the speeches of senior leaders, was the use of values as the calibrators of purpose and performance for members of the army. Malone stressed the importance of values in general, engineering the correct values for the U.S. Army, and socializing those values within the members of the institution. He also noted that, as of 1979 when “X=H” was finished, the army did not have an established set of professional and institutional values. 40

Malone defined values as “things important” to the institution’s members and the institution’s effectiveness. But, in Malone’s definition, values were more than affective qualities or moral and ethical traits. Values were assigned a material worth, because in Malone’s language of organizational effectiveness, values were the

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 39.
“calibrators of purpose and performance.” 41 This means that, again in Malone’s colorful words, values were “smack in the middle of your perceiver,” all information than an individual or organization received was mediated through individual or collective values. 42 Per this logic, part of the secret to effective organizations was properly engineering the mental frames through which members of the army mediated the information they received.

Malone and Starry worked to redefine military professionalism through a conversation about, and the promotion of, values. They did so by working to modify the “things important,” to the army’s members. By 1978, many in the army were rejecting the idea that the army’s performance equated to quantifiable metrics. This rejection was manifest in the backlash against Active Defense doctrine as well as the backlash against the so-called management culture of the Vietnam era. Yet, no organization as complex as the U.S. army could function without managers and management. Thus, the backlash against what members of the army termed management culture was not a backlash against management as such, it was a rejection of “calibrators of purpose and performance” that were purely quantitative. When the army’s purpose and performance were calibrated solely by quantifiable outputs, the Vietnam War body count being the most well-known example, members of the army were encouraged to

41 Ibid., 71.
42 Ibid., 66.
sacrifice other considerations to achieve the desired result. Management culture was so disdained by some members of the army in part because it was believed to be causal to the ethics problems running throughout the army of the 1970s.

Without a system of professional values, for instance honesty or commitment to one’s subordinates, to shape the behavior of members of the army, members of the institution reverted to what the institution’s culture seemed to value. Per Starry and Malone’s formulation, without a concept through which to calibrate purpose and performance, to judge output in terms of a higher purpose or greater good, many members of the army did whatever it took to make their production metrics. Malone further reasoned that an army was a system comprised of people, and due to that simple fact there was an affective dimension to how the army’s individual and collective membership interpreted information. Each individual’s feelings, sentiments, and emotions determined how information was disseminated, perceived, and interpreted. Thus, desired behavior could be shaped through professional values and institutional culture. What remained was to develop and disseminate such a system of professional values.

Regardless of the conception of professionalism which dominates an institution, the term professionalism describes the “conduct, aims, or qualities” that characterize
that specific profession.\textsuperscript{43} Management culture, as it was termed, was one understanding of professionalism that foregrounded quantifiable metrics, and characterized the professional as one that met production quotas. In an army, production quotas are metrics such as numbers of operational or working vehicles, numbers of soldiers present for duty, or even the Vietnam War body count as an extreme example. At the same time, management culture was often dismissive of affective considerations – the human emotions and sentiments that mediated how members of the army perceived and processed the information flowing through the institution. When Malone talked about values as calibrators of purpose and performance, he outlined a different language of professionalism. In Malone’s language of professionalism, which Starry by and large adopted, a common system of values mediated between army’s production quotas and the actions of the “professional” agent. In Malone’s usage, adherence to a set of values rather than attaining a production quota was the mark of a military professional. Of course, the production quotas never went away, but in the move away from management culture, the army changed the valuation of elements within its institutional culture. In “X=H,” Malone argued that the army needed to articulate a system of institutional values because such as system did not exist, that those values had to be messaged from the upper echelons of the army’s

leadership, and finally that without such a system the army could not enhance its overall effectiveness. Such a system would both define army professionalism and align the performance of the individuals within the army to the army’s purpose.44

Of course, calling for renewed emphasis on values in the conception of military professionalism was not inherently new. Values and ethics have always been a component of military professionalism. One only has to look to the West Point motto – Duty, Honor, Country – to note that the army had always acknowledged the importance of values and ethics. The conceptions of military professionalism available in the 1970s and 1980s were never wholly divorced from values, but Malone’s call for the reemphasis on values was new. In Malone’s usage, values equated to performance, and they linked the affective and cognitive domains. In earlier uses, values equated only to ethics, morality, and identity. Earlier conceptions of the term “values” related to a desired professional identity, but they did not directly relate to the army’s performance.45 Unlike Malone and Starry’s usage, earlier conceptions of values were less specific and there existed no connecting language between those values and the army’s performance.

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There was, however, no clearly articulated system or list of army values when Malone wrote “X=H.” In that paper, Malone called for the army to create a system of values, but that concept paper did not suggest what those values should be. Determining the ideal set of values was the next step, and to do so Malone turned to those officers who had most recently seen a battlefield. Malone presented the problem to a group of 15 majors and lieutenant colonels on the faculty at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. These officers had previously served as platoon leaders during the Vietnam War. Older officers, such as Malone and Starry, held the rank of Colonel and above, and even though they served multiple tours in Vietnam their service was at higher echelons during that war. Malone commanded a battalion; Starry commanded a Regiment, both of which were positions that coordinated and directed smaller echelons of army forces. In contrast, the Vietnam War era platoon leaders to which Malone turned all served in positions that directly led combat forces. A platoon leader is the lowest ranking of the officer corps and is generally the first officer in the chain of command. The fact that Malone turned to officers with less years of service but recent experience in battle shows the army’s broader trend towards valuing battle and warriors. After a month of deliberations, the team of officers returned to Malone with four values they deemed most important on the battlefield. They were: competence, commitment, courage, and candor, what came to be known as the “4Cs.”46

46Dandridge M. Malone, “In the Year of Values: A Tribute to CGB III,” 1986, Box 6, Folder Retired Excel Net
The professional values laid out by Malone and Task Force Delta were subsequently published as doctrine on the last page of the 1981 edition of FM 100-1 The Army under the heading of “soldierly qualities.” FM 100-1 was updated every four to six years under the close supervision of the army Chief of Staff. The manual was an outline of “those fundamentals which drive our profession, and which mark us individually as unique contributors to the nation and its security.”47 In other words, the manual was as close as the army had to an outline of its conception of professionalism. In the foreword to the 1981 FM 100-1, General Meyer explained publication’s purpose as follows: “I have used the earlier edition [of FM 100-1] as a primer for conveying to civilians who and what we are as an institution.”48 The 1981 edition of FM 100-1 was the first time that the army published a list of values and individual qualities that were identified as the most important to, and consistent with, the mark of a professional soldier. The fact that in 1981, individual values became foundational to the army’s doctrinal conception of military professionalism is an important marker of cultural change, and that change happened in large part because Starry looked beyond doctrine and training for means to increase the army’s effectiveness.

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Concept Paper, D.M. “Mike” Malone Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
47 Department of the Army, “FM 100-1: The Army,” i.
48 Ibid.
Some members of the army, particularly Malone and TF Delta, further referred to this “new” set of values as being synonymous with what they termed warrior values or ethos. “Warrior ethos” lacked a specific definition, but it referred to a conglomeration of conceptions, ideals, and myths. Malone defined warrior ethos in the following words:

A way of thinking, an attitude, an embodied spirit. A commitment to duty and mission accomplishment despite the odds. Near absolute competence and self-confidence. Willingness to take calculated risks. Extremely difficult to sustain in peacetime because it runs contrary to our heritage and culture. Evident as ‘natural’ in only a select few. Must be taught, or better yet, caught (like a disease) by the rest. An essential element which sustains units and people in battle.  

Malone was describing the heroic warrior ideal. In literary terms, Malone described something like the ethos personified by Myrer’s Sam Damon. Warrior ethos was difficult to define because it was not an analytical term, rather it was a term used to describe a set of cultural values that were unstable and fungible. The perceived importance of warrior ethos, and the behaviors that terms was used to define, in the early 1980s sprang from the rejection of the management culture which was thought to be at fault for the conduct of the Vietnam War. The new measure of professionalism was less the individual’s ability to do something, such as shepherd resources or attain certain metrics, but more so the individual’s ability to adhere to a system of values. In other words, a professional soldier was not one who merely achieved results, but on

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who achieved those desired results through methods that were consonant with the army’s system of values.

Sam Damon, the protagonist in Anton Myrer’s *Once an Eagle*, is the literary embodiment of Malone’s conception of warrior ethos. There was also, at least in the army’s mythology, another embodiment of the archetypal warrior. Particularly for Starry, warrior ethos was personified by the former Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams. General Abrams replaced General William C. Westmoreland as the army Chief of Staff in 1972 after serving as the Commander all military forces in Vietnam beginning since 1968. Despite the perception of the officer corps’ deficiencies during the Vietnam War, Abrams retained the adoration of his fellow officers. In contrast to Westmoreland’s polished image, Abrams was a stocky, cigar chomping, bulldog of an officer. As the chief of staff, Abrams presided over Operation Steadfast, the reorganization that created TRADOC in 1973, and perhaps more famously, Abrams was thought to be responsible for the so-called total army policy that tied any future deployments of the active army to the reserve and national guard forces. Abrams’ tenure as Chief of Staff was cut short by his untimely death due to cancer in 1974, but despite his short tenure, or perhaps because of that fact, Abrams left a lasting legacy on the army. Abrams is often credited with setting the army on its path to revitalization

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50 Scales, *Certain Victory: the U.S. Army in the Gulf War*, 18. The program, known as “total army,” ensured that no future major conflict could be fought without both the active and reserve forces. Abrams motivations and his role in establishing the total army are questioned by some historians, (cite Con Crane’s piece)
after the Vietnam War. General Abrams, at least in mythology and the institution’s memory, also rejected the army’s management culture.

Abrams, both in person and in memory, loomed especially large for Starry. The pair served together on multiple occasions, and often Abrams was Starry’s direct supervisor. In 1949, when Starry was a newly minted Second Lieutenant, Abrams was his battalion commander in the 63rd Tank Battalion. As a major, Starry worked as an operations officer in Abrams 3d Armored Division. When Abrams was promoted to command the army’s V Corps, Starry commanded the 1st Battalion 32d Armor Regiment which was assigned to V Corps. Finally, when Abrams commanded United States Military Assistance Command – Vietnam, he tapped Starry to command the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and ultimately, when Abrams was the Chief of Staff, he was instrumental in placing Starry (now a general himself) in command of the Armor School and Fort Knox in 1973. Needless to say, Abrams groomed and promoted Starry’s career. Abrams was Starry’s coach and mentor; Starry idolized him. After Abrams’ passing, when Starry was in a position to continue Abrams’ work in revitalizing the army, Starry used Abrams as a symbol of the institutional culture he was trying to instill.

51 Guardia, Crusader: General Donn Starry and the Army of his Times, 24.
53 Ibid., 1015, 16.
54 Ibid., 1016; Starry, “Dedication of Abrams Loop at the USACGSC.”
Speaking at a 1979 dedication of a street on Fort Leavenworth named after the late General Abrams, Starry infused Abrams’ memory with the terms of his conception of professionalism. Starry used the “4Cs” to describe Abrams as a truly professional soldier and the address was subsequently published in the military press. According to Starry, Abrams represented “more than any military man in my lifetime, the values and attributes we hope to infuse into our officer corps.”

Starry remembered Abrams as a product of adherence to a few simple values, and argued that those values were foundational to what an officer should be. In the dedication speech, Starry used examples from Abrams’ career to relate Abrams’ behavior to the army’s new values. Starry painted for the audience an image of Abrams as the consummate military professional, but Starry’s image of Abrams’ professionalism placed less focus on Abrams’ accomplishments and more on how Abrams pursued those accomplishments. Mostly, Starry noted how Abrams focused on taking care of the people that worked for him, whether he did so through the promotion of their careers, encouragement, or just as often rigid standards and what could be termed tough love. Abrams was committed to his soldiers, and subsequently earned their trust and motivation. Starry’s dedication speech provides an example of his ideal values-based leadership culture. Starry insisted that Abrams’ adherence to this set of values directly related to the effectiveness of the organizations which he led because it developed unit cohesion based on mutual trust.

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55 Starry, "Dedication of Abrams Loop at the USACGSC,” 37.
and commitment between Abrams as the commander and Abrams’ soldiers. In short, through the work of Starry and others, Abrams came to embody the “give a damn” that Starry, Malone, and others attributed to highly effective organizations.\footnote{Ibid. Though published later, in 1993, Lewis Sorley’s biography of Abrams is an example of the mythmaking surrounding Abrams following his death. Sorley, \textit{Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his Times}.}

Even as Starry looked to the memory of General Abrams for the ideal of what the army’s concept of professionalism should be, he also assumed that the American society which the nation served was in the midst of a fundamental change. The idea that not just American society, but also the global society was in the midst of change was central to the development of Airland Battle doctrine and the post-Vietnam army’s institutional culture.

Starry’s conception of societal change, and his ideas about future wars were drawn, in part, from his reading of Alvin Toffler’s \textit{The Third Wave} (1980) which Starry often cited in speeches and correspondence where he described the changes he was trying to make to the army’s culture.\footnote{Starry, "The Military Policy of the United States: Some Observations about its Past, Present, and Future."; Donn A. Starry, “Really Good Outfits,” Remarks before the U.S. Armor Association 11 May 1983, in Sorley, \textit{Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry Volume II}, 902. Sorley, \textit{Press On!: Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry Volume I}, 393.} Toffler’s theme in \textit{The Third Wave} was societal change, particularly the characteristics of change from industrial to postindustrial societies. Per Toffler, human societies had undergone two major waves of societal change by 1980. The first wave was the invention of agriculture. Toffler conceived of
the agricultural revolution beginning around 8000 B.C., and subsequently dominating human society until around A.D. 1650. The second wave was the industrial revolution, which started to gain momentum after 1650 and continued through the twentieth century. The third wave began in the United States around 1955, and was still building throughout the world when Toffler published the book in 1980. He described the third wave as a radically different society where “old ways of thinking, old formulas, dogmas, and ideologies, no matter how cherished or how useful in the past, no longer fit the facts.”58 The third wave carried with it a new “code of behavior” that moved beyond “standardization, synchronization, and centralization.”59 Thus, Toffler contrasts the standardization and collectivization of industrial or second wave societies with the atomization and individualism inherent to his formulation of third wave societies.

Toffler’s synthesis addressed many aspects of modern life, such as the media, material production, computers and technology, the family, corporations, and education, but Toffler did not address the military or armed conflict. Starry explicitly conceived of Airland battle as a third wave military doctrine to the extent that he developed a friendship with Toffler. In a 1982 letter to Toffler, Starry noted that, the more we pondered third wave concepts, the more we realize that we could no longer fight the enemy, man for man, bullet for bullet, or tank for tank….. We had to shuck off the second wave cocoon and develop new tactics, doctrine, and procedures – third wave procedures.60

58 Toffler, The Third Wave, 18.
59 Ibid., 26.
60 Sorley, Press On!: Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry Volume I, 393.
As Chapter 1 has shown, many members of the army rejected Active Defense using many of the same terms that were also used to describe a post-industrial society. Specifically, they advocated for a focus on individual initiative and creativity. Their critiques predated *The Third Wave*, but they were loosely analogous to Toffler’s synthesis. Toffler prophesied that the collection and management of information would eclipse the importance of material production in third wave societies, and in the same way Starry believed that Airland Battle’s emphasis on intelligence collection, synchronization, initiative, and leadership would offset opponents’ material advantages. Much of Toffler’s synthesis was debatable then and now, but for Starry it linked his ideas about warfare to a broader argument about American society.

Indeed, *The Third Wave* inspired TRADOC’s concept of futures, dubbed “Airland Battle 2000.” That document accompanied the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, and outlined a vision for future concepts and technologies. The 1982 FM 100-5 and the white paper “Airland Battle 2000” served separate purposes but complemented one another. FM 100-5 was a statement for the present, a doctrine that could be applied with the personnel and technology which were currently in the army’s inventory. In contrast, “Airland Battle 2000” was a concepts white paper that looked twenty years into the future to project the material and equipment needed to improve the Army’s ability to

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61 Ibid.
execute Airland battle doctrine. “Airland Battle 2000” not only gestured to the types of equipment and formations needed to enhance the Army’s ability to execute Airland Battle doctrine, but also hypothesized how new war materiel would be put to use.

Starry read *The Third Wave* in 1980 prior to the publication of any of Airland Battle doctrine’s foundational documents, and in his mind, Extended Battle, Airland Battle 2000, and the eventual 1982 edition of FM 100-5 were the answer to how militaries should function in third wave societies.

Thus, what Starry and Malone drew from Toffler and TF Delta’s study of behavioral and managerial science was an interpretive language that shifted the focus of improving the institution from materiel and technology to the human interactions that could maximize the use of materiel and technology. The key to achieving parity with the Soviet army was not more “stuff,” but rather to maximize the quality of the individuals within the army as well as the interactions between those individuals. The team of officers that wrote Airland Battle doctrine under Starry’s supervision used this language – the idea that optimized soldiers and information flows were the keys to success – while authoring the new doctrine. Airland Battle doctrine reflected the emphasis on maximizing human quality and performance through the reengineering of institutional culture. Thus, Airland Battle doctrine was never simply a doctrine about warfighting, the “nuts and bolts” of how the army would engage an opposing force,
rather, promoted a new discourse on professionalism based upon Starry’s conceptions of a third wave military.

Starry spread his vision for both the importance of values and professionalism, as well as the need for the army to adapt to a changing society, to a broader audience through multiple speeches and published articles. In each speech, Starry echoed his sentiments that the army needed to change the mindset of its soldiers and officers at least as much as it needed to update the equipment those people used. In many of these speeches, which were often slightly adapted variations of the same theme, Starry said that, “modernization is not solely the buying of more and technically advanced equipment. Modernization begins with doctrine – concepts about how the army should conduct its business.” Certainly, the centrality that Starry gave to doctrine would not have surprised his audiences, but in these same speeches, Starry quickly turned from doctrine to the importance of what he termed “battlefield values.” This aspect of Starry’s address would have sounded different to late 1970s audiences, because for the previous generation, even before the Vietnam war, the army primarily focused on technology rather than maximizing the effectiveness of individual soldiers. For

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62 Donn A. Starry, “Remarks to George C. Marshall ROTC Award Conference,” 1980, Box 36, Folder 5, Donn A. Starry Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
63 Chapter One shows how army leaders, such as William E. Depuy, focused on technology and firepower over more affective human dimensions. Even during the 1950s, the army’s focus was often more on technology, particularly the army’s role on the nuclear battlefield, see, Linn, Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield. Certainly, the army did focus on people in their recruitment and VOLAR campaigns of the 1970s, but the 1980s discourse changed from the VOLAR campaigns of making soldiers want to reenlist and making young people want to join the army to a focus on what the ideal soldier traits should be. For a
example, in the 1950s, the army wrestled with the nuclear battlefield and a half-hearted attempt at reorganization into “Pentomic” Divisions – an attempt to use technology and organization to maximize the effectiveness of the army in atomic warfare. Yet, in speech after speech, Starry linked the subjects of doctrine to individual moral and ethical values. Such a conception linked performance in battle with the individual soldier, that soldier’s leader, and their overall cohesion more so than performance in battle was linked to technology or the organization of the army. This was a new definition of professionalism for a new, volunteer, force. Starry’s speeches were an important part of building a consensus for the concepts that became Airland Battle doctrine and for the importance of values and the optimization of the individual soldier.

In an article published in 1983 entitled “To Change an Army” Starry explicitly identified the reasoning behind his focus on values. Written near the end of his military career, the article was Starry’s list of his assumed prerequisites to lasting and positive change in military institutions based upon his interpretation of military history. He argued that the German army had been historically more willing and able to adapt to change because their officer education system and better engendered the officer corps with a common understanding of the German army and its relationship to German

history of VOLAR programs see, Rostker, I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force; Bailey, America’s Army.

64 Linn, Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield.
society. Starry’s assertion was that for armies to change they required a mechanism to identify the need to change, a spokesman for change, consensus among the armies members, consistency of ideas about the need and direction of change, and a way to test proposed changes. The article described each of these requirements for change, but the article’s conclusion is most telling. There, Starry reinforced that armies needed to develop and continually refine what he termed a “cultural commonality of intellectual endeavor” within the institution, and he further defined such a commonality in terms of a common understanding of the institution’s values. Values were not merely behavioral traits, nor did they belong solely in the realm of morality and ethics. Values mediated between information and action. For an army to change, for an army to perform better, the members of that army had to internalize a system of values that could shape their perceptions and behaviors in ways that were beneficial to the institution.

III.

Airland Battle doctrine was the culmination of a process of cultural change. The new doctrine not only circumscribed the trajectory of change, erasing other possibilities, but also helped transmit a new institutional culture throughout the army. Airland Battle

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66 Ibid., 21.
67 Ibid., 27.
doctrine was an official statement, and because it was readily accepted thanks in no small part to Starry’s early efforts to build consensus during the process of doctrine revision, it anchored the discourse taking place within that army. After the publication of Airland Battle doctrine, members of the army continued to build upon the new professionalism discourse, but they now did so within the terms of the new doctrine, such as initiative, leadership, cohesion, and operational art. Subsequent discussions of the army’s values, doctrine, or culture all used the terms and conceptual frameworks of Airland Battle doctrine.

Airland Battle doctrine placed the same emphasis on the individual traits of the doctrine’s practitioners as on the operational concepts comprising the doctrine. It specifically recognized what it referred to as the “nonquantifiable elements of combat power, especially maneuver,” and emphasized “the human element, the courageous, well-trained soldiers and skillful, effective leaders.”

Airland Battle brought the individual soldier, now conceived of as a consummate professional, to the forefront of the army’s doctrine. The writers of Airland Battle doctrine argued that the “success of the operation depends on proper understanding and aggressive execution at the battalion level and below.” They further stated that the “fluid nature of modern war will place a premium on leadership, unit cohesion, and effective independent

\[\text{\textsuperscript{68}}\text{Department of the Army, "Field Manual 100-5: Operations," 7-2.}\]
operations.” Airland Battle doctrine’s authors outlined a battlefield that demanded more “leader skill, imagination, and flexibility” than had supposedly been required on previous battlefields. Certainly, Airland Battle doctrine did not completely move away from the importance of technology, the new doctrine was predicated on emerging technological intelligence collection techniques and weapons systems that could now be delivered in depth to opposing armies’ second echelons. Indeed, some of the technology that Airland Battle doctrine required was only in the developmental state in 1982. In self-conception, Airland Battle doctrine was human-centric to a much greater degree than was Active Defense doctrine.

Airland Battle doctrine’s authors encapsulated the dialogue about values and effective organizations in a section entitled “Dynamics of Battle.” This section of the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 described the so-called intangibles of warfare, and contained phrasing and language plucked straight from TF Delta’s concept papers. The doctrine stated that “force ratios and the effects of fire and maneuver are significant in deciding battles; however, a number of intangible factors often predominate.” The manual then listed several elements of combat power, but noted that leadership was the most crucial of those elements. Leadership was said to be “the component upon which all others

72 Department of the Army, “Field Manual 100-5: Operations,” 2-10. “Soldiers who serve in disciplined, cohesive units will be on hand with functioning equipment when the decisive moment arrives.”
depend.” It was the “effect the leader creates through proper application of his potential maneuver, firepower, and protection capabilities which generates combat power.”

Finally, the doctrine tied the intangible characteristics of combat power to the 4Cs by claiming that “superior combat power derives from the courage of soldiers, the excellence of their training, and the quality of their leadership.” In this case, “quality” brings to mind Malone’s conception of values as the calibrators of purpose and performance. “Quality” of leadership is undefinable except through cultural knowledge. In stating that superior combat power derived from quality leadership, the authors of Airland Battle doctrine drew upon a four-year long process that defined quality leadership through a system of professional values. In that sense, leadership was not a function of position within the army’s structure, rather, it equated to adherence to the army’s values – the 4C’s.

The human-centric language of Airland Battle doctrine, and the importance the new doctrine placed on leadership were accepted by members of the army in ways that Active Defense doctrine was not. Members of the army noted that, unlike Active Defense doctrine, Airland Battle was not forced on the army, rather the doctrine was an evolution of concepts and ideas grown organically within the institution. On soldier, a Private First Class in the army reserve, noted that the whole of the doctrine relied on the

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73 Ibid., 2-5, 2-6.
74 Ibid., 2-6.
75 Starry, "Values, Not Scores, the Best Measure of Soldier Quality."
76 Ibid.
individual soldier, and that such reliance was the doctrine’s greatest strength.\textsuperscript{77}

Furthermore, the immediate acceptance of Airland Battle doctrine was not limited to the officers corps. \textit{Soldiers} magazine, for example, published an article entitled, “Airland Battle” in 1983 which argued that the individual soldier was the “key” to battle and the gaining and maintaining of initiative that was so central to the new doctrine.\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Soldiers} was published primarily for a junior enlisted soldier and noncommissioned officer audience, and articles such as “Airland Battle” circulated the new concept of military professionalism among that audience.\textsuperscript{79}

Of course, not all of the changes contained within the new doctrine were cultural, but even when those changes were not explicitly cultural, they still reflected changes in the army’s conceptions of professionalism. Airland Battle doctrine’s most noted change to the army’s warfighting methodology was the articulation of the operational level of war. In fact, Airland Battle doctrine stressed the importance of excelling at the operational level of war.\textsuperscript{80} With regards to the army’s conception of military professionalism, the most important aspect of the operational level of war was that it was assumed to be apolitical. Locating the nexus of military professionalism, as did Airland Battle doctrine, at the operational level of war separated military

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\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
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professionalism from the military’s civilian leadership. This conception resulted from the army’s experience during the Vietnam War. An emphasis on civilian control of the military has been central to American civil-military relations, but many officers believed that civilian control had been taken to the extremes during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Certainly, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s tenure as Secretary of Defense introduced an “activist” defense department, but the McNamara model continued into the Nixon years. Thus, the operational level of war was conceived of as a means to address Active Defense doctrine’s shortcoming, that is, its failure to provide for action against the enemy’s subsequent echelons, yet it also completed important ideological work. The emphasis on the operational level and its construction as a strictly military sphere central to the army’s professionalism, redrew the boundaries between civilian and military spheres in the conduct of war. It should be no surprise that members of the army, particularly the officer corps, gravitated so decisively to the operational level of war. It answered both the conceptual need for a means to defeat a numerically superior Soviet army as well as a need for a new professional narrative in a volunteer army that was wrestling with the memory of the Vietnam War.

The operational level of war became foundational to most officers’ conceptions of military professionalism. It was conceived as a body of knowledge that supposedly took decades of study to master, but was also construed to be outside the reach of the army’s civilian leaders. Because of its assumed apolitical essence, articulating the operational
level of war was essential to reestablishing the members of the army’s perceptions of institutional autonomy. Soldiers, particularly the officer corps, had to retain some measure of autonomy from their civilian leadership for them to be conceived of as belonging to a profession, and reestablishing some measure of that autonomy was one of the primary motivations of the army’s officer corps following the Vietnam War.81 As noted earlier, one of the most basic concepts of a profession contends that any profession must include specialized knowledge. Acquiring such knowledge is the foundation for separating the members of a profession from laymen and of measuring the relative competence of professionals.82

Defining professional knowledge in terms of the operational level of war was an important turning point in the army’s cultural transformation. First, the operational level of war tied the army’s professional image directly to battle. Strategy, as it was defined in the army’s doctrine, bridged national policy and military activity. Indeed, beyond a short definitional sentence, Airland Battle doctrine omitted further description of the army’s relationship to the development of strategy. But more so, strategy could not define military professionalism because it was not, particularly in the nuclear era, predominantly a military function. After the end of World War II, strategy, both its

study and development, increasingly became the province of civilians. Both civilian political leaders, and the civilian strategic theorists who worked on nuclear and deterrence strategy. If the army were to define their conception of professionalism in terms of strategy it would have been impossible to separate military professionals from civilians. The operational level of, in contrast, was inextricably tied to battle, an activity which was, presumably, the sole province of military professionals. The construction of the operational level of war as the acme of the army’s professionalism provided a discrete and bounded body of knowledge which the military professional could master. Additionally, because that professional knowledge was tied to the act of battle, the practice of military professionalism was only open to members of the army. In large part because of their construction of the operational level of war in Airland Battle doctrine, members of the army had a specific professional identity to which they could lay claim.

In the 1980s, as a volunteer force, the army desperately needed a concept such as the operational level of war through which to rebuild its professionalism narrative. Through two world wars and multiple generations, the army was manned predominantly through conscription. In both the officer and enlisted ranks, men were brought into the institution, provided with a short period of training, and then became

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full-fledged members of the military. Only the long serving officers were considered “professionals.”84 The majority of conscripted soldiers and reserve officers remained in the army for only a short while and did not reach senior levels of command or positions of higher responsibility. However, no one in the army could deny that many of these men mastered the basic fundamentals of military life, and in World War II, the Korean, and Vietnam Wars, many served with some success at the tactical level – the level of individual engagements or battles.85 The operational level of war that separated the fully professionalized, all-volunteer army of the 1980s from U.S. army of previous decades.

Additionally, the army’s omission of the strategic level of war played an important role in the institution’s narrative about the Vietnam War. By the 1980s, the predominant narrative was that the army was successful at the tactical and operational levels, and that the loss of that war was due to failed strategy and civilian encroachment into the military sphere.86 By omitting strategy from their conception of professionalism, members of the army, at least in their self-conception, were not to blame for the loss of Vietnam. For the post-Vietnam army, the operational level of war was more than a construct of military science of battlefield effectiveness, it was an important component of the institution’s identity narrative.

84 For a description of this phenomenon at work in the officer corps of the 1950s see, Linn, Elvis’s Army : Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield, 132-64.
86 This was the central argument of Summers, On Strategy : a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.
The operational level of war became the narrative through which the army officer corps defined and ultimately asserted its professional expertise and claimed control over the use of military force in battle. In effect, the army created its own definition of professionalism and expertise with the publication of Airland Battle doctrine. Airland Battle doctrine established the values to which each professional soldier should strive, and by defining the operational level of war the army set the definition and boundaries of its specialized expertise. The operational level of war was also a unifying narrative. By the 1980s, despite the army’s talk of battle, the army was vast bureaucratic institution where many soldiers’ occupations were no different than their civilian counterparts. Defining professionalism in terms of the operational level of war and therefore battle constructed a collective identity for members of the army. The operational level of war was a cultural language that both encompassed all members of the army and helped the institution deal with the loss of the Vietnam War.

IV.

General Donn Starry believed that the army’s culture needed to change so that its actual performance might reach closer to its potential. Revising Active Defense doctrine was important to Starry, but his first priority as the TRADOC commander was to initiate a process with TF Delta to reengineer how the army functioned as an all-volunteer force within an emerging postindustrial society. As a result, when Airland Battle doctrine
was published in 1982 it was as much a reflection of that process of cultural reengineering as it was the result of new and updated operational concepts.

The reengineering of values and culture began prior to the publication of Airland Battle doctrine. Instead of defining quality in terms of the efficient production of traditional military power – bombs, bullets, and shells methodically delivered onto the soldiers and material of opposing armies – by the early 1980s the army valued professional soldiers and officers capable of independent action and thought. The army, at least according to its own narrative, valued qualitative human considerations more than the technological material that those human soldiers used in the conduct of their work.87 Another aspect of this professionalism discourse was the increased valuation placed on individual and institutional loyalty, initiative, and interpersonal cohesion. Members of the army gravitated to this set of values in explicit repudiation of the management culture that dominated the army for much of the twentieth century. In the professionalism discourse of the 1980s, people were no longer interchangeable components in a machine; rather, they were individuals in a system, and the quality of those individuals needed to be maximized for the good of the institution. This is not to imply that the values and ideals associated with management culture went away. Likewise, the new values associated with the leadership or warrior culture were already

87 Dandridge M. Malone, “Army of Excellence,” Box 9, Folder Army of Excellence, D.M. “Mike” Malone Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
present within the army. The process depicted in this chapter is one where a once predominant culture lost that dominance, and a new cultural style formed to take its place. Leadership, or “warrior” culture supplanted management culture as the army’s dominating cultural narrative.

The publication of Airland Battle doctrine was the point at which leadership culture became the predominant form of the army’s institutional culture. Not only did members of the army’s lower ranks and civilian commentators agitate against the vestiges of the so-called management culture. But also, two of the army’s most influential senior leaders, General Starry and the Army Chief of Staff General Meyer, promoted a discourse of values-based leadership from the top-down. TF Delta was a bridging strategy of sorts. In “X=H,” Malone was able to express the various elements of leadership culture, in the language of management culture. “X=H” showed how human-centric elements such as a focus on the qualitative aspects of warfare, the importance of values, and the interdependence of such elements to increasing the performance of the army, could increase the performance and productivity of the army as well as address the perceived ethical issues that plagued both the Vietnam era army and the army of the 1970s. Mostly, Malone’s concept papers and Starry’s speeches provided the language of leadership culture and a new concept of professionalism that would appear in Airland Battle doctrine.
A military’s culture is ultimately shaped both from the institution’s leadership and from its rank and file. Airland Battle doctrine was the product of the army’s leadership. Certainly, Starry reacted to the backlash against Active Defense doctrine and Depuy’s failure to build consensus for the 1976 edition of FM 100-5. But, throughout his tenure as TRADOC commander, Starry oversaw a deliberate process to revise and update the army’s capstone doctrine. Once that doctrine was published, members of the army were free to interpret the meaning of the new doctrine in their own way.
Chapter 3: Warrior Ethos and the German Model of Professionalism

“AUFRAGSTAKTIK, SCHWERPUNKT, AUFRollen” scrolled across a two-page spread in the May 1984 issue of Military Review, marking an article written by Cadet Stephen Richey. Richey argued that the German army’s doctrine from 1917 through the end of World War II was, what he termed, the “philosophical foundation” of Airland Battle doctrine. He supported his thesis through the exploration of three concepts that he believed linked German army doctrine to the U.S. army’s Airland Battle doctrine. The first concept, auftragstaktik which Richey translated as “mission-oriented orders,” meant that commanders gave their subordinates only general guidance of an operation’s objective, and the subordinate was left to their own devices to determine how to meet that objective. Richey’s second concept, schwerpunkt, referred to the center of gravity, or “the point of main effort of the attack.” Finally, there was aufrollen, which he translated as “striking out laterally from the penetration” made at the main point of attack.¹

Richey further described the attacks led by Captain (later Wehrmacht Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel during the German army’s Italian Campaign of World War I. He referred to Rommel’s methods, which he knew about through reading Rommel’s

World War I memoir *Infantry Attacks*, as a “textbook definition” of auftragstaktik, schwerpunkt, and aufrollen even though, as Richey notes, “he [Rommel] never used those words himself.”

The young cadet went on to state that, “the achievements of the German army at the tactical and operational levels remain objects of admiration.” That “the Germans eventually lost both wars” had been ”the fault of a national leadership which twice tried to take on almost the whole world at once.”

Richey’s essay could be dismissed as the slightly misguided historical scholarship of a university undergraduate except that it speaks to the significance of the German military within the minds of many U.S. army officers. Cadet Richey identified with the German military. Richey read deeply, if not broadly, in German military history, and he used that knowledge to express his own professionalism and his conception of military excellence more broadly.

Like other authors who published in *Military Review* during the 1980s, Richey went to the trouble to use a number of terms in the German language throughout his writing. It was as if the German words sprinkled throughout their articles were talismans marking the author’s credibility and professionalism. For certain, taking the time to explain a term or concept such as aufrollen showed the author’s investment in the idea that a knowledge of German military history had something to offer members of

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 49.
the U.S. army. From the article, it is clear that Richey perceived an intellectual link between the German and American armies and believed it be both natural and good.

This chapter argues that during the 1980s members of the U.S. army used an idealized German army as their archetype of military professionalism. In other words, they used the German army to symbolize the type of soldiers, officers, and army that they imagined themselves to be. This chapter further argues that members of the army, primarily the officer corps, did not use a historically accurate symbol, rather, they constructed an understanding of the German military in their own idealized self-image. The German military became, for members of the army, the embodiment of the institution’s professionalism narrative.

Conversations about German military history in the military press were also a central means through which new ideas about military professionalism filtered throughout the institution. This story, however, is also broader than the doctrinal subjects covered in the previous chapters, because the German military symbolized more than military doctrine for the U.S. army. Although the idealized German military was important for how members of the army understood Airland Battle doctrine, they also invested their symbolic German military with an entire constellation of attributes that they believed comprised the ideal soldier and officer and their idealized civil military relationship.
Finally, this chapter shows that the way that members of the army used the German military was not directed or planned by the army’s leadership; rather, it was the symbol through which lower ranking members of the army interpreted both the cultural transformations described in previous chapters and the cultural transformations in American society more broadly. Through multiple published articles and speeches, members of the army connected their constructed image of the German army to professional values, military doctrine, and civil-military relations, ultimately creating a coherent narrative of identity and professionalism for the 1980s army.

Showing the extent to which a material relationship between Airland Battle doctrine and German military doctrine or experience existed is not the purpose of this chapter. Rather, this chapter focuses on how members of the army deployed the German military as a symbol of professionalism, because it is important for understanding the army’s cultural transformation after the Vietnam War. In so doing, this chapter exposes the mechanics of cultural production amongst members of the army. This chapter examines the cultural significance of the German military as a symbol which facilitated the U.S. army’s cultural transition, and through which the institution reimagined military professionalism.

The construction and use of the German military as a symbol of professionalism was, strikingly, an extension and expansion of both the values debate described in the previous chapter and the backlash against Active Defense doctrine described in Chapter
1. Unlike the processes described in the previous chapters, however, the mode of transfer described here was not due to a small group of active reformers, but rather a more diffuse group of predominantly mid-career officers writing in the military press. All ranks of the army employed the German military as a symbol, as did civilian reformers and professors at professional military schools, but it was generally mid-career officers; captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels, who used the German army to interpret the changes happening in the army and the ones who sustained the use of such imagery. Chapter 2 showed that Starry, Meyer, and others deliberately worked to change the army’s culture in ways that they believed improved, what they termed, the army’s actual performance. Their changes began a realignment of the army’s system of professional values which moved the institution away from the so-called managerial culture, which focused on corporate procedures and quantifiable metrics of performance, towards a culture which defined professionalism in terms of individual values and behaviors – the leadership culture defined in the previous chapter. This chapter shows how a younger cohort of, primarily, officers continued that realignment through the promotion of what they alternatively termed as the warrior spirit or warrior ethos. It shows how officers and soldiers made sense of the cultural transformation initiated by the army’s leadership, continued that transformation, and ultimately crafted a new cultural narrative for the U.S. army.
In the 1980s the army’s institutional culture and professional identity placed great value on what the historical actors depicted in this chapter described as “warriors,” and the associated warrior imagery or warrior spirit. One army pamphlet, published in 1985, defined the warrior spirit as, “the state of mind and preparedness required of each officer which blends all the physical, mental, moral, and psychological qualities for an officer to successfully lead an army in its mission of protecting the nation.”

In this conversation, or narrative, about warrior ethos violence was only a secondary image, and more important were the individual’s values and attributes. By that I mean that the warrior narrative focused less on what the warrior did in battle, and more on the warrior’s intrinsic motivations and personal attributes. Primarily, the emphasis on warriors and the warrior spirit was an attempt to define military professionalism in ways that marked such professionalism as distinct from civilian society. “Warrior” was the term used by members of the army to describe a group of behaviors that marked professional soldiers as separate from civilian society. When members of the army invoked warrior imagery, it was the embodiment of the values culture described in the previous chapter.

The tension, of course, was that at the same members of the army sought to create a warrior image, war itself was becoming ever more technological. Thus, any

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5 Ibid., 15-18.
real need for warriors; defined as those persons who actually engaged in battle with a physical enemy that was not mediated through some type of technology such as long range shells, aircraft, or missiles, was decreasing at the same time that the army needed a unifying professional narrative as part of its broader institutional revitalization.

Thus, the army’s valuation of the warrior image was not self-evident, but some members of the army believed they needed such an image as a means to define themselves against what they believed were the military managers who, by some conceptions, were causal to the loss of the Vietnam War. In other words, Starry’s values construct, as well as the importance Airland Battle doctrine placed on individual leadership and initiative, created a space for the cultivation of a warrior image or identity. The warrior image, however, had to be constructed, the values and attributes described in Chapter 2 had to be embodied, and one of the ways that members of the army constructed the embodied warrior image was through their imagined ideas about German military history. Of course, it was not that members of the Wehrmacht were any more or less warriors than members of the American army. Members of the American army equated the Germans with their warrior ideal because of their understanding of the German military which derived from literary and film depictions as well as a flawed history of the Wehrmacht written by the German officers themselves. Many American officers believed that the German army embodied the same military values that they were striving for.
The army’s valuation of a warrior image also connected to broader cultural trends in American society. Historian Susan Jeffords shows in *The Remasculinization of America* that war, particularly representations of the Vietnam War, were used as an “emblem” for what Jeffords terms the “remasculinization” of American culture, “the large-scale renegotiation and regeneration of the interests, values, and projects of patriarchy now taking place in U.S. social relations.”

The army’s conversation about warriors and warrior ethos was, in part, about reestablishing the sense of manhood that the institution lost during the Vietnam War.

This chapter shows how remasculinization was a component of the army’s post-Vietnam cultural transformation by showing the extent to which members of the institution valued the male warrior image. Thus, at the same time that warrior imagery was a military professionalism narrative which attempted to separate the army from society, it was also a point where trends in societal culture intersected with how members of the army viewed themselves and their institution. Both American society’s and the army’s fascination with warriors

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6 Jeffords, *The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War*, xi. Historian James William Gibson has also argued, that “the 1980s saw the emergence of a highly energized culture of war and the warrior.” Certainly, Gibson describes a “paramilitary” rather than a military culture, but he argues that the “new war culture presented the warrior role as the ideal identity for all men.” Gibson describes how American men looked to war films, fantasy novels, and paramilitary war games and simulations as a way to recreate a masculine dominated warrior culture amidst a military defeat in a modern society where most men lived a life that was anything but strenuous. For Gibson, the warrior culture movement was about reclaiming lost cultural territory after two decades of civil-rights advances into a society dominated by white males. Gibson, *Warrior Dreams: Violence and Manhood in Post-Vietnam America*, 9.

and warrior culture were gendered responses to the loss of the Vietnam War, but in the army the warrior image had the added effect of shaping definitions of professionalism.

During the 1980s the army’s professional identity coalesced around the central elements of warrior ethos and effectiveness at the operational level of war. Such an identity promoted, but also limited, the army’s post-Vietnam War revitalization. By the end of the 1980s, the army’s normative professional identity devalued the understanding of national strategy. Members of the army attempted to relegate strategy to the province of the army’s and the nation’s civilian leaders, preserving for themselves the space of battle and military operations in pursuit of civilian dictated policy goals. By military operations however, many members of the army assumed a large-scale, mechanized, and state-on-state conflict rather than the limited counter-insurgency warfare in Vietnam.8 Such a focus came at the expense of building and maintaining a competency in irregular warfare against insurgent forces or other non-state actors. Furthermore, the army’s limited professional focus left the institution ill-prepared to offer the broad strategic advice that civilian leaders required of military professionals.

To come back to the Anton Myrer’s pairing of Sam Damon, the preeminent warrior, with Courtney Massengale, the politically minded staff officer, the, members of the 1980s U.S.

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8 I make this claim based upon the subject matter of many articles in the military press, the character of Airland Battle doctrine described in Chapter Two, and the relative lack of discussion of other types of conflict. Low intensity conflict and “operations other than war” gained greater salience in the army circles during the 1990s, but through the end of the twentieth century the army’s focus remained on large scale conventional operations.
army actively created a professional identity in the image of the fictional Damon. The irony is that members of the army used an idealized construction of German military history, particularly the history of Hitler’s Wehrmacht, to promote both the Damonesque warrior image as well as Airland Battle doctrine. This chapter unpacks why such a symbol was important for the army’s cultural transformation and how that symbol was understood and transmitted through the institution.

I.

The symbolic German military pervaded the army’s professional schools, professional journals, and even the nation’s popular culture. But, for the army, that symbol did not suddenly appear during the 1980s. Throughout its history the U.S. army had often looked to Germany as an archetype of military professionalism. There was, however, a marked increase in references to the German military after the army’s 1982 adoption of Airland Battle doctrine. For example, in Military Review alone, over one hundred articles referencing the German military were published between 1965 and 1995. The occurrence of such articles peaked between 1982 and 1988, with nearly half of the articles about the German military appearing in that six-year period. This data shows that a correlation existed between the number of articles about the German military and the publication of Airland Battle doctrine in 1982 and the revision of that
doctrine in 1986. That correlation existed because members of the army used the imagery of the German military to interpret Airland Battle doctrine and how that doctrine would shape their institutional culture.

The army’s Command and General Staff College’s (CGSC) professional reading list for academic year 1982 contained the memoirs of Field Marshals Erich Von Manstein and Heinz Guderian, both of which were high ranking German officers in World War II, as well as Basil H. Liddell Hart’s *German Generals Talk*, which contained interviews with a number of former Wehrmacht generals and generally praised their performance despite the fact that the Germans lost the war. The course curriculum further listed the memoirs of another ex-German general, F.W. VonMellenthin, as required reading by all students in the course. Indeed, one American officer was so moved by his reading of Mellenthin’s *Panzer Battles*, that he travelled to South Africa to interview the aging General, and later wrote an account of the interview in *Military Review*.

The fact that there was so much mention of the German army specifically in *Military Review* is also important. The military press, particularly *Military Review*, was an important cultural site for the army’s officer corps. As historian and former army officer Andrew Bacevich has stated, *Military Review* is, “ideal for the historian attempting to understand the mind-set of the officer corps at a particular time.” Historian Robert

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9 Amount of German articles cited in *Military Review* data from James Curry, "From Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle: The United States Army, the Wehrmacht, and the German origins of modern American military doctrine" (Master of Arts, University of Western Australia, 2015), 30.
Citino has observed, noting the prevalence of German military history in *Military Review* after the publication of Airland Battle doctrine, that after 1982, “it became difficult to pick up any professional military journal without reading something about the German army. There were occasional complaints that one needed a German-English dictionary to read a typical issue of *Military Review*.”

Many of the articles referencing the German military followed a similar convention. Authors isolated some feature of the German military experience: an individual person, a battle, a particular system, or a tactic used over the course of many battles. They then described that feature in detail, perhaps comparing similar features in the German and U.S. experiences. Authors then argued for a series of lessons the U.S. army could learn from Germany’s past. These authors sought to, as described by historian Martin Van Creveld, “isolate, study, and learn from the factors” that had established the Wehrmacht’s military experience. Some of the articles about the German army were simply a continuation of the argument for maneuver warfare described in Chapter 1, but now with an added emphasis on the operational level of war. The operational level of war, an imagined space of activity that linked individual battles to broader military strategy, was important because that was the imagined space

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of German military exceptionalism. American officers admitted that the Germans lost both world wars, but argued that they did so because of bad strategy rather than because of the army’s performance. Citing strategy as the nexus of the German’s loss shifted the blame for the loss of the war onto the political leader Adolf Hitler, and preserved the imagined superiority of the German army. Incidentally, such a narrative also had analogues to some conceptions of the Vietnam War that blamed the war’s loss on poor strategy and political meddling rather than American military forces.

Specificity, granular data about equipment, people, or battles, marked the articles about the German army during the 1980s. The increasing specificity (from the late 1970s through the 1980s) with which members of the army talked about the German military shows that the symbolic German military became more powerful over time, and that the cultural narrative within which members of the army invoked the German military was becoming more structured and predominant within the institution. As the symbolic German military became more predominant, members of the army read deeper into the history associated with that symbol. As the army’s new cultural narrative became more structured, members of the army read into the German military with more specific questions in mind. In effect, the symbolic German military

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snowballed into a powerful symbol for members of the army through repeated usage across countless social interactions.

In the 1980s, American authors made more explicit and direct references to individual German officers, often tank commanders who had published memoirs, such as Heinz Guderian.\textsuperscript{14} Such a focus on tank, or armor, officers linked with Airland Battle’s focus on mechanized warfare, the European battlefield, and what members of the U.S. army termed, \textit{blitzkrieg}. Authors’ usage of German terminology, such as \textit{auftragstaktik}, also appeared more frequently, and authors described these terms as if they were standardized doctrinal terms in the same way that American doctrine defined terms such as “attack” or “defend.” However, as multiple historians have noted, any German usage of these terms by the German military often referred to a loosely defined frame or caste of mind rather than a specific principle of German military doctrine.\textsuperscript{15} The idea that a German “doctrine” of \textit{blitzkrieg} defined the World War II German army was itself a fabrication. As historian Rolf Hobson has reminded us, there is now something of a “scholarly consensus” that the Wehrmacht “did not have an operational doctrine in 1940, whether it was called \textit{blitzkrieg} or anything else.”\textsuperscript{16} By that, Hobson means that the Germans lacked a clear operational doctrine, and simply grafted new

\textsuperscript{14} Angsten, “Bypassed Forces and the Corps Attack.”
technologies onto their existing ideas about war. He further shows that the paradigmic blitzkrieg operation, the 1940 German invasion of France, was not planned as such, but rather was the result of chance and French mistakes.

The fabrication of the blitzkrieg concept helps explain both the power of the symbolic German military as well as how members of the U.S. army could place such importance on the army of a genocidal and totalitarian regime. American officers appropriated the imagery of the German military. They then infused that imagery with a constellation of meanings which were self-identifying and promoted the institution’s idealized warfare and relationship to society. The army’s symbol of professionalism was a fabrication based upon a flawed interpretation of historical evidence. The fact that the ways in which American soldiers understood the German military were all antithetical to the character of the Vietnam War also shows the symbol’s constructed nature. In the 1980s army’s imagination, the so-called German blitzkrieg was quick rather than prolonged, it was military centric rather than inherently political, it was a non-nuclear war against a clearly defined enemy, and finally the imagined blitzkrieg was a conflict where soldiers displayed courage and honor as well as genius. As members of the army imagined it, blitzkrieg connected to every ideal to which they aspired, and none of the remaining demons of the Vietnam War.17

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Other *Military Review* articles about the German military had little to do with doctrine, but still called for the emulation of specific aspects of the German army. Often, authors argued that the desired practice would increase the army’s cohesion or “warrior culture.” For example, one author advocated for adopting what they believed was the German style of territorial recruiting and the replacement system that the German military used during World War II.\(^\text{18}\) In nearly all cases, the greater specificity with which American officers wrote about the German army was not matched by greater historical accuracy. In short, American officers saw what they wanted to see when writing about their German counterparts.

Articles about German military history increased in tandem with a renewed focus on military history within the army’s professional education system. At General Donn Starry’s direction, a team of instructors that the Command and General Staff School created the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth in 1979. CSI’s charter was threefold: to teach military history at the CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to conduct historical research on matters of present concern to the army, and to oversee military history instruction throughout the army’s professional education.

system.\textsuperscript{19} We should also see CSI’s creation, particularly coming as it did at the behest of General Starry, as a reflection of the army’s broader move away from reliance on quantifiable metrics as measures of performance. The focus on history assumed that certain timeless characteristics characterized warfare, and that the study of past conflicts could better prepare the army for conflicts of the future. CSI’s creation reflected an assumption, held by some officers, that the study of history could be used as lessons, almost a toolkit, for problems of the present. Indeed, the creative spark for CSI came from General Starry’s question as to whether or not “historical knowledge inform[ed] the army’s current doctrines?”\textsuperscript{20} Starry believed that military history should inform current doctrine, and Starry’s ideas informed how lower ranking members of the army used military history when they published articles in the military press.

The desire to apply historical knowledge to present problems led members of the army to, at times, consult sources which were either fabrications or which separated the German military from historical context. Many of the sources that American officers relied upon in their recounting of German military history originated in the U.S. War


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 70. Spiller notes that some of the historians at CGSC were cautious of the proposed CSI for just this reason. They did not believe that history should be used to directly inform current problems. Thus, they alleviated the potential problem through a bureaucratic separation of the teaching of history at CGSC and other army schools with the research of history to inform problems of the present. Still the idea that history is a series of lessons for the present and future is still a feature in some military history writing and in how military history is used within the army professional education circles. For example, as late as 2013 CGSC used historical case studies as the primary means of teaching leadership.
Department Historical Division’s Operational History (German) Section. Those sources, sometimes referred to as the Halder Reports, shaped how members of the U.S. army understood the German army. The Operational History (German) section produced over “2500 reports authored by more than 700 former German officers,” with many recounting how the German army defended against the advancing Soviet army in the final years of World War II.

The American army captured General Franz Halder, the former Chief of the German General Staff, along with other Wehrmacht generals, near the end of World War II. In captivity, these former German officers effectively wrote the history of the World War II German army. They did so at the request of the U.S. War Department which believed that the experiences of their former enemies could prove useful in future conflicts against the Soviet Union. The manuscripts and oral histories of captured German officers became foundational to the historiography upon which American officers based their understanding of the German army throughout the twentieth

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22 For example Robert A. Doughty, "Review of The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of Colonel General Franz Halder," Military Review, 57, no. 7 (1977). Doughty was an instructor at CGSC, and wrote extensively in the military press during this period. He also published the first of CSI's many historical reports known initially as The Leavenworth Papers. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76.
century. Needless to say, the ways in which the former German generals told their story portrayed both them and their institution in a positive context.24

Various Halder reports appeared on U.S. War Department reading lists after the end of World War II. Historian Kevin Sotour has shown that these documents influenced American doctrinal thinking in the 1940s and 1950s as the U.S. Army prepared for the defense of Europe during the early Cold War period.25 Perhaps more important, the German manuscripts help explain why members of the American army found it acceptable to look to the World War II German army as a military worthy of emulation. The Halder reports were full of the German generals’ personal bias which skewed the historical understanding of the German army.26 As Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies have noted, the captured German generals sought to save their reputation by separating the German military from Hitler’s political regime. The German officers laid the mistakes of the war at Hitler’s feet: the attack on the Soviet Union was a political decision rather than a military one, military officers warned Hitler of “adventurism,” and that Hitler was unclear in his portrayal of his strategic goals. In Smelser and Davies’ words, “Hitler’s amateurishness contrasted at every point with the professionalism of the soldiers. Hitler’s lunacy contrasted with the simple patriotism of

26 Ibid., 679.
the army. Hitler’s complete immorality contrasted with the traditional moral code of the officer.”

The Operational History (German) section’s reports did more than influence the army during the 1950s. They were also included in the curriculum at the army’s CGSC, and notably at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). SAMS, formed in 1983, was where the army trained its most promising officers in the intricacies of doctrine and military operations. Former German generals who contributed to the Halder reports were even brought to the United States in 1980 to comment on U.S. army doctrine, and a retired General William E. Depuy authored a report on one such visit of German Generals Hermann von Balck and General F.W. von Mellenthin for the Pentagon’s Office.

28 For SAMS use of Halder Reports and other German sources see, “Course 1 - Directors Brief,” 1985, Box SAMS Historical Files Admin 1984-1992, Folder SAMS Admin 1985 Course 1 Directors Brief, SAMS Historical Files, Combined Arms Research Library; “The German General Staff: Training and Development of Staff Officers,” 1985, Box SAMS Curriculum, SAMS Curriculum, Combined Arms Research Library. SAMS put together abridged version of Halder reports, some included the original forewords written by General Franz Halder see, “Selected German Army Operations on the Eastern Front (Operational),” 1984, Box SAMS Curriculum, Folder SAMS 1983/1984 - Course 13, SAMS Curriculum, Combined Arms Research Library. As an example of what SAMS students were taught about the German Wehrmacht, the foreword to “German Army Operations on the Eastern Front” which was written by Halder, stated, “By German concepts, the conduct of army operations was an art. Army commanders were assumed to have an absolute mastery of the principles and techniques of command. In addition, and of greater importance, they were selected on the basis of creative ability, with which they were expected to extract the fullest value from the men and weapons under their command……the leader learns his lessons through personal experience and the study of military history. The history of warfare reveals that the standards of mental and spiritual force and character required of an army commander tower far above the mere mastery of command technique.”; “Division Operations During the German Campaign in Russia,” SAMS Curriculum, Combined Arms Research Library. For SAMS use and definitions of German military concepts see, “The Unofficial SAMS Glossary,” 1986, SAMS Admin Historical Files 1984-1992, Folder SAMS Admin 1986 - AMS Course 1 - Working Syllabus, SAMS Historical Files, Combined Arms Research Library. See also Benson, “Educating the Army’s Jedi: The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into US Army Doctrine, 1983–1994.”
of Net Assessment.\textsuperscript{29} Halder’s importance in the collective eyes of the U.S Army was such that, when he finally retired in 1961, he was presented with a United States Meritorious Civilian Service Award for his years of faithful service.\textsuperscript{30}

Certainly, some historians associated with the U.S. military understood the possible abuses of history. Daniel J. Hughes, a civilian instructor at the army’s Command and General Staff Course (CGSC), for example, noted that “two fundamental problems seriously detract from the many otherwise laudable efforts to use the German experience to further the U.S. army’s understanding of modern war.”\textsuperscript{31} For Hughes, the first problem was the “careless and superficial” use of nominally German terms and concepts. Second, Hughes argued that many authors who wrote about the German military experience divorced that experience from its historical and cultural context. When critiquing a U.S. army predisposition to use history as a set of lessons which might apply directly to present situations, Hughes noted that, “far too often, German military history has become a storehouse to be looted in search of examples to justify current doctrinal concepts.”\textsuperscript{32} Still, even in his critique, Hughes advocated for the study of German military methods, but noted that such study needed to be completed in more depth than simplistic buzzwords and concepts.

\textsuperscript{29}William Depuy, "Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine,” (McLean, VA: BDM Corporation, 1980).
\textsuperscript{31}Hughes, "Abuses of German Military History," 66.
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., 67.
Indeed, the American army’s affinity for the German army was so strong that it earned its own nickname – the “Wehrmacht Mystique” – a term that Roger A. Beaumont, a professor of history at Texas A & M University, coined in the June 1986 issue of Military Review to describe the U.S. army’s fascination with the German Wehrmacht.33 The fact that Beaumont published his article in Military Review is significant because it meant that his article immediately reached a large portion of the officer corps, and the fact that a civilian academic published a critique of the “Wehrmacht Mystique” for a military audience shows that the army’s conversation about the Wehrmacht was strong enough to attract the interest and criticism of those outside of the military. In short, Beaumont questioned why the American army would choose to learn from a military that committed such notable strategic blunders in both World Wars, ultimately loosing those conflicts, and one that served a morally reprehensible regime to boot.

Beaumont argued that the “image of German military prowess and unique efficiency” was widely accepted in the United States.34 He attributed this fascination to historical roots, noting that the U.S. military had looked to the German army since the nineteenth century. Beaumont also connected the American army’s fascination with Germany to the Cold War era stationing of U.S. military forces in Germany. He noted

33 Roger A. Beaumont, "On the Wehrmacht Mystique," ibid., no. 7: 44.
34 Ibid., 45.
the bonds forged between the U.S. army and German citizens, how many Americans admired how the Germans rebuilt their country after World War II, and how social interactions helped U.S. soldiers to see the Wehrmacht as separate from the Nazi regime. The Germans were now allies rather than a defeated foe. Beaumont further depicted ways in which aging German generals refought World War II in the pages of their memoirs, which many members of the U.S. army eagerly read, as causal the Wehrmacht mystique.35

Many officers and academics disagreed with Beaumont in rebuttals to his article. Both civilian and military authors submitted rebuttals to Military Review charging that the Wehrmacht was the ideal military force for the army to either learn from, or in some cases, emulate. In response to Beaumont, Martin van Creveld, another civilian academic who wrote extensively on German military history in both the civilian and military press, dismissed any relationship between Nazi ideology and the army, stating in a Military Review article, “the role of National Socialist ideology in the Wehrmacht’s combat power was probably no greater, or less, than that of democratic ideals in the willingness of the U.S. army to fight.”36

Van Creveld, specifically, was important in establishing what Beaumont coined as the Wehrmacht mystique. Van Creveld’s importance was due to his support for the

Wehrmacht’s wartime prowess, but also because courses at the Command and General Staff Course regularly featured his work as part of their curriculum. Furthermore, van Creveld was an Israeli Jew. His heritage, coupled with his reverence for the Wehrmacht, gave American officers permission to separate the Wehrmacht from Nazi ideology. Van Creveld said as much in his rebuttal to Hughes’ article. The notion that the U.S. army should not learn from the Wehrmacht where it could bothered him, “as an Israeli and a Jew, part of whose family was exterminated by the Nazis.” With his book Fighting Power (1982), he praised the German army’s ability to maintain its cohesion under extreme stress, and helped popularize the study of the German military within U.S. army circles.

The number of articles published in Military Review alone suggests that Van Creveld’s support for the Wehrmacht was the army’s dominant stance about the German military. The near unanimous consensus held that the U.S. army should at a minimum learn from, and in some ways emulate, the German army. The defense of the army’s reverence for the German army, and the German army’s supposed distinction from the Nazi regime, was not limited to civilian academics. For example, In a 1987

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37 For example, see “Director’s Brief,” 1986, Box SAMS Historical Files, Folder SAMS Admin Course 1, SAMS Historical Files, Combined Arms Research Library. “Modified Syllabus, AMS Course One,” 1986, Box Academic Year 1986-1987, Folder SAMS Admin 1986, SAMS Historical Files, Combined Arms Research Library


article army major Samuel Newland expressed his regret, “that the ideological aspects and atrocities of the National Socialist regime have caused some to feel that little constructive use can be learned from the practices used by the World War II German army.”

Even senior leaders, such as General Starry, wrote articles advocating for the emulation of various aspects of German military culture. Starry viewed the German approach to doctrine and military education as a “model of willingness and ability to adapt to change.”

Almost always, however, authors avoided the Wehrmacht’s affiliation with the Nazi regime. They also explained away the fact that Germany lost both World War II and World War I. Many articles echoed Halder, attributing Germany’s losses to failures of national and military strategy which they attributed to Germany’s civilian leaders rather than the German army. Thus, members of the army separated Germany’s failures from their perception of German army success through allusions to the operational level of war, which Airland Battle doctrine and the army’s growing professional narrative conceived of as a military only sphere.

Despite the many references to the German army in Military Review’s pages, both the calls for emulation and the few dissenting voices, no one questioned whether or not

40 Newland, “Manning the Force German Style.”
members of the army were fascinated with the German army, such fascination was taken as a starting assumption.\footnote{Curry, "From Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle: The United States Army, the Wehrmacht, and the German origins of modern American military doctrine."} The German army was a firmly entrenched, if not universally understood or accepted, symbol within the conversations through which members of the army understood their identity as soldiers and their institution.

For example, in the 1985 September and October issues, the publishers of Military Review featured a special section entitled, “Perspectives on the Operational Level of War.” Multiple articles within that section equated the American military tradition as heavily favoring attrition and firepower contrasted with the German tradition that favored highly educated officers who blended firepower with maneuver to attain a qualitative advantage over their opponents.\footnote{Mark P. Gay, "Soviet and U.S. Operational Styles of War," Military Review, 65, no. 9 (1985); Gregory Fontenot, "The Promise of Cobra: The Reality of Manchuria," ibid.; George A. Higgins, "German and U.S. Operational Art: A Contrast in Maneuver," ibid., no. 10.} The thrust of the articles, nearly all of which were written by army majors, was that throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Prussian/German army understood the importance of the operational level of war and operational art but the U.S. Army did not. Only recently (since the publication of Airland Battle doctrine) had the U.S. Army began to emphasize the operational level of war. Either explicitly or implicitly, these articles assumed that the U.S. Army’s new appreciation of “operations” was the key to excellence and victory on
the battlefield. The evidence which each officer cited, however, was the assumed importance which the Wehrmacht placed upon such an operational level of war.

Not only was the Wehrmacht mystique, the image of German military effectiveness, widespread throughout the 1980s army, its lasting influence and memory also show the symbol’s cultural value for members of the 1980s army. For example, in July of 2017, historian Robert Kirchubel reviewed Gerhard Paul Gross’s *The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger* for h-net.org. Gross’s book offers a critical interpretation of German military history from the middle nineteenth century to the 1950s. He argues that while there was some continuity in the style of German operational thinking from Von Moltke through the early years of the Bundeswehr, that style of thinking came at the expense of national strategy and led to unnecessary preemptive wars. The notable aspect of Kirchubel’s review, however, was neither Gross’s book nor the review itself, but rather the comments section. Over the next three months, a number of retired military officers and military historians debated the military abilities of the German Wehrmacht. Their debate reminisced about their own love affair with the German Army’s exploits. One h-

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46 This image persists despite the fact that Germany was ultimately defeated in World War II. For an extensive analysis of the post-World War II romanticizing of the Wehrmacht, see Smelser, *The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet war in American Popular Culture.*
49 I refer to the individuals responding to Kirchubel’s review as retired military officers and historians because they identify as such in their posts.

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net user, the same Stephen Richey cited in the introduction to this chapter, reminisced about his adolescent love for “Panzerblitz,” a board game inspired by the German military, how he read Ballantine Book’s World War II series about German Wehrmacht divisions, and how, as a cadet at the United States Military Academy in 1984, he wrote an article for *Military Review* arguing that German doctrinal concepts were the foundation of the Army’s Airland Battle doctrine.\(^{50}\) Another user even described, only half-jokingly, how some fellow military historians described themselves as a “*Wehrmachtaholic.*”\(^{51}\) Of course, many of the historians contrasted their previous admiration for the German military with their more sober thoughts of the present (it is important that this thread took place at the same time as the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, VA – a fact also mentioned in the h-net thread). Nonetheless, their “adolescent adoration” as one h-net user described it for the German military, which was the stuff of war movies, strategy board games, dime novels, and popular history, remained visible.\(^{52}\)

The widespread, and culturally powerful, symbol of German military effectiveness was central to the army’s cultural transformation during the 1980s. But,

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\(^{51}\) Kirchubel, “Kirchubel on Gross, *The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger*”.

\(^{52}\) Phrase used by Robert Kirchubel in an August 16, 2017 h net post. Ibid.
the question remains, why? What perceived need or needs did the allusions to German military history answer for members of the U.S. army? Why did the German military experience from the Napoleonic era through the end of World War II hold such power for members of the 1980s army?

II.

The German army was a well-entrenched cultural symbol that addressed many needs for members of the 1980s army. That symbol was important for the 1980s army for three reasons in addition to the supposed affinity between blitzkrieg and Airland Battle doctrine. First, the U.S. army had historically looked to Germany as a symbol of military professionalism; however, in each instance members of the army drew different and often contrasting lessons dependent upon the era and social and cultural contexts through which they gazed. Second, members of the U.S. army connected the German military to their ideals of a warrior or leader identity. Those warrior ideals were part of the broader shift away from the management culture depicted in the previous chapters. The warrior identity that members of the army cultivated in the 1980s also coincided with similar sentiments percolating through American culture as the nation wrestled with the loss of the Vietnam War and the individual rights movements of the long 1960s. Finally, members of the army used the German military to symbolize an idealized civil-military relationship. They drew their conception of an ideal civil-military relationship
from Samuel Huntington’s theory of objective control depicted in *The Soldier and the State* (1957). Huntington’s theory called for maximizing the autonomy that civilian leaders afforded to military forces. Such autonomy, Huntington argued, was a prerequisite to a professional, and by his definition, apolitical military. Because of a historiography that construed the German military as apolitical, American officers looked to the German military as a professional force that excelled at the conduct of military operations, and remained above national politics. Precisely the type of force they desired to be.

Throughout its history, the U.S. army has looked to Germany as an archetype of military professionalism, in much the same way that Germany has often fascinated American society. Indeed, General George Washington and Benjamin Franklin hired a Prussian officer to drill and train the Continental army – the Baron Von Steuben trained soldiers in the Continental Army at Valley Forge, and his drill book served as the American army’s first drill manual. Since von Steuben, American military officers have repeatedly looked to the German military for ideas on how to improve their institution. In like manner members of the 1980s army looked to the German military, and mediated their understanding of the significance of the German military experience through the lens of their personal desires and American society and culture.

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Each instance where the U.S. army looked to Germany was a process of intellectual transfer whereby the American military took the ideas and practices it wanted from its German counterpart, and disregarded those that it did not. This means that the U.S. army mediated their view of the Germans through pre-conceptions, bureaucratic and national differences, and self-interest. Speaking to the complexity of such intellectual transfer and appropriation, Daniel Rodgers has noted, that it is a complex process that is affected by "perceptions, misperception, translation, transformation, co-optation, preemption, and contestation." The U.S. army’s use of the German army was no different.

For example, in the wake of the U.S. Civil War, the army looked to the German army’s education system when the U.S. army’s leadership sought to modernize and professionalize their own education system. This period also marked a broader American societal fascination with German industrialization, science, and philosophy. In the late nineteenth century, thousands of American students studied abroad in Germany, the German educational system was internationally praised, and that system

was in part responsible for German leadership in a number of industries.\textsuperscript{57} The U.S. army used the German military’s professional school for general staff officers, known as the \textit{Kriegsakademie}, as the model for the Command and General Staff School – a postgraduate military school for officers housed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.\textsuperscript{58}

Leavenworth administrators borrowed from the German Army because they saw it as the most successful, modern military force then in existence.\textsuperscript{59} Instructors at the Leavenworth school appreciated the academic freedom of the German Army and the analytic attitude of German Officers, even as they rejected many aspects of German tactics.\textsuperscript{60} The most salient and lasting influence of German Army education adopted by the Leavenworth schools was the “applicatory method of tactical instruction.”\textsuperscript{61} That applicatory method used war-games and map problems rather than rote memorization.

In this early instance of the emulation of the German military, American officers adapted German educational theory and instruction practices while at the same time neglecting to adopt German tactics or operational practices. Such practices continued to develop and continued through the progressive era and into the twentieth century.

\textsuperscript{57} Bonura, \textit{Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from the War of 1812 to the Outbreak of WWII}, 136.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 156.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
A second instance where the U.S Army looked to Germany as a referent of military professionalism was a generation later during the Progressive era. In 1899, President William McKinley appointed Elihu Root as Secretary of War. President McKinley chose Root, a lawyer with little military experience, to both reform the military and assist in the management of the colonies that the United States acquired during the Spanish American War.

The Root reforms did much to create the twentieth-century U.S. military, and were the most substantial reorganization of the military until President Truman reorganized the War Department into the Department of Defense following World War II. Root addressed many of the inefficiencies of the nineteenth century army by creating a general staff system loosely based upon the German General Staff. Creating an American general staff system helped to professionalize the army because it took “policy decisions out of the hands of individual personalities and into the hands of specialized military professionals.”62 The newly created office of the Army Chief of Staff became a senior military advisor to the president, and the duties of war planning, military education, and manning and equipping the force fell to trained military professionals over political appointees and elected officials. Again, the U.S. military did not copy German operational or tactical methods, rather, they looked to the German army as an

62 Bonura, Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from the War of 1812 to the Outbreak of WWII, 176.
example of scientific management. For the American army of the early twentieth century, the German military represented efficiency and the bureaucratic practices required to manage an army with increasingly global responsibilities.63 Ironically, these were the exact behaviors and attributes that members of the 1980s army attempted to define themselves against.

Most important for this chapter was how the U.S. army of the 1940s and 1950s looked to the German Wehrmacht as it developed plans to defend Western Europe and the United States from assumed Soviet aggression. As noted previously, the reports prepared by the Operational History (German) Section were foundational to the skewed historiography that members of the 1980s army used to imagine their symbolic German military. But also, the reports created by the Operational History (German) Section were an active process of capturing “lessons learned” from the Wehrmacht for immediate use in the present. The U.S. army continued the German history project into the 1950s in hopes that by learning from their former adversaries the U.S. army could be better prepared to defend against the Soviet army in Central Europe just as the Wehrmacht had done in World War II. Perhaps the best indication of the importance the U.S. army placed on the Operational History (German) Section is that nearly every volume of the army’s official history of World War II combat, the famous “green book” series, makes

63 Ibid., 175-78, 211.
extensive use of manuscripts produced by captured German officers. The “green book” series, a multi-volume operational history of the war, was and remains the basis for how the American army understood World War II – either directly from the green books themselves or indirectly from historians who used the army’s official history. In this instance where the U.S. army looked to the German military as a model of military professionalism, manuscripts produced by German officers were crucial in shaping how members of the U.S. army perceived the Soviet army during the Cold War, as well as how the army perceived large-scale conventional war. The German manuscripts became, during the early Cold War of the late 1940s and 1950s, nothing less than a series of “how-to” manuals for fighting the Soviet Union.

The American army also accepted the German officers’ description of the Soviet Army. In the German manuscripts, it was the Soviet soldiers who perpetrated war crimes on World War II’s Eastern Front, and not the Wehrmacht’s soldiers. If one imagines how the Soviet Union transitioned from America’s ally to its arch enemy within a few years after World War II, it is not hard to see how the German officers’ portrayal of the Red Army played some part in that transition. The lessons that the U.S. army took from the German manuscripts affirmed their conceptions of German military

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65 Ibid., 126.
professionalism, but those lessons also shaped how members of the army perceived a possible future war with the Soviet Union.

The American army’s use of German military history confirms what historian Michael Geyer has shown, that there is no single German military professionalism. When armies looked to the Germans, they were able to take any lesson they chose based upon a particular historical moment or desire. When the U.S. army looked to Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they looked to German education and management systems, but when army officers interpreted German military history in the 1980s they drew lessons about individual initiative, distributed command, and effectiveness in battle. Members of the 1980s U.S. army adopted a well-worn and accepted professional archetype, the German army, and then they selectively used history to glean examples of their preferred “type” of military professionalism.

The second reason that the German army loomed so large in the imaginations of U.S. army officers had to do with the U.S. army’s fascination with what many, particularly officers, termed as warriors and warrior ethos. “Warriors: An Endangered Species,” an article published in Armed Forces Journal in 1984 by “Colonel Yasotay,” a pseudonym for army brigadier general John C. Bahnsen Jr., was one of the most forceful

calls for the army to cultivate warriors and warrior culture.\textsuperscript{67} His article was full of hyperbole, such as his contention that, “in fact, we [the army] bend over backwards to kill off our warriors at a young age and give them less consideration in our promotion process than we do adjutant general paper shufflers.”\textsuperscript{68} His critique, the subject to which he often returned, was the army’s personnel management and promotion system. He noted that the personnel system focused more on fairness and equality than nurturing combat leaders, and that such a system produced, “a bunch of undertrained pseudo-warriors.”\textsuperscript{69} Bahnsen’s article should be read as a critique of the behaviors and personal attributes which the army seemed to value because of his focus on the promotion and evaluations system. Promotions and assignments were, of course, the most direct means of displaying what the institution valued because when officers are promoted to senior levels of leadership they inevitably try to shape the army in their image. Bahnsen’s contentious arguments could be dismissed, aside from the fact that they flamed a debate where many members of the army lodged similar complaints.

The ensuing manager-warrior debate was over what identity narrative would ultimately dominate the army. The manager-warrior debate depicted here was a continuation of similar conversations depicted in previous chapters where leadership

\textsuperscript{67} Colonel Yasotay, "Warriors: An endangered species," \textit{Armed Forced Journal}, 122 (1984). The General’s pseudonym likely said something about his motivations and self-appraisal. Yasotay was Genghis Khan’s best and most favored warriors, but the Mongol emperor never promoted Yasotay because such a promotion was thought to mess up Yasotay’s warrior abilities.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 117.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
was contrasted with management. The character of the manager-warrior debate changed, and its intensity increased during the 1980s. The debate contrasted “warriors,” which officers defined in different ways, such Bahnsen’s competent combat commanders, with managers. The latter category grouped those soldiers who arguably focused too much on promotion, the politics of life in the army, or focused too much on the army’s bureaucratic systems. No matter the term which members of the army applied to the debate, whether warrior, leader, manager, or bureaucrat, each term was coded language stemming from the “lingering memory of Vietnam.” In the manager-warrior debate’s starkest language, America lost the war in Vietnam, in part, because the military managers were more focused on themselves and their careers than they were on winning the war. In the process, the warriors, whom those engaging in the debate argued focused only on their organization, their soldiers, and battle, were not promoted as quickly, or were not promoted at all. In the terms of the debate, the army’s warriors (because even when they did not dominate the institution “warriors” were always assumed to be present) during the Vietnam era could save neither the army nor the war, and both the nation and the army suffered for the managers’ transgressions.

German army officers, especially those of the Wehrmacht, symbolized warriors throughout the warrior-manager debate, but the ways in which members of the army linked the German military and the concept of warrior was somewhat counterintuitive.

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Members of the U.S. army often pointed to the German general staff as personifying the warrior type, but the German general staff officer was perhaps the least “warrior-like” of German officers. The general staff was a small, elite, intelligentsia within the German officer corps who were more likely to be away from the battlefield planning the next battle or operation. But, when members of the U.S army cited individual German officers as exemplary of the warrior model, those officers were usually members of the general staff. Again, this speaks to the fabrication of the German image. General staff officers were seen as “warriors” not because that was their image within the German army itself. Rather, the general staff officer was the personification of military excellence promoted in Halder’s manuscripts, popular military history, and the memoirs of German officers.71

Members of the U.S. army also promoted the image of the German army officer as warrior because there were fewer German officers in comparison to the American army. This was an explicit gesture to the U.S. army’s perceived managerial culture. German officers often participated in actual fighting, rather than the American system which placed layers of bureaucracy between the individual soldier and the senior commander. German staff organization was smaller, and more of the German army participated in combat rather than performing supply or logistics functions. Also, some

71 Two of the most widely read memoirs were Guderian, _Panzer Leader_; Mellenthin, _Panzer Battles_. Additionally, Colonel-General Franz Halder was, at one point, the chief of the German general staff, and many of the captured officers who wrote the manuscripts for the Operational History Section (German) were general staff officers.
members of the army believed that the “fighting power” of the Wehrmacht derived from the emphasis that the German army placed upon the individual. The connection between the German army’s focus on the individual warrior and the notion of an army’s “fighting power” was a specific nod to Van Creveld’s *Fighting Power* which began as a research monograph for the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment. The warrior image associated with the German officer corps was the result of joining bits of historical evidence with popular images, all of which was mediated through what the U.S. army wanted to say about themselves. The image of the German general staff officer as warrior was constructed, but it was important for how American officers established their own self-identifying narrative.

One of the more measured and thoughtful responses in the warrior manager debate came from Andrew Bacevich, but despite his criticism of the warrior manager dichotomy, Bacevich still accepted the ideas associated with the Wehrmacht mystique.

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73 Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1914-1945*. This book was originally distributed as a research report for the Office of Net Assessment (ONA). See, Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power, German Military Performance, 1914-1945*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Net Assessment, 1980). Andrew Marshall created the ONA in 1973 and directed the office, by appointment from the Secretary of defense, until 2015. The ONA is the Pentagon’s internal think tank, and since its introduction the ONA has been responsible for producing the research that led to some of the nation’s most important national security decisions, including the Carter Administration’s large increases in military spending in the late 1970s. The ONA conducted assessments of foreign military and economic power that guided the DOD’s decisions. The ONA was a dominant sponsor of civilian research, and was thus powerful in shaping knowledge about national security and foreign militaries for American military and civilian decision makers. See, Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, *The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy*, (New York Basic Books, 2015).
Writing in *Military Review* while a Lieutenant Colonel in command of a cavalry squadron, Bacevich made an argument that the “warrior type” had always existed within the army’s ranks. He questioned the sharp dichotomy drawn by some of his contemporaries, but the imagery that Bacevich called upon indicates that, to the extent that the warrior model existed, the German military embodied that personality type. He noted that the resurgence of interest in the German military during the 1980s contributed to the strength of the warrior ideal and warrior culture within the army. Bacevich gestured to the general disdain for managerial by stating, “while the Americans [in World War II] approached war as if it were a gigantic industrial enterprise like digging the Panama Canal, the German subordinated everything to the creation of units with maximum fighting ability,” citing van Creveld’s *Fighting Power* as his source. He even tied his assessment of the warrior-manager debate with a nod to Myrer’s *Once an Eagle*, stating, “This much is certain, however: genuine military effectiveness will improve to the extent that the Damons [meaning warriors] continue to thrive.” What is important is that even a measured response, such as Bacevich’s, still accepted the German army as a symbol of military professionalism, and further

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74 Bacevich, "Prospects for Military Reform,” 35.
75 Ibid., 37.
76 Ibid., 38.
77 Ibid., 42. Other examples of members of the army describing and advocating for the warrior ideal see, Robert W. Cone John C. Bahnsen, "Defining the American Warrior Leader," ibid. 20, no. December (1990); Clifford H. Bernath, "Leadership: The Times are a Changin," *Soldiers*, June 1980; Bob Saxby, “The Nebulous and Esoteric Warrior Spirit,” 1986, 1986, Box 6, Retired Excel Net Concept Papers, D. M. “Mike” Malone Papers, Army History and Education Center
acknowledged that the army’s future success was tied to the cultivation of a warrior image.

Most members of the army who engaged in the debate about warriors and managers argued, like Bacevich, that the warrior was the preferred type. While one can find the occasional article or thesis touting the need for scientific management in the 1970s, those types of articles are all but gone by the 1980s. What we should take from the warrior-manager debate is that it was the process of cultural change. Members of the 1970s and 1980s army predominantly assumed that the manager was the dominant officer type from the end of World War II through Vietnam. Whether or not this was true, or only existed in officers’ minds, is of little consequence. In their public writings, members of the army created an identity which they termed manager, and upon that identity members of the army heaped the blame for the loss of the Vietnam War and the poor performing army of the 1970s. These same soldiers and officers then created an identity of warrior in opposition to the manager. The warrior type became the preferred identity for members of the army by the middle 1980s. Neither the army itself nor the day to day activities of the army fundamentally changed, but beginning with the debate about Active Defense doctrine in 1976 and continuing through the publication of Airland Battle doctrine in 1982, there was a noticeable and definable shift in the

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78 This was the argument of a number of books and articles, for example, Hauser, America’s Army in Crisis; a Study in Civil-Military Relations; Richard A. Gabriel, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army; D.M. Malone, “You Can’t Run an Army Like a Corporation.”
normative conception of what traits and behaviors were most desirable for professional members of the U.S. army.

Of course, many members of the army understood that the issues at play were not so simple. They understood that there was no one warrior or manager “type,” and that modern armies required both the inspiring combat leader as well as the person that could manage complex bureaucracies. Still, the warrior-manager debate filled reams of paper, with many authors, both military and civilian, portraying these two types of soldiers as mutually exclusive.\(^79\) The warrior-manager debate was at the heart of the army’s professionalism discourse during the 1980s, and the debate was an analogue to the backlash against Active Defense doctrine which construed Active Defense as overly centralized and stifling against an idealized maneuver warfare that was thought to maximize individual leaders’ abilities to affect the battle. The German military figured heavily into both debates.

The army’s warrior-manager debate also connected the army to civilian society and the ongoing conservative turn in American political culture. Again, like the backlash against Active Defense doctrine described in Chapter 1, almost as much of the

criticism about the lack of warriors in the army came from civilian journalists, political leaders, and commentators as it did from military officers. In fact, many of the characters remained the same from the previous decade. William S. Lind, the legislative aide who authored so many articles in the 1970s advocating for maneuver warfare, was still referenced in the warrior debate as were Edward Luttwak, Jeffrey Record, and Steven Canby.

By the 1980s, the group of Washington D.C. based civilian military commentators coalesced into what became known as the military reform movement. And, by 1981, this same group banded with political allies in Congress to form the Congressional Military Reform Caucus. The bipartisan caucus grew from an initial sixteen members representing both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives to over 130 members just five years later. One of the uniting factors of caucus members’ was their self-styling as “cheap hawks,” a moniker which connoted both fiscal responsibility and support of military intervention. That moniker helps, in part, explain they the military reform caucus supported of Airland battle doctrine – the focus

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of the doctrine was on maximizing the quality of soldiers rather than building a larger institution.

Although the military reform caucus was bipartisan, it showed a marked neoliberal and conservative slant. Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA) was a vocal member of the caucus as was Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), and other members included Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). Perhaps more telling were the foundations and centers which supported military reform efforts and the caucus itself: The Hudson Institute, The Heritage Foundation, Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the National Strategy Information Center are notable examples. Each of these foundations and centers were known to support conservative ideologies. Though bipartisan in name, the Military Reform Caucus, and the broader military reform movement it represented, were conservative in both ideology and rhetoric. As members of the military reform movement and military reform caucus alternatively critiqued and supported the army, they did so within the terms of conservative politics.

The military reform movement’s rhetoric shows how trends in American society layered onto the army’s cultural transformation. Members of the military reform caucus conjured not only a lost military tradition, but also an assumed loss of something in the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{84}}\text{Ibid., LV; London, } \textit{Military Doctrine and the American Character: Reflection on Airland Battle.} \text{ The National Strategy Information Center’s founding members and advisors included beer-baron Joseph Coors and Frank Shakespeare, former chair of the conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation.}\]
American character. The caucus’ explicit agenda was the reduction of bureaucracy and waste within the Department of Defense in efforts to build a stronger more efficient military, and when members or groups within the military reform movement spoke about Airland Battle doctrine they did so in terms similar to the cohort of officers writing in the military press. Many allusions were made to the German army, leadership, and warriors as both preferred and oppositional to the so-called managerial culture attributed to the earlier McNamara led Department of Defense. When the civilian military reform movement invoked those images in their statements about the army it was a statement about conservative political culture. In other words, when the military reform caucus actively promoted an army that cultivated a warrior identity they also appropriated the warrior ideal for themselves.

For example, a 1984 white paper published by the National Strategy Information Center, a conservative leaning defense and military strategy think tank, explicitly linked Airland Battle doctrine to the conservative movement’s ideologies. Herbert I. London, who was an affiliate of the Hudson Institute, authored the paper, and he argued that military doctrine should be in line with national values. He stated that Airland Battle doctrine was a significant step in the army’s history because it provided a “perspective of war consistent with our [cultural] heritage.” London invoked the example of

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85 For example, London, Military Doctrine and the American Character: Reflection on Airland Battle, 2; Hart, ”An Agenda for More Military Reform.”; Hart, America Can Win : The Case for Military Reform.
86 London, Military Doctrine and the American Character: Reflection on Airland Battle, 1, 54.
Germany throughout the document, citing the German army’s supposed lack of a “management bias” and its ability for adaptation and reform as the antithesis of the U.S. army tradition of management and bureaucracy.

Conservative politicians and pundits who supported the army’s budding warrior culture made an implicit argument that aligned with conservatism’s broader critiques of “big government.” Airland Battle doctrine had an affinity with conservatism’s broader ideas about individualism and meritocracies because of its focus on individual initiative, values, and leadership. In contrast, the army’s management culture ideologically aligned with the American welfare state that so many conservatives opposed. Thus, by supporting the army’s warrior narrative and Airland Battle doctrine, the generally conservative military reform caucus supported their larger social and political project.

Similar to London, Jeffrey Record, then a military history professor at Georgetown University, wrote an editorial in 1984 for The Washington Post entitled, “Why Our High-Priced Military Can’t Win Battles: It’s Full of Bureaucrats Instead of Warriors.” Record’s article came only months after the loss of nearly a battalion of Marines in Beirut, and he connected that incident to what he construed as a record of American military defeats since General Douglas MacArthur’s Inchon landing during the Korean War. After laying out a litany of military sorrows, Record placed the blame

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for the record of defeat on the military’s over-reliance on technology. He further charged that the American military disregarded that war was, for Record, a “human encounter,” by which he meant the “such intangibles as generalship, strategy and tactics, training, morale, unit cohesion, combat experience, and…….chance.” Record charged that America’s military had substituted “managerial and technocratic values for traditional warrior values” since World War II.

In yet another article for The Washingtonian published in 1984, Nick Kotz et al., interviewed over 10 retired senior officers from across the military including former Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer and General Julius C. Becton. Kotz et al. connected the warrior-manager rhetoric of the civilian led military reform movement with the language of these senior officers, showing that both populations thought that manager identity had supplanted the so-called warriors across the U.S. military. The officers interviewed in the article described a stifling bureaucracy that did not reward combat leadership, and placed “too much emphasis on details of management and bureaucracy, and too little on developing combat effectiveness in officers and their troops.” Kotz et al suggested that the “majority of officers we interviewed believe strongly that military preparedness, even in the nuclear age, still depends on the ability of officers to inspire soldiers to fight effectively on the ground, in planes, and on

88 Ibid., D4.
ships.” In short, military success equated to inspired individual leaders and soldiers, an analogue to the type of individualism that was central to the conservative narrative.

Kotz et al., Record, and London all made the same argument as Bacevich and many others, that the U.S. military was ineffective because there were too many managers and not enough warriors. Each author, in turn, contrasted the American managerial approach to war with the German focus on individual warriors and initiative. The important point is that whether additions to the manager-warrior debate came from sources inside or outside the army, such statements were always in reaction to the loss of the Vietnam War, and its language mirrored that of 1980s conservatism. There was an affinity between how military officers attacked military bureaucracy and conservative attacks on the welfare state or the more nebulous “big government.” There was also an affinity between the army’s cultivation of a warrior identity and the “warrior dreams” of civilian men as they were described by Gibson. Each debate, military, civilian, political, or cultural relied on the same nonspecific individualist language that valued individual achievement, coupled with an individual’s values and attributes, over collective attempts to navigate society’s challenges. Each debate also trafficked in amorphous and ill-defined terms and an over-drawn dichotomy of identities. In these debates, terms such as manager and leader did not refer to two parts of the same individual, but were viewed as mutually exclusive identities.

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90 Ibid., 85.
For the army, the entire warrior manager debate was about identity and institutional preservation as much as the army’s effectiveness. The contrast between the manager-warrior debate in the 1980s and Starry and Malone’s case for the importance of values of the late 1970s shows that the warrior image, and the symbolic German military, were constructions through which members of the army created a cultural narrative. Starry and Malone specifically connected the articulation of, and focus upon, values with how such a focus improved the army’s performance. In contrast, the 1980s warrior manager debate made no such connection to performance. Rather, the warrior manager debate used a skewed reading of military history to harken back to a time (generally World War II) when warriors did, supposedly, dominate the U.S. military, suggested that a change had taken place after the war, and then argued that the loss of the Vietnam War was due to the loss of warriors. In contrast to the ways in which Starry and Malone constructed a causal mechanism for how the renewed focus on individual values related to the army’s performance, the individuals arguing for a renewed warrior identity made no such causal connection.


92 Malone, “The Trailwatcher: A Collection of Colonel Mike Malone’s Writings.”
It should not be surprising that the army sought a warrior image, because the fascination with the warrior identity was not limited to the army or the military. The idealized “warrior” permeated American society during the 1980s. Historian Robert O. Self has shown that the Vietnam War caused an undoing of American manhood and the image of the American soldier. He further notes that one of the “central political developments” to emerge from the war was that a “fracturing of coherent wartime manhood laid the groundwork for conservative populists to claim the soldier……and its alignment of manhood and patriotism as a new weapon of political demagoguery.”

Like many soldiers, many American civilian men sought to cultivate the warrior image during the 1980s. For example, George Leonard argued in a 1986 *Esquire* magazine article that “America has discovered a new hero……He is an elite forces man with the muscles of a Western body builder and the mind set of an Eastern martial artist.” Leonard lists the litany of 1980s action film heroes before stating, “the new American warrior….slaughters commies and other enemies by the score, cutting through bureaucratic inertia with a stream of machine-gun bullets.” Again, Leonard positions the warrior in opposition to the nebulous bureaucracy and in reaction to military defeat in Vietnam.

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94 Ibid., 73, 74.
96 Ibid.
The army’s internal debate over managers and warriors and the broader societal embrace of warrior culture were distinct, but they were both cultural, had similar goals, and supported one another. The definitions of the term warrior were different in the civilian debate vice the one in the military, but the fact that both conversations used the same term is an important intersection where societal trends shaped the army’s cultural transformation and the army. As historian James Williams Gibson shows, many American men sought to reclaim and reestablish a masculine identity through an affinity for and identification with a paramilitary warrior culture.97 For members of the army, cultivating a warrior image was about reclaiming a certain type of professional identity. Nor should we associate the army’s image of warrior with the cartoon violence of Chuck Norris or Rambo films. When Leonard interviewed a group of army Special Forces soldiers how they defined warrior, the soldiers cited “loyalty, patience, intensity, calmness, compassion, and will” as central to the warrior image.98 Members of the army constructed their warrior image through countless public and private statements whereby members of the army established an identity narrative for themselves and their institution, but the army’s conversation took place within an American society that was itself, in part, cultivating a warrior image.

98 Leonard, “The Warrior”
Each debate, civilian and military, had elements of dreams and fantasy. For civilian men, the fantasy was the near-supernatural physical powers of the on-screen heroes. Such fantasy explains, in part, the fascination with the 1980s action film genre where Sylvester Stallone as John Rambo refights the Vietnam War singlehandedly, or *Predator* where Arnold Schwarzenegger single handedly defeats an alien invasion.99 Throughout the 1980s, members of the army used the symbolic German military in the same way that civilian men used fictional heroes like Rambo in their warrior fantasies. Because their understanding of the German military was based upon a historiography that separated the German army from the German state (and thus from Nazi ideology), members of the army could imagine individual German warriors in their most sanitized form. They could imagine Rommel standing in the open hatch of his tank barreling hell bent for leather across France at the head of a panzer division, or swimming in the Meuse River to rally his troops as they forced the river crossing. They imagined Rommel existed in a sterile environment unaffected by civilians or their dreaded bureaucracy; the warrior, the master of his craft, facing hardship and in this case winning battles for his country – fantasy.

But, the strongest thread connecting the warrior fantasies of American soldiers with the symbolic German military was loss. Like the American army in the Vietnam

War, the German army lost in World War II. However, the fact that the German officers themselves largely wrote their own history of the war, and because Germany quickly moved from ally to adversary during the Cold War, members of the U.S. army could imagine that the Germans lost gracefully, and with their honor intact. Incidentally, the fascination with the Wehrmacht was not unlike the “lost cause” myth which surrounds some popular understandings of the Confederate army of the U.S. Civil War. This common experience of loss allowed members of the U.S. army to use the German army as a symbol to both nurture their warrior identity and to assuage their sense of guilt of the loss of the Vietnam War. Even the best warriors sometimes lose.

A final reason that the symbolic German military was important to members of the U.S. army was what it signified about civil military relations. An ongoing debate about civil military relations, particularly the army’s autonomy vis-à-vis the nation’s political leaders and their appointees who controlled the American military, led members of the army to look to their understanding of both German military professionalism and the German military’s relationship with the German government. The army’s post-Vietnam War revitalization was about doctrine, demographics, and values, but it was also about resolving an internally perceived crisis in civil military relations. The perceived crisis was that civilian leaders had encroached too far into the realm of military professionals, and in so doing, jeopardized, primarily the officer corps’, sense of professional identity. Thus, the symbolic German military was an important
symbol not only of battlefield proficiency but also for the army’s ideal civil military relations construct.

A civil-military crisis had been building within the army since the beginning of the Cold War, and that crisis boiled over as a result of the Vietnam War and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s activist Department of Defense. The civil-military relations problems of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, shaped the cultural narratives through which members of the post-Vietnam War army reimagined their institution. 1950s era nuclear-centric strategies, such as massive retaliation, outlined larger roles for the U.S. Air Forces and Navy to the detriment of the army, and that transition weakened the army during the Eisenhower administration through both decreased budgets and influence. Nuclear strategy also outlined a larger role for civilian strategists. It was civilians such as Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling who outlined U.S. defense strategy in the nuclear age rather than military officers.\(^\text{100}\)

The rise of civilian strategists, the predominance of nuclear weapons in American militaries of the 1950s and 1960s, and even the presence of a former army general in the White House wrested control of military strategy from the military in general, but particularly from the army. Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation, threatening a nuclear armed response against the Soviet Union or China as a retaliation against conventional attacks upon American interests anywhere in the world, came at

\(^{100}\) Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 159 - 60.
the army’s expense, and several high-profile generals retired by the end of the 1950s and publicly rebuked Eisenhower’s policies. 101 This shift in the balance of civil-military relations, with civilian leaders playing a greater role in military policy, sparked a backlash within the army where members of the army sought greater autonomy for their organization.

As it was generally understood by members of the army, autonomy meant that army officers held control over the internal workings of the institution. That type of control meant that military professionals, not civilian leaders, possessed the authority to make decisions about manning the army, training those soldiers once they were in uniform, and the types and quantities of equipment available to those soldiers. The army’s leadership also desired to control the employment of the army’s soldiers and formations once they were committed towards national strategic goals.

The desire for control, or autonomy, helps explain the importance which the army ascribed to the operational level of war as it was depicted in AirLand Battle doctrine. By the army’s definition, the operational level of war set a boundary between civilian and military spheres of activity. In that conception, civilian leaders controlled and dictated strategy, where strategy was defined as determining the nation’s goals and allocating resources, but the military controlled those resources (primarily military

personnel and equipment) once they were allocated to achieve a strategic goal. The army’s desire to reestablish institutional autonomy in the 1970s and 1980s was an effort to remake the contours of American civil-military relations, an effort to define where civilian authority stopped, and military authority began, because of the perceived civilian encroachment into the military’s sphere during the Vietnam War. The basic premise of civilian control of the U.S. army remained intact; however, members of the army had to establish a framework that protected military autonomy without invoking a backlash from civilian political leaders. In the parlance of civil-military relations theory, the civil-military relationship that most members of the army wanted, even if they did not always use the specific term, was what Samuel Huntington termed objective civilian control.102

In the 1980s there were two general theories of civil military relations available to army officers; Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control, and Morris Janowitz’s convergence theory. Huntington and Janowitz’s theories were foundational to America’s national security state because they outlined theories of civil-military relationships during a period of technological advancements, a large standing military, and global commitment. Huntington developed his theory during the 1950s. He contended that the increased external threat posed by the Soviet Union was at odds with

102 I make this claim about the importance of objective civilian control based upon the prevalence of articles which cited Huntington.
America’s liberal tradition. Huntington equated liberalism with individualism, which he believed emphasized “the reason and moral dignity of the individual and opposed political, economic, and social restraints upon individual liberty.”\textsuperscript{103} In so doing, Huntington pitted a supposed American penchant for liberalism against the state’s security requirements. For Huntington, the United States could not meet the external threat (what Huntington termed a functional imperative) of the Soviet threat unless it changed its societal structure, namely America’s antimilitary liberal society (what Huntington terms as a societal imperative). Furthermore, Huntington’s formulation was premised on the assumption of a radical separation between civilian and military spheres. The nation’s military performed tasks, namely the defense of the nation, that set it apart from civilian society.

Objective civilian control was Huntington’s prescription for meeting the challenge of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{104} Huntington defined objective civilian control as “maximizing military professionalism through the distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps,” The key to Huntington’s objective civilian control was military professionalism and civilian


\textsuperscript{104} Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State; The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations}. 217
recognition of an “independent military sphere.\textsuperscript{105} His assumption was that professionalizing the military rendered it apolitical, and that only through society’s respect for, and preservation of, an independent military sphere of activity, could a military force be both strong enough to defend the nation but remain politically neutral to such a degree where that force did not challenge civilian control. Huntington’s formulation, however, depended upon his on definition of military professionalism, in which, “a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.”\textsuperscript{106} Thus, a professional military obeys, and a military that is not professional does not obey civilian authorities. For Huntington, an autonomous military, one which acted freely within a bounded sphere of activity, was a prerequisite to professionalism, autonomy and professionalism were inextricably linked.

Janowitz offered a different view of military professionalism and civil-military relations from Huntington. His theory depicted the inevitable politicization and civilianization of the military, predicated upon both nuclear weapons and a technical battlefield. Janowitz foresaw the civil military challenges endemic to the global commitment of America’s military during the Cold War era. More important, Janowitz’s formulation collapsed Huntington’s conception of radically distinct military

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 83.
\end{footnotesize}
and civilian spheres. He argued that the Cold War required both strategic deterrence and limited war, and that the U.S. military should develop an idealized self-conception as a constabulary force. A constabulary force is, “continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory.”\textsuperscript{107} Such a conception viewed the military as more of a police force than warriors, and further assumed that military functions were, in a post-World War II nuclearized world, often undistinguishable from many civilian occupations.\textsuperscript{108}

Indeed, where Huntington argued that less civilian oversight of the military was key to desirable civil military relations, Janowitz argued for increased civilian control.\textsuperscript{109} Janowitz described how the military finds “work-arounds” to civilian control, and his only solution to such work arounds were for the military to fall back on professionalism. Janowitz noted, “the professional officer would be responsive to civilian control because of law, tradition, and professionalism, and because of his integration with civil values and institutions.”\textsuperscript{110} As political scientist Peter Feaver has noted, both Huntington and Janowitz offer essentially the same prescription for ensuring an obedient military, more professionalism.

\textsuperscript{107} Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” 43; Janowitz, \textit{The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait}.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 166; Janowitz, \textit{The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait}. 

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In retrospect, Janowitz was the more prescient of the two theorists, recognizing as he did the difficulty of distinguishing between war and peace in late twentieth century world society. But Janowitz prescribed the exact situation that members of the army rejected in the decades after the Vietnam War, namely, the increased civilian control of military forces. Robert S. McNamara’s activist Department of Defense encroached on supposed military activities in both structuring the military force, manning the force, and the conduct of the Vietnam War. For members of the army, the Janowitzian constabulary ideal not only challenged the institution’s autonomy, but many members of the army assumed that civilian encroachment on the military’s conduct of the war was actually causal to the loss of the Vietnam War.

For those reasons, Huntington was the preferred of the two civil military relations theorists among the army’s officer corps. In short, Huntington’s theory of objective control aligned with what members of the army desired. The army taught Huntington’s theory to its officers in both CGSC and at the War College. When officers wrote about civil military relations and professionalism in the military press, they most

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112 For example, Summers, On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.
113 Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations.
often drew upon Huntington. But, Huntington’s formulation also added to the cultural significance of the symbolic German military.

Throughout *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington repeatedly cited the German military as the archetype of military professionalism. He argued that Germany’s Imperial period between 1871 and 1914 “reflected an extraordinary degree of objective civilian control and military professionalism founded upon a high level and restricted scope of military authority.” While Huntington was mostly correct in his assessment that the modern German military served as the model for the military institutions of many other nations, the image he construed of the German army was over simplified. Like many members of the army, Huntington focused on a few examples from German military history to draw broader, and questionable, conclusions. Huntington projected the image of the nineteenth century von Moltke, the Prussian and later German Chief of Staff from 1857 to 1888, riding into battle with both a sword and a copy of Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*. Huntington contends that, “the values of the German military probably came closer to approximating the ideal-type military ethic than any other officer corps in history.” More recent scholarship has effectively

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116 Geyer, ”The Past as Future: The German Officer Corps as Profession,” 183-212.
challenged Huntington’s vision of an eminently professional Prussian and German officer corps, separate from politics, but Huntington’s conception of military professionalism and civil military relations dominated the 1980s army. Huntington’s construction of German military professionalism made the symbolic German military important not just in the army’s discourse about operational and battlefield effectiveness, but also as a symbol for how members of the army viewed their ideal relationship with the state.

Even in the army’s discourse about civil military relations, the German army connected to the idea of professional autonomy. When Huntington referred to German military professionalism, he did not, as did members of the 1980s army, refer primarily to the Wehrmacht. Huntington referenced the pre-World War I German military and to a lesser extent the interwar era Reichswehr as his professional model. Of note, however, is that the terms Huntington used to describe the German military were much the same as those used in the Halder reports. Like Huntington, the manuscripts produced by the Operational History (German) Section described a German army that was apolitical and focused on military tasks. Moreover, the memoirs of German generals, such as those of Heinz Guderian and F.W. von Mellenthin, are apologies for the German military which

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lay the loss of World War II on Hitler as a civilian leader encroaching on military concerns.

Of course, the image of an apolitical German army was a fabrication. The Reichswehr, which Huntington so revered, explicitly worked to undermine the Weimar Republic after World War I in order to reestablish the military’s prestige. Moreover, the German army worked with Hitler’s regime to prepare the nation for total war. Without the army’s compliance, Hitler’s plans would have been impossible. Thus, Huntington’s position was untenable even in the late 1950s, and he effectively parroted the “self-exculpatory, post-war writings of the Wehrmacht leadership.”

Not only did Huntington include such an interpretation in his 1957 book, but he reiterated his thesis in later works, all of which advocated for objective control and an apolitical autonomous military.

III.

Members of the 1980s U.S. army, primarily the officer corps but all levels of the institution’s hierarchy, constructed an image of the German military that they then used to symbolize their ideal conception of professionalism and their institution’s ideal relationship to the state. They deployed this symbol in multiple discourses: members of

the army used the German military to symbolize their understanding of Airland Battle doctrine, to symbolize a model of professionalism built upon the image of the warrior, and to symbolize their ideal civil military relationship – one that maximized the army’s autonomy.

The reasons why a vanquished army came to symbolize professionalism for so many members of the U.S. army are numerous, but at its foundation, this symbolic German military was built upon a mythos and historiography informed primarily by former German military officers themselves. In effect, World War II’s losers wrote their own history in such a way that their professional stature not only remained intact but was, in many cases, elevated. After the end of World War II, the U.S. Army created the Operational History (German) Section. That section recorded a history of the war from the German point of view, based upon thousands of interrogations of captured German soldiers as well as manuscripts authored by former German officers under the supervision of German General Franz Halder. Not surprisingly, those manuscripts were sympathetic to the Wehrmacht, and they papered over or omitted the Wehrmacht’s participation in war crimes. They were influential in the early years of the Cold War because of the U.S. army’s interest in the Soviet Army, and many of the reports produced by Halder’s team concerned the German defense of Europe against the Soviet army in the final years of the war. The myth of a professional German army that did not deserve portions of the shame cast upon the Nazi regime spread in late twentieth
century America. Certainly, many historians dispelled this myth by the 1980s, but it persisted in popular histories, film documentaries, and the warrior fantasies of both civilian and military men and boys.\textsuperscript{121} Such systematic mythmaking created the conditions for a sympathetic interpretation of the German military by members of the U.S. Army.\textsuperscript{122} Thus, the Wehrmacht entered the U.S. army’s collective memory following the Second World War not as a vanquished foe that was complicit in genocide, but as an elite institution of warriors, forsaken by their civilian leaders, and worthy of emulation on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{123}

The Cold War also amplified the German army’s significance. During that period, American forces were deployed throughout West Germany and United States and Western European nations reconstituted the German army as the Bundeswehr.\textsuperscript{124} Part of this process was the absolving of Germany for much of the blame of the Second World War, particularly the holocaust. The myth of the clean Wehrmacht supported these efforts, making it easier to discursively separate the German army from the Nazi

\textsuperscript{121} Smelser, \textit{The Myth of the Eastern Front : The Nazi-Soviet war in American Popular Culture}, 3.

\textsuperscript{122} Historians Ronal Smelser and Edward J. Davies further link the fascination with the German army to the “lost cause” mythology surrounding the Confederate States of America and the American Civil War. For discussion about the Halder reports see, ibid., 64-89,..

\textsuperscript{123} There are many examples of writers in the United States romanticizing the German military after World War II. Huntington describes the German military as the acme of military professionalism. Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State; The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations}, 90-124. See also, Hackworth, \textit{About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior}, 316; Citino, \textit{Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm : The Evolution of Operational Warfare}; Robert M Citino, "The German Way of War Revisited," \textit{Historically Speaking}, 11, no. 5 (2010).

\textsuperscript{124} The Bundeswehr was reconstituted for the defense of Germany in 1955. For an interpretation of the significance of the Bundeswehr to the Cold War U.S. Army see Ingo Wolfgang Trauschweizer, "Learning with an Ally: The US Army and the Bundeswehr in the Cold War," \textit{The Journal of Military History}, 72, no. 2 (2008).
party and to reconstitute that army for the Cold War defense of Europe.\textsuperscript{125} The Bundeswehr, however, was in many ways a continuation of the Wehrmacht; its founding officers and soldiers began their military career during and before World War II. In 1955, one-hundred percent of Bundeswehr officers had previously served in the Wehrmacht, and even as late as 1967, over forty percent of Bundeswehr officers began their careers in the Wehrmacht.\textsuperscript{126}

The army’s fascination with the German army was also limiting for its post-Vietnam War revitalization. The institution’s predominant model of professionalism centered upon conventional mechanized battle. By the 1980s, when members of the army wrote about the operational level of war and operational art they were barely considering irregular war of the type the army faced during the Vietnam War, or would face in the future in Somalia, Bosnia, or finally Iraq after the initial invasion in 2003. Because the army’s professional culture of the 1980s did not center upon multiple formulations of warfare, the army of the 2000s was less prepared to face the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The army’s fascination with the German army also led to flawed attempts to separate politics from war and operations from strategy. Again, such attempts left the army ill equipped to prosecute the types of limited wars which characterize the post-

\textsuperscript{125} For an analysis of the relationship between the United States, European nations, and the rearming of German after World War II, see ibid.; Smelser, \textit{The Myth of the Eastern Front : The Nazi-Soviet war in American Popular Culture}, 73-90.  
\textsuperscript{126} Smelser, \textit{The Myth of the Eastern Front : The Nazi-Soviet war in American Popular Culture}, 76.
Cold War era. Counterinsurgencies, peace enforcement, and peace keeping operations all call for military professionals who are both warriors and managers or bureaucrats. By emphasizing the warrior image at the expense of the manager, the Sam Damon over the Courtney Massengale, countless officers were ill prepared to function as strategic leaders or provide the type of advice that the army’s civilian leaders required.

The following chapters show how the warrior image, which the symbol of German military professionalism fueled, spilled over into how members of the army made sense of changes in American culture. The model of professionalism described in this chapter was the mental frame through which members of the army processed the institution’s changing racial demographics, the integration of women, and reimagining of the values, morals, and behaviors which should guide the actions of American soldiers.
Chapter 4: Race Relations in the Post-Vietnam War Army, Color-blind Narratives and a Welfare State

Jimmie Childress joined the army to get out of prison. After sitting in a Kansas City jail for two months, Childress took the judge’s offer of military service over spending more time behind bars. It was 1967, Childress was eighteen years old, labeled a criminal, and poor. He trained as a paratrooper in the 101st Airborne Division, and like thousands of other men from the nation’s poorest economic strata, Childress spent his nineteenth birthday in Vietnam.

Like many African American soldiers in Vietnam, Childress became disillusioned amidst the carnage of the Vietnam War, and after months of fighting he quit. Childress went “Absent Without Leave,” or AWOL in military speak, and he lived for a time on the Saigon economy, stealing military equipment and selling it on the black market to make money. What galled Childress most was the idea that he was putting his life on the line for a nation where, in many places, he would not be served a sandwich in the local diner. For his trouble, military police apprehended Childress, and sent him to the Long Binh Jail.

The Long Binh Jail on the outskirts of Saigon was the American military’s primary stockade in Vietnam. Originally designed to hold 400 inmates, by 1968 there were over 700 men in the stockade with Childress. Conditions in the jail were horrible.
Treatment was poor, and following a broader American trend, fifty percent of the prisoners in Long Binh were African American at a time when African Americans represented only eleven percent of troops in Vietnam. The jail was a racial tinderbox, and when the inmates learned the news of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination and of the riots breaking out in many American cities, they reacted. Hot, crazy, and fed up, Childress “decided to burn the motherfucker down.”¹

And that is just what Childress and his fellow inmates did. They fashioned homemade weapons, neutralized the guards, and savagely beat many of them including the stockade’s commander. Violence spread throughout the prison. Childress set fire to the administrative office in hopes of burning prisoners’ records. Eventually, the violence devolved into a melee that left one prisoner dead, and countless prisoners and guards injured. Near the riot’s end it was no longer prisoner versus guard, or white versus black. The spectacle was a collective lashing out against the system, the war, and the heat where everyone simply tried to hurt everyone else. Racial turmoil in the United States catalyzed the Long Binh riot, but the prison revolt was also a product of the army’s growing racial divide. Many African American soldiers no longer tolerated racial discrimination, and they fought back.²

² Ibid.
The Long Binh prison riot touched off a string of military race riots which lasted into the early 1970s, and the riots created a crisis across America’s armed forces. The army was particularly affected. Not only was it the largest military branch, but it was also the one where African Americans were most overrepresented. By the end of the Vietnam War, the army desperately needed to reestablish cohesion among the various races and social groups that comprised the institution if it were to remain a coherent fighting force.

The army’s race problem was part of a definable moment in American society where stymied progress in achieving racial equality led to violence. The African American Civil Rights Movement generally stalled after the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and some Americans challenged many of that movement’s victories leading black activists to seek other strategies and also a broader backlash against racial equality. The army’s race rebellions mirrored domestic urban rebellions such as the 1965 riot in the Watts neighborhood in Los Angeles which broke out in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles following an altercation between an African American family and white police officers. More important to African American soldiers,

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4 Watts was and was one of the worst riots of the twentieth century, leaving 34 dead, 1042 injured, and 3952 arrested. See, Self, *All in the Family: the Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s*, 28.
however, was the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968. Dr. King’s assassination was a hinge point for black activism both in and out of the military. African American soldiers who had long endured the either explicit or unspoken racial discrimination vowed that they “had no intention of allowing things to stay the same way they were when Dr. King was murdered.”

After Dr. King’s assassination, incidences of reported racial altercations increased to weekly or sometimes daily occurrences.

Racial violence was just one way that the army’s race climate deteriorated at the end of the Vietnam War. In addition to riots there were less explicit instances of race discrimination and exclusion such as self-segregation in units, favoritism in promotion, and inequalities in the military’s justice system. Solving the problems of racial discrimination, race-instigated violence, and the self-segregation between white and black soldiers were important parts of the army’s revitalization after the Vietnam War.

The question was, how? Many white soldiers, in particular the predominantly white officer corps, perceived Black consciousness, cultural expression, and activism as undermining unit discipline, crippling to unit cohesion, and antithetical to their

6 Ibid.
conception of the institution’s code of ethics. African American soldiers, conversely, believed that they were asserting their own cultural identity, and that what some soldiers called disorderly conduct was merely African American soldiers claiming their place within the army and American society. For their part, the army’s senior leaders were willing to pursue unconventional solutions to solve the race “problem” quickly.

This chapter argues that in the wake of the Vietnam War the army first tried to solve the institution’s challenges with racism, racial discrimination, and racial unrest through an approach that encouraged multiculturalism and racial diversity. That approach included initiatives such as: so-called racial harmony councils, which gave soldiers from minority populations a direct line to senior army leaders, a strengthened equal opportunity program, and promoting diverse cultural interests, such as cuisine and entertainment, on military installations. That promotion of cultural diversity lasted until the middle 1970s when, due to the end of conscription, African Americans joined the army in unprecedented numbers. The increased numbers of African soldiers sparked an external, civilian and often politically led, but racially coded debate about the army’s quality. The quality debate ostensibly critiqued the perceived intellect of recruits in the first years of the all-volunteer force. But, because a substantially high number of those recruits were African American, the terms of the quality debate were thinly veiled racial attacks.
This chapter further argues that the quality debate coupled with the army’s broader move away from the so-called management culture towards a leader or warrior culture undid much of the army’s focus on diversity. In place of the focus on diversity, the army developed a color-blind rhetoric not unlike the color-blind narrative used by many politically conservative Americans. That narrative, like the army’s conversations about doctrine and professionalism, valued individualism and personal initiative. Color blindness imagined that formal legal equality erased broad structural inequalities and deep-seated cultural biases, or that such structural inequality ever existed.

Finally, this chapter argues that the army’s efforts to achieve racial equality through a color-blind rhetoric were more successful than similar efforts in American society. Indeed, as military sociologists Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler have noted, the U.S. army was “the only place in American life where whites are routinely bossed around by blacks.” The army enjoyed such comparative success because the army adopted conservatism’s color-blind language, but it did not adopt conservatism’s associated political economy. Unlike American society, which continued to unravel the American welfare state during the 1980s, social welfare protections increased for all

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8 This statement does not imply that racial discrimination went away, racial discrimination remained in the army, but in general the army closer approximated a meritocracy than did the majority of American institutions.

9 Butler and Moskos, All that We can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way, 2.
members of the army during that same decade.\textsuperscript{10} The army’s social welfare programs explain why the army’s nominally colorblind language enjoyed some measure of success. The ideal of a meritocratic army worked, at least to some degree because the institution’s members enjoyed a greater measure of economic equality the civilian Americans.

Like the previous chapters, this chapter describes one process, or conversation, within the army’s broader cultural transformation. The first three chapters each dealt in some way with a conversation about the army’s doctrine, or soldiers’ distinct identity as military professionals. This chapter describes how the army’s conversation about doctrine and professionalism spilled into how members of the army transformed their predominant narratives about race relations.

In short, the army’s cultural transformation took place via different modes. By mode of transformation, I mean that unlike the processes depicted in chapters one through three, where there were clearly definable actors or groups of actors who conceptualized and led the process of transformation, the process through which the army reimagined its narrative about race was more diffuse. No single actor or group of actors directed the change in language. Rather, a diffuse process occurred in which the army’s newly predominant narrative about professionalism possessed a greater affinity

\textsuperscript{10} For a study of the army’s welfare state see, Mittelstadt, \textit{The Rise of the Military Welfare State}. This chapter builds upon Mittelstadt’s work, showing how her conception of the military welfare state fits within the army’s broader post-Vietnam War cultural transformation.
with a societal narrative of color-blind meritocracy than it did with a language of
diversity already present within the institution. By the 1980s, both the army’s
professionalism narrative and a conservative trend in U.S. political culture, particularly
conservatism’s so-called color-blind narrative, idealized individualism, personal
initiative, and a culturally normative conception of values and behaviors.

I do not mean to imply that army’s conversations about race relations and
doctrine or professionalism were explicitly connected – one conversation did not direct
the other. In other words, members of the army did not consciously use the
conversation about doctrine and professionalism to argue for a specific conception of
race relations. Rather, the two conversations were different layers within the same
broad cultural transformation. Doctrine, professionalism, and civil-military relations
were the central and most important layers of the army’s culture, and although
important, the army’s conversation about race relations existed towards that culture’s
periphery. As the language of the army’s central cultural layers coalesced, it gained the
power to spill into how members of the army thought, spoke, and acted with reference
to race relations and other peripheral aspects of the institution’s culture. This chapter
depicts how, as the conversation about doctrine and professionalism became stronger,
members of the army mapped that conversation’s predominant terms and ideas onto the
army’s conversation about race. Later chapters will show how a similar phenomenon
took place in the army’s conversations about professional ethics and gender.
Two terms frame this process of transformation. The first is color-blindness or color-blind. At its most basic, the term color-blindness refers to the “elimination of racial classifications and the establishment of formal equality before the law.”¹¹ In the historiography of 1970s and 1980s America, however, color-blindness refers to how white Americans’ defended racial and economic privilege in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement. A color-blind narrative, used most often by the political New Right after 1970, argued that the Brown v. Board decision, which ended legal segregation in public schools, combined with the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of the 1960s meant that the nation had already achieved racial equality. The color-blind narrative, however, conveniently ignored the many structural and systemic discriminations that still existed. Most important, the color-blind narrative contended that since legal equality had been achieved, further government action to ensure such equality was both unnecessary and detrimental.

Color-blindness was a conservative rallying cry against programs such as affirmative action and school busing. The backlash against two-way school busing, a program where students were bused from their own racially or economically homogenous neighborhoods to other schools to ensure racial integration, exemplifies how the color-blind narrative worked. As historian Matt Lassiter has shown, parents in

white middle-class neighborhoods in Charlotte, North Carolina opposed the busing of their children to other, predominantly African American, neighborhoods. However, those parents explained their opposition to busing not in terms of race, but rather in terms of individual rights and privileges. They conveniently overlooked the *de facto* racial segregation which their opposition to two-way busing promoted. Historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall has argued that the New Right’s color-blind narrative contended that “in the absence of overtly discriminatory laws and with the waning of conscious bias, American institutions became basically fair. Free to compete in a market-driven society, African Americans thereafter bore the onus of their own failure or success.”

The color-blind narrative gained national traction during the 1970s, and was an important component of conservative racial and cultural narratives in the 1980s. This chapter uses the term color blindness in a slightly different way. I am less concerned with how a color-blind narrative was deployed by the political New Right than I am with the narrative’s underlying terms and languages. For example, the color-blind narrative relied upon notions of individual merit. Color blindness assumed a formally equal starting point, and that life’s achievements were the results of one’s own hard work and ability. Within such a conception, achievements were the sole the

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physical and intellectual property of the individual, rather than part of an interconnected social ecosystem. Per the color-blind narrative, affirmative action, or any other program that used government interventions to create a level playing field beyond that already achieved legally, only restricted individual achievement. The color-blind narrative gained prominence in an era when Americans generally eschewed overtly racist ideologies or actions because it provided a socially acceptable language through which racial and social privilege could be defended. At the same time, supporting the color-blind narrative was to argue against the government initiatives that were needed to promote true racial equality. Thus, color-blindness also connected with arguments for decreased government control. Color-blind narratives were arguments were against making the structural changes required to establish real equality. The color-blind narrative was anti-statist as much as it was implicitly racist.  

The second term that explains the transformation in the army’s narrative about race and race relations is less a term than a concept. There was no direct causal link between army’s conversation about doctrine and professionalism and the color-blind rhetoric that came to dominate army’s conversation about race relations and racial equality. Yet, there was a clear affinity between the languages of each separate conversation, similar to what sociologist Max Weber has referred to as elective

14 MacLean, Freedom is not Enough : The Opening of the American Workplace; Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past."
affinities. When ideas or narratives have an affinity with one another, perhaps because they use similar terms or derive from similar ideologies, individuals are more likely to see those narratives as supportive of, or easily reconcilable with, one another.

As this dissertation has shown, terms and ideals such as individualism, values, and initiative became the language through which members of the army understood military professionalism. Similar terms pervaded conservative America’s ideas in general, and they were foundational to the color-blind narrative. The concept of affinity, or elective affinity, symbolizes both the intersection of two separate conversations and the ways that those conversations attracted one another. By the late 1970s, when a colorblind discourse became powerful in American society, it also began to appear in the military press to describe how some members of the army understood race relations. At the same time, a narrative about warrior ethos, individualism, and the importance of personal initiative began to dominate the army’s concept of professionalism. The army’s professionalism narrative, the core of the institution’s cultural transformation, had a greater affinity with the color-blind narrative than it did with the army’s racial and cultural diversity language of the early 1970s. Thus, the two disparate conversations bonded as if they were a unitary concept, to the exclusion of the army’s language of cultural diversity.

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This is not to say that the army mapped color-blind policies directly on to the institution. Affirmative action policies remained. A weakened equal opportunity program continued. The programs that remained, however, did not retain the focus on adjusting the structural barriers to racial equality that existed within the institution.

Finally, this chapter is delimited by the fact that it generally considers the stories of white and African American soldiers. Of course, Asian American, Native American, and Latinx soldiers were also part of the army, and those populations were subjected to many of the same inequalities and biases as African Americans. That is not to say that the stories of other ethnic and racial minorities mirrored those of African American soldiers in the 1970s and 1980s, but rather that when members of the army discussed race or racial inequalities during this period, they did so in terms of black and white. Or, when non-African American racial minorities were mentioned, it was in terms of all racial minorities standing in solidarity against a white racial majority.16 Such a white-black conception is possible when talking about the army of the 1970s and 1980s because non-African American racial minorities made up a much smaller proportion of the institution. For example, in 1977, when African American soldiers comprised over twenty-five percent of the army, Latinx soldiers represented less than five percent of the

16 An excellent example of this is Harambe, a weekly publication by the Fort Carson, Colorado racial harmony council. Examples of Harambe can be found in Charles R. Wallis Papers, Box 1, Folder Harambe, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center.
Notably, the percentage of Latinx soldiers has doubled since the late 1970s, and Latinx soldiers now comprise over twelve percent of the army as of 2014.\(^{18}\)

I.

The army espoused a colorblind narrative about race relations by the 1980s, but the post-Vietnam War army was not always colorblind in either its rhetoric or its policies. In the wake of multiple race riots, the army established programs that promoted racial and cultural diversity as a means to overcome the institution’s racial turmoil. The army’s leaders built the equal opportunity program, an existing but underdeveloped and underfunded organization, into an influential part of the institution. The newly imagined program placed equal opportunity and race relations staff positions at all levels of command from the brigade to the Headquarters, Department of the Army in 1974.\(^{19}\)

Strengthening army’s equal opportunity program was one of the first initiatives that army leadership took to alleviate racial discrimination and unrest. Lieutenant General Walter Kerwin, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, revamped the equal

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opportunity program in 1971 at the behest of then Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland. Initially led by Colonel Harry W. Brooks, the new directorate created an affirmative action plan to ensure equal opportunity for both ethnic and racial minorities as well as women.20 The program grew from this small directorate working in the Pentagon to equal opportunity “reps,” school trained representatives that addressed soldier complaints and assessed the organization’s racial climate, in each military organization above the brigade level.21 The equal opportunity program also included quarterly and monthly race relations classes at the company level as well as multi-day classes that were offered to soldiers moving to a new installation. At times, members of the army both white and black, mocked the equal opportunity program for fanciful ideas or tokenism, programs that papered over the racial problems by placing a few soldiers from African American or other minority populations in influential positions, but equal opportunity programs provided clear mechanisms and command influence for addressing both overt racial discrimination and the implicitly discriminatory climates of some army organizations.22 Moreover, thanks to increased staffing and exposure, the equal opportunity program during the 1970s could monitor and ensure compliance with the army’s new equal opportunity directives.

21 “What’s New.”, A Brigade consists of three to five battalions and is roughly 4000 to 5000 personnel in size and commanded by a Colonel (O-6).
According to the army’s 1973 summary of its efforts to improve race relations, the purpose of the equal opportunity program was to both “correct structural deficiencies” to better protect minority populations from discriminatory practices as well as work to “eliminate prejudicial behavior” and promote “harmony” between soldiers of different races.\textsuperscript{23} Such statements meant that in the early 1970s, equal opportunity programs worked not only to decrease instances of individual bias and discrimination, but also to correct structural and systemic racial discrimination. Equal opportunity programs in the early 1970s organized around themes such as: discussion of DOD and army race relations policies, the recognition of personal racism, and how ignorance sustained that racism. The equal opportunity program also showed how institutions founded upon majority cultural value systems tended to ignore minority cultures to the detriment of those ethnic or racial minorities, and also the importance of communication in alleviating racial misunderstandings.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to formal institution-wide programs, several senior army leaders sponsored individually designed programs at the installation or post level to improve the communication between soldiers of different races in hopes of fostering greater

acceptance and understanding. Many of these same leaders promoted expressions of African American culture at the installation and small unit levels. Such initiatives included race relations or racial harmony councils – groups of soldiers that brought adverse racial climates to the attention of senior leaders, as well as responding to the needs of minority populations through acts such as: stocking products marketed for African Americans in Post Exchanges, celebrating African American history in installation sponsored entertainment programs, and providing greater varieties of entertainment in the on-post clubs. Military press publications also reflected the multicultural approach. Those magazines and journals published a number of articles that highlighted the army’s racial and cultural diversity during the 1970s.\(^{25}\)

Though less formal, the racial harmony councils were interesting because they created a space where minority populations could express their perceived grievances or talk about and solve actual instances of racial discrimination directly with senior officers. The councils were distinct from many army practices because they bypassed the traditional chain of command. The chain of command is the succession of authority running from a soldier’s immediate supervisor through the platoon, company, and each level of command ending at the President as the Commander in Chief. Many soldiers complained that reports of racial discrimination never made it past the company or


battalion commander, and were never acted upon. They believed, often for good reason, that lower level commanders were unwilling to truthfully report the race climate in their organizations for fear of repercussions.

The racial harmony councils addressed such perceptions of discrimination through senior leader attendance. General officers or their direct representatives attended the racial harmony councils, and their attendance gave junior soldiers a direct line to senior leaders in hopes of addressing their concerns. This immediate and direct path to affect change was important in changing the perceptions that many new African American soldiers held about the army. As one African American soldier noted, “Many young blacks coming into the army are already against the establishment. They take many army rules and regulations as being aimed at them personally.”  

Racial harmony councils gave these soldiers a voice. Division and post commanders introduced such racial harmony councils – alternatively termed racial awareness programs – on many army installations in the early 1970s.

Racial harmony councils also gave those African American soldiers who were informal leaders in the post’s African American community the power to solve problems

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26 Robert Betts, “The Army’s New Look II: Now There’s a Means of Airing Complaints,” Box 1, Folder Enlisted Men’s Council, Charles R. Wallis Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
27 Memorandum from Commanding General Fort Carson 4th Inf Div (Mech) to Commanding General U.S. Fifth Army Fort Sheridan, IL “Race Relations Briefing for Secretary of the Army” January 1971, in Charles R. Wallis Papers, Box 1, Folder Race Relations in the Army, AHEC.; Fort Benning GA Race Relations Coordinating Group, “Race Relations at Fort Benning,” (Fort Benning, GA: Fort Benning Race Relations Council, 1971).
which were common to all African American soldiers and their families. For example, on Fort Carson one of the most effective individuals in solving racial altercations was a young African American soldier with previous experience as a community organizer. This soldier would often go directly to the most militant African American soldiers involved with an altercation, and work to convince them to sit down with the racial harmony council and vent their feelings.\textsuperscript{28} The leaders of racial harmony programs noted that the most success came when African American soldiers who were influential with their racial peers saw that the division’s leadership was trying to help solve the problem and not simply maintain order or the “status quo.”\textsuperscript{29} Without programs that emphasized the unique problems facing members of the army’s racial minorities, such successes would have been impossible.

Establishing racial harmony councils not only counteracted the perceptions that senior leaders were not doing anything to fix the problem, but they also produced material results. In one instance, African American and Chicano soldiers were added to the inspector general team which investigated claims of discrimination. Another example was that in 1971, the amount of African American military policemen was increased to over ten percent of Fort Carson’s total force, a proportion that was only two

\textsuperscript{28} “Race Relations Briefing for Secretary of the Army”
\textsuperscript{29} Nordlie, “Race Relations and Equal Opportunity in the Army: A Resource Book for Personnel with Race Relations / Equal Opportunity Responsibility,”; See also, Gottlieb, “Brass Raps with Blacks: A Disturbed Command.”
percent less than the proportion of African American soldiers on post.\textsuperscript{30} Across the army, haircut regulations were loosened which allowed African American soldiers to wear the afro hairstyle rather than the “high and tight” as was previously mandated.\textsuperscript{31} Conversations coming out of the racial harmony councils were also important in placing books on African American history in the post libraries, catering to culturally diverse cuisine styles in dining facilities, and offering courses in African American history and Swahili at on-post university branch locations. For the latter, soldiers could attend these classes and work towards a college degree in their off-duty time.\textsuperscript{32}

On-post entertainment was another important space where army leadership set a climate of cultural and racial inclusion. In the early 1970s, the on-post clubs were a popular spot for soldier entertainment. Not only did the type of music performance; whether country and western, rock, or soul, matter, but so did the location where various types of music were performed. In 1973, the 3d Corps Commander Lieutenant General George P. Seneff personally oversaw the entertainment schedule for the Fort Hood clubs. Seneff made sure that different types of music rotated through each on-post club and also made sure the proportions of music performed was equal. In doing this, he encouraged integration and discouraged the grouping of a single race in one


\textsuperscript{31} Gottlieb, “Brass Raps with Blacks: A Disturbed Command.”

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.; “Race Relations Briefing for Secretary of Army,” in Charles R. Wallis Papers, Box 1, Folder Race Relations in the Army, AHEC.
specific entertainment location. Perhaps small victories, racial harmony councils did not eliminate racial incidents or discrimination, but they did help reduce their occurrence in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{33}

A further example of the lengths to which individual installations went to alleviate the racial divide were newspapers such as *Harambe*. *Harambe* was published weekly in the early 1970s by Fort Carson’s racial harmony council. *Harambe* published articles that promoted cultural understanding between races, ones that promoted greater racial solidarity between members of racial minorities, and reports on protests or other activism events across the nation.

Many of *Harambe’s* articles argued that rights and equality had to be taken through action rather than expected through assimilation. In one article, part of a two-part series entitled “Colored, Negro, or Black,” the author, writing under the name Lieutenant Sparrow, called on the late Malcolm X and chided what he termed Negroes who were “a black body infested with a white mind.” The author went on to malign those African Americans who were not radical in demanding changes to the white dominated status quo.\textsuperscript{34} Another installment was the post-trip report from Ed Morgado, the Fort Carson racial harmony council’s representative to the 1971 National Students Association congress. Morgado had spoken at the conference, portraying the challenges

\textsuperscript{33} For an example of soldier perceptions of improving race relations in the early 1970s see, Chick, "White & Black: Looking Back."
\textsuperscript{34} LT Sparrow, “Colored, Negro, or Black,” Box 1, Folder Harambe, Charles R. Wallis Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

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faced by African American soldiers as well as the programs which Fort Carson adopted to remedy the situation. He went on to describe the meetings he held with other speakers at the conference, including; Florence Kennedy, a spokeswoman for Women’s and Black Liberation, Beulah Sanders, a National Welfare Rights Organization leader, and Papandreou, a Greek resistance leader. Even the margins of *Harambe* were filled with drawings and cartoons that either satirized the army’s racial climate or showcased racial minorities and diverse cultural symbols.

*Harambe* is important because, although it was not an “official” army publication – meaning that the views expressed in the magazine were not the views or opinions of the Department of the Army – the weekly paper *was* published using Department of Defense funding provided to the racial harmony council by the installation commander. The newspaper’s content had at least the tacit approval of senior leaders. The existence of such a paper stands in stark contrast to later rhetoric that promoted the army as a multiracial brotherhood devoid of racial classifications.

Nor were these programs limited to one post or segment of the army’s population. Similar programs to the ones noted at Fort Carson were created at Fort Benning and Fort Hood as well as many smaller installations in Germany. Also, many military school curricula were updated to include instruction on the roots of the black

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35 Multiple issues of *Harambe* are in the Charles R. Wallis Papers. Each issue has a similar focus on African American and to a lesser extent Latinx culture. See Charles R. Wallis Papers, Box 1, Folder Harambe.

power movement and to help soldiers, particularly white members of the officer corps, understand African American history. The curricula suggest that the schools were trying to counter the lack of understanding which led many white officers to interpret the symbols displayed during interactions between African American soldiers as inherently militant.37 Two notable examples are the literature curriculum at West Point and the leadership curriculum at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

West Point’s curriculum was the first to adapt to a more multicultural perspective. The military academy’s faculty updated the English and Literature curriculum to include African American literature contemporaneous with the ascendant Civil Rights Movement in the early 1960s. Previously, white authors such as Mark Twain and Walt Whitman had sufficed to provide cadets with literary perspectives of slavery and emancipation. After 1963 however, the U.S. Military academy added James Baldwin’s *Go Tell it on the Mountain* to the literature curriculum, marking the first time that “cadets engaged the African American experience from the perspective of a black

author.”38 This trend continued with other additions to the literature curriculum. By 1969, Ralph Ellison’s *Invisible Man* was required reading for the entire freshman class. Furthermore, Ellison lectured at the academy in 1969, and in 1970 the English Department “dedicated an entire series of classes to orators and authors of the civil rights movement, including Martin Luther King Jr., Stokely Carmichael, Alice Walker, and Eldridge Cleaver.39 West Point’s process of incremental inclusion of racially diverse literatures starting in the late-1960s indicates the direction of army’s broader multicultural focus during the early 1970s.40

In addition, the CGSC curriculum included “race relations” training as part of its leadership and management course in the early 1970s. Those courses informed students on the army’s current race climate as well as America and the army’s history of racial discrimination. The curriculum included an exploration of the history of the institution of slavery and the impacts of that institution on American society. The course of instruction further endeavored to explain for the majority white audience the meanings of African American cultural symbols. One of the course’s many readings stated, “The black man has become aware of himself as a member of the black race. He has

38 Stoney L. Portis, “A Literary History of West Point: Race, Sex, and Gender at the U.S. Military Academy” (Dartmouth College, 2013), 36.
39 Ibid., 39.
40 Ibid. Throughout his thesis, Portis shows how West Point’s American literature canon adapted at distinct moments in the army and the nation’s history. Three periods: the Civil Rights Movement and the increased numbers of African American cadets during the 1960s, the integration of women cadets in 1976, and finally the inclusion of gay and lesbian cadets after the end of the “Don’t ask don’t tell” policy in the twenty first century each marked an inclusion of more diverse literature in West Point’s curriculum.
discovered that he can work with other blacks to achieve goals that would be difficult to
obtain as an individual.” 41 The description of racial consciousness may be stated in
different terms than would be stated today, but it is nonetheless an attempt to counteract
white officers’ fears of what they might have considered African American militancy
through increased understanding.

The CGSC course readings stated that African American racial consciousness
was a source of major “tension in the armed services.” CGSC instructors taught the
students that such racial consciousness often manifested in the display of symbols, self-
imposed segregation, and distinctive clothing. The course readings noted that as
symbols such as “afro hair styles and black power salutes” became more common,
existing prejudices and lack of communication between racial groups led to them
becoming the basis for “suspicion, fear, and insecurity.” What is most telling is the ways
that the course readings suggested that officers interpret those symbols. In the case of
the black power salute, the readings stated, “Top ranking officials in the armed forces
have publicly recognized this symbol for what it is – a gesture of solidarity, a salutation.
The clenched fist gesture, the salute, the exchange of Gary Owen [a greeting exchanged
between members of the U.S. 7th Cavalry Regiment], and ‘Airborne – All the Way’ are all

Book 1, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20-1. See also “Course 2 – Leadership and
Management, Period 1: Race Relations Bibliography,” in USACGSC Regular Course 1973-1974: Subjects
2020-3100 Book 1, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, P1 – 16.

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symbols of esprit de corps or brotherhood.”42 Such a juxtaposition read African American cultural symbols as analogous to some of the army’s most long standing and treasured symbols of belonging. In general, the army was trying to get more of its officers to accept different cultural expressions rather than trying to assimilate those expressions.

Racial harmony councils, increased education on diverse cultures to a still overwhelmingly white officer corps, and the inclusion of African American culture in the form of consumer goods and entertainment available on post helped, but did not solve, the army’s race issue. But the programs shifted the focus of the army’s discourse about race away from the supposed specters of the “race riot” and “black power.”

Certainly, equal opportunity programs and racial harmony councils were not the only reason for the change, but occurrences of overt discrimination and racially charged altercations decreased substantially by the middle 1970s when the programs described above were commonplace throughout the institution.

Despite the reduction in overt race violence and discrimination, racial discrimination remained ever present in the 1970’s army. What remained were subtler, but no less distinct, forms of exclusion. It was almost a given that African American soldiers experienced discrimination off post. Such discrimination was common in all

areas of the United States and particularly in Germany, where racial discrimination
against African American soldiers increased as the decades of American military
presence drew on. But, discrimination existed on post as well. On-post housing was
often criticized. Married soldiers qualified for subsidized housing on the installations
where they served, but often there were not enough homes available and soldiers and
their families had to find housing on the local economy. Several African American
soldiers alleged that they were discriminated against by the housing office. These
soldiers noted that the housing office, the office which managed the on-post housing
and paired available homes with incoming soldiers, sometimes put African American
soldiers on needlessly long waiting lists or only assigned African American soldiers to
certain neighborhoods or specific, often older, homes. Furthermore, when these soldiers
were forced to find housing off post they were at times denied housing by local realtors
and rental agencies.

Likewise, the army’s criminal justice system unfairly targeted soldiers of color.43
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a disproportionate amount of disciplinary actions
occurred among soldiers of racial minorities. In the latter 1970s, for African American
soldiers specifically, they represented one quarter of the army’s population, but over
half of the population of military prisons.44 Not only were military police forces often

43 John Englehart, "The Color Line: High Tension Trip Wire or Hot Line to Understanding," Soldiers,
February 1973, 16.
predominantly white, but according to a New York Times report in 1970 the Confederate flag was “displayed prominently” in the window of the Military Police Headquarters at Kelley Barracks in Heidelberg, Germany. White supremacist organizations were also ever-present in the army’s ranks. The Ku Klux Klan in particular maintained a presence on multiple installations.\(^ {45}\) According to one report, Klan units and public cross burnings were not uncommon in the army in the early 1970s.

II.

Despite such lingering racial inequalities, African Americans enlisted and reenlisted in the army in far greater proportions than white Americans after the end of conscription in 1973. Since World War II, African Americans had often served in over-representative numbers, but when conscription ended, the numbers of African American soldiers swelled to such an extent that they represented over thirty percent of the army by 1980.\(^ {46}\) The increase of African American soldiers in the army profoundly changed the army’s conversation about race relations.

The rise in the number of African American soldiers during the first years of the all-volunteer force was a function of economics. The end of conscription and an economic recession motivated many poor Americans to join the manpower-strapped

\(^ {46}\) Binkin, Blacks and the Military. See also Belew, Bringing the War Home.
army because it was the only employment available. Meanwhile, affluent youths tended to avoid military service because of the remaining stigma from the Vietnam War, and because they were more likely to have other employment or higher education opportunities. Furthermore, proportionally more (both middle and working class) African Americans volunteered for the army because they were hardest hit in the early years of the recession.

The recession affected working class Americans hardest, and African American men proved the most vulnerable within the workforce. Unemployment in the American labor force by the late 1970s was nearly ten percent. “At the same time, the unemployment rate for black teenagers, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, was over thirty-nine percent, but for black youths in large urban areas, unofficial estimates placed the effective rate closer to sixty percent.”47 Significantly less white middle-class youths entered the army after 1973 because there was no draft to motivate them, and they were more likely to find employment. America’s sagging economy during the 1970s made the army, if not a particularly attractive employment option, one of the most readily available for young African American men. Charles Moskos, one of the most noted scholars in the field of military sociology, noted that “many of our young enlisted

white soldiers are coming from nonmetropolitan areas.” Moskos further noted that, “I am even more impressed by what I do not find in line units: urban and suburban white soldiers of middle-class origins.” African Americans and rural whites populated the early all-volunteer force.

In her book, *America’s Army*, historian Beth Bailey has shown that the all-volunteer army’s changing racial demographics led to a debate about the institution’s “quality.” Recruits’ aggregate education levels and scores on the army’s entrance exam – the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) – defined soldier quality, and a quality recruit was one that possessed a high school degree and scored well on AFQT. The, generally civilian, commentators engaging in the quality debate critiqued the army’s recruits because of a reduction in AFQT scores during the first years of the all-volunteer army. Without the draft to either compel or motivate high school and college educate youths to join the army, a much higher proportion of new recruits had little high-school education and no post-secondary education. In short, the declining quality of army recruits had nothing to do with race. However, the quality debate used coded racial language; such as the idea that the army was unrepresentative, that the volunteer army only attracted poor Americans, or that new recruits only joined the army for economic reasons, because of the large increase in African American soldiers happened at the

48 Wilson, “Blacks in the Army: Staying and Advancing.”
same time as the reduction in test scores. The quality debate’s language was an implicit, and sometimes explicit, critique that the army was “too black” that drew upon generations old tropes about African American men’s unfitness for soldiering.

Low AFQT scores, like the increased amount of African American recruits, related to economic inequality. Because there was no draft to draw more educated, and often wealthier, youths into the army, there were fewer educated (high school diploma or higher) youths to counterbalance the lower scores of economically disadvantaged youths who had less access to education. The quality debate did not consider that AFQT scores were most often a function of education opportunities rather than intrinsic or potential intelligence. For instance, a recruit might have high functional intelligence, “street smarts” or an ability to learn through doing, but if that recruit could only read at an elementary level they would still score poorly on the AFQT. Thus, the chief cause of the reduction in the army’s quality was that better educated, and more affluent, youths avoided military service after the end of conscription. The end of conscription forced the army to turn to the only volunteers available, poor whites and African Americans who had difficulty finding employment elsewhere.

This was the free market, one of the principle underlying logics of ending conscription, at work. The volunteer force of the 1970s attracted men and women who saw it as their best option for economic security and advancement, but the majority of those recruits were poor, black, or both because African Americans were
disproportionately affected by a national recession. The aggregate reduction in the army’s metrics of recruit quality and the change in its racial demographics were correlated, but they were not causal. Still, racial demographics and recruit quality became joined in the national debate over the future of the volunteer force.

Conservative columnist George Will explicitly joined the categories of race and quality in a 1973 Washington Post editorial. Will charged that the army deliberately tried to discredit the idea of a volunteer force by overstating the problems of finding quality recruits. He suggested that, in fact, the army was meeting its recruiting quotas, and that the army had not adequately tested its very specific education requirements to see if they had merit. Will, however, cut to the quick in the column’s final paragraphs. He charged that “the constitution will not permit the racial mix of recruits to be counted as a problem,” further noting that “current army talk about recruits being too few or inferior or too black is devious and corrupt nonsense either to get conscription reinstated or to justify a massive budget shift among the services.”

Will provided few connective tissues between his assessment of the army’s misguided definitions of quality and his charge that the army might be attempting an end-run around the Fourteenth Amendment, but he suggested a causal relationship between two facts that were merely correlated. The mid-1970s army was proportionately more African American than the conscription era army, and it was of lesser quality when quality was defined by high

school diplomas and AFQT scores. The racist assumption that African American soldiers are of lesser quality than white soldiers is as old as the U.S. army itself, but the all-volunteer force yielded data, particularly lower AFQT scores and more Category IV recruits, which seemed to validate that assumption.\textsuperscript{51} The seeming validation of an old racial assumption added power and some measure of acceptability to the quality debate.

Army leaders, for their part, were very concerned about recruit quality, but did not explicitly join the categories of race and quality as did Will and other civilian commentators.\textsuperscript{52} Civilian news media, such as \textit{The New York Times} and \textit{The Washington Post}, contained much of the early debate about the quality of the volunteer army, and race was always a component of that conversation.\textsuperscript{53} For instance, several newspaper articles published in 1974 and 1975 cited the disproportionate number of African American soldiers in the volunteer army at the same time they were framing the volunteer force’s problems, and, like Will implied that high numbers of African

\begin{itemize}
\item Bailey, \textit{America’s Army}, 106, 07.
\item Charles C. Moskos, Jr., “Success Story: Blacks in the Military,” \textit{The Atlantic}, May 1986; Jr. Charles C. Moskos, "The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, profession, or occupation," \textit{Parameters}, 7, no. 1 (1977); Will, "The Army’s ‘Problem’." There were also, as mentioned elsewhere, several books published in the middle and late 1970s by military officers or those affiliated with the military that described the army’s declining quality in various ways. These books, however, often described declining ethics within the officer corps or drug and race issues present in the army. The debate about the quality of the volunteer army was a related but separate discourse. Hauser, \textit{America’s Army in Crisis; a Study in Civil-Military Relations}; Richard A. Gabriel, \textit{Crisis in Command : Mismanagement in the Army}.
\item Bailey, \textit{America’s Army}, 89.
\end{itemize}
American soldiers were part of the quality problem.\textsuperscript{54} Members of the army often dismissed the issue of the high proportion of African American soldiers, choosing instead to describe the numbers of African American youth joining the army as indicative of the opportunities available within the army for all Americans.\textsuperscript{55}

This chapter builds upon Bailey’s depiction of the quality debate in the all-volunteer army. Bailey’s work depicts the challenge that the quality debate posed for army leaders during the first years of the all-volunteer force, but it does not show how the quality debate intersected with the army’s ongoing cultural project nor the broad impact that the external critique of African American soldiers had on the army’s culture. As shown in previous chapters, when the quality debate was at its most fervent near the end of the 1970s, army leaders such as General Donn Starry and the CSA General Edward C. Meyer were altering the army’s culture towards one based on individual values.

III.


Like conversations about doctrine, professionalism, and performance, the participation of civilian academics legitimated the ideas of members of the army themselves. In the case of the army’s conversation about race relations, the military sociologist Charles Moskos’ ideas were a connecting link between the diversity focus of the early 1970s, the quality debate that followed soon after, and the eventual color-blind rhetoric that dominated the army’s conversation about race during the 1980s. Moskos served on the faculty of Northwestern University, and he wrote extensively in both military and the academic press, particularly *Armed Forces and Society*, a publication he co-founded and where he also served on the editorial board. Moskos himself was a former army draftee, and remained critical of the all-volunteer force. He wrote extensively about both race and gender integration in the U.S. military, and later Moskos authored the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy for the Bill Clinton administration. In the 1970s, Moskos gained the most notoriety for his institution-occupation model. He posed what became the most debated military sociology question of the era by questioning whether or not the volunteer army was an institution or an occupation. Moskos

initiated the so-called institution-occupation debate with his 1977 article “From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization” in *Armed Forces and Society*.

Moskos argued that the U.S. military, though he mostly referenced the army, was transitioning from “an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation because of the end of conscription and the army’s need to recruit on the labor market.” For Moskos, an institution was “legitimated in terms of values and norms.” He connected the sense of values to an overall purpose that transcended self-interest in favor of a “presumed higher good.” In contrast, an occupation was legitimated in terms of the marketplace, in other words, the exchange of a monetary reward for “equivalent competencies.” An occupation stressed the contractual relationship between employees and employers. But mostly, Moskos noted that “the occupational model implies priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization.”

Moskos argued that the military had traditionally displayed the qualities of an institution, and that the ideal of service to the nation above the needs of the self was one of the army’s greatest strengths. He acknowledged that the distinction between an institution and an occupation could be overdrawn and that any military force exhibited characteristics of both organizational forms. He argued, however, that since the end of

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58 Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," 42.
59 Ibid., 43.
the draft, the U.S. military had moved decidedly towards an occupation, and that this move posed grave challenges for the America’s military. Among the consequences of the occupation model were potential trade unions of soldiers organized against their officers or leaders, of an increased reliance on civilian contractors, and lower morale among soldiers themselves. The occupational model also linked to the quality of life programs initiated after the end of the draft because such programs were designed to entice America’s youth to join the army for personal or economic rather than patriotic reasons. These programs, known as VOLAR an acronym for Volunteer Army, sought to improve soldiers’ lives, but were criticized by members of the army for challenging some ideas of order, discipline, and hierarchy. Moskos explicitly stated that the occupational model’s consequences were detrimental to the military’s quality, and by extension, they were detrimental to national security.

Moskos’ formulation linked the rise in African American soldiers to the U.S. military’s supposed shift from an institution to an occupation because the majority of new African American soldiers were economically motivated, meaning that they joined the army because it was gainful employment in a flagging economy. His message was not explicitly that individual African American soldiers were of lower quality. That

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notion was something Moskos never stated and in fact argued against, citing that African American volunteers of the 1970s were more likely to hold a high school diploma than their white counterparts. Still, the institution-occupation model’s implied message was that the African American soldiers recruited in the first years of the all-volunteer force were less desirable because they were economically motivated to join the army. For Moskos, economically motivated soldiers, of any racial background, were less desirable because they were motivated by self-interest rather than civic obligation or national service.

Moskos’ institution-occupation model was not specifically racialized, but his earlier tipping point theory was. That earlier theory suggests the implicit racial bias underlying Moskos’ ideas. Moskos and his co-author, fellow sociologist and Moskos’ graduate advisor Morris Janowitz who authored The Professional Soldier in 1960, advanced the tipping point theory in a 1974 article in Armed Forces and Society entitled “Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force.” Moskos and Janowitz essentially adapted the sociological phenomena dubbed “white flight,” which referred to the departure of whites from places increasingly or predominantly populated by racial minorities, from the context of urban housing policy to the military. They surmised that at some point, “the proportion of black soldiers becomes so high that large numbers

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of whites are no longer prepared to enter the particular service or branch involved.”

Such an occurrence, they argued, “could be engendered by factors including the perceived status decline of units which were disproportionately black, or the very real fear of black hooliganism.” The tipping point theory, like the institution-occupation model, was a construct through which to challenge the changing racial and socioeconomic demographics of the volunteer army. Moskos and Janowitz went to great lengths in their article to note that they spoke only about race as opposed to the combination of race and quality. They defined the tipping point problem in terms of representativeness rather than quality – if large numbers of whites either left the army or refused to join, then the army would become overwhelmingly African American.

Moskos’ language, if not his intent, flipped the idea of representativeness. During the Vietnam War, representativeness was a critique of the disproportionate number of African American soldiers which charged that the army’s overrepresentation of African American soldier was evidence that the draft unfairly targeted African Americans. In the all-volunteer army, representativeness and the tipping point were veiled critiques that the army was “too black.”

Taken together, the tipping point theory, the institution-occupation model, and the quality debate were arguments against the all-volunteer force and the increasing

64 Ibid.
65 Rostker, I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force, 321.
numbers of poor whites and racial minorities that populated the institution. For their part, the army’s leaders had little choice but to make the volunteer army “work.” Whether or not military leaders desired a return to the draft army was irrelevant, such a political turn was never politically tenable. Making the volunteer army “work” meant, in part, addressing the concerns of increased numbers of racial minorities in the institution. The army’s need to address the quality debate set the stage for the army’s adoption of a color-blind language. Furthermore, the institution-occupation model provided the language for the army’s transition to a color-blind rhetoric. When Moskos promoted the idea of the army as an institution, it aligned with how members of the army wanted to perceive themselves and their institution, but the institution model also necessitated an approach to race relations that construed all members of the army as adhering to a normative conception of cultural values and behaviors. The army could not promote cultural diversity at the same time that it also promoted cultural unity and institutional cohesion.

Moskos developed the institution-occupation model at the same time that others made conceptual distinctions such as maneuver-attrition or manager-leader. In their cultural narratives, members of the army linked terms such as institution, maneuver, and leader because they contrasted with ideas about the ways in which the conscription

66 Selective service was reinstated, but political leaders never went so far as to reinstate conscription, meaning that although young men registered for the draft there was never a realistic effort to draft anyone for service after conscription’s end. The most comprehensive institutional history on the subject is, ibid.
mobilization army, the so-called industrial or second-wave army, failed in the Vietnam War. The terms institution, maneuver, and leader were deployed in separate narratives, such as those about doctrine or the army’s values, but each term connoted the same cultural shift from a so-called managerial culture to a warrior or leader culture. Such narrative dichotomies were easily overdrawn and caricatured, it was difficult to analytically separate and define the boundaries of concepts such as leadership and management in the same way that it was, as Moskos himself suggested, difficult to clearly separate an institution from an occupation. Culturally, however, it was a question of which concepts, terms, and behaviors the members of the army most valued. In short, there was little substantive distinction in the terms of the army’s cultural shift; the cultural terms that members of the army employed were a sort of semantic shell-game. The shift in the army’s conversation about race relations was part of the coalescence of a coherent identity narrative through which members of the army defined themselves and their institution.

In order for members of the officer corps to interpret themselves as professionals in the same way as doctors, lawyers, or the clergy were considered professionals, the army needed to be perceived by the nation’s citizens as an institution. Institutions, such as the bar or the medical field, were set apart from broader society, marked by a field of specialized knowledge, and possessed of a common ethos. Moskos’ institution-occupation model was an analytic through which to promote a conservative, values-
based, middle class, and racially white institutional culture amidst a changing national society and the army’s changing social demographics.

The quality debate and the institution occupation model illustrate the complexity of the army’s cultural transition. The army’s newly emerging culture functioned on multiple levels in seemingly contradictory ways. On the one hand, members of the army preferred self-motivated, individualist soldiers who could function autonomously on the battlefield. However, the army’s emerging culture narrative also sought to constrain those individuals’ behavior and mental frames through normative cultural values. The army’s leadership was predominantly white, middle-class, and Protestant. The values they espoused, as is examined more fully in the next chapter, were defined in terms analogous to white, middle class, Protestant Christian culture. Such a values-based narrative of professionalism, however, was also predicated upon the army’s conception as an institution because occupations, by definition, were defined by economic transactions rather than values.

V.

The army’s concerns over institutions, quality, and racial demographics withered the institution’s earlier focus on diversity into a language of color-blindness. The racial harmony councils, diversity training, and other moves to acknowledge and accept African American culture atrophied to the point where much of the equal opportunity
programs designed to quell racial unrest and ensure racial equality were either gone or understated by the 1990s. In their place, the army built a narrative that accepted African American soldiers as members of the institution, but did not challenge the army’s conception of a professionalism based upon normative values. The irony, however, is that the efforts of the first African American Secretary of the army, in part, built and legitimated the army’s colorblind narrative.

President Jimmy Carter appointed Clifford L. Alexander to Secretary of the Army, and Alexander was sworn in as the Secretary of the Army on February 14, 1977. He was a graduate of Yale Law School, and a veteran of the New York National Guard. Alexander boasted a successful private law career, and served in multiple presidential administrations. Prior to his appointment as Secretary of Army, he also headed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and taught law at Howard University. Though a civilian, the Secretary of the Army represents the institution to both Congress and the administration, and given the politically charged nature of the transition from conscription to an all-volunteer army, Secretary Alexander was a key agent in the army’s conversation about race. Alexander’s take on army race relations also mattered more because he was African American himself. Notably, breaking from his predecessor Harold “Bo” Calloway, Secretary Alexander believed that any talk of the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{67} Bailey, America’s Army, 117.}\]
overrepresentation of African Americans in the army had racist roots, and argued that
the proportion of African American soldiers was of no consequence.\textsuperscript{68}

Alexander put an end to the quality debate by simply refusing to engage with the issue, but the shift away from talk of the army’s social representativeness was a step towards color-blindness. Secretary Alexander forbade any talk about “quality” by members of the army. More important, Alexander dismissed AFQT (later renamed ASVAB for Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery in 1977) scores as a measure of quality. All recruits continued to take the new ASVAB, but it was no longer used to group recruits into mental categories. Alexander noted that the ASVAB might be useful in placing new soldiers in military occupations appropriate to their abilities, but dismissed the mental category scores as a measure of potential. He went so far as to have test scores and mental categories removed from 400,000 soldiers’ files to “prevent their abuse.”\textsuperscript{69} Instead, the new Secretary suggested that actual on-the-job performance was the only true measure of quality. Thus, the quality debate eventually died, but it died from a lack of statistics to feed it rather than from policy solutions to systemic problems. Alexander’s policies did not raise the army’s aggregate mental capacity, that would come later when improved pay and benefits attracted more educated youths, he

\textsuperscript{68} Mittelstadt, \textit{The Rise of the Military Welfare State}, 89-91; Binkin, \textit{Blacks and the Military}, 5.
\textsuperscript{69} Bailey, \textit{America’s Army}, 118, 19.
simply silenced the quality debate by undercutting the processes through which quality was measured.

The army’s EO programs also exhibited signs of the increasing color-blind rhetoric. In the late 1970s, the army began to change the EO programs from the diversity focus of the early 1970s to a focus on the multiculturalism and racial inclusion of the army. The army could rightly point to its status as a forerunner in racial integration, but the turn to a color-blind discourse masked earlier efforts to reimage race relations within the institution. The army both standardized EO programs. Such standardization posed the end of the informal and individualized programs, such as the one at Fort Carson, which were tailored to the unique racial climate on specific army installations. The EO program policy statements of many army organizations and units also began to focus more on the elimination of discrimination as opposed to earlier goals of cultural education and awareness. Such a shift was incremental, but it supported color-blind thinking. In the 1980s army, eliminating discrimination translated to eliminating individual acts of discrimination through policing of the institution’s members, and thus depicted racial discrimination in the same individualist terms as Dowd Hall uses to describe colorblind conservatism. In contrast, the programs described at the beginning

of this chapter were more oriented toward education and awareness, a focus which
depicted racial discrimination in broader societal terms.71

Perhaps most telling was a 1979 study providing recommendations on how to
structure the army’s EO program. That study recommended, among other things, the
“elimination of negative aspects of course content.” The negative aspects to which the
study referred were that EO training should be less “black-white oriented,” less centered
on “minority history and culture,” less slanted to benefit minorities, and “less blaming
of whites.”72

The army acted on many of the recommendations of the 1979 study, and the
language and focus of the army-wide EO policy in 1986 was markedly different from
that of 1972. In 1986, the stated objective of the army’s EO policy was to, “formulate,
direct, and sustain a comprehensive effort that ensures fair treatment of all soldiers
based solely on merit, fitness, capability, and potential.”73 The EO program remained, as
did the formal positions for EO representatives in each army unit, but there was no
longer any discussion of institutional racism, minority cultures, or cultural

72 Ibid., vii. In contrast, the same 1979 study showed that the race relations and EO program’s original conception was that, “The implicit assumption underlying the original DRRI curriculum seems to be that increased awareness and understanding of minority history and culture and awareness of some of the psychological dynamics of racial prejudice will lead to decreased racial prejudice which in turn will lead to better intergroup communication and less intergroup tension and conflict.”
understanding. By 1986, the EO program’s focus was solely on eliminating individual acts of discrimination. This trend continued into the 1990s. The broad EO program remained, and each soldier received training on that policy, but the racial awareness programs and the diversity-oriented training present during the 1970s was gone. 74 Rhetorically, at least, the army’s EO program became color-blind by the 1980s.

Color-blind rhetoric also marked articles in the military press. Many articles during the early 1970s followed the pattern of the army’s EO program, generally multicultural in its approach, showing the diversity of soldiers that comprised the U.S. army, but that focus changed by the late 1970s contemporaneous with the quality debate. For instance, in 1975 and 1976, Soldiers magazine ran a monthly column highlighting the abilities of African American soldier. These articles described African American soldiers as analogous to white soldiers, showing how African American soldiers were always a part of the American army and America’s wars. Like colorblind rhetoric, the articles mentioned the existence of racism, but placed that racism in the distant past. The articles talked about segregation and the segregated army, but did not mention the poor treatment African American soldiers received individually nor the institutional ways in which African American soldiers and black army formations were relegated to second class status. The series of articles portrayed the black units in the segregated army as separate, but not unlike the white units, and further implied that,


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despite the segregation African American soldiers shared in the same successes and trials as did white soldiers.

For example, “Henry Johnson was a Fighting Man,” a 1975 Soldiers article, celebrates Johnson as the first American soldier to win the French Croix de Guerre for bravery during World War I. Johnson, however, was celebrated for his individual bravery, and no mention was made of how his regiment, known as the Harlem Hellfighters, were one of the few black regiments to see combat and only then as part of the French Army. The article suggests a commonality of the bravery and struggle of all American soldiers regardless of race, and depicts an institution where anyone, regardless of race, can succeed through personal effort and courage.

Extolling the virtues of African American soldiers without describing the discrimination and hatred to which they were subjected mutated historical memory. Using historical evidence to show the long record of brave service of African American soldiers reinforced broader narratives that the army was an institution of opportunity. But, by failing to mention the racist conditions under which African American soldiers served for the majority of the nation’s history, such articles overshadowed the army’s remaining racial discrimination. In one 1984 Soldiers article, which prominently featured an interview with Coretta Scott King, the wife of Dr. Martin Luther King, the author

pointed out that although Dr. King questioned the need for war, he did look to the army as an example of what was possible. The authors of military press articles framed the army as a leader in racial integration because they implied that the army had already solved the problems of racial discrimination and that racial classifications were no longer necessary.\footnote{Gene Harper, “Holding Fast the Dream,” ibid., January 1984.}

The very success of some African American members of the army, such as General Colin Powell the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 1990, promoted the color-blind narrative. General Powell seems to have deeply believed in the army’s inherent social equality. That belief, coupled with his success, promoted the army as the paradigmatic color-blind meritocracy. In his memoirs, Powell described his ROTC detachment as a place where he found that, “race, color, background, and income meant nothing.”\footnote{Cited in Phillips, \textit{War! What is it Good For?: Black Freedom Struggles and the US Military from World War II to Iraq}, 193.} Having such a prominent African American soldier touting the army as first and foremost an inherently equal meritocracy did much to change perceptions of the army, both internal and external to the institution. Another example was Lieutenant General Julius Becton. Becton enlisted in the army upon high school graduation in 1944, and remained in the army until his retirement in 1983. As a senior general, Becton commanded the 1st Cavalry Division and later the VII Corps in Germany.\footnote{Meg Anderson, “Julius W. Becton, Jr. (1926- ),” 2009, https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/becton-jr-lieutenant-general-julius-w-1926/. Accessed on March 04, 2019}
magazine interviewed Becton for a 1984 article entitled “A Matter of Perspective.” Like Powell, Becton noted that he found “in the army, a society that would treat them [African Americans] as equal to whites.” He, and the other African American soldiers interviewed, noted that such notions in society were slow in coming into being, but they each noted that the forced integration of the army following the Korean War put the army at the forefront of society with respect to racial equality. Positive statements from African American senior leaders, like Secretary Alexander’s moratorium on quality and representativeness, entrenched the sense that the army stood apart from national society, that the institution had achieved not only legal but actual equality, and affirmed that there were institutions within the United States which were colorblind meritocracies.

VI.

The striking feature of the army’s color-blind narrative was that it did not worsen racial tensions in the same way that similar narratives did in American society. Soldiers were paid the same regardless of race, soldiers were centrally promoted, and even the weakened EO programs were robust enough that acts of overt discrimination were prosecuted. In short, where affirmative actions were challenged in American society, they largely remained in the army. When compared to the bulk of American

society, the army also achieved a higher level of social equality. The social equality came, not simply from EO policies, but also developed through a social welfare system which enabled a nominally colorblind meritocracy to flourish.\(^8^0\) Thus, one of the most prominent examples of a color-blind meritocracy amidst an increasingly conservative America was undergirded by the one of the last expressions of the American social welfare state.

To be clear, the army did not eradicate racial discrimination. Discrimination remained a part of the institution, but overt acts of racism and discrimination were rare by the 1980s. Despite the improved racial climate during the 1980s, army race relations worsened in the next decade amid a rise in white nationalism across American society. Still, despite a nominally color-blind rhetoric, members of the army from all races achieved a measure of social equality unmatched by much of American society.\(^8^1\)

The Nunn-Warner amendment to the 1982 defense appropriation act raised service member pay to a point where soldiers were no longer living at the poverty level. The 1982 increase, when coupled with annual pay increases in 1980 and 1981 of eleven and fourteen percent respectively, meant that service member pay increased by thirty


\(^{81}\) For examples of white supremacy in the army, particularly in the 1990s, see Belew, *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America*. One of the most prominent examples of military white supremacy was Timothy McVeigh, who bombed an Oklahoma City, Oklahoma federal building in 1995. Recent examples include a member of the Coast Guard who had stockpiled weapons in preparation for a future attack. Dave Phillips, "White Supremacism in the U.S. Military, Explained," *The New York Times*, February 27 2019.
percent over the span of three years.\textsuperscript{82} As military pay increased, some members of the army, especially noncommissioned and commissioned officers, enjoyed a relatively secure middle-class life. Pay raises assured that the African American men and women who chose military service enjoyed a higher standard of living, and wages that were both on average more than their similarly educated peers and equal to white members of the institution.

Increases in service member pay were only one component of the solution. Another of the major differences between life for members of the army and America’s civilian population were the social programs open to members of the army. Programs like child care and employment placement services assisted not only servicemembers but also their families. As historian Jennifer Mittelstadt points out, “during the 1980s, soldiers and their families occupied one of the sole legitimate sites that Reagan’s policies reserved for government support.”\textsuperscript{83}

The most well-known military social program was the Montgomery G.I. Bill. The Montgomery G.I. Bill, named after the bill’s sponsor Congressman Gillespie V. Montgomery (R-MS), was a resurrection of the original post-World War II G.I. Bill which traded military service for federally funded grants and stipends that funded servicemembers’ pursuits of higher education. Congress signed the new

\textsuperscript{82} Binkin, \textit{Blacks and the Military}, 138, 39.
\textsuperscript{83} Mittelstadt, \textit{The Rise of the Military Welfare State}, 166.
“Montgomery,” G.I. Bill into law in 1984, and it provided qualifying service-members with up to four years of fully funded college tuition. The G.I. Bill was the most popular of many federal programs supported the social well-being of soldiers during the 1980s. Other programs also included: free medical care, housing subsidies for married soldiers or soldiers who were single parents, family support centers that offered youth programs and child care along with counseling and financial management classes for adults, employment services for soldiers’ spouses, and substance abuse prevention programs. Each program all fell under the rubric of the Army Family, a paternalistic conception whereby the army took care of its members as if they were all part of the same dependent family. The programs were either free of charge, or substantially discounted from what similar services might cost outside of the military. Mittelstadt suggests that the army’s welfare programs were acceptable because they were promoted under a family narrative, a narrative that was in line with conservative ideals. Still, these programs were no different than the social welfare programs that many conservatives shunned.84

Cutting welfare, or the “size” of the U.S. government was part of the conservative project, particularly after the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan.85 The conservative majority in Washington D.C. reduced funding for programs such as Aid to

84 Ibid., 37, 114-17, 56, 57, 67.
85 For one interpretation of Reagan era cuts to U.S. social welfare see, Orleck, Storming Caesars palace: How black mothers fought their own war on poverty.
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, and Medicaid. Moreover, part of the reductive measures was the institution of additional means testing for welfare recipients, particularly those families receiving aid through AFDC. In short, during the 1980s, supporting the American military family was construed as beneficial to the nation while some political leaders argued that similar support for civilian families was detrimental to American values. The result was that basic social needs such as: food, water, shelter, education, a secure and livable wage, and access to economic opportunity, were secure for members of the army and their families while those same protections were not afforded to the vast majority of American citizens.

The military, particularly the army because it was the largest of the services in terms of numbers of personnel, was a Reagan era antidote to broader cuts in social welfare. For instance, at the same time that Congress approved the Montgomery G.I. Bill, the Reagan administration substantially cut federal aid for college tuition. Effectively, Reagan era welfare reforms tied state funded social benefits to national service. During a time of increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, Reagan’s rhetoric and policies fostered a militarized form of domestic politics that “championed the military functions of government while dismantling the social welfare functions of government.”

87 Ibid., 96.
During his 1981 commencement address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Reagan described his conceptions of how the nation should support the military vice the ways in which state sponsored financial support should be apportioned to the nation at large. He noted that that during the 1970s the “government began to grow beyond the consent of the governed.” Further noting that taxation became “more and more confiscatory” while it neglected its responsibility of national security. At the same time, President Reagan noted that “Congress has voted the greatest reduction in the budget ever attempted and, at the same time, has mightily increased the spending for the military.” President Reagan concluded his speech by listing the multiple ways in which federal dollars would be used to support and strengthen the military, noting that previously the “federal government, in effect, provided more benefits to those who were not serving their country and reduced them to those who were.”

In this speech, Reagan delegitimated social welfare for the nation at large while establishing the same type of support to members of the military as a pillar of his presidency. This, coupled with the army’s growing colorblind narrative, created a situation where color-blind conservatism, as Dowd Hall coined the term, proved effective. Certainly, military funding was on the rise during the Carter administration,

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but Reagan increased the funding directed at military personnel and provided his unfettered support. For the army, the influx of funding and support built the institution’s confidence and set it on the path that culminated in Operation Desert Storm – where the army emerged victorious and journalists claimed that the institution represented the best of America. More so, the military could boast not only the material equality between races, in terms of equal pay and benefits, but also the opportunity for individual excellence, defined most prominently in senior leaders like General Becton and General Powell. In the post-Desert Storm narrative, color-blind meritocracy seemed to describe the U.S. army. An individual, regardless of race, could rise on their merits alone. Omitted from that narrative, however, was how the military provided for its members’ basic social needs, creating the social security and opportunity that made it easier for member of the army to succeed regardless of their economic or racial background.

Still, while race relations had improved, tensions remained just below the surface. A 1991 *Washington Post* article captured the sentiment well with the subheading, “For Gulf War Veterans, Green Isn’t Army’s Only Color.”

89 Racial jokes and banter were the norm among mixed-race army units, and many soldiers felt they had to “hold their tongue” for the good of the organization despite taking offense to the

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There was, however, a sense of what might be termed task cohesion, if not always social or racial cohesion. Task cohesion meant that by 1990 soldiers identified first with the army, their company, their platoon, or even their squad as much as their race, meaning that during a period of combat, like Desert Storm, or even during period of difficult work or training, soldiers bound together despite whatever internal biases they might have held. In many cases, racial “unity was born of necessity.” Beyond task cohesion, economic security cooled reactions to racial bias and discrimination in the same way they did for soldiers in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the army’s soldiers were compensated as well as and often better than their civilian counterparts. Committing acts of discrimination, or banding together and speaking against a racially unequal climate as many African American soldiers did in the early 1970s, might have jeopardized what was otherwise stable and secure employment. Thus, it was not that that the army was free of discrimination, or that the army’s EO programs were imminently successful, but rather that the army was, by the 1980s, a sought-after form of employment. Well-paid soldiers remained quiet.

During Operation Desert Storm, twenty percent of soldiers were African American, nearly the same racial proportions that were present in the early 1970s prior to the end of conscription. Furthermore, like during the Vietnam War, the army was

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\(^90\) Ibid.

\(^91\) Ibid.
dominated by men (and many women) from poor and working-class families. Much was similar, but what had changed was the social protections that the army afforded to its members, and those social protections helped create a harmonious social and racial climate. Unlike the Vietnam era, soldiers during Desert Storm were relatively well-paid. Many of those soldiers expected to leverage their military service for college education. Many more soldiers used the variety of programs offered on army posts; whether fully funded medical care, subsidized child care, or job placement programs for military spouses.

Finally, by 1991, the U.S. army was fully professionalized, not only did each member of the army make a conscious decision to join the army, but for the first time in perhaps the history of the institution the army’s definition of professionalism included all soldiers, not just members of the officer corps. Maintaining one’s identity as a soldier, as well as all of the social benefits that came with that identity in 1980s America, was incumbent upon performing, if not always internalizing, behaviors commensurate with the army’s values. Not only was bigotry antithetical to those values, but so was social activism directed against the army or the nation. The army’s cultural revolution of the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with a marked increase in social benefits, did not end racial discrimination and bias within the institution, but it made it beneficial to hide racist sentiments.
VII.

Racial violence nearly tore the army apart during the Vietnam War, and the army first attempted to quell racial unrest through an approach that advocated multiculturalism and diversity. That approach lasted through the first half of the 1970s when, after the end of conscription in 1973, there began a substantial rise in the proportion of African American soldiers. The substantial increase in African American soldiers initiated a debate about the quality of the volunteer army. That debate was explicitly about the perceived intelligence of incoming recruits, but was also an implicit critique of the army’s changing racial demographics. In the first years after the end of conscription, prior to any substantial increases in pay and benefits, there was little incentive for middle-class youths to join the army. In those years, the volunteer army overwhelmingly attracted recruits, both white and black, from the nation’s poorest citizens. In general, economically disadvantaged recruits scored lower on the army’s entrance test because they were less educated. It was harder for the army to promote cultural diversity because the increase in African American soldiers was associated with the perceived decrease in the army’s quality. But also, the promotion of cultural and racial diversity did not match the army’s new professionalism narrative which was based upon values which were constructed as normative, or held in common by all members of the institution.
To solve the problem, the army pivoted to a color-blind narrative appropriated from American society. That narrative focused on the legal equality of all persons in the army, papering over the still extant race discrimination. However, despite the remaining discrimination, the army seemed to be the most multicultural and socially equal of America’s institutions. African American soldiers rose to the rank of general, they received equal pay and benefits, and were promoted according to their individual ability. The difference in how color-blind language functioned in the army vice how similar rhetoric affected national society was the litany of social welfare programs undergirding the lives of soldiers and their families. These benefits, and the social protections they provided, were the reason that the army’s nominally colorblind policies seemed to “work.” The “military welfare state,” as Mittelstadt refers to it, did not end racial discrimination in the army’s ranks, but it leveled the playing field for members of all races to such an extent where upward social mobility was more likely within the army than it was across national society.

Within the larger context of the army’s post-Vietnam War cultural transformation, the change in the ways that members of the army predominantly understood race and race relations, from a diversity to a color-blind narrative, is important because it shows how different conversations spilled into one another. As an entire process, the army’s cultural transformation was multilayered and complex. The core of that transformation was doctrine and professionalism. Those changes, depicted
in previous chapters, were more important to the army’s cultural identity than questions of race and race relations as evidenced by how often members of the army wrote about each topic in the military press. Because of their relative importance, as the conversations about doctrine and professionalism became stronger and more structured they shaped how members of the army described other topics. With respect to how members of the army talked about race, two narratives were available to members of the army during the 1970s, one narrative valued cultural and racial diversity, and the other was nominally color-blind, valuing normative values and individual achievement at the expense of addressing broad structural inequalities. Put simply, the latter narrative had a much stronger affinity with the army’s new professionalism narrative, contained in Airland Battle doctrine, that valued individual initiative and leadership. Because of that affinity, color-blindness became the narrative through which members of the army predominantly described race relations within the institution.

Thus, the army did not turn away from the diversity language that first marked the ways in which the army overcame the racial animus of the Vietnam War era because of a deliberate plan shepherded by a few influential leaders. Rather, the diversity language became untenable because of a racially charged debate about the army’s quality, and because of the institution’s 1980’s predilection for narratives that supported the army’s value-based, individualist conception of military professionalism.
The reception battalion is a new soldier’s first taste of army life. Reception battalions are located at each post where soldiers go through their initial entry or “basic” training. By the late 1990s, when a recruit entered a reception battalion’s headquarters, the walls were plastered with large posters featuring the stereotypical muscular and mean looking drill sergeant emblazoned with words such as: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Together these words represented the seven army values, which were a concise statement of the army’s professional ethic, and they were everywhere. Each hallway, barracks room wall, and sidewalk within the confines of the reception battalion made reference to the seven army values. These words, and the values to which they referred, were as much a part of indoctrination into the U.S. army as drill sergeants, marching, and the M-16 rifle. They were foundational to the transformation from citizen to soldier. As soldiers progressed through their careers, the army values remained. The army values were, and continue to be, the behavioral standard to which each soldier is held.

But as Chapter 2 showed, even in the 1990s an established code of army values was quite new. The U.S. army did not formalize a professional ethic until 1981, and the conceptualization of that ethic was part of the army’s cultural transformation.
Previously, many officers believed that the United States Military Academy’s motto of “Duty – Honor – Country” sufficed for guiding the conduct of the institution’s members, but that commonly held belief fell apart during and after the Vietnam War. Incidents such as the My Lai massacre, where a platoon of American soldiers executed over 400 Vietnamese civilians, shook public confidence in the army and embodied the institution’s moral slippage. That moral slippage also horrified many younger members of the officer corps, and prompted them to action.

The Vietnam War was not only a military defeat. It was also a moral defeat that nearly ripped apart the institution. By moral defeat, I mean that the Vietnam War challenged the army’s professional identity, and the institution’s standing within American society. A generation removed from the victory parades at the end of World War II, the Vietnam War was the army’s moral and ethical nadir in both the minds of members of the army and the minds of the American public. Gone were the clean cut, wholesome, neighbors and brothers returning victorious from World War II, and in their place stood Lieutenant William Calley, convicted of the murder of civilians at My Lai,


and a parade of bedraggled, scruffy, veterans broken by war. Because of the shock of
the loss of the Vietnam War, because of the officer corps’ recognition of its own ethical
shortcomings during that war, and because of the need to reestablish the American
public’s trust, defining a professional code of ethics was a central component of the
army’s cultural transformation following the Vietnam War. This chapter depicts how
the process of determining those values connected with the army’s ongoing cultural
processes as well as trends in American society, particularly the evangelical Christian
movement.

This chapter argues that, during a moment of cultural instability following the
Vietnam War, ideas associated with America’s ascendant evangelical movement shaped
how the army reimagined its system of professional ethics and acceptable behaviors.
Prominent army leaders such as General John A. Wickham, the Chief of Staff of the
Army from 1982 to 1986, encouraged the ideological alignment between evangelical
Christians and the members of the army. Such advocacy enabled an extant stream of
fundamentalist Christian thought within the army to ultimately dominate the ways that
the institution conceptualized ethics and morality. In the army’s conversation about
ethics and behavior, members of the army appended religious imagery onto
predominant narratives of professionalism, in particular the warrior narrative described
in Chapter 3. When members of the army explained their conception of ethical
behaviors in terms of individualistic traits it was one more way that the army moved
away from the management culture of the Vietnam War era. Explaining the institution’s ethical code in individualist and culturally conservative terms was yet another self-identifying narrative aimed at creating a cohesive institution which was separate from American society.

An extension of that narrative was how numerous members of the army promoted the institution as a moral enclave within an increasingly permissive American society. Such language aligned the army with the religious right, affirming the conservatism and the evangelical movement at the same time it transformed the institution. The army’s Christian influenced expression of values was informed by American society. But, it also affirmed the evangelical movement and the broader Christian right during the late 1980s because many Christian Americans looked to the army as an example of an institution which reflected, what members of the Christian right viewed as traditional American values – defined as Protestant Christian inspired behaviors, patriarchal nuclear families, and sacrificing in service to the nation. Instead of increased defense spending, new warfighting doctrine, and new training techniques, these same Christian Americans attributed the army’s revitalization of the 1980s to its realignment along these traditional values and ethics – the same model that the Christian Right espoused as the ideal for the entirety of American society.
The army’s ethical climate concerned many members of the army, but the ethics conversation was primarily led by the officer corps and senior NCOs. For these career officers and NCOs, establishing a code of ethics was about preserving a culturally conservative army amidst what they perceived as an American society which was “morally permissive.” They feared that what they often termed the moral relativism, moral pluralism, or permissiveness in American society would affect the army. Thus, the concern over establishing a code of ethics, as members of the army referred to it, was about controlling soldier behavior during a period of institutional change brought on by the end of the draft, the Vietnam War, and the perceived cultural liberalization which took place in some sectors of American society during the 1960s. Officers’ fears were also in reaction to the series of programs instituted in the first years of the all-volunteer force. Army leaders, among them the General William C. Westmoreland, designed these programs, nicknamed “VOLAR” for volunteer army, to make the army more attractive to American youth. But for many career soldiers, the VOLAR programs were nothing more than what they saw as society’s lax morals and indiscipline creeping into the army. The increased focus on professional codes to control individual behaviors was

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a conservative reaction to the moderate liberalization of the army in the first years of the all-volunteer force.⁴

These career soldiers felt that if they did not do something to protect their institutions from perceived social and cultural changes taking place in American society, then the army would become ineffective at its job of defending the nation. Many of these same individuals believed that the moral pluralism would eventually tear apart the fabric of the nation as well as the army.⁵ Multiple historians have shown that there was a noticeable conservative backlash against the individual and collective rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s that lamented the supposed “permissiveness” of American society.⁶ This same backlash took place within the army, and along with the recognition of the loss in Vietnam, was part of the army leadership’s motivation for the focus on military ethics and morality.

⁴ For information on the VOLAR programs see, Hauser, America’s Army in Crisis; a Study in Civil-Military Relations; Griffith, The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1868-1974, 80, 81.; Donn A. Starry, “Sergeant’s Business,” Box 36, Folder 2, Donn A. Starry Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
⁶ This idea is prevalent throughout Self, All in the Family: the Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s.; See also James A. Morone, Hellsfire Nation : The Politics of Sin in American History, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), Chapter 15.
To describe the conversation about ethics, members of the army often used the term ethical climate. Ethical climate referred to both the accepted behaviors of members of the institution as well as the degree to which they perceived members of the army adhering to those standards. In like manner, when members of the army used terms such as ethics, morality, or derivations of those terms, they referred to individual behaviors. Each of these terms describing behaviors or codes of behaviors became prevalent after a 1970 U.S. Army War College study showed that many members of the officer corps perceived that the ways that members of the army actually behaved did not match its professed ethic of “duty, honor, and country.” In short, the study showed that members of the army perceived that their peers often acted more out of self-interest than in the best interest of their soldiers or the institution. The term values, as members of the army used it, referred to the language that symbolized the acceptable or idealized behaviors. Values were symbolized by terms such as courage, competence, and commitment to the institution.

Like other cultural changes described in this dissertation, this process followed a specific mode of transmission throughout the institution. The evangelical movement connected to the army’s broader membership through the Chaplain Corps and members of the army, such as General Wickham, who were self-professed evangelicals. Members of the army who were evangelical or fundamentalist Christians actively promoted their religious beliefs in professional journals and, in the case of General Wickham, in official
policy. Such active promotion of evangelical and fundamentalist forms of Christianity, particularly by senior officers, both emboldened Christians in the army to openly attempt to shape the institution in terms of their faith, and it normalized religious speech in a state institution that, theoretically, remained separate from the church.

I.

In 1970, Army CSA William C. Westmoreland commissioned the “Study on Military Professionalism,” and that study’s results showed how members of the army perceived their institution’s ethical climate at the end of the Vietnam War. Written primarily at the U.S. Army War College by Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) Dandridge M. Malone – the same Malone who later figured so heavily into the development of Airland Battle doctrine – and Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Walter F. Ulmer, this study became the referent for the army’s conversation about ethics for the next two decades. The “Study on Military Professionalism” sampled over four hundred army officers who were attending professional military schooling such as the War College, the Command and General Staff College, or at various branch – Infantry, Armor, etc. – courses, and it also used data collected from

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other recent studies on military ethics and morality. The study’s central question was whether or not there was a discrepancy between the unofficial but accepted professional ethic of “duty, honor, country” and officers’ experience with the army’s lived or actual values. The results were staggering.

The study found that officers of “all grades perceived a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the officer corps.” Furthermore, this perception was “strong, clear, pervasive, and statistically and qualitatively independent of grade, branch, education level, or source of commission.”

The study’s authors noted that the disillusionment was particularly noticeable at the lower ranks – the lieutenants and captains – of the officer corps. It seemed that by 1970 many, if not most, army officers knew there was a problem, that the army was only now starting to identify this problem, and that younger officers attributed greatest violators of the army’s ethic to be officers of middling and senior ranks – Majors, Colonels, and Generals. The problem, these officers thought, was an over-reliance on statistical data as measures of performance and success, and that senior officers placed greater importance on managing these metrics than they did on taking care of the people within their

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., iii.
organizations – what they termed management culture. In short, careerism had eclipsed virtue as the motivator of officers’ decisions.11

The disillusionment of junior officers in the early 1970s, which the “Study on Military Professionalism” shows so clearly, was important for how those officers lead and demanded change later in their careers. The junior officers, lieutenants and captains, in 1970 were the majors and lieutenant colonels who wrote extensively in the military press in the late 1970s and 1980s. Their writings were an important catalyst for institutional change within the army, but also sustained that change throughout a decades long process. In retrospect, the 1970 “Study on Military Professionalism” shows that it was, in part, the behavior of their seniors during the Vietnam War that disillusioned these young officers. The conversation about ethics was never a master discourse within the army’s cultural transformation, but it was an important sustainer of the process of cultural change because it was an emotional debate about how officers perceived their institution.

The following statement summarized the army’s ethical climate in 1970:

A scenario that was repeatedly described in seminar sessions and narrative responses includes an ambitious, transitory commander – marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties – engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless

completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates.\textsuperscript{12}

The “Study on Military Professionalism” was remarkable because of the “near unanimity” of the responses to the surveys and interviews.\textsuperscript{13} Because of the study, army leadership and the institution’s rank and file could no longer deny or brush aside perceptions of soldiers’ misbehavior, and members of the army launched a debate throughout the institution that filled countless pages of professional journals and publications, not to mention innumerable cocktail and workday discussions.\textsuperscript{14}

Aside from identifying the problem and igniting the debate, the “Study on Military Professionalism” set the contours of the debate over military professional ethics. The study found no direct evidence that factors external to the army were directly causal to the army’s troubling behaviors. Rather, the study found that the army’s institutional culture was the source of many of the army’s ethical problems. In 1970, members of the army felt that their institution “generated an environment that rewards relatively insignificant, short term indicators of success, and disregards or discourages the growth of long-term qualities of moral and ethical strength.”\textsuperscript{15} The officers in the study referred to the perceived structural bias towards measures of

\textsuperscript{12} U.S. Army War College, "Study on Military Professionalism," iv.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., v.
\textsuperscript{14} Some of the examples of later writings that drew upon this study are, James L. Narel, "Values and the Professional Soldier," Parameters, 11, no. 4 (1981); Charles F. Kriete, "Ethical Presuppositions of the Army’s Professional Slogans," ibid. 10, no. 3 (1980); Donn A. Starry, “Ministry in Combat,” Remarks to the TRADOC/FORSCOM Chaplain’s Conference, 13 October 1981,” Donn A. Starry Papers, Box 37, Folder 2, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
\textsuperscript{15} U.S. Army War College, "Study on Military Professionalism," v.
effectiveness and performance grounded in quantifiable metrics. The “Study on Military Professionalism fueled the debate, mentioned in previous chapters, that pitted “managers” against “leaders.”

For example, a typical measure of performance of a commanding officer was the material readiness of their organization. Material readiness refers to metrics such as: the amount of fully operational vehicles, the percentage of soldiers who have met certain training requirements, or the condition of the organization’s smaller equipment such as rifles and protective clothing. If an organization did not achieve established material readiness metrics, it would negatively impact the career of that organization’s commander. Thus, some officers were reluctant to factually report the true state of their organization’s readiness.16 The “Study on Military Professionalism” is rife with examples such as this: relatively minor transgressions of ethical behavior made for the purpose of protecting one’s career, or achieving a short-term success, at the expense of the long-term health of the organization. It seemed that over time the army’s officer corps let their standards of professional ethics erode through countless “little white lies.”17

The “Study on Military Professionalism” also noted that the army had not explicitly identified a standard of ethics, which meant that there was no clearly

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16 Ibid., 14.
17 Ibid., Part V.
articulated structure of what constituted acceptable behavior. There army had no professional code such as that observed by medical and legal professionals. Only implied or traditional ideas existed about what constituted acceptable behavior, and because those ideas were not codified, they were more easily cast aside in the name of expediency. In short, without an established code of behaviors, it was easier for members of the army to act in ways that were self-serving.

The idea that the army lacked a code of ethics also turned from disillusionment to fear amongst the army’s membership for reasons that were not directly tied not to Vietnam. The disillusionment of junior officers over senior officer conduct in Vietnam meshed with senior officers’ fears over the VOLAR programs. These programs aimed to improve the quality of life of all soldiers, but they also challenged many of the long-held traditions of military life. Through VOLAR, soldiers gained greater flexibility and freedoms in their daily lives, but those freedoms came at the expense of officers’ and NCOs’ ability to directly control younger soldiers. More soldiers lived off post, grooming standards relaxed, and soldiers gained more free time during the day. However, career officers and NCOs believed that the VOLAR programs undermined the discipline that soldiering required. They believed that an established code of behavior, or ethics, could prevent the slippage of discipline in the all-volunteer army. Establishing a code of ethics also answered senior officers’ discomfort over the army’s place in American society. In that sense, the army’s conversation about ethics connected with
the institution-occupation model described in Chapter 4. Without a code of ethics, it was difficult to differentiate the army and military service as an institution and a profession rather than an occupation. Although still a contentious issue in the early 1970s, a growing number of officers, even retired ones, saw the utility of the further articulation of a specifically military code of ethics. The conversation about ethics, like many facets of the army’s post-Vietnam War revitalization was about reconstructing the institution’s identity as much as it was about fundamental change.

No matter how members of the army thought about ethics, or what they believed the stakes of that conversation were, the conversation centered on the Chaplain Corps. Chaplains taught ethics in the military’s professional education courses, and they shaped the conversation about ethics and morality throughout the institution. Thus, even members of the army who were not themselves religious learned about the army’s conceptions of ethics from members of the clergy. During this period, however, the chaplain corps was in the midst of a demographic shift. Prior to and during the Vietnam War, the Chaplain Corps was broadly representative of the nation’s mainline religious

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denominations, but as the Vietnam War dragged on many of those mainline churches parted with the U.S. military over concerns of the war. ¹⁹

The nation’s mainline denominations ceded the army to the same denominations that led the fundamentalist evangelical movements and aligned with the New Right. For their purposes, evangelical and non-denominational churches actively cultivated an increased presence in the chaplain corps because the army represented a promising mission field. ²⁰ Evangelical Christians were, by doctrine, more active in promoting their faith than other Christian denominations. Moreover, evangelical and fundamentalist Christians placed more emphasis on the individual, particularly an individual’s adherence to prescribed behaviors, a doctrine that appealed to members of the army in the 1970s.

Evangelical Christianity was, of course, not new to the army. An evangelical brand of Christianity had been present, and not without influence, in the army for much of the twentieth century. Anne C. Loveland points out in *American Evangelicals and the U.S. Military 1942-1993*, that since the 1940s evangelicals “succeeded in winning thousands of military men and women to evangelical religion and……… exerted a significant impact on the armed forces as an institution.” ²¹ Perhaps the most well-known of army leaders who openly confessed their adherence to Christian faith were

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²⁰ Ibid., ix-xi.
²¹ Ibid., ix.
Generals Harold K. Johnson and John A. Wickham. Both men served as the CSA; Johnson during the Vietnam War and Wickham from 1983-1987. In addition to these high-ranking officers, however, many other soldiers were vocal about how their Christian beliefs impacted their military service. As concern for the army’s ethical climate grew in the wake of the “Study on Military Professionalism” these same soldiers argued that the army’s informal ethic of duty-honor-country derived from Christian conceptions of ethics, and that such connections should be strengthened. This contingent of officers conceptualized a professional ethic rooted in immutable human virtues. The increased evangelical influence ultimately made the army more culturally and socially conservative, and that process played out in large part within a conversation about professional ethics.

Articles about ethics and behavior in the military press show evangelicals’ growing influence. Dozens of soldiers, primarily officers, authored articles, editorials, and letters to military publications commenting on military ethics and morality. One contributor urged his fellow soldiers to fix the army’s ethical climate by, “brush[ing] off those ethics we all learned in Sunday school and start living them.” While CSA,

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22 Ibid., 101. Although General Johnson left active service prior to the end of the Vietnam war, he is important to this story because he continued to write and influence army leaders even in retirement.  
General Wickham opined that most soldiers possessed a faith in god, but also “that a soldier’s adherence to Judeo-Christian values points him in the direction of duty, dedication, and service.”

He further regarded “individual initiative [as] the traditional hallmark of American fighting men,” and that the army should be a place where individuals could maximize their “god given talents.” Such statements echoed the individualist language so prominent in the conversations about doctrine and professionalism with religious imagery. In a 1980 Military Review article entitled, “The First Commandment of Leadership: Love Thy Soldier,” Colonel Richard J. Kattar stated, “above all, leadership implies the willingness for self-sacrifice.”

These articles demonstrate how members of the army wrote Christian imagery and language into the army’s culture by describing religious imagery in terms of military professionalism. Kattar makes a clear reference to the Ten Commandments, a basis of Christian theology, and in linking leadership to self-sacrifice, he connects the ideal military leader to the Christian belief in Jesus Christ’s willingness to suffer crucifixion. The prominent theme in many articles connected acts of self-sacrifice with individual service in the army construing both as moral acts in service to American society.

General(Ret.) Ralph E. Haines, a former Vice CSA, voiced many of the views of this contingent of officers in a 1977 article published in Military Chaplain’s Review entitled

25 Wickham, Collected Works of the Thirtieth Chief of Staff, United States Army, 26.
26 Ibid., 61, 181.
“Spiritual Renewal in the Army.” Haines was convinced that the army needed the services of “god-fearing men and women if it is to achieve optimum effectiveness.” Haines spoke of the declining ethical climate in the army as a reflection of a similar erosion of morality in American society, tying the West Point cheating scandal – where nearly an entire West Point class was caught cheating on exams - to the decreased exposure of Cadets to chapel services and religious indoctrination. In order to improve the army’s ethical climate, Haines argued, “training centers should reserve one Saturday morning during the first four weeks of basic training as a duty day with god, with attendance on a voluntary basis.”

As a retired four-star general writing an article in a publication directed at military chaplains Haines could afford to be vocal about his convictions, and his idea that the army should look to religion as the fix for the army’s ethical woes. His retired status meant that he was not as concerned about publicly using overt religious language. However, “Spiritual Renewal in the Army” is important for a few reasons. First, Haines was a professed evangelical Christian, a member of a charismatic Pentecostal denomination who often described his baptism with the “Holy Spirit” and his

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29 During this period the MCR had a distribution of between four and five thousand per issue. The Vice CSA assists the CSA, does not serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and oversees the daily operations of the army.
experience of speaking in tongues. The continued validity of Haines’ opinions four years after his retirement also corroborates the growing power of evangelical Christians in the army after the Vietnam War. Second, Haines conception of a “spiritual renewal” puts the efforts to change the army’s ethical climate in terms of war. Per Haines conception, the army had to clearly establish ethical guidelines to protect the institution from the invasion of societal norms that Haines perceived as too permissive for an institution charged with defending the nation. For Haines, establishing a code of ethics for the army was about shaping soldiers’ behavior, but it was also a spiritual campaign to increase Christianity’s influence within the institution.

Many authors, predominantly chaplains but also self-identified Christian officers, supported the idea of a so-called spiritual renewal or revival. They argued that such a process was taking place in the army’s ranks. An article in the Spring 1977 issue of Military Chaplain’s Review featured a description of a “Pentecost” at the Fort Greeley, AK post chapel. The author, an army chaplain, went on to describe his own experiences with faith healing and spiritual renewal, and compared his experiences at Fort Greeley to an earlier “spiritual awakening” that took place at the Arlington Hall Chapel in Washington, D.C. One entire issue of MCR was devoted to “The Charismatics” noting

34 Ibid., 23-26.
that “religion is definitely “in” again in American life and culture.”

Another overt example of military leaders’ linkage of Christian faith and military prowess comes from General Jerry R. Curry, who clearly equated military ethics and professionalism with Christian beliefs, stating, “God intends Christians not only to make the military a career, but when they go to war they are to fight better than unbelievers.” By the late 1970s, many officers talked about religion and ethics in the army as if it were a spiritual campaign in the same way as General Haines. They described the campaign as a spiritual renewal which in their terms was noticeable for its magnitude and the evangelical flavor of its theology. Furthermore, the growth in influence of such evangelical theology matched the growing evangelical movement in American society.

The character of the army’s religiosity had not always slanted so far towards evangelical conceptions of Christianity. Like other conversations within the army’s cultural transformation, the conversation about ethics did not follow a smooth teleology, nor was it a foregone conclusion. The evangelical slant of MCR articles by the later

Good Fight of Faith,” ibid.: 63.; H. Richard Casdorph, “Healing and the Charismatic Renewal in the Contemporary Christian Church,” ibid.
37 Curry, “Fight the Good Fight of Faith,” 59.
1970s is even more indicative of a significant cultural change when compared to that publication’s earlier offerings which reflected the predominance of social gospel in American society. In *Hellfire Nation*, James Morone describes how a social gospel, “a communal view of vice and virtue” associated with religious leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Reinhold Niebuhr, was the dominant religious trend in the United States from the 1930s through the middle 1970s.\textsuperscript{39} The social gospel of the middle twentieth century urged society to take responsibility for all its people. However, as Morone shows, the social gospel was supplanted by the evangelical movement during the 1970s which viewed sin as an individual act or trait.\textsuperscript{40} In the like manner, the tenor of religious discussion in the military press changed from something resembling a social gospel to the more evangelical flavor of the statements made by men such as Haines and Curry.

*Military Chaplain’s Review* articles in the early 1970s often looked to the moral theory of H. Richard Niebuhr for guidance rather than that of ministers such as Billy Graham and Jerry Falwell.\textsuperscript{41} Chaplain George W. Alexander’s 1973 “Racism and the Chaplaincy” urged chaplains to understand, acknowledge and move beyond the institutional racism in the army when they are training soldiers on values and ethics. Alexander further applauded the army for its increased emphasis on equal opportunity

\textsuperscript{39} Morone, *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History*, 19, 407, 44.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 445, 53.
training.\textsuperscript{42} The summer 1975 issue of \textit{Military Chaplain’s Review} was devoted entirely to feminism and women’s equality, featuring articles casting women’s liberation in terms of religiosity, and argued against the stereotyping of the army family as synonymous with the patriarchal nuclear family.\textsuperscript{43} Other articles argued that part of the chaplain’s role in the army was to promote and encourage “social change with in the military community.”\textsuperscript{44} Per these articles, the chaplain corps should not only focus on promoting individual values that were commensurate with military ethics, as later articles would highlight, but were also supposed to be agents of social change for the organization. Of course, there is not a clear delineation, articles espousing a social gospel continued after 1975, and articles informed by fundamentalist theology were published prior to that year, but there was a notable change in the articles featured in \textit{Military Chaplain’s Review}. The change in the character of articles in \textit{Military Chaplain’s Review} reflects the general trend of other facets of the army’s cultural transformation. In almost every way that the army’s culture changed, it moved from could be described as politically centrist positions to ones that reflected the conservative turn in American political culture.

In the middle 1970s, evangelicals within the army, such as Haines, argued for what Haines termed a spiritual renewal, but what I term a spiritual redirection. By spiritual direction I mean that the terms that members of the army used to describe ethics and behaviors changed. When evangelical and fundamentalist Christians became predominant after the Vietnam War, they conceived of ethics and morality in different terms than were predominant prior to and during the Vietnam War. The changes in the army were part of the growth of evangelicalism throughout American society. From the middle 1970s through the 1980s, the goals of evangelicals in the army and evangelicals in civilian society aligned. Each group sought to develop and promote a culturally conservative conception of acceptable behaviors based upon their understanding of theology. Thus, the U.S. Army was a space where the evangelical movement took place.

Religion, particularly Protestant Christianity, became more prominent in the army, and the institution became more socially, culturally, and politically conservative. As early as 1972 the United States Military Academy presented the Sylvanus Thayer

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Award, given annually to a citizen who exemplifies “outstanding devotion to the principles expressed in the motto of West Point – Duty, Honor, Country” to Reverend Billy Graham.\(^{46}\) Furthermore, “at least a dozen groups” met for prayer and discussion in the Pentagon meditation room.\(^{47}\) Perhaps most telling, was a surge of religious sentiment at the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. CGSC graduates approximately 1000 army majors each year. These officers were selected for attendance to this school and were typically among the top 50 percent of their peer group.\(^{48}\) Between 1973 and 1977 at the Fort Leavenworth chapel, LTC George B. Kuykendall “increased the number of bible study groups among students from 12 to 34, involving some 450 students.”\(^{49}\) Kuykendall was also the Fort Leavenworth coordinator of the Officer’s Christian Fellowship – an organization that engaged “military leaders in Biblical fellowship and growth to equip them for Christ-like service at the intersection of faith, family, and profession.”\(^{50}\) By the 1980s, certain


\(^{48}\) Peer group here refers to the cohort of officers commissioned each year. During this period, approximately fifty percent of a year group of officers was selected to attend the resident CGSC. Attendance at the resident CGSC at Fort Leavenworth was a discriminator for later career advancement.


\(^{50}\) The OCF mission statement comes from the organization’s website. Officer’s Christian Fellowship, http://www.ocfusa.org/about/. Accessed on 26 June, 2018
parachurch organizations such as OCF and the Navigators – a fundamentalist organization specifically focused on evangelical outreach – were seen as a welcome addition to official chapel programs.51

General Donn Starry, Commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 1977 to 1981, is often remembered as one of the intellectual leaders of the post-Vietnam army. He was the leader who restructured army doctrine into a system commonly referred to as “AirLand Battle.”52 Less well known is that Starry advocated for an adherence to traditional moral virtues as part of a turn away from the so-called management culture. Starry joined the ideas of idealized behavior conceived in religious terms and the ideals of the manager-leader debate. In multiple speeches and published writings, Starry described how the values of a changing American society were detrimental to the U.S. Army and military morality. Starry described the “moral ethics of leadership” – a construct combining a sense of the loss of desired “leaders” and the transgression of “traditional” morals.53 For Starry, the adherence to a set of established values was the most important aspect of leadership.54 And while many soldiers talked about ethics and values, Starry was in the position to take steps to develop a codified system of values.

53 Ibid.
“Moral guidelines are not a nicety, they are a necessity,” Starry remarked in 1977. For Starry, the army required an ethical code because the “assault” on traditional standards of morals and honesty left the young soldier confused, the family unsure, and the officer and NCO pressured. Starry stated, “several years ago the liberals buried God. He wasn’t important to them,” and also that “because the Christian ethic is the very basis of our culture, Western civilization has been stricken with the cancer of declining morality.” Clearly, for Starry, reestablishing moral guidelines and standards were of the utmost importance for not only the army, but for American society. Also, for Starry, military ethics were synonymous with Christian ethics.

Furthermore, Starry thought that the army needed a set of values that were different from those of society, that those values must be demanded of members of the army, and that without a clearly defined set of values the army could not be effective. In 1980 he noted, “the values that the military profession must embrace, if it is to serve the nation well, are the same values that soldiers must develop if they are to be effective. Values spring from the heart of an army – from its traditions shared hardships, and its leadership.” Starry guided the development of a simple code of ethics, alternately

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56 Ibid.
57 Donn A. Starry, “Remarks by Donn Starry to the Frankfurt High School Graduation, 10 June 1977.”; Donn A. Starry, “Remarks at Founder’s Day, HQ SHAPE Belgium.”
58 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 711.
calling them soldier values or virtues.\textsuperscript{61} He believed the traditional army ethic of duty, honor, country was fine, but he also believed it fell short of guiding the actions of officers and soldiers.\textsuperscript{62}

II.

Publishing a code of ethics was an emotional issue because many officers were offended to think that the army should even have to articulate a system of values.\textsuperscript{63} They figured that such virtues should be intrinsic to the military officer. Also, there was no simple method for articulating what those values should be and what they should accomplish. The question of what values and behaviors should define a member of a volunteer professional army was a subjective values-based question, and that question came during a time of cultural instability. As Chapter 2 showed, Starry charged Malone with the task of establishing a set of values to “calibrate purpose and performance” for the army, and Malone returned with: competence, courage, candor, and commitment, the 4C’s that became the army’s values. The 4C’s, along with what General Meyer termed the professional army ethic, became the idealized behaviors for members of the institution, the code of ethics recommended by the 1970s “Study of Military

\begin{itemize}
\item Donn A. Starry, “Remarks by General Donn A. Starry, Dining-In ROTC Detachment, Georgia Military College, January 1980,” 1980, Box 36, Folder 5, Donn A. Starry Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
\item U.S. Army War College, "Study on Military Professionalism," Appendix B.
\end{itemize}
Professionalism.” The 4C’s and the professional army ethic also became a symbol to which so members of the army assigned religious meaning.

The 1981 version of FM 100-1, where the 4C’s were first published, also included a section dubbed, “The Professional Army Ethic,” and together the 4C’s and the Professional Army Ethic became the army’s code of ethics. Like the 4C’s, the “Professional Army Ethic” consisted of four principles: loyalty to the institution – the army, loyalty to the unit – the sub-organization to which a soldier belonged, personal responsibility, and “the last and perhaps most important” selfless service. FM 100-1 stated that, “such a professional ethic must be understood and accepted in its totality by individuals at every level of military operations.”64 FM 100-1’s authors intended the army’s code of ethics to serve as an undergirding foundation of universally held values that would assist members of the army in the performance of their “duties and functions as professionals.” The army’s professional ethic further formalized “the soldiers’ philosophy,” and clarified “how we differ from the broader society which we serve.”65 The code of ethics, what later became the army values, was about controlling soldier and officer behavior, but it was also about the institution’s identity. The army’s leadership

64 Department of the Army, "FM 100-1: The Army,” 25. FM 100-1 is generally updated once during the tenure of a CSA. During the period of this study, FM 100-1 was updated in 1978, 1981. Ibid.; Department of the Army, "Field Manual 100-1: The Army,” ed. Department of the Army Headquarters (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986); Department of the Army, "FM 100-1: The Army,” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1978).
65 Department of the Army, "FM 100-1: The Army.”
set the institution apart from society, and they did so within mental frames which were profoundly affected by conservative Protestant Christianity.

The 1981 version of FM 100-1 defined professionalism entirely in the human terms of values, virtues, and ethical philosophy. In contrast, the previous version of FM 100-1, published in 1978, projected a different tone. “Leadership,” in the earlier 1978 version of FM 100-1, was listed as “the ethical dimension,” but is outlined last in a laundry list of other components professionalism.66 Prior to the mention of leadership, the earlier FM 100-1 describes professionalism in terms of, “military arts and science,” “training and education,” “readiness,” and “management.”67 The change in language between the two versions of the same manual shows how the army’s conversation about ethics became codified in doctrine as that conversation grew stronger. The emphasis on values and individual qualities in 1981 vice the emphasis on the quantitative aspects of military service such as readiness and management are further evidence of the changed valuation of different elements within army’s institutional culture. Establishing a code of ethics was an attempt to correct the undesirable behaviors of some soldiers and officers during the Vietnam War era, but it was also part of a broader institutional move away from management culture.

66 Department of the Army, "FM 100-1: The Army."
67 Ibid., 24-27
The new code of ethics framed the institution’s conversation about ethics throughout the 1980s. After 1981, the conversation about ethics was always stated in terms of the 4C’s. The code of ethics was imagined as an enduring, idealized, and individual ethic with analogues to Christian theology. Finally, for the ascendant Christian Right, the 4C’s symbolized a national institution that was in line with their conceptions of Christian virtue.68

Although it was not stated in overtly religious language, the army’s professional ethic showed a marked resemblance to the Christian Bible, which also consists of a set of laws and individual qualities to which followers of that faith should aspire. The Ten Commandments of the Christian Old Testament were a set of laws which all Christians were expected to understand and obey. In Jewish and Christian theology, the Ten Commandments were given to the Jewish people to guide their lives and show them how to live correctly.69 In a similar manner, per Christian religious ideology, the introduction to the Sermon on the Mount, as it has been recounted in the New Testament book of Matthew, contains what Christians refer to as the “beatitudes.” The beatitudes: blessed are the poor, blessed are those who mourn, blessed are the meek, etc., represented, for Christian theology, the values that Jesus Christ expected of his

69 Deut. 5, 6. (New International Version)
followers. In contrast to the Ten Commandments, the beatitudes were not laws to which all should adhere, rather, they were the ideal qualities of a Christian in the same way that competence, courage, candor, and commitment were the ideal qualities of a member of the army.

Thus, while the army’s professional ethic maintained the required legal separation from religion, it followed a similar format and logic as the moral philosophy contained in the Christian Bible. In the 1980s army, without embodying the soldierly qualities, a member of the army could never fully embrace and adhere to the army professional ethic. This does not mean that army leaders such as General Starry and General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer – the CSA from 1979 to 1983 – who oversaw the content of FM 100-1, explicitly structured the army’s professional ethic in congruence with the Christian bible. It does, however, show the influence of Christian theology in the army’s cultural transformation. The growth in the importance of Christian theology was evident in the many allusions to Christian theology in many professional journals as well as its implied presence in the army’s newly articulated professional ethic. Furthermore, FM 100-1 was traditionally authored with significant input from the army’s Chief of Staff. General Meyer oversaw the first formal articulation of the army’s professional ethic. Meyer’s first message to the Army’s general officers upon assuming the office of CSA in 1979 also contained the line “let us take the opportunity to

Matt. 5:3-11 (New International Version)
rededicate ourselves to the fundamentals of our profession – service to our God, our country and the people in our army.”71 Christian religiosity was always a part of the army, but by the 1980s it was an explicit part of the army doctrine that governed the individual behaviors of all members of the army – whether they adhered to a religious faith or not.

By the mid 1980s army leaders drew an even stronger link between the idealized behavior of members of the institution and Christian theology. Moreover, many evangelicals in American society, including many leaders within the evangelical movement, cultivated a stronger relationship with the army. Because the army embraced Christian theology, the army also affirmed the ascendant evangelical movement.

III.

In 1983 General John A. Wickham succeeded General Meyer as the CSA. Like Meyer, Wickham focused on the army’s ethical climate during his tenure as CSA, but he more explicitly connected military professionalism with Christianity. Whereas Meyer’s allusions to religion and his own spirituality were either implied or contained in personal communication, Wickham’s leadership clearly and publicly reflected his

religious convictions. Wickham made it known that his ideal military professional adhered to standards of behavior that aligned with Christian strictures.

During Wickham’s tenure, both the army’s leadership and its rank and file increasingly described their institution’s professional code of ethics in terms of immutable and enduring values, traits, and virtues to the delight of conservative politicians and conservative Christians. Moreover, Wickham actively built connections between the army and Christian conservatives. Wickham received many letters and correspondence from Christian Americans, in essence “fan-mail,” thanking him for his religious convictions, his emphasis on preserving the army family (defined as the patriarchal nuclear family), and his commitment to “traditional values.” Through his openly faith-based leadership, Wickham built upon the army’s 1981 code of ethics in terms that explicitly joined the army’s code of ethics with what he believed were traditional American values, through what he called the army family.

As historian Robert O. Self has shown, by the 1980s, conservative politicians, and the broader conservative social movement controlled the narrative and normative definitions of the American family. The New Right defined the family in expressly

73 For example, “Alan Kemper to John Wickham,” Box 3, Folder D.; “David A. Hubbard to John Wickham,” Box 6 Folder H.; “J. Allan Petersen to John Wickham,” Box 9, Folder P-Q; “Douglas E. Coe to John Wickham,” Box 2, Folder C.; “Fletcher Anderson to John Wickham,” Box 1, Folder A.; “H. Bruce Ayers to John Wickham,” Box 1, Folder A.; “Sharon Crevenston to John Wickham,” Box 2, Folder C.; “Bruce Cort to John Wickham,” Box 2, Folder C. All in John A. Wickham Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center.
74 Self, All in the Family: the Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s, 7-10.
patriarchal terms. Families consisted of a husband, wife, and children living under the general direction of the male head of household. Men were the primary “breadwinners” of the family, and the wife managed the home and the raising of children. Deploying that conception of a supposedly traditional American family was a political weapon which promoted a normative conception of American “values” and behaviors. Wickham’s conception of the army family mirrored these broader societal trends. As Jennifer Mittelstadt has argued in *The Rise of the Military Welfare State*, “the army family model provided precisely the symbolism and metaphor for the kind of institutional goals the army was at pains to promote in the volunteer force: unity, cohesion, commitment, loyalty.” That army’s family model appealed to culturally conservative Americans, especially the growing Christian right. Wickham became a powerful symbol to the Christian right because he championed family values, even proclaiming 1983 as the “Year of the Family” for the army. Christian Americans supported Wickham, and by extension the army, because of the way he promoted the army as an institution based on perceived Christian values.

By the time Wickham assumed the office of CSA, the army was climbing out of its institutional morass of the 1970s. For Wickham, and in the minds of many Americans, the army improved not because of the influx of funding and equipment that began during the Jimmy Carter administration, but because the army reformed itself, 

now following a virtuous path that was in line with “traditional” American – and Christian values. If it was, as President Ronald Reagan described, a new day in 1980s America, the revitalized Army, with its strong families and code of supposed traditional ethics, was part of the cultural mash symbolizing America’s renewed strength and virtue. Thus, as this chapter argues, the army’s articulation of a professional ethic which interweaved the “warrior” culture depicted in Chapter 3 with Christian theology was not only important for the institution, but helped affirm the conservative shift in U.S. political culture. Because of the particular way that members of the army articulated their new professionalism, many conservatives saw in the army a glimpse of their desired identity and the “traditional” society which they sought. Not only its adherence to traditional and immutable values, but “the soldier-breadwinner and the Army Family model helped lift the army’s reputation from its depths and revived its social and political standing.”

Moreover, Wickham actively cultivated this image of the army in American society, particularly in evangelical Christian publications. To the media, Wickham described himself as a man “of quiet faith,” but he made two very public statements affirming that faith, and those statements endeared him to the evangelical Christian

76 Ibid., 43.
community. The May 1984 “Focus on the Family” newsletter, published by James Dobson, featured an article on General Wickham’s efforts to strengthen army family programs. “Focus on the Family” was Dobson’s nonprofit organization, dedicated to, “the preservation of the family and the propagation of traditional pro-family views.”

In addition to the newsletter and seminar series, Dobson’s organization consisted of a nationwide radio broadcast carried by over 250 stations. After seeing Wickham’s interview in “Focus on the Family,” the editors of Decision, a magazine published by the Billy Graham Evangelical Association, requested an interview that outlined Wickham’s approach to strengthening army families and his personal testimony of faith. During that same period, late Summer of 1984, Wickham appeared along with Lieutenant General Robert Elton and Lieutenant Colonel Ed Solymosy as a guest on Dobson’s radio program.

The interview with Dobson, held at the Pentagon in August of 1984, grew out of Wickham’s use of Dobson’s “Where’s Daddy” video as part of the army-wide “year of the family.” Dobson’s video in its original form was too overtly religious for use in the army, but Dobson and Wickham produced a different version that was disseminated

79 Ibid.
80 “Decision Magazine to John A. Wickham,” Box 33, Folder S, John A. Wickham Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center.
81 “Transcript of Remarks to ‘Focus on the Family’ with Jim Dobson,” Box 33, ibid.
and viewed by all members of the army. For Wickham, a strong army family equated to enhanced readiness and efficiency.\textsuperscript{82} Readiness referred to the army’s ability to fulfill tasks directed of it by the nation’s civilian leadership. Wickham defined the army family as: the family of components, active, reserve, and national guard, the “many units of different variety that we have in the army,” and the “traditional family of man.”\textsuperscript{83} The short interview promoted Wickham’s family programs, programs initiated not only because of Wickham’s religious convictions, but also because the all-volunteer army raised the number of married soldiers to over fifty percent of the army force.

Wickham’s second public profession of faith was in a 1985 issue of \textit{Decision} magazine, a periodical published by the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. In that article, Wickham described the value of prayer. He recounted his Christian conversation experience as a battalion commander in Vietnam. In Vietnam, Wickham was wounded, his battalion’s defensive position overran, and during the attack he prayed that he might remain conscious for the remainder of the firefight so that he could help his soldiers. Wickham believed that because he lived through that night his prayers were answered, and thereafter he dedicated his life to the Christian faith. Wickham drew a connection between his religious convictions, his reliance on prayer, and his leadership of the army. In short, Wickham had a “born again” story when that form of religious expression was

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 2.
gaining predominance in America. He struck a chord with Christian Americans, lifting not only Wickham’s personal reputation among that community, but also the army’s.84

On the heels of these two public expressions of faith, General Wickham received numerous letters and sentiments from private citizens expressing support for Wickham’s religious convictions as well his army family programs. Wickham was singular among the army Chiefs of Staff during this period for the presence of such fan mail in his correspondence records.85 The general theme of these letters was thankfulness to General Wickham for his work at strengthening families and what the authors of the letters termed traditional values. These correspondents offered thanks and prayers for the fact that a man with such “faith in God” was leading a branch of the nation’s military.86 One woman was so inspired by Wickham’s example that she left her occupation to stay at home with her two kids.87 Another correspondent, the owner of several Christian radio stations, thanked General Wickham for spending so much time with James Dobson, and expressed joy that “there were so many people in Washington that are committed and dedicated to the same ideals that we [evangelical Christians] have.”88

84 “A Soldier Who Cares About Families.”
85 This statement based on the author’s reading of the papers of each Chief of Staff from 1973 through 1987.
87 Crevenston, “Sharon Crevenston to John Wickham.”
88 Fletcher Anderson, “Fletcher Anderson to John Wickham,” Box 1, Folder A, John A. Wickham Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center.
Beyond private citizens, Wickham received letters from Christian leaders, such as civilian ministers or leaders of seminaries, who influenced larger networks of Christian citizens. This suggests that the social network which held Wickham and the army in such high regard was even larger than the individual pieces of fan mail demonstrate. In 1983, David A Hubbard, the President of Fuller Theological Seminary, noted how “heartened” he was by Wickham’s concern and efforts on the part of families. Wickham also corresponded with Bill Bright, the founder of Campus Crusade for Christ which was one of the nation’s largest parachurch organizations.

Wickham reciprocated these letters and support. In addition to Wickham’s extended correspondence with Dobson, and the army’s use of Dobson’s materials, Wickham spoke before a gathering of Dobson’s supporters in 1986. Furthermore, Wickham met with Reverend Billy Graham and extended an open invitation to “share your [Graham’s] ministry with our soldiers whenever time permits.” Wickham noted that, “we have a number of large military installations with tens of thousands of soldiers plus dependents.” Through the ties between prominent Christian groups such as Focus on the Family, Campus Crusade for Christ, seminaries, and even and even some

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90 John Wickham, “John Wickham to Bill Bright,” Box 1, Folder B, John A. Wickham Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center.
91 John A. Wickham, “Address to Dr. Dobson’s Focus on Family Group,” Box 39, Folder Remarks to Dr. Dobson, Ibid.
92 Wickham Papers Box 5 Folder G Letter from Wickham to Billy Graham. John A. Wickham, “John Wickham to Reverend Billy Graham,” Box 5, Folder G., Ibid.
mainline church denominations, thousands of Christians were exposed to the Army's emphasis on values which seemed rooted in Christian theology.

It is clear from the letters contained in Wickham's correspondence that many Christian evangelicals saw Wickham as an ally in what they referred to as a spiritual awakening. As many historians have shown, the increased influence of Protestant Christianity in American social life, what the authors of Wickham's fan mail referred when they used the term spiritual awakening, was a component of the conservative turn in American political culture.\textsuperscript{93} Christians supported Wickham because they perceived him to be a Christian ally, and they supported the army, in part, because they believed the institution was a Christian enclave within American society. Such support for the army was part of a broader cultural move whereby conservative Americans regained control of the defining narratives of patriotism, national service, and so-called traditional American values.\textsuperscript{94}

Bacevich has argued that the army was also held in high regard by the Christian right because of the Conservative coalition's support for a strong military. Bacevich also shows that, by the 1980s, the army and evangelical American held many of the same

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\textsuperscript{94} Alan Kemper, "Alan Kemper to John Wickham," Box 3, Folder K, John A. Wickham Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center. For conservative reclamation over narratives of the American family see Self, \textit{All in the Family: the Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s}.
\end{flushleft}
social values. Loveland argues that evangelicals and their brand of theology were influential in the army, pointing to leaders such as Wickham. This chapter supports the arguments of Bacevich and Loveland, but suggests they do not capture the breadth of the cultural connection between American society and the army during the 1980s.

Because of its particular conceptualization of a professional ethic grounded in immutable and unquestioned values, the Christian right perceived the army as an ideal social group and national institution. The army’s rejuvenation in the 1980s was the result of many factors, but evangelicals could point to the theologically charged leadership of so called “men of God,” such as Wickham, as being responsible for the army’s post-Vietnam War revitalization. Furthermore, the alignment of the Christian Right and the U.S. Army of the 1980s was based in large part upon how members of the army articulated a professional ethic and set of values. As this chapter has shown, this was not inevitable, rather it was a cultural process whereby the army’s institutional values were realigned and reimagined.

Leaders of the Christian right also used the army’s perceived embrace of Christian ideologies for their own purposes. For example, a 1984 letter sent from Dobson to financial supporters of “Focus on the Family” stated, “what excites me most is that the army has shown great concern for the welfare of its families.”

96 Dobson, “Dobson Message to Focus on Family Donors,” Box 3, Folder D, John A. Wickham Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center.

95 Bacevich, The New American Militarism : How Americans are Seduced by War, 122-46.
further suggested, “he [Wickham] recognizes clearly that the effectiveness of service men and women is often directly related to the cohesiveness of their individual families.”

Dobson noted that he “rarely” accepted speaking commitments, but did so on this occasion because General Wickham called home “seven four-star generals and three three-star generals (and their wives)” for the occasion. Dobson highlighted such connections to the army in the opening to a donor solicitation letter: “we’ve been led to believe that military generals and admirals are egocentric maniacs who are itching to blow up the world.” But “nothing could be further from the truth.” In short, an established connection between Dobson’s ministry and the army was likely good for business because it helped garner monetary support for Dobson’s ministry.

Dobson imagined a common struggle between the efforts of “Focus on the Family” and the sacrifice of members of the military. He described how the press and the public have “criticized and misjudged” the military and its leaders, while the military leaders he met were “dedicated patriots” who have “sacrificed dearly.” In the same letter Dobson recounted the remainder of his trip where he and his team “struggled” on behalf of American families, describing a political battle over “equal access” legislation, which would have allowed high school students to meet for religious purposes before and after classes. Dobson noted that, “the ACLU were there in full

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
battle gear, while only one representative of our position was in attendance. The tone and structure of Dobson’s letter to his donors linked the military’s sacrifice for the nation with the sacrifice of evangelical Protestant Christians, and ministry groups such as “Focus on the Family,” in support of their beliefs.

The relationship between the army, the Christian right, and political conservatism was complex. It was due to more than militarism. For many evangelical Christians the army represented more than strong national defense. The army of the 1980s represented an idealized conservative social group. Thus, it was not only the army’s role in national defense that was valued by Christian conservatives, but also the army’s adherence to a code of ethics and values that was thought to reflect a traditional American – in this case coded as Protestant Christian - worldview. The army’s adherence to this code of values, like the Christian right itself, was perceived by many Protestant Christians, both military and civilian, as a bulwark against the majority of American society that was, arguably, complicit with the ethical relativism that many Christians feared.

IV.

This chapter describes one component of the cultural transformation that took place in the U.S. Army between 1970 and 1990. In 1970, as evidenced by “The Study on

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.

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Military Professionalism,” the military manager was no longer held in high esteem, especially by younger officers. They thought that the army’s reliance on statistical metrics produced an officer corps that focused on short term gains for their own careers at the expense of the long-term health of the institution and its soldiers. Such a focus turned disastrous during the Vietnam War, and many members of the army blamed, what they termed, a poor ethical climate for some of that war’s disastrous events, particularly the atrocities at My Lai.

As previous chapters have shown, by the 1980s many members of the army valued the ideal of the warrior or leader, and a renewed interest in individual virtues and professional ethics was a part of that transformation. By 1981, the army codified the personality traits of this archetypal soldier in the combination of the army’s professional ethic and the “4C’s” – Commitment, Competence, Candor, and Courage. After the articulation of a formal professional ethic, the symbol of the military manager was eschewed in favor of the virtuous warrior. The “warrior,” had always been a part of the army’s culture, but by the 1980s, was the predominant archetype.

What is remarkable, however, is how the trajectory of the army’s efforts to establish a professional ethic supported, legitimized, and affirmed the Evangelical Right and the broader conservative turn in American political culture. With a professional ethic structured around normative, enduring, individual values, the army became an ideal social group in the eyes of Christian conservatives. Furthermore, after 1983, the
army was led by a General that openly espoused connection with the Christian right through public pronouncements of faith in evangelical media outlets such as Dobson’s “Focus on the Family” radio broadcasts and Billy Graham’s Decision magazine. Wickham’s papers are littered with fan mail from individual Christians expressing their support for him, the army, and army families.

This analysis suggests that, while the nation’s resurgent militarism of the 1980s and after is an important aspect in understanding why so much of the nation perceived the army in such positive terms during Operation Desert Strom, the full story is more complicated. As American political culture took a conservative turn in the latter 1970s, the army’s institutional culture followed suit. In efforts to change its own leadership culture, the army articulated a professional ethic based on values that were similar to the “traditional” values espoused by conservative Christians. In the army of the 1980s, many conservatives found their idealized social group.

The next chapter examines how the 1980s focus on cultivating warrior identity, normative values, and particularly socially and culturally conservative conceptions of families and gender norms shaped the integration of women into the army. Women soldiers were an important component of the all-volunteer army. The challenge for the army’s cultural transformation, however, was to develop a narrative that both recognized women as members of the institution, and preserved the army’s sought-after warrior identity and its embrace of so-called traditional family values.
Chapter 6: A Category Apart, The Woman Soldier from Integration to Exclusion

A bullet makes a distinctive sound when it is coming towards you. When a bullet is travelling away from you, you hear the sharp bang of the round’s powder exploding, but a bullet that is coming towards you is felt as much as it is heard. The bullet disturbs the air around it with a sharp ppfffttttt that segues into pings and zings as the bullet ricochets off the structures and earth around you. Those are the only sounds; by the time you hear the bang associated with the firing of the bullet, it has either hit you, or it has not. These sounds, of bullets both incoming and outgoing, punctuated the night of December 20, 1989 as Captain Linda Bray led a group of soldiers through the Panamanian darkness.¹

Bray was the first American woman to lead soldiers in ground combat.² She commanded the 988th Military Police Company, and with two of her platoons led an assault through a series of military working dog kennels that guarded the approach to a

² In making this claim, I mean that Bray was the first U.S. Army officer or NCO to lead soldiers as a part of her official duties. Undoubtedly, American women had previously led soldiers in battle as part of irregular forces, or when masquerading as a male soldier.
Panamanian Special Defense forces outpost. The story of Bray’s actions on that night quickly made national news. Overnight Bray became a symbol of how women were an integrated and indispensable part of the U.S. Army.

But all was not well. Bray’s vaunted status did not last. Bray, commissioned in 1983, had to this point in her career been a so-called “one blocker,” an officer who consistently received the highest rankings on her officer efficiency reports (OER). In her first OER after her service in Panama, however, Bray’s commander rated her in such a manner that her chances of further promotion were slim, effectively killing her career.

At first, Bray was lauded as a heroine, but was ultimately punished for her inadvertent transgression of the norms of a nation and an army that retained a strict gender division of labor. In 1989, women could be soldiers, but were expected to remain apart from “combat,” a male-only space and vocation. Bray’s story captures the arc of this chapter. Her service as a military police commander was a result of the massive expansion of the role of women in the U.S. Army during the 1970s, and her later persecution for engaging in supposedly male-only combat was a result of the anti-feminist backlash that marked the army during the 1980s.

Between 1973 and 1980, women’s role in the U.S. Army expanded exponentially; the army integrated initial entry training for soldiers, nearly all military occupations

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3 Bray, "Oral History Interview with Linda Bray."
4 Ibid., 34.
5 Ibid., 42.
were opened to women, women began to attend the United States Military Academy in 1976, and high-ranking officials in the army gestured towards the eventual integration of women in all aspects of the institution, to include combat. In the 1980s, however, the conversation about the inclusion of women in the army abruptly shifted. The policies excluding women from combat were more forcefully articulated, and because they remained absent from combat, women’s service was devalued because they could never be “fully” soldiers. Women remained excluded from service in organizations and occupations that had a high probability of direct contact with the enemy. They remained a category apart, an internal external.

This chapter is not a history about women’s integration into the Army; rather, it is an investigation of the trajectory of the army’s conversation about women soldiers. The period after the Vietnam War was a historical break for the army which was followed by a period of rupture where members of the institution formed a new institutional culture that transformed the institution’s identity across many subjects. In short, this was a period of radical and contested cultural change within the institution, and the conversation about women soldiers was an important aspect of that cultural change. The conversation about women did not develop consistently towards a

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predetermined end. Women soldiers were viewed as crucial to the Army’s success in the first years of the volunteer force and their opportunities within the institution quickly expanded, but later, in conjunction with the conservative movement’s growing political power in the latter 1970s, many members of the Army adopted a more socially and culturally conservative conception of what they considered the proper role of women soldiers. This chapter is a story about how members of the army, most of them men, made sense of the role of women in the institution using social cues from both within the army and from civilian society.

This chapter argues that three events frame the discourse about women’s integration into the U.S. army in the 1970s and 1980s. First, the congressional passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) happened at nearly the same instant as the end of conscription. Second, the ERA prompted an emotional backlash instigated by Phyllis Schlafly’s STOP ERA campaign. Third, the army’s leaders were unable to define combat in a manner that logically explained the continued exclusion of women from combat duties, which led members of the army to a language similar to the anti-feminist critics of the ERA. Passage of the ERA signaled to U.S. Army leadership that Congress approved of expanding opportunities for women as an answer to the Army’s difficulty in finding adequate numbers of male recruits. The ERA passed in 1972, in part because of the political power generated by the women’s movement. The army expanded the

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8 Bailey, America’s Army, 131-36; Binkin and Bach, Women and the Military, 1-3.
opportunities available to women even prior to the expected ratification of the amendment. As I will show, at all levels of the institution’s hierarchy there was an openness during the 1970s to expand the opportunities available to servicewomen.

Women’s rights and social equality was a contentious issue throughout American society. In reaction to the ERA, conservative political operative Phyllis Schlafly created a counter movement known as STOP ERA that facilitated an anti-feminist social movement against the ERA. STOP ERA peddled statements and ideas that played to societal fears of and anger at the supposed changes in gender norms and hierarchies that the ERA portended. By the late 1970s, the success of these antifeminists – and conservative ideologies more broadly – drowned out the army’s research initiatives showing that women were a positive addition to the institution. Multiple research projects suggested that women adapted well to military service, did not decrease the effectiveness of the organizations to which they were assigned, and were more than capable of serving in military occupations traditionally reserved for men. Schlafly’s campaign not only contributed to the defeat of the ERA, but the social conservatism of which it was a part helped forestall women’s cultural and social integration into the army. Conservatism’s national success created the conceptual space that allowed similar conservative narratives of gender norms to reassert their dominance within the Army’s institutional culture.
Third, the Army’s official policies helped create an environment which allowed anti-feminist ideas to permeate the Army’s culture. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Army worked to define “combat.” Defining combat was central to the process of integrating women soldiers, because of how the soldier’s identity connects with the concept of combat. Combat, the activity of battle, is the single thing that separates the soldier from the non-soldier. Thus, combat’s definition, who or what is a part of battle, marks the boundaries of the soldier identity. In the army’s conversation about women, the definition of combat was about reconciling the need for women in uniform to meet personnel needs and the desire to retain the category of soldier’s male gendering. Thus, the Army sought to define combat in ways that could maximize the use of women soldiers while still segregating them from the military occupations where they would have to engage, or might be engaged by, enemy combatants.

This was no easy task. The confusion over the articulation of the combat exclusion policy resulted in a lack of a performance-based, clearly understood, set of guidelines on the assignment of women to military occupations. This confusion created an environment where, just as in American society, emotional rhetoric constructed upon supposed immutable differences between men and women ultimately dominated the discourse surrounding women’s rights and equality.

The conversation about women in the army was about reconciling women’s presence in a traditionally male institution. But the process of how particularly male
members of the army understood women soldiers took place during a broader cultural transformation that shaped the army’s conversation about women soldiers. That cultural transformation, described throughout this dissertation, was a broad transition from what members of the army called a management culture towards a culture that promoted individual leadership and attributes, what I call a leadership or warrior culture. The army’s new culture, which began developing in earnest in the late 1970s, was inherently coded male. The terms warrior or leader meant many things, but they were always described, during this period, in relation to battle. Women were denied access to military occupations in which they would be routinely exposed to combat, but because they worked in nearly every other military occupation, women challenged the army’s warrior culture narrative. Moreover, the army’s cultivation of a warrior identity was part of a broader societal remasculinization. As this warrior or leader culture solidified and strengthened, it challenged women’s place in the institution. The Army’s cultural narrative came to explain woman soldiers in such a way that those women could be accepted while still preserving a male-only sphere within the Army’s social structure, to the detriment of women soldiers. Limiting where women could serve, and what occupations they could perform, did not follow from the empirical evidence gleaned from the army’s studies about women soldiers, but such practices remained because they affirmed broader trends in doctrine and professionalism which were the core elements of the army’s cultural narrative.
A two-decade conversation about women soldiers in the military press shows how members of the army changed the narrative about women soldiers. That conversation, which includes articles and editorials in various publications, is a means through which to examine how some members of the Army worked to explain the changes in the gender dynamics of their institution in the years following the Vietnam war and the transition to a volunteer army. The authors were often males from the junior or mid-career ranks in the officer and non-commissioned officer corps, and they helped shape a discourse that outline how the army understood the expanded role of women in this traditionally male institution. Their conversation intersected with the army’s conversation about race, doctrine, and professionalism. Each of those conversations shaped how members of the army explained the inclusion of women.

The history of women in the post-Vietnam era U.S. army has not been fully explored. Besides a relatively small number of books produced by servicewomen themselves, or by the Army’s Center for Military History, few historians have examined how the expanded role of women intersected with a narrative of a revitalization and improvements made to and within the Army between the Vietnam War and the first Persian Gulf War. This is despite the fact that it was during this period that the

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separate Women’s Army Corps was dissolved, and women began to serve in nearly all military occupations.10

The existing work does show, however, that the history of the twentieth-century U.S. Army cannot be understood without understanding both the Army’s need for women’s labor and what military service offered to many women. Military service is inextricably bound with questions of citizenship. In a period, especially the 1940s and earlier, when women were not universally considered full citizens, women’s service in the U.S. military was controversial because of the social changes it portended.11 As Leisa D. Meyer has shown in *G.I. Jane*, the push to create the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps in World War II was not only so that women serving the U.S. military could receive equal rights and treatment as soldiers, but also because it enhanced women’s claims as full citizens.12 This was particularly true for African American women soldiers whose service challenged barriers of not only gender but also race. The history of African American women’s service should be seen as not only part of a broader struggle for

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African American civil rights, but also as part of the history of women’s struggle for equal rights and economic opportunity.

In short, most women in the U.S. army saw military service as an opportunity. Military service provided access to higher paying jobs, the potential for upward social mobility, and ever-present (for both men and women) thought that military service represented an adventure. Even today, although servicewomen still endure outsized challenges in a male-dominated institution, military service represents an opportunity for many women.

Although questions of citizenship and equality are important for understanding the importance of the military in women’s history and the importance of women in military history, servicewomen’s role in reconstructing gender has received the most attention from historians. Meyer has argued that one of the difficulties in the creation of the WAC was the reconciling of soldier and woman into the same category. She argues that the category of woman soldier was consciously constructed by WAC leadership in ways that limited society’s fears about the presence of women soldiers. Wacs were constructed as feminine in appearance and demeanor, sexually respectable, “less powerful than their male soldier counterparts,” middle class, and despite the fact that African American women served in the WAC in disproportionate numbers – white.14

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13 Ibid., 5.
14 Ibid., 52.
Still, the joining of conceptions of woman and soldier, a woman’s presence in a male institution, and her donning of uniforms construed as traditionally male marked the woman soldier as mannish, thus rendering her threatening in post-World War II America.

Some historians note that the women soldiers’ suspected deviance left them open to allegations of lesbianism and sexual deviance, while at the same time many others feared that women soldiers would be likely sexual victims. Margot Canaday has shown how lesbianism was a threat used against many women soldiers. Furthermore, when reports of lesbianism were investigated, the investigations were so wide-ranging that they effectively policed all women soldiers. Because attacks on women soldiers’ sexuality were so widespread, while at the same time inconsistent and inconclusive, they should be seen as a means to preserve and solidify military masculinity and gender hierarchies rather than an effort to ferret out assumed subversive behaviors.

Thus, the woman soldier is important for understanding the army’s institutional culture, and she is also important for understanding the changing landscape of gender in American society. Bringing this history forward to include the decades after the

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Vietnam War, and placing that history in conversation with the conservative turn in American political culture is this chapter’s purpose. This chapter shows that dominant themes in U.S. society shaped the army’s discourse about women soldiers as did the predominant narratives within the army’s culture. Ultimately, like that of the nation, the army’s conversation about women became more restrictive, closing down the openness of the 1970s.

I.

Historically, the expansion of opportunities for women in the U.S. Army has happened under the banner of expediency. Just as women formally entered the U.S. Army during World War II because of the perceived need for additional labor, the increase in the percentage of servicewomen after the Vietnam War was in large measure due to the end of conscription and the need for additional volunteers to fill the Army’s ranks.

The Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was organized during World War II, but women have always been a part of U.S. military history. From the colonial period through World War I, however, women’s status in the U.S. armed forces was unofficial. Some women masqueraded as men to serve on the front lines. Some women, often wives or family members of male soldiers, nursed, cooked, cleaned, or otherwise

17 Meyer, Creating GI Jane : Sexuality and Power in the Women’s Army Corps During World War II, 2.
supported the U.S. military in traditionally conceived women’s work either as a service to their male partners or as paid contractors.\textsuperscript{16} During World War I, many women served the American Expeditionary Force, but were denied recognition as soldiers. These women served as medical personnel, or more often, as clerical workers or switchboard operators for the army’s growing bureaucracy. Despite their service, women’s unofficial status prevented them from receiving veteran’s benefits or the recognition as both patriots and citizens often associated with military service.\textsuperscript{19}

This changed in World War II with the creation of the WAAC. From its inception, the WAAC (renamed the Women’s Army Corps [WAC] in 1943 when the WAC became a designated component of the army and not an auxiliary corps) was inextricably tied questions of citizenship and gender. Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers (R-MA) introduced legislation calling for the creation of the WAAC in 1941 in reaction to her own and other women’s unofficial service in World War I. The initial creation of the WAAC as an auxiliary corps was, in part, a solution to concerns that women should be enlisted in the Army on the same terms as men.\textsuperscript{20} An auxiliary corps was clothed, housed, fed, and transported by the army, but its members were paid less,

\textsuperscript{16} DeAnne Blanton, \textit{They Fought Like Demons: Women Soldiers in the American Civil War}, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002).


\textsuperscript{20} Morden, \textit{The Women’s Army Corps: 1945-1978}, 4,5.
because an auxiliary corps was not considered a full-fledged component of the army. Furthermore, members of the auxiliary corps were not subject to the same regulations as male soldiers and were not covered under the articles of war. Women’s auxiliary status lasted until 1943 when, at the request of Army General George C. Marshal, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), the U.S. Senate dropped the auxiliary status because the separate WAAC structure proved unwieldy and inefficient. Thus, by the end of World War II women were, for the first time, officially considered soldiers in the eyes of the U.S. Army’s bureaucracy.21

From the creation of the WAAC in 1942 through the 1970s, restrictions on the “recruitment and functions assigned to women in the U.S. army” were not explicitly incorporated into federal law.22 The guidance that informed the army’s policies on women after the Vietnam War, unchanged since the 1948 Women’s Armed Services Integration Act was, “the secretary of the army shall prescribe the military authority which commissioned officers of the WAC may exercise and the kind of military duty to which they may be assigned.”23 This specific clause for the Army stood in distinction to the same legislation’s verbiage for the air and sea services which stated that women were “prohibited from serving on Navy ships and aircraft engaged in combat missions

21 Ibid., 10-13.
22 Binkin and Bach, Women and the Military, 30.
as well as combat positions in the Marine Corps.” 24 The only other legislation concerning women in the military came in 1967, when President Lyndon Johnson signed a bill that removed restrictions on the promotion of women over the rank of colonel and the stipulation in the 1948 law which capped the number of women in the military to two percent of the total force. 25

Congress effectively delegated the authority to prescribe where women could serve within the army and the types of duty they could perform (i.e. combat or non-combat) to the army itself, and this led to an interpretation, reinforced by prevailing and male-dominated cultural understandings of gender norms, that Congress did not have a strong desire for women to serve in combat or be exposed to combat dangers. 26 Moreover, the WAC remained segregated within the army’s structure, few Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) were open to women, and women and men served in separate command structures. Some women officers described the WAC as a “pink ghetto,” where women had few opportunities for career advancement. 27 The separate status of women soldiers also reinforced traditional conceptions of military masculinity because it maintained the façade of the gendered division of labor so prevalent in


25 Binkin and Bach, Women and the Military, 12.

26 Ibid., 26, 27, 30.

American society. While they were legally soldiers, servicewomen from the 1940s through the 1960s did not challenge the masculine identity of “soldier” because they were prevented from doing, so called, men’s work. Wacs wore uniforms, drew pay and benefits equal to male soldiers, and were officially a separate Corps within the U.S. army; however, their separate status meant that culturally they were not soldiers in the same way that men were soldiers.

During World War II and after, WAC leadership constructed the image of “female soldier” in ways that reinforced such institutional separation because of the real and perceived need to counter public antagonism. These first official female soldiers were construed as feminine, controlled, and educated. Furthermore, although African-American women served in the WAC in disproportionate numbers, Wacs were construed in ways that invoked white middle-class respectability.\(^28\) Meier has argued that the category of female soldier was consciously created in the early years of the WAC by the first WAC Commander Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby as “feminine in appearance, sexually respectable, and less powerful than their male counterparts.”\(^29\) Meyer describes a process where Wacs, whom Meyer describes as female soldiers, had to be constituted in such a way that they would be accepted by both the army and the American public.

\(^{28}\) Meyer, *Creating GI Jane: Sexuality and Power in the Women’s Army Corps During World War II*, 52.\(^{29}\) Ibid.
Because of such conscious construction, the WAC did not discursively challenge the ideal of the military as a male only space because, symbolically, women were not soldiers – they were Wacs. “Wac” was a social category that enabled the army to make use of women’s labor while maintaining a discursive separation between woman and soldier. This gender-divided structure remained uncontested until 1972.

Two events led to the opening of the Army to women beyond the confines of the WAC. First, the 1960s women’s movement had a transformative effect on conceptions of gender throughout U.S. society. The ERA’s passage through Congress was one of the public policy implications of this cultural change. Second, the end of conscription forced the army to compete for manpower in the general labor market. Taken together, the ERA and the end of the draft signaled both the need for and possibility of an expanded role of women in the military. A 1977 Brookings Institute study noted that “facing shortages of high-quality males willing to volunteer and a declining reservoir of male youths in the general population, the military had to turn to other sources, particularly women.” Evelyn P. Foote, a woman who began her career as a Wac in 1959 and retired as a Brigadier General in 1989, echoed the Brooking’s assertion in a 1982 speech to women soldiers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina:

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30 WAC referred to the Women’s Army Corps as well as the women who served in that Corps. In this essay, I use the acronym WAC to refer to the Women’s Army Corps and Wac to refer to the category of person that served in the WAC.
31 Binkin and Bach, Women and the Military, 1; Bailey, America’s Army, 134.
if anybody says the reason we [the army] expanded the utilization of women was
simply in the interest of human rights and women’s rights, I’d say they’re dead
wrong. We were simply a very convenient response at that moment to the fact
that a volunteer armed force needed every good person – man or woman – it
could get to enter the ranks.33

Together, the Brookings’ Institute analysis and General Foote’s statement show that
labor requirements were the catalyst for the expansion of women’s opportunities in the
volunteer army of the 1970s. But they do not illuminate the mechanisms through which
women were culturally accepted and integrated into the army’s corporate body. To
understand those processes, the ERA becomes central.

The ERA, both the Congressional passage of the proposed amendment and the
conservative backlash against it, profoundly shaped the army’s conversation about
women. The ERA passed through Congress with the simple verbiage that “equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state
on account of sex.”34 Although the amendment failed to make it through the ratification
process in the early 1970s many political and military leaders assumed that ratification
was certain. Within only one year, 22 of the needed 38 states had already approved of
the amendment.

Smith Reynolds Library Special Collections and Archives, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA.
34 Michael S. Foley, Front Porch Politics: The Forgotten Heyday of American Activism in the 1970s and 1980s,
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), 74. The ERA easily cleared Congress, passing through the House of
Representatives with 354 to 23 in favor, and the Senate 84 to 8.
By 1973 many members of the army assumed the days of gendered separations of labor, gender inequality, and gender exclusion in public institutions such as the army were coming to an end. The initial momentum of the ERA suggests why the numbers of women soldiers and opportunities available to them expanded so rapidly. As an institution, the army had, since 1948, taken its cues on the “woman question” not from explicit national or Department of Defense policy, but rather from the ways in which the Army’s leadership interpreted congressional guidance. That same leadership took the passage of the ERA as “writing on the wall.” The army’s leadership believed if they did not take steps to integrate women into the institution, they would be forced to do so by the nation’s political leaders and citizens.

Immediately after congressional approval of the ERA, the presence of women in the army exploded by multiple orders of magnitude. Between 1972 and 1980, the number of women serving in the army increased by over 50,000 individuals, from 16,800 to 69,300. Such numbers represented a rate of expansion of women in uniform of over twenty percent each year. Even this four-hundred percent increase still left women comprising less than ten percent of the overall force. However, despite the relatively small overall percentage of women in the Army’s overall personnel strength, the early and middle 1970s remain a watershed moment for women soldiers.

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It is not an understatement to say that women soldiers saved the all-volunteer force. Not only were the numbers of women soldiers important in filling personnel needs, but women soldiers were often better-educated than their male counterparts. Women soldiers were required to possess a high school degree, and in aggregate women scored higher on the army’s entrance exam. One male basic training commander even noted that women, “even if they are less physically adept,” were “smarter.” Despite the restrictions on where women could serve in the institution, they were quality recruits at a time when American society actively questioned the quality of the volunteer army.

For the first time in the Army’s history, women were not only Wacs, but became accepted by male members of the institution as soldiers. After the dramatic expansion of women in the army, Wacs no longer performed only so-called women’s work such as administrative and medical tasks because at the same time that the numbers of women increased, the positions and MOS open to women increased from 35 percent of enlisted positions to over 80 percent by 1976. By 1978, only 16 of 345 enlisted MOS remained closed to women. The only occupations remaining closed were jobs such as those in the infantry, the armor or tank corps, army special forces, and some jobs in the field

40 Woelfel, "Women in the United States Army," 785; Blumenson, "The Army’s Women Move Out," 18. These sources use different numbers for the amount of military occupations open to women. Blumenson uses data from 1978 and Woelfel uses data from 1977. I cite both as evidence of how frequently the army’s policy changed during this period.
artillery. In other words, women served everywhere except for those occupations which were the traditionally conceived “combat” jobs. By the late 1970s, women soldiers were performing nearly all of the same military occupations as were male soldiers.

It was increased opportunity more than the increase in numbers of women that shifted the perception of women soldiers. Prior to the 1970s, women’s cultural separation from the Army, as well as constructions which desired that Wacs retain their outward femininity, led to restrictions on women receiving weapons training and wearing fatigue uniforms. Unlike men, who predominantly wore fatigue uniforms, women were only issued a feminized version of the army’s dress uniform for service in indoor environments. After 1975 women received formal training in the use of personal weapons. They were also issued fatigue uniforms which decreased the visual separation between men and women soldiers.

In contrast to the strict gender division of labor until the early 1970s, by 1977 only sixty percent of the women in the army were working in the “traditional” women’s army occupations such as “office clerks, typists, and medics.” The other forty percent were employed throughout the institution in so-called purely military specialties such as

41 Meyer, Creating GI Jane: Sexuality and Power in the Women’s Army Corps During World War II.; Vuic, Officer, Nurse, Woman: The Army Nurse Corps in the Vietnam War.
the military police, heavy equipment operators, mechanics, and military intelligence.\textsuperscript{43} Despite such expanded numbers and roles, women remained assigned to the WAC until 1978. This meant that, while they spent their days working alongside the men in their military organization they were housed in separate barracks and fell under an all-woman WAC chain of command. Their labor was needed for the army to meet its personnel requirements, but women remained outside of the institution in many formal and informal ways.

Prior to the dissolution of the WAC, however, this system began to change. Because of the increased presence of women soldiers performing well in jobs that were once relegated to men only, earlier misogynist gender stereotypes were losing predominance. One author in \textit{Army} magazine noted, “the old male stereotype that the army is not place for women because they’re too temperamental, don’t take responsibility seriously, are generally incompetent, cry-babies, self-centered, emotional, immature, unmilitary, and often just plain \textit{dumb} no longer has any meaning.”\textsuperscript{44}

The same author argued that this older conception had been replaced by a new one that recognized women as good soldiers.\textsuperscript{45} By the late 1970s, women were commanding male soldiers, they were becoming parachutists (a long-standing cultural symbol of “elite” soldier and military masculinity), and since 1974, had served as

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\textsuperscript{43} Blumenson, "The Army’s Women Move Out," 15. \\
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 14. \\
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
helicopter pilots. By 1977, Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander went so far as to argue that women “could handle combat duty.” While Alexander maintained that his views did not outweigh national policies excluding women from combat, the mere fact that the Secretary of the Army voiced these statements suggests the fracturing of older, more conservative, conceptions of women’s ability to serve in the military. General Foote echoed these statements when she stated “the men are being continually amazed at just how competent we women are” during an address to a group of Wacs during a 1974 WAC of the year ceremony. She contrasted this to earlier times when, “women had to constantly prove their worth to the armed services.”

The Army’s need for additional personnel, of any gender, placed women in so-called non-traditional roles, and such changes took place even though the Army did not change its policies excluding women from combat. Thus, the army’s official policies did not accurately depict the changed social relationship between male and female soldiers. The daily interactions between men and women soldiers in different spaces and situations started to remap understandings of gender norms within the army as the women’s movement and women’s expansion into the workplace reimagined such understandings in American society. During the 1970s, more soldiers, both male and female, accepted women as soldiers.

46 Ibid., 16.
47 General Foote was a Lieutenant Colonel when she made these statements.
48 Correspondence 1974, Box 4 Folder 5, MS517, Evelyn P. Foote Papers, Z. Smith Reynolds Library Special Collections and Archives, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA.
In 1979 issue of *Parameters*, a male battalion commander reflecting on women in his command rated their performance as “excellent” when performing in “traditional” roles such as typist or medic and equally “excellent” when performing less traditional roles such as mechanics, military police, and heavy equipment operators. For that commander, the fact that women had, on average, less physical strength than their male counterparts posed a limitation, but a limitation that could be overcome.49 This same commander noted that women were excellent not only in their job performance, but also in the “total soldier concept.” By that he meant that women were as professional as their male counterparts.50

One officer published a fictional letter to his daughter in a 1977 issue of *Army* that answered her request for advice about whether or not to pursue a career in the military.51 This letter is distinct in its format, but encapsulates many other statements written about women in the army in the middle and late 1970s. The author stated “with confidence” that attitudes “are changing” and that legal barriers “are falling.” He also noted that women only served in offices – as opposed to outdoors in traditionally male spaces - by choice and not because that was the only option available. Women, the male author stated, “are trusted as people first and as women second; sex is far less a factor

50 Ibid., 21.
than before.” The author’s final recommendation in his fictional parental advice was to “not make your decisions regarding a military career based on the fact that you are a woman. Instead, think of yourself as a person and gauge your own personal strengths.” This article is significant for two reasons. Not only does it generally praise the performance of women in the military, but also it is written by an army officer and framed as if it were written to the officer’s daughter. The imagery of America’s daughters dying in combat was an oft-employed sign in the arguments against women in the military, but this was an army officer rhetorically supporting his fictional daughter’s pursuit a military career. Such examples demonstrate the socially progressive the thinking of some members of the army was in the 1970s.

Even as late as 1980 when, as the chapter will show, the conversation about women in the army was shifting to emphasize separation and difference more than integration, some men continued to argue for the meaningful integration of women in the army. Major Peter F. Herrly wrote, “there is a small but steadily growing group of American women who are tough enough and aggressive enough to meet the stresses of combat support and even incidental combat.” He went on state, “Indeed the

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52 Ibid., 11.
demonstrated performance of a few of these women under extended stress has been so excellent as to raise at least the possibility of their fitness for combat arms.”

The contention that the army was moving, both officially and culturally, towards ever greater integration of women is more evident when the statements made in the army press are viewed next to the results of the army’s MAXWAC (Maximum Women’s Army Corp) and REFWAC (Return of Forces to Germany Women’s Army Corps) studies. The MAXWAC and REFWAC studies, completed in 1977, pursued two questions: would the inclusion of women in an army organization decrease the effectiveness of that organization, and could women effectively perform their assigned tasks during a long duration field training exercise.

During 1976 and 1977, the U.S. Army Research Institute conducted the MAXWAC tests to determine if greater numbers of women in combat support units had a detrimental effect on the performance of the unit. The tests concluded that there was no discernable difference in the performance of the company based on the number of

55Ibid., 3. For another example of writings that supported women in the army in 1980, Thomas Huey, "Integrating Women Soldiers Requires Command Interest," ibid., December, 67, 68. “combat arms” is a military term, used both officially and in unofficial conversation, referring to MOS such as infantry, artillery, or armor whose purpose focuses almost singularly on ground combat.
56 Return of Forces to Germany or REFORGER was a yearly exercise performed by the U.S. and other nations of NATO that trained these armies on the plans for the defense of Western Europe against an invasion by the nations of the Warsaw Pact. The United States would sea, rail, and airlift entire divisions from their home bases in the continental United States to Germany for a ten-day field training exercise. A field training exercise simply means that army units trained under simulated combat conditions.
57 This test observed forty different company sized organizations over a three-day field exercise to determine whether or not the number of women in the organization had an effect on the organization’s performance. Companies of up to 35% women were assembled and evaluated.
women present. In contrast, the study determined that the more completely the organization was integrated, the fewer discipline and performance problems arose.\textsuperscript{58} Per MAXWAC, if women and men were in the same unit, the organization performed better when less gender division or separation existed.

REFWAC took place later in 1977, and it consisted of the same type of analysis as the MAXWAC study. The difference the two studies was duration. REFWAC took place during a ten-day exercise called Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER). REFORGER was a yearly exercise in which military units stationed in the United States deployed to Germany for force-on-force simulated war exercises. Again, the results of REFWAC suggested that neither the mere presence of women nor increased densities of women had discernable negative effects on the performance of a military organization.\textsuperscript{59}

MAXWAC and REFWAC were not the only studies which assessed the performance of women in expanded roles throughout the army. For instance, a study by the Army Research Institute of over 12,000 randomly selected soldiers taken conducted in 1974 showed that seventy-seven percent of male officers and sixty-six percent of male enlisted had a favorable opinion of the increase in MOS open to women.\textsuperscript{60} In a 1978 master’s degree thesis written at the army’s Command and General Staff College, thirty-

\textsuperscript{58} “Women Content in Units Force Development Test (MAXWAC),” ed. Department of the Army (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1977), 1-2; McKnight, “Women in the Army: Experiences of a Battalion Commander.”

\textsuperscript{59} Woelfel, “Women in the United States Army,” 792-95.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 788.
six percent of male captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels surveyed either agreed or strongly agreed with the idea of women serving in combat, compared with fifty-two percent who either disagreed or strongly disagreed (the rest were undecided).\textsuperscript{61} That same thesis showed that fifty percent of those surveyed had an increasingly favorable conception of women in the military (twenty percent were undecided).\textsuperscript{62}

The result of these studies, coupled with the writings in \textit{Army} and other military journals, suggest that by 1977 many members of the army accepted, or were in the process of accepting, women’s presence in the institution. In this midst of this extensive testing, the \textit{Army Times} reported that Lieutenant General Smith, a deputy chief of staff for personnel, stated that “the army is looking into the possibility of putting some women into close combat units.”\textsuperscript{63} There was no serious attempt made by the army to remove the restrictions on women’s service in combat, but by the end of the 1970s women soldiers were no longer Wacs separated from the army in a “pink ghetto.”

Still, most of the arguments seeking greater equality for women soldiers came from middle and lower level officers and non-commissioned officers. This younger

\textsuperscript{61} Dorothy E. Spencer, “Toward the Army of the 1980s: A Study of Male Attitudes Toward Women as Combatants” (Master’s, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1978), 166. The respondents in this study, which consisted of a survey instrument were all male, predominantly from the “combat arms,” and over 80% served in combat previously.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 163.

cohort came of age during the 1960s – an era of quickening social change. When historians have focused on the ever-present conservative opinions about women in the army, they are often citing older male officers such as General William Westmoreland, or citing the words of some women officers, namely commanders of the WAC. For instance, Brigadier General Elizabeth Hoisington, the commander of the WAC from 1966 to 1971, was among the most vocal critics of the expanded role of women because of her role as a former WAC Commander and her conservative worldview. When we look to the younger generation of officers and NCOs, we see a different, and generally more progressive story. The predominantly egalitarian discourse of the 1970s makes the backlash against women soldiers in the 1980s all the more intriguing, not only for ferocity of that backlash, but also for the degree that it silenced the army’s conversation about women’s equality that during the 1970s.

II.

The change in the army’s conversation about women hinged upon the term “woman soldier.” As women gained acceptance in the army, members of the institution

constructed the term woman soldier as a social category that joined the categories of “soldier” and “woman.” Both women themselves, and their male counterparts, used the new category. At first, they coded this category with terms of acceptance and empowerment. Eventually, however, “woman soldier” became the central term in women’s exclusion. Through the constitution of “woman soldier,” women became internal externals within the army’s culture. By internal externals I mean that women were, for the first time, culturally accepted as soldiers. However, women still remained external to combat, the core of the army’s predominant conception of a soldier’s identity. Thus, woman soldier both explained women’s presence in the institution and reaffirmed the male dominance of the institution.

Initially, the existence of a segregated women’s corps and the U.S. army’s gender division of labor kept the terms woman and soldier from coalescing into a single category. It was not until American social mores changed because of the women’s liberation movement and the common assumption that the ERA would soon be ratified that the perception of women in the Army changed to such an extent that “woman soldier” became a social and cultural as well as legal and official category. For instance, at a conference in Fort Riley, Kansas in 1974 General Foote, then the WAC staff advisor to the Commander of Forces Command, presented the award for “Wac of the year.” In that presentation, General Foote referred to herself as an “officer who happened to be a woman.” Yet, three years later, after Foote took command of a basic training battalion at
Fort McClellan, she penned a letter to the editor of the Post newspaper that referred to “female soldiers.”

Later, in 1978, in correspondence with another female officer, both Foote and her correspondent, Lieutenant Jane Roper, referred to themselves as “woman soldiers.” In that same correspondence Roper also described herself as a feminist, joining her feminist self-identity with her identity as a woman soldier. The fact that Roper and Foote combined their self-conceptions of feminist and “woman soldier” in the same conversation suggests that the term woman soldier was, for these women, a term of empowerment. Naming themselves woman soldier or female soldier, as opposed to “Wac,” was a sign that they felt they belonged in a male-dominated institution.

General Foote and multiple correspondents always used the term woman soldier or female soldier after 1975, but in her earlier correspondence and writings, Foote used the term “soldier-who-happens-to-be-a-woman.” The change was subtle, but it suggests changes in the cultural meaning of women in the armed forces.

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66 A battalion consists of 500-700 soldiers and is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. Foote’s basic training battalion was responsible for providing initial training to newly recruited soldiers. See “Correspondence 1977,” Box 4, Folder 8, MS517, Evelyn P. Foote Papers, Z. Smith Reynolds Library Special Collections and Archives, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA.


68 Ibid.

Men also used the term woman soldier during this period of rapid expansion in the number of women in the army. A male first sergeant wrote a letter to the editor of Army in 1975 where he stated: “Don’t pamper the female soldiers; she doesn’t like it. Do not generalize by referring to them as the ‘weaker sex.’ This view is outdated.” Thus, male soldiers also used the term woman soldier as an empowering descriptor.

In its 1970s usage, woman soldier was not a term designated by the Army, it was a social and cultural category that informed the way that members of the army spoke about their institution. The WAC was not dissolved until 1978, but woman soldier appears regularly by 1975, showing the power that individual members of the Army exercised in defining their institution. Wac connoted a member of the army, but not quite a soldier. Wacs were secretaries and medical personnel. Wacs were not generally in command of men. Wacs did not carry weapons, or wear fatigue uniforms. Women soldiers, in contrast, did all of those things. When male soldiers began to use this term, it signifies that some of them acknowledged and accepted the expanded role of women in the army.

The cultural meaning and conceptions of woman soldier were, however, unstable. After the ERA failed to be ratified, a marker of the national backlash against

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71 A First Sergeant is a senior non-commissioned officer. The First Sergeant is assigned to each army company and is the senior NCO in that organization.
women’s equality, the army’s conversation about women shifted. Once again women came to be marked as separate from male soldiers, and the category of woman soldier became the term of that segregation.

Despite the increased acceptance of women soldiers during the middle 1970s, there remained residual ideas that women still did not belong in the Army. While these voices had been pushed to the margins of the conversation during the 1970s, they dominated the army’s conversation about women throughout the 1980s. To understand why the predominant trend in the army’s conversation about women’s equality changed, we must look at two concurrent phenomena. The first was a growing anti-feminist backlash evidenced by Schlafly’s STOP ERA campaign. The other was the Army’s awkward process of defining combat in such a way that the labor of women soldiers could be maximized but retained combat as a male-only activity. These phenomena were interrelated, each amplifying the other.

III.

The Congressional passage of the ERA and the end of the draft were nearly contemporaneous in 1972 and 1973. These events led to the rapid expansion of women’s role in the army out of necessity, but as army studies later admitted, that expansion happened prior to the development of comprehensive policies that guided the ways in which women soldiers were assigned to occupations and managed throughout their
military careers. As more women served in traditionally male occupations within the army, there were insufficient policies in place to restrict women to so-called non-combat occupations. For example, women could not serve in the infantry, but might be mechanics or military police who routinely worked alongside the infantry in combat situations. Thus, while formally excluded from combat, women routinely served in the battlefield spaces where combat activities were likely to occur. Such policies were inconsistent, and the women’s combat exclusion policies had to be recreated. Either combat had to be defined in such a way that women could remain excluded, or the army would have to allow women to serve in combat.

The latter was unlikely. Although many (but certainly not all) men and women in the army called for greater gender equality, both civilian political leaders and the nation as a whole seemed to be against women’s service in combat. This was evidenced by the prevailing argument against the now-languishing ERA that centered on visions of women in combat. At the same time, defining combat in ways that explained women’s continued exclusion was no easy task. By the 1970s, warfare did not lend itself to a cleanly defined architecture that could be used to cleave members of the army authorized to serve in combat from those who weren’t. As the Vietnam War had shown,

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it was impossible to separate “combat” from support areas, or the so-called rear areas where many of the army’s support functions took place.

The post-Vietnam War all-volunteer army, however, simply could not function without increased numbers of women serving in the majority of military occupations because there weren’t enough male volunteers to fill the ranks. The army’s problem was the proverbial catch-22; the army needed women in occupations where they would be exposed to combat, but the army’s policies forbade women from engaging in combat. In this difficult situation, the army’s leadership was not able to provide the members of the institution with a definition of combat that explained women’s exclusion. Such inconsistency in the army’s formal procedures caused an instability in the army’s conversation about women, and such instability was a moment where the predominant ideas about women could more easily shift. In the 1980s, it was the backlash against the ERA and women’s rights more broadly, rather than the 1970s promotion of women’s rights, that provided members of the army with terms and language through which they could reconcile the instability in the institution’s conversation about women. By the 1980s, the same ideas and terms used to argue against the ERA came to be used within the army. That is, a language based upon assumed immutable differences in physical strength between men and women came to dominate the army’s conversation about the integration of women soldiers. The army continued to bar women from combat service because, supposedly, they were unable to withstand combat’s physical rigors. The
ERA’s downfall changed some perceptions of women in society, and the army followed suit.

By 1977 the ERA had stalled in the ratification process, and the amendment died in 1982. Schlafly’s STOP ERA campaign played a crucial role in the defeat of the ERA. Her campaign also shifted the discursive field, or the boundaries of the army’s conversation about women, in such a way that it once again became socially acceptable to argue for the exclusion of women from broad sectors of military service because such language was once again acceptable in some sectors of American society. This new, or rather returned, discourse focused on physical differences between men and women. As Beth Bailey has noted in her book *America’s Army*, the army’s conversation became one where advocates of women’s equality used “law and logic,” and the opponents made their arguments through appeals to “timeless truth, personal experience, and God’s will.”

Schlafly was an operative of the conservative movement from the 1950s through the 1980s. Despite her visceral anti-feminist rhetoric, she was the epitome of a “liberated” woman. As a young adult, she worked nights assembling and test-firing rifles to finance her college education. Schlafly would go on to run (unsuccessfully) for Congress multiple times, she served in the Eisenhower administration, and worked as both an investigator for Senator Joseph McCarthy as then as an advisor to the Barry

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Goldwater campaign in 1964. Schlafly’s journey was the same type of story she sought to deny other women.

Beginning in the 1970s, Schlafly published a monthly political newsletter entitled the *Phyllis Schlafly Report* (PSR). In one the first editions of the PSR, she entered the conversation about the ERA. The headline of that month’s PSR read, “What’s Wrong with Equal Rights for Women?” That article was the ideological foundation of STOP ERA, and Schlafly’s anti-ERA message developed in the pages of PSR through the remainder of the 1970s until amendment’s death in 1982.

In her opening salvo against the ERA, Schlafly argued that it was the American free enterprise system that freed women from the “backbreaking drudgery” of “women’s work.” Schlafly stated that the ERA would take away a woman’s “right” to be supported by her husband, the “right of a mother to have her minor children supported by the children’s father,” and lead to the “state” setting up child care centers for all children. Schlafly’s most forceful argument, however, was that the ERA would lead to both the conscription of the women citizens into the U.S. military, and women’s service in direct combat.

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76 Ibid., 2.
77 Miller, "Phyllis Schlafly’s “Positive” Freedom."
Schlafly appropriated this rhetoric from Senator Sam Ervin’s (R-NC) proposed series of amendments to the ERA which undercut the proposed legislation’s broad language. The most notable amendment specifically limited the ERA by exempting women from compulsory service. Ervin’s amendment 1065 stated, “This article shall not impair, however, the validity of any laws of the United States or any State which exempt women from compulsory military service,” and amendment 1066 stated, “This article shall not impair the validity, however, of any laws of the United States which exempt women from service in combat units of the Armed Forces.” Phyllis Schlafly, “The Legislative History of the ERA,” Phyllis Schlafly Report, November 1976. As to why these amendments were not accepted, Mansbridge offers two ideas: first proponents of the ERA knew that any amendment weakening the ERA would fracture the coalition of legislators and citizens who supported the amendment, and second, any amendment would have forced the legislation back to committee, where it would likely have been killed by anti-ERA legislators.

women soldiers focused less on women’s performance in their military occupations and more upon the real and imagined differences between men and women.\textsuperscript{80}

Again, it was Congress that signaled the changing ideas about women in uniform. Schlafly testified before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in 1979 and 1980 on the issue of women in the military and the requirement for women to register with Selective Service. The hearings reviewed the ways in which women were utilized in the military, and the overall focus was whether or not women could serve in combat.\textsuperscript{81} The tone of the hearings, not to mention Schlafly’s participation, signaled the acceptance of conservative rhetoric in mainstream national political culture because the HASC hearings sided against women being included in any future selective service programs.

Schlafly’s 1979 testimony before the HASC military personnel subcommittee suggests a direct connection between STOP ERA and the army’s internal discourse. One of the witnesses who testified alongside Schlafly in the four days of hearings was Brigadier General (Ret.) Andrew J. Gatsis. General Gatsis testified as a veteran of the Korean and Vietnam wars, and was construed as an “expert” witness on the subject of


\textsuperscript{81} HASC. \textit{Women in the Military}, 1.
combat. He acknowledged that some women liked the army and served excellently in noncombat positions. His testimony, however, hinged on the idea that women lacked the physical strength needed for combat. While Schlafly’s testimony focused on her perception that women’s service in the army deprived them of their femininity, Gatsis’ testimony focused on his perception that women’s service in combat deprived the army of the additional physical strength that a male soldier provided in the same situation. Other witnesses supplemented their arguments about “femininity” and strength with statements about women lacking the aggressiveness of men. Although Gatsis did reference the MAXWAC and REFWAC tests, he did not mention the fact that the observers of those tests noted that men and women soldiers adapted the performance of military tasks in ways that normalized differences in physical ability to no significant reduction in the efficiency of the units conducting the test. This is not to say that the testimonies of Schlafly and Gatsis were responsible for the backlash against women soldiers. Rather, their statements marked a shift in American society which enabled a similar shift in the army’s conversation about women. The army’s general trend in the army’s conversation moved from one of optimistic integration to one focused on dubiously articulated essential differences between the sexes.

82 Ibid., 279.
83 Ibid., 276.
84 Ibid., 277.
Furthermore, while Schlafly did not directly make statements within the army’s internal conversation about women, Gatsis did. In a 1979 letter to the editor of *Army*, Gatsis railed against the expanded role of women in the army stating, “We all know that the army is being used by the Pentagon (saturated with women’s libbers and their supporters) as a mechanism to promote the Equal Rights Amendment and mislead Americans into believing that combat and war are natural roles for women.”

There is little daylight between the arguments of Gatsis and Schlafly. Schlafly also posted Gatsis’ testimony before the HASC in the February 1980 issue of the PSR, suggesting that, at a minimum, Schlafly and General Gatsis approved of, and drew upon, each other’s statements. Moreover, the connection between Schlafly and a retired senior officer that authored articles in military publications demonstrate the links between Schlafly’s campaign against the ERA and the army’s conversation about women that helped forestall women’s integration in the institution during the 1980s. There was still a need, however, for the army to update its official policies in such a way that it could make use of women’s labor while still excluding them from combat. And that required a firmer definition of what it meant to be in combat.

The broadest definition of “in combat” is the mere presence of a soldier in a theater of operations (for example the Pacific or European theater of World War II); by

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that definition, women always served in combat. A definition of combat that broad, however, potentially includes every soldier in the military during a time of conflict, and thus the army needed to scope the meaning of combat in a way that matched the combat exclusion policy.

The army’s combat exclusion policy, adopted until 1977, dispensed with the definition of combat entirely, stating, “women may not serve in Infantry, Armor, Cannon Field Artillery, Combat Engineer, or Low Altitude Air Defense Artillery units of Battalion / Squadron or smaller size.” While it might seem that this policy tied the combat exclusion to military occupation, the policy was actually an articulation of combat as imagined space. The documents which explained the combat exclusion policy in detail used a graphic depiction of the battlefield that defined the battalion’s area (nearest the front lines) as the “combat” space. The “battalion or smaller in size” clause in the army’s exclusion policy suggests that the army’s policy was more concerned with keeping women away from the front line of troops where direct combat occurred than it was with the occupation a woman soldier performed. The 1977 policy, however, did not account for women soldiers in combat support occupations which necessitated their presence in “combat” space.

88 Ibid., 4-4.
In 1982, when the army reviewed the combat exclusion policy, it did so in part because “currently, women are assigned to duty positions and MOS that require them to engage routinely in direct combat. Women may be found in every battlefield sector including forward, alongside of, or interspersed with direct combat units.”\textsuperscript{89} The MOS and duty positions the study referred to were ones where women soldiers were assigned to combat support occupations, such as mechanic or equipment operator that, by the army’s doctrine, “supported” combat as far forward as possible.\textsuperscript{90} Removing women from all or most combat support positions, with women now representing ten percent of the army, might have put the army’s ability to support its “combat” forces in jeopardy.

Therefore, the army could not define the exclusion of women from combat in spatial terms because such a definition prevented women from being in the proper location to perform their MOS. Likewise, army policy could not define the combat exclusion solely in terms of MOS. The battlefield was so fluid in the 1980s, as imagined in the Army’s Airland Battle doctrine, that even occupations as seemingly benign as “interior electrician” or “plumber” had the potential to be routinely in direct combat.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Interior electrician and plumber are two examples of MOS that were once open to women, but then closed after the 1982 Women in the Army Policy Review because they had too high of a probability of routine direct combat. “Women in the Army Policy Review,” 4-9. The same review used the following, slightly updated definition of direct combat as follows, “Direct combat is engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy’s personnel, and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with
In 1982, however, the army again attempted to rewrite the combat exclusion policy in terms of MOS. The army’s new policy closed twenty-three MOS – in which women were then currently serving – to women. The reasoning for closing these MOS was that they were combat support MOS that worked in close proximity to combat forces. Thus, combat’s definition remained a formulation of combat as space even as warfare was assumed to be ever more fluid. The 1982 policy marked women soldiers as different, even more so than they were in the 1970s, because it hardened the boundaries of a male only combat space. By this point, the discourse about women soldiers reflected their gender difference as “woman” more than it reflected their performance and abilities as “soldier.”

The preceding analysis demonstrates the contestation over where, and in what capacity, women soldiers could officially serve. Furthermore, it demonstrates how policies that excluded women from combat had broader implications for the ways that gender was reimagined in the army during the 1970s and 1980s. The exclusion of women from combat was an attempt to write a culturally constructed gender “norm” into policy, but such attempts conceptualized women’s exclusion from combat in terms of a space where combat was likely to occur rather than the physical and mental

the enemy by fire, maneuver, or shock effect in order to destroy or capture him, or while repelling his assault fire, close combat, or counterattack.”
requirements of the MOS. In effect, the army’s policy reinforced cultural constructions of immutable difference between men and women soldiers because it did not explain the combat exclusion in terms of women’s job performance. The Army’s policies about women soldiers and Schlafly’s anti-feminist rhetoric reinforced one another. Women were simply different, and in terms of combat, unacceptable.

Thus, it was not combat exclusion policies themselves that shaped the army’s discourse about women soldiers in the 1980s. Rather, combat exclusion policies provided the conceptual space for the societal backlash against women’s rights to shape the army’s conversation about women. Those members of the army, who had always opposed an expanded role for women soldiers, drowned out the statements of the cohort of soldiers that supported women’s equality within the institution. Eventually, the statements opposing women’s equality coalesced into a predominant discourse which precluded women from being considered “fully” soldiers.

The changing content of the articles in the military press supports this contention. “Backlash” articles moved from the periphery to the center of many publications after the national conversation about women’s rights and the ERA shifted. In a 1981 article, Colonel B.G. Beck stated that, “any alteration of sex composition in the makeup of ground fighting units based on social pressure alone, without considering the

92 Stiehm, "Women and the Combat Exemption.” Stiehm does not support these arguments but argues that conceptions of physical difference became by 1980 the dominant theme in discussions of women in the army.
influence on military effectiveness in combat, is dangerous."\textsuperscript{93} Beck acknowledged that the increase in women soldiers was largely responsible for the success of the volunteer force because the broader use of women allowed the army to meet its personnel needs. His argument, however, was that although women could perform well in some jobs that, "women had traditionally performed such as food services, health care, administration, and communications," it was unclear whether increased numbers of women would interfere with a military unit’s “capacity to provide the necessary security-defense response.”\textsuperscript{94} Colonel Beck, and many other authors, were part of a shifting narrative that, while accepting the need for women in the army, maintained the concept of combat as a male only enterprise. It was as if the army’s defenders of patriarchy fell back to an alternate defensive position; not unlike they did when accepting women into the Army in the first instance during World War II. As a whole, the Army needed women’s labor, but still felt a cultural need to uphold the military as a male space.

In addition to physical strength, pregnancy was a component of the backlash against women soldiers. In many 1970s articles, pregnancy was cited as a personnel issue that had to be solved on a case-by-case basis, but by the 1980s, pregnancy was used as a central argument in the case against an expanded role for women in the army. Many members of the army, nearly all men, argued that pregnant soldiers caused

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 26, 27.
unacceptable reductions in unit readiness. In like manner, some writers went so far as to cite the possibility of fraternization between officers and noncommissioned officers and young female soldiers as reason to restrict opportunities for women to serve. Thus, sexual deviance returned as a component of the narrative through which to exclude women from full acceptance as soldiers. Whether pregnancy or “fraternization,” by the 1980s, members of the army used these issues in tandem with physical strength as reasons why women were unfit for service in combat, and discursively, why women soldiers were less than soldiers.

Despite the positive results of the MAXWAC and REFWAC tests, and the qualitative statements of many soldiers that saw no deficiency in the performance of their women colleagues, the backlash against women soldiers in the 1980s focused almost entirely on the physical differences between men and women. This is in contrast to other narratives being constructed within the army; whether members of the army described ethics or job performance evaluations, they described soldiers in terms of the “total soldier.” What is remarkable is that when discussing women soldiers many

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* Pregnancy was an important issue in the eyes of not only soldiers, but also army decision makers. The 1976 Women in the army study devoted an entire chapter to the issue of lost work time due to pregnancy. Fox et al., "The Final Report of the Women in the Army Study Group." For an example of attempting to solve the supposed issue of pregnant soldiers, Margaret M. Bahnsen, "A Question of Fairness: The Army and Pregnancy," *Army*, March 1979, 11. Examples of articles that use pregnancy as an argument against the expanded role of women soldiers. James P. Fazekas, "Army Women's Place: Behind the Desk of the M16," ibid., January 1980.

members of the army focused one aspect of job performance: physical ability. Yet, no physical standards existed for the military occupations in question. Thus, claiming that women should be excluded from certain military occupations pushed the debate away from the objectivity it enjoyed in the 1970s into conjecture and rhetoric. The types of statements made in the discourse against women soldiers reflected Schlafly’s campaign against women’s equality, which relied less on objectivity and fact than on emotion and opinion.

As the backlash against women grew, the category woman soldier went from a marker of success to a term of exclusion. Some members of the army recoded woman soldier as something less than the universal category of “soldier” which retained its male gendering. A soldier had the physical ability to serve in the army; a woman soldier did not, and thus could only serve in certain occupations. Discursively, a soldier could serve in combat, a woman soldier could not. A soldier served in situations where he could die for his country, a woman soldier served in situations where she, likely, would not. Women soldiers developed into a special category of soldier that was not interchangeable with their (male) peers.

A final example is the 1980 article “Women in Combat: Two Views.” The article was a conversation between a woman officer named Major Doris Kessler and the same

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98 Ibid., 55.
Major Paul Gabriel who coauthored *Crisis in Command*. Kessler supported the position that women should be permitted to serve in any occupation for which they were qualified. Gabriel supported a position that, while women soldiers could do many military tasks as well as men, they were physically unable to perform many duties particular to combat, and moreover would prevent the “psychological” bonding of the “battle group.” Major Kessler grounded her argument in the army’s need for personnel, women’s current satisfactory performance, and the effects that cultural norms had on gender roles. In contrast, like the testimony of General Gatsis and Phyllis Schlafly before the HASC, Major Gabriel bases his argument on personal experience and “immutable laws.” Gabriel went so far as to argue that the integration of women in combat units risked the psychological bonding mechanism among men in the combat group because “anthropological development has placed the role of women in war as booty, rewards for heroism, or as charges to be protected from the enemy.” Just as the earlier contributor to *Army* penned a fictional letter to his daughter urging to consider the army as a career represented the progressive thinking of some members of the army, Gabriel’s discussion of “anthropological development” clearly shows how conservative some members of the army remained. The fact that Gabriel’s article was featured in

100 Doris H. Kessler, "Women in Combat? Two Views."
101 Ibid., 49, 50.
Army suggests that the mainstream of the Army as an institution was also moving in a conservative direction.

In recoding woman soldier as a separate category of soldier rather than a term of women’s empowerment and acceptance, members of the army charted a discursive middle ground that functionally retained combat as a male only space. By the 1980s, the category ‘woman soldier’ acknowledged women’s role in the institution while enabling the conceptual space for statements about supposed fundamental and irreconcilable differences between the sexes.102

The talk of immutable differences between the sexes, of women’s inability to be aggressive, and “anthropological development” of male-only warrior bands was Schlafly and Senator Ervin’s language dressed in a military uniform. Because of the confusion over defining combat and the systemic lack of a methodology whereby the myths that deemed women unfit for combat could be challenged, Gabriel and others’ culturally based arguments became predominant, and they remained so until the 2014 reversal of women’s combat exclusion policies.

III.

102 Boening, "Woman Soldier, Quo Vadis?," 58. Boening states, “The army has forced itself into the philosophical position that women are only ‘a little bit equal;’ and, in an effort to satisfy both “innatists” and feminists, it has created an ever-changing jumble of personnel policies that dissatisfy both groups.”
By the late 1980s, the doors of fire departments, police departments, and other government institutions and departments that were traditionally only open to men were also open to women. The U.S. military’s combat exclusion policy was one of the few remaining examples of *de jure* segregation in this nation. What is all the more interesting is that this segregation was accepted by such large segments of the army’s and the nation’s population. The answers as to why, I argue, lie in the ways in which the anti-feminism displayed in the backlash against the ERA shifted the boundaries of what was considered acceptable speech with regards to women’s equality.

The continued segregation of women soldiers was not only a product of conservative anti-feminism, but also legitimated and shaped society’s anti-feminist discourse. While members of the army appropriated the arguments of General Gatsis, Schlafly, and others, Schlafly used the army to support her contention that breaking with traditional gender stereotypes was disastrous for society. The September 1979 issue of the *Phyllis Schlafly Report* led with the headline, “What Sex Equality Means in the Military: How Women’s Lib Has Created a Problem That Never Before Existed.” Additional headlines in the newsletter included: “Army Tries to Compete with Stork as the boom in pregnant GI’s dilutes the Army’s strength,” “Problem: G.I. Pregnancy,” “Defeminized to the Point of Depression,” and the final “Retired Generals Charge:
Women are Ruining the Army.” Furthermore, because the army officially excluded women from some occupations without clear reasoning, its policies affirmed Schlafly’s arguments. Societal and military cultures were inextricable. Each reflected and amplified the other.

CPT Linda Bray obliterated the foundations of the discourse against women soldiers when she crashed her HMMWV through the front gate of a Panamanian compound in 1989 and led her soldiers, women and men, in a battle against Panamanian defense forces. In just “doing her job,” she transgressed the last defense of combat’s discursive coding as a male-only space. Sadly, Bray paid for her transgression with her career. Barely two-years later, however, in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq, other women would fly, drive, and walk through the gate opened by Bray. Although the formal exclusion of women from “combat” would linger until 2014, as early as 1990, during the Persian Gulf War, named Operation Desert Storm, it was undeniable that women were combatants, and their performance as soldiers was exemplary.

Making visible the earlier moment during the 1970s, when women were generally accepted as soldiers shows the power of the backlash against women soldiers. The prevalence of statements advocating for an increased role of women soldiers has received little attention by historians. This is not to say that the removal of women’s exclusion from combat was ever envisaged during this period, but culturally, the army,  

both officially and unofficially, worked towards the broad inclusion of women into the ranks. There was a moment during the 1970s where members of the army imagined a gender-neutral army oriented on a person’s ability to perform the required tasks. This possibility, however, was not able to withstand the conservative turn in American political culture. When the ERA was defeated amid a societal backlash against the women’s movement, the army followed suit. Although women remained a vital component of the army, serving as soldiers throughout the institution, after the 1970s they found themselves relegated to internal externals until the removal of combat exclusions three decades later.
Conclusion: Still in the Desert

My opportunity to attend the Command and General Staff Course (CGSC) came in 2013. Military Review was still housed at Fort Leavenworth, as was the army’s doctrine writing team. CGSC was still a year-long seminar on military operations, tactics, and strategy. New copies of Once an Eagle still held real estate in the school’s book store. My seminar professor, a retired Colonel and a man who continues to be a mentor and trusted friend, had begun his army career as a Lieutenant in the 1980s, and remained in active service for thirty years until his retirement during America’s second Iraq war in 2009. He was a devout Christian, a military historian who had previously taught at West Point, and a veteran of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. He was the type of officer who helped form, and was formed by, the institutional culture depicted in this dissertation, and he taught us according to those values.

In our seminar we studied military history so that we might better understand what was still known as operational art, a concept coined in the 1986 revision of Airland Battle doctrine. We read histories of German operations during World War II, particularly the 1940 German invasion of France, and we learned the importance of the army’s doctrine from talking with the doctrine writers themselves. We learned about idealized leadership through the study of historical vignettes which outlined the exploits of past leaders, both military and civilian. In short, as late as 2013, the
institutional culture depicted in this dissertation continued, in many ways, to dominate the army. The culture continued to replicate itself through the transmission of knowledge and symbols from one generation of soldiers to another.

The same focus on battle, the operational level of war, values, and normative behaviors continued to shape the twenty-first century army in the same way those notions shaped the 1980s army. The army that rapidly invaded Iraq in 2003, but then responded so slowly to the ensuing insurgency, was an army born of the cultural transformation of the 1970s and 1980s. The world had changed by 2003, and so had military technology. The Soviet Union had collapsed, America had no peer military competitor, but it was engaged in multiple counterinsurgency operations.

Still, the army’s warrior, or leader, culture remained. A soldier’s conduct in and knowledge of battle and the operational level of war were the hallmarks of military professionalism, and individual behavior commensurate with the army’s code of values or ethics was a prerequisite for acceptance by the institution’s members. Women, at that time, were still excluded from service in some occupations in the infantry, armor, and artillery branches despite the fact that women routinely engaged in combat in many other military occupations. Arguably, and despite numerous geopolitical and societal changes, the army’s culture still has not made a shift commensurate to the one which took place in after the Vietnam War even though the world is vastly different over four decades later.
This dissertation has argued that the army’s revitalization following the Vietnam War was due to a fundamental realignment of the institution’s culture. The army transitioned from what members of the army termed a management or managerial culture to one that valued individual values, behaviors, and battle, what I have termed a leader or alternatively warrior culture. As such, the army’s cultural transformation was about establishing a new language or professionalism to guide members of the institution. That language, or conception, of professionalism defined, for members of the institution, who were the desired types of soldiers, what were their desired behavior patterns, and what knowledge and skills a professional required.

This dissertation has also shown that the conservative turn in American political culture profoundly shaped the U.S. army in the decades after Vietnam. Each of the conversations depicted in this dissertation, but particularly the final three chapters, show that the ways in which members of the army tried to solve the institution’s problems did not resemble the eventual solutions. For example, the members of the army began to embrace women soldiers before reasserting the institution’s masculine culture. With regards to race, the army first pursued policies that were multicultural and promoted diversity before investing in a supposedly race-neutral or color-blind narrative of race relations. Even in the conversation about doctrine, a language of individualism and initiative supplanted Active Defense doctrine’s assumed ties to the army’s management culture.
Thus, the U.S. army was another location within American society where the conservative movement took place, and another way in which that movement has shaped American life since the last quarter century of the twentieth century. Certainly, the army leaned conservative prior to and during the Vietnam War, but the army, like the nation, developed a much greater affinity with the cultural and social conservatism associated with the Republican party after 1980.

Between 1976 and 1988 there was a sharp increase in the numbers of military personnel who self-identified as either conservative or affiliated with the Republican party. The percentage of members of the U.S. military (the data is not broken out by individual service) increased from thirty-three to fifty-nine percent.\(^1\) In short, the army first appropriated the language of conservatism, and then identified with conservatism’s political party. Despite claims to an apolitical concept of professionalism, part of the army’s cultural transformation was a marked toward partisanship.

This dissertation has not only “read” the army’s culture, showing how different cultural elements or ideas wove together to create a coherent narrative, but it has also shown the multiple processes through which members of the army created that culture. Changes in American society during the 1960s, the loss of the Vietnam War, and the end of conscription created a moment of cultural instability where a new culture narrative could form. The army’s new culture formed in multiple layers. Like the concentric

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\(^1\) Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, 34 Table 2.2.
rings, some of those cultural layers were more central and important to the army’s core identity while others lied at the periphery. Those peripheral layers were still necessary for how the army understood itself, but members of the army did not invest those peripheral layers with the same level of importance as they did other conversations.

These were the layers, or subjects, such as those depicted in the latter three chapters of this dissertation. They added texture to the army’s culture, but they did not, on their own, have the power to shape other aspects of the army’s cultural transformation because the peripheral layers of the army’s culture did not define the soldier’s core purpose, fighting battles in defense of the nation’s interests. Thus, the central layers of the army’s culture were narratives about doctrine, civil-military relations, and how those subjects shaped the army’s conception of professionalism and its performance in battle.

Different processes shaped the different layers, or narratives, within the army’s culture. Members of the army came to understand doctrine, warfighting, and the meaning of military professionalism, through what I have termed a leadership or warrior culture. Those ideas, such as values-based leadership and the warrior imagery, had always been present in the ways that members of the army described themselves and their institution, but had not been predominant in the army’s culture for much of the twentieth century. When members of the army rejected the so-called management culture after the Vietnam War, they fashioned these existing ideas into a narrative
focused on the behaviors, initiative, and relative merit of the individual soldier or officer. The army’s new cultural narrative solidified contemporaneous to the conservative shift in American political culture, and the ways that members of the army defined their institution was often in the same terms and languages of that broader cultural shift in American society.

The shifts in both the army’s and American society’s culture were similar reactions to the 1960s and the Vietnam War. They should not, however, be construed as the same process, they were independent cultural shifts that took place in different social groups through the actions of different agents; American societal culture did not directly shape the ideas underpinning the army’s culture just as the army did not directly shape American society. Yet, the terms and languages in each cultural process had a clear affinity with clear affinities with each other. Those affinities between conservative political culture and the army’s institutional culture drew the army towards conservative ideals. Indeed, if funding and support for the military were the only things joining the army with Reagan era conservatism, then members of the army would have supported President Jimmy Carter who initiated some of the largest increases in defense spending.²

In like manner, the ways in which members of the army came to understand doctrine and professionalism possessed a greater affinity, or elective affinity, with conservative ideals about subjects such as race, gender, and codes of ethics. In each of those conversations, as Chapters 4 through 6 have shown, the army created a narrative in the early 1970s that was very different that the conservatism that dominated the institution during the 1980s. But, there was always a counter narrative, and as the narrative about doctrine and professionalism coalesced around terms and languages analogous to those of the conservative movement, the languages of that central narrative about doctrine and professionalism shaped how members of the army thought about the peripheral elements of its culture. Thus, the color-blind narrative, fundamentalist Christian conceptions of ethics, and a strict gender division of labor became predominant elements of the army’s culture, in part, because those politically and culturally conservative narratives possessed a greater affinity with the army’s leader or warrior culture, the core of the army’s identity. Those affinities bonded the army’s conversations about very different topics into what seemed like one coherent cultural narrative.

To be sure, other factors were at play in the army’s revitalization. The army’s budget, specifically the amount of money it paid its soldiers, increased during both the Carter and Reagan administrations. The army introduced new technologies, specifically the so-called “Big 5,” a fleet of new air and ground vehicles such as the M1 Abrams tank,
the AH-64 Apache Helicopter, and the Patriot Missile System that are still in use by
today’s army. These were all important changes, but such material changes did not
address the fact that members of the army lost confidence in the army’s foundational
identity forming narratives. Without the corresponding cultural transformation
depicted in this dissertation, the army would have lacked the unifying identity narrative
through which to guide the better funded and modernized fighting force.

This dissertation’s introduction asked the question of what the limits were of a
military institution that so valued the warrior over the manager, the Sam Damon over
the Courtney Massengale. The limits of any culture are the boundaries that cultural
narratives place upon the full expression of human thought and activity. In the case of
the post-Vietnam army, the focus on battle, on warrior ethos and the idealized warrior,
came at the cost of nurturing those members of the institution who might have thought
deeper and more broadly about future warfare rather than the concerns of the 1980s.
The 1980s army was so focused on war with the Soviet Union, on mechanized and so-
called conventional war against a peer nation state, that it was not prepared for the post-
Cold War world that found the institution in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Somalia – not to mention Iraq and Afghanistan. The army’s culture valued an idealized
“battle” over understanding the nuances of policy and grand strategy.

Socially, the army’s culture affirmed conservative political culture where it could
have conceivably affirmed a more socially progressive understanding of American
society. One popular narrative upholds the army as an American institution which led the rest of the nation in terms of race and gender integration, and also supports the army as fostering important ideals of patriotism and national service. What that narrative does not highlight is that while the army was a leader in race and gender integration, the institution integrated African Americans and women into its ranks under limited conceptions of what constituted a soldier and member of the institution. Women were an important component of the post-Vietnam War army, but they were barred from combat. African American soldiers comprised over fifty percent of some army units, but by the 1980s the army’s narrative about race relations focused on the institution’s culture unity rather than its racial and cultural diversity. Black soldiers were welcomed, but the army’s cultural norms limited their ability to express a black or African American racial and cultural identity. Thus, the army did integrate women and racial minorities more quickly than some national institutions, but the specific ways in which it did so reified many of America’s racial and gender divisions.

And for the army itself, its cultural transformation came at a cost. The institution was vastly improved by 1991, but the bill for that improvement came due in the next decade. The army did not make the transformations needed to prepare for the twenty-first century when it was more likely to engage with non-state irregular forces than peer competitors like the former Soviet Union. Such findings beg the question; with the Iraq war over; the nation’s leaders seeking to further limit America’s involvement in
Afghanistan; America’s geopolitical challenges include an economically ascendant China and a saber-rattling Russia; and with American society being more divided than ever, will the members of the army make the necessary cultural transformation to meet the challenges of the looming decades?
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