States’ Pursuit of Sovereignty in a Globalizing Security Context: Controlling International Human Mobility

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University

2010
ABSTRACT

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Abstract

The goal of this dissertation is to inquire into how states balance economic motivations and security concerns when pursuing sovereignty at borders. More precisely, the dissertation examines tradeoffs between interdependence sovereignty – control over transborder flows—and Westphalian sovereignty defined as exclusion of external actors from states’ authoritative space. Focusing on control over cross-border human mobility as the issue area, I put forward the securitized interdependence framework as a theory that encompasses economic and security logics of policy-making. Because migration control rests at the nexus of economic/material and geopolitical/military dimensions of state security, it provides an ideal testing ground for observing the interaction of economic and security motives. The theoretical framework draws on the literature on complex interdependence and the logic of the trading state to postulate empirically verifiable propositions on migration control policies.

The central claim of the dissertation is that human mobility is conditionally securitized and that security logics are modulated by material/economic incentives. Facing informational asymmetries vis-à-vis transnational terrorists, states rely on migration and border control strategies to screen and deter non-state threats to security. However, economic interdependence—trade and capital ties—mitigates fears over transnational terrorism by reconfiguring state preferences, bolstering the relative
salience of material concerns in policy-making, tempering perceptions of threat, and creating vested interests at the domestic level.

To test the theory I have collected and compiled data on i)visa restrictions for pairs of 207 X 207 directed dyads ii)visa rejection rates for European Union and/or Schengen member countries for the period 2003-2007, and iii)asylum recognition rates for 20 select OECD recipient states for the period 1980-2007. I then use this data to test the implications of the theory by distinguishing between economic/voluntary and political/involuntary migration. Additionally, I tease out the distinct effects of two different types of security concerns over transnational terrorism: a reputational effect that considers origin country citizens’ involvement in terrorism incidents worldwide and a targeted/directed impact through which states take into account past experience as targets of terrorism. To illustrate the effect of economic interdependence, I analyze trade and capital flows separately and illustrate that both types of commercial ties facilitate liberalization of controls over human mobility through direct and indirect mechanisms.

I employ a variety of statistical techniques to study the effect of economic and security concerns including several cross-sectional time series techniques, structural break and recursive residual tests for temporal change, and maximum likelihood. Furthermore, I complement my quantitative empirical analyses with an in-depth process tracing approach that traces the evolution of Turkey’s migration policies in the context of Turkey’s post-1980 economic liberalization. The qualitative analysis makes use of
primary and secondary resources obtained from archival field work in Ankara and
Istanbul, Turkey.

The dissertation demonstrates that the impact of security concerns over
transnational terrorism is contingent on the type of migration policy under
consideration. In particular, policies of control over involuntary/political migration are
guided by humanitarian and normative motives, limiting the effect of security concerns.
Furthermore, the securitization of visa policies is strongest if recipient states are directly
targeted by incidents of transnational terrorism perpetrated by origin country nationals.
While states take into account incidents of global terrorism – attacks against other
country nationals or territories by origin country citizens—this channel of impact is
more modest. Additionally, empirical results show that economic interdependence
effectively undercuts the effect of global terrorism, driving migration control policies
towards liberalization. In sum, the dissertation demonstrates that ways in which states
assert interdependence sovereignty exhibit temporal and cross-sectional variation as
well as functional differentiation across types of border and migration control policies.
Dedication

For my dad, who encouraged me to pursue the academic lifestyle and career path.
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This project was inspired both by academic and personal interest. As a citizen of a country that faces visa restrictions from a majority of countries, I was compelled to question the notion of a borderless world brought about by globalization. Living abroad rendered this question more salient in my mind: whereas most fellow nationals view visa requirements as an ineluctable fact of foreign travel, the relative ease with which my colleagues and friends from other countries traverse international borders allowed me to frame the question as an academic puzzle with implications for political science and international relations scholarship. Having moved (back) to the United States shortly after September 11, I was also led to inquire into the extent to which human mobility was securitized and how this process comported with the so-called borderless world.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations...just as the protection of the home is the most vital care of the private citizen, so the integrity of her borders is the condition of existence of the State”.
- Lord Curzon, Romanes Lecture on the Subject of Frontiers (1907).\(^1\)

“In order to monopolize the legitimate means of movement, states and the state system have been compelled to define who belongs and who does not, who may come and go and who may not, and to make these distinctions intelligible and enforceable”.
- John C. Torpey, The Invention of the Passport (2000).\(^2\)

1.1 Controlling Human Mobility in a Changing Security Environment

Monitoring movement of individuals across borders is an integral aspect of statehood and is an unequivocal expression of states’ assertion of territorial sovereignty. In that respect, states’ control over the legitimate means of transborder movement complements states’ exclusive right to exercise coercive force within their territories.\(^3\)

Just as states’ monopoly over coercion domestically enables them to maintain internal order and prevent domestic challenges to their authority, border control is integral to maintenance of territorial integrity and allows states to thwart external threats to their rule. Although states may differ in terms of the policy instruments they employ to control borders and human mobility, these instruments shed light on the variation in states’ security seeking behavior.

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\(^1\) Curzon 1907, 318.
\(^2\) Torpey 2000.
\(^3\) Ibid; Weber 1958. Torpey’s concept of “monopoly over the legitimate means of movement” parallels Weber’s notion of the “monopoly over means of coercion”.
1.1.1 Migration and Security

The connection between migration and state security becomes quite clear if we consider the events of September 11: the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks took advantage of loopholes in the United States’ border and migration control policies.\(^4\) In fact, all 19 of the terrorists entered on visas, underscoring the importance of control over legal migration for national security.\(^5\) While 9/11 constituted a turning point for the securitization of human mobility, the security-migration nexus did not originate with September 11 but was intimately tied to the processes of globalization.\(^6\) Well before 2001, the United States had elected highly visible policies to quell fears over loss-of-control over the border with Mexico. In fact, in the 1990s, Clinton underlined the loss-of-control theme by noting: “We have traveled all over the world as a nation since 1914, securing the frontiers of other nations, but the greatest power in the world has not chosen to secure its own national territory”.\(^7\) Similarly, policy-makers in Europe responded to rising domestic anti-immigration sentiment with symbolic policies of control.\(^8\) As the ties between migration and criminal activity crystallized in the post-Cold War context, border management became a hot topic for the European Union’s agenda. In a nutshell, both in North America and in Europe, states escalated border

\(^4\) Rudolph 2003.
\(^5\) State Department 2004.
\(^6\) Faist 2005; Rudolph 2003.
\(^7\) ABC News, 1993.
\(^8\) Andreas 2003; 2001.
controls and in the process sought to use innovative technology and visible border surveillance and patrol methods to symbolically reassert control over borders.

What was distinct about the post 9/11 context however was the increasing attention paid to migration as a potential threat to military—rather than just societal or economic—security.\(^9\) Shortly after the September 11 attacks, Dick Oosting, head of the EU section of Amnesty International drew attention to the securitization of the European Union’s approach to asylum procedures by noting the “enormous dominance of concern with fighting terrorism and illegal immigration”.\(^10\) In an environment characterized by heightened perceptions of threat to national security, the importance of border control in the fight against terrorism became evident. For the United States, the increasing salience of borders as perimeters of defense not against the militarized forces of state actors but against terrorist infiltration translated into allocation of more resources to border management and to the reorganization of institutions of migration control.\(^11\) On the European continent, fears over security contributed to increasing attention paid to migration control as a mechanism of combating terrorism. This resulted in a number of policy changes: increase of border patrol and policing, sanctions against carrier airlines

\(^9\) Rudolph 2003.
\(^10\) Oosting 2004.
\(^11\) Andreas 2003. An example of policy innovation spurred by the 9/11 attacks was the consolidation of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service under the newly formed Department of Homeland Security. Other significant policy changes in this context were the USA Patriot Act of 2001, and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSVERA) of 2002. See also Rudolph 2003, 2006.
and employers, and tighter asylum control measures including readmission agreements with safe third countries, to name a few.\textsuperscript{12}

These policy shifts signified the reconfiguration of border salience in the post-September 11 context. As Andreas surmises, borders had traditionally been regarded as sites of economic exchange and/or military defense.\textsuperscript{13} The declining role of territorial conquest for state power led scholars to claim that border salience was on the decline, and more broadly that state territoriality was losing meaning in the face of globalization.\textsuperscript{14} While the replacement of the geopolitical territorial state by the trading state was hailed as signaling the triumph of neoliberalism\textsuperscript{15}, this did not automatically entail borders permeable to all types of flows. Instead, the declining role of borders in military defense was accompanied by a growing awareness of borders as institutions of protection against “clandestine transnational actors”: illegal migrants, militants, potential terrorists, smugglers and traffickers.\textsuperscript{16} The recognition of a broader array of roles that interstate boundaries play paralleled the broadening of the concept of security to include elements of societal and human security. The changing security environment put into question the traditional distinction between low politics and high politics by demonstrating that migration—an issue area previously relegated to the realm of low

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Lahav 2004; Rudolph 2003; 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Andreas 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Biersteker 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Rosecrance 1986.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Andreas 2000; 2003; 2001. Donaldson 2005. Donaldson refers to this shift as signifying a growing emphasis on the security rather than defensive function of borders. He notes that security policies are designed to counteract threats from undesirable and clandestine actors whereas defensive measures are designed to prevent infiltration by traditional threats.
\end{itemize}
politics—could threaten state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. This also necessitated a more nuanced approach to security as involving societal, economic, and military dimensions.¹⁷

Whereas the imposition of entry barriers against cross-border flows, far from being new, represents the traditional authority of the territorially bounded state, what is novel is the shift in the approach to territoriality. In the context of this shift, we would expect border and migration control to reflect fears over threats emanating from individuals. Put differently, given the security implications of human mobility and the significance of border control for state security, we would expect states to jealously guard their borders. From an economic standpoint however, there are compelling reasons for liberalization of border and migration control policies. Policy governed by neoclassical principles would be expected to favor fewer restrictions on migration and allow countries to take advantage of the positive linkages between flows of goods and capital and labor flows.¹⁸ Especially given the rise in demand for low-skilled labor in industrialized countries, labor mobility should be conducive to economic growth.¹⁹ Furthermore, states might be prompted to enact liberal border and migration policies in order to grant easier access to their territories and thereby encourage the exchange of

¹⁷ Rudolph 2003.
¹⁸ Collins et al. 1999; O’Rourke K 1999.
¹⁹ Cornelius 1998.
goods and services.\textsuperscript{20} In effect, the economic logics of policy-making emerge as a counterweight to border closure driven by securitization dynamics.

In fact, despite what the securitization logic might suggest, empirical evidence shows that border and migration control has not completely been driven by national security concerns. While the post-9/11 environment exhibited a clampdown in border security by the United States, for example, the new measures enacted did not target border closure. Andreas articulates that although migration control became politicized prior to 9/11, trade concerns trumped security interests. Policies were designed to be high-profile and visible and assuage domestic fears over loss-of-control over the border but at the same time aimed to facilitate economic integration, especially in the context of NAFTA.\textsuperscript{21} Rather than seeking to limit the volume of cross-border individual flows, they aimed to improve screening and selection procedures to reduce the risk of infiltration by transnational terrorists.\textsuperscript{22} This presents an apparent puzzle for political scientists: given the security implications, when do states relax controls over human mobility?

On the one hand, if security logics prevailed completely, we would witness increased barriers to human mobility in the changing security context. On the other hand, the expectations of neoliberalism are not wholly fulfilled given that borders are not completely porous to all types of flows. In fact, as scholars of migration point out,\

\textsuperscript{20} Neumayer 2006.  
\textsuperscript{21} Andreas 2003.  
\textsuperscript{22} Golovetsky 2006.
whereas states have liberalized borders with respect to financial flows and trade, they have been reluctant to dismantle controls vis-à-vis flows of individuals.\(^{23}\) The research puzzle can then be reframed as: how do economic motivations and security logics influence the ways in which states assert their territorial sovereignty? The existence of opposing logics of decision-making complicate the picture and suggest that migration policy is best studied by looking at the interaction of economic and security logics. I further contend that mechanisms of control over borders and migration capture how states exert their sovereignty. These connections will be further delineated in the theoretical chapter.

### 1.1.2 International Relations and Migration Policy

Why study migration policy? Answering this question will also serve to contextualize the dissertation in broader international relations (IR) literature. International human mobility, more than other types of global flows, underscores the quandaries that states encounter in a securitized globalization environment. The globalization of migration has called into question the erosion of territoriality as an ordering principle in world politics and as a central component of sovereignty.\(^{24}\) Correspondingly, migration policy allows us to rethink territorial sovereignty and to cast these concepts in a different light. At the core of the project are questions such as: does globalization threaten the territorially demarcated state-system? To what degree do

\(^{23}\) Cornelius et al. 2004.

\(^{24}\) Albert et al. 2001.
states enjoy agency in the face of growing interdependence? Does the increasing pace and volume of cross-border mobility entail a borderless world?

The dissertation tackles these questions by examining migration policy as an expression of states’ interdependence sovereignty. As such, the project fits squarely within an expanding body of literature that seeks to reconceptualize state sovereignty. Previous work has shown the contingent and dynamic nature of sovereignty by disaggregating the concept into its constitutive elements.\textsuperscript{25} This literature affords considerable mileage in thinking about how the dimensions of sovereignty interact and relate to one another. Proceeding along these lines, Rudolph’s incisive comparative analysis of migration policy in trading states has articulated the relationship between interdependence and domestic dimensions of state sovereignty. I develop these ideas further in three ways.

First, taking Rudolph’s work as a launching pad, my dissertation puts aside the domestic dimension and focuses on the interaction of interdependence and Westphalian dimensions.\textsuperscript{26} Interdependence sovereignty prioritizes maintaining control over transborder flows whereas Westphalian sovereignty requires the exclusion of external actors from states’ authoritative space. The theoretical framework which encompasses both dimensions brings to light dilemmas the solutions of which might not be self-

\textsuperscript{25} Krasner 1999; Thomson 1995.
\textsuperscript{26} Rudolph 2003; 2006.
evident. The dissertation illustrates how tradeoffs between economic and security logics shape ways in which states pursue sovereignty.

On the one end of the spectrum, policies may align almost completely with material incentives. Somalia paints an interesting picture in which economic logics may eclipse security interests: in the absence of a central state authority, decision-making is dictated by the logic of the trading state. Because the country lacks a government that can set policy to maximize Westphalian sovereignty, policy is set to maximize economic gain. Although beyond the scope of my dissertation, the anecdotal example of Somalia also casts doubt on our conventional understanding of sovereignty. In fact, Somalia’s quality of life indicators improved after the collapse of its government and in a stateless environment. A simple understanding of sovereignty would suggest that pursuit of material security should go hand in hand with human and military security. On the opposite end, we might imagine a state like North Korea where the geopolitical military logic prevails and security concerns trump material considerations. North Korea stands out as an autarkic state “locked in a Westphalian model (of sovereignty) that stresses territorial integrity and national self-determination”. Although an extreme example, North Korea provides an example of a state willing to forego economic gain for the sake

28 Rodrik 2002. Rodrik surmises that the asymmetry is not wholly explicable through security concerns or reducible to the unpopularity of migration in trading states. Rather, liberalization in labor mobility is limited because of a lack of a well-defined organized pro-immigration constituency in advanced states. Of course, we may also argue that the lack of such a constituency is in part attributable to perceptions of threats to security.
29 Asia Times, September 22, 2006.
of security and practicing an exclusive model of sovereignty to shield itself from external threats.\textsuperscript{30} Broadly speaking, fears over societal/human and state security have been paramount in generating an asymmetry in liberalization: despite the sizeable gains achievable through liberalization of labor flows\textsuperscript{31}, labor mobility still lags behind liberalization in trade and finance.

Second, the dissertation also purports to show that states’ expressions of sovereignty may be differentiated within the area of migration policy. Ways in which states assert sovereignty at borders are not only dependent on the type of transborder flow they seek to control – goods, finance, individuals—but also exhibit variation within a single issue-area, a fact which challenges approaches to sovereignty as a unified concept. In that sense, the dissertation goes beyond unbundling sovereignty into distinct dimensions and shows that even focusing on one dimension—interdependence sovereignty—yields variable responses. The third contribution of the dissertation is an empirical one: focusing on border and migration policies grants a way to measure and operationalize a complex concept and do so in a way that yields falsifiable propositions.

The focus of the dissertation—migration and border control policies—relates directly to states’ strategies of pursuing sovereignty but theoretical framework also

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. The author of the article notes that an exclusive Westphalian approach to sovereignty might be thought of as a tool of weak fragile states.

\textsuperscript{31} 2002. In fact, Rodrik remarks that liberalization of labor controls is where advanced states stand to benefit the most from globalization.
pertains to what Rodrik has referred to as the “trilemma of globalization”.32 Given a territorially demarcated state system, deeper economic integration presents a challenge for democratic governance, leading scholars to rue the democratic deficit resulting from full-blown economic liberalization. As governments aggressively compete for market competence, globalization imposes the proverbial “golden straitjacket” on governments, forcing convergence in policies in a number of ways.33 Competition for material gain undermines independent standard-setting, impels uniformity in regulations and taxing practices and decreases institutional diversity.34

My dissertation speaks to the broader literature on globalization through the lens of migration and border control. On the one hand, the golden straitjacket and the resulting crowding out of non-economic politics from decision-making might entail that governments’ hands are tied with respect to security-seeking in the age of globalization. This is even if states willingly cede sovereignty to achieve material gains; as Friedman points out, governments pay the price of sovereignty in the face of internationalization by pursuing policy through a narrower domain. On the other hand however, the increasing salience of non-state threats to security underscores the perils of policy-setting according to strictly economic criteria. Rodrik has in fact made a case for diversity in the face of interdependence. My dissertation shows that considerable diversity in policies does in fact exist: there is variation across time, space, and policy-

32 Ibid., 1.
33 Friedman 1999, 87.
34 Rodrik 2002.
domain. The moral of the story is that policy is malleable and that a uniform approach to maintaining sovereignty in the face of globalization is hard to identify. At the same time, such diversity also shows that we have not seen the twilight of the territorial state system. Globalization does not automatically spell the universal triumph of the trading state; neither does the post 9/11 world entail across-the board securitization.

The remainder of this chapter will proceed in the following manner: Section 1.2 highlights the deeper theoretical linkage between security-seeking and border/migration control by providing a review of the literature on state sovereignty and territoriality in international relations (IR) scholarship. Section 1.3 provides a preview into the debates on globalization and the changing nature of state sovereignty. Section 1.4 articulates how focusing on specific types of migration policy can shed light on states’ sovereignty bargains. Most contemporary approaches to border and migration control focus either on the security motives undergirding tighter policies or emphasize economic interdependence as the motor driving border liberalization. While both strands of the literature serve as theoretical building blocks, considered alone, they lend an incomplete picture.

1.2 Territoriality, Security, and State Sovereignty

For scholars in the realist tradition, the significance of territoriality and the role that international borders play in international relations are undergirded by the basic
assumption that power and security are the central features of the state system.\textsuperscript{35} In classical realist understanding, territory forms the bedrock of state sovereignty and “the impenetrability of a nation’s territory” is congruent with the preservation of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{36} In other words, the definition of sovereignty found in the classical realist tradition is inherently territorial and borders mark the extent of state authority and law-making power. Before delving into the scholarly nuances behind the concept of sovereignty, however, it will serve us well to define the concept of sovereignty.

1.2.1 Defining Sovereignty

The working definition of sovereignty for the purposes of this dissertation will be \textit{supreme authority within a (territorially demarcated) territory}. The definition encapsulates the core constitutive ideas that render meaning to the concept of sovereignty. While the evolution of the concept is inextricably tied to that of the modern state, the core principles of sovereignty are grounded in a rich body of political thought.\textsuperscript{37} Although it is beyond the scope of this section to engage in a foray into the normative literature on sovereignty, it is pertinent to discuss briefly the origins of the working definition.

The working definition implies that sovereignty has three signature elements: authority, supremacy, and territoriality. Authority confers the right to command but

\textsuperscript{35} Waltz 1979. For the purposes of this section, I am using realism as an umbrella term without distinguishing between different variants of realism; arguably, the assumption that all states seek survival has come under criticism by some scholars. See for instance Schweller 1996.

\textsuperscript{36} Morgenthau 1978, 319.

\textsuperscript{37} Philpott 2001.
also is intimately tied to the notion of legitimacy. Supremacy entails that a specific form of authority that is superior to contenders and that excludes rival sources of power from its domain. Finally, territoriality specifies the geographic location over which supreme authority is exerted and mirrors the principles of property rights.\(^{38}\)

Historical manifestations of sovereignty have exhibited variation first, in the sources whence legitimacy was derived: natural law, divine mandate, popular mandate, or law. Second, the holders of sovereignty have taken various forms—monarchs, dictators, elites, empires, states—with the state as the victorious and enduring successor of sundry political units.\(^{39}\) Normative thought has disagreed on how sovereignty should be shared or compartmentalized, whether it should reside in a single individual or in a ruling class, or the citizenry.\(^{40}\) Relatedly, scholars conceptualized the mechanism through which sovereignty was conferred in different ways: for example, Hobbes conceived of the formation of the state as contract through which the populace transferred authority to the Leviathan; in contrast, Rousseau believed that the collective continued to be sovereign in ruling through the general will.\(^{41}\) Significantly, empirical and normative variation existed on the scope of sovereignty, or the extent to which it

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\(^{38}\) Ibid. Philpott points out that territoriality as an ingredient for sovereignty and property rights go hand in hand in the thoughts of Hobbes.

\(^{39}\) Spruyt 1994.

\(^{40}\) Bartelson 1995.

should be absolute.\textsuperscript{42} Absolute sovereignty implies that authority encompasses all aspects of decision making within the polity; deviations from it entail that sovereignty is limited in specific issue areas. The rise of regional institutions such as the European Union and increasing power of international norms and regimes constitute developments that constrain absolute sovereignty. Finally, as the next section will further elaborate, the concept’s territorial aspect is a modern invention in rending geography as the determinant of community over which sovereignty is exerted.

\subsection*{1.2.2 Sovereignty and Territoriality}

Morgenthau recognized that sovereignty, defined as “supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce law” is bounded by international borders and tied to a certain piece of territory.\textsuperscript{43} The monopolization of coercive forces is constrained by international boundaries which demarcate the bounds of states’ policing and law-making authority.\textsuperscript{44} The concentration of sovereignty as indivisible law-making authority follows naturally from the fallibility of human nature -- an idea central to classical realism— in which “the laws of politics have their roots”\textsuperscript{45}. In this regard, territorial sovereignty serves as a solution to the problem of anarchy by imposing constraints on man’s quest for domination over others.

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{42} As Bartelson elucidates, Hobbes and Bodin were two theorists who made a case for absolute sovereignty. Rousseau’s conception of sovereignty deviated from an absolute understanding in locating the locus of sovereignty in the collective. Other scholars, such as Grotius held that sovereignty could be limited externally, a notion that evokes contemporary justifications for foreign intervention.
\textsuperscript{43} Morgenthau 1978.
\textsuperscript{44} Salehyan 2006.
\textsuperscript{45} Morgenthau 1978, 4.
\end{flushright}
Territoriality as a refuge from anarchy outside the “hard shell” of state boundaries is echoed in Herz’s argument that the sovereign territorial state provided its citizens with a “wall of defensibility” against external aggressors.\footnote{46} Paralleling Morgenthau on the impermeability of territorial sovereignty as the basis of state survival, Herz contended that the security-provision function of the modern state was predicated on its territory remaining impenetrable to external forces.\footnote{47} Arguing that the “peculiar unity, compactness, and coherence of the modern nation-state” stemmed from its impermeability to foreign actors, Herz emphasized the significance of borders as a defensive perimeter enclosing the population from the anarchy of the state system.\footnote{48} In a later article, Herz recognized that the allure of the territorial unit transcended the defensive function of borders and linked the persistence of “the territorial imperative” to man’s quest for identity-formation, legitimacy, and recognition.\footnote{49}

These ideas point to a utilitarian understanding of sovereignty whereby the territorial organization of the state system best serves man’s desire for protection. A central function of international boundaries that emerges from this understanding is that of a defensive barrier, captured succinctly in Boulding’s concept of a “critical boundary”.\footnote{50} Emphasizing the defensive aspects of a border, Boulding wrote that “the penetration of an alien organization inside (the) critical boundary will produce grave
disorganization...War, therefore is only useful as a defense of the national organism if it is carried outside the critical boundary.”^51

These ideas highlight the significance of territorial boundedness for human security and view territorial sovereignty as a natural outcome of human inadequacy. A review of classical realism’s take on territoriality would be incomplete, however, without discussing how territoriality relates to state security. In Morgenthau’s understanding, geography constitutes a central source of state power and territorial reallocation is a fundamental mechanism through which states can maintain the balance of power. Natural frontiers marked by conspicuous terrain and maritime boundaries afford states security by shielding them from foreign invasion. In that respect, control over an advantageous geographic position can enhance the prospect of state survival by deterring foreign conquest. The security-oriented geopolitical argument found in classical realist thought mirrors closely 18th and 19th century geographical thought in focusing on the immutable aspects of a country’s territory as deterministic of its security.\(^52\) Territory not only figures as the primary source of national power in Morgenthau’s thought but also is also posited to be “the most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends.”\(^53\) Moreover, in Morgenthau’s understanding, territory is intimately tied to other sources of state power, foremost among them, a state’s population. Thus, “conquest of a considerable portion of a country without prospects

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^51 Ibid., 265.
^52 Simmons 2005; 2006; Starr 2006.
^53 Morgenthau 1978, 110.
for speedy recovery” could undermine state survival by breaking the will of the people to resist. 54 For states seeking to aggrandize power, effective management and protection of populations from military conquest proves crucial. In sum, underpinning territorially as a central component of the state system is the notion of “the (more or less deterministic) geopolitical setting that also affects the security of states.” 55

For neorealist scholars, the spatial demarcation of the state system and the division of the world into mutually exclusive territorial states are two defining features of international politics. These features have a taken-for-granted quality, a perspective Agnew has referred to as the field’s “territorial trap”. 56 Much of the literature in this vein “assumes implicitly that a state is a fixed territorial entity operating much the same over time and irrespective of its place within the global geopolitical order.” 57 The assumption of geographic fixity has resulted in three ancillary claims: that the foreign and the domestic spheres are distinct, that states are the containers of society, and that states are fixed units of sovereign space. While this implicit assumption is not limited to realist scholars, the spatial representation of world politics assumes a stronger role in the neorealist tradition. In that respect, Waltz’s theory of international relations rests on a

54 Ibid., 122.
55 Starr 2006, 4. Emphasis exists in original text.
56 Agnew 1994. Agnew’s territorial trap serves as a critique of mainstream International Relations literature ranging from neorealist to realist to liberal theories; he also notes that the implicit territoriality assumption is strongest in the realist tradition.
57 Ibid., 4.
strong conception of territoriality.\textsuperscript{58} Importantly, this conception is inextricably linked to the contrast between the domestic and international spheres in terms of the ordering principle. Laying out the foundations to the systemic theory of international politics, Waltz underscored this contrast by defining national politics as the “realm of authority, of administration, and of law” and international politics as the “realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation.”\textsuperscript{59}

The marked contrast between anarchy outside of state borders and hierarchy at the domestic-level leads Waltz to carry the logic of the territorial state to its extreme. In fact, as Caporaso aptly notes, Waltz’s three levels of analysis laid out in \textit{Man, The State, and War} – the individual, the national state, the international system – build implicitly on this distinction.\textsuperscript{60} Waltz urged scholars of international politics to ignore the second-image by presenting states as like units. This argument is elaborated further in \textit{The Theory of International Politics} in which Waltz claimed that “anarchy entails relations of coordination among system’s units, and that implies their sameness.”\textsuperscript{61}

The significance of territorial conquest in 20\textsuperscript{th} century geopolitical thought overlaps with Gilpin’s claim that “the conquest of territory in order to advance economic, security, and other interests” serves as a principal objective for states.\textsuperscript{62}

Territorial reallocation is central to Gilpin’s understanding of change in the international

\textsuperscript{58} Starr 2006.
\textsuperscript{59} Waltz 1979, 113.
\textsuperscript{60} Caporaso 2000; Waltz 1959.
\textsuperscript{61} Waltz 1979, 93.
\textsuperscript{62} Gilpin 1981; Simmons 2005.
system and the geographic division at any point in time is reflective of states’ relative wealth and power. Moreover, positing territoriality as a “functional equivalent of property rights”, Gilpin argued that the division of territory serves as the basic mechanism of distributing scarce resources among states in the international system.\textsuperscript{63} Furthermore, the growth in power of a rising state compels it to seek further territorial expansion; the growth in state size is only limited by decreasing returns to scale. Following this logic, while territorial control could lessen in importance, it should (inevitably) continue be the central ordering mechanism in international politics.

Paralleling Gilpin’s idea of conquest as conflict over a “bundle of rights”, Murphy traced the roots of territorial disputes to Western notions of property ownership. He argued that territory often is associated with militarized disputes not only because it provides a “tangible basis for the exercise of state power” but also because claims to past ownership serve as casus belli for states in initiating conflict. Central to justifications couched in terms of historical ownership is the notion that governments exist to secure and protect the rights of their people to property. Analogous to the Western legal tradition of property rights, the logic of ownership forms part of the nationalist foundation of the international state system.

\textsuperscript{63} Gilpin 1981, 37.
By extension, territory is the core of national identity and cohesion and is fundamental for state autonomy.64 Territory as source of nationhood constitutes the cornerstone of the citizenship as a geographically bound concept.65 The meaning of citizenship is incomprehensible without the territorial state which serves as a container for the state’s population. Taking this logic further, we can state that the security of citizenry requires the territorial integrity of the state.66 Perhaps more fundamentally, territoriality is inextricably tied to state survival because the state is “fundamentally a place and its very existence and autonomy are rooted in territory.”67 These ideas have led to an interdisciplinary consensus on the close link between territory and state security, which in turn explains the prevalence of territory as source of conflict.68

The scholarly consensus on the centrality of territory in warfare is not radically different from realists’ emphasis on the zero-sum nature of territory and international borders.69 The empirical veracity of the conflict propensity of territorial issues is summarized in Vasquez’s observation that “of all the issues over which wars could logically be fought, territorial issues seem to be the ones most often associated with wars. Few interstate wars are fought without any territorial issue being involved in one

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67Mann 1984; Murphy 1990, 531.
68 Boulding 1962; Starr 2002.
way or another.” Similarly, stressing the indivisibility of territorial claims, Goertz and Diehl have remarked that “because a territorial dispute is primarily zero-sum, it may appear surprising that a vast majority of all territorial changes over the last 165 years have been completed successfully.”

In conclusion, the arguments laid out by scholars of territorial conflict build on a realist understanding of what territoriality entails for security and/or power seeking states. As Starr notes, “geography”, “territory” and “borders” serve as interchangeable concepts with “borders serving as indicators and measures of distance, location, and spatiality.” With that in mind, it is possible to draw implications from the territorial conflict literature on how territoriality relates to states’ security seeking behavior. To the extent that security seeking necessitates preservation of sovereignty, it is integral at this point to trace the evolution of territoriality as the backbone of the Westphalian state system.

1.3 Territoriality and the Westphalian Order

The concept of state security is intimately tied to defending the integrity of territorial space in international relations scholarship. The key to state security lies in preservation of sovereignty of the state over its territory. As Agnew succinctly elucidates, “the total sovereignty of the state over its territorial space in a world

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70 Vasquez 1993, 151.  
71 Goertz and Diehl 1992, 51.  
72 Starr 2006, 6.
fragmented into territorial states gives the state its most powerful justification. Without this, the state would be just another organization.”\(^\text{73}\) The distinctiveness of the territorially sovereign state is the mirror image of realism’s view that sovereignty follows from the existence of the state.\(^\text{74}\)

The notion of the territorially bounded Leviathan can be traced back to the origins of Westphalian sovereignty.\(^\text{75}\) While the key features of the Westphalian order emerged before 1648, the treaties of Munster and Osnabruck spelled the hallmark of the modern state system.\(^\text{76}\) Offering an early realist perspective, Herz contended that the emergence of the Westphalian order was a necessary step in ensuring survival.\(^\text{77}\) The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) had been characterized by bloody sectarian conflict and replacing the system of overlapping jurisdictions served as a means to end violence in the European continent. By consolidating political authority within a distinct territory, Westphalian sovereignty excluded external actors from domestic authority structures.

The emphasis on exclusive and monopolistic control over territory in the Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty finds its parallel in an understanding of territoriality as a “strategic undertaking.”\(^\text{78}\) This understanding forges together control and space and arises from the need for territory to be bounded and exclusive. As

\(^\text{73}\) Agnew 1994, 60.
\(^\text{74}\) Gilpin 1981; Waltz 1979.
\(^\text{75}\) For a criticism of Waltz’s systemic theory as ahistorical see Ruggie 1998. Spruyt 1994. Spruyt also criticizes the assumption of anarchy as a static concept.
\(^\text{76}\) Spruyt 1994. Zacher 2001. Spruyt argues that the key features of the modern state evolved before the seventeenth century.
\(^\text{77}\) Herz 1957.
\(^\text{78}\) Agnew 1994.
Rudolph has pointed out, whereas the Peace of Westphalia demarcated lines of sovereignty among states, it did not guarantee state survival or systemic stability. This culminated in a system of states characterized by “an inherently open-ended, competitive, and risk-laden power struggle.” Consequently, the preservation of territorial integrity emerged as a strategic endeavor to guarantee survival.

### 1.3.1 Territoriality and State-Building

Under Westphalian sovereignty, borders mark political jurisdiction by confining state authority to a particular domain and distinguish between inside and outside. Sovereignty in this sense does not refer to authority over a social-political community but over a specific piece of territory. Concomitantly with the dissolution of these hierarchical authority structures came the emergence of territorially bound citizenship. The medieval world was characterized not by a clearly defined system of international boundaries but by overlapping and fluctuating authority over territorial space. In the medieval system, the legitimacy of interstate boundaries was defined in dynastic terms; in contrast to the modern system, the international order did not entail any absolute right to a particular piece of territory. The modern state system accomplished two tasks:

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79 Rudolph 2003, 4.
80 Herz 1968; Kratochwil 1986.
it delineated sharp political boundaries and it swept away the “inextricably superimposed and tangled loyalties” prevalent in the feudal era.  

As Hedley Bull recounts, the practice of establishing international boundaries emerged in the eighteenth century as a “basic rule of coexistence”. Nevertheless, territory as determinant of prosperity and security, owes its legacy to the pre-Westphalian era and the processes of state-building. Scholars of these processes have advanced war as playing a prominent role in the establishment of the territorial state. War required the creation of standing armies, which in turn necessitated a geographically demarcated population. In the words of Charles Tilly, “the competition for states for hegemony in disputed territories…stimulated war-making and temporarily erased the distinctions among war-making, state making, and extraction”, the key components for the creation of the territorially-bound state. Fixed territorial borders were also advantageous in ensuring the survivability of the centralized state in being

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82 See Anderson 1986; 1994; Torpey 2000; 2000. Torpey elaborates on the role that nationhood and citizenship played in the development of the modern state.

83 Bull 1977, 34.

84 Holsti 1991.

85 Bean 1973; Weber 1958. Scholars of state-building underscore the linkage between war and the evolution of the state by focusing on Weber’s notion of monopoly over legitimate means of coercion as central to statehood. From a slightly different perspective, economic historians point to the state as a guarantor of property rights as paramount to state-building. See for example Lane 1979; North and Thomas 1973. While not exclusively focusing on war-making, these scholars also outline the relationship between controlling violence and offering protection to citizenry as a means of establishing property rights. For North and Thomas, provision of property rights and monopoly over means of violence permit individuals to secure returns to innovation, allowing wealth accumulation. For Lane, governments sell protection and control violence, dynamics which favor centralization of state authority.


87 Tilly 1985, 184.
better able to rationalize and harness resources. In that respect, “the logic of external state-making” complemented the logic of local aggrandizement and both processes impinged on the territorially bound unit. Consequently, self-preservation came to be tied to power and territorially exclusive state authority emerged as the most effective means of consolidating and wielding power.

In sum, if we view the Westphalian order as an outcome of the desire for security and survival, the material interests rendered the Westphalian order enduring. Westphalian sovereignty remained dominant in the Western world through its ability to mobilize society’s resources more effectively than other forms of political organization. By replacing overlapping forms of political jurisdiction and laying the foundations of an international system of sovereign states, the Westphalian order acted as a landmark in the development of “territory (as one of the fundamental) characteristics of the state.”

1.3.2 Statehood, Citizenship, and Territorial Control

The political change from medieval to modern came with the creation of the delimited territorial state which established authority over its spatial domain. In contrast to the pre-Westphalian conception of ‘statehood’, the modern state is an organization with closed-off boundaries, which cultivate an outside-them, inside-us

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89 Tilly 1985, 184.
90 Hintze 1975.
91 Spruyt 1994.
logic by altering the relative incentives in favor of voice against exit.93 Just as the pre-Westphalian state did not exert authority over a demarcated territory, the linkage between citizenship and statehood was also loosely defined. Even the early Westphalian system was comprised of states that were often culturally diverse and politically disorganized. Populations that were not collectively identified by state borders were free to move across boundaries with little regard to them.94

It was with the nineteenth century, and the wave of nationalism, that the precept of territory tied to a national grouping gained intellectual clout. In that sense, the modern conception of citizenship was spearheaded by the definition of political identity in exclusively state-territorial terms. Agnew views this as a progressive movement from populations’ hierarchical subordination to empires to a participatory embrace of popular membership.95 As Hobsbawn articulates, the French Revolution played a prominent role in codifying sovereignty as an inalienable right of the “nation”.96 In essence, this shift altered the relationship between the state, territory, and the people, marking a transition from the public as subjects to the public as citizens.

Aside from the rise of nationalist sentiment, states’ security seeking rationale contributed to the emergence of territorial citizenship. With the declining role of mercenary armies in Europe, mass conscription became the primary tool of national

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94 Hirschman 1977.
95 Agnew 1994, 62.
96 Hobsbawm 1990.
defense. The inside/outside distinction gained additional significance in so far as military duty required social solidarity and a sense of national identity. As Paul Kennedy observes, the reciprocal relationship between the citizenry and the state was an integral part of the state-building process. Going back to an earlier point, the monopolization of military prowess by the state and the consequent “enhanced authority and resources of the state in turn gave to their armed forces a degree of permanence.” The French Revolution was instrumental in transforming modern warfare and establishing a link between military might, national fervor and loyalty and between military prowess and population size. The creation of citizen-armies underscored the centrality of war-making and its internal cognate, policing, in not only state-building but nation-building as well; in the process, European states were redefined to exist “of and for, a particular, bounded citizenry.”

The notion of the nation hinged on marshalling a sense of belonging to an “imagined community”, a concurrent exclusion of non-members, and finally, the institutionalization of mechanisms to document identities. Torpey has referred to this process of institutionalization and codification of “belonging” as the “monopolization of the legitimate means of movement” by states. More precisely, the establishment of both types of monopoly—over violence and over individuals’ movement—drove states

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98 Kennedy 1987, 75.
100 Anderson 1996; 1997.
101 Torpey 2000, 35.
to develop agencies that can guarantee an enduring relationship between state and society.\footnote{This idea is apparent in the works of several state theorists. See for instance Habermas 1987 on the ‘penetrative state’ and Foucault 1980 for the role of surveillance and punishment mechanisms in state power over society. Foucault 1980; Habermas 1987.} In securing the authority to retain their own citizens and deny non-members, modern states expropriated from individuals and private entities the legitimate means of movement across international boundaries.

In order to effectively extract and cultivate resources, demographic controls needed to be institutionalized, allowing states to lay claim to goods and people. Successful monopolization of the means of movement had to await the creation of elaborate bureaucracies and continued into the nineteenth century.\footnote{Torpey 2000.} The development of identity cards and codes, and eventually the passport, was essential in documenting membership and developing mechanisms to distinguish among them for administrative purposes. In this way, the passport came to be an instrument that ensured states’ monopolized control over international mobility by enabling states to identify foreigners and certify the destination of nationals.\footnote{The passport regime was not instituted until the 20th century: the institutionalization of the passport as an instrument of control over international mobility proceeded in two stages. First, after World War I, the passport emerged as a security measure to track combatants and verify deserters. Second, after World War II, the passport played an economic role in facilitating the reintegration of economies in Europe and acting as a macroeconomic tool to regulate the size of the labor market. Salter notes that both in the interwar and post- World War II periods, states experimented with the idea of doing away with passport controls but once introduced into the international system, the passport became indispensable for security and stability. See Salter 2005, 75-81.}

Ultimately, the authority to regulate movement came to rest on the international system as a whole, with states working in concert to enforce their interest in controlling...
movement across borders. At the same time, control over borders came to be pivotal in accentuating the statehood of centralized modern states. Salter surmises that the passport and in the backdrop, the mobility regime initially embodied two conflicting state interests: responding to the security challenges from international mobility and promoting the liberal ideal of freedom of movement. At the inception of the passport, threats to the state originated from marginalized populations. In effect, constraints upon international travel acted as state authorities’ effort to curtail the “return of the repressed”: postcolonial subjects, criminals, globetrotters, and other types of individuals marginal to mainstream society whose cross-border movement governments deemed necessary to control.

In the current era of globalization, international society still remains focused on concerns similar to those that fueled the formation of the passport regime and necessitated controls over human mobility. On the one hand, states seek to foster international integration through travel, trade, and communication and contact. This desire reflects liberal norms of an integrated world economy and international society. On the other hand, however, states are charged with the important role of protecting their populations and territories over which they exert sovereignty. In other words, the source of threats to security might have shifted over time from within-society elements to “clandestine transnational actors” but the basic motive behind restrictions over

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105 Salter 2003.
106 Salter 2005, 96.
mobility continues to reflect a drive towards security and protection. Moreover, the nature of globalization might look different today than the early phases of integration, but the impetus towards less stringent controls over movement and more open borders continues to offset security-driven motives.

The preceding paragraphs offer a preview of several related and compelling reasons to devote time to understanding how human mobility relates to state security. First, as Rudolph suggests, security is a multidimensional concept embodying the goals of maximizing economic gain, preserving social cohesion and identity, and military defense against external threats. Second, in so far as managing transborder flows relates to state security, we are witnessing a rise in importance of interdependence sovereignty. Third, whereas most of the globalist literature has focused on the erosion of Westphalian sovereignty, there is relatively little scholarly focus on the evolution of interdependence sovereignty. Furthermore, the literature on sovereignty and globalization has focused predominantly on economic flows across borders, while neglecting the security implications of human mobility. Only recently have scholars turned their attention to migration policy as state strategy. The subsequent section seeks to spell out how human mobility fits within debates on globalization and evolution of state sovereignty.

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107 See Andreas 2000.
108 While an extensive body of literature studies international migration, most of this work is from the perspective of migrants or inquires into how flows of migrants influence state policies. For a study of how migration diffuses state control, see Cornelius et al. 2004. Exceptions exist in recent literature, see in particular Andreas 2000; 2003; 2006; 2001, 1; Bigo 1997; Faist 2005; Joppke 1998; 2005; Rudolph 2003; 2006.
1.4 **Globalization Theory and Pursuit of Sovereignty**

Understanding migration and border control is essential for theorizing about how states wield sovereignty given a globalizing international context. First, flows of individuals are an integral component of globalization: at the global level, migrants have numbered 191 million since 2005.\(^9\) From 1975 to 2000, the number of individuals living outside of their country of nationality increased from 85 million to 175 million. In 2005, Europe hosted 34% of all migrants, North America 23 percent and Asia 38%. Migration also accounts for a significant part of population growth, especially in developed regions.\(^10\) While it is possible to speak of greater flows from the developing to the developed world—the concept of South-North migration—as Figure 1 below depicts, human mobility is a global phenomenon such that it is rare to find a country with zero or negligible migrant stock.\(^11\)

\(^9\) UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009.
\(^10\) Rudolph 2006. Rudolph notes that this trend is most distinctive in Europe with migration-induced population growth almost tripling from 29.6 to 87.5 percent.
\(^11\) Ibid. Nearly 6 out of 10 international migrants reside in high income countries but these high income countries also include 22 developing countries such as the Republic of Korea and Gulf countries.
Human mobility is not only an important component of globalization in terms of volume and scope but is also facilitated by the processes of globalization. For one, reduced transportation costs, technological development that facilitates information-exchange across borders, and the growth of social capital in terms of migrant networks, are factors spurring international migration flows.\textsuperscript{112} For another, push and pull factors that guide global migration are a function of the disparity in wealth between developed and developing countries: the North-South income gap that is itself an outcome of globalization pressures. A related phenomenon is the domestic economic restructuring of developing countries: industrialization prompts short-term labor surpluses.

\textsuperscript{112} Rudolph 2003.
contributing to outward migration from these countries. As globalization theorists point out, globalizing processes are fraught with contradictions and at the same time highlight emerging conflicts of interest between states.

Migration is exemplary of this phenomenon in not only generating winners and losers at the domestic level but also in creating a divergence of interest between sending and recipient countries. For sending states, emigration serves as a safety net in that it counteracts unemployment pressures and functions as an important source of foreign currency through remittances. For recipient countries, while migration may bolster economic growth by expanding the labor force and lowering prices, it also imposes significant domestic distributional costs. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, migration—much like trade—benefits skilled workers in host countries and unskilled workers in origin states. In sum, migration resembles other types of factor flows in terms of macroeconomic effects and domestic costs. In that sense, it unveils how globalization compels states to engage in cost-benefit analysis in devising policies to manage these flows.

Global migration pressures also relate to the debates on the obsolescence of borders and the erosion of state sovereignty. From one perspective, debates over how

113 Martin 1998.
114 Roderik 1997; Sassen 1998.
115 Koslowski 2001; Rudolph 2003.
116 Lowell LB and de la Garza 2000; Massey et al. 1998. This is not to say that outward migration is a completely benign process for sending countries: brain drain and outflow of skilled labor impose costs for origin countries.
migration should be controlled highlight external constraints on state authority. As discussed in the above paragraph, migration flows may on the one hand offer a valuable demographic asset for countries seeking to make use of foreign labor but also may present a domestic burden and exacerbate societal insecurities. Furthermore, economically motivated states might pursue liberal migration policies as economic interdependence spurs competition for skilled labor and are likely to fear the negative effects of stringent border control policies on economic security. From another perspective, migration control policies also reveal the constraining effect of international norms and human rights on state authority. Asylum and refugee admissions in particular bring to light humanitarian concerns: policy in this area is subject to international law prohibiting the expulsion of legitimate political migrants.

Beyond illustrating the limits imposed on state authority through external economic and ideational forces, human mobility also draws attention to the defraying of state’s territorial sovereignty at borders. On the one hand, fears over uncontrollable and/or undocumented flows across borders may lead to perceptions of diminishing control over boundaries, which might in turn make for a seductive narrative in justifying restrictive policies. On the other hand, continued migration even in the face of strict

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120 Salehyan 2008; Teitelbaum 1984. These principles will be further discussed in Chapter 4 but for now it suffices to point out that one such overriding principle is that of non-refoulement. Additionally, asylum policy is unique as a dimension of migration policy in being subject to an international regime. See Koslowski 2001. In the post-World War II environment, refugee protection and assistance was one of the first international humanitarian initiatives of the newly formed United Nations and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
policies calls into question the effectiveness of governmental authority.\textsuperscript{121} Scholars have pointed to cross-border human flows as an example of transnational systemic constraints that undermine state control.\textsuperscript{122} Both trends have bearing on the claim that states’ sovereignty is on the decline, as a result of increased permeability of borders to flows. Taking the loss of control argument to its logical end, we might contend that the security externalities generated by human mobility reveal “the dark side of globalization”.\textsuperscript{123} In particular, threats posed by clandestine transnational actors such as terrorists, militants, organized crime networks, traffickers and smugglers, demonstrate how the technologies of information, communication, and transportation that propel globalization may be used against states by these actors.\textsuperscript{124} In other words, human mobility is a component of and an outcome of globalization processes but also may imperil state sovereignty in ways that allow non-state threats to state security to exploit the dynamics of globalization.

\section*{1.5 Migration and Border Control and States’ Pursuit of Sovereignty}

The central premise of this dissertation is that how states control migration is directly related to the ways in which states exert their sovereignty. I contend that rather

\textsuperscript{121}Andreas 2000; 2000; Thielemann 2006.
\textsuperscript{122} Thielemann 2006. As Thielemann points out, the effectiveness of state authority is open to debate. The transnational strand of the literature argues that state sovereignty is on the decline. See Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1996; 1998; Soysal 1994. In contrast, state-centric scholars argue that innovation of new measures allows states to control flows despite increasing interdependence. For such arguments see Joppke 1998; 2006; Lahav 2004.
\textsuperscript{123} Kellner 2007, 246.
\textsuperscript{124} Adamson 2006; Collins et al. 1999; Koslowski 2001; Williams 2001.
than signifying diminishing sovereignty—voluntarily or involuntarily—border and migration controls provide a way to tease out states’ sovereignty bargains. More specifically, migration policy serves as a lens through which scholars may observe the kinds of tradeoffs states strike in pursuit of sovereignty. If interdependence sovereignty has bearing on other dimensions of state sovereignty as suggested, then it becomes significant to understand why states would cede interdependence sovereignty.

In building my theoretical framework, I take Rudolph’s approach to migration policy as the nexus of material/economic, geopolitical/military, and societal/domestic facets of state security as my starting point. As the next step, I contend that migration and border control policies situate themselves at the fault line between Krasner’s three dimensions of sovereignty: interdependence, domestic, and Westphalian. The overlap between these three dimensions is captured by Figure 1.2 below. In this dissertation, I turn my attention to how states balance the goals embodied in two specific dimensions of sovereignty: Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty. Put differently, I focus on the intersection between the Westphalian and Interdependence spheres as indicated by the overlapping area between the two spheres in Figure 1.2. Importantly, it is possible to suggest that the intersection of these spheres represents two distinct functions of borders: institutionalizing exchange between states and acting as military defense perimeters against both state and non-state actors. Whereas different strands of

126 Krasner 1999.
the literature have focused on one of these functions, I maintain that given a securitized
globalization context, these functions serve complementary goals for states.\footnote{Simmons 2005; 2006; Starr 2006.}

Globalists claim that increasing interdependence erodes sovereignty or compels
states to relinquish sovereignty. We might say that relaxed controls over borders
indicate a relaxation/ceding of interdependence sovereignty.\footnote{Adler 1998; Anderson 1997.} However, this is too
simplistic in two regards. First, whereas migration policy is directly related to
interdependence sovereignty in a definitional sense, dimensions of sovereignty are
interlinked in numerous ways. To illustrate, ceding interdependence sovereignty over
migration affects domestic sovereignty by calling into question the link between the
state and subject. At the same time, policies that allow for porous borders and ease of
access to territory might jeopardize territorial security, the defining element of
Westphalian sovereignty.
My theory further draws links between states' expression of these dimensions and the logics of statehood. Building on the distinction that Rosecrance makes between the logics of the trading state and the geopolitical/military state, I argue that states ascribing to geopolitical/military state logic prioritize Westphalian sovereignty over other dimensions. Whereas the maintenance of territorial integrity is predicated on protection of borders against intrusion by external actors for the military state, the trading state emphasizes interdependence sovereignty to facilitate cross-border exchange, and thereby seek economic security. In effect, the degree to which states permit flows of individuals across borders and the types of policy instruments through which they seek to control human mobility will shed light on the types of tradeoffs that states make between interdependence and Westphalian dimensions of sovereignty.

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129 Rosecrance 1986.
Because I am explicitly interested in further exploring the linkage between these two dimensions, I focus on *upstream* policies of migration control. To further delve into the linkage between these two facets of sovereignty, it is important to differentiate between three different types of policy with respect to migration and border control: upstream (deterrent), on-site, and downstream policies. Upstream policies, by emphasizing the deterrent function of borders, shift the locus of control to sending countries.\(^{130}\) These are policies designed to minimize potential human flows and to screen out undesirable migrants. These policy instruments control access to territory through the visa regime, regulation of outside carriers, or safe third country provisions. Determination procedures such as asylum and refugee recognition criteria also fall into this category as their central goal is to screen individuals *before* they cross a state’s borders. Alternatively, border closure can also develop through on-site policies that target protection of the border against illegal entry. Border patrol, deployment of state troops at the border, construction of physical barriers such as fences or walls, building surveillance technology to monitor flows, as well as visas imposed at the border fall under this category of border policy. Lastly, migration policy also encompasses migrant integration procedures; these are downstream policies in the sense that they control

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\(^{130}\) Andreas 2000; Thielemann 2006.
migrants by granting or limiting rights to foreigners after they have entered a state’s territory.\footnote{Thielemann 2006 notes that migrant integration procedures might also act as deterrents to potential migrants in rendering the state less appealing as a possible destination country.}

In this dissertation I focus on upstream and on-site policies of control. This choice makes theoretical sense in light of the dissertation’s focus on ways in which states assert their sovereignty as territorial entities. Furthermore, I leave aside downstream policies of control in that states’ decision-making regarding citizenship regime and naturalization might reflect cultural norms and practices that have evolved over time.\footnote{Brubaker 1992; Graziella 2010 (forthcoming); Money 1997; 1999.} A final basis for choosing to focus on deterrent and on-site measures lies in my theoretical framework’s emphasis on the tradeoff between interdependence and Westphalian aspects of state sovereignty. Whereas downstream policies might be better suited to capture societal anxieties and thereby provide insights into how migration pertains to domestic sovereignty, policies that control individuals’ access to states’ territories are more directly related to security threats.

Whilst the focus of this dissertation is on upstream policies of control, a few remarks are in order at this point about the connection between upstream/on-site and downstream measures. Downstream policies are closely associated with fears over loss of domestic sovereignty in emphasizing the ties between the state and citizenry. In that regard, maintenance of societal security also enters the equation when states devise
policies of control. From a broad perspective then, migration policies—while directly associated with interdependence sovereignty—have implications for the maintenance of domestic sovereignty. Societal insecurities, in turn, are a function of the ease with which migrant populations assimilate and/or integrate into recipient countries. It is plausible to suggest that in crafting strategies of control over transborder flows, states anticipate the domestic repercussions of migrant inflows. From a narrower perspective, then, the restrictiveness of upstream and on-site policies also embodies concerns over the domestic and societal dimensions of sovereignty.

The distinctions between types of border and migration control policies according to the locus of control are summarized in Table 1.1 below:

**Table 1.1: Types of Migration and Border Control Policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>locus of control</th>
<th>type of policy</th>
<th>policy instrument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upstream</td>
<td>Visas; asylum/refugee recognition</td>
<td>visa restrictions; visa quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>visa rejection rates; asylum recognition rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on-site</td>
<td>Border management and security</td>
<td>fencing, militarization, enactment of physical barriers to entry at border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policies</td>
<td>increase of border patrol/policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>downstream</td>
<td>citizenship and naturalization</td>
<td>citizenship regime, naturalization rates, migrant rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Importantly, these represent a menu of options available to countries when formulating border and migration policy. As Rudolph notes, border policy is much more nuanced than a dichotomous conceptualization of open/closed can capture.\textsuperscript{135} Understanding where restrictions are imposed is informative with respect to how states react to security and economic concerns. In other words, the interaction of economic and security concerns produces predictions about both degree and type of border restrictions.

The core assumption in International Relations scholarship is that as territorially demarcated unitary actors, states are the arbiters of sovereign authority. To what extent do states guard the right to determine who crosses their borders? If territoriality is integral to all three dimensions of state sovereignty, why would states ever relax control over territorial control at borders? More specifically, given threats to state security from cross-border human mobility, how does economic interdependence influence the ways in which states assert their territorial authority? This dissertation argues that human mobility is unique as a component of globalization in challenging different facets of state security. From a security perspective, states face the possibility of intrusion by non-state threats; the information asymmetries states face vis-à-vis such actors render border and migration control integral to security-seeking. On the economic side of the medallion, economically interdependent states are compelled to maintain borders open to cross-

\textsuperscript{135} Rudolph 2006.
border exchange. What is necessary then is a theory that brings together insights from the securitization and interdependence strands of the literature.

**1.6 Outline and Overview of Dissertation**

The following theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) formulates such a theory by seeking to answer the questions outlined above. In the next chapter, a number of themes will be addressed. First, background literature on how International Relations scholarship—particularly realism and neoliberal institutionalism—has approached state territoriality will be explored with the goal of also laying out how the literature has formulated the role that interstate boundaries play in world politics. The survey of the literature will serve as a lead-in to further unpacking the linkages between control over human mobility and states’ sovereignty bargains. Third, the chapter will also delve into how migration control has been viewed from the economic and security perspectives, with the goal of bridging the gap between these two strands of the literature. Fifth, Chapter 2 will establish the causal mechanisms behind the securitized interdependence framework. In brief, capital and trade interdependence are posited to mitigate the impact of security imperatives in pushing states’ policies of control in a more liberal direction. More specifically, fears over backlash by economic partners and domestic vested interests benefiting from liberalization prove crucial to understanding the impact of economic ties on migration control policies. Additionally, commercial ties downplay perceptions of security threat from migrants of economic partners.
The empirical chapters following the theoretical chapter explore the causal impact of economic interdependence, security concerns over transnational terrorism, and the interaction of economic and security concerns on different types of migration policies. Chapter 3 focuses on visa policies as a upstream instrument of controlling human mobility by screening undesirables and deterring them from crossing borders. This chapter develops several hypotheses relating to the impact of economic interdependence and fears over terrorism on visa policies. It focuses on two pathways through which transnational terrorism might induce tight visa controls: fears over directed threats against territory and/or nationals of the home country as well as concerns over the reputation the origin country’s citizens have garnered for involvement in global attacks. Chapter 3 conducts two sets of empirical analyses using a variety of methodological techniques. The first employs a directed-dyad dataset of visa controls to conduct large-N cross-sectional statistical analysis. The second section focuses on a smaller subset of countries by using a complementary and alternate measure of visas; it does so by using original data collected from the European Union (EU) Council documents on visa rejection rates for EU and/or Schengen member states from 2002-2007. Trade interdependence within the dyad is shown to exert both direct and indirect effects—through its impact on the effect of terrorism—on visa policies. A similar but more modest effect is demonstrated for capital ties, lending credence to the claim that human mobility is conditionally securitized.
Chapter 4 shifts attention to asylum and refugee admissions as another form of upstream/deterrent migration control. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate how economic and security motives and the interaction between them operate through a different logic when political migration is concerned. First, to the extent that economic concerns condition migration policies, they do so by inducing reluctance on the part of recipient states to grant formal asylum recognition to nationals of commercial partners. Second, humanitarian and normative concerns are found to overwhelm the effect of instrumental motives, a finding that flies in the face of claims by securitization scholarship that the migration-security linkage should result in a deviation away from a humanitarian approach to political migration.

Chapter 5 engages in an in depth exploration of the theoretical framework’s causal mechanisms by tracing the evolution of Turkey’s migration policies over time. The process tracing approach is intended to capture the interaction of economic and security dynamics in the post-1980 period, an era marked by growing economic liberalization on the one hand, and on the other, intensifying anxiety over terrorist activity. The case study chapter illustrates the constraining effect of economic motivations by underscoring two types of mechanisms: fears over economic retaliation from trade partners and domestic lobbying by groups benefiting from liberalization. This chapter employs qualitative data obtained from both secondary sources and primary archival material: specifically parliamentary debates pertaining to migration
policy, excerpts of formal speeches by political elites, and addresses to the Grand National Turkish Assembly. The chapter takes a close look at policy changes in three aspects of border and migration control: visa policies, asylum and refugee recognition, and on-site border control measures.

The final chapter (Chapter 6) provides concluding remarks. This chapter will detail the original contributions of the dissertation and summarize the substantive findings. The conclusion chapter also aims to offer policy implications emerging from the theoretical framework and empirical findings. A final section will lay out a research agenda that builds on the securitized interdependence framework and seeks to answer questions that were set aside in the dissertation. Of particular interest will be questions pertaining to security externalities generated by other types of clandestine transnational actors that seek to cross states’ borders: organized crime and trafficking networks. Chapter 6 recapitulates how this dissertation has advanced our knowledge on states’ sovereignty bargains in the face of non-state threats to state security emerging from cross-border human mobility. The dissertation establishes a framework for understanding how economic and security logics of decision making interact, and posits that in the context of growing interdependence, securitization of human mobility is circumscribed by states’ economic interests.
Chapter 2:: Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Literature: Towards a Theory of State Strategies of Controlling Human Mobility

The Introduction Chapter illustrated how Westphalian sovereignty came to conceptually rest on two pillars: territoriality and nationhood. From the perspective of classical realists, defense of the homeland constitutes a “universally recognized vital interest”.1 A corollary of this conception of security was that of concentric circles of defense surrounding the homeland. In this sense, borders are the external perimeters of defense against military threats from state actors. The modern understanding of citizenship, however, adds another layer to Hertz’s view of borders as the external shell of the state: borders serve to protect the state’s population against external intruders.

2.1.1 Controlling Borders, Maintaining Sovereignty

To the extent that Westphalian sovereignty is not simply authority within a given territory but authority granted to the state to defend a national group’s interests, then state boundaries embody the “protective shell of a sovereign state in order to fulfill its potential.”2

From this perspective, “impermeability” of boundaries and “impenetrability” of the modern state, as inextricably linked concepts confer legitimacy to statehood through the functions of security-provision for the citizenry. Herz stipulated that war, in the age

1 Lippmann 1943.
of territoriality, was constrained by the principle of impermeability of sovereignty and reflected a quest for power aggrandizement, rather than a process that risked annihilation of states. The possibility of nuclear annihilation marked the end of the age of territorial sovereignty and coupled with the increasing permeability of frontiers translated into an international order in which survival, rather than power, emerged as the objective of interstate conflict.

While Herz viewed the demise of the territorial ordering occurring as a result of declining defensibility of territory in the nuclear age, the globalization literature locates the erosion of territoriality in the increased permeability of states to trans-border flows.3 A world characterized by transnational security threats is not easy to divide into zones of peace and conflict. International borders are reconfigured as a protective barrier against new types of threats: clandestine transnational actors such as potential terrorists and criminal networks. The divide between zones of war -- where gains from war outweigh gains from economic exchange-- and the zones of peace—in which the trading state logic is prevalent— was based on a strict distinction between economic and security concerns. Due to the transnationalization of security threats the economy/security divide has become less apparent and the partition into polar zones less plausible.

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As Rudolph further explicates, however, security should not be understood simply in the military sense but also incorporates societal and economic components. Whereas territorial conquest was paramount to maintaining sovereignty, the growing significance of the material dimension of security means that security has come to be associated with the ability to manage flows.⁴ Documenting the rise of trading states in the contemporary era, Rosecrance argued that state strategy would increasingly come to be dominated by the logic of the market and driven by the accumulation of wealth, augmenting the importance of transborder flows. Elaborating further on this critical linkage, Rokkan has contended that “the military-administrative power of any state can best be gauged by an analysis of its success in controlling interaction across its boundaries, in checking the movement of men, commodities, and ideas.”⁵

Given the increasingly salient connection between international migration and global terror⁶, we would expect states to be cautious of ceding interdependence sovereignty when seeking ‘sovereignty bargains’. Put differently, Westphalian sovereignty – the preservation of territorial security— should become more salient, in the face of transnational threats. This highlights the puzzle of this research project: if ceding control over cross-border mobility risks undermining territorial security, why would states relinquish interdependence sovereignty? I now turn to how recent scholarship on globalization and security has approached this question.

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⁴ Rosecrance 1986.
⁵ Rokkan 1975, 589.
2.1.2 Globalization and Human Mobility

One possible answer to the above question is captured by the contention that globalization imposes a “golden straightjacket” on state behavior and creates an impetus towards converge in states’ responses to a changing security environment.\(^7\) The processes of international and regional integration, the increased mobility of transborder flows of goods, capital, ideas, and individuals, the increasing permeability of borders, a growing web of global communication, have spawned a cottage industry of literature on globalization. A common thread within this scholarship points to the obsolescence of the state, the erosion of territorial sovereignty, and declining role of interstate boundaries in world politics.\(^8\)

As an early voice in the globalist literature, Ohmae wrote that economic flows have transformed the world into a borderless one and resulted in a significant “retrenchment of state powers”.\(^9\) Exploring the proliferation of human rights norms, Zacher has argued that external normative constraints curtail state autonomy.\(^10\) Writing in a similar vein but taking this claim a bit further, Susan Strange argues that globalization undermines not just state power but international society as a whole.\(^11\) Furthermore, the fast pace of capital movements across borders coupled with the ease of

\(^{7}\) Friedman 1999.
\(^{8}\) Ohmae 1990; Rosenau 1997; Sassen 1996; 1998; Solingen 1998; Strange 1997.
\(^{9}\) Ohmae 1990.
\(^{10}\) Zacher 2001.
\(^{11}\) Sassen 1996.
information exchange empowers the hand of capital and creates a race to the bottom.\textsuperscript{12}

The race to the bottom concept suggests that globalization restricts governments’ ability to respond effectively to domestic demands. More generally, globalists have also argued that the processes of globalization are dismantling the fundamental basis of international society—state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{13}

A complementary claim in the globalist tradition is that the decline of state power is coupled with a concomitant withering away of borders.\textsuperscript{14} Underpinning this contention is the shift away from the state as a spatial unit of authoritative organization, whereby transnational, regional, and/or supranational forms of authority usurp the hierarchical organization of the territorial state.\textsuperscript{15} Additionally, this underscores a significant shift away from the “use of border to protect and insulate a population from external influences.”\textsuperscript{16} Noting these trends, scholars have called for a reconceptualization of borders and a rethinking of territoriality. The changing significance of the interstate boundary as hard shell might be understood in two ways. The first reemphasizes that claim that the nation-state is on the decline and that globalization is undermining the very fabric of Westphalian sovereignty. A second understanding states that globalization has in fact led to an increased salience of control

\textsuperscript{12} Rodrik 1998.
\textsuperscript{14} Biersteker 2002.
\textsuperscript{15} Murphy 1999.
\textsuperscript{16} Biersteker 2002, 166.
over territorial space due to increasing significance of non-state threats in the international arena.\textsuperscript{17}

Challenges to the globalists’ notion of a borderless and stateless world underscore state agency in modulating policy responses to the exigencies of global/systemic forces. Krasner’s work constitutes a notable counterargument to the globalist claim. Writing in 1979, Krasner argued that state interests had historically been instrumental in facilitating the development of international trade.\textsuperscript{18} Underscoring this linkage, Krasner noted “that the structure of international trade is determined by the interests and power of states acting to maximize national goals.”\textsuperscript{19} More precisely, he argued that periods of hegemonic ascendancy were marked by a relatively more open international economic system. Similarly, stressing the pivotal role of states in managing the global economy, Held dismissed the obsolescence of states in the face of globalization as academic hype and stated: “on a political map, the boundaries between countries are as clear as ever. On a competitive map, a map showing the real flows of financial and industrial activity, those boundaries have largely disappeared.”\textsuperscript{20} Other scholars of globalization have pointed to the continuing significance of borders by demonstrating that borders continue to exert a decisive effect on trade patterns.

Looking at the impact of the Canadian-American border, McCallum has shown that

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid; Helliwell 1998; Thomson and Krasner 1989.
\textsuperscript{18} Krasner 1979.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 317.
\textsuperscript{20} Held 1999, 23.
despite Ohmae’s depiction of the world as effectively borderless, even among culturally and linguistically similar countries within-country trade significantly exceeds cross-border trade.\(^{21}\) Furthermore, Rodrik’s work has illustrated that border effects are not specific to the movement of goods but that capital also remains subject to “home bias”.\(^{22}\)

Taking a further position, more recent scholarship has argued that if anything, transborder flows have emphasized the importance of territoriality and state power in managing these flows.\(^{23}\) Drawing on this literature, we might speculate that the impact of globalization varies according to the type of flow across borders. Scholars of migration have elaborated on the divergent paths that states have taken vis-à-vis each dimension of globalization. Even states that have relaxed trade and capital controls continue to remain vigilant when it comes to flows of individuals; in fact, migration policy has gone in the opposite direction in becoming more restrictive.\(^{24}\) More recently, Hanson and coauthors have drawn attention to differences between distributional consequences of labor mobility and those accruing from trade and capital flows.\(^{25}\) In conclusion, in one way or the other, the globalization of migration flows has resulted in a reemphasis of territoriality as a fundamental component of sovereignty and as an ordering principle in international relations.\(^{26}\) If migration policy— more than other

\(^{21}\) McCallum 1995.
\(^{22}\) Rodrik 1998.
\(^{25}\) Hanson 2005.
\(^{26}\) Albert et al. 2001; Rudolph 2005.
dimensions of globalization—is the area in which states jealously guard territorial sovereignty, the puzzle is why states would relax control over human mobility. A useful pedantic endeavor in approaching this question lies in unbundling the concept of sovereignty as it pertains to world politics.

2.1.3 Sovereignty: Dimensions and Bargains

At the core of debates about the impact of globalization is the question of whether the changes in policy are a result of state choices or of autonomous structural forces. This question is tantamount to asking whether state sovereignty is on the decline. This inquiry is fruitful to understanding how statehood is changing in a globalized context, especially because territoriality, citizenry, and legitimate authority—aspects essential to the core of statehood—are closely linked. It is not surprising that scholars who view sovereignty as an unchanging, universal, unified attribute of the state are quick to conclude that sovereignty is being eroded by external systemic forces. Realism’s take on sovereignty has traditionally ascribed to the singular and unified view of sovereignty. Thus, Morgenthau remarked “if sovereignty means supreme authority, then it stands to reason that no two or more entities—persons, groups of persons, or agencies—can be sovereign within the same time and space.”

Taking Morgenthau’s comprehension of sovereignty to heart, we can surmise that growing economic and

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27 Caporaso 2000.
28 For a criticism of lack of dynamism in realist understanding see Ruggie 1998.
29 Morgenthau 1978, 259.
political interdependence, the rise of regional and supranational institutions, the increasing salience of non-state actors in world politics, the increased pace and volume of flows across borders work in concert to circumscribe territorial statehood.

In contrast, Krasner has provided a compelling argument against the decline of state sovereignty by reminding scholars that sovereignty has never been absolute.\textsuperscript{30} In fact, states, acting in accordance with logics of consequences at times, have deviated from a perfect application of Westphalian sovereignty.\textsuperscript{31} This vantage point brings state agency back in by viewing these deviations from the norm of territorial sovereignty as an outcome of state choices, that are in turn, determined by state interest. It also offers a dynamic and multifaceted concept of sovereignty; the concept is redefined as a norm subject to change over time and adaptable to the context at hand. The latter is in stark contrast with a realist approach to sovereignty as immutable.\textsuperscript{32} What results is organized hypocrisy as an enduring norm that states have interest in maintaining but that affords flexibility in allowing states to compromise sovereignty voluntarily through conventions and contracts or involuntarily through coercion and imposition.

Of critical importance for theorizing on how international human mobility alters state sovereignty are the dimensions of sovereignty that Krasner’s work brings to light.

\textsuperscript{30} Krasner 1999.
\textsuperscript{31} For a definition of the logics of consequences see March and Olsen 1984. Krasner 1999 builds on the distinction between the logics of consequences, which he contends dominates the international system, and the logics of appropriateness, which predominate the domestic realm.
\textsuperscript{32} Barkin and Cronin 1994. The authors point out, however, that the static view of sovereignty is not exclusive to realist scholarship; in fact, scholars with a normative orientation also approach the concept in a static manner.
International legal sovereignty hinges on mutual recognition among states in the system and carries and affords legitimacy to state authority. Domestic sovereignty captures governmental authority over society. Interdependence sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to control cross border flows.

It is possible to summarize Krasner’s framework by noting that each dimension of sovereignty embodies a distinct aspect of statehood. By way of illustration, while domestic sovereignty brings to the fore the link between sovereign authority and a defined population, Westphalian sovereignty underlines the territorial aspect of state authority. In contrast, by emphasizing control over flows, interdependence sovereignty hinges on state authority expressed at boundaries. The distinction between interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty offers an invaluable stepping stone in comprehending the ramifications of cross-border flows for territorial states. In that respect, territoriality is strongly expressed through Westphalian sovereignty, which mirrors the realist emphasis on territorial security. Alternatively, interdependence sovereignty echoes liberal and neoliberal emphasis on optimizing transborder flows to maximize economic gain.

The concept of sovereignty may be further unpacked according to whether it rests on state authority or state control (or both). In Krasner’s overview, while Westphalian and legal international dimensions are predicated on authority, interdependence sovereignty involves control, and lastly, domestic sovereignty
incorporates elements of both. In parallel, Thomson writes that whereas state control
has “waxed and waned enormously over time, regions, and issue-areas” political
authority has proven more enduring over time and context.33 Disaggregating
sovereignty enables us to examine how the concept has shifted over time and context; it
further transcends the static formulation of sovereignty and recasts it as an
institution/norm subject to manipulation.34 However, such a theoretical exercise leads to
a further important question: what prompts deviations from territorial sovereignty?
Restated, under what conditions do states emphasize one form of sovereignty over the
other?

Before venturing into an examination of these conditions, it is essential to define
what changes in sovereignty entail. A useful way of expressing such changes is through
the notion of sovereignty bargains.35 These bargains enable tradeoffs between different
elements of sovereignty, which might also be seen as exchanges between different
aspects of state “grand strategy”.36 Keohane has promulgated the idea that states might
willingly relinquish exclusive political authority in order to enter into multilateral
contracts.37 Defining grand strategy as a composite of material, cultural, and military
interests, Rudolph has more recently argued that liberal states might cede
interdependence sovereignty by relaxing control over transborder flows, in order to

33 Thomson 1995, 214.
34Krasner 1999; Rudolph 2005.
35 Litfin 1997; Rudolph 2005.
ensure economic security. In contrast, cultural insecurities might prompt states to reassert interdependence sovereignty in an effort to assuage fears over loss of national identity and social cohesion.

In moving towards a theory of strategies of control over human mobility, two tasks are at hand. First, we need to examine how interdependence redefines territorial sovereignty, and second, how it moderates the security concerns arising from global flows. In attempting these interrelated tasks, it is necessary to explore how scholarship has approached these issues.

2.2 The Literature: Security Seeking in an Interdependent Environment

2.2.1 The Logic of the Trading State

The countervailing logics of the trading state and the military-territorial state offer an important lens through which we can (re)examine sovereignty bargains. In documenting the rise of the trading state, Rosecrance argued that state interests have been recast such that whereas earlier eras were marked by pursuit of military goals and territorial expansion, material requirements of security have compounded the importance of managing flows across borders. Long term changes in the international system have thus favored accumulation of wealth through trade instead of maximization of state power through territorial conquest.

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38 Rudolph 2005.
The logic of the trading state stands in polar opposition to that of the military-territorial state in which the defense of Westphalian sovereignty is based on military capacity. For the military-territorial state, the use of force to defend territory underlies the defense of sovereignty. In that sense, the rise of the trading state has corresponded with a shift in the mechanisms through which sovereignty is maintained, from a strategy emphasizing geopolitical security to one predicated on the pursuit of material wealth. Although Rosecrance’s framework is useful in documenting the shift from territorial to material based security, the notion of complex interdependence goes further in elucidating how economic ties between states have changed conceptions of state sovereignty.

2.2.2 Complex Interdependence and Transnational Security Threats

Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence elucidates how sovereignty as an institution has evolved in response to a growing web of transnational flows.40 By defining interdependence and detailing the mechanisms through which linkages between redefine international relations, Keohane and Nye’s framework puts into context current debates on interdependence and state behavior. Importantly, interdependence is not equivalent to interconnectedness but is defined instead as reciprocal effects among countries. In this sense, interdependence does not simply point to the existence of economic, ideational, or diplomatic ties between states but involves

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40 Keohane and Nye 1977.
costly interconnectedness and restriction of state autonomy. In *Power and Interdependence*, the authors contend that interstate ties shape states’ incentives by engendering sensitivity and vulnerability to changes in other states’ policies. It is possible to view sensitivity of states as capturing short-term effects and vulnerability encompassing the costs of long-term policy adjustments.\(^{41}\)

A number of features of complex interdependence prove fundamental to theorizing about how states control mobility. First, rather than exclusively focusing on commercial ties, Keohane and Nye assert that complex interdependence involves multiple channels of contact including formal and informal ties between diplomats, governmental and non-governmental elites, and transnational organizations. I build on the notion of multiple channels of interconnectedness to argue that economic ties alter threat perceptions by fostering ties between domestic elements, which can then influence policy at the state-level. Second, complex interdependence rests on the absence of a hierarchy among multiple issues that characterize interstate relations; this notion in turn makes possible issue-linkages in world politics. I also draw on this logic to posit that states may employ strategies of migration control as a foreign policy tool and make use of such issue linkages. Lastly, Keohane and Nye purport to show that within regions or issues characterized by complex interdependence, military force is highly unlikely to be used by interconnected states. While my research project does not

\(^{41}\) Ibid, 12-13. Sensitivity refers to liability to costly external effects before a state alters its own policies whereas vulnerability encapsulates costs that accrue from external changes even after a state adapts its behavior.
deal with the use of military force per se, I take a broader perspective in applying this logic to states’ security seeking behavior in general and argue that costly ties condition how states respond to threats associated with transborder mobility.

2.2.3 State Security in the Context of Interdependence

An extensive body of literature in international relations builds on the concepts laid out by Keohane and Nye’s framework to draw linkages between interdependence and interstate conflict. Even though this literature is more specific in its focus on conflict behavior, the causal mechanisms it generates rest on the twin notions of dependence-induced vulnerability and sensitivity.42 First, a central assumption is that beyond the volume of economic flows between states, the magnitude of costs imposed by these flows determines constraints on state behavior. Thus for instance, if states trading heavily can easily locate alternate sources for these goods being exchanged, vulnerability is limited.43 Second, the effects of bilateral trade are contingent on the salience of the economic relationship to states’ economies as well as to their degree of commercial openness.44

43 Barbieri 1996. Barbieri for instance employs measures of level and salience of trade to capture the difficulty of substitutability of economic exchange.
44Hegre 2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Oneal and Russett 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001. This notion undergirds quantitative analyses of interdependence and conflict that employ measures of the size of the state’s economy to capture its sensitivity and vulnerability to changes in its trade partners’ policies.
It is possible to identify and distinguish between several causal pathways to peace this literature puts forward. One argument builds on Rosecrance’s trading state logic to posit economic exchange and military conquest act as substitutes. Increases in trade and investment reduce incentives for territorial expansion, imperialism, and foreign conquest. The flip side of this mechanism is that barriers to international economic activity may generate conflicts of interest, increasing conflict potential in the international system. A second argument found in the sociological variant of liberalism contends that economic ties are conducive to international cooperation because economic exchange increases communication and contact between states. To recapitulate, whereas economic liberalism highlights the opportunity costs generated by commercial ties, sociological liberalism stresses face-to-face contact and diplomatic ties fostered through increased economic exchange. The common view tying these arguments together is the notion that the liberal economic order contributes to international stability. A third theme emphasized in the literature centers on the domestic consequences of economic interdependence and contends that the efficiency gains generated by interstate commerce render private actors and consumers dependent on foreign markets. These domestic actors, in turn, are expected to impel state elites

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45 For a comprehensive summary Mansfield and Pollins 2003.  
46 Viner 1951.  
48 Stein 1993.  
towards peaceful means of conflict resolution because political antagonism risks disrupting economic exchange.50

Finally, extensions of the trade leads to peace argument build on the ideas laid out by Immanuel Kant in the *Perpetual Peace* and focus on the jointly pacifying effects of democracy and economic interdependence.51 This argument also hinges on domestic mechanisms; because democratic regimes are characterized by a large selectorate and large-winning coalitions, democratic leaders are more susceptible to powerful commercial interests and consequently more wary of policies that might endanger trade ties.52

While the extensive body of literature I have briefly explored has laid out mechanism through which trade ties reduce interstate conflict, the literature has not explicitly addressed how interdependence shapes states’ security-seeking behavior. 53 This amounts to stepping back from conflict as the outcome and asking how economic interdependence moderates the salience of security. Before we can do so however, we need to look at how migration control lies at the juncture of economic and security motives.

50 Hirschman 1977.
51 Gelpi and Grieco 2008.
52 Bueno de Mesquita 1999.
53 For the purposes of this literature review, I am laying aside studies that challenge the contention that trade ties produce peace. See for example Barbieri 1996.
2.3 Controlling Transborder Human Mobility: The Literature

2.3.1 Migration from an Economic Perspective

Economic migration is traditionally explained by neoclassical economic rational actor models, where individuals migrate because of expected increases in wages.\textsuperscript{54} Formulating policy responses to economic migration entails first, taking into account how push/pull factors affect state control over economic migrants and second, considering the consequences of this form of migration. First, the sources of economic migration are located in a broader process of globalization and economic integration. Global economic integration decreases the cost of migration by creating new linkages between sending and receiving countries.\textsuperscript{55} Relatedly and second, this form of migration is self-perpetuating to the extent that labor exporting countries gain social capital through the operation of migrant networks.\textsuperscript{56} Finally, whereas the wage differential might act as a push factor in encouraging labor to flow to economically developed countries, pull factors complement this process. Specifically, demand in specific sectors that have grown dependent on immigrant labor in developed countries spur labor migration.\textsuperscript{57}

The economic impact of labor mobility for recipient states may be broadly categorized into two types of effects: macroeconomic overall effects and domestic

\textsuperscript{54} Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005.
\textsuperscript{55} Sassen 1996.
\textsuperscript{56} Massey et al. 1998.
\textsuperscript{57} Cornelius 1998.
distributive effects. In terms of the former, immigration expands the labor force and lowers prices, bolstering economic growth.\textsuperscript{58} From a demographic perspective then, migration may be an important source of national power in providing human capital. In fact, after World War II, in an effort to rebuild their economies, Western European countries sought to capitalize on the gains rendered available through migration. The role of Mediterranean migration in postwar economic boom and the impact of migration on U.S. economic growth in the 1990s illustrate the positive economic effect of human mobility on recipient states.

In the contemporary era, because of the pivotal role of human capital in the areas of knowledge economy and information technology, industrialized states seek to attract skilled foreign labor, as exemplified through the efforts of the U.S. to recruit white-collar workers by granting the H1B workers visa.\textsuperscript{59} Sending countries benefit in two ways; first, labor mobility operates domestically as a safety valve by relieving employment pressures.\textsuperscript{60} Second, research shows that remittances contribute significantly to economic growth and development in sending countries, especially by expanding origin countries’ foreign exchange reserves.\textsuperscript{61} From that perspective, economic migration is a benign process for both recipient and sending countries.

\textsuperscript{58} Cornelius et al. 2004.
\textsuperscript{59} Rudolph 2003.
\textsuperscript{60} Massey et al. 1998; O’Rourke K 1999.
\textsuperscript{61} Cornelius et al. 2004; Lowell LB and de la Garza 2000.
From another perspective, however, increased labor mobility entails distribitional costs for receiving states. Distributive effects are usually analyzed through the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. According to the relative factor endowment framework, migration, similar to trade benefits the owners of abundant factors and hurts owners of scare factors. The application of the Heckscher-Ohlin model to migration has led immigration policy to be described as a form of client politics in which the degree of closure is determined by the relative lobbying power of groups benefiting from migration. Broadly speaking, the domestic politics approach posits situational socioeconomic factors as the primary explanatory factors of economic migration policy.

Other complementary international economy perspectives stress international factors—in combination with domestic factors—as determinants of migration policy. First, some analysts argue that international migration should be understood as a function of a broader process of global economic and political integration. In this sense, the globalization of capital and the empowerment of multinational corporations (MNCs) create pressures towards more liberal immigration policies in host states. A second and related international-level argument is that international humanitarian norms and

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66 Sassen 1996.
liberal ideas may supersede exclusive national identity based migration policies.\textsuperscript{67} Although this argument is not strictly based on economic constraints, it posits that international humanitarian norms and ideas produce liberal domestic institutions integral to facilitating economic exchange. Third, states may utilize migration policy as a tool of foreign policy by linking cooperation on border control and/or removal of visa restrictions to other aspects of bilateral relations, in particular, international trade and investment, as well as to security relations.\textsuperscript{68}

An understanding of the international dynamics of migration and border control suggests that a purely economic understanding of migration is too simplistic; in addition to posing economic challenges for recipient states, migration has security implications. Within scholarship on voluntary migration, however, the linkage to security has been largely evaluated through the economic and cultural lens.\textsuperscript{69} These arguments may be grouped into three related arguments. In principle, high levels of economic migration may overwhelm the integrative capacity of recipient states and pose a challenge to national identity by breeding intergroup conflict.\textsuperscript{70} Migration may also engender economic problems at the local level by constituting a net fiscal burden for areas of settlement.\textsuperscript{71} Finally, as outlined above, the distributive costs of migration render

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Jacobson 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Meyers 2004.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Cornelius et al. 2004; Ireland 2004.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Meyers 2000; Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995; Teitelbaum 1984.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Cornelius et al. 2004.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
economically vulnerable owners of scarce factors, namely unskilled workers in the North and skilled workers in the South.

The shift in focus to security threats as emerging from individuals rather than states suggests that there is an additional dimension of security that migration scholarship has so far neglected. The next section provides an overview of recent literature on the security implications of human mobility.

### 2.3.2 Migration from a Security Perspective

The linkage of human flows across borders to security may be said to occur through two channels: first by pointing to actual threats to state security generated by human mobility and second through the process of securitization. Whereas the former deals with objective threats, the second mechanism rests on threat creation and/or alteration of perceptions of threats associated with migration. I begin by elucidating how migration can create security externalities and then talk about how these processes can heighten perceptions of threat.

There are a number of ways in which migration may pose security challenges for states. First, it is important to note that traditionally, states’ geopolitical and strategic concerns have affected migration policy. This linkage can most clearly be witnessed in terms of asylum policy; Rosenblum and coauthors show how the United States’ refugee

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72 Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004; Rudolph 2006.
and asylum policies have been viewed through the foreign policy lens.\textsuperscript{73} During the Cold War, the United States was more likely to accept refugees from countries where it had military operations or strategic interests; thus Vietnam, Laos, Somalia were among the countries that came to be major sources of refugee flows. More precisely, granting asylum to individuals from countries with poor human rights records or authoritarian regimes served as a mechanism of discrediting these regimes.\textsuperscript{74} In contrast, the United States had to a large extent been reluctant to grant asylum to individuals from countries with which the United States enjoyed positive diplomatic and economic relations, fearing that a liberal asylum policy towards these countries might jeopardize these ties.

Generalizing this argument, we might say that security interests may influence how states control human flows by allowing states to employ migration policy as a foreign policy tool. Through restrictions on visas, low visa approval rates, immigration quotas and high asylum recognition rates, recipient states might attempt to shame origin countries with which they have weak/negative diplomatic and economic ties. In contrast, liberal visa policies and visa approval rates and tight asylum recognition policies serve to preserve good relations and commercial ties.

Furthermore, whereas economic migration is voluntary in nature and occurs as a result of individual pursuit of economic gain, political migration is involuntary in that it

\textsuperscript{73} Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.
\textsuperscript{74} In some cases, such as in US law, asylum policy refers to how states deal with political migrants after they enter a state’s territory whereas refugee policy is proactive in that states choose to grant access to territory to individuals while they are still overseas. See Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.
involves individuals fleeing a hostile domestic regime, civil strife, or interstate conflict. A second and related point then is that political migration transpires as a result of international or domestic conflict; consequently, host countries with weak regimes might face instability as a result of mass refugee flows. By way of illustration, Botswana has fenced its border with Zimbabwe partly in response to fears over mass influx of refugees fleeing Robert Mugabe’s regime. In sum, human mobility presents security concerns because of the possibility of conflict contagion through mass migration.

Third, scholars of migration have also pointed to diasporas as a potential security challenge for recipient states. Transnational diasporas may emerge as a destabilizing force in host countries for a number of reasons. A clash of civilizations perspective suggests that diasporas resort to violent means in order to escape what they perceive as a cul-de-sac in Western values or styles of life. Vociferous diaspora communities may pose a threat for national identity and social cohesion and constitute a societal threat. Fears over societal insecurity might in turn hurt bilateral relations, as exemplified by tensions over political Islam between Western European recipient states such as France and Germany and origin states such as Turkey and Algeria. On a related note, scholars have suggested that the emergence of transnational organizational structures such as diasporas challenge traditional conceptions of citizenship, create “dual loyalties” and

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76 Huntington 1993; Lewis 2003.
identities. Pursuing this argument further, other scholars have noted that the transnationalization of citizenship may impair a state’s ability to formulate foreign policy based on a coherent national interest.

Fourth, the mobility of people across national borders poses a security challenge by overwhelming state’s capacity to control its borders, thus undermining the territorial basis of state sovereignty. Large population flows and multicultural societies challenge the very foundation of state as a bounded entity with clearly demarcated population and territory. These fears are closely linked to globalists’ claims of a borderless world and echo claims that increasing cross border mobility is increasingly eroding statehood. Such sensationalist fears however, cannot be understood without inquiring into how human mobility has come to be securitized.

In the words of Barry Buzan securitization involves the perception by (state) actors of an issue-area as an existential threat. In fact, literature on public attitudes towards immigration underlines the significance of threat perception—defined along cultural and economic lines—in guiding individual opinion. Perceptions of threat, in turn, are based on compounded fears. For example, although large influxes of migrants do in fact undermine state capacity, states still retain control over who enters their

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78 On this note, Huntington argues that skillful ethnic lobbying imperils the United States’ policy making in some issue areas.
80 Buzan et al. 1998.
territories. As Freeman aptly notes, “anyone who thinks differently should try landing at a Sydney airport without an entry visa or go to France and apply for a job without a work permit.”

Fears over loss of control are in part an (unintended) consequence of the securitization of policies such as new surveillance methods, fencing, and increase in border patrol. Political elites employ the “loss of control theme” to garner support from public audiences for newer—and often visible—policies of control. In this sense, the escalation of border controls in the form of expansion of the budget, increase in number of border control personnel, innovation in technology, and the increasing role of the military in border surveillance serve a symbolic function of reasserting state control over territories.

Elaborating on the emergence of the migration-security nexus, Faist argues that the “nexus cannot be explained exclusively by actual threats to the state and human security” but is also an outcome of psychological mechanisms of threat construction. The end of the Cold War era, by removing a significant external threat, opened political space for focusing on diffuse and hard-to-grasp security threats originating from non-state actors and involving new challenges such as organized crime, smuggling, trafficking in substances and humans, and transnational terrorism. Finally,

82 Thielemann 2006.
83 Freeman 1998.
84 Andreas 2000.
85 Faist 2005, 7.
securitization is in part a result of the changing security environment as these new challenges—previously considered issues of domestic sphere—forge new links between security and human mobility.86

Finally, while the literature surveyed above has largely focused on the negative consequences of migration for state security, as Adamson notes, migration can also be security-enhancing. During times of war, migration may bolster state security since an effectively mobilized population provides states with an important instrument of power.87 Thus, states might draw on immigrant populations to augment their military strength. For instance, during both World War I and World War II, the United States sought to recruit contract labor from Mexico. To provide another example, more recently, the United States attempted to mobilize recent immigrants—Iraqi expatriates and descendants—in seeking to create Free Iraq Forces.88 Additionally, migration may facilitate the transfer of technical skill and intelligence expertise such as foreign language knowledge and analysis. Aside from providing demographic and military strength, migration can further states’ security interests by acting as a diplomatic channel. States might employ their diasporas to push for favorable policy changes in host countries; the role played by Eastern European diasporas in encouraging NATO enlargement is a case in point.89

87 Adamson 2004.
88 Garamone 2003, cited in ibid, 189.
89 Shain and Barth 2003.
So far, the linkage of migration to security has been framed in terms of traditional threats arising from human mobility. The emerging migration-security nexus is associated with the post-9/11 world; however, as a number of scholars emphasize, whereas the claim that human mobility affects states’ security interests is nothing new, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have highlighted new types of threats emanating from migration. In that respect, the linkage of migration to security works through a distinctly different channel, entailing a change in the security paradigm. This change is marked by a shift away from exclusive focus on conventional inter-state warfare to concerns over non-state threats.90 That said, concerns over non-state actors crossing interstate borders predate the September 11 attacks. Even before 9/11, increased mobility had made it possible for clandestine transborder actors (CTAs) to challenge state authority by circumventing the state apparatus.91 In the United States for instance, illegal border crossings have provided the impetus for stepped up border controls.92 Similarly, the European Union’s integration agenda linked issues of organized crime and illegal entry to its common frontier and visa policy; these issues played an important role when crafting the Schengen Accords.93 The ability of such actors to gain unauthorized access to states’ territories has not only undermined states’ control over

90 Salehyan 2008.
93 Andreas 2000; Guiraudon 2000.
borders but also presented a problem of human security, societal stability, and state security.

These actors encompass a variety of phenomena: transnational militancy, terrorism, smuggling, trafficking, and illegal migration. Thus, even though security studies in the wake of 9/11 have to a large extent focused on the migration-terrorism link, it is possible to say that the migration-security involves other types of threats and actors. These ‘new’ security threats share a number of attributes. First, as will be explored below, the ease of travel and the development of new technologies have empowered these actors. Second, these actors can operate under the radar of state surveillance and can cross national boundaries in a surreptitious and unauthorized manner. Third, as non-state threats, such actors are hard-to-identify and target. The clandestine and diffuse nature of non-state threats can render states “asymmetrically vulnerable” in the sense that CTAs are able to exploit the informational disadvantages of states.94 A fourth and related concept points to the distinction between conventional threats and new security threats: in dealing with the latter, states face an asymmetry of strategies in the sense that violent acts such as suicide terrorism and the targeting of civilians are not among the repertoire of tools available to states.95 Finally, they may exploit transnational forms of organization and operate across several host countries.

94 Keohane 2002.
95 Ibid. Keohane posits that this leads to an asymmetry of beliefs because states fail to anticipate the power of non-state actors.
Taking a broader perspective, it is possible to view the proliferation of security threats emanating from non-state actors as inextricably linked to globalization. Globalization has transformed the international security environment by fostering changes in resources, infrastructures and capacities available to non-state actors to partake in global mobilization. At the same time that globalization has enabled economic actors to operate transnationally, it has also provided incentives for non-state actors to move beyond state borders and mobilize transnationally/globally. Importantly, different facets of globalization—the mobility of goods, capital, individuals—operate in tandem and mutually reinforcing ways to facilitate the transnational structuring of political entrepreneurship. Much as newer technologies and infrastructure increase the pace and volume of licit capital flows, globalization also entails illicit capital flows, in the form of money laundering and smuggling of goods by organized crime networks operating across borders. We may envision these processes as representing the dark side of globalization; as Keohane notes, whereas globalism and globalization have been narrowly defined as economic integration, increasing interdependence also entails emerging networks through which violence flows across borders.

To recapitulate, although the negative externalities of increased mobility across borders are tied to the processes of globalization, the post-9/11 world is characterized by increasing attention to the security implications of migration. The increased emphasis

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96 Adamson 2006..
97 Keohane 2002.
on security is accompanied by a paradigm shift in which scholarship draws attention to threats stemming from individuals rather than other states. In other words, the attacks of September 11 starkly illustrate that the traditional assumptions about state security are flawed and limited by pointing to the obsolescence of existing assumptions about geographical space. More specifically, the globalization of violence blurs the distinction between the domestic and international sphere. A transnational (terrorist) network such as Al-Qaeda represents simultaneously an internal threat—through sleeper cells—and external threat as the members of its organization can infiltrate states’ territory by crossing its borders.

Whereas the traditional IR security paradigm maintains that states’ security seeking involves balancing against external threats arising from other states and mobilization internally of resources necessary to project military power, transnational non-state threats necessitate a rethinking of state security. Security seeking in response to non-state actors draws attention to individuals with ties to terrorist organizations—rather than their home governments—as sources of threat. In essence, the new security paradigm requires seeing private actors as capable of devastating damage once thought to be reserved for states. Additionally, weak states are defined as new sources of threat to the extent that domestic conditions resembling anarchy provide the breeding

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98 Herz 1968. In fact, as Herz points out, nuclear weapons, well before the globalization of violence, compelled states to rethink the linkage between territoriality and security.
99 Adamson 2006; Andreas 2000.
100 Waltz 1979.
101 Kaldor 1999; Salehyan 2008.
ground for non-state actors who resort to strategies of violence to give voice to their demands.\textsuperscript{102}

To conclude, given new types of security threats stemming from the transnational organization of violence and the increasing role of non-state actors in the globalization of violence, controlling access to territory has become integral to security seeking. September 11 constituted a turning point in recasting the migration-security linkage: as the immigration system came under increased scrutiny in the United States, pundits and politicians in Europe began to focus further on the linkage between immigration, asylum-seeking on the one hand, and terrorism, militancy, and societal instability, on the other.\textsuperscript{103} The globalization of violence in general has revealed the inadequacy of traditional assumptions about geographic space in international relations and led to a reconceptualization of the linkage between territory and security. An important consequence of the shift in thinking about state security is that the strict separation between security studies and international relations is rendered anachronistic as areas deemed non-security issues—such as international migration, environmental politics, and domestic health and disease control—are now designated as issues of “high politics”.\textsuperscript{104} The crucial question is how states respond to these new security challenges in the context economic interdependence. Migration and border control policy proves

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\textsuperscript{102} Krasner 1995. Krasner notes that the character of transnational action will reflect the institutional environment in which actors find themselves.
\textsuperscript{103} Levy 2005.
\textsuperscript{104} Rosecrance 1986; Rudolph 2003; 2006.
\end{flushright}
an ideal testing ground for understanding the intersection of economic and security motivations. The theoretical section describes how the incentives and constraints engendered by economic ties shape states’ responses to new security challenges.

2.4 Controlling Human Mobility: The Securitized Interdependence Framework

My theoretical framework brings together and builds upon insights from several strands of International Relations scholarship. Drawing upon theories of economic interdependence, I seek to spell out how economic ties between states influence security-seeking behavior. More specifically, I elucidate mechanisms through which trade ties shape the sovereignty bargains states pursue; of specific interest here is the tradeoff between interdependence sovereignty—control over transborder flows— and Westphalian sovereignty, defined as exclusive authority over territory. In this framework, international migration serves as the crucial site at which we can observe the interaction between security and economic concerns as states pursue sovereignty bargains. Rephrasing it in terms of Rosescrance’s theory of the state in an interdependent world, control over human mobility offers an excellent issue area for studying the interaction of two competing logics: that of the trading state and the territorial/military state.¹⁰⁵

A related theoretical construct that I bring to bear on my project is Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence. Promulgating another perspective on how

¹⁰⁵ Rosecrance 1986.
interdependence moderates state behavior, the concept of complex interdependence proves fruitful in understanding how different dimensions of globalization interact.¹⁰⁶ Both the rise of the trading state and the emergence of complex interdependence are key developments strongly linked to globalization that have altered the structural environment in which state interests are formulated. First, the rise of the trading state has compounded the importance of facilitating economic flows. Second, whereas the logic of the trading state has entailed increasing border permeability vis-à-vis flows of trade and capital, liberal states have continued to pursue stringent policies with respect to human mobility.¹⁰⁷ Rudolph contends that the core difference between financial flows and human mobility is that the latter lies at the nexus of different element of the “contemporary security dilemma”, defined by the economic, societal, and security/military dimensions.¹⁰⁸ The security dimension of globalization—a phenomenon that Keohane refers to as the globalization of violence—underscores the significance of interdependence sovereignty as a prerequisite to defending other dimensions of statehood.¹⁰⁹

Implicit in the idea of sovereignty bargains is the assumption that tradeoffs between economic and security interests emerge as state choices, and not as an

¹⁰⁶ Keohane and Nye 1977.
¹⁰⁸ Rudolph 2003; 2006. Whereas Rudolph’s framework is about the relationship between the societal security and economic aspects of state strategy, I focus on the interaction of economic and security dimensions. Moreover, within the military/security dimension, I specifically look at new security issues, such as international terrorism, transborder organized crime, and trafficking.
¹⁰⁹ Keohane 2002.
automatic outcome of structural constraints. Instead of being passive objects amidst the forces of globalization, states have been instrumental in shaping the current system of globalization.\textsuperscript{110} However, it is hard to deny that the rise of the trading state has required a redefinition of security interests, both by accentuating the connection between different facets of security (internal and external, material and military) and by ushering in new types of threats that partially supplant the old. With these observations in mind, I conceptualize state strategy of controlling human mobility as rational choices to a changing international context. Here, I make use of Starr and Most’s opportunity-willingness framework. The framework enables scholars to take into account entity (actor) – environment (context) relationships in explaining international phenomena.\textsuperscript{111}

Whereas the opportunity dimension refers to contextual opportunities and constraints, willingness encapsulates actors’ perception, preferences, and decision-making processes.

On the opportunity side, then, interdependence might reshape opportunity structures states find themselves embedded in; in that sense, they unwittingly give up territorial control. This first mechanism runs parallel to globalist arguments suggesting that Westphalian sovereignty is being eroded by systemic forces.\textsuperscript{112} Turning to the willingness dimension, economic interdependence might change states’ willingness to relinquish territorial sovereignty; in the latter case, sovereignty is redefined to fit

\textsuperscript{110} Krasner 1995; 1999.
\textsuperscript{111} Starr and Most 1978.
\textsuperscript{112} Ohmae 1990; Sassen 1996; 1998; Strange 1996; 1997.
changing state preferences. In accordance with the opportunity-willingness logic, globalization affects both the range of possibilities available to states, delimits or broadens the set of choices available, and alters the willingness to choose certain policy options over others.

I now turn to detailing distinct—but complementary—mechanisms through which interdependence modulates both dimensions. As Most and Starr point out, in most cases the impact transpires on both dimensions: a development that affects structural constraints also changes incentive structures. With that in mind, I see each causal process I posit as affecting both the opportunity and willingness dimensions, as well as the relationship between the two.

Sovereignty Bargains and Territorial Control

My framework is premised on the idea that how states control their borders and manage cross-border flows of individuals can shed light on states’ sovereignty bargains. This follows from the role that interstate borders play as spatial manifestations of political control and territorial lines of marking the outreach of state authority. Simply put, we might say that as states relinquish sovereignty, states’ borders become more permeable to flows. However, equating permissive policies of border control with diminishing sovereignty might be overly simplistic; as Rudolph’s recent work has

114 This does not preclude the fact that one causal process might weigh more heavily on the opportunity as opposed to the willingness dimension and vice versa.
highlighted, a more nuanced account requires an understanding of how the different dimensions of sovereignty interact.

Globalization scholarship has informed us that as interdependence sovereignty gains importance, management of flows across borders becomes integral to maintaining security. As I highlighted in the previous pages, control over transborder flows is a manifestation of states’ interdependence sovereignty; however, decisions regarding interdependence sovereignty have critical bearing on the other facets of sovereignty. In general, we may imagine interdependence sovereignty to vary along a continuum where tighter policies and less permeable borders correspond to greater control over flows, maximizing interdependence sovereignty and less restrictive policies fall on the other end of the spectrum, relaxing interdependence sovereignty. On the one hand, states opting for tighter control might at the same time be maximizing interdependence sovereignty and bolstering Westphalian sovereignty by protecting their territory against intruders. Tighter policies that ensure territorial exclusion—such as stricter citizenship criteria—also bolster domestic sovereignty by reinforcing the link between the state and the community and by strengthening national identity.

On the other hand however, as Rudolph notes, maintaining domestic sovereignty requires ensuring territorial security which requires strengthening Westphalian sovereignty. Given (complex) interdependence, the provision of material security becomes wedded to the ease of factor mobility across borders. Hence,
maintenance of Westphalian security itself becomes tied to relinquishing
interdependence sovereignty in an effort to garner material resources. Ensuring
territorial security entails relaxation of interdependence sovereignty for another reason:
the demand for foreign labor in times of war has required permissive migration
policies.¹¹⁵ A related concept is that external military threats encourage the rally-around-
the flag effect, removing homogeneity as the basis for the preservation of domestic
sovereignty, making for relaxed migration policies.¹¹⁶ Consequently, interdependence
entails tradeoffs in how states maintain their sovereignty.

States’ policies of border and migration control illustrate these sovereignty
bargains not only because borders mark the end of states’ territorial authority and act as
lines of defense against external state and non-state actors but also because transborder
human mobility brings to light the clash between economic interests and security
concerns. As the previous section highlights, globalization theory entreats us to note
that given commercial ties between states, human capital matters more significantly
than territory for national power. As also discussed previously, the economic logics of
permeable borders notwithstanding, another strand of the scholarship has noted the
security externalities of cross-border human mobility.

From another perspective then, it stands to reason that states’ sovereignty
bargains reflect the ways in which states pursue security. Policies that seek to facilitate

¹¹⁵ Rosenblum 2003.
cross-border mobility emphasize the economic dimension of security; in contrast, policies designed to promote territorial exclusion and maintain hard borders correspond to an emphasis on geopolitical/military interests.\textsuperscript{117} Taking a step further, I theorize that economic interdependence influences security tradeoffs either directly by altering how states control their borders or indirectly by modulating the effect of security concerns on policies of border management. Following up on this logic, the interaction between the degree of interdependence and the extent of security threats provides a concise framework to theorize about how states maintain sovereignty. These ideas are summarized in the subsequent table.

Broadly speaking, interdependence may be said to affect ways in which states defend their sovereignty by 1) reinforcing and reshaping the linkages between different facets of sovereignty 2) increasing the salience of control over trans-border flows in the pursuit of state security 3) weakening the impact of security concerns arising from cross-border mobility in policy-making 4) emphasizing the role of interdependence sovereignty as a prerequisite to bolstering Westphalian and domestic sovereignty.

\textsuperscript{117} Rudolph 2003; 2006. Rudolph refers to these dimensions of security as different facets of grand strategy.
Table 2.1: Security Seeking and Sovereignty Bargains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Security Threat</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Interdependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material/economic</td>
<td>geopolitical/military</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geopolitical/military dimensions predominant</td>
<td>dimension predominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tradeoffs exist between dimensions of sovereignty</td>
<td>Westphalian sovereignty predominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material/economic dimension predominant</td>
<td>variable/dimensions equally salient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interdependence sovereignty predominant</td>
<td>maintained without sovereignty tradeoffs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cross-Border Economic Flows and Human Mobility

The theoretical framework is couched in terms of the impact of economic interdependence on ways in which states assert their sovereignty at borders. This effect is however undergirded by the relationship between migration and economic flows across borders. Put differently, the linkages between distinct facets of globalization inform us on the direct effect of mobility of trade and finance on policies of migration control. Neoclassical logic stipulates that factor market liberalization leads to the movement of factors from countries of abundance to those of scarcity." In a similar vein, an economic account of migration focusing on micro-dynamics posits that

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migrants relocate to maximize returns to their labor.\textsuperscript{119} To illustrate given a labor abundant but capital scarce economy, capital moves in the opposite direction of labor as labor scarcity attracts higher returns for investment. Absent capital liberalization, factor price equalization occurs through the flow of goods across borders.\textsuperscript{120} In a nutshell, labor flows stem from international differentials in earnings and employment rates and aggregate migration flows reflect the sum of individual decisions to migrate.

The factor endowment model has allowed scholars to formulate the association between migration and other factor flows as one of complementariness or substitutability. Building on Mundell’s two-factor, two-country model and assuming immobile factors between countries, scholars have posited that factor-price equalization can occur through the movement of goods, or alternatively capital.\textsuperscript{121} Given trade interdependence, economic incentives for migration are removed as the flow of goods alters factor endowments of commercial partners, and the same logic may be applied to labor mobility. Similarly, an expansive body of literature has targeted the relationship between capital and labor flows. Analyzed through the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, foreign direct investment (FDI) to capital scarce countries should be concentrated in

\textsuperscript{119} Massey et al. 1993. Theorizing on the individual dynamics of migration is not limited to neoclassical models of expected income maximization. Among alternative models advanced are the new economics of migration focusing on the family as risk-minimizer, network theory, world systems theory, the dual labor market model, to name a few. A comprehensive discussion of these theories is beyond the scope of this section. See also Leblang 2009.

\textsuperscript{120} Mundell 1957.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. A growing body of literature challenges the substitutability of trade and migration by critiquing Mundell’s assumptions—such as that of factor immobility. For an excellent survey of the literature see Rudolph 2008.
lower-skill intensive sectors. Thus, by improving the wages of unskilled workers, FDI improves the labor market in host countries and curbs emigration from these states, underlining the potential substitutability between capital and labor mobility.122

In both cases, the substitutability thesis is politically appealing in rendering possible gains from economic liberalization sans the challenges inherent in population transfers.123 That being said, the substitutability thesis occludes the complexity of globalization insofar as the nature of the association between labor and other factors of production is contingent on model assumptions. As a brief illustration, capital and labor mobility may enjoy a complementary relationship to the extent that FDI encourages emigration from the host country by removing constraints on liquidity, enhancing human-capital formation, and by reducing transaction and information costs necessary for relocating.124 Analogously, if trading states benefit from economies of scale, specialization in sectors with increasing returns to scale will increase wages and induce more migration, suggesting a positive linkage between inflows of goods and labor.125 These examples demonstrate the contingent nature of the relationship between transborder flows. On a related but further note, it might be difficult to reduce a particular type of flow to a specific factor of production. Human capital is a case in point in the sense that it simultaneously embodies flows of capital and (skilled) labor:

122 D’Agosto et al. 2006.
123 Rudolph 2008.
125 Collins et al. 1999.
not only does the stock of highly skilled workers increase returns to investment, but the mobility of human capital also involves transfer of technology and information.\textsuperscript{126}

Human mobility is further complicated by the fact that it is difficult to reduce migration to economic flows or to treat it simply as a form of factor mobility. In fact, labor and other factor flows are subject to a form of asymmetry through which liberalization of migration has lagged behind liberalization of trade and capital.\textsuperscript{127} This asymmetry is not surprising given that population transfers can trigger societal insecurities—xenophobia, fears over loss of national identity and social cohesion—and exacerbate perceptions of threat to national security. As such, we might expect states to take advantage of the substitutability of migration and other economic flows and avoid human flows as much as possible. As I will argue, however, states are guided by differing constellations of economic and security incentives. States might utilize migration control policies to harness economic flows to their advantage and manipulate the inherent linkages between these flows in different ways; these variations in turn are a function of the degree to which states are motivated by economic as opposed to security logics.

Capital and trade ties depend on personal contact with economic partners; in that sense, stringent policies of control may undermine both types of interdependence.\textsuperscript{128}

However, I believe it is necessary to examine the relationship between migration control

\textsuperscript{126} Checci et al. 2006; Ivlevs 2006.
\textsuperscript{127} Cornelius et al. 2004.
\textsuperscript{128} Neumayer 2009.
policies and capital and trade interdependence separately. The rationale behind this is threefold. First, as outlined in preceding paragraphs, while the linkages between migration, capital, and trade may be analyzed through the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, the nature of these linkages is subject to different sets of constraints. Second, capital and trade interdependence may both impose limits on policy-making but operate through different channels. A crucial difference lies in time-horizons: because capital flight can occur much more rapidly than the deterioration of trade ties, states face a relatively longer time horizon in the context of trade interdependence.\textsuperscript{129} In contrast, capital liberalization may influence policy through the immediate opportunities capital flows present for arbitrage. More recently, Gartzke has argued that while trade may shape governments’ polices through opportunity costs, capital’s influence functions through the necessity of risk management. I now outline the micro-mechanisms through which interdependence shapes the ways in which states control human flows.

\textbf{Trade (Inter)Dependence and Opportunity Costs}

Economic ties can affect state behavior in two ways, or on two levels. First, on one level, decision-makers may be concerned with the effects of security policies on their states’ economic links and the health of their economies. Second and on another level, the effect of economic integration may manifest itself through vested interests created by globalization. Taken together, these two levels may also be rephrased as a broader and

\textsuperscript{129} Garrett 1995.
state-level impact and a narrower domestic-channel impact.\textsuperscript{130} I refer to the broader
effect as the 	extit{retaliation effect} and to the domestic-mechanism as the 	extit{vested interests effect},
and briefly discuss each in turn. Finally, trade ties may factor into policy choices not
only through the anticipated costs of economic partners’ actions or domestic
constituents’ responses but also through expected logistical costs of tight borders, a
mechanism I refer to as 	extit{border effects}.

	extit{Retaliation Effect}: Economic ties, especially if they render a state vulnerable or
sensitive to changes in other states’ policies may create fears of reprisal by trade
partners. These fears hinge on the opportunity costs of expected trade losses and factor
in as a fundamental peace-inducing mechanism in theories of interdependence and
conflict.\textsuperscript{131} State leaders may be sensitive to expected adjustment costs resulting from
the interruption of economic flows. In the absence of strong economic linkages, such
cornsers over security policies’ impact on prospective adjustment costs will be lacking.

Tight migration and border policies constitute potentially hostile signals and
have a deleterious effect on the trade relationship. For instance Flynn argues that
stringent border controls “place governments on a collision course with easy trade,
which is central to sustained expansion and integration of the global economy.”\textsuperscript{132}
Similarly, other scholars argue that restrictive migration policies run counter to the idea

\textsuperscript{130} For an analysis of how these two channels influence state balancing behavior see Papayoanou 1996. I
believe that the same two channels of influence may be applied broadly to state behavior.
\textsuperscript{131} Mansfield and Pollins 2003; Papayoanou 1996.
\textsuperscript{132} Flynn 2003, 58.
of a liberal society and preclude integration of foreign labor into the host country’s socioeconomic structure. On a parallel note, Neumayer contends that countries that trade a lot with each other would be more likely to refrain from imposing visa restrictions in order to facilitate free access to each other’s territories. In terms of asylum policy, a different logic prevails where liberal asylum policies, by casting origin states’ regimes in a negative light impose reputational costs and thereby carry the risk that sending states will retaliate by cutting off trade ties. On a broader level, it might be argued that facilitating the cross-border mobility of individuals across borders is conducive to political and social rapprochement between states, which in turn increases cooperative proclivities and dampens probability of conflict. Taking this argument a step further, we might conjecture that liberal migration and border policies serve as an ideational tool of “soft power” by projecting a message of inclusiveness. Furthermore, it stands to reason that perceptions of inclusiveness enhance a feeling of community, which in turn may strengthen economic linkages.

*Vested interests:* This mechanism undergirds the domestic component of theories of interdependence and state behavior and focuses on the creation of groups within states who benefit from trade liberalization.

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133 Bigo 1997; Sassen 1996; 1998.
134 Neumayer 2006.
135 Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004. Because of the distinct repercussions of policy across types of migration policies, I hesitate to cast the distinction in terms of liberal/restrictive policies. Rather, I opt for favorable/unfavorable policies, for the moment. Policy specific hypotheses, however, will go back to the restrictive/open terminology.
136 For a similar normative argument as to how the European Union could benefit from relaxing its strict external visa controls and thereby enhance its soft power see Kiriçi 2005.
To the extent that these societal elements influence policy-making at the state-level, the public’s desire to maintain trade and financial ties might push policy to be less restrictive.\textsuperscript{137} In that sense, economic ties both create and reflect the interests of vested interests—groups that stand to gain from maintaining trade, financial links, and investments with other countries. Second and furthermore, we might argue that given the complementariness of trade and migration\textsuperscript{138}, sectors of the domestic populace benefiting from liberal trade policies also stand to gain from labor mobility.\textsuperscript{139} Third, recipient states’ citizens who are cognizant of a possible retaliation by trade partners in response to antagonistic migration and border policies might lobby for favorable policies towards trade partners.

In sum, vested interests that are affected by states’ security policies will seek to influence these policies. Because antagonistic policies against trade partners risk disrupting gains from economic openness, such domestic groups will pressure state leaders against hostile policies.

\textit{Border Effects and Economic Exchange}

Tight border policies might hamper economic exchange not only through the retaliatory action of other states but through logistical difficulties that result from stricter measures. Security scholars suggest that the costs of border control measures go beyond

\textsuperscript{137} Admittedly, the vested interests channel may be contingent on regime type-or at least domestic institutional context that enables ‘median voter’ interests to influence state-level decision-making. See Gelpi and Grieco 2008; Papayoanou 1996.
\textsuperscript{138} Collins et al. 1999.
\textsuperscript{139} Rudolph 2005; 2008.
the costs of personnel and infrastructure: increased waiting and document processing times result in trade losses. As a result, reduction in trade and changes in the structure of trade comprise the bulk of security costs.140

Previous studies on trade have demonstrated that borders affect trade in ways that are not reducible to the effects of distance; while there is considerable debate in the literature on the nature of border effects, research shows that borders constitute longstanding barriers to interstate trade.141 More specifically, Simmons’s recent work has shown that unsettled borders have a significant negative impact on bilateral trade between contiguous states.142 In contrast, settled territorial boundaries function as effective international institutions, allowing states to realize mutual economic and political gain. Borders that are mutually accepted by contiguous states as legitimate reduce transaction costs, dispel uncertainty, and by doing so, facilitate economic exchange and cooperation. Although the impact of tighter measures might wane in the long-term as states restructure trade through cooperation with neighbors, we might imagine policy-induced costs as compounding already extant border effects. Consequently, it stands to reason that expected logistical costs impel economically interdependent states to weigh economic logics more heavily in designing measures of control.

140 Flynn 2003; Golovetsky 2006.
141 Mc Callum 1995; Rodrik 1998.
142 Simmons 2005.
Beyond imposing logistical costs, tight border/migration control policies could also undermine the effectiveness of borders as international institutions. Furthermore, boundary security measures may also complicate the resolution of border disputes by decreasing flexibility.\textsuperscript{143} Although these measures are enacted to target non-state security threats, because defensive measures against military threats from other states are hard to distinguish from security measures against non-state actors, these measures might create fears over other states’ intentions, even in the absence of boundary disputes or territorial claims.\textsuperscript{144} While such measures do not always lead to interstate conflict, it is very probable for border security measures to negatively affect the relationship between two states, by impeding economic development of borderlands and discouraging transborder cooperation. The possibility of a weakened trade relationship, in turn, might deter states that trade heavily with neighbors from enacting tight security measures, even given security threats.

\textbf{Capital Interdependence Induced Vulnerability}

Increasing interdependence in goods and services is only one channel through which globalization constrains state behavior. Globalization has increased capital mobility and monetary cooperation, constituting another manifestation of the global spread of capitalism. Parallel to the pacifying effect of trade, financial ties can foster

\textsuperscript{143}Donaldson 2005.
\textsuperscript{144} An example is the construction of a fence by Botswana in its border with Zimbabwe; although Botswana claims that the fence is intended to prevent livestock from straying into Botswana and thus prevent the spread of livestock associated diseases, Zimbabwe has accused Botswana of using the fence to prevent the movement of people. See Ibid., 185.
peace between states. In fact, Montesquieu argued that mobile wealth constrains sovereigns domestically by noting that “rulers have been compelled to govern with greater wisdom than they themselves would have thought.”

Although the vast body of literature on interdependence and conflict has primarily focused on trade, capital markets dwarf the exchange of goods and services. Moreover, foreign investment is vulnerable to policy changes in host states in ways that trade is not.

More recent work by Gartzke and coauthors has shown that capital mobility may exert an impact on state behavior distinct from the effect of trade ties. Instead of imposing opportunity costs, the pacifying effects of capital interdependence occur through the role of financial ties as a mechanism of signaling resolve. Rather than deterring conflict, interdependence can convey credible signals and differentiate between resolved and unresolved challengers, obviating the need for interstate conflict.

Capital, rather than trade interdependence, serves as an effective signal because whereas trade might or might not be affected by political shocks, capital markets are particularly susceptible to intervention. In that respect, capital flows link aspects of domestic economies that otherwise have limited global exposure.

It is possible to differentiate between two types of capital (inter)dependence: investment/equity dependence and debt dependence. Longer term capital flows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) are particularly responsive to host country’s

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147 Chase-Dunn 1975.
domestic context. More specifically, because equity flows depend on firm-level decision-making, political risk will curtail long term investment. Long term capital flows are especially subject to the threat of loss of ownership through expropriation and nationalization. Capital investments may also be affected by host country’s macroeconomic decisions that directly target multinationals (renegotiation of tax or tariff rates, depreciations) or other policies that do not necessarily target foreign firms (such as the imposition of capital controls or devaluations). In contrast, interdependence that is contingent on the purchasing of foreign debt is primarily vulnerable to sovereign default by host countries.

Capital dependence is constraining on state behavior because host countries fear exclusion from capital markets and/or tarnishing their reputation in a way that jeopardizes future capital flows. In laying out how capital mobility might shape states’ sovereignty bargains— as evinced through the control of borders—we might first propose an argument about capital induced constraints that parallels the opportunity costs model for trade interdependence.

*Capital Induced Constraints*

First, hard borders and exclusionary migration policies might act as a deterrent for potential investors. Restrictive policies that limit access to territory constitute a

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148 Jensen 2003. Jensen argues that while direct expropriation and nationalization have become less frequent, indirect expropriation—referred to as “creeping expropriation”—may occur whereby states take control of a foreign firm’s revenue.

149 Tomz 2007; Tomz and Wright (forthcoming).

150 Tomz 2007.
logistical cost for business travel. It is plausible to imagine that such policies hinder capital flows and that capital is likely to flow more freely to countries with more permeable borders. Especially in the context of long-term capital flows, the additional costs imposed by entry and work visas will deter long term foreign direct investment. Consequently, to the extent that states rely on capital markets for economic prosperity, capital interdependence promotes less stringent policies of border control.

A complementary domestic mechanism could also come into play whereby policy reflects the interests of owners of capital. Domestic coalitions with internationalist preferences may forge cross-national bonds at the national level, facilitating economic interdependence and prosperity.\(^{151}\) The formation of such coalitions, in turn, might transform state preferences in a way that assigns greater weight to economic logics of policy formation. Following this logic then, we may also posit an indirect effect of capital market liberalization on state behavior: expected losses accruing from capital flight create a focus shift away from policy driven by the logics of security-seeking towards policy driven by wealth-seeking. States’ sovereignty bargains would be expected to reflect this tradeoff, leading to softer borders and more permissive policies of control over human mobility.

\textit{Uncertainty and Capital Flight}

\(^{151}\) Solingen 1998.
Second, to specify how flows of capital exert an impact distinct from flows of goods and services, it is useful to begin by noting that the central premise of Gartzke’s argument is that capital markets are more sensitive to an uncertain domestic environment. The military use of force functions as such a political shock as can changes within the polity that endanger capital flows. Political risk becomes an important issue especially in the context of large flows of equity; long term investments –purchasing of drilling rights, real estate, owning factories-- places the investing country at the mercy of the host country, as governments of investing countries are likely to stand in for the rights of their national private investors.

On the one hand, as touched on above, capital flows may be less likely to flow to host countries with hard borders and restrictive migration policies. On the other hand, it is plausible to say that (sudden) changes in border control policies might drive out capital and endanger economic linkages. Abrupt changes in policy that act as a signal of a negative domestic environment threaten short-term capital whereas states with hard borders face difficulties in attracting longer-term capital. For example, the closure of a previously open border through on-site measures such as physical barriers, deployment of armed forces and militarization of border ports or the imposition of exit visas could constitute hostile signals against neighboring economic partners and consequently serve
to disrupt economic exchange. The imposition of tight border controls may especially act as a negative signal—either as a non-cooperative signal of states’ intentions or as a signal of impending domestic instability—when borders are unsettled or host states face domestic turmoil. To the extent that changes in border control policies place at risk capital flows with economic partners, states are expected to be more wary of imposing tight control measures.

Reputational Spillovers

Another take on how abrupt changes in ways that states control their borders may have an impact on the availability of capital is through the idea of reputational spillovers. From this perspective, a government’s behavior in one area of world affairs affects all of its international relations. More precisely, under uncertainty, states’ actions in one issue area act as signals about its broader intentions. To return to an idea touched on above, the closing off of borders might indicate changes in the domestic context. For example, given an economic downturn in host country conditions, the imposition of border controls creates fears over sovereign theft (in the form of expropriation or defaulting). Alternatively, given unsettled borders or past territorial claims, such

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152 Golovetsky 2006. Golovetsky describes how the imposition of tighter border controls by the US on its border with Canada in the wake of the 9/11 attacks led to temporary disruptions of economic exchange.
153 Cole and Kehoe 1996.
policies could constitute signals of hostile intentions against neighboring economic partners.\textsuperscript{154}

In sum, scholars of globalization often point to capital interdependence as one manifestation of diminishing sovereignty.\textsuperscript{155} Integrated financial markets render capital controls less useful even as pressures from powerful interest groups and multinational corporations influence decision making.\textsuperscript{156} My framework suggests that capital mobility has implications for sovereignty in ways previously not addressed by the literature. Whereas scholarship has heretofore focused on the repercussions of monetary policy for state sovereignty, I contend that financial integration influences the ways in which states assert territorial sovereignty.

**Threat Perception and Sociological Liberalism**

I ground my second argument in two disparate strands of scholarship: on a version of the liberal argument that economic integration enhances communication and trust, and second on Walt’s notion of threat perception as the basis of state behavior.

The first component to uncovering how economic ties shape sovereignty bargains lies in recognizing the role that threat perception plays in migration policy. Consistent with Rudolph’s argument, I presume that threat perception lies at the core of

\textsuperscript{154} Donaldson 2005. Donaldson’s account of border security policies documents how on-site measures of control such as fencing and militarization of the border increase threat perception in neighboring states, perceptions of threat increase even if such policies are enacted in response to non-state threats such as illegal migrants and traffickers rather than as a direct threat against neighboring states.

\textsuperscript{155} Andrews 1994.

\textsuperscript{156} Leblang 1997.
not only alliance behavior but other forms of state behavior, including migration and border policies.\textsuperscript{157} Furthermore, this insight also builds on the contention within migration scholarship that attitudes towards migration—which influence policy decisions—often constitute responses to created rather than extant threats.\textsuperscript{158} In an important sense, threat perception determines the weight attached to economic as opposed to security interests in shaping state strategies of migration and border control.

Second, it is plausible to imagine that the existence of commercial ties influences states’ perceptions of threat.\textsuperscript{159} A fundamental argument elucidated by classical liberals is that within a dyad, trade ties increase contact and promote communication, both between private actors and between governments. This increased web of connections, in turn promote cooperative political relations.\textsuperscript{160} The emphasis of this strand of the liberal argument—also referred to as sociological liberalism—lies not in shared interest in maintaining economic ties per se but in the pacifying impact of commerce. Stated concisely, the logic maintains that communication and contact pave the way to cooperation between trade partners by increasing knowledge about the other state’s customs, practices, and concerns. Implicit in the commercial peace argument is the notion that increased contact engenders trust in trade partners; the benefits of trade prompt countries to view their partners as benefactors and friends. These favorable

\textsuperscript{157} Rudolph 2003; Walt 1987.
\textsuperscript{158} Lahav 2004; Lavenex 2001.
\textsuperscript{159} Doyle 1997; Hirschman 1977; Polachek 1980; Stein 1993.
\textsuperscript{160} Viner 1951.
perceptions, in turn, entail that states are less likely to respond to trade partners’ citizens as potential security threats. This mechanism is likely to tilt the balance towards economic incentives as states design policy measures to control cross-border flows of individuals.

Although this liberal argument is usually cast at the state-level, it rests on the belief that economic intercourse fosters communication and trust both between governments and between private actors (individuals) within countries. Following this logic, we might formulate an analogous domestic-level mechanism that stipulates that trade relationships influence individual perceptions of threat towards trade partners.161 As Andreas contends, escalation of border controls in part constitutes a response by state leaders to domestic demand.162 In essence, responding to domestic audiences, state leaders exploit perceptions of threat arising from loss-of-control over flows to enact symbolic and highly visible policies of control.163 Such domestic audience effects suggest that individual-level perceptions of threat might then prompt a reconsideration of security interests and enable economic concerns to predominate in decision-making. Domestic pressure towards unfavorable/restrictive migration policies would be expected to be relatively higher towards countries with which the home country does not enjoy a significant economic relationship.

161 Fordham 2009.
162 Andreas 2000.
163 Such policies take the form of physical on-site border measures; these symbolic policies might not be effective in stemming flows of individuals but reflect an attempt by state leaders to respond to domestic pressures to impose control over flows. Ultimately, they reflect responses to domestic perceptions of threat.
Reconfiguration of State Preferences

A third mechanism that builds on the aforementioned components hinges on the shift in relative salience of economic as opposed to security motives. To reemphasize a previous point, in line with Rudolph I maintain that the national interest is composed of material/economic and geopolitical/military elements. In other words, grand strategy requires finetuning policy such that both economic and security concerns are addressed.

Fundamental to this mechanism is the recognition that globalization coexists with older features of world politics, most notably the self-help system. Additionally, sovereignty is defined as an institution subject to change across time and context. Complex interdependence prompts changes in state sovereignty in specific issue areas where multiple channels of contact exist among pluralistic societies. Importantly, the shift is characterized by a movement away from a conception of sovereignty that relies on exclusive territoriality and the exercise of supremacy within a bounded area to one that stresses transnational processes—whether such processes involve multinational involvement, flows of migrants, or movement of cross-border non-state actors. In effect, states express sovereignty in ways that deemphasize the border’s function as a

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165 Waltz 1979.
territorially defined barrier and emphasize instead its role as a bargaining resource in areas characterized by complex transnational networks.\textsuperscript{167}

Applied to migration and border policies, perceptions of threat determine which facet of the national interest assumes primacy in decision-making. To the extent that there is a tradeoff between material and politico-military concerns\textsuperscript{168}, emphasizing one dimension of the national interest reduces the salience of the other. In other words, the logic of the neoliberal trading state necessitates a reconfiguration of the national interest such that security concerns are deemphasized.

Finally, both effects—the anticipation of retaliation and perception of threat—are a matter of state choices. In both cases, states willingly cede sovereignty over transborder flows. In the latter mechanism, the salience of security concerns recedes in favor of concerns over economic wellbeing. In the former case, while the existence of interdependence imposes constraints, policy is still the outcome of state decisions to react to anticipated trade losses. According to the logic of sovereignty bargains, states relinquish interdependence sovereignty to maintain trade and financial ties and bolster domestic sovereignty.

\section*{2.5 Variation in Migration Policies}

To reiterate, as emerging literature on migration has pointed out, migration policy lies at the center of different facets of security. Earlier research approaches

\textsuperscript{167} Keohane 1991; Keohane and Nye 1977.\textsuperscript{168} Golovetsky 2006.
migration control as a function of economic interests. More recent work elucidates the securitized aspect of human flows across borders and exhorts scholars of migration to transcend an exclusively economic understanding of migration control. Other work has recognized that border policy lies at the juncture of security and economic concerns and models policy-making as a tradeoff between material and security motives.

My dissertation makes three overarching contributions to scholarship. Few scholars have attempted to observe the linkage between the economic and security dimensions of globalization; my dissertation addresses this lacuna in the literature. First, the dissertation’s framework addresses the interrelationship between the material and security aspects of globalization: trade and financial integration constitute the economic dimension whereas international terrorism and transborder organized crime and trafficking capture “the globalization of violence”. This also serves to bridge the gap between security studies and economically oriented scholarship on globalization. Existing International Relations (IR) scholarship has focused on the impact of interdependence on conflict behavior. I take a step back and show how economic interdependence affects territoriality in the context of non-state threats to security.

Second, the theory generates empirically verifiable predictions about how the interaction between states’ economic and security incentives produce temporal and

171 Golovetsky 2006.
172 Keohane 2002.
cross-unit variation in ways in which states assert interdependence sovereignty. I posit that both economic and security motives might operate either in tandem to prompt closure or liberalization in border and migration policy or in opposing directions. This conceptualization is depicted in the figure below. 173

In quadrants I and III, economic and security logics reinforce each other; in contrast, in quadrants II and IV, they work against each other. The letters k and n signify the relative weights attached to economic and security dimensions, respectively. A central contention of the proposed project is that there is variation in the way these two dimensions interact cross-sectionally—across countries—and dynamically (over-time).

Figure 2.1: Interaction of Economic and Security Logics

173 A similar depiction may be found contrasting normative and instrumentalist dimensions in US asylum policy in Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004, 682.
Third, a further contribution of the dissertation lies in recognizing that globalization is not only about the increasing volume or pace of flows across borders but about the changing relationship between cross-border flows. An empirical implication that follows from this insight is that the interaction of economic and security incentives will also produce functional variation. The linchpin of the theoretical argument presented in the dissertation is that economic interdependence will have direct and indirect effects on migration policies by tempering the impact of security concerns. However, the nature of the effect varies in theoretically predictable ways across dimensions of migration control. In particular, I distinguish between policies designed to control economic migration (visa restrictions, migration quotas, citizenship/naturalization policies) and measures targeting political migration (asylum and refugee policies).

Specific expectations on the direction of the relationship between economic interdependence and policies targeting economic and political migration will be laid out in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, but at this point a few more remarks are worth noting regarding the substantive impact of interdependence.

In general, while the theoretical framework put forward in this chapter is generalizable across the dimensions of migration policy, we might expect the effect of interdependence to be more salient when measures related to economic/voluntary migration are considered. In contrast, the impact of material considerations may be
muted in the context of political/involuntary migration for several related reasons. First, extant literature suggests that normative/humanitarian concerns function as a counterweight to instrumental motives in shaping asylum and refugee admissions. In fact, the predominance of norms and the existence of an international regime upholding these norms are factors that set apart political migration from voluntary/economic human mobility. In the post-World War II environment, refugee protection and assistance was one of the first international humanitarian initiatives of the newly formed United Nations and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Since then, even as restrictions were put in place towards economic migrants, liberal democracies have all adopted special admissions categories for asylum seekers as well as a common definition for refugees. In other words, we would expect decision-making in this arena to be constrained simultaneously by international norms and domestic humanitarian lobbies. To the degree that norms hold sway over policy, the impact of instrumental factors—both material and security—will be diminished.

Finally, aside from the power of humanitarian norms, we might expect asylum admissions to be subject to securitization to a lesser degree in the sense that asylum might be the channel of entry that terrorists and other types of undesirable clandestine transnational actors are least likely to exploit. As Salehyan aptly points out, due to the high legal and administrative costs of asylum applications, potential terrorists would

174 Ibid.
opt for alternative channels of entry. Moreover, because the burden of proving bona fide refugee status falls on applicants even after they have crossed states’ borders, individuals also encounter more careful scrutiny as political migrants. Therefore, for most states, the nature and structure of asylum/refugee admissions might inherently constitute a deterrent for non-state security threats.

The following chapters will develop testable hypotheses from the theoretical framework, discuss operationalization of concepts, and conduct empirical analyses to probe the validity of the argument presented in this chapter.

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176 Salehyan 2008. This does not mean however that the asylum channel is completely immune to the threat of terrorism. To provide an example, Ramzi Yousef, one of the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing of 1993 used the asylum process to enter the United States.
Chapter 3: Visa Policies as Instrument of Control over Cross-Border Human Mobility

3.1 Introduction

The proposition central to the theoretical framework is that states balance economic and security objectives in controlling cross-border flows of individuals. Economic interdependence modulates security-seeking behavior and affects the types of sovereignty bargains states pursue. Although the trading state logic enables scholars to understand why economic incentives might render military-territorial conceptions of sovereignty less attractive, the emerging migration-security nexus suggests that in a globalizing world, states increasingly confront new types of threats that have implications for how states exert sovereignty. We would expect that the unique security challenges resulting from unscreened cross-border flows would impel states to reconsider a grand strategy dictated predominantly by economic interests. Sovereignty bargains must also reflect economic logics, however, because interdependent states are susceptible to opportunity costs of closed borders and possible backlash from economic partners. In effect, states’ expression of sovereignty can be best understood by looking at the intersection of economic incentives and security challenges brought about by globalization.

This chapter develops several testable hypotheses based upon this claim. Employing a variety of data, two distinct tests are conducted to evaluate the observable
implications emerging from the securitized-interdependence framework. First, using a directional-dyad design, a cross-sectional analysis of visa restrictions for 207 recipient countries and independent territories is presented. Dyadic economic ties—in terms of both trade and capital interdependence—are expected to influence states’ visa policies directly and indirectly by moderating the impact of security concerns. Second, yearly data collected for European Union (EU) member countries affords a closer look at how states use visas as an instrument of control over borders. Whereas the first part of the analysis deals with a dichotomous measure of visa restrictions, the second section utilizes a percentage measure of visa rejection rates for select EU recipient countries. Both components of the empirical analysis focus on transnational terrorism as a security concern arising from cross-border mobility. The next subsection defines transnational terrorism and discusses particular attributes of the terrorist threat that drive states’ policy responses when controlling their borders.

3.2 Responding to Transnational Terrorism

Transnational terrorism represents one facet of the new security environment that scholars often trace back to the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War created an impetus for a new security paradigm by drawing attention to a host of new threats to security.¹ Concomitantly, the forces of globalization have spurred the rise of non-traditional threats to security. As elaborated on in the previous chapter, processes

¹ Buzan et al. 1998; Caldwell and JR. 2006.
of globalization—the increased ease of international travel, the development of new technologies, and increasing interconnectedness of the world—have empowered transnational actors.\(^2\) Additionally, globalization has also spawned violence through discontent by accentuating relative disparities in wealth and compounded resentment against countries and institutions of the West.\(^3\) In that respect, the spread of informal violence—violence wielded by non-state actors capitalizing on secrecy and surprise to inflict harm on states—represents a nontrivial dimension of globalization.\(^4\) At the same time that the significance of traditional issues for the security agenda diminished, new challenges came to the fore: drug trafficking, smuggling, organized crime, failed states, terrorism, among others. Although transnational terrorism presents problems akin to the war on drugs and organized crime and similarly requires a new set of strategies of combat, it possesses a number of distinct attributes that demand the separate analysis of terrorism with regard to states’ sovereignty bargains.

A definition of terrorism that encompasses its key characteristics as a security problem notes that it is an “anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby…the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.”\(^5\) A further definitional distinction is of importance: transnational terrorism—as

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\(^3\) Huntington 1993; Rudolph 2003.
\(^4\) Keohane 2002.
opposed to domestic terror—involves incidents in which the perpetrators, victims, or audience are from two or more countries.\(^6\) A crucial aspect of transnational terrorism is that it involves cross-border flows and targets a global audience. The attacks against the World Trade Center on 9/11 or the kidnapping of foreign workers in Iraq in 2004 were transnational not only because these incidents began in one country and terminated in another but also because the victims were from numerous countries and the audience was global.

T.V. Paul contends that the new security challenges have fundamentally changed the meaning of security-seeking for states because the four foundations of military strategy—offense, defense, deterrence, and compellence—assume unitary, rational, state actors as opponents. Traditional security seeking behavior comes under challenge for a number of reasons that are inextricably tied to the nature of new types of threats.\(^7\) Transnational terrorism poses a problem for state actors for one, because of its reliance on asymmetric strategies of warfare against militarily superior state actors. These strategies enable terrorists to demonstrate that even the most powerful states are vulnerable, and thereby, to gain a symbolic sense of power.\(^8\) Furthermore, offensive action against terrorism is hampered by the fact that terrorist actors are not easily detectable; defense against terrorist attacks is further limited by the stealth element. Because terrorists tend to select a non-hierarchical cell structure, members of terrorist

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\(^6\) Mickolus et al. 2007; Sandler et al. 2009.

\(^7\) Paul 2005.

\(^8\) Juergensmeyer 1997.
organizations are able to hide among the general population.\(^9\) Deterrence is also
predicated on adequate information about the adversary’s capabilities and intentions;
this is problematic not only because terrorists are elusive and clandestine but also
because their goals differ markedly from survival driven state actors.\(^{10}\) The asymmetric
nature of the terrorist threat may be summed up by saying that the Clausewitzian
rationality assumptions do not hold in the same way for terrorist actors.\(^{11}\)

A further source of asymmetry arises from collective action problems that
governments face in dealing with transnational terrorism.\(^{12}\) Scholars attribute this type
of asymmetry to several factors. First, states value their autonomy in security matters
and consequently are reluctant to cooperate in counter-terrorism strategies; in contrast,
terrorists effectively collaborate through loose networks.\(^{13}\) Second, terrorists’ relative
weakness against state actors compels them to pool resources together to augment their
strength. Finally, international cooperation against transnational terrorism is further
inhibited by governments’ inability to agree on which groups are terrorists.\(^{14}\) In effect,

\(^9\) Enders and Su 2007.
\(^{10}\) Stern 1999, cited in Paul 2005.; Bloom 2005. See also Rapoport 1984. Rapoport documents that while
transnational orientation for terrorism began in the 1960s with the third wave, the fourth wave of terrorism
is characterized by fundamentalist goals, and raises new difficulties for states.
\(^{11}\) This is not to say that a form of instrumental rationality does not apply to terrorists. I acknowledge the
ongoing debate on the rationality of terrorism but do not consider it relevant to my argument. See Bloom
2005; Pape 2006.
\(^{12}\) Enders and Sandler 2006; Sandler et al. 2009.
the 9/11 attacks constitutes an exception to the degree of international cooperation against the terrorist
threat.
\(^{14}\) Enders and Sandler 2005; Sandler et al. 2009.
soft targets. The latter underscores the global nature of the terrorist threat: in contrast to home-grown terrorism, transnational terrorism entails that grievances in one country can lead to attacks against other countries, especially if they are perceived to be ‘softer’ targets.\textsuperscript{15}

Finally, an important source of vulnerability for states concerns informational disadvantages. States might be asymmetrically vulnerable with respect to networks of individuals whose communications transpire through face-to-face contact.\textsuperscript{16} The attacks of September 11 provide a stark example to this phenomenon: despite being an information society, the United States faced this type of asymmetry because whereas potential terrorists had good information about their targets, the United States had limited information about the identity and location of terrorist networks prior to the attacks.

In sum, given various types of asymmetric vulnerabilities that states confront vis-à-vis transnational terrorist networks, states face a different security dynamic in dealing with such non-state actors. Although military/territorial conceptions of sovereignty might recede in favor of trading state logic, these attributes bring to light new security challenges that reshape the intersection of economic/security logics. The rise of non-state actors entails that states no longer hold the monopoly over coercive violence; in parallel, this amounts to greater emphasis on borders as lines of defense

\textsuperscript{15} Enders and Sandler 2006.
\textsuperscript{16} Keohane 2002.
against non-state threats.\textsuperscript{17} Although the significance of territoriality for state power through conquest might be on the decline, border salience can be defined in terms of a protective shield against flows of informal violence.\textsuperscript{18} The security-migration nexus suggests that states should attempt to bolster territorial security (Westphalian sovereignty) by limiting access to territories, particularly through deterrent policies that allow screening of cross-border flows of individuals. To the extent that security logics shape policy, the threat of terrorism would predict restrictive policies.

\section*{3.3 Hypotheses}

The first set of hypotheses concern origin states’ ties to transnational terrorism. More specifically, under what conditions does the threat of terrorism result in tight border control measures? I posit two mechanisms through which fears over transnational terrorist attacks engender restrictive border control measures. First, transnational terrorism is distinct from its home-grown variants in embodying the possibility of contagion where grievances in one country can lead to attacks in other parts of the world. This highlights the global nature of transnational terrorism: tight security measures implemented by some countries might in turn alter the geographical distribution of terrorist attacks, channeling flows of informal violence from harder to softer targets.\textsuperscript{19} Second, precisely because of asymmetric vulnerabilities, states will rely

\textsuperscript{17} Adamson and Grossman 2004; Biersteker 2002; Koslowski 2004.
\textsuperscript{18} Donaldson 2005.
\textsuperscript{19} Enders and Sandler 2006.
on heuristic shortcuts in tightening borders against potential terrorist flows. The literature on crisis bargaining and war emphasizes that behavioral and reputational histories of other states may be informative under conditions of uncertainty. 20 Especially in the context of informational disadvantages, states are likely to factor in origin countries’ reputation for ties to global terrorism attacks. Such shortcuts will especially be attractive for states with borders that are permeable to economic flows. Because interdependent states desire to pursue discerning border control measures, they benefit from policies that are effectively able to deter undesirable clandestine actors from accessing territory while at the same time facilitating the flow of goods, capital, tourists, and legal migrants.21

These insights entail that states respond to the threat of transnational terrorism as a global problem by taking into account origin states’ ties to incidents of terrorism in other countries, as opposed to attacks specifically targeting them. Furthermore, because a central characteristic of flows of informal violence is that they originate from individuals crossing borders, states are expected to be cautious about origin states’ citizens (past) involvement with terrorist attacks around the globe. Therefore, this hypothesis is given as:

20 Crescenzi 2007; Mercer 1996.
21 Golovetsky 2006; Neumayer 2006.
**Hypothesis 3.1 (Security: Global Terrorism Reputation Effect):** States will pursue restrictive visa policies against the nationals of states that have gained a reputation for ties to global terrorism.

A second and complementary security challenge may be in the form of directed threats to security from origin countries’ nationals. States’ past experience with origin states’ citizens as perpetrators of attacks against their own nationals might also act as a heuristic device. This suggests that states rely on experiential learning in coping with transnational terrorism; this complements the vicarious type of learning that occurs when states react to (global) terrorist incidents taking place in other countries or against other countries’ citizens.\(^{22}\) Put differently, recipient states whose citizens have been targeted by nationals of specific states of origin in terrorist attacks will respond with restrictive border policies against the nationals of these countries.

**Hypothesis 3.2 (Security: Targeted Terrorism Effect):** Past incidents of targeted attacks against the nationals of host states will prompt restrictive visa policies against the nationals of sending states associated with these attacks.

In contrast, economic incentives compel states to relax interdependence sovereignty by pursuing more permissive policies of border control. Given the gains available through liberalization, states will seek to encourage the liberal movement of

people across borders. Furthermore, contiguous and interdependent states are expected to enhance the locational advantages of proximity by keeping borders permeable to different types of flows. As discussed in the theory section, physical barriers on borders and strict visa policies detract from such locational advantages. Additionally, permissive visa policies are prompted by incentives generated by economic ties; by providing free access to each others’ territorial space, interdependent states seek to facilitate the exchange of goods and services. These lead us to expect a direct positive impact of economic interdependence on visa policies.

**Hypothesis 3.3 (Interdependence Effect):** Economically interdependent states should be less likely to pursue restrictive visa policies when monitoring the cross-border movement of one another’s nationals.

The final hypothesis concerns the interaction between security concerns and economic exchange, which comprises the centerpiece of the theoretical argument. The theory presented in the previous chapter discussed several mechanisms through which economic ties modulate the impact of security concerns on policies of border control. First, states anticipate retaliation from economic partners and design policies to minimize economic losses. This opportunity costs model derives from the interdependence literature on conflict behavior and is applied to security-seeking behavior in general. Second, economic ties reshape state interests by downplaying the

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24 Hanson 2005.
impact of security concerns; this mechanism is supplemented by domestic vested interests that are able to lobby for open borders. Third, the logic of cultural liberalism suggests that states are less likely to perceive citizens of economic partners as threatening; in parallel, perceptions of threat are weaker at the domestic level, which in turn means weaker domestic demand for strict border controls. Finally, the theory section explored the impact of two types of interdependence—capital and trade—on policies of control over human mobility. Therefore, I formulate these as two interlinked hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 3.4i (Security-Trade Interdependence Interaction effect):** Trade ties will decrease the probability that states pursue restrictive visa policies against the citizens of states with ties to international terrorism.

**Hypothesis 3.4ii (Security-Capital Interdependence Interaction effect):** Capital interdependence will decrease the probability that states pursue restrictive visa policies against the citizens of states with ties to international terrorism.

### 3.4 Data and Methods

**Data Design**

The unit of analysis is the directed-dyad; this design enables me to analyze policies of recipient states against the nationals of origin states, which might not
necessarily be symmetric.\textsuperscript{26} In other words, each state A in this data is treated one time as the origin state and one time as the recipient state. To illustrate, Germany’s visa policy vis-à-vis Turkey constitutes a separate observation than Turkey’s policy towards Germany; that there is limited reciprocity within dyads entails that the A-B dyad and B-A dyad can be analyzed as separate observations.\textsuperscript{27} This design is appropriate given that my goal is to analyze the policies of each state as recipient of human flows against each state that serves as the origin of migrants. As will be further explained below, the chapter relies on two sets of analyses with two different operationalizations of visa policy. The first set of analyses is based on data in cross-sectional directed dyad format; the second set of results is obtained from separate cross-sectional data that has a longitudinal component.

**Dependent Variable**

The main dependent variable in this chapter is the imposition of visa restrictions. The degree of documentation required at borders is a good indicator of how closed or open a state’s borders are.\textsuperscript{28} More specifically, visa restrictions serve as an upstream policy of territorial control in screening out and deterring unwanted individuals from

\textsuperscript{26} Neumayer 2006. Neumayer notes that whereas there is a principle of reciprocity in visa restrictions among developed countries, the principle does not apply widely.

\textsuperscript{27} In fact, this gets at the main point of contention with directed dyad designs; to the extent that the AB and BA dyads are correlated with respect to the DV, observations are not independent, violating the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. However, the limited reciprocity in border policies mitigates this problem.

\textsuperscript{28}Boehmer and Peña 2008. The authors employ a three degree specification of border controls, the most open borders are ones where entry requires no documentation, the most closed borders require visas, and somewhat in between are borders where only a passport is required for entry.
crossing state borders. On the one hand, the requirement of documentation prior to entry imposes a transaction cost on human mobility and in doing so acts as a deterrent on cross-border movement of individuals. In this sense, visas function as the “first line of defense” against the entry of undesirables. On the other hand, visas make it possible for recipient states to distinguish between individuals whose entry is deemed as nonthreatening and individuals who might present a potential risk. States utilize visa restrictions to categorize individuals before they are granted access to territory: those who do not need a visa are regarded as risk-free by default and those who need a visa are required to undergo closer inspection at consulates or embassies before being granted permission of entry.

Although the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 applies to how states control the movement of people across borders in general, this chapter focuses on visa policies. Previous work on visa policies suggests that visa restrictions enable states to cope with the possibility that foreigners will overstay the legal duration of stay; in other words, states may utilize visas to curtail illegal migration. Visa controls also allow states to screen out security threats arising from potential terrorists or members of...

29 For categorization of border policies see Thielemann 2006.
30 Peña 2004; Thielemann 2006.
31 Neumayer 2005.
32 Andreas 2000; 2000; Koslowski 2001; Torpey 2000. Andreas points out that illegal migration does not only occur through illegal border crossings; it also occurs when individuals exceed the legally prescribed duration of stay.
criminal networks. Importantly, visa restrictions are a significant manifestation of states’ monopoly of control over human mobility; by enabling states to determine who crosses their borders, visas capture one mechanism through which states exert interdependence sovereignty. States are expected to capitalize on the deterrence and screening functions of visa restrictions, making it possible to observe the linkage between security challenges and territorial controls.

I operationalize the imposition of visa restrictions in two ways. The first measure of visa policies employs a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for the existence of visa controls by a recipient state on the citizens of an origin state and 0 otherwise. The second measure is a percentage-based measure of visa rejection rates for applicants from origin states to recipient countries. These two operationalizations of visa restrictions yield separate dependent variables (DV$s) and make possible complementary but distinct sets of results. I now discuss data for each DV in turn. Data for visa restrictions builds on Neumayer’s measure, coded from the 2004 version of the International Aviation Association’s Travel Manual (IATA). Utilized by the majority of airlines and travel bureaus, this manual provides authoritative information on visa controls in place.

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33 Neumayer 2006.
34 Torpey 2000.
Bilateral visa restrictions cover 189 member states of the United Nations and 18 non-member political territories, totaling to 207 dyads, or 36,300 directional dyads.\footnote{Data was not available for Montenegro, Nauru and Timor-Leste. The data also covers 16 non-member political entities, most of which are overseas dependencies of former colonial powers, UK, France, and The Netherlands and the United States. They are: American Samoa, Cayman Islands, Faeroe Islands, French Polynesia, Greenland, Guam, Hong Kong and Macao, Isle of Man, Mayotte, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and West Bank/Gaza. Although these territories differ in terms of independence of foreign policy and have citizenship policies dependent on the former colonial power, they enjoy independence in immigration and visa policies; thus, they are included in the IATA manual and consequently in the original data. However, visa information proved to be unavailable for 14 of the 16 territories mentioned. Thus data is available for 191 sovereign territories, making for 191*190 relevant country pairings.}

Turning to the second dependent variable, visa rejection rates, data on recipient countries’ visa policies is provided as annual reports by the Council of the European Union for member-states of the EU and/or Schengen area and covers the years 2003 to 2007. These reports are based on member-states’ consular yearly reports to the Council.\footnote{Figures from the Council reports which are in Adobe Acrobat portable digital format (pdf) were encoded into excel files via optimal character recognition (OCR) software. More specifically, in addition to Acrobat’s OCR functions, AbleToExtract and Cogniview were used to convert scanned pages into excel format.} Members of the EU and/or Schengen area report statistics on visas under the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of December 1994 Decision of the Executive Committee on the issuance and exchange of information on the uniform visa policy.\footnote{www.europa.eu, Exchange of Statistical Information on the Issuing of Visas, 2003-2007.} Visa rejection rates are expressed as a percentage and vary from 0 to 100 and represent the ratio of total number of visas denied by the recipient state against the total number of yearly applicants. Therefore, visa rejection rates function as a proxy for tighter visa controls. The Council files report data on visa applications for each city where a consulate or embassy of the recipient
state exists and accepts applications. In order to enable country-level (aggregate) analysis, visa rejection rates reflect averages across cities per each origin state.

Data is in dyadic format where recipient states are member countries of the European Union and origin states are countries where visa applications were filed for each recipient state. The group of recipient countries differs across the range of years covered by the Council documents and increases with the enlargement of the European Union within this time span. The years 2003-2004 include 15 member countries of the EU and/or Schengen area plus Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia, of the group of candidate countries that acceded to the EU in 2004. The years 2005-2007 encompass all 27 current member countries of the European Union as well as Iceland and Norway as Schengen states.

The second operationalization of visa controls targets several limitations inherent in the dichotomous specification of visa policies. First, while it would be ideal to observe over-time variation in policies, the IATA manual provides cross-sectional figures. Second, although the requirement of visas prior to entry is a good indicator of how open or closed a state’s border is with respect to an origin state’s citizens, we would

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39 Countries included as EU and/or Schengen members are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, and Norway. The United Kingdom and Ireland, who are EU member states but are not a part of the Schengen area do not provide statistics; Norway and Iceland, who are non-EU Schengen states are included in the group of countries covered by the Council documents.

40 Romania did not provide statistics until formally acceding in 2007. Data on Austria in 2006 is also missing.

41 Although different editions of the manual exist, they do not come out annually. Earlier versions of the manual were difficult to find. Thus, coding time-series data for visa restrictions would be financially and time-wise costly.
prefer more nuanced indicators that lend information on how difficult it is to obtain permission to cross the recipient state’s borders. For example, even though state X might require a visa from the nationals of states Y and Z, the citizens of Z might find it easier to obtain an entry visa than those of Y. Analysis using visa rejection rates as the dependent variable complements analyses of dichotomous visa restrictions in both respects. While the time period is not long enough to qualify as time-series data, it is still possible to exploit the information available in additional time periods. Furthermore, analysis using visa rejection rates makes for a more detailed inquiry into how stringent border controls are.\footnote{42}

That said, there are two potential caveats worth mentioning about visa rejection rates reported by the Council. First, the rejection rates are calculated by taking into account the total number of applicants across all four categories of visas granted by the European Union member countries. These four categories include short-term and long-term visas; categories A and B grant airport and land transit, respectively; C is the common Schengen visa for short-term stay and travel whereas category D refers to national visas granted for longer term stay for purposes of business, study, and/or work.\footnote{43} Thus, even for pairs of states that grant visa free access to territory, longer term

\footnote{42}{Other types of measures of visas such as wait time before obtaining entry stamp, extent of documentation necessary might provide further insight into the stringency of such policies. In the absence of such data, visa rejection rates are a good way to gain further knowledge on how states employ visa controls.}

\footnote{43}{Hence, the common Schengen visa refers to class C. The visa rejection rates reported are not Schengen visas for countries that were/are not a part of the Schengen area but these countries still employ the short-}
visas might still be required; this entails that even when the dichotomous visa measure is coded as 0, visa rejection rates might be valid. A second and potentially problematic aspect of reported visa rejection rates is that the Council documents report rejection rates on the basis of number of applicants in consulates in origin states. This entails that rates do not exclusively reflect visa rejection against nationals of origin states but against all applicants in origin states. Controlling for the imposition of visa /and/or running the models only for countries against which visa was imposed is a partial solution to this problem.44

**Independent Variables**

**Transnational Terrorism:**

The first two hypotheses put forward focus on the impact of security concerns on visa restrictions. In particular, recipient countries are expected to pursue more stringent policies given origin states’ ties to transnational terrorism. I further contend that states react to fears over the threat of terrorism by taking into account a) the propensity of origin countries’ citizens to be involved with global terrorist incidents b) own past experience as targets of terrorist attacks by nationals of these countries. In other words, states seek to overcome unique challenges posed by flows of transnational terrorism by term and long-term distinctions. Additionally, another class of visa that exists for all countries is the LTV which allows limited access to territory and is subject to certain constraints on travel.

44 However, the first point suggests that the correct model specification includes all set of cases for which the visa rejection rates are available and not for the subset of cases in which the dichotomous specification is one: this is because taking into account only directional dyads in which visa restrictions exist would exclude cases in which rejection rates reflect applications for long-term visas for states that allow visa-free short-term access and travel.
considering the reputation of origin countries as source of terrorist actors and also by
engaging in experiential learning. This yields two separate but related
operationalizations of threats posed by transnational terrorism. First to capture global
terrorism incidents, I employ a variable that accounts for the number of yearly
international terrorism incidents the nationals of origin states are involved in anywhere
around the world. In the first set of analyses employing the dichotomous visa
specification, the global incidents term aggregates terrorist attacks perpetrated by the
nationals of an origin country anywhere around the world from 1990 to 2004. In the set
of results focusing on visa rejection rates as the dependent variable, the same variable
sums global terrorist attacks undertaken by origin countries’ citizens in the prior year.

Second, in order to account for directed terrorism incidents, I use two types of
directed measures of terrorism. In the first set of analysis, I employ a variable that
counts the number of yearly targeted attacks against citizens of the home state
undertaken by the origin state nationals. For the broader analysis with visa restrictions
as the dependent variable, I use the sum of targeted incidents from 1990 on, in order to
facilitate comparison with the global incidents measure. With visa rejection rates as the
dependent variable, the directed incidents variable is conceptually different in
accounting for attacks by nationals of origin countries within recipient states’ borders.
The latter operationalization is referred to as targeted terror (territorial) to distinguish it
from targeted terror (citizens). I then create five-order lags to account for past directed terrorist incidents and use the sum of targeted incidents in the past five years.

Several datasets on incidents of terrorism exist but the concepts utilized in my study require a focus on incidents of transnational terrorism. Two major datasets have been created detailing attributes of transnational/global incidents. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is composed of terrorist events recorded for the entire world from 1970 through 1997. The International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) data covers the years 1968-2005 and provides time-series data for key attributes of terrorist incidents. Information on terrorist events is obtained from media accounts of incidents, including such sources as Reuters, Associated Press, United Press International, Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS), Daily Reports, and major US newspapers.

In both datasets, the working definition of terrorism is the use, or threat of use of (anxiety-generating and extra-normal) violence by any individual or group, where such actions is intended to influence the behavior and attitudes of a target audience greater than the immediate victims. To be defined as a transnational terrorist incident, an attack has to transcend national boundaries through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its victims, the mechanics of resolution, or the ramifications of the incident. In an important sense, transnational terrorism is distinct

45 LaFree 2010.
46 Mickolus et al. 2007.
from international terrorism in that perpetrators are non-state actors (groups or individuals) even if they are backed by states sympathetic to their interests.\textsuperscript{48}

Whereas both GTD and ITERATE are comparable in the types of attributes of events they include information on, a key difference is that the former database focuses on particular terrorist groups as perpetrators, whereas ITERATE includes information on the nationality of terrorists. A crucial contention in my argument is that the migration-security nexus shifts focus to threats from individuals; consequently, ITERATE is advantageous in allowing me to create a measure that counts the number of incidents in which the citizens of origin countries have been the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{49} My set of terrorist incidents includes only those cases in which the nationality of perpetrators is different from that of the victims. The second measure of directed terrorism (territorial) takes into account the location of the terrorist incident, where the nationality of origin is different from the territory in which the incident transpired.

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\textbf{Economic Interdependence}

\textsuperscript{48} In the case of international terrorism, perpetrators are direct proxies for sovereign states. Note that ITERATE does contain a variable for state sponsorship; however, it is not essential to include this in the analysis because the sponsor state may or may not be the same as the country of nationality of perpetrators.

\textsuperscript{49} ITERATE also includes information on terrorist groups; hence, a later project will look at countries of origin as bases of operation for terrorist groups.
The theoretical framework implies that both trade and capital interdependence may shape the ways in which states control borders. I briefly discuss the variables pertaining to each type of interdependence.

Trade Interdependence: Alternate models use different measures for the flow of goods. In all measures however, the operationalization is dyadic. For the set of analyses with dichotomous visa controls as the dependent variable, I employ Rose’s measure of bilateral trade.⁵⁰ This variable measures the value of bilateral trade—imports and exports—for the recipient country, divided by the total trade value of the recipient country; this measure might also be seen as tapping the salience of dyadic trade for the recipient.⁵¹ A caveat of Rose’s measure is that data is collected for the year 1996; therefore, for all my analyses, I also employ an updated measure of trade interdependence. Using Correlates of War project’s dyadic trade data, I created the trade interdependence variable by taking the ratio of bilateral exports and imports to recipient state’s economy, in line with Russett and Oneal’s measures of trade.⁵² Following the authors’ logic, I calculated dependence scores for the recipient state and for the origin state. More specifically, the recipient country’s trade dependence on the origin is:

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⁵⁰ Rose 2005.
⁵¹ Neumayer 2006; Rose 2005.
However, my measure of trade interdependence differs from Russett and Oneal’s operationalization in that the authors’ measure is based on the lowest of the dependence scores in the dyad; instead of following the weakest link assumption, I create an average dependence score for the dyad. In alternate models, I also utilize the directed dependence measure to take into consideration the possibility that the recipient state’s policy reflects its dependence on the origin state, instead of simply the non-directed (average) trade dependence of the dyad.\textsuperscript{53} The variable employed in the models is rescaled to vary from 0 to 2.66, to facilitate interpretation (especially of interaction effects) and graphical illustration.

A final note on this measure relates to potential endogeneity: it is plausible to suggest that visa restrictions affect the level of trade interdependence in a dyad by acting as an obstacle to economic flows.\textsuperscript{54} This entails that current levels of trade interdependence might be correlated with visa restrictions although there may be no causation (type 1 endogeneity). To account for this possibility, I employ the first-order lags of the trade interdependence terms.

\textit{Capital Interdependence}

\textsuperscript{53} Gelpi and Grieco 2008.
\textsuperscript{54} In fact, a working manuscript by Neumayer suggests that visa restrictions can depress trade and foreign direct investment flows. See Neumayer 2009.
The first measure of capital flows is intended to assess recipient country’s exposure to foreign direct investment (FDI). This variable is the ratio of the gross inflows of FDI to the recipient’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in purchasing power parity (PPP). Yearly data on FDI inflows and GDP-PPP were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The second measure captures the recipient country’s level of openness and exposure to capital markets. Simmons’s data for governmental restrictions on foreign exchange, capital, and current account transactions proves ideal for this measure. These data have been coded by authors from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Special Appendices and pertain to 1996. This yields a composite score for the degree of capital liberalization which is reversed to vary from most restrictive (0) to least restrictive (3).

Finally, recent data made available through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s resource base—OECD Outlook—offers information on bilateral flows of FDI. Whereas earlier data and research based on this data focused on monadic (state-level) measures of FDI flows to countries, the new database encompasses FDI inflows to and outflows from 61 OECD countries. Capital flows for dyads were then aggregated into a common currency using market exchange rates; the aggregation metric was the widely used economic construct, purchasing power parity (PPP). The variable employed in the models measures net FDI flows to recipient states where net inflows of FDI refer to transfers of investment dollars from origin to recipient countries.

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55 Simmons and Elkins 2004. These data were originally coded from the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls.
56 Inflows of FDI refer to transfers of investment dollars from origin to recipient countries.
FDI equals the difference between inflows to the recipient as host from the origin in terms of the amount of investment dollars that flow from the origin country to the recipient minus those that flow in the opposite direction.

**Control Variables**

The main independent variables relate to the interaction effect between economic motives and security concerns, which is the cornerstone of my theoretical argument. However, a number of other factors have been shown to be important in shaping visa policies and need to be incorporated into the analyses. In particular, human mobility is prompted by “push” and “pull” factors. These factors relate to economic, socioeconomic, and political attributes of sending (origin) countries that motivate or compel individuals to migrate.

To begin with, a measure for *Gross Domestic Capita (GDP) per capita for target country* is included to tap into the economic context that prompts exit. This control serves a second purpose: Neumayer has demonstrated that citizens of poorer countries are more likely to face visa restrictions and controls for this effect. This variable is expressed in thousands of US Dollars per capita (logged) in purchasing power parity (PPP); data for this measure is drawn from the Penn World Trade Tables; in alternate

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57 Most of the control variables employed in the first set of analyses with dichotomous visa restrictions as the DV existed in the dataset used by Neumayer 2006 which this project builds on; however, I cite original sources from which these measures are drawn. Controls and variables for the second set of analyses with visa rejection rates as the DV were compiled from the same sources but are embedded in a separate dataset. Finally, I list all control variables here but alternate models include different sets of controls. The second set of results with visa rejection rates as the DV typically include a smaller subset of controls.


59 Neumayer 2006.
models I use Gross National Income per capita (GNI per capita), obtained from the same source. 60

A second insight from work on migration and asylum is that negative social and political conditions in sending states such as domestic violence, poverty, and repression of freedom are well-established push factors. 61 In order to measure domestic violence, I utilize an ordinal measure of origin’s civil strife and unrest derived from the International Peace Institute conflict project. This variable measures conflict intensity and is based on fatality levels and varies between 0 and 3. 62 In the second empirical section, I capture the degree of violence in the origin by using the political terror scale score, which varies from 1 to 5. Third, I control for the political climate in the sending country by including a measure for the restrictions on political freedom; this variable is drawn from the Freedom House Index, and is based on experts’ judgments on restrictions on civil and political rights. 63 In further models, I include a control for the regime type of the origin country; this is guided by the notion that autocratic regimes also act as push factors. 64 This control is the Polity score provided by the Polity IV dataset and varies from -10 for the most autocratic regimes to 10 for full democracies. 65

60 Heston et al. 2002.
61 Neumayer 2005.
62 Strand et al. 2004. Here 0 denotes absence of fatalities, 1 captures conflicts with a fatality of 25-1000, 2 refers to casualties within the same range in a given year but with an accumulated total of at least 1000; 3 denotes conflicts with more than 1000 casualties. Data reflect 2002 figures.
64 On the other hand, autocracies are also more likely to impose exit controls on their citizens. See
A second set of controls involve attributes of recipient states that might shape visa policies. First, we might imagine that autocracies are more likely to be threatened by open borders and fear that foreign influence might undermine the regime’s influence. We might then expect democracies to maintain more liberal visa regimes.\textsuperscript{66} These insights lead me to include a control for the recipient state’s regime type; once again, I employ the Polity score from the Polity IV dataset. Furthermore, scholars of migration contend that open borders are congruent with liberal norms, beliefs, and practices in home countries.\textsuperscript{67} To account for this possibility, some models include the degree of political restrictions extant in the recipient state; this measure comes from the Freedom House Index. Finally, states that are major tourist destinations have an incentive to shy away from visa restrictions; in these states, the domestic tourism industry would be expected to lobby for fewer restrictions.\textsuperscript{68} I control for this effect by including a variable for the recipient’s international tourism receipts. This measure is obtained from the World Bank and denotes expenditures by international inbound visitors divided by the value of the country’s exports of goods and services.

\textsuperscript{66} Anderson 1997.
\textsuperscript{67} Lahav 2004; Messina and Lahav 2006; Meyers 2000; Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.
\textsuperscript{68} Neumayer 2006. A caveat here is that countries may impose visa restrictions to generate revenue; however this revenue must be balanced against the logistical costs of controlling border ports, payments for personnel, in addition to transaction costs of non-permeable borders. As Neumayer points out visas that are imposed to garner foreign currency are often more flexible types of visas that foreigners may obtain at the border as these types of visas minimize processing and opportunity costs for recipient countries. The dataset contains a separate variable to count only visas-at-borders, distinct from the visa variable employed as the DV in these analyses.
The final set of controls target characteristics of the dyad that might influence visa policies of the recipient state vis-à-vis its dyadic counterpart. First, others have applied the logic of the trade gravity model to argue that shared borders facilitate the movement of individuals as well as goods and services across borders. This prompts me to include a variable for state contiguity that is derived from the Direct Contiguity dataset, which is a part of the Correlates of War project. Instead of employing a dichotomous measure for state contiguity, I use an ordinal variable to account for the possibility that proximity rather than strict adjacency of states functions as a “pull” factor by facilitating transborder movement of individuals. Second, historical, geographical, and civilizational patterns of shared belonging might make for more liberal visa policies insofar as tight controls are guided by principles of inclusion of the similar and exclusion of the culturally dissimilar. In different models I include alternate controls for cultural ties between recipient and origin countries: a dummy coded 1 if the pair of states belong to the same civilizational category based on Huntington’s classification of civilizations; a dummy for the existence of colonial ties, coded 1 if the dyad shares a colonial past; and a geographic dummy coded 1 if the dyad is located in the same region, where regional classifications are those employed by

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70 The modified Direct Contiguity score varies from 1 to 6 with decreasing levels of proximity, 1 refers to direct contiguity (shared land border). A dummy is also derived from this where categories 2-6 on the ordinal scale are coded as 0 (non-contiguous) and 1 refers to a shared land border.
71 Huntington 1993.
72 1996. Henderson and R. 2001. Because Huntington’s categories are controversial, Henderson and Tucker have modified these categories, lending an alternate measure of civilization ties.
73 Dollar 2000.
the World Bank. Third, it is possible to capture economic push and pull factors within the dyad by controlling for wealth differentials. This also follows from the notion that citizens from poorer countries are likely to be regarded with distrust and perceived to exacerbate economic and social problems within recipient states. I control for differentials in economic wealth by including a variable that measures the difference in GDP per capita in PPP between the recipient and origin states; the data were drawn from the World Bank.

Finally, whereas I focus on the transnational security implications of human mobility, there might be other security concerns engendered by open borders that states factor in. Put differently, states are expected to pursue stringent policies against the citizens of other states they view as a risk to security. This should especially be the case given past hostility within the dyad. In order to account for the possibility that past disputes prompt closed borders, I include a dummy for militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), coded 1 if the dyad engaged in a MID in the past decade. Furthermore, states might particularly be cautious in opening borders given territorial disputes with origin countries. If states are more wary of neighbors in the presence of territorial claims, then they are likely to be more cautious in granting territorial access to the nationals of their adversaries. Consequently, in some models I include a control dummy for the existence of

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74 WDI 2008. The regions are North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific. Arguably, the regional dummy also captures proximity of recipient and origin.
75 Newman 2005.
territorial disputes; this variable is based on Huth’s set of territorial disputes and is coded 1 for the existence of official territorial claims by the origin against the recipient.77

Methods

Visa Policy as Dependent Variable: Logistic Regression:

For the first set of analyses, I present results with visa policy as the dependent variable. The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, visa restrictions (1 if visa restrictions are in place and 0 otherwise) necessitates the use of a non-linear estimator, such as logit or probit78. I display logit results but probit yields qualitatively parallel findings. The logit equation that I estimate is:

\[ P(Y_i \mid X) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(x_i \beta + \epsilon_i)}} \]

Logistic regression employs maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) after linear transformation of the dependent variable into the natural log odds of visa restrictions. In this way, the logistic regression estimates the probability that the recipient state imposes visa restrictions on the origin country; in contrast, linear regression would estimate the changes in the level of the dependent variable on a continuous scale. Logit coefficients correspond to the \( \beta \) in the logistic regression equation displayed above; because this form of regression does not assume a linear relationship between independent and dependent variables, discussion will focus on the statistical

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significance and direction of the coefficients displayed. Finally, because the first set of results employ data that is cross-sectional in nature, robust standard errors are presented to account for the possibility of heteroskedastic error variances, namely the fact that variance of disturbances will be non-constant across dyads.

Visa Rejection Rates as Dependent Variable

For the second set of results where the dependent variable is the visa rejection rate, I employ a set of techniques that make use of the time variance in the data. Because it is important to analyze the sensitivity of results to model specification and estimation technique, a number of different models are presented. More specifically the second part of the empirical analysis uses three statistical techniques i) linear regression with Huber-White standard errors ii) random effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimation iii) panel corrected-standard errors (PCSEs).  

Linear Robust Regression

The continuous nature of the visa rejection rate as the DV permits the use of linear regression techniques. To reiterate, the data used in the second set of analyses is composed of 15-27 recipient states that are members of the European Union and/or Schengen area and up to 180 origin countries, compiled across 5 years from 2003-2007. The structure of the data suggests that error disturbances might not be constant across units. Potential heteroskedasticity has been shown to decrease the power of hypothesis

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79 Arguably, the time-period is too short for a PCSE approach, especially given the unbalanced nature of the data. Problems would have especially arisen if the data contained nonstationarity that is not shared by all dyads. However, tests for non-stationarity were found to be insignificant.
tests by producing biased and inconsistent standard errors.\textsuperscript{80} With nonconstant error disturbances, ordinary least squares (OLS) would yield unbiased and consistent regression coefficients but statistical inference will be invalid.\textsuperscript{81} In the absence of a correction factor, the net result would entail incorrect confidence intervals and a higher probability of Type I error as well as invalid tests for overall model significance.\textsuperscript{82}

Formal tests for heteroskedasticity corroborate these concerns and suggest that the constant error variance assumption is violated.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, I adjust for heteroskedasticity in two ways. First, I run analyses using the Huber-White (sandwich) estimator, which is ideal for contexts in which the form of heteroskedasticity is unknown.\textsuperscript{84} This method enables the estimation of OLS regression coefficients while relaxing the homoskedasticity assumption.\textsuperscript{85} Second, I present the same models with a robust estimator that adjusts for a particular form of heteroskedasticity stemming from the presence of influential outliers.\textsuperscript{86}

Random Effects Linear Regression

\textsuperscript{80} White 1980.
\textsuperscript{81} The direction of and the extent to which standard errors are divergent from their true values will depend on the form of heteroskedasticity. For example, if the errors are less variable around extreme values of one of the independent variables, standard errors will be overestimates; in contrast, if errors exhibit more variability around the extremes, standard errors will be underestimated.
\textsuperscript{82} Hayes and Cai 2007.
\textsuperscript{83} Tests employed are the Breusch-Pagan and White tests, both of which point to the existence of heteroskedasticity.
\textsuperscript{84} In contrast, other possible adjustments for heteroskedasticity such as Weighted Least Squares (WLS) or Generalized Estimation Equation (GEE) require some knowledge of the form of heteroskedasticity, or the relationship between the error disturbances and one or more of the regressors. I also run FGLS and obtain parallel results.
\textsuperscript{85} Huber 1967; White 1980.
\textsuperscript{86} Long and Ervin 2000.
In the final set of models, I seek to exploit the time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) nature of the data for visa-rejection rates. TSCS data are useful to the extent that there is both over-time and cross-sectional variation\(^87\); hence, a few cautionary remarks are in order here. Scholars have illustrated that TSCS techniques are justified by the asymptotics of time and typically demand a large time period to be useful.\(^88\) The data for visa-rejection rates is too short to qualify fully as TSCS data; the rule of thumb requires at least 10 time periods. However, given that the data is considerably wide, I employ techniques that take advantage of the additional information contained in possible over-time variation. Additionally, data that exhibit cross-sectional and time series variation present three distinct types of challenges: panel-specific heteroskedasticity, serial autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation in errors.\(^89\) Even though caution is necessary in evaluating the results of these models, because TSCS methods enable me to go beyond simply adjusting for unit heteroskedasticity, this section provides a stricter test of my hypotheses.

As a first approach to TSCS analysis, I present a random-effects model that takes into account panel-level heteroskedasticity through feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) analysis. The model that I estimate is:

\[ y_{it} = \alpha + x_i \beta + \nu_i + \epsilon_{it} \]

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\(^{88}\) Beck 2001.
\(^{89}\) Greene 1997.
Here, heteroskedasticity is modeled through the decomposition of the error term into a unit-specific residual $v_i$ and the overall residual, assumed to be distributed normally. Thus, rather than imposing unit-specific effects, the panel structure of the data is treated through the error term that is allowed to vary across units. I do not present fixed effects results for a number of reasons. First, random effects are preferable if the panel data is wide rather than long; second and related, unit-specific dummies will soak up the degrees of freedom available, which is problematic given the short-time period of the data at hand.\footnote{Beck and Katz 2001; Kennedy 2000.} Third, the Hausman test reveals that random effects estimation is consistent and therefore justified.

**OLS With Panel-Corrected Standard Errors**

As a second approach to dealing with TSCS data, I present ordinary least squares coefficients with panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Researchers have noted that especially in the context of contemporaneous serial correlation, this method is superior to FGLS estimation.\footnote{Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 1995.} In particular, PCSEs will yield more conservative standard errors, thereby presenting a stricter test of the hypotheses.\footnote{In other words, contemporaneous correlation entails that $\Omega \neq \sigma^2 I$. If the Gauss-Markov assumption is violated, instead of the standard formula for the covariance-variance matrix of the OLS estimate $\sigma^2[(X'X)^{-1}]$ we have (FGLS uses) the following formula for $\text{cov}(\hat{\beta}) = (X'X)^{-1}X'\Omega X(X'X)^{-1}$. The contemporaneous covariances of the errors is an $N \times N$ matrix, $V$, estimated by $T$ replicates of the OLS residuals, $v_{ij} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} e_{it} e_{jt}/T$.} A final methodological note here concerns a caveat in the data structure: the data used in this section is unbalanced in that...
the time period is heterogeneous. That is, for some directed-dyads information exists in all time periods whereas there are gaps in other directed dyads for that time period. A second source of imbalance pertains to the fact that some recipient countries have failed to provide information to the European Council in a certain year.

The standard assumption of the PCSE model is that errors are contemporaneously correlated and that each unit of observation (directed dyad) has its own variance (panel-level heteroskedasticity). Unbalanced data is suboptimal with respect to PCSE estimation because the technique requires balanced panels to impose both constraints, in other words, to estimate the coefficient for contemporaneous serial correlation and panel-specific disturbances. Opting for piecewise deletion to obtain balanced panels results in considerable loss of information. Consequently, I opt for the hetonly (heteroskedasticity only) option in Stata that enables the relaxation of the contemporaneous correlation assumption.93

3.5 Empirical Results

Analysis of Visa Restrictions

93 Alternatively, PCSE is also possible by relaxing the panel-level heteroskedasticity assumption via the independent option; this specification lends parallel results. It is important to note here however that a problem with not accounting for contemporaneous correlation is failing to control for dyads that might be serially correlated whereas others are not. LaGrange Multiplier tests for serial correlation were insignificant; however, the power of these tests is limited by the unbalanced panel nature of the data. Therefore the results from PCSE should be interpreted with caution. I have also run fixed effects with unit-specific time trends; while the individual t-tests on coefficients failed to yield significance, the direction of the coefficients paralleled those presented here.
I begin by displaying a table of summary statistics which allows an overall glance at the data in the first part of the empirical section. The table displays the mean, standard deviation, and ranges for the dependent variable (visa restrictions), the main independent variables, and controls described above.
Table 3.1: Summary of Variables and Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa Restrictions of recipient against origin</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Concerns</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global terrorism (sum of attacks by citizens of origin)</td>
<td>11.77</td>
<td>30.74</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>245.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted terrorism (sum of attacks against recipient)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>149.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Interdependence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment (flow) % of GDP</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>25.30</td>
<td>-2.90</td>
<td>297.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net FDI flows to recipient from origin</td>
<td>13.69</td>
<td>685.49</td>
<td>-4665</td>
<td>91558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's restrictions on capital mobility</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral trade as % of recipient country total trade (Rose measure)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>81.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russett Average Dependence</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Push and Pull Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's regime type (Polity IV score)</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>-10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's restrictions on political freedom</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's GNI per capita (logged)</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>10.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed political conflict in origin country</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's restrictions on civil liberties</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's regime type</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>-10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's tourism revenue as percent of exports</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>15.41</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>70.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic Attributes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in wealth (GNI/per capita differences)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>12198.28</td>
<td>-43357.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity (Modified direct contiguity score)</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional ties (shared region)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial link</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared civilization</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial dispute dummy</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized interstate dispute in past decade</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I now turn to the logistic regression results. Analysis will proceed in two stages, first focusing on trade and next, capital interdependence as the economic dimension in
states’ decision-making. In both cases, I attempt to distinguish between the effects of global and targeted terrorism terms by including them in separate models.

Table 3.2 reports logistic regression results for visa restrictions as the dependent variable. Logit coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses beneath; statistical stars of significance are shown for conventional levels of significance. The first two models illustrate the effects of origin states’ nationals’ involvement in global terrorism; in contrast, the last two models show the impact of targeted terrorism attacks by nationals of the origin state against those of the recipient. Models I and III employ controls for push and pull factors—attributes of origin and recipient states driving human flows—as well as controls for recipient’s domestic characteristics that might influence its visa policies. Models II and IV include dyadic characteristics suggested to shape how open the recipient’s borders are towards the origin.

94 For now, I do not report clustered standard errors because the data for visa restrictions is not panel. However, an argument could be made for the existence of within-dyad dependence; errors would be correlated within dyads (but independent across) insofar as there is reciprocity in visa policies. This calls for clustering by dyad; I obtain parallel results when doing so, but do not present them here. Additionally, Neumayer 2006 contends that such reciprocity is only prevalent in a subset of cases—for developed countries and controls for shared civilization and economic development in part to account for that.

95 There is a debate in the literature on the utility of presenting stars or probability values; because four models are presented in one table, I find it more efficient to present stars with standard errors beneath logit coefficients. Additionally, there is further debate on the meaning and functionality of standard errors. If the data exhaust the population, standard errors lend information on the consistency of the statistical relationship within the data rather than on the true population parameters. Because the data for visa restrictions consists of all pairings of countries and independent territories for 2004, it might be argued that the data does in fact approach the universe of cases for this time period. See Bollen 1995.

As can be seen in Table 3.2, the results are highly robust to the types of controls employed and somewhat consistent across all models. As expected, in all models, trade ties exert a negative direct impact on visa restrictions as well as having an indirect effect by weakening the effect of concerns over transnational terrorism. With a large sample size, variables tend to be statistically different from zero but their substantive significance may be small; I later provide predicted probability tables to assess the impact of my main independent variables on the probability of visa restrictions. Furthermore, the Wald test statistic for overall model significance provides confidence in overall model fit. I now turn to the discussion of individual hypotheses in light of the results presented in Table 3.2

To begin with, Models I and II show a highly significant and positive effect for the impact of origin states’ nationals’ ties to global terrorism incidents. In line with Hypothesis 3.1, in the absence of trade ties, security concerns over global terrorism increase the propensity of recipient countries to impose visas on nationals of countries with a reputation for involvement in terrorist incidents in other states. Let us consider Hypothesis 3.2: we observe that the signs on the coefficients of targeted terrorism are in the hypothesized direction. Comparing the models employing targeted terrorism (Models III and IV) to those that include global terrorism (Models I and II) we note that the substantive impact of targeted terrorism is also comparatively higher than that of global terrorism. The joint effect of targeted terrorism and trade interdependence is
significant at the 0.001 level and demonstrates that, targeted terrorism dominates the interaction in an adverse security context.

Let us now consider the more theoretically interesting contention that economic interdependence modulates the impact of security concerns on visa policies. The indirect effects of trade ties are captured by the interaction terms Bilateral Trade*Global Terrorism in Models I and II and Bilateral Trade*Targeted Terrorism in Models III and IV. The negative sign on the coefficient for the two interaction terms across Models I and II lends support to Hypothesis 3.4i; the coefficients are statistically significant at 0.000 levels in all models. Substantively, this entails that trade interdependence not only functions as a determinant of liberal visa policies in a benevolent security context but also attenuates the positive impact of concerns over global terror on restrictive visa policies. Considering targeted terror, although the individual coefficients on the interaction terms in Models III and IV do not obtain conventional levels of significance97, the F-test of joint significance for the targeted terrorism and interaction terms reveals that these terms are significant at the 0.001 level, lending support for Hypothesis 3.4i.

To reiterate, we observe that interdependence significantly undercuts the effect of global terrorism, conferring support for Hypothesis 3.4i. However, setting trade levels to zero indicates that for low-trade dyads, global terrorism has a positive impact on the probability that visas will be imposed by the recipient state. This is indicated by

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97 The lack of significance of the individual coefficients is also attributable to the fact that t-tests on these variables are based on one-unit change in the variable. Because the variables of interest are more than one unit, global tests of significance are more informative.
the positive sign on the global terrorism term: the impact of global terrorism is limited to
dyads characterized by low levels of interdependence. In contrast, given targeted
terrorism, the impact of interdependence is circumscribed to low-terror dyads. Given a
security context characterized by low terrorism, trade ties have a negative effect on the
probability of visa restrictions and are able to temper concerns over targeted terror, in
accordance with Hypothesis 3.3 and 3.4i. In sum, interdependence has a substantively
dominant causal effect when modulating global terrorism; in contrast, terrorism emerges
as the predominant factor when interacting trade interdependence with targeted
terrorism.

Turning our attention to the control variables, we can observe that most are in
the hypothesized direction and statistically significant. More specifically, civil conflict in
origin countries acts as a push factor in motivating emigration from these countries.
Consistent with the migration literature, certain attributes of origin states make them
less likely to face visa restrictions: democratic regimes and economic development are
two primary factors. Furthermore, in line with literature and intuition, democratic
recipients and/or recipients scoring high on civic freedom are less predisposed to pursue
stringent visa policies.

Models II and IV might be considered dyadic models in including only controls
pertaining to the recipient-origin pair that might influence visa policies in a certain
direction. Joint democracy and civilizational links make for open borders, as suggested.
In contrast, greater differences in economic development, operationalized as GDP/capita income increase the propensity of recipient countries to impose visas on origin’s nationals, illustrating that nationals of poorer countries have more limited access to foreign space. The insights from the literature on contiguity suggest that shared borders increase cross-border flows but implications for border controls vis-à-vis flows of people are more ambiguous. The results demonstrate, however, that higher levels of contiguity (or proximity) decrease the propensity for recipients to impose visa controls. Finally, an insight emerging from recent work on the role of borders as institutions of exchange is that past or extant territorial disputes disrupt cross-border flows and render closed borders more likely. The positive sign on the territorial disputes dummy is in line with this notion but fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.

---

98 Neumayer 2006.
Table 3.2: Visa Restrictions, Terrorism, and Trade Interdependence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistic Regression Results</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th>Model IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef./se</td>
<td>Coef./se</td>
<td>Coef./se</td>
<td>Coef./se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism Incidents</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Trade</td>
<td>-0.087***</td>
<td>-0.070***</td>
<td>-0.086***</td>
<td>-0.081***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Trade*Global Terror</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism Incidents</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Trade*Targeted Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict in Origin</td>
<td>0.265***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Democracy</td>
<td>-0.083***</td>
<td>-0.083***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's GNI per capita</td>
<td>-0.308***</td>
<td>-0.301***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's Democracy</td>
<td>-0.058***</td>
<td>-0.058***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's Freedom</td>
<td>-0.115***</td>
<td>-0.117***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's Tourism Revenue</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>-0.026***</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Liberal State</td>
<td>-1.115***</td>
<td>-1.112***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Civilization</td>
<td>-1.452***</td>
<td>-1.460***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Dispute</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.488</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity Score</td>
<td>-0.162**</td>
<td>-0.160**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.484***</td>
<td>1.696***</td>
<td>5.473***</td>
<td>1.759***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-statistic: 2106.993  1980.961  2043.990  1944.244
Wald test: 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
number of cases: 22057.000  17539.000  22057.000  17539.000

standard errors in parentheses
two-tailed tests employed
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 3.2 employed a measure of economic interdependence that reflects the significance of bilateral trade for the recipient country’s trade portfolio. An alternative operationalization takes as its basis Russett and Oneal’s measure of trade (inter)dependence as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). I diverge from the Russett and Oneal measure by employing a directed trade dependence variable and accounting for the recipient state’s trade dependence on the origin state. In that sense, the measure utilized in Table 3.2 might be narrower in measuring bilateral flows of goods as a proportion of recipient’s trade volume and the Russett and Oneal measure broader in taking into account the size of the recipient’s economy.

Table 3.3 presents results with the alternate specification for economic interdependence. The results reported in the following table reflect two additional specification decisions, both of which target the possibility that visa policies are characterized by reciprocity between states. I address this possibility in two ways. First, I cluster standard errors by dyad; this allows for non-independence within the dyad. Second, I run the analysis on a subset of cases: because previous work suggests that reciprocity is prevalent within OECD and/or high income countries, I present results

[102] AT this point it is worth mentioning the debate targeting measures of trade dependence, especially with respect to missing data. Because some countries do not report their trade to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade data suffers from a missingness problem. Scholars differ in their treatment of this problem; Barbieri 1996 deletes missing data whereas Oneal and Russett impute zero values for missing cases. For the purposes of this chapter, I follow their example. However, recently scholars have argued in favor of multiple imputation (MI) methods to treat missing data; see for instance Ibid; King et al. 2001. Supplementary results exist with imputed trade values but require further analysis and cleaning for analysis and presentation.
excluding this subset from the analysis. Models V through VII employ the directional
dependence term; Model V reports clustered standard errors. Models VI and VII
replicate the models in Table 3.2 by controlling for push and pull attributes within the
dyad and for dyadic characteristics, respectively, but restrict analysis to non-OECD/high
income dyads. Finally, Model VIII reintroduces the bilateral trade measure from the
first set of models and reruns the model with the targeted terrorism term for non-OECD
countries.

To begin with, we note that the targeted terrorism term does appear in the
predicted direction and except in model V achieves statistical significance. This offers
support for the targeted terrorism effect proposed in Hypothesis 3.2; previous terrorist
attacks by nationals of origin states against citizens of recipient countries make it more
likely that recipients will impose visa controls against these states.

Hypothesis 3.1 achieves strong support in that global terrorism is robust to
model specification.\textsuperscript{103} We can further infer from the table that restricting the analysis to
less economically developed and non-OECD countries accentuates the targeted
terrorism effect. Moreover, the final model in the table which reintroduces the bilateral
trade measure of economic interdependence demonstrates that targeted terrorism is
positive and significant for non-OECD dyads. This lends support to the notion of
reciprocity in border policies within economically developed dyads. Furthermore, the

\textsuperscript{103} Due to limitation of space and because the goal of Table 3.3 is to further explore the impact of targeted
terrorism on visa policies, I do not present the results for the global terrorism models here.
results reaffirm the conclusion that interdependence modulates fears over targeted terrorism given a benign security context (low levels of terrorism).

Lastly, models V, VI, and VIII employ controls for push and pull factors discussed earlier whereas model VII focuses on dyadic attributes for non-OECD pairs. These controls are included in an effort to rerun the models in Table 3.2 for the subset of less economically endowed countries in order to focus on the impact of directed terrorism. The signs and significance of the controls parallel the results obtained in Table 3.2. Importantly, regardless of the set of controls included, targeted terrorism attacks increase the propensity of recipient countries to pursue visa restrictions against origin country nationals.
Table 3.3: Visa Restrictions and Targeted Terrorism Reexamined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model V</th>
<th>Model VI</th>
<th>Model VII</th>
<th>Model VIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism Incidents</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.375*</td>
<td>0.602**</td>
<td>0.383**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td>Dependence*Targeted Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.723+</td>
<td>-1.073</td>
<td>-1.103</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
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<td>Economic Dependence</td>
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<td>0.122</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>-0.177***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>Bilateral Trade</td>
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<td>-0.177***</td>
<td>0.075</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict in Origin</td>
<td>0.246***</td>
<td>0.269***</td>
<td>0.304***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Democracy</td>
<td>-0.087***</td>
<td>-0.073***</td>
<td>-0.072***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's GNI per capita</td>
<td>-0.399***</td>
<td>-0.308***</td>
<td>-0.253***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's Democracy</td>
<td>-0.130***</td>
<td>-0.092***</td>
<td>-0.056***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>-1.659***</td>
<td>-1.584***</td>
<td>-0.232***</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity Score</td>
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<td>-0.279***</td>
<td>-0.232***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
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<td>-0.038***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient Liberal State</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference in GDP per capita</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Civilization</td>
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<td>-1.186***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militarized Dispute</td>
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<td>0.175</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's Freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.046***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's Tourism Revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>4.932***</td>
<td>1.424***</td>
<td>4.414***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chi-statistic</td>
<td>2958.906</td>
<td>1941.810</td>
<td>986.714</td>
<td>963.751</td>
</tr>
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<td>Wald test</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of cases</td>
<td>22802.000</td>
<td>19610.000</td>
<td>15378.000</td>
<td>18949.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses under regression coefficients
Significance reflects two-tailed tests
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Variables of interest in **Bold**
In sum for models involving non-OECD dyads, both the direct and indirect effects of economic interdependence are contingent on the set of controls included. These findings point to the possibility that the hypothesized effect of trade ties on border policies is weaker for dyads that are less economically developed. For these cases, security concerns outweigh constraints imposed by economic interdependence. Restricting the sample to less developed countries also accentuates the influence of targeted terrorism, once again underscoring the notion that targeted terrorism overwhelms the effect of interdependence in increasing the probability of visa restrictions.

I now proceed to testing Hypothesis 3.4ii, namely, the proposition that capital interdependence influences how open borders are. The first three models presented in Table 3.4 focus on the impact of global terrorism and the final two on targeted terrorism on visa restrictions; the final model focuses exclusively on the subset of less economically developed non-OECD countries. The series of models presented employ three different indicators of capital interdependence; in Model IX and XIII, I use a (monadic) measure of foreign direct investment (FDI) as percent of the recipient’s GDP; in both models, I include interaction terms for global and targeted terrorism, respectively. In Models X and XII, I use a dyadic measure of FDI that captures net FDI flows to recipient from the origin country. Finally, Model XI introduces a measure for
the recipient state’s degree of openness to capital flows; a 4-point measure that indicates increased openness. As before, robust standard errors are used to account for country specific heteroskedasticity. All models include controls for both push and pull factors as well as dyadic attributes such as contiguity, extant disputes, and regional ties.

Reassessing the impact of global terror on visa restrictions in light of the results in Table 3.4, we observe that the coefficient for global terror in the first three models displayed are all in the expected direction and weakly significant. The F-test reveals that the global terror and global terror*capital interdependence interaction terms are jointly significant, offering support for Hypothesis 3.1. The last two models presented report highly significant and positive coefficients for targeted terror. This is in line with Hypothesis 3.2: in the absence of capital interdependence, targeted terrorism has a pronounced positive impact on the probability of visa controls. Paralleling the results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the impact of targeted terrorism is markedly higher than that of global terrorism

Turning our attention to the effect of capital ties, we note that the results differ according to the measure used to capture capital interdependence. In Model IX, the recipient state’s openness to flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) exerts a negative effect on the propensity of the recipient to impose visa controls. This lends support to Hypothesis 3.3 in illustrating that capital interdependence complements the impact of trade in driving liberal border policies. Similarly, this notion is further bolstered by
Model XI. This model includes an ordinal measure for the recipient’s openness to capital flows where a higher score denotes the absence of restrictions on capital and current accounts and on the exchange rate. The negative sign on the coefficient for this term indicates that the absence of restrictions entails more liberal visa policies when terrorism is set to zero. This finding is of theoretical relevance as the securitized interdependence framework suggested that a state’s openness—and consequent vulnerability—to capital markets might render it more reluctant to pursue closed border policies for fear that its economic partners retaliate.

However, the results must be interpreted with caution in that the measure taps the salience of FDI for the recipient’s economy and does not speak to the commercial relationship pertaining to the dyad. This leads me to model capital interdependence at bilateral FDI flows, which effectively measures capital ties within the dyad. Models X and XI report the models with the net FDI flows included; unfortunately, in neither model does this term achieve conventional levels of significance. Furthermore, in both models, the sign of the coefficient is in the opposite direction. Although this weakens the support lent by the models in Table 3.4 for Hypothesis 3.3 on economic interdependence, the change in signs on the measures of capital interdependence might also stem from the ambiguous direct relationship between capital flows and migration. More specifically, scholars of migration disagree on whether capital and migration
function as complements or substitutes, suggesting that the direct association between flows of money and people is contingent on a host of other factors.¹⁰⁴

Because all models include a capital interdependence*terrorism interaction term, the measures of capital interdependence illustrate the effect of capital ties in the absence of transnational terrorism. Hypothesis 3.4ii, however, focuses on the indirect effect of capital ties and contends that parallel to the effect of trade ties, capital interdependence will weaken the impact of security concerns on border policies. The first three models in Table 3.4 present evidence in favor of this type of effect given global terrorism. The negative sign on the coefficient for the recipient’s FDI inflows in Model IX, bilateral FDI in Model X, and finally, capital openness in Model XI are all in the expected direction and statistically significant. This points to the fact that even given different operationalizations of capital flows, capital ties do in fact shape responses to transnational terrorism. The last two models focusing on the effect of targeted terrorism are inconclusive as to the interaction effect.

In light of the fact that the effect of targeted terror is substantively significant and positive, these findings mirror those obtained for trade interdependence, in the presence of targeted terrorism. The results suggest that capital ties fail to allay security concerns if targeted terrorism is high; in that scenario, regardless of levels of interdependence, the effect of targeted terrorism remains dominant. In contrast, for dyads enjoying a benign

¹⁰⁴ Rudolph 2008.
security environment, capital interdependence decreases the probability of visa restrictions.

Finally, throughout the models the controls for push and pull factors behave as expectedly. Thus, poorer and undemocratic countries are more likely to face visa restrictions and democratic recipients are more likely to pursue liberal visa policies. Dyadic controls are also in the expected direction: contiguity and shared region both decrease the propensity for visa restrictions. However, in contrast to the previous models, past disputes fail to exert a significant effect.

In sum, the estimated results in the first section provide evidence for the hypotheses in this chapter. In general the signs of coefficients are in the predicted direction; however, the substantive impact of the coefficients is small, given the large sample size.
Table 3.4: Visa Restrictions as Function of Capital Interdependence and Transnational Terrorism

Logistic Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model IX</th>
<th>Model X</th>
<th>Model XI</th>
<th>Model XII</th>
<th>Model XIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>Targeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism Incidents</td>
<td>0.001+</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflow as % of GDP</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.027***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global terrorism*FDI inflow</td>
<td>-0.017**</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism Incidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.147**</td>
<td>0.419*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral FDI*targeted terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.012+</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflow*targeted terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial openness</td>
<td>-0.066*</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financially open*global terrorism</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral FDI* global terror</td>
<td>-0.000*</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral net FDI (lagged)</td>
<td>0.014+</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's GNI per capita</td>
<td>-0.267***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-0.267***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Civilization</td>
<td>-1.447***</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>-0.789***</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized Dispute</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity Score</td>
<td>-0.318***</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>-0.254***</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's Democracy</td>
<td>-0.118***</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>-0.085***</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target’s restriction on freedom</td>
<td>0.151***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.127***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>-1.579***</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>-1.175***</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.58)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.059***</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>3.497***</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.219***</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>4.162***</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.862***</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>3.497***</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.162***</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>3.497***</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-statistic                                     3248.97  2416.179  1946.968  3890.67  2253.877
Wald test                                         0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000
number of cases                                   24261.00 26901  18989  26901  20196

standard errors in parentheses
Results reflect two-tailed tests.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Key independent variables in bold
Unlike in linear models, logit coefficients are not easily interpretable. The best way to explore the substantive impact of independent variables on visa restrictions is to compute their effects on the predicted probabilities of the dependent variable.\textsuperscript{105} Because the effects of logit coefficients on the dependent variable are contingent on the values of other regressors (that is, the probabilities are non-additive), a baseline category must first be set.

Table 3.5 calculates the predicted probability of visa restrictions across levels of transnational terror as trade and capital interdependence are allowed to vary from their minima to maxima. The first two columns of the table may be thought of as displaying ideal type categories by allowing observers to compare the predicted probability of visa controls for benign and adverse security contexts and different degrees of economic interdependence. The final column portrays the impact of interdependence in different security contexts (given zero or high levels of terror) by varying levels of trade and capital ties from zero to their maximal values.\textsuperscript{106} Thus, Table 3.5 offers another way to study the interaction effect between economic interdependence on the one hand, and concerns over security threats stemming from transnational terrorism, on the other.

In the hypothetical worst case scenario characterized by the absence of trade ties and a high degree of threat from global terrorism, the probability of visa restrictions is

\textsuperscript{105} Long 1997.

\textsuperscript{106} The high category for global terrorism corresponds to the maximum number of attacks. In contrast, with targeted terror as the independent variable, because insufficient observations do not permit the calculation of predicted probabilities the high category for targeted terrorism is established by setting the value to the 95\textsuperscript{th} percentile.
92.3 %. In the contrasting best case situation with a high level of trade interdependence and nonexistent global terror, the same probability is only 0.33%. Taking a look at the effect of targeted terror, we witness a similar and more striking contrast. A world characterized by a high number of incidents targeting host country nationals and zero trade ties produces a 99 % probability of visa controls against nationals of the origin state. The opposing ideal case defined by a high degree of interdependence and absence of incidents targeting the home state is characterized by a very low probability of visa restrictions: 0.57 percent. The contrast between ideal categories is in line with intuition and confirms our expectations regarding the joint impact of security concerns and trade ties.
Table 3.5: Predicted Probabilities for Visa Restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predicted Probability of Visa Restriction (%)</th>
<th>Changes in Predicted Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Terror High</td>
<td>Global Terror Zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Ties at Zero</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>88.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Ties at Max</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min to Max in Trade Ties</td>
<td>-91.64</td>
<td>-85.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Liberalization at Zero</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital Liberalization at Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terror High</td>
<td>90.64</td>
<td>88.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terror Zero</td>
<td>88.02</td>
<td>85.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARGETED TERROR</td>
<td>Trade Ties at Zero</td>
<td>Trade Ties set at Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terror High</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>83.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terror set to Zero</td>
<td>85.95</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min to Max in Trade Ties</td>
<td>-17.21</td>
<td>-85.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Inflow at Zero</td>
<td>99.84</td>
<td>99.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terror High</td>
<td>99.84</td>
<td>99.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terror set to Zero</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>53.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min to Max in FDI Inflow</td>
<td>-33.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The results are based on Model I in Table 3.2, Model V in Table 3.3 and Model XI and Model XIII in Table 3.4.

**All other independent variables are held at their respective means.

Turning to the effect of capital interdependence, the table brings to light several observations worth noting. With regard to the effect of FDI inflows, we note that despite the more modest impact of capital ties, a similar contrast exists between the worst case scenario of high targeted terror and zero FDI inflows (99.84%) and the ideal case of zero terror and strong capital flows (53.17%).

What is more informative, however, is the impact of economic interdependence on the change in predicted probabilities of visa restrictions, given a benign or adverse
security context. Taking a look at the first row, we observe that regardless of security context, increasing trade ties from zero to the maximum value results in a significant drop in the probability of visa controls; in fact, the impact of trade dependence is higher given high global terror. In contrast, in the case of targeted terrorism, the impact of economic interdependence is more pronounced given low levels of terrorism. When targeted terrorism is set to low, increasing trade interdependence from minimum to maximum values produces a sizeable drop in the predicted probability of visa restrictions of 85.38%.

Importantly, the results in Table 3.5 are in line with expectations: economic interdependence diminishes the impact of security concerns over terrorism. However, we also observe that this effect operates through different mechanisms when predicted probabilities of visa restrictions given global and targeted terrorism are contrasted. More specifically, the effect of interdependence is predominant when the interaction with global terrorism is considered. In contrast, terrorism has a more powerful impact when the interaction of economic interdependence with targeted terrorism is considered. Put differently, global terrorism drives visa policy towards stringency for states characterized by low levels of interdependence. Conversely, when targeted terrorism is considered, economic interdependence has a mitigating effect for dyads enjoying high levels of trade ties and bilateral FDI.
Caution is necessary however in drawing conclusions from changes in predicted probabilities. Because linear (additive) changes in the log odds produce nonlinear changes in probabilities in logistic regression models, at the middle-ranges, modest regression coefficients can yield substantive changes in predicted probabilities. In contrast, at extreme values of the regressors, log odds translate into smaller changes in probabilities.\textsuperscript{107} In other words, because the setup of Table 3.5 lets interdependence vary across its whole range, the striking changes in probabilities displayed by the table are partially attributable to the nature of the logit curve. That being said, these results provide further confidence in the claim that interdependence makes for more permeable borders with respect to human flows in spite of the security context but also illustrate that the impact is stronger for trade as opposed to financial ties. Furthermore, we can infer that the effect is also contingent on the type of security threat recipient countries confront.

**Visa Rejection Rates**

Before launching into the formal analysis, I provide a table of descriptive statistics. In Table 3.6, we observe that the dependent variable in this section, visa rejection rates, is a percentage varying from 0 to 100. We observe that in this sample of cases, on average, citizens of origin countries face a visa rejection rate of a little over 11\% from member states of the EU and Schengen area. While models presented in the

\textsuperscript{107} Aldrich and Nelson 1984.
subsequent pages parallel those in the first empirical section, there are a few important changes that need mentioning. The goal is once again to analyze the direct and indirect effects of interdependence and second, to compare the effect of global and targeted terrorism separately. To capture the latter concept, I utilize a different measure that counts the number of incidents by nationals of origin taking place within the territories of recipients over the last five years. This is to be contrasted with the targeted terrorism term utilized in the first empirical part which counted the number of incidents by origin nationals against the citizens of the recipient. Note that both tap into directed attacks against recipient states but do not overlap; thus attacks occurring within recipient territories might not always involve recipients’ nationals as victims.108

The models in the second set of analyses include controls for push and pull factors and dyad-specific characteristics proposed to influence visa policies but also introduce a few additional controls. First, the score for the political terror scale (PTS) is used to control for violence in the origin country, a variable proposed to function as a push factor. Second, I also control for unemployment in the origin as an economic push factor. Finally, some models bring in the visa restrictions dummy because visa rejection rates reflect reports collected at consulates in origin countries, allowing for the possibility that non-nationals of origin states are included in these rates. Beyond this

108 In fact, the correlation between the two terms, while positive, is weak at 0.15. The rationale for focusing on the alternate operationalization of targeted terror is guided in part by fewer data points for this set of analysis using the former directed term (targeted terror-citizens) and in part by the goal of demonstrating the impact of directed attacks from another perspective.
fact, recipients report rejection rates for origins whose nationals are not required to apply for short-term visas; in other words, for cases in which the dichotomous visa dummy would be zero. In fact, we observe that this is true for close to half of the cases in the sample. Additionally, instead of controlling for direct contiguity, the models in this set of analyses control for proximity by including a measure for the distance between capitals. The global terrorism term parallels the specification employed in the first section except that instead of summing incidents over time it captures the yearly number of attacks by nationals of the origin against those of the recipient in the previous year.

Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics for Analyses on Visa Rejection Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visa rejection Rate (%) (for dyad year)</td>
<td>11.13</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Independent Variables</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global terrorism incidents by origin nationals</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>110.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted terrorism incidents by origin nationals in recipient territory</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>234.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic interdependence (Average of dependa and dependb)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Bilateral FDI to recipient from origin in thousands USD PPP</td>
<td>-0.512</td>
<td>47.28</td>
<td>-7895</td>
<td>1319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controls</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to recipient as % of GDP</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>17.21</td>
<td>-82.89</td>
<td>522.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Push and Pull Factors</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourism revenues of recipient as % of GDP</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's Democracy (Polity 2 score)</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>-10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's unemployment level (as % of labor force)</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>37.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Democracy (Polity 2 score)</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>-10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Political Terror Scale (PTS)</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyadic Attributes</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difference in GDP per capita in dyad</td>
<td>-9643.86</td>
<td>14113.78</td>
<td>-51888.62</td>
<td>52690.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance between capitals</td>
<td>3521.91</td>
<td>2333.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>12347.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa Dummy</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.7 reports results for three models: robust regression with Huber-White standard errors, random-effects, and panel-corrected standard errors. The first column under each model type focuses on global terrorism and the second column on targeted terrorism; these terms are interacted with economic interdependence—bilateral net FDI—to account for the indirect effects of interdependence on visa policies.

Turning to Hypothesis 3.1 on security concerns as a predictor of stringent visa policies, we observe that this contention receives support from the positive and significant coefficient on global terror across all three models. Looking at the table, we note that in the absence of trade ties, for every global incident nationals of origin states have been involved in the visa rejection rate increases by a little over 1 percentage point in Model Ib and Model Vb and a little below 1% point in Model IIIb.

In the two models that address the time-component of the data, the coefficients are in the predicted direction but fail to achieve significance.109 These findings underscore the fact that parallel to the results obtained in the first section, the reputation origin states’ citizens have garnered for global incidents of terrorism compels recipient countries to pursue more stringent visa policies. Additionally, targeted terrorism has a comparatively larger impact on visa rejection rates (by about 3.7 percentage points) than global terror does. This supports the contention in Hypothesis 3.2 that recipients’ direct

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109 Arguably, the lack of significance might also be attributable to the fact that TSCS methods such as random effects or PCSEs impose additional constraints on data, which is problematic given a short time period. However, between-effects regression which takes into account only cross-sectional variation also failed to yield significant results.
experience with targeted terrorist attacks predicts stricter policies of border control. In sum, these findings echo the logistic regression results in illustrating that targeted terrorism and global terrorism both make for tighter visa controls but function differently.

Directing our attention now to Hypothesis 3.3 on the effect of economic interdependence, we observe that across all models, in the absence of terrorism (when global or targeted terrorism terms are set to zero), trade interdependence does in fact decrease visa rejection rates, as indicated by the negative sign on the coefficients. The effects also appear to be relatively substantial: varying from a little over 12 percentage points in Model Ib to over 32 percentage points in Model IVb. However, the coefficients are only statistically significant at the conventional level in Model IVb and significant at the 0.10 level in Models IIb and IIIb. Because all models employ interaction terms, the lack of significance pertain to the impact of interdependence when the terrorism terms are set to zero and cannot be interpreted as lack of significance for the direct (overall) effect of interdependence. In fact, a joint Chi-square test of the economic interdependence term and the interaction terms reveal that for Model Ib and Vb, these variables are jointly significant, bolstering our confidence in Hypothesis 3.3 that commercial ties predict more liberal visa policies, ceteris paribus.

Let us now consider the proposition put forward in Hypothesis 3.4i that trade interdependence weakens the impact of concerns over transnational terrorism on visa
policies. The negative sign on the dyadic trade interdependence*global/targeted terrorism interaction terms across all models in Table 3.7 provides support for this hypothesis. For Model Ib, for example, interdependence decreases the impact of global terror on the visa rejection rate by about 28.4 percentage points. Whereas global terror’s impact is positive given no trade ties in the dyad, economic interdependence weakens this impact. The coefficient on the interaction term is also substantial—negative 28.3—illustrating that for one unit of increase on the interdependence scale, the impact of global terror decreases by that amount. However, given that the economic interdependence term varies from zero to 2.65, we need a closer look at the interaction term to understand its substantive effect.

Looking at the linear combination of variables reveals that as economic interdependence moves past 0.045, the effect of global terrorism on the dependent variable becomes negative. Detailed summary statistics show that dyads enjoying levels of interdependence beyond that threshold value fall approximately into the 90th percentile; that is, only 10% of dyads have interdependence levels beyond this value. In other words, while economic interdependence does alleviate concerns over transnational terrorism across all dyads, global terrorism continues to exert a positive impact on visa rejection rates for dyads characterized by lower levels of interdependence.
Table 3.7: Visa Rejection Rates, Trade Interdependence, and Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>M Ib Robust</th>
<th>M IIb Targeted</th>
<th>M IIIb Regression</th>
<th>M IVb Random</th>
<th>M Vb Targeted Effects</th>
<th>M VIb Global PCSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism</td>
<td>1.195***</td>
<td>0.762***</td>
<td>1.170***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic Interdependence</td>
<td>-12.01</td>
<td>-9.066+</td>
<td>-27.859+</td>
<td>-32.300*</td>
<td>-13.35</td>
<td>-20.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.55)</td>
<td>(5.18)</td>
<td>(15.70)</td>
<td>(15.78)</td>
<td>(13.46)</td>
<td>(13.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence*Global Terror</td>
<td>-28.43**</td>
<td>-13.86</td>
<td>-29.470**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.34)</td>
<td>(9.39)</td>
<td>(9.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terror</td>
<td>3.624***</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(2.37)</td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence*Targeted Terror</td>
<td>-23.64</td>
<td>-15.74</td>
<td>-20.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.57)</td>
<td>(57.55)</td>
<td>(66.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows to Recipient</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin’s Democracy</td>
<td>-0.115*</td>
<td>-0.154***</td>
<td>-0.353***</td>
<td>-0.390***</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.151*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance between capitals</td>
<td>-0.000+</td>
<td>-0.000+</td>
<td>-0.000+</td>
<td>-0.000*</td>
<td>-0.000*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin’s Unemployment</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient’s Tourism Revenue</td>
<td>-16.89</td>
<td>-18.724+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.11)</td>
<td>(11.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa Dummy</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin’s Political Terror</td>
<td>0.666+</td>
<td>0.892*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.37)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(3.38)</td>
<td>(3.38)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-statistic: 212.80, Wald test: 0.000, number of cases: 2505.00

standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Variables of interest in **Bold**
Similarly, in Model Vb, we note that the coefficient on the interaction term interdependence*global terror is substantial and significant. At low levels of interdependence, global terrorism increases visa rejection rates, for dyads characterized by stronger trade ties, this impact is attenuated, and for highly interdependent dyads, the impact is reversed. Beyond a threshold value, interdependence overwhelms the effect of origin’s ties to global terror, but only a subset of cases (approximately 10%) in the sample enjoy levels of interdependence beyond this value.

Finally, most of the controls are in the expected direction. Turning to the characteristics of origin countries we observe that as expected, democratic origins face lower visa rejection rates whereas origin countries with higher political terror scores face higher rates. When recipient state’s characteristics are considered, in line with intuition, a higher reliance on tourism as a source of revenue is negatively associated with stringent visa policies. The Polity 2 score for the recipient is in the correct direction but does not attain significance; this might be attributable to the fact that the sample of recipients are limited to EU and/or Schengen members where the democracy scores do not vary greatly. The proximity measure-distance between capitals—exerts an effect similar to that of the ordinal contiguity score in rendering visa policies less strict. Finally, the differences in economic wealth, although significant, are minimal and close in size to zero.
These findings suggest that the proposed effect of trade interdependence in Hypothesis 3.4i is more nuanced: in particular, the indirect effects of economic ties vary with the strength of the economic relationship; whereas interdependence attenuates the impetus towards border closure in response to security concerns, it obviates the effect of security threats in a subset of high-interdependence cases. To explore these ideas further, I now turn to the impact of capital ties put forward in Hypothesis 3.4ii.

Turning to the final set of models, Table 3.8 presents robust regression results for visa rejection rates; this specification was preferred in particular because FDI values are characterized by extreme values. I include two measures of capital interdependence: in Models VII and VIII, a dyadic measure for foreign direct investment (FDI) is used, in the next two models in Table 3.8, a state-level measure of FDI is included instead. In the final model in the table, Model XI, I include the state-level measure of FDI by rescaling it to exclude outliers. The bilateral measure of FDI captures net inflows (inflows minus outflows) from the origin to the recipient; the state-level measure weights total FDI to recipient by the state’s GDP. As before, I present results for both global and targeted terrorism terms; Models VII and IX focus on the impact of global terrorism while the other three models include the targeted terror term. All models include a set of controls for recipient country pull factors and origin country push factors as well as controls for distance and differences in wealth. Some models also include the dummy for visa
because visa rejection rates are reported regardless of the existence of short-term stay visa requirements.

Hypothesis 3.1 on the effect of global terrorism receives support from both Model VII and IX: the positive and significant coefficient on global terror, once again illustrates that recipient states respond to origin nationals’ ties to global terrorism with higher visa rejection rates. The effect of targeted terrorism, displayed in Models VIII and X, is in the direction predicted by Hypothesis 3.2 and again substantively higher, although the discrepancy is smaller than that observed in the first set of analysis. In a nutshell, these results are consonant with those obtained in prior models and portray that in the absence of commercial ties, fears over terrorism drive more stringent visa control policies. Additionally, the significance and signs of the coefficients on controls parallel those obtained in Table 3.7 with recipient’s reliance on tourism revenues and origin countries’ levels of democracy driving liberal visa policies.

Hypothesis 3.3 stated that economic interdependence will provide an impetus toward more liberal visa policies. Table 3.8 tests this proposition by looking specifically at capital ties as an element of economic interdependence. The results presented in the first two models in the table employing net bilateral FDI as a measure of capital interdependence lend support to this contention.
Table 3.8: Visa Rejection Rates, Capital Interdependence, and Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Global Foreward</th>
<th>Targeted FDI</th>
<th>Global Recipient</th>
<th>Targeted FDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M VII</td>
<td>M VIII</td>
<td>M IX</td>
<td>M X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism</td>
<td>0.225**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.283***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral FDI*Global Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.035*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net bilateral FDI inflows</td>
<td>-0.015*</td>
<td>-0.037***</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.913***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism</td>
<td>1.105**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.913***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral FDI*Targeted Terror</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Democracy</td>
<td>-0.104***</td>
<td>-0.103***</td>
<td>-0.076*</td>
<td>-0.080*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance between capitals</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient's FDI as % of GDP</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient FDI*Global Terrorism</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient's Tourism Revenue</td>
<td>14.864***</td>
<td>14.389***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.66)</td>
<td>(3.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa Dummy</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient FDI*Targeted Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.436</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.931***</td>
<td>5.695***</td>
<td>4.453***</td>
<td>4.599***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-statistic
Key independent variables in bold
Wald test
number of cases
standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Variables of interest in Bold
Judging from the negative and significant sign on the coefficient, in the absence of terrorism, greater net inflows of foreign direct investment from the origin to the recipient are associated with lower visa rejection rates. Note that the bilateral FDI term varies from a negative value to a positive (in thousands of USD adjusted for purchasing power parity) and that positive values indicate higher inflows of capital from origin to recipient whereas negative values denote higher outflows.

Zero on this term indicates absence of FDI in either direction. We see that when the terror terms are set to zero, higher net inflows predict lower visa rejection rates. The small magnitude of the coefficient on bilateral FDI is in part a function of the scale of the bilateral FDI variable; in fact, a one standard deviation increase in bilateral FDI (48.28 units, in thousands of USD), results in a decent decrease on the visa rejection rate by about 0.70 percentage points in Model VIII. In comparison, the state-level measures for FDI in Models IX and X are in the predicted direction but not statistically significant. This draws attention to the fact that given a benign security environment, dyadic capital ties exert a significant negative impact on visa rejection rates but that recipient’s overall openness to capital flows does not have a similar constraining effect.

Finally, evaluating the proposition in Hypothesis 3.4ii that capital ties decrease the impact of transnational terrorism on visa policies requires an analysis of the terrorism*capital interdependence interaction terms. At first glance, we note that
throughout the models in Table 3.8, the sign on the interaction terms are in the predicted direction. Models IX and X interact the state-level measure of recipient FDI with global and targeted terrorism, respectively. Neither of these interaction terms is significant, and the F-test reveals that the interaction term and FDI are weakly significant at the 0.1 level, highlighting the fact that state-level FDI emerges as a relatively weak predictor of visa rejection rates.

A Closer Look at Interaction Effects

We might say that tables of regression results with interaction terms provide limited information on the conditional impact of variables of interest. For one, the coefficients on the constitutive terms of the interaction variable cannot be interpreted as direct (average) effects; for another, the significance of the interactive effect is contingent on the standard errors of component variables. For example it is possible for the marginal effect of the independent variable on the DV to be significant across certain values of the modifying variable even when the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant. Hence it is hard to ascertain the range of values of either variable for which the interaction effect has a significant impact on the dependent variable.

These insights lead me to provide two figures: Figure 3.1 depicts predicted values of the visa rejection rate as trade interdependence increases in contexts

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110 Brambor 2006. For example the impact of X (terrorism) when the modifying variable Z, (interdependence) is set to zero can be directly observed from the table but the conditional impact for higher values of Z is harder to assess. More difficult to assess is the significance of the interaction term; one might wrongly assume from an insignificant coefficient on the interaction term that the modifying variable has no impact.
characterized by low and high global terrorism. Figure 3.2 portrays predicted values of the visa rejection rate across levels of trade interdependence given environments marked by low and high targeted terrorism.

Table 3.7 showed that the sign on the interaction term global terror*interdependence is significant and negative. The conclusion based on the results reported was that as interdependence increases, it weakens the effect of global terrorism on the visa rejection rate. A further conclusion had been that for non-interdependent dyads, global terrorism increases the visa rejection rate; in contrast, for highly interdependent dyads, the effect was reversed. This effect was to be contrasted with the impact of interdependence in the context of targeted terrorism. Given high levels of targeted terrorism, visa policies are stringent and the impact of trade and capital interdependence remains limited. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 visually sketch this contrast.

The overlaid graphs portray the impact of trade ties on the visa rejection rate across different security contexts. As the legend indicates, the blue line captures the effect of trade interdependence on the visa rejection rate whereas the red line displays the same effect for the context of high global terror. As can be observed, regardless of the security context, stronger trade ties result in a decline in the visa rejection rate. Importantly however, the effect is much more conspicuous in the context of high global terror, as demonstrated by the sharper slope and the negative sign on the interaction term.
Predicted Values for Visa Rejection Rates

Figure 3.1: Impact of Interdependence on Visa Policies Across Different Levels of Global Terrorism

*The graphs are based on Model IIIb in Table 3.7.
**The high category for global terror is defined by setting the threshold value to the 95th percentile (more than 13 incidents of global terrorism per year).

This is not surprising given that in the absence of trade ties, a negative security environment marked by a high degree of global terrorism, the predicted value for the visa rejection rate is approximately 20%. In contrast, in the absence of global terror and given zero trade, the rate is around 10%. Increasing interdependence from zero to its maximum results in a marked drop in the visa rejection rate for the high global terror
case: from over 20% to a little over zero. By comparison and in line with intuition, in the absence of global terror, the intercept is much lower at slightly below 10%. Of further interest, we can observe that trade interdependence remains more limited for cases characterized by a high degree of threat from global terror. This can be seen by comparing the range of values of fitted interdependence across the two security contexts. These figures are in line with the theoretical expectations put forward: even given perceived threat from incidents of global terrorism, interdependence reduces restrictions on international human mobility.

Turning our attention to the impact of targeted terrorism, we observe in Figure 3.2 that given an adverse security context defined by high levels of targeted terrorism, the negative effect of trade ties on the visa rejection rate is more modest. However, in a benign security context, the effect of trade interdependence is substantively significant. These observations reaffirm the contention that economic interdependence mitigates security contexts and drives visa policies in a liberal direction but this effect operates through different channels when global and targeted terrorism are compared.

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111 Note that the graph plots predicted values and not observed values. Therefore, actual values of zero visa rejection rates might not be observed but the zero predicted value derives from the fitted model. Additionally, because the dependent variable, the visa rejection rate, is in percentage terms, the graph was fitted over the range of values of interdependence that do not produce negative (nonsensical) predicted values for the rejection rate.

112 Trade dependence varies from zero to 2.65 but the fitted values
3.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

This chapter has shown that concerns over transnational terrorism generate an impetus towards visa restrictions; the ties of origin states’ citizens to global terrorist incidents prove particularly strong in driving stringent visa policies whereas targeted attacks exert a similar impact in a subset of countries. Hypotheses on the direct and indirect effects of economic interdependence are largely validated. Trade
interdependence and capital interdependence in the form of FDI as well as the absence of capital account restrictions emerge as predictors of open borders.

The crux of this chapter’s argument is that economic interdependence shapes border and visa policies indirectly by mitigating concerns over transnational terrorism. In most of the models presented in this chapter, the hypothesized effect is evident. Furthermore, the analysis of predicted probabilities in section 1 and the overlaid graphs in section 2 of the analysis showed that the impact of economic interdependence is somewhat nuanced. In particular, the impact of interdependence functions through different mechanisms for global versus targeted terrorism.

When *global terrorism* is considered, economic interdependence decreases the probability of visa restrictions and the visa rejection rate, as predicted, and decreases the effect of security concerns. The positive impact of global terrorism on the probability of visa controls and the visa rejection rate remains limited to low-interdependence dyads. In contrast, when the interaction of interdependence with *targeted terrorism* is examined, the effect of targeted terror remains predominant and the causal impact of trade and capital ties is dependent on the security environment. Given a benign environment (low levels of targeted terrorism), capital and trade ties exert the hypothesized mitigating effect only for dyads enjoying high levels of interdependence. This further demonstrates that while commercial ties do in shape security-seeking behavior, how they do so is contingent on the nature of the security threat states encounter.
The next chapter develops these ideas further by looking at another instrument of control over human mobility: asylum and refugee policy. An empirical study of asylum policies will shed further light on the nexus between economic interdependence and security concerns.
Chapter 4: Asylum and Refugee Policy in a New Security Environment: Old Concerns or New Fears?

Following the war between China and Vietnam and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, the international community bore witness to a significant refugee crisis, highlighted by the televised spectacle of Malaysian officials pushing boats full of people back to the South China Sea. This event gained international attention not only because of the tremendous upsurge in the number of refugees but also because of Thailand and Malaysia’s refusal to accept more refugees. Thailand, already under a sizeable burden of refugees since 1975 refouled over 42,000 Kampucheans and Malaysia was forced to turn away 30,000 boat people. The Indochinese boatpeople crisis epitomizes the image of “footloose masses roaming uncontrollably across borders”¹, underscoring the theme of erosion of state authority over unsolicited migration flows across their borders. The same event also paved the way for the organization of three refugee conferences in Geneva, Switzerland in 1979, drawing attention to states’ humanitarian obligations vis-à-vis refugees and asylum seekers.²

It is possible to list more recent examples of refugee crises that further testify to the importance of asylum/refugee policy in world politics. First, interstate warfare may prompt an exodus of refugees out of war zones. The flood of refugees fleeing Ethiopia to neighboring countries in the wake of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict is a case in point.

¹ Teitelbaum 1984, 430.
² Stein 1979.
More recently, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, Refugees International has recorded 1.5 million Iraqi refugees living in the neighboring countries of Syria and Jordan. Second, a refugee crisis may also erupt from domestic political ferment, underlining the international repercussions of intrastate instability. The mass migration of Cubans to the United States after the 1959 Cuban Revolution provides another example. In the latter case, the US policy of welcoming political migration from hostile communist countries also exemplifies the foreign policy lens through which asylum policy has commonly been viewed. Third, unsolicited migration across borders has implications for international politics because refugee communities may serve as a training ground for rebels and military combatants against origin countries, acting as a source of friction between recipient and origin states. As Salehyan aptly observes, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was closely tied to the growing strength and belligerence of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) insurgents, originally recruited from refugee camps in Lebanon.

These anecdotal cases demonstrate that the ties between refugee/asylum admissions and foreign policy are hardly new. What is novel, however, is the linkage of asylum/refugee policy to concerns over threats emanating from non-state actors. The new security environment is marked by the increasing salience of threats from individuals rather than states. While the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks did not exploit

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3 Gleditsch and Salehyan 2007.
4 Salehyan 2006.
5 Rudolph 2006.
the asylum channel, September 11 constituted a watershed event in heightening concerns over migration control overall, necessitating scrutiny over all channels of entry. To the extent that actors who cross borders as asylees or refugees imperil state security and accentuate perceptions of threat, we should observe a tightening of asylum/refugee admissions in the face of global terror.

The previous chapter provided evidence that origin country nationals’ ties to transnational terrorism translates into more stringent visa controls against these countries. At the same time, the chapter illustrated that commercial ties between states can temper perceptions of threat and make for more permissive visa policies. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, inquiring into where restrictions are placed—in terms of the dimension of migration and border control policy—should prove informative with respect to states’ sovereignty bargains. This chapter investigates the securitization of policies dealing with political migration. In doing so, it also inquires into whether the humanitarian ideals undergirding asylum admissions are reshaped by the war on terror. A major theme of this dissertation is that whereas concerns over non-traditional security challenges can compel states to reassert sovereignty at borders, economic ties can weaken or reverse this trend. As this chapter illustrates, interdependence is closely linked to more geopolitical and diplomatic concerns that have traditionally driven asylum and refugee policies. Consequently, the role of

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6 Salehyan 2008.
economic interdependence in shaping these policies is critically different than that of the mediating role it plays in visa policies.

The goal of this chapter is to illustrate how asylum and refugee policies are conditioned by the new security context. The central premise is that by constituting a separate upstream/deterrent measure, asylum admissions enable states to exert authority over who crosses their borders.\(^7\) In that sense, asylum/refugee policies complement other types of migration control and allow states to exert interdependence sovereignty. In constituting a deterrent vehicle of control over mobility, asylum admissions embody a parallel role to that of visa restrictions. That said, asylum and refugee policies occupy a separate category in part due to the traditional linkage to geopolitical/strategic concerns and in part to the humanitarian norms governing asylum and refugee recognition. For that reason, before delving into the hypotheses on asylum admissions, it is important to understand first, how asylum policy relates to states’ sovereignty bargains and second, how it has traditionally been linked to states’ foreign policy interests.

**4.1 Asylum Policy through the Foreign Policy Lens**

Asylum and refugee admissions offer another prism through which we might understand states’ sovereignty bargains. Flows of asylum seekers and refugees pose a challenge for state sovereignty in several distinct ways. First, along with illegal

\(^7\) Thielemann 2006.
migration, political migration comprises unsolicited flows of individuals across borders. In contrast to migration motivated by economic and/or touristic reasons, states do not stand to directly gain from such unwanted flows across borders. Unsolicited migration also directly relates to concerns over states’ diminishing capacity to control their borders. Although the prognosis of uncontrollable unwanted flows across borders might be somewhat overblown, rising numbers of asylum seekers do present a burden for states. In this context, it stands to reason that in addition to being concerned with the rise in numbers of asylum applicants, states are anxious over the relative distribution of asylum seekers and refugees. Given that lenient asylum/refugee policies might impose an unwelcome and disproportionate burden, tight asylum recognition procedures serve an attractive deterrent rationale.

Second, asylum seekers and refugees have presented a challenge for states’ control over borders by constituting an alternate channel for access to states’ territories. Asylum became an alternative avenue for migration as a result of tighter controls imposed by recipient countries, starting with the economic downturn of the 1970s. As destination countries switched to a policy of zero immigration, asylum seeking transformed into a means of circumventing rigid immigration quotas or arduous

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11 Thus, asylum and refugee policies constitute a deterrent instrument even though asylum seekers apply for refugee status after they have entered the recipient state’s territory. Asylum policies serve a deterrent function because stringent policies can thwart political migration and/or redirect it to states with more permissive policies.
application procedures.\textsuperscript{13} The 1980s witnessed the “jet-age” of asylum-seeking, particularly from postcolonial countries in Asia and Africa to Western democracies.\textsuperscript{14} Table 4.1 below details the numbers of asylum applications to industrialized countries by region and era.\textsuperscript{15} As can be seen, while asylum applications have shown a more or less steady increase through the period from 1980 to 2000, the post-2000 period is marked by a decrease in flows to United States and Canada.\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>201.16</td>
<td>368.97</td>
<td>673.67</td>
<td>773.27</td>
<td>586.89</td>
<td>220.81</td>
<td>2017.08</td>
<td>807.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>592.63</td>
<td>1125.17</td>
<td>2550.99</td>
<td>1933.4</td>
<td>2160.55</td>
<td>743.46</td>
<td>6301.59</td>
<td>2904.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>793.83</td>
<td>1495.63</td>
<td>3373.32</td>
<td>2751.78</td>
<td>2793.66</td>
<td>962.78</td>
<td>8414.55</td>
<td>3776.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The marked rise in the numbers of applicants coupled with the role of asylum as a back-door to destination countries gave rise to alarmist claims over the obsolescence of state authority over entry and expulsion of migrants. This phenomenon also has

\textsuperscript{13} Freeman 1995.
\textsuperscript{14} Miller and Martin 1982.
\textsuperscript{15} The aggregate data the first set of analyses is conducted on is not based solely on industrialized countries as destination states. However, there is considerable overlap between the aggregate and European samples. Appendix A provides more information on the list of recipients, top destination countries, and top origin countries.
\textsuperscript{16} Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004. This is consistent with the authors’ INS data for the United States as destination country.
necessitated a distinction between bona fide asylum seekers and bogus refugees as the prevention of false claims came to occupy an integral place in migration control.\textsuperscript{17} At the same time, weeding out migrants desiring to exploit the asylum route has come to be intertwined with domestic sovereignty: because mass influxes of refugees/asylees may overwhelm state capacity to deliver services to the public, governments of recipient states also face domestic pressure to only accept legitimate asylum seekers and refugees.\textsuperscript{18}

A third way in which asylum and refugee policy differs from other aspects of migration control is through the emphasis on humanitarian norms and international legal constraints.\textsuperscript{19} Whereas other aspects of migration policy are defined by the absence of an international regime that regulates policy\textsuperscript{20}, asylum/refugee admissions are subject to two core principles outlined by the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol.\textsuperscript{21} The principle of \textit{non-refoulement} enshrined by the Geneva Convention prohibits states from sending back legitimate asylum seekers and refugees to countries where they are likely to face persecution and torture (Article 33). The principle of \textit{non-discrimination} prevents denial of asylum against certain refugee groups (Article 3). The Convention and Protocol established the postwar refugee regime, defining a refugee as a

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} Neumayer 2005.
\textsuperscript{18} Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005. This linkage may be especially relevant for affluent welfare states where the provision of welfare to non-nationals places additional burden on the government and conflicts with the popular mandate.
\textsuperscript{19} Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004; Salehyan 2008.
\textsuperscript{20} Ghosh 2000; Koslowski 2004.
\end{flushleft}
person outside of his country of citizenship, confronting a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” Consequently, while states have been usually free to determine the number of economic migrants they are willing to accept, they face international legal obligations when it comes to controlling political migration.

The existence of an international regime regulating asylum and refugee admissions entails that asylum measures more than any other type of migration policy are conditioned by international norms. In that sense, humanitarian migration policy—the protection of individuals from violence—is governed by “principled beliefs.” To the extent that such beliefs shape policy, the rights of individuals may supersede the rights of citizenship, which are conditional on membership in the polity. The constraining effect of international norms may further be enhanced by their internalization by states. In fact, scholars have commented that domestic pressure to adhere to humanitarian norms in asylum/refugee admissions has come to be rooted in

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23 Although the Convention has matured into customary international law and is binding on states, consonant with the principles of international law, the right of asylum is not the right to gain asylum by the individual but of states to grant asylum. Consequently, states are free to grant asylum and to determine the conditions under which asylum will be granted. See Martin 1988. Currently 147 states are signatories to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol that extends the Convention’s scope. Additionally, all destination (recipient) states in the European sample and all but one (Tunisia) in the aggregate analysis are signatories to the Convention, the Protocol, or to both.
26 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.
domestic judicial institutions that have incorporated these norms.\textsuperscript{27} In another sense, international humanitarian norms might go hand in hand with a “rights-based liberalism” embedded in domestic institutions.\textsuperscript{28} As a result, even in the face of public restrictionist sentiment vis-à-vis economic migrants, in the area of forced/political migration, states are domestically compelled to honor their international commitments and act in accordance with human rights norms. Given a normative framework for asylum/refugee policy, we might expect that policy-making in this area reflects ideational—rather than strictly instrumental—concerns.\textsuperscript{29}

The above paragraphs paint a picture of asylum/refugee admissions as a category of migration control that is challenging to state sovereignty in unique ways. In a nutshell, states’ interdependence sovereignty is under threat because asylees may exploit the asylum/refugee system and also because large influxes of refugees may undermine popular sovereignty. States also find themselves delimited by ideational motives and international legal standards. Scholars also contend, however, that asylum/refugee policy has traditionally been tied to geopolitical and strategic concerns.\textsuperscript{30} Rosenblum and Salehyan empirically demonstrate that during the Cold War, United States’ asylum decisions were influenced by military ties and reflected an effort to

\textsuperscript{28} Hollifield 1992. Hollifield builds on the concept of embedded liberalism put forward by Ruggie 1998 to argue that liberal states may be domestically constrained when imposing stringent immigration controls.
\textsuperscript{29} Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004; Soysal 1994.
\textsuperscript{30} Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004; Salehyan 2008.
discredit communist regimes.\textsuperscript{31} Similarly, writing during the Cold War era, Teitelbaum argued that refugee admissions policies were guided by the belief that granting asylum discomfits and embarrasses origin country governments.\textsuperscript{32} They also show that strategic bias survived the end of the Cold War although the nature of the bias shifted with commercial interests and diplomatic ties beginning to shape asylum admissions. In general, states may instrumentally utilize asylum/refugee decisions to weaken origin country regimes by shaming and illustrating the perfidy of non-democratic regimes and/or by facilitating the creation of opposition movements in exile.\textsuperscript{33}

To summarize, states’ asylum/refugee policies encapsulate both ideational and instrumental goals and have ramifications for interstate relations. The increasing role of non-state threats and resultant transformation of the security context might necessitate a reassessment of the traditional ways in which asylum/refugee policies have been construed. I develop this idea further in the next section and provide the theoretical argument that forms the basis for the hypotheses in this chapter.

\section*{4.2 Asylum Policy in a New Security Environment}

In Chapter 3, it was argued that the linkage of human mobility to transnational terrorism has implications for states’ visa policies. How do concerns over global terrorism shape asylum/refugee policies? There are a number of mechanisms through

\textsuperscript{31} Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004; Rudolph 2006; Teitelbaum 1984.
\textsuperscript{32} Teitelbaum 1984.
\textsuperscript{33} Weiner 1995; Zolberg 1995.
which individual ties to global terrorism might create an impetus towards tight deterrent policies, indicating that asylum/refugee admissions are subject to a process of securitization that parallels other deterrent measures of migration control.

The first mechanism relates to the shift in security paradigm through which a sharper focus on the individual rather than other states as a source of threat emerged. Although 9/11 signified a turning point in tragically demonstrating that individuals can wreak considerable damage, concerns over terrorism and militancy resulting from uncontrolled migration had been on the agenda since the end of the Cold War. The resulting redefinition of national security might entail a finessing of asylum admissions to respond to individuals rather than their home governments as threats. What follows entails a change in the nature of (non-humanitarian) bias dictating asylum admissions; instead of reflecting geopolitical concerns, biases may be levied against particular individuals given ethnic and/or religious background. Salehyan surmises that the bias manifests as individual profiling and screening according to religious background. His argument is based on the premise that states rely on religious background as proxy for likelihood of security threats, in particular, for the possibility of individual ties to terrorist organizations. As Salehyan further notes however, religious background is a weak measure of security risks associated with individuals; hence, we might expect systematic bias against asylum seekers and refugees to arise directly in response to

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34 Levy 2005.
35 Salehyan 2008.
36 Ibid.
origin country nationals’ involvement with transnational terrorism. In both instances, destination countries are constrained by limited resources and depend on a quick means of screening high-risk individuals.

Second, the emerging migration-security nexus might blur the distinctions that exist between voluntary and forced migration. As the UNHCR has noted, “the distinction between… the refugee and the so-called ‘economic migrant’ is not always clear and definite” especially given that persecution and violent conflict in origin countries often overlaps with other push factors. In the face of preoccupation with global terrorism, states are likely to perceive all types of migrants as not only problematic for cultural integrity but threatening for national security. Especially given sensationalist press and media, the subtle—but crucial—distinctions between the refugee and the economic migrant might also fade in the eyes of domestic audiences. Furthermore, the linkage between asylum and terror is likely to weaken the power of humanitarian ideals with respect to asylum and refugee recognition. We might then expect a push towards more stringent policies across the board in all types of migration control.

A third consequence of the connection between terror and asylum seeking has been a trend towards increased reliance on the “exclusion principle” codified in the 1951

37 Loescher 2003.
Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{39} Given the aftermath of 9/11 the trend to rely more on the exclusion principle has intensified. This principle, articulated in Article 1F of the Convention, places individuals who have committed war crimes outside the protection of the international refugee regime. Denial of asylum on the basis of the exclusion principle is automatic and bypasses status determination procedures. The feeling of vulnerability engendered by global terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has reinforced the perception that the institutions of asylum are refuge for potential terrorists. Additionally, whereas domestic audiences might have been agnostic to strategic/geopolitical concerns that had influenced asylum policy in the past, global terrorism is likely to be a more visible issue for the public. As a result, at the same time that normative ideals recede into the background, states might be more likely to rely on the exclusion principle and quick to denounce the applicant as a potential terrorist.

The above mechanisms point to the possibility that recipient states are increasingly more likely to regard asylum seekers and refugees as potential threats with terrorist motives. This suggests that the desire to screen out these individuals constitutes an effort to minimize short-term risks to state security. Alternatively, states might also consider longer term dangers in admitting individuals from origin countries with a record for involvement in global terrorism. Scholars have elucidated that refugee flows may be destabilizing for host countries by exacerbating existing tensions in

\textsuperscript{39} Zard 2002.
recipient countries.\textsuperscript{40} In particular, diaspora communities emerging from refugee settlement may jeopardize social stability if sending states utilize them as instruments to further their own goals\textsuperscript{41} and/or if these individuals are unable to adjust economically and culturally to host countries.\textsuperscript{42} In other words, individuals granted asylum may become security-threatening over time. In particular, these individuals may be drawn into terrorism networks, particularly given preexisting sleeper-cells in host countries\textsuperscript{43}, especially if they fail to be economically and socially integrated into host states. It stands to reason that states would consider origin country nationals' ties to global terrorism in screening out applicants.

\section*{4.3 Hypotheses}

\textbf{Securitization and Asylum Policy}

We can infer from the above discussion that asylum and refugee policy might be subject to securitization in ways similar to other forms of human mobility. In the previous chapter, it was argued that states respond to the asymmetric threats posed by global terrorism by emphasizing the pre-selection and deterrent functions of visa restrictions. The previous section highlights the possibility that states confront a parallel

\begin{itemize}
  \item Salehyan 2008; Zolberg 1987. Whereas Salehyan's argument is about rebellion against origin country governments, diasporas can be destabilizing for host countries as well.
  \item Adamson and Grossman 2004.
  \item Huntington 1993.
  \item Neumayer 2005.
\end{itemize}
dilemma with regard to asylum and refugee determination procedures. Despite the distinctiveness of political migration, recipient governments are compelled to use limited resources, suffer from an information disadvantage vis-à-vis potential terrorists, and consequently are driven to screen out high risk category individuals. In that sense, asylum/refugee policy complements other dimensions of migration control. More specifically, the increasing emphasis on global terrorism is expected to engender a deviation away from policy motivated by normative humanitarian concerns.

Paralleling the argument with respect to visa controls, it is plausible to suggest that host countries factor in origin country nationals’ reputation for involvement in terrorism incidents in other countries.

**Hypothesis 4.1 (Global Terrorism):** Asylum applicants from origin countries whose nationals have been involved in global terrorism incidents will face lower recognition rates.

We might also imagine that securitization of asylum occurs through another channel: recipient states take into account targeted incidents by country nationals.

**Hypothesis 4.2i (Targeted Terrorism-Citizens):** Asylum applicants from origin countries whose nationals have targeted host country nationals in incidents of terrorism will face lower recognition rates.

**Hypothesis 4.2ii (Targeted Terrorism-Territory):** Asylum applicants from origin countries whose nationals have engaged in terrorist attacks against or within host country territory will face lower recognition rates.
These hypotheses lend a picture in which security concerns come to predominate at the expense of recipient states’ humanitarian obligations. Alternatively, we might contend that because asylum is the least attractive channel for entry into states’ territories, political migration is less likely to be securitized. Additionally, as elaborated on earlier, the international regime on political migration imposes limitations on states, limiting the power of instrumental motives and increasing the salience of humanitarian ideals.

**Hypothesis 4.3 (Normative):** Asylum applicants from origin countries with poor human rights conditions and/or characterized by political repression face higher recognition rates.

A further insight that emerges from the above discussion is that the September 11 attacks signified a dramatic change in the way that national security was defined. In other words, although decision-makers had previously tied flows of asylum seekers and refugees to militancy, crime, and terrorism, these linkages came into sharper focus following the 9/11 attacks. Beyond focusing on across-time variation, this effect suggests a crucial break with the past in terms of how asylum seekers are perceived, with origin ties’ involvement in transnational terror drastically mounting in salience.

**Hypothesis 4.4 (September 11 effect):** Applicants from origin countries whose nationals have been involved in transnational terrorism will face lower recognition rates in the post September 11 context than in the period before.

**Economic Interdependence, Commercial Interests, and Asylum Policy**
The touchstone of my theoretical argument is the notion that economic interdependence— in the form of capital flows and trade ties— modulates states’ strategies of control over human mobility. The impact of commercial interdependence on asylum and refugee policies might take a different shape, however, from the mitigating effect observed with respect to visa restrictions. In particular, previous literature has portrayed economic relationships as a measure of interconnectedness between recipient (host/destination) and origin states. The strength and significance of economic ties have been put forward as an indicator of positive linkages between countries. Because granting asylum acknowledges human rights violations in origin countries and may serve as a shaming device for origin country governments, it constitutes a diplomatically costly act. Moreover, an open asylum recognition policy towards citizens of an origin state might be discomfiting because host states may harbor dissidents against the origin’s regime. Given this logic, we would expect recipient states to embrace a prudent approach to asylum admissions towards nationals of economic partners. Therefore, rather than economic interdependence producing more permissive policies of control on the part of recipient states vis-à-vis economic partners, we would expect a negative relationship between economic ties and the leniency of asylum/refugee approval. As elaborated on in the theory chapter, capital as well as trade ties generate fears over expected losses from commercial activity; insofar as

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44 Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.
granting asylum comprises a negative signal against origin countries, both types of interdependence should render recipient states reluctant to pursue lenient asylum/refugee admissions.

**Hypothesis 4.5 (Trade Interdependence):** Trade ties between the recipient (destination) and origin states will decrease asylum recognition rates.

**Hypothesis 4.6 (Capital Interdependence):** Capital flows between the recipient (destination) and origin states will decrease asylum recognition rates.

The hypotheses above relate to the direct association between interdependence and asylum policy. My theoretical framework also emphasizes the possibility that economic ties temper security concerns. The literature points to two opposing pathways through which interdependence may condition the effect of transnational terrorism on asylum/refugee policies. On the one hand, scholars have contended that economic interdependence draws attention to states’ normative obligations and thereby tilts the balance towards asylum policy guided by humanitarian—rather than strategic—ideals. At the same time, the theoretical section posited that commercial ties may weaken perceptions of security threats from flows of individuals. Taken together, this entails that economic interdependence will weaken the negative effect of concerns over transnational terrorism and make for more lenient asylum admissions.

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**Hypothesis 4.7i:** Trade and capital interdependence will decrease the effect of origin country nationals’ ties to global terrorism on asylum recognition.

On the other hand, however, asylum/refugee policy is distinct in that the opportunity costs logic is constraining in the opposite direction. As discussed above, if states are motivated by instrumental goals, policy will be circumscribed by the desire to maintain good economic relationships. These processes suggest a competing hypothesis on the indirect effects of economic interdependence whereby security and economic concerns act in the same direction.

**Hypothesis 4.7ii:** Trade and capital interdependence will increase the effect of origin country nationals’ ties to global terrorism on asylum recognition.

### 4.4 Data and Methods

To test the impact of securitization of human mobility and the direct and indirect effects of economic interdependence on asylum and refugee policy, I conduct statistical analysis on two samples of data. The first encompasses 34 countries as recipient (host) of asylum seekers and refugees and up to 141 origin (sending) countries as source of flows and spans the years 1996-2007.\(^{47}\) The second subsample contains information for 17 European countries as host and up to 179 origin countries and covers the years 1980-

\(^{47}\) Data exists for up to 179 recipient states but data is jointly available for all independent and dependent variables only for a subset of these countries. Hence the aggregate analysis was performed on these 37 countries as host for refugees and asylum seekers. This results in considerable overlap in terms of recipient (host) countries in the larger and smaller samples. The impetus behind conducting the analyses separately is to exploit the longer time period for the subset of European countries for which data goes further back.
Appendix A provides a list of countries for analysis of both the aggregate and smaller samples.

The research design is dyadic and allows me to examine asylum policies that are specific to host and origin countries.\(^{48}\) This design is advantageous also because the list of origin countries differs according to the recipient; this difference introduces an intrinsic variation to the merit of claims recipients are compelled to consider. Consequently, a monadic design would not be sufficient for purposes of cross-sectional comparison because aggregate differences in recognition rates for host countries might in part be attributable to variation in sources of asylum and refugee flows.\(^ {49}\) Second, the dyad-year as unit of analysis is appropriate also because the goal of this chapter is to analyze first, whether and the extent to which origin countries’ ties to transnational terrorism shape asylum/refugee policies and second, the degree to which economic interaction alters this relationship.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable employed in this chapter is the asylum recognition rate which measures the percentage of claims from the origin country approved by the recipient (host) state. Asylum admissions—as opposed to refugee admissions—pertain to the recognition of claims by individuals after they have already traversed the host state’s

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\(^{48}\) I do not consider the unit of analysis the directed dyad; even though a country may appear as origin and host in the data, this is an exception in the data rather than the norm. Data consists of all origin countries listed as sources of refugees for that particular host (recipient) country.

\(^{49}\) Neumayer 2005.
borders. Beyond data availability issues, my decision to focus on refugee rather than asylum recognition is motivated by the observation that asylum claims impel recipients to make a decision about migrants’ fates whereas refugee admissions involve the selection of individuals from overseas by interested governments. The latter fact entails that states have more leeway in avoiding selection of refugees when faced with cases in which strategic and humanitarian motives come into conflict.\textsuperscript{50} Given this distinction, I believe that asylum recognition rates are better calibrated to capture the impact of security concerns and economic incentives.

As a further note, asylum admissions reflect the enforcement dimension of policy; in contrast, de jure policy embodies legislation on asylum and refugees. Paucity of dyadic data on de jure policy in part guides my focus on enforcement. Additionally however, Rosenblum and Salehyan note that de jure policy has predominantly been geared towards geopolitical concerns.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, it is plausible to presume that changes in legislation are slow and might not be well suited for testing the hypotheses on securitization.

Arguably, asylum recognition is not the only instrument through which recipient states may seek to monitor and deter refugee flows. Aside from using low asylum recognition rates to curtail flows of political migrants, states may in conjunction use a...

\textsuperscript{50} Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004. This might imply that states choose refugees based on one or the other dimension (strategic or normative), making it more difficult to assess the impact of security and economic motives when controlling for normative concerns.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
plethora of public policy measures to curb future influxes of refugees.52 To illustrate, European Union (EU) countries have signed safe third country provisions which result in automatic denial of an asylum claim if migrants have traveled through another country deemed safe for asylum prior to entering the recipient’s territory.53 Further examples of deterrent policies that stand out are integration procedures that circumscribe the social, economic, and travel rights asylum seekers are granted while waiting for their claim to be recognized. A host country that places constraints on free travel of political migrants, pursues a compulsory dispersal policy, and restricts the right to work of asylum seekers is likely to not be the destination of choice for migrants, at least insofar as political migrants engage in “asylum-shopping.”54

Data on such measures is very recent and limited and is geared towards recipient-level measures that are not appropriate for a dyadic design.55 However, as Neumayer incisively articulates, low recognition rates engender a political climate that increase perceptions of political migrants as bogus refugees and thereby enable governments to enact other types of stringent measures. Furthermore, the deterrent function of recognition rates is validated not only theoretically but empirically as witnessed for example by the shift in Sri Lankan refugee flows from Germany to the

52 Thielemann 2006.
54 The notion that political migrants may be motivated by reasons other than the desire to escape persecution and might thus constitute bogus refugees forms the basis of measures designed to thwart and redirect asylum flows.
55 So far only one study has been published with the data collected by Thielemann 2006 and research assistants. Although I was able to acquire the portion collected by one of the research assistants, the data does not capture the dyadic dynamics my research tries to tap into.
United Kingdom following the former country’s clampdown on refugee admissions.\textsuperscript{56}

We can conclude from these insights that low recognition rates not only capture recipient country’s efforts to thwart political migration but also act as a proxy for other types of measures that define how stringent or welcoming the recipient’s asylum/refugee policies are.

Having established the suitability of asylum recognition rates for the theoretical question at hand, a few remarks are now in order with respect to data sources and actual figures employed in the analysis. The data on asylum recognition rates has been collected from the statistical unit of UNHCR (United Nations Refugee Agency). The UNHCR statistical unit offers data on all states and independent territories that are destination countries for political migration or serve as sources of refugee flows. The online statistical unit covers the years from 1996 to the current year and provides hardcopy data to interested scholars on asylum policies of select European countries from 1980 onwards.\textsuperscript{57} Analysis focusing on the smaller sample of European countries as recipients uses data that builds on Neumayer’s work on European political migration and complements it with data compiled from the online unit.\textsuperscript{58}

In both the larger sample and the smaller sample focusing on European host states, I follow UNHCR practice in computing recognition rates as the number of

\textsuperscript{56} Neumayer 2005.
\textsuperscript{57} At the time of data collection the online data encompassed the 1996-2007 range; currently it has been updated to cover 2008.
\textsuperscript{58} Neumayer 2005; UNHCR2008.
decisions in which a claim is recognized in a year relative to the number of claims decided upon. As Neumayer states, this is different from the theoretically correct asylum recognition rate, defined as the percentage of recognized claims over asylum claims lodged that year.\textsuperscript{59} The distinction arises from the fact that many asylum claims are backlogged and not decided upon during the same period; hence, the rate employed by the UNHCR and in this chapter measures the successful rate of decisions (instead of the successful rate of applications). As a final note, the UNHCR’s statistical unit offers information on two (related but distinct) measures of asylum recognition: the rate of decisions granting full refugee status according to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the composite rate granting either full refugee status or allowance to remain in the host country. The theoretical distinction relates to the empirical pattern in which states increasingly resort to granting a lower protection status and are more prudent in granting full refugee recognition.\textsuperscript{60} Hence, the data on composite recognition exhibits more variability. However, because we would expect control variables pertaining to destination country economic conditions to exert more impact on full refugee admissions, I analyze my models using both types of rates but present only the results for the composite asylum recognition rate.

Before proceeding to the discussion of the independent variables, I present a graph depicting over-time changes in asylum recognition rates for the aggregate sample

\textsuperscript{59} Neumayer 2005.
\textsuperscript{60} Noll 2000.
and the European sample. As previously stated and illustrated by the figure, the aggregate sample spans the years 1996-2007 whereas the data for a select subset of European countries as recipients goes back to 1980. A first glance at variation over time in asylum recognition rates reveals that first, European rates follow a similar pattern to the mean rates in the aggregate sample. Second, the sharp decline in yearly asylum recognition rates in the European sample provides evidence towards a possible backlash by European recipient states in response to the surge in refugee flows in the 1980s. Third, asylum recognition rates for both the larger and smaller samples exhibit greater variability in the post Cold-War period. However, Figure 4.1 displays another conspicuous decline of short duration after 2001. The latter observation lends preliminary evidence towards the possibility of a significant change in the post-September 11 period, as proposed by Hypothesis 4.4. However, we can also note that the rates for both samples pick up quickly and show more variation towards the end of the range covered by the data. I examine the possibility of a structural break in the post 9/11 world more formally in the empirical section.

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61 The INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) records dyadic data for the United States beginning from 1983 but the data is not publicly available. See Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.
Independent Variables

Security Concerns

The previous chapter focused on transnational terrorism and drew attention to two channels through which concerns over terror could shape visa policies. In a similar vein, the security dimension explored in this chapter relates to origin country nationals’ association with transnational terror. I had posited that recipient states respond to both the reputation that the origin’s citizens have for worldwide involvement in terrorist incidents and to origin nationals’ involvement in incidents of terror specifically targeting their own citizens. The former I refer to as the *global terrorism effect* and use a variable that counts the number of incidents of transnational terrorism origin nationals have been
involved in as perpetrators. The latter mechanism I label the *targeted terror effect* and capture it by employing a variable that counts only incidents of transnational terror by origin country nationals against citizens of the recipient (host) state. A second operationalization of targeted terror counts the incidents origin country nationals have perpetrated in host country territory in previous years. Alternate models include lags of these measures or variables that sum global or targeted terror in the five years prior to the current year of asylum applications. Data for both variables come from the ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) database. To reiterate a distinction I drew attention to in the previous chapter, in order to qualify as a transnational incident, the attack must transcend interstate boundaries and/or involve victims and perpetrators of different nationalities. The use of the ITERATE data allows me to focus on the individual as the source of security threat in constructing measures of global and targeted terrorism; of substantive interest is the reputation citizens of particular countries have garnered for involvement in global or targeted terrorism.

**Economic Interdependence**

Theoretically, I expect two types of interdependence—trade ties and capital flows—to influence asylum and refugee policies. To operationalize trade interdependence, I code a variable that measures the recipient (host) state’s dependence

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63 The global terrorism term captures incidents by origin country nationals in other countries as well as the destination (recipient) state. To be counted in the ITERATE data and make it into the analysis, however, incidents have to be transnational; that is, victims must be of a different nationality than that of the perpetrators.

64 Mickolus et al. 2007.
on flows of goods and services from the origin state. More specifically the directed dependence term is the following:

\[
\text{Trade dependence} = \frac{\text{recipient's exports to origin} + \text{recipient's imports from origin}}{\text{recipient's GDP}}
\]

Trade dependence mirrors the trade interdependence terms employed by Russett and Oneal but differs from their work in using a directed dependence term instead of the lowest score for the dyad.\(^\text{65}\) An alternate coding measures trade salience as the ratio of dyadic trade to the recipient country’s overall trade value:\(^\text{66}\):

\[
\text{Dyadic Trade Salience for Recipient} = \frac{\text{(imports from origin} + \text{exports to origin)}}{\text{recipient's overall trade value}}
\]

The second operationalization parallels Rose’s measure of trade dependence but extends the data to encompass the 1980-2006 period by using the Correlates of War project (Version 2.01) data on monadic and dyadic trade.\(^\text{67}\)

To capture capital interdependence, I make use of data recently made available through OECD Outlook, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s statistical unit. This data is ideal for testing whether dyadic capital ties shape the recipient’s asylum policies vis-à-vis the origin’s nationals because in contrast to most other extant databases on foreign direct investment (FDI), this data includes

\(^\text{65}\) Gelpi and Grieco 2008; Oneal and Russett 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001.

\(^\text{66}\) It is also possible to distinguish between import and export dependence respectively. In the Correlates of War trade data, flow1 and flow2 correspond to imports and exports, respectively.

\(^\text{67}\) Barbieri 1996; Rose 2005.
information on bilateral FDI. The data comprises measures for bilateral FDI inflows and outflows for 62 OECD countries as recipients. I construct a variable that taps net bilateral FDI in terms of investment dollars by subtracting outflows from inflows to the recipient from the origin country. Alternate analyses disaggregate capital interdependence into inflow based as opposed to outflow based foreign direct investment. As a final note, the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 took into account possible endogeneity between visa policies and economic ties. Although there is some evidence that tighter visa policies do in fact present an impediment to commerce68, there is no analogous empirical work on asylum policy and economic interdependence. However, theoretically we might expect economic partners to retaliate by withdrawing capital and limiting trade, pointing to possible (type 1) endogeneity. To account for the possibility that current levels of trade and capital interdependence reflect such a backlash, I lag variables measuring trade and capital dependence.

As a further methodological note, measures of economic interdependence suffer from missing data points. As also articulated on in the previous chapter, existing literature has dealt with this issue in a number of ways: through piecewise deletion, by imputing zero values to missing data, and by multiple imputation techniques. For the

68 Neumayer 2009.
purposes of this chapter, I relied on the first two techniques but present analyses with zero-imputed data.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{Other Explanatory Variables}

\textbf{Humanitarian/Normative Concerns}

Hypothesis 4.3 contends that to the extent that asylum admissions are grounded in human rights norms, claims should be judged on merit. In other words, rather than strategic or security factors determining whether refugees from certain countries are recognized, the political context of the origin country should be an important determinant. Adverse political conditions in the origin state should increase the likelihood that refugees from that country are granted asylum.\textsuperscript{70}

I use a number of variables to capture conditions in the origin country. First, I include a variable for \textit{political terror}, taken from the Political Terror Scale (PTS), an ordinal score running from 1 to 5 where higher scores denote higher degrees of human rights violations in the origin country. The PTS includes two codifications, one based on the Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports and the second one based on the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human rights Practices.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{69} For the first treatment see Barbieri 1996. For the second see Russett and Oneal 2001. For multiple imputation on dyadic trade data see Gelpi and Grieco 2008. I acknowledge the drawbacks of analysis on zero-imputed data; I opted for presentation of results with this procedure mainly because case deletion of missing values resulted in loss of information. I hope to further extend and replicate results with multiple imputation (MI) techniques.

\textsuperscript{70} Neumayer 2005; Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.

\textsuperscript{71} Codification is according to rules as follows: “1. Countries . . . under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. . . . Political murders are extraordinarily rare. 2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. However, few are affected;
As a second way to assess the origin country’s political context, I include the Polity 2 score from the Polity IV database. As an index varying from -10 to 10, Polity 2 measures the degree of institutionalized democracy of the origin state; because autocratic regimes are less likely to guarantee political and civil rights, lower scores on this variable might be thought of as another way to get at human rights violations in the origin.

As a third way of tapping into the merit of asylum claims, I include a variable that measures the degree of violent conflict in the origin country. This variable is coded from the Uppsala Armed Conflict database, which records events that result in more than 25 fatalities as violent conflict. The updated version of the database includes a variable that varies from 0 to 2 and measures the intensity of internal conflict; the variable is coded zero for cases in which there was no armed conflict within the territory of the origin with more than 25 deaths. The rationale for including this variable is that...
insofar as humanitarian ideals shape asylum admissions, refugees that flee conflict-zones should be more likely to be granted asylum.

Recipient (Host) Country Conditions

A domestic-politics approach to migration would contend that recipient country conditions should condition how lenient or stringent policy measures should be. In particular, macroeconomic conditions have been posited as main determinants of the degree of closure to migrants in general. To assess whether the host’s economic context has an impact on recognition rates, I include the recipient’s GDP per capita (logged), in PPP dollars, the recipient’s GDP per capita growth in the previous year, and the recipient’s unemployment percentage. Both variables are derived from the World Bank’s WDI database, are annual, and span the 1980-2007 period for all destination countries of asylum. In principle, we expect financial downturns and a weak economic context to predict lower recognition rates.

The domestic-politics model also suggests that the openness of migration policy is in part a result of client politics, where policy is a function of the comparative lobbying power of pro and anti immigration groups. Although this literature does not distinguish between economic and political migration, scholars writing on asylum argue that right wing incumbents signify a shift of the median voter to the right.

77 Freeman 1995.
78 Neumayer 2005.
seeking right wing elites in turn pass stricter legislation to accommodate domestic preferences.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, regardless of political elites’ own preferences, a direct consequence of right wing incumbency is often less forgiving policy measures with respect to migrants. To that end, I include two variables, measuring the \textit{percentage of the right vote} and the \textit{percentage of right seats}, in national assemblies. Data for these variables comes from the Comparative Welfare State project, a dataset of social welfare measures for 18 OECD countries through 1960 and 2003.\textsuperscript{80}

As a further note, the literature on asylum and refugees suggests that destination states may resort to low recognition rates and tight measures as a response to an increasing burden of flows as pending applications become backlogged and bureaucracies face difficulties in handling an increasing number of claims. In order to account for an increasing asylum burden, I include a measure of the \textit{past year’s number of pending asylum claims} (logged) and in different models, a measure of \textit{the past year’s refugees as a proportion of the host country total population} coded from the UNHCR’s statistical unit. Intuition suggests that higher numbers of pending claims would exert a downward pressure on recognition rates.

Strategic Considerations

\textsuperscript{79} Downs 1957.
\textsuperscript{80} Brady et al., \textit{Comparative Welfare States Data Set} 2004.
Finally, there are a number of other strategic/geopolitical concerns that might influence asylum admissions. First, states have traditionally been reluctant to accept asylum seekers and refugees from countries with which they enjoy solid diplomatic ties. As elaborated on previously, asylum recognition acts as a hostile signal in shaming the origin’s government. To control for this possibility, I include a dummy for alliance ties between the recipient and origin states, coded 1 if any type of alliance exists within the dyad in that particular year. Data for the dummy comes from the Correlated of War project (version 3.03) dyadic alliances dataset.

Lastly, Rosenblum and Salehyan have illustrated that in recent years, strategic concerns have broadened to include fears over undocumented migration. More specifically, states have an interest in preventing the entry of individuals deemed undesirable. In this respect, asylum may be a “back-door” for such individuals who are inadmissible through other channels of entry, especially for individuals who would attempt to cross borders illegally. With that in mind, I include a dummy variable for the threat of undocumented migration from the origin state, coded 1 if the origin appears in the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) list of countries listed as sources of undocumented migration. As a second means of addressing fears over entry of undesirables, I include a score for the origin country’s tier placement as source of

82 Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.
84 This measure also appears in Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004. The INS codings are based on the 1987 and 1989 reports.
human trafficking. This measure is coded from the U.S. Department of State’s tier categorizations of countries and varies from 1 to 3, with higher tiers indicating a greater threat of trafficking from that country.85

Methodology

I rely on two types of estimation techniques to accommodate the across-time and cross-sectional (TSCS) nature of the data. Because it is necessary to determine the sensitivity of results to different models, I discuss two basic alternatives and relevant modifications here. Additionally, as analysts of TSCS and/or panel data have noted, this type of data is plagued with two major issues: groupwise heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.86 Both models employ the (feasible) least squares (FGLS) estimator to correct for an error structure that is not homoskedastic by transforming the covariance-variance matrix.87

Fixed Effects

85 http://www.state.gov/g-tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/82802.htm
86 Beck and Katz 1995; 2001. The authors distinguish between TSCS and panel data based on the length of the time period T; temporally dominated data of more than 20 time points is referred to as TSCS and is subject to other issues that pure time series data are vulnerable to: non-stationarity and autocorrelation being primary examples. The aggregate analysis comprises 11 time points and is thus panel-dominated. The data on European recipients has 27 time points and may be considered TSCS data, according to the Beck and Katz categorization. The issue at hand has less to do with categorization than with the types of problems characterizing the data. Relevant formal tests and results will be discussed in the empirical analysis section.
87 Greene 1997.
One approach to modeling panel heteroskedasticity is by explicitly estimating individual level effects by including dummy variables for each grouping.\(^8^8\) The model estimated is:

\[
y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta_1 x_{ijt} + \epsilon_{ijt}
\]

where

\[
\epsilon_{ijt} = \mu_i + \omega_j + v_{ijt}
\]

In this model, the subscript “i” refers to the recipient country-specific effects, j to the origin country effects and t to time. \(X\) signifies the vector of explanatory factors.

In the fixed effects model, the error term is decomposed into an element capturing latent effects particular to the destination (recipient country), and unobserved effects pertaining to the origin country.\(^8^9\) The remaining component is distributed normally. The advantage of the fixed-effects model is that attributes of countries that are not directly modeled can be controlled for through the (implicit or explicit) inclusion of country dummies. However, a drawback of the fixed effects approach is that it does not permit the effects of time-invariant regressors to be estimated as these variables would be collinear with the unit-specific fixed effects.\(^9^0\) Furthermore, fixed effects force the analyst to focus solely on within-unit variation while removing cross-sectional variation.\(^9^1\) Moreover, although consistent, they are inefficient, especially given small

\(^8^8\) The Stata 8 xtsuite which estimates fixed effects via FGLS suppresses unit-level constants through unit-centering.

\(^8^9\) \(\mu\) and \(\omega\) respectively.

\(^9^0\) Beck and Katz 2001; Maddala 1998.

\(^9^1\) Green et al. 2001. The authors note that the fixed effects approach is akin to assuming that the analyst should only take into account quasi experimental evidence from interrupted time-series analysis.
samples. As a result, variables that do not exhibit much over-time variation are not likely to be significant. 92 These caveats are problematic to the extent that the model relies on time-invariant variables and also to the extent that we are interested in examining variance across dyads. An alternate means of modeling unit-level heterogeneity is the random effects approach, which allows a weighted estimation of within and between variance.93 The model estimated here is the following, where the unit-specific error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors.

\[ y_{it} = \alpha + x_{it}\beta + v_i + \epsilon_{it} \]

Although I include models with random effects given the aforementioned caveats of this approach, the Hausman specification test rejects the null of orthogonality of random effects and regressors. An alternative modification of the fixed-effects approach put forward relies on error decomposition that proceeds in three stages by breaking down the fixed effects into first an unexplained part and second, a portion explained by time-invariant (or slowly changing) variables. The fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) model allows for the inclusion of time invariant (or near time variant) explanatory factors and has been shown to be more efficient than pure fixed effects (FE).94

93 Greene 1997.
94 Plumper and Troeger 2007. The first stage of the proposed estimator runs a fixed-effects model to obtain the unit effects, the second stage decomposes the unit effects into a part explained by the time-invariant and/or rarely changing variables and an error term, and the third stage reestimates the first stage by pooled OLS, allowing for autocorrelation and/or panel-level heteroskedasticity upon the choice of the analyst.
GLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors

As a second approach to tackling problems associated with TSCS data, I employ panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to control for panel-level heteroskedasticity. Because panels contain gaps, the data is (temporally) unbalanced as asylum recognition rates are missing for some dyads for the time period covered by the data. The PCSE technique with unbalanced data entails that the concomitant estimation of contemporaneous serial correlation and correction for panel heteroskedasticity is not possible. Rather than opting for piecewise deletion and suffering loss of considerable data, I rely on the heteroskedasticity-only option which relaxes the assumption of contemporaneous correlation. To take into account first-order autocorrelation, estimation is achieved through the iterated Prais-Winsten procedure.95

4.5 Empirical Analysis

Aggregate Analysis

Before proceeding to the first set of results, I present a descriptive table detailing the dependent variables, main independent variables, and controls. The table is organized into categories with the security-related factors and economic interdependence measures are displayed first and second followed by the controls discussed previously.

95 The Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation in panel data was marginally significant for the aggregate sample at 0.45 and significant for the subsample 0.37. Additionally, panel-level tests for stationarity revealed that a unit-root does not exist. However, I acknowledge that unit-root tests for unbalanced panel data lack statistical power.
Next, I present the first table of results for asylum recognition rates. Table 4.4 displays the impact of global terrorism on asylum recognition rates. Two measures of trade dependence are utilized: the first three models include the *trade dependence* measure—the ratio of dyadic trade to the recipient’s GDP—and the last three models bring in the *trade salience* measure where dyadic trade is weighted by the recipient’s total trade volume.
Table 4.2: Asylum Recognition Rates and Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum recognition rate-Europe</td>
<td>24.23</td>
<td>31.95</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum recognition rate-Aggregate</td>
<td>20.64</td>
<td>30.55</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>110.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism-Territorial (sum of 5 years)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>234.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism-Against Nationals (summed)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>110.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Interdependence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Dependence</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Salience</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>27.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Bilateral FDI</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>47.03</td>
<td>-7895.00</td>
<td>1319.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Inflow to Recipient as % of GDP</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>18.36</td>
<td>-15.13</td>
<td>522.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin Country Conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uppsala External Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale-U.S. Dept of State score</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scare-Amnesty Score</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin’s Polity 2 Score</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>-10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recipient Country Economic Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Refugees (logged)</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>14.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>10.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment as % of total labor force</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>43.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (lagged)</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>-50.49</td>
<td>82.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Right Party Seats</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>85.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Right Party Vote</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>58.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic/Geopolitical Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Dummy for Top List of Undocumented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic Alliance Ties Dummy</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin’s Tier Ranking for Trafficking</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The models employ different techniques to model across-time and cross-unit variation. As can be observed from the heading over each model, Model 1 offers random effects results, Models II and IV present fixed effects, Model III relies on fixed effects with the Plumper-Troeger correction and Models III shows Prais Winsten GLS coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors.
The first hypothesis for this chapter, Hypothesis 4.1 had predicted that recipient countries would enact stricter asylum measures against nationals of origin countries with past involvement in transnational terrorism anywhere around the world. This contention would lead us to expect lower asylum recognition rates, given origin ties to global terror. This expectation is upheld by the negative sign on *global terrorism* in all models except for Model II suggesting that in the absence of trade ties, the threat of terrorism by itself renders asylum recognition more difficult; however in the first three models, the coefficient falls short of conventional levels of significance. In contrast, in Models IV-V, we observe that each additional incident in which citizens of the origin country have been involved in produces approximately 2.4 percentage point reduction in the asylum recognition rate. The distribution of global terrorism for this sample tells us that this effect would hold for a quarter of the cases in the sample. For the 10% of cases where the origin country’s citizens have engaged in 10 or more terrorist attacks in the previous year, the effect is sizeable: a 24% decrease in the recognition rate. These findings provide mixed evidence for securitization of asylum policy.
Table 4.3: Global Terrorism, Trade Interdependence, and Asylum Recognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>FEVD</th>
<th>PCSE</th>
<th>FE</th>
<th>FEVD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trade</td>
<td>dependence</td>
<td>trade</td>
<td>salience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M I</td>
<td>M II</td>
<td>M III</td>
<td>M IV</td>
<td>M V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>-2.450*</td>
<td>-2.387**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism*Trade Dependence</td>
<td>38.926</td>
<td>1.818</td>
<td>3.137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.55)</td>
<td>(8.05)</td>
<td>(4.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Dependence</td>
<td>-71.917+</td>
<td>-6.552</td>
<td>-44.92**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39.21)</td>
<td>(14.68)</td>
<td>(15.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Salience</td>
<td></td>
<td>-38.211**</td>
<td>-37.893***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(13.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism*Trade Salience</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale (U.S. State)</td>
<td>4.657***</td>
<td>1.244</td>
<td>5.355***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>-1.12***</td>
<td>-0.655</td>
<td>-0.596*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Democracy</td>
<td>-1.146***</td>
<td>1.016</td>
<td>-1.12***</td>
<td>-0.655</td>
<td>-0.596*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Trafficking Ranking</td>
<td>-3.891*</td>
<td>-6.269***</td>
<td>-3.098*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Uppsala Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>2.175+</td>
<td>1.758</td>
<td>3.195</td>
<td>3.527</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td>(1.66)</td>
<td>(5.21)</td>
<td>(2.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Refugees(logged)</td>
<td>2.389**</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>2.334***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>3.125</td>
<td>-16.712***</td>
<td>3.391</td>
<td>19.535</td>
<td>41.683***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.17)</td>
<td>(1.74)</td>
<td>(2.07)</td>
<td>(39.45)</td>
<td>(3.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.452*</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>-0.468</td>
<td>-0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees as % of Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient % of Right Seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic Alliance Dummy</td>
<td>5.864+</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>3.515</td>
<td>2.454</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.47)</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>(3.75)</td>
<td>(5.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (ETA)</td>
<td>1.000***</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>1.000***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-34.629</td>
<td>191.395***</td>
<td>-40.862*</td>
<td>-103.110</td>
<td>-319.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.54)</td>
<td>(16.58)</td>
<td>(20.19)</td>
<td>(387.57)</td>
<td>(42.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald test number of cases</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1202.000</td>
<td>1204.000</td>
<td>1204.000</td>
<td>1268.000</td>
<td>1268.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standard errors in parentheses</td>
<td>+ p&lt;0.10, * p&lt;0.05, ** p&lt;0.01, *** pp&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The inconclusive results for the effect of terror in the first three models might be partially attributable to the distribution of the global terrorism variable: in half of the cases, global terrorism in the preceding year is zero. In other words, asylum policy does take into account origin country nationals’ reputation for involvement with global terrorism. Nevertheless, given that more than one incident in the preceding year is relatively rare, the data is not ideal for illustrating the reputation effect.96

A second substantively important pattern that emerges from these results is that economic interdependence in the form of trade ties has the hypothesized negative effect on the asylum recognition rate. As mentioned earlier, this expectation arose from the insight that granting asylum functions as a hostile signal against the origin’s regime. The theoretical insight underlying Hypothesis 4.5 is that trade ties would exert a constraining effect by generating fears that a lenient stance towards refugees from economic partners would spur retaliation by these states, resulting in commercial loss. The coefficient on trade dependence is marginally significant in Model I and significant at the 0.01 level in Model III. Substantively the coefficient observed in the latter Model reveals that when global terrorism is zero, a standard deviation increase in trade dependence culminates in a 2.5 percentage point decrease in the recognition rate.

The effect is even more sizeable when we consider the coefficient on trade salience: a unit increase in this variable diminishes the asylum recognition rate by 38

96 In models that I do not display, I also ran analyses with second to fifth order lags of the global terrorism variable, as well as measures summing the number of incidents in the preceding three, five, and ten years but obtained similar results, mainly because the distribution of global terror was largely unaffected.
percentage points. To reiterate, this operationalization of trade ties captures the significance of bilateral trade for the recipient country’s overall trade portfolio and varies between 0 and 27.6 with half of the recipients characterized by a value greater than 0.2 on trade salience. Another way to interpret the results then is that in the absence of terror, for recipient states for which dyadic trade is moderately salient—between 0.2 and 0.8 on this variable—, interdependence leads to a decrease of 7.5 to 30 percentage points on the dependent variable. These findings lend significant support for the direct negative effect of trade ties.

While the literature supplies an expectation regarding the direct effects of trade interdependence on asylum policy, as highlighted earlier, the predictions regarding the indirect effects of trade ties are ambiguous. In fact, I had formulated two antagonistic hypotheses on how trade dependence and security concerns would interact. The results in Table 4.4 are not conclusive with regard to the indirect impact of trade. The positive sign on the interaction term with trade dependence comports with Hypothesis 4.7i that trade reverses the negative effect of terror on asylum recognition. In contrast however, the negative coefficients on the last three models focusing on trade salience seem to support the competing idea outlined by Hypothesis 4.7ii that trade ties will serve to exacerbate the effect of terrorism by rending asylum recognition less permissive.

Across Table 4.3, the statistical findings corroborate the impact of normative concerns posited to shape asylum admissions. Hypothesis 4.3 had contended that
despite the effect of instrumental motives and even given securitization of refugee flows, recipient states would take into account origin country’s humanitarian conditions. Across the models, we find that recognition rates are lower for refugees from relatively democratic countries and higher for claimants from countries characterized by political terror and/or external conflict. We also find that strategic concerns vis-à-vis the role of origin countries as conduits of human trafficking and/or sources of undocumented migration make for stricter asylum procedures against refugees from these states. In line with intuition, a higher GDP per capita for the recipient state entails higher recognition rates. Surprisingly, the percent of right seats in the parliament proves insignificant, a finding partly arising from the fact that data on this variable was only available for 18 recipient states. Past year’s pending applications as a proportion of the recipient total population appears to exert a positive and significant effect; we might say that this variable reflects host countries capacity to absorb refugee flows.

Finally, the Wald test of global significance demonstrates that the models exhibit good fit overall; only Model II with fixed effects shows somewhat poorer fit and coefficients not in the direction hypothesized. The ETA term displaying the variance decomposition vector in the fixed effects with vector decomposition models meets the expectation of point estimate of unity.97

The next set of results turns to testing the impact of targeted terrorism on asylum recognition rates. Table 4.4 reports results for two measures of targeted terror: Models VI and VII focus on terror by origin’s nationals targeting citizens of the recipient state and Models VIII and IX illustrate the effects of terror taking place within the recipient’s borders. As in the previous table, the models employ both generalized least squares (GLS) fixed effects with vector decomposition and iterated Prais-Winsten GLS with panel-corrected standard errors to control for possible serial correlation and groupwise heteroskedasticity. The results are displayed side by side to facilitate comparison.

Turning to the key independent variables, we note that the sign on the targeted terrorism term is negative in all models except for Model IX; however, none of the models reveals a statistically significant relationship between targeted terror and asylum recognition. As mentioned previously, both measures of targeted terror sum up the past five years incidents. Had the effect been significant, we would have observed that a standard deviation increase in the term targeting recipient’s citizens leads to a 0.6 to 1.3 percentage point decrease in asylum recognition. For the second term capturing assaults occurring within the host country, the analogous effect would be about 2.8 percentage points. In the final model, the positive sign contradicts Hypothesis 4.2 but is statistically insignificant. It is plausible to imagine that this contradictory finding points to possible omitted variable(s) that drive refugee flows out of the origin but this exploration is
beyond the scope of the current chapter. Hence for the time being, we are led to conclude that evidence in favor of Hypothesis 4.2 is inconclusive.

Considering the effects of trade, we find that with the first two models, only the trade salience term in Model VII emerges as marginally significant. The substantive effect of trade dependence for Models VIII and IX with the territorial terrorism term appears to be considerably larger but is only significant at the 0.05 level in Model VIII. According to the coefficient in this model, in the absence of targeted terror a standard deviation increase in trade dependence would yield a 2.86 percentage point drop in the asylum recognition rate. Nevertheless, this model stands out in terms of the positive sign on the interaction term which would lend support to the contention that trade dependence mitigates the negative effect of targeted terror on asylum policy. The rest of the table paints a different picture: in line with Hypothesis 4.7ii, both targeted terror and trade are negatively associated with the dependent variable and furthermore, as the negative signs on the interaction terms illustrate, trade dependence accentuates the negative effect of security concerns.
Table 4.4: Targeted Terrorism, Trade Dependence, and Asylum Recognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>terror against citizens</th>
<th>terror within territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FEVD Model VI</td>
<td>PCSE Model VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeted Terrorism-Citizens</strong></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism-Territory</td>
<td>-0.535</td>
<td>-1.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
<td>(1.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*<em>Terrorism (citizens)<em>Dependence</em></em></td>
<td>-169.716</td>
<td>(168.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*<em>Terrorism (territory)<em>Dependence</em></em></td>
<td>-1.831</td>
<td>(12.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade Dependence</strong></td>
<td>-1.013+</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeted Terrorism*Trade Salience</strong></td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin Political Terror Scale (U.S. State)</strong></td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)</strong></td>
<td>3.613**</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin's Democracy</strong></td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin Uppsala Conflict Intensity</strong></td>
<td>2.427*</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin Undocumented Migration Dummy</strong></td>
<td>56.553***</td>
<td>(8.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin's Trafficking Ranking</strong></td>
<td>-7.128***</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Refugees(logged)</strong></td>
<td>-0.786+</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recipient Unemployment</strong></td>
<td>0.473*</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recipient GDP per capita (logged)</strong></td>
<td>-17.186***</td>
<td>(1.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recipient GDP/pc growth</strong></td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dyadic Alliance Dummy</strong></td>
<td>2.304</td>
<td>(2.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETA</strong></td>
<td>1.000***</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>202.861***</td>
<td>(17.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chi-statistic</strong></td>
<td>137.730</td>
<td>216.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F-statistic</strong></td>
<td>141.486</td>
<td>150.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wald test</strong></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| number of cases | 1140.000 | 738.000 | 1202.000 | 1202.000 |
| standard errors in parentheses | + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 |
Paralleling the results in former table, Table 4.4 conveys a fairly consistent story vis-à-vis the effects of humanitarian concerns on asylum policy. In most of the models, the signs on the variables pertaining to origin country domestic conditions are in the expected direction and statistically significant. By way of illustration, the full range of variation in the political terror Amnesty score from 1 to 5 produces a 10 to about 16% decrease in the recognition rate. In contrast, refugees from origin states with a full democracy score of 10 face a lower recognition rate by 8.6 to 12.3 percentage points. In a similar vein, recipient countries take into consideration conflict conditions in countries of origin, as evinced by the positive sign on the conflict intensity term. These findings provide further evidence consistent with Hypothesis 4.3: normative concerns over the merit of asylum claims influence asylum admissions, regardless of anxieties over targeted terrorism.

Of the controls, the findings offer strong support for the negative impact of contemporary strategic concerns over origin country ties to undocumented migration and trafficking, as portrayed by the positive signs on these terms. As before, the role that past refugees play seems to be ambiguous, the negative sign in Models VI and VIII would indicate that as expected high numbers exert a burden on recipient countries; this is to be contrasted with the positive and significant sign in model IX, which, in line with Table 4.3 suggests that high numbers of refugees can also be indicative of recipient’s capacity to absorb further flows. Curiously, coefficients on economic factors such as the
rate of unemployment, growth in GDP per capita, and current GDP per capita appear to be sensitive to model specification.

We are led to conclude from this table that the effect of securitization when incidents of transnational terror targeting the citizens or territory of host states are considered is very limited. Instead, the impact of humanitarian motives is fairly robust across all the models.

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below provide a graphical representation of the relationship between economic interdependence in the form of trade ties and asylum recognition rates, across different security contexts. Figure 4.2 contrasts the relationship between trade dependence and the asylum recognition rate given zero global terror to the security context defined by high global terrorism.98

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98 High is defined by the 90th percentile, or, more than 7 incidents of global terrorism by origin country citizens in the previous year. For targeted terror, the same category translates into one or more incidents in the five years prior to the current one.
Figure 4.2: Impact of Trade Interdependence on Asylum Recognition, Across Levels of Global Terrorism

*Results based on Model III in Table 4.3

Figure 4.3 depicts the relationship between trade salience and asylum recognition in the absence of incidents targeting host country citizens and given high targeted terror.
Lack of significance of security factors notwithstanding, the Figures illustrate that economic interdependence—operationalized as trade dependence and trade salience, respectively—further depresses the asylum recognition rate. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation that states are motivated (strategically) by the desire to preserve trade ties in enacting policy vis-à-vis refugees from economic partners. Moreover, given an adverse security context—high levels of global or targeted terror—the drop in the asylum recognition rate is noticeably sharper. As both graphs further illustrate however, dyads enjoying higher levels of interdependence also benefit from a
more benevolent security context, which partially explains the differences in slope across security contexts.

I now proceed to analyzing the effect of capital ties on asylum recognition rates. Table 4.5 below displays five different models: Models X through XII include the global terrorism term; Model XIII focuses on targeted terror against recipient citizens and the final model includes the territorial targeted terrorism term. As identified by the model subheadings, the Table displays fixed effects with the Plumper-Troeger correction (FEVD) as well as Prais-Winsten results with panel corrected standard errors.

As can be seen from Table 4.5, all of the transnational terrorism terms—global and targeted—are in the hypothesized negative direction but none of them reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The sensitivity of the statistical significance of transnational terror to model specification calls into question the validity of Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2. Turning our attention to Hypothesis 4.6, the results are mixed: only Model IX indicates a statistically significant negative effect for capital interdependence.99

99 Arguably though, this is the model with the poorest fit, as indicated by the failure of the residuals (ETA) to approach unity. Moreover, the inclusion of an AR1 term results in loss of data points, as illustrated by the drop in number of cases compared to the other models.
Table 4.5: Capital Interdependence, Terrorism, and Asylum Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Terror</th>
<th>Targeted</th>
<th>Terror</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MX RE</td>
<td>XI FEVD</td>
<td>XII PCSE</td>
<td>XIV FEVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terror (Territory)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.938</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terror (Citizens)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net bilateral FDI</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terror*Bilateral FDI</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI*Targeted Terror (Territory)</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI*Targeted Terror (Citizens)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale (U.S. State)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)</td>
<td>2.874*</td>
<td>2.909+</td>
<td>3.774**</td>
<td>1.830*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Democracy</td>
<td>-0.582**</td>
<td>-0.786</td>
<td>-0.674***</td>
<td>0.215+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Uppsala Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>1.380</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>1.311</td>
<td>1.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
<td>(2.00)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>-3.886***</td>
<td>-2.234</td>
<td>-3.782***</td>
<td>8.540***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(6.91)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Undocumented Migration Dummy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin's Trafficking Ranking</td>
<td>-3.094+</td>
<td>-3.729***</td>
<td>-2.528+</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td>(1.54)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Unemployment</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.470*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>9.424***</td>
<td>5.741</td>
<td>9.124***</td>
<td>-35.849***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
<td>(14.03)</td>
<td>(1.96)</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic Alliance Dummy</td>
<td>-3.694</td>
<td>-9.899**</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.77)</td>
<td>(3.61)</td>
<td>(2.37)</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>0.686***</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000***</td>
<td>1.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-44.497+</td>
<td>-17.07***</td>
<td>-46.898*</td>
<td>295.374***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.25)</td>
<td>(2.31)</td>
<td>(23.90)</td>
<td>(18.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-statistic</td>
<td>85.441</td>
<td></td>
<td>126.878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>50.425</td>
<td></td>
<td>124.734</td>
<td>124.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald test</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of cases</td>
<td>1155.000</td>
<td>526.000</td>
<td>1155.000</td>
<td>1155.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Errors in Parentheses
Variables of Interest in Bold
The theoretical section of the chapter had posited an opportunity-costs logic engendered by capital interdependence, analogous to the negative effect of trade ties on asylum recognition. Logically, we might imagine that recipient states would be cautious in recognizing too many refugees from financial partners, given the risk of commercial retaliation. This contention is weakly confirmed by the results in Table 4.5, which prima facie suggests that the constraining effect of capital ties on asylum policy is weaker. When the indirect effect of foreign direct investment is considered, the results are once again not conclusive, as can be observed from the sign flip of the FDI*terror interaction terms.

Importantly, the results reported in Table 4.5 paint a similar picture to those previously presented with regard to Hypothesis 4.3. The positive sign on the Amnesty International political terror score and the negative sign on the origin democracy variable indicate that recipient states respond to the origin country political context. Likewise, refugees from origin countries experiencing external conflict are more likely to be granted asylum. In Table 4.5, I also included a variable to target origin country economic conditions given the posited role of the economic context as a push factor in emigration.\textsuperscript{100} The effect of this control is hard to specify; consistent with the literature, we can infer that on the one hand, a higher GDP per capita can be an enabling factor in outflows of migration and on the other hand, a lower GDP can serve as a push factor.

\textsuperscript{100} Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998; Neumayer 2005.
The strategic controls included behave more or less as expected. The only exception is the impact of unemployment, which emerges contrary to the previous results and accordance with expectations in two of the models. Alliance ties exert a negative effect on asylum recognition rates whereas origin states known to be source countries for trafficking face lower asylum recognition rates.

I now direct my attention to the analysis of the smaller sample and focus on European recipient states.

Analysis of European Recipients

The rationale behind analyzing the European sample separately is severalfold. First, we might imagine that parallel to other dimensions of migration policy, asylum recognition for EU and/or Schengen states is subject to policy harmonization. Second and related, Western European countries are parties to the 1951 Convention for the protection of refugees. In light of Neumayer’s conclusions that convergence in asylum policy is limited in Europe, it is plausible that asylum recognition is governed by a distinct data generating process for European host states. Third, scholars have articulated that the harmonization of border and migration control has drawn attention to the security implications of human mobility. Hence we might say that the securitization of migration has a history unique to European Union recipient states.

Finally, focusing on the subsample allows for a longer time period given that data is available as far back as 1980.

Table 4.6 offers a first cut look at the role that trade ties on the one hand and on the other, concerns over transnational terrorism play for European host states. Models Ib to IIIb report results with the measure for global terrorism and Models IVb and Vb display the findings with terrorism targeting host country nationals. I relied on a variety of techniques to capture cross-sectional and across-time variation while addressing issues specific to TSCS data. All models employ a first order autoregressive (AR1) term to account for possible serial correlation. The first model presents random effects results, models IIb, IVb, and Vb perform fixed effects regression with vector decomposition and Model III employs panel corrected standard errors.

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102 I also ran the models with the alternate targeted terrorism term; results mirrored those presented here in that signs on coefficients changed according to model specification but lacked statistical significance.
103 The Durbin Watson statistic was marginally insignificant (p value of 0.0851) but I chose to include an AR1 term as it is consistent with standard procedure given a marginally insignificant serial correlation result.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M I b</th>
<th>M II b</th>
<th>M III b</th>
<th>M IV b</th>
<th>M V b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
<td>-1.957***</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>2.544</td>
<td>-0.919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.19) (0.44) (0.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism-Citizens</td>
<td>-94.973**</td>
<td>572.583</td>
<td>-74.856**</td>
<td>-216.868</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(52.78) (428.90) (26.84)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(167.55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Salience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-6.040***</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism*Trade Dependence</td>
<td>5.191</td>
<td>322.879**</td>
<td>1.479</td>
<td>-731.852</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26.08) (181.45) (11.57)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(783.65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terrorism*Dependence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.493</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.24) (2.33) (1.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin’s Democracy</td>
<td>-1.107***</td>
<td>-0.669</td>
<td>-1.037***</td>
<td>-1.886***</td>
<td>-0.361+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.21) (0.61) (0.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Uppsala Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>9.639***</td>
<td>2.131</td>
<td>3.066</td>
<td>7.349***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.86) (2.49) (1.69)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin’s Trafficking Ranking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.09) (1.34) (1.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Unemployment</td>
<td>1.243**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient GDP per capita</td>
<td>5.036</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient GDP/pc growth</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>-1.365**</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.94) (0.50) (0.89)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic Alliance Dummy</td>
<td>-27.85***</td>
<td>-8.364*</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>-0.968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.76) (3.41) (4.62)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5.45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Refugees(logged)</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>2.917</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>-9.824***</td>
<td>-10.885***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.86) (2.08) (0.61)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Unemployment</td>
<td>4.979***</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.109***</td>
<td>2.374***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (ETA)</td>
<td>0.909***</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000***</td>
<td>1.000***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-31.098</td>
<td>14.189***</td>
<td>17.752*</td>
<td>159.64***</td>
<td>189.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(53.50) (2.08) (8.77)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(13.47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-statistic</td>
<td>109.035</td>
<td>145.217</td>
<td>56.468</td>
<td>66.276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald test</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 865.000 169.000 1035.000 334.000 178.000

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Directing our attention to the terrorism terms, we can note that the effects are similar to those observed from the aggregate analysis. Only Model IIb yields a significant and negative coefficient for global terrorism, which—in the absence of trade ties—translates into close to a 2 percentage point decrease in the asylum recognition rate for every incident of transnational terror nationals of the origin were involved in. Although the coefficients are in the expected direction in all models but one, neither the global nor the targeted terror variables attain conventional levels of significance. Based on this pattern, we can infer that the securitization of refugee flows remains limited in the European context, which is in a similar vein to the picture painted by the aggregate analysis.

Hypothesis 4.5 on the impact of trade interdependence finds stronger support, as captured by the negative sign on the trade dependence and trade salience variables on all models but one, but the size of the coefficient is dependent on model specification. Turning to Model IIIb for example, we can observe that a standard deviation increase in trade dependence yields a 4.3 percentage point decrease in the rate of asylum recognition. By way of comparison, a standard deviation increase in trade salience in Model Vb leads to a decrease of 18 percentage points, a substantively important and statistically significant decrease. Judging from the coefficient, we note that a unit increase in trade salience results in slightly more than a 6 percentage point drop in the asylum recognition rate. This is an important finding in that about a quarter of the smaller sample is
characterized by a value of 1 or higher on this variable. These findings provide strong evidence that trade ties exert a directly constraining effect on asylum policy in the European arena, analogous to the effect observed in the larger sample. In contrast, analogous to what was observed in the aggregate analysis we find that the interactive effect of trade ties and transnational terrorism is ambiguous. As before, the coefficients are unstable but do not achieve statistical significance.

Analysis of the smaller set of European countries bolsters our confidence in Hypothesis 4.3 that humanitarian motives influence asylum decisions. The results in Table 4.6 by and large echo those obtained from the larger sample: asylum admissions are more lenient if refugees originate from countries experiencing political terror and/or external conflict and from states with less democratic regimes.

Except for destination (recipient) country’s unemployment, the controls behave in line with expectations. Thus, we note that pending refugees in the recipient country function as a constraint in capping asylum admissions. As predicted, strategic factors aside from the independent variables of interest play a significant role. In particular, states are more stringent in asylum admissions towards claimants from allies as well as from countries known to be sources of trafficking and undocumented migration.

Next, in Table 4.7 I examine the impact of capital interdependence—in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and transnational terrorism—on European recipient states’ asylum recognition rates. The first three models focus on the effects of global
terrorism; Model IXb and Xb includes the targeted terrorism terms, operationalized as attacks within host territory and as incidents against host country citizens, respectively. All models employ an AR1 term to control for possible serial correlation. The models account for panel heteroskedasticity via different statistical techniques; the two models in Table 4.7 use random effects and fixed effects with the Plumper-Troeger correction and Models VIIIb through Xb present Prais Winsten GSL coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs).

Table 4.7 sketches a similar pattern in terms of the effects of transnational terror: Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 receive little support. The signs on the global and targeted terror terms are as expected, negative but fall below the conventional level of statistical significance. In terms of substantive effect, the coefficients would translate into a 0.43 (based on Model VIIIb) to a 1.8 (Model VIb) percentage point decrease for a standard deviation increase in the global terrorism term, if bilateral FDI is set to zero. When targeted terror within recipient’s territory is considered, a standard deviation increase would entail a 0.23 percentage point decrease in the recognition rate.

104 The Woolridge test for serial correlation was marginally rejected at 0.095 which leaves it up to the analyst to include an AR1 term.

105 The standard errors of global and targeted terror for the European sample are higher at 6.06 and 7.01 respectively.
Table 4.7: Capital Flows, Terrorism, and Asylum Policy in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>global</th>
<th>targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M VIIb</td>
<td>M VIIIb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>FEVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.184 (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terror (Citizens)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Terror (Territory)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.015*** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral FDI*Global Terror</td>
<td>-0.028+ (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net bilateral FDI</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.015*** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI*Targeted Terror (Territory)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.21)</td>
<td>1.955 (1.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI*Targeted Terror (Citizens)</td>
<td>-0.938*** (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.197 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)</td>
<td>4.069*** (1.14)</td>
<td>1.955 (1.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin’s Democracy</td>
<td>-0.938*** (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.197 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Uppsala Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>2.261 (1.76)</td>
<td>0.834 (2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Undocumented Migration Dummy</td>
<td>-1.472 (1.76)</td>
<td>0.834 (2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Unemployment</td>
<td>0.805* (0.35)</td>
<td>1.598*** (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num of Refugees, (logged)</td>
<td>-0.227 (0.72)</td>
<td>0.005 (2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient GDP/pc growth</td>
<td>-1.097* (0.55)</td>
<td>0.172 (0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient % Right Seat</td>
<td>0.148* (0.06)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic Alliance Dummy</td>
<td>-11.591** (4.16)</td>
<td>-4.616 (3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>0.850*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-4.616 (3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>17.810+ (9.62)</td>
<td>29.370*** (1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-statistic</td>
<td>91.792 (9.62)</td>
<td>156.378 (1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>73.671</td>
<td>156.378 (1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald test</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of cases</td>
<td>971.000</td>
<td>490.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standard errors in parentheses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ p&lt;0.10, * p&lt;0.05, ** p&lt;0.01, ***p&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In other words, the impact of terror is very limited and given the size of the standard errors, insignificant. Additionally, three quarters of the sample enjoy freedom from security concerns in that targeted terror in the past five years is zero. Likewise, only in a quarter of the cases do we observe at least one incident of global terror. In other words, the negative effect of terrorism on asylum recognition does exist, but is limited to a small number of cases.

The negative coefficient on bilateral FDI reveals that as posited in Hypothesis 4.6, bilateral foreign direct investment results in a more cautious approach to recognizing refugees from financial partners. To illustrate, Model VIIb reveals that a standard deviation increase in bilateral FDI (measured in thousands of USD PPP) leads to a drop in the asylum recognition rate of close to 2.2 percentage points. However, this effect is only significant in this model and substantively smaller in the rest of the models. As before, the indirect effect of financial dependence on the dependent variable is ambiguous.

Akin to the results obtained from the larger sample, variables expressing the humanitarian merit of asylum claims emerge as highly significant and are robust across models. More specifically, recipients are reluctant to recognize claimants from democratic origins and are more welcoming of refugees from origin states suffering from political terror and/or external conflict.
Parameter Constancy

Hypothesis 4.4 contends that asylum recognition in the post 9/11 period will be driven by different dynamics. This proposition hints at a structural break in the data; in other words, testing the Hypothesis necessitates evaluating parameter constancy over time. Table 4.8 reports the results for two types of tests for a structural break: the Chow test and the recursive residual test for years 1997-2005.106

Looking at the first column, we note that the Chow test returned significant results for years preceding 2002. Whereas this points to a structural break well before 2001, caution is necessary in interpreting these results as the test-statistic in years near the end of the time period is based on a shorter T.107 I refined my analysis of parameter constancy by performing a recursive residual test. This test rests on the calculation of residuals from one set of observations to forecast predicted asylum recognition rates for the subsequent sample year. For example, the mean recursive residual for 2001, 0.24, was computed by estimating model parameters in the period prior to 2001 (1996-2000), interacting those residuals to yield predicted values on the dependent variable (yhat), which are then compared to actual values of the asylum recognition rate for that year. Mean recursive residual values more than twice the standard error of regression are indicative of a structural break.108 As can be observed from the third and fourth

107 This is analogous to the problem with interrupted time series analysis; the power of tests is contingent on length of the time period before and after the hypothesized break. See McDowall et al. 1980.
columns, the recursive residual test casts doubt on the existence of a structural break in the data.\textsuperscript{109}

Table 4.8: Test for Structural Break in Asylum Policy in Aggregate Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chow Test</th>
<th>mean recursive residual</th>
<th>standard error of regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>12.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
<td>12.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>16.34**</td>
<td>-7.79</td>
<td>15.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>16.23**</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>16.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>17.2**</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>14.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>35.98***</td>
<td>-4.34</td>
<td>12.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>44.53***</td>
<td>-7.91</td>
<td>8.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>89.36***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a.} Year refers to the year at which the structural test was performed.
\textsuperscript{b.} Results calculated from Model III
\textsuperscript{**p<0.05 ***p<0.001}

Based on these results, I am reluctant to conclude that a significant structural break occurred precisely in 2001. However, the Chow test points to the possibility that the effects of independent variables are changing over time but that this change may be spread over several years. In fact, this is consistent with the literature on securitization of migration which points to a growing emphasis on the security externalities of human mobility in the post Cold War period.

\textsuperscript{109} As an additional diagnostic test and a test for stationarity in data, I ran a partial adjustment model. The model yielded a rho of 0.21, which suggests that about 1/5\textsuperscript{th} of the impact on the dependent variable is evident in the first year and that the full effect of independent variables is spread over time.
To further investigate how the effects of variables of interest in the post-2001 sample compare to the pre-2001 period, I include a final table displaying random effects coefficients for split samples.\textsuperscript{110}

Several observations about the divided sample stand out. First, the effect of global terrorism in the pre and post 2001 samples is not distinguishable in either the aggregate or the European sample; in fact, the effect of global terrorism appears to be smaller in the latter period for European recipient states.\textsuperscript{111} Second, and in contrast, there is some variation in the explanatory power of variables symbolizing humanitarian concerns. To provide an example, in both the larger and narrower analysis, the post 2001 period depicts a higher impact for the origin country political terror score. Moreover, the origin’s Polity 2 score exhibits a robust and consistent impact across time. Third, with a divided sample design, while trade dependence has the predicted negative impact, it fails to achieve significance in pre and post 2001 samples.

\textsuperscript{110} I only present random effects results for the basic model given that the post-2000 sample is too short for a PCSE or Fixed Effects (FE) model.

\textsuperscript{111} Granted, this effect is partially attributable to the smaller sample size (2002-2007) compared to 1980-2001.
Table 4.9: Split Sample Analysis of Asylum Recognition Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>β Global Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Global Terrorism*Trade Dependence</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>6.437</td>
<td>21.496</td>
<td>-0.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.80)</td>
<td>(16.22)</td>
<td>(40.82)</td>
<td>(45.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Trade Dependence</td>
<td>-49.664</td>
<td>-42.881</td>
<td>-176.059</td>
<td>-86.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39.79)</td>
<td>(33.34)</td>
<td>(110.48)</td>
<td>(56.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)</td>
<td>3.233+</td>
<td>5.249***</td>
<td>1.916</td>
<td>6.645***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.65)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Origin’s Democracy</td>
<td>-1.188***</td>
<td>-0.946***</td>
<td>-0.989**</td>
<td>-0.761**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Origin Uppsala Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>2.615</td>
<td>1.196</td>
<td>3.204</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.43)</td>
<td>(2.43)</td>
<td>(2.16)</td>
<td>(2.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Origin’s Trafficking Ranking</td>
<td>-4.373*</td>
<td>-1.432</td>
<td>-8.598***</td>
<td>-2.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.14)</td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
<td>(2.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Number of Refugees(logged)</td>
<td>2.169*</td>
<td>1.257</td>
<td>-2.524*</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Recipient Unemployment</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>-0.705</td>
<td>1.734***</td>
<td>-0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Recipient GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>7.340*</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>18.896*</td>
<td>7.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.65)</td>
<td>(4.20)</td>
<td>(8.44)</td>
<td>(8.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Dyadic Alliance Dummy</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>-6.324</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.47)</td>
<td>(5.98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β Constant</td>
<td>-69.018*</td>
<td>-0.539</td>
<td>-137.189+</td>
<td>-60.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34.02)</td>
<td>(39.27)</td>
<td>(81.43)</td>
<td>(76.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-statistic</td>
<td>74.430</td>
<td>52.252</td>
<td>63.694</td>
<td>42.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald test</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of cases</td>
<td>634.000</td>
<td>559.000</td>
<td>527.000</td>
<td>444.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Variables of interest in **Bold**
What can we infer from these findings? Whereas the Chow test points to the possibility of a structural break, Table 4.9 demonstrates that in terms of the variables of interest, the impact is not distinctly different in the post-2001 sample. If anything, consistent with some scholars’ argument, the humanitarian dimension of asylum policy is gaining salience as the spread of human rights norms gains steam.112

4.5 Discussion and Conclusion

The emerging migration security nexus has spawned a burgeoning body of scholarship on the challenges brought about by human mobility across borders. A significant lacuna in this literature, however, is the failure to differentiate between different types of policy. As Rudolph has argued, migration and border security is a broad concept comprised of different elements; studying them separately might prove highly informative on states’ pursuit of sovereignty. This insight has provided a logical point of entry and rationale for a separate chapter on asylum recognition. An important goal of the current chapter has been to complement the analysis of visa restrictions as a response to the security externalities of human mobility.

Analyzing asylum policies in a separate chapter was also important in capturing the functional variation postulated in the theoretical section in Chapter 2. According to this proposition, the effects of security concerns and economic interdependence were expected to be overshadowed by normative/humanitarian considerations. These

expectations were corroborated in the empirical results presented in this chapter. In effect, by comparing the role that transnational terror plays in shaping visa policies to its role in modulating asylum and refugee admissions, I have addressed a significant gap in the literature. While scholars have contended that the emergence of non-state threats to state security has led to an overhaul of migration policy in general\textsuperscript{113}, my results indicate that the size and robustness of this effect is dependent on the type of migration considered. In that sense, this chapter has contributed to our understanding of the conditions under which human flows are securitized.

More precisely, my analysis has shown that the securitization of asylum flows remains limited. Importantly, states design asylum policies by taking into account origin countries’ political context. Furthermore, this effect is not only robust across samples but the data provide some evidence that normative constraints are increasing in importance over time. These findings are somewhat surprising given that debates on asylum admissions have revolved around new security threats emanating from bogus refugees. While the results do in fact show that recipient states factor in origin states’ role as sources of undocumented migration and trafficking, the impact of terrorism is circumscribed by humanitarian factors. Notably, normative incentives continue to hold political clout in guiding asylum procedures. Based on this, it would be premature to conclude that asylum determination procedures are divorced from ethical restraints.

\textsuperscript{113} Adamson 2006; Adamson and Grossman 2004; Andreas 2003; 2006; Bigo 2000; Faist 2005; Huysmans 2006; Rudolph 2003; 2006; Salehyan 2008.
However, neither does the data present sufficient evidence in favor of constructivist arguments that human rights codes are completely transforming state behavior, at least with respect to refugee policies.\footnote{Jacobson 1996.}

With regard to how economic interdependence shapes asylum and refugee admissions, Chapter 2 had further laid out a rationale for divergence between policies concerning political as opposed to economic migration. In brief, because states fear damaging commercial ties, they are less likely to admit refugees from economic partners. This expectation received support in that trade and capital ties exerted a negative effect on asylum recognition rates, rendering policies more stringent. Put differently, whereas security and economic logics operate in opposing directions in economic migration control policies, when policies of control vis-à-vis involuntary/political migration are the issue at hand, security concerns and economic ties work in the same direction. This effect notwithstanding, economic motivations were also dominated by concerns over origin country’s humanitarian conditions. This is in line with previous literature and theoretical expectations in the sense that economic concerns constitute instrumental imperatives that are counteracted by ideational ones.

Arguably, the time period under consideration might be too short to provide a definitive answer as to whether asylum admissions will follow a trajectory similar to other types of deterrent migration control policies in becoming more responsive to the
threat of terrorism. In sum, the findings might point to a gradual securitization of political migration and it remains to be seen whether this will eventually cause a retrenchment of normative guidelines for asylum policy-making.
Chapter 5: Evolution of Turkey’s Migration Policies: An Empirical Illustration

How do security concerns influence the evolution of migration policies in the context of economic liberalization? Chapter 2 laid out a theoretical framework which advanced the argument that increasing economic contact between states would alleviate fears over the security implications of human mobility. The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 strongly suggests that trade and capital interdependence undercut the impact of transnational terrorism on visa policies. Chapter 4 set out to test the theoretical framework by examining asylum and refugee policies and found that despite the salience of the humanitarian dimension, political migration is similarly securitized. Commercial ties were found to exert an important tempering effect in so far as home countries shy away from pursuing an overly liberal asylum approach vis-à-vis nationals of their economic partners.

This chapter complements the statistical analyses in preceding chapters by providing case evidence from the evolution of Turkey’s migration policies in the context of economic liberalization in the post-1980 era. Whereas the quantitative analyses showed that capital and trade ties can function as a modifying factor in modulating the impact of transnational terrorism on visa and asylum policies, the current chapter will delve into the specific mechanisms underpinning this relationship. More specifically,
the case study will allow us to go beyond simple correlational analysis and demonstrate how the threat of terrorism alters the security environment in which states operate.¹

The focus of this chapter is on *temporal variation* in Turkey’s migration policies. The organization of the analysis section reflects this focus and traces changes in migration policies over time. Additionally however, the theoretical framework had drawn attention to the distinct patterns that different domains of migration might exhibit. As such, the secondary goal of this chapter is to illuminate *functional variation* across policies of migration control. Because the focus of the dissertation is on how states control access to their territories (rather than on how states handle foreigners residing within their boundaries) special attention will be given to visa and asylum policies as well as border control measures.² Downstream migration-control policies concerning naturalization and citizenship acquisition will be touched on briefly, with the aim of illustrating their linkages to other aspects of managing migration. Close inspection of each dimension of migration policy—visa restrictions, asylum/refugee admissions, and border control/management—also affords a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of how states exert interdependence sovereignty.

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¹ Gavrilis 2004; Neumayer 2004; Thielemann 2006.
² To go back to an earlier point, visa and asylum policies can be considered upstream because they seek to deter and/or screen access to states’ territories. Downstream policies deal with how states cope with migrants who are already within their territories. Alternatively, Meyers 2000 refers to asylum, border, and visa policies as immigration control policies and to citizenship and naturalization as immigration policies, pertaining to the rights and conditions of resident immigrants. He notes that immigration control policies are distinct in relating to rules and procedures governing selection and admission of foreigners.
Table 5.1 below summarizes the across-time and temporal variation subsequent sections of the chapter will elaborate on. It also provides a snapshot into the organization of the rest of the chapter.

**Table 5.1: Turkey’s Migration Policy Changes Across Time According to Migration Policy Domain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period and Policy Domain</th>
<th>Change in Policy</th>
<th>Direction of Change in Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa Policy</td>
<td>Nascent</td>
<td>Liberalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Recognition</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Tightening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Control</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Liberalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa Policy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Liberalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Recognition</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Tightening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Control</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Liberalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa Policy</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Recognition</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Liberalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Control</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **a.** Change captures existence of policy changes in the particular area of migration policy. Nascent refers to extant but novel processes of change and limited refers to negligible change or stalling in reform.
- **b.** Direction of change refers to whether the policy dimension was characterized by tightening—stricter policies of control over human mobility—or liberalization, or relaxation of controls over mobility. Mixed occupies a middle category and denotes policy changes in both directions; for example liberalization with respect to a set of countries, nationalities, or borders juxtaposed with closure toward another group of countries, nationalities, or borders.

**5.1 The Argument**

In the pages that follow, I show how economic interdependence modulates the influence of security logics by mitigating perceptions of threat from migration flows, tilting the decision calculus towards economic motives, and leading to a reconfiguration of state interests. From a deeper substantive standpoint, these mechanisms entail that in
the context of interdependence, states exert sovereignty by prioritizing the
interdependence rather than the territorial dimension.³ Focusing on Turkey, I
demonstrate how interdependence acts as a significant limitation on policy-making as
political decision-makers seek to balance the pursuit of material security against
maintaining territorial control. I sketch how Turkey’s efforts to pursue liberalization of
capital and trade shifted policy priorities by giving rise to a legacy of liberalization and
creating a domestic environment conducive to liberal migration policies. In particular, I
contend that economic interdependence created an impetus toward liberalization of
border and migration control through two complementary channels. First, commercial
ties had a constraining effect on decision-making by generating fears over reprisal by
commercial partners. Additionally, liberalization created domestic interests espousing
liberal migration policies.

Second, the evidence I present shows that security concerns were conditionally
influential in driving Turkey’s migration policies toward a more stringent and/or
prudent direction. The impact of transnational terrorism was contingent on both
objective and perceived threats. Threat perception exhibited considerable variation
across the time period under consideration and hinged on the frequency and visibility of
attacks within Turkish territory or against her citizens and the salience of and the
amount of damage caused by incidents. A close examination of parliamentary debates

³ For the different dimensions of sovereignty see Krasner 1999.
reveals that beliefs of prospective failure or success of governmental efforts to curb terrorism also affected perceptions of threat. Third and relatedly, evidence points to the growing salience of material interests in policy debates in response to economic liberalization. The prioritization of economic motivations in turn put into question the utility of tight border and migration control measures as a counterterrorism strategy.

Third, paralleling the results of the preceding empirical chapters, predictions of the securitized interdependence framework were easiest to demonstrate when visa and on-site policies of control were considered. In contrast, while depicting a pattern similar to other dimension of migration control, asylum and refugee admissions proved to be governed by deeper institutional factors. Importantly, in line with extant literature and the dissertation’s empirical results, asylum policies exhibited susceptibility to normative and humanitarian concerns. Taken together, the case study shows that when deterrent and on-site measures of migration control are considered, transnational terrorism heightened perceptions of threats from human mobility but securitization of migration was modulated by economic motivations.

5.2 Alternative Theories

Alternative theories of migration policy focus exclusively on either the economic factors driving policy or on the securitization of human mobility. Additionally, these arguments locate causality mostly on the domestic level or alternatively focus solely on international dynamics. This section sketches these arguments and provides an
overview of scholarship that applies these models to the case of Turkey, with the aim of showing how the securitized interdependence framework addresses the gaps in the literature.

An important contribution to theorizing on migration policy emerges from domestic-level models which posit that policy is an outcome of clientelist bargaining amidst interest groups.\textsuperscript{4} According to these models, migration policy becomes more or less restrictive according to socioeconomic factors: economic downturns, large-scale immigration, rising unemployment, or rising nationalist sentiment.\textsuperscript{5} A significant caveat of society-centric approaches is that they fail to specify how these interests originate. Furthermore, as Meyers points out, they cannot account for the adoption of policies in spite of domestic opposition.\textsuperscript{6} In the Turkey case for example, despite the fact that human rights advocacy groups have made headway into penetrating the Turkish bureaucracy, especially in the context of candidacy for European Union (EU) membership, the Turkish state has maintained an exclusive approach to asylum and refugee admissions.

\textsuperscript{4} Freeman 2001; Hollifield 2000.
\textsuperscript{5} Keyman 2000; 2000. The closest approximation to this type of model applied to Turkish migration policy is Keyman’s work on societal mechanisms of modernization. While Keyman’s work is not on migration per se, it postulates that Turkey’s economic transformation has altered the state-society dynamic and empowered domestic interest groups, giving rise to bottom-up modernization processes.
\textsuperscript{6} Meyers 2000.
A different body of literature finds the source of state interests in the unique history of a country and in its cultural practices and norms of identity and citizenship. Applied to the Turkish case, this perspective would contend that Turkish conceptions of citizenship and nationality as homogeneous and unified undergird all dimensions of migration policy. While “the civic republican” formulation of national identity goes some ways in explaining the restrictionist trends in policy-making in Turkey, arguments based on this conception would not be able to predict or explain change over time. Also falling under this type of theorizing would be arguments that center on Turkey’s geopolitical situation as an explanatory factor. Most scholars of Turkey would acknowledge that geostrategic concerns over being a transit belt for human flows between East and West as well as a destination country for flows from neighboring countries experiencing political turmoil exert an important impact on policy outcomes. However, given that geography is a constant (with the exception of boundary changes or changes in the political conditions of neighboring countries), it would not help us fully understand the evolution of Turkey’s migration policies.

Domestic-level approaches suffer from a neglect of international factors that might be at work in driving policy change. It is possible to identify two major approaches that factor in systemic factors. The first body of scholarship is informed by

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8 İçduygü 2004; İçduygü and Kıriççı 2009.
globalization theory and argues that economic interdependence impels states to
dismantle border and migration controls. Writing on modernization and globalization
processes, Keyman and Içduygu apply a similar logic to the Turkish case to argue that
the Turkish conceptions of nationality and citizenship have been challenged in
significant ways by international forces.\textsuperscript{11} Faced with on the one hand, the mass flows of
international migrants and on the other hand, the domestic revival of political Islam and
Kurdish nationalism, Turkey has been compelled to rethink its approach to citizenship.
The revision of Turkish Citizenship Law in 1981 to allow for dual citizenship is
exemplary of globalization induced change.\textsuperscript{12}

Even though globalization theory enriches our understanding of international
economic factors as a motor for change in migration policy, its conclusions are often
overdrawn in claiming that international mobility renders borders obsolete. As Freeman
aptly assures us, states retain a high degree of control over who crosses their borders.
Furthermore, although globalization theory is informative with respect to the types of
external pressures states face, these approaches are more useful when studying change
in (downstream) migration and citizenship policies rather than in migration and border
control.\textsuperscript{13} That is, they shed more light on rights and privileges granted to foreigners that
are already within a state’s territory than on how states manage cross-border human
mobility.

\textsuperscript{11} Keyman and Içduygu 2003.
\textsuperscript{12} Içduygu 1996.
\textsuperscript{13} Meyers 2000.
A second approach informed by interstate relations builds on realist thinking to emphasize security and strategic concerns behind migration policy. One argument that emerges from this literature is that conflict between states makes for more restrictive policies of migration and border control.\textsuperscript{14} By taking the foreign policy motives behind migration policy seriously, this body of thought offers insights into ways in which controlling human mobility relates to state security. Nevertheless, the approach falls short of articulating when states’ strategic considerations affect controls over human flows. Turning to the case of Turkey for instance, this approach would fail to explain why Turkey liberalized its visa and border control measures vis-à-vis Greece despite extant territorial disputes and past conflict over Cyprus. Similarly, it would fail to offer an explanation of why Turkey and Armenia are currently considering moving towards open borders.\textsuperscript{15} A second caveat is that traditional security approaches are silent on the role that non-traditional security factors—undocumented migration, human trafficking, smuggling, and transnational terror—play in states’ control over human mobility.

In sum, in taking international dynamics seriously, globalization theory and securitization literature each offer invaluable components to understanding policy. According to globalization theorists, increasing interdependence would predict that Turkey is increasingly compelled by systemic constraints to relax or completely abolish border/migration controls. In contrast, traditional security approaches would suggest

\textsuperscript{15} Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2009.
that Turkey’s relations with her neighbors drive migration policies. A framework that takes into account the role of non-state security threats would foresee more draconian border measures in the face of undocumented migration, trafficking, and transnational terrorism. The theory of securitized interdependence brings these insights together under a single framework to posit that fears over transnational terrorism conditionally impel Turkey to enact restrictive policies and further that trade and capital ties should be important in understanding when Turkey moves towards liberalization of migration and border policies.

5.3 Research Method and Procedures

This chapter employs the method of process tracing to illustrate across-time variation in Turkey’s migration policies. Through a focused within-case longitudinal analysis, the chapter intends to provide a plausibility probe of the theoretical framework.16 As a case study method, process tracing is well suited to identifying the sequence of relevant causal factors and bolstering the theoretical argument through more fine-grained analysis.17 The structure of the narration reflects the goal of illustrating temporal variation by considering how the explanatory factors were influenced by time. The temporal focus makes possible the contextualization of the causal steps that have led to change in the dependent variable.18 Process tracing also

16 For the use of plausibility probes in qualitative analysis see Bennett and George 1997; Buthe 2002.
17 Checkel 2008; George and McKeown 1985.
18 Bennett and George 1997; Buthe 2002.
improves validity of within-case analysis by allowing consideration of factors besides
the main variables of interest and offers a check on spuriousness of the causal argument.
More specifically, the within-case design allows me to avoid having to control for
confounding variables across cases.\textsuperscript{19}

The process tracing method grants a further advantage by allowing us to move
beyond a dichotomous characterization of policies as restrictive or liberal. Furthermore,
in addition to distinguishing between migration policies, in depth focus on a single case
enables me to unpack each dimension in ways that were not possible in the statistical
analyses. Thus, for example, states might resort to downstream measures of controlling
involuntary migration after political migrants gain access to states’ territories and
consequently, asylum recognition rates might not fully capture the degree to which
asylum/refugee policies are restrictive.

In order to avoid providing an ad hoc historical account, I proceed by structuring
the qualitative analysis according to the theoretical framework and specifying relevant
criteria for measuring the variables of interest.\textsuperscript{20} More precisely, policy change is based
on a comparison with other periods under consideration and reflects within-case
change. Thus, first I seek to define the types of policy instruments employed to control

\textsuperscript{19} Some qualitative scholars believe that process tracing approaches have an edge over case-comparisons
designs to the extent that the latter group is subject to the pitfalls pertaining to Mill’s methods of
comparison. See Campbell 1975.

\textsuperscript{20} Buthe 2002. Buthe draws an important distinction between theoretically guided historical narratives and
descriptive historical accounts. In structuring my argument, I have sought to follow the guidelines he sets
for a theoretically informed narrative.
economic or political migrants. Next, I categorize policy pertaining to that domain as liberal/open or restrictive/stringent based on secondary accounts. Finally, policy change may be defined as “liberalization” or “tightening; these observations are based on both secondary accounts and my interpretation of historical accounts.

The qualitative data for this chapter comes from both primary and secondary sources I collected during field research in Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey. Two sources of primary documentation proved exceptionally informative: 1) Proceedings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM Tutanakları) 2) Primary legislation stated in various government documents. These two sources were obtained from the Library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM Kütüphanesi) in Ankara, Turkey. The secondary sources included original theses and scholarly articles on the topic of migration and border control, Turkish jurisprudence on asylum and refugee law, relevant migration and newspaper pieces in both Turkish and English. These were collected from the Library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and National Library (Milli Kütüphane) in Ankara, The Center for Migration Research at Bilgi University (Bilgi Üniversitesi Göç Çalışmaları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi), European Union Information Center (Avrupa Birliği Bilgi Merkezi) and Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği) in Istanbul. Additionally, figures and statistics on asylum and visa applications were compiled from the Ministry of the Interior (İçişleri Bakanlığı), the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel
Müdürlüğü), secondary sources, and the Turkish branch of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

5.4 Case Selection and Scope

The selection of Turkey as a case for empirical illustration is based on a number of factors. First, logistical considerations—language proficiency and citizenship—granted me access to the aforementioned primary research sites and facilitated a close reading of materials. Second, the choice of the post-1980 time period for analyzing Turkey’s migration policies is appropriate from a methodological standpoint as well. We observe considerable variation in both explanatory variables of interest.21 The 1980s marked the beginning of a comprehensive program of trade and financial liberalization under the Özal administration. Additionally, the intensification of militancy, fighting between Kurdish guerillas and Turkish police, and anxiety over terrorist infiltration from Turkey’s borders in the Middle East all contributed to the securitization of human flows. Finally, on the dependent variable side, Turkey is a suitable case because her migration policies exhibit variation across time, and especially undergo several episodes.

21 King et al. 1994. The authors emphasize that the ideal research design ensures variation in the explanatory variables while making sure not to select on the dependent variable. They also warn that selecting on both the explanatory and dependent variables may inadvertently introduce selection bias, especially if the researcher selects the cases according to the hypothesized relationship between independent and dependent variables. The current case study avoids this pitfall by choosing the scope of the analysis based on variation on the independent variables; that is, although I made sure that the dependent variable—migration policies—varied during this time period, I did not base my selection on the expected relationship between the explanatory factors and the dependent variable.
of upheaval and change in the period under examination, a fact that offers sufficient qualitative data for longitudinal analysis.

Turkey’s experience until the 1980s was marked by migrant flows out of Turkey into Europe whereas migration into Turkey remained limited. Migration policy began to increase in political salience in the 1980s with the first substantial waves of population flows into Turkey. The increase in human flows, in turn, was closely tied to international events, most importantly political turbulence in neighboring countries. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War produced two types of flows of immigrants: asylum seekers seeking refuge in Turkey and migrants from the Middle East headed for Europe attempting to use Turkey as a country of transit. The transition to a recipient state continued with the end of the Cold War as processes of democratic transition in the communist bloc spurred political migrants to seek asylum in Turkey.

At the same time, this period was marked by an increase in undocumented flows of migrants. As a result, the post-1980s era saw approximately 2.5 foreigners—asylum-seekers, illegal migrants, and transit migrants—crossing Turkey’s borders, a figure that is more than five times higher than the flow of migrants from 1945 to 1980. With these

22 UNHCR figures indicate for example that close to a million refugees fled to Turkey from 1988 to 1990 in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. Additionally, İçduygü and Keyman have calculated that close to a third of Europe’s asylum seekers use Turkey as a transit route.
23 İçduygü and Ünal 2002.
flows, Turkey’s geographic situation came into sharper focus as playing a pivotal role in its transition to a country of immigration and transit.

As shown in the map below, Turkey occupies a position between the politically and economically less stable East and the prosperous West, a fact that became more increasingly conspicuous as contributing to migration pressures. The unique geopolitical status of Turkey as a bridge between the Middle East and the European continent renders it an attractive country of immigration and transit.\textsuperscript{25} Turkey is also an appealing tourist destination and relies heavily on the revenue from tourism, especially to finance its budget deficit\textsuperscript{26}, a fact that stresses the importance of visa policies as an instrument of control over short-term migrant flows.

\textsuperscript{25} İçduyuğu and Kırişçi 2009; Kırişçi 2007.
\textsuperscript{26} Sübidey 2004.
Figure 5.1: Turkey and Migration Flows

Source: UNHCR 2009. As can be seen on the legend, the map also indicates the location of refugee camps, camps for internally displaced populations (IDP), and UNHCR offices.
Taken together, these factors entail that migration and border control should rank high on the political agenda and be considered to be essential for Turkey’s sovereignty. As will be further elaborated on in the subsequent pages, Turkey’s migration policies are circumscribed by a restrictive approach to settlement and citizenship. Enshrined in the 1934 Settlement Law and embodying a quest for a homogeneous and exclusionary sense of national identity, this approach should predict highly restrictive migration policies. That is, population transfers into Turkey should be inherently threatening to Turkey and we should see little change over time. On the contrary, Turkey’s migration policies have evolved through several phases, as will be discussed below. Why would we observe such variation over time? In particular, how did the economic liberalization starting with the Özlal administration shape migration control?

I will demonstrate that the securitized interdependence framework lends crucial insights into answering these questions. The post-1980 period is instructive in supporting the conjecture that the migration-security linkage provides an impetus towards tightening of policies. In this process, economic interdependence plays an important role in shaping threat perceptions and acting as a countervailing mechanism towards more permeable borders. I proceed by sketching changes in the explanatory variables of interest—security concerns and economic interdependence—before moving on to examining Turkey’s migration policies.
5.5 The Emergence of the Securitized Interdependent Context

5.5.1 Economic Liberalization in the Post-1980 Era

It would be accurate to refer to the post-1980 period in Turkey as one of profound transformation, politically and economically.¹ In the aftermath of the military coup of 1980, economic restructuring was first undertaken in a top-down manner by the military regime in power and under the purview of Turgut Özal as Prime Minister (PM) gained momentum in the mid to late 1980s. The January 24 reforms set in motion a series of programs targeting structural adjustment and stabilization. The programs implemented by the Özal regime were crucial to Turkey’s economic liberalization and instrumental in the growth of Turkey’s capital and trade ties.

As an avid advocate of free market capitalism, Özal faced the daunting task of opening up Turkey to capital and trade flows. Prior to the military coup, Turkey’s economy had been structured according to the logic of industrialization through import substitution (ISI), a system famously based on tight restrictions over commercial movements across borders.² From its advent, the economic restructuring programs sought to move away from development through statist economic planning and dispel public and elite discomfort with liberalization. Taking individualism as their leitmotiv, Özal’s policies were based on a number of tenets emphasizing economic liberalism:

¹ In fact, Turgut Özal, the architect of economic liberalization has referred in various speeches to the process as revolutionary transformation, preferring to use the term transformation (devrim) instead of simple change (değişim). See Özal 1983.
privatization, minimizing quotas and subsidies, reformulation of the tax system, the establishment of a coherent banking system, endorsement of exports and liberalization of imports, support for foreign direct investment and removal of restrictions on capital. Outlining these goals in the ruling party’s program (Anavatan Partisi –ANAP-Motherland Party); Özal linked the necessity of these reforms to Turkey’s ongoing efforts to achieve a level of progress commensurate with that of “modern civilization”.  

At the domestic level, the transition to free market capitalism from import substitution facilitated the rise of the middle class and the creation of new vested interests. One outcome of this process was the eventual weakening and dissolution of domestic coalitions championing a closed economy system and isolationist foreign policy— particularly ultranationalists suspicious of foreign investment and bureaucratic interests resistant to change. By effectively overcoming the resistance of these sectors, the new regime was able to foster a new outlook on economic growth and development.  

Just as liberalization created room for the reconfiguration of interests at the domestic level, it also reshaped Turkey’s economic relations with other countries. In particular, the opening up of Turkey’s borders to the movement of capital and goods translated into rising interdependence. Constituting a significant shift from previous

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3 Özal 1983. (translation mine) This phrase—reaching levels of progress commensurate with civilization (muassir medeniyet seviyesine erişmek)— harked back to the motto used by elites during the series of reforms undertaken by Atatürk in the early days of the Turkish Republic.

4 Türkiye Günlüğü Dergisi, 1996.
periods in which the Turkish government had jealously guarded the country against commercial flows into Turkey, the ÖZal administration relaxed restrictions—tariffs, quotas, and red tape—on imports and promoted exports, encouraging Turkish industrialists to import raw products and intermediate materials.\(^5\) The period between 1983 and 1987 also coincided with the opening of new markets in the Middle East, allowing Turkey to establish economic linkages with her neighbors in the southeast. Economic contact was not limited to this region; instead, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, political elites in the ÖZal administration began to view the Central Asian Republics as the new economic frontier.\(^6\) At the same time, Turkey zealously pursued its aspirations to join the European Community (EC), a goal that was believed to comport well with the political elites’ Westernization/Europeanization agenda as well as with the goal of economic liberalization.

The reforms instigated by the 24\(^{th}\) of January Framework also launched a process of liberalization and deregulation of financial markets during the 1980s. Controls on interest rates were removed during the interim military rule in 1981, followed by liberalization of the exchange trade in 1984. Other developments in the area of capital mobility included the founding of the Istanbul Stock Exchange in 1986 and the opening of the Central Bank to market operations the following year. The benchmark date for

\(^{6}\) Kozlu 1994.
full liberalization was 1989 when the remaining barriers to capital mobility were dismantled and the Turkish Lira (TL) became fully convertible as a result.7

Table 5.2 below numerically illustrates the increase in trade interdependence in the post-1980 era. The table provides foreign trade statistics for Turkey for close to 4 decades. A number of observations are worth noting. First, the period after 1980 exhibits continual growth in trade volume, showing that governmental efforts at liberalization were in fact effective. Second, we also note an initial spike in percentage increase in exports and imports in the early 1980s. Third, the trade statistics draw attention to an export spurt in this period, signaling an important change from the import-substitution policies of previous decades.

7 Arin 1998.
## Table 5.2: Imports and Exports for Turkey, 1970-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Volume of Foreign Trade</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Value '000 $</td>
<td>Change %</td>
<td>Value '000 $</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>588 476</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>947 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>676 602</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1 170 840</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>884 969</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>1 562 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1 137 083</td>
<td>48.8</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>1 532 182</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>3 777 501</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>1 401 075</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>1 960 214</td>
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<td>2 261 195</td>
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<td>2 910 122</td>
<td>28.7</td>
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*Data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). Data current as of 2009.*
Beyond increases in volume of commercial flows, change also occurred at the ideational level. For one, the Özal administration saw economic reform and liberalization as a prerequisite to Turkey’s pursuit of political influence at the international level. For another, in the spirit of classical liberalism, Özal believed that increased economic contact could mitigate belligerence between states. Relatively, he emphasized the connection between economic prosperity and national power, maintaining that economic reorientation should supersede security-seeking. It was this mindset that for example facilitated a reversal of Turkey’s stance towards her neighbors in the Middle East from Cold War assertiveness to cautious rapprochement. The rapid collapse of the communist bloc furnished a corollary argument for economic liberalization: Turkey’s geographic role could be used to facilitate the economic integration of the newly independent countries, rendering Turkey a conduit for Western investment.

Despite setbacks in the 1990s—the banking crisis of 1994, growing public disillusionment with the unbridled free market model, rising unemployment, rampant inflation, and the growing obstructionism from traditionalist interests—Turkey continued on the trajectory of liberalization. On the one hand, in the aftermath of Özal’s

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8 Özel 1995.
9 One of the most well-known visions of this era was the ‘peace pipeline’: the idea that twin pipelines could carry the waters of the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers from southern Turkey to her Middle Eastern neighbors, a proposal that can be seen as an indication of the government’s desire for rapprochement with the countries in the region.
10 The pursuit of regional cooperation with the Balkan countries was also very attractive because Turkey’s hopes for admission to the European Community began to wane at this time.
political tenure, Turkey witnessed the (re)emergence of nationalist sentiments decrying Özal’s policies as unsustainable at best, and at worst as a danger to Turkey’s independence and territorial integrity. On the other hand however, the 1980s had created a well entrenched and sizeable liberal middle class, able to now act as a counterweight against the more traditionalist elements. The 1990s thus saw continual economic liberalization with Turkey joining the European Customs Union in 1995 and becoming a formal candidate country for the European Union in 1999.

5.5.2. Transnational Terrorism in the Post-1980 Period

The previous section traced Turkey’s economic liberalization and increasing interdependence with neighboring countries in the post-1980 period. While the economic context is crucial to shaping Turkey’s approach to control over borders and migration, it would provide a partial story. To fully understand the emergence of a new interdependent security context in this period, it is necessary at this point to delineate how the threat of transnational terrorism conditioned state responses to controlling human mobility.

The problem of terrorism in Turkey has its origins in home-grown leftist movements in the Cold War context; exploiting economic grievances born from rapid industrialization and urbanization, domestic groups began fomenting political unrest as early as the 1950s.\(^\text{11}\) These groups initially took the form of rebellious student

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\(^{11}\) Wyne 2005; Zehni 2008.
movements that in the relatively liberal climate following the 1960 coup d’état engaged in various anti-government activities. Though initially squashed by the Turkish state in the 1971 coup, they resurfaced as extremist organizations against the backdrop of the left-right polarization of the decade.\textsuperscript{12}

Terrorism of a transnational character emerged in the era following the 1980 coup d’état but was rooted in patterns taking hold in the preceding decades. Cold War dynamics in particular played an important role in incubating transnational terrorism.\textsuperscript{13} The PKK (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan—the Kurdish Workers’ Party) which would come to comprise the leading threat to national security for the Turkish state, formed in 1983 by Abdullah Öcalan, was initially governed by Marxist-Leninist doctrines. The PKK also exploited socioeconomic grievances stemming from the rapid modernization and transformation of Turkish society, using both socialist principles and the promise of the liberation of Kurds to recruit more members. Within the context of the Cold War, the Turkish state mimicked the repressive measures of the Western block against political terrorism, inadvertently strengthening the hand of terrorist networks by creating further

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. On the left were organizations such as the People’s Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C) and Turkish People’s Liberation Army (THKO); the rightist groups were extreme nationalist organizations such as the Turkish Revenge Brigade (TTT). Also see Alkan 2003.

\textsuperscript{13} In Chapter 3, transnational terrorism had a specific definition: acts of terror that either cross borders or involve perpetrators and victims of different nationalities. This chapter adopts a looser definition. As further discussed, PKK has bases in countries neighboring Turkey and consequently is organized transnationally. Additionally it involves activities that cross borders. However, acts against Turkish citizens or within Turkey perpetrated by the PKK based in Turkey might not necessarily be coded in ITERATE as transnational because its members often have Turkish citizenship. Lastly, although the discussion here is mostly centered on the PKK, the threat of transnational terror is not confined to the PKK but other major organizations with transnational character are in general either affiliated with the PKK or are offshoots of it.
resentment. Thus, the Turkish state adopted a no-compromise stance, relying on military measures to crush terrorism, and declaring a state of emergency in the eastern provinces.14

Terrorism instigated by the PKK evolved through several phases in terms of tactics, organization, and ideology and countermeasures employed by the Turkish government.15 Although it is beyond the scope of this section to offer a comprehensive discussion of the sources, nature, and history of terrorism in Turkey, a brief survey of the evolution of the PKK is important for understanding its transnational character, the international dynamics at play, and how these processes fed into perceptions of threat against national security. The PKK moved from a smaller organization using a socialist ideology to recruit members in the 1980s to a transnational organization using Kurdish nationalism to draw new members in the 1990s. It also diversified its portfolio of tactics; the mid 1980s witnessed the rise of mass targeting of civilians whereas by the 1990s, the PKK had begun perpetrating acts of suicide terrorism in metropolitan areas.16 Within the period from the end of the Cold War to the decapitation of the organization in 1999, the PKK also managed to acquire international support for its cause, facilitating the transnational organization of its activities. In the post-Gulf War environment, Turkey took advantage of infighting between factions in northern Iraq to engage in cross-border

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16 Crenshaw 2002. According to Pape 2003, the PKK’s use of suicide terrorism is one of 11 cases of failure in the sense that the organization failed in achieving any concessions from the Turkish government.
operations, which were effective in containing the cross-border flow of terrorism from Iraq.

Weakened after the capture of its leader Öcalan in 1999, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire, while initially maintaining cadres capable of carrying out suicide attacks, if necessary. Two direct consequences of Öcalan’s arrest were the exodus of Kurdish guerillas into Northern Iraq, in part responding to Öcalan’s call to cease activities in Turkey, and the splintering of the group, with most violent activities carried on by dissident factions. Additionally, the 2000s saw increasing emphasis on the cause of self-determination and separatist aims, drawing increased international attention to the organization. In part to showcase its willingness to cooperate within the democratic system and emphasize renunciation of violence, the PKK announced in 2002 that it had disbanded and changed its name to KADEK, then to KONGRA-GEL. In the wake of the Iraq War, fearing that the political vacuum in Northern Iraq would exacerbate terrorism, Turkey intensified its cross-border efforts towards destroying the camps, logistic lines, and infrastructure of the organization in northern Iraq and

17 Although the European Union countries updated their list of terrorist organizations to include the PKK, the efforts on the part of the PKK to rename itself as a political party meant that identifying its offshoots as terrorist organizations became increasingly difficult. Zehni 2008 argues that this also resulted in increasing pressure to Turkey by European governments to reach a political compromise and to move away from military responses.

18 The name changes also came about as a response to recognition of the PKK as a terrorist organization by European countries.
complemented these efforts with economic rehabilitation programs in the southeast provinces.¹⁹

To briefly digress, whereas political, media, and academic attention has focused largely on the PKK as a source of transnational terrorism, it is possible to identify three other types of terrorist organizations in Turkey that contributed to fears over national security. A recent report published by Turkey’s police department established that PKK is one of 12 active terrorist groups and categorized these organizations into Marxist-Leninist cells, separatist organizations including the PKK and its offshoots, and religious/fundamentalist organizations.²⁰ Importantly, the development and growth of these organizations are tied to the PKK in one of several ways. In sum, although concerns over terrorism hinged on PKK activity in previous decades, political attention broadened to encompass Islamic terror networks particularly after the 2003 Istanbul attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda.²¹

In the face of transnational terrorism, number of factors intensified perceptions of threat in Turkey’s case. At the outset, the vulnerability of the Turkish state especially

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¹⁹ An example of this sort of policy was an initiative undertaken by the Ministry of the Interior to compensate villagers who had been compelled to evacuate towns for reasons of security. Ministry of the Interior 2007. Other than that GAP, the Southeastern Anatolian Project designed to revitalize the economy of the southeast through sustainable development is the most important example of this type of policy.

²⁰ TNP2009. The most famous in the first group are DHKPC—Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party, MLKP—The Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, and the TKP/ML—The Turkish Communist Party. Among fundamentalist organizations the most well-known are the Turkish Hezbollah with no known ties to Lebanese Hezbollah, Great Islamic Raiders’ Front, IBDA-C, the Anatolia Federative Islamic State, AFIS, partially based in Germany, and Al Qaeda, responsible for the 2003 bombings of HSBC and two synagogues in Istanbul.

²¹ Cline 2004.
against non-conventional threats and the guerilla tactics these actors employed exacerbated fears over security.\textsuperscript{22} In this context, the ability of terrorist groups—in particular the PKK— to exploit Turkey’s rugged terrain in border regions by using mountainous territory as hideouts played a significant role in augmenting the Turkish state’s anxiety. Border regions with Iran and Iraq in particular provided safe bases for terrorist groups to conduct hit-and-run attacks against Turkish forces. Unequipped to respond to non-conventional warfare and thwarted by unwelcoming terrain, Turkish military forces opted at the outset for strictly military measures, declaring martial law and subsequently a state of emergency in these provinces.\textsuperscript{23} These dynamics illustrate the asymmetric nature of the threat that Turkish authorities faced vis-à-vis actors that were typically hard to deter or locate.

Although these border areas had historically posed a challenge for the central government’s authority by serving as a breeding ground and haven for bandits and smugglers, the threat of terrorism had an additional transnational dimension to it.\textsuperscript{24} Importantly, the perception that the terrorist threat in Turkey was manipulated by foreign powers and created in part by international dynamics can be traced back to the early 1980s. In fact, early on during his term as Prime Minister, Turgut Özal underlined the Cold War’s effects on domestic terrorism. The following quote from Özal’s address

\textsuperscript{22} Mango 2005; Zehni 2008.
\textsuperscript{23} Parliamentary proceedings taking place as recently as 2000 provides a glimpse into the political debate on the security rationale for continuously extending the state of emergency in these provinces. See TBMM 2000.
\textsuperscript{24} USAK 2007.
to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1984 on the topic of terrorism illustrates the connection drawn between international dynamics and terrorism in Turkey.

“For the past 15 years, terrorist incidents have been used as a tool of worldwide strategy. The hot war was replaced by a cold war and the cold war was replaced by a war being waged by terrorist organizations...In countries not armed against terrorism, professional terrorist groups can achieve surprising results in a short time.”

Furthermore, the transnational organization of the PKK ignited fears that terrorism was employed as a strategic tool by countries that were avowedly sympathetic to Kurdish separatism but exploiting the PKK to further their own interests. The Turkish government quickly became concerned that her neighbors—Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Greece—were using the bases of operation on their own soil as leverage to achieve concessions in other foreign policy issues. Iran was believed to manipulate Kurdish terrorism to block Turkey’s influence in the region. Syria’s territorial ambitions towards Hatay—in incorporated into Turkey in 1939—meant that it sought to spark unrest on Turkish soil by allowing Kurdish guerillas access to bases on its territory. It is plausible that territorial issues (over the Aegean and Cyprus) also lay behind Greece’s funding and support for PKK activity. Iraq similarly welcomed the operation of bases within its borders to weaken Turkish presence in the Middle East.

Beyond concerns over the operation of PKK bases in neighboring countries, Turkish officials also pointed to a somewhat less direct and broader form of support for

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26 Alkan 2003; Robins 1993.
Kurdish separatism in Europe, believing that the widespread campaign of funding and propaganda might further incite terrorist activity against Turkish targets.\textsuperscript{28}

Underscoring the linkage between border control and security, the Özal administration stated that the goals of the government should be “ensuring the continuity of state and security, securing tranquility, preventing illegal crossing—particularly from Iran and Iraq—in and out of Turkey through effective border control and isolating terrorism.”\textsuperscript{29}

With recent attacks against Turkish targets and civilians, the role of Turkey’s geographic situation as an enabler of “fallout” terrorism from external groups has come into the political limelight.\textsuperscript{30} The government’s counterterrorism efforts are further complicated by external events. The Iraq War is a case in point: the power vacuum in northern Iraq has engendered a perception in the Turkish media of the border-zone as a “Black Spot”—a dangerous breeding ground for militancy and terrorism.\textsuperscript{31} A recent strategic report has drawn attention to these factors by pointing to the precarious situation in Northern Iraq as a source of continued threat to Turkey’s security.\textsuperscript{32}

International dynamics aggravate fears over terrorism in another way: the Turkish

\textsuperscript{28} TBMM 1984.
\textsuperscript{29} BBC, “Turkish Prime Minister on Terrorist Incidents in Anatolia,” \textit{BBC}, on October 19, 1984
\textsuperscript{30} Cline 2004. Among the examples of fallout terror were attacks by Chechen sympathizers, mostly in the form of hijackings, incidents perpetrated by the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Algerian FIS, and various Islamic groups with ties to Afghanistan.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Hürriyet}, June 20, 2007.
\textsuperscript{32} USAK2007.
government believes that other states’ interests in the region might foil Turkey’s efforts to minimize terrorist activity in the region.³³

Finally, even though the focus of this chapter is on terror as a security threat, securitization of human mobility was also critically linked to other types of clandestine transnational actors (CTAs), most importantly illegal migrants and traffickers and smugglers who aided their surreptitious entry into Turkish territory. Moreover, undocumented migration was linked in important ways to the problem of terrorism. One article notes for example that the greatest beneficiary of organized crime activity—smuggling of drugs and contraband arms and human trafficking—was the PKK.³⁴ As a result, discussions of illegal entry into Turkish territory usually established a link between the problems of transborder crime to and transnational terror and portrayed these phenomena as interlinked.

5.5.3 The Interdependent Security Environment

The above paragraphs provided an overview of how the economic and security context was reshaped in the post-1980 era. The discussion illustrates that on the one hand, this period was characterized by capital and trade liberalization and the domestic restructuring of Turkey’s economy. On the other hand, within the same period, the threat of terrorism became salient and at the same time, an explicit linkage was drawn

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³³ Cline 2004; New York Times, March 1 2008. For example, in the post Iraq War context, the U.S. has pressured Turkey to remove security and intelligence personnel from Northern Iraq. Additionally, Turkey’s cross-border operations have come under criticism.

³⁴ Arti Haber, 1998.
between national security and border management. There were also indications, however, that economic change moderated the process of securitization. Summarizing the period, Özel contends:

“The Özalist vision and reprioritizing of the principles of Turkey’s national security led to an outward-looking policy. Overcoming the rigidity of physical and political borders, Turkey tried to extend its influence, primarily economically, to all surrounding areas, to act as a broker between the West and the expanded Middle East, and to benefit economically and politically from Turkey’s increasing importance as a gateway.”

He further observes that this approach stood in stark contrast to the nationalist perspective that held considerable political clout prior to Turkey’s liberalization program. Notably, this traditional approach was predicated on the primacy of Turkey’s territorial integrity and maintained that national security goals took precedence over economic aspirations. Economic liberalization provided the impetus for a reordering of the three official tenets defining the national interest—territorial integrity, peace, and economic and social development—such that economic progress was held to be the foundation of the other two goals. In that sense, we might say that Turkey’s liberalization process exemplifies the transition from a military state logic to the logic of the trading state. The process also illustrates how Turkey moved away from a conception of sovereignty exclusively based on territorial integrity to a one emphasizing interdependence. To recapitulate, Turkey’s economic restructuring in the 1980s and

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35 Özel 1995, 176.
36 Özal 1990. The change in the ordering of national goals could be seen in Özal’s opening speeches to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
37 Rosecrance 1986.
consequent reconfiguration of domestic interests cultivated a paradigm shift in Turkey’s approach to security-seeking. Referring to this shift as a “change in mentality”, Özal underscored that the transformation would have far-reaching repercussions in a plethora of issue-areas.38

Figure 5.2 summarizes this section by showing the variation in number of terrorist incidents within Turkish territory.39 As the Figure illustrates, the 1980s saw a marked increase in terrorism. Although the late 1990s saw a decrease in the rate, especially after the capture of Öcalan, the post 2003 environment has been characterized with the resurgence in terrorist activity, in part as a result of the Iraq War.

38 Özal 1983.
39 These statistics are taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) but do not necessarily coincide with the operationalization of targeted terror employed in previous chapters because they do not control for the nationality of the perpetrators. For example, incidents by the PKK might not be included in the targeted incident count if the PKK members who were involved were Turkish citizens. To be coded as a transnational incident, the nationality of perpetrator and target had to be distinct.
To return to the theoretical framework this section has identified several crucial processes we would like to see in the case study: 1) domestic economic restructuring and creation of vested interests in favor of liberalization 2) growth of capital and trade ties with neighboring states 3) increased perceptions of threat to national security arising from transnational terrorism 4) securitization of human mobility and border control 5) modulation of security concerns by economic incentives. What remains to be demonstrated is how these factors influenced migration policies. With this goal in mind, I now proceed to tracing changes in Turkey’s migration policies. Following the outline of the dissertation, I begin with an evaluation of Turkey’s visa policies, followed by a
discussion of asylum and refugee admissions, and finally provide an overview of on-site measures of border control.

5.6 Tracing Turkey’s Migration Policies Over Time

5.6.1 The 1980s: Economic Liberalization

Visa Policies

A study of the evolution of Turkey’s visa policies in the 1980s will reveal that liberalization of the visa regime went hand in hand with liberalization of trade and capital movements. To go back to an earlier point, the Özal administration’s foreign policy bore the imprint of classical liberalism. As Özel observes, “Prime Minister Özal, like a good nineteenth-century liberal, had faith that extensive economic relations between nations would generate nonbelligerence.”

Parliamentary debates at the time reflected the belief among political elites that the visa regime should be based on the principle of reciprocity. Moreover, an explicit linkage was drawn between commercial relations and the visa regime through which a liberal visa policy was advanced as an instrument of diplomatic rapprochement with Turkey’s neighbors. The dialogue between members of parliament in 1984 on the issue

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of visas against citizens of Turkey’s neighbors in the Middle East illustrate the dilemma the Turkish state faced: although some members of parliament shared the sentiment that Turkey should retaliate with restrictions against countries harboring territorial ambitions, others counteracted this belief stating that it might hamper economic partnership. Thus, during a debate on Turkey’s policy responses to selective visa requirements for Turkish citizens from Hatay by Saudi Arabia, whereas Cüneyt Canver, voiced opposition party sentiments and contended that visa policies were a matter of “national pride”, members of the ruling party, led by Mesut Yılmaz, cautioned against retaliation with strict regulations on the grounds that it might hurt trade between the two countries.41

Importantly, a liberal visa regime emerged as a fundamental way of ensuring peace through economic and social contact.42 Along these lines, Turkey signed a series of bilateral agreements with neighboring states to facilitate travel. The visa waiver agreement signed with Greece in 1988 is exemplary in demonstrating how Turkey used the waiver as a foreign policy instrument. In particular, Özal sought to repair relations with Greece which had deteriorated in the 1960s as a result of conflict over Cyprus and saw visa-free travel as a means of boosting commerce and improving social trust; economic interdependence would serve the longer-term goal of resolving the political

41 TBMM 1985. At the time Cüneyt Canver was a member of parliament (MP) from Adana for one of the opposition parties, Halkça Parti, a nationalist party that later became known as the SHP, the Social Democratic People’s Party.
42 Hale 2002.
stalemate between the two countries.\footnote{Kirişçi 2007. Prior to 1964, Greek nationals enjoyed visa-free travel to Turkey but both countries had rescinded the waiver as a result of conflict over Cyprus.} The waiver policy was successful in increasing the volume of travel between the two countries, with the number of arrivals from Greece almost doubling within a decade. Pursuing a similar logic, Turkey signed a series of agreements granting visa waivers or facilitating travel with her neighbors and near-neighbors in Europe. In effect, the visa policies of the 1980s were a continuation of the relatively liberal travel arrangements Turkey had established with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.\footnote{Ibid. Most of these arrangements allowed free transit travel but a waiver was signed with Romania and was in place until 2004 when Romania was compelled to harmonize her policies with the EU.}

Turkey’s visa policies with respect to countries in Western Europe paint an interesting picture. Turkey was a signatory to the European Agreement on Regulations Governing the Movement of Persons between member states of the Council of Europe of 1957. The European Agreement ensured the relaxation of controls over mobility for citizens of the Council of Europe countries.\footnote{Ibid.} In addition, pursuant to her application for associate membership in 1958, Turkey had also signed the Ankara Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963; this document intended to prepare Turkey for full membership with the EEC and in this context, facilitate the free movement of goods, capital, and labor. The 1970 Additional Protocol ratified by EEC member states in 1973, reiterated member states’ commitment to
liberalization of borders and outlined the steps to reach this goal.\textsuperscript{46} In the context of these European agreements, Turkey’s visa system had come to hinge on the principle of reciprocity, allowing for visa-free travel in and out of Turkey.

Regardless, a number of developments in the 1980s prompted EEC countries to impose visa restrictions against Turkish citizens. Spearheaded by the Federal Republic of Germany’s revocation of free travel rights for Turkish nationals in 1980, European countries imposed visa restrictions following Turkey’s coup d’état.\textsuperscript{47} Experiencing fears that the political environment following the coup would generate mass flows out of Turkey, European countries also responded to the threat of undocumented migration from Turkey as well as from Turkey’s neighbors. On the one hand, the discontinuation of the guest worker program by Germany had resulted in an increase in incidents of illegal flows. On the other hand, political turbulence in the Middle East –the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War in particular— in the 1980s coupled with Turkey’s liberal visa policies for her southeast neighbors created incentives for migrants from these territories to use Turkey as a transit route to access European states. As a result, even after Turkey’s return to civilian rule in 1983, visa restrictions against Turkish nationals remained in place. What is remarkable, however, is that Turkey deviated from the principle of reciprocity by continuing her liberal visa practices towards EEC countries.

\textsuperscript{46} Aksoy, Iktisadi Kalkınma Yayınları No. 213, 2007. It is important to note that the Agreement ensured visa-free short-term travel not for all citizens but for specific categories of individuals: business, service providers, academics, and employers.

\textsuperscript{47} Işveren. 04/2008.
countries. Importantly, economic considerations and Turkey’s dependence on tourism revenue from these states constrained Turkey’s visa policies against Western European states.48

Whereas policies towards Turkey’s Western neighbors showed continuity, visa policies with respect to Turkey’s neighbors in the Middle East did constitute a change from earlier eras when political considerations had led to tighter policies against citizens of these countries. In particular, suspicion of pan-Arab ideology had entailed travel restrictions for nations of Syria, Egypt and Iraq.49 Furthermore, tension over the role that Syria and Iraq played in secessionist terror in Turkey had fed into perceptions of threat from these countries. Since the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey had responded to pan-Arab nationalism that swept the Arab world by allying itself with Western interests, which in turn served to further alienate Arab countries.50 A speech by Özal on counterterrorism highlighted that various terrorist organizations operating in Syria and Lebanon exacerbated divisive terror in Turkey and sought to “take Turkey back to the

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48 Kırişi 2005. Turkey did impose a sticker visa—a visa at the border—on a number of Western European countries in the 1990s but as explained, this system allowed Turkey to maintain liberal border policies rather than tightening control over mobility. See Appendix B for list of countries included in the sticker visa category.

49 Hale 2002.

50 Özel 1995. Examples of Turkey’s stance in favor of Western interests were Turkey’s militarization of the border with Syria to forestall radicalization of Syria’s government in 1957, the decision to allow the United States to use the Incirlik air base to intervene in the Lebanon crisis of 1958, and voting in favor of France in the United Nations during the Algerian War of Independence. Additionally Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact along with the United Kingdom, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan in an effort to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East.
days of chaos and disorder” and stood in the way of Turkey’s democratization.51

Furthermore, political elites pointed to the adverse effects of the ongoing Iran-Iraq war for the border-region, and argued in favor of stricter border enforcement and monitoring. Despite these concerns however, Turkey relaxed its visa controls vis-à-vis her Middle Eastern neighbors. This policy reversal must be understood in the context of the government’s effort to draw tourism and investment into Turkey and was inextricably tied to expanding trade with Arab countries.52 As a result, visa policies were relaxed with Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, followed by similar agreements with Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco.

The 1980s era saw the emergence of Turkey’s highly flexible visa regime, which still remains in effect in modified form. It also established the categorical system which became the cornerstone of Turkey’s approach to managing short-term migration. According to this system, Turkey grants a visa waiver for a category of countries whose nationals can enjoy a stay in Turkey up to a predetermined length of time. A second category comprises those whose nationals may obtain a visa-at-the border, dubbed the “sticker-visa”. This flexible approach dates back to the 1970s but was extended to apply to a wider group of countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The third group of countries constitutes those whose nationals are required to apply for a visa prior to

51 TBMM 1984. Thus Turkey was concerned not only with PKK activity but other organizations with a leftist orientation. Parliamentary proceedings refer to groups such as ASALA, an Armenian-Leftist organization, the Japanese Red Army, German Baader-Meinhof. The concern was that infiltration by these groups would in turn trigger PKK activity. There was additional concern that ASALA was cooperating with the PKK.
52 Kirişçi 2005.
arrival, or those against which Turkey imposes (upstream) visa restrictions. It is worth noting that the sticker visa policy in particular reflected pragmatism in control over human mobility; while the Turkish state could generate revenue from the fees for entry, the visa-at-border approach allowed Turkey to de-emphasize the deterrent and selection features of visa restrictions.

**Asylum Policies**

In contrast to the visa domain, Turkey’s asylum and refugee policies remained stagnant throughout the 1980s. However, in order to understand the lack of change, we need to look at the institutional mechanisms underpinning Turkey’s asylum regime. Turkey’s asylum system is multi-tiered in categorizing individuals according to whether they are convention or non-convention refugees, or refugees of Turkish descent. The tier system itself is grounded in Turkey’s conceptions of national identity which were to make a deep imprint on Turkey’s migration policies. These conceptions were cemented by the 1934 Law of Settlement through which migration emerged as a privilege restricted only to individuals of Turkish descent and culture. As such, although Turkey is among the original signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, it is one of the few remaining countries that maintain a geographical limitation to the applicability

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53 The Appendix provides a list of countries falling into each category. This information can be obtained from the Turkish General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü-EGM). www.egm.gov.tr.
54 Neumayer 2006. Neumayer also notes that visa-at-border is geared towards generating revenue from foreign travel instead of acting as a deterrent instrument against short-term migration.
55 Keyman and İçduygu 2000.
56 Kirişçi 2000.
of the Geneva Convention. The geographical limitation disaggregates political migrants according to their countries of origin. The first tier—convention refugees—comprise migrants of European origin who enjoy all the rights granted by the Geneva Convention and are granted de jure refugee status, with the expectation that they will eventually be resettled or return to their countries of origin.

Non-convention refugees constitute the second tier and refer to individuals from outside of Europe, mostly from the Middle East and Asia. Turkey’s geographical limitation implies that individuals seeking asylum from outside of Europe are not granted de jure status. As a consequence, in lieu of granting refugee status, the Turkish government has traditionally granted tourist visas to individuals from non-European countries. This approach has on the one hand reflected pragmatism on the part of the Turkish government in allowing Turkey to harbor political migrants on her own territory without formal recognition but on the other hand has absolved Turkey of providing governmental assistance. As an example, Iranian political migrants fleeing persecution in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution were allowed to stay in Turkey on tourist visas but were required to reenter every three months and did not benefit from the protection of the 1951 Convention.

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57 Congo, Madagascar, and Monaco are the other three countries that along with Turkey include a geographical limitation to the applicability of the Geneva Convention.
58 Foreigners Department of the Ministry of the Interior.
The third group is governed by the 1934 Law of Settlement and comprises political migrants of Turkish ethnicity and descent arriving mostly from the Balkan countries and Central Asia. Instead of viewing these individuals as political migrants, the Turkish government has treated them as legal immigrants, with the result that the third tier enjoys generous support schemes undertaken by the government. The latter approach is conditioned by the sense of moral obligation on the part of the Turkish state towards ethnic Turks in neighboring countries that were left behind after the Ottoman Empire retreated from its territories in the Balkans. Concomitantly, political elites face domestic pressure, especially from diaspora communities of ethnic Turkic origin, to protect the rights of Turkish minorities by allowing individuals of Turkish descent to immigrate, settle, and apply for full citizenship.

In sum, while asylum and refugee admissions continued to be under the purview of the tier-system, the 1980s saw a number of political developments that would subsequently create a push towards tighter policy. First, mass refugee flows following the regime change in Iran engendered anxieties over the spread of religious fundamentalism and as a result, the 1980s created an impetus towards more restrictive policy. Second, mass flows of Iraqi refugees arising in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war and

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60 In actuality the logics governing the first and third tiers, convention refugees and political migrants of ethnic origin, have at times overlapped. This is in part because the Law of Settlement fails to clearly specify what Turkish heritage entails. As a consequence, individuals not of Turkish ethnicity such as Kosovans and Bosnians have benefited in part from the protection of the Law of Settlement. Additionally, Turkish officials have at times stated that the same law exempts them from any obligations to extend protection rights to individuals belonging to the second tier. Similarly, political migrants of Turkish descent, such as Bulgarians fleeing to Turkey in the 1980s, also benefited from the Turkish government’s policy of granting asylum to migrants from communist countries. See Kiriçi 1996. Also see Forum, Kasım.
gaining speed with the 1991 Gulf War spurred fears over Kurdish separatism and militancy in the Middle East, compounding Turkey’s reluctance to grant refugee recognition to individuals of non-European origin.

**On-Site Border Control Policies**

Change in Turkey’s border control policies was characterized by limited liberalization and reflected the influence of both material interests and security concerns. In fact, shortly after coming to power, the Motherland Party (ANAP) stated in an address to the parliament that “facilitating cross-border exchange” would constitute a fundamental step in “preventing stagnation in border regions” and in the longer-term goal of liberalization.61 Although the government worked towards this goal by liberalizing other aspects of migration policy—in particular visa policies—it also maintained tight control over border policies. Most of Turkey’s borders remained heavily militarized and the Turkish state maintained strict control over cross-border flows.

To reemphasize an earlier point, Turkey’s borders in the Middle East had been traditionally vulnerable to infiltration by clandestine transnational actors (CTAs). Mountainous terrain obstructed the Turkish government’s efforts to counteract CTA activity in the area, rendering her borders in the region particularly porous.62 In addition to the problems of smuggling and banditry, cross-border terror gained

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61TBMM 1983, 75.
predominance in discussions of border security in the 1980s. In a subsequent parliamentary address in 1984, Prime Minister Özal drew attention to increasing terrorism as a negative externality of the “authority vacuum resulting from the Iran-Iraq War”, emphasizing that the onus of monitoring the border had fallen on the Turkish military forces.\(^63\) In the same speech, Özal hinted that other states exploited the threat of terrorism to undermine Turkey’s liberalization and democratization.\(^64\)

In fact, a factor that exacerbated perceptions of threat was the belief among elites that neighboring countries sought to exploit terrorist activity as leverage to impose their own interests on Turkey.\(^65\) In other words, outside support for or sponsorship of terrorism was tied to extant or past territorial disputes between Turkey and neighbors. To give an example, state elites tied the operation of terrorist bases in Syria to Syria’s territorial ambitions over Hatay as well as disagreement over Turkey’s control of the Euphrates River.\(^66\) As a result, the border with Syria was mined in the 1980s and became militarized. Greece provides another example in which past disputes resulted in tight border policies on the part of Turkey: the border with Greece had become fortified and controlled in the 1960s as territorial issues negatively affected relations between the two countries. Beyond territorial issues, Turkey believed that her neighbors in the Middle East in particular sought to undermine Turkey’s regional influence and followed “a

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\(^{63}\) TBMM 1984, 396.

\(^{64}\) Ibid., 396.

\(^{65}\) Mango 2005.

\(^{66}\) Hatay—previously Alexandretta had been incorporated into Turkey in 1939 after first declaring its independence from French Syria in 1938 and then voting to join Turkey in 1939.
divide and conquer logic” by endorsing PKK activity. In other words, traditional security concerns over regional dominance, territorial rivalry, and territorial claims and fears over non-traditional threats arising from terrorist activity, organized crime, and undocumented migration made for tightly controlled and militarized borders in the 1980s.

5.6.2 The 1990s: The Post-Cold War Environment

Visa Policies

The post-Cold War era saw the crystallization of Turkey’s liberal visa regime; the sticker visa was granted to a wider range of countries and visa waivers were introduced to more countries. The linkage between economic interdependence and liberalization of Turkey’s visa policies in this period became more evident. Two specific trends were influential in guiding this process. First, Turkey sought regional cooperation with contiguous states and with her near-neighbors and against this background, a liberal visa regime supplied the crucial link between peaceful relations with neighboring states. Second, Turkey aimed to take advantage of the end of the Cold War to reinvigorate her cultural and economic ties with the Eastern Bloc, especially with the newly independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

With these goals in mind, Özal and the ruling Motherland Party had advocated the establishment of an organization for regional cooperation with countries in the Black

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Sea region several years before the Cold War had drawn to a close.\textsuperscript{68} Stressing the primacy of “eco-strategy” over “geostrategy”, Şükrü Elekdağ, Turkey’s former head of the Foreign Ministry, argued that in the post-Cold War environment, Turkey’s political power would be a function of its economic and diplomatic strength rather than its military prowess.\textsuperscript{69} These goals came to fruition in 1992 with the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area (BSEC). A liberal visa regime was used by the Turkish government to strengthen regional ties and embodied a broader approach to cooperation in fostering exchange on a number of issue areas.\textsuperscript{70} Also in this vein, in 1995 Turkey entered a regional trade agreement with countries in Asia and Eurasia: the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). The ECO constituted a milestone in Turkey’s growing economic ties with regional powers and facilitated travel between countries for business and skilled labor.\textsuperscript{71}

Table 5.3 below gives the number of arrivals into Turkey from the Soviet Union and the former Soviet Republics from 1980 until 2000. The extension of the sticker visa regime to the former Soviet Republics encouraged flows into Turkey, as can be seen in the marked increase in arrival from these countries. What is interesting to note is that the Turkish government did not revoke the facilitated visa privileges she granted for

\textsuperscript{68} Özal was the head of government as Prime Minister from 1983 until 1989; from 1989 until his death in 1993, he served as Turkey’s 8\textsuperscript{th} President. Although the president as the head of state in Turkey mostly enjoys symbolic powers, the presidential office is influential for establishment of diplomatic contacts. In fact, Özal’s ideas about liberalism continued to be influential in this period as well as after his death.


\textsuperscript{70} Kirişçi2007.

\textsuperscript{71} ECO member states are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
nationals of these countries despite the growing salience of illegal trade and undocumented migration in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{72}

Table 5.3: Short-Term Flows into Turkey from the Soviet Union and former Soviet Republics, 1980-2000.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td>40,015</td>
<td>222,537</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,235,290</td>
<td>677,152</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asian States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>31,373</td>
<td>38,939</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8,052</td>
<td>8,789</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>3,087</td>
<td>952</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5,035</td>
<td>10,987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>13,558</td>
<td>21,062</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Caucasus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,345</td>
<td>17,549</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>100,249</td>
<td>179,878</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>116,709</td>
<td>179,563</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
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<td>222,303</td>
<td>376,990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>474</td>
<td>9,622</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,290</td>
<td>62,687</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>93,794</td>
<td>173,551</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td>40,015</td>
<td>222,537</td>
<td>1,621,256</td>
<td>1,380,731</td>
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</table>


Table 5.4 displays arrival statistics for migrants from the Middle East and Balkans. As can be observed in Table 5.4, arrivals from Turkey’s contiguous and regional neighbors in the Middle East and Balkans also exhibited a significant increase in the 1990s. Beyond this general trend, several other facts are worth noting. First, Turkey’s liberal visa policies and the consequent increase in travel continued even when

\textsuperscript{72} Eder et al. 2003. İçduygu and Ünalan 2002. Other issues were undocumented migration resulting from the economic transformation of the Eastern Bloc as well as concerns over societal security.
political relations between states deteriorated. For example, even in the wake of the Kardak Crisis between Greece and Turkey in 1996, arrivals from Greece continued to increase.\textsuperscript{73} Scholars have noted that the ease of travel to Turkey encouraged the growth of societal ties and mitigated feelings of mistrust at the domestic level; it might be said that these factors contributed to the thawing of relations between the countries after 1999.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{73} The Kardak Crisis ensued over two small islets on the Aegean Sea and is inextricably linked to the two states’ ongoing maritime disputes.

\textsuperscript{74} Kiri\c{s}ci2007. Kiri\c{s}ci cites commentators in both Greece and Turkey who underscore the importance of Turkey’s liberal visa system in peacebuilding between the two states. Some commentators also contend that the effect would be greater if Greece could relax its visa controls vis-à-vis Turkish nationals.
Another striking example of peace-building through non-governmental contact concerns Turkey’s migration policies with respect to Armenia. Whereas the interstate border was closed after the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1993, the late 1990s saw efforts by political entrepreneurs in both countries to achieve societal reconciliation. Although it was not until 2003 that Turkey extended the sticker visa policy to include Armenia, the efforts of The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) emphasized the role of increased societal contact and cultural exchange at achieving reconciliation. Where Turkey’s neighbors in the Middle East are concerned, the extension of the sticker visa or facilitation of travel increased short-term flows from

### Table 5.4: Short-Term Flows into Turkey from the Middle East and Balkans, 1980-2000

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>12,796</td>
<td>14,247</td>
<td>42,082</td>
<td>219,958</td>
<td>379,003</td>
<td>380,819</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3,919</td>
<td>6,518</td>
<td>14,046</td>
<td>13,372</td>
<td>14,137</td>
<td>20,776</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>9,996</td>
<td>13,184</td>
<td>26,384</td>
<td>113,959</td>
<td>92,033</td>
<td>122,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf States**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43,088</td>
<td>40,029</td>
<td>19,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>7,383</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>7,347</td>
<td>12,410</td>
<td>7,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balkans</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>1,924</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,971</td>
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<td>Bosnia</td>
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<td>12,115</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>693</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>11,313</td>
<td>19,477</td>
<td>203,720</td>
<td>147,553</td>
<td>218,092</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>108,928</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>352,034</td>
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<td>191,203</td>
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<td>265,128</td>
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<td>Serbia-Montenegro</td>
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<td>44,600</td>
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<td></td>
<td>128,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>5,661</td>
<td>28,352</td>
<td>13,817</td>
<td>296,843</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,068</strong></td>
<td><strong>99,211</strong></td>
<td><strong>147,129</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,252,245</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,134,971</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,711,912</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ministry of the Interior and Kirişçi 2007

**Gulf States are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
these states at different rates, with Iran and Syria and Gulf countries in total constituting the top origin countries.75

**Asylum Policies**

While visa and border-control policies exhibited liberalization in the 1990s, Turkey tightened control over political migration. The most significant change to Turkey’s asylum policy came in 1994 with the adoption of the *Regulation on the Procedures and Principles Related to Mass Influx and the Foreigners Arriving in Turkey and Requesting Resident Permits with the Intention of Seeking Asylum from a Third Country.*76 This was also the first legal provision through which the Turkish government sought to address asylum procedures regarding non-convention refugees. Prior to the 1994 Framework, Turkish refugee policy vis-à-vis non-European migrants reflected piecemeal decision-making based on a number of national laws concerning other types of migration.77 With this new legislation, for the first time government authorities began to screen refugee claims themselves rather than delegating the task to the UNHCR. Aside from bringing control over non-convention refugee status determination under national control, the 1994 regulation brought about two significant procedural changes. First, the new law imposed a five day time limit for non-convention political migrants to file their

75 Syria is an exception in that Turkey did not include Syria in the sticker visa program but granted other privileges such as allowing Syrian nationals living in border regions to travel within 50 kilometers of the border.

76 UNHCR2000. The adoption of the Regulation was announced in the Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete), No. 22127, on November 30, 1994.

77 These were the Law on Settlement (No. 2510), the Citizenship Law (No. 5682), the Passport Law (No.5683) and the Law on Sojourn and Movement of Aliens (No. 5687). See Odman 1995.
request for political asylum. Second, it also introduced a further limitation by requiring asylum seekers who had not entered the country legally to submit their applications to the provincial authorities most proximate to the border points of entry.  

It is important to understand the security concerns that played a role in inducing the Turkish government to take matters into its own hands. First, the sheer volume of flows into Turkey was unprecedented and gave rise to the perception that the government was losing control over borders. Although there is a paucity of accurate statistics, newspaper reports at the time underlined political elites’ concerns over the number of refugees flowing into Turkey. One such article quoted a member of parliament (MP) as stating that the Iranian refugees had exceeded 1.5 million. Similarly, Turkey had confronted waves of refugee flows from Iraq: in 1988 more than 60,000 crossed the border into Turkey, followed by 450,000 amassing at Turkey’s border ports in 1991. Second, this period coincided with increasing number of terrorist incidents undertaken by the PKK, a trend which had, beginning with the 1980s already created a less tolerant attitude towards accepting migrants of Kurdish ethnicity. In that sense, the terrorism linkage exacerbated the perception that non-convention refugees

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78 This provision has come under criticism first due to the time it takes individuals to travel back to border provinces but second and more importantly because requiring that political migrants go back to border provinces poses a significant risk for political migrants. For example, the southeast border provinces of Van, Şırnak, and Ağrı were under martial law during the 1990s due to ongoing conflict with Kurdish guerillas and Turkish authorities, presenting a danger for Iranian and Iraqi asylum seekers. For a critique of the 1994 Regulation see Frelick 1997. For pathbreaking court cases pertaining to this issue see UNHCR2000. Noteworthy cases are E:1997/286, 117-8; E:1997/276, 119-20.
80 Mannaert 2003.
posed a threat to national security. Third, the Iranian revolution had exacerbated the secular elites’ fears over possible contagion of radical Islam. Fourth, economic conditions in post-communist regimes coupled with Turkey’s liberal visa regime gave way to undocumented migration, creating anxieties over bogus refugees exploiting the asylum channel to gain access to Turkish territory. The situation was aggravated by the increasing strictness of the European asylum and refugee policies, which in turn led to growing anxieties that Turkey would become a dumping ground for Europe’s unwanted political migrants.

Confronted with mass refugee flows in the 1990s, Turkey signed several protocols with her neighbors to ensure close cooperation between officials to stop unauthorized border crossings. Most significant among these were a series of agreements signed with Iran aimed at curbing the activities of each other’s opposition groups. In that respect, this stance reflected a desire on the part of the Turkish government to reassure the Iranian government that Turkey would return any asylum seekers that Iran saw as dissidents and opponents to Iran’s regime. Underscoring this notion, the Turkish Ministry of the Interior noted after the signing of the third protocol for cooperation on border security with Iran: “No element acting against the Islamic Republic of Iran in Turkey will be allowed to remain on Turkish territory.”81 The strategy of cooperating with neighbors to prevent cross-border dissident activity served

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81 Cumhuriyet, 14 June 1994.
Turkey’s interests in two fundamental ways. First, it was in accordance with Turkey’s
desire to protect diplomatic and economic ties with her neighbors by reassuring origin
country governments that Turkey would not provide sanctuary to rebels. Second, this
strategy also contributed to Turkey’s counterterrorism efforts and was in that sense an
outcome of the securitization of refugee flows. In fact, by promising to return political
exile activists to Iran, Turkey was in turn able to demand the expulsion of Kurdish
rebels.

Turkey moved towards more restrictive asylum admissions vis-à-vis Iraqi
political migrants against a distinct foreign policy context. The existence of a safe zone
in Iraqi territory justified Turkey’s policy of returning asylum seekers to Iraq with the
presumption that Iraqi Kurds could be extradited without fear of persecution (and thus
without violating the principle of non-refoulement). The establishment of the safe haven
on the 36th parallel in northern Iraq was an outcome of the humanitarian crisis that
ensued when Turkey closed off its borders in response to the deluge of almost half a
million asylum seekers at 14 border points in April of 1991. Whereas the increasing
salience of humanitarian considerations against the context of Turkey’s application for
membership in the European Community (EC) had made for a more liberal policy
towards the influx of refugees in 1988, the difficulties the government had faced in

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82 See Salehyan 2006.
83 Despite serving security goals, this stance came under criticism as cooperation agreements with Iran led to
violations of the principle of non-refoulement embodied in the 1951 Geneva Convention.
coping with the earlier flow had rendered Turkey staunchly reluctant to open its borders in 1991.

In a nutshell, the November 1994 Regulation was commensurate with the distinction that already existed between convention and non-convention refugees in Turkish asylum and refugee law. It also constituted an effort to systematically address both the volume and changing direction of refugee flows. The fact that influxes came from non-European countries of origin heightened perceptions of threat and contributed to the securitization of political migration. On the national security front, fears over terrorism, Kurdish separatism and militancy, and the spread of religious fundamentalism rendered Turkey’s asylum policies more restrictive. At the same time, diplomatic considerations further curtailed the pragmatic and more flexible approach to non-convention refugees. By bringing status determination under the control of the Turkish state, the 1994 decree attempted to address national security concerns and to do so, introduced strict measures on asylum procedures.

**Border Control Policies**

With the end of the Cold War came a period of selective liberalization of border policies. During and before the 1980s, Turkey’s borders with Bulgaria and with the Soviet Union had been tightly controlled. Concomitant with Turkey’s bridge-building efforts towards the newly independent Turkic republics, borders with Georgia and
Azerbaijan were demilitarized. Following the collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria, the Turkish government relaxed controls over the previously tightly sealed boundary. In contrast, Turkey closed off and militarized the border with Armenia in retaliation for Armenia’s occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in Azerbaijan.

Liberalization of Turkey’s borders in the Middle East remained limited; whereas Turkey had laid the foundations for cross-border cooperation with Iraq and Iran to combat transborder terrorist activity in the mid-1980s, the 1990s brought to the fore two other types of security problems. First, as the previous section recounted, Turkey feared a deluge of mass refugees fleeing political conditions, a fear that was intensified during the Gulf War in the early 1990s. Second, and related, were fears over irregular migration in the form of bogus refugee seekers exploiting the asylum channel, illegal migrants crossing the border in a clandestine manner, or short-term migrants overstaying or violating their visas. The post Cold-War context intensified these fears as turbulent economic transitions drove undocumented migrants from the former East bloc countries.

5.6.3 Post-2000 Era: Turkey’s European Union Candidacy

Visa Policies

85 TBMM 1984.
87 İçduygu 2004.
After Turkey was recognized as a candidate for the European Union at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, Turkey’s visa system came under the scrutiny of EU member states. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, migration control and border security had gained increasing salience for European Union countries. By bringing these issues under the ‘first pillar’, the Amsterdam Treaty required member countries to move away from an intergovernmental approach to migration policy towards a community approach, with matters relating to “asylum, visas, and immigration and controls at borders” gradually coming under Community procedures. This process has spurred the development of a wide range of community law—the Acquis Communautaire—addressing the common frontier policy and allowing for internal controls within the EU to be abolished.

The implications of the European Union’s common frontier policy for Turkey have been continued pressure throughout the 2000s for Turkey to align its policies with community standards. At the core of the harmonization process is the overhaul of

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88 Lahav 2004; Messina and Lahav 2006. The European Union’s pillar system was set up by the Maastricht Treaty: migration and border control originally fell under the ‘third pillar’ which allows for intergovernmental rather than supranational decision-making. By bringing these issues under the ‘first pillar’ the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 increased the role of the European Commission over these issues, paving the way for a common frontier policy.

89 At the same time that the EU moved towards a supranational approach to immigration and border control policy, the linkages between immigration, crime, and security became more tightly drawn. As fears over transnational terrorism following the 9/11 attacks against the US reverberated across Europe, security increasingly came to be defined in terms of threats to national security rather than as challenges to cultural identity. The linkage to core security interests of member countries was further reinforced in the wake of the Madrid and London terrorist attacks. For candidate countries, this has necessitated a period of harmonization of national immigration policies with EU standards.

90 Kirişçi 2007.
Turkey’s visa system. The 2001 and 2003 Accession Partnership programs have outlined the steps Turkey has to take in order to adjust her policies to comply with the Schengen visa regime. First, Turkey was required to adopt the Schengen negative list and revoke its visa waiver policies for these countries. Second, the harmonization process required that Turkey terminate her sticker visa regime; in effect, the middle category of countries does not comport with the distinction the Schengen regime draws between negative list and positive list (visa-waiver) countries. Moreover, the existence of a facilitated visa-at-the-border accentuates fears in the EU that Turkey’s neighbors may employ Turkey as a transit route to Western Europe. Third, Turkey was required to impose a transit airport visa, in accordance with the Schengen system.

While Turkey has taken a number of steps in the direction called for by the Accession Partnership documents, the reform process has been slow and punctuated by obstacles. In the 2001 and subsequent versions of the National Action Program for Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), Turkey outlined her intentions to adopt the Schengen negative list. While moving towards this goal by imposing visas on a number of states on the list, Turkey held back from adopting the entire list due to cultural and economic ties to some of the countries on the list. However, a number of other factors have been influential in preserving the liberal visa regime. At the domestic level, the Turkish

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91 Commission2001[2003].
92 Despite the pejorative connotation of the phrase, the negative list is simply the list of countries whose nationals need to acquire a visa prior to traveling to the Schengen zone.
93 For example, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia are two countries that Turkey prefers to maintain visa-free arrangements.
government has encountered domestic disenchantment with the reform process. This sentiment is itself an outcome of the perception of a double-standard on the part of the EU; while Turkey is expected to conform to the Schengen black list, she remains on the list herself. Second, and related, the Turkish public and political elites are cognizant of facilitated visa arrangements offered to candidate countries that Turkey has not been able to take advantage of, a fact that exacerbates feelings of resentment.94

Discomfort with the double-standard is also shared by Turkey’s business circles, especially by those who feel affronted by continuing visa requirements for Turkish nationals.95 Commentary by the Chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce proves illuminating for how domestic economic interests approach the issue: the Chairman notes that “visa restrictions run counter to the spirit of capitalism” and might even be considered non-tariff barriers to trade in creating a situation in which goods and capital can circulate freely but producers of goods and owners of capital cannot.96 Expanding on this logic further, the Chairman of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Hüsamettin Kavi writes that visa restrictions against Turkish citizens run counter to the spirit of the Customs Union.97 Furthermore, the shared expectation among political elites and business circles is that visa policies continue to be guided by the principle of reciprocity. This expectation on the one hand presupposes that economic partners will pursue

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95 Asomediya, Şubat.
96 Ibid.
relatively liberal visa policies and on the other hand warrants the enactment of visa restrictions against those who do not. Moreover, continued visa controls defy the “standstill clause” embodied in these agreements because this principle aimed to prevent states from imposing tighter controls on travel and economic transactions than were in place prior to the Association Agreement.

It is plausible to suggest that external pressures stemming from Turkey’s EU candidacy were only partially successful in pushing visa policies in a more restrictive direction. More recently, for example, growing economic ties and rapprochement with Middle Eastern countries, led by the majority party — the Freedom and Justice Party (AKP) — have resulted in the extension of visa-waiver privileges to a number of Middle Eastern countries. In September 2009, Turkey signed accords with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria stating her intentions to grant reciprocal visa-waivers.

98 Siyaset, 2004. An article on the bilateral visa regime between Turkey and Iraq published in September 2004 lamented for instance that whereas the Turkish government was constrained by concerns over trade, the Iraqi government had responded to the threat of cross-border terrorism by imposing visas on Turkish citizens. The article further denounced the Iraqi policy reversal as an outcome of the dominance of third party — United States and the United Kingdom — interests in the interim government.

99 Finans Dünyası, February 2007. The standstill principle has been a subject of a number of lawsuits Turkish citizens filed against European Union countries. These cases were eventually referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In its more recent rulings, including the Abatay-Sahin and Tum-Dari cases, the ECJ made explicit that the Agreement applies to visa restrictions whereas more ambiguous references to free travel were used before. Moreover, the Court also ruled in 2009 that Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol demands that parties to the Association Agreement refrain from imposing additional visa restrictions. However, visa controls remain under the purview of individual states and subject to member state immigration law, mainly because the ECJ does not have coercive power to dictate rulings that might contravene member states’ legal systems.

100 Ortadoğu Analiz, September 2009.
Table 5.5 documents the arrivals to Turkey in the post-2000 period and shows that arrivals continued to increase in the 2000s.\textsuperscript{101} As part of the effort to conform to Schengen criteria, Turkey began collecting official statistics on visa approval and rejection rates.

Table 5.5: Foreign Arrivals According to Region, 2000-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe-OECD</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>10.01</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>11.41</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>13.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other OECD</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-OECD Europe</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Republics</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>5.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Latin America</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Countries</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Arrivals Total</strong></td>
<td>10.43</td>
<td>11.62</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>13.96</td>
<td>17.55</td>
<td>21.12</td>
<td>19.82</td>
<td>23.34</td>
<td>26.34</td>
<td>27.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers expressed in millions of migrants
*Source: Directorate General of Security

Between the years 2004 and 2005, of 1.7 million applications, 1.1 million were granted, amounting to an approximate rejection rate of 35 percent. While this figure is seemingly high –especially when compared to the European Union mean of about 12%-- it does not account for sticker visas granted at the border.\textsuperscript{102} Considering that close to 25

\textsuperscript{101} Only the aggregate regional numbers are provided (in millions) here due to space limitations. The breakdown by country is available through the Turkish Statistical Institute, Turk Istatistik Kurumu (TUIK), or from the author upon request.

\textsuperscript{102} See Kiriçi 2007, 43. The author notes that these statistics come from the Justice, Freedom, and Security Bilateral Screening of Turkey conducted in February 2006 and resulting Document of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Ankara.
million sticker visas were granted within the same time span, we cannot infer a trend towards a tighter visa system based on this figure alone.  

Economic considerations were pivotal in keeping Turkey’s visa policies relatively liberal, even in the face of external pressures arising from the her EU candidacy to tighten visa controls. Domestic economic interests played a fundamental role in offsetting external pressures to move towards a more stringent visa regime; influential organizations such as the Istanbul and Ankara Chambers of Commerce, and the Young Turkish Businessman Association of Turkey (TUGIAD) pointed to the economic and logistical costs associated with tighter policies. These organizations also worked to raise awareness about the inconsistencies of the Schengen visa system from an economic standpoint, arguing that strict visa controls run counter to the goal of establishing greater contact at the societal level. This led to increasing recognition that the termination of the sticker visa system would involve considerable technical and transaction costs and would impose a further burden on Turkish consulates and embassies abroad.

Above and beyond logistical costs, the Turkish government was constrained by adverse effects on her economic and social relations. Turkey had benefited from the liberalization of former Soviet Republics in the post Cold-War era and had cultivated economic and social contacts with the newly independent regimes in the Caucasus and 

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103 Moreover, because the Turkish government did not collect comparable statistics on visa rejection rates before 2004, we cannot conclude based on the rate that policy moved in a more restrictive direction. 
Black Sea region as well as in Eastern Europe. Amidst growing concerns that the imposition of strict measures would disrupt commercial relations, Turkey also feared hurting the “soft power” she yielded with respect to countries with which she’d enjoyed positive transnational contacts. The resistance to the adoption of the Schengen regime corresponded with the dawning of a consensus among political elites that Turkey’s liberal visa policy had been unequivocally instrumental in bridge-building with neighboring states especially in the post-Cold War context.

Furthermore, economic motivations and domestic vested interests dampened the effect of security concerns. Thus, on the one hand, the terrorist attacks in Istanbul in 2003 served to emphasize the linkage between migration control and threats to national security. The perpetrators of these attacks as well as sponsors had in fact exploited Turkey’s liberal visa policies and traveled back and forth between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey and had thus infiltrated Turkish society by forging domestic contacts. It is striking that although these incidents drew attention to the negative aspects of a liberal visa regime, they did not result in a significant shift away from the liberal visa system.

**Asylum Policy**

Turning to asylum admissions, the post-2000 context witnessed the increasing salience of humanitarian and normative aspirations with regard to political migration.

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Kiriçi 2005. The author further argues that a more liberal visa policy at the EU level would be in line with the EU’s aspirations to foster a civic society dialogue.
The uncompromising adherence to the procedural limitations stipulated by the 1994 Regulation drew bitter criticism from Western governments and humanitarian organizations. International criticism centered on a number of key points.106 First, by not defining non-European political migrants as refugees, the Turkish government did not accept any responsibility to apply the humanitarian principles enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention. Although this stance was inherent in the tiered asylum system, critics contended that the application of the 1994 framework was undermining asylum seekers’ rights. In effect, the 1994 regulation codified Turkey’s preferred asylum policy of “resettlement and repatriation”, a strategy that was denounced by the European Community for paying little heed to the humanitarian aspect of involuntary migration.107 Second and related, an additional normative problem arose from the status of the Regulation as secondary legislation.108 The lack of primary domestic legislation raised concerns over the enforceability of humanitarian principles embodies in the Geneva Convention.

Third, human rights advocates further drew attention to the five day time limitation for filing asylum claims as leading to deportations of genuine refugees. Fourth, the requirement that asylum seekers who had entered with incomplete or zero documentation file applications in border provinces meant that their fate was at the mercy of officials who were not properly informed on asylum determination procedures

106 For criticisms of Turkey’s asylum policies see Frelick 1997 and U.S. State Department 1997.
107 Mannaert 2003.
and thus were likely to reject bona fide cases. Both the time and location limitations for filing a claim made it more difficult to lend individual cases fair consideration and increased the number of individuals refouled. Fifth, the 1994 decree was agnostic to the procedure for appeals, rendering deportations of bona fide refugees more likely.\footnote{UNHCR 1995. 42 of these individuals were from Iran, 31 from Iraq, and 5 from other nationalities.} A final concern was that security arrangements concluded with neighboring countries in the Middle East such as Iran and Tunisia for immediate repatriation of activists further undermined asylum seekers’ rights and made it probable that genuine cases would be rejected.

Although these criticisms were met with defensive denial by the Turkish government, starting with the late 1990s, the Turkey began to move towards liberalization of asylum and refugee admissions. Reform in this area was an outcome of initiative on the part of the Turkish government dovetailed by strategic considerations stemming from Turkey’s desire for EU membership.\footnote{Güner 2007.} Importantly, a number of developments in this era raised consciousness over the humanitarian dimension of political migration. The first of these was the reestablishment of close cooperation between the Turkish government and UNHCR officials. As the Turkish government confronted growing criticism over its asylum and refugee policies and limited capacity to handle the growing number of asylum claims, the late 1990s saw the revitalization of the UNHCR’s role. This process culminated in an understanding that the UNHCR
would assume responsibility for de facto status determination for non-convention
refugees. In other words, although the Ministry of the Interior was formally in charge
of granting recognition, the difficulties that Turkey faced led to an agreement that in
practice resembled the arrangement in place prior to the 1994 Regulation.

Moreover, cooperation with the UNHCR in turn made possible key public
initiatives that opened the way for a more relaxed approach to asylum admissions.
Among these initiatives was the introduction of training seminars for Turkish officials
partaking in any part of the asylum recognition process: gendarmerie, border guards,
police, judges and prosecutor dealing with refugee law, and Ministry of the Interior
(MOI) officials. The seminars aimed to educate officials on the distinction between
asylum seekers and illegal migrants and on international law pertaining to political
migration and to thereby prevent human rights abuses.

Against a slightly more tolerant context, in 1997, the Turkish government opened
the way for judicial appeal signaling the government’s willingness to move away from a
stringent application of the 1994 Framework.\footnote{UNHCR2000.} In fact, in 1999 a more concrete
relaxation of policy ensued with the Turkish government raising the official five-day
limit to 10 days. Hailed as a hallmark in the Europeanization of Turkey’s asylum and
refugee policy, this reform was considered by human rights watch groups and Western
governments as an indication that Turkey was moving towards a more humanitarian
political migration policy.\textsuperscript{112} Against the background of increasing cooperation between Turkish authorities and the UNHCR, non-governmental organizations were able to make progress towards raising awareness on normative and ethical issues surrounding political migration. With the aid of the UNHCR, NGOs such as the \textit{Amnesty International} (Turkish branch) and the \textit{International Catholic Migration Commission} undertook training seminars, set up informal means of aiding refugees and worked diligently to disseminate information on refugee law.\textsuperscript{113}

It is important to note that these reforms predated Turkey’s acceptance for European Union candidacy. Kirişçi contends that the reforms preceding EU candidacy reflected a “paradigmatic shift” allowing the political focus to move away from a strictly securitized understanding of political migration towards a more comprehensive approach taking humanitarian and ethical considerations more seriously.\textsuperscript{114} That being said, 1999 marked a turning point in that it brought into the picture strategic motives for modifying policies in accordance with refugee law. With the European Council decision during the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 to accept Turkey for EU candidacy, Turkey came under increasing pressure to reform her asylum and refugee policy to conform to EU standards. 2001 marked the Accession Partnership with the European

\textsuperscript{112} Amnesty International 1997; Kirişçi2007.
\textsuperscript{113} Forum, Kasım; 2007.
\textsuperscript{114} Kirişçi2007, 15.
Union, thus instigating a series of reforms aimed to develop migration policies that are convergent with the *Acquis*.\textsuperscript{115}

The most noteworthy change that came with the Accession Partnership was the stipulation that Turkey would lift the geographical limitation with the condition that this policy change would not encourage large-scale refugee flows.\textsuperscript{116} In the NPAA Turkey promised institutional and legislative reforms but also aimed to make use of the flexibility afforded by the EU harmonization process. Most importantly, the Action Plan compelled the Turkish government to set benchmarks and a timetable for reform. A number of small but concrete changes followed. In 2006, Turkey finally lifted the time limit for filing an asylum claim. An additional step came with an internal regulation (genelge) circulated by the Ministry of the Interior in the same year, which relaxed policies concerning asylum seekers entering the country without proper documentation.\textsuperscript{117} Although these reforms did not constitute a major overhaul of the Turkish asylum system, they pointed to a weakening of the ideational opposition to reforming policies that had previously been under the sway of national security considerations.

Figure 5.3 below displays how the asylum recognition rate has changed with the adoption of the 1994 Framework. We can observe a decrease in the recognition rate in

\textsuperscript{115} The Accession partnership was subsequently renewed in 2003 and then in 2006.
\textsuperscript{117} Uygulama Talimati, Genelge No 57, June 22, 2006.
the immediate aftermath of the adoption of the 1994 Regulation. The late 1990s slightly reversed this trend, with considerable improvements in the 2000s. The Iraq War however, led to a resurgence of fears over mass inflows of refugees; to the extent that states use a low asylum recognition rate as a deterrent tool, this might be said to be reflected in the decrease in the rate in the mid to late 2000s.

Figure 5.3: Turkey’s Asylum Recognition Rate, 1994-2006

*Source: Turkish branch of the UNHCR

The Turkish government foresees eliminating the geographical limitation by 2012. This projection notwithstanding, the reform process is hamstrung by a number of factors. First and foremost, any policy change hinges on modifying Turkish Settlement Law which acts as a constraining factor on all elements of migration policy. A
significant consequence of the EU harmonization process was the adoption of a modified Settlement Law in 2006.\textsuperscript{118} In contrast to the 1934 Settlement Law, the recent modification does not hold being of “Turkish descent and culture” as a prerequisite for achieving refugee status.\textsuperscript{119} Nevertheless, the 2006 Settlement Law continues to reserve the right of permanent residency to individuals of Turkish heritage and thus its real effects on asylum and refugee laws are currently indeterminate.

Aside from this roadblock, Turkey’s reticence towards liberalizing its asylum policy is attributable to three main factors. For one, while recognizing that other candidate countries have faced a similar reform process, the fear of ending up with the ‘sucker payoff’—that is, with the scenario of being denied membership while having to open Turkey’s borders to an influx of political migrants—comprises a major stumbling block. Second and related, the tightening of European Union’s frontier and migration polices creates further reluctance toward reform. Asylum policies against this background have the potential to turn Turkey into a buffer zone between migrant generating countries in the Middle East and “fortress Europe.”\textsuperscript{120} Finally and significantly, security considerations continue to be prominent in official circles despite

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{118} This was adopted as part of the Ninth Reform package Turkey undertook in the context of EU harmonization.

\textsuperscript{119} As stated previously, Turkish law takes a convoluted approach to defining “refugee” where only those of European origin countries can be considered refugees. Above and beyond this limitation, even convention refugees—those from European countries of origin—have usually been granted temporary status, while enjoying refugee rights. That is, only those of Turkish descent are allowed to stay in Turkey permanently and Turkey continues to pursue a policy of resettlement with respect to all other asylum seekers. See Mannaert 2003.

\textsuperscript{120} Lavenex 2001.
the fact that humanitarian and ethical concerns have increasingly gained currency in policy debates.

**Border Control Policies**

Border policies in the last decade reflect broader processes of political rapprochement with Turkey’s neighbors. To illustrate, beginning with ‘earthquake diplomacy’ in the early 2000s, Turkey and Greece experienced a thaw in relations, enabling commercial flows and private traffic to increase considerably in the subsequent years. Perhaps most notable developments concern Turkey’s border policies with respect to Syria and Armenia. Signing an agreement in 2004, Turkey and Syria both agreed to remove the mine fields in respective border zones.\(^{121}\) Perhaps even more striking is the recent development in September 2009 by Turkey and Armenia to normalize relations and open the border to traffic.\(^{122}\)

Trade ties and regional interdependence have played a vital role in softening Turkey’s stance towards neighboring countries against which Turkey had taken an antagonistic stance due to rivalry or territorial disputes. As an *Economist* article on Turkey’s growing cross-border trade notes, since the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey has increased her exports to Middle East by sevenfold.\(^{123}\) At the same time, Turkey signed bilateral free trade pacts with Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia. In addition to these developments, the 2000s accentuated Turkey’s aspirations to become

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\(^{121}\) Kirişçi2007.  
\(^{123}\) *The Economist*, October 29, 2009.
an energy hub in the region when various proposals for gas pipelines across Turkish territory were developed.\textsuperscript{124} Pundits have linked Turkey’s growing economic ties with Middle Eastern countries to the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP)—the majority party in parliament since 2002—Islamist leanings and roots, noting that a less militant approach to secularism has allowed Turkey to take advantage of her proximity to markets in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{125} In fact, a “zero problems with neighbors” approach has been the oft-cited motto of Prime Minister Erdoğan, reflecting the incumbent party’s aspirations to use the soft power of trade and historical and religious ties to increase Turkey’s economic influence in the region.\textsuperscript{126}

Moreover, the zero-problems-with-neighbors outlook has not been limited to Turkey’s neighbors in the Middle East. September 2009 witnessed a breakthrough effort on the part of Turkey and Armenia to open the heretofore tightly sealed borders to traffic and trade. This development is significant from a theoretical standpoint precisely because, the Turkey-Armenia border constitutes a ‘hard-case’: although the border’s closure was a direct result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, relations between Turkey and Armenia have been strained by a number of deeply sensitive issues, primarily over the massacre of ethnic Armenians during World War I. Moreover, Armenia presents

\textsuperscript{124} Babali 2009. The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipelines are examples of transit routes through the Black Sea and Caucasus region. In the Middle East, the most famous project is Nabucco, a pipeline that is proposed to carry gas across Turkey from Azerbaijan and possibly Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt.

\textsuperscript{125} Pivariu 2010.

\textsuperscript{126} Economist 2009. The phrase ‘zero problems with neighbors’ was initially used by Davutoğlu, an academic and an adviser to Erdoğan, and foreign minister since 2009, but has been used time and again by Erdoğan to describe the AKP’s approach to neighboring countries.
another case in which the association between external support for terror and interstate disputes has compounded threat perception among political circles. The linkage had gained salience in the 1970s and 1980s as terrorist attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) were believed to be acts of revenge against Turkey.\textsuperscript{127}

It is possible to contend that economic interests have influenced the recent move towards reconciliation and the resultant 2009 Geneva accord envisaging the liberalization of borders. As recounted earlier, although the border remained closed, Turkey extended facilitated travel-privileges by relaxing controls over visas for Armenian citizens in the 1990s, in part to stimulate trade. As a result, trade volume has reached, 200$, a development that can be attributed to the successful lobbying of economic interests in both countries, including exporters, business groups, and diaspora communities. More recently for example, the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC), an influential organization aiming to bring together business circles, praised the Geneva accord by noting the projected effects of open borders for increased cross-border trade.\textsuperscript{128} While it might be premature to predict a complete reconciliation between the two countries—especially as the border liberalization process faces stumbling blocks—the commitment to open borders despite historical disputes and security concerns illustrates the impact of economic motives.

\textsuperscript{127} Mango 2005.
\textsuperscript{128} Mumyakmaz 2009.
These developments are not to say that security concerns with respect to Turkey’s border policies have receded into the background in the recent past. In fact, the Turkish government’s hesitation at harmonizing her border policies in accordance with European Union standards is telling in that regard. A crucial aspect of the harmonization reforms is the replacement of Turkey’s current border control and management system with a professional civilian unit.\textsuperscript{129} Currently, Turkey’s east and southeast borders are controlled by the land forces of the military except for a short stretch of the border with Syria controlled by the gendarmerie.\textsuperscript{130} In the recent National Action Programs (NPAAs), the Turkish government sketched the steps necessary to accomplish the transition from military to civilian control over borders.\textsuperscript{131} One of the first steps was the establishment of a \textit{Task Force on Asylum, Immigration, and External Borders}, responsible for pinpointing the discrepancies between the EU Acquis and Turkey’s migration policies in general. The Task Force published a \textit{Strategy Paper for the Protection of External Borders}, which reiterated the goal of setting up a civilian border control unit. Furthermore, Turkey worked on harmonization through a Twinning

\textsuperscript{129} Kiriçi 2007.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. The General Directorate of Security—operating under the Ministry of the Interior—is responsible for carrying out passport controls. Coastal borders are patrolled by the coastal guard.
\textsuperscript{131} Commission2001[2003]. The first NPAA was ambiguous about the necessary statement but the 2003 Action Plan specified Turkey’s commitment to establishing a professional border guard.
Project, through which Turkey aimed to take concrete measures with respect to legislative and institutional change on border policy.\textsuperscript{132} Despite these measures, the Turkish government has exhibited considerable reticence towards the transition to civilian control over borders. Aside from recalcitrance on the part of the military—a domestic actor with important stakes in Turkey’s European Union candidacy—apprehension over terrorism is paramount as a constraint on reform. Threat perception has increased in the mid to late 2000s in response to a significant increase in terrorist activity in the border-region with Iraq. Perhaps paradoxically, the EU demands reform in this area precisely because it desires an effective border management system on Turkey’s eastern and southeastern borders, which would become the EU’s external frontiers in the event of Turkey’s accession. However, security interests in Turkey call into question the effectiveness of a civilian unit in protecting and controlling borders. In an important sense, the military’s reluctance towards deferring authority to a civilian institution illustrates the discrepancy between the EU’s and Turkey’s approaches to border policy. Whereas border policy for the EU embodies the goals of intercepting illegal migrants and preventing smuggling, the Turkish government places emphasis on the physical protection of borders.\textsuperscript{133} In sum, Turkey’s border policies reflect the primacy of security concerns; although

\textsuperscript{132} MOI2006. Twinning projects are instruments through which EU member states and candidate countries cooperate on administrative reform on a variety of issue areas and constitute the cornerstone of harmonization processes for candidates.

\textsuperscript{133} Kirişçi2007.
economic interdependence—mostly through the lobbying of domestic economic interests—has driven policy in a less restrictive direction, liberalization in this area remains limited.

5.7 Evaluation and Conclusion

The evolution of Turkey’s migration policies demonstrates the importance of both security motives and economic interests in guiding policy-making. Moreover, careful evaluation of different aspects of migration control—visas, asylum, borders—reveals that economic concerns mitigate the impact of security factors, along the lines suggested by the theoretical framework. Of considerable theoretical relevance is the variation between these three distinct aspects of migration control in the degree to which security and economic factors influence policy and in how the two logics interact.

Table 5.6 below summarizes policy changes according to each dimension and depicts the variation observed in the independent variables across the time periods. Model predictions are also included.
Table 5.6: Predictions of the Securitized Interdependence Framework and Summary of Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model Prediction</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Interdependence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Trade</strong></td>
<td><strong>Capital</strong></td>
<td><strong>Migration</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>nascent</td>
<td>limited</td>
<td>nascent/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>liberalization</td>
<td>liberalization</td>
<td>growing/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>nascent</td>
<td>high/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>liberalization</td>
<td>liberalization</td>
<td>fluctuating</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>continued</td>
<td>continued</td>
<td>moderate/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>liberalization</td>
<td>liberalization</td>
<td>fluctuating</td>
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</table>

i. Coding and Categorization of Interdependence: Nascent refers to growing but novel patterns; limited entails that there were some indications of liberalization but it was not yet a full-fledged process; moderate refers to growing liberalization but also points to extant countervailing forces or obstacles; continued liberalization indicates that trends from the previous decade continued at a steady pace.

ii. Coding and Categorization of Terrorism: Cells capture both levels as well as direction of change in actual and perceived threat. Nascent means that the threat of terrorism was new; fluctuating refers to rapid changes in levels of threat within that era; growing indicates a steady pattern of intensification in the perception of and in observed threat levels. Levels—very high, high, moderate—are coded in comparison to values within the case itself. Categories are based on both objective threat levels—the number of incidents—and perceived threat levels. Very high refers to the highest number of incidents (over 300 per year on average) according to the Global Terrorism Database in that era and/or very salient attacks; and marked significance in the media; high to over 150 incidents per year and high salience of events; moderate to at least 50 incidents per year and a reasonable degree of attention to terrorism in political circles and media.

iii. Coding of Model Predictions and Outcomes: Values on model predictions and observed outcomes may ordinarily be ranked as: limited, mixed/modest and modest, high. Values reflect within-case comparisons. Limited means liberalization began but faced obstacles; mixed points to the existence of opposing tendencies in the time period; moderate to gradual and steady removal of barriers to human mobility; high to an across-the-board and rapid liberalization in migration policy.
If migration policy is considered as a whole, security concerns over transnational terrorism should make for tighter policies while economic liberalization drives policy in a liberal direction. Thus, the theoretical framework suggests that security and economic motives work against each other but the levels of security threat and the degree of interdependence determine which direction policy moves in. Additionally, economic interdependence exerts a unique effect on political migration policies because commercial liberalization is expected to lead to tighter and more discriminating measures against citizens of commercial partners.

Several important patterns emerge from Turkey’s case study that parallel the empirical findings in Chapters 3 and 4. Over-time changes in Turkey’s visa policies provide the most clear-cut illustration of the mechanisms posited by the securitized interdependence framework. The post-1980 was defined by increasing economic interdependence but at the same time plagued by increasing numbers of terrorism incidents. As an examination of parliamentary debates and quotes from political elites revealed however, despite worries over cross-border infiltration, economic considerations prevailed in motivating the Turkish government to pursue liberal visa policies. What was equally striking was the reticence of Turkey to move towards a more restrictive approach by aligning policies with the Schengen system.

In contrast, asylum and refugee admissions, traditionally based on conceptions of a homogeneous nation-state, have been guided predominantly by security-
motivations. As evidenced by the empirical findings in Chapter 4, the impact of economic interdependence in the area of political migration is more ambiguous. More precisely, although the case study yielded instances in which trade ties with neighbors compelled Turkey to be prudent in accepting refugees from these states, other factors—such as Turkey’s reluctance to reform its tiered approach to asylum admissions played a more definitive role. Moreover, the EU harmonization process brought normative concerns to the fore; paralleling the conclusions from Chapter 4 and the theoretical literature, asylum policy reflected tradeoffs between interest-based (security) and normative/humanitarian motives.\footnote{Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.}

Of the three policy-areas examined, border control policy can be said to be where security imperatives—concerns over terrorism in particular—were most influential in leading to tighter restrictions. Additionally, the divergence between the Turkish government and the European Union on the meaning of border management and control highlights differences in emphasis on specific functions that borders serve. In a nutshell, it is possible to conclude that Turkey stresses the security-provision and defense functions of borders, an understanding that mirrors the realist focus on borders as ramparts of defense against incursion by external actors.\footnote{Donaldson 2005.} Turkey’s reluctance to transition from military to civilian border control is an example of a country acting in

\footnotesize{134 Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004.}
\footnotesize{135 Donaldson 2005.}
accordance with the logic of the “military-territorial state” rather than that of the trading state.\textsuperscript{136}

Theories of migration that focus exclusively on domestic mechanisms fall short of explaining how international dynamics shape policy. In contrast, theories that emphasize securitization of migration grant traction in understanding how threats that are carried on the backs of individuals affect state policies. That said, they are less insightful in understanding when and how security motives shape migration policy. First, as the Turkey case showed, the impact of security concerns might vary across the pillars of migration policy. Second, they fail to specify how security concerns interact with other dimensions of “state grand strategy”.\textsuperscript{137} As Rudolph elucidates, migration policy is informative with respect to how geopolitical/military and economic/military interests interact because migration control challenges state sovereignty from both security and economic angles. As such, studying the interaction of economic and security motives is integral to understanding states’ sovereignty bargains.

\textsuperscript{136} Rosecrance 1986.
\textsuperscript{137} Rudolph 2003; 2006.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This chapter offers concluding remarks on the dissertation. The first section discusses the unique contributions of the project as a whole. Second, the main findings of the dissertation will be recapitulated. Third, the concluding chapter lays out the theoretical contributions of the thesis to international relations scholarship and proceeds to discuss the policy implications of the theoretical framework and findings. Finally, potential avenues of future research that follow from the dissertation will be explored.

6.1 What is Novel Here?

This dissertation challenges the conventional thinking in the political science literature about state sovereignty by examining states’ policies of control over one facet of globalization: human flows across borders. The introduction chapter linked migration and border control to states’ sovereignty bargains and asked: in the face of globalization, how do states monitor flows across borders? A more specific question that followed from this was: how do economic and security logics operate to shape states’ policies of control? Although monopoly over transborder mobility is critical to statehood, increasing economic contact and deepening interdependence have given rise to a fundamental quandary in states’ policy-making. Attracting foreign capital, facilitating cross-border trade, drawing intellectual enterprise and skilled labor while minimizing the probability of clandestine entry and the economic burden of undesirable
human flows might be common goals for states; however, the compromises that states
enact in pursuing this goal exhibit variation.

Put differently, states differ in the extent to which their policies are governed by
economic as opposed to security motives: some states might pay little heed to military
and societal security and devise policies to render borders completely permeable to
flows whereas others might pursue a more prudent approach; at the other extreme,
military state logic might make for hard borders closed to economic exchange.¹ The
dissertation demonstrates that the differential effects of economic and security motives
are evident even when considering one facet of global flows: human mobility. In other
words, states’ responses to globalization are less straightforward and more nuanced
than might seem at first glance. Additionally, this entails that our conception of
sovereignty is more complex and dynamic than either globalization scholarship or
security studies might suggest. The dissertation has sought to lay out the linkages
between different dimensions of globalization—flows of capital, goods, information and
technology, and individuals across borders—and in doing so contributes to a more
comprehensive understanding of state sovereignty.

Conventional analyses of migration policy provide important insights in
emphasizing market dynamics that determine how open or closed states’ borders are

¹ An example of the former case might be Somalia which lacks a central authoritative structure to define
policies according to security interests. An example of the latter might be North Korea, a fortified garrison
state that maximizes security at the expense of civil liberties.
with respect to human flows. This literature emphasizes principles of supply and demand to suggest that ease of factor mobility maximizes economic growth and production and in the long run, through factor price equalization dampens the drive to migrate to economically advanced countries. One further argument that emerges from this body of literature is that domestic economic interests condition states’ responses. More precisely, given the short-term distributional costs of migration, decision-making dictated by clientelist interests whereby policy outcomes are a function of political mobilization. Economic models of migration policy inform this dissertation’s theoretical framework in that ease of factor mobility comports with the trading state logic. A purely economic approach would predict that states characterized by a robust and growing economy and/or low unemployment tend to favor liberalization of migration policies. In that respect, the literature provides valuable insights in drawing parallels between other types of factor mobility and migration flows and outlining the economic incentives underpinning liberal migration policies.

More recent scholarship has criticized the economic models of migration by pointing to the fallacy of equating migrants with other types of factors of production that cross borders. Arguing in this vein, two notable scholars of migration surmise that

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2} Tichenor 2002.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{3} Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Cornelius et al. 2004.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{4} Freeman 2001.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{5} Rosecrance 1986.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{6} Rudolph 2006.} \]
overshadowed by political, cultural, and ideological arguments”.7 One strand of the 
literature that aspires to transcend the narrow economic focus of the conventional 
literature draws attention to the challenges posed by international migration for the 
domestic/societal aspect of state security.8 This body of literature is important in several 
respects. First, a cultural focus is important in revealing deeper normative legacies that 
might work in tandem with or in opposition to economic logics.9 Cultural factors 
warrant attention also because while markets might be elastic and responsive to change, 
social identities might be sticky and resistant to change.10 Second, such a focus may 
shed light on the conditions under which migration movements generate societal 
anxiety.11 Furthermore, this outlook enables a more nuanced approach to state 
sovereignty and relatedly, by focusing on societal consequences of migrant flows, 
encourages theorizing about security through a broader framework.

My dissertation has adopted similarly a broader approach to state security but 
has bracketed the societal dimension and focused instead on the intersection of 
economic concerns on the one hand and on the other, threats to state security arising 
from non-state actors, namely transnational terrorists. In that respect, my work is more 
closely informed by a second strand of scholarship that aspires to go beyond a strictly

7 Brettell and Hollifield 2000, 162.
8 Rudolph draws a distinction between Krasner’s domestic sovereignty and societal sovereignty, noting that the former refers to the relationship between the government and society and the second refers to cohesiveness of national identity. See Krasner 1999; Rudolph 2003; 2006.
economic focus. This literature, instead of emphasizing cultural anxieties and national identity expounds on the connection between human mobility and an emerging security paradigm and underscores threats to security arising from individuals rather than other state actors. Notably, although the migration-security linkage has deeper roots than the new security paradigm might suggest, the paradigm shift is important in drawing attention to states’ vulnerability with respect to non-state actors.

As Andreas has noted, a novel way in which migration might threaten state security is by permitting undesirable actors to cross borders in a surreptitious manner. The very possibility of unauthorized access to states’ territories poses a problem for the maintenance of sovereignty because it circumvents state authority and control: the fundamental pillars of state sovereignty. Although such clandestine transborder actors encompass a broader array of phenomena than I have focused on in the dissertation, I have argued that clandestine entry and difficulty of identification and detection are important to understanding the informational dilemmas states face vis-à-vis transnational terrorists. Moreover, among the category of clandestine transnational actors, terrorists most starkly capture the egregious nature of the new security environment states find themselves in by demonstrating the ability of private actors to

12 Salehyan 2008.
13 Adamson 2006; 2006.
15 For a discussion of control and authority as constitutive parts of state sovereignty see Thomson 1995.
endanger states’ physical security in ways previously attributed to military threats from other states.16

Recognizing the security externalities of migration is important in uncovering the ways in which states’ strategies of control over human mobility might come to reflect the military/territorial state logic. The trading state logic expects that given increasing interdependence between states, territorial conquest recedes in favor of material accumulation in states’ pursuit of power.17 The migration-security nexus, by highlighting non-state threats, shows that the declining salience of territorial conquest does not automatically entail the eradication of borders or waning salience of territoriality. Once we move beyond the confines of the traditional perspective of security, borders reassert significance not only as markers of states’ territorial authority but also as sites of defense against intrusion by undesirable non-state actors.

Yet, the possibility of terrorism flows does not lead to closed borders in and of itself. By building on the insights of both traditional economic models and security studies, my dissertation is able to uncover the interplay between economic and security concerns. Previous chapters were able to demonstrate both cross-unit and temporal variation in states’ strategies of territorial control. Above and beyond that, the empirical sections of the dissertation also brought to light significant functional variation across types of border policies. Importantly, the existence of such variation behooves scholars

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16 Kaldor 1999; Salehyan 2006.
17 Rosecrance 1986.
to develop a more complex understanding of state sovereignty. The dissertation also
calls for a rethinking of the logics of the military and trading states as polar opposites,
and equally significantly, suggests that even within a single issue area—in this case,
migration control—these logics might be operative to different degrees. What we might
be observing in the context of globalization may not necessarily be an easy triumph for
trading state dynamics but instead the recasting of the relationship between these two
logics of the state.

6.2 Findings

The empirical analyses presented in this dissertation provide four major
findings. First, Chapter 3 outlined that visa controls may act as an instrument of
screening and deterrence against threats emanating from cross-border human mobility.
The chapter showed that in order to take advantage of the deterrent purpose of visa
restrictions and thereby overcome the information disadvantage they face with respect
to terrorist threats, recipient states engage in two types of learning: experiential learning
from past attacks by nationals of the origin state against their nationals and/or territory
and vicarious learning from attacks perpetrated globally by origin country’s citizens.
The chapter depicted that these two complementary types of learning translate into two
channels through which concerns over transnational terror exert an effect on states’ visa
policies. Two different operationalizations of visa controls were employed in Chapter 3
to demonstrate these two channels of influence: the first section relied on a dichotomous
measure of visas to examine variation across dyads. The second section focused specifically on European Union and/or Schengen members as recipient states by utilizing a time-variant and percentage based measure of visas—the visa rejection rate—to assess the influence of security concerns. Both sets of empirical analyses yielded a similar pattern: transnational terrorism leads to an increased probability of visa restrictions and stricter visa controls, in line with expectations generated by the security literature.

A second significant finding that empirical research lent us relates to the impact of economic interdependence on migration policies. The results in Chapter 3 demonstrated that trade ties exert both a direct and indirect effect on visa controls. Trade linkages render recipient countries less likely to impose visas and to be less stringent when visa rejection rates are concerned. At the same time, trade interdependence tempers the effect of transnational terrorism, a theoretically important finding which emphasizes the moderating effect of commercial relationships on states’ security seeking behavior.

Third, disaggregating the effect of security concerns into fears over global versus targeted terrorism also facilitated a more nuanced understanding of how security and economic logics interact. A significant finding concerned the contrast on how the two types of security threats operate. Chapter 3 demonstrated that trade and capital ties overpower the impact of global terrorism. Global terrorism does drive policy in a
stringent direction but this effect is limited to low-trade dyads. In stark contrast, targeted terrorism is more influential regardless of levels of interdependence and makes for tighter visa controls. Economic interdependence is effective in mitigating fears over terrorism only for low levels of terrorism. A further conclusion that followed from Chapter 3 was that both trade and capital interdependence has a more pronounced impact for a subset of economically developed countries—in this case members of the OECD—suggesting that for these countries, economic ties may more effectively counteract securitization induced border closure.

Fourth, a further contention of the dissertation was that aside from cross-sectional and across time variation in the influence of states’ security and economic interests on migration policies, functional variation exists across the dimensions of migration and border control. More specifically, it is important to analyze the dynamics of voluntary and involuntary migration separately. Chapter 4 sought to illustrate this distinction by shifting empirical attention to policies targeting political migration. Security concerns were found to be important when asylum/refugee admissions were analyzed but the effect of transnational terrorism was less robust compared to the results obtained in Chapter 3. In an important sense, while instrumental concerns have traditionally affected states’ policies vis-à-vis asylum seekers, they do so in empirically distinguishable ways when compared to policies regarding economic migrants. The clearest example of this was the impact of economic interdependence: in line with
theoretical expectations, economic ties shape policies with respect to political/involuntary as well as economic/voluntary migrants but the direction of the relationship is reversed when it comes to setting policies. Because granting refugee status to migrants from sending states is diplomatically costly, states fear to jeopardize ties with commercial partners by being too liberal when recognizing asylum claims.

Likewise, the interaction of economic and security dynamics was found to be significant but outweighed by the impact of humanitarian conditions in the origin country. These results were in accordance with expectations put forward by extant work on asylum and refugee policies: policies governing political migration more than any other area of migration control reflect the post World War II liberal consensus on human rights, which has been further reinforced by international and domestic laws.18 From one perspective then, the prevalence of normative concerns in this domain of migration control is not surprising given that the dominance of liberal norms in this arena prevent discrimination against refugee seekers according to the country of origin. As previously touched on, a second way in which asylum admissions differ is that the asylum channel of entry is the least likely to serve terrorists’ aims because the determination process is often arduous, complicated, and requires that the legitimacy of the political migrant’s claim be validated.19

19 Also see Saleyhan 2008 for this point.
The findings of Chapter 4 also challenge the notion that securitization of migration has put the liberal consensus at risk. More importantly, that ideational motivations have not been replaced completely by anxieties over transnational terrorism points to the fact that securitization of migration is not an across the board phenomenon. Security minded scholars might have foreseen a complete overhaul of migration and border control in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, but over-time analysis in Chapter 4 casts doubt on the existence of a structural break, suggesting that it might be premature to conclude that a significant and generalizable shift has occurred in all aspects of migration and border control. The evidence also indicates that a dichotomous approach to understanding the evolution of migration and border control policies as one of closure or liberalization is too simplistic.

Finally, using a process-tracing approach, Chapter 5 delved into the micro-mechanisms of the securitized interdependence framework. A careful look at primary and secondary sources afforded insights that were largely in parallel with the quantitative evidence provided in Chapters 3 and 4. In particular, Chapter 5 revealed that the evolution of Turkey’s migration policies exhibited functional variation that underscored the differential impact of security concerns on economic as opposed to political migration. The time period under consideration –the post-1980 era—was characterized by an intensification of concerns over transborder terrorism in Turkey but

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20 For a discussion of securitization of political migration see Huysmans 2006; Levy 2005; Salehyan 2008.
at the same time by increasing economic liberalization. It was primarily in the areas of visa and on-site border control policies that fears over terrorism had the most pronounced effect. Analogous to the findings in Chapter 3, the modulating effect of economic motivations was easiest to tease out when visa policies were considered. In contrast, asylum and refugee admissions were governed by an interplay of strategic and diplomatic concerns and normative aspirations that gained salience in the context of Turkey’s European Union candidacy. Economic linkages had the effect of engendering reluctance on the part of Turkey to devise liberal admissions criteria for migrants from commercial partners. These effects, however, operated against the backdrop of Turkey’s geographical limitation on political migration; while this limitation is institutionally embedded and dates back to the early years of the Turkish Republic, it also buttresses policies dictated by security concerns and acts as a counterweight against normative policy-making. In effect, the case study showed that asylum policies reflect a tug of war between instrumental concerns over security and economic interdependence and normative concerns over humanitarian ideals.

Globalization scholarship has stimulated extensive scholarship on migration but most of these studies have taken migrant flows as the dependent variable and theorized about economic push and pull factors on the right hand side. Security minded scholars, particularly in the wake of 9/11, have turned academic attention to the possibility that human mobility may act as a conduit for terrorist flows. This scholarship, however, has
mostly been policy-driven, focused on single case studies, or written from a normative standpoint that argues in favor of or in opposition to increased liberalization.\footnote{There are exceptions to the rule, however, with scholars of migration calling for theoretical work on migration. See Brettell and Hollifield 2000. For a normative account promoting liberalization see Hayter 2000. For an account espousing greater restrictions see Beck 1996, cited in Hayter 2000.}

Moreover, empirically driven work has mostly studied the effectiveness of migration policy, rather than theorizing about the causes of specific policies.\footnote{See Rudolph 2006 for similar criticism. For examples of empirical work on policy see Cornelius 1998; 1998; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Freeman 1995; Thielemann 2006.} Additionally, migration studies have been characterized by a divide between economic models and security-minded studies.

More recently, Rudolph’s excellent comparative case study of trading states’ border and migration policies has been notable in bringing together insights from divergent literatures and studying migration policy under a more comprehensive framework.\footnote{Rudolph 2003; 2006.} While my empirical research has benefited from and built on such a perspective, I have taken a large-n approach to analyzing migration policies and rather than limiting my scope to trading states, have sought to evaluate the broader impact of economic interdependence. Moreover, in contrast to Rudolph’s theoretical framework, the empirical research in this dissertation has bracketed the internal security dimension—identity politics and societal cohesion—and focused instead on the interaction of security threats from terrorists and economic interdependence.
6.3 Theoretical Contributions

The theoretical framework presented in this dissertation proffers three related contributions to scholarship. First, the dissertation speaks to the debates on the changing nature of state sovereignty in the globalizing world by offering a detailed look at the interplay between dimensions of sovereignty. Second, this project suggests a possible reconceptualization of conceptions of state territoriality and border salience. On a related note, the dissertation’s framework has broader implications for our understanding of the concept of state security. In that respect, the thesis not only responds to the call for broadening the scope of security studies but through the securitized interdependence framework aims to capture the impact of economic interdependence on states’ security seeking in an international environment characterized by non-traditional threats. Third, the dissertation contributes more generally to globalization scholarship, by exploring the connections between non-economic and economic dimensions of globalization and delving into the relationship between different types of cross-border flows. I discuss these contributions more in depth in the subsequent paragraphs.

Implications for Debates on State Sovereignty
Academic debates on the evolution of sovereignty have given rise to two (seemingly) irreconcilable claims: first, that states maintain sovereignty even in the face of globalization or second, that sovereignty is on the decline. The waning of sovereignty is intertwined with forces that have given rise to the logic of the trading state: economic interdependence, regional integration, the rise of multinational corporations, increasing permeability of borders to transborder flows.24 Above and beyond economic globalization, the spread of international norms on human rights, the growing influence of international institutions and regimes on states’ decision-making have been posited to herald in a new era in which world politics is defined by multinational rather than hierarchical state authority.25 Globalists have cast such contemporary changes as revolutionary developments that detract from absolute Westphalian sovereignty, which rests on the exclusion of external influence on state’s authority within its borders.26 In sum, a clear message that emerges from the transnationalist strand of the literature is that globalization is increasingly undermining state sovereignty as the foundation of the territorial state.

This contention is countered by state-centric scholars who emphasize the pivotal function of the state in spurring and shaping the very processes of globalization.27 The key point of criticism levied against the transnationalist conclusions is that global flows

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26 Strange 1996.
27 Krasner 1979.
are not as novel as they are made out to be.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, far from being at the mercy of systemic forces stemming from economic globalization, states have innovated ways to reassert their territoriality. When applied to border and migration control for example, states have adopted new measures that bolster their regulatory capacity, even in the face of increasing interdependence.\textsuperscript{29} In that sense, rather than dismantling state authority, globalization emphasizes the continuing importance of the sovereign state as the main actor in world politics.

The dissertation addresses this debate by recognizing the tension presented by globalization: while economic globalization foresees the increased dominance of the trading state logic, the direct relationship between state security and sovereignty presents a paradox to the extent that this logic necessitates a deviation from our conventional understanding of sovereignty. More recent work has approached the paradox of statehood in the face of globalization by unpacking the concept of sovereignty itself. One way to accomplish this task is to unbundle the dimensions and/or functions of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{30} Such a perspective not only allows us to develop a dynamic conception of sovereignty but also provides a glimpse into the kinds of tradeoffs states strike in asserting their sovereignty. Referring to these tradeoffs as “sovereignty bargains”, Rudolph’s work offers an invaluable benchmark for theorizing

\textsuperscript{28} 1999.
\textsuperscript{29} Guiraudon 2000; Joppke 1998; 2006.
\textsuperscript{30} Krasner 1999; Thomson 1995.
about how the different dimensions of sovereignty interact. Turning to migration as the lens through which we may observe these bargains, Rudolph focuses on the intersection of the interdependence and domestic/societal dimensions of sovereignty. While drawing on this logic, my dissertation conceptually differs from this focus in putting aside the societal dimension and inquiring instead into the interaction of the interdependence and Westphalian dimensions of sovereignty.

Focusing on this interaction places the dissertation in an expanding body of scholarship seeking a broader approach to security. From a broad perspective, the theoretical framework illustrates how states’ pursuit of sovereignty takes into consideration threats carried on the backs of individuals. From a narrower perspective, the dissertation contributes to debates on the emerging migration-security nexus by showing that securitization is conditional on i) types of threats that states face ii) levels of economic interdependence and iii) the type of migration control policy under consideration.

In an important sense, the dissertation seeks to reconceptualize sovereignty not only by unbundling the concept but also by theorizing about variation across-time and

31 Rudolph 2005.
32 Rudolph’s framework does recognize the implications for Westphalian sovereignty. In contrast, my dissertation acknowledges but does not delve into the implications of my framework and findings for the societal dimension of sovereignty. Additionally, as noted before, downstream policies of control—citizenship rights, naturalization—would be better suited to accommodating such a focus shift.
33 Put differently, Rudolph’s work offers a way to broaden the concept of state security by looking at the domestic level, at issues of identity, national cohesion, and societal stability; in contrast, this dissertation explores the interaction of economic security and security against non-state threats.
34 Andreas 2006; Bigo 1997; Rudolph 2003.
space. Second, aside from introducing much needed dynamism into our understanding of the concept, the framework accommodates functional variation by highlighting the ways in which economic and security logics may interact. Stated differently, the framework acknowledges the tension between Westphalian and interdependence aspects of sovereignty but also draws attention to the fact that the precise relationship between the two dimensions of sovereignty may be contingent on state goals.

From an economic standpoint, ceding interdependence sovereignty boosts Westphalian sovereignty in facilitating economic exchange. This linkage is more pronounced given interdependence as autarkic states with closed borders will have less capacity to ensure adequate economic productivity and are likely to become dependent, undermining Westphalian sovereignty. When material dimension of the state interest is considered, then, it is possible to suggest that voluntary relinquishment of interdependence sovereignty reinforces the Westphalian dimension. From a security standpoint however, ceding interdependence sovereignty may imperil Westphalian sovereignty by making it possible for external (and often clandestine) undesirable actors to gain access to a state’s territory. To the degree that territorial integrity is a crucial element of Westphalian sovereignty, we might say that the security externalities of human flows problematize the relationship between Westphalian and interdependence dimensions.
Thus, the dissertation entreats scholarship to recognize that globalization does not always entail a ceding of interdependence sovereignty and further that, even when states voluntarily relinquish control over flows, this does not automatically detract from states’ sovereignty.

Implications for Territoriality and Borders in International Relations

A further contribution that this dissertation makes is to the study of borders and more broadly, to territoriality in international relations. A parallel argument to claims about the demise of state sovereignty has revolved around the declining salience of borders.\(^3\) This contention is closely linked to the decline of the military state in that territorial acquisition is increasingly eclipsed by control over trade and finance in the quest for power. Taking this argument to its logical extreme, scholars have equated the withering away of borders with the complete retrenchment of statehood.\(^3\) Thus globalists point to the emergence of a “borderless world” in which human capital matters significantly more than territorial conquest and markets sweep away border controls.\(^3\)

Several threads may be identified behind the conjecture of a borderless world. The first line of thinking sees globalization as a process that compels a deviation away from the primary function of borders as zero-sum manifestations of state power and authority. As a result, globalization is posited to give rise to a movement away from the

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\(^3\) Biersteker 2002.
\(^3\) Strange 1997.
\(^3\) Ohmae 1990.
spatial organization of world politics and to raise doubts about the taken-for-granted quality of territorial demarcation.\textsuperscript{38} The second line of thinking follows from the view of globalization as imposing a “golden straitjacket” on state behavior and emphasizes waning state authority in the face of transnational processes.\textsuperscript{39} The transnationalist literature draws attention to a variety of diverse phenomena that are harbingers of deterritorialization: the decline of legal spatiality\textsuperscript{40}, the emergence of regional economic zones of authority not confined to a unitary-state\textsuperscript{41}, the global organization of finance\textsuperscript{42}, to name a few. Third, states’ inability to control borders is another example that points to the demise of territoriality in international politics. In this understanding, failure to control borders entails that exogenous processes usurp states’ hierarchical authority within clearly delineated territory.\textsuperscript{43} Importantly, beyond driving policy convergence regardless of international boundaries, globalization of human mobility underscores the ineffectiveness of policies that seek to control borders.\textsuperscript{44}

This dissertation challenges the claim that we live in a borderless world by recognizing the multiple roles that borders play for states. Beyond being ramparts of defense against external state actors, borders function as institutions that facilitate...

\textsuperscript{38} Murphy 1999. For a criticism of the territoriality assumption in international relations, see Agnew 1994.
\textsuperscript{39} Friedman 1999.
\textsuperscript{40} Raustiala 2003.
\textsuperscript{41} Held 1999; Ohmae 1990.
\textsuperscript{42} Rodrik 1998.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994.
economic exchange, delineate areas of legal competence, delimit the reach of state authority, permit or constrain social interaction, and as markers of national identity. Policies of control over human mobility in particular shed light on the multifaceted role that borders play in areas beyond traditional security. More specifically, by focusing on one type of non-state threat to state security—transnational terrorism—the dissertation shows that border salience is reconfigured to encompass non-traditional threats to state security. Territorial conquest may no longer matter as much for national power but that does not automatically mean that borders cease to matter. In the words of Peter Andreas, “globalization may be about tearing down economic borders, as globalists emphasize, but it has also created more border policing work for the state. At the same time as globalization is about mobility and territorial access, states are attempting to selectively reinforce border controls.”

From another perspective, the securitization of human mobility has provided the impetus for a shift away from policies that emphasize the defense of borders (against military incursion) to policies that emphasize border security, policing, and management. This shift goes hand in hand with the evolving security paradigm which broadens the prism through which scholars conceive of security to take into account

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45 Simmons 2005.
46 Salehyan 2006.
47 Starr 2006; Starr and Thomas 2005.
48 Rudolph 2005.
49 Andreas 2003, 83.
phenomena previously relegated to the domain of low politics and recognize the connections between internal and external security. In sum, the dissertation is important in showing ways in which conceptions of territoriality are evolving in the face of increased interdependence and globalization and how the spatial demarcation of world politics continues to matter, albeit in novel ways.

**Implications for Globalization Scholarship**

Finally, this dissertation also enhances our understanding of globalization in two ways. First, it offers a way to study the ways in which different types of flows across borders—capital, goods, intelligence, technology, skill, and labor—interact. Second, it aspires to transcend the divide between literature on international political economy and security studies and brings into sharper focus the non-economic facet of globalization.

So far, scholarship has addressed the relationship between different types of economic flows by grounding analysis in terms of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework whereby trade is posited to follow the logic of comparative advantage. Scholarship adopting the factor-endowment model is plagued by disagreement over whether migration and other types of factor flows (capital or trade) are complementary or substitutive. Mundell’s model of trade has informed studies arguing in favor of substitutability of migration and trade; the crux of these arguments is that factor price

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52 Rudolph 2008.
equalization may be achieved through any type of factor mobility.  The contention that migration and trade function as substitutes offers a politically palatable solution for policy-makers. If states can reap the same economic gains from free trade while avoiding the negative externalities of migration, they are poised to take advantage of the macroeconomic gains that liberalization of borders has to offer while sidestepping security concerns. On the other hand however, more recent work has shown that the relationship between migration and other types of factor flows is more complicated and contingent than the naïve model suggests.

Following a similar track, my dissertation offers a way to rethink the relationship between labor mobility and other facets of globalization by shifting the focus from flow to state policy. In effect, the theoretical framework that I develop recognizes that restrictions on human mobility may hamper trade and capital flows in important ways. How they do so also depends on the type of migration—short term or long term, voluntary/economic or involuntary/political—that policies target. Recognizing these connections rests on an understanding of transborder flows as not simply mechanical but as contingent on human networks. For example, to the extent that foreign trade depends on personal contact, visa restrictions may impede trade by raising transaction costs and imposing a burden on business. Similarly, instruments that restrict short term

53 Mundell 1957.
54 Much of the criticism is centered on relaxing the assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. See primarily Markusen 1983; O’Rourke K 1999. Other scholars contend that substitutability might be achieved in the long term but that in the short-term trade liberalization may produce a “migration hump”. See Martin 2006; Miller and Martin 1982.
travel may hamper foreign direct investment, especially in the context of imperfect information that prevents economic partners from being compensated for these additional costs.\textsuperscript{55}

Additionally, to the degree that contiguity benefits economic partners, on-site barriers obstruct cross-border trade, disrupting local markets that are dependent on such activity.\textsuperscript{56} Beyond the direct economic effects of policies, the dissertation has illustrated the more subtle psychological or reputational channels through which strict policies may impair economic ties. Just as fenced and militarized borders and stringent visa controls discourage trade and capital flows by sending hostile signals to commercial partners, liberal asylum policies may jeopardize economic relations insofar as they shame and discredit origin country regimes.

Furthermore, the dissertation asks us to reevaluate the relationship between different types of flows by demonstrating that within the issue area of migration policy, economic and security interests are influential to varying degrees. Thus, the assumption that policy-makers seek to avoid the security externalities of labor mobility by designing policies to forestall human mobility and instead draw in financial flows is misleading, not only because of inherent complementariness but because not all state policies reflect the primacy of security imperatives.

\textsuperscript{55} Neumayer 2009.  
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. Boehmer and Peña 2008; Golovetsky 2006. Neumayer points out that this might disproportionately hurt poorer countries that stand to benefit most from border trade.
Human mobility is also closely intertwined with other elements of globalization: the exponential growth in technology and the immense pace of innovation and development, the proliferation and spread of ideas and norms, and the rise of new international actors and institutions. As a recent article in *The Wall Street Journal* documents, according to OECD figures, the number of globally mobile students has increased by 57% while cross-border science collaboration has more than doubled since 1990, developments that comprise “academic globalization”. These developments highlight the interconnectedness in the facets of globalization: the transborder flow of students is a form of human mobility but also involves flows of labor, skill, and information. Although widespread, academic globalization evokes different policy responses: while origin countries like China and Singapore become apprehensive about brain drain, other countries such as Saudi Arabia and South Korea might devise strategies to aggressively court foreign academics. In sum, a conclusion that we might draw from the dissertation is that states’ strategies of managing flows across borders may shape the contours of world politics in ways not foreseen by conventional accounts of globalization.

Finally, the dissertation has attempted to formulate a theoretical framework that encompasses both the economic and non-economic aspects of globalization. Migration is an ideal issue area that brings to light the intersection of economic and security

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considerations for several reasons. Migration flows can interact with other factors in ways that spark or fuel international conflict, may provide resources that foment domestic instability, bolster the opportunity framework for the operation of transborder crime networks, or act as channels for the spread of militancy and terrorism. The possibility of “informal violence” demonstrates most clearly that globalization has narrowly been defined simply as “economic integration on a global scale”. In being informed by the emerging migration-security nexus, the dissertation has sought to move beyond the narrow perspective of globalization as purely economic or benign to develop a theory that views flows of terrorism as a dimension of globalization.

More specifically, the theoretical framework accommodates the possibility that the technologies, information, communication, and transportation that facilitate globalization may be exploited by flows of violence, and may in turn, undermine its benign aspects. Broadening our view of globalization has also necessitated a theoretical bridge between literature on economic interdependence and security.

6.4 Policy Implications

In the aftermath of 9/11, draconian border security controls on the North American continent resulted in net economic losses. For example, along the United States-Canada border, Canadian GDP declined by 0.6 percent, and the unemployment

58 Adamson 2006.
60 Kellner 2007.
rate rose by 8 percent in the last quarter of 2001. On the one hand, these figures illustrate the tradeoffs associated with increased border controls as well as showing the uneasy relationship between permeable borders and security. On the other hand however, contrary to the initial reaction on the part of the US, and in spite of additional security measures taken since 9/11, we have not witnessed a complete clampdown on mobility on either side of the Atlantic. Thus, despite the hype over securitization of migration and despite the very real and perceived dangers associated with open borders in a world where a few individuals can wreak devastating damage against states’ territory and citizens, economic interests continue to guide policy.

In the words of Philip Martin, we may conclude that “there are no easy or ‘magic bullet’ answers to the migration dilemma”, which suggests that policies of control over human mobility reflect a compromise between competing motives. While the dissertation’s emphasis on the interaction of economic and security motivations behind policy might have led us to expect an optimal strategy as a policy prescription, the conclusion is rather that it is difficult to prescribe an optimal strategy or degree of border permeability. That said, a few more implications follow from this observation.

First, the variation across states in the relative value attached to physical security/geopolitical concerns over material/economic aspirations opens the grounds for cross-border cooperation in border management. We might imagine for instance that

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61 Golovetsky 2006.
63 Martin 1998, 473-78.
states are vulnerable to security externalities of migration to differing degrees; in the framework of this dissertation, this would be expressed in terms of a greater probability of being targeted in instances of transnational terrorism. To the extent that vulnerability leads to greater emphasis placed on security, these states have incentives to partially diffuse the costs of border security policies by collaborating with neighbors. In the context of interdependence, trade may provide the incentives for trading partners to participate in security policies, rendering trade and security complements.\textsuperscript{64} The “Smart Borders” initiative, through which the US has sought to establish harmonization of border policies with its neighboring NAFTA partners, is exemplary of cooperation prompted by the desire to effectively filter out terrorists while keeping borders open to economic flows.\textsuperscript{65}

Second, an emerging conclusion from the dissertation’s theoretical framework was that territoriality is gaining a new meaning in world politics in the sense that borders assume the role of perimeters of defense against non-state threats. The parallel policy implication of the reconfiguration of border salience is that, security-seeking can shift away from the logic of military defense to one of international law enforcement and border management.\textsuperscript{66} This implication not only suggests that effective border

\textsuperscript{64} Golovetsky 2006.
\textsuperscript{65} Koslowski 2004. Examples of such initiatives were harmonization on biometric data collection and prescreening of frequent travelers.
\textsuperscript{66} Rudolph 2006.
management decreases the probability of interstate conflict\textsuperscript{67}, but also draws attention to the importance of border policies as an effective counterterrorism strategy.

Third, the dissertation’s empirical findings highlight the difficulty in obtaining an optimal border policy by also demonstrating variation in threat perception. Escalation of border controls, innovation of new technology, the enactment of physical barriers at the border, increase in personnel, and the use of surveillance techniques might serve as much a symbolic function as an objective security goal.\textsuperscript{68} Such symbolic policies seek to diffuse public apprehension over security externalities of migration and create an image of state control over borders. Consequently, what might be optimal from a symbolic standpoint might not necessarily be so from a policy perspective, particularly because such highly visible policies may be inefficient in being expensive but not preventing clandestine border crossings. In the dissertation’s framework, the reputation that origin country’s nationals had garnered for involvement in attacks globally as well as the recipient state’s past experience proved fundamental in overcoming asymmetries of information states face vis-à-vis terrorist actors. In effect, policies taking into account the information that reputation and past experience have to offer might be more efficient in targeting objective rather than perceived threats.

Finally, as aforementioned, liberalization of controls over human mobility may endow recipient states with soft power by projecting a message of inclusiveness to other

\textsuperscript{67} Gavrilis 2004.
\textsuperscript{68} Andreas 2000.
states, allowing cross-border networks to develop, and aiding the transfer of norms and ideas. In other words, beyond enhancing commercial ties, by facilitating transborder contact and travel, liberalization of borders may strengthen the liberal consensus underpinning economic interdependence. Recently, the attempts by states in Eastern Europe—Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine—to lobby the European Union for visa liberalization portrays how border control policies can grant international institutions influence. In fact, referring to visa liberalization as a “currency that the EU should wield wisely”, Poland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sirorski drew attention to how liberalization of migration controls can act as a carrot in driving domestic reforms in origin countries.

6.5 Avenues for Future Research

A number of avenues for future research directly tied to the dissertation’s framework and findings or indirectly originating from the themes may be identified. First, a significant theoretical insight emerging from the dissertation is the reputational information mechanism through which recipient states are postulated to react to security concerns. A way to extend this idea is by unpacking the reputational dynamic. It is plausible to imagine for example that recipient countries are more cognizant of and/or sensitive to attacks by transnational terrorists against similar countries. Similarity may

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69 Kirisci 2005. Kirisci makes a similar argument towards the liberalization of the European Union’s visa and border controls.
be conceptualized in a number of ways: regime type, geographic location, parallel foreign policy interests. While the dissertation did not delve into such a specific mechanism, incorporation of data to allow for similarity between states targeted in attacks of terrorism and the recipient country would allow for such a nuanced analysis. Such a research project would also allow a further inquiry into distinctive patterns of learning; to the extent that securitization is more acute the closer threats hit home, security concerns should matter more for incidents of terror targeting similar states.

Second, whereas the dissertation has focused on upstream and on-site policies of migration and border control as an expression of interdependence sovereignty, there is room for incorporating domestic sovereignty into the picture. As hinted at in the Introduction, states should factor in the challenges migrant populations will pose for the pursuit of domestic sovereignty. In particular, to the degree that migrant flows generate a crisis of identity and endanger the linkage between state and society, they engender societal anxieties. One way to approach this is by considering the assimilability of migrant populations into the host country’s culture and society; mass flows of migrants that retain their “apartness” are likely to exacerbate perceptions of threat to society and identity.71 Additionally, the legal and institutionalized context of the recipient state—

71 Caldwell 2009. I recognize that assimilation might not always be a desirable goal in the normative sense; from the migrant’s perspective, assimilation might be costly and entail the loss of cultural identity. Arguments also can be made about assimilation being undesirable in eradicating differences that should be celebrated and detracting from authenticity. I also recognize that assimilation and integration are not fully exchangeable terms. This discussion is beyond the scope of the concluding section. However, Caldwell’s
the state’s citizenship and naturalization regime—and the recipient’s political culture may influence the ease with which migrant populations adjust to and identify with the recipient’s society. In other words, the implications for domestic sovereignty would be a function of both the cultural dissimilarity of migrants and the domestic cultural, legal, and institutional context of the host country. The relevance of this idea for this project is that expectations on the ease of integration of these populations into the recipient’s society should feed into states’ calculus in devising upstream and on-site policies of control over migration. In other words, a direct way to extend the dissertation is by bringing domestic sovereignty back in and studying its impact on interdependence sovereignty.

Finally, an agenda for research that follows less directly from the dissertation would draw attention to other types of clandestine non-state threats against states stemming from human mobility. This dissertation has explicitly focused on one type of threat: transnational terrorism. However, clandestine transnational actors encompass a variety of other types of actors: organized crime networks, smugglers of contraband, human traffickers, and illegal migrants. While also exploiting the technologies of globalization, these actors might pose a challenge for state sovereignty in ways that differ markedly from transnational terrorists. Consequently, these phenomena warrant exploration in a separate project. One important research question that I hope to inquire

point is that from the state’s perspective the cultural apartness of migrant populations poses difficulties in terms of the maintenance of domestic sovereignty.

into relates to the reciprocal relationship between organized crime and states’ border and migration control policies. To the extent that this relationship mirrors a vicious cycle, the prevalence of organized crime undermines state sovereignty by putting into question the effectiveness of states’ policies. By examining states’ sovereignty seeking through a different vantage point, this research agenda will seek to complement and broaden the theoretical reach of this dissertation.
Appendix A: Recipient and Origin Country List for Analysis of Asylum Recognition Rates

List of Recipient (Destination) States in Aggregate Sample

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List of Recipient (Destination) States in European Sample

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## Top 10 Origin Countries by Destination State

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Appendix B: Turkey’s Visa Tier Categories

List of Turkey’s Visa-Waiver Countries

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<th>Category 1-Visa Waiver Countries</th>
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<td>Kazakhstan (1 month)</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan (1 month)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Macedonia (2 months)</td>
<td>Macau-China (1 month)</td>
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Source: The Directorate General of Security (EGM) of Turkey.
Note: The EGM list does not reflect recent changes in visa policy for Middle Eastern origin states.
## List of Turkey’s Sticker Visa Regime Countries

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Biography

Nazlı Avdan was born on February 4, 1981, in Istanbul, Turkey. After growing up primarily in Turkey and spending four years of her childhood in Westchester, New York, she completed her Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degree at Bogazici University in Istanbul where she graduated magna cum laude from the political science and international relations department (2002). Nazlı then returned to the United States for graduate work and attained a Master of Arts (M.A.) degree in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. During her time there, she was selected for the Merriam Fellowship and the Graduate Distinction Award for research excellence. After receiving her M.A. degree (2004), Nazlı opted for the PhD program in political science at Duke University and specialized in the subfields of International Relations (IR) and Political Methodology (M). In her time at Duke, she has received the James B. Duke Fellowship (2004-2008), the Horowitz Foundation Harold D. Laswell Award in International Relations and Foreign Affairs (2008), and Institute for Humane Studies Fellowship for Graduate Work (2010), the Program for Advanced Research in the Social Sciences (PARISS) Fellowship (2010), and a nomination for the Katherine Stern Dissertation Fellowship (2009). She is receiving her PhD in political science from Duke University in fall of 2010 and is appointed as a Junior Research Fellow at University College, Oxford University, United Kingdom, for the 2010-2013 academic years.