Boundaries of the State in US History

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Youth as Infrastructure: 4-H and the Intimate State in 1920s Rural America

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Today, 4-H is global. The iconic rural youth clubs, moored intractably in the American public imagination to state fairs, pet calves, and rural traditionalism, now persist in more than eighty countries around the world and on every inhabited continent. In sub-Saharan Africa, the most recent frontier for 4-H expansion, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Gates Foundation, Cargill, DuPont, Nike, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and numerous NGOs promote 4-H clubs as a revolutionary social technology capable of transforming economies and cultures through the labor and bodies of youth. Imagining a sea of clover across the African continent, this collection of actors now directs millions of dollars to agricultural youth clubs work in thirteen countries. With the assistance of national ministries of agriculture, African 4-H hopes to enroll 250,000 members by 2015. The African 4-H network has embraced a strategy of development in which a sweeping agricultural transformation aligns the interests of millions of youth, transnational agribusiness firms, international development agencies, and national bureaucracies.

If 4-H’s current status as an instrument of international development is in tension with the American public’s perception of it as a provincial feature of a bucolic countryside, it is only because most Americans are unaware of 4-H’s history. Since its origins in Progressive-era America, 4-H has always allied technocracy, agribusiness, and youth volunteerism to “develop” rural economies, cultures, and politics from within. What appears to be a neoliberal development strategy actually has its roots in a century-long experiment conducted by the USDA and agribusiness allies in the American countryside. By enrolling millions of farm youths in 4-H in the 1920s, governing actors hoped to extend the infrastructure of American statecraft and a burgeoning
agribusiness economy into the nation's spatial and temporal frontiers. 4-H members would act in lieu of the state and on behalf of capital in the agricultural hinterlands of a contested present, as well as in the prosperous, managed countryside of an imagined future. In contrast to the brute materiality of bridges, pipes, and roads—strong but static and immobile—these "people as infrastructure," to quote sociologist Abdou Malik Simone, offered the USDA and its allies maneuverability, adaptability, and room for strategic growth, qualities that promised to bridge the gaps between center and margin, present and future. This human infrastructure permitted action at a distance in agricultural peripheries that foreshadowed—and, indeed, permitted—the contemporary neoliberal development projects to which 4-H is still attached in various global agricultural peripheries.\(^3\)

This essay follows the USDA's strategy of human-infrastructure building with an eye on contemporary debates about the history of the American state. Historian William Novak, borrowing from historical sociologist Michael Mann, encourages historians of the American state to attend to "infrastructural power," originally defined by Mann as "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."\(^4\) Sociologist Philip Gorski notes that Mann's schema of power permits but leaves unexamined "diffuse ideological power" that is "fragmented, decentralized, and flat," is dependent upon "peaceful and persuasive tactics," offers "partial or incomplete worldviews," and is "often absorbed and deployed without the conscious will or knowledge of the actors."\(^5\) How can scholars study diffuse ideological power? Among other things, Gorski recommends we "look for tactics of seduction and a politics of pleasure," as well as "for the mute practices and rituals through which ideology acts on the body."\(^6\)

I ask historians of the American state to take Gorski's notion of the seductive powers of the state, with its bodily politics of pleasure, quite literally. What does it mean for the state to seduce private bodies? At the very least, the state must affect desire, affection, and intimacy for its projects, schemes, and agents. Historians of sexuality have long identified the American state as a vital mediator of desire. Political histories of desire often focus on how state policies and actors both produce and regulate sexual intimacy between and among subjects. By contrast, I want to "bring the state back in" to American history as a potential object of desire, intimacy, and affection and as a historical actor that uses affection to mobilize bodies in lieu of coercion. Intimacy, as I mean it, is affective and embodied. It is closeness and visceral friction among bodies. One needs long arms indeed to hug the Department of Agriculture. To understand the state as an intimate object requires us also to examine how a dynamic network like the USDA is localized in particular, if diffuse bodies—how it interpellates bodies, cultivates them, and then ultimately deploys them for strategic ends.

My essay expands upon the approach to American state building taken by scholars of American political development (APD) by giving attention to feminist, queer, and Foucauldian analytics of political culture and governance.\(^7\) While maintaining APD's focus on institutional capacity building, I invest minimal stability in state/civil and public/private boundaries that undergird those accounts. Instead, I foreground the supposedly private ideological, affective, embodied, and disciplinary valences of the American state's governing network. I follow that network past the doorstep and threshold and into the intimate realms beyond: the capillaries where demarcations between public and private become murky and untenable and where the state and civil are mutually constituting and interpenetrating.\(^8\) 4-H provides exceptional territory to explore this political intimacy, in part because its parent agency, the USDA, has been the subject of several important APD works.\(^9\) My approach reveals the vital intimate machinery of American governance neglected by APD scholars, and, in turn, also uncovers a surprising genealogy of intimate state power that connects the rural United States in the early twentieth century to the global South of the postwar period.

In this essay, I chart intimacy in three successive registers: cooperation, self-care, and publicity. The first section examines how cooperation produced personal contact and intimacy between rural people and the USDA and rendered rural people vital components of the USDA's governing alliance. In the next section, I describe how 4-H clubs, as a part of that intimate state, linked the self-care of private bodies to the USDA's public goal of modernizing the American countryside. The final section charts the potentials and limits of 4-H as a component of the intimate state. It examines the publicity of 4-H bodies during debate on the 1928 Capper-Ketcham Act, legislation that increased general federal appropriations for the USDA's Cooperative Extension Service (CES) for the first time since its creation in 1914. Once affected, intimacy produced unexpected obligations for the USDA. In particular, emphasis on 4-H bodies placed the USDA's relationship to urban capital under the scrutiny of materialist activists. These activists used the private bodies of 4-H'ers to stake a powerful claim to the public resources of the extension service and illustrated how intimacy inflected state politics even among those so often historically relegated to the state's margins.
Building an Intimate State in Rural America

For much of rural America, the decade preceding the Great Depression could easily be summarized with two words: crisis and cooperation. Crisis was the economic and social blight that afflicted rural America throughout the decade with an intensity not seen since the great agricultural depression of the 1890s. Cooperation, a ubiquitous buzzword of the age, was the tonic for that malady, prescribed by countless, breathless technocrats at the USDA and in the progressive agricultural press. Cooperation did mean engaging in collective economic action. However, it also required openness to various elite actors who, in prior decades, had provoked anger, skepticism, and populist rebellion from rural people. Preeminent progressive agriculturalist Kenyon Butterfield characterized this openness to the complementary interconnections of modern life as the “New Day” in American agriculture. 10

The dawn of the “New Day” would bring professionals, experts, bankers, managers, and marketers into the fabric of everyday rural life, and it would give local expression to previously distant sources of capital, knowledge, and technology. But the dawn hinged on something more visceral than the esoteric arguments of USDA officials and rural sociologists. As extension officials and county agents labored to create grassroots cooperative institutions in rural communities, they also worked to generate intimacy between rural people and the American state. In this sense, the cooperative mania that engulfed rural America in the 1920s also multiplied the personal, embodied contacts between technocratic expertise and rural people.

Even before the farm crisis, efforts to reorganize the American countryside were rooted in recognition of the unique powers of personal contact between the USDA and rural people. In pressing for the Smith-Lever Act in 1914, advocates of the bill favored a diffuse system of county agents living and working close to local people over “Farmers’ Institutes” and publications by mail, because those older methods lacked the intimacy of “personal contact.” 11 During floor debate, Indiana’s representative John Adair expanded on what the genius of that “personal contact” entailed. It “carr[ied] the truths of agriculture and home economics to the door of the farmer” and “maj[ed] the field, the garden, the orchard, and even the parlor and the kitchen the classrooms.” In those intimate spaces, county agents would become “the instrumentality through which the colleges, stations, and Department of Agriculture will speak.” 12 Not everyone was quite so enamored of government agents probing “parlors and kitchens,” and opponents characterized it as onerous “paternalism.” This paternalism was not just the idea that the CES would treat farmers like children, but, rather, that with access to rural homes, government agents might actually supplant rural fathers. The horrifying scenario of rural emasculation structured the concerns of many congressmen during the floor debate. New York’s John Joseph Fitzgerald blasted the idea of “an agent of the Federal Government” being given access to a farmer’s “wife or . . . other female members of his family.” Both support and opposition to the bill hinged on the assumption that the CES, for better or worse, would dramatically change the countryside by multiplying intimate “personal contacts” between government agents and rural people. 13

Smith-Lever passed during a period of relative rural prosperity, but economic problems after World War I only intensified concerns about rural dysfunction and the need for rural reform. Faced with tightening budgets, rural people, and particularly rural women, searched for work in nearby towns. Others fled the farm altogether. Farmers abandoned two million acres of land by the middle of the decade, and the farm population declined from one-third to one-quarter of the nation’s population by 1930. 14

The drift to the city had long been a popular source of national anxiety, but the events of the early 1920s inflamed those concerns and framed the economic crisis as a dire catastrophe of social reproduction. Commentators characterized cities as pits of sexual vice and decadence and that view, inflected by Jeffersonian agrarianism and nativist concerns about the nation’s racial composition, suggested that urban industrialism was driving American civilization to a “race suicide.” As the white middle class left the countryside for professional and managerial employment in the crowded, sterile city, it would also abandon its reproductive prowess and the source of its manly vigor. 15 In response to the decennial census in September of 1920, which revealed that a majority of the nation no longer resided in rural areas, journalist Frederic J. Haskin explicitly tied the nation’s agricultural and racial futures. He warned the readers of his regular Los Angeles Times column that in the not-distant future, the United States would be “a heavily populated country of short dark-skinned men, living [in] crowded, complicated and enormous cities” unless the government adopted a policy that produced more farms and kept the next rural generation from moving to the city. 16 Similarly, a New York Times editorial pondered what rural dysfunctions might be driving the trend: “Evidently something is wrong with country life, its occupations and amusements, when so many cannot resist the ‘lure’ of the city.” The Times editorial articulated a popular imagined geography of social reproduction. Rural spaces were fecund but faltering, while urban spaces pulsed with a vibrant but fruitless sexuality. The choice seemed to be between a series of painful births or a pleasurable sterility. 17
But the farm crisis was also surely evidence that sound farmers-businessmen were few and far between. Many elites merely shrugged at the structure of economic incentives that induced a spiraling price situation. The more proximate problems, they reasoned, were ignorance and a lack of organization: farmers failed to understand how to use credit responsibly; to record their expenses properly; to monitor market conditions; to grow crops suitable for both soil and market; to take advantage of premiums, value-added crops, and niche marketing possibilities; and, most crucially, to engage in cooperative economic endeavors where it might pad their margins and stabilize prices. In sum, this elite consensus held that far from being farmers-businessmen, few Americans knew how to run their farms like businesses. As historian Deborah Fitzgerald argues, the USDA and agricultural progressives doggedly promoted an “industrial ideal” as a tonic for the farm crisis under a variety of deceptive monikers. Extension officials used “efficient,” “progressive,” “businesslike,” and “scientific” nearly interchangeably to describe a prescriptive model of agriculture that privileged capital- and technology-intensive agricultural practices and operationalized “large scale production, specialized machines, standardizations of processes and products, reliance on managerial (rather than artisanal) expertise, and a continued invocation of efficiency as a production mandate.” Small farmers could neither capture the economies of scale to compete with larger operations, nor could they afford the “specialized machines” that minimized production costs. And, without cooperation, farmers could never curb overproduction. Absent cooperation, farms would stay small and they would die small.18

Agricultural marketing cooperatives were among the more popular palliatives the USDA prescribed in response to the farm crisis and agricultural atomization. In 1900, the USDA had recorded only 1,167 agricultural cooperatives nationwide.19 By 1924, 12,000 agricultural marketing cooperatives did business worth $2.5 billion.20 With the pretext of creating economic opportunities for farmers, this “cooperative turn” circulated the industrial ideal among smaller producers and defused radical political challenges to capitalist agriculture. After the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act in 1922, marketing cooperatives could also issue stocks and bonds to finance mechanization and the hiring of marketing and management experts. The agricultural cooperatives the USDA and the agricultural press envisioned were not so much ways for farmers to band together and defend themselves from predatory firms and the caprices of the market as they were instruments to ease farmers into management models suitable for an economy dominated by large, efficient, highly mechanized firms.21

Beyond marketing cooperatives, the cooperative turn found its clearest expression in the explosive growth of farm bureaus. Beginning in upstate New York in 1911, county extension agents and chambers of commerce urged the creation of these voluntary farmers’ associations or clubs. Ultimately, farm bureaus served simultaneously as locally rooted clearinghouses for businesslike and scientific agriculture; cooperative purchasing and marketing organizations; political muscle for the CES, USDA, and progressive agriculturalists; and community organizations for rural people. The Smith-Lever Act fed the Farm Bureau’s flame with an accelerator of public subsidies. County extension agents with salaries and expenses paid by federal, state, and municipal agencies did the organizational legwork of, and often gave free office space to, the ostensibly private farm bureaus. In return, farm bureaus provided the USDA with grassroots allies and acted as extension’s civil-society partner. By 1921, membership in the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), the national umbrella organization for county and statewide farm bureaus, topped one and a half million, and the AFBF was already the most formidable agricultural lobby in Washington.22

Farm bureaus also gave the USDA and CES consolidated access points for personal contact, further multiplying the advantages of extension’s intimate approach. New York extension official and Farm Bureau pioneer, Maurice Burritt, laid out that case in his book, The County Agent and the Farm Bureau (1922). Farm bureaus, by Burritt’s reckoning, permitted collective economic action, but they also offered a “common meeting ground” where “the farmer and the government’s agricultural employees” could be “brought closer together.” In the Farm Bureau office ordinary farmers, middlemen, financiers, agricultural experts, and county agents would all congregate, “sharing agricultural statistics and records” and “information and advice as to what the best practices and methods” were.23 Burritt’s emphasis on shared social space underscored the trust and intimacy that farm bureaus fostered between farmers and sometimes-distant sources of capital, knowledge, and technology. That cooperative spirit was also highly infectious beyond the confines of the meeting room. Describing the cooperative activities of a Maryland farmer’s club, B. H. Crocheron noted that the greatest benefit of the organization was to circulate among “the people of the country-side a concrete example and ideal of fine American citizenship and strong country manhood.” If proximity in cooperative spaces produced the necessary masculine self-possession, rationality, and comfort with external expertise and capital needed for rural leadership, that exemplar of manhood
could be translated furthest through the daily interactions between members and the rest of the community. To complement the promise of better men, rural cooperative institutions also promised to improve the lot of women and children. The CES, of course, employed female home demonstration agents and invested a third of its resources in its expansive youth club program, 4-H. Mirroring this strategy, farm bureaus featured “home bureaus” for rural women and a variety of planned activities and events for rural youth. Beyond ensuring the personal contact of cooperation was gender appropriate, such activities provided additional access points, allowing the farm bureau to appeal on multiple fronts, not just to rural patriarchs. It also made use of the labor and activism of rural women, who, according to Burritt, gave their “natural” attention to “rural social and community problems and to the needs of children.” In deploying this familial rhetoric, advocates of the cooperative turn also appealed to female reformers concerned with the relationship between rural family life and poor rural health. The alleged causes of poor rural health were numerous. Reformers rightly noted that distance to both potable water and medical care in rural communities drove the countryside’s comparatively higher morbidity rates. Reformers also pointed out that rural women engaged in strenuous labor during and immediately after pregnancies, which undoubtedly posed a serious danger to mothers and infants. But they also blamed the consequences of poverty and racism on ignorance and bad “mothering” skills. The ideal of the “farmer’s wife” home economists circulated encouraged rural women to abandon revenue-producing labor and focus on domestic consumption, nurturing, health, and aesthetics—changes that essentially sought to transform farm women into rural analogues of urban, middle-class housewives.

As with male-focused agriculturalists, cooperation’s promise of multiplied personal contacts offered female reformers a number of new tools. Cooperation could mean broader public support for rural infrastructure improvements that shrank distances to clean water and medical care. And women’s rural organizations provided grassroots workers for health campaigns. But social connectivity also enhanced the educational opportunities that female reformers hoped would transform coarse rural women into efficient farmers’ wives. Just as cooperation expanded the reach of the CES’s county agricultural agents, it did the same for their home demonstration agents, who introduced USDA-approved homemaking techniques into rural communities through public demonstrations, home visits, and clubs. Justifications for cooperative social forms also circled back to the specter of rural-to-urban migration. By making rural life more socially fulfilling for rural women, reformers could hope to retain the countryside’s most eugenically fit. For the many female rural reformers enamored of eugenics, cooperative institutions provided the means to assess and voluntarily regulate reproductive fitness. Female health reformers organized “Better Baby Contests” at state and county fairs next to stalls featuring livestock produced through better breeding techniques. Such a juxtaposition of standardized animal and human bodies was far from accidental. Rather, those reformers simply transposed to the problem of rural health the grammar, values, and organizational techniques of the industrial ideal.

Cooperation meant more than merely collective economic action, and it involved a colorful palette of participants with competitive agendas. Across various scales, cooperative institutions claimed the ability to reshape rural practices and bodies through the multiplication of personal contacts, but they often begged a thornier question: to what and whom were rural people being opened and connected? In aiming to better integrate rural communities into the urban industrial order, the cooperative turn issued an ambiguous and open-ended promise. The cooperative turn’s very personal medium of transmission could open a rift between progressive agriculture’s paternalist and maternalist wings. Urban capital, vital for the business of farming, carried the taint of urban vice, and its uncontrolled diffusion promised to undo the careful work of female rural reformers. The potentially toxic embodied costs of unmediated urban capital became clearest when the stakes were the vulnerable bodies of rural youth brought into intimate contact with the USDA through the burgeoning 4-H network.

Self-Care, 4-H Bodies, and Youth Infrastructure

Among the CES’s tools for cultivating grassroots goodwill and trust among rural people, 4-H was paramount. With the promise of improving the “head, hands, heart, and health” of all 4-H members, the USDA simultaneously created loyal allies in rural communities, and it habituated future rural citizens to working with and trusting the USDA’s recommendations from childhood. Rural corn and canning clubs originated among turn-of-the-century educational reformers seeking a means independent of the troubled rural schoolhouse to reach farm children. Agricultural reformers quickly grasped their potential and worked youth clubs into early extension programs. Illinois’s burgeoning corn clubs solved “the problem of arousing an interest in farmers’ institute,” gushed the USDA’s Dick Crosby in 1905: “The farmers were reached through their children, and the interest thus aroused will be handed down to their children’s children.” By 1920, 4-H
clubs extended the USDA’s reach in rural communities under its four-leafed clover emblem. Although extension officials trusted that rural youth would demonstrate technical prowess in rural communities, barnyards, and parlors around the nation, they also believed that club work communicated the value of cooperation by producing highly publicized perfect “specimens” of rural living. By cultivating self-care, 4-H offered rural America the “perfect boy and girl,” as the Washington Post put it. 4-H showcased the advantages of intimacy with the USDA and rendered their bodies indispensable parts of the USDA’s governing infrastructure.30

4-H’s goal, announced O. H. Benson, the USDA agent who headed club work throughout the North, should be “a man for every boy”; for every club member, there should be a corresponding adult—parent, relative, or neighbor—whose interest, alliance, and affection would be won over to the USDA’s cause. Every club member, simply by enrolling, became “a demonstrator for the State and the United States Department of Agriculture . . . the cooperator is a man who will agree to cooperate with the boy and the State and Government authorities in getting the best possible results from this club work.”31 Earlie Cleveland of Decatur, Mississippi, reported to the USDA that his previously indifferent father was now invested in the practices of scientific agriculture. Papa Cleveland could be found “hustling Round for seed corn” to help his son improve his contest acre of corn. At other times, alliance with the USDA pitted rural children against their parents. Perry T. Dill of Taylor, South Carolina, sent the USDA his father’s address so that they could mail the stubborn patriarch literature. Paul Burtner of Harrisonburg, Virginia, reported to the USDA that his father “was simply not on our side,” but the boy was “hopeful of winning him over.”32 In these cases, the USDA created persistent allies inside rural homes.

American entry into World War I, of course, increased both the value and quantity of those allies, as 4-H members participated in wartime food production campaigns. County agents encouraged rural youth to direct their patriotism into home gardening and canning projects. 4-H enrollments swelled to nearly two million a year. The end of lavish wartime appropriations, however, required the CES to shed its temporary wartime agents. Many temporary agents had done shoddy work and, in fact, had overextended the club network beyond what it could accommodate. As the farm crisis intensified into the 1920s, the mandate for greater efficiency in extension work spurred the USDA to launch a “standardization” campaign. The USDA promulgated basic rules governing 4-H clubs and CES agents that provided a USDA charter for clubs that reached a minimum enrollment

of youth ten to twenty years in age, met once a month, and achieved basic pedagogic goals. The campaign also encouraged clubs to adopt a unified set of symbols and mottoes: the 4-H name itself, the clover symbol, the motto “making the best better,” and, after 1927, the national 4-H pledge: “I pledge my head to clearer thinking, my heart to greater loyalty, my hands to larger service, and my health to better living for my club, my community, and my country.” As a result of the standardization campaign, 4-H ended the decade with smaller enrollments than during wartime—around 800,000 members in 1930—but it was also much better coordinated with the national extension program and institutions of the cooperative turn.33

4-H’s close relationship to the local farm bureau ensured members had access to the capital needed to conduct projects. For children from wealthier families, the expenses of fertilizer, cloth, or a purebred hog were manageable, but poorer farm families hesitated to divert money to an untested educational project. Extension agents worked through the Farm Bureau to convince local businesspeople and bankers to provide “loans at reasonable interest rates directly to club members.”34 Extension officials argued that credit services offered businesses free publicity, strengthened their standing in the community, and habituated the youth of their communities to doing business with them. Bankers heeded the call. In 1920 alone, bankers provided over $1.6 million in loans to club members.35 By 1925, the idea that country banks should be a primary source of capital for club projects was so well institutionalized that industry publications identified support for club work as a foundational element for agricultural finance departments.36

The USDA’s insistence that club members generate exhaustive records of everything they did convinced the business community of 4-H’s value. Record keeping, after all, allowed a bank or investor to assess the soundness of a farmer’s operation. The proliferation of records, ledgers, scorecards, and bank books encouraged businesses like agriculture, and they provided a visceral conduit between club members, businessmen, and USDA officials. Of course, record keeping touched a variety of practices that were not explicitly concerned with production for the market. For girls, the ultimate product of a given project, like for sewing or meal planning, was usually intended for domestic use, and, in the case of health projects, the product was a member’s own body. As one Arizona girl explained, “efficiency [was] taught in keeping records.”37 And efficiency, always assessed through objective quantifiable metrics club organizers provided, applied to all elements of rural life, not merely agricultural production. The CES proffered scorecards covering quantifiable standards for corn, oats, wheat, dresses,
canning, interior decorating, nutrition, club organization and leadership, parliamentary procedure, the aesthetics of human and animal bodies, and even the frequency of bowel movements (at least once every day, preferably in the morning). The ubiquity of records and scoring permitted a variety of useful comparisons—the member to the ideal, the member to her peers, and the member to her past and future self. Through these comparisons and the practices of self-care they enabled, 4-H members could track individual and collective progress. As Hallie Hughes, a West Virginia club leader, explained, “The individual self must be studied, analyzed and trained... Self-management must be practiced.” 4-H records could function as a crucial technology of “self-management” by permitting the intensive study, analysis, and training of bodies.

This kind of self-scoring formed the foundation of 4-H’s most publicized and publicly esteemed activity: health contests. Parallel to the rural “maternal health” initiatives of the Sheppard-Towner Act (1921), club leaders recognized that 4-H health projects could generate new connections among medical professionals, maternalist activists, extension officials, and rural people. 4-H’s health-improving potential appealed to the USDA because it provided a compelling advertisement for the broader extension program, even as it knit the extension program into the maternalist networks that mobilized, financed, and maintained rural medical and nursing efforts. Gertrude Warren, a club specialist at the USDA, urged county extension and home economics agents to concentrate on health promotion work in 4-H. “In conferences, talks in public, and in publicity articles, emphasize ways in which the health of club members is being looked after through club work,” Warren wrote in a manual on girls’ work in 1925. By the end of the decade, most states featured comprehensive 4-H health programs, including local health examinations, sustained health education, and county and statewide health contests. Doctors and nurses examined club members at county and state fairs, judged them according to a standardized scorecard, deducted points for “defects,” and selected a winning boy and girl as a desirable “specimen.” Much like “Better Baby Contests” organized by Sheppard-Towner nurses, 4-H health contests transposed the logics of industrial agriculture and livestock breeding to human bodies by scrutinizing them as standardized, interchangeable, and marketable commodities.

The effectiveness of 4-H health programs hinged on the regular use of the health “scorecard”—a device that permitted both medical professionals and club members to scrutinize bodies and quantify their copious “defects.” The Iowa 4-H scorecard, for example, was composed of over seventy particular metrics, covering categories as diverse as the flushness of the lips, the symmetry of “sex characteristics,” the shape and position of ears, and the quality of posture. Although the scorecard covered health dimensions influenced by habit and behavior, it also deducted points for features outside of the youth’s control—the presence of “birth marks,” flat feet, or an “abnormally shape[d]” skull. A full 13 percent of the total score was governed by an entirely subjective assessment of attractiveness called “general impressions.” “Health improvement” awards encouraged all participants, even those who were initially infirm or sickly, to have “some defects corrected [and] bring up her standing for next year.”

Examinations enabled medical authorities to quantify both the defects and potentials of 4-H bodies, and it generated valuable bodily knowledge that could be distributed to personal or cooperative health activities executed over the course of months. Media presented 4-H health champions as the “healthy specimens” of a wholesome, gender-appropriate middle-class white rural lifestyle. 4-H health competitions received coverage in local, regional, and even national newspapers, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Chicago Daily Tribune. Newspaper accounts referenced the youths’ attractiveness and fitness and provided photographic evidence with the articles. An account of the 1928 National 4-H Health Competition, for example, lauded champion Thelma Swarstad of South Dakota for her “blond, clear skinned” appearance, while the Times of Alden, Iowa, celebrated Tennessee’s Margaret Martin as the “ideal of perfect health.” These media accounts also emphasized that this attractiveness was a natural outcome of a wholesome rural lifestyle, one in which boys and girls played their accepted parts. For boys, this meant a robust physique gained from helping out on the farm, playing on athletic teams, or hiking in the woods. For girls, it meant naturally rosy cheeks and no makeup, helping mother in the kitchen, and getting their “beauty sleep.” Florence Smock of Florida, the 1929 National 4-H Health Champion, “use[d] no rouge nor lipstick but ha[d] rosy cheeks” and, despite going on a “few dates,” was always in bed by nine o’clock. Harold Deatline, the boys’ champion, had “broad shoulders and was strong muscled because of plenty of good, hard work on his father’s farm.” While Smock enjoyed dancing, Deatline reported that he did not “care for dancing or ‘gadding about.’ For recreation he [went] hunting and fishing sometimes.”

By the end of the decade, 4-H offered health projects and examinations to rural youth around the nation. A 1931 American Medical Association survey reported that 40 percent of all responding county medical associations cooperated with 4-H to conduct medical examinations. By 1930, more than 100,000 youth were annually enrolled around the nation in 4-H health
projects and examinations. Media accounts focused on the pristine winners of health competitions, but ignored the copious supply of "defective" contest losers and the tens of thousands of nonwhite 4-H'ers who were systematically excluded from competing. Throughout the South, health promotion ranked among the highest priorities for the African American extension services. Nearly 20 percent of all 4-H'ers in the South were African American, and they also regularly received lessons in hygiene and health from black county agents. In the West, the extension service considered health promotion an important component of work with "Mexican" and "Indian" girls. Yet only white 4-H'ers were permitted to compete in health competitions at the National 4-H Congress. Nor did media accounts rhapsodize about perfect nonwhite bodies produced through club work. Instead, media descriptions frequently conflated whiteness and attractiveness when lauding the pristine skin and hair of winners. The publicity associated with 4-H health competitions circulated the ideal 4-H body as white and, simultaneously, suggested that state experts, in cooperation with a well-ordered farm home, could produce this perfected white body. Nostalgic agrarianism, whiteness, and the gendered aesthetics of normal bodies intersected in public celebrations of the intimate state's great bodily harvest.

The Capper-Ketcham Act of 1928 and the Politics of the Publicized 4-H Body

Although club experts like Gertrude Warren advised county and home demonstration agents to advertise the benefits of 4-H health work, publicity for National 4-H Health Champions was handled by Guy Noble, the managing director of the National Committee for Boys' and Girls' Club Work (the National Committee). Formed in 1921 with the USDA's encouragement and operated out of office space provided by the AF&F, the National Committee raised money from the business community to support club work. Like his associates at the USDA, Guy Noble recognized the value of equating 4-H with wholesome, white rural youth and he regularly used that rhetorical figure in publicity. By the end of the decade, that publicity had garnered the National Committee substantial support from firms interested in reaching rural consumers. Noble's activities brought him the political clout necessary to engineer a lobbying campaign for 4-H and the extension service. That lobbying campaign ultimately brought Noble and several 4-H members to the floor of the United States Senate, where healthy 4-H'ers continued to symbolize the embodied benefits the intimate state offered to rural Americans.

Guy Noble more aggressively publicized 4-H than anyone in the USDA, and he had little patience for the deliberate pace of bureaucrats. In January of 1925, Noble used advertisements in the national AF&F newsletter to launch a 4-H "one million members" drive without first consulting the USDA. The move earned him a polite but decisive letter from C. B. Smith, pointing out that the CES could not accommodate so many members. Privately, CES director Clyde W. Warburton fumed to Smith about Noble's "aggressive" behavior, complaining that his scheme would so overtax the extension service it would be "one of the worst things that could possibly happen to club work." Was "boys' and girls' club work . . . being directed by the National Committee or by the extension service of the Department and the State colleges of agriculture?" Warburton wondered. Noble's more "aggressive" approach reflected, in part, an obvious pecuniary interest. Extension officials at the USDA had the luxury of a permanent, reliable congressional appropriation. The National Committee, however, depended on constant donations that might dry up at any moment and leave Noble unemployed. While the nuts and bolts of club work could survive on money from the CES and state sources, the big-ticket events the National Committee favored—an elaborate national meeting and a variety of lavish prizes—required contributions from urban firms.

Noble's aggressive approach reaped greater financial security for his organization. Mail-order titan Montgomery Ward began sponsoring national club awards through the National Committee in 1922, and, in 1925, Sears sponsored a contest to promote "the use of mail-order catalogues." Noble even arranged to have attendees of the National 4-H Club Congress tour the offices of the major mail-order firms in Chicago. Smaller firms took the less expensive route of advertising in the National Boys and Girls Club News, the monthly magazine Noble published and circulated to club leaders and members free of charge. Whether large or small, all these businesses hoped to reach rural consumers through the 4-H clover. Through the National Committee, businesses could market directly to club members in advertisements and at sponsored events, and they could win the affection of rural people by sponsoring the emblem of healthy rural living.

Noble's publicity strategy placed the health benefits of 4-H and wholesome rural living front and center. A 1925 article in the Washington Post, based on Noble's press release, announced that alongside "grand champion steers, prize porkers, sheared sheep, high-stepping horses" were "the healthiest boy and girl in the United States . . . selected in very much the same manner. . . . Expert judges looked them over, poked them, punched them and put them through their paces." Female health champion Inez
Harden, the article continued, was a “beauty,” whose “splendid body” was complemented by “so sunny a disposition.” The article also described the “perfect” body of her male counterpart, Coe Emens: “His eyes, ears, nose and throat are perfect, netting him a total of fourteen points. His head is perfect, too, as are his hair, his scalp, his face, neck, chest, back, abdomen, arms, hands, legs, feet, posture, gait, muscles and nerves. . . . His clean, lean body netted him two more points, and the perfection of his measurements netted him seven.” The author of the article was also duly impressed with how Coe dealt with “being the most perfect specimen of boyhood,” modesty the author attributed to his masculine countenance. The article included a lengthy quotation from Noble, concluding, “As a result of the work done by the committee [the National Committee], farm boys and girls are better farmers, are better physically and the girls are better housewives.”

Warburton was livid about the article, though not because the article belittled farm youth. Rather, Warburton charged that the article had neglected to mention the USDA’s role in cult work. Extension officials complained that whatever the benefits derived from the National Committee, Noble tended to “commercialize” club work and to induce confusion among the public about 4-H’s public status. Despite these misgivings, there was little Warburton could do about Noble’s excesses. Noble enjoyed the backing and financial support of both the AFBE and influential farm-state politicians like Arthur Capper. Even as the conflict between Noble and the USDA unfolded, Noble was in the process of launching a lobbying campaign to increase the CES’s federal appropriation, money that both the USDA and the Land Grant College Association (LGCA) craved.

As early as 1921, Noble began to engineer support for an increased federal appropriation. He began by seeking and then circulating supportive resolutions from the AFBE, the LGCA, and a variety of industry organizations. Following a meeting of the executive committee of the LGCA in November of 1926, Noble believed that he had sufficient support from the LGCA to begin to formulate specific legislation. Noble then initiated the legislative process by coordinating between the LGCA, Kansas senator Arthur Capper, and Michigan representative John Ketcham and by circulating the copious private support for the legislation he had gathered over the past six years. By 1927, Noble had amassed an impressive display of support for legislation expanding club work. Nineteen different national organizations, including the AFBE, National Grange, the American Bankers Association, American Home Economics Association, and the National Dairy Council; forty-five state associations; and scores of prominent individuals pledged support for the Capper-Ketcham Bill. “The National Grange favors every movement that will extend the usefulness of boys’ and girls’ club work,” explained a resolution of the Grange’s executive committee. “We favor the Capper-Ketcham Bill recently introduced into Congress to provide additional funds for this class of extension work.”

By 1927, two separate ideas—an expansion of club work and a general expansion of extension—became conflated in a single piece of legislation, the Capper-Ketcham Act, which, if passed, would double federal appropriations to the CES. A memo circulated by Noble described the legislation as the first step in a plan to place a club agent in every county. Clyde Warburton and the USDA, however, supported the legislation because it allowed, in broad language, a general expansion of extension, only some of which would be dedicated to club work. In his public testimony on the legislation, Warburton consistently steered clear of committing the department to placing a club agent in every county and instead argued that the funds would be split between club agents, home demonstration agents, and agricultural agents. Capper and Ketcham, for their parts, gave statements that only vaguely supported Noble’s intent. Although the legislation explicitly mentioned club work, it contained no specific language to mandate any spending, instead leaving it up to the department’s discretion. When the legislation was first introduced in 1927, it was passed unanimously out of the House, but it stalled in the Senate. In 1928, Capper and Ketcham reintroduced the legislation with only minor changes.

Despite Warburton’s reluctance to view the legislation as exclusively directed toward club work, Noble initially controlled the terms of the debate on Capper-Ketcham. Noble’s lobbying proved so effective that the public often assumed that the legislation was narrowly tailored to support club work and club work alone. To hammer his point home, Noble brought club participants to testify before both Senate and House committees. Club members Viola Yoder of Cumberland, Maryland, and John Visny of Newtown, Connecticut, praised 4-H to the Senate committee. Yoder stressed that 4-H club work had transformed her family’s home and improved her person through better nutrition. 4-H had “brought [her] closer to her parents and to [her] home.” In addition to imparting him with valuable knowledge, 4-H had entirely changed Visny’s attitude toward life on the farm. “I know that if I had my choice to start all over again,” Visny announced, “I should want to be born and brought up on a farm, but the most important part of that would be that I be granted an opportunity to take part in 4-H club activities.” Other rural youth, without that fortune, would abandon
the countryside and make the slow drift to “overcrowded cities.” Mrs. D. B. Phillips, a club leader from Forestville, Ohio, also called to testify, expanded on Visny’s point. “We do not want to keep everyone of our boys and girls on the farm,” she explained. “We want to keep our best boys and girls on the farm, and then you may have the rest of them out in the city.”

Even as the complexities of the legislative process shaped the bill, the public image its supporters presented coalesced around the image of robustly healthy, wholesome rural youth, an image that crystallized the benefits of intimacy with the state. A moment of serendipitous theater brought this rhetorical strategy into focus. As the Senate committee prepared to adjourn, Alabama senator James Heflin asked how many members of the committee were raised on the farm. After most of the members volunteered that they had been and Senator Capper prepared again to adjourn, Mrs. Phillips interjected. Asserting her maternal authority, she asked those who had been raised on the farm to stand so that the audience could “view them.” When they did so, she offered her appraisal: “Well that is fine. But I would like to remark one thing, that the farm boys are the best looking members of the committee.” The committee shortly thereafter voted unanimously to report the bill to the Senate.

Observers may have assented to healthy intimacy between rural youth and the state through 4-H, but they were less certain about how wholesome the National Committee was, as the General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) soon made clear. The GFWC complained that the legislation would allow the USDA to continue to neglect home demonstration work, farmwomen, and rural girls. Speaking on behalf of the GFWC, President Mary Belle King Sherman explained to the House committee that even though 100,000 more girls than boys were enrolled in 4-H, male agricultural and club agents outnumbered female home demonstration and club agents by a considerable margin. This resulted, she continued, in the distressing “tendency under men agents to divert girls from home making to the raising of baby beef, pigs, and field crops for purely commercial ends.” This diversion led to both the overproduction of agricultural commodities and a neglect of the rural home. To remedy the situation, Sherman suggested that the legislation should be amended to ensure that the CES hire “equal numbers” of home demonstration and agricultural agents.

Sherman attacked the National Committee by arguing that that it introduced an unsavory, “outside” element to 4-H and thus threatened to make such intimate contact with the state corrupt and untoward. Intimacy, in this view, was a binary relationship between the government and youth, not to be sullied by urban businessmen. The tendency to enroll girls in agricultural projects was “greatly emphasized,” Sherman argued, “by the policy of the national committee on boys’ and girls’ clubs.” While Sherman had no qualms with 4-H, she emphasized that farm girls needed the direction of women and that the legislation needed to focus not just on the promotion of club work, but on a broader strengthening of home economics work. In the popular press, she was more explicit. Sherman told the Atlanta Constitution that the National Committee’s “tamper[ing]” encouraged overproduction and gendered disorder. She demanded “to know why the 4-H clubs [were] being tampered with by an outside committee with the full sanction of the extension heads at Washington. [The GFWC] hopes that Congress will inquire in these matters at an early date and clean up the situation.”

By focusing on rural girls and dangers to the rural home, Sherman dramatized her case for an expansion of home demonstration agents and appropriated for her own ends Noble’s rhetorical focus on the bodies of rural youth. The GFWC approved of club work, but it “favor[ed] the girls being under women,” Mrs. John S. Sippel of the Maryland GFWC affiliate testified to the House committee. The image of men directing vulnerable rural girls evoked gendered disarray and it portrayed extension as a threat to rural households. The GFWC portrayed the National Committee as a nefarious, sinister organization, a far cry from the image Noble promoted of a group of public-minded businessmen cooperating to keep the fittest youth on farms. They “tampered” with 4-H, apparently indifferent to the potential damage wrought by their producer mindset to farm girls, country homes, and rural communities. In that narrative, the commercial interests the National Committee represented were willing to exploit rural girls and place them in the care of men—an arrangement as inappropriate as it was ineffective. “What does a man know about teaching a girl home economics?” Representative James Aswell of Louisiana, the GFWC’s champion in the House, asked Clyde Warburton. If Guy Noble had hoped to capitalize on the highly publicized intimacy with the state 4-H generated, Sherman and her allies demonstrated that the gendered complexities of that strategy could also cut against his schemes.

The resolution of the debate on Capper-Ketcham both vindicated and indicted Noble’s chosen rhetorical strategy of promoting the perfected bodies of rural youth. The Senate and House committees adopted the GFWC amendment providing for a “just and fair” distribution of funding between male and female extension workers. The Coolidge administration, however,
signaled that it would veto the legislation and encouraged Congress to pare down the price tag. The version of the bill presented to the president eliminated nearly $5.5 million in appropriation authorizations from the original legislation, but it did secure an increase of $1.5 million in funding for extension and left open the possibility that later congresses would revisit the issue. Calvin Coolidge signed Capper-Ketcham into law on May 22, 1928. Noble proclaimed the lobbying campaign a singular success and issued a series of letters thanking his various supporters for their contributions to the effort. But the reality behind Noble's public words was surely more mixed. The GFWC's amendment and the Coolidge administration's threat of veto had diluted Noble's vision of thousands of new club agents and had, instead, strengthened the influence of home economics within the CES. More importantly, the debate surrounding Capper-Ketcham had accentuated ways in which advertising 4-H through the bodies of rural youth made Noble's private work suspect and potentially dangerous. If 4-H was to produce robust rural bodies, and through them to extend the intimate state's infrastructure, the USDA would need to temper Noble and the urban businesses he represented.

Capper-Ketcham was just the beginning of Noble's fight with the USDA. In 1930, Noble unilaterally approved a girls' outfit arranging contest sponsored by the Chicago Mail Order Company that featured a grand prize of a trip to Paris. An enraged Gertrude Warren penned a scathing memo to C. B. Smith. Noble's "Style Revue" promoted the dangerous idea that learning proper homemaking methods was less important than prevailing in a subjective, frivolous outfit arranging contest. Echoing Mary King Belle Sherman's characterization of the National Committee as subverting appropriate gender roles, Warren blasted Noble's publicity for its use of titillating "bathing beach" style headlines that made rural girls the objects of urban lust, thus multiplying precisely the sorts of desire 4-H was intended to stave off. Nor was the problem confined to the "Style Revue." "Our relationship with business interests is being brought to the attention of Congress," she warned, and an "outside agency" manipulating club work would "jeopardize the whole movement." Smith and Warburton took Warren's complaint seriously, and they spent the next decade struggling to bring Noble under the USDA's control—a struggle that led in 1939 to the criminalization of use of the 4-H name and emblem without USDA authorization.

What made 4-H such a sturdy infrastructure that Warren, Smith, and Warburton would, to secure it, willingly imperil the USDA's relationship with the National Committee and the political and financial capital it represented? 4-H'ers simultaneously advertised capitalist agriculture and the authority of state actors, often using one as proof of the other. They did so through numerous quotidian acts distributed across realms both public and private: growing corn, raising pigs, canning tomatoes, and sewing dresses; in parlors and barns; and in county fairs, public rallies, and newspaper articles. These simple acts—guided by technocratic authority, funded by private capital, and executed by the bodies of rural youth—inserted the USDA (and its inconstant allies) into the everyday fabric of countless rural communities, mustering intimacy and personal contact in service to state-directed political and economic development. The USDA recognized that vigorous young bodies testified to its wisdom and trustworthiness, and that by cultivating, claiming, and mobilizing those bodies they could also expand governing capabilities in rural America. This was, as historians typically describe it, state building. But the product of these actions was not a formal agency or bureaucracy. It was, instead, a diffuse ideological acceptance of the appropriate contours of the state. It was a normalized relationship among rural subjects, technocratic authority, and capital—a broad cultural consensus about how those three elements could safely interface for the healthy benefit of all. The tug-of-war between the USDA and the National Committee clarified the stakes and fragility of that consensus. Noble was an "outside" force. His actions threatened the viability of the intimate state by rendering its boundaries too porous. He sold access to youthful rural bodies and imported urban corruption to rural homes. Noble used a public infrastructure for an unoward, private end. Warren, Smith, and Warburton might countenance such behavior if the infrastructure in question were merely a road to Chicago. They were less willing to permit their road to the future to be so abused.

Historians of the postwar United States increasingly view the American nation-state as an imperial formation operating globally through a series of intertwined military, economic, cultural, and political networks that trouble conventional distinctions between public and private, state and civil, global and local. The globalization of American empire has been inseparable from the proliferation of local strategies of governance that produce, condition, and mobilize the private, the intimate, and the somatic—often with global geopolitical implications. This same apparatus vigorously exported 4-H clubs to battlegrounds in the global Cold War—Korea, Latin America, Cuba, and Vietnam among others—just as a second wave of international 4-H now targets pockets of underdevelopment throughout the global South. As this essay argues, to understand this postwar proliferation of intimate governance we need new genealogies that look anew to the
history of American state formation. These new genealogies may take as a
guiding principle that in the American past, the production of the state was
always also the production of the intimate.

Notes

6. ibid., 130 (emphasis mine).

22. Keller, Regulating a New Economy, 152.
26. Burritt, County Agent and the Farm Bureau, 228.
31. O. H. Benson and Gertrude Warren, "Organization and Results of Boys' and Girls' Club Work" (1918), 22–23, in unmarked folder, box 3a, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
32. "Extracts from Letters of Boys' Corn Club Members" (1912), "Records of Development of Early Phases of Development" folder, Box 1, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
33. See Rosenberg, Breeding the Future, 54–87.
34. C. B. Smith, "How Banks Can Cooperate in Agricultural Extension Work" (1919), 7, in "Significant Talks and Addresses on 4-H Club Work, Volume 1: 1904–1929" folder, Box 4, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
35. G. L. Noble, untitled article in The Banker Farmer (1921), in "4-H Early Development (Folder 2)" folder, Box 1, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
38. Hallie Hughes, "Self Management" (1931), 1, in "National 4-H Club Camp, June 17–25" folder, Box 33, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
41. "Pick Healthy Specimens of Boys and Girls," Oelwein Daily Register, December 3, 1924, 1A.
45. W. W. Bauer, "Contesting for Better Health" (1931), in "1933 Club Congress" folder, Box 1, 4-H Service Committee Program Files, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
46. For health club enrollments see the statistical compilations found in "Statistics" folder, Box 16a, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
48. Letter, Noble to Smith, January 2, 1925, Box 1a, in "4-H Goals" folder, Box 1a, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park. See also the announcement in the National Boys and Girls Club News, January 10, 1925, in "National 4-H Club News 1924–1935" folder, Box 13, 4-H Service Committee Program Files, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
49. Letter, Smith to Noble, January 10, 1925 and Telegram, Smith to Noble, January 5, 1925, in "4-H Goals" folder, Box 1a, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
50. Letter, William M. Jardine to H. L. Russell, April 26, 1925; Letter, Warburton to Smith, February 18, 1925; Letter, Smith to Warburton, February 20, 1925, "4-H Goals" folder, Box 1a, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
53. Letter, Warburton to Noble, February 27, 1925; Letter, Noble to Warburton, March 3, 1925; Letter, Warburton to Directors of Extension, March 10, 1925, in "4-H Service Comp. & Ext. Rel." folder, Box 1a, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park. See collected responses of the state directors in the same folder. See also discussion of the article in correspondence between Warburton and Smith in "4-H Goals" folder, Box 1a, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
55. See Mary Belle King Sherman, Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States House of Representatives, Seventieth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 6074 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1928), 24; and Letter to N. T. Martin, April 7, 1932, in "Capper-Ketchum" folder, Box 1c, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
56. See statements of support collected by Noble in "Capper-Ketchum" folder, Box 1c, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
57. Resolution of the National Grange in "Capper-Ketchum" folder, Box 1c, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park. See also Oscar G. Mayer, Letter to House Committee Members, February 1, 1927, and Statement by National Swine Growers Association (1927) in "Capper-Ketchum" folder, Box 1c, 4-H Extension Service Collection, RG33, National Archives—College Park.
In 1943, more than 80 percent of Americans surveyed by George Gallup reported that they had donated to the American Red Cross during the past year. Other war charities benefited from elevated levels of giving, and at the same time, citizens purchased war bonds in large numbers. Although all these contributions were understood as “voluntary,” the pressures to give were often intense. The scale of citizen support for the war exemplified the consolidation of a strong civic culture in which giving, loaning, and volunteering were powerful enactments of citizenship. Linked to the nationalization of economic activity and the power of a revered wartime president, this pattern of citizen engagement was a formidable political resource.

But by 1946, this regime of wartime solidarity expressed through civic benevolence was already at risk. The American Red Cross commissioned another confidential poll from George Gallup. This time they found that support had fallen dramatically, particularly among those who had direct ties to someone serving overseas. Troubling as this discontent among veterans and their families was to the Red Cross, it represented only one dimension of the destabilization of the distinctive regime of national mobilization that had characterized the Second World War. In an extension of patterns evident for decades, and especially in the mobilization for the Great—not yet First—World War, military mobilization had driven the US government to expand in ways that depended massively on extended collaborations with private organizations to rally support, to produce war material, to provide aid to the troops, and to discipline the civilian population. Reliant as it was on local business leaders, corporate executives, and a nascent category of public relations experts, this model of governing through public-private