Economic Voting and Regionalism in South Korea:

A Statistical Analysis of the 2007 Presidential Election

by

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William Keech

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University

2011
ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Although economic voting is a common phenomenon in most democracies, voters in young democracies do not necessarily vote based on the economy because at the early stage of democratization, the salience of political issues, regarding transition, overwhelms economic issues. Similarly, economic voting has not been observed in newly democratized South Korea since its first meaningful election in 1987. The absence of economic voting in Korea has widely been attributed to the overriding effect of regionalism, the phenomenon in which Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives vote for candidates born in their provinces. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that economic voting recently gained strength with 1) the consolidation of Korean democracy and 2) the traumatic experience of the IMF. In the meantime, the pre-democratic resource allocation political division, regionalism, has developed into the ideologies of native Jeolla and Gyeongsang voters today; liberal Jeolla natives tend to value distributive justice and freedom of speech, while conservative Gyeongsang natives value economic growth and security.

To support this theory, the study provides empirical evidence for the rise of economic voting in Korea. The results of the empirical analysis are fourfold. First, a time series regression model shows that economic voting in Korea is not observed over time at the macro level. Yet, a correlation analysis shows that economic indicators have stronger relationships with recent presidential electoral outcomes. Second, a
multinomial logistic regression model shows that both economic voting and regionalism are statistically significant at the micro level. Third, an estimated effect analysis of the same data shows that the variables in the order of the largest marginal effect on the electoral outcome are: party identification, economic voting, and regionalism. Although the overall impact of economic voting exceeds that of regionalism, the result is contrary among Jeolla natives. Finally, a subset analysis shows that Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives vote economically whereas those born elsewhere vote ideologically. This suggests that the regional division has become an ideological division among Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives. Taking all the results into consideration, both economic and democracy issues in Korea seem to have become valence issues, as in other consolidated democracies.
Dedication

I thank God for giving me the privilege to have been able to interact with distinguished faculty members and brilliant students on the beautiful Duke campus. I feel that I am truly lucky to be able to continue my Ph.D. work at Duke. I am greatly indebted to Prof. Emerson Niou who has provided me academic advice, encouraging words and vision for my career as an academic. Comments and guidance from Prof. Sunshine Hillygus and Prof. William Keech were also indispensable for this project. I also appreciate helpful comments from Maria Parker, Sam Kwon, and Sandra Ley. Although not involved in this project, I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Joseph Grieco and Prof. Bahar Leventoglu for having provided academic guidance and support during my training in the master’s program. Finally, I am grateful to my family for having given me unconditional support. Without their prayers, I might have given up my studies long ago. Despite valuable contributions from many I mentioned above, I admit that there is much more work to be done for this project, which I plan to continue to undertake in my Ph.D. studies.
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1. Introduction

Democracy is so central a topic in the field of political science. Scholars from Aristotle to Dahl have asked questions about how to improve accountability in democratic institutions. Along the same lines, a strand of literature in political behavior has especially devoted its focus to the electoral process. As a result, the process by which voters decide their favorite candidates has been explained by scholars of electoral behavior in different terms. For example, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) claim that voters’ decisions are heavily influenced by the party identification built through socialization. Other scholars, such as Downs (1967) or Black (1947), emphasize candidates’ issue positions, claiming that voters assess their proximity to the issue position of each candidate. And then some scholars, such as Fiorina (1981) and more recently Vavreck (2009), argue that voters make decisions in terms of their economic interests, whether the interests are national or personal. In fact, there is a general consensus that this behavior of economic voting is common in most democratic countries because prosperity has a positive value.

Interestingly, however, this pattern has not necessarily been the case in South Korea (Lee, 1998; Cho 2000). According to Lee (1998), since democratization, regionalism has been the “most crucial factor in both the presidential and the congressional elections in Korea” because no other political ideologies could appeal to the public than the pre-democratization regionalist politics from the Park Junghee era.
Regionalism is believed to have emerged in the 1970s and developed through 1980s due to the policies of the last pre-democratic authoritarian leaders, Park Junghee and Chun Doohwan: favorable resource allocations to their birthplace, Kyungsang province, and the conduct of massive killings to quell democratic movement in Jeolla province (Brown and Kim 2001, 4; Kwon 2004, 548-555). The antagonism between the two provinces grew and political leaders in Korea have become the “favorite sons” of regional voters even after democratization.

Scholars in 1990s expected that economic voting would gradually become the primary factor in explaining the Korean voting behavior as democracy stabilizes (Wade and Kang 1990, 45). Several news media have reported that the economy has become the most significant factor in voting decisions, especially in the 2007 presidential election (Choe 2007). Yet this popular claim has not been substantiated in academia.

Hence, to fill this gap, this paper aims to provide a theoretical foundation as well as empirical evidence for the rise of economic voting in Korea. To that end, this study shows the following four results. First, economic voting at the macro level seems to have gained strength recently. Second, economic voting, in fact, is statistically significant in the 2007 election data, as is regionalism. Third, the impact of economic voting on the electoral outcome exceeds that of regionalism. Finally, regionalism fills the absence of ideological voting among Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives, suggesting that regionalism
may not be groundless irrational behavior – regionalism indeed developed into ideologies.

To support these claims, the paper begins by reviewing the established literature on economic voting and the current debate on economic voting in Korea. In the ensuing section, the following four tests are presented: 1) economic voting at the macro level, 2) economic voting at the micro level, 3) the estimated effect analysis and 4) subset analysis. A discussion section concludes that South Korea has followed a path of democratic consolidation that other young democracies have taken.
2. Literature Review

Before testing whether Koreans are economic voters, I contextualize the issue at hand and theoretically justify my model by reviewing four strands of literature. Moving from the general to the specific, I start by discussing definitions and types of economic voting and criteria under which economic voting is observed. I then review case studies from both western and young democracies to specify the Korean economic voting model. After introducing the history of Korean politics and regionalism, I focus on the changed electorate and background information of the 2007 presidential election.

2.1 Economic Voting

Economic voting is defined as a phenomenon in which voters choose whom they consider the most economically competent candidates. The theory makes two assumptions. First, prosperity has a positive value. Second, voters make rational choices. Simply put, people reelect the incumbent when they are economically well off, and punish the incumbent when they face economic situations that they do not welcome (Fiorina 1981, 61).\(^1\) Despite its simplicity, economic voting is often heterogeneous in its

\(^1\) Recent scholarship suggests that voters not only punish and reward the incumbent depending on their economic interest, but also assess each candidate’s abilities. Because voters think ahead and elect the candidate they think will deliver prosperity, this type of voting is referred as prospective economic voting whereas the punishing the incompetent incumbent is called retrospective economic voting. For instance, Erikson et al. argue that the US electorate “efficiently combines its knowledge of the current economy with its informed expectation of economic change (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2000, 259).” However because prospective voting is a more sophisticated version, the pattern is not observed in every country. Also, the election survey data at hand does include prospective voting questions. Thus, in this study, the scope of economic voting is limited to retrospective type.
applications because every voter’s economic interest may differ (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007, 523). To account for the variances among voters, scholars classify economic voting into two categories: sociotropic and egotropic voting. Sociotropic voting refers to a phenomenon in which voters elect their favorite candidates based on national interests, whereas in egotropic voting voters cast their ballots according to their own financial interest.

Despite the differences in the two types of economic voting, the scholarly community formed a consensus that either can occur when three conditions are fulfilled: 1) clarity in economic responsibility, 2) voter rationality and 3) political efficacy or electoral accountability. The rationale behind each necessary condition is explained in order.

First, the responsibility for the economic situation must be clear. Thus, voters under coalition governments, proportional electoral systems, and parliamentary systems are less likely to be economic voters because they have greater difficulty collecting information about who is responsible for the current economic situation (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2007). Samuels (2004)’ study on Latin American elections supports this claim by revealing that institutions of presidentialism strengthen economic voting. In “Economic Voting and Political Context: A Comparative Perspective,” Anderson (2000) aptly explains this clarity of responsibility thesis. “Taken together,

---

2 This is also known as pocketbook voting.
these findings suggest that voters’ ability to express discontent with economic performance is enhanced when accountability is simple” (Anderson 2000, 168).

A second conditional factor under which economic voting is observed is voter rationality. The entire economic voting theory assumes that voters are responsible, rational, and interest seeking. Duch and Stevenson define rational voters as those who “maximize their utility by voting for the most competent economic managers” (Duch and Stevenson 2008). Thus, rational voters cast their ballots for economic benefits such as low inflation, low unemployment, and high GDP growth (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981).

A final precondition for economic voting is political efficacy. The economic voting theory holds that elections function as a market in which voters and politicians effectively exchange interests (Downs 1957). Since voting takes effort, without political efficacy, voters have no incentive to express their political opinions. Thus, it is natural to assume that when there is no functioning democracy, people do not necessarily vote as they intend. For example, in an autocracy, voters are coerced to cast ballots in a certain way, in which case, analyzing vote components would be meaningless.

In sum, for economic voting to work, voters must be able to collect information, be rational, and believe that sanctioning the government through elections is a viable option for them. These conditions partly explain some of the variances in different countries, which will be further explored in the next section. By reviewing case studies
below, I attempt to seek explications for different patterns and strength in economic voting, and specify variables for the 2007 Korean presidential election model.

**2.2 Case Studies: Economic Voting in Western Democracies and Young Democracies**

Many scholars agree that, economic voting is widely observed in most democracies. For example, in “From Argentina to Zambia: A World-Wide Test of Economic Voting,” Wilkin Haller, and Norpoth (1997) show that voters around the world practice a standard form of economic voting, after controlling for political systems, such as parliamentarianism or presidentialism. Besides comparative studies across the world, many case studies provide further evidence supporting the same conclusion. The most studied cases are the United States, Great Britain, and France (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007, 521).

According to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, the model generally used in the US case is:

\[ \text{Vote} = \text{economics} + \text{party identification} + \text{other issues} + \text{socioeconomic status} \]

Scholars such as Alvarez and Nagler (1995; 1998) and Norpoth (2004) adopted this model and find that economic voting in the US is consistently observed. For example, with this specification, Alvarez and Nagler (1995; 1998) find the importance of the economy was about the same to American voters in the 1992 and the 1996 presidential elections. Reaching a similar conclusion, Norpoth (2004) argues that despite the incumbent party’s loss after a booming economy, the economy was still an important
issue in the 2000 election. The specification of these US case studies hints that based on political context of the election year, salient issues can be judiciously added to the model.

To the specification above, some vigorous studies of British elections add a variable; the impact of local context on national retrospective voting (McAllister and Studlar 1992; Johnston, Pattie, Dorling, MacAllister, Tunstall and Rossiter 2000). In an exploration of a geographical pattern in the electoral outcome, scholars find that when the voter’s neighborhood has a high unemployment rate, the likelihood of positive evaluation of the national economy is much lower. These British studies which control for the impact of regional differences are particularly pertinent to this study, because voters favoring certain candidates based on a geographic reason are observed in South Korea as well.

In studies of French elections, scholars control for religiosity and class. A widely agreed upon baseline specification of the vote choice in French national elections is

\[
\text{Vote} = \text{economics} + \text{left-right ideology} + \text{religiosity} + \text{class}
\]

In the French model, two variables are added to reflect political cleavages in France: religiosity and class. Taking account for these two factors seems justified given the political context that some nationwide political parties pursue Trotskyism (e.g. New Anti-capitalist Party and Workers’ Struggle) and Christian democracy (e.g. New Centre). Lewis-Beck (1993, 4) justifies his control of class by citing his analysis of the Euro-
barometer data. He reports that “class had a moderate relationship with vote intention” and the effect of class persists with consistent correlation coefficient of 0.20 over decades. Regarding the religion variable, Michelat and Simon (1977, 159) find a robust relationship between religiosity and vote.

These case studies of Western democracies show that specification of the economic voting model can vary according to national political context. Even with these differences, however, economic voting is generally measured after controlling for 1) political predisposition such as party identification and ideology, 2) voter’s positions on salient political issues, and 3) political cleavages such as socioeconomic status or class.

Yet these specifications do not yield the same result in transitional countries where democratization has just begun -- economic voting is often not observed in transitional societies. The absence of economic voting in young democracies may be attributed to two factors. First, these democratizing countries, sometimes, do not meet the preconditions for economic voting. Because transitional societies may suffer from economic disparity or inflation caused by hasty transition, the incumbent may not be responsible for the economic situation. Moreover, citizens who have never been exposed to democracy are less likely to have trust in their new democratic system (Jhee 2006, 2). These factors imply that newly democratized countries may lack the essential components for economic voting to occur: clarity of responsibility and political efficacy.
Second, scholars show that economic issues are not necessarily a primary concern in transitional societies even if these young democracies meet the preconditions for economic voting (Benton 2005; Duch 2001; Harper 2000). According to these scholars, economic issues start gaining public attention once a new democratic regime is consolidated, because during the transitional period, other political issues such as the pace of shift to a new society or power-sharing processes, may be more salient. This relationship between economic voting and democratic consolidation has been systematically studied in a comparative setting by Jhee (2006). After analyzing data from 70 young democracies, he provides evidence that the age of democracy mediates economic voting. Jhee also finds that “electoral competition in transitional societies is centered on issues about transforming the political regime” (Jhee 2006, 6). Additionally, Lopez de Nava (2004)’s study offers a consistent conclusion that extensive democratic experience tends to promote economic voting.

These studies of young democracies are particularly illuminating because the results of these consolidating democracies may be consistent with the Korean case. Two decades have passed since Korea became democratized. Nonetheless, economic voting has still not been observed. Yet, if the 2007 presidential election data shows that economic voting started to occur, Korea also follows the democratic path that other young democracies have taken, which confirms that economic issues gain salience once a democratic regime is consolidated. Similar to the 70 democracies that Jhee (2006)
analyzed, it is likely that the Korean electorate may also have been divided around the transformation issues such as the speed of transition. To examine the plausibility of this theory, a detailed description of Korean politics in the context of economic voting will be provided in the next section.

2.3 The History of South Korean Politics and Regionalism

By exploring economic voting models in other democracies, the previous section discusses how a Korean economic voting model should be specified. Models with similar specifications were used in previous studies examining Korean elections (Lee, 1998, 83; Cho 2000) However, the statistical models that demonstrated the existence of economic voting in other democracies did not yield the same results in the Korean case. For example, in an analysis of the 1992 presidential election, Kim (1993) concludes that economic issues did not affect vote decisions. In addition, Pak (1993) also concludes that the explanatory power of economic voting in the same election was at best marginal.

Ironically, South Korea meets all the criteria for economic voting to occur -- clarity of responsibility, voter rationality, and political efficacy. The country has presidentialism with effectively two political parties, which clarifies the responsibility for national economic performance. Although South Korea is notorious for having a complicated history of 141 political parties since 1963 and numerous realignments, it has two de facto parties, one conservative and one liberal. Table 1 shows a brief history of the two major Korean political parties. Although there have been minor changes and
mergers, Koreans generally view the current United Democratic National Party (UDNP)\(^3\) to be liberal, to stem from the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) of the late 1980s, and to have its base in Jeolla province. Similarly, Koreans view the current Grand National Party (GNP)\(^4\) to be conservative, stemming from the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) of the pre-democratic era, with its stronghold in Gyeongsang province. Hence, even with a history of the complicated realignments of political parties, Korean voters can easily identify a party or a candidate to blame for the current national economic situation.

Furthermore, South Korea boasts the highest tertiary education rate among the OECD countries with close to 100 percent literacy (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2010). Although high education rate does not necessarily equal rationality, the populace seems no less rational than other democracies.

Needless to say, South Korean voters have political efficacy under a functioning democracy. The country has been recorded as democratic by Freedom House since 1987, when the first meaningful election took place (Country Report: South Korea 2010). The citizens earned democracy through a bottom up process, fighting for freedom. This history of the Korean democratization process shows Korean citizens’ commitment to democracy. Therefore, it is justifiable to say that voters believe that they have access to

\(^3\) UDNP is also known as Democratic Party or Minjoo Party.
\(^4\) GNP is also known as Hannara Party.
politics through elections. All of these facts indicate that Korea meets the preconditions for economic voting. Yet, it has not been observed in South Korea since its democratization in 1987 (Lee, 1998, 83; Cho 2000; Kim 1993).

Table 1: Simplified History of Political Parties in South Korea (1987 – 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liberal (Jeolla)</th>
<th>Conservative (Gyeongsang)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>New Korean Democratic Party</td>
<td>Democratic Justice Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Democratic Reunification Party</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Democratic Reunification Party</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal Party</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>Democratic Reunification Party</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>New Korea Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>New Korea Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>New Korea Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>New Korea Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>National Congress for New Politics</td>
<td>National Congress for New Politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>National Congress for New Politics</td>
<td>National Congress for New Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Our Open Party</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Our Open Party</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>United New Democratic Party</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>United New Democratic Party</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>United New Democratic Party</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Number in Bold - Election Year, Gray Area - Party in Power

5 OOP is also known as Uri Party
Scholars often attribute the absence of economic voting in Korea to the overriding effect of regionalism: people born in Jeolla province tend to vote for candidates born in Jeolla and those born in Gyeongsang province tend to vote for candidates born in Gyeongsang. The population of these two provinces constitutes nearly 40 percent of the entire Korean population. Thus, Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives can effectively sway the national electoral outcome by voting for their “favorite sons.” It should also be noted that whenever a candidate born in Gyeongsang ran, no candidate

*Note: 1: Gwangju, 2: Daegu, 3: Busan, 4: Wulsan

Figure 1: Map of South Korea

* Figure 1 shows the administrative divisions in South Korea. Jeolla (Southern and Northern) and Gyeongsang (Southern and Northern) are four of the eight provinces in Korea. Jeolla is located on the west coast and Gyeongsang is located on the east coast of South Korea. The population of Jeolla (including Gwangju) composes 10.25 percent and Gyeongsang (including Daegu, Busan and Wulsan) composes 26.27 percent of the entire population (Korea National Census 2010).
from another region won the presidential election; the two terms served by liberal candidates were the only times without any conservative Gyeongsang native candidates in the presidential election.

This interesting phenomenon, that the economy does not matter but regionalism does, has been studied by several scholars. For example, Kim’s study (1993) concludes that in the 1992 presidential election, the effect of regionalism was so dominant that economic issues did not affect vote decisions, and therefore evaluation of competence of candidates or parties did not have a causal relationship with voting behavior (Kim 1993). In addition, Pak’s study (1993) supports the same conclusion: in the 1992 presidential election, the economy did not matter, but regionalism did. Although candidate Kim Youngsam had significantly more support from those who cared about the inflation rate, Pak’s study shows that this effect faded out after controlling for regionalism.

Furthermore, Lee (1998) claims, since democratization, regionalism has been the “most crucial factor in both the presidential and the congressional elections in Korea” because no political ideologies, other than the pre-democratic regionalist politics, could appeal to the public (Lee 1998, 83).

At this point, it is natural to suspect that regionalism is a smaller scale version of economic voting. It is possible that people vote for their favorite son, believing that he will benefit their local economy. In fact, a recent scholarly work claims that the current phenomenon of the “regionalist voting pattern is not from the old political rivalry but
from the politics of resource allocation for the region” (Browne and Kim 2003, 4).

Browne and Kim hypothesize that regionalism may be a manifestation of economic voting, but at a different level of economic calculation -- provincial economic interest rather than national economic interest.

However, the data at hand shows the contrary. Among the Jeolla natives who left their hometowns, 44 percent of the respondents voted for Jung, Jeolla’s favorite son. This rate is 25 percent higher than the vote received from those born everywhere else. Likewise, Gyeongsang natives who left Gyeongsang also show 12 percent higher support for Lee, Gyeongsang’s favorite son, compared to the voters from other regions.

Furthermore, these results are consistent with Lee’s findings (1997). He demonstrates that birthplace better explains Korean’s overall electoral behavior than voter’s current residential area; even if voters had left their hometowns, they still support the candidate born in their home provinces. He also asserts that the geographical division in the electorate does not reflect differences in socio-economic development. Lee points out that the developmental or economic difference between Jeolla and Gyeongsang are not as great as the difference between greater Seoul and other regions. Therefore, regionalism seems to be much more than just a manifestation of economic voting at a regional level.

Regionalism is widely believed to have emerged in the 1970s and developed through the 1980s (Kwon 2004, 548). Although the last pre-democratic authoritarian
leaders, Park Junghee (presidency: 1963-79) and Chun Doohwan (presidency: 1980-88), were dictators who manipulated elections, they still had incentives to be popular. To do so they chose to appeal to the group identity of the most heavily populated province: Gyeongsang, which happened to be their birthplace. They adopted several policies to favorably allocate resources to Gyeongsang province. In response to these discriminatory policies, Jeolla natives initiated the democratic movement in South Korea because they wanted to be able to complain without the fear of retribution and be treated equally. To defuse the protest, the authoritarian government ran over the Jeolla protesters with tanks. The scale of the protest grew, becoming a nationwide democratic movement. Given this historical background, most scholars attribute regionalism to Park’s and Chun’s policies (Browne and Kim 2001, 4; Kwon 2004, 555).

Furthermore, this study conjectures that regionalism was exacerbated without alleviation because South Korea lacked a systematic outlet for regionalist voters. Until 1995, there were no meaningful gubernatorial elections. Although there were a few elections during the authoritarian period, these elections, including local ones, were not meaningful (Billet 1990, 300; Lee 1998, 635). Even those local elections were abandoned for three decades. They were only revived in June 1995, long after Korea became democratic (Kim 2010, 12-15). In the absence of any other outlet for regional concerns,

\[\text{\footnote{Although there is no universally accepted death toll for the 1980 Gwangju Uprising, it has been reported that the death toll was in the 1000 to 2000 range (Plunk 1985, 5)}}\]
the only way that voters could influence their local politics was through presidential elections. Hence, regional sentiment remained strong.

Regionalism later became a symbol of the old regime versus new regime debate, autocracy (Gyeongsang) versus democracy (Jeolla). The people of Jeolla, who were long discriminated against under the authoritarian regimes, tend to value freedom of speech, democracy, and distributive justice. On the other hand, Gyeongsang natives value national security and governmental intervention, which they believe facilitates economic growth because they were allocated economic benefits by the authoritarian presidents, Park and Chun. As previously discussed, the electoral division between the old and new regimes is commonly observed in transitional societies. If regionalism in Korea is a debate about democratic transition, the question is when the new phase arrives because that is when people start voting based on issues other than democracy.

Scholars in the 1990s expected that economic voting would gradually become the primary factor in explaining Korean voting behavior once democracy stabilized (Wade and Kang 1990, 45). However, even recent studies show that economic voting still has not become statistically significant. For example, Jhee and Shin analyzed the 2002 presidential election data and concluded that economic voting did not have significant explanatory power (Jhee and Shin 2007, 56). The debate in academia reached a consensus that it still is regionalism, rather than economic calculation, that prevails in the electorate’s mind.
Meanwhile, several news media reported that the economy became the most important factor in the electorate’s decision in the 2007 presidential election (Choe 2007; Koo 2007). In fact, the President elect Lee’s campaign slogan was “economy president.” To substantiate this popular claim, I introduce background information regarding the 2007 election and those news media reports in detail to show how the 2007 election was indeed different.

### 2.4 The Changed Electorate: the 2007 Presidential Election

The 2007 election was different. For the first time in the history of Korean elections, the strategy of appealing to voters’ economic interests worked. Lee, winner of the 2007 election, was not the first candidate whose main campaign theme was the economy. For example, in the 1992 election, a former Hyundai CEO, Jung Juyoung, tried to appeal to the public by portraying himself as an experienced economic manager. Nevertheless, Jung ended up with a mere 10 percent of the vote. 15 years later, the candidate Lee with the same background, a former Hyundai CEO, received the overwhelming majority of votes.

Then, it is of interest to learn what changed the Korean electorate over the past 15 years. The first possible answer can be found in the literature on young democracies. As discussed previously, the established literature shows democratic consolidation tends to promote economic voting. During the early transitional period, however, economic issues are often overshadowed by political issues that are related to the social
transformation. Later, as the democratic institution is consolidated, political issues become less salient while economic issues gain salience.

Inspired by these studies, I first theorize that economic issues became central in Korea because many critical political issues settled down. These political issues, which were primary in earlier presidential elections, mostly centered on promoting democracy. For example, the winner of the 1987 election, Roh Taewoo, promised to promote freedom of speech, self-governance at the gubernatorial level, and diplomatic relations with North Korea (Hahm 2001, 95). Kim Youngsam, the runner-up, and Kim Daejung, who came third in the same election, were the two candidates who fought for democracy and their main campaign theme was about establishing democracy. In the next election, in 1992, the elected Kim Youngsam’s campaign slogan was “New Korea” and his main public pledges were promoting minority rights, introducing transparency in governance, and implementing local elections.

After a decade of democratization, South Korea became a fully functioning democracy. Consequently, the democracy agenda inevitably started to become antiquated. Thus, economic issues that were traditionally considered to be less important moved to the spotlight. This trend is reflected in the change of the

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8 In that election, because Roh was not a Condorcet winner, it is also worth noting other candidates’ campaign pledges. It is commonly accepted that Roh Taewoo was elected because voters’ support was split between the two other candidates, Kim Daejung and Kim Youngsam, who once allied for pushing democratization and then disassociated from each other, branching two different political parties right before the 1987 election. People widely believe that Roh would not have been elected if either Kim Daejung or Kim Youngsam had quit the race (Niou 2001, 221).
presidential election campaign rhetoric starting in the late 1990s. For example, Kim Daejung, who won the 1997 election, made the unprecedented move of stressing the importance of economic issues as he pledged to save the economy from the IMF\textsuperscript{9} crisis. Although his campaign did not solely focus on economic issues, it clearly targeted the panicked public who were reading about the beginning of the IMF era every day. Kim’s successor, Roh Mu-hyun did not directly campaign in economic terms, but his pledge to promote distributive justice and welfare for the middle class is within the scope of economic issues.\textsuperscript{10}

Indeed, since the late 1990s, both democratic freedom and economic stability seem to have become valence issues. As long as the people are guaranteed political freedom and economic stability without alarming incidents indicating deprivation of either, the public seems to be content. However, once Koreans feel that they are deprived of either political freedom or economic stability, they start reacting by voting out the incumbent party or demonstrating on the streets.

This observation is supported by an ex post analysis of Lee’s approval rating (2008 to present). With regard to the political issues, one need not look further than the beef protests, which dropped Lee’s approval rating to his lowest at 17 percent. Unhappy with Lee’s decision to open the Korean beef market to the US, some members of the

\textsuperscript{9} It is also known as the Asian Crisis of 1997.
\textsuperscript{10} Political issues, however, were also an important, if not a primary, part of Roh’s campaign discourse. He promised to condemn “the old politics,” referring to corruption and hierarchy.
public started to protest Lee’s policy of reinstating the US beef import without legal authorizations. The Lee administration responded to these unauthorized street protests with his zero-tolerance policy approving the police’s use of liquid tear gas to protesters (Choe 2008). After several reports about police brutality and detainment of demonstrators, the protest grew considerably in size and started to violently oppose President Lee’s stance on the opening of the Korean beef market. About 3 million people gathered all across Korea for a period over a hundred days, calling Lee a dictator (Yunhap News 2010). The protest ended only after Lee formally apologized for his disregard for the public’s opinion and promised to renegotiate the US beef import deal. This incident, which at heart was about preserving democracy, shows that the Korean public can panic when they feel that democracy is being taken away.

No longer limited to the issues of preserving democracy, presidential approval ratings are also affected by economic issues. The fluctuations in Lee Myungbak’s overall approval rating suggest that the public’s support for Lee coincides with its positive perception of the national economy (Park 2011). Furthermore, many political analysts believe that Lee’s failure to control the inflation rate caused the GNP’s loss in the by-election of 2011 and Lee’s low approval rating during the period (Kim 2011). The media claim that the former President Roh Moohyun’s lowest approval rating was also caused by the public’s negative perception of the economy. The political hero who had pledged
to promote freedom of speech and egalitarianism was not popular any longer due to the high unemployment rate and the sluggish real estate market (Ka and No 2010, 71).

Besides the consolidation of democracy, another factor promoted economic voting in Korea -- the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997, also known as the IMF. The harrowing experience of the IMF taught Koreans the misery of an economic recession that can take away financial stability, job security, and even family members. During the IMF, there was a drastic increase in the divorce rate as well as the suicide rate, both of which had a strong correlation with the unemployment rate (Bang and Jang 2003; Oh, Cho, and Kim 2005; Kim, Song, Yi, Chung, and Nam 2004; Yoo et al. 2003). Since the IMF, suicide even became the number one death cause among the 20s and 30s (Oh et al. 2005, 192). The overall social and economic impact of the IMF was so large that it made Koreans to tremble whenever they were reminded of the economic recession trauma. Thus, it is highly plausible that Koreans started to pay close attention to the economic policies since the IMF. Indeed, Kim Daejung’s success in recovering from the IMF crisis boosted the public confidence in the liberal party’s economic competence, benefitting the next liberal candidate, Roh Moohyun. Unfortunately, the 2002 election survey data collected by the Korea Social Science Data Center (KSDC) does not include questions regarding the retrospective sociotropic economic voting, thus this hypothesis cannot be tested in that race. However, it is widely believed that the liberal president Kim Daejung
managed the economy well during the IMF crisis, thus Roh Moohyun, from the same liberal party could succeed Kim.

The emergence of the economic issues to the center stage may also explain why the conservative party reacquired its majority control following Roh’s term. While the two liberal presidents were in power, they promoted egalitarianism and peace with North Korea. In achieving these goals, Roh and Kim implemented policies to crack down on South Korea’s corrupt business conglomerates. Along the same lines, Roh tried to deflate the real estate market to prevent a possible bubble. However, this led the public to perceive Roh to be economically incompetent (Koo 2007; Choe 2007). The 2007 election survey from the KSDC shows that more than 60 percent of the respondents said the most problematic policies implemented by the Roh administration was economic policies including real estate policies.

While public distrust toward the Roh administration was prevalent, a pro-business candidate, Lee Myungbak, emerged from the conservative Grand National Party (GNP). His perceived political ideology, along with other candidates in the 2007 election, is shown in Figure 2. He was born in Japan, then raised in Gyeongsang province, and thus is considered a Gyeongsang native. As a former star executive from Hyundai, Korea’s most famous business conglomerate, he was perceived by the public to be competent with economic issues. Building on this public perception, his pledge included 7 percent annual economic growth and $40,000 per capita income by 2017.
Despite corruption charges that he engaged in stock manipulation and had hidden a fortune in real estate investments, his success as a mayor of Seoul buttressed his claim that he would revitalize the South Korean economy. With his campaign catch phrase “economy president” and “pragmatism,” Lee ended up winning a landslide election victory. Although voter turnout was a record low 63 percent, the margin between the winner and the runner up was the largest in history (National Election Commission 2008). Lee’s strategy of emphasizing the issue of economy obviously worked well. In the same election survey from KSDC, almost 65 percent of the respondents said the issue they cared the most in the election was the economy (boosting employment and the real estate market).

Figure 2: Candidate’s Perceived Political Ideology and Voters Ideology Parameter
The runner up in the 2007 election was Jung Dongyoung, from the UDNP. He was a former unification minister and news anchor. According to the National Election Commission, Lee Myungbak won a plurality in every province except in Jeolla, where Jung was born. During the campaign, Jung promised to support the middle class and women’s rights. Of the eight other candidates, Lee Hoi-chang was the only one who received more than 10 percent of the vote (15.1 percent) and the only independent candidate. In both the 2002 and 1997 elections, Lee Hoi-chang was the runner-up, representing the right wing political party. After losing in the 2002 election, Lee retired from politics but suddenly decided to rerun in the 2007 election. As a former Supreme Court judge, his public pledge was to achieve a society with the rule of law. Some political analysts have said that the only reason Lee lost to Roh Moohyun, or Kim Daejung was because he was not from the home of the conservatives, Gyeongsang, which means he lacked a solid political platform.11

All in all, Lee’s landslide victory seems to arise from his success in stressing his credentials as a competent leader who would fix the economic problems that Korea faced. It should also be noted that in the GNP primary, there was another native Gyeongsang candidate, Park Guenhye. Despite the media attention on her due to the fact that she is a daughter of the authoritarian leader, Park Junghee, she lost to Lee

11 Although Lee Hoi-chang was born in North Korea, some people regard that his birthplace is in Chungcheng province of South Korea because his father was born in Chungcheng.
Myungbak in the primary. Lee had corporate background that he could easily back up his campaign slogan as an “economy president” while Park lacked such a qualification as a competent economic manager. Even Lee’s nickname, a bulldozer, which Lee gained due to his authoritarian leadership style during his mayorship of Seoul, or corruption charges, could not stop him from seizing power.
3. Empirical Analysis

The 2007 presidential electoral outcome provides a basis for evaluating the recent trend of economic voting in South Korea. Four specific hypotheses are examined.

**H1.** At the aggregate level, voters tend to reward the incumbent party when the economy is prosperous and punish the incumbent party when the economy is sluggish.

**H2.** At the individual level, retrospective sociotropic economic voting in the 2007 Korean presidential election is statistically significant, and so is regionalism.

**H3.** In reference to the same election, an estimated effect analysis shows economic voting has a larger marginal effect on the voting behavior than regionalism.

**H4.** The middle class, who have more political knowledge than the lower class and have a larger economic stake than the upper class, voted based on the economy.

To test these hypotheses, this paper employs four models: 1) economic voting at the macro level, 2) economic voting at the micro level, 3) estimated effect analysis of regionalism and economic voting, and 4) subset analysis.

First, by comparing the direction of the electoral results (from the incumbent party to the opposing party), and key economic indicators, the macro-level economic voting model shows discrepancies between national economic performance and the electoral outcome. Convinced by the argument that voters’ judgments are based on their subjective perceptions, rather than the objective economic situation (Ansolabehere, Meredith, and Snowberg 2008; Markus 1988), I then present a micro-level economic voting model: a statistical analysis of the 2007 presidential election data collected by the KSDC. A multinomial logistic regression model as well as a binary logistic regression
model shows that retrospective sociotropic economic voting is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level after controlling for respondent’s birthplace and socioeconomic status. Third, using a STATA package Clarify (2002), I analyze the estimated effects of five statistically significant independent variables on the electoral outcome. Namely, the two regionalism variables, 1) Jeolla and 2) Gyeongsang, two political party variables, 3) the GNP and 4) the UDNP, and 5) retrospective sociotropic economic voting. The results show that the impact of economic voting on the voting decision is stronger than that of regionalism. Finally, a subset analysis shows that Jeolla/Gyeongsang natives vote based on the economy whereas non Jeolla/Gyeongsang people vote ideologically.

3.1 Economic Voting at the Macro Level

Among many economic indicators, the unemployment rate and GDP adjusted by the inflation rate, are the most common economic indicators used in the retrospective macro level economic voting literature (Wilkin, Haller, and Norpoth 1997, 306; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007, 520). Thus, to test H1, this section presents datasets of these two indicators, and examines whether Korean voters have changed their support for the incumbent depending on the national economic performance. Figure 3 and Figure 4 below show the economic performance of Korea since 1987, the year South Korea held its first democratic election (Billet 1990, 300; Lee 1998, 635). The actual values of changes
in the growth rate adjusted by inflation and the unemployment rate are summarized in Table 2.

**Figure 3: Gross Domestic Product Growth Adjusted by Inflation in South Korea (1983 – 2007)**

![Graph showing change in GDP adjusted by inflation from 1982 to 2007.](image)

**Figure 4: Unemployment Rate in South Korea (1983 – 2007)**

![Graph showing change in the unemployment rate from 1982 to 2007.](image)
Table 2: Records of South Korean Presidential Elections and Economic Indicators (GDP Adjusted by Inflation and Unemployment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Support for Incumbent Party Candidate (%)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
<th>GDP_I</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roh Taewoo</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>12.182</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>9.859</td>
<td>-6.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7.471</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>-4.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1987*</td>
<td>12.266</td>
<td>-19.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>11.661</td>
<td>-18.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6.752</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9.297</td>
<td>-4.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>9.713</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Youngsam</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>5.765</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6.329</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>8.772</td>
<td>-14.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8.931</td>
<td>-16.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7.186</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Daejung</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>1997*</td>
<td>5.767</td>
<td>27.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-5.714</td>
<td>165.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10.731</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8.798</td>
<td>-32.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.973</td>
<td>-9.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh Moohyun</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>2002*</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>-18.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.803</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4.619</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3.957</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.179</td>
<td>-7.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Myungbak</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>2007*</td>
<td>5.106</td>
<td>-6.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Election years marked with asterisks.

To see whether economic voting has occurred in South Korean presidential elections at the macro level, a time-series regression model is employed. The statistical equation linking economic conditions to the incumbent vote assumes

$$ \text{VOTE} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \sum_{t=2}^{5} \text{GDP} + \beta_2 \sum_{t=2}^{5} \text{emp} + \epsilon $$

Where:
VOTE is the percentage of the popular vote received by the candidate from the incumbent’s political party

\[\sum_{i=2}^{5} \text{GDP} \]

is the sum of the four years’ annual changes in the GDP adjusted by the inflation rate from the second year to the fifth year of presidency. The economic indicator of the first year in presidency is not included due to a possible lag. The results of economic policies may not be realized within a year of presidency.\(^1\)

\[\sum_{i=2}^{5} \text{emp} \]

is the sum of the four years’ annual changes in the unemployment rate from the second year to the fifth year of presidency.

\[e\]

is an error term.

Table 3 shows that economic voting in Korea at the macro level has been extremely unstable at best; none of the regressors have explanatory power at the 95% confidence level. Although the statistical model does not seem to predict Korean electorate’s voting behavior based on national economic performance, it is worth examining each election. Starting from the first election, the unemployment rate escalated nearly by 64 percent and the GDP plummeted by 19 percent in 1986. Yet, the candidate from the incumbent party was elected. Also, in the 1997 election, the incumbent party was punished despite the outstanding growth rate and 40 percent decrease in the unemployment rate during the last two years of incumbency. Moreover, in the 2002 election, the liberal party was rewarded after the hardships that voters went through during the Asian economic crisis: the growth rate dropped by almost 20 percent,

\(^1\) Figure 1 also shows that the impact of the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 is reflected in the data of 1998. Similarly, the impact of the late 2000s financial crisis, which started in the late 2007, in the US resulted in a negative growth rate in 2009 (International Monetary Fund 2010).
and the unemployment rate rose by 30 percent in the single year. Korean voters clearly did not punish the incumbent for the economic situation that they did not welcome.

Table 3: Economic Voting at the Macro Level in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP adjusted by Inflation</td>
<td>0.346 (0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>-0.050* (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p <0.10. ** p <0.05. (Neither variables exhibit the p value lower than 0.05)
Standard errors in parentheses. All values rounded up to the third decimal point.

The only two elections consistent with the economic voting theory at the macro level, were the 1992 and the 2007 elections. Kim Younsgam from the incumbent Roh Taewoo’s party was elected in 1992. However, because the national economic performance in 1991 and 1992 were not necessarily excellent, it is hard to conclude that it was the sound economic condition that led voters to reward the incumbent party in that election. Despite this instability of economic voting, the 2007 election is worth noting. In fact, as mentioned earlier, in the 2007 presidential election, the economy seemed to be an important factor as Roh Moohyun did not manage the economy well. This hypothesis, that the economy started to matter, is reflected in the correlation coefficients as captured in Table 3. As the sample drops older data, the absolute values of the correlation coefficients decrease. For example, when including all five election data points, the correlation coefficient of VOTE and GDP is 0.472. This increases almost twice when only including the recent three election data points (1997, 2002, and 2007).
Table 3: Correlations of Vote and GDP, and Vote and EMP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation Coefficients of</th>
<th>VOTE and GDP</th>
<th>VOTE and EMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 elections (1987-2007)</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 elections (1992-2007)</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>0.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 elections (1997-2007)</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>0.931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All coefficients absolute values. Rounded up to the third decimal point.

Although the correlation testing is preliminary, it seems that the macro level economic indicators have stronger relationships with incumbent party’s supporting rate. This begs the following question; did the economy finally start to play an important role in South Korean presidential elections?

To answer this question, a micro level economic voting model is explored in the next section. Unlike the macro level economic voting model, the micro level model does not assume that voters assess national economic performance by the objective data. The micro level model rather assumes that the information by which the electorate makes decisions is subjective, due to several factors such as media effects (Ansolabehere, Meredith, and Snowberg 2008, 9). Thus, in the section below, the micro level economic voting model tests whether people punish and reward the incumbent party, depending on their subjective perceptions of national economic performance.

3.2 Economic Voting at the Micro Level

To test H2, a multinomial logistic regression model is presented. The data was collected by the Korea Social Science Data Center (KSDC) right after the 2007 presidential election. Trained part-timers visited randomly selected households all over
South Korea and interviewed one respondent from each visit. 1200 respondents agreed to participate in the interview.\textsuperscript{2} After the interview, the respondents were compensated with a gift of an umbrella.

Using the survey data, a specification for the Korean economic voting model is drawn. As discussed in the case studies section, economic voting is generally measured after controlling for 1) political predisposition such as party identification and ideology, 2) voter’s positions on salient political issues, and 3) political cleavages such as socioeconomic status or class. This is consistent with the result of a KSDC survey question which asks respondents the primary factors that influenced their electoral choices. Thus, the Korean economic model employs all three components from the general model. Further justifications for those three components are in order.

First, controlling for political predisposition is justified in the 2007 presidential election model. In the KSDC survey question, which allowed a single choice answer, respondents replied as summarized in Figure 4. Accordingly, the model will control for party identification, and political ideology.

Second, almost 65 percent of the respondents picked the economy (specifically, employment and real estate market) as the most salient issue in the 2007 election. Unfortunately the model does not take account for respondents’ positions on these

\textsuperscript{2} The KSDC did not record the response rate. The interviews were conducted until the number of respondents reached the quota in a given area.
issues, due to the unavailability of the data. The model, however, is specified with economic variables, which can at least indirectly indicate respondents’ perceptions and positions on these economic issues.

Figure 5: Factors that Influenced Respondent’s Vote Choice

Finally, as for political cleavages, the model controls for education, income level, gender, and age, as well as regionalism. Although only 1 percent chose regionalism as a primary factor influencing their voting decisions, respondent’s birthplace (Jeolla and Gyeongsang) has a strong correlation with electoral outcomes. Indeed, about 40 percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement that “regionalism has been alleviated” and nearly 10 percent of the respondents picked regionalism as the single most serious problem of the 2007 presidential election. Thus, controlling for the two birthplace variables, Jeolla and Gyeongsang, in the 2007 Korean election model is justified.
Using this specification, two models will be adopted to analyze the 2007 presidential election. The study first employs a multinomial logistic regression model because it is the most commonly used model when testing voting outcome under multipolarized political systems (Lee 2000, 96). Then, a binary logistic regression model will be employed because Korea has two de facto parties. The two models assume the following.

Model 1. Multinomial Logit Regression

$$\text{Vote} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Jeolla} + \beta_2 \text{Gyeongsang} + \beta_3 \text{Sociotropic} + \beta_4 \text{Egotropic} + \beta_5 \text{GNP} + \beta_6 \text{UDNP} + \beta_7 \text{Ideology} + \beta_8 \text{Edu} + \beta_9 \text{Income} + \beta_{10} \text{Female} + \beta_{11} \text{Age} + \epsilon$$

Model 2. Binary Logit Regression

$$\text{Vote}_{LJ} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Jeolla} + \beta_2 \text{Gyeongsang} + \beta_3 \text{Sociotropic} + \beta_4 \text{Egotropic} + \beta_5 \text{GNP} + \beta_6 \text{UDNP} + \beta_7 \text{Ideology} + \beta_8 \text{Edu} + \beta_9 \text{Income} + \beta_{10} \text{Female} + \beta_{11} \text{Age} + \epsilon$$

where:

**Dependent variables**

- \( \text{Vote} \): indicates respondent’s choice among four options: 1) voted for Jung Dongyoung, 2) voted for Lee, Myungbak 3) voted for Lee Hoi-chang or 4) voted for someone else.

- \( \text{Vote}_{LJ} \): is a binary variable which codes respondent’s vote choice between Lee (Y=1) and Jung (Y=0).

**Independent variables:**

3 Var133 in the data file
4 Var136 in the data file
Jeolla\textsuperscript{5} indicates that the respondent’s birthplace is either south or north Jeolla province or Gwangju\textsuperscript{6}.

Gyeongsang\textsuperscript{7} indicates that the respondent’s birthplace is one of the following: south or north Gyeongsang province, Daegu, Busan, or Wulsan\textsuperscript{8}.

Sociotropic\textsuperscript{9} is a trichotomous variable which codes respondent’s perception of national economic performance for the past five years. 1 indicates the economy has gotten better, 3 indicates the economy has gotten worse.

Egotropic\textsuperscript{10} is a trichotomous variable which indicates respondent’s the level of satisfaction with household economy. This variable codes responses from the people who said that the government is responsible for the current household economic situation. 1 indicates the respondents are happy with their domestic economic situation, -1 indicates that they are unhappy, and 0 indicates that they believe that that government does not hold responsible for their current economic situation.

Control Variables

**GNP**\textsuperscript{11} is a dummy variable which indicates that the respondent supports the conservative Grand National Party.

**UDNP**\textsuperscript{12} is a dummy variable which indicates that the respondent supports the liberal United New Democratic Party.

**Ideology**\textsuperscript{13} is a 10 point scale where 0 represents very liberal, 5 represents neutral, and 10 represents very conservative.

---

\textsuperscript{5} Var114 in the data file
\textsuperscript{6} Gwangju is one of the six ‘Metropolitan Cities’ in South Korea. The official name of Gwangju is Gwangju-gwangyeoksi which translates to ‘Gwangju Metropolitan City.’ It is geographically within Jeolla province although technically it does not belong to Jeolla.
\textsuperscript{7} Var116 in the data file
\textsuperscript{8} Wulsan, Daegu, and Busan geographically belong to Gyeongsang Province and people generally consider these cities to be parts of Gyeongsang although technically these cities do not belong to Gyeongsang.
\textsuperscript{9} Var94 in the data file
\textsuperscript{10} Var119 in the data file
\textsuperscript{11} Var141 in the data file
\textsuperscript{12} Var142 in the data file
**Edu** is a trichotomos variable indicating respondent’s education level. 1 is with middle school diploma or lower education, 2 is with high school diploma and 3 is some college education or above.

**Income** is a 10 point scale where 1 represents that the respondent’s household income is less than KW 1,000,000 and 10 represents that the respondent’s household income is more than KW 5,000,000.

**Female** is a dummy variable, indicating femaleness (1) and maleness (0).

**Age** is a 5-point ordered scale where 1 indicates the respondent is in his/her 20s, 2 indicates 30s, 3 indicates 40s, and 5 indicates 60s or older.

Table 3 shows the results of the multinomial logistic regression when the base outcome for the model is 1. The results reveal three important implications. First, at the 95 percent confidence level, sociotropic economic voting is statistically significant across all the choices among viable candidates. Voters with negative perceptions of national economic performance were more likely to choose Lee Myungbak, or Lee Hoi-chang over Jung Dongyoung by 3.28 times and 2.56 times, respectively.  

Second, as can be seen in the table, the results reveal that both the regionalism variables are statistically significant when the voting outcome is Lee Myungbak (Y=2).  

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13 Var90 in the data file  
14 Var104 in the data file  
15 Var106 in the data file  
16 Responses of 1, 2, 3, 4 constitute 53 percent and 7, 8, 9, 10 constitute 17 percent of respondents.  
17 Var3 in the data file  
18 Var111 in the data file  
19 Estimated by a STATA command option rrr (Relative Risk Ratio).
Yet, the Gyeongsang variable is not significant when the voting outcome is Lee Hoi-chang (Y=3). This means that regionalism plays an important role in explaining the electoral choice between the two de facto party candidates, Lee Myungbak and Jung Dongyoung.

Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Model: The Impact of the Economy and Regionalism on the Voting Outcome (Y: 1=Voted for Jung Dongyoung, 2=Voted for Lee Myungbak, 3=Voted for Lee Hoi-chang, 4=Voted for Other Candidates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>Y=2 (0.30)</th>
<th>Y=3 (0.58)</th>
<th>Y=4 (0.34)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeolla</td>
<td>-0.96**</td>
<td>2.08**</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongsang</td>
<td>0.68*</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic</td>
<td>0.81**</td>
<td>0.65*</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egotropic</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>2.33**</td>
<td>1.32**</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDNP</td>
<td>-2.64**</td>
<td>-2.99**</td>
<td>-3.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.16*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R²: 0.304
N: 945

*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseoutcome: Y=1.
All values rounded up to the third decimal point.

Third, it should be noted that when voters compare Lee Hoi-chang or other candidates against Jung Dongyoung, only the Jeolla variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. This result indicates that Gyeongsang natives tend to avoid Jung but may vote for other candidates while Jeolla natives tend to only vote for Jung but no other candidates. If born in Jeolla, the respondent tends to vote for Lee.
Myungbak by negative log-odds 1.97; in other words, voters whose birthplaces are in Jeolla are less likely to vote for Lee Myungbak as opposed to Jung Dongyoung by 0.14 times, *ceteris paribus*. The likelihood that the Jeolla people vote for other candidates as opposed to Jung Dongyoung is low as well. Jeolla voters are 0.07 and 0.35 times less likely to vote for Lee Hoi-chang or any other candidates, respectively.

Table 5: Binary Logistic Model: The Impact of the Economy and Regionalism on the Voting Outcome (Y: 1=Voted for Lee Myungbak, 0= Voted for Jung Dongyoung)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeolla</td>
<td>-1.074*** (0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongsang</td>
<td>0.808** (0.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic</td>
<td>0.806*** (0.238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egotropic</td>
<td>-0.163 (0.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>2.364*** (0.327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDNP</td>
<td>-2.602*** (0.397)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.081 (0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.345 (0.227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.107* (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.058 (0.106)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R² 0.519
N 732

* *p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All values rounded up to the third decimal point.

To closely examine the electoral decision between the two “favorite sons” from Jeolla and Gyeongsang, the study now presents a binary logistic regression analysis. Also, this model is used in the estimated effect analysis in the ensuing section. The binary logistic regression model measures the logistic probabilities of voting for Lee and Jung. In the multinomial logistic regression model above, both the sociotropic and the
regionalism variables are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. In other words, both multinomial and binary logistic regression models suggest that sociotropic economic voting, as well as regionalism, is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Sociotropic economic voting is also observed among those non-regionalist voters. When being run in a multinomial logistic regression model with the sample excluding both Jeolla and Gyeongsang voters, sociotropic voting still has an explanatory power in the voting outcome.  

Table 4 shows that the results of the binary logistic regression are consistent with the multinomial logistic regression. Most notably, the results reveal that when voters compare Lee and Jung, the four independent variables, Jeolla, Gyeongsang, Sociotropic, and Income, are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The directions of coefficients in this model confirm that Jeolla and voting for Lee Myungbak are negatively associated, whereas Gyeongsang and voting for Lee are positively associated; voters born in Jeolla are likely to vote for Jung, while those born in Gyeongsang are likely to vote for Lee.

Moreover, the Income variable is negatively associated with voting for Lee again. Given that the liberal agendas have more to do with distributive justice and the conservative political rhetoric pursues deregulatory libertarian market values, this result seems quite unintuitive. This result may be attributed to the association between

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20 See Appendix B for the results.
household income and regionalism. Income is, indeed, positively correlated with Jeolla at the 0.06 coefficient and negatively correlated with Gyeongsang at the 0.11 coefficient. Not surprisingly, it is negatively correlated with Vote LJ at the 0.14 coefficient. As Appendix E shows, those who responded that their household income falls under categories of 1 to 3 constitute almost 46 percent of those born in Gyeongsang, while the same responses constitute only 33 percent of those born in Jeolla. Since the income variable is correlated with the regionalism variables, this hypothesis sounds plausible.

However, the income variable is statistically significant even after controlling for regionalism. The correlation between the income and regionalism factors alone cannot explain the statistical significance in the regression models. Thus, it may also be plausible to say that those with high income are more convinced by the United Democratic Party’s liberal agenda such as freedom of speech.

In the next test, I employ a loop approach to generate an estimated effect analysis. I attempt to compare the impact of the four statistically significant variables on the voting outcome: Jeolla, Gyeongsang, Sociotropic, and Income.

3.3 Estimated Effect Analysis of Regionalism and Economic Voting

In the test above, the binary logistic regression model estimated the log-odds of the electoral outcomes for Lee Myungbak and Jung Dongyoung. However, the test results do not show which variable is the most potent one. Is the impact of regionalism bigger than the impact of economic voting? To answer to this question, I compare the
impact of the four statistically significant independent variables on the election outcome.

A STATA package software Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001) calculates predicted values for the electoral outcome as the independent variable changes.

Table 6: Marginal Effect of Changes in Independent Variables on the Voting Outcome (1= Voted for Lee, 0=Voted for Other Candidates)

| Regressor     | $|\Delta| \text{ between min and max} |
|---------------|---------------------------------|
| UDNP          | 0.497                           |
| GNP           | 0.333                           |
| Sociotropic   | 0.276                           |
| Jeolla        | 0.170                           |
| Gyeongsang    | 0.091                           |

Note: All values rounded up to the third decimal point.

Table 5 captures the effects of Jeolla, Gyeongsang, economic voting, GNP and UDNP on the predicted probabilities that the voting outcome is Lee Myungbak as opposed to Jung Dongyoung. As both binary and multinomial logistic regression models show that Jeolla and voting for Lee are negatively associated whereas negative perception of the national economy and voting for Jung are positively associated.

The estimated effect analysis provides two pieces of unique information. First, the degree that Jeolla decreases the predicted probability of voting for Lee far exceeds the degree that Gyeongsang increases the predicted probability of voting for Lee. This is measured in numeric terms in Table 5: the marginal effects of the independent variables. The table shows that party identity (UNDP + GNP) has the largest marginal effect.
following sociotropic voting and regionalism (Jeolla + Gyeongsang). Even after combined, the estimated effect of both Jeolla and Gyeongsang does not exceed that of sociotropic economic voting. Second, the effect of Jeolla exceeds that of Gyeongsang. This indicates that regionalism is stronger among those whose birthplaces are in Jeolla. The reason that regionalism is a stronger electoral factor among Jeolla natives may be due to the historical cause of regionalism. Jeolla natives were discriminated while Gyeongsang natives were favored. Thus, the anger may linger longer in the scarred Jeolla natives.

3.4 Subset Analysis

At this point, since regionalism encompasses only two provinces of South Korea, it is of the interest to learn about the difference in voting behavior between the Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives and those from other regions. In this section, the former will be referred as group 1 (Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives) and the latter will be referred as group 1 (non-Jeolla or Gyeongsang natives).

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21 Although many statistical studies with estimated effects analysis compare the changes of Xs from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above, or changes of Xs from 25% to 75% on Y, this study compared the change of X varying from min value and to max value on Y. The study employed a different approach because the two regionalism variables are dichotomous scale, varying only between 0 and 1. Thus, measuring Y value when X changes from the 25% value (0.25) to the 75% value (0.75) cannot yield results with realistic implication because one cannot be born 25% in Jeolla or 75% in Gyeongsang.
Table 7: Comparison of the Voting Behavior between Respondents born in Jeolla/Gyeongsang and Other Provinces.
(Base Outcome—Voted for Jung, Reference Outcome: Voted for Lee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>Voting Outcome</th>
<th>Group 1 (Jeolla/Gyeongsang)</th>
<th>Group 2 (Other Provinces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongsang</td>
<td>Omitted (Collinearity)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeolla</td>
<td>-1.711*** (0.391)</td>
<td>0.250 (0.312)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic</td>
<td>1.203*** (0.320)</td>
<td>0.056 (0.261)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egotropic</td>
<td>-0.269 (0.273)</td>
<td>2.469*** (0.443)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>2.511*** (0.510)</td>
<td>-2.485*** (0.549)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDNP</td>
<td>-2.799*** (0.603)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.069 (0.109)</td>
<td>0.170** (0.076)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.126 (0.299)</td>
<td>0.138 (0.315)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.065 (0.071)</td>
<td>-0.047 (0.076)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.245 (0.362)</td>
<td>0.245 (0.353)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.023 (0.152)</td>
<td>0.108 (0.133)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>475</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All values rounded up to the third decimal point.

A subset analysis shows that group 1 and group 2 display a clear difference in their voting pattern. As captured in Table 7, the Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives vote based on the economy while those born in other provinces vote ideologically. Party identification is statistically significant across the groups. It is plausible to say that the reason political ideology is not significant among Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives is because another variable in the model already takes account for ideology. An obvious possibility for the substitute of regionalism is ideology. As previously mentioned, regional sentiment is not simply about birthplaces. It has become an ideological division in Korea; Jeolla natives who were oppressed against Gyeongsang demanded equal
treatment, distributive justice, and freedom of speech while Gyeongsang natives preferred to stay as the status quo. Thus, regionalism is neither merely nepotistic nor wholly irrational. Although regional sentiment in Korea has aspects of both nepotism and irrationality, it has shaped people’s political values among Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives.

Figure 6: Comparison of the Coefficients between the Voting Models of Jeolla/Gyeongsang Natives and the Models of Non-Jeolla/Gyeongsang People

A secondary subset analysis shows that the voting behavior of the respondents who fall in the bottom 23 percent of the income category cannot be explained by any factors in the model as shown in Table 8. In other words, the electoral outcome of the lower class does not show any generalizable pattern. Surprisingly, even party
identification does not matter to them. In contrast, the respondents whose household income falls in the middle 55 percent exhibit both sociotropic and egotropic economic voting. The voting behavior of the middle class is also explained by regionalism variables. Finally, the respondents with the top 20 percent of the income show the ideological voting pattern as well as economic voting pattern. Given that most Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives fall in the lower to the middle class category, this result is consistent with the first subset analysis.

Table 8: Comparison of the Voting Behavior among Different Income Groups
(Base Outcome=Voted for Jung, Reference Outcome: Voted for Lee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>Lower Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Upper Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeolla</td>
<td>-0.568 (0.654)</td>
<td>-1.357*** (0.423)</td>
<td>-0.571 (0.624)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongsang</td>
<td>0.715 (0.672)</td>
<td>0.684* (0.415)</td>
<td>0.549 (0.639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic</td>
<td>0.719 (0.469)</td>
<td>0.674** (0.279)</td>
<td>0.834** (0.383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egotropic</td>
<td>-0.108 (0.347)</td>
<td>0.239 (0.244)</td>
<td>-0.616* (0.319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>2.602*** (0.674)</td>
<td>2.290*** (0.428)</td>
<td>2.909*** (0.657)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDNP</td>
<td>-2.386* (1.260)</td>
<td>-3.157*** (0.573)</td>
<td>-1.799*** (0.620)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.005 (0.118)</td>
<td>0.026 (0.083)</td>
<td>0.214* (0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.197 (0.398)</td>
<td>0.450 (0.288)</td>
<td>-0.653 (0.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.636 (0.526)</td>
<td>-0.253 (0.157)</td>
<td>-0.101 (0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.457 (0.525)</td>
<td>0.225 (0.313)</td>
<td>0.061 (0.466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.138 (0.187)</td>
<td>0.139 (0.141)</td>
<td>-0.224 (0.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>262/1200 (22%)</td>
<td>664/1200 (55%)</td>
<td>(23%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All values rounded up to the third decimal point.

Although household income level does not necessarily equal with the level of political knowledge, it may at least indirectly indicate the general level of political
awareness. Hence, the fact that lower class does not show any generalizable voting pattern, and only the middle to the upper class vote economically, probably means that economic voting requires some level of sophistication. By the same token, the result indicates that the regional division between Jeolla and Gyeongsang province is a foundation for ideological division.
4. Discussion and Conclusion

The study tested four hypotheses regarding economic voting and regionalism in South Korea: macro level, micro level, estimated effect analysis and subset analysis. At the macro level, the pattern of economic voting did not seem to be established in South Korea at least until 2002. Beginning with the first meaningful democratic election in 1987, the negative economic situation did not coincide with the punishment of the incumbent party. However in recent elections, the sluggish economy seemed to have led the public to punish the incumbent party. This change is captured by high correlation coefficients between economic indicators and recent election data.

In the micro level test, the KSDC data confirms that retrospective economic voting, as well as regionalism, is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Thus, economic voting has gained strength as of the 2007 Korean presidential election. Furthermore, an estimated effect analysis of the same data shows that the impact of economic voting exceeds that of regionalism. In the estimated effect analysis, the variables in the order of the largest marginal effect on the electoral outcome are: party identification, economic voting, and regionalism. Yet, one caveat is in order. Although the overall impact of economic voting exceeds that of regionalism, the result is contrary among Jeolla natives. The fact that regionalism is a compelling factor among
Jeolla natives is also consistent with the Korean historical context of then-President Park Junghee’s policy of benefiting only Gyeongsang natives while marginalizing Jeolla natives. The feeling of relative deprivation and the ongoing angst from the Gwangju massacre in 1980 may still be an overwhelming psychological factor that influences Jeolla people’s electoral choices.

Finally, a subset analysis shows that Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives vote economically whereas those born elsewhere vote ideologically. It is plausible to say that the reason political ideology is not significant among Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives is because another variable in the model already takes account for ideology. An obvious possibility for the substitute of regionalism is ideology. As previously mentioned, regional sentiment is not simply about birthplaces. It has become an ideological division in Korea; Jeolla natives who were oppressed against Gyeongsang demanded equal treatment, distributive justice, and freedom of speech while Gyeongsang natives preferred to stay as the status quo. Thus, regionalism is neither merely nepotistic nor wholly irrational. Although regional sentiment in Korea has aspects of both nepotism and irrationality, it has shaped people’s political values among Jeolla and Gyeongsang natives. Thus, this paper concludes that regionalism is a form of ideological voting, started from the old and the new regime debate.

All in all, these findings are consistent with the comparative literature on the trajectory of democratic transition. As in other transitional societies, it took a decade for
Koreans to start caring about the economy. After a while, both economic stability and democracy seem to have become valence issues.

I concede that the study is limited in its analysis of retrospective economic voting. The specification of the models in this study did not include prospective voting because the KSDC dropped the question about prospective economic voting from this wave. Yet, the results suggest that Koreans are likely to be prospective voters because the impact of the negative perception of the national economy is particularly large. Moreover, among those who perceived the national economic situation to be sluggish, many were likely to elect Lee over other candidates. Given his corporate background, Lee may have been taken as a competent economic manager. Thus, future research may assess the existence and the extent of prospective economic voting in South Korea.

Despite its limitations, the study still contributes to the body of the literature on economic voting in three ways. First, the 2007 presidential election data provides evidence for the popular but unsubstantiated claim that the economy has become important to Korean voters. Second, this study compares the impact of regionalism and economic voting on the electoral outcome in a scientific way. Finally, the study adds evidence to the comparative literature that economic issues become salient once a democratic regime is stabilized.
Appendix A

Y: 1=Voted for Jung, 0=Voted for other candidates
| var135 | Coef. | Robust Std. Err. | z      | P>|z|   | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|--------|-------|------------------|--------|-------|----------------------|
| **var14** | 1.015201 | .2650737 | 3.83  | 0.000 | .4956663    | 1.534736 |
| **var16** | -.4908894 | .307828 | -1.59 | 0.111 | -1.094221    | .1124423 |
| **var94** | -.5547965 | .2032722 | -2.73 | 0.006 | -.9532026    | -.1563903 |
| **var95** | .1141051 | .1747709 | 0.65  | 0.514 | -.2284396    | .4566498 |
| **var141** | -1.813723 | .3169075 | -5.72 | 0.000 | -.2.43485    | -.1.192596 |
| **var142** | 2.824043 | .31608 | 8.93  | 0.000 | 2.204537    | 3.443548 |
| **var90** | -.0522372 | .0575947 | -0.91 | 0.364 | -.1651208    | .0606463 |
| **var104** | -.2604267 | .1926253 | -1.35 | 0.176 | -.6379653    | .1171119 |
| **var106** | .0589964 | .047753 | 1.24  | 0.217 | -.0.345977    | .1525906 |
| **var4** | .080523 | .2329932 | 0.35  | 0.728 | -.3746301    | .5363346 |
| **var111** | .047753 | .0936757 | 0.51  | 0.610 | -.1358476    | .2313544 |
| _cons  | .0103236 | .9014551 | 0.01  | 0.991 | -1.777143    | 1.756496 |

**Logistic regression**

Number of obs = 945
Wald chi2(11) = 217.34
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -269.59559
Pseudo R2 = 0.4348

Y: 1=Voted for Lee, 0=Voted for other candidates.

| var134 | Coef. | Robust Std. Err. | z      | P>|z|   | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|--------|-------|------------------|--------|-------|----------------------|
| **var14** | -3.412186 | .2495541 | -1.37 | 0.172 | -.8303385    | .1478985 |
| **var16** | .5342087 | .1956755 | 2.73  | 0.006 | .1506918    | .9177255 |
| **var94** | .4704466 | .1526705 | 3.08  | 0.002 | .1712179    | .7696753 |
| **var95** | .0235196 | .1262449 | 0.19  | 0.852 | -.2.239158    | .270955 |
| **var141** | 1.901037 | .1830929 | 10.50 | 0.000 | 1.546101    | 2.255972 |
| **var142** | -1.769695 | .3920428 | -4.51 | 0.000 | -.5.38084     | -.1.001305 |
| **var90** | .0347023 | .0407187 | 0.85  | 0.394 | -.0451049    | .1145095 |
| **var104** | -.1076848 | .1517808 | -0.71 | 0.478 | -.4051696    | .1898001 |
| **var106** | -.008242 | .0350931 | -0.23 | 0.814 | -.0770233    | .0605393 |
| **var4** | .1816741 | .1706312 | 1.06  | 0.287 | -.1.257569    | .5161051 |
| **var111** | .1333419 | .073493 | 1.81  | 0.070 | -.0.107018    | .2773856 |
| _cons  | -2.166138 | .7349438 | -2.95 | 0.003 | -.3.606602    | -.7256749 |

**Logistic regression**

Number of obs = 945
Wald chi2(11) = 263.92
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -450.00786
Pseudo R2 = 0.3027
Appendix B

Questionnaire (These are selected questions from the original questionnaire. Data sets and do files can be found on http://duke.edu/~jl324 under ‘Data’ menu)

*Observation: 1200
*Response rates at the end of each question.

Preliminary Question No. 3. Respondent’s sex (var3) – [1200/1200]
(1) Male (2) Female

3. Did you vote? (var7) – [1197/1200]
(1) Yes (2) No

5. What was the most important factor in deciding your favorite candidate? (var9) – [941/942]
His.. (1) Policy (2) Political Party (3) Abilities (4) Ideology (5) Morality (6) Birthplace (7) Acquaintances’ opinions about the candidate (8) None of above – specify please

7. Who did you vote for? (var12) – [929/942]
(1) Jung Dongyoung (2) Lee Myungbak (3) Lee Hoi-chang (4) Kwon Youngkil
(5) Lee Inje (6) Moon Kukhyun (7) Jung Guenmo (8) Heo Kyungyoung (9) Jun Kwan
(10) Kuem Min

40. How do you feel about the national economic condition, compared to 5 years ago? (var94) – [1191/1200]
(1) Better (2) About the same (3) Worse

41. How do you feel about your household economic condition? (var95) – [1189/1200]
(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat unsatisfied (4) Very unsatisfied

SQ 2. What is your education level? (var104) – [1192/1200]
(1) Less than middle school diploma (2) With high school diploma (3) Some college or above

SQ 3. Where is your birthplace? (var105) – [1197/1200]
(1) Seoul (2) Incheon/Kyungki (3) Daejon/Chungcheng (4) Gwangju/Jeolla
(5) Daegu/Northern Gyeongsang (6) Busan/Wulsan/Southern Gyeongsang (7) Kangwon
(8) Jeju (9) North Korea/Outside of Korea/ or else
SQ 4. What is your household income, including all sources such as salaries, interests, grants? (Unit: 1000 Korean Won = App USD 0.9-1) (var106) – [1163/1200]
(1) Less than 100   (2) 100~149  (3) 150~199  (4) 200~249  (5) 250~299
(6) 300~349  (7) 350~399  (8)400~449  (9)450~499  (10) 500 or above

SQ 7. What year were you born? (       ) – [1200/1200]
References


