ABSTRACT

Turkish Foreign Policy: Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and the Future of Turkey’s Relations with the West.

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Abstract

One of the more perplexing foreign policy questions of our day pertains to the conditions of Turkish-Western relations and cooperation. The undergoing transformation of Turkish-Western relations over the last five years has produced much trepidation that the “model of democracy” in the Middle East is moving towards political Islam, and that Turkey is leaving behind its “Western” allies to pursue a foreign policy of “neo-Ottomanism.” The notion of neo-Ottomanism as a foreign policy doctrine is essential not only for understanding future cooperation in Turkish-Western relations, but also for appreciating the far reaching effects on concurrent geopolitical outcomes in light of the ongoing “Arab Spring”, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and future reliance on the state of Turkey as a vital NATO member. Despite its significance, the current discourse on Turkish-Western relations is devoid of a systematic definition and understanding of how “neo-Ottomanism” affects cooperation with the West. This paper aims to achieve an understanding of the conditions in which cooperation should occur in Turkish-Western relations, by first correcting the term “neo-Ottomanism” and updating our understanding of it by incorporating audience costs. Under this decision-making model of “neo-Ottomanism 2.0” a comparative historical analysis will designate the new audience costs associated with Turkish foreign policy and will reevaluate contemporary Turkish politics. By constructing a theory illustrating how audience costs at the domestic level of politics incur costs on the current Turkish government that make cooperation less likely, this paper demonstrates the conditions under which cooperation should occur between the West and Turkey. Ultimately, this paper will show that when audience costs associated with “neo-Ottomanism 2.0” are not high enough and do not threaten the government’s hold on power, cooperation with Western powers will ensue.
Dedication

In loving memory of Peter DeMasi and Carmine R. Gullo for their love of family and unweaving confidence that: “I could do it”.
## Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................................................. iv  
Dedication .......................................................................................................................................................................................... v  
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................................................... vi  
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................................................ vii  
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................................................ viii  
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................ 1  
2. Towards Western-Turkish Cooperation ........................................................................................................................................ 13  
   2.1 Audience Costs ............................................................................................................................................................. 14  
   2.2 Audience Costs for neo-Ottomanism 2.0 ..................................................................................................................... 22  
   2.2.1 Issue Intensity ........................................................................................................................................................... 24  
   2.3 Cooperation ................................................................................................................................................................ 29  
   2.4 The Decision-making model ........................................................................................................................................... 35  
   2.5 Conditions for Cooperation ........................................................................................................................................ 43  
3. Methods ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 47  
   3.1 Other Approaches ........................................................................................................................................................... 47  
   3.2 Historical Analysis ....................................................................................................................................................... 48  
   3.3 Case Selection .............................................................................................................................................................. 52  
4. Between neo-Ottoman and Kemalism ........................................................................................................................................ 57  
   4.1 Kemalism ....................................................................................................................................................................... 58  
   4.2 Neo-Ottomanism ........................................................................................................................................................... 64  
   4.3 Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 ....................................................................................................................................................... 66  
   4.4 Turkey’s Intrinsic Paradoxical Nature ............................................................................................................................. 72
List of Tables

Table 1: Assumed Audience Costs in Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 ................................................................. 38
Table 2: The Causal Chain for Turkey’s Foreign Policy Shift .............................................................. 50
Table 3: Atatürk’s Reforms 1922-1937 .............................................................................................. 63
Table 4: Differences between Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 ........................................ 69
Table 5: List of Turkish Prime Ministers, Party, and Ideology after the 1980 Coup ......................... 79
Table 6: Contending post-Cold War Foreign Policy Orientations, the 1990s ................................. 80
Table 7: Contending Foreign Policy Orientations in 2011 ................................................................. 81
Table 8: 1990-2001 Turkish Economic Performance ..................................................................... 93
Table 9: 2002-2011 Turkish Economic Performance ..................................................................... 96
Table 10: List of Top 20 Economies 1995-2015 ............................................................................. 105
List of Figures

Figure 1: A Expected Cooperation based on Intensity ......................................................... 45

Figure 2: Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 Causal Thread ................................................................. 71
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1. Introduction

The last few years of Turkish-Western relations have produced a significant amount of trepidation that the “model of democracy” in the Middle East—as Turkey has been hailed by both George W. Bush and Barack Obama—is gravitating towards political Islam, and thereby realigning its axis away from the so-called ‘western bloc’ of the international political order. At the crux of this fear is the claim that Turkey is pursuing a “neo-Ottomanist” foreign policy with the objective of “restoring” the influence it commanded as the Ottoman Empire (1453-1918), in addition to the endgame of and re-establishing itself as the principal power broker in the Middle East. Given the unknown intentions of this strategically important state as a Western ally, identifying the conditions under which the Turkish governments employs “neo-Ottomanism” as a foreign policy doctrine is essential not only for understanding future cooperation in Turkish-Western relations, but also for far reaching effects on concurrent geopolitical outcomes in light of the ongoing “Arab Spring”, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and future reliance on a vital NATO member.

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1. President Bush first used the term ‘model for democracy’ to describe Turkey in 2004 (See Tocci 139-142). On June 8, 2005, Bush stated that Turkey’s: “democracy is an important example for the people in the broader Middle East” (See Bush 2005). President Obama during his first major trip aboard as President attached Ankara to end of it, and on April 9, 2009, he addressed the Turkish parliament on the importance of U.S-Turkish relations with an emphasis on its: “it is also clear that the greatest monument to Atatürk’s life is not something that can be cast in stone and marble. His greatest legacy is Turkey’s strong, vibrant, secular democracy, and that is the work that this assembly carries on today (see: Obama 2009). In a report prepared by Stephen Larrabee, Institute entitled: Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner, he writes: “...in the last decade, Turkish policy has shown a new degree of independence and activism, particularly in the Middle East. At the same time, the U.S-Turkish security partnership has come under new strain. (See: Larrabee 2008 page 1).

2. I use the word “restoring” to describe political influence in terms of a sphere of influence and not of Turkey having any territorial ambitions. Neo-Ottomanism is geared towards a “soft power” dynamic rather than hard power.

3. For a discussion on the Turkey and the Arab Spring please see: Pollack (2011): The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East 273-274, and Pack (2012) In the Arab Spring, Watch Turkey. For a discussion on the Turkey
For over sixty years, Turkey has been a part of what can be described as the “Western bloc” of the international political order. 4 Albeit a neutral and a non-participatory actor during the Second World War, Turkey, in addition to Greece, was the first nation to receive money from the United States’ European Recovery Program (ERP) in 1947, and over the course of the next four years Turkey would receive 152.5 million dollars (USD) in foreign assistance. 5 The ERP money was given to seventeen different European states after the war to rebuild war-ravaged economies and to make them less susceptible to communism and/or Soviet influence. The ERP money was part of a larger courtship of Turkey by the United States that revealed its strategic calculation of Turkey as an important “frontline” state during the impending conflict against the Soviet Union. In 1952, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and interfaced and integrated its military structure with the Western alliance, and by 1960, the United States was already putting its Jupiter missiles in Izmir after French President Charles de

4. The “Western bloc” or also sometimes referred to the “Western orbit” of the international political order refers to both the Cold War bi-polar world and the same valued sharing system in areas such as perception of human rights, liberal democratic, and have interwoven security concerns. This bloc is traditionally is headed by the United States. Unlike the argument by Samuel Huntington who divides the world up by more of less religious classification (see Huntington’s Clash of Civilization), the Western Bloc hereforth refers to those states that act within the same sphere of foreign policy as “the west” including but not limited to Japan, Australia, South Korea, etc.

5. For a chart on the European Recovery Program (ERP) payments overseas see: Sorel (2008), The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the 21st Century, pages 14-15. The chart will indicate the real value of the U.S dollar during the time of payments (1947-1951) and it is not adjusted for inflation in 2012 dollar value.
Gaulle rejected their placement in France a year earlier. Throughout the decades Turkey has been a vital ally to the United States and the West as it fought by their side during the Korean War, became a full participatory member of the coalition that invaded Iraq in 1991 (Gulf War I), and is currently a close collaborator on the war on terror.

Besides cooperating with and integrating into the security organizations of the West, Turkey has sought to politically amalgamate with Europe by becoming a member of the European Community. Turkey joined the Council of Europe in 1949 and became an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) several years later. The Ankara Agreement, signed in 1963, declared that the EEC and Turkey would seek to integrate into one custom union with the final objective of full membership. In the two decades preceding Turkey’s formal application to become a member of the European Community (in 1987), Turkey’s goal of full membership was hampered by hostile relations between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, in addition to undemocratic tendencies

6. In 1958, negotiations to host US nuclear warheads in France broke down when Charles De Gaulle, the then new French President refused to accept U.S missiles in France. This prompted U.S. to explore the possibility of deploying the missiles in Italy and Turkey. By 1959, the U.S and Turkey agreed that Turkey would host 15 nuclear warheads spread out over five bases near Izmir Turkey, and that the United States Air Force would operate them in-conjunction with the Turkish Air Force. However by the time the Jupiter missiles had been installed in 1960, they were already largely obsolete and removed in due to a secret agreement during the course of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963, see Wenger (1997) Living with peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons. The removal of the missiles caused much ire in Turkey as it was taken as a sign the U.S was not fully committed to Turkish security, see.

7. The Korean War was a turning point in US-Turkish relations as Turkey sent a brigade (5000 Troops) to Korea on a one year rotation for each year of the War (1950-1953) which resulted in over 15,000 Turkish personal fighting in Korea. During the war Turkey’s willingness to fight and support the war effort did not go unnoticed. President Harry Truman signed a Distinguished Unit Citation (now the Presidential Unit Citation) award for their actions. This also moved the United States to support Turkey’s bid to become a member of NATO, which it did in 1952. See: Tocci (2011) Turkey’s European Future: Behind the Scenes of America’s Influence on EU-Turkey Relations, pages 104-107.

8. Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement states: “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community”. For the full text of the Ankara Agreement, see Ankara Agreement in the bibliography.
and human right issues that had stalled formal negotiations with the ECC/EU. Finally in 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the launch of negotiations, to great fanfare in Turkey, with 73% of the Turkish public in favor of joining the European Union (EU). However, since then support for joining the EU has rapidly eroded, given the tepid response by EU governments, especially those of Austria, France, and Germany. Moreover, as Turkey’s economic and indigenous military power expands and its transformation into a regional power-broker becomes more apparent, much of the Turkish public have abandoned their preference for joining the EU with support hovering at 35% in-favor of EU membership at the end of 2011.

Low domestic support for joining the EU and a feeling of being unwanted by Europe are just a few factors that have led Turkey to embark on a new foreign policy,

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9. Since the Ottoman-Venetian of 1570, when the Ottoman Empire took over the island from the Republic of Venice, the Island of Cyprus has been in contention. Throughout the centuries its population remained heavily Greek; however, a small but slowly growing “Turkish” population grew on the island. After the British left in 1960, the status of the island was once again in question as there were frequent clashes between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In 1963, inter-communal violence broke out, partially sponsored by both the Greek and Turkish states; as a result, Turkish Cypriots were forced into enclaves in the north of Cyprus. For a discussion on enclaves in Northern Cyprus see Hoffmeister 2006, pages 17-20). On July 20 1974, the Turkish military invaded Cyprus in response to a Greek military junta backed coup in Cyprus and the war broke out over the islands. In Arikan’s Turkey and the EU: An awkward candidate for EU membership? He speaks of the problems facing Turkish EU membership during this ear. “The Council of Ministers has approved the Accession Partnership and notified short term and medium term priorities and intermediate objectives, with particular reference to human rights, the Cyprus problem, as well as bilateral issues between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea”, see Arikan (2003) Turkey and the EU: An awkward candidate for EU membership? Pages 71-72.

10. The Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) of Austria and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CDA) parties in Germany both agreed that Turkey should not be admitted into the European Union, but rather it should from a “Privileged Partnership” with the EU. According to Wolfgang Schäuble “Europe should start thinking seriously about new frameworks for cooperation with outside states: arrangements that would bring maximum benefits to all sides without endangering the EU itself” (see Schäuble Taking Turkey). Schäuble’s worry that the further expanding the EU, although might be a major concern for Austria and Germany, it may be not be the foremost concern as Turkey has big population that will change the major influence on EU politics under the EU’s Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system; coupled with Germany having a large domestic Turkish population (see Flam, Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession). In 2009, French President Nicholas Sarkozy (along with German Chancellor Angela Merkel) “reignited the debate on Turkey’s place within Europe by questioning the wisdom of Turkey seeking full membership....They instead reiterated their support for “privileged partnership” as an alternative framework to regulate Turkish-EU relations” (see Kardas (2009) Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey). For poll data on Turkish public opinion see Pew Research Center: Global Attitudes Project (2011). On Eve of Elections, a More Upbeat Mood in Turkey.

which some commentators have deemed “aggressive”. Consequently, Turkey’s international intentions have become marred in the West as Turkey has taken anti-Western positions in regard to issues including Iran’s nuclear program, Palestine’s political status in the international community, and Cyprus’ role as the rotating President of the Council of the European Union. The recent fallout with Israel (once one of Turkey’s staunchest allies) over the *Mavi Marmara* incident in 2010 has only increased suspicion that Turkey’s is increasingly reoriented in world affairs. Alternatively, during the same time-span, other events in Western-Turkish relations have provided fruitful results, such as hosting NATO’s radar headquarters for its missile shield in Kürecik, sanctioning Syria for its human right violations, and deepening U.S-Turkish security

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12. Examples of commentary that put Turkey’s foreign policy and thus “neo-Ottomanism” as being subservient to political Islam are growing within the media and journalism. One example from a section of Paul Starobin’s recent work *After America*; Starobin interviews a Turkish private school teacher who stated that “Iran is a good model of governance for Turkey, and that her Muslim identity is more important than her Turkish one,” see Starbin (2009) *After America*, page 143. Academic work on the other hand tend to frame neo-Ottomanism as a foil to Kemalism, and is used as framing term to contextualize a difference in Turkish foreign policy that gives an explanation to different times and different political objectives, see Göcek (2011) *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*. In terms of the three listed cases when Turkey went against a Western the position. In regards to Cyprus, Turkey has claimed it is opposed to Cyprus taking over the EU rotating Presidency as Turkey and Cyprus have a long running feud. For more discussion see Rettman (2011), *EU leaders tell Turkey to 'respect'.* Another area where the U.S and Turkey have differed is over Palestine’s United Nations Membership; whereas Turkey supports the Palestinian application for United Nations membership, while the United States and many EU countries do not. See Rice, Susan (2009), *On the Middle East*. While in Statement by Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations at the 66th Session of the General Assembly on Agenda Item: "The Situation in the Middle East," he stated that "Turkey, welcomes and strongly supports the Palestinian application for United Nations membership submitted by President Mahmoud Abbas on 23 September 2011 and believes that it is high time for Palestine to take their rightful place in the international arena, among the community of nations." See Apakan (2011), *On the Middle East*. Lastly, in regards to Iran’s Nuclear Program, Arron Stein writes: “Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Iran has drawn the ire of the United States because of Turkey’s swift recognition of President Ahmedinejad after the controversial 2009 election, Prime Minister Erdogan’s unabashed support of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, Turkey’s (and Brazil’s) separate fuel-swap agreements with Iran, and its “no” vote on the recent UN Security Council sanctions against Iran.” See Stein (2011) *Resetting U.S.-Turkish Relations: Charting a New Way Forward.*

13. See Kösebalaban (2010) *The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is its Strategic Significance?* Also see Walker the *United States and Turkey: Can They Agree to Disagree?*
relations concerning Iraq and the fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{14} Given Turkey’s increasing international stature and the perceived reorientation of its foreign policy, understanding the conditions under which cooperation \textit{should} occur in Turkish-Western relations equates a vital topic to be studied.

Given the sudden increase in Turkey’s economic growth and potential, coupled with its proclivity for creating regional soft power and growing indigenous military industrial complex, Turkish clout in the Middle East is growing rapidly and is often sought by the West to help solve exceptionally complicated foreign policy issues, such as the ongoing Syrian Civil War, the rebuilding of Libya, and the stabilizing of war-torn Somalia. Speaking to Turkey’s new role in international affairs, U.S Secretary of State Clinton, while giving remarks on Turkish-American relations, said, “I want to emphasize that the United States welcomes Turkey’s growing role in the region [Middle East] and on the world state. Now, we don’t always see eye-to-eye. In fact, no two nations or friends …ever do…we are confident that as Turkey assumes the responsibilities that come with increased influence, our partnership will become more predictive in the years ahead.”\textsuperscript{15}

As Clinton pointed out, nation-states have differing national-interests and these interests are sometimes linked to domestic audience costs, such as in democratic regimes


\textsuperscript{15} Clinton (2011) \textit{Secretary Clinton Delivers Remarks on U.S.-Turkey Relations}. 
where a leader’s position in power is related to his or hers domestic support. Since cooperation is indicative of mutual interests, conflict may erupt when there are contradictory interests between states at both the international and domestic levels of politics. It is this growing divergence of interests that has caused trepidation towards Turkey; yet instead of focusing on interests as well as domestic and international audience costs for cooperation, the literature has overwhelming supported and has proliferated the notion that Turkey is moving away from the West and is becoming ever more involved in political Islam.\(^\text{16}\)

As a result, the term “neo-Ottomanism” has been utilized to describe Turkey’s new external outlook and its drift away from the West, rather than a policy that has been formulated by domestic coalitions. Through a reexamination and reimaging of contemporary Turkish politics and history, this paper will show that the doctrine of “neo-Ottomanism” in literature has incorrectly been framed as a phenomenon associated with Erdoğan’s government; its inception had taken place and had influenced Turkish statecraft over the two decades before Erdoğan took power. Thereby, updating neo-Ottomanism to neo-Ottomanism 2.0 will better contextualize and enhance our understanding of Turkish foreign policy today, while also adding clarity in order to properly designate the new audience costs associated with Turkish politics, and thus its affects on statecraft and cooperation with the West.


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Although neo-Ottomanism is currently receiving a copious amount of attention in foreign governments, as well as academia and the media, this notion is not a new term in the discourse regarding Turkish foreign policy. In fact, it can be traced back to 1985 when David Barchard coined this term in his work *Turkey and the West*. At its origins, neo-Ottomanism was first used to depict the economic reform and idiosyncratic worldview during the tenure of Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who broke with Turkey’s traditional policy, Kemalism, during the 1980s by engaging previously alienated states on the Turkish periphery. The Özal era also saw Turkey become a more autonomous international actor, but yet a committed Western Ally.

Similar to the Özal period, the Erdoğan period has experienced comparable conditions and reforms, yet neo-Ottomanism has become a modern phenomenon regardless of the context from which it was created. This development has created a disconnect throughout the current literature in the usage of neo-Ottomanism, as there are discrepancies as to what constitutes it in its current form, and what are the discernable differences between its definition and implementation in the 1980s and 1990s and today. Therefore, so-called neo-Ottomanism in its current denotation—what I call neo-

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17. It is somewhat disputed who actually coined the term neo-Ottomanism. From my own research Barchard’s (1985) *Turkey and the West* was the first time Turkish foreign policy was described in a “neo-Ottomanism” foreign policy initiative. While a footnote (8) in Yavuz (1998): *Turkish identity and foreign policy influx: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism, Critique,* states that “The first short discussion of neo-Ottomanism in English is Ihsan D. Dagi’s (1993) *Turkey in the 1990s: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and the Search for New Identity.* This alludes to that Turkish authors pre-dating both Barchard and Dagi who may have first came up with the term neo-Ottomanism and is therefore disputed who actually coined the term.

18. For a discussion on Özal break with Kemalism and secularism in Turkish foreign policy see Taspınar (2007). *The Old Turks’ Revolt: When Radical Secularism Endangers Democracy.* For a further discussion on what constitutes the Turkish periphery see Mardin (1973) *Center-Periphery Relations: a Key to Turkish Politics.* The Turkish periphery is generally referred to states that share a border with Turkey, but also the meaning of periphery can also include states that were a part of the former Ottoman Empire at its height.
Ottomanism 2.0—breaks from this traditional categorization in several aspects through its contemporary usage. This distinction is important for contextualizing the normative “what the doctrine should be” and the positivist “what the doctrine is”. By discerning between these to construct, it avoids overlap from two divergent periods in Turkish history and foreign policy objectives by correctly contextualizing neo-Ottomanism 2.0 in its present context and its effects on international cooperation.

I will critique the concept of neo-Ottomanism and properly identify the “causal threads” that facilitated Turkey’s international doctrine vis-à-vis imagining Turkish domestic and international politics and underscoring changes in the international power structure. This analysis will lead to the designation of the new audience costs in Turkish politics for a decision-making model that will prescribe under what conditions cooperation with the West should occur. Thereby, crafting a comprehensive explanation for why neo-Ottomanism 2.0 has materialized as the foreign policy doctrine of “New Turkey”, by focusing on audience costs in conjunction with issue intensity to designate the importance of an interest or issue in contemporary Turkish politics.19

In order to achieve an understanding of Turkish foreign policy practices, two questions will be addressed and thoroughly analyzed. First, under what conditions should

19. Within the literate and in the rhetoric of the Turkish established on Turkish foreign policy, the terminology they are trying to put forth is of “New Turkey” and not of a “neo-Ottoman” Turkey and/or “Western Turkey.” In his book The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe, Chris Morris (see Morris 2005) examines this term and underscores “new Turkey” as the ongoing political and economic reforms undertaken the AKP government and what the author describes as a second (but quite) revolution in Turkey Republic. While the U-S based Turkish think-tank SETA Foundation has used this time quite often in its publications pertaining to Turkish foreign policy. New Turkey at present does not have the same potency in the literature and therefore opted to use neo-Ottomanism 2.0 for this paper and to also use that term to show the two different periods of Turkish foreign policy in the context of neo-Ottomanism.
cooperation between Turkey and the West occur under neo-Ottomanism 2.0? Second, how and why has Turkish foreign policy changed over the last decade and how has this development changed relations with the West? To answer these questions, a decision-making model that denotes the conditions for when cooperation is primed will be crafted. This model will underscore how the most important conditions that create neo-Ottomanism 2.0 are also the same conditions that explain the prospects for cooperation, as during its inception certain domestic coalitions (a further discussion will be conducted in the follow section) have political input, which then become the new associated audience costs for the Turkish governments under this doctrine. Hence, there is a significant relationship between how domestic politics affect a state’s foreign policy insofar as redefining a state’s *raison d’etat* by domestic interests.

Domestic interests are especially important in the calculus for deciding foreign policy objectives and the considerations are equally applicable to neo-Ottomanism 2.0. They are based within a framework of strategic calculations that have to simultaneously reconcile both domestic and international (two-level game) imperatives as well as respond to the pressures associated with a specific decision point.\(^2^0\) However, as neo-Ottomanism 2.0 is a newer political phenomenon, the audience costs associated with this doctrine are still rather unambiguous, and as the power structure of the international

\(^{20}\) In this paper any reference to “two-levels” or “both levels” of politics is a reference to the international and domestic realm. This terminology stem from Putnam (1988) *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games* and how foreign agreements vis-à-vis negotiations need to first be cleared and/or are influenced at the domestic level before an agreement can be reached at the international level.
system shifts to either a period “non” or multi-polar system (this being a dramatic shift from the ubiquitous bi-polar alliance system of the Cold War), Turkey’s *raison d'etat* may also continue to change. Therefore, by process tracing the audience costs at the inception of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and by delving into the history of the Third Turkish Republic (starting after the 1980s coup), I will establish the primary actors in the domestic realm that currently empower the ruling governments, while analyzing critical events in Turkish foreign policy during this period that add another dimension in determining the current audience costs. This analysis will then establish a thesis that explains when Turkish-Western cooperation *should* be the most primed to occur under neo-Ottomanism 2.0.

With the aim of further understanding the forces driving Turkey’s contemporary international doctrine, it may be helpful to review the relevant literature on audience costs and cooperation that assist in understanding the rationale for the decision-making model. Subsequently, in the second section, I will present my decision-making model to describe the conditions in which cooperation between the West and Turkey *should* occur under the new understanding of both neo-Ottomanism and Western-Turkish relations that will be compiled for this study. In the third section, I will lay out my methodological approach and explain the choices I have made to construct and test the research question, and why the dependent variable (audience costs) and the independent variable (issue intensity) are appropriate mechanisms to be utilized in determining cooperation. Furthermore, I will explain my case selection rational to test the decision-making model and theory. In the
fourth section, I will briefly review the literature pertaining to neo-Ottomanism and properly set a definition and contextualization of neo-Ottomanism 2.0. A conversation on the preceding doctrine in Turkish foreign policy—Kemalism—will also be conducted to illustrate variance.21 This discussion will serve as the backdrop of Turkey’s intrinsically paradoxical nature and underscore why there is a clear disconnect between Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism 2.0 in regard to Western-Turkish cooperation. Subsequently, in section five, I will present an abridged history of the Third Republic and how neo-Ottomanism 2.0 was crafted throughout this time. Throughout this section, I will focus on potential audience costs and important events that are essential for understanding neo-Ottomanism 2.0 which will be used to signify “the most critical factors” for Turkish foreign policy decision-making. This discussion will culminate in the sixth section that evaluates the theory vis-à-vis a case study analysis.

21. Kemalism has traditionally been the principle that guided the Turkish state throughout the decades. It is sometimes referred to the as the “Six Arrows,” with one arrow representing: Populism, Republicanism, Secularism, “Revolutionism” (devrimcilik), and Nationalism. These principles were formulated and applied but not defined as an ideology during the life of Atatürk. Given the importance of Atatürk within Turkey, this has lead to many political parties claiming to uphold the values and principles of the Six Arrows, and/or acting in a way that Atatürk would have also acted. Therefore, Kemalism in a general context is very broad; however, by gaining moving into the positivist denotation of how Kemalism has been used throughout the Republic after Atatürk’s death, the position of the military will be given as an equal to Kemalism in terms of policy output.
2. Towards Western-Turkish Cooperation

Cooperation can be built upon or hindered by a multitude of factors. Scholars have long assumed cooperation in the international system is contingent upon factors such as “self-interest” and “institutionalism”.1 However, the concept of audience costs offers a great deal of insight in determining when the conditions for collaboration are primed for success. If a leader feels that his/her continuation of power can be threatened by cooperating with another state, he or she will be punished for that decision during the next election cycle. Therefore, a leader will not cooperate under conditions that have the potential to threaten his/her hold on power or that is politically destabilizing or gives an opportunity to an opposition party to further punish a leader.

Although Turkish-Western cooperation has improved since it hit “rock bottom” in 2007, they are still a long way from the “golden years” during and directly after the Cold War. Now with Turkey’s rise and American influence waning down in the Middle East, it is more of an imperative to hold a conversation on this vital security question. Throughout this section and this paper, it is my intention to examine the conditions for cooperation in Turkish-Western relations by examining the virtues of audience costs within the framework of Thomas Putnam’s seminal work on two-level (international and domestic) bargaining. The end results of this conversation will bring forth a theoretical premise of when cooperation should occur in Turkish-Western relations. I shall do this

1. For a complete discussion between realism and institutionalism on the issue of cooperation see Keohane (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Particularly in Part I, Chapter 1: Realism, Institutionalism and Cooperation; and in Part 2, Chapter 4: Cooperation and International Regimes.
by imaging Turkish political culture and determining its “social reality” through the intensity of its audience costs at both levels of politics.

2.1 Audience Costs

A major hub in the scholarship of international relations pertaining to democratic peace theory has been the concepts found in audience cost theory. This concept is “now central to theories about the initiation and course of military crisis”, and was first introduced by James Fearon in his 1994 landmark article Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. This article theorizes that at the international level of politics, leaders who back down during an international crisis will incur audience costs. The longer the crisis lasts, the more the costs increase. However, other factors, such as the behavior and decisions of the leader during the crisis, also determine how much they actually “pay”. Fearon argues that the “cost” for backing down results in a loss of reputation, which results in said leader receiving the most serious of incurred audience costs: not being re-elected, as the public dissatisfied by a blunder on the international stage jeopardizes the security of their state.

Fearon’s argument that leaders can be punished domestically by their “audience” has spawned literature that examines the different conditions under which these costs

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2. Tomz (2007) Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach, pages 821-822. Tomz, goes as far to say that audience costs also have far-reaching effects and ideas: “into models of alliances, economic sanctions, foreign trade, foreign direct investment, monetary commitments, interstate bargaining, and international cooperation generally.” See page 822 for further discussion.

occur (to the extent that they exist at all).⁴ For example, Alastair Smith takes Fearon’s model and argues that only incompetent leaders (when in equilibrium) will back down during a crisis, given the sobering effects of the prospect of war.⁵ These leaders will have to pay audience costs because they are shown to be incompetent as they threaten to go to war and then back down.⁶ In Kenneth Schultz’s article *Looking for Audience Costs*, he explains that there are methodological problems with determining when audience costs occur, given both partial observability and the strategic selection of cases; yet he still claims that costs can only be detected when they actually do incur. Schultz goes on to say that “only states with low audience costs ever incur them”.⁷ This conclusion appears intuitive, given what we know about audience costs; if the audience costs are too high, the cost of backing down during a crisis for a leader is too much and he or she will be punished.

Fearon, Smith, and Schultz place audience costs at the international level of politics and within the framework of leaders threatening to go to war. That assessment, however, leaves open a small space where audience costs can actually occur within this

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⁴ Some part of the audience costs literature suggests that they do not exist, or empirically cannot be proven. See Tomz (2007) *Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach* and Schultz (2001) *Looking for Audience Costs*.

⁵ A. Smith (1998) *International Crises and Domestic Politics*. Smith writes that: “In equilibrium, only competent leaders make threats. These types also carry them out.” In other words the leader has to be incompetent to issue a threat and get into a bad situation before realizing the severity and backing out. Page 631.

⁶ A. Smith (1998) *International Crises and Domestic Politics*. Smith writes: “Leaders vary in quality, and this is reflected in their ability to perform during crises. Talented leaders, with the appropriate skills, are more likely to be successful during a crisis than their less competent peers. Since ability affects outcomes, voters want to remove incompetent leaders, but they can only perceive leaders’ ability through actions and performance. Thus, when choosing foreign policy, leaders must consider not only how it influences foreign rivals but also how it will be received at home. All else equal, leaders who expect to perform poorly in conflict avoid foreign entanglement. This is true for two reasons. The first is obvious: Poor performance is inherently undesirable. The second is that revealing low competence harms a leader’s electoral prospects.” Page 623.

Taking note of this issue, Guisinger and Smith’s article *Honest Threats: the Interaction of Reputation and political Institutions in International Crisis* attempts to move the literature further by adding a factor of “domestic accountability” within the audience costs paradigm.\(^8\) Guisinger and Smith offer a theory that opposition parties matter because they act as a “watchdog”, given that the opposition has no incentive to support a bluffing government.\(^9\) Since the opposition party adds credibility to a leader’s threat, the opposition theoretically makes a leader more selective when he or she decides to issue a threat.\(^10\)

For much of the early international relations literature, audience costs generally tend to fall into the "second image reversed" paradigm: events on the international level affect domestic politics (moving aside selection and focusing on outcome).\(^11\) Given that audience costs usually refer to the threat faced by leaders in democratic states and the

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\(^{8}\) Guisinger and Smith write: "For policy pledges to bind, citizens must know what commitments their leaders have undertaken. Thus, diplomatic statements must be more widely communicated. In contrast, when the credibility of messages is not supported by domestic accountability, the wider distribution of information is unnecessary and, as a consequence, likely to be rare. This suggests that in closed negotiations, such as are often used for economic trade agreements, regime type is less important in signaling credibility, but threats, unless expressed publicly, are also less credible," Page 196. See Guisinger (2002) *Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises* for further expiation on domestic accountability.

\(^{9}\) Guisinger and Smith write: “Because their domestic political survival rests on living up to their commitments, democrats are more likely to follow through with stated foreign policy goals than are autocratic leaders. This enhanced ability to commit enables democrats to better communicate intentions and consequently deter adversaries," Page 197 Guisinger (2002) *Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises*. For a further discussion on domestic opposition and international signaling and audience costs: see Schultz (1998) *Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises*.

\(^{10}\) Ibid

\(^{11}\) The term “second image” comes from Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work: *Man State War: Theoretical Analysis*. The “second image” refers to Waltz’s discussion that attributes the “characteristics of states” as the primary determinant for its crafting of foreign policy. The "second image reversed" takes Waltz’s causality and reversed it, as Gourevitch’s paper examines the impact of the international system– the distribution of power among states and the economic opportunities offered by the global system– on domestic political structures and domestic politics. For this discussion see Krasner (2010) *Revisiting “The Second Image Reversed”*. For a further on the Second Image Reversed see Gourevitch (1978) *The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics*. 

16
costs they suffer domestically for making errors in judgment at the international level, once their error is realized by the greater public, that leader will be punished in elections. In his article *The Foundations of Domestic Audience Costs: Attitudes, Expectations, and Institutions*, Michael Tomz writes to this point in the audience cost scholarship:

> Many scholars think that the credibility of international threats depends, at least to some degree, on the leader’s vulnerability to “domestic audience costs.” According to domestic audience costs theory, citizens would disapprove if their leader made military threats and subsequently backed down. In democracies and other types of countries where leaders care about swings in public approval, leaders will have incentives to avoid making false threats, because they fear that getting caught in a bluff would lead to domestic repercussions. By this logic, the presence of a powerful domestic audience can contribute to the credibility of international threats.  

Given Tomz's assessment of the early scholarship, we can place audience costs within a second image reversed framework; thus, it serves as the first piece of the puzzle in denoting the overarching effects of audience costs for the upcoming decision-making model at the international level.

The second piece in understanding the "applied" audience costs in the context of cooperation is by reversing back to Waltz's "second image", while adding how the characteristics of a state matter in statecraft, it is this image we are most concerned with understanding. By also incorporating the "second image" into the model both the characteristics of the state and the relationship between how international relations and domestic politics are “interrelated” can be constructed. Given that domestic politics influence foreign policy, but also because the international system influences domestic authority structures and policies as well. In this context, audience costs can be incurred

13. For a full discussion on the Second Image see Waltz (1959) *Man State War: Theoretical Analysis.*
on a leader if he or she decides to act in a manner that is outside of normal characteristics of the state given the state’s "social reality", or if leaders decide to do something that disenfranchises its domestic (supports) coalition: e.g., impose an austerity measure, sign an unbalanced international agreement, or cooperate, or offer détente with an arch-enemy.

In this view, audience costs are incurred at the domestic level from an action taken place in the international level, but it is the event at the international level that is the cause for domestic repression, however, what is contingent is the point of origin of the cost in the second image. This upward (domestic level to international level) and downward (international level to domestic level) constraint supposedly gives audience costs “blocking power”. However, as suggested, predetermined domestic concerns can effect international cooperation. For example, there are three logical and documented illustrations that are solely domestic and impede cooperation. First, leaders may not be able to reach an international agreement as they are blocked by domestic coalitions (their supporters) from making an agreement. Second, leaders can self-impose audience costs to establish a better negotiating position. Third, a leader might make a public pledge to do one thing and then do the opposite.

The first circumstance in which leaders might be impeded in efforts to reach an agreement is in times during which they lack domestic support. This concept is rather intuitive given what we know about audience costs. For instance, consider the peace talks which led to the Camp David Accords (1978) and the Good Friday Agreement: both
were heavily influenced by the level of domestic support that negotiating leaders could bring to the table. Other examples can be found in literature on the construction of international agreements, epitomized by a study that looks at the conditions for states to be potential "clients" of the IMF. James Vreeland’s book *The IMF and Economic Development*, states that “[c]ountries in economic crisis with dire need for foreign exchange may negotiate with the IMF, but governments must weigh the domestic audience costs of surrendering national sovereignty to the Fund. These costs may depend on easily observable measures such as a country’s history, [and] the prospect of an election”.

Second, the discussions on states’ self-imposed audience costs go back several decades to Thomas Schelling’s seminal work *The Strategy of Conflict*, with his soothsaying perception that “when national representatives go to international negotiations knowing that there is a wide range of potential agreements within which the outcome will depend on bargain, they seem often to create a bargaining position through public statements, statements calculated to arouse a public option that permits no

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14. In regards to the Israeli-Egyptian agreement at Camp David in 1978, the reference to audience costs do flow both ways but in different context given regime type. For Egypt the audience costs was international dissatisfaction with its discussion to rapprochement with Israel. "The 1978 Camp David agreements provide a second example of the power of larger alliances to generate political audience costs. Egypt’s diplomatic overture to Israel in 1978, followed by the Camp David accord in 1979, caused outrage among members of the Arab League. The Arab League condemned Egypt’s decision, Egypt’s membership to the Arab League was suspended, and the headquarters of the League were moved from Cairo to Tunis. Ultimately, while the political audience costs did not prevent states from violating the Pact, they did raise the risks of doing so...”see Collard-Wexler (2009) *Strength in Numbers? Testing the effects of Alliance Size on Alliance Duration*. In reference to the Good Friday Agreement, George Mitchell in his book discusses internal politics and the domestic pressure related to reaching an agreement. On page 47–48, he discusses reasons why David Trimble did not block Mitchell becoming the chairperson due to concerns of costs from his party, if he were to collapse the negotiations by joining Ian Paisley Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Robert McCartney of the UK Unionist Party in blocking Mitchell. Mitchell (2001) *Making Peace.*

concessions to be made”.16 Decades later, Leventoğlu and Tarar’s article *Pre-negotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining* expanded this concept and reiterated Schelling’s point when they stated, “leaders [negotiators] often publicly commit themselves to obtaining certain benefits prior to entering into negotiations.”17 Through imposed constraints on themselves that facilitate their desired international outcome, leaders seek to create a stronger position by making statements that would incur costs for reaching an agreement domestically. However, these statements have to be compared against the domestic support for a policy.

Finally, public pledges have a significant impact on audience costs, since a promise is publicly given from the leader to the audience. For example, take the 1988 campaign pledge of President George H.W. Bush when he infamously remarked: “read my lips: no new taxes,” only later to be forced to raise taxes after the First Gulf War.18 His public promise to not raise taxes was popular since his political base was largely Republican supporters, but once he abandoned his policy and raised taxes, he paid a high price for it as he was defeated in the 1992 elections.19 The relationship between a public statement expressing a policy and going against it later results in the same theoretical punishment—if the issue is important enough—that is a leader who issues a threat and

18. Spoken during the 1988 Republican Convention, Bush’s promise not to raise taxes was cited as being a major contributing factor to his victory that year. However, when Bush did raise taxes in light of a ballooning debt, he was severely punished by both domestic audience costs for breaking his well-known pledge. For further discussion see Jamieson (2000) *Everything You Think You Know About Politics...and Why You’re Wrong*, pages 33-34.
19. Ibid.
then backs down incurs. Therefore, by moving the context of audience costs from solely at the international level, the “Second Image reversed”, and coupling it in the domestic level Waltz’s Second Image, the context of audience costs in the so-called “high politics” of international relations can be now downgraded towards the concepts and theories surrounding international cooperation between states.

The relationship of audience costs can be associated not only with having costs imposed by another state for non-cooperation, but also with costs that are self-imposed. They might further be associated with the support of leaders for breaking a pledge or for not acting within the “national character” which elected them. Given this new understanding that audience costs can be incurred on both levels (international and domestic) of politics, and since this paper is primary interested in the prospects of cooperation between Turkey and the West, the costs and benefits of cooperation (agreeing on a common policy or acting collectively) will be viewed within the two levels of politics as prescribed by Putnam. Adding to this thought, Dorussen and Mo write that “that audience costs have been analyzed most extensively in the framework of two-level games. In these games, the negotiators are principals and the domestic institutions agents with a strong preference for the disputed policy”.²⁰ Therefore, this paper will define audience costs in both the context of the second image and the second image reversed and thereby will capture both levels of politics. Methodically, this approach captures a

2.2 Audience Costs for neo-Ottomanism 2.0:

Audience costs are critical in a leader’s decision calculus, as high costs can potentially end his or her career; thus, when framing this in the context of Turkish-Western relations, the foremost consideration in the decision-making model are the new audience costs associated with Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine: neo-Ottomanism 2.0. These costs are based on either (a) the viewpoint of key groups that support the government or leadership decisions, and, (b) the rhetoric that is articulated by the government in public, which carries consequences if a leader decides to change policy or back down. The severity of the punishment (costs) that will be incurred on a leader stems from the intensity—importance and pressure—of a particular issue that interacts at both levels of politics. Therefore, leaders will strive to insure that when either issuing a threat, bargaining, or cooperating, they will not take a position that will incur a domestic punishment and will subsequently be voted out of office. With this principle established, it is now important to deal with how leaders seek to negotiate and the pressures and concerns they will encounter at both levels of politics.

In his seminal work *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games*, Putnam explains that in order to reach an international agreement, the parties require a “chief negotiator” who seeks to reach an agreement that best maximizes his or
her own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while also minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.”

Putnam posits the theory that treaties can only be ratified at the international level once they pass through the rigors of domestic politics: i.e., no international agreement is possible if it does not bear the print of domestic approval (Level II). Any agreement between the two sides has to fall within the acceptability of the domestic win-sets of each player, and at the domestic level, influential political actors (unions, lobbies, coalition partners, a large part of the electoral, etc.) strongly manipulate the terms of a final international agreement.

Putnam’s theory neatly underscores that: “domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled…Each national political leader [chief negotiator] appears at both game boards.” However, he also explains that the domestic level of politics holds a veto over an agreement (cooperation) at the international level. This brings us back to why the foremost considerations in the model are the new audience costs associated with the policy of the government in question, as this is a study of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and cooperation as much as it is of audience costs. The impact of Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine and its impact on Turkey’s relationship with the West is an important facet at this stage, and it is therefore essential to properly denote the audience costs and to identify the influential actors involved in Turkey’s domestic

22. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
politics. These reasons are why it is also important to reconstruct how and why neo-Ottomanism 2.0 initiated and to determine the new audience costs (this will be done in great depth through the historical review section).

Putnam’s framework of accounting for two-level decision-making contributes to the general understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy. The prospect of when cooperation should occur is indicative of balancing these two levels with an emphasis placed in the domestic realm. Since audience costs are a vital aspect of the rationale in a leader’s decision-making calculus, the important missing element is what makes an issue have audience costs associated with it and how those costs affect cooperation. Currently, as Turkey becomes a more democratic country, the punishment for leaders acting inappropriately both domestically and internationally, given the openness of society and media attention, creates costs that can lead to his or her ousting during the next election cycle. Additionally, the intensity of what is important to a leader’s coalition can be discerned from public rhetoric and election results.

2.2.1. Issue Intensity

The intensity associated with a particular issue, when placed within Putnam’s two-level paradigm, adds another layer, as leaders have to gauge the costs and payoffs at both levels that public statements create.25 Within the two levels, a strategic interaction that influences Turkish foreign policy behavior occurs with calculations that are based

upon the public audience costs associated with a policy. The two components of audience costs and two-level balancing determine the conditions and prospects for Turkish-Western cooperation. It is assumed that a problem for leaders is that rational moves in level I may prove impolitic at level II or vice versa. The sets of all possible agreements fall within the domestic constituents of the chief negotiator, and that an agreement will be ratified is called the level II “win-set.” To achieve a successful agreement, the leader must locate the intersection (if any) between his constituency’s win-set and what the other level I of the policy game will accept (that is, the level 1 “win-set”).

Using Putnam’s typology as a model for Turkey’s own decision-making calculus, but adding the factor of “intensity” in the Turkish context, the decision-making model will provide a holistic view of how the domestic and international balancing, coupled with issue intensity, offers vast explanatory power to the decision-making model.

To measure audience costs within the two levels of politics, the intensity of an issue is paramount, because the expected associated audience costs incurred for acting incorrectly is based upon this variable. The importance of a particular issue in both the domestic and international levels of Turkey and the pressure and/or costs coming from the international Western level (domestic is assumed by the outward action) affects the conditions of cooperation. In the international realm, Turkey cannot control the preferences of the opposing player that it seeks to cooperate with, or subsequently how

much pressure will be levied against it if they do not act a certain way. However, the intensity of some issues can be intuitively deduced based upon previous public statements or learnt behavior; in this sense Turkey is an exogenous actor in the international part of the model because it does not seek to influence the pressure that is placed upon it, but rather can only react. As Putnam points out, the final decision falls within the win-sets of the paradigm on whether or not a player wants to cooperate, and the understanding that each other’s win-sets is central for the decision-making model.²⁷

Adding intensity to the model provides another layer due to the punishing effects of audience cost. However, people care about different issues at different times. An issue that is the proverbial “third rail” one moment can be a non-issue the next and vice versa, creating a slightly problematic aspect for the theory given this constant fluctuation within politics. However, as previously touched upon, a government is accountable to a specific domestic audience and has public international objectives it wants to accomplish. As a result, there are several assumptions to be made about which position(s) a government might decide to take and the importance of an issue considering either a common knowledge of the domestic actors or intensity stemming from historical events. Therefore, by reviewing previous cases in Turkish history, an intensity measurement can be signified. Since intensity is set against the domestic and international costs of a leader

acting a certain way (i.e. with higher importance or pressure comes a greater reward or punishment), the question remains: What makes something important?

Unfortunately, there is no universal answer to how or why something becomes important (although a great deal of international relations scholarship seeks to answer this question, there is no consensus as of yet) for a political actor or a state. Within the archetypical paradigms of international relations theory, each tradition will provide a differing conclusion. For example, a realist would assume that costs would be imposed only when a leader did something to jeopardize state security. Constructivists, on the other hand, offer superior insight into how audience costs are denoted because their approach assumes that actors are not simply governed by the assumed theoretical imperatives, and can create the necessary room for identities and interests to be constructed.28 By focusing on how language and rhetoric is used by governments, audience costs can be constructed from a perception of the “social reality” of Turkish

28. One of the most seminal works on constructivism is Alexander Wendt (1992), *Anarchy is what States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics*. In Wendt's section on "Anarchy and the social construction of power politics," he states that: Conceptions of self and interest tend to "mirror" the practices of significant others over time. This principle of identity-formation is captured by the symbolic interactionist notion of the "looking-glass self," which asserts that the self is a reflection of an actor's socialization (page 404). This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a "socialact" and begins the process of creating inter subjective meanings. It advances the same way. The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other's future behavior: potentially mistaken and certainly tentative, but expectations nonetheless. Based on this tentative knowledge, ego makes a new gesture, again signifying the basis on which it will respond to alter, and again alter responds, adding to the pool of knowledge each has about the other, and so on over time. The mechanism here is reinforcement; interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding other, page 405. Wendt's theory is that a leader's cognitive perception of how both sides act is a major underlying factor when dealing with other states. And that once both leaders learn a certain behaviorally pattern it effects the way they conduct foreign affairs. In Turkish foreign policy, the process of learning how to act within the paradigm of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 is a similar function for the West, which were previously accustom of a less autonomous Turkey. For further reading on other aspects of constructivism see Legro (2005), *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*. 

27
politics by accounting for Turkey’s goals, threats, fears, cultures, identities, and other elements that are social facts in relation to neo-Ottomanism 2.0.\textsuperscript{29}

Leaders understand the importance of an issue by the cues given to him or her in the communications received from an opposing leader, or how they are interpreted through a leader’s understanding of both countries’ “social facts”. Self-interest and learned behavior may enhance the probability of guessing what will make one issue more important than another, but only when a statement of policy preference from the opposing leader is publicly announced (since privately there are no audience costs) does the importance of an issue finally reveal itself. For example, during the Cold War both Soviet and American leaders referred to only the most important issues as “red lines” to assign to the opposition a value to the issue being challenged. Meaning that an evaluation of each case has to be analyzed individually to understand how much importance it should be given, which is why the historical analysis will provide an adequate assessment of the audience costs associated with neo-Ottomanism 2.0 in order to generalize several issues. Only then can this paradigm function.

The rationale behind crafting a decision-making model approach (which will be explained in detail in the methods section) and utilizing the aforementioned factors is developed because the objective of this paper is to construct an original theory of the

\textsuperscript{29} Durkheim defines social facts in sociology, as values, cultural norms, and social structures that are external to the individual with the ability of exercising a constraint on that individual way of thinking, Durkheim, (1938) \textit{The Rules of Sociological Method}, pages 142-148. For further reading on social facts see: Searle (1995), \textit{The Construction of Social Reality}, pages 36-42.
conditions under which there should be expected cooperation between the West and Turkey in the current international relations system and under the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism 2.0. Additionally, a decision-making model clearly lays out an approach that uses a paradigm moving the conversation into the emerging “non” or multi-polar world order that is vital for its applicability in a realistic (and Turkish) context. The decision-making model provides an ample outline in answering the research questions and enhancing, with some parsimony, an understanding of Western-Turkish relations.

2.3 Cooperation

The previous sections have so far outlined the basic framework for the decision-making model when cooperation between Turkey and the West should occur. However, what do we mean by cooperation? Before delving into that discussion, I will momentarily make a slight yet important digression in order to make some preliminary assumptions related to cooperation. To move forward in a constructive way, I will assume two things about Turkish-Western cooperation. First, issues in which there is a clear alignment of preferences (with no domestic obstacles) and policy positions are excluded from the model. This is because there is no strategic interaction or “costs” associated when both states are in complete general agreement. Second, for simplicity, the model is reflective of the West’s desire to have Turkey do something or cooperate on a particular issue. By constructing the model through this structure, the audience costs for Turkey are more visible.
In international relations, pending on what world-view one subscribes to, the feasibility of cooperation is both fungible and complicated. One view coming from the realist tradition of international relations assumes that states are rational unitary actors with the foremost objective of ensuring their survival. Kenneth Waltz argues that states are predominately concerned with survival because even if a state wants to do other things, it can't do them unless it first survives. Bolstering a state’s ability to survive for a realist can constitute maximizing power (military) as theorized by Mearsheimeir, or by balancing or bandwagoning with great powers as discussed by Waltz. Regardless of the exact way a state tries to survive, we can assume states act rationally or face near-certain destruction. This assumption leads to uneasy cooperation amongst states, as each state might fear the “relative gains” that the other state will make by cooperating.

Ole Holsti, speaking to this point, argues that the prospect for cooperation arises from “self-interest and not from some utopian attribution of altruism to state leaders”. Instead, states cooperate to achieve maximum payoffs that generate the best possible benefits (utility) for themselves. In some cases, the “game” that two states are playing

31. Mearsheimeir (2001) believes that states realize that the most efficient way to guarantee its survival in anarchy is to maximize their relative power with the ultimate aim of becoming the strongest power to achieve hegemony. However, not all states can maximize their relative power simultaneously, which means in international politics, states are destined to be an arena of relentless security competition as long as it remains anarchic. For further discussions on offensive realism and power maximization see: Mearsheimeir (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; chapter 2 for direct conversation, and Layne (2006), The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present.
33. For a discussion on relative gains see Grieco (1993) The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation. While, neo-liberals will counter the relative gains argument in cooperation as they tend not take seriously enough the possibility that states may choose absolute over relative gains, particularly in situations where institutions can alter payoffs, For further discussion on this point see: Keohane (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.
34. Holsti (1986) Theories of International Relations.
makes cooperation less likely or alternatively more likely as the payoff function serves as a linchpin for cooperation. Kenneth Oye’s compilation related to his work in *Cooperation under Anarchy* uses game theory to explain this relationship, as the concept of “cooperation” is not applicable in some matters of statecraft. Two such examples are the pursuit of hegemony *vis-à-vis* tit-for-tat exchanges (in Oye’s terms deadlocked games: that the action that is mutually most beneficial is also dominant) and when there is equal sharing between states (Harmony Games: dividing a resource in such a way that all recipients believe that they have received a fair amount) as illustrated with the dividing of Berlin after the Second World War. Oye, however, opens space for conditions for cooperation through the establishment that cooperation between states can be conducted through a change of the payoff structure, which then in-turn changes the game (e.g. from Prisoners' Dilemma to Stag Hunt) to facilitate cooperation between the players. This condition means that issues become the centerpiece for modeling cooperation as the punishment and payoffs can change given the utility function for cooperation.

“The idea that different international issues and issue domains have different strategic structures has had at least three important consequences for the evolution of research on international cooperation”. The idea of diverse strategic structures inevitably leads scholars to focus on the questions: “what are the preferences?”,

35. Oye’s *Cooperation under Anarchy*.
36. Ibid.
“how do states understand this is mirrored?” 38 Debates on relative-gains (Greico: 1988, Baldwin: 1993) argue that under realism, there is international cooperation under some circumstances but states are worried about cooperating as the other side may cheat and grow in relative power. Others, (Keohane 1984, Weber: 1991) argue that international organization deemed possible a theoretical setup for cooperation, as institutional structures. Nonetheless, as Fearon states in his article Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation: “Cooperation theory provided no guidance to the problem of how to assign preferences, and often seems so difficult or controversial as to render the exercise pointless—most of the ‘action’ of the theory is loaded into the arguments about what the right preferences are and how exactly to characterize what ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’ mean in a particular setting.”39 Given this discussion, I will reiterate his rationale and take a constructivist approach and use a historical review to indicate audience costs on issues vis-à-vis imaging Turkish social reality.

Solving cooperation problems has been a part of human nature and political theory for centuries. For example, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality, he writes:

> If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple... in doing so he would have caused his comparison to miss theirs.40

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38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
Rousseau's intuition sets up the classic “Stag-Hunt” game. This game's story plays out between two individuals who are going out on a hunt, with each individual choosing to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Each player must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other player. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to be successful in the hunt. Both have the common knowledge that each can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. If both cooperate the reward is higher than that of non-cooperation. In the same construct of the “applied concept” of the Stag-Hunt game is somewhat helpful in understanding general cooperation in Turkish-Western relations the default position, when compared to the Prison’s Dilemma game.

If the game was similar to a Prisoner’s Dilemma format between the West and Turkey, cooperation would not occur and the payoff structure for cooperation could not be changed to make cooperation more preferred for either side. In Robert Jervis’ important article: Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, he discusses that if state relations are in a “Security Dilemma”, cooperation will not occur because it is in the best interest for each side to defect rather than to cooperate. Jervis writes:

*The Prisoner's Dilemma differs from the Stag Hunt in that there is no solution that is in the best interests of all the participants; there are offensive as well as defensive incentives to defect from the coalition with the others; and, if the game is to be played only once, the only rational response is to defect. But if the game is repeated in-definitely, the latter characteristic no longer holds and we can analyze the game in terms similar to those applied to the Stag Hunt. It would be in the interest of each actor to have others deprived of the power to defect; each would be willing*

to sacrifice this ability if others were similarly restrained. But if the others are not, then it is in the actor’s interest to retain the power to defect.\footnote{Jervis (1978) Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, page 178.}

In current Turkish-Western relations there is no fear of a security dilemma arising in the near future, as it is in the best interest of both sides to generally cooperate and to receive mutual benefits from cooperation. By framing the question in terms of Prisoner’s Dilemma versus Stag Hunt cooperation, Jervis underscores the conditions of what makes it more or less likely that the players will cooperate. He claims that the “chances of achieving this outcome [cooperation] will be increased if: “anything [is done] that increases each side's expectation that the other will cooperate!”\footnote{Jervis (1978) Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, pages 178-179.} Using Jervis’ theory, and given that Turkish-Western relations are within a “Stag Hunt” game, and that both sides would rather cooperate, (given the natural conditions for cooperation is that each side will seek cooperation) means that under the medium domestic intensity level it can be assumed that collaboration will continue because each side will want continued cooperation over time.

Metaphorically speaking, as Turkish influence grows in the Middle East, the West will want to “hunt” with Turkey because it has become a more proficient and skilled hunter (given soft power, economic growth, and trade) and the rewards for hunting together will bring a bigger reward with higher payoffs if both sides cooperate. This trend also means for the West that they should also be more inclined to want to cooperate with Turkey than previously. However, because states are “selfish” and have separate national
interests, a natural tension can arise when there are changes to the traditional power structure of a relationship, as Turkish-Western relations have demonstrated over the last decade. The conditions for cooperation have become harder as both states are increasingly dealing with conflicting interests that do not allow them to “hunt together”. Examples of this include Iran’s nuclear program, relations with Israel, etc.

In the context of Turkish-Western relations, cooperation is not an intangible concept, as it has not been illusive and at times quite clear in several areas as touched upon before; nevertheless, a theory that examines the conditions for Turkish-Western cooperation and when cooperation should occur still remains absent from the literature. Thus far the discussions on audience costs at both levels of politics and a general premise of cooperation within this paradigm have been reviewed. At this time a decision-making model that underscores the conditions when cooperation should occur can now be explained.

2.4 The Decision-making Model

For the decision-making model on Turkish statecraft and when cooperation should occur with the West, I will first make the following three assumptions: (i) neo-Ottomanism 2.0 is Turkey’s foreign policy doctrine and the domestic considerations for cooperation are linked to the preferences of the AKP’s internal supporters (also known as a coalition), (ii) the Western-world’s preferences can be summarized by the perspective of the United States, and (iii) the intensity of an issue is denoted by the public value given to it by aspects of national character, public sentiments, and national interests. Given that
this paper is interested in cooperation, the view one should hold when conceptualizing this model is that the West is seeking to cooperate with Turkey.

The interaction in the model occurs between the audience costs that the Turkish government will receive from taking a foreign policy position, and whether cooperation can be reached given these costs. If the costs are high and are contrary to Turkey’s national character, or if the government backs down after issuing a threat and breaking a policy pledge, then audience costs will be imposed on them. This phenomenon sets the concept of audience costs as the dependent variable given the clear constrains placed on the government that remain constant because of democratic elections set every four years. The intensity of an issue is the independent variable because it represents the variable that is being manipulated. Within the confines of the decision-making model, a generalized denotation of intensity pertaining to certain issues is given. This designation stems from the historical review section by reimagining Turkish politics since the start of the Third Republic, and will be explained in depth in sections 4 and 5, where Turkish politics under the framework of four “causal threads” that occurred at both levels of Turkish politics, have become interconnected by the historical developments and political changes that created neo-Ottomanism 2.0. These sections will disentangle and tease out only the most significant themes related to neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and audience costs for further review so they may be denoted with an intensity level to further enhance and contextualize the decision-making model.
To present the decision-making model at this time, I will summarize the findings in the historical analysis and indicate several important issues and audience costs that are currently prevalent and static in Turkish politics, while a further rationale of issue intensity and its plausible denotation will stem from the following sections. This rationale is mentioned in the re-interpretation of the issues from the viewpoint of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and in regard to cooperation. The issues that appear to be most influential in Turkish domestic polices and Turkish-Western relations are the following: sustained economic growth, European Union membership, status in NATO, fighting terrorism, relations with Israel, the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, nationalism, and self-reliance.

To simplify the intensity level of an issue and thus the audience costs associated with it, I will use a basic scale ranging from to -3 (being punishment by an issue) as the lowest, and +3 (receiving a payoff by an issue while cooperating) being the highest. The following issues and their intensity scores are black-boxed within the model and these factors are being explained and used to gauge when cooperation between Turkey and the West should occur given the significant of these variables. The table below (1) shows the amount of costs and benefits being levied against a leader and their intensity designation. It is these two variables interacting in tandem and at both levels of politics that produce audience by neo-Ottomanism 2.0.
Although these issues will be raised and explained in-depth in the proceeding sections, I will now offer a quick explanation here to achieve a basic understanding of the decision-making model and how these issues and their intensity can be conceptualized, as well as the audience costs.

Starting in the domestic realm, economic growth underpins the support of the current government and it will not do anything to disrupt this progression, as economic upheaval will cause lower domestic support. Turkish nationalism has always been prevalent within society and cuts two ways. First, nationalism in one context is about preserving so-called Turkishness, which is governed by Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, and is perceived as being contrary to the notions of freedom of speech. The Article states that a “person who publicly denigrates the Turkish Nation, the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the judicial organs of the State, shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to two
Nationalists have evoked Article 301 against the Nobel prize-winning novelist Orhan Pamuk, along with another novelist, Elif Şafak, and the late Hrant Dink for supporting the theories of the Armenian Genocide. Second, nationalism is closely associated with Atatürk (Kemalism), and when the government acts in a nationalist sense during the latter aspect of nationalism, it co-opts the opposition and gains further domestic support.

Nationalism might also arise when Turkey acts independently, since it gains domestic benefits if the policy is popular among Turks who feel a sense of pride in Turkey’s growing power and economic ability. By acting independently, Turkey has achieved a level of self-help where it can solve foreign policy and domestic issues without the influence of external actors. It is, however, important to note that acting independently does not equate with non-cooperation; rather, acting independently demonstrates Turkish power by being the focal point on a foreign policy question. For example, take the Brazil/Turkey Nuclear Deal with Iran in 2010. This agreement would ship much of (in 2009 terms) Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium abroad for further processing and the uranium would then return as fuel rods for a medical research.

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44. For a primary reference (in Turkish) to Article 301 please see T. C. Resmi Gazete Kuruluş tarihi: 7 Ekim 1336 – 1920. The author would like to thank Mr. Güneş Ünüvar formerly of Bilkent Üniversitesi LL.B., Law for the explanation and reference to Article 301 and its legality.

45. For a complete analysis and depiction of different facets of Turkish Nationalism in relation to "Turkishness" see (especially chapters 4, 5, and 6) Çağaptay (2006). Islam, secularism, and nationalism in modern Turkey: who is a Turk? For further commentary on the growing nationalism in Turkey pertaining to insulting "Turkishness" and intolerance to civil discourse in Turkey and directly relation to Pamuk, Şafak, and Hrant Dink: see Grossbongardt (2007), Deadly Nationalism: The Struggle of Orhan Pamuk and Turkey’s Intellectuals. For a views the differing types of violence and threats see Morewitz (2010), Death Threats and Violence: New Research and Clinical Perspectives, page 11.

reactor. This deal was supported by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and correlates with his stance that Iran can develop peaceful nuclear technology, which is in sharp contrast to the view coming from London, Paris and, Washington D.C. If one accepts the viewpoint of Stephan Kinzer, as he describes this deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey as “show[ing] the two countries are a new global force”. While Ziya Önis, in his article *Multiple Faces of the “new” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique*, correctly frames the rationale and costs of Turkey acting independently. He writes:

> Even more problematic was the approach towards the Iranian nuclear program, a policy which may have significant long-term negative repercussions for Turkey's relations with the West, taking into account the fact that there is a far greater degree of convergence among the American and the European positions as far as the security threats posed by Iran's nuclear program are concerned. Again, it would have been quite legitimate for Turkey to propose a different style of engagement with Iran while remaining firmly within the Western alliance. Instead, Turkey preferred to act more independently and pro-actively by going along with Brazil and signing a trilateral agreement with Iran... the agreement and the subsequent “no” vote against the proposed sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council were clearly interpreted as obvious signs of Turkey's shifting course away from the West. The costs of signing such an agreement for Brazil might be minimal.

Acting in view of their own convictions and being able to mediate and influence power in world politics gives a domestic boost to the government under neo-Ottomanism 2.0, even if it might incur international punishment.

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47. Önis (2011). *Multiple Faces of the “new” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique.*

48. In his article Kinzer counties to say: “Turkey and Brazil were once near-automatic supporters of Washington, but they have struck out on their own path. Distressed by what they saw as blundering American unilateralism that destabilised entire regions of the world, they have sought to defuse international confrontations and promote peaceful compromises instead. By felicitous coincidence, both are now nonpermanent members of the security council. This gave them special leverage over Iran. They have used it deftly.” See Kinzer, Stephen (2010) *Iran's nuclear deal.*

49. Önis (2011). *Multiple Faces of the “new” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique.*
When campaigning for national office in 2001, one of Erdoğan’s first promises was that when in office he would move forward Turkey’s EU membership bid. In 2004, when negotiations started with the EU, he received a major boost in domestic support for not only delivering on a campaign promise, but also for raising a widely important issue in Turkey. However, as discussed, EU membership still remains a domestic consideration, but given that public support for this has eroded, it is not as valued as it once was. Lastly, the political fallout between Israel and Turkey, coupled with the public sentiment towards Israel, gives Erdoğan benefits when he publicly opposes Israel and receives a domestic boost. This aspect will be explained further in the case study.

In the international realm, the costs are viewed in both gains and punishment. For example, if a state acknowledges or makes it a crime to deny the Armenian Genocide, Turkey will incur international “punishment” as it insults “Turkishness” and makes cooperation with that state less likely. One example of this occurred when France passed the bill on the Armenian Genocide on January 23rd 2012. The next day, the Turkish ambassador in Paris, Tahsin Burcuoglu, said that the vote would lead to a “total rupture” of relations between the two countries, and that Ankara could seek to downgrade its diplomatic presence in Paris. Erdoğan personally denounced the bill before the Turkish parliament and called it a “political ploy” by French President Sarkozy. As of this

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50. Irish (2012), *France Passes genocide Law, Faces Turkish Reprisals.*
51. In a speech before parliament on January 24, 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that the “vote in the Senate [French] and the bill itself is openly discriminatory and racist and a massacre of freedom of thought in an effort to win votes by playing on anti-Turkish sentiment”. For further discussion see Poirier (2011). *Sarkozy should leave the Armenian genocide to the historians.*
writing, two months after the passage of the bill, relations were still cold between France and Turkey. Even in the case of the Arab Spring, Turkey has sought to punish France for the bill, as Turkey prepares to host the second gathering of the “Friends of Syria” group to discuss the Syrian crisis in Istanbul in March; Ankara is still deciding whether to invite French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. Therefore, any movement on the Armenian Genocide will seriously hinder cooperation with Turkey.

In the previous coup d’état by the military, public support stemmed from the civilian government not being able to stop terrorism within Turkey. If the government does not seem proactive in fighting terrorism, it will incur costs or lose ground to the opposition, as it does not seem capable of ensuring the safety of its people. However, if the government is proactive in fighting terrorism (especially the PKK), it gains benefits from both the West and from domestic audiences. Lastly, given the importance of international security, Turkey receives benefits when it acts within a pro-NATO manner. This tendency is because Turkey benefits from NATO in military material, although it is expected that as Turkey continues to develop and enhance its indigenous military industrial complex, the value attached to this point will decrease, as it is a part of an alliance that gives it benefits for cooperation in fighting terrorism and ensuring state security. These points demonstrate the assumed audience costs in Turkey’s foreign policy that are currently the most significant in the AKP’s decision-making calculus with

52. Turkish Foreign Ministry (2012). Interview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on 12 March 2012.
the West. The following case studies will test these facts in conjunction with the
decision-making model to underscore that during equal domestic and international
pressure, Turkey’s domestic politics will triumph over international pressure.

2.5 Conditions for Cooperation

The denotation above creates the content for the independent variable to interact
with the dependent variable to create an understanding of the prospects for cooperation,
which brings forward a “theoretical” model that explains how the aforementioned
prescriptions matter in Turkish decision-making as Turkey is responding to both levels of
its own politics and the opposing sets as well. When domestic audience costs for an issue
increase, the AKP will become more constrained to cooperate because the costs for
cooperation have punishing effects. However, if the costs are not high, then cooperation
is more likely given that the government will not be punished or punished severely. This
paradigm is modeled from the review that “only states with low audience costs ever incur
them”. Thus, Figure 1 (below) demonstrates when cooperation should occur given the
differing levels intensity that draws audience costs pertaining to a particular issue.

At the LL there are only nominal benefits or punishment for cooperation, but still
there is an expectation at this level of cooperation. As Oye states, “First, states must
expect to continue dealing with each other. This condition is, in practice, not particularly
restrictive. With the possible exception of global thermonuclear war, international politics
is characterized by the expectation of future interactions; while Jervis discusses how
cooperation over time makes it more likely to be a continuous process.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, any increase in domestic benefits in the international realm, or payoffs, or pressure from the other players in the international realm while the domestic audience costs for Turkey are low, means that cooperation \textit{should} occur.

Moving into the \textit{MM} dimension once again, cooperation is expected at this level under the same premise as that of the \textit{LL}. Once again, although a leader might receive some audience costs for cooperating, he or she can be punished internationally for not cooperating or may miss the benefits of cooperating. However, an important issue at this level is that cooperation becomes more competitive, as already discussed by Schultz concerning methodological problems with determining audience costs given observability and selection issues. With that in mind, the list above provides the basis for the analysis in this view, because analyzing when a leader self-imposes audience costs through a public statement, or if an issue seems somewhat important to a state, generally indicates that conditions for cooperation are not very ideal, but not impossible. Therefore at the medium intensity level, only when the international payoffs are higher than the domestic costs will the leader cooperate. Because at the medium level, although leaders will be hurt by cooperation, international punishment and less future cooperation is considered worse because of the future prospects of cooperation by remaining in a Stag Hunt game and not cutting off cooperation by continued acts of non-cooperation and compromise.

Lastly, at the $HH$, as already discussed given the blocking power of the domestic realm and a leader’s unwillingness to lose his/her power, cooperation when there are high audience costs in the domestic level (and even if there is a high demand to cooperate at the international level of the Western power that offers big benefits to Turkey), cooperation is not expected given what we know about the effects of audience costs. By either being seen as bullied by an international power (via high intensity) or acting outside the scope of domestic support, leaders will face consequences by cooperating (C) if their non-cooperation (NC) is expected.

As explained, this theory is based on the theoretical premise of initially laying down the foundation for future research on this topic. The model’s explanatory power is placed within the confines of the denoted areas explained and is theoretical to only those prescriptions. The decision-making model will later be reinforced by a case study that explains and highlights the research question and also illustrates what factors should be considered to foster Turkish-Western cooperation that are based upon a newly denoted...
set of audience costs for the current Turkish government under neo-Ottomanism 2.0. By moving down a notch and away from the context of consideration to go to war and utilizing the audience cost concept in the sense of cooperation—international and domestic bargaining situations—it provides an interesting characteristic in understanding how Turkey is reorganizing its position in world affairs and when cooperation should occur.
3. Methods

Now that a decision-making model that explains the conditions when Turkish-American cooperation *should* occur has been completed, and the rationale behind using this approach to answer the research question has been presented, I will now explain the other choices I made to construct this theory by first properly contextualizing neo-Ottomanism 2.0 in the literature pertaining to foreign policy. Then, by using this new understanding of Turkish foreign policy, I reimagine a comparative historical analysis that clearly explains changes at both levels of politics and establish the social reality of this new paradigm in Turkey to explain the new audience costs associated with neo-Ottomanism 2.0 so that additional context can be added to the model.

3.1 Other Approaches

Thus far, the decision made to utilize a decision-making model has been thoroughly discussed, however, at this time I want to also acknowledge that other methodical approaches can also offer an advanced understanding of the research question. Approaches such as advanced multi-layered game theory, an advanced statistical analysis with a dataset devoted to newly prescribed audience costs in neo-Ottomanism 2.0 (see Table 10), or more case studies, can also draw out the effects of audience costs on foreign policy decision-making. These approaches can enhance the theory for future research, nonetheless, as this is a conceptual paper that provides an original understanding of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 as Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine and its effects on Turkish-Western relations. Thus a decision-making model approach is
best used in first framing the discussion, while offering explanatory power in giving the conditions when Turkey will act independently or when it should cooperate fully with a Western-led policy.

3.2 Historical Analysis

In this section, I will bring out the most important issues and their intensity to produce an understanding of the condition when Turkish-Western cooperation should occur. By analyzing how the social and political reality in Turkey has changed over the last three decades, I can also address the general issue with the independent variable I just raised. I will start this process off by utilizing a causal chain that facilitated the outcome of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 starting with the Third Republic, as these factors embody the new social reality of Turkish domestic and international politics and neo-Ottomanism 2.0. This abridged analysis will help put together a general understanding of what audience costs the government faces and how much they matter. Given that the events in the causal-chain have facilitated neo-Ottomanism 2.0, this is a logical starting point.

A causal chain occurs when a “sequence of events leading up to some final effect, where each member of the sequence causes its succeeding member to come about”. In the relationship between a causal chain and Turkish foreign policy, a series of events have facilitated its ability to be able to shift its foreign policy; a singular contributory force did not change overall internal dynamics, but rather it took several threads coming

together in succession to facilitate neo-Ottomanism 2.0. There are four causal threads that establish the conditions that created neo-Ottomanism 2.0: (i) the curtailment of the Turkish military’s power, (ii) rejection of and periods of isolation from the West, (iii) the emergence of a new middle class, and, (iv) changes in the international power structure. These four categorizations are followed by several subthemes apiece, which will also be drawn out in the historical review.

Metaphorically speaking, the “prompt critical” event that triggered the reaction in Turkish politics was the 1980 coup d’état, which started the gradual decline of the Turkish military’s grip on power. Once the military’s veto of domestic politics was lifted, the other threads in the causal chain were free to interact and create the foreign policy preferences seen today. Although the military decline was the trigger to such a change, the events and decisions that formulated the changes were constructed over the last three decades (see Table 3). Therefore, curtailment of Turkey’s military power is a major factor in the current government’s ability to shift its international orientation, with the deep state being dismantled by the ongoing Ergenekon case. This development has allowed civilian control to be established for arguably the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic.

The second link in the chain is the rejection of Turkey as a full member of the Western bloc and its feeling of periodical isolation when its geopolitical importance was in question. As already touched upon, there is a growing feeling in Turkey that it has been mistreated on its path to EU membership. For example, although Turkey was one of
the first members of the Council of Europe in 1949, it still has not seen its membership bid move as expediently as other states such as Romania and Bulgaria. The second factor is Turkish fear of isolation that was realized during the end of the Cold War as Turkey’s strategic importance temporally declined and it became isolated by the West.²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2: The Causal Threads for Turkey’s Foreign Policy Shift</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rejection from Europe/West</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of Isolationism</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU rejection</td>
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The third link in the change deals with Turkey’s demographic shift during the mid-1980s and early 1990s during which it saw the emergence of the Anatolian middle class and their migration into cities. The more conservative Anatolians (who were politically neglected by the secularists) generally do not share in Atatürk’s model of “one people, one country” and offer a counter view to where Turkey should hold its political allegiance. This view, coupled with a rekindling of Ottoman history, (Atatürk though utilizing Ottoman history would slowed down the development of a modern Turkey) has created a short of nostalgia for Turkey’s past while generating vast soft power results (especially throughout the Muslim world) with Turkish music, television shows, and

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² Oran (2010) *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006*, page 567
films such as *Fetih 1453* which glorifies the Ottoman capture of Constantinople and is widely influential in the Muslim world.³

The final link in the chain is the changing balance in the power structure of the international political system, with Turkey and the *Bric'n'Mitsk* states gaining relevantly when compared to Europe and the United States. Over the last decade, Turkey has seen its fortune change, and went from being economically stagnant with high inflation and debt to an economy that has outpaced China during the second quarter of 2011.⁴ Currently, the ongoing financial crisis that has crippled many Western economies, which have been traditionally more powerful than Turkey, has provided Turkey with room to shift towards an independent foreign policy. All of these factors are a part of so-called “new Turkey” that has different audience costs associated with its decision-making calculus. The causal chain underscores the conditionality of Turkey’s emergence as a regional power, and how it has been able to act independently in world affairs. These points will be discussed in great depth to open space for a decision-making model that will theorize what conditions *should* foster easier cooperation with the West under a policy of neo-Ottomanism 2.0. To put forward a general model that will craft this

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3. *Fetih 1453* has become been the biggest box-office success in Turkey and has also had the largest production budget, see Kenes (2012). *Fetih 1453: Turkish cinema on the brink of a new era.* For other references to Turkish soft power goals and a vision for a multi-polar world see, Çandar (2009). *Turkey’s “Soft Power” Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World.*

4. For information on Turkey’s growth that outpaces China see Bryant (2011) *Turkey Growth Outpaces China Piling Pressure on Central Bank.* For current economic data on Turkey see World Bank-Turkey (2012) *The Turkish Economy and Economic Initiators.* For references too previous economic performs of the Turkish Republic see Rubin (2003) *The Turkish Economy in Crisis: Critical Perspectives on the 2000-1 Crises.*
understanding, several parts of international relations theory will be used in juxtaposition to capture many of the interwoven working parts of statecraft and decision-making.

3.3. Case Selection

When using case studies, the issue of “selection bias” is always prevalent. As King, Koehane, and Verba rightly describe it: “no issue [selection bias] is so ubiquitous early in the design phase of the research phase project as the question: which cases should we select for study?”5 With this in mind, McNabb in his book Research Methods for Political Science explains that the rationale behind case selection is to first explain why a case study method should be used in preference to other methods. Second, why should a particular case is studied? Third, why choose a specific behavior or phenomena to study?6 Using these dimensions, I will explain the choice to use the case of U.S-Turkish relations as the case study and the issues of: (i) Turkey’s agreement to host the radar for NATO’s Missile Shield, and, (ii) Israeli-Turkish relations, to test the decision-making model.

Case studies are useful in explaining a political phenomenon by taking the prescribed theory and running it against real life events. Case studies are also useful for exploring how actors see themselves and others, what values and interests they have, how they came to have them, and how they understand the choices they confront.7 In several dimensions, the use of a case study is practical for this paper because it embodies the

ideals of constructing the social reality between the actors when discussing the issues in question, and can be used not only to explain the behavior between Turkey and the West, but also to understand how the actors themselves are constructed within the paradigm. Then these factors can be shown vis-à-vis their effect on the independent variable and thereby the dependent variable.

In Alexander George's article *Case Studies and Theory Development: the Model of Structured Forced Comparisons*, George makes an important contribution to this discussion. George advocates for “structured and focused comparisons” between two nearly identical cases. Ideally, these cases differ in only one way: they have different values for one crucial variable (the causal variable) in which we are interested. With everything else held constant in experiment, we can see how this single variable affects an outcome. George also suggests looking at individual cases as they develop over time to “process trace” differences in the casual variable. This approach to case studies is very valuable because it creates a manageable way to explore arguments and evaluate them empirically by underscorring and understanding how individual actors understand their own situation, communicate, and interact. By using a case study, the results from the historical analysis and imaging of Turkish politics since the end of the 1980 coup will clearly show how audience costs have become more pronounced between the West and Turkey given the implications of neo-Ottomanism 2.0. These new costs contribute to an

9. Ibid.
understanding of the conditions when cooperation should occur given the intensity of an issue. This discernment not only provides an outlet to show how political actors make decisions but how those decisions are communicated to the other player.

The issues of Turkey’s agreement to host the radar for NATO’s Missile Shield and Israeli-Turkish relations fall within George’s statement about how the cases should differ in only one way. For Turkish-American relations the status of the relationship will be blacked-boxed to remain constant, while independent variables within the framework of the decision-making model can then be tested to see if there are differences in outcomes based on intensity. I will show that by testing along the lines of the independent variable, the first issue falls within the medium-intensity level of the model, while Israeli-Turkish relations is at the high intensity level. The general theory of audience costs as a dependent variable stays constant throughout the cases and is tested to illustrate how cooperation is effected by audience costs. Having set forth the rationale for using case studies in testing the theory, I will now explain the selected cases.

As this paper is interested in Turkish-Western relations in the foreign policy arena, the cases must be reflective of an interaction between “the West” and the Turkish Republic. I will do this by selecting two cases that fall into this relationship by using the preference United States as a proxy for Western. And Turkey and the United States being the two players being discussed during the case study; i.e. the United States and Turkey are the two states that seek to cooperate over an issue (Missile Shield and Arab Israeli relations) and the United States clearly wants the missile shield in Turkey as Turkey is
close to the prime target of the shield—Iran. While the United States views Israeli-Turkish relations and cooperation to be vitally important to its national interests, as both states are important U.S. allies, the peace process between Syria and Palestine had better prospects when Turkey had good relations with Israel and was seen as an honest broker. Subsequently, Israeli-Turkish relations create a more stable Middle East.

By selecting United States-Turkish relations as the case study, and with two different issues to judge intensity, I am making the assumption that the United States serves as a proxy for the “Western world.” I make this claim to simplify the different testing processes by selecting the most critical-case. The United States’ position in the international political system as the foremost world power in both economic and hard power, coupled with its influence in international institutions, such as the World Bank, NATO, and the United Nations, and overlapping liberal values, makes the United States a sufficient surrogate for the rest of the West. Additionally, Turkish-American relations provide ample rationale for and insight into the decision-making model because it cannot only draw differing levels of intensity, but also adds to the United States’ Cold War hegemony. Turkish-American relations also clearly show transition points (from the Cold War, to the post Cold War—when Turkey was firmly in the Western orbit—to the emerging age of multi-polarity) that are widely covered. These points show how audience costs have changed and how the new costs have affected how agreements can be blocked.

in the Turkish domestic realm that effect international cooperation based on intensity, thus addressing the third aspect of case selection: choosing a specific behavior or phenomena to study within the same case but with variance.

The debate between traditional Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism 2.0 is currently raging inside Turkey and in foreign capitals around the world. The controversies over Turkey’s international intentions are captured by the harsh discourse surrounding this issue. For example, according to the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, “the notion of neo-Ottomanism is not innocent; they [Kemalist] have deliberately used this term in an attempt to reduce our influence in the Balkans and to intimidate people”. On the other hand, a member of the Serb Republic [RS] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, Nebojsa Radmanovic, criticized Turkey's investments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and warned that:

"Turkey appears as an important factor in the western Balkans, which would not be bad if the policy of neo-Ottomanism was not stressed, which their foreign minister is openly presenting...the efforts to expand the influence of Turkey are legitimate, but we do not favour it. At least one half of the B-H population is Christians and over one half of its territory is controlled by Christian peoples, They cannot benignly look upon calls for Neo-Ottomanism. We must be watchful, and we will be."

Radmanovic’s remarks speak to the sense of fear surrounding neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and a more powerful Turkey. Although examples of politicians directly confronting neo-Ottomanism are infrequent, they are growing in number and are at the epicenter of this heated debate over the nature of Turkey’s rise and its expected future interaction with other states.

1. For the full quote and in context see Mahcupyan (2011) Neo-Ottomanism.
2. BBC Monitoring International Reports (2010). Bosnian Serb Presidency Member Criticizes Turkey’s "neo-Ottomanism."
The characterization of Turkey as a western state does not follow either a strictly political association or a strictly cultural association, as there are many differing social, economic, and political cleavages throughout its diverse landscape. Instead, the placement of Turkey in the “Western World” stems from the ideals and will of the Republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It was the “Father of the Turks” who wanted to transform the young Republic into a western liberal-oriented country, as shown by his domestic reforms during the 1920s and 1930s. The pillars of “Kemalism” are still rather ubiquitous throughout the Republic today and serve as a foil to neo-Ottomanism. The contrasting principles of these two doctrines are currently gripping Turkish society, identity, and foreign policy. To understand the effects of both neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, these concepts need to be further explored and contextualized to underscore the audience costs of each doctrine.

4.1 Kemalism

As a hero of World War I and the leader of the War of Independence, no man has had more impact on modern Turkey than Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Turkey's victory at the Battle of Dumlupınar against the Greek army marked the end of the War of Independence and re-established its sovereignty after the failed colonization attempt by the Greeks.

3. Even though Kemalism means a break with the Ottoman past, the movement which Atatürk's group (Committees of Union and Progress—İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyet—or also known as the Young Turks) of young Ottoman officers who were a part of the so-called Ottoman enlightenment that started in the mid-1860s. Therefore some residue Ottoman influence of course is left on Atatürk's reforms. However, due to Atatürk's poor relationship with other leaders such as Enver Pasha and Djemal Pasha who would die before the end of the War of Independence, Atatürk's control and influence over the reforms were so profound it is more a creation of himself than the collective ideals of the Young Turk movement.
Italians, French, and British. Atatürk's leadership during the two wars solidified his position and power to give him the support to start his revolution that ushered in a new era in Turkey’s history. Additionally, his quest for a unified social state (Egemenlik, kayitsız, sırtsız milletindir) began.

In 1922, the removal of Sultan Mehmed VI, whose family had ruled over the Turkish people for over 500 years, marked the beginning of Atatürk's reforms. The following year he proclaimed the Turkish Republic (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) that consigned the Ottoman Empire into the dustbin of history. Atatürk’s reforms cut deeply into the society and wiped away traditions such as the customary headgear and dress for public occasions (the Fez for men and headscarf for women were outlawed), while granting full political rights to women and introduction of a new penal law and civil code that was modeled after Italy and Switzerland, respectively. The adoption of a new Turkish alphabet that switched from the Arabic script to the Latin alphabet put up linguistic barriers towards Turkey’s neighbors. Other reforms that “Europeanized” Turkey were the “Weekend Law” that comprised of making the new weekend to be Saturday and Sunday, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, and subscribing to international time zones made Turkey follow a time-keeping structure used in the West. It appears that

4. For a references referring to the Turkish War of Independence or also known as the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) see Howard (2001) The History of Turkey, page 87-90. For information on how Nationalism/Kemalism evolved out of the War of Independence see Uzer (2011) Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy, pages 39-41.
5. October 29, 1923, Atatürk during a meeting of the Turkish Grand National Assembly declares Turkish state as a republic is elected President. For events that led up the October 29 declaration see Lord Kinross (1969) Atatürk, chapters 11 and 12.
 Atatürk’s foremost desire was to make Turkey into a “contemporary civilization,” as he believed that meant progress for Turkish civilization. Atatürk said, “They [Turkish people] are civilized in history and reality. But I tell you… that the people of the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilized, must prove that they are civilized, by their ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way of living.”

To achieve his vision of a contemporary civilization and to fully transform Turkey into a secular and Western-like country, Atatürk’s first line of business was the dismantling of the political apparatus that linked Turkey to political Islam and legitimized the rule of the Ottoman Sultans. During the Fourth Anniversary of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in 1924, when Atatürk announced the abolishment of the Caliphate, he stated, “it has now become a plainly evident truth that it is necessary to liberate and to elevate the Islamic religion...from its position of being a tool of politics, in the way that has been traditional for centuries.” With the Caliphate officially abolished and its powers transferred to the GNA, Turkey abdicated its religious authority as the foremost leader of the “Muslim world” and consciously decided to emulate other secular European powers. Over the course of the next decade, Atatürk transformed Turkish society through

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7. Atatürk never mentioned the words to be “Europeanized” as a goal, but rather fixated on the notion of a contemporary civilization. The usage of contemporary civilization was the language chosen by Atatürk to describe his final desires of a new Turkish state. However, a contemporary civilization in the context and period of his reforms means to “Europeanized” as shown by the reforms he implemented emulated the civil-codes and policies of European states. Therefore, it could be argued within this context that establishing a contemporary civilization is synonymous with becoming “Europeanized”. For a further discussion on contemporary civilization and Atatürk’s view on Europe and reform see Landau, (1984) Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, Kinzer (2001) Crescent and Star, and Smith (2005) Between Allah and Atatürk: Liberal Islam in Turkey. In Lord Kinross’ (1965) Atatürk he writes of Atatürk saying: “the Turkish people, who founded the Turkish Republic, are civilized; they are civilized in history and reality. But I tell you... that the people of the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilized, must prove that that they are civilized, by their ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way of living,” page 471-472.

the introduction of many monumental reforms that would create a vision for a
contemporary civilization.

For Atatürk, Turkey’s legitimacy and power was connected to its ability to
liberalize and emulate the great European powers of the day, particularly that of France,
as illustrated by the Turkish language reform which borrowed heavily from French by
adding the principal of laïcité to its constitution. These reforms would make Turkey a
nation reminiscent of other western states, similar to how Peter the Great modeled Russia
after European societies during the seventieth and eightieth centuries. Atatürk’s
revolution “from above” eliminated the previous religious, cultural, and political
legitimacy that stemmed from the Ottoman Empire. These reforms also made Turkey
constitutionally a liberal “western” country, but Atatürk’s goal of establishing a single
society based within these values was never realized given the plurality of Turkish
society, and the reforms were not fully accepted by the populations living in rural
Anatolia and the Eastern provinces en masse.10

In the realm of foreign policy, Atatürk's watchwords “peace at home and peace
abroad” comprises the maxim that would guide the young Republic. The Turks were to

9. For a reference on Peter the Great and his quest to “Europeanization” Russia see Bushkovitch (2003) Peter the Great,
especially Chapter Two. It is unclear whether or not Atatürk was influenced by the reforms of Peter the Greats, but it is clear
that he was influenced by his time spent in Europe as a part of an officer exchange between the Ottoman Empire and the
French Republic. For a reference on Atatürk time as a military officer and his travels to Bulgaria and France see Lord Kinross

10. During the time of Atatürk and into the early 1980s, Turkey was a rural and agrarian based society. The governments
control over these areas is without question, but the effects of Atatürk's reforms and the less than desired liberalization and
the transformation into more secularization of the society is within the framework of this argument. I.e. although the
government controlled the area physically the ideology of Kemalism has not fully penetrated the Eastern areas of Turkey. For
further discussion see Taspinar (2008) Turkey’s Middle East Policies between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, and Smith (2005)
Between Allah and Atatürk: Liberal Islam in Turkey.
be friends with all civilized nations and put their former lust of conquest behind themselves internationally, while domestically, it meant the Turkey would have to deal with its domestic unrest and plurality to achieve a peaceful and stable home front.\footnote{Lord Kinross (1969) \textit{Atatürk}, page 520.}

Another noteworthy aspect of Atatürk’s time is that although Turkey would actively seek better relations with its neighbors, it would also become a time of self-imposed isolation, as Atatürk gravely felt another World War was imminent by at least 1936 and that Turkey should not be involved.\footnote{Lord Kinross (1969) \textit{Atatürk}, page 632.} Since the era of Atatürk, the two main pillars of Kemalism have been: (i) a revolutionary and militant version of secularism (pure \textit{laïcité}), and (ii) assimilationist nationalism (or Turkishness: common national, linguistic, and territorial identity).\footnote{Taspinar (2008) \textit{Turkey’s Middle East Policies Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism}, pages 15-17.}
### TABLE 3:
Atatürk’s Reforms 1922-1937

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Reform Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Abolished Ottoman Sultanate</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Proclamation of the Republic</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Unification of education</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>The Weekend Act</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Abolished the Caliphate</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Dervish brotherhoods abolished</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Change of headgear and dress</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Establishment of Collective Farms</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Adoption of the Gregorian Calendar</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Adoption of International Time</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>New penal law</td>
<td>Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>New civil code</td>
<td>Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>The Obligation Law</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>First systematic census</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>New Turkish alphabet</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Woman’s Suffrage</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Law on family names</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Abolition of titles and by-names</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Laïcité added to the Constitution</td>
<td>Legal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, these two pillars have been imposed from above and therefore have not been widely accepted by the whole of society. This trend is coupled with the fact that Turkey is a pluralistic state with roughly 70-75% being ethnically Turkish, 15-20% Kurdish, and the rest a mixture of other ethnic groups. The rejection of the single unitary state with a national, linguistic, and territorial identity has always remained in

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14. For a table on Atatürk’s religious reforms see Topraz (1987). *The Religious Fight: Turkey in Transition*. For a table relating to political reform see Burrell (2005) *Turkey in the European Union: Implications for Agricultural, Food, and Structural Policy*, page 29. For detailed commentary on the progression of the reforms (political, social, and economical) see Lord Kinross *Atatürk*. Political reforms are reforms that involve changes to the former political institutions of the Ottoman Empire. Social reforms although can be considered political moves, reforms in this area are denoted given how laws govern the society and the space that is created thereby. While economic reforms are denoted by laws and programs that deal with trade and fiscal and monetary matters.


society; however, the Turkish military has carried on the tradition of Kemalism and has attempted to interweave this into the identity of the Republic. Thus, once the military’s stranglehold on power was broken, a new policy had been “waiting in the wings” to become the dominant policy in Turkish foreign policy, and successfully moved a new audience in Turkey’s domestic realm into the political limelight.17

4.2 Neo-Ottomanism

The shifting mindset towards neo-Ottomanism has had a significant effect on Turkish foreign policy and society. At its most basic level, neo-Ottomanism directly challenges the foundations of Kemalism by accepting a new doctrine that conceptually is radically different than the “one-state” Atatürk envisioned. In Ömer Taşpinar’s paper entitled Turkey’s Middle East Policies: between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, he correctly frames this debate when he wrote: “a shift in mindset has serious implications for policy making. For instance, because neo-Ottomanism is at peace with the imperial and multinational legacy of Turkey, it opens the door for a less ‘ethnic’ and more multicultural conceptualization of citizenship.”18 By allowing or easing the definition of “citizenship”, the common denominator between Kurds and Turks and the rest of society

17. Turkey is an emerging democracy as the 2011 election were not influenced by the military nor was their claims of irregularities in the election progress. However Freedom House’s ranking of Turkey in its 2011 edition refers Turkey as “Partly Free.” See Freedom House.
is Islam. This definition sharply contradicts the idea of an unequivocal *laïcité* state and naturally pits these two philosophies against one another.

If neo-Ottomanism equates having a more flexible mindset in the domestic level, it will also have effects on the international level, as the nostalgic grandeur of its Ottoman past gives policy makers a sense of self-confidence that Turkey can once again be a crucial state in world affairs. A Neo-Ottomanist worldview seeks to utilize the ideals of “Ottoman cosmopolitanism” which can influence many people from differing backgrounds via historical lineage. However, Kemalists push back on belief and deem that neo-Ottomanism will lead to a foreign policy that is unrealistic and prone to adventurism. The current government is attempting to utilize its multiculturalism to engage states around its periphery to embrace the Islamic world as much as the Western world. The growing change in the worldview of the current drivers—Erdoğan’s government—of Turkish statecraft is directly challenging the worldview of Atatürk’s Republicanism.

Neo-Ottomanism, as previously mentioned, is not a new phenomenon and has been in the discourse of Turkish foreign policy for well over two decades. However, because of the changes in the domestic politics of Turkey, coupled with a government that has emphasized the utilization of an Ottoman legacy, this term has re-emerged in the

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19. Ibid.
discussions over where Turkey’s foreign policy is heading. To avoid confusion on this term and to properly identify divergences in the characteristics of neo-Ottomanism, I will refer to the period of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) as neo-Ottomanism 2.0, while the foreign policy during the tenure of Prime Minster Özal (which will be explained later in-depth) will be classical neo-Ottomanism.

4.3 Neo-Ottomanism 2.0

The chieftain behind Turkey’s foreign policy and neo-Ottomanism 2.0 is the renowned academic and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. In his book *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu outlines Turkey’s desired international position and argues that Turkey can be a valuable and powerful member of the international system given its unique geographical (strategic) location and its historical importance as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire.²² Davutoğlu explains that Turkey’s national power can be enhanced by non-traditional means such as utilizing its long standing cultural links and shared common history with the Balkans, the Middle East, and even Central Asia with the end goal of increasing Turkish influence aboard.²³ By utilizing Turkey's soft power as the heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once ruled the Muslim world for well over 500 years,

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²² *Davutoğlu is a professor of International Relations and his views and ideas underlying his conception of the world and Turkey's place in it have been well-known to those who read his work in Turkish, but rarely examined outside this small circle given the lack of an English translation for his seminal 2001 book* *Strategik Derinlik, Turkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth, Turkey’s International Position)* *on which a large portion of Turkey’s current foreign policy agenda can be interpreted (see Walker Architect of Power).*

²³ *Warning, Martina (2009). The Impact of Changing Islamic Identity on Turkey’s New Foreign Policy.*
Turkey, in its current form, according to Davutoğlu, has the potential to become a “Muslim super power”.24

Similar to neo-Ottomanism, neo-Ottomanism 2.0 accepts a pluralistic view of Turkish identity and rejects the Kemalism predisposition of ‘one society’ that is solely westward leaning, while actively seeking to establish stronger ties with members of the former Ottoman Empire. However, under a doctrine of neo-Ottomanism 2.0, Turkey’s predilection to actively engage states that are Muslim trumps those states that are Turkic.25 In contrast to the Özal era, Turkey is currently seeking to establish ties with states that are often in dispute with the United States and the West (given its own state interest and prospects for economic growth), such as Iran, Russia, and Syria.

Furthermore, with its current “zero problems with neighbors” policy, these ties have on occasion put Turkey at odds with the United States given the geo-political circumstances

24. Walker (2010) Architect of Power, the author writes: “In the same vein, Davutoglu argues that Turkey is the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire that once unified the Muslim world and therefore has the potential to become a “Muslim super power.” This is his interruption from his reading of Davutoglu’s book Strategic Depth.

25. In the middle of his first term as Prime Minister, Turgut Özal wanted to form a Turkic league which Turkey would be the predominate power in and preside over. Although many of the surrounding Turkic states, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, are mostly Muslim states, Özal’s engagement was based not in religion but in ethnicity, see Laciner (2009) Turgut Ozal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Ozalism, pages 168-170. Currently, Turkey has been courting the Arab states and has been focusing on developing deeper trade relations. In Nader Habibi and Dr. Joshua W. Walker’s (2011) What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World? They write: “During the past ten years, the rapid increase in economic relations between Turkey and the Middle East has been paralleled by a similar rise in the frequency of high-ranking diplomatic visits from Turkey to the region with a particular focus on Arab neighbors. These official visits have played a key role in promoting economic cooperation agreements and facilitating trade relations between the two sides. The high priority of economic and trade objectives in these high-level visits is best reflected by the large number of business and commercial representatives who routinely accompany diplomats on these visits. The activities and travel schedules of Turkish leaders further establish that Turkey’s once Western-only diplomatic initiatives are now more widely directed. Although it is an imperfect indicator, and indeed has rarely even been systematically notated or recorded, the pattern of foreign visits by Abdullah Gul, as foreign minister from 2003 to 2007 and then as president from 2007 to 2011; and by Ahmet Davutoğlu as foreign minister from 2009 to 2011; and by Recep Erdoğan as prime minister from 2003 to 2011 is revealing”, see page 4-5.
of the region. Another prescription of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 is that it seeks to position Turkey as the indispensable moderator of the Middle East while trying to make Turkey an independent regional power not based in any international orbit, but rather the bridge between East and West. In other words, neo-Ottomanism 2.0 in spirit is based on cultural ‘soft power’ as a doctrine, but in practice it is a part of foreign policy objective to bridge East and West by establishing itself as a influential power to optimize its international utility for maximizing payoffs when possible and to boost domestic support. This is coupled with Turkey becoming an increasingly independent and self-sufficient country.

that responds to a nationalist audience that desires to see a more powerful and globally engaged Turkey.\footnote{Much has been written on Turkey wanting to be the bridge between the Muslim and Western World. For an in-depth look at this see Bal (2004). \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era}, page 367-380.}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Differences between Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Ottomanism 2.0}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
 & \textbf{Neo-Ottomanism} & \textbf{Neo-Ottomanism 2.0} \\
\hline
\textbf{Alliance} & The United States/West & Independent Actor \\
\textbf{Polarity} & United States/Cold War & Multi or non polarity \\
\textbf{Regional Preference} & Turkic World & Muslim/Arab World \\
\textbf{International Engagement} & Moderately Engaged but follow NATO/US foreign policy & Very engaged, makes separate deals without the EU or U.S. \\
\textbf{Soft Power} & Minimum & Vast investment in cultural Production \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Neo-Ottomanism 2.0, therefore, constitutes “the utilization of Turkey’s heritage to engage states that were former members of the Ottoman Empire, to cultivate stronger ties and expand its sphere of influence to become an independent regional power in the Middle East.” Doing so requires both a soft power approach, “to obtain what one wants through co-option and attraction”, and a hard power approach of gaining economic and military advances over other regional actors, all while establishing its own military industrial complex that is not dependent on Western powers for weaponry.\footnote{For the definition of “Soft Power” see Nye (2004), \textit{Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics}, pages 1-11 carry the quote and context for the theory. For rationale behind Turkey attempting to not be dependent on other nations for military weaponry see Waltz’s (1979) \textit{A Theory of International Politics}, particularly his discussion on “self-help”, page 118} Although not as direct, even in Turkey’s own discourse on its foreign policy, the essence of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 is captured in an excerpt of the mission statement of the Embassy and Consulates of Turkey to the United States, as it outlines neo-Ottomanism 2.0 in its own context:

\begin{quote}

\end{quote}
“As a dynamic and responsible member of today’s globalized world, Turkey is doing its best to reconcile the West with the East and the North with the South. Turkey is active in a multitude of regions. It serves by way of its geographic location at the heart of Eurasia and its close historical and cultural ties across a vast landscape as a crucial catalyst for enhancing dialogue and interaction between cultures”.

The dualism in Turkish foreign policy coincides with the intrinsic aspects of Turkish society and identity. On the whole, akin to Turkey’s largest city, Istanbul, which straddles Europe and Asia, Turkey as a society has many identities that go beyond the dichotomy of secularism and non-secularism. In other words, one can be pious and Kemalist while one can be secular and in favor of neo-Ottomanism 2.0. The relationship between these two foreign policy doctrines is not based on a singular casual relationship but rather on several interactional relationships. In fact, the implementation of either foreign policy is related to the two-level balancing of domestic and international politics that maximizes the payoffs in each level. Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism speak to Turkey’s intrinsic paradoxical nature given its geographical and cultural history. This often creates an uneasy balance in the task of harmonizing the two-levels, but also designates a preference list (see page 31) that adds to an understanding of its decision-making.

29. The Consulate General of Turkey in New York is one of the four Turkish consular missions in the USA, the others are located in Los Angeles, Chicago and Houston, with the Embassy of Turkey to the United States located in Washington D.C. For the direct quote see: Consulate General of Turkey in New York (2012).
Figure 2:
Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 Causal Thread
4.4 Turkey’s Intrinsic Paradoxical Nature:

There are undoubtedly numerous paradoxes in the modern Turkish Republic that pulsate throughout the various eighty-one provinces in this diverse country. From business practices to language and from lifestyle to religion, the inherent nature of Turkey is paradoxical, complex, and deeply interwoven into its long history. One example of a modern paradox can be found at Yeditepe Universitesi (Seven Hills University) of Istanbul, currently the largest private university in Turkey and aptly named for the many hills surrounding the institute. Yeditepe, similar to many other Turkish universities, is modeled after universities found in the United States and Europe. Yet, what makes Yeditepe different from the public universities in Turkey is the allowance of the Islamic headscarf to be worn by its female students, as it is illegal to wear it as prescribed by Turkish law.30 Ironically enough, on the top of two highest hills surrounding Yeditepe, two enormous portraits of Atatürk overlook the university from both sides. This picturesque scene describes one of many paradoxes in modern Turkey, and its founder, who brought a “revolution from above,” now figuratively oversees a place that does not correlate with everything that the Father of the Turks wanted in his Republic.

As the same paradoxes found in the domestic realm naturally transcend into the foreign policy realm, it is also these types of paradoxes in Turkish foreign policy that

30. This law is a pursuant to the Turkish State Personnel Law annexed Article 19 and the Regulation Regarding the Appearance of the Personnel Working in State Institutions and Organizations Article 5/a.
have created a great deal of trepidation currently proliferating vis-à-vis numerous media outlets, national governments, and policy makers who have commented on Turkey’s increasingly diverging traditional foreign policy. Although the AKP government states it wants to be a part of the European Union and an active and influential member of NATO, Turkey has considered buying Russian and Chinese arms and hardware instead from traditional NATO allies, while at the same time it has lamented the European Union’s poor economic and societal policies.\textsuperscript{31} On the other hand, Turkey has granted access to build a missile shield for NATO and is trying to conform to European Union standards to obtain membership into the Union.

Turkish foreign policy has evolved in two ways over the last decade. These developments create the foundation for the context of neo-Ottomanism 2.0. First, Turkey no longer feels that it is an “associate member” of the Western bloc and has established itself as a non-dependent independent actor within a different interpretation of the international political structure. Second, given the demographical, economic, and political changes in the domestic level of politics, there are new audience costs for the AKP government that have to be calculated when crafting foreign policy decisions and understood by any “cooperation seeker”.\textsuperscript{32} In the next section, Turkey’s path to neo-

\textsuperscript{31} For a discussion on Turkey contemplating buying Chinese weapons see Bitzinger (2009) \textit{China’s Re-emergence as an Arms Dealer: The Return of the King}? For the questioning of European Union’s economic and societal policies see Erdoğan, (2011) \textit{The Robust Man of Europe: Turkey has the vigor that the EU badly needs.}

\textsuperscript{32} The premise of this statement is taking from de Mesquita article: \textit{An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace} and take his underlying assumption that within his paradigm on democratic peace and conflict selection. A lost war costs the country a lot, so democratic losers will promptly be voted out. Therefore, expect democracies to (1) only pick fights that they are sure they can win (autocrats will engage in riskier conflicts) and (2) work harder to mobilize resources and win. Applying
Ottomanism 2.0 will be analyzed to produce a list that is fairly parsimonious to its new audience costs and their intensity score.
5. Comparative Historical Analysis

Winston Churchill once remarked, “…study history, study history. In history lies all the secrets of statecraft.” History can be a powerful tool in contextualizing important themes in foreign policy rhetoric and doctrine, especially in high-context societies that have a proud attachment.\(^1\) Important events, issues, and tensions from the past can also still pulsate throughout a society’s contemporary history, especially if it is the social reality of a country’s public discourse. By recanting contemporary Turkish policies and process tracing both internal and external circumstances, a clearer understanding and rationale for the causal chain that created neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and its new audience costs and the intensity related to them will be ascertained by this review.

5.1. Overview

The multifaceted rendition of Turkish politics is directly related to its inception as a laic nation under the principles of its revered leader—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Even at almost ninety years after the Kemalist revolution, the Turkish Republic is still not unified under the one set of guiding principles that are prescribed in its Constitution, but rather Turkey is still polarized by its many differing social cleavages. For instance, in respect society is seen as a liberal, Western-orientated one that is redolent of many European

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1. Anthropologist Edward T. Hall in his 1976 book *Beyond Culture* refers to high and love context as a culture's tendency to context messages in routine communication. This choice of communication styles translates into a culture that will cater to in-groups, an in-group being a group that has similar experiences and expectations, from which inferences are drawn. In a high context culture, many things are left unsaid, letting the culture explain. Words and word choice become very important in higher context communication, since a few words can communicate a complex message very effectively to an in-group, see Hall (1976) *Beyond Culture* for further reference.
countries; while on another side a more Middle Eastern and conservative culture remains ever prevalent. Between the two main distinctions of “Eastern and Western” or “Secular” and “Religions” there are still many other different social, economic, political, religious, and ethnical cleavages within the Republic. This complex demographic distinctiveness presents a unique challenge towards remedying many contemporary issues such as constitutional reform, national governance, the Kurdish question, and statecraft. Whilst, within this plurality Turkey seeks to cultivate its distinctive power to influence other states, because of its soft power stemming from cultural and historical characteristics, therein laying the paradoxical nature of neo-Ottomanism 2.0.

Contemporary political history has shown that many different parties have vied to influence the preferences in the philosophy of Turkish foreign policy. Preferences on chief foreign policy concerns, such as key allies, European Union membership, civic cultural, and how Turkey should position itself in the international system are all important and relevant considerations in statecraft. Throughout most of the Republic history, democratic parties were free to construct their own worldview, but they were not allowed to implement that view or related policy, because a check on any policy decision has historically been by the military establishment, which had maintained a “pocket veto” on all substantive matters of state since Atatürk’s death until very recently. Without the blessing of the Army Chief of Staff any doctrinal shifts most likely would have been blockaded and the civilian leadership deposed, as demonstrated by the four coups (3 direct, 1 post-modern) that have taken place in Turkey since 1961. The last direct coup
occurred on September 12, 1980 and lasted a total of just over three years and three months, ending on December 6, 1983. In his work *Turkish Politics and the Military*, William Hale states that this coup “was not only longer lived than either of its two predecessors, but was arguably more successful”. The coup’s effects have had a profound impact on Turkish political development and social thought in the proceeding decades.

After the reestablishment of democracy in 1983, a systematic shift in the domestic politics of Turkey started to occur. In his campaign to become Prime Minster, Turgut Özal’s party casted a wide-net to catch many of the different cleavages in Turkish society: moderately social conservatives or religious voters, as well pro-European and merchant class voters formulated the supporting base of the Motherland Party. This formula dominated domestic politics for the next two decades and had vast electoral success (see Table 5) following its development. Concurrently, parties based in political Islam (that have been around since the 1950s) started to emerge out of older parties and spread after they had been banned from politics. In 1996, the Welfare party was the first party that has an ideology based in political Islam to win a national election. The electoral success of the Welfare party had more to do with the unstable coalition governments that ruled Turkey from 1993-1996 and poor economic conditions, rather than a nation embracing political Islam, and mobilized the highly religious votes. However, this

government was short-lived after the post modern coup of 1997, whereas it was banned from politics a year later. Years later many members of this party and other smaller parties, coupled with defectors from the Motherland party, came together in 2001 to form the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) AKP. This new formula has given the AKP a virtual political monopoly over the Turkish electoral since they first came to power in 2002, but it was not until 2007 did the AKP manage to fully establish themselves with a landslide election that year, and the Turkish military’s grip on power started to loosen.

### Table 5:
List of Turkish Prime Ministers, Party and Ideology after the 1980 Coup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turgut Özal*</td>
<td>1983-1989</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
<td>Social conservatism, economic-liberalism, neo-Ottomanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Demirel</td>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
<td>Kemalism, social conservatism, economic liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tansu Çiller</td>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
<td>Kemalism, social conservatism, economic liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesut Yılmaz (2)</td>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
<td>Social conservatism, economic-liberalism, neo-Ottomanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bülent Ecevit</td>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
<td>Kemalism, Social Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Gül</td>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
<td>Moderate Islam, economic liberalism, neo-Ottomanism 2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recep Erdoğan</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
<td>Moderate Islam, economic liberalism, neo-Ottomanism 2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the latter days of the Cold War and until the post-modern coup that forced Erbakan out, the political dynamics in Turkey can be divided into four major groups that have different preferences in how to conduct foreign policy and their world outlook. In Hasan Kösebalaban’s work *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and* Globalization,
Globalization, he provides a useful chart to explicate the differing domestic actors and their preferences during the 1990s:

Table 6: Contending post-Cold War Foreign Policy Orientations, the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Ally</th>
<th>Ozal/Liberal</th>
<th>Military/Kemalist</th>
<th>Erbakan/Islamist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilisation focus and discourse</td>
<td>The United States</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>The Islamic World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish/Ottomanist</td>
<td>Western/Secularist</td>
<td>Islamic unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Opposes the requisite reform process</td>
<td>Opposes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown by Kösebalaban’s chart, three of the four major groups in the Turkish political system had a Western orientation in their foreign policy preference. Only the Islamist group favored better ties with the Muslim world and opposed EU membership. Two decades later, the domestic political landscape of Turkey has changed dramatically with new parties emerging, old parties and the military declining, and established parties reforming. The political climate and culture have also changed given demographic shifts and the urbanization of many Turkish cities and an increase in wealth and prospects of a newly emerging middle class. This shift, coupled with the return of the Kurds into the political process, has had a tremendous impact on the domestic political association in Turkey.

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6. Izmir is often considered one of the most liberal (in both the modern and classical sense of the word) cities in Turkey, and if the patterns holds in Izmir it is most likely to hold in other Turkish cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa, etc. For a discussion on views of the emerging Middle Class and the urbanization of Turkish cities see Saraçoğlu (2010). The changing image of the Kurds in Turkish cities: middle-class perceptions of Kurdish migrants in Izmir.
In 2001, against the backdrop of vast economic turbulence and political
disenfranchisement, the AKP has managed to cleverly splice together several cleavages
of Turkish society: the conservative Anatolian middle class, pro-European Union and
business secularists, pious Muslims, and a small mixture of Kurdish and Nationalist
voters. Consequently, a new era in Turkish politics was ready to commence. This
coalition is an important factor in bringing about neo-Ottomanism 2.0, as this policy is
favored by this coalition because it brings new markets and trade to pro-business voters,
better relations with Muslim countries for both pious Muslims and pro-business voters,
while crafting a stronger and more independent Turkey for nationalists.

Table 7: Contending Foreign Policy Orientations in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Erdoğan/AKP</th>
<th>Military/Kemalist</th>
<th>Kılıçdaroğlu/CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Ally</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Israel/NATO</td>
<td>EU/NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilization focus and discourse</td>
<td>Neo-Ottomanism 2.0</td>
<td>Western/Secularist</td>
<td>Nationalism/Secularist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Supports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the last decade, Turkish politics has stabilized in terms that there are three or
four main political parties that have taken shape, compared to the turbulent years of
1993-2001 when many small parties made up governing coalitions. The stability that the
AKP created has translated into electoral success and underpins its credibility with the
Turkish public and its current governing basis. This political group has been a part of
Turkish society since the urbanization of the 1960s; however, their empowerment in the

8. For information on the position of Kılıçdaroğlu/CHP see Paylaş, Sayfayı (2010), the European Weekly/Kader Sevinç/
Daha İyi Bir Avrupa: Bir Türk bakış açısı. For a change in the Military's position on Europe see Aydinli (2006) The Turkish
Military's March Toward Europe.
political process could not have been taken seriously because the civilian government in Turkey was the “audience” and the only group that could punish it was the military. Therefore, once the military has been out of politics and civilian rule has been established, a group that empowers a government now matters insofar as they now can punish a civilian government via audience cost through elections if that leader does something against their wishes.

5.2. End of the Deep State

Throughout its history, the military—at least from its perspective—has been the glue that has held the Turkish Republic together and remains the vigilant vanguards that protect Atatürk’s principles and legacy. Military interventions in the latter half of the twentieth century were a common occurrence and even during periods of civilian rule, political parties would either favor politicians who had military credentials in order to ensure that their power was not in immediate jeopardy or strive to not alienate the military. This tendency is because since the founding of the Republic, the military has performed three direct coup d’états in 1960, 1971, and 1980. In 1997, vis-à-vis a memorandum, the military toppled the government of the first Islamist Prime Minister Erbakan. A decade later in 2007, the then Chief of General Staff of the Military, General Mehmet Yaşar Büyükanıt, issued what is now know as the “e-memorandum” that confronted the probable election of the President Abdullah Gül, who is known to have a

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10. Çelik (1999) Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, pages 91-92
history in political Islam and whose wife wears the Islamic head scarf—a symbol of political Islam to Turkey’s secular establishment. The military which throng to Atatürk's republicanism in the 1920s and 1930s formed a “deep state” over the decades that until recently held a veto on matters of the state.

Starting in 2008, the ebb of the military's power has been progressively eroding during the almost ten years of the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) rule. Although the popularity of the military has been declining since the start of the new millennium due to the coverage of the crimes it committed during its rule, it is the ongoing Ergenekon investigation that has crippled its political influence. Ergenekon is named for the secret organizations that plotted to overthrow the newly elected Erdoğan government in 2003 by creating tensions with Greece. The exposure of this group has had a major impact on Turkey’s domestic politics as it discredited the Turkish military, journalists, and the security apparatus that once were highly respected. Although the two year old case thus far has had no convictions, it has led to the arrests of hundreds of high-level politicians, journalists, and military officials. According to Taspınar, Ergenekon has put “half of all Turkish admirals and one out of ten active duty generals…in jail for plotting against the government.”

On July 29, 2011, the ongoing battle between the military and the AKP came to a head, when nearly the entire leadership of Turkey’s armed forces departed en masse. The

Chief of General Staff İşık Koşaner along with commanding officers of the ground forces, navy, and air force resigned their posts in protests of the ongoing investigation. A month later during the 2011 Victory Day ceremony that commemorates Turkey’s victory over Greece during the War of Independence, the President Gül and not the Chief of General Staff of the military received greetings from officials and dignitaries for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic. This development was more than a symbolic change and underscores a more assertive civilian government that has control over the military, in addition to the realignment of internal Turkish polices.

Since the mass resignation of the military, the Turkish “deep state” appears to have been finally crushed and “the days of military coups in Turkey are officially over”. For the first time since İsmet İnönü ended the single-party system in 1945 and the peaceful transition of power within democratic institutions occurring in 1950, the military's predominance over the political landscape has been curtailed to the point where the democratically elected officials are non-responsive to the military. The transition of power not only correlates with a change of internal, domestic political culture, but also has effects within the sphere of international relations. The AKP and Turkey's civilian elites now more than ever have the ability to shape and forge a new policy without the military's “pocket veto.” Therefore, now more than ever the AKP’s hands are free to further embark on both domestic and international policy preference that is indicative of

its domestic base. The reining in of the military’s power directly correlates with the
government’s ability to undertake a less traditional foreign policy and signifies the first
link (and start) in the causal chain that facilitates a policy of neo-Ottomanism 2.0,
because the audience costs have shifted from the military to the people.

5.3. The Birth of Neo-Ottomanism:

The 1980 coup re-launched Kemalism into the political scene. The reasons given
for the coup d’état were that the civilian government did not properly address or handle
years of terrorism, economic stagnation, and instability. When General Kenan Evren
took over the reins of power, he laid out four primary goals: suppress terrorism and
radicalism, restore economic growth and stability, introduce a new constitution and legal
arrangement, and return government to civilian rule. The military started to Atatürkize
the society by renaming streets, roads, and new buildings after Turkey’s revered founder.
Even Istanbul’s busiest airport was renamed in Atatürk’s likeness. In 1982, the military
rolled out a new constitution which denoted that the military remain the guardians of the
secular state—especially in Article 34, which essentially gave the army the right to
intervene in governmental affairs if a civilian government, strayed off the Atatürkçuluk
(Atatürkness) path.

18. Ibid
20. Ibid
As the military started to tackle its elucidated reforms, one area in which it lacked the expertise to carry out its promise was in the economic realm. The junta sought and needed the assistance from a 54 year old American educated and former World Bank official Turgut Özal, who was tasked with reforming and modernizing the Turkish economy. Özal’s reforms from 1980-1982 had liberalized the Turkish economy and had “freed the statist economy spurring export-led expansion and sectoral diversification.”

The success of Özal’s reforms led to “a new middle class in the conservative and pious Anatolian periphery.” The same support base that he used to win the first post-coup election is also a part of the current political coalition that the AKP relies on for its electoral success today.

Although at first the military found the international response positive towards its coup d’état, by the middle of its three year rule it felt a growing amount of pressure coming from the international community, especially from the European Community to return to democracy and civilian control. The military kowtowed to international pressure and started to make plans to hand power back over to the civilians in 1983. It established two parties: the moderate right-wing party Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetcu Demokrasi Parti) NDP and the moderate left Populist Party (Halkci Parti) PP

22. Ibid
23. Evin, Ahmet (1994) Demilitarization and Civilization of the Regime, pages 23-27. Also in Krastev (2010) The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe, the authors go on to say that: “Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has embarked on a prolonged battle against the military and bureaucratic establishment, which singled out the party as enemy number one. The latest episode in this struggle between the AKP and the secularist elite, represented by the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Партиси, CHP), was the constitutional referendum of 12 September 2010,” page 45.
24. Ibid
in an effort to establish a Kemalist right and left in a new calibrated two party system.\textsuperscript{25} However, when the Özal established his own Motherland Party (\textit{Anavatan Partisi}) ANAP, the military’s plans were dashed and he went on to win 45% of the vote and 212 of the 400 seats in parliament during the 1983 elections.\textsuperscript{26} Once Özal entered office he would start another transformation within Turkish society and pave the way for Erdoğan’s rise two decades later.

During Özal’s tenure as Prime Minster (1983-1989), he sought to engage states on Turkey’s periphery, especially in the Balkans and Turkic Central Asian nations. He believed that Turkish integration into the European Community would secure Turkish democracy (especially from the prospects of another military coup) and physical security, while he sought out former foes such as Greece’s Andreas Papandreou to improve relations between the arch rivals.\textsuperscript{27} Additionally, Özal attempted to carry out reforms to make Turkey’s bid for European Economic Community (EEC) membership more palpable, such as “consolidating the parliamentary regime and improve the conditions for human rights”.\textsuperscript{28} However, it would be his outlook on Turkish and Ottoman identities that would become the catalysts for change in both the international and domestic sphere that pushed back on Atatürk’s worldview.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: State, Political Parties, Civil Society, Civil-Military Relations, Socio-Economic Development, EU, Rise of Political Islam and Separatist Kurdish Nationalism}
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Laciner (2009) Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism,}
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Kalaitzidis (1997) Papandreou’s NATO Policy: Continuity or Change?}
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Arikan (2003) Turkey and the EU: An awkward candidate for EU membership? Page 119}
Contrary to Atatürk’s desire for a Europeanized unity state, Özal, on the other hand, believed that European values were not obligatory for progress, but rather the liberalization of education and scientific thinking would push Turkey forward.\textsuperscript{29} Subsequently, Özal understood that Turkey’s multiculturalism had enormous potential and range to influence bordering states by engaging and establishing ties with former Ottoman states. The essential take-away from Özal’s worldview is that he was as “comfortable with Western leaders as he was in a mosque.”\textsuperscript{30} Hitherto, it was unfathomable to contemplate having one foot in Europe and one foot in the Middle East; yet currently this strategy is the nucleus of Turkey’s current foreign policy, identity, and is what Philip Robins uses to define Turkey as a “double-gravity state,” or one that links the Western World to the Middle East.\textsuperscript{31} Turkey is currently seeking to further extrapolate from all aspects of its vast identity to increase its international standing, hence the potential of neo-Ottomanism as a foreign policy doctrine grows as well.

From the founding of the Republic until the Özal era, Kemalism has been the only path allowed in the Turkish state and it was postulated by the military as the only way forward, and by challenging Kemalism, Özal was creating a lasting rebuttal to Atatürkculuk. Yet, by 1984, as Casier and Jongerden claim: “Özal seemed ready to

\textsuperscript{29} Under the aegis of Prime Minister Turgut Özal, an official revaluation of Islam as part of Turkish identity took place. The state was no longer regarded as a mere collection of institutions and agencies, but as the champion of a collective identity. Özal’s liberal economic and social policies promoted religious interest groups; the development of an Islamic business world and of the religious but pro-democratic “Anatolian bourgeoisie”. For further discussion see Laciner (2009) \textit{Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism},


\textsuperscript{31} Robins (2005). \textit{The 2005 BRISMES Lecture: A Double Gravity State: Turkish Foreign Policy Reconsidered}.
challenge and change the ‘one state, one nation, one people’ canon of Kemalism, and actually prepare for a re-foundation of the Republic”. By seeing religion not as an obstacle to progress, while also embracing the diversity of the Turkey, a course shift away from traditional Kemalism was on its way. The main divergence then became: can Turkey be pluralist in both international outlook and in social cohesion? The answer to that question has been a resounding yes, with the birth of neo-Ottomanism: a new political ideology that coupled both Turkey’s liberal and progressive aspect with its religious and cultural heritage to make an impact in the international political arena, until Özyal's sudden death in 1993.

5.4 Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and its Audience: The Domestic Level

The reforms of Özyal have had a profound impact in Turkey. The economic development—along with other factors such as the rise in the number of universities and small and medium-sized organizations (SMEs), facilitation of transportation and liberal economic policies that started with the late Prime Minister Turgut in the 1980s are among the factors that have led to the diversification of the middle class in Turkey, and the audience of neo-Ottomanism 2.0. Although, there is not a universal definition of Turkey’s “new middle class” that is widely accepted. It is rather a subjective category with income and purchasing power parity (PPP) a common factor used in assessing a criterion of its determination. In the Turkish case, the definition and significance of the

middle class has yet another dimension, as intellectuals and academics frequently talk of the emergence of a “new” middle class in the country and their relation to democratization and audience costs by being highly engaged in civic affairs.\textsuperscript{33}

The members of this new middle class do not share the same ideology and also differ in their approaches to life, but they do “share a liberal and pluralist mindset”.\textsuperscript{34}

The members of this new middle class, as distinct from traditional middle classes, are strongly opposed to the involvement of relatives, neighbors and religious-ethnic communities in the affairs of the individual and attribute great importance to individual freedom of choice. This claim is reinforced by a 2007 Open Society Institute study at Boğaziçi University (formally Roberts College) of Istanbul, which produced noteworthy finding in its \textit{In Search of a Turkish Middle Class: Economic Occupations, Political Orientations, Social Life-Styles, Moral Values} study. 1,809 people living in 18 different provinces were polled for this study and 56 in-depth interviews in 8 provinces were conducted. Of the respondents, 58.3\% said they believed their income level and quality of life were average for their society, while 24.8\% percent and 8\% said they were slightly

\textsuperscript{33} “The economist Moises Naim has pointed out, these middle classes (Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey) are relatively well educated, own property, and are technologically connected to the outside world. They are demanding of their governments and mobilize easily as a result of their access to technology. It should not be surprising that the chief instigators of the Arab Spring uprisings were well-educated Tunisians and Egyptians whose expectations for jobs and political participation were stymied by the dictatorships under which they lived”. See Fukuyama (2012) \textit{The Future of History Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?} Fukuyama makes an important point on the distinctiveness of the middle class and the prospects for democratization. By taking this assumption by Huntington (see: Huntington (1993). \textit{The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century}) Fukuyama it can be assumed that states with emerging Middle Classes are more prone to be engaged in civic affairs and thus can impose higher audience costs on a government.

\textsuperscript{34} For a complete discussion on public opinion in Turkey see: \textit{Çarkoğlu (2009) The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey}. This work also provides a strong insights into public opinion in previous years that shows changing threads in since AKP came to power in 2002.
below and above average, respectively. Thus, it can be said that a great majority of the Turkish population consider themselves as part of the middle class. In a summary of the “three basic social classes in Turkey today,” the report shows that the middle class has both a “high optimistic” outlook on the “future expectations regarding social status and welfare” and strong attitudes towards the E.U. The entire report underscored an important development, which is that when it came to what the respondents thought about military interventions into civilian politics, the respondents had strong feelings: 81.9% said they would never support a coup regardless of the circumstances.

To get at international cooperation it is important to analyze the “in-group” who support the principles and what issues can be raised for conflict. This dimension is important to discuss because the bulk of supporters for the AKP stem from this new middle class and a vast majority of the civilization believe that coups should not occur. This development gives way to an understanding that Turkish society and not the military is the audience for which the government is playing, while this new middle class is specifically a part of a coalition supporting the AKP governing. In the domestic level, the audience costs and the associated intensity will now be discussed in the following sub sections through this abridged historical analysis that reconstructs the social reality for each factor discussed.

36. Ibid
5.4.1. The Rise of the Turkish Economy

During most of the 1990s, Turkey was living up to its reputation as the so-called ‘sick man of Europe,’ as rampant inflation and sluggish growth dominated the Turkish economy (see Table 8). Disputes between Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (1993–1996) and the Central Bank governors undermined confidence in the government and in Turkey’s economic institutions. Çiller insisted on monetizing the fiscal deficit (selling government debt instruments to the Central Bank) rather than acceding to the Central Bank's proposal to issue more public debt in the form of government securities.37 The Central Bank governor resigned in August 1993 over this issue. In January 1994, international credit agencies downgraded Turkey's debt to below investment grade, which prompted a second Central Bank governor to resign. Inflation then soared to 106% and the economy contracted by 4.6%. The Turkish Republic seemed paralyzed by internal politics and archaic institutions.

By 1999, the overall situation did not improve as sluggish growth, high inflation, and, what the renowned Turkish political economist Ziya Önis describes as the thread of “populist cycles,” continued in the structural economy and hampered long-term growth.38 On February 19, 2001, Turkey’s chronic economic problems caught up with it when the financial system started to collapse and frightened investors rushed to convert their Liras

38. Ibid
into U.S dollars, producing a liquidity squeeze for the banks.\textsuperscript{39} Two days later, two public banks were unable to meet their obligations to other banks, which resulted in the collapse of the inter-bank payments system in Turkey. The Lira lost 50\% of its market value and the economy entered into a deep recession.\textsuperscript{40} As a result of the bail out of the banking system, government debt soared to 100 percent of Turkey’s GDP and the economy contracted by 5.6\%, while unemployment shot up to over 10\% all in few months.\textsuperscript{41}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation Rate</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>GDP (nominal) (millions)</th>
<th>GDP (PPP)</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1506</td>
<td>4424.72</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>4545.23</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1590</td>
<td>4848.54</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1804</td>
<td>5264.37</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>1306</td>
<td>4997.81</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1694</td>
<td>5379.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1814</td>
<td>5790.43</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>6251.74</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2692</td>
<td>8671.23</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2497</td>
<td>8258.41</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2665</td>
<td>9260.67</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8691.95</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the time that the 2002 elections came around there was vast disenfranchisement with the previous ruling parties of Turkey given the poor state of the economy and political fragmentation. In a poll conducted before the election, a dazzling

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid
\textsuperscript{41} Hale (2010) Islamic, democracy and liberalism in Turkey: the case of the AKP, pages 101-102
\textsuperscript{42} Hale and Ozbudun (2010), Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the case of the AKP, page 100.
90% of respondents cited the economy as “the most important problem with the country”. Adding to this point, Hale and Özbudun write that: “voters may have been uncertain whether the AKP could do better than its predecessors, but they were at least prepared to give it [the AKP] the benefit of the doubt, since it could hardly do worse”. These economic conditions paved the way for the AKP’s election victory, capturing a polarity of the votes and the ability to form a majority government with 363 representatives in the parliament and only 5 seats short of the two-thirds majority.

Although the AKP’s victory was incontrovertible, Erdoğan’s tenure as Prime Minister was delayed due to his previous criminal conviction that prevented him from holding political office. During the intermitting time from the election until a constitutional amendment could be pushed through to allow Erdoğan to hold his post, Abdullah Gül became prime minister and remained there until the March 2003 by-election.

During AKP’s rule, the Turkish economy has performed very strongly with inflation dropping to forty year lows, a growing GDP, and declining unemployment. In a Newsweek article written by Prime Minister Erdoğan entitled “The Robust Man of

44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Erdogan stated his speech in Siirt by reciting the following quatrain: "Minarets are bayonets, Domes are helmets, Mosques are barracks, and Believers are soldiers. This speech led to his conviction on April 12, 1998, by the State Security Court of the city of Diyarbakir for: “inciting people to hatred on the basis of religion and trying to set up an Islamic state.” When Erdoğan on August 14, 2001, “the Justice and Development Party were founded and Erdoğan was elected its leader. The intensity of criticism directed at him increased. It culminated in the Turkish Republic’s Chief Prosecutors’ demand that the constitutional court should terminate Erdoğan’s founding member status of the AKP because of his 1998 conviction”. When the APK won the 2002 election his status was still in litigation and to an act a parliament to allow him to become Prime Minister. For further discussion on Erdoğan see: Heper (2003) Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Europe: Turkey has the vigor that the EU badly needs,” he proclaimed that Europe has a growing need to accept Turkey into the European Union and hailed the achievements and dynamism of Turkey under his leadership.\textsuperscript{47} He appears to be correct as, during the first quarter of 2011, the Turkish economy grew by 11.7%, not only exceeding expectations but becoming the fastest among the Group of 20 major economies, including China. Since the AKP took over, Turkey's GDP has tripled and went from the 22nd largest economy to the 16th, and the International Monetary Fund projects that Turkey will be a 1 trillion dollar economy by either the end of 2011 or early 2012.\textsuperscript{48} Furthermore, Erdoğan has established the goal of Turkey being a two trillion dollar economy by 2023.\textsuperscript{49} The “2023 vision” is a major focus of the current government that wants to mark the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Republic with Turkey being a foremost power in world affairs.

\textsuperscript{47} Heper (2003) Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Page 45. 
\textsuperscript{48} For a list of the World’s economies listed by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) see World Bank (2012a) World GDP. 
\textsuperscript{49} Erdoğan (2011) The Robust Man of Europe: Turkey has the vigor that the EU badly needs.
TABLE 9:  
2002-2011 Turkish Economic Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>GDP (nominal) (millions)</th>
<th>GDP (PPP)</th>
<th>Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2325</td>
<td>8741.43</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>3030</td>
<td>8860.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>3921</td>
<td>10241.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>4829</td>
<td>11464.73</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5309</td>
<td>12953.31</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6471</td>
<td>13.949.65</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7303</td>
<td>14995.25</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>6145</td>
<td>14228.46</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7343</td>
<td>15320.87</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rapid economic growth and success during the last decade has propagated confidence within Turkey given its growing power, economic dynamism, and resurgence as a global actor. While in the domestic realm, the government will have more room to maneuver its supporters and is bolstered by Turkey’s growing power, economic dynamism, and resurgence as a global actor. The sustained growth of the economy is of vital importance for the government’s prospects of its continued rule.

If one accepts that there is a strong correlation to government popularity and the country’s economic conditions (in democratic regimes), as the economy continues to do well so will the incumbent government. However, economic mismanagement can have dreadful audience costs for a government. For example, the ongoing economic crisis in

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Europe has unseated governments in Iceland, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and Finland during their election cycles. While in other special cases the international pressure and domestic disconnect was so great that it prematurely collapsed the government of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Georgios Papandreou in Greece, who were replaced with technocratic governments. In the domestic realm, economic mismanagement is an enormous cost for a government and an important consideration in international politics.

5.4.2. European Union Membership

As previously touched upon, Turkey has sought to become a member of the full European Union but has so far had little success in this endeavor. Previously, the merchant class and the new middle class have been fanatic supporters for joining the European community. But as contention grows over Turkey’s membership bid, it has resulted in a precipitous drop of domestic support. This trend, coupled with Turkey showing its independence and influence as a global actor, co-opts supporters from the opposition and negates any audience costs associated with acting in a way that might impede its progress to become a Europe Union member.

A second reason why audience costs are not incurred if Turkey does something domestically or internationally that might impede its accession into the EU is because of the negative rhetoric and signals from Europe. Germany and France, especially, are portrayed in the Turkish media as anti-Turkish given their policies on Turkish membership. Another example widely cited for a bias against Turkey pertains to the
thirty-five Chapters for EU membership. Although Turkey has thus far has only completed one chapter, it claims that it is being treated unfairly compared to states such as Bulgaria and Romania who have had their membership expedited. Adding to this contention are European claims that only when the issues with Cyprus and the Kurdish question are resolved, can some states consider Turkey a fellow Member State.

Recently the negotiations have taken on a more blunt tone. One such example is the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bağış’, statement that: “Turkey is coming to the rescue of Europe,” which illustrates a more confident Turkey who now believes that the EU needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU. The frustration over the progress of its membership track has turned off people’s enthusiasm in Turkey to join the EU. Nonetheless, even-though the AKP holds the position of wanting to be in the EU, it has shown both passion and anger towards the process to become a member. The domestic population for joining the EU has dwindled. Therefore, when Turkey is aggressive with the EU, which might slow down integration, it can do so because there are little audience costs given that the intensity related to this issue has decreased.

52. To accede to the EU, Turkey must first successfully complete negotiations with the European Commission on each of the 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire, the total body of EU law. Afterwards, the member states must unanimously agree on granting Turkey membership to the European Union.
54. In Hale and Ozbudun (2010), Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the case of the AKP, they write: “The Kurdish problem was also critical in government-military relations, since the AKP accepted the cultural diversity of Turkey and moved some way to meeting EU demands on this score, whereas the military opposed any moves that might be seen as endangering Turkey’s territorial integrity”. Page 86.
55. Sackur (2012) Hold on tight Europe, Turkey’s coming, interview with Turkish Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bağış. During this March interview Minster Bağış stated that: “Turkey is coming to the rescue of Europe”. He cited Turkey’s growing economy, its young population, a strong currency, and the gateway to many natural resources as reasons why the Turkish economy is strong enough to enter the EU.
5.4.3. Turkey's Growing Soft Power:

Traditionally, the international relations scholarship has theorized that if states did not successfully emulate the great powers of their time they would “fall by the wayside”.

However, Turkey, by moving away from emulating the United States or Europe and trying to forge its own independent foreign policy, has managed to not fall by the wayside. Rather, it has increased its own importance and fortunes in the Middle East by using its cultural and religious heritage as a tool to achieve its geopolitical objectives, or also known as Soft Power. In Joseph Nye’s influential work *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, Nye defines Soft Power as the utilization of a state’s culture, language, and media “to obtain what one wants through co-option and attraction”.

Turkey, over the last decade, has successfully utilized its culture and heritage to become an important player in the Middle East. The “spell” of Turkey’s soft power has even influenced the United States and Europe, as those states tout Turkey to be a model for the Islamic World and support the ruling government because “[the AKP’s] coming to power comprises an asset for the Turkish model, as it demonstrates both the evolution of the Islamist movement in Turkey, and the potential for reconciling democracy and Islam”.

Turkey has also gone on a media splurge by investing heavily in its domestic visual arts industry. Over the last 10 years Turkey produced an average of 10 films per

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56. For a direct quote see Waltz (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, page 118. For a further discussion on Waltz’s “self help” contribution see Chapter’s 5, 6, and 7 of *Theory of International Politics*.


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year; currently it produces 60-70 films a year. Turkey has spent millions in its entertainment industry development with very good payoffs, as currently Turkish TV series such as the *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* (Magnificent Century) and *Aşk-ı Memnu* (Forbidden Love) are breaking viewer records in the Middle East and North Africa, while raising Turkey’s clout in the region through the promotion of the Turkish lifestyle and culture. Turkey earned more than $60 million this year from exporting TV series. More than 100 Turkish TV series have been watched in over 20 countries this year.

Turkey’s media outputs have given it greater exposure to the Middle East and have increased its soft power in the Muslim world.

In the foreign policy realm soft power is at the epicenter of a so-called “neo-Ottomanism 2.0” foreign policy, with the idea of soft power as a policy to increase its prestige in the Middle East to its advantage and to further Turkish interests and regional stability under the auspiciousness of Turkey's recent success, model of governance, and growing power. In the foreign policy arena, Erdoğan also scored high marks. A Pew Research poll just before the elections in June illustrated that “about six-in-ten (62%) Turks have a lot or some confidence in Erdoğan to do the right thing in world affairs.” The same poll indicated that people believed that “under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey has played a more assertive role in international affairs and most Turks give the prime

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58. Hatice (2011) *Series boosts Turkish 'soft power' in region.*
59. Ibid.
60. Hatice (2011a) *Soap operas increasing Iraqi interest in Turkish literature.*
minister positive marks on foreign policy.” Furthermore, since Prime Minister Erdoğan’s walk out at the 2009 Davos conference after an exchange with Israeli President Shimon Peres, he became the most popular figure in the Middle East. This trend has led to immense benefits in seeking cooperation with “post” Arab Spring states such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, whose populations and governments have embraced parts of the “Turkish Model.”

As Turkey's power grows, it is only logical that it would want to establish itself more independently from any other great power(s); however, given Turkey's unique geographical location in juxtaposition to the European Union, Russia, and Iran, it has vast potential to maximize its power in both hard power (as Turkey's military remains the second largest armed forces in NATO) and soft power. The economic growth has resulted in a renewed confidence in Turkey that continues to underpin these two threads. All of these factors have created a new relationship between domestic and international outlooks and a new domestic audience. First, soft power plays to the AKP’s base as it causes them to want to play the “neo-ottoman” card domestically as well as want to bring their Muslim neighbors closer through a sharing of heritage. Second, internationally, the benefits are two-fold as Turkish soft power offers a different cultural perspective to

62. Ibid
63. Uslu (2009) Erdoğan’s Middle East Diplomacy. In the article Uslu writes: “In addition to Turkey’s diplomatic presence in Middle Eastern affairs, Erdoğan’s condemnation of Israel has made him especially popular among ordinary Arabs. The Turkish press reported that a big anti-Israel demonstration was held in Damascus and participants chanted”.
64. For a discussion on how the so-called “Turkish Model” can affect the Arab Spring see: Bâli (2011) A Turkish Model for the Arab Spring?
Middle Eastern states, which then in turn makes engagement with those states easier, as it creates payoffs through increased trade and economic cooperation.

5.5. Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and its Audience: The International Level:

At the international level audience costs have changed given a new outlook of Turkey's being a growing major power, and a change in the international political system of a “non” or multi-polar world. This new feeling stems from both Turkey achieving a self-help system insofar as it has actively sought to create a domestic military industrial complex, whilst being actively engaged in world affairs to boost its international clout and avoid being isolated as it has been in the past.

5.5.1 International Polarity and Power:

Even before Mikhail Gorbachev gave his surprised ‘Christmas gift’ of dissolving the Soviet Union, there were already discussions on the impending change to the polarity of the international system. In 1990, Charles Krauthammer theorized that the United States had entered its Unipolar Moment, while others wrote of the emerging new world order in light of the “democratic triumphalism” of the United States’ status as the lone superpower. However, in a span of a mere eighteen years, the triumphalism of the 1990s quickly subsided and scholars soon focused on an impending shift of multi or non-polarity.

One example of a thesis for twenty-first century international polarity is Richard Hass’ landmark *Foreign Affairs* article, *The Age of Nonpolarity What Will Follow U.S. Dominance*, which classifies the world entering an age of non-polarity with the “world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past.”66 Another thesis put forward is Samuel Huntington’s influential work on the *Clash of Civilizations*, theorizing that cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world.67 Additionally, Former National Security Zbigniew Brzezinski writes: “with the decline of America’s global preeminence, weaker countries will be more susceptible to the assertive influence of major regional powers.”68 Finally, scholars such as Aaron Friedberg pose the question: will the international system again become a bi-polar system with a new Cold War between China and the United States?69

The future of polarity, although important for Turkey’s international development and which, according to Brzezinski’s thesis would be the most palpable for Turkey, could be theorized with some confidence that in the near and intermittent future the current *status quo* will remain with the United States being the strongest great power. However, Turkey is continuing its attempt to become more powerful by establishing itself as an

68. Zbigniew Brzezinski (2012). *Balancing the East, Upgrading the West*.
independent regional power through crafting its own “self-help” system by developing its own domestic weapons systems and platform such as the Milgem class corvette (Turkey’s first domestically produced warship), designing of a domestic produced tank (Ataly), national rifle, and “working on another ambitious project to bolster its surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities”.  

For example, recently, Ankara announced plans to develop a national fighter jet. By creating and investing in a domestic military industrial complex, Turkey plans to increase its arms exports as well as reduce its reliance on imports, as the United States is its chief arms exporter, both of which will make an independent foreign policy more sustainable.

As Turkey is bolstering its domestic weapons production with the objective of modernization and upgrading its weapons platforms while lowering military dependence, Turkey has also sought to amplify its soft power potential by investing in media and televised entertainment, portraying itself as a Muslim country that can be both a prosperous and pious democracy. Additionally, it has increased its prestige in the Middle East by taking assertive policy against its former close ally Israel. As Turkey invests heavily in new technology and military capabilities, its spending binge is sustained by a rapidly growing economy and the emergence of a new economic order, or post Washington Consensus.


71. Ibid
The financial crisis of 2008 has seriously harmed the credibility and economic policies and practices of the West. The crisis has put the literature of the “decline of the west” on overdrive and has moved the “rise of the rest,” as Fareed Zakaria describes the shifting global balance of power, to the forefront of much scholarship relating to the future of the so-called global order. The emerging or reemerging “Bric'n'Mitsk” states: Brazil, Russia, India, China Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and Korea,

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72. Table 10 is not reflective of the G-20 organization per-say, but rather a list of the Top 20 world economies to highlight the growing economies of “the rest” while there is a practice relative decline in the economies of the west. IMF
and the emergence of the G-20 over the G-8 as the premier international financial forum, have only added to a fundamental change in how global decisions, especially about economics, are agreed upon.  

The delineation of economic power from the Western world and a transferring of power to “the rest” have added a new layer of complexity to international relations as power in its traditional context. As shown by Table 10, the leading Western states are declining while states in Asia and the Middle East are emerging in economic power.

Turkey, as a part of this new emerging group, has strong economic indicators with positive outlooks from most credit agencies, while most of the states in the European Union have been downgraded and have negative outlooks. A new debate raging about Turkish-EU membership has dramatically changed in the last five years. Previously, the discussion on this issue was framed as: “Does the EU need Turkey?” Now, the discussion raging in Turkey is: “Does Turkey need the EU?” This change again speaks to the lowering of the payoffs for Turkey joining the EU for the AKP government. As an international system changes, Turkey has a strong desire to become independent and emphasize that the world polarity no longer gravitates towards the West.

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73. Hughes (2011), "Bric" creator adds newcomers to the list.
74. For most of 2010 Turkish economic outlook as denoted by Standard and Poor and Fitch was "positive" credit ranking agency outlook Turkey, see Hudson (2010) Fitch lifts Turkey's rating outlook to "positive".
75. Der Spiegel Online International (2011) Spiegel Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu: "Turkey and Europe Need Each Other"
5.5.2 Fear of Isolationism:

During the Cold War, Turkey was part of the “frontline of the Western alliance against the Soviet Union.”76 During this time Turkey was sure of its standing given that it was a “particularly important [partner] in the defense of NATO’s southeastern flank. It maintained both intelligence-gathering bases, which monitored Soviet troop movements and communications, and major air fields on its soil.”77 However, on November 9, 1989, in a surprising twist of events the Berlin Wall came crashing down and the expected Soviet clamp down never arrived. With Gorbachev’s reversal of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the fall of the Soviet Union two years later, Turkish-Western relations started to consistently change as Turkey’s importance seemed in decline.78 When the Cold War ended and the Soviet security threat was no longer present, Turkey’s significance to the United States was put into question. As testified by the United States giving less economic and military aid to Turkey, the U.S administrations stopped lobbying to prevent the consideration of any bill in reference to the Armenian genocide by Congress, and increased pressure on Turkey over Cyprus and human rights pertaining to the Kurdish

76. Meral (2010), Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity, page 80.
77. Steinback (1994) The European Community, the United States, the Middle East, and Turkey in Politics of the Third Turkish Republic, pages 106-107.
78. Until the end of the Cold War, American-Turkish relations were defined on the security concerns and threat from the Soviet Union. The abrupt end of the Cold War caught many in Washington by surprised an often quoted example is that of a CIA analyst that said “there was no way the Soviet Union was going to break up in his lifetime or his children’s lifetime.” The analyst’s name was Robert Gates who would later become CIA director and the Sectary of Defense for two Presidents (see Chakrabortty (2010) Prepare to be pummelled by the political predictions). For further information on the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Staar, (1987) Foreign policies of the Soviet Union, pages 8-14.
people. Baskin Oran writes: “concern began to grow after 1989 that Turkey’s place and importance for the U.S and the West in general were waning.”

During this time, although Turkish-Western relations were generally good, anxiety grew in Turkey over what they considered was their declining status and importance within the Western orb. However, on August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait and subsequently Turkey was propelled back onto the ‘frontline’ of international politics and became a valued member of the Western alliance. By the time the Gulf War started in 1991, Turkey again was on good terms with the United States and allowed for the use of Turkish airspace to attack targets in Iraq and Kuwait and for its territory to open a second front in Northern Iraq. Özal, in contrast to many others in his own party, military, and government (foreign Minister Bozer, Defense Minister Giray, and General Staff Chief Torumtay all resigned), supported the United States’ efforts wholeheartedly. He expected high levels of economic aid from the U.S and Gulf states, and although a $4.2 billion defense fund was set-up for Turkey, the embargo imposed on Iraq after the war and the effects of the war itself ravaged the Turkish economy as “the loss of income as Iraq-Turkey pipeline, large scale disruption of bilateral trade as well as the border trade and the unemployment that this caused in south-eastern region, Iraq’s nonpayment of its debts to Turkey.”

79. Oran (2010) *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006*, page 567
80. Ibid.
81. Oran (2010) *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006*, page 681
82. Ibid
As a result of the deep economic losses incurred by Turkey’s support of the First Gulf War, it appealed to the United Nations and evoked Article 50 of its Charter, which stipulates:

*If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.*

However, unlike the Jordanians who did not participate in the coalition that invaded Iraq and stood closely to Saddam Hussein during the war (most likely in a bid to appease the Palestinian demographic of its population) and who received compensation under Article 50, Turkey could not persuade the U.S to support them in the United Nations Security Council and they did not receive any compensation for their losses during the aftermath of the war. Another ramification of the Gulf War was that the PKK (*Parti Karkerani Kurdistan*) capitalized from skyrocketing unemployment in the eastern region, coupled with a power vacuum left in Northern Iraq, to start to carry out operations against Turkey from their safe-haven, while obtaining arms and ammunition from the defeated Iraqi army for “rock-bottom prices”. During the mid-1990s the Kurdish–Turkish conflict reached its peak in violence and massive military deployments by both sides.

83. See United Nations Charter Article 50 for a complete version of that text.
84. Oran (2010) *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006*, page 681
85. Ibid
86. Ibid
It was these events at the end of the Cold War and during the first Gulf War that would remain at the forefront of policy makers’ minds and who came to realization that “cooperation with the U.S in a crisis as natural consequence of the convergence of Turkey’s interests with America’s. However, this had to be weighed against Turkey’s losses and Turkey’s cooperation with Iraq on the Kurdish questions over many years.”

Turkey would not forget the events that happened at the tail end of the Cold War and the first Gulf War One, and decided to become self-reliant to overcome isolation while these events have led to steep anti-Americanism that persists to this day. This sentiment makes cooperation with America a bit difficult because of the nature of the tension between these two populations.

When Özal died in 1993, his death ended to the first wave of so-called neo-Ottomanism and it would not be another ten years before Erdoğan (who was just starting to become politically recognizable as mayor of Istanbul in 1994) would move Turkey back on Özal’s original path of neo-Ottomanism with some variance—neo-Ottomanism 2.0. Yet, when Erdoğan was faced with another American war in Iraq, the actions he took were very different than those of Özal. Also, another difference is that during Özal’s Presidency, the United States was at the zenith of its power and the world was “uni-

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87. Oran (2010) *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006*, page 682

88. Turkish views of the U.S. have not always been so downbeat. U.S. State Department polling from the beginning of this decade found just over half (52%) of Turks expressing a favorable opinion of the U.S. However, the widely unpopular Iraq war led to a steep decline in America's image, and it has essentially never recovered. While overall ratings for the U.S. have improved throughout much of the world, in Turkey they remain dismal - only 14% of Turks expressed a positive view of the U.S. in Spring 2009 after Obama’s trip to Ankara. The Pew Global Attitudes survey, still show that Turkey gives the lowest rating the United States among the 25 nations included in the poll. See: Pew Research Center: Global Attitudes Project (2011). *On Eve of Elections, a More Upbeat Mood in Turkey.*
polar” with one great superpower and only a handful of other major powers. During Erdoğan’s tenure many theories arose about the “the rise of the rest” in the wake of declining United States’ power and the growing relative power of the China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey.

Turkey’s fear of isolation has had a two-fold impact on the audience costs under a doctrine of neo-Ottomanism 2.0. First, because the times of isolation from the West meant that Turkey was briefly on its own and was internationally weak, this designation within the model denotes a negative cost for the government. Second, and more importantly, because although the Turkish military is in the process of becoming indigenously built, its reliance on the West for security matters means that cooperation in NATO is expected, while failing to cooperate in this area might result in creating domestic instability (as information pertaining to the PKK might be withheld) and with modern weaponry Turkey might not have the hard power to influence international outcomes.

5.6 Summary:

This analysis has provided a fruitful assessment of domestic issues that are significantly important within the paradigm of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and current Turkish politics. The issues presented above contextualize Turkey’s social reality to underscore the public and elite social construction of where Turkey is going, what its goals and objectives are, and how the country can get there. Throughout this section, by detailing the intensity of the prescribed issues and thus audience costs that are associated with
them, the conditions of cooperation can be constructed for Turkish-Western relations. Given that main component of the decision-making model has been thoroughly laid out, it can now be tested via a comparative case study will be employed to test the decision-making model and its placement of when cooperation between Turkey and the West should occur.
6. Case Studies

The decision-making model takes two key variables into account to determine the conditions when Turkey should cooperate or act independently from a specific Western policy preference. Within this paradigm the audience costs are derived from the preference and policies of the government’s supporters, while the intensity of an issue is related to internal and external balancing. Given that these variables that are interlocked with one another in a leader’s decision-making calculus the following cases offer insight into how the decision-making model functions in a theoretical sense, and how issue selection and intensity are measured by exogenous shocks and jolts to Turkey’s foreign policy.

6.1. NATO Missile Shield

Turkish-Western relations in the “medium intensity sphere” are highlighted by the case of the radar installation for the NATO missile shield at Kürecik. This case is a substantial issue in Turkish-Western relations, but it does not come with high international or domestic audience costs that are associated with issues such as Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, or a potential falling out between the United States and Turkey over the Armenian genocide issue. The missile shield issue is substantial due in part because it brings with it the possibility of Turkey being targeted by Iran if a war or conflict breaks out. However, Turkey has already assumed such risks by its continued membership in NATO, thus the intensity in the domestic realm is not high because of the previously learned behavior of taking that risk during the Cold War. Turkey’s decision to
host the radar for NATO’s missile shield is then only contingent on what the government would lose by not cooperating with the West.

The radar has a high priority but given that NATO can find other sites (as it did with the missiles), it is not the case that if Turkey rejects the radar station, NATO would have to go without it, thus firmly putting this at the medium level. This case will show that the payoff the Turkish government derives from both cooperation with NATO and from protecting its citizen’s leads to a prediction that cooperation should occur at the MM level, even if there is some discomfort with and opposition resistance towards its placement in Turkey.

6.1.1. Background

Iran’s nuclear program was first created with the help of the United States in the 1950s (when Iran was a very important and strategic U.S ally) as a part of Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program, and cooperation between the U.S and Iran over its nuclear program continued until 1979 when the “The Shah” Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was deposed. In 1979, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France, and later that year the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded, with deep anti-American sentiment. Through the last three decades and into the present, the United States has openly attempted and funded the destabilizing of Iran, while Iran has funded and openly armed terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. In 2003, Iran along with Iraq and North Korea

were named members of the so-called “axis-of-evil”, which at the time were the announced enemies of the United States.\textsuperscript{2} Relations between the two states have been unequivocally hostile, with mutual distrust since then; furthermore, even though its efforts were hampered without U.S or Western support, Iran continued with its nuclear ambition and sought help from the Russians.\textsuperscript{3} Now almost three decades later, Iran is on the verge (once again) of ascending into the infamous “nuclear family”, generating much apprehension in the West. Iran’s impending nuclear bomb has resulted in a decision by NATO to construct a missile shield to attempt to shoot down incoming missiles into Europe.

The plan calls for the deployment of U.S. interceptor missiles at a Romanian air force base in approximately four years, while Turkey (the country geographically closest to Iran) will host the radar to detect if a missile from there has been launched. The agreement to put the radar station in Turkey was hailed by American officials as “probably the biggest strategic decision between the United States and Turkey in the past 15 or 20 years,” one senior administration official stated at a White House briefing meant to call attention to the developments. Also, it was “the most significant military

\textsuperscript{2} Bush singled out Iran when he said that: “[Iran] aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom...States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic”. For the complete speech see Bush (2002) The President’s State of the Union Address.

\textsuperscript{3} “Iran is not a marginal state like Libya or Syria, but neither is it a great power. It has few friends and fewer allies. By alienating the United States and Europe, Iran has increased its dependence on Russia for diplomatic support, nuclear and other technology and conventional arms. It has thus compromised its vaunted ‘independence’, inhibiting the pursuit of its interests in the Caspian and Caucasus.” see Chubin (2009) \textit{Iran's Power in Context}, pages 179-180.
cooperation between Washington and Ankara since 2003, when Turkish officials infuriated their American counterparts by refusing to allow an armored division to cross Turkish territory to join the invasion of Iraq”.

Over a year ago it would have seemed unlikely that Turkey would be willing to cooperate from the aesthetic level because at the start of Erdoğan’s second term, Iran and Turkey started moving closer together, arousing trepidation in Western policy-makers. The tone of this new relationship was set when President Gül was among the first world leaders to congratulate Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad on his contested reelection, which was condemned by the West. Then in 2010, Ankara put its relationship with Washington on the line by voting against Iran sanctions in the United Nations Security Council; however, when digging deeper and using the decision-making model a clearer picture of why Turkish-Western cooperation happened with regard to the missile shield.

6.1.2 Reaching Cooperation

Unlike Iranian-American relations, Turkish-Iranian relations are more complex, coupled with a long historical context, as relations between the two states have been stable, with no real change to their shared boarder since the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639. The level of trade between the two neighbors rose to $16 billion at the end of 2011 (from

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. For a brief discussion on the Iranian and Ottoman relations and border see Masters (1991). The Treaties of Erzurum (1823 and 1848) and the Changing Status of Iranians in the Ottoman Empire, pages 3-15.
$1 billion in 2000); the rise in oil-and-gas imports by Turkey was the greatest contributing factor. Iran generally provides 30 percent of Turkey’s mixed-oil supply and one-third of its total natural gas imports. If it were not for Iran, Turkey would be almost totally dependent on Russia for its energy supply. \(^7\) Annually, more than 70,000 Turkish trucks go through Iran to take goods to and from Central Asian countries. Additionally, both Ankara and Tehran often cooperated in their fights against Kurdish separatists. With such interests at stake (high intensity), Turkey was against imposing harsher sanctions against Iran when the issue came before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2010, the point at which Turkey was at the end of its two-year rotating member stint. \(^8\) Turkey’s vote can be attributed to protecting its valuable commercial ties, as Turkish negotiators worked tirelessly to keep diplomatic options open, instead of triggering an impending axis shift.

A few months after Turkey’s objection to the UNSC resolution on Iran, Erdoğan made an unscheduled trip to Tehran in coordination with Brazilian President Luiz “Lula” da Silva to make an agreement to outsource Iranian uranium enrichment to his country to avoid any further sanctions on Iran. \(^9\) This agreement sparked outrage in Washington and other European capitals as it was a major break with past behavior and they were already critical of Turkey’s trade levels with Iran. Erdoğan’s reply after supporting Iran sheds light on his own audience concerns when he fired back: “In fact, there is no nuclear

\(^7\) Mercan (2010). *Turkish Foreign Policy and Iran.*
\(^8\) Hürriyet Daily News (2010) *Turkey’s no vote on Iran sanctions a ‘strong rebuke,’ former US politician says.*
\(^9\) Mercan (2010). *Turkish Foreign Policy and Iran.*
weapon in Iran now but Israel, which is also located in our region, possesses nuclear arms. Turkey is the same distance from both of them. What has the international community said against Israel so far? Is this the superiority of law or the law of superiors?  

Throughout 2010, Iranian and Turkish relations were generally good, with both states cooperating. However, when the ongoing events of the Arab Spring started to erupt throughout the Middle East, Turkey positioned itself as a supporter of democracy and even of the secular state as a model for the new regimes. This change began to pose the greatest threat to Iranian-Turkish relations, none more so than Ankara's support of the Syrian opposition. Nuray Mert, a political scientist at Istanbul University, has written that “if there is going to be a regime change in Syria, the whole power balance will change...because if Iran loses Syria, they will lose an important base of power in the Middle East.” Since Turkey has sided with the dissidents, it has “economically and politically sanctioned Syria, and supports some sort of regime change in Syria. Iran will take Turkish actions in Syria as it directed against itself”. Adding to Tehran's angst, Ankara is now closely coordinating its Syrian policy with Washington, as there have been “a number of very high-level phone calls with the two sides on the same page in a coordinated effort.

10. Ibid  
12. Ibid  
13. Ibid
6.1.3. Decision-making model on the Missile Shield

Given that the protests in Ankara and Istanbul against the radar installation were attended by only roughly a few thousand people, coupled with a moderate amount of backlash from opposition parties, the APK had to endure moderate opposition to its policy and no domestic reprisals for agreeing to install the missile shield within its domestic realm.14 The Turkish government stated that the NATO system neither caused threat to any nation nor targeted any particular nation, while the Turkish Minister of Defense, İsmet Yılmaz, claimed that the NATO missile defense system's objective is to secure Europe, while also adding that it's for the security of Turkey.15 The cooperation under the missile shield was made possible because Turkey’s domestic audience costs were at the medium level, while the international payoffs and interests were also at the same level.

6.2 Relations with Israel:

Traditionally, Turkey and Israel have been the strongest and most reliable U.S allies in the Middle East. The preponderance of the partnership and close collaboration between the two states serves U.S interests and reinforces its political influence as they complement its wider regional objectives of containing Iran as well as preserving a pro-Western Jordan.16 However, the fallout and tension between Turkey and the West over its relations with the State of Israel has created deep concern for the U.S. On September

14. Hafedell (2012) Turkey-NATO Relations at the 60th Anniversary
15. Ibid
09, 2011, a State Department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland, said the United States is urging both sides to “cool it,” and refrain from talk or action that could exacerbate tensions. Nuland stated that “we [the United States] support the right of free navigation obviously. But we are concerned about any action that could be perceived as provocative that could escalate tensions. We want to see these two strong allies of the United States get along with each other, and work together in support of regional peace and security.”

Yet even amidst heavy U.S pressure for both Turkey and Israel to cooperate, not even the slightest measure of rapprochement has transpired due to the deep audience cost if either side backs down or changes its policy. Therefore, the cooperation between the two states provides an excellent example to demonstrate the power of high adverse audience costs for Turkey’s domestic level to cooperate with Israel, while there is a medium to high preference of international Western pressure for them to cooperate.

6.2.1. Background

In 1948, the State of Israel was founded despite violent attempts to prevent its independent being in the wake of British decolonization. After Israel was able to militarily subdue its opponents and consolidate its boarders, it sought to locate friends in the region, and a year later Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel (in deference to the U.S). Soon thereafter Israel place a high premium on having strong relations with Turkey, with Ankara being one of only four capitals (Washington, Paris,

17. Hafdell (2012) *Turkey-NATO Relations at the 60th Anniversary*
18. Ibid
and London were the others) where Israel accredited a military attaché, while also “sending mostly high-ranking and very qualified diplomats to head their respective legacies”. 19 From early on, Israel sought Turkey as an important partner because it would provide some legitimacy and regional support.

Relations between Ankara and Jerusalem remained congenial over the decades; yet given U.S policy during the Cold War and several Israeli-Arab conflicts, the deepness desired by Israel was never realized. However, in 1991 with the Cold War ending and new security concerns arising from Iran, Iraq, Cyprus and its growing conflict with Greece in the Aegean Sea, Turkey and Israel became natural security allies.20 The driving force behind the improving relations was the Turkish military, who felt a bit isolated from the U.S. immediately after the end of the Cold War, but more importantly sought to update and upgrade their weapons platforms, and who were of course knowledgeable of Israel’s military success over the decades. Adding to this point, improvement continued during the tenure of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, who was also a military man and the Israeli Military’s Chief of Staff during the Yom Kippur Wars, which also improved the strategic depth to their relations.21

Throughout the 1990s and into the turn of the century, Turkey and Israel enjoyed very favorable relations, with new trade agreements, joint military exercises, and Israel enjoying carte blanche use of Turkish airspace for both civilian and military uses. When

21. Ibid.
Erdoğan came to power in 2002, relations continued to prosper, with Turkey taking on the new role of the arbiter of the Syrian-Israeli peace process; furthermore, it was also involved with trying to find a peace solution to the Israel-Palestinian issue. At first, relations between the two states went well, with Turkey seeking help from Israel to “use its influence in the American Congress to battle repeated attempts by American Armenians to have the events of 1915 recognized as genocide”.22 By 2005, relations reached a new level of cooperation after Israel’s evacuation of its settlements in the Gaza Strip created a positive mood. In return, Turkey arranged meetings between Israelis and Pakistanis in Istanbul while also working towards peace.23

Leading up to 2009, Turkish-Israeli relations were never better (which was not the case with the U.S.), but then came Operation Cast Lead (also known as the Gaza War 2008-2009) and the relationship deteriorated. On December 27, 2008, Israel launched a major offensive with the objective of stopping the rocket fire coming into Israel, and to stop the arms imports into the Gaza strip.24 The Turkish leadership which had hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Minister of Defense Ehud Barak only days earlier were “surprised by the breath and forcefulness” of the attack and reacted swiftly to the events.25 The events of the Gaza War created a unique event in Turkish politics: the uniting of all the opposition parties along with the ruling party in condemning the
operation and calling for an immediate cease-fire. Erdogan, who felt personally betrayed by Olmert, vowed that he was no longer a credible partner for peace and Turkey disengaged from the peace negotiations that it was leading. Throughout Anatolia, city squares were flooded with protestors who were against the Israeli military campaign and who demanded the “unilateral abolition of all existing treaties between Turkey and Israel. For the first time since Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 1949, relations began to move backwards, and this was happening rapidly.

Operation Cast Lead was the first of a series of events that sent Turkish-Israeli relations spiraling downwards, but it was the “walk out” incident at Davos that gave it a public face and made Erdogan an extraordinary figure in the Muslim world. During the conference, Erdogan (who was at a forum with Israeli President Shimon Peres), along with the United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki-moon and the Arab League’s Secretary General Amr Moussa, all walked out after feeling the moderator did not allocate a fair amount of time to him, and all seemed genuinely outraged by the recent Israeli operation. Erdogan is quoted repeating the Sixth Commandment from the Decalogue (Thou shall not kill) in both English and in Hebrew, which might be the first time a Turkish Prime Minister spoke Hebrew in public, to show how personally wronged he felt by Israel for the killings taking place in Gaza.

27. Bacik (2009). Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey, pages 38-39
28. Ibid
The effects of the fallout between the two states were almost immediate. Turkey was the premier destination among Israeli vacationers with approximately 500,000 going to Antalya annually, depositing approximately 300 million into the Turkish economy; a year after the incident, Israeli tourism to Turkey was down over 50%. More importantly than the costs associated with tourism was Israel’s consideration for changing its stance on the 1915 Armenian genocide from one of “silence and non-recognition” to one of recognition. Meanwhile in Turkey, the Free Gaza Movement (FGM) and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İHH), started gathering humanitarian aid and construction materials, with the intention of breaking the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the Gaza Strip.

Before the flotilla was ready to leave, another diplomatic incident occurred when Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon summoned the Turkish Ambassador, Ahmet Oğuz Çelikkol, to complain about a Turkish television series Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu (Valley of the Wolves: Ambush), which showed anti-Semitic motifs, including Mossad agents snatching a Muslim baby to convert to Judaism and shooting old men. At the meeting, Ayalon was critical of what he saw as Turkish anti-Semitic television programming, and emphasized the seriousness of the issue. However, during the meeting he broke with diplomatic protocol by not displaying the Turkish flag, and then proceeded

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32. Merley (2011) Turkey, the Global Muslim Brotherhood, and The Gaza Flotilla.
to point out to the media that the Turkish Ambassador sat on a lower sofa. In the aftermath of the incident, Ayalon was publicly denounced by Peres for such a breach in diplomacy, and later had to apologize to Çelikkol. However, the damage was done.\(^{34}\)

By May 30, 2010, six of the eight ships that made up the flotilla departed from international waters off the coast of Cyprus, en route to Gaza. Although in the past previous flotillas were able to obtain permission to access Gaza, the Israelis publicly stated they would not permit the entry of this flotilla. Then during the early morning of May 31, \textit{Shayetet} 13 (the elite naval commando unit of the Israeli Navy) started their mission to take over the ships and tow them into the Port of Ashdod for inspection and temporary containment.\(^{35}\) Although there was little confrontation with five of the six ships, the Comoros-flagged \textit{Mavi Marmara} put up a fierce resistance and during the course of the attempted takeover, nine activists were killed in the raid, while three IDF soldiers were injured.\(^{36}\)

The raid dealt a serious blow to Turkish-Israeli relations and it caused great outrage in both states. Reactions to the incident were swift, with anger and outrage coming from Turkey. President Abdullah Gül said that “from now on, Turkish-Israeli ties will never be the same. This incident has left an irreparable and deep scar…and Turkey will never forgive this attack”. Prime Minster Erdoğan upped the ante by saying that Israel should be “punished” for its “bloody massacre,” and that it was no longer possible

\(^{34}\) Merley (2011) \textit{Turkey, the Global Muslim Brotherhood, and The Gaza Flotilla}.  
\(^{35}\) Ibid.  
\(^{36}\) Ibid.
to cover up or ignore Israel's lawlessness, which he referred to as that of “spoiled children”. Erdoğan even suggested that he would consider sending the Turkish Navy to escort any future flotillas, or to visit Gaza himself in order to break the blockade. He also urged the international community to impose sanctions on Israel. All joint war-games and military cooperation was cancelled. On the other hand, Prime Minister Netanyahu, during an address to the nation, defended the decision to raid the ships as a part of its mission to prevent rockets from entering Gaza. He stated that “Israel cannot permit the free flow of weapons into Israel from the sea…or allow an Iranian port a few kilometers from Tel Aviv”, and that “we will never apologize for defending ourselves” and accused the international community of hypocrisy. Netanyahu claimed that his country took appropriate action and “that had Israel not stopped the flotilla from breaking the blockade and entering the Gaza Strip illegally, hundreds of more flotillas would arrive carrying weapons,” and Israel’s actions were in self-defense.

On August 2, 2010, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that the U.N. would conduct an investigation of the incident, with former Prime Minister of New Zealand Sir Geoffrey Palmer leading the investigation, former President of Colombia Álvaro Uribe as Vice Chair, and with one representative from Israel (Joseph Itzha) and one from Turkey (Süleyman Sanberk). The report found fault with the

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37. Ibid.
actions of both states; a final resolution or attempted rapprochement between the two has yet to be realized. In fact, Turkey reacted to the report and Israel's continued refusal to apologize by expelling the Israel's ambassador and by cutting all military ties with the Jewish state, bringing bilateral relations to their lowest point in decades.41

6.2.2 The Decision-making model and Future Cooperation

As demonstrated above, Turkish-Israeli relations have soured badly over the last three years. The secession of diplomatic incidents coupled with relatively low trade levels (7 billion in 2011) make resumption of the previous close cooperation unlikely in the near-to-intermediate future. Previously, the primary link for cooperation between the two states was military cooperation. However, as Turkey builds its own military industrial complex, the need for Israeli technology and weaponry declines. Additionally, given the rhetoric from the Turkish government and the public sentiment towards the Jewish state if Turkey suddenly reversed its course and reinstalled former agreements without receiving an apology or other rapprochement measures from Israel, the ruling government would have to absorb a tremendous amount of audience costs, given the negative outlook of the Turkish people and its own rhetoric pertaining to the State of Israel.

On the other side of the coin, costs can also be incurred by Turkey if it shuns cooperation. These costs include losing Israel's help on blocking legislation pertaining to

41. Greenwood (2011) Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to apologise to Turkey.
the Armenian genocide in the U.S Congress, or having colder relations with the United States, which might translate into the U.S not providing intelligence to Turkey on PKK movements and supply lines in Northern Iraq. Nonetheless, the Turkish government is limited in the options it has to cooperate with Israel due to the audience costs it would have to suffer, with the opposition waiting to jump on this potential opportunity. This case has shown that at the high domestic audience costs level, Turkey’s foreign policy decision-making is constrained by audience costs that have been established with Israel over the last few years, and unless there is a change in Jerusalem, there is an expectation within the conditions of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 that cooperation will remain elusive.
7. Conclusion

By reimagining Turkish politics since the start of the Third Republic and re-contextualizing neo-Ottomanism by accounting for changes in both domestic and international politics, this paper has shown that understanding the associated audience costs is an important component for recognizing the conditions for when cooperation should occur in Turkish-Western relations. The issues raised in this paper have provided a list of critical events and characteristics of neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and a characterization of what this term is defined with the literature. However, as mentioned, much more work can be done in examining how audience costs affect international cooperation by formal modeling and an expansion upon this decision-making model. Given that Turkish foreign policy is only now starting to come into its own independent formation after being subjugated to the Western orbit of the international political system since the end of the Second World War, this is the optimal time to study and elevate Turkish foreign policy more thoroughly.

Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 has been presenting a serious challenge to Turkish-Western relations, as there was a steep decline due to a confrontation over the structure and view of the relationship from the previous status quo. However, cooperation has slowly been restored as Turkey and the West realize the importance to each other as international partners, and as this paper has outlined, cooperation is firmly within the confines of a stag-hunt game—both sides seek to actively cooperate—and that cooperation is available when both states understand the audience costs and their relation to a particular issue. By
doing such, this paper demonstrated when cooperation should occur between the West and Turkey, and that when the audience costs associated with “neo-Ottomanism 2.0” are high enough, they will weaken the government’s hold on power, thus making cooperation less likely.

In answering the question pertaining to the future of Turkish-Western relations, this paper has shown that the purported trepidation of Turkey’s wayward journey from the West has been incorrectly framed in the context of international affairs because the literature has used an outdated paradigm of a world that is no longer structured as it once was during the Cold War or even five years ago. Instead, the paradigm offered in this paper demonstrated that the future of Turkish-Western relations are contingent upon each other understanding of the associated audience costs that each state would have to endure for engaging in cooperation. This paradigm still holds true even if the APK loses its hold on power, because of the deepness of Turkish political history and the augmentation of different social cleaves that moved its “social reality.” The current learnt behavior between Turkey and the West now has a new foundation that has middle to long term duration for an understanding of the conditions for cooperation.

As Turkey continues its rise, it is ever important to see beyond the labels of “moving towards political Islam” or moving away from the Western Orbit, and it is additionally important to understand social and political changes that move elected officials towards a certain policy position and/or commitment. The decision-making model outlined in this paper has accomplished that by demonstrating that a leader’s
decision to cooperate is indicative of more than just generalizations of national power and interests, and stem from many differing concepts that give domestic audience an issue specific importance vast explanatory power.
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