Essays in Political Economy

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Economics in the Graduate School of Duke University

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Abstract

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the connection between voter turnout and candidate polarization and the institutional structure of international unions. The first chapter considers a voting game with turnout and endogenous candidates, and maps the equilibria of the game under different assumptions regarding citizen’s preferences over policy. The second chapter considers the impact of measures to increase turnout on political polarization. The third chapter analyzes optimal institutional structures of international unions and the existing institutions in the EU.
To my family, friends, and faculty. Thank you for your invaluable help and support.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Turnout is an important determinant of which candidate wins an election. Since candidates know this, it follows that they will consider turnout when choosing their policy platforms. In the first chapter, I formally examine the effect voter turnout has on candidates’ policy positions. In a related paper Ledyard (1984) finds that, with strictly concave citizen utility, both candidates choose the same policy and no citizens vote. I also consider convex and linear utility and find that turnout can cause candidate polarization in these cases. I characterize the equilibria and show that alienation among extreme voters, which does not occur with concave utility, is a necessary condition for polarized, positive-turnout equilibria. My model also suggests that as the importance of an election increases, candidate policy positions will move closer together.

Concerned about low turnout, some US states have introduced measures to encourage voter participation. In the second chapter, to study how these measures affect political outcomes, I develop a novel two-stage model of elections that consid-
ers candidates’ choice of political position along with citizens’ decision of whether to vote. I find that at high enough levels, measures to increase turnout cause candidates to switch from choosing political positions that motivate their partisan base to competing over centrist voters, which leads to candidates converging at the median voter’s ideal point. At intermediate levels, however, decreasing the cost of voting and subsidizing voting can result in drastically different political outcomes. Also, counter-intuitively, voter turnout is non-monotonic in measures to increase turnout: since these measures decrease the difference between the candidates’ political positions, they decrease the benefit of voting.

The last chapter addresses the institutional structure of international unions. I model an international union as an institution which centralizes policy at a supranational level and analyze the implications of different institutional structures on both union-level and national policy. I find that if policy is set by citizen majority, then the median voter at the union level will choose union-level policy to influence the policy choice of the median voter at the national level. If policy is set by nations (national representatives), then there is no strategic behavior. For the union to be sustainable, however, a unanimity rule among national representatives at the union level is required. The EU uses a hybrid two-stage decision rule which features unanimity in the first stage and either unanimity or majority rule in the second stage. This decision rule outperforms unanimity with policy set independently in each area, and avoids high transaction costs of bargaining over policy in all areas simultaneously.

Since it is relevant for both chapters 2 and 3, I make the case for diminishing intensity of political preferences in the following section.
1.2 The case for diminishing intensity of political preferences

Diminishing intensity of political preferences translates into citizen utility functions over the political spectrum that are convex, while increasing intensity of political preferences implies concavity. Increasing intensity of political preference (concave utility) implies that citizens with extreme preferences will be very sensitive to differences in moderate candidates. Because of this thought experiment, leading scholars in the area of voting such as Osborne (1995) have expressed doubt as to whether concave utility is the appropriate assumption. The distinction between concave and convex utility (given fixed candidate positions), however, is empirically mute in most elections since voters choose between only two viable candidates (Duverger’s law). Congressional and presidential elections in US are exceptions, since parties use primary elections to choose which candidates will stand in the general election. With this two-stage election procedure, the shape of utility is empirical relevant to voting patterns, even assuming fixed candidate positions.

I construct a thought experiment which asks whether voting patterns in primary elections are consistent with convex or concave utility. Consider the following stylized example of a citizen, \( i \), with a political ideal to the left of the political space who is participating in the primary elections. The voter can vote in either the Republican or the Democratic primary, but only in one.\(^1\) The Democratic candidates, \( \{A, B\} \), are the same distance apart as the Republican candidates, \( \{C, D\} \). Assume, for the purpose of illustration, that regardless of who contests the general election, the Democratic and Republican candidates have the same chance of winning. This example is illustrated below in Figure 1:

If voter \( i \) has concave utility, as illustrated above, then the outcome of the Republican primary will be more important to \( i \) than the outcome of the Democratic primary.

---

\(^1\) This is the case in most US states; some states even hold open primary election, which do not require a citizen to be registered for a party to vote in that party’s primary.
primary \((x < y\) above). Therefore, if \(i\)'s vote carries equal weight in both primaries, then \(i\) will choose to vote in the Republican primary, and vote for the moderate Republican candidate.

While this is a very stylized example, the same logic would hold in a more fully specified model of elections with primaries. If citizens have increasing intensity of political preferences, then a significant proportion of partisan citizens would “hedge” in primary elections by voting for a more moderate candidate in the opposing partisan primary election. This type of crossover voting is uncommon, which suggests that voter behavior is inconsistent with increasing intensity of political preferences.

There are two types of crossover voting which are observed empirically. First, crossover voting by Democrats (Republicans) is observed in elections where the Republican (Democratic) party’s candidate is considered a shoe-in for the general election, making a vote in the Democratic (Republican) primary superfluous (this type of crossover voting is common in Idaho, where primaries are open and the Republican candidate almost always wins [citation?]). This type of crossover voting is distinct from the type detailed above since crossover voting only occurs in one direction.
Secondly, crossover voting occurs when a Democratic (Republican) citizen votes for a spoiler candidate in the Republican (Democratic) primary [citation?]; that is, they vote for a candidate which has a small chance of winning the general election. The strategic calculus of this type of crossover voting is more complex, but spoiler candidates often have a more extreme political preferences and have a positive probability of winning. Therefore, voting for spoiler candidates is less costly, and hence more likely to occur, with diminishing intensity of political preferences.
The Connection Between Turnout and Policy

2.1 Introduction

The possibility that parties will be kept from converging ideologically in a two-party system depends upon the refusal of extremist voters to support either party if both become alike – not identical, but merely similar. (Downs (1957), p. 118)

As Downs suggests, there is an important connection between the citizen’s decision to vote and the policy positions chosen by the candidates. When office-motivated candidates choose policy platforms, they are not concerned with maximizing their support; they are concerned with maximizing their relative support among citizens who have a high incentive to go to the polls and vote. Turnout, therefore, is an important factor in the strategic game between the candidates.

To formally explore the effect of turnout on the policy positions of the candidates, I construct a basic model of an election: two office-motivated candidates choose policy on a one-dimensional policy space, and citizens have single-peaked preferences over policy. In this setting the Hotelling-Black median voter result holds as long as full
turnout is assumed. In direct contrast to the median voter result, however, I find that the added element of rational turnout can cause political polarization in equilibrium. Additionally, I find that with certain distributions of citizen ideal points, candidates have considerable flexibility in setting policy since a large set of policy pairs are equilibria of the model.

An earlier paper that considers a model of rational turnout and office motivated candidates is Ledyard’s (1984) seminal paper. Ledyard shows that if citizens have strictly concave utility in the distance between realized policy and their ideal policy and candidates are office motivated, then the unique equilibrium of the model is for candidates to converge and for turnout to equal zero. In this paper I use a similar setup to Ledyard, but consider utility functions other than concave: specifically linear and convex. I find that Ledyard’s convergence result is not general to other functional forms of utility. In fact, concave is the only class of utility in which a polarized, positive-turnout equilibrium cannot be found.

Osborne (1995) suggests the possibility of convex utility leading to equilibria with positive turnout and candidate policy divergence, but states that:

Nevertheless, for some distributions $H$ and $G$ there may be an equilibrium in which the candidates choose different positions (suppose that $G$ is symmetric and bimodal, and suppose that $x_1$ and $x_2$ [the candidates’ policy positions] are at the modes), though no example exists in the literature and it is not clear that there is one that is robust. (pp. 23-24)

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that demonstrates the existence of positive turnout equilibria in a model with rational turnout and office motivated candidates.

Another interesting result follows from the case of convex utility and a bimodal distribution of citizen ideal points. In direct contrast to the Hotelling-Black median voter result, it will not be an equilibrium for candidates to set policy at the median (for low voting costs). At the median, candidates will have a best response to set policy closer to one of the modes of the distribution; while fewer citizens prefer the deviating candidate, the deviating candidate will have a larger number of supporters who have a high incentive to vote, resulting in an expected plurality.

Given the sensitivity of these results to the form of utility used, a brief discussion about utility over policy is warranted: Concave utility, and particularly the quadratic loss function, is often used in the voting literature, but it is not clear that this assumption accurately describes citizen preferences over the policy spectrum. In an economic setting, concave utility has a logical foundation: you get more utility from the first apple than from the second. In a political setting, the same logic does not necessarily apply: does a unit move towards your ideal policy bring more utility if you start farther away from your ideal? Uncertainty regarding the shape of utility is expressed by Osborne (1995):

The assumption of concavity is often adopted, first because it is associated with ‘risk aversion’ and second because it makes it easier to show that an equilibrium exists. However, I am uncomfortable with the implication of concavity that extremists are highly sensitive to differences between moderate candidates...Further, it is not clear that evidence that people are risk averse in economic decision making has any relevance here. I conclude that in the absence of any convincing empirical evidence, it is not clear which of the assumptions is more appropriate. (p. 22)

Rather than make a specific assumption on utility, I characterize the equilibria
with concave, linear, and convex utility. First, I show that with concave utility, candidate policy will converge and turnout will be zero, a result analogous to Ledyard (1984). In addition, I am able to provide some intuition regarding why this result is sensitive to the shape of citizens’ utility over policy. In accordance with Downs’s logic, equilibria with policy separation and positive turnout only occur when citizens in the extremes abstain due to alienation (Lemma 3 below formalizes this result). With concave utility, the utility difference between the two candidates’ policy positions is the greatest for citizens at the extreme ends of the distribution. Therefore, citizens with extreme ideal points will have the highest incentive to vote, which precludes alienation in the extremes.

With convex utility, however, the utility difference between the candidates is the greatest for citizens with ideal points that coincide with candidates’ policy. This allows for alienation among the extreme voters, which is why convex utility admits equilibria with candidate polarization and positive turnout.

The equilibria in the convex case are sensitive to the distribution of citizens’ ideal points. Positive turnout equilibria exist in the uniform and bimodal case, but not if the distribution is single-peaked. With a uniform distribution, as long as policy is sufficiently close to the median citizen’s ideal point to induce alienation among both the extreme right and extreme left, then candidates have no incentive to either polarize or converge. This gives an interval centered at the median citizen in which any policy pair is an equilibrium. In this case candidates have considerable flexibility in setting policy.

With a bimodal distribution of citizens and convex utility, the existence of a Nash Equilibrium with positive turnout depends on the functional form of the distribution

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2 John Aldrich, among others, has suggested that sigmoid utility, an S-shaped utility function that is at first concave and then convex, best captures citizen preferences. While I do not present the sigmoid case formally, as long as the utility function turns convex “soon enough,” then the results in the sigmoid case will mirror the convex case.
and the utility function. While a Nash Equilibrium might not exist, I show that a unique symmetric Local Equilibrium with positive turnout does exist.

As might be expected, the linear utility case falls between the concave and convex cases: any policy pairs in an interval centered at the median citizen are equilibria, but turnout is only positive when candidates set policy at the endpoints of this interval. This positive turnout equilibrium is very robust to the distribution of citizens, as it exists for any continuous distribution or any finite distribution of citizens drawn from a continuous distribution.

One of the main substantive insights from the model is that, all else equal, as the importance of an election increases (or the cost of voting decreases) candidate policy positions will weakly move closer together. In certain cases this prediction is strict. Therefore, the model suggests that if the outcome of elections to the Senate are more important than elections to the House, then we should see senatorial candidates that are closer together, in terms of policy, than candidates in elections to the house. This is consistent with evidence from the US congress, where Senators are, on average, less polarized than Representatives.

Most formal models of elections have either focused on candidates’ choice of policy position, given the assumption of full turnout, or focused on citizens’ decision to vote, given exogenous candidates policy positions (for example Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), Uhlaner (1989), Feddersen and Sandroni (2006); see Aldrich (1993), Blais (2000), and Feddersen (2004) for a review of the turnout literature). While this literature has established the effect of turnout on who wins an election, it has not addressed the effect of turnout on who runs in an election. This is the question I address here.

McKelvey (1975) explores how turnout could lead to candidate polarization by formally defining how voters must behave for policy motivated candidates to set divergent policy positions in equilibrium. The explicit nature of these equilibria, and
the microfoundations that would lead voters to turnout in this manner, however, have remained largely unexplored until now.

Other models of elections have demonstrated that candidate policy polarization can be achieved in models of full turnout if candidates have motivations other than winning office, or if voters care about candidate characteristics other than policy. Candidate policy separation has been achieved in models with policy motivated candidates and an uncertain median (Wittman (1983), and Calvert (1985)), where candidates cannot commit to policy (Alesina (1988), Osborne and Slivinski (1996), and Besley and Coate (1997)), and with uncertainty regarding candidate characteristics (Kartik and McAfee (2007), and Callander and Wilkie (2007)). Calvert (1985) demonstrates that without significant uncertainty and differences in ideal policy, candidate differentiation will be marginal. Alesina (1988) shows how the repeated nature of elections could cause candidates to approximate commitment through reputational mechanisms. Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) develop a model of citizen candidates who institute their ideal policy if elected and make the choice of whether to run for office (at a cost).

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 examines equilibria under different assumptions on utility, and Section 4 concludes.

2.2 The Model

There are 2 candidates, \( j \in \{A, B\} \), who are able to commit to policy, \( g_j \in [0, 1] \), prior to the election. Candidates receive a utility of 1 if elected and 0 otherwise, making their expected utility equal to their probability of winning the election. I assume (without loss of generality) that \( g_A \leq g_B \). Take \( g = (g_A, g_B) \), and \( g_m \) to be the average candidate policy; \( g_m = \frac{g_B + g_A}{2} \).

There is a continuum of citizens of measure one whose ideal policy points, \( \alpha_i \), are distributed over \([0,1]\) according to the function \( f \). \( f \) is symmetric about \( \frac{1}{2} \).
differentiable, strictly positive over $[0,1]$, and equal to 0 elsewhere. Take $\alpha_m$ to be the ideal point of the median citizen, equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ for all symmetric distributions. Take “interior” to refer to the set of citizens with ideal points between $g_A$ and $g_B$ the interior, and “exterior” the set of citizens not in the interior. All agents have complete information.

Citizens have a common cost of voting, $c$, and have preferences over policy that are a strictly decreasing function of the distance of policy from their ideal point; their (von Neuman-Morgenstern) utility functions are of the form:

$$U_i(\hat{g}, \alpha_i) = u(|\hat{g}, \alpha_i|) - c,$$

where $\hat{g}$ is the realized policy. $u(.)$ is continuous and differentiable, and $u'(.) < 0$.

Take $\beta(g, \alpha_i)$ to be the net utility that citizen $i$ receives if their preferred candidate wins; $\beta(g, \alpha_i) = |u(|g_A, \alpha_i|) - u(|g_B, \alpha_i|)|$. Note that $\beta(g, \alpha_i)$ is twice the benefit of voting when pivotal.

Take $V_A(g)$ to be the set of citizens who vote for candidate $A$; $V_B(g)$ is defined analogously.

The support set for candidate $A$, $S_A(g)$, is the set of citizens who prefer candidate $A$ and for whom voting is not a strictly dominated action; $S_A(g) = \{\alpha_i; u(|g_A, \alpha_i|) - u(|g_B, \alpha_i|) \geq 2c\}$. $S_B(g)$ is defined analogously. The support sets are significant since citizens in the support set will vote as a best response when pivotal, while citizens outside the support set will always abstain. Take $|S|$ to be the Lebesgue measure of set $S$, and $n_f[S]$ to be the measure of citizens with ideal points in $S$ given $f$. I refer to $n_f[S_A]$ as the size of candidate $A$’s support set.

Since I use a continuous distribution of citizens as an approximation of a large $N$ election, I assume citizens are pivotal whenever $n_f[V_A] = n_f[V_B].^3$ In appendix B I

---

3 Individual pivotalness can formally be restored in the model with a continuum of citizens with the following assumption: Take $\hat{V}_A$ to be the closure of all subsets of $V_A$ that are not separated
show that the linear model can be extended to a distribution of a finite number of voters, where the problem of zero-mass voters is alleviated.

**Election Rules**

(1) If $n_f[V_A] > n_f[V_B]$ then candidate $A$ wins the election; If $n_f[V_A] < n_f[V_B]$ then candidate $B$ wins the election.

(2) If $n_f[V_A] = n_f[V_B]$ then each candidate wins with equal probability.

**Stages of the Game**

(1) Candidates set $g_j$ simultaneously.

(2) Citizens choose to vote or abstain. The winning candidate is determined by the election rules outlined above.

I simplify by considering only the case where the candidate who has the support of the largest number of citizens wins an expected plurality: $n_f[S_A] > n_f[S_B] \rightarrow n_f[V_A] > n_f[V_B]$. This eliminates situations where candidates tie regardless of position or where candidates have an incentive to decrease their relative support. Since candidates can always equalize their relative support by setting policy equal to the opposing candidates policy, unequal support is never equilibrium play (I formalize this in Lemma 1 below). This simplification, however, requires that I use Nash Equilibrium as my equilibrium concept, rather than Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.

by closed neighborhoods. Candidates tie if $n_f[V_A] = n_f[V_B]$ and all citizens with ideal points in $\hat{V}_A$ and $\hat{V}_B$ vote; if all citizens in $\hat{V}_A$ vote, but not all citizens in $\hat{V}_B$ vote, then candidate $A$ wins an expected plurality. This reintroduces the notion of each voter being pivotal, since every citizen with an ideal point in $\hat{V}_A$ and $\hat{V}_B$ must vote for the candidates to tie.

With a finite number of voters this is equilibrium behavior, but it does not always hold asymptotically (see Taylor and Yilderim (2010)). Since I am using a continuous distribution only as an approximation of a large $N$ election, I assume that the candidate who has the support of the largest number of citizens wins an expected plurality to approximate equilibrium behavior in finite $N$ elections.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis

In this section I will first detail some general results. Following subsections examine the equilibria of the election model under different assumptions of the shape of utility. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.

2.3.1 General Results

In this section, I establish three general lemmas that will be helpful for characterizing the equilibria under the different assumptions on citizens’ utility over policy.

Lemma 1. In equilibrium, \( n_f[V_A(g)] = n_f[V_B(g)] \). Moreover, if \( n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)] \) then it is an equilibrium for the citizens in the support set to vote \( (S_k(g) = V_k(g)) \) and for all other citizens to abstain.

The first result follows from candidates’ ability to set always guarantee a payoff of \( \frac{1}{2} \) by choosing the same policy as the opposing candidate. Citizens are all pivotal when \( n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)] \) and if all citizens in the support sets vote, then voting is an equilibrium strategy, since abstaining will cause their preferred candidate to lose the election. Lemma 1 allows easy identification of equilibria: an equilibrium is a policy pair where \( n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)] \) and neither candidate can secure a relatively larger support set by choosing a different policy.

Lemma 2 provides some geometric results that will be useful for determining the set of equilibria for the different cases.

Lemma 2. (i) If neither support set includes an endpoint of the distribution, then \( |S_A(g)| = |S_B(g)| \).
(ii) If \( \beta(g, \alpha = 0 < 2c) \) and \( \beta(g, \alpha = 0 > 2c) \), then \( |S_A(g)| > |S_B(g)| \).
(iii) If both endpoints are in the support sets and \( g_m < (>,-)\alpha_m \), then \( n_f[S_A(g)] < (>,-)n_f[S_B(g)] \).
The intuition behind the proof is as follows:

(i) If neither support set includes an endpoint of the distribution, then both support sets are intervals interior to [0, 1] (see Appendix A for a proof that the support sets are intervals). \(S[A]\) and \(S[B]\) are symmetric about \(g_m\) and must therefore have the same length.

(ii) If \(S_A(g)\) is interior and a subset of \(S_A(g)\) has a symmetric (about \(g_m\)) subset that falls outside of \([0, 1]\), then \(|S_B(g)|\) will be smaller than \(|S_A(g)|\). This will be the case when \(\alpha = 1\) is strictly greater than \(2c\), due to the continuity of citizens’ utility in \(\alpha_i\).

(iii) Since the support sets are intervals on \([0, 1]\), they can be represented as \(S_A(g) = [0, \alpha_A^+]\) and \(S_B(g) = [\alpha_B^+, 1]\). \(\alpha_A^+\) and \(\alpha_B^+\) are symmetric about \(g_m\); therefore, if \(g_m\) is smaller than \(\alpha_m\), then \(\alpha_A^+\) is farther from \(\alpha_m\) than \(\alpha_B^+\). Since \(f\) is symmetric and \(S[B]\) extends farther towards \(\alpha_m\) than \(S[A]\) it follows that \(n_j[S_A(g)] < n_j[S_B(g)]\). The other results follow from the same logic.

Lemma 3 shows that for a policy to be an equilibrium, citizens with ideal points at the extremes of the distribution must have voting as a weakly dominated strategy.

Lemma 3. If citizens with ideal points at 0 and 1 strictly prefer to vote when pivotal \((\beta(g, \alpha) > 2c\) for \(\alpha = 0, 1\)), then \((g_A, g_B)\) is not an equilibrium.

Suppose \(\beta(g, \alpha) > 2c\) for \(\alpha = 0, 1\). Since the distribution of voters is symmetric and the support sets are intervals that include the endpoints of the policy spectrum, \(g_A\) and \(g_B\) must be symmetric about \(\alpha_m\) otherwise the size of the support sets will not be equal. Since \(\alpha = 0, 1\) have \(\beta(g, \alpha)\) strictly greater than \(2c\), \(A\) can move \(g_A\) marginally towards \(\alpha_m\) and \(\alpha = 0, 1\) will still be in the support sets. Following this deviation, however, \(g_A\) is slightly closer to the median voter \((g_m > \alpha_m)\) and, by Lemma 2 (iii), the size of candidate \(A\)'s support set is relatively bigger. This shows that if \(\beta(g, \alpha) > 2c\) for \(\alpha = 0, 1\), then at least one candidate always has a strictly profitable deviation.
Before discussing the significance of Lemma 3, I distinguish between abstention due to alienation and abstention due to indifference. Intuitively, alienation occurs if both candidates’ policy choices are too far from a citizen’s ideal point (ideal points at the extreme), while indifference occurs when a citizen’s ideal point lies close to the candidate (ideal points near the center). The distinction between alienation and indifference is largely semantic: both result from the citizen’s net utility between the candidates being too low to vote. Since the set of citizens who abstain due to alienation are affected differently by moves in a candidate’s policy than the set of citizens who abstain from indifference, it will be useful to distinguish between the two.

I formalize the distinction between alienation and indifference with the following definitions:

**Definition 1.** \(A_A(g)\) is the set of \(\alpha_i\) such that:

\[
u([g_B, \alpha_i]) \leq u([g_A, \alpha_i]), \beta(g, \alpha_i) < 2c, \text{ and } \partial \beta(g, \alpha_i) / \partial \alpha_i > 0.
\]

I refer to \(A_A(g)\) as the alienation set for candidate \(A\); \(A_B(g)\) defined analogously.

\(I_A(g)\) is the set of \(\alpha_i\) such that:

\[
u([g_B, \alpha_i]) \leq u([g_A, \alpha_i]), \beta(g, \alpha_i) < 2c, \text{ and } \partial \beta(g, \alpha_i) / \partial \alpha_i < 0.
\]

I refer to \(I_A(g)\) as the indifference set for candidate \(A\); \(I_B(g)\) defined analogously.

If citizens at the endpoints of the distribution abstain due to indifference, then all citizens abstain due to indifference, since the set of indifferent citizens is convex and always contains citizens with \(\alpha_i = g_m\). Therefore, Lemma 3 shows that, without alienation among the extremes, office-motivated candidates will converge to the point where no citizens will bother to vote. This result allows us to characterize the general shape of any positive-turnout equilibrium: two candidate support sets, with \(n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)]\), separated by non-empty indifference sets, and bounded away from the extremes by sets of alienation (illustrated in Figure 1).
2.3.2 Concave Utility

Proposition 1 provides an analogous result to Ledyard’s proof of no turnout in equilibrium with strictly concave preferences.

**Proposition 4.** If \( u(\cdot) \) is strictly concave, then no equilibrium with positive turnout exists; i.e. for any equilibrium value of \( g \), voting is a strictly dominated strategy for all citizens.

Lemma 3 specifies that alienation must occur for a positive turnout equilibrium to exist. Concave utility, however, precludes alienation since \( \beta(g, \alpha_i) \) is the highest for citizens with ideal points at the extremes. Therefore, it follows that positive turnout equilibria cannot exist with concave utility.

The concave model predicts that candidates will set policy close enough to the ideal point of the median voter that turnout will equal zero (all citizens are indifferent). While this is not enough to dismiss concave utility over policy, as shown below, the model does produce more realistic predictions with alternative forms of utility.

2.3.3 Convex Utility

The equilibria with convex utility are sensitive to the distribution of citizen ideal points. I therefore examine three different distributions separately: uniform, single peaked, and bimodal. With a uniform distribution, any pair of policy points within a certain distance of the median citizen are equilibria. With a single-peaked distribu-
tion, the equilibrium replicates the zero-turnout result from the concave model. With a bimodal distribution, a unique Nash equilibrium with positive turnout, alienation and indifference, and policy separation exists in some cases. Generally, however, there exists a Local Equilibrium (defined formally in the Bimodal section) with positive turnout.

As I will catalogue throughout this subsection, the equilibria described here were intuited by Downs (1957). While Downs did not formally model turnout, he reasoned that abstention of extremists would counteract the centripetal incentive of the Hotelling model of elections. Even without the benefit of a formal model, the equilibria predicted by Downs given the different distributions of citizen ideal points are strikingly similar to the equilibria found in the convex-utility case.

With a formal model, however, I am able to give a more complete description of the equilibria and also look at the comparative statics of the model. The main comparative static given by positive turnout equilibria is that as the cost of voting decreases, turnout will increase and candidate positions come closer together.

When interpreting this comparative static, it is important to consider the implicit normalization of utility over policy. While voting costs are likely to remain relatively constant between elections, the benefit of voting will likely change depending upon the office the election concerns. Since the benefit of winning the election is normalized in my model, the cost of voting, $c$, should actually be interpreted as the cost divided by the benefit of winning the election. This allows us to restate the comparative static: as the relative importance of an election to the citizens increases, candidate positions will come closer together and turnout will increase.

**Uniform Distribution**

With strictly convex utility and a uniform distribution, all $(g_A, g_B)$ within a certain distance of $\alpha_m$ are equilibria. All equilibria feature alienation (or marginal alienation)
for citizens with ideal points at the extremes, and as long as candidates locate far enough apart that voting is not a dominated strategy for all voters, then turnout is positive.

Before proving the existence of equilibria in the convex-uniform model, it is useful to characterize the maximal equilibrium distance from \( \alpha_m, \delta \).

**Definition \( \delta \):** Take \( \delta = \min\left[\frac{1}{2}, \min\{d \geq 0 : \beta(\alpha_m - d, \alpha_m + d, \alpha = 0) = 2c\}\right] \)

In words, \( \delta \) is the maximum distance that candidates can be from \( \alpha_m \) before citizens at the endpoints have a strict preference for voting (given \((g_A, g_B)\) symmetric about \( \alpha_m \)).

When \( \delta = \frac{1}{2} \), then voting is a dominated strategy for all positive measures of citizens, regardless of candidate policy. To see why this is the case, note that with convex utility \( \beta(g, \alpha_i) \) is highest for citizens with ideal points equal to candidate policy; also, \( \beta(g, \alpha_i) \) is increasing for citizens with ideal points at candidate policy as the distance between candidate positions increase. Therefore, since the distance between candidate positions is maximized at \((g_A, g_B) = (0, 1)\), if \( \beta(g, \alpha_i) \leq 2c \) for citizens with ideal points at the endpoint of the distribution, then voting is strictly dominated for all other citizens \( \beta(g, \alpha_i) < 2c \forall \alpha_i \in (0, 1) \), and turnout will be zero regardless of candidate positions.

**Proposition 5.** If \( u(\cdot) \) is strictly convex and \( f \) is uniform, then a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium is \((g_A, g_B) \in [\alpha_m - \delta, \alpha_m + \delta]^2 \). Equilibria with positive turnout exist iff \( \delta < \frac{1}{2} \).

If one candidate sets policy outside of \([\alpha_m - \delta, \alpha_m + \delta]\), then the opposing candidate can deviate to either \( \alpha_m - \delta \) or \( \alpha_m + \delta \), whichever maximizes the distance between candidates. At this new point, citizens at the extremes will be in the support sets; the deviating candidate, however, will be closer to \( \alpha_m \) and, by Lemma 2 (iii), will
receive an expected plurality. This means that the original policy pair cannot be an equilibrium.

For any $g_A$ and $g_B$ in $[\alpha_m - \delta, \alpha_m + \delta]$, citizens with $\alpha$ equal to 0 and 1 will be alienated. By Lemma 2 (i) the length of the support sets will therefore be equal, and, since length equals size in the uniform case, the candidates will tie. No deviation can leave a candidate better off.

Turnout is positive for a range of equilibria in this model. Specifically, turnout is positive as long as candidates set policy so that $\beta(g, \alpha_i = g_A) > 2c$. In other words, as long as the candidate policy is distinct enough that at least one voter would pay $c$ to break a tie between the candidates, then turnout is positive.

Note that $\beta(g, \alpha_i = 0)$ decreases as the candidates move closer together, which implies that $\delta(c)$ will be increasing in $c$. This gives the following comparative static: as the relative importance of an election to the citizens increases ($c$ decreases), candidate positions will not move farther apart. While this is not a strict comparative static in the uniform-convex case, as I will show below, it can be strict in the convex-bimodal and the linear cases.

The uniform-convex model formalizes Downs's (1957) intuition that the convergence of politicians to the median voter in the (uniform) Hotelling model of elections would be checked by abstention at the political extremes. Downs goes on to say:

At exactly what point this leakage checks the convergence of A and B depends upon how many extremists each loses by moving towards the center compared with how many moderates it gains thereby. (p. 117)

As explicitly modeled above, candidates’ incentive to converge disappears as soon as they are close enough to the median voter that alienation occurs at the ends of the political spectrum.

**Example:** $u(|g_j, \alpha_i|) = -(|g_j, \alpha_i|)^{1/2}$
The definition of $\delta$ gives the following equation:

$$((|\alpha_m + \delta, 0|)^{1/2} - (|\alpha_m - \delta, 0|)^{1/2} = 2c$$

Solving for $\delta$ with respect to $c$ gives:

$$\delta = c(2 - 4c^2)^{1/2}$$

With a voting cost of 0.1, for example, $\delta$ is equal to 0.14 and any policy pair with $g_A$ and $g_B$ in $[0.36, 0.64]$ is an equilibrium.

Continuing with the example of $c = 0.1$, take $(g_A, g_B)$ equal to $(0.37, 0.63)$. With this policy pair, the support set for $A$ consists of all citizens with ideal policy points in $[0.068, 0.431]$. The citizens in $[0, 0.068]$ abstain due to alienation, and those in $(0.431, \alpha_m]$ abstain due to indifference.

The size of the support set is increasing as the candidates move farther apart; for $(g_A, g_B)$ equal to $(0.32, 0.68)$, approximately 83.5% of citizens vote. It is also possible to find a closed form solution for the minimum distance between candidates at which turnout is positive: $d = 2c^2$. For $c = 0.1$, turnout is positive for all $g_A$ and $g_B$ that are farther apart than 0.02.

Candidates do not need to be placed symmetrically about $\alpha_m$ to be in equilibrium. In the above example, $g_A = 0.40$ and $g_B = 0.65$ is an equilibrium with positive turnout.

Single-Peaked Distribution

If utility over policy is strictly convex and $f$ is single-peaked, then, equivalent to the concave case, no equilibrium with positive turnout exists. The intuition behind the candidates’ incentive to move towards the middle, however, is different: in the concave case, candidates moved inward to press the opponent’s support set towards the endpoint of the distribution; in the convex-uniform case, a move inward will leave the Lebesgue measure of the support sets equalized, but will increase the relative size of the deviating candidate’s support set.
Proposition 6. If \( u(\cdot) \) is strictly convex and \( f \) is single-peaked, then no equilibrium with positive turnout exists.

Since the number of citizens over an interval of a given length is higher the closer it is to the median citizen, candidates will always have an incentive to deviate closer to \( \alpha_m \) to increase the relative size of their support set. Therefore, the only equilibria are for candidate support sets to be empty and turnout equal to zero.

Proposition 3 formalizes Downs’s statement that with a single peaked distribution:

The possible loss of extremists will not deter their movement toward each other, because there are so few voters to be lost at the margins compared with the number to be gained in the middle. (p. 118)

Bimodal Distribution

With a bimodal distribution I show the possibility of a unique equilibrium with positive turnout. In this case, candidates have a centripetal incentive if they are far apart, similar to the uniform case; different from the uniform case, however, candidates also have a centrifugal incentive if they are too close together.

Unfortunately, a Nash Equilibrium need not exist with a bimodal distribution. The existence of an equilibrium with positive turnout needs joint conditions on the degree of convexity of preferences and the shape of the distribution of voters. Also, contrary to the median voter result, as long as \( c \) is low enough, it will not be an equilibrium for candidates to set policy at the median.

Deviations of this type, however, require that candidates make large discrete jumps in policy. If candidates are constrained to incremental changes, equilibria do exist. I therefore focus on local equilibria that give positive turnout (Local Equilibrium defined below) and show the conditions under which a unique symmetric
Local Equilibrium with positive turnout exists. Since Nash Equilibria are also Local Equilibria, the unique Local Equilibrium is the only possible location of a Nash Equilibrium with positive turnout.

**Local Equilibrium:** A policy pair \((g_A, g_B)\) from which neither candidate has a marginal deviation as a best response (over staying at \((g_A, g_B)\)).

I focus on bimodal distributions with interior modes.\(^5\) Take \(\alpha_A\) equal to the minimum of \(S_A(p, q)\) and \(\alpha_A^+\) to equal the maximum of \(S_A(p, q)\).

**Proposition 7.** If \(u(.)\) strictly convex and \(F\) is bimodal, then take \((g'_A, g'_B)\) such that \(\alpha_i = 0, 1\) both have \(\beta(g'_A, g'_B, \alpha_i) = 2c\):

**Case 1:** If \(f(0) \leq f(\alpha_A^+)\) at \((g'_A, g'_B)\), then a sufficient and necessary condition for a symmetric local equilibrium with positive turnout \((g^*_A, g^*_B)\) is \(f(\alpha_A^-) = f(\alpha_A^+)\).

**Case 2:** If \(f(0) > f(\alpha_A^+)\) at \((g'_A, g'_B)\), then \((g'_A, g'_B)\) is the unique symmetric local equilibrium.

Moreover, a symmetric local equilibrium with positive turnout exists iff \(\beta(p_A, p_B, \alpha = p_A) > 2c\), where \(p_A\) is the left mode of \(f\) and \(p_B\) is the right mode of \(f\); if it exists, then the symmetric equilibrium is unique.

The logic behind Proposition 4 is that if the candidates are at a symmetric policy pair and \(\alpha_A^- < \alpha_A^+\), then candidate A will have a centripetal incentive, since the region gained has a higher probability measure than the region lost. If \(\alpha_A^- > \alpha_A^+\), then, similarly, candidate A will have a centrifugal incentive as long as \(\alpha_A^- \neq 0\). If \(\alpha_A^- = 0\) and \(\beta(g, \alpha_i = 0) = 2c\) then, by Lemma 2 (iii), candidate A will not have an incentive to move outward or inward (Case 1 equilibrium). Otherwise, the only symmetric equilibrium with positive turnout will be where \(\alpha_A^- = \alpha_A^+\) (Case 2).

\(^5\) A bimodal distribution with modes at 0 and 1 gives a unique Nash Equilibrium with positive turnout (the proofs closely follow the proof of nonexistence of positive turnout equilibria in the single-peaked model). I do not cover this model, however, since it implies that extremists are the largest electoral group.
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium with bimodal distribution.

Case 1 gives a local equilibrium with marginal alienation at the extremes (citizens with ideal points at 0 and 1 get equal utility from voting and abstaining). Case 2 gives equilibria with a set of alienated voters in each extreme, as illustrated below:

While Proposition 4 only gives the existence of a Local equilibrium, it is relatively easy to check if the Local equilibrium is Nash using numerical techniques. If the equilibrium is Nash, then it will be the unique Nash equilibrium with positive turnout. While asymmetric Local equilibria can exist, they will not be Nash equilibria (since one candidate can always deviate to a point symmetric to the opposing candidate’s position plus or minus some small epsilon and win an expected plurality).

It is also interesting to note that in many cases, it is not an equilibrium for both candidates to set policy at the median voter’s ideal point. Since $f$ is low at the median, a candidate who deviates to a point closer to one of the modes of $f$ can guarantee a relatively larger support. The only cases for which this will not be true is if the cost of voting is very large, or if the modes of the distribution are very close to the median, so that any deviation which results in non-empty support sets gives the deviator a support set which lies on the outside of the mode of $f$, which could result in smaller support.

Again, this style of equilibrium was intuited by Downs. Downs stated that with
a symmetric bimodal distribution:

...the two parties will not move away from their initial positions at 25 and 75 at all; if they did, they would lose far more voters at the extremes than they could possibly gain in the center.

Downs’s logic shows that the bimodal distribution and abstention in the extremes leads to a situation where candidates do not have an incentive to deviate inward. As shown above, however, we must also consider the incentive to deviate outward; only at one symmetric policy pair will there be neither a centripetal or a centrifugal incentive.

While the convex-bimodal model gives a unique symmetric local equilibrium with alienation and indifference, the comparative static of candidate positions and costs depends on relative steepness of the slope of bimodal distribution at the equilibrium values of $\alpha^-_A$ and $\alpha^+_A$. If $f'(\alpha^-_A) > -f'(\alpha^+_A)$, then a marginal drop in $c$ will cause candidates to move closer together (since $f(\alpha^-_A) < f(\alpha^+_A)$ at the old equilibrium). If $f'(\alpha^-_A) > -f'(\alpha^+_A)$, however, then candidates move farther apart with a marginal drop in $c$.

2.3.4 Linear Utility

Linear utility over policy is certainly a knife-edge assumption, but, as I show in this section, the results and comparative statics of the linear model are quite similar to the convex and sigmoid model with uniform distributions of citizen ideal points. The linear model, however, benefits from analytical ease: the equilibrium is easy to calculate and is the same for all symmetric distributions. The linear model also extends easily to the full-information model with finite voters. It might therefore be useful to use as an approximation of the more complex convex and sigmoid cases.
Proposition 8. A necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium is \( g_A, g_B \in [\alpha_m - c, \alpha_m + c]^2 \). At \((g_A = \alpha_m - c, g_B = \alpha_m + c)\) turnout is positive; all other equilibria have zero turnout.

The logic of the proof is similar to that for Proposition 3 (convex-uniform case). Note, however, that Proposition 5 holds for any symmetric distribution of voters.

If either \( g_A \) or \( g_B \) is interior to \([\alpha_m - c, \alpha_m + c]\), then turnout is zero, which is not very appealing from an empirical viewpoint. If candidates have a secondary concern of maximizing turnout, or even just a secondary preference for non-zero turnout, then \( g_A = \alpha_m - c, g_B = \alpha_m + c \) becomes the unique equilibrium of the model. To see how a preference for positive turnout arises, consider the following modification to the setup: if no citizens vote then the election is rerun and candidates will pay an additional election cost in the second election. If this is the case (and if cheap talk is allowed), then \( g_A = \alpha_m - c, g_B = \alpha_m + c \) becomes the unique equilibrium of the model.\(^6\)

With \( g_A = \alpha_m - c, g_B = \alpha_m + c \) as the unique equilibrium, the distance between candidates is strictly decreasing in the benefit on the election (increasing in \( c \)).

While Proposition 5 holds only for symmetric distributions of citizen ideal points, an analogous result holds for any continuous distribution over \([0, 1]\). Even with an asymmetric distribution, \((g_A^*, g_B^*)\) such that \(|g_A^*, g_B^*| = 2c\) and \(n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)]\) will be an equilibrium where the exterior citizens vote and the interior voters abstain (proof analogous to Proposition 5). Note that such a point exists for all continuous distributions, but need not be centered about the median citizen.

As discussed in the previous section, I use an infinite number of voters only as an approximation of a large election. In the case of linear preferences, however, the

\(^6\) With a continuous distribution of citizens, note that citizens in the exterior only vote as a weak best response. With a finite number citizens drawn from a continuous distribution, however, there will almost surely exist an equilibrium where exterior citizens vote as a strict best response. Proof available on request.
equilibria found in the infinite population case also easily generalize to any N greater than one. In particular, Proposition 6 shows that with linear utility, a positive turnout equilibrium where the exterior citizens vote and the interior citizens abstain exists almost surely for any finite population drawn from any continuous distribution (symmetry is not needed).

**Proposition 9.** A sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with positive turnout given a finite distribution of citizens is that there is no overlap in citizens’ policy preferences; i.e. \( \alpha_i \neq \alpha_j \forall i \neq j \).

With no overlap in citizens’ policy preferences, a policy pair \( g^*_A \) and \( g^*_B \) can be found such that the distance between \( g^*_A \) and \( g^*_B \) is equal to \( 2c \) and the number of citizens in each candidate’s support set is equal, which gives a set of equilibria akin to those given in Proposition 5. The formal proof of Proposition 6 requires the introduction of a different set of notation and is therefore left to Appendix B.

### 2.4 Conclusion

This paper takes an important step in understanding the connection between electoral turnout and policy and lays the foundation for further study in this area. I find that positive turnout equilibria exist with non-concave utility, and generally have the following properties: Candidate policy is separated, but lies on opposite sides of the median voter. Citizens with policy preferences “close” to the candidates’ policy positions will vote, while citizens with preferences close to the center (average candidate policy) will abstain due to indifference, and citizens at the very extremes of the distribution will abstain due to alienation.

I have three main conclusions based on my model of elections: First, the policy positions of the candidates are sensitive to the shape of utility and distribution of citizens’ ideal points over the policy space (citizen preferences, not just voter pref-
ferences, matter here). This begs the following empirical questions: what is the form of citizens’ preferences over policy, and what is the distribution their preferences? Aldrich and McKelvey (1977), using data from the 1968 and 1972 US presidential elections, conclude that citizens’ preferences follow a unimodal distribution; Palfrey and Poole (1987), however, find that heteroscedasticity can introduce bias that “...causes the scaled distribution to be very centrally tended (unimodal), even in strongly bimodal populations.”

If the distribution of preferences is uniform, or if candidates are uninformed about the distribution of citizen preferences, then a wide range of policy positions could be equilibria. In this case, the selection of candidates in the primary elections can be of great importance in determining final policy outcomes. Explicitly modeling the primary elections could be an important extension of the general-election model presented here.

Second, turnout can be an important reason why candidates do not converge to the median voter, but remain polarized. Downs (1957) presents a logical argument that abstention would mitigate and, depending on the distribution of citizen preferences, overcome the incentive of candidates to set policy at the median voter. This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to demonstrate that this logic can be formalized as the equilibrium of a model of elections with rational agents. By formally modeling the mechanism behind Downs’s logic, I am able to characterize the equilibria and examine the comparative statics of the model.

Lastly, these equilibria also suggest that if the importance of an election increases, or the cost of voting decreases, then candidate polarization will decrease. This comparative static suggests an important tool for changing polarization, which, according to certain policy makers, has risen to above optimal levels in the US. In a working paper, I use a related model to examine the effect of measures to increase turnout, such as mandatory voting, on candidate policy choice and election outcomes.
Get Out The Vote: How Encouraging Voting Changes Political Outcomes

3.1 Introduction

Policy makers can influence voter turnout indirectly by decreasing the cost of voting, or directly by making voting mandatory. In the United States, measures that decrease the cost of voting have been introduced by individual States, which are responsible for running elections. Citizens of Oregon vote by mail instead of using polling stations and as a result are more likely to turn out (Southwell and Burchett (2000)), and six other States allow all citizens to register as permanent absentee voters. Other US measures that encourage voting include early voting and federal measures such as the Motor Voter Act, which decreased the cost of registering to vote. Internationally, roughly one out of every five citizens in an electoral democracy is legally obligated to vote (Engelen (2007)), and empirical studies have shown that turnout is systematically higher in these countries (Birch 2009). Voter turnout increased by over 30 percent after Australia introduced mandatory voting in 1924. Conversely, voter turnout in Holland and Venezuela dropped significantly after the
abolition of mandatory voting.

But measures to increase turnout are not neutral or innocuous. Encouraging turnout changes citizens’ incentives to vote, and may affect which candidate wins the election. Additionally, candidates may change their political platforms in response to these measures; candidates are also strategic actors in elections and are sensitive to changes in voter behavior. Therefore, to understand the full effect of measures to increase turnout on election outcomes, it is important to understand their effect on both the strategic decisions of the citizens and the strategic decisions of the candidates. To capture the actions of both citizens and candidates I use a two-stage approach: in the first stage, candidates choose between partisan or centrist political positions; in the second stage, citizens decide whether or not to vote.

Using this two-stage model, I compare the consequences of decreasing the cost of voting to the consequences of making voting mandatory (which entails a penalty for not voting). Both measure reduce political polarization: if the cost of voting is made low enough, or no-vote penalties are high enough, then the candidates converge at the median citizen’s ideal point. The intuition is as follows. Candidates choose political positions to maximize relative turnout; they face a tradeoff between taking a partisan political position to increase turnout among partisan voters or taking a centrist position to win centrist votes. Significantly decreasing the cost of voting or a high penalty for not voting, however, ensures high turnout among partisan voters and therefore causes the candidates to converge at the center.

Even though both measures decrease the net expense of voting, decreasing the cost of voting is not equivalent to no-vote penalties. The political impact of the two measures can be drastically different for small changes in the net expense of voting. This difference occurs because the measures affect the distribution of heterogeneous

1 This paper considers measures to increase general turnout, not party-specific voter turnout drives a la Kramer (1970).
voting costs differently. Decreasing the cost of voting lowers the net expense of voting proportionally, which keeps the net expense positive. No-vote penalties lower the net expense of voting by a fixed amount, which gives some citizens a negative net expense of voting. This can result in an equilibrium where only citizens with a negative net expense of voting vote and the candidates converge at the center. Therefore, it is possible that even small penalties for not voting will have a large impact on political polarization.

Counter-intuitively, my model suggests that voter turnout could decrease as a result of measures that encourage voting. While these measures decrease the net expense of voting, they can also decrease the benefit of voting since the candidates’ political positions move closer together. Funk (2005) finds precisely this phenomenon in Switzerland: relative voter turnout has decreased in cantons that switched to voting by mail. I also examine data on the political positions of US congressional representatives and, consistent with my model, I find that polarization is lower (relative to the national average) for representatives elected in states that allow voting by mail.

A key feature of the model is citizens’ preferences over the left/right political spectrum. Following standard spatial models, citizen utility is decreasing in the distance between their ideal point and the political outcome. I make the additional assumption that citizens have decreasing intensity of political preferences, which entails that citizens care less about political differences that are farther from their ideal point. For example, a Democratic citizen with decreasing intensity of political preferences cares more about the political difference between two Democratic candidates than the difference between two far-right candidates. If citizens had increasing intensity of political preferences, then a Democratic citizen would care more about the political difference between the two far-right candidates.

This assumption is supported by the empirical observation that voters do not
“hedge” in primary elections by voting for a moderate candidate in the opposing party’s primary when the primary and general elections are competitive. If citizens had increasing intensity, we should see significant crossover voting (Democrats voting in Republican primaries and vice versa) in competitive elections. In Introduction, I present this argument more formally.

In my model equilibria exist in which candidates take partisan positions. This divergence is in stark contrast to the Hotelling-Black median voter result and the findings of Ledyard (1984). Ledyard (1984) shows that in a two-stage model with increasing intensity of citizen’s political preferences there exists a unique equilibrium in which candidates choose the same political position. Ledyard’s seminal paper is one of the only other papers that explicitly models citizens’ decision to vote and the candidates’ choice of political position, but his paper does not considers the impact of decreasing the net expense of voting.

Another important feature of the model is the motivation to vote. Voting in large elections is not rational from an individual cost-benefit calculation. The expected utility an individually-rational citizen receives from voting is equal to the probability that their vote influences the outcome of the election (this event is referred to as a “pivotal” vote) times the benefit of their vote being pivotal, minus the effort and opportunity costs of voting. Since the probability of being pivotal in a large election is very small, voting in large elections is not rational at the individual level (this “paradox of voting” was first presented by Downs (1957)).

While no consensus has been reached, explaining why people vote has proved a rich area for theoretical analysis (see Feddersen (2004), Blais (2000), and Aldrich (1993) for reviews of the extensive literature on voter turnout). Ledyard (1981) introduced a game theoretic analysis, which recognized that the probability of being

\[ p_{\text{pivotal}} = \frac{1}{N} \]

\[ U_v = p_{\text{pivotal}} \times B_p - C_v \]

\[ B_p = B_{\text{benefit}} - C_{\text{cost}} \]

\[ C_v = C_{\text{effort}} + C_{\text{opportunity}} \]

\[ N = \text{number of voters} \]

2 Some voters do crossover when one candidate is a “shoe-in” in their party’s primary, or when the opposing party’s nominee is a shoe-in for the general election (Alvarez and Nagler (1999)).
pivotal is endogenous. It is not an equilibrium for no one to vote, since one vote would determine the election. Instead, citizens turn out at a level such that the expected benefit of voting is equal to the cost of voting for the marginal voter. Experimental studies have shown that this approach, known as the pivotal voter model, does well at explaining the comparative statics of turnout, but that it under-predicts levels of turnout (Levine and Palfrey (2007), Gerardi et al. (2008)).

I use the rule-utilitarian model of voter turnout, which accounts for both high turnout in large elections and the comparative statics of turnout. First suggested by Harsanyi (1980) and extended to non common-value elections by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), this approach makes the argument that like-minded citizens consider the probability of collectively influencing the outcome of the election given “a rational commitment to a comprehensive joint strategy” (Harsanyi (1980)).³ Specifically, the rule-utilitarian equilibrium makes the behavioral assumption that citizens choose a voting rule as if all other like-minded citizens will follow the same voting rule. In a structural analysis of turnout in Texas liquor referenda, Coate and Conlin (2004) find that the rule-utilitarian model out-performs the expressive voting model, which models turnout as an exogenous function of the intensity of voter preference.

This paper is related to a recent set of articles that examine the impact of no-vote penalties (Börgers (2004), Krasa and Polborn (2009), and Gerardi et al. (2008)). Börgers (2004) considers a model of elections with two symmetric groups. He shows that, in this setting, voluntary voting gives higher aggregate utility than full turnout. Krasa and Polborn (2009) consider two asymmetric groups and find that no-vote penalties are welfare improving when the size of one group is sufficiently close to one, or when the number of citizens is very large. Both papers focus on the effect of no-vote penalties on citizen behavior, holding the behavior of the candidates fixed. This

³ Although their microfoundations are quite different, the group-leader models of turnout by Morton (1991) and Uhlaner (1989) have a similar mathematical structure.
paper extends the analysis to account for the political positions of the candidates; candidates are also strategic actors in an election and to get a full understanding of the effects of decreasing the net expense of voting, we must account for their actions.

I remain agnostic as to whether increasing turnout has inherent value, but consider normative criteria similar to Börgers (2004). In contrast to Börgers (2004) I find that full turnout can increase aggregate utility, since it both insures that the option preferred by the majority wins the election and results in convergence at the median voter’s ideal point. Convergence is not always welfare improving, however, since it eliminates voter choice.

Gerardi et al (2008) consider a related and important question: how no-vote penalties affect the information aggregation properties of elections. They model a common-value election, where all individuals have identical preferences but receive different signals as to which candidate is “best.” In this setting, penalties for not voting have two competing effects: they increase the number of people who vote and decrease the average quality of their information. The authors show that increasing turnout in small elections can be welfare improving.

This paper makes two methodological contributions. First, I show that the Hotelling-Black median voter theorem does not hold in a model with diminishing intensity of political preferences and costly voting. Second, I extend the proofs of existence and uniqueness from Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a) (who consider a contest between two groups) to a setting with an arbitrary number of groups distributed over the political space. By considering more than two groups, I expand the analysis of rule-utilitarian equilibria to include the strategic interaction between citizens who prefer the same candidate, but have different ideal political positions.

Section 2 introduces the model, and Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium. Section 4 I show this result in a setting with complete information and citizens who turn out according to pivotal voter model (Valasek (2010)). Here I extend the result to incomplete information and a rule-utilitarian model of voting.
4 details the effects of measures to increase turnout, and Section 5 provides a discussion and examines polarization in US states that allow voting by mail. Section 6 concludes, and all formal proofs are given in Appendix C.

3.2 The Model

This section introduces a two-stage model of elections. In the first stage, two candidates choose political positions (partisan or centrist) to maximize the probability of winning the election. In the second stage, citizens choose whether or not to vote according to the rule-utilitarian approach.

2.A Candidates

I consider a majority rule election with 2 candidates, \( k \in \{D, R\} \). As a mnemonic tool rather than a political statement, consider \( D \) to be a Democratic candidate, and \( R \) to be a Republican candidate. Candidates are purely office-seeking in the tradition of Mayhew (1974) and Ledyard (1984) and are not motivated by policy preference. Candidates receive a utility of 1 if elected and 0 if not. I denote the probability that candidate \( k \) wins as \( P_k \); \( P_k \) is also candidate \( k \)'s expected payoff.

Candidates have two characteristics: a political position and a measure of charisma. The political position, \( g_k \), is a choice variable. The political space consists of three points: \( \{0, \frac{1}{2}, 1\} \).

Candidates simultaneously commit to observable political positions prior to the election; the Democratic candidate sets \( g_D \) at 0 or \( \frac{1}{2} \) and the Republican candidate sets \( g_R \) at \( \frac{1}{2} \) or 1; take \( g \equiv (g_D, g_R) \).

Candidates are restricted in that they cannot adopt a position overlapping with the opponent’s partisan base. Candidate \( D \) chooses between running as a partisan

\(^5\) As discussed in Kamada and Kojima (2009), a three-point policy space is useful since it offers (relative) analytical ease and allows any convex utility function over the political space to be characterized by a single variable. I discuss the robustness of my main results to a continuous policy space in Appendix B.
Democrat or as a centrist, and candidate $R$ chooses between running as a partisan Republican or as a centrist. This assumption is supported by the observation that Democratic candidates almost always take positions that are to the left of Republican candidates (see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2001)). The restriction also allows for asymmetric payoffs: if candidates were unconstrained, then they would tie in any equilibrium since a candidate could always copy their opponent’s strategy.

The charisma of candidate $k$ is chosen by Nature from the distribution $q_k \sim U[0,1]$, however, its value is unobserved. Charisma is not directly valued by citizens, but it does influence their behavior; specifically, a proportion of citizens are disillusioned and will not participate in the election, and the number of citizens that are disillusioned is a function of their preferred candidate’s charisma (I will formally describe disillusioned citizens in the next subsection). Charisma can include such factors as the quality of the campaign, the effectiveness of the party’s voter turnout drive, and the candidate’s ability to engage the electorate. Candidates cannot be certain how effective they are at preventing disillusionment among their supporters. Therefore, candidates know the distribution of $q_k$, but not its realization.\footnote{A stochastic number of disillusioned voters is analogous to the stochastic number of ethical citizens in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a,b); both introduce uncertainty over the final election outcome. It is not a valence term since it does not enter into citizens’ utility functions. Turnout and election outcomes are uncertain ex ante, perhaps best demonstrated by Truman’s historic and unexpected defeat of Dewey in the 1948 presidential election.}

2.B Citizens

There is a continuum of citizens of measure 1. Each citizen, $i$, is one of three different types ($t$): left ($t = l$), middle ($t = m$), and right ($t = r$). Types correspond to ideal points in the political space; citizen $i$ of type $l$ has an ideal point, $\eta_i$, equal to 0, type $m$ has $\eta_i = \frac{1}{2}$, and type $r$ has $\eta_i = 1$. The measure of each type is $\lambda_t$.\footnote{A stochastic number of disillusioned voters is analogous to the stochastic number of ethical citizens in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a,b); both introduce uncertainty over the final election outcome. It is not a valence term since it does not enter into citizens’ utility functions. Turnout and election outcomes are uncertain ex ante, perhaps best demonstrated by Truman’s historic and unexpected defeat of Dewey in the 1948 presidential election.}
Citizen’s utility over the political space is:

\[
u_i(|\hat{g} - \eta|) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } |\hat{g} - \eta| = 0; \\
-(\frac{1}{2} + v) & \text{if } |\hat{g} - \eta| = \frac{1}{2}; \\
-1 & \text{if } |\hat{g} - \eta| = 1; 
\end{cases}
\]

Where \( \hat{g} \) is the political position of the winning candidate, and \( 0 < v < \frac{1}{2} \), which implies that citizens have diminishing intensity of political preferences.

The cost of voting, \( c_i \), is heterogeneous and is drawn from a uniform distribution with a support of \([0, \bar{c}]\). \( c_i \) is stochastic, but since the population is a continuum the distribution of voting costs is identical for each type and is known by both citizens and candidates.

A proportion of citizens who prefer candidate \( k \), \((1 - q_k)\), are disillusioned. Disillusioned citizens do not participate in the election unless they have a negative net expense of voting (which is possible with no-vote penalties). \( q_k \) citizens are not disillusioned; I refer to these citizens as “motivated” citizens.

Following Harsanyi (1980), motivated citizens play a rule-utilitarian equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy always takes the form of a cutoff cost, \( \tilde{c}_i \), where citizen \( i \) votes if their cost of voting is below \( \tilde{c}_i \), and abstain if it is above \( \tilde{c}_i \). Motivated citizen \( i \) of type \( t \) chooses a cutoff cost, \( \tilde{c}_i \), to maximize the ex-ante utility function:

\[
W_i = W_i(g, \tilde{c}_i, \{\tilde{c}_j\})
\]

subject to:

- \( \tilde{c}_j = 0 \) if \( j \) disillusioned.
- \( \tilde{c}_j \) constant if \( j \) is motivated and \( j \)’s type is not \( t \).
- \( \tilde{c}_j = \tilde{c}_i \) if \( j \) is motivated and \( j \)’s type is \( t \).

The rule-utilitarian equilibrium models the voting game as a hybrid between a non-cooperative and a cooperative game. Strategies between types are non-cooperative.
Strategies within a given type, however, are not non-cooperative. Instead, the rule-utilitarian equilibrium makes the behavioral assumption that motivated citizens consider the probability of collectively influencing the outcome of the election given “a rational commitment to a comprehensive joint strategy” (Harsanyi (1980)); motivated citizens choose a cutoff cost as if all other motivated citizens of their type will follow the same cutoff cost.\(^7\)

Since all citizens of type \(t\) have identical ex ante utility functions, these strategies imply that all motivated citizens of type \(t\) choose the same cutoff cost, labeled \(c_t\) (\(\hat{c}_i = c_t\) for all motivated \(i\) of type \(t\)). \(c_t\) maximizes the ex ante utility:

\[
W_i(g, \hat{c}_i, \{\hat{c}_j\}) = \beta_i(g)P_k(c_t, c_m, c_r) - E(c_t|c_t).
\]

\(\beta_i(g)\) is the benefit \(i\) receives if their preferred candidate wins the election, which is equal to \(i\)'s utility difference between the two candidates \((\beta_i(g) = u([g_D, 0]) - u([g_R, 0]))\); \(P_k(c_t, c_m, c_r)\) is the probability \(i\)'s preferred candidate wins given the voting rules \(\{c_t, c_m, c_r\}\); and \(E(c_t|c_t)\) is \(i\)'s expected voting cost given the cutoff cost \(c_t\).\(^8\)

Before detailing the probability that each candidate wins \((P_k(c_t, c_m, c_r))\), I introduce the following notation: take \(V_k\) to be the proportion of motivated citizens who vote for candidate \(k\). For example, if types \(l\) and \(m\) prefer candidate \(D\), then \(V_D = \lambda_l c_l + \lambda_m c_m\). The probability that candidate \(D\) wins, \(P_D(c_t, c_m, c_r)\), can be

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\(^7\) Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) show that the rule-utilitarian equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium if motivated citizens receive a “warm glow” payoff from playing according to their type’s optimal joint strategy.

\(^8\) Harsanyi (1980), Morton (1987, 1991), Uhlaner (1989), Fedderson and Sandroni (2006a,b), and Coate and Conlin (2004) all use similar models of turnout. These models vary in the level of citizen altruism assumed. At one end is Harsanyi, who models voting as a purely social or altruistic activity: citizens care about aggregate utility (aggregate benefits and aggregate costs). My model is at the other end: citizens care only about individual benefits and costs. If citizens are altruistic over aggregate elections costs, as in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a,b), then a no-vote fine would not impact voting behavior, since the fine nets out of aggregate election costs. This prediction contradicts evidence that mandatory voting increases turnout (see Birch (2009)).
written as \( P(q_DV_D > q_RV_R) \) or:

\[
P_D(c_l, c_m, c_r) = P\left(\frac{V_D}{V_R} > \frac{q_R}{q_D}\right) = G\left(\frac{V_D}{V_R}\right)
\]

Where \( G \) is the distribution of the ratio of two uniform variables distributed between zero and one.

2.C Timing and Information

The timing of the game is as follows:

1. Nature chooses \( q_k \), which is unobserved.
2. Candidates simultaneously set \( g_k \).
3. Citizens simultaneously set \( \tilde{c}_i \).
4. Citizens draw \( \{c_i, \theta_i\} \) and choose whether to vote or abstain. The election results are revealed.

Information is incomplete since neither candidates or citizens observe \( q_D \) and \( q_R \) (although they can be inferred when the election results are revealed). I assume that the beliefs of both candidates and citizens over \( q_D \) and \( q_R \) are determined according to Bayes’ Rule at each stage of the game. Since no information about \( q_D \) and \( q_R \) is revealed until stage three of the game, the beliefs of both candidates and citizens over \( q_D \) and \( q_R \) remain equal to the prior (\( q_k \sim U[0, 1] \)) at all decision nodes.

2.D Equilibrium in the Voting Game

Following standard backward induction, I start with the citizens’ choice to turnout given the candidate positions \( g \).

Definition 2. An equilibrium in the voting game is a set of cutoff costs, \( \{c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r\} \), where

\[
\beta_l(g)P_k(c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r) - E(c_i|c^*_l) \geq \beta_l(g)P_k(c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r, c_i)\backslash c^*_l - E(c_i|c^*_l) \text{ for all } c_l \in [0, \tilde{c}] \text{ and for all } t.
\]

Whenever possible, I drop the asterix and refer to the optimal cutoff cost for type \( t \) as simply \( c_t \).
2.E Equilibrium in the Candidates’ Game

Take \( \{c_t(g)\} \) to be a rule-utilitarian equilibrium of the voting game at \( g \). Candidates choose positions to maximize their probability of winning the election given the equilibria of the resulting voting games. I focus on pure strategy equilibria to avoid introducing additional notation (I will prove that candidates play pure strategies in equilibrium in the following section). Also for simplicity, when a candidate receives the same probability of winning as a partisan and as a centrist, I assume the candidate will choose a partisan position.\(^9\)

**Definition 3.** An equilibrium in the candidates’ game is a policy pair \((g_D^*, g_R^*)\) such that \( U_D(g_D^*, g_R^*, \{c_t(g)\}) \geq U_D(g_D^*, g_R^*, \{c_t(g)\}) \), for \( g_D \in \{0, \frac{1}{2}\} \), and \( U_R(g_D^*, g_R^*, \{c_t(g)\}) \geq U_R(g_D^*, g_R^*, \{c_t(g)\}) \), for \( g_R \in \{\frac{1}{2}, 1\} \).

Since I use a non-Nash equilibrium in the voting game, I define an equilibrium of the full election game as the set \( \{g_D^*, g_R^*, \{c_t(g)\}\} \) (with beliefs equal to \( q_k \sim U[0, 1] \) for all agents at all decision nodes).\(^{10}\) The equilibrium specifies that candidates consider equilibrium play in the voting game for \( g \) not reached in equilibrium, and that the beliefs of both candidates and citizens over \( q_D \) and \( q_R \) are determined according to Bayes’ Rule at each stage of the game.

3.3 Equilibrium

In this section I characterize the equilibrium of the voting game and the candidates’ game. I first look at the voting game and show that a unique equilibrium exists for any \( g \). I also show that the proof generalizes to \( n \) groups, extending the rule-utilitarian equilibrium of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) to a setting with \( n \) groups distributed over the left-right political space. I then characterize the equilibrium of

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9 This tie-breaking rule does not affect the predictions of the model, but gives a unique equilibrium in the knife-edge cases when one candidate is indifferent about running as a partisan or a centrist.

10 By using Feddersen and Sandroni’s (2006a) method to make the equilibrium in the voting game a Nash Equilibrium, the equilibrium concept can be changed to PBE.
the candidates’ game. Importantly, the candidates can be polarized in equilibrium; i.e. the median voter result does not hold in a model of elections with turnout and diminishing intensity of political preference.

3.3.1 Voting game

I first solve for the equilibrium of the voting game. I find that an equilibrium exists and is unique.

**Proposition 10.** *A unique equilibrium of the voting game exists for all g.*

A formal proof is given in Appendix C, however, I give some intuition regarding the strategic interaction between citizen types here.

Refer to a type that prefers the candidate with an expected minority as the “minority type,” and a type that prefers the candidate with an expected majority as the “majority type.” The reaction functions (shown for an interior equilibrium only) give insight into the strategic interaction between citizen types:

\[
c_{\text{min}} = \frac{1}{V_{\text{maj}}} \left[ \frac{\beta_{\text{min}} \lambda_{\text{min}} \bar{c}}{2} \right]
\]

And:

\[
c_{\text{maj}} = V_{\text{min}} \left[ \frac{\beta_{\text{maj}} \lambda_{\text{maj}} \bar{c}}{2V_{\text{maj}}^2} \right]
\]

The voting game has 2 components: the game between types who prefer the same candidate, and the game between types who prefer opposing candidates. I start with the former. Suppose types \( l \) and \( m \) prefer same candidate, which is true at the political position pair \((\frac{1}{2}, 1)\). Whether the minority or majority type, the ratio of the reaction functions of type \( m \) and type \( l \) shows that the ratio of the \( c_m \) and \( c_l \) is constant. Therefore, given an equilibrium value of \( c_l \), the equilibrium value of \( c_m \) is a fixed proportion of \( c_l \). The linear relationship between types who prefer the same candidate holds regardless of the number of types. Therefore, no matter the number of types, the voting game can be fully characterized by determining the equilibrium
cutoff costs for two types who prefer opposing candidates. For example, in the model with three types $c_m$ is a fixed proportion of either $c_l$ or $c_r$ and the equilibrium of the voting game can be characterized by the equilibrium values of $c_l$ and $c_r$.

I now turn to the game between types who prefer opposing candidates. Suppose $t$ is the minority type. Equation 3.1 shows that if the majority type increases their cutoff cost, then $t$’s best response is to decrease $c_t$. Equation 3.2 shows that if $t$ is the majority type, however, the result is reversed: if the minority type increases their cutoff cost, then $t$’s best response is to increase $c_t$.

The intuition is as follows. If the majority type increases their cutoff cost, increasing their expected lead, then the minority type has less of an incentive to vote since they are further behind. Conversely, if the minority type increases their cutoff cost then the election becomes more competitive, increasing the majority type’s incentive to vote. This relationship leads to a unique equilibrium: in two-player games where one player’s strategy is a strategic substitute and the other’s is a strategic complement the best response functions cross only once. The full proof of uniqueness is more involved, however, since $l$ is the majority type for only part of strategy space, and the minority type for the other part.

3.3.2 Candidates’ game

Before giving the general result, I characterize the payoffs when candidates both choose partisan political positions. In this case type $m$ citizens are indifferent between the candidates, the voting game reduces to a game between two types with identical benefits from winning, which corresponds to the game studied in most rational agent models of turnout (Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), Börchers (2004), and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a,b)). Also, since the equilibrium of the voting game is unique for each $g$, candidates’ probabilities of winning are also unique for each $g$. Therefore, I will refer to the probability that candidate $k$ wins the election as $P_k(g)$.

**Lemma 11.** $P_D(0, 1) = \frac{\lambda}{2\lambda_r}$. 

The formal proof is relegated to Appendix C. In line with the results of other
papers, the candidate preferred by a larger number of citizens wins an expected plurality.

**Proposition 12.** Assume (without loss of generality) that $\lambda_l \leq \lambda_r$. An equilibrium in the candidates’ game exists and is unique. Moreover, the equilibrium is either: $(0, 1)$, $(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, or $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$.

Proposition 12 is a key result of this paper: it shows that polarization can occur in equilibrium. This result formalizes the intuition, dating back to Downs (1957, p. 118), that candidates take partisan positions to motivate turnout among partisan citizens. Again, I leave the formal proof of existence for Appendix C. I detail the intuition behind the result below, but first give a short discussion of the importance of the distribution of citizen types.

The relative number of citizens of each type affects the strategic behavior of candidates. As a benchmark, I use the distribution of types where the median citizen is of type $m$, and the number of citizens of type $m$ is smaller than both partisan types. Mathematically:

$$\lambda_m < \lambda_l < \lambda_r \text{ and } \lambda_l + \lambda_m > \lambda_r$$

Other distributions give potential equilibria that are a strict subset of the benchmark case. In the benchmark case, candidates are fully polarized when $g_D = 0$ and $g_R = 1$ and converge when $g_D = g_R = \frac{1}{2}$.

My results hold generally, but the definition of full polarization and convergence change with other distributions. Full polarization is when each candidate sets $g_k$ at the ideal point of the largest group in their half of the policy space, and convergence is when the political outcome is the median citizen’s ideal point. For example, if $\lambda_l < \lambda_m < \lambda_r$ then full polarization changes to $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ and convergence is still $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$.

Returning to the intuition for Proposition 12, if both candidates take partisan positions or converge to the middle, then the expected utility for candidate $D$ depends only on the relative number of partisan types $((P_D|g = (0, 1)) = \frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r}$ and $(P_D|g =
Figure 3.1: candidates’ game at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$.

Therefore, the equilibrium of the candidates’ game depends crucially on the payoffs at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$.

The intuition of why partial turnout and decreasing intensity of political preference can result in candidate polarization lies in what happens when candidate $D$ takes a centrist position, and candidate $R$ takes a partisan position, illustrated in Figure 1. In this case, a majority of citizens prefer candidate $D$. Therefore, if all citizens were to vote then candidate $D$ would win the election. With full turnout, however, $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ is not an equilibrium: since any candidate who is preferred by the median citizen wins the election, the unique equilibrium would be for both candidates to locate at the median.

Since voting is costly, however, the relative strength of preferences also matter. Referring to Figure 1, we see that while a majority of citizens prefer candidate $D$, the average benefit of having their preferred candidate win is smaller than the average benefit for citizens who prefer candidate $R$ ($\beta_l = \frac{1}{2} - v$ and $\beta_m = \beta_r = \frac{1}{2} + v$).

Therefore, the turnout rate for citizens who prefer candidate $D$ is be lower than turnout rate of type $r$ citizens, and the probability candidate $D$ wins can be less than $\frac{1}{2}$, or even less than $\frac{\lambda_r}{2\lambda_l}$. Even though candidate $D$ is preferred by a majority of citizens, candidate $D$ can still lose the election in expectation.

Given the probability that candidate $D$ wins at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, the equilibrium is
easy to identify: if the probability is less than $\frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r}$, then the equilibrium outcome is $g = (0, 1)$; if it is between $\frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$, then the equilibrium outcome is $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$; and if it is greater than $\frac{1}{2}$ then the equilibrium is $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$.

It is also easy to show why increasing intensity of political preference would lead to candidate convergence. With diminishing intensity of political preferences $v$ is positive and a candidate can be preferred by a majority of citizens and still lose the election in expectation. With increasing intensity, however, $v$ is negative. Looking again at Figure 1, we see that at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ increasing intensity implies the average benefit of winning for citizens who prefer candidate $D$ is higher than for citizens who prefer candidate $R$. Therefore, candidate $D$ wins an expected plurality.\(^{11}\) Candidates’ payoffs at $(0, 1)$ and $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$, however, are the same whether $v$ is negative or positive. Therefore, the unique equilibrium would be for both candidates to converge at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$; if any candidate chooses a partisan position, then the other candidate can win an expected plurality by setting $g_k = \frac{1}{2}$.

Diminishing intensity of political preferences is a necessary condition for candidate polarization, but it is not sufficient. The probability that candidate $D$ wins given an interior equilibrium is:

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{\left(\frac{1}{2} - v\right)\lambda_l^2 + \left(\frac{1}{2} + v\right)\lambda_m^2}{\left(\frac{1}{2} + v\right)\lambda_r^2} \right]^{1/2}.$$  

This equation identifies two sufficient conditions for polarization: candidates are polarized if $v$ is high enough, or if $\lambda_m$ low enough. Additionally, when $(\lambda_r - \lambda_l)$ is higher then the probability that candidate $D$ wins at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ is lower, making a polarized equilibrium more likely.

\(^{11}\) This result corresponds with the results of both Ledyard (1984) and Taylor and Yildirim (2010a).
3.4 Measures to Increase Turnout

The previous two sections have described and analyzed a two-stage model of elections. In this section, I introduce measures to increase turnout to this model. Suggested measures to increase turnout usually fall into two categories: decreasing the cost of voting, such as Oregon’s switch to voting by mail; or penalizing nonvoters (called mandatory or compulsory voting), such as Australia’s no-vote fines. In this section I analyze and compare the effect of the two measures on political outcomes. Mechanically, the two differ because decreasing the cost of voting leaves all citizens with positive voting costs, while a fine for nonvoters gives citizens with low voting costs an incentive to vote regardless of whether or not they are disillusioned. If the cost of voting is made low enough, or no-vote penalties are high enough, then the candidates converge at the median citizen’s ideal point. At lower levels, however, the mechanical difference in the two measures could lead to substantially different results.

4.A Decreasing the cost of voting:

First, I introduce additional motivation for the distribution of voting costs, \( U[0, \bar{c}] \). A major component of the cost of voting is the opportunity cost of time. Consider \( \bar{c} \) the amount of time it takes to vote and \( U[0, 1] \) the distribution of opportunity costs. Measures to decrease the cost of voting target the time it takes to vote. Therefore, they can be represented as a decrease in \( \bar{c} \); if switching to voting by mail decreases the time it takes to vote by one-half, then this changes the distribution of voting costs to \( U[0, \frac{\bar{c}}{2}] \). This logic also applies to a non-uniform distribution of opportunity costs.

Again, the probability that candidate \( D \) wins at \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) is pivotal for the analysis. For high enough \( \bar{c} \), all cutoff costs are interior and the probability that candidate \( D \) wins the election is constant and equal to:

\[
\hat{P}_D \left( \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} - v)\lambda_l^2 + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_m^2}{(\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_c^2} \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}
\]
Proposition 13. If $\hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \leq \frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r}$, then there exists $\bar{c}_2 > \bar{c}_1 > 0$ such that the unique equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $(0, 1)$ for $\bar{c} \geq \bar{c}_2$, $(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ for $\bar{c} \in (\bar{c}_2, \bar{c}_1]$, and $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ for $\bar{c} < \bar{c}_1$.

If $\hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \in (\frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r}, \frac{1}{2})$, then there exists $\bar{c}_1$, such that the unique equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ for $\bar{c} \geq \bar{c}_1$, and $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ for $\bar{c} < \bar{c}_1$.

If $\hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) > \frac{1}{2}$, then the unique equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$.

The intuition is as follows. The equilibrium of the candidates’ game depends on the value of $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$; if $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ is smaller than $\frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r}$ then $g = (0, 1)$, if it is between $\frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ then $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, and if it is greater than $\frac{1}{2}$ then $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$. For a high $\bar{c}$, the cutoff costs are interior and $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$. For a lower $\bar{c}$ the proportion of citizens who vote is higher, but if cutoff costs remain interior then the election outcome stays the same.

For some $\bar{c}'$, however, all motivated citizens who prefer candidate $R$ turnout. As $\bar{c}$ decreases further, turnout among citizens who prefer candidate $D$ continues to increase. Therefore, starting at $\bar{c}'$, $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ increases continuously as $\bar{c}$ decreases until all motivated citizens turnout, at which point $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) > \frac{1}{2}$.

While decreasing the cost of voting results in convergence, increasing the cost of voting cannot decrease the payoff to candidate $D$ at $(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ past $\hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$. Therefore, raising $\bar{c}$ can never result in greater polarization than is found at an equilibrium with interior cutoff costs.

Note that decreasing the cost of voting does not need to increase turnout. For example, assume $\bar{c}$ is initially greater than $\bar{c}_1$, and is lowered to a value less then $\bar{c}_1$. If candidate positions were fixed at $(0, 1)$, then turnout would increase. The candidates move to $(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, however, which decreases the incentive for the partisan types to vote and could decrease aggregate turnout.

4.B Penalties for not voting:

To be consistent with previous literature, I model no-vote penalties as a lump sum
payment, \( s \), given to all citizens who vote, rather than a fine on abstaining. Modeling no-vote penalties as a subsidy is without loss of generality since any uniform fine \( f \) is equivalent to some uniform subsidy \( s \).

Take \( s^* = -\left(\frac{1}{2} + v\right) \). For \( s \leq s^* \), turnout is zero if candidate \( D \) sets \( g_D = \frac{1}{2} \), since the benefit a citizen receives from having her preferred candidate win is always smaller than the cost of voting. Therefore, when \( s \leq s^* \) candidate \( D \) can force a tie by setting \( g_D = \frac{1}{2} \), which is an equilibrium of the candidates’ game.

**Proposition 14.** There exist \( s^* < s_1 < s_2 < \bar{c} \) such that for \( s \in (s^*, s_1) \) the candidate equilibrium is \((0, 1)\) and for \( s \in [s_2, \infty) \) the candidate equilibrium is \((\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})\).

When \( s \) is low enough, but not below \( s^* \), a candidate only receives votes from the type whose ideal point coincides with the candidate’s political position. For example, if \( s < -\beta_l(g) \) at the political position \( \left(\frac{1}{2}, 1\right) \) then \( c_l \) equals zero even though type \( l \) strictly prefers candidate \( D \). By continuity, there exists some \( s_1 \) larger than \(-\beta_l(g)\) where candidates choose to locate at the two largest groups and the equilibrium \( g \) is \((0, 1)\).

On the other hand, when \( s \) is high enough, the proportion of citizens with negative voting cost is large enough that any candidate who is preferred by the type \( m \) wins the election with probability one. Again by continuity there exists some \( s_2 \) smaller than \( \bar{c} \) so that both candidates locate at the median voter.

### 4.C Comparing Measures

Propositions 13 and 14 show that if the net expense of voting is made low enough, then measures to increase turnout effectively remove turnout as a strategic consideration for candidates; with turnout among the partisan base secured, candidates compete over centrist voters and converge at the median citizen’s ideal point.

While decreasing the cost of voting and no-vote penalties can both cause convergence, there are two important differences between the two measures. First, a subsidy on voting can always achieve full polarization with a low \( s \) and full convergence for a high \( s \). Changing the cost of voting, however, can only achieve the level
of polarization found at interior equilibria of the voting game since changing the cost of voting does not change the candidate’s payoffs at interior equilibria of the voting game. Should a social planner desire to increase polarization, then it might require a poll tax.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the two measures can behave quite differently for intermediate values. As is evident from Proposition 13, decreasing the cost of voting results in a predictable path towards convergence. No-vote penalties, however, can produce a quick shift to convergence.

The reason no-vote penalties can cause a quick shift to convergence is as follows. A subsidy on voting gives candidate $D$ a “built in” lead at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$; some citizens, both disillusioned and motivated, vote simply because their cost of voting is negative; therefore at $\{c_l, c_m, c_r\} = \{0, 0, 0\}$ candidate $D$ has a vote share advantage of $z = (\lambda_l + \lambda_m - \lambda_r) s$. The vote share advantage affects the marginal returns to voting for type $r$: when $c_r \lambda_r < z$ there are no returns to voting ($P_R(0, 0, c_r) = 0$) and when $c_r \lambda_r \in (z, (z + c_l \lambda_l + c_m \lambda_m))$ there are increasing returns to voting for type $r$ as candidate $R$ “catches up” to candidate $D$’s lead among disillusioned voters.

Formally, if $c_r \lambda_r \in (z, (z + c_l \lambda_l + c_m \lambda_m))$ then:

$$P_R(c_l, c_m, c_r) = \frac{c_r \lambda_r}{(c_l \lambda_l + c_m \lambda_m)} \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \frac{z^2}{2(c_r \lambda_r)^2} - \frac{z}{c_r \lambda_r} \right]$$

Since $P_R(c_l, c_m, c_r)$ is convex in $c_r$, both the benefits and the costs of voting are increasing at an increasing rate for $c_r \lambda_r \in (z, (z + c_l \lambda_l + c_m \lambda_m))$. Therefore, the payoff function for type $r$ is neither concave or quasi-concave. With non-concave payoffs, multiple equilibria of the voting game can exist at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$. Moreover, if multiple equilibria exist and $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) < \frac{1}{2}$ at one equilibrium, then $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) > \frac{1}{2}$ at all other equilibria.\(^\underline{12}\)

\(^\underline{12}\) Because of the payoff functions are not quasi-concave, the first-order conditions no longer define the best response functions. They do still define local reaction functions and can be used to find local equilibria, which are a necessary condition for an equilibrium. Since the local reaction functions are still concave in the region where candidate $R$ wins an expected plurality, a local equilibrium
The uncertainty of candidates’ payoffs at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ has important implications for the equilibrium of the candidates’ game. If $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) < \frac{1}{2}$, then candidate $R$ does better setting $g_R = 1$. If $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) > \frac{1}{2}$, however, then the unique equilibrium is for both candidates to set $g_k = \frac{1}{2}$. With multiple equilibria in the voting game, the equilibrium of the candidates’ game is sensitive to candidates’ beliefs over which equilibrium will be played in the voting game. Therefore, even a small fine on non-voting could change the equilibrium of the candidates’ game from an equilibrium where candidates choose partisan positions to an equilibrium where candidates both locate at the center.

In addition to multiple equilibria, no-vote penalties could result in candidate convergence for other reasons. Normative institutions such as voting can be fragile to the introduction of direct monetary incentives.\textsuperscript{13} Once citizens are paid to vote, the collective action problem of voting disappears. Without the collective action problem, citizens might switch from behaving normatively and playing a rule-utilitarian equilibrium to playing individually-rational strategies. The individually-rational strategy is for citizens with negative net expense of voting to vote, and for all others to abstain. These strategies also lead to convergence, as the candidate who is preferred by the median citizen will win the election.

The distinction between the two measures is important: a politician interested in increasing turnout with minimal effect on partisan outcomes should consider a small decrease in the cost of voting, since this has little effect on which candidate wins. A small fine on not voting, however, could result in a large partisan advantage. A social planner, however, might be interested in general citizen welfare; in the following subsection I examine the welfare implications of measures to increase turnout.

with $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) < \frac{1}{2}$ is unique over that portion of the strategy space. Note that with $s > 0$, $\{c_l, c_m, c_r\} = \{0, 0, 0\}$ is always a local equilibrium.

\textsuperscript{13} See discussion in Benabou and Tirole (2006); for example Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show in their article “A Fine is a Price” that instituting a fine can actually increase deviant behavior as it undermines social enforcement.
3.5 Discussion

3.5.1 Costs and Benefits of Full Participation

There is no clear normative criterion that captures all relevant political and economic considerations of increasing voter turnout. Scholars such as Hill (2006) argue that voter turnout has independent value, since it is essential to democracy legitimacy. The precise point at which turnout is too low, however, is undefined. Others, such as Lijphart (1997), are concerned with equal representation.

Campbell (1999 p. 1200-1202) suggests two normative criteria: a democratic criterion based on the probability that the option preferred by a majority of citizens wins the election, and an economic criterion based on aggregate welfare. Under the democratic criterion, full turnout clearly outperforms partial turnout: with full turnout the majority always wins. Under the economic criterion it could be welfare optimal for a minority with relatively strong preferences to receive an expected plurality. While each citizen only has one vote, voluntary voting allows citizens with relatively strong preferences to skew the outcome in their favor by voting at a higher rate.

As this paper illustrates, increasing participation also influences the candidates’ choice of political position. Therefore, the relevant welfare comparison is between full turnout and convergence on one hand, and partial turnout and polarization on the other. At first glance full turnout might seem the best of both worlds: decreasing polarization and ensuring majority representation. As Fiorina (1999) notes, however, polarization has only recently gained a negative connotation:

At mid-century popular commentary often derided American politics as “issueless.” Candidates imitated each other with “me too” strategies. Prominent political scientists proposed institutional reforms intended to produce clear partisan differences...Today, popular commentary bemoans the polarization of American politics. Candidates sharply differentiate themselves from each other. Political scientists ponder institutional reforms designed to mute the strident voices that characterize politics to-
This quote illustrates a potential problem with full turnout: convergence removes voter choice by inducing candidates to choose identical political positions.

To analyze the tradeoff formally, I use the economic criterion introduced by Börgers (2004) and consider whether full turnout increases citizens’ ex ante utility (which, in my model, is equivalent to increasing aggregate utility). Using this metric, full turnout and political convergence outperforms partial turnout and polarization if:

\[
\frac{\lambda_m}{2} - (\lambda_l + \lambda_r - \lambda_m)v - \frac{\bar{c}}{2} > \frac{(\lambda_r - \lambda_l)^2}{2\lambda_r}
\]

Convergence is optimal when the number of centrist citizens is high and when the cost of voting is low. Polarization does better when \(v\) is larger, since partisan voters have a smaller utility difference between \(g = \frac{1}{2}\) and the opposing partisan position, and when \((\lambda_r - \lambda_l)\) is larger, since both \(\lambda_r\) and the probability that type \(r\) gets their most preferred outcome are higher.

In Section 3, I showed that candidate convergence occurs in equilibrium when \(\lambda_m\) is large, and when \(v\) and \((\lambda_r - \lambda_l)\) are small, which is precisely when convergence is most likely to increase aggregate utility. It is not true, however, that the convergence conditions and the welfare conditions overlap perfectly. Therefore, measures to encourage voting can still improve economic welfare. This result contrasts starkly with Börgers (2004), who finds that full turnout is never welfare improving; when we also consider the impact on candidates’ political positions, full turnout can improve economic welfare in a large number of cases.

3.5.2 Voting by Mail in the US

The empirical literature on measures to increase turnout has focused mostly on the following two questions: Do measures actually increase turnout? And, do measures to increase turnout give a partisan advantage? Neither question, however, tests the prediction that a decrease in the net cost of voting will decrease candidate polariza-
In this section, I examine whether there is evidence for the comparative static that a decrease in the net cost of voting decreases candidate polarization. Specifically, I look at data from US states that conduct elections entirely by mail or allow voters to register as permanent absentee voters. While this analysis does not amount to a rigorous test of causality, I do find that relative polarization has decreased after these measures have been introduced.

Conducting elections by mail was virtually unheard of 25 years ago, but today at least 11 states vote by mail in some elections. Oregon has been a leader of the vote-by-mail movement, and has conducted all elections via mail since 2000. The high turnout and low costs of holding elections in Oregon has induced a number of states to consider transitioning to voting by mail. In Washington, 38 of 39 counties vote by mail. An intermediate step has been to allow citizens to register as permanent absentee voters; since 2001, California, Colorado, Montana, Hawaii, and New Jersey have all introduced this policy. While western states have been the first to adopt voting by mail, states such as West Virginia and North Carolina have run pilot all-mail elections.

In 1996, Oregon conducted a special election for Senate entirely by mail. In the presidential election that same year, Oregon allowed citizens to register as permanent absentee voters. Subsequently, 48% of ballots were cast by mail, compared with just 13% in the 1992 presidential election. In 1998, 58% voted by mail and a referendum to conduct all future elections via mail was passed.

Figure 2 maps average polarization for congressional representatives from Oregon compared to the national average (I also include the average for western states that did not allow voting by mail). The measure of polarization I use is the distance of a politician’s DW-Nominate score from the median score. Between 1982 and 1994 the Oregon delegation was more polarized than the national average, and in

---

14 I label the following states as western: Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

15 The Poole-Rosenthal DW-Nominate scores are a standard measure for political position on a left/right space. The measure is based on voting records; for more detail and data see Keith Poole’s website voteview.com.
all subsequent elections, where all citizens were allowed to vote by mail, it was less polarized.\footnote{Average polarization among congressional representatives from the other Pacific Northwest state, Washington, followed a similar trend of decreasing relative polarization. Washington does not provide a good control, however, since they allowed citizens to register as permanent absentee voters starting in 1993.}

To examine the data in more detail, I present the following regressions. Regression 1 (presented in Table 1) examines the levels of polarization in Oregon before and after the shift to voting by mail. The dependent variable measures the level of polarization of each Oregon representative relative to the national average: specifically, it is the absolute value of the DW-Nominate-dimension-one score the Oregon congressional representative minus the average absolute value for the US House of Representatives. The independent variables are a dummy equal to one for representatives that were elected in all-mail polls, and a dummy for the party of the representative. The congresses included are 99-104th, which did not feature vote by mail, and 107-111th, which were conducted entirely via mail. I exclude the 105th and 106th congresses, in which all voters were allowed to register as permanent absentee voters.

The Regression 1 shows that the decrease in polarization among Oregon represen-
Table 3.1: Regression 1: Oregon Vote-by-Mail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vote by mail</td>
<td>-0.071*</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dem</td>
<td>-0.079*</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.110**</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: †: 10%  *: 5%  **: 1%

tatives elected in all-mail elections, relative to the national average, is statistically significant. Since the Poole-Rosenthal scores are based on a cluster analysis, it is difficult to quantify the magnitude of the decrease in polarization. Compared to average polarization, which ranged from 0.3 and 0.5 depending on the congress, a decrease of 0.07 suggests that the effect of voting by mail is significant. Regression 1 is necessarily a comparison over time, however, and I cannot exclude the possibility the negative coefficient on “vote by mail” is due to a state or regional trend. Polarization in the US has increased in the past quarter-century (Fiorina (1999)), but it is possible that Oregon has bucked the trend for reasons other than their electoral system.

To compare across states as well as across time, I also examine voter polarization in states that allow (or have allowed) citizens to register as permanent absentee voters (California, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, and Washington). After a one time registration, citizens automatically receive an absentee ballot for future elections. In California, for example, over 41% of ballots were cast by mail in the 2008 general election. Both Oregon and Washington allowed permanent absentee voters prior to switching to voting by mail.\(^{17}\) To mitigate the possibility that the results are driven by a regional trend of decreasing relative polarization, only representatives from western states are included in the analysis.

In Regression 2 the dependent variable is the same measure of polarization used in Regression 1; the independent variables are a dummy for permanent absentee voting, a party dummy, and dummies variables for the individual states. California instituted permanent absentee voting in 2001, Colorado in 2008, and Montana in 2005. Oregon

\(^{17}\) In 2007, 36 out of 39 counties in Washington state switched to voting by mail.
had permanent absentee voting from 1996-1999, and Washington 1993-2006; years where these states voted by mail were not included in the analysis.

Table 3.2: Regression 2: Permanent Absentee Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>absentee</td>
<td>-0.037*</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dem</td>
<td>-0.110**</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.175**</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: †: 10% *: 5% **: 1%

Regression 2 shows that polarization is lower for congressional representatives elected under polls that allowed permanent absentee voting (the results are also negative and significant if all states are included). Moreover, the effect is smaller than for representatives elected under polls conducted entirely by mail, which is consistent with the predictions of the formal model. Again, it is not possible to separate the effects of time and voting by mail. For example, if the analysis is limited to the years that California allowed permanent absentee voting (the 108-111th congresses) the coefficient on “absentee” is negative but insignificant.

Regressions 1 and 2 show that polarization has decreased in states that have switched to allow voting by mail, but since this analysis cannot separate the effect of voting by mail from a possible trend of decreasing relative polarization in the West, more study on the effects of decreasing the net cost of voting on polarization is needed.

3.5.3 Penalties for not voting: Partisan advantage and turnout

For lack of data, I cannot conduct a similar analysis of no-vote penalties and polarization. I do, however, look at predictions of the model regarding the partisan effects of penalties for not voting and compare them to empirical studies.

Twenty-nine countries worldwide have mandatory voting laws and of these, 16 apply sanctions for non-voting (Birch 2009). It has been documented that mandatory voting laws can increase turnout: When penalties on not voting were introduced in Australia, voter turnout jumped from 59 to 91 percent. Birch (2009) finds that
voter turnout is higher in countries with no-vote penalties, even accounting for other factors. I have not, however, found an empirical study that examines whether penalizing non-voters affects the political position of parties, and data from countries that enforce no-vote penalties is inappropriate for evaluating the effect of no-vote penalties on polarization in the US.

The reason is as follows: High penalties for not voting removes the strategic effect of turnout on candidates. In electoral systems with single member districts, full turnout results in policy convergence and a “return” to the median voter result. In proportional representation systems, however, the median voter result is not applicable, and removing the strategic effect of turnout in these countries could lead to different predictions with respect to the political positions of candidates. Almost all of the countries that enforce penalize non-voters also elect legislatures in multi-member districts or through some proportional electoral system.

The model does predict that no-vote penalties benefit the party with relatively ideologically split (diffuse) support, and this prediction should hold even under proportional representation. The literature has generally found that if penalties for not voting have a partisan effect, then it benefits the left (Birch 2009 p. 127). Lower turnout among low income/education groups cannot be explained by a positive correlation between income/education and political involvement, since turnout has been decreasing over time while both income and education have been increasing (see Filer et al. (1993) for a discussion of the subject and a group model of voting that accounts for the trend).

This paper suggests that lower turnout among leftist citizens and the resulting partisan advantage from no-vote penalties could stem from heterogeneous ideology among the left’s support. With diffuse support, a leftist candidate cannot adopt a political position that caters to all its supporters. For example, if rightist citizens all agree on lower taxes and smaller government while leftist citizens are split over protectionism, then we should expect turnout to be lower among the left. Even though citizens have the same strength of preferences over the political space, some portion of leftist citizens care less about the outcome of the election, since no candidate is
at their ideal point. Instituting high penalties for not voting removes the connection between candidate’s positions on turnout, and ensures that the candidate who is favored by the highest number of citizens wins the election, regardless of how diffuse their support is.

3.6 Conclusion

In this paper I formally model elections, considering both the candidates’ choices of political position and the citizens’ decisions to vote. I show that the Hotelling-Black median voter theorem, which predicts candidate convergence, does not hold in a model with diminishing intensity of political preferences and costly voting. I then use this model to study how electoral outcomes change with the introduction of measures to increase turnout. In contrast to previous literature on turnout and penalties for not voting, which takes candidate positions as fixed, I analyze the effect of decreasing the net expense of voting on both who wins the election and the candidates’ political positions.

Generally, measures to increase turnout decrease political polarization. If the cost of voting is made low enough, or no-vote penalties are high enough, then candidates converge at the median citizen’s ideal point. When the net expense of voting is made low enough, the strategic effect of turnout on candidates effectively disappears, returning the median voter result. Full turnout ensures that the candidate who is favored by the highest number of citizens wins the election, regardless of how diffuse their support is. Regarding the partisan effect of these measures, current party registration numbers in the United States suggest that the Democrats, who are greater in number but have a lower rate of turnout, would benefit from no-vote penalties. The partisan advantage would not be as large as direct extrapolation of registration numbers suggest, however, since the Republican party would respond by moving to the center and “poaching” some citizens who currently prefer the Democrats.

To ensure equal representation, Lijphart (1997) advocates increasing turnout in the US by either decreasing the cost of voting or penalizing non-voters. Which
measure is used to increase turnout can be important; the two measures can have drastically different outcomes for small changes in the net expense of voting. Decreasing the cost of voting leads to a systematic decrease in polarization. Penalties for not voting, however, do not give predictable results; even a small fine could result in multiple equilibria, which in turn could lead to convergence and a large decrease in political polarization.

Penalties for not voting have not been enforced in the US since the 19th century. Instead, many states in the US are considering a switch to voting by mail. The results of this paper suggest that broader adoption of voting by mail will decrease polarization in US politics. It is unclear, however, whether polarization in the US is too high. While polarization is often portrayed in a negative light by the current popular media, historically the reverse has been true. My analysis suggest that candidate convergence increases aggregate welfare when citizens preferences are close to linear, and when the number of centrist citizens is high.

A rigorous empirical test of whether decreasing the cost of voting decreases polarization would be desirable. A change at the federal level might allow such a test; the federal Motor Voter Act of 1993 stipulated that all states adopt certain measures to make voter registration easier. While this act did not have a discernible effect, since the change occurred at the federal level, it does not suffer from the same potential endogeneity as voting by mail, which has been introduced primarily in western states.

This paper adds to the formal literature on the effect of decreasing the net cost of voting on political outcomes by analyzing the impact on the candidates’ political positions. This approach could also be applied more broadly to the literature on voter turnout. For example, Goeree and Grosser (2007) and Taylor and Yilderim (2010b) analyze the effect of public information on voter turnout. It is quite possible, however, that the level of public information affects candidates’ positions as well; therefore, extending these models to include the candidate’s choice of political positions could provide a fuller understanding of the impact of measures such as banning pre-election polls.
4

International Unions – Local Concerns: Should citizens or nations play the defining role in European integration?

4.1 Introduction

Contradicting the predictions of many political analysts, the phenomenon of nations voluntarily ceding sovereignty to supranational unions has proved remarkably robust. While it is by no means unique, the European Union stands out as the most advanced project to date. The East African Union, however, might be the most ambitious; it hopes to institute a common currency by 2012 and establish a political federation by 2015. The emergence of unions as distinct political entities raises important questions about how supranational government should be structured.

I model an international union as a group of countries deciding to centralize policy across countries. Centralization provides spillover benefits, but precludes tailoring policy to fit local conditions. I detail the implications of different institutional struc-
tures for deciding which, and how much, policy should be determined at the union level. I also present a positive analysis of existing EU institutions and demonstrate how these institutions address problems that are peculiar to centralizing policy at a supranational level.

An international union is built on top of existing national structures. Within a nation, some policy is provided at the national level to realize the benefits of centralizing policy among local districts. Centralizing policy at a supranational level will affect the amount of policy centralization at the national level. Therefore, I analyze policy outcomes at three levels of government (union, nation and district) under the different decision rules. This allows me to detail the interaction between national and union-level policy.

I find that if union-level policy is set by a pure majority, then voters will behave strategically. Specifically, the median voter at the union level will choose union-level regulation to influence the policy choice of the median voter at the national level. In contrast, if union policy is set by national representatives (representative democracy), then the representatives will cater to the preferences of the median voter at the national level and there is no strategic voting. Both pure majority and representative democracy can fail to result in a sustainable union: the policy chosen by these political systems could result in a nation having a strict preference for exiting the union.

Unanimity rule among national representatives overcomes this problem since each representative can block any proposal that leaves their nation worse off than the status quo. Moreover, if union-level policy is set simultaneously (rather than indepen-
dently) across all policy areas by unanimity rule, then the resulting union policy will be nation-optimal; that is, there is no alternative vector of policies that is preferred by all member nations.

The hybrid, two-stage, decision rule used by the EU also allows for some gains from centralizing policy across multiple policy areas, and also insures that the union is sustainable. In the first stage, representatives use a unanimity rule to decide whether union-level policy in each area will be chosen by unanimity or majority rule. In the second stage, union policy is set according to the decision rule specified in the first stage. The first stage ensures that each nation will prefer to remain in the union, and the second stage allows nations to commit to the policy that is support by a majority of member nations.

Recent changes to the Treaty of Europe stipulate that policy in certain areas shall be passed by both the Council of Ministers (a body of national representatives) and the European Parliament (a body of directly elected politicians). I show that this process, known as codecision, ensures that union policy is preferred by a majority of citizens of the EU (over the status quo). This might not be true when union policy is determined solely by national representatives. This analysis also suggests that aggregate welfare in the EU might be increased if the European Parliament (EP), which represents the median EU citizen, were given the power to propose legislation. However, giving the EP a larger role in the legislative process would be politically difficult: any change to the Treaty of the European Union needs to be approved by the median voter in each member nation, and the median voter in a majority of the member nations would be made worse off if the EP were to gain the power to propose
Related Literature:

From the federalism literature, the most relevant paper is by Cremer and Palfrey (2000), who consider the interaction of policy setting at national and district levels (local governments). Adding an additional level of government, however, introduces additional considerations. First, the institutional setting is different: with an additional layer of government, it is important to consider the interaction of policy-setting at the union and national levels. Second, the objectives of a supranational government (which must consider the welfare of individual nations) might be different from a federal national government (where the focus is the welfare of national citizens).

Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005) model the provision of public goods by international unions, and compare the effect of uniform and non-uniform union policy on aggregate welfare and the equilibrium size of unions. Their analysis models nations as unitary actors and policy as one dimensional; in this paper, I consider the effect of centralizing policy across multiple policy dimensions.

In the political science literature, Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) present a model of EU governance that focuses on actors at the EU level (the EP, Commission, and Council) where the EP is assumed to be more pro-integration than Council. Our model provides microfoundations for the preferences of EU institutions according to the preferences of the nations and citizens in the EU, and the underlying structure of national and EU institutions. For example, the model predicts that the EP will be more pro-integration than the Council since the EP represents the median EU
citizen, while the Council (and the European Council) represent the interests of the median voters at the national level.

4.2 Model

There are three nations, \( n \in \{1, 2, 3\} \), and each nation consists of three districts of equal size, \( d \in \{l, m, h\} \). The three nations are joined in a union.\(^1\)

I model a union as an institution that provides regulation, rather than one that provides costly public goods. This choice is partially based on the experiences of the EU, which has a relatively small budget but controls policy in a significant number of areas. As Simon Hix and Bjorn Hoyland write: “In the area of policy-making, the EU shows how regulation has become a key instrument of modern governance.” (2011, p. 338) Specifically, each level of government (union, nation and district) can supply regulation, denoted \( x_u \), \( x_n \), and \( x_d \), subject to the constraint that \( x \in \{\mathbb{R}^+, 0\} \).

As an example, take the regulation of air particulates. Environmental policy is an area in which the EU has jurisdiction. National governments, however, are explicitly allowed to enforce environmental standards that are more strict than EU standards (they cannot issue national standards that are less strict).

Locally, citizens care about two factors: air quality and the cost of complying with regulations. From the a citizen’s perspective, it does not matter which level of government provides the regulation, the resulting air quality and cost of complying are the same. Take \( \bar{x} = x_u + x_n + x_d \). There is heterogeneity in policy preferences: each citizen has an ideal amount of total regulation, which is independent of the

\(^1\) I use three countries and three districts for the purpose of illustration; my results hold for any number of countries and any number of districts per country.
level of government the regulation is supplied at (i.e., citizens have an ideal amount of regulation of air pollution). This heterogeneity could result from differences in underlying preferences for clean air, or differences in the cost of compliance (it is less costly for a district with an abundance of hydroelectric power to reach a certain level of CO2 emissions than a district that relies on coal for power). For simplicity, I assume that there is perfect sorting among districts and all citizens within a district have the same ideal amount of regulation, $\bar{x}^d$. I label the districts as follows: a low demand district ($d = l$), a median demand district ($d = m$), and a high demand district ($d = h$); for each $n$, $\bar{x}^l \leq \bar{x}^m \leq \bar{x}^h$.

There are also positive spillover effects from centralizing regulation. For example, there are efficiency gains for monitoring and controlling air pollution at a higher level of government, and there are also gains from solving collective action problem associated with air pollution which spills across boarders. Citizens might also benefit directly from centralizing regulation since businesses exporting to other districts face uniform standards; standards for vehicle emissions are standardized across the EU, which allows manufacturers to produce a single version of each model for the EU market. I capture these spillover benefits with the function $g(x_u, x_n)$.

If the collective action problems are solved at the union level, then there is no need to solve them at the national level. Similarly, a national institution to monitor air quality is less beneficial if such an institution already exists at the union level. Therefore, I assume that there is ‘crowding out’ of centralized regulation (i.e., that the cross-partial of $g(x_u, x_n)$ is negative).

There are also costs to centralizing the provision of policy. For example, the cost
of applying for (and evaluating) exceptions to the rules is higher. A British citizen wishing to apply for an exception from emission rules for machines which pull boats on to the beaches of Dover must apply to Brussels [economist citation]. Also, if regulation is provided centrally, it can be more difficult to tailor standards to local conditions; it might be more efficient for districts to restrict local air pollutants, such as ozone and wood smoke, during an inversion rather entrusting this to the union. I model these costs as linear in the amount of regulation that is centralized, represented by the parameters $\alpha_u$ and $\alpha_n$ (both in $\mathbb{R}^+$).

A citizen in nation $n$ and district $d$ has the following utility function over regulation:

$$U^d(x_u, x_n, x_d) = w(||\bar{x}, \bar{x}_d||) + g(x_u, x_n) - [\alpha_u x_u + \alpha_n x_n]. \quad (4.1)$$

$w$ represents citizen $i$’s preference for regulation; it is a differentiable and concave function that is decreasing in the distance between $\bar{x}$ and the citizen’s ideal point $(\bar{x}_d)$.

The function $g$ captures the spillover benefits of centralizing regulation at levels higher than the district level. There are several regularity conditions and properties that I wish to capture in $g$. Specifically: the returns to centralizing regulation are diminishing, and diminishing ‘fast enough’ that at some interior point the costs of providing regulation at a national or union level are greater than the benefits ($\lim_{x \to \infty} g(x) = 0$); there is some crowding out of centralized regulation, and it is always optimal to provide some regulation at each level of government. To reflect
these conditions, $g(x_n, x_u)$ has the following form:

$$g(x_n, x_u) = g_1(x_n + x_u) + g_2(x_u) + g_3(x_n),$$

(4.2)

where all $g$ are increasing and concave, $g(0) = 0$, $g'(0) = \infty$, and $\lim_{x \to \infty} g'(x) = 0$. I also make the technical assumption that the third derivative of $g$ and $w$: $g'''$ and $w'''$ are negative. This assumption is necessary for preferences to be single peaked.

In the EU, union policy supersedes national policy; likewise, in most nations, national policy supersedes local policy. Therefore, the timing of the policy setting game is as follows: (1) the union sets $x_u$, (2) nations set $x_n$, (3) districts set $x_d$. Information is perfect and complete. The equilibrium concept I use is SPNE.

**Decision rules**

Policy is set by majority vote at the national and regional level. Following Cremer and Palfrey (2000) I approximate a majoritarian election by using the following decision rule: each agent, either each citizen or each national representative, reports their ideal level of regulation, and the policy outcome is the median of the reported values. This decision rule results in truthful reporting and a policy outcome equivalent to the median voter result, as long as preferences are single-peaked.\(^2\)

Since the preferences of citizens within each region are homogenous, representative democracy and direct democracy are equivalent at both the regional and national levels. At the union level, however, policy need not be equivalent under these different systems. I consider three different decision rules at the union level.

**Citizens; Majority Rule:** Union level policy is determined by majority rule

\(^2\) Using this decision rule eliminates the need to model politicians.
among the union citizens.

**Nations; Majority Rule:** Each nation nominates a representative; union level policy is determined by majority rule among national representatives.

**Nations; Unanimity (Bargaining):** Union level policy is determined through bargaining among national representatives, and each representative has a veto. There is generally no equilibrium outcome of unstructured bargaining. Since I focus on the ex post outcomes, I choose a bargaining structure that illustrates the full range of possible outcomes of the bargaining process.

- One national representative is chosen at random to propose a level of $\tilde{x}_u$.
- The national representatives vote to approve or reject the proposal.
- If all national representatives approve, then the proposal, $\tilde{x}_u$, is accepted; if at least one nation votes to reject, than the status quo of $x_u = 0$ is maintained.

With this structure, each nation will propose their most preferred level of regulation, subject to the constraint that it makes no nation worse off than the status quo. The outcomes range from the ideal point of the lowest demand nation to the proposal of the highest demand nation. Since the status quo is $x_u = 0$, this implies that the constraint is an upper bound on the level of regulation.

**EU Decision Rule:** The EU uses a hybrid, two-stage decision rule. In the first stage, nations commit to the decision rule for each policy area by unanimous consent. In the second stage, the level of $x_u$ is set according to the agreed upon decision rule (either unanimity or majority). I formalize this decision rule as follows.
• One national representative is chosen at random to propose as decision rule (unanimity or majority).

• The national representatives vote to approve or reject the proposal.

• If all national representatives approve, then the proposed decision rule is accepted; if at least one nation votes to reject, than the status quo of unanimity is maintained.

• The level of $x_u$ is set by the specified decision rule.

Unless specified otherwise, I assume that the majority decision rule is a majority among national representatives. In section 4, I will also discuss the implication of the EU’s use of codecision in certain policy areas, a procedure which give the European Parliament (a body of EU-wide representatives) and the Council of Ministers (a body of national representatives).

4.3 Institutional Structures of Unions

The choice of national and district level regulation follow simply from the logic of the median voter theorem. Since there are no spillovers to providing regulation at the district level, in the last stage of the game, districts will provide regulation only

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3 I simplify the analysis by assuming a pure majority rule. The EU uses qualified majority voting (QVM), a complicated decision rule which currently requires a majority of member states, 74 percent of weighted votes, and 62 percent of the EU population to pass legislation. In November 2014, the decision rule will change to pass with $255/345$ of votes (each country gets one weighted vote) or 55 percent of member states and at least 65 percent of population vote (or 24 of the 27 member nations; it takes 4 member states to block legislation).
to fill local, residual demand for regulation. That is, $x_d$ will equal:

$$
x_d = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \bar{x}^d - (x_u + x_n) \leq 0, \\
\bar{x}^d - (x_u + x_n) & \text{if } \bar{x}^d - (x_u + x_n) > 0.
\end{cases}
$$

Since districts fill residual demand with district-level regulation, national and union level regulation is not supplied past the level where the marginal cost to supplying regulation at a higher level outweighs the marginal spillover benefit. Nation and union level regulation may be set below the level where marginal cost equals marginal benefit, however, if the median voter’s ideal point for regulation is below this level.

At the national level, citizens’ preferences for $x_n$ are ordered by their ideal point, given any level of $x_u$. That is, even though conditional preferences for $x_n$ are a function of $x_u$, $\hat{x}^l(x_u) \leq \hat{x}^m(x_u) \leq \hat{x}^h(x_u)$ for any $x_u$. Moreover, preferences are single-peaked, which implies that the equilibrium level of $x_n$ is $\hat{x}^m(x_u)$.

More specifically, take $\tilde{x}_n$ to be the level of $x_n$ (given $x_u$) where marginal spillover benefits equal marginal costs:

$$g_1'(x_u + \tilde{x}_n) + g_3'(\tilde{x}_n) = \alpha_n$$

Given $x_u$, a citizen of district $d$ has an ideal point of $x_n$ which solves:

$$
\begin{cases} 
w'(||\bar{x}, \bar{x}^d||) + g_1'(x_u + x_n) + g_3'(x_n) = \alpha_n & \text{if } \bar{x}_n + x_u > \bar{x}^d, \\
x_n = \tilde{x}_n & \text{if } \bar{x}_n + x_u \leq \bar{x}^d.
\end{cases}
$$

At the union level, however, the voting decision is more complex. Providing regulation at the union level crowds out regulation at the national level (the cross
partial of \( g \) is negative). Therefore, the equilibrium value of \( x_n \) is a decreasing function of \( x_u \), and citizens will choose \( x_u \) strategically to influence the amount of regulation at the national level. Induced preferences over \( x_u \) represent preferences over the pair \( \{x_u, \hat{x}_n(x_u)\} \). I examine the implications of the strategic behavior in the next subsection, but importantly, preferences over \( x_u \) are still single peaked, which implies both that (i) an equilibrium of the policy setting game exists with a union wide majority vote, and (ii) that national representatives will represent the preferences of the national-level median.

**Lemma 15.** Citizen’s preferences are single-peaked in \( x_u \). Moreover, preferences over \( x_u \) are ordered by ideal point at the national level.

Lemma 15 is the key technical result of this paper; the formal proof is given in Appendix D. Preferences over \( x_u \) are a function of both a citizen’s ideal point, \( \bar{x}^d \), and the maximization of the national median’s utility over \( x_n \) given \( x_u \). Therefore, preferences over \( x_u \) are not ordered by \( \bar{x}^d \), which could potentially result in a failure of the median voter theorem. For example, two individuals with the same ideal amount of \( \bar{x} \) could have different induced preferences over \( x_u \) if one citizen is in their nation’s high-demand district, and the other citizen is in their nation’s low-demand district. The median voter result holds, however, since preferences over \( x_u \) are still ordered by \( \bar{x}^d \) within the nation. Key to this result is that \( \partial(x_n + x_u)/\partial x_u < 0 \); that is, the total level of supra-district regulation is decreasing in \( x_u \). This implies that, within a nation, \( l \) will prefer a lower level of \( x_u \) than \( m \), and \( h \) will prefer a higher level of \( x_u \).

Lemma 15 gives the following corollary, which establishes the existence and
uniqueness of an equilibrium when policy is determined by majority rule, with independent voting in each policy area.

**Corollary 16.** (i) The median voter result holds for a majoritarian decision rule at the union level if voting is independent by policy area. (ii) National representatives will represent the preferences of the national-level median.

The first result follows directly from single-peaked preferences in $x_u$. The second result is more subtle: since preferences over $x_u$ are single peaked and ordered by $\bar{x}^d$ at the national level, a representative with preferences identical to citizens of type $m$ will be the Condorcet winner. That is, a national representative of ‘type’ $m$ will win in a pairwise vote against a representative with any other preferences (not just type $l$ or $h$). Likewise, if the representative is office seeking (rather than a representative with policy preferences) then they will choose the policy preferred by the median voter.

*Normative Conditions:*

I consider two normative conditions: no exit and optimality. Both conditions are politically motivated (I discuss a traditional economic measure, aggregate welfare, later in the paper). The no exit condition is a minimum condition: no nation should wish to exit the union. Since the decision to exit the union would likely be decided by a national referendum, it is logical to model the exit decision as a majority-rule vote.

**Definition 4.** No-exit: The no-exit condition is satisfied if, in each country, the median voter supports remaining in the union.
Optimality provides a metric for performance; I consider two possible metrics: nation-optimal and citizen-optimal.

**Definition 5.** Nation-optimal: union-level regulation is nation-optimal if no policy exists that makes the median voter in all countries weakly better off, and the median voter in at least one nation is strictly better off.

**Definition 6.** Citizen-optimal: union-level regulation is citizen-optimal if no policy exists that makes a majority of citizens in the union weakly better off, and at least one citizen strictly better off.

Citizen-optimal is a stronger condition than nation-optimal; since any union-wide majority must include at least one national median (50 percent of the population of every member nation cannot be in the minority), citizen-optimal implies nation-optimal, but the reverse need not be true.

For the remainder of this section, I detail the performance of the three different decision rules under both independent policy making in each area, and simultaneous policy making in all areas. In the following section, I will examine the decision rules of the EU and show how they have evolved to address the no-exit and optimality conditions. I also show that there is a tension between the condition of nation-optimal and citizen-optimal, and this tension is manifest in the struggle between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers over the control of legislation.

**4.3.1 Independent policy making:**

For the following analysis, regulation is determined independently across policy areas. Likewise, the normative conditions are applied independently to each policy area.
Citizens, Majority Rule:

**Proposition 17.** If regulation at each level of government is determined by majority rule, then there is strategic voting at the Union level; that is, voters choose $x_u$ to influence the national median’s choice of $x_n$. Despite this strategic behavior, the equilibrium outcome $\{x_u^*, x_n^*, x_d^*\}$ is nation-optimal and citizen-optimal, but need not satisfy no-exit.

As mentioned in the discussion of lemma 15, a citizen’s induced ideal point of union level regulation is a function of the national median’s preferences over $x_n$. That is, induced preferences over $x_u$ represent preferences over the pair $\{x_u, \hat{x}^m_n(x_u)\}$, where $\hat{x}^m_n(x_u)$ is the national median’s induced ideal point of national-level regulation as a function of union-level regulation. This strategic behavior has a polarizing effect on preferences: compared with myopic behavior, citizens in district $l$ will choose a lower level of $x_u$ to decrease the overall level of regulation, and citizens in district $h$ will choose a higher level of $x_u$.

Since the equilibrium level of $x_u$ is the ideal point of the median EU citizen, any other level of $x_u$ will make a majority of citizens worse off, and the equilibrium is citizen-optimal. The equilibrium is also nation-optimal, since any majority of EU citizens must contain at least one national median.

Take $x_u^{max}$ as the highest level of regulation that all nations prefer to the status quo.

$$x_u^{max} = \min_{\{x_u : x_u > 0 \ \& \ \{x_u, x_u^m(x_u)\} \sim_n \{0, x_u^m(0)\}\}}.$$

Any union-level regulation that exceeds $x_u^{max}$ violates the no exit condition, since at
least one country will prefer the status quo to remaining in the union. With majority rule, the no-exit condition will be violated when $x_u^{max}$ is smaller than the amount of $x_u$ preferred by the union-level median.

Nations, Majority Rule:

**Proposition 18.** *If regulation is decided by representative democracy with majority decision-making at each level of government, then the equilibrium outcome is nation-optimal, but need not satisfy no exit or be citizen-optimal.*

Corollary 16 states that national representatives will represent the preferences of the national medians. Therefore, the majority rule among national representatives will give a level of $x_u$ which is preferred to any other level of $x_u$ by a majority of national medians. The equilibrium level of $x_u$ need not be citizen-optimal; a majority of national majorities could theoretically contain just over 25 percent of the union population.

For example, assume there are 11 nations in the union (each with three districts). 6 of the nations are 'low demand' nations, and 5 are 'high demand' nations. All citizens in the high demand nations have ideal points of $x_u$ that are greater than the medians of the low demand nations. Also, all $h$ districts in the low demand nations have ideal points of $x_u$ that are greater than the medians of the low demand nations. In this case, the equilibrium level of $x_u$ under majority rule among national representative will be the ideal point of the national level median of the low demand nation with the highest ideal point. At the citizen level, however, 21 districts would prefer a higher level of union regulation, while only 11 would prefer a lower level
of union regulation. This example shows that there can be a significant difference between the policy preferred by the median nation and the policy preferred by the median citizen.

_Nations, Unanimity (Bargaining):

**Proposition 19.** *If union-level regulation is decided by unanimity among nations, then the equilibrium outcome is nation-optimal and satisfies no-exit, but need not be citizen-optimal.*

The nation chosen to select the policy proposal will propose the minimum of their optimal policy and $x^{max}_u$; the lowest demand nation will reject any proposal greater than $x^{max}_u$ since it leaves them worse off relative to the status quo. Similarly, since no nation would vote to accept a level of regulation that makes them worse off, the unanimous decision rule will satisfy the no exit condition. (Nations can only be worse off if $x_u$ is too high since the status quo is $x_u = 0$.) While unanimity satisfies both the no-exit and nation-optimal condition, it will result in a level of regulation that is bounded by “the lowest common denominator of the member states.” (Knill and Liefferink (2007))

_EU Decision Rule:

**Proposition 20.** *The EU decision rule results in policy being set by unanimity.*

Since a move from unanimity to majority will make at least one nation weakly worse off, that nation will vote to reject any proposal of majority rule. This result is sensitive to the assumption that the status quo in the EU is unanimity rule. This has been true historically; the Luxembourg Compromise established a baseline of a
de facto national veto in every policy area. Even in areas where the EU does not have competency, such as foreign policy and education, the EU still officially facilitates centralization (through measures such as the Bologna Process, which established voluntary participation in EU-wide standards for higher education).

Proposition 20 establishes that the EU decision rule is no different than unanimity rule. This analysis suggests that there is no difference between the EU and intergovernmental organizations, such as the WTO, which centralize policy in a single policy area. So far, however, I have assumed that policy is determined independently in each policy area. In this setting, there is no difference between the EU decision rule and unanimity rule. In the following section, I will examine simultaneous policy setting in multiple areas; in this setting, there is a significant difference between the policy outcome of the EU decision rule and setting policy by unanimity rule independently in each area.

4.3.2 Simultaneous Policy Determination

So far, I have considered setting regulation in each policy area independently. While the unanimity decision rule satisfies no-exit and is nation-optimal in each policy area, it can result in a vector of policy that is not nation-optimal. To illustrate the intuition behind the failure of optimality, I present the following example:

Example 1. Regulation is set in three policy areas, the environment, transport, and energy, represented by $x_j$, with $j \in \{1, 2, 3\}$. Each representative has the highest preference for union-level regulation in one policy area, the median preference in another, and the lowest preference in the last. Assume that policy is set independently, and that the nation with the lowest preference for regulation is chosen to propose
policy in each area. Under the unanimity rule the equilibrium level of union-level regulation, $x^*_j,u$, will equal the lowest level in each policy area. Comparing this outcome to the vector of median’s preferred levels in each policy area, $\{x^m_j,u\}$, we can see that $\{x^*_j,u\}$ could fail optimality. With unanimity, each country gets their first choice in one policy area, their second choice in another, and their third choice in the remaining area; with regulation set at the median level, each country gets their first choice in one policy area, and their second choice in the two other areas.

A potential solution to the failure of nation-optimality over the vector of union regulation is to set union policy in all areas simultaneously. This immediately excludes the use of majority rule: there are generally no clear predictions for majority decision over multiple dimensions. As the McKelvey Chaos Theorem illustrates, without the existence of a median in all dimensions, no equilibrium exists and, under certain conditions, any outcome can be supported through a sequence of pairwise votes between policy options. Setting policy simultaneously by a unanimity rule (bargaining), however, will result in a clear set of outcomes.

**Proposition 21.** Simultaneous determination of policy by unanimity over all policy areas will satisfy no-exit and is nation-optimal.

The nation chosen to propose will propose a vector of policy that lies within the set of policies that are preferred by all nations to the status quo (policy satisfies no-exit). More specifically, they will propose their most-preferred vector of policy among the policies that satisfy no-exit; therefore, the resulting policy will be nation-optimal.

---

4 This is not necessary to demonstrate a failure of nation-optimality; since union policy is bounded above in each area by $x^{\text{max}}_j,u$, the vector of policy could fail nation-optimality regardless of who proposes policy.
(any other vector that satisfies no-exit will leave them weakly worse off).

The Institutional Structure of the EU

With multiple policy areas, there is a significant difference between the policy outcome of the EU decision rule and setting policy by unanimity rule independently in each area.

**Proposition 22.** The EU mechanism satisfies no-exit. Moreover, it performs better than independent policy setting by unanimity (some efficiency gains from multilateral bargaining are realized).

The example presented above illustrates the potential efficiency gains from the EU decision rule. The EU decision rule would result in the vector of median levels in each policy area, \( \hat{x}^m_{j,u} \), while unanimity rule in each policy area independently would give a lower level of regulation in each area, \( \hat{x}^l_{j,u} \).

This suggests that the benefit of supranationalism over intergovernmentalism is that it enables negotiations of policy centralization (with commitment) over multiple policy areas simultaneously. While the EU mechanism is not always nation-optimal, it has the benefit of commitment and lower transaction costs. As shown in the previous section, nation-optimality can be achieved by requiring national politicians to bargain over all regulation simultaneously, rather than determining regulation in each area separately. Such a system, however, could be difficult to implement. EU law consisted of “14,000 or so legal acts” as of 2003 (Dinan (2005), p. 92); therefore, the transaction costs of setting policy simultaneously could be significant.
4.4 Citizens or Nations: The codecision procedure

A second question is whether the policy areas determined by majority rule should be set by member nations or by the citizens of the EU. Traditionally, passing legislation was the exclusive domain of the Council of Ministers (commonly referred to as the Council), a body of national representatives. Recent changes to the EU legislative process, however, have resulted in legislative power being split between the European Parliament (EP), where the MEPs are elected in an EU wide vote, and the Council of Ministers.

The decision between giving legislative powers to nations or citizens can significantly affect policy. While both will result in policy that is nation-optimal (in the individual policy dimension), as illustrated in section 3, a majority vote in the Council of Ministers could result in a policy that is preferred by as little as 25 percent of the EU population, while a majority vote in the EP will be citizen-optimal (which implies nation-optimal).

Even though a majority of EU citizens will be better off if legislative power is granted to the EP, it will be difficult to change this policy. While at least 50 percent of the EU population would be better off if legislative power was transferred from the Council of Ministers to the EP, 50 percent of the national medians will be made worse off. Changes of the Treaty of the EU require individual ratification by each nation, which gives each national median veto power over any potential changes.
Appendix A

Proofs For Chapter 2

The following result will be needed for the proofs of Lemmas 1-3:

Result 23. $A_A(g), I_A(g), \text{ and } S_A(g)$ are all convex sets; i.e. they are all intervals on $[0, 1]$.

Proof: I focus my attention on $S_A(g)$ without loss of generality and therefore restrict my attention to $[0, g_m]$. I show that the alienation set is convex and, if nonempty, includes $\alpha = 0$ and that the indifference set is also convex and always includes $g_m$. Therefore, $S_A(g)$, which is just the complement of $A_A(g) \cup I_A(g)$ on $[0, g_m]$, must also be convex. Before proving the result, it will be useful examine the curvature of $\beta(g, \alpha_i)$.

Properties of $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i) / \partial \alpha_i$:

Note that:

$$
\frac{\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i)}{\partial \alpha_i} = \frac{\partial u(|g_A, \alpha_i|)}{\partial \alpha_i} - \frac{\partial u(|g_B, \alpha_i|)}{\partial \alpha_i} \quad (A.1)
$$
A marginal change in $\alpha_i$ is equivalent to a marginal change in distance. In the interior (between $g_A$ and $g_m$), a marginal increase in $\alpha_i$ moves $\alpha_i$ farther away from $g_A$ and closer to $g_B$. This implies $u([g_A, \alpha_i])$ decreases, and $u([g_B, \alpha_i])$ increases, with $\alpha_i$. By Equation 1

$$\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i) / \partial \alpha_i < 0 \text{ when } \alpha_i \in (g_A, g_m].$$

In the exterior (between 0 and $g_A$), a marginal increase in $\alpha_i$ moves $\alpha_i$ closer to both $g_A$ and $g_B$. Therefore, both $u([g_A, \alpha_i])$ and $u([g_B, \alpha_i])$ are increasing with $\alpha_i$. The sign of $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i) / \partial \alpha_i$ will depend on relative magnitude $\partial u([g_A, \alpha_i]) / \partial \alpha_i$ and $\partial u([g_B, \alpha_i]) / \partial \alpha_i$, and hence the curvature of $u(.)$.

If $u(.)$ is concave, then $\partial u([g_A, \alpha_i]) / \partial \alpha_i < \partial u([g_B, \alpha_i]) / \partial \alpha_i$, and by Equation 1:

$$\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i) / \partial \alpha_i < 0$$

Similarly if $u(.)$ is convex, then:

$$\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i) / \partial \alpha_i > 0$$

If $u(.)$ is linear, then:

$$\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i) / \partial \alpha_i = 0$$

$A_A(g)$ Convex:

This part of the proof must be done for each class of utility functions separately:

**Concave:** For $u(.)$ concave, $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i)/\partial \alpha_i < 0$ in both the interior and the exterior. By definition, this implies $A_A(g)$ will be empty.

**Linear:** For $u(.)$ linear, $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i)/\partial \alpha_i \leq 0$ in both the interior and the exterior. By
definition, this implies $A_A(g)$ will be empty.

**Convex:** For $u(.)$ convex, alienation can occur, but only in the exterior, since $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i)/\partial \alpha_i > 0$ in the exterior. Given $A_A(g)$ non-empty, take $\alpha^-_A$ to be the supremum of $A_A(g)$. $\alpha_i < \alpha^-_A$ must be in the exterior, since $A_A(g)$ is in the exterior. Therefore, since $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i)/\partial \alpha_i > 0$ for $\alpha_i < \alpha^-_A$ and $\beta(g, \alpha^-_A) \leq 2c$, then $\beta(g, \alpha_i) < 2c$ for all $\alpha_i < \alpha^-_A$.

This shows that $A_A(g) = [0, \alpha^-_A]$ or $\emptyset$.

**Sigmoid:** For $u(.)$ sigmoid, take any $g_A, g_B$. Because $u(.)$ is concave initially and then convex, the exterior can be broken down into an interval, $[0, \alpha^*]$, where $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i)/\partial \alpha_i > 0$ and an interval, $(\alpha^*, g_A]$, where $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i)/\partial \alpha_i < 0$. Since alienation can only occur in $[0, \alpha^*]$ the proof that $A_A(g) = [0, \alpha^-_A]$ or $\emptyset$ follows from the convex case.

$I_A(g)$ Convex:

Indifference can only occur in the subset of the policy space where $\partial \beta(g, \alpha_i)/\partial \alpha_i \leq 0$. Call this subset $X$; for all utility functions considered, $X$ is an interval on the policy space (a convex subset of $[0, g_m]$). For $u(.)$ concave or linear, $X = [0, g_m]$; for $u(.)$ convex, $X$ is equal to the interior only; and for $u(.)$ sigmoid, $X = [\alpha^*, g_m]$, where $\alpha^*$ denotes the lower bound of the concave portion of the exterior.

Also note that $g_m$ is always in $I_A(g)$ since $g_m$ is in the interior and $\beta(g, \alpha_i = g_m) = 0$. Take $\alpha^+_A$ to be the infimum of $I_A(g)$. Since $\beta(g, \alpha_i) < \beta(g, \alpha^+_A) \leq 2c \forall \alpha_i \in (\alpha^-_A, g_m]$ and $(\alpha^+_A, g_m] \subset X$ we can use the same logic as used above to show that $I_A(g) = (\alpha^+_A, g_m]$

$S_A(g)$ Convex:

$A_A(g)$, $S_A(g)$, and $I_A(g)$ are a partition of the policy spectrum from 0 to $g_m$; i.e. they are disjoint but their union covers $[0, g_m]$. Therefore, if $S_A(g)$ is non-convex
then for some \( x, y \in S_A(g) \) \((x < y)\) there exists \( z \) in either \( A_A(g) \) or \( I_A(g) \) such that \( \lambda x + (1 - \lambda)y = z \). Since \( A_A(g) \) and \( I_A(g) \) are convex and \( x < z < y \), the definition of convexity implies that either \( x \) or \( y \) must be in \( A_A(g) \) or \( I_A(g) \), clearly a contradiction.

\[ \triangledown \]

**Proof of Lemma 1:**

If \( n_f[V_A(g)] \neq n_f[V_B(g)] \) then either \( n_f[V_A(g)] > n_f[V_B(g)] \) or \( n_f[V_A(g)] < n_f[V_B(g)] \). Supposing (without loss of generality) that \( n_f[V_A(g)] > n_f[V_B(g)] \), then candidate B will receive an expected utility of less than \( \frac{1}{2} \), and will have an incentive to deviate to \( g_A = g_B \), where \( n_f[V_A(g)] = n_f[V_A(g)] = \emptyset \).

If a citizen is pivotal, then their benefit from voting is equal to \( \beta(g, \alpha_i) \); if a citizen is not pivotal, it is equal to zero. For a citizen outside of a support set, the benefit from voting is less then \( c \) by definition, and abstaining is therefore a dominant strategy. For a citizen in a support set, the benefit of voting is greater or equal to \( c \) if they are pivotal. Therefore, if \( n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)] \) and all other citizens in the support sets are voting, it is a best response for \( i \) to vote, since their vote will move the candidates into a tie.

\[ \triangledown \]

**Proof of Lemma 2:**

The following fact will be helpful for the proof of Lemma 2:

**Fact 1:** If \( \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \) are equidistant to \( g_m \), then \( \beta(g, \alpha_1) = \beta(g, \alpha_2) \).

This fact follows directly from \( u(,) \) being a function of distance only, and since
citizens with ideal points symmetric about \( g_m \) have the same distance between their ideal point, the candidate policy they prefer, and the candidate policy they oppose.

(i) If neither support set includes an endpoint of the distribution, then \(|S_A(g)| = |S_B(g)|\):

If neither support set includes an endpoint of the distribution, then \( S_A(g) \) and \( S_B(g) \) are interior to \([0, 1]\), by convexity. By Fact 1, any point \( \alpha_1 \) in \( S_A(g) \) has a corresponding symmetric point \( \alpha_2 \) in \( S_B(g) \), since \( \beta(g, \alpha_2) = \beta(g, \alpha_1) \geq 2c \). Since \( S_A(g) \) and \( S_B(g) \) are interior, they must be intervals symmetric about \( g_m \) and therefore have the same Lebesgue measure.

(ii) If one of the support sets includes an endpoint, and the other is interior, then the length of the interior support set is weakly greater, and strictly greater if \( \beta(g, \alpha = 0 \text{ or } 1) > 2c \):

Assume, without loss of generality, that \( 0 \in S_A(g) \) and \( S_B(g) \) is interior. Take \( S_B(g)' \) to be the interval symmetric, about \( g_m \), to \( S_B(g) \); note that \(|S_B(g)'| = |S_B(g)|\). By Fact 1, \( S_B(g)' \) must cover \( S_A(g) \), which gives \(|S_B(g)'| = |S_B(g)| \geq |S_A(g)|\). If \( \beta(g, \alpha = 0) > 2c \), then \( S_B(g)' \) must cover \( S_A(g) \cup [\epsilon, 0] \), where \( \epsilon < 0 \). This implies that the Lebesgue measure of \( S_B(g)' \) is greater than that of \( S_A(g) \) (\(|S_B(g)'| = |S_B(g)| \geq |S_A(g)|\)).

(iii) If both endpoints are in the support sets and \( g_m < (>,=)\alpha_m \) then \( n_f[S_A(g)] < (>,=)n_f[S_B(g)]\):

Take \( S_B(g)' \) to be the interval symmetric, about \( \alpha_m \) (not \( g_m \)), to \( S_B(g) \). By the symmetry of \( f \), \( n_f[S_B(g)'] = n_f[S_B(g)] \). By Fact 1 and since \( g_m < \alpha_m \), \( S_B(g)' \) must cover \( S_A(g) \cup [g_A^+ - \epsilon] \), where \( g_A^+ \) is the max of \( S_A(g) \) and \( \epsilon > 0 \). This implies that
\[ n_f[S_A(g)] < n_f[S'_B] = n_f[S_B], \] since \( f \) is strictly positive. The proofs of \((>,=)\) are analogous.

\[ \diamond \]

**Proof of Lemma 3:** If \( \beta(g, \alpha) > 2c \) for \( \alpha = 0, 1 \) then \((g_A, g_B)\) is not an equilibrium:

Suppose an equilibrium, \((g^*_A, g^*_B)\), exists with \( \beta(g^*_A, g^*_B, \alpha) > 2c \) for \( \alpha = 0, 1 \). Since the support sets are convex and include the endpoints, \( S_A(g) = [0, \alpha^+_A] \), where \( \alpha^+_A > 0 \) since \( \beta(g, \alpha = 0) > 2c \) and \( \beta(g, \alpha) \) is continuous in \( \alpha \). Symmetrically, \( S_B(g) = [\alpha^+_B, 1] \) with \( \alpha^+_B < 1 \).

By Lemma 1 \( n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)] \) which implies, by Lemma 2 (iii), that \( g_m = \alpha_m \). Suppose candidate A deviates to \( g'_A = g^*_A + \epsilon \) where \( \epsilon > 0 \) but is small enough that \( \beta(g'_A, g^*_B, \alpha) > 2c \) for \( \alpha = 0, 1 \). Note that such an \( \epsilon \) exists because \( \beta(g, \alpha) \) is continuous (and decreasing) in \( g_A \). Now \( g'_m > \alpha_m \) and \( \alpha = 0, 1 \) are still in the support sets. By Lemma 2 (iii), therefore, \( n_f[S_A(g)] > n_f[S_B(g)] \). This contradicts the assumption that \((g^*_A, g^*_B)\) is an equilibrium, since candidate A receives an expected plurality if she deviates to \( g'_A \).

\[ \diamond \]

**Proof of Proposition 1:** Suppose an equilibrium, \((g^*_A, g^*_B)\), exists where \( |S_A(g)| > 0 \) for at least one support set (assume without loss of generality \( S_A(g) \)). By \( |S_A(g)| > 0 \), there exist some \( \alpha' \) in \( S_A(g) \) where \( \alpha' \in (0, g_m] \). Since \( u(.) \) concave, \( \beta(g, \alpha = 0) > \beta(g, \alpha_i) \forall \alpha_i \in (0, g_m] \) so \( \beta(g, \alpha = 0) > \beta(g, \alpha') \geq 2c \). By Lemma 1, \( |S_A(g)| = |S_B(g)| \), and following the same argument as above \( \beta(g, \alpha = 1) > 2c \). Then by Lemma 3, \((g^*_A, g^*_B)\) cannot be an equilibrium.

\[ \diamond \]
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that the proof is trivial for $\delta = \frac{1}{2}$ since voting is a strictly dominated strategy for all sets of voters with positive mass for all $(g_A, g_B)$. Therefore, for the remainder of the proof, assume $\delta < \frac{1}{2}$.

Necessity: Assume an equilibrium, $(g_A^*, g_B^*)$, exists where $g_B^* > \alpha_m + \delta$. Suppose candidate A sets policy to $g_A' = \alpha_m - \delta$. Since $\beta(\alpha_m - \delta, \alpha_m + \delta, \alpha = 1) = 2c$ and $\beta(g, \alpha = 1)$ is increasing in $g_B$, $g_B^* > \alpha_m + \delta$ implies that $\beta(g_A', g_B^*, \alpha = 1) > 2c$ which in turn means that $S_B(g)$ is non-empty. Note, however, that $g_m' > \alpha_m$. By Lemma 2 (ii), $|S_A(g)'| > |S_B(g)'|$ since $\alpha = 1$ is interior to $S_B(g)$. Since $|S| = n_f[S]$ with a uniform distribution, this gives $g_A'$ as a strictly profitable deviation.

Sufficiency: If $(g_A^*, g_B^*) = (\alpha_m - \delta, \alpha_m + \delta)$ then $g_m = \alpha_m$ and by Lemma 2 (ii), $|S_A(g)| = |S_B(g)|$. For any $g_A^*, g_B^* \in [\alpha_m - \delta, \alpha_m + \delta]$ with at least one policy point interior, $\beta(g_A^*, g_B^*, \alpha = 0$ and 1) < $2c$, and by Lemma 2 (i) $|S_A(g)| = |S_B(g)|$.

To see that neither candidate has an incentive to deviate from any $g_A^*, g_B^* \in [\alpha_m - \delta, \alpha_m + \delta]^2$, note that any deviation that such that $|S_A(g)| \neq |S_B(g)|$ will leave the deviator’s policy farther from $\alpha_m$ than the other candidate, and by Lemma 2 (iii) the deviator will receive a utility of less than $\frac{1}{2}$.

Positive turnout for $\delta < \frac{1}{2}$: If $\delta < \frac{1}{2}$, then $(g_A^*, g_B^*) = (\alpha_m - \delta, \alpha_m + \delta)$ is an equilibrium, and since $\beta(g, \alpha)$ is increasing in the exterior, $\beta(g, \alpha_m - \delta) > \beta(g, \alpha = 0) = 2c$. Therefore, $[0, \alpha_m - \delta] \subset S_A(g)$.

Proof of Proposition 3: Note that since $f$ is single peaked and symmetric, $f(\alpha_m) > f(\alpha) \forall \alpha \neq \alpha_m$. Also, $f(\alpha) > f(\alpha')$ iff $|\alpha, \alpha_m| < |\alpha', \alpha_m|$. Therefore, for any two intervals $S, S'$, if $|S| \geq |S'|$ and $S$ closer to $\alpha_m$ than $S'$, then $n_f[S] > n_f[S']$.

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First, I show that no equilibrium exists where $\beta(g, \alpha) > 2c$ for $\alpha$ equal to either 0 or 1. By Lemma 3, $\beta(g, \alpha) > 2c$ for $\alpha = 0$ and 1. Assume an equilibrium exists where $\beta(g, \alpha) > 2c$ for only one of the endpoints, without loss of generality $\alpha = 0$, and one of the support sets has a positive Lebesque measure. By Lemma 2 (ii), $|S_A(g)| < |S_B(g)|$. It is also the case that $S_B(g)$ is closer to $\alpha_m$ than $S_A(g)$ and, as showed above, this implies $n_f[S_A(g)] < n_f[S_B(g)]$, which contradicts Lemma 1.

Secondly, I show that $\beta(g^*_A, g^*_B, \alpha) \leq 2c$ for $\alpha = 0$ and 1 and cannot be an equilibrium if the Lebesque measure of the support sets is non-zero. Suppose an equilibrium exists, if $\beta(g^*_A, g^*_B, \alpha) \leq 2c$ for $\alpha = 0$ and 1, then $|S_A(g)| = |S_B(g)|$ by Lemma 2 (i). By single-peakedness of $f$ and since $n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)]$ in equilibrium, $S_A(g)$ and $S_B(g)$ must be symmetric about $\alpha_m$. By the continuity of $\beta(\cdot)$, there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ small enough that a deviation to $g'_A = g^*_A + \epsilon$ will leave the Lebesque measure of the support sets greater than zero. The deviation will leave $\beta(g'_A, g_B^*, \alpha) \leq 2c$ for $\alpha = 0$ and 1 and hence $|S_A(g')| = |S_B(g')|$. Since, $|g'_A, \alpha_m| < |g_B^*, \alpha_m|$, however, $S_A(g')$ will be closer to $\alpha_m$ than $S_B(g')$ which implies $n_f[S_A(g')] < n_f[S_B(g')]$ and precludes $g^*_A$ as a best response.

$\diamond$

Proof of Proposition 4:

Sufficiency:

Case 1: I will consider a deviation by candidate $A$, without loss of generality. Since $S_A(g)$ is an interval, $|S_A(g)| = \alpha_A^+ - \alpha_A^-$, which gives $\partial|S_A(g)|/\partial g_A = \partial \alpha_A^+)/\partial g_A - \partial \alpha_A^-)/\partial g_A$. And since $S_A(g)$ and $S_B(g)$ are interior, $|S_A(g)| = |S_B(g)|$ after a marginal
change in $g_A$, which gives $\partial |S_A(g)|/\partial g_A = \partial |S_B(g)|/\partial g_A$, or, equivalently:

$$
\partial \alpha^+_A/\partial g_A + \partial \alpha^+_B/\partial g_A = \partial \alpha^-_B/\partial g_A + \partial \alpha^-_A/\partial g_A \tag{A.2}
$$

$$
n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)] \text{ at } (g^*_A, g^*_B) \text{ by Lemma 2 (iii) . Therefore, for } (g^*_A, g^*_B) \text{ to be a local equilibrium, } \partial n_f[S_A(g)]/\partial g_A = \partial n_f[S_B(g)]/\partial g_A. \text{ Since } S_A(g) \text{ is an interval, } n_f[S_A(g)] = F(\alpha^+_A) - F(\alpha^-_A) \text{ and:}
$$

$$
\partial n_f[S_A(g)]/\partial g_A = \partial F(\alpha^+_A)/\partial g_A - \partial F(\alpha^-_A)/\partial g_A = f(\alpha^+_A)\partial \alpha^+_A/\partial g_A - f(\alpha^-_A)\partial \alpha^-_A/\partial g_A \tag{A.3}
$$

For any $(g_A, g_B)$ symmetric about $\alpha_m$, $f(\alpha^+_A) = f(\alpha^+_B) = f(\alpha^+)$ and $f(\alpha^-_A) = f(\alpha^-_B) = f(\alpha^-)$. Plugging Equation 3 into $\partial n_f[S_A(g)]/\partial g_A = \partial n_f[S_B(g)]/\partial g_A$ and rearranging gives:

$$
f(\alpha^+)[\partial \alpha^+_A/\partial g_A + \partial \alpha^+_B/\partial g_A] = f(\alpha^-)[\partial \alpha^-_A/\partial g_A + \partial \alpha^-_B/\partial g_A] \tag{A.4}
$$

As the terms within the brackets are equal by Equation 2, Equation 3 is true iff $f(\alpha^+) = f(\alpha^-)$, which gives $(g^*_A, g^*_B)$ as a local equilibrium.

Case 2: At $(g'A, g'B)$, neither candidate has an incentive to deviate outward, since both endpoints will be in the support sets, and by Lemma 2 (iii) the deviator will receive a utility of less than $\frac{1}{2}$.

A deviation inward from $(g'A, g'B)$ will leave $|S_A(g)| = |S_B(g)|$, since both support sets will be interior. Therefore, Equation 2 will hold, and since $f(\alpha^-) > f(\alpha^+)$ at $(g'A, g'B)$, the LHS of equation 3 will be greater than the RHS, which implies $\partial n_f[S_A(g)]/\partial g_A < \partial n_f[S_B(g)]/\partial g_A$. This shows that candidate A will also be strictly
worse off with a marginal inward deviation (candidate B has analogous payoffs).

Existence and Uniqueness:
Take \( g_A \) and \( g_B \) symmetric about \( \alpha_m \) and \( |g_A, \alpha_m| = d \). The of existence and uniqueness of a symmetric local equilibrium (done simultaneously for Case 1 and 2) follows from Equation 3 and that \( \alpha_A^- \) and \( \alpha_A^+ \) are strictly decreasing in \( d \), the distance between the policy positions and the median ideal point.

First, I show that no positive turnout equilibrium exists if \( \beta(p_A, p_B, \alpha = p_A) \leq 2c \) (where \( p_A, p_B \) are the location of the left and right modes of \( f \), respectively). \( \beta(p_A, p_B, \alpha = p_A) \leq 2c \) implies that \( S_A(g) \) and \( S_B(g) \) are empty, or have no mass, for \( d = p \), where \( p \) is the distance between the mode of \( f \) and \( \alpha_m \). Turnout can only be positive for \( d > p \), but in this case, \( S_A(g) \) is located on the increasing portion of \( f \), so \( f(\alpha^-) > f(\alpha^+) \). By Equation 3, \( \partial n_f[S_A(g)]/\partial g_A > \partial n_f[S_B(g)]/\partial g_A \), and for any \( d \) with positive turnout, candidate A will have an incentive to make a marginal inward deviation.

If \( \beta(p_A, p_B, \alpha = p_A) > 2c \), then \( S_A(g) \) and \( S_B(g) \) have positive mass for \( d = p \). Since \( \alpha_A^- \) and \( \alpha_A^+ \) are on opposite sides of \( p_A \), and \( \alpha_A^- \) and \( \alpha_A^+ \) are strictly decreasing in \( d \), \( \partial f(\alpha_A^-)/\partial d > 0 \) and \( \partial f(\alpha_A^+)/\partial d < 0 \). Therefore, if \( f(\alpha_A^-) < f(\alpha_A^+) \) at \( d = p \), then by the continuity of \( f \), there exists \( d^* < p \) such that \( f(\alpha_A^-) = f(\alpha_A^+) \).

Similarly, if \( f(\alpha_A^-) > f(\alpha_A^+) \) at \( d = p \), then there exists either a \( d^* > p \) such that \( f(\alpha_A^-) = f(\alpha_A^+) \) (Case 1), or \( f(\alpha_A^-) = 0 > f(\alpha_A^+) \) (Case 2). Also, if \( f(\alpha_A^-) = f(\alpha_A^+) \) for \( d = p \) then existence is trivial.

Uniqueness for both cases follows from the proof of existence. Case 1: If \( f(\alpha_A^-) = f(\alpha_A^+) \) at \( d^* \), it follows from above that, \( f(\alpha_A^-) < f(\alpha_A^+) \) for all \( d > d^* \) (excluding an
Case 2-type equilibrium), and \( f(\alpha_A^-) > f(\alpha_A^+) \) for all \( d < d^* \). Case 2: If \( f(\alpha_A^-) = 0 > f(\alpha_A^+) \) at \( d^* \), \( f(\alpha_A^-) > f(\alpha_A^+) \) for all \( d < d^* \) (excluding an Case 1-type equilibrium); we showed above that \( d > d^* \) cannot be an equilibrium.

\[ \diamond \]

Proof of Proposition 5:

This proof follows the proof of Proposition 2.

Necessity: Assume an equilibrium, \((g_A^*, g_B^*)\), exists with \( g_B^* > \alpha_m + c \). If candidate A deviates to \( g'_A = g_B^* - 2c \), then all exterior voters will be in the support sets, including \( \beta(g'_A, g_B^*, \alpha = 0, 1) = 2c \) and \( g_m > \alpha_m \), which gives \( n_f[S_A(g)] > n_f[S_B(g)] \) by Lemma 2 (iii). Other results are analogous.

Sufficiency: If \( g_A^* \) or \( g_B^* \) are interior to \([\alpha_m - c, \alpha_m + c]\), then \( |g_A^*, g_B^*| < 2c \) and \( n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)] \) and turnout is zero. If \( (g_A^*, g_B^*) = (\alpha_m - c, \alpha_m + c) \), the support sets will consist of exterior voters only, and since \( g_m = \alpha_m \), \( n_f[S_A(g)] = n_f[S_B(g)] \) by Lemma 2 (iii).

As in Proposition 2, any deviation that leaves \( n_f[S_A(g')] \neq n_f[S_B(g')] \) will leave the deviator worse off.

\[ \diamond \]
Appendix B

Finite Number of Citizens in the Linear Model

As discussed in the introduction, I use an infinite number of voters only as an approximation of a large $N$ election. In this section, I show that as long as an analogous condition to the continuous distribution assumption holds, an equilibrium with positive turnout given any finite distribution of citizens with linear utility over policy.

First, some notation and setup:

There are $N$ citizens ($N \geq 2$); the citizens and candidates are identical to those in the previous model. For simplicity, I normalize the policy space so that $\alpha_1 = 0$ and $\alpha_N = 1$. I only consider the case in which $2c < 1$ (after normalization).

Definitions

(1) $n[(a, b)]$ is now the number of citizens with ideal policy points in $[a, b]$, rather than the probability measure of $[a, b]$. Let $n(g_A) \equiv n(0, g_A)$ and $n(g_B) \equiv n(0, g_B)$.

(2) Let $\alpha_{gA}$ equal the maximum ideal point in $[0, g_A]$ (i.e. $\max\{\alpha_i \in [0, g_A]\}$), and $\alpha_{gB}$ equal the minimum ideal point in $[g_B, 1]$ (i.e. $\min\{\alpha_i \in [g_B, 1]\}$).
Lemma 4 A sufficient condition for an equilibrium with positive turnout in pure NE strategies is the existence of an interval on $[0, 1]$, $S^*$, such that (i) $n(0, \inf(f(S^*))) = n(\sup(S^*), 1)$ and (ii) $|\inf(f(S^*)), \sup(S^*)| = 2c$.

Proof: Take $\inf(S^*) \equiv g_A^*$ and $\sup(S^*) \equiv g_B^*$. Again, interior citizens will abstain due to indifference and exterior citizens will vote. By the same logic of Proposition 2, candidates cannot gain additional votes by moving farther away from the median (in fact they can only lose votes by doing this). If they move closer to the median, then all citizens will abstain and the candidates will remain in a tie.

Lemma 4 gives a sufficient condition for an equilibrium with positive turnout ($S^*$), but does not show when an $S^*$ exists. The following proposition shows that under fairly general conditions (no perfect overlap of policy preferences) there exists an $S^*$ that satisfies Lemma 4.

Proposition 6 A sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with positive turnout given a finite distribution of citizens is that there is no overlap in citizen’s policy preferences; i.e. $\alpha_i \neq \alpha_j \forall i \neq j$.

Proof: The proof proceeds as follows: take any $S \subset [0, 1]$ with $\inf(S) \equiv g_A$ and $\sup(S) \equiv g_B$ and $|g_A, g_B| = 2c$. I will show that, given no overlap, $S$ can always be “shifted” (I use shift to indicate a move to new interval $S'$, also with $|g'_A, g'_B| = 2c$) to increase (or decrease) $|n(g_A^*) - n(g_B^*)|$ by one. Therefore, by an induction-type argument, we can always find a set $S^*$ s.t. $|n(g_A) - n(g_B)| = 0$.

To show that $|n(g_A) - n(g_B)|$ can always be increased by one, I consider two cases
Case 1: \( g_B = \alpha_B \). Shift \( S \) rightward by less than \( \min\{[g_A, \alpha_{A+1}], [g_B, \alpha_{B+1}]\} \). \(|n(g_A) - n(g_B)|\) will increase by one since \( n(g_A) \) stays constant and \( n(g_B) \) decreases by one (\( \alpha_{g_B} \) is now in the interior).

Case 2: \( g_B \neq \alpha_B \). Shift \( S \) rightward by \( \min\{[g_A, \alpha_{A+1}], [g_B, \alpha_{B+1}] + \epsilon\} \) where \( \epsilon \) is small enough.\(^1\) If the first term is smaller, then \( n(g_A) \) increases by one and \( n(g_B) \) stays constant. If the second term is smaller then \( n(g_A) \) stays constant and \( n(g_B) \) will decrease by one.

Together, Cases 1 and 2 show that \(|n(g_A) - n(g_B)|\) can always increase by one. The proof for decreasing \(|n(g_A) - n(g_B)|\) by one is symmetric.

\( \diamond \)

Proposition 6 shows a sufficient condition on the distribution of citizen’s preferences such that an equilibrium with positive turnout exists. I argue that the condition of no overlap is actually quite general, since it will be satisfied almost surely for any finite set of citizens whose preferences are drawn from a continuous distribution.

While \( S^* \) need not be unique, note that \( n(g_A) \) and \( n(g_B) \) move in opposite directions as \( S \) is shifted. This, in turn, implies that \( \alpha_{g_A}^* \) and \( \alpha_{g_B}^* \) are unique; i.e. the set of citizens who vote will be the same for all \( S^* \).

---

\(^1\) Where \( \epsilon < \min\{||g_A + [g_B, \alpha_{B+1}]||, ||\alpha_{A+1}||, ||\alpha_{B+1}, \alpha_{B+2}||\} \) to ensure that \( n(g_A) \) stays constant and \( n(g_B) \) decreases by no more than one. Also, note that \( ||g_A + [g_B, \alpha_{B+1}]||, ||\alpha_{A+1}|| > 0 \) when \( ||g_A, \alpha_{A+1}|| > [g_B, \alpha_{B+1}] + \epsilon \).
Proof of Proposition 10

This proof extends the proof of existence in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a) to \( n \) groups, and proves uniqueness of the voting equilibrium.

**Proof of Existence:** The equilibrium at \((1/2, 1/2)\) is trivially \(\{c_l, c_m, c_r\} = \{0, 0, 0\}\). What follows deals with existence at other political positions.

Using the vote share notation \((V_k)\) allows the probability that candidate \(D\) wins the election to be written as:

\[
P_D(c_l, c_m, c_r) = G\left(\frac{V_D}{V_R}\right).
\]

Where \(G\) is the distribution of \(\frac{q_k}{q_D}\):

\[
G\left(\frac{V_D}{V_R}\right) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{V_D}{2V_R} & \text{if } \frac{V_D}{V_R} \leq 1, \\
1 - \frac{V_R}{2V_D} & \text{if } \frac{V_D}{V_R} \geq 1.
\end{cases}
\]
The ex ante payoff function for type $l$ is:

$$\beta_l(g)G\left(\frac{V_D}{V_R}\right) - E[c_l | c_l]$$

And ex ante payoff function for type $r$ is:

$$\beta_r(g)\left(1 - G\left(\frac{V_D}{V_R}\right)\right) - E[c_r | c_r]$$

The payoff functions are concave over $(0, \bar{c})$, but are not continuous at 0; for example, at the policy pair $(0, 1)$ assume $V_D > 0$ and $V_R = 0$. The payoff for type $l$ is 1 for all $V_D > 0$, but falls discontinuously to $\frac{1}{2}$ at $V_D = 0$.

To deal with this discontinuity, take a modification of the game where some motivated citizens always vote. In this game, called “$\epsilon$-election game” in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a), $q_k\lambda_l(1 - \epsilon)$ citizens follow the optimal cutoff rule, $c_l$, and $q_k\lambda_l\epsilon$ vote with certainty; this modification is only used to prove existence in the voting game. In the $\epsilon$-election game, the payoff and best response functions are continuous over the convex and compact action space $[0, \bar{c}]$, which implies the existence of an equilibrium $\{c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r\}$ for all policy pairs.

For any given policy pair, take an infinite sequence of $\epsilon$ values converging to zero. There exists a corresponding subsequence of $\{c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r\}$ that converges to $\{c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r\}$. $\{c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r\}$ will be an equilibrium in the election game as long as $V_D$ and $V_R$ are greater than zero at $\{c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r\}$. Assume for convenience that $c^*_l$ is the largest cutoff cost among types that prefer candidate $D$, and $c^*_r$ is the largest among types that prefer candidate $R$. A sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium in the
voting game is that \( c^*_l \) and \( c^*_r \) are always strictly greater than 0. This is a sufficient condition for existence even when there are \( n \) types: as long as \( V_D \) and \( V_R \) are greater than zero in the limit as \( \epsilon \to 0 \), then an equilibrium exists.

Since the payoff functions are concave, the reaction functions for types \( l \) and \( r \) are characterized by the first-order conditions:

\[
\beta_l(g) \left( \frac{V_D}{V_R} \right) \frac{\lambda_l}{V_R} - \frac{c^*_l}{c} \begin{cases} 
\leq 0 & \text{if } c^*_l = 0, \\
= 0 & \text{if } c^*_l \in (0, \bar{c}), \\
\geq 0 & \text{if } c^*_l = \bar{c}.
\end{cases}
\]

And:

\[
\beta_r(g) \left( \frac{V_D}{V_R} \right) \frac{\lambda_r V_D}{V_R^2} - \frac{c^*_r}{c} \begin{cases} 
\leq 0 & \text{if } c^*_r = 0, \\
= 0 & \text{if } c^*_r \in (0, \bar{c}), \\
\geq 0 & \text{if } c^*_r = \bar{c}.
\end{cases}
\]

Where:

\[
g\left( \frac{V_D}{V_R} \right) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{2} & \text{if } \frac{V_D}{V_R} \leq 1, \\
\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2V_D} & \text{if } \frac{V_D}{V_R} \geq 1.
\end{cases}
\]

Assume that \( c^*_l \) and \( c^*_r \) are equal to 0. Assume there exists an infinite subsequence where \( V_D \leq V_R \) for all values of \( \epsilon \); in this case the FOC\(_{c_l} \) converges to \( \infty \) as \( \epsilon \) approaches zero. This, however, contradicts the assumption that \( c^*_l \) converges to 0, since FOC\(_{c_l} \) > 0 in equilibrium only if \( c^*_l = \bar{c} \).

If no such subsequence exists, then there must exist a subsequence where \( \frac{V_D}{V_R} \geq 1 \), which implies that FOC\(_{c_r} \) converges to \( \infty \) as \( \epsilon \) approaches zero and contradicts the assumption that \( c^*_r \) converges to 0.

Assume that \( c^*_l = 0 \) and \( c^*_r > 0 \). There is an infinite subsequence such that
\[
\frac{V_D}{V_R} \leq 1. \text{ This implies that } \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \text{FOC}_{[c_t]} < 0. \text{ This is also a contradiction, since } \text{FOC}_{[c_t]} < 0 \text{ implies that } c_t^* \text{ converges to } 0. \text{ The analogous argument holds for } c_t^* > 0 \text{ and } c_t^* = 0.
\]

Together these show that \( V_D \) and \( V_R \) are bounded from zero in the limit as \( \epsilon \to 0 \).

**Proof of Uniqueness:**

\[ [g = (0, 1)]: \quad P_D(c_t^*, c_m^*, c_r^*) = \frac{\lambda_t}{2\lambda_r}. \]
\[ [g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})]: \quad P_D(c_t^*, c_m^*, c_r^*) = \frac{1}{2}. \]
\[ [g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)]: \text{ First I show that there cannot exist multiple equilibria that give the same candidate an expected plurality. Second, I show that if candidate } k \text{ wins an expected plurality in equilibrium, then no equilibrium exists where the opposing candidate wins an expected plurality.} \]

The structure of \( g(.) \) entails that the left-hand-side of the reaction function is the same for types who prefer the candidate with an expected minority, and likewise for an expected majority. That is, the reaction function for a type who prefers the candidate with an expected minority is:

\[
\frac{\beta_t(g)}{2} \lambda_t \left( \frac{c_t}{V_{maj}} \right)^2 \begin{cases} 
\leq 0 & \text{if } c_t = 0, \\
0 & \text{if } c_t \in (0, \bar{c}), \\
\geq 0 & \text{if } c_t = \bar{c}.
\end{cases}
\tag{C.1}
\]

And the reaction function for a type who prefers the candidate with an expected majority is:

\[
\frac{\beta_t(g)}{2} \lambda_t \left( \frac{c_t}{V_{maj}} \right)^2 \begin{cases} 
\leq 0 & \text{if } c_t = 0, \\
0 & \text{if } c_t \in (0, \bar{c}), \\
\geq 0 & \text{if } c_t = \bar{c}.
\end{cases}
\tag{C.2}
\]
The voting game has 2 components: the game between types who prefer the same candidate, and the game between types who prefer opposing candidates. Equations C.1 and C.2 characterize both these games. At \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) types \( l \) and \( m \) both prefer candidate \( D \). Whether in the majority or minority, for interior values, dividing the reaction functions of type \( m \) and type \( l \) gives:

\[
\frac{c_m}{c_l} = \frac{\beta_m(g)\lambda_m}{\beta_l(g)\lambda_l}
\]

This implies that the equilibrium value of \( c_m \) is a fixed proportion of \( c_l \). Corner solutions must be considered as well, but importantly the equilibrium value of \( c_m \) can be expressed as a function of the equilibrium value of \( c_l \) and the parameters of the model. Also importantly, the relationship between the cutoff costs of types who prefer the same candidate is weakly positive.

Since \( c_m \) is a function of \( c_l \), the equilibrium of the voting game can be characterized by the values of \( c_l \) and \( c_r \) that satisfy Equations C.1 and C.2. That is, the equilibrium of the game between types who prefer opposing candidates can be characterized by the strategies of two types who prefer opposing candidates. Equations C.1 and C.2 show that when candidate \( R \) has an expected majority, then \( c_l \) is a strategic complement, and \( c_r \) is a strategic substitute (and vice versa when candidate \( D \) has an expected majority).

Assume an equilibrium exists, \( \{c^*_l, c^*_m, c^*_r\} \), that gives candidate \( R \) an expected plurality (\( V^*_R > V^*_D \)). By contradiction, assume there exists another equilibrium, \( \{c^{**}_l, c^{**}_m, c^{**}_r\} \), with corresponding vote shares \( V^{**}_R \) and \( V^{**}_D \).

First I will show that \( V^{**}_R \) cannot be greater than or equal to \( V^{**}_D \). If \( c^{**}_r > c^*_r \),
then $V_D^{**} < V_D^*$. By equation C.2, however, $c_r^{**}$ cannot be a best response since $c_r^{**} > c_r^*$ and $V_D^{**} < V_D^*$. If $c_r^{**} < c_r^*$, then $V_D^{**} > V_D^*$. Again, by equation C.2 $c_r^{**}$ cannot be a best response. This shows that multiple equilibria cannot exist that give the same candidate an expected plurality.

Therefore, it must be that $V_R^{**} < V_D^{**}$ and $c_r^{**} < c_r^*$. Since $V_R$ and $V_D$ are continuous in the cutoff costs, there exists a $c_r^{**} < c_r' < c_r^*$ such that $V_R = V_D$, assuming $c'_R$ and $c'_m$ are best responses to $c'_r$.

At $\{c'_R, c'_m, c'_r\}$:

$$\frac{\beta_r(g) \lambda_r}{2 V_D} - \frac{c'_r}{\bar{c}} > 0$$

For $c_r < c'_r$, however, candidate $R$ is the minority candidate, and type $r$’s best response function is defined by equation C.1. Therefore, if $c_r^{**} < c'_r$ and $V_R^{**} < V_D^{**}$ then:

$$\frac{\beta_r(g) \lambda_r}{2 V_D} - \frac{c_r^{**}}{\bar{c}} > \frac{\beta_r(g) \lambda_r}{2 V_D} - \frac{c'_r}{\bar{c}} > 0.$$  

By equation C.1, $c_r^{**}$ cannot be a best response. This shows that an equilibrium cannot exist that gives the opposing candidate an expected plurality and completes the proof.

The same proof hold with $n$ types. The voting game can always be characterized by the cutoff costs of two types who prefer opposing candidates, and the relationship between the cutoff costs of types who prefer the same candidate is always weakly positive. Therefore, even with $n$ types, the equilibrium of the voting game can be defined by two cutoff costs that satisfy equations C.1 and C.2.

Case $(0, \frac{1}{2})$: Analogous to $(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$.
Proof of Lemma 11: First assume that the equilibrium cutoff costs are interior, so that the reaction functions are:

\[
\beta_l(g) g \left( \frac{V_D}{V_R} \right) \frac{1}{V_R} \lambda_l - c_l = 0 \tag{C.3}
\]

And

\[
\beta_r(g) g \left( \frac{V_D}{V_R} \right) \frac{V_D}{V_R^2} \lambda_r - c_r = 0 \tag{C.4}
\]

Dividing equation C.4 by equation C.3 gives:

\[
\frac{V_D}{V_R} = \frac{\beta_l(g) \lambda_l c_r}{\beta_r(g) \lambda_r c_l}
\tag{C.5}
\]

Rearranging and plugging in for \(\beta_l(g) = \beta_r(g)\), \(V_D = \lambda_l c_l\), and \(V_R = \lambda_r c_r\) at \((0, 1)\) gives:

\[
\frac{c_l}{c_r} = \frac{c_r}{c_l}
\]

Which implies that \(c_l = c_r\).

Now, assume that in equilibrium \(c_l = \bar{c}\), but that \(c_r < \bar{c}\). This implies that the left-hand-side of Equation C.3 is greater than zero. Again, dividing the reaction functions and simplifying gives:

\[
\frac{c_l}{c_r} < \frac{c_r}{c_l}
\]

This implies that \(c_l < c_r\), which is a contradiction. The same logic holds if we assume that \(c_l < \bar{c}\) and \(c_r = \bar{c}\).
Since $c_l$ is always equal to $c_r$ at $(0, 1)$:

$$P_D(0, 1) = \frac{V_D}{2V_R} \equiv \frac{\lambda_l c_l}{2 \lambda_r c_r} = \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}$$

Proof of Proposition 12: I prove Proposition 12 by proving the following two results:

**Result 24.** If $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \leq \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}$ then $P_R(0, \frac{1}{2}) \leq 1 - \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}$.

**Result 25.** If $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) > \frac{1}{2}$ then $P_D(0, \frac{1}{2}) < \frac{1}{2}$.

Given Lemma 11 and Results 1 and 2, the equilibrium of the candidates’ game can be determined by the value of $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$:

- If $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \leq \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}$ then the equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $g = (0, 1)$; candidate $D$’s probability of winning is higher at $g = (0, 1)$ than at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ and, by Result 1, candidate $R$’s probability of winning is higher at $g = (0, 1)$ than at $g = (0, \frac{1}{2})$.

- If $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \in (\frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}, \frac{1}{2}]$ then the equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$; candidate $D$’s probability of winning is higher at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ than at $g = (0, 1)$ and candidate $R$’s probability of winning is higher at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ than at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$.

- If $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) > \frac{1}{2}$ then the equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$; candidate $R$’s probability of winning is higher at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ than at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$.
and, by Result 2, candidate D’s probability of winning is higher at \( g = \left( \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} \right) \) than at \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \).

This shows that, given Results 1 and 2, a unique equilibrium of the candidates game exists for all values of \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \).

**Interior equilibria:** First I will prove both Results when all cutoff costs are interior at \( g = \left( \frac{1}{2}, 1 \right) \) and \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \).

Since all cutoff costs are interior:

\[
c_m = \frac{\beta_m(g) \lambda_m c_t}{\beta_t(g) \lambda_t c_t},
\]

where \( t = l \) for \( g = \left( \frac{1}{2}, 1 \right) \), and \( t = r \) for \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \).

Taking the case of \( g = \left( \frac{1}{2}, 1 \right) \), plugging in for \( c_m \) in equation C.5 allows us to solve for \( c_r \):

\[
\frac{c_r}{c_l} = \frac{\beta_r(g)^{1/2}}{\beta_t(g) \lambda_t} \left[ \beta_t(g) \lambda_t^2 + \beta_m(g) \lambda_m^2 \right]^{1/2}.
\]

Plugging this solution back into Equation C.5 (and plugging in for the values of \( \beta_t(g) \)) gives:

\[
\frac{V_D}{V_R} = \left[ \frac{\left( \frac{1}{2} - v \right) \lambda_l^2 + \left( \frac{1}{2} + v \right) \lambda_m^2}{\left( \frac{1}{2} + v \right) \lambda_r^2} \right]^{1/2} \text{ at } g = \left( \frac{1}{2}, 1 \right) \quad (C.6)
\]

Following the same process for \( (0, \frac{1}{2}) \) gives:

\[
\frac{V_D}{V_R} = \left[ \frac{\left( \frac{1}{2} + v \right) \lambda_l^2}{\left( \frac{1}{2} - v \right) \lambda_r^2 + \left( \frac{1}{2} + v \right) \lambda_m^2} \right]^{1/2} \text{ at } g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \quad (C.7)
\]

Equations C.6 and C.7 allow us to prove Results 1 and 2 for interior equilibria.

**Result 1:** I will show that if \( P_R(0, \frac{1}{2}) > 1 - \frac{\lambda}{2\lambda_r} \) then \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) > \frac{\lambda}{2\lambda_r} \), which implies…

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Result 1. By contradiction, assume that $P_R(0, \frac{1}{2}) > 1 - \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}$ and $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \leq \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}$.

By equation C.7, since $P_R(0, \frac{1}{2}) > \frac{1}{2}$:

$$P_R(0, \frac{1}{2}) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_l^2}{(\frac{1}{2} - v)\lambda_l^2 + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_m^2} \right]^{1/2}.$$ 

And since $P_R(0, \frac{1}{2}) > 1 - \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}$ then:

$$1 - \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_l^2}{(\frac{1}{2} - v)\lambda_l^2 + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_m^2} \right]^{1/2} > 1 - \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r},$$

which simplifies to:

$$\left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} + v)}{(\frac{1}{2} - v) + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\frac{\lambda_m}{\lambda_l}} \right]^{1/2} < 1 \tag{C.8}$$

By equation C.6, since $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) < \frac{1}{2}$:

$$P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} - v)\lambda_l^2 + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_m^2}{(\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_l^2} \right]^{1/2}$$

And since $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \leq \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r}$ then:

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} - v)\lambda_l^2 + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_m^2}{(\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_l^2} \right]^{1/2} \leq \frac{\lambda_l}{2 \lambda_r},$$

which simplifies to:

$$\left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} + v)}{(\frac{1}{2} - v) + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\frac{\lambda_m}{\lambda_l}} \right]^{1/2} \geq 1$$

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Since $\lambda_l < \lambda_r$, this equation implies that:

$$\left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} + v)}{(\frac{1}{2} - v) + (\frac{1}{2} + v) \frac{\lambda^2}{\lambda^r}} \right]^{1/2} \geq 1,$$

which contradicts equation C.8.

**Result 2:** By contradiction, assume that $P_R(\frac{1}{2}, 1) < \frac{1}{2}$ and $P_D(0, \frac{1}{2}) \geq \frac{1}{2}$. By Equation C.6, $P_R(\frac{1}{2}, 1) < \frac{1}{2}$ implies that:

$$P_R(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ (\frac{1}{2} - v) \lambda^2_l + (\frac{1}{2} + v) \lambda^2_m \right]^{1/2}.$$

Since $P_D(0, \frac{1}{2}) > \frac{1}{2}$, $P_D(0, \frac{1}{2}) = 1 - \frac{V_R}{2V_D} < \frac{V_D}{2V_R}$ which, by Equation C.7, implies that:

$$P_D(0, \frac{1}{2}) < \frac{1}{2} \left[ (\frac{1}{2} - v) \lambda^2_l + (\frac{1}{2} + v) \lambda^2_m \right]^{1/2}.$$

And since $\lambda_l < \lambda_r$, these equations imply that $P_D(0, \frac{1}{2}) < P_R(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, which is a contradiction.

**Non-interior equilibria:** Now I must show that the same result holds for non-interior solutions. First, I show that when two types strictly prefer the same candidate, these two types set lower cutoff costs in equilibrium than the opposing type. Take $t_1 = r$ at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ and $t_1 = l$ at $g = (0, \frac{1}{2})$, so that $t_1$ prefers one candidate, and $t_2$ and $t_3$ prefer the opposing candidate.

**Fact 1:** If the equilibrium of the voting game at $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ or $g = (0, \frac{1}{2})$ is interior, then $c_{t_1} > c_{t_2}, c_{t_3}$.

Dividing the reaction function for type $t_1$ by the reaction function for type $t_j$ with
\( j \in \{2, 3\} \) and rearranging gives:

\[
\frac{c_{t1}}{c_{tj}} = \left[ \frac{\beta_{t1}(g)}{\beta_{tj}(g)} \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_{t-1}(g) \lambda_{t-1}}{\beta_{tj}(g) \lambda_{tj}} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{2}},
\]

where \( -j = \{1, 2\} \setminus j \). Since \( \frac{\beta_{t1}(g)}{\beta_{tj}(g)} \) is greater or equal to one, \( \frac{c_{t1}}{c_{tj}} \) is strictly greater than 1, which proves Fact 1.

For following part of the proof, it will be useful to consider comparative statics on \( \bar{c} \). Therefore, for the remainder of the proof of Proposition 12, I label the parameter value of \( c \) as \( \bar{c}_p \), and consider \( \bar{c} \) as variable.

**Fact 2:** For \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) or \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \): if the equilibrium of the voting game is not interior at \( \bar{c}_p \), there exists a some \( \bar{c}' > \bar{c}_p \) such that the equilibrium of the voting game is interior; if the equilibrium of the voting game is interior at \( \bar{c}_p \), there exists a some \( \bar{c}' < \bar{c}_p \) such that \( c_{t1} = \bar{c}' \).

First I will show the existence of \( \bar{c}' \). By the best response functions, \( c_{t1} = \bar{c} \) only if:

\[
1 \leq \frac{\beta_{t1}(g)V_{\text{min}}}{2\lambda_{t1}\bar{c}^2}
\]

Since \( V_{\text{min}} \) bounded above by \( \bar{c}(\lambda_{t2} + \lambda_{t3}) \), there exists some \( \bar{c}' > \bar{c} \) where the left-hand side of the inequality is smaller than one and the equilibrium of the voting game is interior.

\[
1 \leq \frac{\beta_{t1}(g)\lambda_{t1}}{2V_{\text{maj}}}
\]

Since \( V_{\text{maj}} > \lambda_{t1}\bar{c} \) (\( t_1 \) is the minority type), there exists some \( \bar{c}' > \bar{c} \) where the left-hand side of the inequality is smaller than one and the equilibrium of the voting game is interior.
Next I will show the existence of $\bar{c}''$. If the equilibrium is interior then $\frac{c_t}{\bar{c}} \leq 1$, and by the best response functions:

$$1 \geq \frac{\beta_t(g)\lambda_t}{2V_{maj}} \left[ \frac{V_{min}}{V_{maj}} \right]$$

Since $\left[ \frac{V_{min}}{V_{maj}} \right]$ is constant for an interior equilibrium and $V_{maj} < \bar{c}\lambda_t$, however, there exists a $\bar{c}'' < \bar{c}$ such that the right-hand side of the inequality is greater than one and $c_t = \bar{c}''$. Similarly:

$$1 \geq \frac{\beta_t(g)\lambda_t}{2V_{maj}}$$

Since $V_{maj}$ bounded above by $\bar{c}(\lambda_t+\lambda_{t_2})$, there exists a $\bar{c}'' < \bar{c}$ such that the righthand side of the inequality is greater than one and $c_t = \bar{c}''$. This proves Fact 2.

Since the equilibrium cutoff costs are continuous in $\bar{c}$, Facts 1 and 2 show that if the equilibrium of the voting game is non-interior, then $t_1 = \bar{c}$. Returning to the proof for non-interior solutions, if $c_r = \bar{c}$ at $(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, then at the equilibrium of the voting game:

$$\frac{V_D}{V_R} = \left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} - v)\lambda_r^2 + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_m^2}{2\bar{c}^2\lambda_r^2} \right]^{1/2} \text{ at } g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \quad (C.9)$$

And if $c_l = \bar{c}$ at $(0, \frac{1}{2})$, then:

$$\frac{V_D}{V_R} = \left[ \frac{(\frac{1}{2} - v)\lambda_r^2 + (\frac{1}{2} + v)\lambda_m^2}{2\bar{c}^2\lambda_l^2} \right]^{1/2} \text{ at } g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \quad (C.10)$$

Equations C.9 and C.10 have a very similar structure to the equations C.6 and C.7 (which were used to prove Results 1 and 2 for interior equilibria), swapping only
\( (\frac{1}{2} + v) \) for \( 2\bar{c}^2 \) in the denominator of the term in brackets. It is therefore possible to manipulate equations C.9 and C.10 to prove Results 1 and 2 just as Equations C.6 and C.7 were used to prove the Results for interior equilibria.

It remains to be shown that Results 1 and 2 hold when one equilibrium of the voting game is interior. Fact 2 shows that for some \( \bar{c} \), the equilibria of the voting game will be non-interior for both \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) and \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \). Take \( \bar{c}_y \) to be the largest \( \bar{c} \) such that both equilibria are non-interior. Also, for some \( \bar{c} \) greater than \( \bar{c}_y \), the equilibria of the voting game is interior for both \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) and \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \). Take \( \bar{c}_x \) to be the smallest \( \bar{c} \) such that both equilibria are interior.

For \( \bar{c} \in (\bar{c}_y, \bar{c}_x) \) the equilibrium of the voting game is either interior for \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) and non-interior for \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \), or non-interior for \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) and interior for \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \). Consider the case where the equilibrium of the voting game is interior for \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) and non-interior for \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \). For \( \bar{c} \in (\bar{c}_y, \bar{c}_x) \), \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) is constant and by equation C.10, \( P_D(0, \frac{1}{2}) \) is decreasing. Therefore, since Results 1 and 2 hold for at \( \bar{c}_y \) and \( \bar{c}_x \), they also hold for \( \bar{c} \in (\bar{c}_y, \bar{c}_x) \). The case where the equilibrium of the voting game is non-interior for \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) and interior for \( g = (0, \frac{1}{2}) \) is analogous.

\( \diamond \)

**Proof of Proposition 13:** As I show in the proof of Proposition 12, the equilibrium of the candidates’ game depends on the value of \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \): if \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \leq \frac{\lambda_l + \lambda_m}{2\lambda_r} \), then \( g^* = (0, 1) \); if \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \in (\frac{\lambda_l + \lambda_m}{2\lambda_r}, \frac{1}{2}] \), then \( g^* = (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \); and if \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) > \frac{1}{2} \), then \( g^* = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) \).

First, I will show that \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r} \) for some \( \bar{c}_x \), and that \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) for some \( \bar{c}_y > \bar{c}_x \). Then I will show that \( \partial P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)/\partial \bar{c} \leq 0 \). Together, these imply
that $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ decreases continuously from $\frac{\lambda_l}{2\lambda_r}$ to $\hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ as $\bar{c}$ increases from $\bar{c}_x$ to $\bar{c}_y$, which proves the Proposition.

Fact 2 from the proof of Proposition 12 implies that the equilibrium of the voting game is interior for some $\bar{c}'$ high enough. Since the equilibrium at $\bar{c}'$ is interior, $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ (this proves the existence of a $\bar{c}_y$, but I define $\bar{c}_y$ more precisely below). Also by Fact 2, there exists a $\bar{c} < \bar{c}'$ such that $c_r = \bar{c}$. Take $\bar{c}_y$ to be the maximum $\bar{c}$ such that $c_r = \bar{c}$. By continuity, at $\bar{c}_y P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$.

When $c_r = \bar{c}$ the best response functions of types $l$ and $m$ simplify to:

$$c_t = \max \left\{ \bar{c}, \frac{\beta_l(g) \lambda_l}{\lambda_r} \right\}$$

This equation shows that $c_l = c_m = \bar{c}$ for some $\bar{c}_x < \bar{c}_y$. Since all motivated citizens vote at $\bar{c}_x$, $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \frac{\lambda_l + \lambda_m}{2\lambda_r}$.

When $c_r = \bar{c}$, equation C.9 shows that $\partial P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)/\partial \bar{c} \leq 0$. Therefore, $\partial P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)/\partial \bar{c} \leq 0$ for $\bar{c} < \bar{c}_y$. Lastly, since $\bar{c}_y$ is the maximum $\bar{c}$ such that $c_r = \bar{c}$, all cutoffs costs are interior and $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \hat{P}_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ for $\bar{c} > \bar{c}_y$.

\[ \diamond \]

**Proof of Proposition 14:** $[s_1]$ Propositions 10 and 10 and Lemma 11 hold for $s < 0$. Take $s^* < s \leq -(\frac{1}{2} - v)$. If $g = (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ then $c_l = 0$, since $\beta_l(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = (\frac{1}{2} - v)$ is lower than the lowest net cost of voting. Since no type $l$ votes, $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) = \frac{\lambda_m}{2\lambda_r}$. Therefore, for $s^* < s \leq -(\frac{1}{2} - v)$ $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ is strictly lower than $P_D(0, 1)$, and the equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $g = (0, 1)$. Since $P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ is continuous in $s$, there exists some maximum $s_1 > -(\frac{1}{2} - v)$ such that for all $s \in (s^*, s_1]$ the equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $g = (0, 1)$. 109
[s_2] Take \( s' < \bar{c} \) such that \( (\lambda_l + \lambda_m) s' = \lambda_r \bar{c} \). Such an \( s \) exists since \( \lambda_l + \lambda_m > \lambda_r \).

For all \( s \in [s', \bar{c}] \) \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) is strictly greater than \( P_D(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) \), and the equilibrium of the candidates’ game is \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) \). Again by continuity, there exists some minimum \( s_2 < s' \) such that for all \( s \in (s_2, \infty) \) the equilibrium of the candidates’ game is \( g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) \).

\( \diamond \)

C.1 Appendix B

C.1.1 The case for diminishing intensity of political preferences:

Diminishing intensity of political preferences translates into citizen utility functions over the political space that are convex, while increasing intensity of political preferences implies concavity. Increasing intensity of political preference (concave utility) implies that citizens with extreme preferences are very sensitive to differences in moderate candidates. Because of this thought experiment, leading scholars in the area of voting such as Osborne (1995) have expressed doubt as to whether concave utility is the appropriate assumption. The distinction between concave and convex utility (given fixed candidate positions), however, is empirically mute in most elections since voters choose between only two viable candidates.\(^1\) Congressional and presidential elections in US provide an exception, however, since parties use primary elections to choose which candidates will stand in the general election. With this two-stage election procedure, the shape of utility is empirical relevant to voting patterns, even assuming fixed candidate positions.

\(^1\) See Cox (1994) for a formal discussion of Duverger’s law.
I construct a thought experiment which asks whether voting patterns in primary elections are consistent with convex or concave utility. Consider the following stylized example of a citizen, $i$, with a political ideal point in the left of the political space who is participating in the primary elections. The voter can vote in either the Republican or the Democratic primary, but only in one.\footnote{Which is the case in most US states; some states even hold open primary elections, which do not require a citizen to be registered for a party to vote in that party’s primary.} The Democratic candidates, \{A, B\}, are the same distance apart as the Republican candidates, \{C, D\}. Assume, for the purpose of illustration, that regardless of who contests the general election, the Democratic and Republican candidates have the same chance of winning. This example is illustrated below in Figure 1:

**Figure 1:**

If voter $i$ has concave utility, as illustrated above, then the outcome of the Republican primary is more important to $i$ than the outcome of the Democratic primary ($x < y$ above). Therefore, if $i$’s vote carries equal weight in both primaries, then $i$ will choose to vote in the Republican primary, and vote for the moderate Republican
While this is a very stylized example, the same logic would hold in a more fully specified model of elections with primaries. If citizens have increasing intensity of political preferences, then a significant proportion of partisan citizens would “hedge” in primary elections by voting for a more moderate candidate in the opposing partisan primary election when both the primary election and the general election is competitive. This result is not consistent with the empirical evidence on crossover voting. Voters in primary elections crossover when their first choice candidate is in the opposing party’s primary, or when a vote in the opposing primary is considered to carry greater weight (Alvarez and Nagler (1997)). For example, crossover voting by Democrats occurs if a candidate is a “shoe-in” for the Democratic nomination, or if the Republican party’s candidate is considered a shoe-in for the general election, making a vote in the Democratic primary superfluous (a recent legal decision in Idaho, where the Republican candidate almost always wins, closed primaries to prevent this type of crossover voting). Therefore, while there is evidence of strategic crossover voting, it is not consistent with the hedging in competitive elections that concave preferences predict.

C.1.2 A continuous political space:

In the above analysis, I have assumed that candidates choose to run either as partisans or centrists. A more realistic model would include a more dense political space, but sacrifices analytical ease and the ability to unambiguously compare convexity between different utility functions. Additionally, a more dense political space results in nonexistence of an equilibrium in pure strategies in the candidates’ game for cer-
tain parameter values. The proofs of Propositions 3 and 4, however, show that the main result of political convergence holds even with a continuous political space.

Take the following modifications to the model: candidate $D$ sets $g_D \in [0, \frac{1}{2}]$, and candidate $R$ sets $g_R \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$. Also, $u_i(\hat{g} - \eta_i)$ is defined over $[0, 1]$, and is decreasing, differentiable and convex.

**Corollary 26.** There exists a $\bar{c}_1$ such that the unique equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ for all $\bar{c} \in [0, \bar{c}_1]$.

There exists a subsidy, $s_2$, such that the unique equilibrium of the candidates’ game is $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ for all $s \geq s_2$.

The proof of Proposition 13 shows that as long as $g_D = \frac{1}{2}$ and $g_R > \frac{1}{2}$ there exists a $\bar{c}_1$ so that candidate $D$ wins an expected plurality for all $\bar{c}$ lower than $\bar{c}_1$. The same is true for if $g_D < \frac{1}{2}$ and $g_R = \frac{1}{2}$. This implies that $g = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ is an equilibrium for $\bar{c} < \bar{c}_1$, and that for any $g \neq (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ at least one candidate has a best response to deviate to $g_k = \frac{1}{2}$. The proof of $s_2$ follows directly from the proof in Proposition 14.
Appendix D
Proofs for Chapter 4

Proof of Lemma 15

First I prove the result that citizens’ preferences are single peaked in $x_u$. To demonstrate this result, I first solve for the equilibrium value of $x_n$ as a function of $x_u$. I then show that an induced ideal point of $x_u$ exists for each citizen, and that the citizen’s utility is globally smaller for any $x_u$ greater or smaller than the induced ideal point.

Take $\tilde{x}_n$ to be the solution to:

$$g_1'(x_u + \tilde{x}_n) + g_3'(\tilde{x}_n) = \alpha_n$$

In the second stage, given $x_u$, the national median sets $x_n$ so that:

$$\begin{cases} w'(||\bar{x}, \bar{x}^m||) + g_1'(x_u + x_n) + g_3'(x_n) = \alpha_n & \text{if } \tilde{x}_n + x_u > \bar{x}^m, \\ x_n = \tilde{x}_n & \text{if } \tilde{x}_n + x_u \leq \bar{x}^m. \end{cases}$$
I denote this function $x_n^u(x_u)$

In the first stage, citizens have induced preferences over \{x_u, x_n^u(x_u)\}; that is, $U_n^d(x_u, x_n, x_d) = U_n^d(x_u, x_n^u(x_u), x_d)$ Take $\tilde{x}_u$ to be the solution to:

$$g_1'(\tilde{x}_u) + g_2'(\tilde{x}_u) = \alpha_u$$

Citizens ideal points of $x_u, \hat{x}_u$, are in $[0, \tilde{x}_u]$. That is, citizens never prefer a level of $x_u$ higher than the level where spillover benefits equal spillover costs. Since the induced utility function is bounded and continuous, a maximum exists. Moreover, since $g_2'(0) = \infty$, the maximum is interior (in $(0, \tilde{x}_u]$).

Since the solution is interior, the derivative of $U_n^d(\hat{x}_u, x_n^u(x_u), x_d)$ with respect to $x_u$ is decreasing:

$$w'(|(\hat{x}_u + x_n) - \bar{x}^d|)(1 + x_n^u(\hat{x}_u)) + g_1'(\hat{x}_u + x_n)(1 + x_n^u(\hat{x}_u)) + g_2'(\hat{x}_u) + g_3'(x_n^u(\hat{x}_u))x_n^u(\hat{x}_u) - \alpha_u - \alpha_n x_n^u(\hat{x}_u) \leq 0$$

I divide the derivative of $U_n^d(x_u, x_n^u(x_u), x_d)$ with respect to $x_u$ into a direct effect:

$$w'(|(x_u + x_n) - \bar{x}^d|) + g_1'(x_u + x_n) + g_2'(x_u) - \alpha_u \tag{D.1}$$

And an indirect effect:

$$(w'(|(x_u + x_n) - \bar{x}^d|) + g_1'(x_u + x_n) + g_3'(x_n^u(x_u)) - \alpha_n)x_n^u(x_u)$$

From the national median’s maximization problem, however, we have:

$$-w'(|(x_u + x_n) - \bar{x}^m|) = g_1'(x_u + x_n) + g_3'(x_n^u(x_u)) - \alpha_n$$
Which allows us to simplify the indirect effect to:

\[
(w'(|(x_u + x_n) - \bar{x}^d|) - w'(|(x_u + x_n) - \bar{x}^m|)) x_n^m(x_u)
\]

(D.2)

For \(x_u \succ \hat{x}_u\) the direct effect is smaller (more negative) since the spillover effects are be increasing at a decreasing rate (\(g\) is concave) and the derivative of \(w\) is decreasing as well. The indirect effect is also smaller: since \(w^m\) and \(g^m\) are negative, the absolute value of \((w'(|(x_u + x_n^*(x_u)) - \bar{x}^d|) - w'(|(x_u + x_n^*(x_u)) - \bar{x}^m|))\) and \(x_n^m(x_u)\) are both decreasing with \(x_u\), which implies that their sum in decreasing as well. This shows that the derivative of \(U^d_n(x_u, x_n^*(x_u), x_d)\) with respect to \(x_u\) decreasing in \(x_u\). Since the derivative is negative at \(\hat{x}_u\), this implies that the derivative of \(U^d_n(x_u, x_n^*(x_u), x_d)\) with respect to \(x_u\) is negative for all \(x_u > \hat{x}_u\). Similarly, it can be shown that the derivative of \(U^d_n(x_u, x_n^*(x_u), x_d)\) with respect to \(x_u\) is positive for all \(x_u < \hat{x}_u\), which proves that preferences are single-peaked.

Lastly, I show that \(\hat{x}_u^d\) are ordered by \(\bar{x}^d\) within any nation. By contradiction, assume that \(\hat{x}_u^l \succ \hat{x}_u^m\). Since \(g(x_u, x_n)\) is the same for citizens \(l\) and \(m\), given any fixed amount of \(\bar{x}\), both \(l\) and \(m\)'s utility will be maximized at the levels of \(x_u\) and \(x_n\) where \(g_2'(x_u) - \alpha_u = g_3'(x_n) - \alpha_n\). Take \(x_n^m(x_u)\) equal to the value of \(x_n\) (given \(x_u\)), where \(g_2'(x_u) - \alpha_u = g_3'(x_n) - \alpha_n\). This ideal division between \(x_u\) and \(x_n\) is only achieved at \(\hat{x}_u^m\): for \(x_u < x_n^m(x_u)\), \(g_2'(x_u) - \alpha_u > g_3'(x_n) - \alpha_n\); and for \(x_u > x_n^m(x_u)\), \(g_2'(x_u) - \alpha_u > g_3'(x_n) - \alpha_n\).

Take \(X\) to be the set of \(\{x_u, x_n^*(x_u)\}\). \(l\)'s unconstrained ideal pair \(\{x_u, x_n\}\) is in \(X\) and \(x_u < \hat{x}_u^m\). Moreover, \(l\)'s preferences over \(X\) are single peaked. Therefore, since
\{\hat{x}^m_u, x_n(\hat{x}^m_u)\} \in X:

\{\hat{x}^m_u, x_n(\hat{x}^m_u)\} >_I \{x'_u, x_n(x'_u)\},

where \(x'_u + x_n(x'_u) = \hat{x}^l_u + x_n(\hat{x}^l_u)\).

Since \(g'_2(\hat{x}^l_u) - \alpha_u > g'_3(x_n(\hat{x}^l_u)) - \alpha_n\), however:

\{x'_u, x_n(x'_u)\} >_I \{\hat{x}^l_u, x_n(\hat{x}^l_u)\},

Together, these imply that:

\{\hat{x}^m_u, x_n(\hat{x}^m_u)\} >_I \{\hat{x}^l_u, x_n(\hat{x}^l_u)\}

which is a contradiction.
Bibliography


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Biography

1. Justin Sage Mattias Valasek


3. BA from University of Oregon, Masters in Economics from Duke University, PhD in Economics from Duke University

1. Entered the realm of the Fae at age 15 and spent 5 years there, only to come out a day later. Therefore we estimate his real age at the time of this transcript to be 34, rather than the 29 years his birthdate would suggest.