Exploring Strategies to Address the Prevalence of Islamophobia in America

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION & POLICY QUESTION

9/11 marked a notable rise in Islamophobia within American society that has since remained a prevailing reality. The prevalence of Islamophobia is problematic because it threatens the wellbeing of its targets, the Islamophobes themselves and American society as a whole. To its targets – Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim – Islamophobia can ultimately,

• motivate physical damage against their property and actual person;
• restrict their educational success, occupational achievement, and self image;
• and increase psychological distress, reduce happiness levels, and worsen health.

To Islamophobes, Islamophobia could:

• hinder their ability to work effectively in a pluralistic setting;
• and lower self-esteem and increase anxiety.

As for American society as a whole, Islamophobia:

• erodes national unity;
• signals a departure from our nation’s core value of e pluribus unum;
• and can spur mass murder and terrorism.

In light of Islamophobia’s corrosive potential, this paper explores the following policy question: What efforts are feasible and sustainable with respect to curbing Islamophobia among the American public? This paper has relevant implications for a range of actors across society, including but not limited to: 1) policymakers; 2) civil rights advocates; and 3) interfaith movements and organizations. This paper does not intend to present the ultimate, static solution to Islamophobia but rather seeks to 1) identify possible strategies towards addressing Islamophobia in America and 2) contribute a foundation for which societal problems like Islamophobia can begin to be addressed in an organized and strategic manner.

PREVALENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN POST-9/11 AMERICA

In order to identify effective strategies, it is imperative to understand the nature of the post-9/11 prevalence of Islamophobia. An examination of how Islamophobia has manifested and persisted in the American populace since 9/11 represents a first critical step in understanding its nature. Overall, Islamophobia has manifested in a wide range of forms, including but not limited to:

• Islamophobic public sentiments and opinions;
• Islamophobic media messages, particularly by right-wing sources;
• Islamophobic rhetoric by prominent politicians, other government officials and religious figures;
• Islamophobic talking points in the race for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination;
• grassroots organizations and think tanks that promote Islamophobic materials and messaging;
• an increase in Islamophobia-motivated hate groups after 9/11;
• 20 states have proposed anti-Sharia bills in their state legislatures;

1 The research, analysis, and strategies contained in this paper are the work of the student who authored the document, and do not represent the official or unofficial views of the Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University or the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC).
• Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Louisiana have passed anti-Sharia laws;
• 26 incidents of opposition to mosques and Islamic centers in the last 5-years;
• the use of Islamophobic training materials by the NYPD and FBI;
The nation also witnessed a notable increase in Islamophobic sentiments, rhetoric, and incidents in 2010.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PREVALENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA
It is also critical to identify the factors behind the current Islamophobia trend in America in order to fully grasp its nature and consequently identify effective strategies that target and reduce the potency of these factors. The following eleven factors have been cited as either associated with or promoting the current Islamophobia trend in America:
1. ignorance and misconceptions;
2. believing that Islam and Christianity lack similarities;
3. lacking an interpersonal relationship with a Muslim;
4. prejudice against Jews;
5. fear of terrorist attacks;
6. terrorist attacks and incidents related to the war on terror;
7. media;
8. Republican affiliation;
9. Evangelical Christian affiliation among white Americans;
10. religiosity;
11. and the Islamophobia Network.
These eleven factors are presented as a starting point to guide and focus efforts attempting to curb Islamophobia.

METHODOLOGY
The methodological approach towards identifying possible strategies consisted of the following:
1. an interventions matrix based on public health theoretical tools;
2. best practices within efforts to reduce the risk of cardiovascular disease and curb tobacco usage;
3. literature review of effective strategies in prejudice reduction;
4. case studies of past and present efforts by local communities, nonprofits and the federal government to reduce prejudice based on race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation on a local, state, national and even international level;
5. research on anti-Islamophobia efforts;
6. and interviews with seven experts.

IDENTIFIED STRATEGIES
This paper focused on the following five identified strategies directed at reducing American society’s general risk of becoming Islamophobic:
1. Invest in interfaith and intercultural leadership youth programs that involve Muslim youth and are driven by contact theory.
4. Implement an email and social media campaign to stop the 7 foundations’ funding of Islamophobia propaganda.

5. Provide CRS’ conflict resolution services to communities with Islamophobia related to tension or conflict.

As recommended by five of the interviewed experts, all of the identified strategies would benefit from coalition support.

**CRITERIA & ANALYSIS OF THE IDENTIFIED STRATEGIES**

The five strategies were further examined on the basis of a set of criteria as summarized below.

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<th>Address the Nature of Islamophobia</th>
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**MOVING FORWARD**

In moving forward with efforts to curb Islamophobia in America, additional research must be done to:

1. build upon and tailor the identified strategies to the specific temporal and societal environment in which they are to be implemented;

2. and identify other strategies targeting aspects of Islamophobia that were not targeted with the identified strategies presented in this paper.
INTRODUCTION & POLICY QUESTION

9/11 marked a notable rise in Islamophobia within American society that has since
remained a prevailing reality. For the purposes of this paper, I define Islamophobia as a
negative bias against Islam and/or Muslims expressed as hostile and discriminatory
perceptions, sentiments, attitudes, and behavior towards Muslims and those perceived to
be Muslim - including Sikhs, Arabs and South Asian Americans.¹ Questioning,
disagreeing with or critically analyzing Islam or Muslims is not necessarily
Islamophobic.² Just as Americans are not labeled anti-American for critiquing U.S.
policies, those who critique Islam or Muslims should also not be automatically labeled as
Islamophobes.³

The prevalence of Islamophobia is problematic because it threatens the wellbeing of its
targets, the Islamophobes themselves and American society as a whole. To Muslims and
others perceived to be Muslim, Islamophobia can ultimately motivate physical damage
against their property and their actual person.⁴ As a type of prejudice, Islamophobia also
threatens to restrict its targets’ “self image, educational success, occupational attainment,
mental health status and health status.”⁵ A 2010 study confirms some of these effects by
revealing that perceived Islamophobia-motivated “abuse and discrimination” is
associated with “increased psychological distress, reduced levels of happiness and worse
health status.”⁶ To Islamophobes, similar to the impact of racism on racists, Islamophobia
could ultimately hinder Islamophobes’ ability to work effectively in pluralistic settings
and could lead to “lower self-esteem and higher levels of anxiety.”⁷ As for society as a
whole, Islamophobia erodes national unity, signals a departure from our nation’s core
value of e pluribus unum, and has the potential, as a form of prejudice, to spur mass
murder and terrorism.⁸ Anders Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist who intended to “save
Europe from Marxism and ‘Muslimization,’” stands as proof of Islamophobia’s terrorism
potential.⁹ Islamophobia may also enable extremist groups like the Taliban and Al Qaeda
to recruit and carry out terrorist attacks for two reasons. First, Islamophobia can result in
the isolation and marginalization of its targets, which can leave them vulnerable and
receptive to radicalization.¹⁰ Second, Islamophobia perpetuates the notion that the West is
at war with Islam, which is a recruitment tactic used by such groups.¹¹

The client for this Master’s project is the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), a
policy advocacy nonprofit for the Muslim American community. MPAC is interested in
knowing the possible range of efforts that should be taken to prevent future backlash -

¹ This definition was adapted from the definition of prejudice defined by Elizabeth Levy Paluck and
Donald P. Green.
² “Same Hate, New Target: Islamophobia and Its Impact in the United States, January 2009-December
2010” 11
³ ibid 11
⁴ “Hate Crime Statistics 2010: Incidents and Offenses”
⁵ McKown, Clark 177
⁶ Padela, Aasim I. and Michele Heisler 284
⁷ McKown, Clark 177
⁸ Khera, Farhana 2; Paluck, Elizabeth Levy and Donald P. Green 343
⁹ Ali, Wajahat, et al. 1
¹⁰ Silke 112; Cilluffo, Frank J., Sharon L. Cardash, and Andrew J. Whitehead 114; Hanniman 274
¹¹ Cilluffo, Frank J., Sharon L. Cardash, and Andrew J. Whitehead 116; Ali, Wajahat, et al. 1
against Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim - if another domestic terrorist attack is implemented by a self-described Muslim. This paper explores possible strategies that have the potential to effectively reduce the current Islamophobia trend and minimize possible future resurgence: What efforts are feasible and sustainable with respect to curbing Islamophobia among the American public?

This paper begins with an examination of the nature of the post-9/11 prevalence of Islamophobia in America, specifically how and to what extent it has manifested along with what factors are cited as sources behind of the Islamophobia trend. Next, the methodology section details the analytical strategy used to identify possible strategies. A menu of strategy options is then presented through the lens of a set of evaluative criteria. This paper ultimately concludes with a discussion on next steps in addressing Islamophobia in America.

This project has relevant implications for a range of actors across society, including but not limited to: 1) policymakers who seek to maximize social welfare; 2) civil rights advocates across religious, racial, and ethnic minority communities who seek to combat bigotry; and 3) interfaith movements and organizations that seek to promote tolerance. This paper does not intend to present the ultimate, static solution to Islamophobia. Instead, the paper seeks to 1) identify possible strategies towards addressing Islamophobia in America and 2) contribute a foundation for which societal problems like Islamophobia can begin to be addressed in an organized and strategic manner.

**PREVALENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN POST-9/11 AMERICA**

This section presents an overview of how Islamophobia has manifested and persisted among the American populace since 9/11. Doing so is an imperative first step in comprehending the nature of the current Islamophobia trend – specifically its gravity and scope – which is critical in identifying effective strategies, geared towards curbing Islamophobia in America.

Since 9/11, Islamophobia has manifested in a wide range of forms, including Islamophobic sentiments and opinions. Poll results have generally exposed opinions of incompatibility between American and Islamic values; self-reported prejudice against Muslims and Islam; general negative opinions of Islam; general desires to limit Muslim Americans’ “civil and legal rights”;12 discomfort with Muslims Americans’ participation in the political process; and associations of violence, terrorism, untrustworthiness, extremism and fanaticism with Muslims and Islam. For example,

- 58% of respondents in a 2006 ABC News/Washington Post poll reported that Islam “produces more violent extremists than other religions.”13
- In a 2009 Gallup poll, Americans expressed the most prejudice toward Muslims relative to Christians, Jews and Buddhist;14

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12 “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 172
13 ibid 164
14 “Religious Perceptions in America: With an In-Depth Analysis of U.S. Attitudes Towards Muslims and Islam” 18
• In a 2010 ABC News/Washington Post poll, only 37% of Americans held a favorable opinion of Islam.\textsuperscript{15}

Other manifestations of Islamophobia include but are not limited to:
• Islamophobic media messages, particularly by right-wing sources;\textsuperscript{16}
• Islamophobic rhetoric by prominent politicians, other government officials and religious figures;\textsuperscript{17}
• Islamophobic talking points in the race for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination;\textsuperscript{18}
• grassroots organizations and think tanks that promote Islamophobic materials and messaging;\textsuperscript{19}
• an increase in Islamophobia-motivated hate groups after 9/11;\textsuperscript{20}
• 20 states have proposed anti-Sharia bills in their state legislatures;\textsuperscript{21}
• Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Louisiana have passed anti-Sharia laws;\textsuperscript{22}
• 26 incidents of opposition to mosques and Islamic centers\textsuperscript{23} in the last 5-years;\textsuperscript{24}
• the use of Islamophobic training materials by the NYPD and FBI;\textsuperscript{25}
• harassment and discrimination against Muslim, Sikh, Arab and South Asian Americans in the work place;\textsuperscript{26}
• harassment and discrimination against Muslim, Sikh, Arab and South Asian American youth in school;\textsuperscript{27}
• and an increase in anti-Islam motivated hate crimes in 2001 and again in 2010.\textsuperscript{28}

The nation also witnessed a notable increase in Islamophobic sentiments, rhetoric, and incidents in 2010.\textsuperscript{29} According to an ABC News/Washington Post poll, 49 percent of Americans held “an unfavorable view of Islam” in 2010 compared to 39 percent in 2002 - a 10 percent increase.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly, polls from 2003 to 2010 highlight that “since 2005, the percentage of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans who held favorable views of

\textsuperscript{15} Ali, Wajahat, et al. 6
\textsuperscript{17} Khera, Farhana 5; Ali, Wajahat, et al. 109; Lepeska, David; Shane, Scott
\textsuperscript{18} Lepeska, David; Shane, Scott, Ali, Wajahat. Personal Interview. 17 Mar. 2012.
\textsuperscript{19} Ali, Wajahat, et al. 63-66; Smith, Ben
\textsuperscript{20} Khera, Farhana 3/4; Smith, Ben; “Intelligence Files: Anti-Muslim”
\textsuperscript{21} Ali, Wajahat, et al. 38; Elliot Andrea
\textsuperscript{22} ibid
\textsuperscript{23} As described by the ACLU, opposition has manifested as criminal acts like vandalism and efforts to block the obtainment of zoning permits.
\textsuperscript{24} Ghosh, Bobby; “Map – Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity;” Goodstein, Laurie; Murphy, Laura W. and Michael W. Macleod-Ball 6
\textsuperscript{25} Ackerman, Spencer; Goode, Erica; Hawley, Chris; Khera, Farhana 5
\textsuperscript{26} Khera, Farhana 13; Murphy, Laura W. and Michael W. Macleod-Ball 4; “ADC Releases Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans”
\textsuperscript{27} Khera, Farhana 15/6; “ADC Releases Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans.”
\textsuperscript{28} Khera, Farhana 9/10; Schevitz, Tanya; “ADC Releases Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab Americans;” “Hate Crimes on the Rise in 2011: According to FBI”
\textsuperscript{29} Khera, Farhana 2
\textsuperscript{30} Ali, Wajahat, et al. 63
Islam has declined rapidly.”

During 2010, the nation also experienced the “Ground Zero Mosque” controversy and became aware of Pastor Terry Jones’ plans to burn copies of the Qur’an. Finally, the FBI’s 2010 Hate Crime statistics revealed a 50 percent increase in “anti-Islamic” motivated hate crimes since 2009. This is particularly notable given that “anti-Islamic” motivated hate crimes have been consistently above pre-2001 levels.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PREVELEANCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA

It is also critical to identify the factors behind the current Islamophobia trend in America in order to fully grasp its nature and consequently identify effective strategies that target and reduce the potency of these factors. This section therefore highlights eleven factors that have been cited as either associated with or promoting the current Islamophobia trend in America. This list is not meant to be exhaustive nor is each listed factor a definitive catalyst of Islamophobia in America. Given the limitations of research and the reality that Islamophobia is not attributable to a single source, these eleven factors are presented as a starting point to guide and focus efforts attempting to curb Islamophobia.

IGNORANCE & MISCONCEPTIONS

Islamophobia is commonly attributed to the acceptance of misconceptions in the absence of genuine information on Islam and/or Muslims. Ignorance alone does not automatically give rise to negative prejudice like Islamophobia. In a state of pure ignorance, devoid of any information, Americans are believed to not harbor any prejudice. In fact, “in the absence of contrary information, people tend to assume that what others say is true, and that unfamiliar objects and people in our environment are good.” Only by learning misconceptions can prejudice, particularly extreme prejudice, emerge.

BELIEVING THAT ISLAM & CHRISTIANITY LACK SIMILARITIES

In a 2009 Gallup poll, respondents who disagreed with the statement that Islamic and Christian beliefs are ‘basically the same’ were ‘nearly five times as likely to self-report a
great deal’ of prejudice towards Muslims.”\textsuperscript{41} The same poll found that only 29 percent of Americans agreed that Islamic and Christian beliefs are ‘basically the same.’\textsuperscript{42}

**Lacking an Interpersonal Relationship with a Muslim**
According to the same poll, Gallup found that respondents who did not personally know a Muslim were twice as likely to report “a great deal” of prejudice against Muslims.\textsuperscript{43} As of 2009, approximately 47 percent of Americans fell within this category. However, having an interpersonal relationship with a Muslim was not found to cancel out the emergence of Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{44} This suggests that social interaction with Muslims may not be sufficient to overcome Islamophobia in the presence of misinformation about Islam.\textsuperscript{45}

**Prejudice against Jews**
Gallup has found that reported prejudice against Jews was associated with reported prejudice against Muslims. Respondents who reported a “a great deal” of prejudice — or extreme prejudice — toward Jews are about 32 times as likely to report feeling “a great deal” of prejudice toward Muslims.\textsuperscript{46} Conversely, no reported prejudice against Jews was noted to be “the attitude most strongly associated with no self-reported prejudice toward Muslims.”\textsuperscript{47} No reported prejudice against Christians was also found to be associated with no prejudice against Muslims, yet to a lesser extent.\textsuperscript{48}

**Fear of Terrorist attacks**
Fear and feeling threatened by terrorist attacks is associated with negative perceptions of Muslims. A 2008 study found that “increased fear of terrorist attacks leads to greater support for restrictions on Muslim Americans.”\textsuperscript{49} Neuropsychology and prejudice literature attests to this association. Neuropsychology highlights the primacy of emotions, like fear, over rationality in moral reasoning along with the role of accumulated stress and emotional responses to threats in the creation of stereotypes.\textsuperscript{50} Prejudice literature also points to fear and feelings of being threatened as sources of prejudice.\textsuperscript{51}

**Terrorist attacks and Incidents Related to the War on Terror**
Terrorist attacks by self-described Muslims and incidents related to the War on Terror are thought to stir Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{52} Events related to the War on Terror in particular are

\textsuperscript{41} ibid 14  
\textsuperscript{42} ibid 14  
\textsuperscript{43} ibid 16  
\textsuperscript{44} ibid 14  
\textsuperscript{45} ibid 18  
\textsuperscript{46} ibid 12  
\textsuperscript{47} ibid 15  
\textsuperscript{48} ibid 15  
\textsuperscript{49} “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 192  
\textsuperscript{50} Tutt, Daniel  
\textsuperscript{51} Stephan, Walter G. and Cookie White Stephan. 25  
\textsuperscript{52} Nimer, Mohamed 63; “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 173
thought to perpetuate the Islamophobia-inducing notion that Islam is at war with the United States. For example, there was a notable spike in American’s unfavorable opinion of Islam in March 2006, which coincided with a spike in sectarian violence in Iraq. Even news like the assassination of Osama Bin Laden, can worsen public opinion of Muslim Americans. In the wake of Bin Laden’s death, researchers specifically found that media attention on Bin Laden’s death resulted in:

- Americans viewing Muslim Americans as more threatening;
- a significant decline in positive perceptions of Muslim Americans;
- Americans were less likely to oppose restrictions of civil liberties on Muslim Americans;
- increased resentment against Muslim Americans;
- greater perceived differences between Muslim Americans and the rest of American society;
- and reduced willingness to interact with Muslims.

It is important to note that the extent to which these events stir Islamophobia may be a function of the amount of media attention these events receive.

**MEDIA**

The media has played a significant role in promoting negative stereotypes of Muslims, Arabs, and Islam that generally perpetuate “fear or perceived threat of [a] terrorist attack.” Within the entertainment industry, over 200 post-9/11 movies “have portrayed Arabs and Muslims in prejudicial dialogues.” As for television entertainment, the majority of Arab and Muslim characters from 2001 to about 2006 were in some way connected to violence “and were featured primarily in plots involving torture or terrorism.” Within television news, coverage of Islam is significantly negatively. According to Media Tenor, a research organization that monitors and analyzes media content, the tone of television coverage of statements about Islam, between January and August 2009, was “twice as likely to be negative than the statements made about Christianity.” Media Tenor also found that, during that same time period, “two-thirds of the television coverage about Islam associate[d] Muslims with extremism.” Among television news sources, Fox News plays a prominent role in promoting Islamophobia. The Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) found a

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53 “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 174
54 ibid 164
56 “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 164
57 ibid 175
58 Tutt, Daniel
59 “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 177
60 “Religious Perceptions in America: With an In-Depth Analysis of U.S. Attitudes Towards Muslims and Islam” 9
61 ibid 9
62 ibid 9
significant correlation between trust in Fox News and negative attitudes about Muslims. Americans who most trust Fox News are more likely to believe that Muslims want to establish Shari’a law, have not done enough to oppose extremism, and believe investigating Muslim extremism is a good idea. There are even differences among Republicans and white evangelicals who trust Fox news most and those who trust other media.63

In contrast to television, newspaper coverage is thought to be “associated with less stereotyping of Muslim Americans and increased knowledge and familiarity with Islam.”64 In fact, researchers found that ‘heavier television news users sustained a higher level of negative emotional reactions to the terrorist attacks than heavier newspaper users.’65

**Republican Affiliation**

Pew and Gallup poll results reveal that Republicans, especially more conservative Republicans, are more likely to harbor Islamophobic sentiments than others. For example, a 2005 Pew poll found that, a majority (51%) of Republican conservatives had an unfavorable opinion of Islam, a number 25 and 17 percentage points higher than the numbers for both moderate, conservative, and liberal Democrats, respectively. A full 37% of Republican conservatives expressed an unfavorable opinion toward Muslim Americans specifically, again almost 20 percentage points higher than conservative/moderate Democrats, liberal Democrats, and liberal/moderate Republicans.66

In addition, a 2011 Gallup poll found that unlike a majority of independents and Democrats, only 43 percent of Republicans thought Muslims were ‘supportive of the United States.’67

**Evangelical Christian Affiliation Among White Americans**

Poll results also reveal that white evangelical Christians are more likely than others to harbor Islamophobic sentiments. For example, a 2005 Pew poll found that “white evangelical respondents were 38% more likely than white Protestants, and 62% more likely than secular respondents, to express unfavorable opinions of Islam generally.”68 White evangelicals were also found to be 79 percent more likely than white Protestants and 92 percent more likely than secular respondents to report, “Islam promotes violence more than other faiths.”69 A 2011 PRRI poll also revealed that, “more than any other group, white evangelicals (62%) report that Muslim Americans have not done enough to

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63 “Survey | Majority say Congress Hearings on Alleged Extremism in American Muslim Community ‘Good Idea’”
64 ibid 182
65 ibid 176
66 “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 180
67 Newport, Frank
68 “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 181
69 ibid 181
oppose extremism.” However, research by the PRRI suggests a generational divide among white evangelicals’ perceptions of Muslim religion and culture, with younger white evangelicals showing greater acceptance of Muslims within American society. For example, 51 percent “of younger white evangelicals feel comfortable with a group of Muslim men kneeling to pray in an airport, compared to 40% of older white evangelicals.”

**Religiosity**

Studies and polls provide mixed conclusions about the association between religiosity and Islamophobia. Some studies suggest that Christian religiosity may be associated with support for restrictions on Muslim Americans’ civil liberties. However, there are mixed results as to whether levels of support for restrictions vary across Christian denomination. A 1982 study found that the differences are essentially nonexistent while a 1984 study found evidence suggesting that differences exist between “Catholic, mainline Protestant, and conservative Protestant denominations.” In addition, two different studies found that increased frequency of church attendance was associated with increased support for restrictions of civil liberties across all denominations. In contrast, Gallup found that, religiosity, regardless of particular faith, does not necessarily lead to “having negative opinions about people of another faith.” According to a 2009 Gallup poll, attending a religious service less than once a week was associated with reports of “a great deal of prejudice” against Muslims while more frequent attendance of a religious service – i.e. more than once a week – was associated with reports of “no prejudice.”

**Islamophobia Network**

The “Islamophobia Network,” as labeled and researched by the Center for American Progress (CAP), essentially consists of three groups of interconnected, Islamophobia-promoting actors: 1) foundations, 2) “misinformation experts,” and 3) the “echo chamber.” As a unit, CAP believes that the network is the key source behind the rise and mainstreaming of the post-9/11 Islamophobia trend given its production and dissemination of Islamophobia propaganda.

CAP has listed seven top foundations that represent “the lifeblood of the Islamophobia network in America.” These foundations have provided a total of $42.6 million in

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70 “Survey | Majority say Congress Hearings on Alleged Extremism in American Muslim Community ‘Good Idea’”
71 “Younger White Evangelicals Express Comfort With Muslim Religion, Culture.”
72 ibid
73 “Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use” 179
74 ibid 180
75 ibid 180
76 “Religious Perceptions in America: With an In-Depth Analysis of U.S. Attitudes Towards Muslims and Islam” 5
77 ibid 14 & 17
78 For a list of the individuals and organizations specifically listed by CAP as members of the network, please refer to Appendix A
79 Ali, Wajahat, et al. 9
80 ibid 3
funding, between 2001 and 2009, to the “misinformation experts” – i.e. prominent Islamophobia-spreading figures, academics and activists – through the think tanks and grassroots organizations these experts have formed and work within.\textsuperscript{81} This funding has enabled the misinformation experts to manufacture and spread Islamophobia propaganda through books, websites, blogs, films, reports, and other mediums.\textsuperscript{82} For example, in 2008, Donors Capital donated more than $17 million to the Clarion Fund which helped the organization pay for the distribution of more than 28 million DVD copies of “Obsession: Radial Islam’s War Against the West.”\textsuperscript{83} CAP notes, however, that the funding may not always be directly intended to promote Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{84} A majority of the time, “the support provided is for general purpose use,” which the think tanks and grassroots organizations then use for the promotion of Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{85}

As for the misinformation experts, CAP highlights five as the leading figures responsible for generating the majority of Islamophobic misinformation. The misinformation produced by these experts has been used as talking points and elaborated upon by other misinformation experts; Islamophobia-promoting think tanks and grassroots organizations; and those with the “echo chamber” – right wing figures, organizations, politicians, and media outlets.\textsuperscript{86} All the misinformation experts have generally echoed, supported, and maintained close connections with one another. For example, David Yerushalmi is Pamela Geller’s personal attorney while Geller has promoted Yerushalmi’s anti-Sharia legislation movement through various state campaigns.\textsuperscript{87}

Finally, the echo chamber, as a whole, further disseminates the islamophobic messages created by the misinformation experts. A range of right wing figures and groups fall within the echo chamber, including Pat Robertson and the Christian Broadcasting Network, who have added Islamophobia to their conservative platform.\textsuperscript{88} As for media outlets, CAP has identified various websites, blogs, radio stations, magazines, television news shows and newspapers that have either “echoed” Islamophobic rhetoric and/or are actively used by misinformation experts to amplify their messages.\textsuperscript{89} For instance, during the Park51 controversy, Rush Limbaugh used his show to disseminate strong criticism of the center while Geller, a misinformation expert, was said to have “introduced the controversy” through her blog, Atlas Shrugs.\textsuperscript{90} As for the political players, these Republican politicians, whom CAPS has identified at the local, state and national level, have strategically promoted Islamophobia as a means to “raise campaign funds and get voters to the polls.”\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{81} ibid 3, 13
\textsuperscript{82} ibid 13
\textsuperscript{83} ibid 109
\textsuperscript{84} ibid 13
\textsuperscript{85} ibid 13
\textsuperscript{86} ibid 27
\textsuperscript{87} ibid 91
\textsuperscript{88} ibid 78
\textsuperscript{89} ibid 85
\textsuperscript{90} ibid 92, 102
\textsuperscript{91} ibid 109
METHODOLOGY
The methodological approach towards identifying possible strategies consisted of the following:
1. an interventions matrix based on public health theoretical tools;
2. best practices within efforts to reduce the risk of cardiovascular disease and curb tobacco usage;
3. literature review of effective strategies in prejudice reduction;
4. case studies of past and present efforts by local communities, nonprofits and the federal government to reduce prejudice based on race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation on a local, state, national and even international level;
5. research on anti-Islamophobia efforts;
6. and interviews with seven experts.

1: INTERVENTIONS MATRIX BASED ON PUBLIC HEALTH THEORETICAL TOOLS
Public health provides useful theoretical tools through which to begin to conceptualize and identify appropriate strategies to counter emerging and continuing large-scale threats to populations’ wellbeing, like Islamophobia.92 Although Islamophobia is not a traditional public health threat, public health tools have been utilized to address other non-traditional societal threats like youth violence, juvenile delinquency, cyber security and terrorism.93 In addition, public health’s history of successful interventions – e.g. curbing tobacco usage – attests to the field’s overall “problem solving capacity” to effectively address threats to populations’ wellbeing.94

The below interventions matrix was created using the social-ecological model and Gordon’s classification system to facilitate the identification of strategies across a broad range of intervention points. The matrix was purposely designed to serve as an idealistic framework for a comprehensive set of strategies that would counter Islamophobia in a multi-pronged manner. Although impractical for the purposes of real world implementation, this matrix served as a useful starting point in attempting to address societal problems like Islamophobia in an organized and strategic fashion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISLAMOPHOBIA INTERVENTIONS MATRIX</th>
<th>LEVELS OF INFLUENCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
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<td>Relationships &amp;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Societal Factors</td>
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<td>Public Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMERICAN SOCIETY</td>
<td>Universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO RISK</td>
<td>Selective - Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selective – White Evangelical Christians</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selective – Fox News devotees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamophobes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92 The Future of Public Health 1
93 As described by Dahlberg, Linda L. and Etienne G. Krug; Foster, Morris W. and Jesse W. Butler; and The Future of Public Health
94 The Future of Public Health 35; The Future of Public Health in the 21st Century XV
The x-axis of the table, Levels of Influence, was adapted from the social-ecological model\(^95\) – a tool used to conceptualize the range of risk factors associated with promoting the development of a public health threat and generating an associated multipronged set of preventive interventions to counter the threat. Social-ecological models are centered on the notion that risk factors are interconnected and arise within multiple levels of physical and social contexts.\(^96\) Consequently, social-ecological models implicate that altering one or more of these levels of influence can ultimately lead to reducing the risk of developing the public health threat.\(^97\) Social-ecological models typically consist of four general, interconnected levels - individual; interpersonal relationships; community settings; and society.\(^98\) These four levels of influence were adapted for Islamophobia as follows:

1. Individual: This level refers to the individual level characteristics - such as attitudes, emotions and beliefs – that are associated with promoting Islamophobia for an individual.\(^99\) From the list of eleven cited factors, this would include ignorance and misconceptions; religiosity; believing Islam and Christianity lack similarities; harboring prejudice against Jews; and fear of terrorist attacks.

2. Interpersonal Relationships & Networks: This level refers to social, family and community networks; the interpersonal relationships these networks generate and sustain; and living and work conditions that influence Islamophobic sentiments, attitudes, behaviors, etc.\(^100\) Examples include lacking an interpersonal relationship with a Muslim, Republican affiliation, and Evangelical Christian affiliation among white Americans.

3. Societal Factors: This level refers to the broad social, economic, cultural, health and environmental factors that affect American society as a whole and have the potential to spur Islamophobia.\(^101\) This includes the Islamophobia Network; terrorist attacks and incidents related to the war on terror; the media; the “misinformation experts” and their organizations; right wing figures and their organizations; and republican politicians.

4. Public Policy: This level refers to the policies at the local, state, and national levels that influence Islamophobic sentiments, attitudes or behaviors. While none of the eleven identified factors fall within this category, the importance of considering policy options to address Islamophobia prompted the creation of a public policy cell.\(^102\)

The y-axis of the table, American Society Classified According to Risk, was adapted from Robert S. Gordon’s classification system for preventive programs seeking to counter medical public health threats.\(^103\) Gordon’s system is used to identify interventions

\(^{95}\) For more information on the Social-Ecological Model, please refer to Appendix B

\(^{96}\) The Future of Public Health in the 21st Century 51

\(^{97}\) McKown, Clark 179


\(^{99}\) adapted from “The Social-Ecological Model: A Framework for Prevention”

\(^{100}\) adapted from Dahlbeg, Linda L. and Etienne G. Krug 287; The Future of Public Health in the 21st Century 52

\(^{101}\) adapted from The Future of Public Health in the 21st Century 52

\(^{102}\) Professor Kurt Ribisl brought this to my attention and recommended that I do so for this project.

\(^{103}\) For more information on Gordon’s classification system, please refer to Appendix C
tailored to three general categories of the population – universal, selective and indicated. The universal interventions target the population as a whole and focus on minimizing the risk of developing a disease for the entire population rather than minimizing the risk of only high-risk people. Selective interventions target those within the population that have an above average risk of developing the disease and seek to reduce their respective elevated risk. Indicated interventions target those who are at extremely high risk of developing a disease and seek to reduce their respective risk. These three categories were adapted for Islamophobia as follows:

1. Universal: this level focuses on strategies tailored for American society as a whole, which is not assumed Islamophobic. Instead, I assume that American society as a whole faces a general risk of developing Islamophobia given existing societal factors. These strategies would therefore focus on reducing American society’s general risk of becoming Islamophobic.

2. Selective: this level focuses on strategies that would reduce risk for segments of society who have an above average risk of becoming Islamophobic. I define those who have above average risk as those who face general societal risk factors along with additional risk factors within the individual and/or interpersonal relationships and networks level. Given the eleven identified factors associated with Islamophobia, I have made broken down the selective level into three categories: Republicans, white Evangelical Christians and Fox News devotees.

3. Islamophobes: straying completely from Gordon’s originally definition of indicated, this level focuses on strategies that would reduce the Islamophobia of the “misinformation experts” and other generally recognized Islamophobes.

2: Best Practices From Efforts to Reduce the Risk of Cardiovascular Disease and Curb Tobacco Usage

The second step in identifying possible strategies was reviewing the effective efforts used to reduce the risk of cardiovascular disease and curb tobacco usage - two highly noted, successful public health interventions. For cardiovascular disease efforts, the Stanford Three-Community Study and the Stanford Five-City Project programs were examined. For tobacco usage efforts, general effective strategies, primarily from school-based interventions, were examined. Altogether, these best practices highlight what preventive approaches are effective and provide general strategies as to how to counter rises in Islamophobia. Together, these efforts highlight the following lessons:

- Comprehensive interventions that consist of multiple strategies that target a range of different intervention points are effective.
- Mass media strategies may be more effective if they entail more than the dissemination of general information, utilize multiple channels of communication, and include “face-to-face” instruction.
- Theory-based interventions may have a higher probability of effectiveness.

104 Gordon, Robert S. 107
105 The Future of Public Health in the 21st Century 72
106 ibid 72
107 ibid 72
108 Reducing Risks for Mental Disorders: Frontiers for Preventative Intervention Research 34
109 35
• Involving multiple stakeholders may enhance effectiveness.\textsuperscript{110}
• Utilizing social influences can be effective in shaping risky behavior.\textsuperscript{111}
• Enacting regulations and laws can be effective in shaping risky behavior.\textsuperscript{112}

3: \textbf{LITERATURE REVIEW OF EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES IN PREJUDICE REDUCTION}

The third step involved conducting a literature review of effective prejudice reduction strategies. Given that Islamophobia is a type of prejudice, it is necessary to have an understanding of what works in prejudice reduction. A literature review revealed theory-driven strategies that have shown some level of effectiveness, including intergroup interactions based on contact theory. These strategies are based on contact theory, which suggests that intergroup interaction can reduce prejudice if the following four conditions exist:

1. equal status between the out-group and majority members;
2. meaningful cooperation on a task or activity in achieving a common goal(s);
3. support of the intergroup contact by authority figures or local norms;
4. “personalized acquaintance,” or the opportunity for participants to get to know each other on a personal level and become friends.\textsuperscript{113}

This strategy has proven effective in the work place and school settings.\textsuperscript{114} However, Intergroup interaction is not without its respective set of weaknesses in 1) internal validity, or its ability to reduce and sustain reductions in prejudicial attitudes, emotions and behavior and/or 2) external validity, or the ability to generate the same outcomes in another setting. Overall, prejudice reduction literature does not yet provide a definitive answer as to what interventions most effectively reduce prejudice.\textsuperscript{115} Nor does the literature illustrate “whether, when, and why interventions reduce prejudice in the world.”\textsuperscript{116} Nonetheless, the following strategies are informative in addressing Islamophobia.

4: \textbf{CASE STUDIES OF EFFORTS TO REDUCE PREJUDICE & ASSOCIATED TENSION}

The fourth step entailed examining past and ongoing efforts by local communities, nonprofits and the federal government to reduce prejudice against racial/ethnic groups, religious groups, and the LGBT community and mitigate its associated tension on a local, state, national and even international level. In regards to efforts by local communities and nonprofits, these efforts can be summarized as three general categories: 1) monitoring media coverage, maintaining media relations, and producing documentaries to promote dialogue on race; 2) providing anti-bias teaching and educational materials; and 3) providing diversity/cultural sensitivity training, facilitated dialogues and other training for employees, law enforcement, educators, students, youth and community members. Most of these efforts have been cited as effective with the backing of awards, recognition and/or anecdotal evidence. Few efforts have proven effective through rigorous evaluations.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} ibid 37
\item \textsuperscript{111} The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 74
\item \textsuperscript{112} ibid 75
\item \textsuperscript{113} Oskamp 9
\item \textsuperscript{114} Paluck, Elizabeth Levy and Donald P. Green 346; McKown, Clark 182
\item \textsuperscript{115} Paluck, Elizabeth Levy and Donald P. Green 352
\item \textsuperscript{116} ibid 360
\end{itemize}
As for the federal government, notable efforts have come from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Relations Services (CRS). CRS’ mission is to assist communities with preventing and addressing:

1. “racial and ethnic tensions, incidents, and civil disorders, and in restoring racial stability and harmony,”\(^{117}\)
2. and “alleged violent hate crimes committed on the basis of actual or perceived race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion or disability.”\(^{118}\)

Specifically, CRS provides state and local governments, community groups, nonprofits and private organizations with trained, conflict resolution experts to provide any of the following services:

1. mediation of conflicts or disputes;
2. conciliation services;
3. community outreach activities;
4. training in cultural competence;
5. enhanced dialogue and communication among involved parties;
6. conflict resolution skills;
7. expert advice and materials appropriate for addressing the situation;
8. assistance to schools, colleges and universities;
9. Student Problem Identification and Resolution of Issues Together (SPIRIT) Programs for school settings;
10. facilitation in developing strategies to prevent and resolve conflicts.”\(^{119}\)

Examples of CRS interventions during the 2010 fiscal year include:

- facilitating a work session between local, state and federal officials and Sikh community leaders in Columbia, South Carolina in response to increased racial tension spurred by reports that a State government official had called a fellow South Asian government official, Nikki Haley, a “rag-head.”\(^{120}\) The session aided Sikh leaders in prioritizing issues affecting the Sikh American community, developing solutions and associated strategies.\(^{121}\) CRS also facilitated a Sikh community forum in which over 160 Sikhs attended.\(^{122}\)
- Facilitating “the Staten Island Hate Crimes Forum alongside the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, the New York Police Department (NYPD) Hate Crimes Task Office, and the State Island District Attorney’s Office.”\(^{123}\) CRS assistance was requested in response to a string of alleged hate crimes and incidents targeting Mexican, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals.\(^{124}\) CRS also assisted with the launching of the “We ARE Staten Island” public campaign, which sought to disseminate and obtain information that would

\(^{117}\) “The Community Relations Service: About the Office”
\(^{118}\) ibid
\(^{119}\) “Annual Report Fiscal Year 2010” 24
\(^{120}\) ibid 12
\(^{121}\) “Annual Report Fiscal Year 2010” 12
\(^{122}\) ibid 12
\(^{123}\) ibid 11
\(^{124}\) ibid11
aid in resolving the hate incidents. The campaign was noted to have “increased youth engagement, education and community policing.”

CRS also provides a variety of resources for communities on its website, such as law enforcement training curriculum on hate crimes; law enforcement training curriculum on Sikhism called “On Common Ground;” Arab and Muslim cultural awareness called “The First Three to Five Seconds;” and “Twenty plus things law enforcement agencies can do to prevent or respond to hate incidents against Arab-Americans, Muslims, and Sikhs.”

5: ANTI-ISLAMOPHOBIA EFFORTS
The fifth step consisted of reviewing current anti-Islamophobia efforts, including those by the interfaith organization Shoulder-to-Shoulder and Unity Productions Foundation (UPF). Most of their efforts do not involve a performance measurement or evaluation component, which makes evaluation of their respective efforts difficult to ascertain. Shoulder-to-Shoulder focuses on three general strategies, including advocacy work with a current focus of meeting with the Department of Justice and the FBI to address incidents of surveillance of Muslim Americans and the use of Islamophobic training materials. Shoulder-to-Shoulder is also currently working in collaboration with a law firm to create memorandums on anti-Sharia state legislation. Each memorandum would be tailored to the respective piece of legislation and would be provided to local interfaith communities to educate them on the respective bill and serve as talking points in their efforts to oppose the bill. Of UPF’s efforts, two are of particular note – the provision of advice and storylines related to Muslims and Islam to the entertainment industry through its MOST Resource Center and its 20,000 dialogues project.

6: INTERVIEWS WITH EXPERTS
To further supplement this research, interviews were conducted with experts on public health, public policy, civil rights advocacy and Islamophobia along with prominent figures within the Muslim American community. Discussions with these individuals provided constructive feedback on the methodological approach for this paper and the identified strategies. The following seven experts were interviewed:

1. Christina Warner – Campaign Director at Shoulder-to-Shoulder Campaign.
2. Faiz Shakir - CAP expert on media and politics, vice president at American Progress and Editor-in-Chief of ThinkProgress.org.
3. Professor Kurt Ribisl - Professor of Public Health whose research interests includes health behavior and tobacco control policy.

125 ibid
126 “Community Relations Services: Publications and Resources”
128 ibid
129 ibid
130 To see the notes from the interview with Christina Warner, please refer to Appendix D
131 To see the notes from the interview with Faiz Shakir, please refer to Appendix E
132 “Experts: Faiz Shakir”
133 To see the notes from the interviews with Professor Kurt Ribisl, please refer to Appendix F and Appendix G
134 “UNC School of Public Health – Kurt Ribisl, PhD”
4. Michael Lieberman\textsuperscript{135} – Washington Counsel and Director of the Civil Rights Policy Planning Center for the Anti-Defamation League.

5. Professor Sherman James\textsuperscript{136} - Professor of Public Policy; Sociology; Community and Family Medicine; and African American Studies.\textsuperscript{137} James’ research interests include Social Policy and Race/Ethnicity.\textsuperscript{138}

6. Wajahat Ali\textsuperscript{139} - Essayist, attorney and co-author of the CAP’s Fear Inc.” report.

7. Imam Zaid Shakir\textsuperscript{140} - Prominent Islamic scholar and figure in the Muslim American community with a history of grassroots community activism.\textsuperscript{141}

IDENTIFIED STRATEGIES
Below is a summary of the possible range of strategies identified through the previously stated research methodology.

\textsuperscript{135} To see the notes from the interview with Michael Lieberman, please refer to Appendix H
\textsuperscript{136} To see the notes from the interview with Professor Sherman James, please refer to Appendix I
\textsuperscript{137} “People – Sanford School of Public Policy – Sherman A. James”
\textsuperscript{138} ibid
\textsuperscript{139} To see the notes from the interviews with Wajahat Ali, please refer to Appendix J and Appendix K
\textsuperscript{140} To see the notes from the interview with Imam Zaid Shakir, please refer to Appendix L
\textsuperscript{141} “About Imam Zaid Shakir”
I ultimately decided to focus on the numbered strategies in red within the universal level for two reasons. First, universal level interventions, as highlighted by Professor Ribisl, generally produce the maximal societal benefit because they focus on reducing the risk of a public health threat for the society as a whole rather than for specific high-risk
people. Second, I decided to exclude the strategies within the individual, universal level because of the voluntary and impractical nature of these skill-building strategies. Although feasible to conduct, such individual level, skill-building strategies would require voluntary participation, which could have a tendency to draw those with minimal of developing Islamophobic sentiments, perceptions, attitudes and/or behavior. There may therefore be little benefit in conducting these strategies relative to resources costs. In addition, theses strategies would ultimately be conducted in a laboratory type setting which calls into question the practically of implementation.

As mentioned by Professor Sherman James, Michael Lieberman, Imam Zaid Shakir, Wajahat Ali and Faiz Shakir, all of the identified strategies would benefit from coalition support. Working with coalition partners would not only allow for resource-cost sharing but could also mainstream the fight against Islamophobia as part of the overall fight against bigotry and prejudice. Mainstreaming the fight against Islamophobia is particularly important in regards to promoting awareness of the problem and ultimately reversing the current social norm of Islamophobia as a socially acceptable form of discrimination and bigotry. Allies should be sought from prominent groups representing racial minority communities along with civil rights advocacy and anti-bigotry groups. Potential allies include the ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, Anti-Defamation League, the National Council of La Raza, Color of Change, the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Japanese American Citizens League and the Leadership Conference of Civil and Human Rights. Coalition partners should also be sought within religious communities, academia and the media. Politicians, both Democrats and Republicans, along with public figures in addition to Jon Stewart and Keith Olbermann should also be engaged.

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE IDENTIFIED STRATEGIES
The selected universal level strategies were further examined on the basis of the following set of criteria:

- **Readily available.** The strategy can be feasibly implemented in the short-term given the existence of ongoing programmatic efforts or the possibility of preparation work taking no more than one year.
- **Effective in reducing Islamophobia.** The strategy is proven to reduce Islamophobic sentiments, perceptions, attitudes and/or behavior.
- **Address the nature of Islamophobia.** The strategy specifically addresses a manifestation and/or a factor associated with promoting Islamophobia.
- **Lacks insurmountable resource barriers.** The resources – i.e. funding, staffing, time and other costs – required to implement and sustain the effort are practical and

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142 Ribisl, Kurt. Personal Interview. 15 Mar. 2012; The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 47
146 ibid
147 Adapted from “C.L.E.A.R. P.E.A.R.L” - criteria used to assess policy option for alternative tobacco price regulation - as developed by Kurt M. Ribisl, Todd Rodgers and Maggie Mahoney.
148 ibid
do not create insurmountable barriers in regards to implementation. Given that this paper is not structured to provide strategies tailored for a particular implementer in mind, this criterion will generally be presented as ambiguous. However, I include this criterion to serve as a means to discuss the possible required resources associated with implementation.

It is important to note two general limitations of this set of criteria – its generic nature and the difficulty of ascertaining the effectiveness of a single strategy within a vacuum. As for the first issue, this set of criteria was purposely designed to be generic given the absence two critical details: 1) a particular implementing entity(ies) and 2) the specific temporal context in which the strategies would be implemented. Given its generic nature, this set of criteria is limited in its ability to facilitate a thorough analysis comparable to that done with a set of criteria designed with specificity. As for the second issue, as highlighted by Michael Lieberman, it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of a single strategy when a single anti-prejudice strategy is generally not effective if done in isolation.\textsuperscript{149} For example, efforts to counter anti-Sharia bills may not be as effective if the respective community does not have anti-prejudice materials available to mitigate an Islamophobic atmosphere conducive to the creation of such state legislation.\textsuperscript{150} According to Michael Lieberman, individual strategies should therefore be seen all together as one interconnected pieces.\textsuperscript{151} While these limitations should not be ignored, this set of criteria, nonetheless, provides an analytical lens through which to begin to critically examine efforts to curb Islamophobia.

ANALYSIS OF THE IDENTIFIED STRATEGIES

STRATEGY 1: INVEST IN INTERFAITH & INTERCULTURAL LEADERSHIP YOUTH PROGRAMS THAT INVOLVE MUSLIM YOUTH AND ARE DRIVEN BY CONTACT THEORY

An abundance of extracurricular youth leadership programs – targeting high school to undergraduate college students – exist in the US. Some, like the Anti-Defamation League’s Camp IF & Interfaith Leadership Program and the Interfaith Youth Core, target religiously diverse youth, while others target culturally diverse youth, like the ANYTOWN, Bridges and Youth Action Coalition programs of Connecticut/Western Massachusetts’ National Conference for Community and Justice chapter.\textsuperscript{152} Overall, both categories of programs generally seek to reduce prejudice across cultural and faith groups, build tolerance and empower the young leaders to continue to spread the message of tolerance to their communities. Funding, staffing and other forms of programmatic support should be invested in such interfaith and intercultural leadership programs on the condition that they satisfy two criterion: 1) draw Muslim youth participants and 2) include the four conditions of contact theory-based intergroup interactions.

\textsuperscript{149} Lieberman, Michael. Personal Interview. 9 Apr. 2012.
\textsuperscript{150} ibid
\textsuperscript{151} ibid
\textsuperscript{152} “Programs: ADL’s Camp IF & Interfaith Youth Leadership Program;” “IFYC: Funders;” “Youth Programs”
Readily Available: Interfaith and intercultural leadership youth programs exist throughout the country. However, whether such programs satisfy the two criteria – Muslim youth participants and the four conditions of contact theory – is not generally apparent. Preliminary research must be conducted to: 1) account for the total number of available programs in the U.S.; 2) assess whether they draw Muslim participants and if not, whether it is feasible to do so; and 3) assess whether these programs include the four conditions of contact theory-based intergroup interaction, and if not, whether it is feasible to incorporate them into the program.

Effective in Reducing Islamophobia: These programs have the potential to be effective in reducing Islamophobia if: 1) Muslim youth participate and 2) the four conditions of contact theory-based intergroup interaction are incorporated. If these conditions are met, these programs have the potential to reduce Islamophobic sentiments, perceptions, attitudes and/or behaviors among the participants in the particular programs. However, it is important to note that there are several weaknesses with regards to this strategy’s ability to effectively reduce Islamophobia. First, contact theory-based strategies are not a definite means of reducing prejudice. Contact theory-based strategies have been proven effective in reducing certain prejudicial behavior but not much is known about contact theory-based strategies’ ability to change prejudicial attitudes. In addition, there are mixed conclusions about the ability of contact theory-based strategies’ effectiveness to extend beyond the immediate out-group participants towards the out-group at large and other out-groups. Also, contact theory-based strategies’ effectiveness may also vary depending on the age group of the participants due to age-related development changes. A final weakness revolves around the participants of these programs. The programs’ goals and voluntary nature are such that these programs have the potential to primarily draw participants who have a minimal risk of developing Islamophobic sentiments, perceptions, attitudes and/or behavior.

Address the Nature of Islamophobia: These programs address a factor associated with Islamophobia – lacking an interpersonal relationship with a Muslim. This is based on the assumption that Muslim and youth of other cultures participate.

Lacks Insurmountable Resource Barriers: Required resources to implement this strategy could include but are not limited to funding, staffing and other costs associated with the maintenance of each particular program. However, resources would also be needed to conduct the initial research previously described.

STRATEGY 2: MONITOR MEDIA COVERAGE OF ISLAM & MUSLIMS

153 McKown, Clark 183
154 Oskamp 10
155 McKown, Clark 183
Drawing from the monitoring activities of the Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee on the Media (MCAC) and the News Watch Project, media coverage of Islam and Muslims from select major media outlets should be monitored to keep those select media outlets accountable for any Islamophobia-motivated coverage. Those assigned to monitor the media coverage would ideally watch and/or read particular sources regularly for portions of time and would prepare a critique of any Islamophobia-motivated coverage, as needed. Critiques could then be sent to media representatives of the respective media outlet and/or discussed in meetings with the appropriate media representatives, as was done by the MCAC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readily Available</th>
<th>Effective in Reducing Islamophobia</th>
<th>Address the Nature of Islamophobia</th>
<th>Lacks Insurmountable Resource Barriers</th>
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<td>No</td>
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*Readily Available:* This option is not readily available. Staff must be hired, tasks must be delegated and media outlets must be selected. Potential implementers should consider implementing this strategy in collaboration with other minority groups that face similar prejudice, as seen by the News Watch Project. Potential collaborators include but are not limited to the Asian American Journalists Association, the National Association of Black Journalists, the National Association of Hispanic Journalists, the Native American Journalists Association, the National Lesbian and Gay Journalists Association and the Religious News Service.

*Effective in Reducing Islamophobia:* Neither the MCAC or the News Watch Project have readily accessible reports on how or whether their efforts directly reduced prejudicial sentiments, perceptions, attitudes or behavior. Nor is it known how the media sources responded to these groups’ advocacy for fair representation of their respective groups. More information should be obtained to confirm whether this strategy would be effective with regards to Islamophobia.

*Address the Nature of Islamophobia:* Monitoring activities would be posed to counter media sources’ Islamophobic messaging.

*Lacks Resource Barriers:* Required resources to implement this strategy could include but are not limited to potentially significant amounts of funding to hire staff members to monitor, prepare critiques and contact media representatives. The number of staff would depend on 1) the number of media sources chosen to monitor and 2) the delegation of tasks. Funding would also depend on the professional background of the staff. For example, the News Watch Project had a team of journalists, educators, and research assistants. However, if this strategy were done as a collaboration, the overall resource burden on each implementing group would be lessened.

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156 President’s Initiative on Race 9, 11
157 ibid 9
158 ibid 11
159 ibid 11
160 ibid 11
STRATEGY 3: MONITOR ISLAMOPHOBIC ORGANIZATIONS
As suggested by Professor Kurt Ribisl, sustained efforts should be taken to monitor anti-Muslim hate groups, as identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center, and other Islamophobia-promoting organizations, as identified by the CAP in its Fear Inc. Report. These monitoring efforts would consist of:

1. regular monitoring and content analysis of these groups’ websites;
2. subscribing to their respective email or other electronic updates (if applicable);
3. regularly checking the Southern Poverty Law Center’s list of active anti-Muslim hate groups;
4. regularly checking the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Intelligence files on anti-Muslim groups;
5. and subscribing to receive the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Intelligence Reports.

This monitoring strategy would provide constant awareness of the goals, agenda and activities of Islamophobic groups and consequently facilitate informed efforts aimed to counter these groups’ respective activities. For example, staying abreast on Act! For America’s legislative agenda could guide anti-Islamophobia lobbying efforts to block Islamophobic legislation like the enacted anti-Sharia state bills, which ACT! For America has helped passing in Oklahoma, Tennessee and Arizona.161

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<tr>
<th>Readily Available</th>
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<th>Lacks Insurmountable Resource Barriers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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Readily Available: All five components can be easily implemented in the short-term given the accessibility of resources through the Southern Poverty Law Center and the accessibility of such organizations’ websites.

Effective in Reducing Islamophobia: The effectiveness of this strategy in reducing Islamophobia is ambiguous. Its effectiveness would depend on the particular efforts taken upon gaining and being updated on such information.

Address the Nature of Islamophobia: This strategy would be posed to counter the rise of Islamophobic hate groups and the Islamophobic organizations that are part of the Islamophobia Network.

Lacks Insurmountable Resource Barriers: Required resources to implement this strategy are potentially significant. Resources for this strategy could include but is not limited to funding to hire staff members to regularly check the Islamophobic organizations’ websites and conduct content analyses, the initial subscriptions to these groups’ updates and the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Intelligence Reports, and regularly checking the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Intelligence Files and list of active anti-Muslim hate groups. Further staffing and other resources may be required to implement actions or strategies associated with the resulting gathering of information.

161 “About ACT! For America”
STRATEGY 4: IMPLEMENT A PETITION CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE FOUNDATIONS’ FUNDING OF ISLAMOPHOBIA PROPAGANDA

A petition campaign should be implemented to pressure the seven foundations, identified by CAP, to stop donating money to Islamophobic misinformation experts, grassroots organizations and think tanks. There is evidence that enough societal pressure could ultimately shame the organizations into cutting off such funding. According to Wajahat Ali, similar pressure ultimately reduced the number of identified foundations from eight to seven. CAP had originally identified eight organizations associated with funding the Islamophobia propaganda, but one foundation was so shocked by its association with promoting Islamophobia that it asked for its name to be taken off the list and notified CAP that it would no longer donate money towards the promotion of Islamophobia. The campaign should include:

1. the use of a care2.com or change.org petition;
2. a petition asking the population at large to add their signature to list that would be sent to each foundation demanding that they stop donating towards Islamophobia;
3. advice from experts within the fields of social psychology and/or communication strategies on the specific text for the petition and specific messaging catch phrases to spread the petition;
4. the use of social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to circulate the link and related information;
5. And assistance, from within and outside the Muslim American community, in spreading the petition across different segments of society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readily Available</th>
<th>Effective in Reducing Islamophobia</th>
<th>Address the Nature of Islamophobia</th>
<th>Lacks Insurmountable Resource Barriers</th>
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<td>Yes</td>
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Readily Available: Although none of the elements are ready for the campaign to be launched, preparation of the campaign could be completed within a year.

Effective in Reducing Islamophobia: Theoretically, the campaign could reduce the spread of Islamophobia if at least one foundation were to stop donating towards Islamophobia. However, this assumes that the campaign would go viral, that enough people would care to sign the petition and that the foundations themselves would be pressured to make amends through this petition. The current assumptions suggest ambiguous results.

Address the Nature of Islamophobia: The project directly targets the foundations that fund the promotion of Islamophobia as researched by the CAP.

Lacks Insurmountable Resource Barriers: Required resources to implement this strategy could include but are not limited to staffing to create the petition, check the petition with experts, spreading the petition through social media sites and contacting Muslim American and non-Muslim allies to spread the petition. In addition, advice from experts

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162 This strategy was adapted from Wajahat Ali’s suggestion of an email campaign.
on communication strategies and social psychology could be costly if a public relations expert is not already available.

**STRATEGY 5: DIRECT COMMUNITIES WITH ISLAMOPHOBIA RELATED TENSION OR CONFLICT TO CRS’ CONFLICT RESOLUTION SERVICES**

Communities with Islamophobia related tension or conflict should be made aware of CRS conflict resolution services and encouraged to utilize those services. Communities with Islamophobia related tension or conflict would include but are not limited to those that have recently witnessed an anti-Islam motivated hate crime, an incident of opposition to local mosques and Islamic centers, local programming by Islamophobia promoting grassroots organizations, and harassment and discrimination against Muslim, Sikh, Arab and South Asians. As mentioned earlier, CRS could provide the following mediation services to such communities:

1. mediation of conflicts or disputes;
2. conciliation services;
3. community outreach activities;
4. training in cultural competence;
5. enhanced dialogue and communication among involved parties;
6. conflict resolution skills;
7. expert advice and materials appropriate for addressing the situation;
8. assistance to schools, colleges and universities;
9. Student Problem Identification and Resolution of Issues Together (SPIRIT) Programs for school settings;
10. facilitation in developing strategies to prevent and resolve conflicts.”

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<td>Yes</td>
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*Readily Available: CRS services are readily accessible by request through its ten regional and four field offices.*

**Effective in Reducing Islamophobia:** The effectiveness of CRS’ mediation services to reduce Islamophobic sentiments, perceptions, attitudes and/or behavior is ambiguous given that the details of its work are confidential and that only short-term anecdotal evidence of its success is readily accessible. CRS services appear to have the potential to reduce Islamophobia, particularly Islamophobic behavior, but not enough readily accessible information exists to confirm or negate this potential. More information on CRS’ evaluation efforts, the results of those evaluations and the long-term impact of its work is needed.

**Address the Nature of Islamophobia:** The strategy could directly address manifestations of Islamophobia such as harassment and discrimination, anti-Islam motivated hate crimes and incidents of opposition to mosques and Islamic Centers.

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164 “Annual Report Fiscal Year 2010” 24
165 ibid 25
**Lacks Insurmountable Resource Barriers:** Required resources to implement this strategy could include but are not limited to staffing to stay updated on incidents of community tension and conflict related to Islamophobia. This would require regular checking of news sources along with maintaining contact with local mosque leaders, local affiliates of Muslim American organizations and possibly local law enforcement.

**MOVING FORWARD**

The purpose of this paper was not to present the ultimate comprehensive solution towards curbing Islamophobia but rather to provide 1) a framework through which to approach societal problems like Islamophobia and 2) potential strategies for addressing Islamophobia. In moving forward with efforts to curb Islamophobia in America, additional work must be done to:

1. build upon and tailor the identified strategies to the specific temporal and societal environment in which they are to be implemented;
2. and identify other strategies targeting aspects of Islamophobia that were not targeted with the identified strategies presented in this paper.
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“UNC School of Public Health – Kurt Ribisl, PhD.” UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health. http://www.sph.unc.edu/?option=com_profiles&Itemid=1874&profileAction=ProfDetail&pid=706269233


Appendix A: Foundations, Organizations and Individuals Labeled by CAP as Part of the Islamophobia Network

Foundations
1. Donors Capital Fund
2. Richard Mellon Scaife Foundations
3. Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation
5. Russell Berrie Foundation
6. Anchorage Charitable Foundation and William Rosenwald Family Fund
7. Fairbrook Foundation

Misinformation Experts & their Respective Organizations
1. Frank Gaffney and the Center for Security Policy
2. David Yerushalmi and the Society of America for National Existence
3. Daniel Pipes and the Middle East Forum
4. Robert Spencer, Jihad Watch and Stop the Islamization of America
5. Steven Emerson and Investigative Project on Terrorism

Other Islamophobic Experts, Activists & Figures
1. Zuhdi Jasser
2. Walid Shoebat
3. Walid Phares
4. Nonie Darwish
5. Stephen Coughligh
6. Tawik Hamid
7. Clare Lopez
8. Brigette Gabriel
9. Pamella Geller
10. David Horowitz

Other Islamophobia-focused Organizations
1. ACT! For America
2. David Horowitz Freedom Center
3. The Middle East Media and Research Institute
4. The Clarion Fund
5. Former Muslims United

Right Wing Figures and Organizations
1. John Hagee and Christians United for Israel
2. Pat Robertson, Christian Broadcasting Network and the American Center for Law & Justice
3. Ralph Reed and the Faith & Freedom Coalition
4. Franklin Graham
5. American Family Association
6. Eagle Forum
7. Tennessee Freedom Coalition
8. State-based & Local Tea Party Groups
9. Christian Action Network

Media Sources:
1. David Horowitz FC – FrontPage Magazine
2. David Horowitz FC – Jihad Watch
3. David Horowitz FC – News Real Blog
4. Pamela Geller’s Atlas Shrugs blog
5. The Rush Limbaugh Show
6. The Sean Hannity Show
7. The Savage Show
8. The Glenn Beck Program
   1. The Mark Levin Show
   2. Focal Point, hosted by Bryan Fischer
   3. Secure Freedom Radio, hosted by Frank Gaffney
   4. Fox News
   5. Christian Broadcasting Network
   6. National Review
   7. Washington Times

Political Players
1. Rep Peter Kind (R-NY)
2. Rep Sue Myrick (R-NC)
3. Rep Paul Broun (R-GA)
4. Rep Allen West (R-FL)
5. Rep Renee Ellmers (R-NC)
6. Rep Michele Bachmann (R-MN)
Appendix B: Social-Ecological Model

The social-ecological model serves as a framework for conceptualizing the multitude of possible risk factors of a public health threat and generating an appropriate, multipronged preventive approach to addressing the highlighted risk factors. Social-ecological models are centered on the notion that the multitude of risk factors and health determinants are interconnected and exist within multiple levels of physical and social contexts. Consequently, social-ecological models also imply that interventions that alter one or more of these levels can ultimately lead to reductions in risk. Social-ecological models are typically designed with four general, interconnected levels that can be described as individual; interpersonal relationships; community settings; and society.

The individual level focuses on the unique biological and personal factors that increase the risk of a public health threat. This includes factors such as race, sex, education, age, income, history of abuse, etc. Preventive interventions at this level “are often designed to promote attitudes, beliefs and behaviors” that decrease risk. Examples include skills development and educational workshops.

The second level, examines how interpersonal relationships along with social, family and community networks influence behavior, attitudes, etc that heighten risk of a threat to public health. Preventive interventions at this level can include peer and mentoring programs.

Community Settings, the third level, examines the characteristics of living conditions and work settings in which interpersonal relationships are created and maintained that are associated with heightened risk. Examples of settings include neighborhoods,

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166 The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 51
167 McKown, Clark 179
172 ibid
173 Dahlbeg, Linda L. and Etienne G. Krug 287; The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 52
175 Dahlbeg, Linda L. and Etienne G. Krug 287
workplaces and schools.\textsuperscript{176} Interventions in this level are generally designed to alter the climate and processes of these settings.\textsuperscript{177} Examples of interventions include “social norm and social marketing campaigns” that engender community climates that reduce the risk.\textsuperscript{178}

The societal level investigates what larger societal factors give rise to the public health threat and to what extent they heighten the risk of disease.\textsuperscript{179} This includes the “broad social, economic, cultural, health and environmental conditions and policies at the global, national, state and local levels.”\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{176} “The Social-Ecological Model: A Framework for Prevention”
\textsuperscript{177} ibid
\textsuperscript{178} ibid
\textsuperscript{179} Dahlbeg, Linda L. and Etienne G. Krug 287
\textsuperscript{180} The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 52
Appendix C: Robert Gordon’s Classification System of Prevention Programs

The second system was created by Robert S. Gordon as an alternative method of classification that moves away from a focus on the “biological origin of disease.” Gordon argued that the Commission’s focus on the “identification of the biological origin of disease” renders its classification system applicable to only medical disorders, such as injuries and acute infections, which have an easily identifiable onset. Other medical disorders, such as chronic disease, have a biological origin that is not as easily identifiable, which therefore makes the Commission’s classification system not as well suited for them. Gordon’s classification system consequently defines prevention around the specific level of the risk of getting the disease and narrows prevention interventions to those applied to “persons who are not, at the time, suffering from any discomfort or disability due to the disease or condition being prevented.” In addition, this classification system also frames interventions by weighing the benefits of intervention against the risk of disease and the costs of intervention. Gordon’s classification system can be described as follows:

1. Universal interventions – interventions aimed for the entire eligible population or community. Individual risk factors are not taken into consideration. Such interventions focus on minimizing the risk of disease of the entire population rather than minimizing the risk of only high-risk people. The benefits for these interventions “outweigh the cost and risk for everyone.” Interventions aimed to curb tobacco usage and automobile-related injuries suggest that universal interventions “may be more optimal and cost-effective” than those that are more focused at the individual level. An example of a universal prevention intervention for heart disease could entail “the provision of general advice to consume a diet low in fat accompanied by a regulatory policy requiring food labeling.” Other examples include population level interventions to reduce automobile injury through seat belt legislation and curb the use of tobacco through information dissemination along with legislation.

2. Selective interventions – interventions aimed at those who have an above average risk of becoming ill. The benefit-risk-cost analysis of these interventions reinforces the necessity of only implementing such interventions for limited individuals with such a relatively higher risk. These include “the more traditional population-oriented public health education interventions targeted

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181 Gordon, Robert S. 107
182 ibid 107
183 ibid 107
184 ibid 108
185 Reducing Risks for Mental Disorders: Frontiers for Preventative Intervention Research 21
186 The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 72
187 Reducing Risks for Mental Disorders: Frontiers for Preventative Intervention Research 21
188 The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 72
189 ibid 72
190 ibid 72
191 ibid 72
192 Gordon, Robert S. 108
toward the high-risk segments of the population.”\textsuperscript{193} An example of a selective prevention intervention for heart disease could consist of a “program focusing on diet and behavioral changes for overweight individuals who do not exercise regularly.”\textsuperscript{194} Other examples include special immunizations for international travelers and annual mammograms for women whose family has a history of breast cancer.\textsuperscript{195}

3. Indicated interventions – interventions aimed at those who, “on examination, manifest a risk factor, condition, or abnormality that identifies them individually as being at high risk for the future development of a disease.”\textsuperscript{196} Recipients of these interventions are “asymptomatic regarding the disease” yet have a ‘clinically demonstrable abnormality.’\textsuperscript{197} An example of an indicated preventive intervention for heart disease could consist of “antihypertensive medication for those diagnosed as hypertensive.”\textsuperscript{198} It is important to note that indicated measures are not equivalent to treatment measures, which aim to be therapeutic and provide immediate relief.\textsuperscript{199} The goal of indicated measures “is to provide an intervention for an asymptomatic, clinically demonstrable abnormality that will result in the prevention of some later anticipated symptoms and disability.”\textsuperscript{200} According to Gordon, “careful quantitative analysis of benefits, costs, risks and effectiveness frequently reveals that a preventive intervention is best applied to only a high-risk group.”\textsuperscript{201} However, interventions within this category “are usually not totally benign or minimal in cost.”\textsuperscript{202}

Most of the interventions under this classification system primarily depend on voluntary participation from individuals to either carry out or seek out the preventive measures.\textsuperscript{203} This makes information dissemination a crucial strategy for preventive programs.\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{193} The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 72
\textsuperscript{194} ibid 72
\textsuperscript{195} Reducing Risks for Mental Disorders: Frontiers for Preventative Intervention Research 21
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\textsuperscript{198} The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 72
\textsuperscript{199} Reducing Risks for Mental Disorders: Frontiers for Preventative Intervention Research 21
\textsuperscript{200} ibid 21
\textsuperscript{201} Gordon, Robert S. 107
\textsuperscript{202} ibid 108
\textsuperscript{203} ibid 108
\textsuperscript{204} ibid 108

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Appendix D: Notes From 4/10 Interview with Christina Warner

Feedback on strategies

- Strategy 1: Youth Programs
  - Selection bias: children who are participants in the camps may already be comfortable in interreligious and interracial contexts
  - How do you reach out to children who are not already used to these interreligious and interracial contexts?
  - Ex: Eastern Mennonite University, Center on Justice and Peace Building
    - They have interreligious family camp
  - Ex: Interfaith Alliance

- Strategy 2: Mass Media Campaign
  - Hattaway Communications is putting out a message manual
    - MPAC is connected with them already
    - They have done research on how we speak about American Muslims, what we say, and how we introduce the topic
    - Goal was to provide research that would put Shoulder-to-Shoulder and MPAC on the same footing so over the long term they could use a shared language that is proven to impact perception
  - Hattaway communications’ research has shown that it is more effective to avoid theological discussions which can be divisive
    - also may not have expertise to put out theological information
    - issue with disseminating accurate information on Islam

- Strategy 4: Media Relations
  - Although we don’t know that positive media coverage changes things directly, we do know that there is a correlation between anti-Muslim sentiment and the news outlets that people listen to
  - we may not know about the inverse but its something that we think we know but just hasn’t been proven yet

- Strategy #8: Federal Legislation
  - Changing behavior may be just as useful as changing perceptions although such a piece of legislation would not directly target perceptions

Shoulder-to-Shoulder’s national advocacy work

- Press conference during Peter King Hearings
- Submitted testimony for congressional hearings
- Few of members spoke at hearing held by Senator Durbin in response to the Peter King hearings
  - Shoulder-to-Shoulder’s written testimony was quoted by Senator Durbin
- Most of advocacy efforts have been focused on FBI and DOJ because of training issues that have come to light
  - Been part of meetings that MPAC has been involved in; meetings with FBI around training materials
  - Have met with FBI three times now
- Have mostly meet with Public Affairs office and Director Mueller (came to one meeting)
- Personal and coalition meetings with them (with members outside of the campaign)
o Asking FBI to let Shoulder-to-Shoulder partner with them to ensure that training material incidents never happen again
o FBI responds well and consistently and Shoulder-to-Shoulder is working to continue holding the FBI accountable
o Throughout nation, we are seeing incidents of misinformation within training material and surveillance by not only FBI but also local law enforcement
o Trying to figure out how to stop anti-Muslim sentiment from being institutionalized and codified across the country and interwoven within these agencies, local and federal
o Written letters to DOJ
o Asked to meet with Attorney General Holder which hasn’t happened yet
o outcomes of these meetings:
  ▪ haven’t seen anything new come out from these meetings
  ▪ haven’t seen any outcome from the meetings that rectify the consequences of these trainings
  ▪ FBI or DOJ have not gone back and reeducated these individuals who have been affected by the misinformation training
  ▪ They have put in place some standards to make sure that new misinformation trainings don’t get in but not sure what happens to materials outside of training materials that also deal with Islam and American Muslims and Muslims international
  ▪ FBI and DOJ have been straightforward about work but still waiting on certain results to ensure these incidents stop
  ▪ Frustrated with the fact that they have not moved forward with looking at the behavior of the NYPD
o Shoulder-to-Shoulder does not advocate for specific materials to be used for training but there are campaign members that are part of the process of advocating for specific materials
  ▪ There are materials that campaign members have influenced the making of
  ▪ e.g. Connecting Cultures has put out the CRS training video on Arabs & Muslims
o Shoulder-to-Shoulder has not endorsed specific training materials
  • Through contacts (white house etc,) able to have meetings and information sharing
  • Shoulder-to-Shoulder does not really work within the Senate or the House; have worked in hearings
  • Mostly do work with administrative agencies
  • Allies: Senator Durbin, Rep. Keith Ellison
  • Faith-based office does a good job in connecting people with contacts in different agencies (set up as an entry point in finding other people)

Press strategy
  • Still in progress because of capacity issues
  • Christina is the only full-time staff member for the campaign
  • Press strategy will probably entail:
    ▪ Presenting religious leaders to media as go to people

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If press needs speakers, dialogue partners who can speak to issues of anti-Muslim/Islam sentiment,
- To provide a different pool of speakers to pull from
  - Have written op-eds and press releases with regards to national incidents
    - E.g. fire bombings in Queens, All American Muslim, etc
  - Press conferences
    - Hoping to do a consistent presentation of Shoulder-to-Shoulder as another voice that isn’t within the Muslim community but rather an interreligious voice of Jews & Christians
    - Hoping to provide the same anti-Islamophobia message from a different messenger
  - Goal is to speak to have Christian and Jewish leaders speak out against Islamophobia to Christian and Jewish audiences

Assistance to local communities
- Goal is to have website serve as a database
  - Central source to see what events and programming already exists
- Want to be able to coordinate a network, to provide people with a place to come together to share those stories and have those conversations in a way that allows those best practices to be replicated across the country
- Hopefully network will allow for Shoulder-to-Shoulder to ask local groups to do work such as participating in national advocacy, etc
- Can ask local organizations to take action in own communities, but this is down the line
- When Islamophobic incidents take place in the united states, it puts religious minorities in Muslim majority countries in danger, like what happened when Terry Jones threatened to burn the Qur’an
- Shoulder-to-Shoulder wants to calm those type of backlash events by highlighting work in the states
- Anti-Sharia Legislation
  - Have been working with a law firm in order to put together a memorandum on these pieces of legislation
  - Putting together letters of support for local interfaith communities
  - Tool for local interfaith communities deal with different forms of the legislation that they see
  - What does it mean when the words of the legislation is changed just slightly?
  - Working on developing tools to help support those interfaith organizations which do want to challenge that legislation
  - And provide them with tools to broad their coalition
  - Provision of written or advocacy resources to move them forward
  - Written material to educate local interfaith groups on legislation and to serve as talking points from a legislative point of view
Appendix E: Notes From 4/10 Interview with Faiz Shakir

• more specificity is helpful
  o categories are amorphous
  o get beyond general strategy and drill down on specifics to various people, places, things that are relevant to this particular fight and a general strategy

• want to try to think about the most successful and relevant strategy that would be valuable to the Muslim American community at this particular time

• No hierarchy of important issues regarding Islamophobia
  o A hierarchy suggests a recipe for curing Islamophobia
  o The recipe is addressing all the existing issues in a mixture and not in a hierarchy
  o Trying to address as many of the existing issues as you can simultaneously

• Don’t know if there is anything that can be done in the short-term to definitely obtain impact

• Take the environment of the time and work within it
  o E.g. current environment = campaigns (presidential, state & local). This environment is suggestive of trying to get politicians to speak out against Islamophobic rhetoric and incidents

• vary unlikely that any federal legislation would pass

• be more specific about media coverage
  o different sources
  o different forms of media
  o jihadwatch vs normal blogosphere

• Department of Homeland Security is work on putting out some guidelines for law enforcement about how to deal with their interactions with the Muslim community
  o Drill down on those guidelines and help form and shape it is better than wasting time getting a piece of legislation passed because its just not going to pass

• Sites that monitor anti-Sharia legislation:
  o http://gaveltogavel.us/site/

• Need help from other minority groups to help fight some of the battles
  o esp anti-sharia bills: e.g. Florida & Oklahoma – Jews & ADL have been very helpful in fighting against anti-Sharia bills
  o Muslims need help on all issues
Appendix F: Notes From 3/15 Meeting With Professor Kurt Ribisl

- Paradox of Prevention by Geoffrey Rose
  o Paradox prevention: largest benefit to the community means targeting entire population as a whole rather than focusing on most affected
  o Small changes across lots of people add up
  o make broad changes
  o don’t just look at most Islamophobic people
  o target entire population as a whole
- Robert Cialdini & work on social influence
  o Power of social norms
  o Simple things like “the majority of people think xxx,” that shifts peoples behavior
  o The more local norms, the more impact on
    ▪ More people in this city, this block, room #312
  o Experiment of getting people to reuse towel in hotels
- Comments on matrix
  o Merge interpersonal relationships with community
  o Keep policy separate from societal
- For big issues, policy is more effective
- adapt CLEAR PEARL criteria for Islamophobia
- What are 2/3 things that we can do
  o Can’t do everything
  o Pick a couple things to do that are the most important
  o create a menu of 3-4 strategies you can do
- Think about who might do what
- Think in phases of implementation
- Media-monitoring is key
- Also important to focus on entertainment industry
- Meet with a public relations person
Appendix G: Notes From 4/11 Meeting With Professor Kurt Ribisl

- **Strategy #8: Training Material**
  - Currently not framed in a realistic manner
  - not a salient thing for all police departments
  - more salient issue for a handful of police departments (i.e. New York City, Dearborn, etc)

- **Possible strategy #1: Improving Hate Crime Statistics**
  - What can be improved with the reporting of hate crimes?
  - part of police culture = have to report on these hate crimes
  - think about ways to improve or strengthen hate crime statistics (a public policy idea)
  - has someone been analyzing these to look at hot spots? Or areas where the greatest concentration of these crimes occur?
  - Can’t do much from an intervention standpoint if just have state-based information, would need to break up statistics to be more finely grained
  - Would need more specific statistics that are more based on district, etc rather than sub-state regions (larger blocks)

- **Possible Strategy #2: Education-targeted interventions**
  - More of a societal strategy rather than policy strategy
  - Education is done at the local level you can’t really mandate from the federal level
  - Something worth doing within societal because of community education

- **Possible Strategy #3: Anti-Sharia laws**
  - Useful to write about it and then knocking it down to educate the reader
  - These were struck down as violating, etc so there is not that much reason to focus on them when efforts could be focused elsewhere

- **Possible Strategy #4: Condemning terrorist attacks**
  - Groups and leaders should condemn incidents as not condoned
  - Think about how groups can speak out and try to set a norm against terrorist attacks
  - Something you have control over

- **Possible Strategy #5: monitoring/surveillance of hate groups**
  - Be aware of hate groups policies and agenda and being up to date
  - Look at racists websites, spend time reading them and doing content analysis
  - Monitoring what these hate groups and organizations do
  - “know thy enemy”
  - similar to project of SPLC
  - see if publish reports
  - spend time looking at the most Islamophobic websites and reading what their agenda is, what their goals are, and just being aware of them broadly.
  - To better understand what the most extreme groups are going to do and what they will be pursuing

- **Other ideas for strategies:**
  - Look at policy platform/policy goals of ADL, NAACP, NOW and SPLC
  - Look at the policy agenda of groups looking into racism
- Have really well thought out policy agendas
- Policy agendas that you can easily adapt
- Cite other agendas
Appendix H: Notes From 4/9 Interview with Michael Lieberman

• A couple different things that were missing from strategies document sent to Michael

• Missing Strategy #1: Working with Coalition Partners
  o Michael focuses on working with coalition work in DC
  o MPAC & ADL work on hate crime issues, profiling and bullying
  o “the coalition work is essential”
  o obviously its so much better if people are fighting Islamophobia who are not just Muslim
  o “this needs to fit in within any attempt to address Islamophobia”
  o maybe a separate strategy to reach out to coalition partners or component part of each individual strategy “because nothing gets done in this town without coalitions”
  o “I would infuse or elevate or set up a whole new strategy that involves coalition work” and that’s what the ADL does best
  o Important to hear from:
    ▪ The Japanese Americans Citizens League: have a pretty big megaphone because they represent a people that went through internment
      • Have been against Guantanamo and detainees
    ▪ Leadership conference on civil and human rights: most important umbrella organization in DC of coalition of civil rights organizations
      • put out a 2009 report on hate crimes
      • spoke out on issue of hate crimes against Arabs

• Can’t fight against Islamophobia in isolation
  o The idea of fighting against Islamophobia in a vacuum is an idea that is very difficult
  o Starting point for ADL is fighting against all forms of bigotry
  o You don’t want to put Islamophobia in a different category than other forms of bigotry
  o Islamophobia needs to be seen as overall element of fighting against anti-Semitism, fighting against racism, etc

• Want to mainstream the fight against Islamophobia
  o Cant just be MPAC or ISNA, etc, has to be a broad range involvement on a range of different issues

• Missing Strategy #2: anti-Sharia laws
  o Anti-Sharia laws as very good laboratory for fighting Islamophobia
  o People involved in promoting anti-Sharia laws are people that ADL has not been hesitant to call bigots
  o Who else is going to fight anti-Sharia laws other than MPAC?
  o ADL & ACLU have done work in this area
  o Incorporate coalition building

• Missing Strategy #3: counter efforts to restrict the building or expansion of mosques
  o Look at work done by Interfaith coalition on mosques
    ▪ ADL has done work through this coalition
    ▪ Have filled briefs on behalf of Muslim communities, a couple outside of Atlanta
    ▪ ADL has brought these cases to the attention of the govt and has always won
• Have provided amicus briefs
  Also instance where ADL has brought these cases to the attention of DOJ and tried to encourage the federal govt to support these mosques. In these cases, they have always won
• Missing Strategy #4: Data collection
  o FBI is in charge of hate crime collection in the US
  o Do not collect separate data on crimes against Arabs or sikhs
  o Do have separate data on crimes against Muslim Americans
• Missing Strategy #5: Engagement by US Attorneys around the country
  o Outreach is critically important both for Muslim Community and US government
  o Will find a number of programs, initiatives and speeches
  o This work is very important
  o Federal govt can send a message
  o There have been very substantial efforts to engage the Muslim community here in America
  o Utilizing Muslim community members to help fight terrorism
  o Look at their work at promoting engagement and outreach
• Missing Strategy #6: Muslim organizations and leaders need to speak out against terrorism
  o Muslim leaders: local imams and national leaders
  o Muslim leaders are going to be looked at to repudiate terrorism in US and any where abroad
  o Need to condemn the terrorism and not justify it in any way or adding anything else; not the time for bringing up other issues or grievances
  o Consistent theme for anti-Muslim bigots in America: that Muslim leadership does not repudiate terrorism
  o People turn to ISNA or MPAC and say “we haven’t heard from you” or “why haven’t you put out a press release repudiating this?”
  o Qualified repudiations are not nearly as effective
• Law Enforcement Training, like that available by CRS, is good but not enough
• PR Campaign Feedback:
  o Very important to understand who is the speaker in the campaign
  o who are these people that are speaking against anti-Muslim bigotry and what type of baggage do they bring?
  o don’t incorporate speakers that bring a lot of baggage
  o very important to have a PR strategy and important to know who is the speaker in that PR strategy and to respect the mixed messages that can be sent in a PR campaign that is not run by an organization that is anti-bigotry credentials across the board
• Education strategies:
  o Always going to be primarily a local initiative
  o At the same time, there could be standards set by big states like CA or Texas that could elevate issues
  o Peer to Peer training
- Usually something bad happens, e.g. racial incident, then the school reaches out or ADL reaches out, after reading about it, and says we have online resources for you or we can work with you to craft a programmatic training
- Probably happens frequently that the ADL sees a problem and inserts itself

- Feedback on Criteria
  - Difficult to speak to effectiveness of strategies because no strategy can be effective if done in isolation
  - the individual strategies should be seen all together as one, interconnected piece; its kind all one piece
  - e.g. you cant not oppose anti-Sharia laws and then advocate for anti-prejudice material to be added to curriculums
  - anti-Sharia laws = promoting fear, bigotry and suspicion

- Other ADL work to look at:
  - Curriculum connections on ADL website
  - Vast majority of training is either open source or training for law enforcement
Appendix I: Notes From 3/26 Interview with Professor Sherman James

- Mass Media Campaign
  - To raise awareness
  - Erase stereotypes
- Think about universal audience
- Focus on:
  - Targeting children to young adults (college age) age range
  - Where can you intervene to do some re-education?
  - Re-education requires some intelligence on part of recipients
  - Where can you expect the least intense backlash
- Not going to get much traction from Fox News Fans
- Must be a sustained effort
- How do you get the country ready?
  - Raise consciousness
  - Increase understanding
  - More constructive dialogue
- Who are the actors that need to be in this conversation?
  - The National Council of La Raza
  - SCLC
  - NAACP
Appendix J: Notes From 2/28 Interview with Wajahat Ali

- Inoculate people with information
  - Use new media/social media
  - Not just Muslims
  - List of interfaith & multicultural allies & republican allies

- Get Allies
  - Politicians (especially Republicans)
  - Interfaith leaders
    - Religious Jews & Christians have stood up against the anti-Sharia bills because it hurts them too
  - Multicultural leaders
  - Civil rights activist groups
  - Allies from All-American Muslim and Lowes threat to remove advertisement

- Create a grassroots counter-narrative
  - Opposite of Act! For America

- Republican party strategy
  - Islamophobia is bad for the party long-term
  - Want tips and ideas on how to vomit this element out of the party after 2012 elections

- Stop funding of misinformation experts
  - Expose foundations & people who fund
  - Originally CAP found 8 founders
  - I was so shocked that it asked to for its name to be taken off the list and told CAP that it would no longer give money towards Islamophobic purposes

- Media outreach
  - More people engaged in media or allies in media
  - Already have Keith Olbermann & John Stewart

- Academia

- Look into chambers of commerce of different states
  - To fight against anti-Sharia bills → against foreign and religious law
Appendix K: Notes From 3/17 Interview with Wajahat Ali

- Coalition building with non-Muslim allies
  o e.g. CAP & Fear Inc. report
- Create a grassroots counter-narrative
  o Replicate model of Act! For America
  o Can be the entity that responds to anti-Sharia legislation
- Need significant financial investment
  o Grant money; multi-million dollar grants or several 6-figure grants
- Audit of groups/allies
  o Who is effective, what is their capacity, what is their outreach, what’s their niche
  o Don’t just invest in Muslim acronyms without knowing how effective they are
  o We really need to track organizations on the grassroots, think tanks, philanthropists, activists that are doing great work and this money can help empower them and give them the capacity to do even better work.
  o Is UPF working? Find out if their efforts are effective and if so, invest in them.
- Email campaign to stop foundations’ funding of misinformation experts
Appendix L: Notes From 4/11 Interview with Imam Zaid Shakir

• Priority Area #1: building coalitions with other minorities
  o Native American
  o Black Americans
  o Latinos
  o What is happening to Muslims is inseparable from the prejudice experienced by other minorities
  o Symptoms of the same disease
  o Groups:
    ▪ NAACP
    ▪ Color of Change
    ▪ Immigrants rights groups
    ▪ Japanese American amnesty & civil rights groups (most supportive of Muslims since 9/11)

• Priority Area #2: religious education amongst young Muslims
  o small minority of people within Muslim American community are susceptible to radicalization
  o need to provide community education and prevent radicalization and entrapment cases
  o educational program that emphasizes how illegitimate those appeals and arguments are within Islamic teaching
  o value would be:
    ▪ reducing the percentage of youth (which is a small percentage) who are susceptible to radicalization
    ▪ shows that Muslim American community is working internally to combat extremism. Make it difficult for bigots to say “What are the Muslims doing to combat extremism?”
  o possible implementers: MSAs, local mosques, national organizations, Zaytuna, etc

• Make paper relatable to other group’s experiences and something of value of approaches to move on and overcome
  o Situate people in its historical context of prejudice
  o What Muslims are experiencing, others have experienced
  o Identify common patterns of behavior from past incidents
  o Situate paper in context of past incidents of discrimination
  o Islamophobia as latest manifestation of religious and racial bigotry in the US
  o Create link with other religious and racial minorities
  o Illustrate that Muslims are overwhelmingly ethnic minorities
  o Proscription becomes relevant for other ethnic and religious minorities
  o Draw on strategies from past incidents
  o Just a repetition of historical patterns of behavior
  o A new manifestation of an old problem
  o Older solutions are just as relevant as they are now
    ▪ Look at strategies employed by Jews and Catholics