POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAYS FOR THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE TO BETTER USE CIVILIAN-ACQUIRED SKILLS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\(^1\)

POLICY QUESTION

Since the projected demand for civil affairs activities is outpacing the supply of civil affairs forces, how should the U.S. Army Reserve better use its soldiers’ civilian-acquired skills in planning and implementing civil affairs operations abroad?

BACKGROUND (p. 1)

*The Civil Affairs Mission and the Civil Affairs Community*

Civil Affairs (CA) are activities that foster relations between military forces and civil societies. These activities improve mission effectiveness and help achieve military objectives. CA forces use cultural, linguistic, and technical expertise to inform military commanders about the civil society within the operational environment. CA forces may interact with governmental and nongovernmental agencies.

Nine-four percent of CA forces are in the U.S Army. The remaining six percent of the CA forces are comprised of U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy personnel. There are approximately 7,500 CA reserve and active soldiers in the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army Reserve provides the U.S. Army with 87 percent of its CA capacity, and the Active Component provides the remaining 13 percent.

CA units emerged during World War II and were known as Military Government units. CA activities evolved to include humanitarian assistance and development projects during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The appeal of CA skills surged in the 1990s as global instability rose, contributing to reconstruction and humanitarian efforts around the world. The demand for CA units remains high in the 21st Century.

U.S. Army Reserve personnel are a vital element of the U.S. Army’s military capabilities, namely its deployable strength. Within the last decade, the U.S. Army Reserve has been transitioning from a supplemental force-in-waiting into an operational force.

\(^1\) This student paper was prepared in 2010-2011 as a requirement for the Masters of Public Policy Program at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. The research, analysis, policy alternatives and recommendations contained in this paper are the work of the student who authored the document, and do not represent the official or unofficial views of the Sanford School of Public Policy or Duke University. Without the specific permission of its author, this paper may not be used or cited for any purpose other than to inform the client organization about the subject matter. The author relied in many instances on data provided by the interviewees and makes no independent representations as to the accuracy of the data.
U.S. Military Doctrine is causing a High Demand for Civil Affairs Forces

The post-9/11 shift from fighting traditional warfare to irregular warfare elevated the importance of “soft power” and CA activities. National security policy emphasizes an integrated approach to conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations. The combination of these operations with “hard power” remains a national security priority. The number of CA units is expanding to meet U.S. national security obligations.

PROBLEM STATEMENT (p. 6)

There is a CA Capability Gap: the Demand for CA forces is Outpacing Supply

Despite the U.S. Army’s plan to expand its CA forces, the Center for Strategic and International Studies asserts that the “projected demand for civil affairs continues to outpace supply.” This shortfall gives rise to the importance of maximizing the efficiency of CA activities and forces. However, recent reforms in the U.S. Army have the potential to hinder the capability and efficiency of CA units to deliver its missions.

The Emphasis on Functional Specialties is declining in the U.S. Army

In 2006, the U.S. Army transformed its CA doctrine in support of new national security objectives. Reform of the CA doctrine included the decision to emphasize general competencies over functional specialties. The doctrine replaced twenty-two functional specialties with six general areas.

This new classifying system for CA competencies gives the U.S. Army Reserve a less precise indication of its service members’ skill set acquired from civilian education and professions. This reform works against the ability of the U.S. Army Reserve to capitalize on its members’ unique functional expertise, which plays a significant role in performing well in CA operations and civil-military operations.

The Requirements for the Eleven Skill Identifiers are Too Broad

The U.S. Army Reserve also awards eleven skill identifiers for eleven civil sector functions. These skill identifiers were established to help the service track civilian skills. The requirements for earning a skill identifier are “broad, set low and outdated” in some cases. Also, there is a lack of emphasis at the commander level for service members to apply for the skill identifiers.

The U.S. Army Reserve’s Database for Tracking Civilian Skills has Many Shortcomings

The U.S. Army Reserve created the Civilian Acquired Skills Database to track data about service members’ civilian occupations. This database facilitates the ability to identify and access functional expertise to fulfill mission requirements by providing improved
sourcing options to commanders. Despite reporting requirements, the service is struggling to collect timely and accurate data from its service members.

**CRITERIA (p. 9)**

- Improve the ability of the U.S. Army Reserve to identify the actual level of functional expertise currently resident in the CA force.
- Close the U.S. Army Reserve’s CA capability gap in order to better execute reconstruction and stabilization operations.
- Enhance the U.S. Army Reserve’s participation in whole-of-government planning efforts related to CA activities.

**ALTERNATIVES (p. 11)**

1. **Study and Re-Write the Skill Identifiers.**

   Evaluate the current system of classifying functional specialists in the CA force to determine the civil-sector specialized skills that are truly critical in achieving national security objectives. At this point, it is unclear if the eleven broad skill identifiers are capturing the essential skills that are needed to conduct civil affairs operations. Once these skills are identified, update the list of skill identifiers accordingly. Re-write the skill identifiers in a way that distinguishes the service member’s level of expertise. There should be three levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) awarded for each skill identifier to reflect the service member’s actual level of competence. Require service members with identified functional expertise to periodically take competency evaluations to validate the actual level of functional expertise. The competency evaluations should be tailored to test a specific level of expertise within a specific skill identifier.

2. **Require CA Personnel to Apply for Skill Identifiers.**

   Require CA reserve service members to apply for a skill identifier within their civil-sector functional area of expertise. In order to keep the U.S. Army Reserve continuously informed of its supply of functional expertise, this requirement should be infused into the U.S. Army Reserve’s continuous training schedule. Place the emphasis of functional expertise at the command level. Require commanders to discharge service members who refuse to apply for the skill identifiers. This alternative will be fully realized only with the participation of the entire CA reserve force; partial participation will not provide the U.S. Army Reserve with an accurate picture of the civil-sector skills resident in the CA force.
3. Remodel the Army Reserve Civilian Acquired Skills Database (CASDb).

Remodel the Army Reserve Civilian Acquired Skills Database to improve its utility to the service. This alternative consists of three steps. First, expand the database’s format to allow service members to insert more than one current occupation as well as previously-held occupations. This reform allows the service to capture past experience that can be harnessed alongside of newly acquired skills in the civil sector. Second, require CA service members to update their employment information on a regular basis to allow to service to take advantage of any newly acquired skills. Third, infuse this requirement into the continuous training schedule in order to meet Department of Defense established reporting requirements. The goal of the above efforts is to provide commanders with improved sourcing options to fulfill mission requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS (p. 16)

I recommend the full implementation of Alternatives 1 and 3. I recommend implementing all provisions of Alternative 2 except for the requirement to discharge service members who fail to comply with the directive.
CHAPTER I: POLICY QUESTION

Since the projected demand for civil affairs activities is outpacing the supply of civil affairs forces, how should the U.S. Army Reserve better use its soldiers’ civilian-acquired skills in planning and implementing civil affairs operations abroad?

CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND

Civil Affairs Mission

Civil Affairs (CA) are activities that foster relations between military forces and civil societies. These activities improve mission effectiveness and help achieve military objectives. CA forces use cultural, linguistic, and technical expertise to inform military commanders about the civil society within the operational environment. CA forces may interact with governmental and nongovernmental agencies.

The Army Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, defines CA units as: “Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations (CAO) and to support civil-military operations” (see Appendix I for other terms and definitions).

According to Joint Publication 3-57, CAOs do the following:

1. “Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present;

2. Require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and

3. Involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.”

According to the Civil Affairs Association, CA forces provide these key services to military operations based on their knowledge of civil sector programs and functions, cross cultural communications and foreign area expertise, and military-civilian cooperation.

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The Civil Affairs Community and a Brief Overview of that Community's History

Nine-four percent of CA forces are in the U.S. Army. The remaining six percent of the CA forces are comprised of U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy personnel. There are approximately 7,500 CA reserve and active soldiers in the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army Reserve provides the U.S. Army with 87 percent of its CA capacity, and the Active Component provides the remaining 13 percent.

Historically, the entire CA force—Active and Reserve—within the U.S. Army was assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) under the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), reporting to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). However, in 2006 the U.S. Army Chief of Staff issued a memorandum reassigning the Reserve CA force under USACAPOC from USASOC to the U.S. Army Reserve Command while keeping the Active CA force under USASOC. In effect, this memorandum ordered a “divorce” between the Reserve CA force and the Active CA force.

Currently, U.S. Army Reserve CA personnel support general purpose forces and Active CA personnel support special operations forces. According to a report issued by The Center for Strategic and International Studies, the idea for the “divorce” came from the Department of Defense (DOD), which thought that the split would improve the relationship between the Reserve CA and general purpose forces.

CA units emerged during World War II and were known as Military Government units. The units restored order, supported civil administration efforts and rebuilt parts of Europe and Japan during and after World War II. CA activities evolved to include humanitarian assistance and development projects during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The appeal of CA skills surged in the 1990s as global instability rose, contributing to reconstruction and humanitarian efforts around the world. The demand for CA units remains high in the 21st Century as global conflict ensues.

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
The Transformation of the U.S. Army Reserve into an Operational Force

The service members of the U.S. Army Reserve are a vital element of the U.S. Army’s military capabilities, namely its deployable strength. Within the last decade, the U.S. Army Reserve has been transitioning from a supplemental force-in-waiting into an operational force. U.S. Army Reserve service members are a “contributing rotational element” of the Total Force, and they are essential to the execution of the U.S. National Security Strategy.

U.S. Military Doctrine is causing a High Demand for Civil Affairs Forces

National security policy since the 9/11 attacks has increased the demand for CA units. The post-9/11 shift from fighting traditional warfare to irregular warfare elevated the importance of “soft power” and CA activities. National security policy began to emphasize an integrated approach to winning operations to defeat terrorism.

The George W. Bush Administration supported a “whole-of-government” approach in the 2002 National Security Strategy. In 2005, the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) granted the Secretary of State the authority to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts…to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations (R&S).” The Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 declared stability operations to be a core military mission and emphasized the importance of integrated civilian and military efforts in R&S operations.

DoDD 3005.05 directs the DOD to:

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18 Joseph Nye defines soft power as the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our [U.S.] policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our [U.S.] soft power is enhanced.” Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. p. x.
1. “Support the stability operations planning efforts of other U.S. Government agencies.

2. Collaborate with other U.S. Government agencies and with foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector firms as appropriate to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations.

3. Continue to support the development, implementation, and operations of civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unity of effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.”

Operating under the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also works with the military during stability missions. In response to the NSPD-44, the USAID Office of Civilian Response was created in 2009 to administer the training and deployment of Foreign Service and Civil Service Officers to support R&S operations abroad. Further, USAID and DOD have a personnel exchange program aimed at strengthening civil-military relations in R&S activities. USAID senior officials provide development advice to top military officers conducting R&S operations. In exchange, DOD liaison officers work at USAID and their role is to coordinate and manage R&S efforts.

The DOD-USAID exchange program is linked to the DoDD 3000.07 that was issued in 2008. Article 6(h)(4) of the directive charges DOD to support exchange programs for the purpose of synchronizing DOD and U.S. Government (USG) irregular warfare-related activities. DoDD 3000.07 recognizes that improved military proficiency for irregular warfare can enhance the management of stability operations.

The integration of R&S and development aid with “hard power” remains a national security priority in the Barack Obama Administration. The number of CA units is

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expanding to meet national security obligations. The U.S. Army plans to add another brigade to its Reserve Component and Active duty CA forces by 2013.27

CHAPTER III: PROBLEM STATEMENT

There is a CA Capability Gap: the Demand for CA forces is Outpacing Supply

Despite the U.S. Army’s plan to expand its CA forces, the Center for Strategic and International Studies asserts that the “projected demand for civil affairs continues to outpace supply.”\(^28\) A recruitment shortfall for CA personnel is contributing to a lack of adequate force structure to meet the U.S. Army’s rotational plans and requirements across multiple theatres.\(^29,30\) This shortfall in manpower gives rise to the importance of maximizing the efficiency of CA activities and forces. However, recent reforms in the U.S. Army have the potential to hinder the capability and efficiency of CA units to deliver its missions.\(^31\)

The Emphasis on Functional Specialties is declining in the U.S. Army

As previously mentioned, the U.S. Army transformed its CA force structure in 2006. Concurrently, the U.S. Army transformed its CA doctrine in support of new national security objectives, namely the interagency cooperation for R&S operations. Reform of the CA doctrine included the decision to emphasize general competencies over functional specialties, which are professional civilian skills.\(^32\) The doctrine replaced twenty-two functional specialties with six general areas: governance, economic stability, public health and welfare, infrastructure, rule of law, and public education.\(^33,34\)

It appears that there were two reasons for the emphasis on general competencies over functional specialty skills. First, the change was in response to increased support requirements for maneuver commanders, and in response to recruiting and retention realities for reserve personnel.\(^35\) Second, the change occurred in order to have CA functional specialty areas correspond to and complement the five stability sectors adopted by the Department of State, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.\(^36,37\)

\(^{30}\) Due to this shortfall in supply, “in lieu of” service members from other military services have been filling some of the empty CA personnel slots. Hicks, Kathleen and Christine E Wormouth. “The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces.” \textit{Center for Strategic and International Studies}. Feb. 2009. p. viii.
\(^{35}\) This synchronization likely took place to meet the national security priority of integrating civilian and military efforts in R&S operations. The five stability sectors are: governance and participation, economic
This new classifying system for CA competencies gives the U.S. Army Reserve a less precise indication of its service members’ skill set acquired from civilian education and professions. This reform works against the ability of the U.S. Army Reserve to capitalize on its members’ unique functional expertise, which plays a significant role in performing well in CAOs and civil-military operations. Overall capability and efficiency of performance in CAOs may be reduced when CA generalists are deployed in lieu of functional specialists.

The deterioration of the U.S. Army Reserve’s CA functional specialty capability to provide subject-matter experts with backgrounds in one of the six core competency areas has reached an all-time low. The Reserve Offices Association reports that less than four percent of the U.S. Army Reserve’s CA officer force has a functional specialty capability. This Association suggests that nearly a decade of war and the high operational tempo are eroding the functional specialty capability.

The Requirements for the Eleven Skill Identifiers are Too Broad

The U.S. Army Reserve also awards skill identifiers for eleven civil sector functions: Civil Defense Officer, Economist, Public Education Officer, Civilian Supply Officer, Public Transportation Officer, Public Facilities Officer, Public Safety Officer, Public Communications Officer, Agricultural Officer, Cultural Affairs Officer and Archivist. These eleven skill identifiers fall under the six general competency areas for CA functional specialties, and they were established to help the U.S. Army Reserve track civilian skills. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, determines the qualifications for the eleven skill identifiers.

However, there are more than eleven civil sector functions that are germane to CA activities. The requirements for earning a skill identifier are “broad, set low and outdated” in some cases. Thus, the benefit of awarding the skill identifiers—knowing the actual level (i.e. tactical, operational or strategic) of functional specialty expertise stabilizing and infrastructure, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, and justice and reconciliation, and security. Kemp, Jack. “Stability and Reconstruction Operations: Connecting the Dots Between Military and Civilian Efforts.” Small Wars Journal. 2007. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v7/kem-swjvol7.pdf>.


Ibid.


Whereas the numerous functional specialty areas were downsized, the eleven skill identifiers were not affected by the 2006 reforms. Anonymous Lieutenant Colonel. U.S. Army Reserve. Telephone Interview. 28 Feb. 2011.

Ibid. See Appendix V for a description of these skill identifiers.


currently resident in the U.S. Army Reserve—is diminished. For example, a commander may order a service member holding the Public Education Officer skill identifier to help design a provincial school system. Yet, this service member may be a school teacher in his/her civilian profession, rather than a school system administrator. This example illustrates that teachers, principals, superintendents and school administrators fall under the same skill identifier despite having functional skills across the tactical, operational and strategic levels.  

There is also a lack of emphasis at the commander level for service members to apply for skill identifiers. As a result, service members rarely apply for the skill identifiers. For example, only twenty-nine U.S. Army Reserve service members assigned to USACAPOC had a skill identifier in March 2009. This is another hindrance that works against the ability of the U.S. Army Reserve to capitalize on its members’ unique functional expertise.

The U.S. Army Reserve’s Database for Tracking Civilian Skills has Many Shortcomings

The U.S. Army Reserve created the Civilian Acquired Skills Database (CASDb) to track data about service members’ civilian occupations. The CASDb facilitates the ability to identify and access functional expertise to fulfill mission requirements by providing improved sourcing options to commanders. Despite DOD-imposed reporting requirements, the U.S. Army Reserve is struggling to collect and maintain accurate data from its service members. The Government Accountability Office reported that the U.S. Army Reserve does not know whether the catalog of skills in the CASDb is current. Lastly, the CASDb does not capture data on civilian jobs previously held by U.S. Army Reserve personnel.

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CHAPTER IV: CRITERIA

• Improve the ability of the U.S. Army Reserve to identify the actual level of functional expertise currently resident in the CA force.

This criterion seeks to overcome the U.S. Army Reserve’s struggle to capitalize on its service members’ unique functional specialties while enabling commanders to access and assign CA personnel to specific missions. Alternatives are evaluated on the extent to which they contribute to identifying a service member’s precise level of competence within a CA functional area. The precise level of competence corresponds with a functional specialty capability at either the tactical, operational or strategic level. Alternatives are judged on their ability to distinguish service members with functional skills at the tactical level (such as a teacher) and those with functional skills in the same broad skill identifier but at the strategic level (such as a school superintendent).

• Close the U.S. Army Reserve’s CA capability gap in order to better execute R&S operations.\(^5\)

Per DoDD 3000.05, R&S operations are a core military mission. Functional expertise is needed to successfully conduct the core tasks of R&S operations, which require advanced technical skills to restore essential services and rebuild a country’s infrastructure.\(^5\) The six CA functional specialty areas reflect the core tasks of R&S operations.\(^5\) Yet, the U.S. Army Reserve is further contributing to the CA capability gap—a shortfall in manpower and functional expertise—by placing little emphasis on CA functional specialty areas. Alternatives are hence judged on their contribution towards closing this CA capability gap in order to strengthen the overall effectiveness of CA activities and forces.

\(^5\)CA capability refers to two key factors: 1) the ability to meet the U.S. Army’s rotational plans and requirements across multiple theatres; and 2) the ability to access and use functional specialists to meet the requirements for civil-military and CAO operations. As previously mentioned, the demand for CA forces is outpacing supply and the number of CA reserve members holding skill identifiers is at an all-time low.


\(^5\) As noted earlier, the six general CA competency areas are governance, economic stability, public health and welfare, infrastructure, rule of law, and public education.
• Enhance the U.S. Army Reserve’s participation in whole-of-government planning efforts related to CA activities.

The DOD reported that R&S operations are best employed when the military and the USG are involved.\(^{54}\) Unified strategic and implementation plans necessitate the ability for the military and the USG to have an accurate assessment of each other’s potential contributions to operations before deployment. This information sharing from the planning stage to the completion stage facilitates R&S operations and also helps meet doctrinal requirements to synchronize efforts as part of the interagency process.\(^{55}\) Effective information exchange necessitates the ability of the U.S. Army to have readily available data on its service members’ strengths and weaknesses. Alternatives are evaluated on the extent to which they improve the U.S. Army Reserve’s ability to positively contribute to the whole-of-government approach.


\(^{55}\) Ibid.
CHAPTER V: ALTERNATIVES

1. Study and Re-Write the Skill Identifiers.

Evaluate the current system of classifying functional specialists in the CA force to determine the civil-sector specialized skills that are truly critical in achieving national security objectives. At this point, it is unclear if the eleven broad skill identifiers are capturing the essential skills that are needed to conduct CAOs. Once these skills are identified, update the list of skill identifiers accordingly. Re-write the skill identifiers in a way that distinguishes the service member’s level of expertise. There should be three levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) awarded for each skill identifier to reflect the service member’s actual level of competence. Require service members with identified functional expertise to periodically take competency evaluations to validate the actual level of functional expertise. The competency evaluations should be specifically tailored to test a specific level of expertise (tactical, operational, and strategic) within a specific skill identifier.

2. Require CA Personnel to Apply for Skill Identifiers

Require CA reserve service members to apply for a skill identifier within their civil-sector functional area of expertise. In order to keep the U.S. Army Reserve continuously informed of its supply of functional expertise, this requirement should be infused into the U.S. Army Reserve’s continuous training schedule. Place the emphasis of functional expertise at the command level. Require commanders to discharge service members who refuse to apply for the skill identifiers. This alternative will be fully realized only with the participation of the entire CA reserve force; partial participation will not provide the U.S. Army Reserve with an accurate picture of the civil-sector skills resident in the CA force.

3. Remodel the Army Reserve Civilian Acquired Skills Database (CASDb).

Remodel the Army Reserve Civilian Acquired Skills Database to improve its utility to the service. This alternative consists of three steps. First, expand the database’s format to allow service members to insert more than one current occupation as well as previously-held occupations. This reform allows the service to capture past experience that can be harnessed alongside of newly acquired skills in the civil sector. Second, require CA service members to update their employment information on a regular basis to allow to service to take advantage of any newly civilian-acquired skills. Third, infuse this requirement into the continuous training schedule in order to meet DOD-established reporting requirements. The goal of the above efforts is to provide commanders with improved sourcing options to fulfill mission requirements.56

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CHAPTER VI: ANALYSIS

ALTERNATIVE 1: Study and Re-Write the Skill Identifiers

Alternative 1 fully meets the criterion of improving the U.S. Army Reserve’s ability to identify the actual level of functional expertise currently resident in the CA force. Rewriting the skill identifiers—which are used to track functional expertise—to include three distinct levels of competencies provides the U.S. Army Reserve with an improved ability to assess its CA talent pool. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, requiring service members to be regularly tested on a skill identifier and a corresponding competency level will ensure the data on force-wide specialized skills are timely and accurate.

Alternative 1 partially meets the criterion of closing the U.S. Army Reserve’s CA capability gap. This measure improves the service’s ability to execute R&S operations by creating a classifying system for functional specialties that is meaningful, precise, and feasible. An anonymous Lieutenant Colonel asserts that distinguishing the type and level of functional expertise that is needed for the future will enhance the utility of the classifying system. Overall effectiveness of the CA force will likely improve as commanders have better access to specific functional specialty skills that are needed for core military operations. This alternative only partially meets this criterion because completely closing the capability gap requires fulfilling recruitment needs—a provision that is not covered by this alternative.

Alternative 1 fully meets the criterion of enhancing the U.S. Army Reserve’s participation in whole-of-government planning efforts. By conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the skill identifiers, this alternative identifies which specialized skills commanders should target and leverage in the interagency planning process. Since the skill identifiers are tracked by the service, the re-written skill identifiers and the associated tests facilitate the planning process by providing commanders precise data on the functional expertise that is available for R&S operations. Tracking these skills enables the service to share information with the USG and to develop integrated whole-of-government plans based on the available cultural and functional expertise.

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62 Ibid.
DECISION MATRIX 63

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Study and Re-Write the Skill Identifiers</th>
<th>Improve the ability to identify the functional skills in the CA force</th>
<th>Close the CA capability gap</th>
<th>Enhance the participation in whole-of-government planning</th>
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ALTERNATIVE 2: Require CA Personnel to Apply for the Skill Identifiers

Alternative 2 partially meets the criterion of improving the U.S. Army Reserve’s ability to identify the actual level of functional expertise currently resident in the CA force. Since the skill identifiers are used to track functional specialists, and service members will be tested to validate their expertise, this alternative creates a standard mechanism to keep the service continuously informed of its supply of functional expertise. This alternative will likely increase the number of skill identifiers awarded since the application pool will expand with increased commander emphasis. As reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tracking civilian skills provides space for the service to access and capitalize on its service members’ unique expertise.64

This alternative only partially meets this criterion for two reasons. First, the current requirements for some of the skill identifiers are too relaxed. In order to fully meet this criterion, each skill identifier must be re-written in a way that clearly conveys a service member’s precise level of competence within a CA functional area. Second, this measure may shrink the talent pool available to commanders since the directive calls for commanders to fire service members who do not apply for a skill identifier. Given the recruitment shortfall and the high operational tempo, firing service members may not be a luxury available to the U.S. Army Reserve.

Alternative 2 partially meets the criterion of closing the U.S. Army Reserve’s CA capability gap in order to better execute R&S operations. This measure helps close the capability gap by restoring the emphasis on the CA functional areas by requiring the entire CA force to apply for skill identifiers. By documenting the specialized skills that are actually available to commanders, the CA unit and team selection process improves and contributes to an overall improved force performance since commanders do not have

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63A decision matrix is an evaluation tool that prioritizes a list of alternatives by weighing them against each criterion. 1=barely satisfies criterion; 2= partially satisfies criterion; 3=fully satisfies criterion.

to rely on “ad hoc” management of the CA force. This alternative potentially widens the CA competency gap by directing the commanders to discharge service members who do not comply with the directive. As a result, this alternative only partially meets this criterion.

Alternative 2 fully meets the criterion of enhancing the U.S. Army Reserve’s participation in whole-of-government planning efforts related to CA activities. This measure sets in motion a process that enables the service to obtain an accurate assessment of the functional expertise that is available for use in the planning stage of interagency operations. As reported by the DOD, the use and sharing of data between the military and USG in the planning and implementation stages facilitates R&S operations. In effect, this alternative contributes to meeting the national security priority of integrating military and civilian efforts in R&S operations.

**DECISION MATRIX**

<table>
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<th>Require CA personnel to apply for the Skill Identifiers</th>
<th>Improve the ability to identify the functional skills in the CA force</th>
<th>Close the CA capability gap</th>
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**ALTERNATIVE 3: Remodel the CASDb**

Alternative 3 fully meets the criterion of improving the ability of the U.S. Army Reserve to identify the actual level of functional expertise currently resident in the CA force. This alternative improves upon a tool that increases the extent to which the U.S. Army Reserve can capitalize on its members’ civilian-acquired skills. Inclusion of the skill identifiers into the database allows the service to assess the force-wide level of functional expertise. Given the top-down nature of the military, restoring commander emphasis and

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65 Ibid. p. 3.
67 1=barely satisfies criterion; 2= partially satisfies criterion; 3= fully satisfies criterion.
infusing this measure into the continuous training schedule will likely ensure that reporting requirements will be achieved and employer information is updated.

Alternative 3 partially meets the criterion of closing the U.S. Army Reserve’s CA capability gap. This measure helps close the capability gap by reconfiguring the database to better expose the strengths and weaknesses of the CA talent pool. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves reports, “to best use the limited manpower available in the reserve military forces to accomplish DOD’s mission, the strengths and weaknesses of that manpower must be accurately known.”  

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves reports, “to best use the limited manpower available in the reserve military forces to accomplish DOD’s mission, the strengths and weaknesses of that manpower must be accurately known.”  

Commands can use the remodeled database to harness the functional specialties that are already present in the CA force. As intense CA recruitment efforts are underway, this alternative enables commanders to target the specialized skills that are most needed to successfully execute R&S missions. 

As previously mentioned, meeting the CA recruitment requirements and goals is required to fully meet the criterion.

Alternative 3 fully meets the criterion of enhancing the U.S. Army Reserve’s participation in whole-of-government planning efforts. Readily available data on functional expertise improves the ability of commanders and other senior officials in the service to plan for interagency operations. The catalog of skills in the database allows the service to convey its potential contribution to impending missions to the USG agencies before the personnel are deployed. In effect, synchronization of CA activities among all parties involved can be achieved in a timelier manner with the use of this valuable tool.

**DECISION MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Improve the ability to identify the functional skills in the CA force</th>
<th>Close the CA capability gap</th>
<th>Enhance the participation in whole-of-government planning</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Remodel the CASDb</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>8</td>
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70 Ibid.


73 1=barely satisfies criterion; 2= partially satisfies criterion; 3=fully satisfies criterion.
CHAPTER VII: RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend the full implementation of Alternatives 1 and 3. I recommend implementing all provisions of Alternative 2 except for the requirement to discharge service members who fail to comply with the directive.

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74 1=barely satisfies criterion; 2= partially satisfies criterion; 3=fully satisfies criterion.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX I: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**Civil Affairs:** Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.\(^{75}\)

**Civil Affairs Operations:** Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.\(^{76}\)

**Civil-Military Operations:** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.\(^{77}\)

**Irregular Warfare:** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Irregular warfare encompasses stability operations, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency.\(^{78}\)

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\(^{76}\) Ibid

\(^{77}\) Ibid

APPENDIX II: NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 44

Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization

Introduction

The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States (U.S.) through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

Responsibilities of the Department of State

Need for Coordinated U.S. Efforts. To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.

Coordination. The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.

To achieve the objectives of this Directive, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the following functions and may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (“Coordinator”) to assist the Secretary to:

(1) Develop and approve strategies, with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, for reconstruction and stabilization activities directed towards foreign states at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife;

APPENDIX II CONTINUED

(2) Ensure program and policy coordination among Departments and Agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and other relevant assistance laws, as well as section 408 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and related Agencies and Appropriations Act, 2005, with respect to such states;

(3) Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate;

(4) Provide United States Government decision makers with detailed options for an integrated United States Government response in connection with specific reconstruction and stabilization operations including to recommend when to establish a limited-time PCC-level group to focus on a country or region facing major reconstruction and stabilization challenges;

(5) Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine;

(6) Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities with capabilities that can contribute to such efforts provided that the Secretary of the Treasury shall lead coordination with the international financial institutions and multilateral financing bodies and shall facilitate the Secretary of State's stabilization and reconstruction work with respect to these institutions and bodies;

(7) As appropriate, work with people and organizations, including in expatriate and foreign communities, with relevant ties, expertise, or knowledge related to countries in which the United States may conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities;

(8) Develop strategies to build partnership security capacity abroad and seek to maximize nongovernmental and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities;
(9) Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively;

(10) Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations;

(11) Resolve relevant policy, program, and funding disputes among United States Government Departments and Agencies with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, related to reconstruction and stabilization consistent with the Office of Management and Budget's budget and policy coordination functions; and

(12) When necessary, identify appropriate issues for resolution or action through the NSC interagency process in accordance with NSPD-1. Such issues would include the establishment of a PCC-level group as described in sub-paragraph (4) above.

**Coordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense**

The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.

Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be re-designated as transitions are required.
APPENDIX III: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 3000.05\textsuperscript{80}

STABILITY OPERATIONS

4. POLICY. It is Department of Defense policy that:

a. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The Department of Defense shall be prepared to:

(1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The magnitude of stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration.

(2) Support stability operations activities led by other U.S. Government departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “U.S. Government agencies”), foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, or when otherwise directed.

(3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities.

b. The Department shall have the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations activities to fulfill Department of Defense Component responsibilities under national and international law. Capabilities shall be compatible, through interoperable and complementary solutions, to those of other U.S. Government agencies and foreign governments and security forces to ensure that, when directed, the Department can:

(1) Establish civil security and civil control.

(2) Restore or provide essential services.

(3) Repair critical infrastructure.

APPENDIX III CONTINUED

(4) Provide humanitarian assistance.

c. Integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. The Department shall:

(1) Support the stability operations planning efforts of other U.S. Government agencies.

(2) Collaborate with other U.S. Government agencies and with foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector firms as appropriate to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations.

(3) Continue to support the development, implementation, and operations of civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unity of effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

d. The Department shall assist other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international governmental organizations in planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts, to include:

(1) Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society.

(2) Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.

(3) Strengthening governance and the rule of law.

(4) Fostering economic stability and development.

e. The Department of Defense Components shall explicitly address and integrate stability operations-related concepts and capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans.
APPENDIX IV: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 3000.07

IRREGULAR WARFARE (IW)

4. POLICY. It is Department of Defense policy to:

a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.

b. Improve Department of Defense proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.

d. Explicitly integrate concepts and capabilities relevant to IW across all Department of Defense activities including doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities; policy; analysis; exercises; experiments; and applicable strategies and plans.

e. Maintain capabilities and capacity so that the Department is as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare in order to ensure that, when directed, the Department can:

   (1) Identify and prevent or defeat irregular threats from state and non-state actors across operational areas and environments.

   (2) Extend U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces.

   (3) Train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces to operations elsewhere.

   (4) Through direct or indirect means, and on a large scale when required, support a foreign government or population threatened by irregular adversaries.

   (5) Create a safe, secure environment in fragile states and, if required, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure restoration, and humanitarian relief.

APPENDIX IV CONTINUED

(6) To meet Combatant Commander objectives, conduct other related activities abroad, including: strategic communication; information, psychological, civil-military, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations; and support to law enforcement.

g. Establish and sustain manpower authorizations, personnel policies, and organizational structures to provide sufficient capacity and expertise in both the Department of Defense civilian workforce and Military Services to conduct activities in support of IW.

h. Synchronize appropriate Department of Defense IW-related activities with the efforts of other U.S. Government agencies, foreign security partners, and selected international organizations by supporting:

(1) Collaborative policies, plans, and procedures, including collaborative training and exercises that promote interoperability, for steady-state and surge activities.

(2) Integrated civilian-military teams for steady-state and surge activities, and lead them if civilians are unable.

(3) Information strategies and operations to neutralize adversary propaganda and promote U.S. strategic interests.

(4) Exchange programs and rotational assignments that build DoD understanding of the functions and structures of other relevant organizations.

(5) Efforts to enhance information sharing, as appropriate, to increase situational awareness of irregular challenges.
APPENDIX V: THE ELEVEN SKILL IDENTIFIERS AWARDED BY THE U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL AT FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

Civil Defense Officer (Code 5Y): Identifies positions requiring analysis, planning, implementation, and management of indigenous emergency service assets in the preparation for or conduct of civil defense or disaster relief operations.

Qualifications

(1) Requires the completion of Federal Emergency Management Agency independent study instructions courses, which include the following:

- IS-1 Emergency Program Manager
- IS-22 Are You Ready? An In-Depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness
- IS-3 Radiological Emergency Management
- IS-5a An Introduction to Hazardous Material
- IS-7 A Citizen Guide to Disaster Assistance

Alternatively, requires the equivalent experience as a Regional Civil Defense Director, certification as a Certified Emergency through the International Association of Emergency Managers, or a degree in Emergency or Disaster Management through an accredited teaching institution.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.

82 Major Glenn H. Anderson, the current Directorate of Special Operations Proponency at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, provided the data regarding the descriptions, qualifications, and restrictions for each skill identifier.
APPENDIX V CONTINUED

**Economist (Code 6C):** Identifies positions requiring analysis, assessment, planning and implementation of economic, industrial, financial, business, and agricultural programs and policies to enhance the development of Allied/Host nations.

**Qualifications**

(1) Masters degree in economics, finance, international business, or business administration and/or a minimum of five years civilian experience in economics, banking, public finance, or foreign/domestic development or a related field.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponenty of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

**Restrictions**

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.

**Public Education Officer (Code 6D):** Identifies positions requiring the knowledge to evaluate current educational systems and provides guidance to foreign nation agencies responsible for the administration of the indigenous educational institutions.

**Qualifications**

(1) Requires a master degree in either education administration or education with and emphasis on school administration or vocational education; and/or five years civilian experience in either public or private school district administration, or state/national department of education activities.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponenty of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

**Restrictions**

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.
APPENDIX V CONTINUED

Civil Supply Officer (Code 6E): Identifies positions requiring knowledge in administration, storage, and distribution of consumer goods and commodities to the indigenous population of an area of operations. Surveys local availability of food and supplies from military and other agencies for use by the local population. Assists in identifying and acquiring local resources for use by the tactical commander.

Qualifications

(1) Requires a bachelor degree in economics or business administration emphasizing supply management and distribution, and/or five years experience in the management of food or product distribution systems.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.

Transportation Officer (Code 6F): Identifies positions requiring identification, categorization, rehabilitation, mobilization, development, and operation of civilian transport assets and facilities in support of Civil-Military Operations.

Qualifications

(1) Bachelor degree in civil engineering or transportation; or, equivalent experience in the management or design of transportation systems either public or private; and/or three years experience in the development of plans and policy at the state or national Department of Transportation level.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.
APPENDIX V CONTINUED

Public Facilities Officer (Code 6G): Identifies positions requiring identification, assessment of capability, rehabilitation, development, and operational supervision of Public Works and Utilities in the conduct of civil-military operations.

Qualifications

(1) Bachelor degree in either civil, electrical, mechanical, waste, or water management engineering, and/or five years experience in either management, design, or operation of public or private works and utilities. Officers holding a professional engineering license in any discipline are considered uniquely qualified.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.

Public Safety Officer (Code 6H): Identifies positions requiring knowledge to provide advice, assistance, supervision, and control in the development, rehabilitation, sustainment of indigenous police administration, fire protection, penal institutions, and emergency rescue services.

Qualifications

(1) Bachelor degree in criminology, fire science, police science, corrections management, or public administration and/or three years practical experience in a supervisory or management position in a government related public safety field or equivalent private industry position.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.
APPENDIX V CONTINUED

Public Communication Officer (Code 6R): Identifies positions requiring knowledge in telecommunications engineering, network architecture and technical expertise in the identification, assessment of capability, rehabilitation, systems analysis, development planning, and operational oversight/supervision of indigenous public and private communications technologies, assets and facilities during the conduct of civil-military operations.

Qualifications

(1) Bachelor degree in either Electronic or Electrical Engineering, communications management, or computer science and/or five years civilian experience in either engineering or management in a related public or private communications position to include radio, television, postal service or automated data processing network.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.

Agricultural Officer (Code 6U): Identifies positions requiring knowledge in civilian production, processing, storage, and distribution of food, fiber, and wood products, and for the development and management of resources essential to these activities. Categories of agricultural production include livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber, and forestry products.

Qualifications

(1) Bachelor degree in an agricultural discipline and/or five years experience in an agricultural related profession, preferably in a County/State Agricultural Extension position or Federal Department of Agriculture.

(2) Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.
Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.

**Cultural Affairs Officer (Code 6V):** Identifies positions requiring knowledge in evaluating and preserving socio-religious arts, artifacts, monuments, shrines and other physical manifestations of the culture and the institution of the people in the area of operations.

**Qualifications**

1. Requires professional knowledge or experience with the ethnography, culture, sociology, institutions, and religious heritage of the people of the areas of assignment or potential assignment.

2. Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.

**Archivist (Code 6W):** Identifies positions requiring identification, recovery, appraisal safe-guarding and disposal of official and semiofficial public documents and records relating to persons, groups, institutions, and property interests that impact on the pursuit of U.S. National Policy objectives in a military area of operations.

**Qualifications**

1. Requires a baccalaureate degree in library science, political science, or history, from an accredited college or university, and/or five years equivalent practical training in one or more of such fields.

2. Validation of qualifications will be made by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.
APPENDIX V CONTINUED

Restrictions

For use with any area of concentration (all components) in grades Corporal through Colonel.
APPENDIX VI: INTERVIEW SUMMARIES

Captain Nicholas Turza, U.S. Army
January 4, 2011

In the U.S. Army, all active duty CA personnel are generalists. In the U.S. Army Reserve, CA functional specialists are usually higher up in rank and work in a bureaucratic environment. However, functional specialists are usually not a luxury that Commanders have. A CA company usually consists of four to five teams, and each team has four to five people. Generally, teams are not handpicked, and issue areas are not necessarily relevant for the mission at hand.

Colonel Jeff Williams, U.S. Army Reserve
January 9, 2011

Overall, CA forces are running out of people. CA leadership is constantly recruiting to meet increased demand. The Department of Defense has resorted to relocating people from other units to CA units. CA personnel are required to take a basic nine week training course. This course is designed for generalists, with some attention to cultural sensitivity issues. Each commanding unit in the U.S. Army Reserve recruits for their own unit based upon their needs.

Reservists are classified as a generalist or a specialist based upon their civilian skills. There are eleven skill identifiers available to CA officers for application. A CA officer’s job in the U.S. Army Reserve is not required to match the officer’s civilian job. Ideally, a Commander prefers for the civilian skills to match up with the military skills.

The U.S. Army Reserve tracks its service members’ current civilian jobs. However, service members do not always participate or accurately update their profile to reflect a new occupation and its associated civilian skills. For example, CA service members who are on their third or fourth tour may say, “I’m done” because they are burnt out. Many of these service members feel like there is no incentive to update their newly acquired skills accurately—that way they are not heavily coveted by the Commander.

Further, each Commander has a Commander’s Book to track and update the civilian skills of the service members in the unit. Commanders know the service members in their unit at personal level. The tracking of civilian skills seems like a budget issue.
APPENDIX VI CONTINUED

Monica Davis, Office of Civilian Response, U.S. Agency for International Aid  
January 20, 2011

USAID is one of eight civilian U.S. government agencies that support members of the Civilian Response Corps. There are 135 active members, and over 1,000 standby members in the Civilian Response Corps. Active members are required to take eight weeks of training per year, and standby members are required to take two weeks of training per year. Also, there are Response Corps Coordinators stationed at each agency.

The Office of Civilian Response tracks the skill set of the members via the Deployment Tracking System Database, which is web-based. Members of the Civilian Response Corps log-in and update their skill set, and members are limited to selecting five skills. The Office of Civilian Response does not have a standard operating procedure with respect to validating the actual level of expertise of the members. Rather, the members are vetted through an interview process.

Major Timothy Popek, U.S. Army Reserve  
January 22, 2011

Functional specialists are mainly at the brigade and command level in CA. Prior to 2007, there were two CA companies at the battalion level. One company was direct support to the maneuver unit and the other was called general support—which is where the functional specialists were located. The functional specialists were broken down into teams like Civil Defense, Public Health, etcetera.

In 2007, the Reserve Component CA battalions were re-designated as generalist bodies. As a result, there were no functionalist specialist teams. Mr. Popek guesses that the Active Component began doing more counter-insurgency operations and felt like CA personnel were no longer needed.

Prior to the 2003 Iraqi invasion, the U.S. Army Reserve was approximately at 200% strength on the roster. After multiple deployments, most CA officers found that they could not maintain their professional civilian careers and their military careers. Many officers began to resign or retire from their service positions, thereby eroding the CA talent pool.

Tracking the civilian skills takes place at the unit level. Traditionally, someone in the Operations Section will have service members fill out their job skills on a spreadsheet that can be referred to later.
APPENDIX VI CONTINUED

Anonymous Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve
February 28, 2011 and March 8, 2011

There are two facets to the problem of tracking civilian skills. First, the U.S. Army Reserve established eleven skill identifiers to track certain civilian skills. The eleven CA skill identifiers fall under six major categories of CA functions. The major challenge is that the qualifications for the skill identifiers are broad. Also, some skill identifiers have low standards and are outdated. Thus, the idea of skill identifiers can be meaningless. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina determines the qualifications for the eleven skill identifiers and issues the skill identifiers to the service members.

Second, there is a lack of emphasis on applying for skill identifiers at the Commander level. Hardly anyone applies for the skill identifiers. However, the Commanders know the civilian jobs of his or her subordinates. An individual CA company is about thirty-two people, and there are no functional specialty teams.

Often, the problem is that service members want to have a different occupation, thereby making them more marketable in their civilian profession. The U.S. Army may need to offer incentives to service members for their skill set to defray the costs of professional development that is currently paid by the U.S. Army Reserve. If a bonus is paid, the service member should be under some sort of service obligation requirement in return.

Also, the eleven skill identifiers do not give the leadership the ability to assign the correct people at the appropriate level. The U.S. Army Reserve may need to distinguish the way skill identifiers are written. For example, there should be three levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) awarded for each skill identifier to reflect the service member’s level of competence. Likewise, the U.S. Army Reserve needs to study and determine the skills that are truly needed for the future, update the civilian acquired skills database to conform to these changes, and ensure that people are applying for the skill identifiers.

CA generalists are currently at the brigade level. The functional specialists are at the battalion headquarters, and they operate as a team whose role is to move between companies to assist them with needed skills. The team of functional specialists rotates around four companies. Lastly, there is a lot of force structure being used, and the leadership can’t limit the positions to only those with experience.