Military Institutions and State Formation in the Hellenistic Kingdoms

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University

2012
ABSTRACT

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the history of the military institutions of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The kingdoms emerged after years of war-fighting, and the capacity to wage war remained central to state formation in the Hellenistic Age (323-31 B.C.). The creation of institutions and recruitment of populations sufficient to field large armies took a great deal more time and continual effort than has generally been imagined. By bringing documentary evidence into contact with the meta-narratives of the Hellenistic period, and by addressing each of the major powers of the Hellenistic world, this project demonstrates the contingencies and complexities within the kingdoms and their armies. In so doing, it offers both a fresh perspective on the peoples and polities that inhabited the Hellenistic world after Alexander and a much-revised narrative of the process by which Alexander’s successors built kingdoms and waged war. Inheritors of extensive political and military traditions, they were forced to reshape them in their new and volatile context, eventually establishing large and powerful kingdoms and armies that dominated the eastern Mediterranean and Near East for over one hundred years.

The early model of Hellenistic kingship was based on military successes and martial valor. It found a complement in the burgeoning mercenary market of the early Hellenistic period, which allowed Alexander’s generals to field massive armies without
relying on complex military institutions for recruitment and mobilization. As years of continual warfare stressed populations and war chests, several new kings, crowned in the era of war, sought to end their reliance on mercenaries by developing core territories, settling soldiers, and constructing powerful military institutions. These institutions did not develop seamlessly or quickly, and often functioned awkwardly in many of the locales that had recently come under Macedonian rule, whether in the cities of Syria or along the Nile valley in Egypt. My project involves several detailed studies of military mobilization during the Hellenistic period, as a way to analyze the structures and evaluate the successes of the kingdoms’ respective military institutions.

I employ methodologies from both history and classical studies, moving between technical work with papyrological, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence, close reading of ancient texts, and comparative analysis of narrative and documentary texts, while drawing upon the large historiographies of each of the largest kingdoms. One of this dissertation’s contributions is in making comparisons between these spaces and across time, when much of Hellenistic history has trended toward ever-greater partition. The papyrological material, in particular, permits the greatest access into both the social activities of individuals and the particular elements of human, legal, and customary infrastructure within a Hellenistic state, though it has rarely been used outside of particularly Ptolemaic histories. My dissertation argues against Egyptian exceptionalism, and offers a Hellenistic history drawn from the full array of available
sources. Part of the narrative of Egyptian exceptionalism developed from the perception that it was in some sense less traditionally Macedonian than the other two kingdoms. A careful reading of the evidence indicates instead that in the violent and multi-polar world of the Hellenistic age, military identity was very flexible, and had been since the time of Alexander. Additionally, the strict adherence of the other kingdoms to the Macedonian way of war ended in defeat at the hands of the Romans, while the Ptolemies in Egypt innovated counterinsurgent activities that preserved their power in the wealthiest region of the Mediterranean.
To my wife, Laura,
for her support in the writing process
in our first year of marriage,
Ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε πίπτει.
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Map 1. Regions of the Eastern Mediterranean
Map 2. Key Cities and Locations of the Hellenistic Near East
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Introduction: The Significance of Military Institutions in the History of the Hellenistic Kingdoms

“It is neither descent nor law which gives monarchies to men, but the ability to command an army and to handle affairs with intelligence, as was the case with ... the Successors of Alexander.”
-Suda, s.v.basileia (B’147)

“‘Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!’
Nothing beside remains.”
-Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Ozymandias”

At the turn of the second century BC, an agrarian revolt broke out in Egypt, home territory of the Ptolemaic kingdom. The Ptolemies were one of several Hellenistic dynasties that arose out of the dissolution of Alexander the Great’s empire. The revolt put the Ptolemies and their army in a particularly dangerous position by threatening the fundamental structures underlying Ptolemaic military institutions. The Ptolemaic army was organized in imitation of Alexander’s own force, meant for conventional war, and the bulk of it was mobilized from and supplied by an extensive agricultural system stretching along the Nile valley. The revolt threatened the state and military institutions that sustained the army; conventional military action threatened only to extend the damage. The Ptolemaic response succeeded in suppressing the revolt effectively, following the most extensive reforms implemented by any Hellenistic kingdom. The Hellenistic kingdoms arose within the context of endemic warfare in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries BC: the Ptolemies in Egypt, Antigonids in Macedonia, and Seleucids in Asia. Within these kingdoms, the construction of military institutions tells much of
the story of state formation, and the continual modification of these institutions reveals much about the weaknesses and strengths of the Hellenistic kingdoms.

This study takes as a fundamental assumption that the purpose of a Hellenistic kingdom’s military institutions was to mobilize armies. This should seem fairly obvious, and yet there has not been much sustained inquiry into mobilization as a key factor in Hellenistic military institutions. This dissertation corrects that. The kingdoms were built out of mercenary armies, plundered wealth, scraps of legitimacy, and the remnants of previous empires’ administrations. The language of kingdoms and states can convey a sense of completion, as if whole armies, military institutions, and other elements of a kingdom sprang into existence the moment kings were crowned. The periodization of Hellenistic history by historians and classicists has only exacerbated this problem, as few histories follow the process of state-formation from the fourth century into the second, obfuscating continuities and complications.

This study shows that the development of military institutions that could mobilize armies effectively was a continual process, driven more by necessity than the kings’ rapacity. I deploy three criteria—legitimacy, stability, and proficiency—to structure my evaluation of this significant component within Hellenistic state formation. Military institutions, armies, and warfare all contributed in different ways to the legitimacy of the state, and of the king in particular. Systems of administration, settlement, conscription, and mobilization promoted the stability of military institutions.
And success on these two fronts ultimately mattered only so far as an army’s ability to fulfill the kingdom’s military needs, particularly on the battlefield by defeating enemy armies. These three criteria cover the necessary qualities of Hellenistic military institutions, and provide a basis for comparisons between kingdoms and for tracking change over time.

This study examines military settlements, reforms, and warfare, through the three categories of legitimacy, stability, and proficiency, to revise the prevailing narrative of state formation in the Hellenistic Successor kingdoms. By placing the metanarrative(s) of Hellenistic history in dialogue with primary evidence, I demonstrate the centrality of military projects to the identity, successes, and failures of Hellenistic polities, and in many places correct and contextualize the story of the Successor States. In reconstructing this story, two themes recur. First, repeated cycles of modification, expansion, and reform characterize the Hellenistic kingdoms’ pursuit of an ideal military. The kingdoms were not static, and seldom particularly stable, as real capacity, emulation of Alexander, and the changing requirements of Hellenistic warfare required continual recalibration. Second, this study highlights the considerable opportunities for non-Macedonian and non-Greek soldiers to become part of the dominant class, a significant contribution to the prevalent historiographical tradition of the Hellenistic kingdoms’ Macedonian domination of Asiatic or Egyptian (or even Greek) native populations. In fact, this process of incorporation is shown to have been necessary from
the beginning of the Hellenistic period, and formed an important aspect of Hellenistic authority in all three kingdoms.

Hellenistic histories have long recognized the significance of warfare in that age, begun and ended as it was by the conquests of Alexander and the Roman Republic.¹ This does not mean that there has been a great deal of rigorous scholarship on the place of war and military institutions within Hellenistic history. Military histories of the period have been dominated by operational studies and “great-man” history, including an un-ending stream of biographies of Alexander the Great. There have also been a number of significant contributions in the form of social histories of armies and institutional studies of the various systems within Hellenistic warfare, and, more recently, several attempts at social and cultural histories of aspects of Hellenistic warfare.² These represent the advent of New Military History, or War and Society


² Tarn (1930), Griffith (1935), Launey (1949-50), Lévêque (1968), and Garlan (1984) and (1999) are standard works on Hellenistic military history. Launey’s two-volume study of military institutions, in particular, remains essential, though dated. Pritchett’s The Greek State at War (1971-91) is a fundamental work for ancient military history, but like much Greek-oriented ancient military history, is focused on the Classical Age and the Greek city-states. For the expansion of New Military History in Hellenistic subjects, see Austin’s work on kingship, economics and warfare (1986), the edited volume by Couvenhes (2004), and especially Chaniotis’ socio-cultural approach to aspects of Hellenistic warfare (2005), as well as more recent entries in the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, vol. 1 (2007), particularly the entries by Hanson (3-21), though he largely ignores the Hellenistic era in offering a summary of the historiography of ancient military history, Billows (303-24), Sekunda (325-56), and Lendon’s social history (in fact far more a cultural history) of Mediterranean warfare in the third and second centuries (498-516). On Macedonian subjects, see
history, into the broad and much sub-divided field of Hellenistic history. This study presents a thorough and critical history of military institutions, informed by modern scholarship in its close attention to texts and its emphasis on the activities of individuals within the creation and operation of institutions.

There are several important areas of historiography, in addition to histories of warfare, upon which this work relies heavily, tied as it is to state formation. One of these is the large historiography on Hellenistic kingship, and particularly the ties it had with the army and with warfare. The Hellenistic kings were originally warring, non-royal, often treacherous generals, who adapted their models of kingship from Macedonian tradition. Their own origins, and their model for kingship, tied their fortunes closely both to their armies and to the battlefield itself. There are a number of significant works on the origins and operations of Hellenistic political, military, and economic institutions,

and many of these lay the foundation for my own analysis. However, few have recognized the central importance of military recruitment and mobilization within the structure, operation, and function of the Hellenistic state. The kingdoms were complex structures, exerting coercive rule over subsets of the populations through many different potential associations with the monarchy or with Hellenism. Hardly monolithic states, the kingdoms negotiated power by legal tradition, economic activity, military force, and the lived activities of individuals who constituted parts of the institutions themselves.

The kingdoms’ relationships with large Greek cities or Greek federations have been a productive area for recent analysis, encourage a better understanding of the contingency of royal authority, and raise further questions about the relationship between language and performance on the one hand, and coercive power on the other.

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4 On Hellenistic states the classic works are Tscherikower (1926) and Ehrenberg (1969: 135-240). More recently, see Hammond (2000), Ellis (1970) and (1976), and Errington (1974) and (1978) on the pre-Hellenistic Macedonian state and its relationship with Hellenistic state formation. See Billows (1995) on colonization and state formation in the early Hellenistic era, Jouguet (1928) on the formation of strong central rule under the monarchies, and especially Préaux (1978) for the tensions between city and country, between Greeks and the East, and the construction of institutions in the eastern kingdoms that balanced those tensions. See Cohen (1983), (1991), (1995), and (2006) on colonization and city foundation as a function of state formation, though note the latter two are mainly collections of resources. Much recent work on ideologies of kingship and the institutions of the Hellenistic state has relied heavily upon (primarily epigraphic) royal correspondence, for which see Welles (1934). See Rostovtzeff (1951) and Archibald et. al. (2001) and (2011) on economics, though note the influence of Finley (1985 – 2nd ed.) on all subsequent discussion of Hellenistic economic activity, namely, that, as there is no definitive proof of political or diplomatic strategy, so there is none for economic policy. Recent work on economics shows the traces of economic policy in known activity (see Archibald above, and Aperghis 2004), much as my dissertation seeks to show, in several places, that activities indicate the existence of strategies related to the management of military institutions.

The historiography of the individual kingdoms has highlighted particular problems with regard to each. This study brings each of these often-independent historiographies into contact to produce a history of military institutions throughout the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Antigonid kings established their authority over the kingdom of Macedonia later than the Ptolemies or Seleucids, but have often been understood to have inherited (by conquest) the Macedonian state and legacy of the powerful Philip II, father of Alexander. The key interpretive points in the case of the Antigonid kingdom are: 1) the relationship of the king with his Macedonian subjects, and whether his rule over the Macedonian nation differed significantly from Seleucid or Ptolemaic rule over foreign populations, and 2) the effectiveness of Antigonid or Macedonian rule over subject and allied populations, both within greater Macedonia and the Balkan peninsula. My work shows that these problems were far more similar between the kingdoms than has generally been assumed. The historiography of Seleucid state and relations with the Hellenistic kingdoms, see Hauben (1977) on Rhodes, Habicht (1982) and Oliver (2007) on Athens, Grainger (1999) and Scholten (2000) on the Aetolian League, Gulath (1982) on the Boeotian League, and Nottmeyer (1995) on the Achaean League.

* For the preeminent history of Macedonia, see Hammond and Walbank (1988: vol. III) on the Hellenistic era, and Hammond and Griffith (1979: vol. II) on the late classical; Buraselis (1982) and Errington (1990) are also helpful. The most recent and significant work on Hellenistic Macedonia and its institutions are those of Hatzopoulos (1996) and (2001), developed mainly from recently published inscriptions. See also Hatzopoulos (2007) on aspects of Hellenistic administration, particularly in Macedonia, but with application abroad. See Tarn (1913) for the beginning of Antigonid control in Macedonia, Hammond (1992) on the Macedonian state, though Hammond also published numerous articles on aspects of Macedonian state institutions, kingship, and the army, e.g., (1988) on the relation between Macedonian monarchy and the land, (1995) on the meaning of Macedonian-ness, and (2000) on continuities between the Argead and Hellenistic monarchies.
military institutions has made a significant shift toward recognizing the importance of Achaemenid heritage and Asiatic populations within the state.\(^7\) The role of Asiatic populations within military institutions, on the other hand, has drawn little interest, which this study seeks to remedy. The role of Egyptian populations in the Ptolemaic army has received more attention recently, and indeed, thanks in part to the increasing publication of demotic (native Egyptian) language papyri, the historiography of the Ptolemaic state has incorporated a much-expanded view of the activities of Egyptians within the Hellenistic kingdom.

A significant part of the historiography of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms involves the nature of the monarchy itself, that is, whether it was a personal monarchy bound up in the accomplishments, relationships, and activities of the ruler and his predecessors, or a national (Macedonian) monarchy defined foremost in the king’s relations with a large, expatriate citizen community of real or imagined Macedonian identity. This historiography has rarely been discussed in military terms, yet is closely

related to the status of the army and its constituent components, and so the patterns of settlement, recruitment, and mobilization can contribute to further analysis of eastern Hellenistic kingship. The historiography of Ptolemaic Egypt is large, and significant, for two reasons: 1) the large and growing numbers of published documentary papyri from Egypt provide insights into the administrative, legal, and personal activities of Greeks and Egyptians living under and living out Ptolemaic rule; and, 2) the Ptolemaic kingdom has generally been treated in isolation and as exceptional. This Ptolemaic exceptionalism is partly because it is unclear how institutions revealed in papyrological sources should relate to activities in other kingdoms, and partly because Ptolemaic Egypt has, long before the discovery of papyri, been considered different from the other kingdoms, due to its more impressive bureaucracy and the perception that Hellenistic virtue and valor faded more quickly along than Nile than elsewhere.

The case of Ptolemaic exceptionalism leads to one of the dissertation’s significant interventions, which is to emphasize the changing nature of the individual kingdoms and the broad comparisons to be made between the kingdoms as contemporaries. In Hellenistic historiography, the tendency has instead been to extrapolate within single kingdoms across time, rather than across them, if comparisons are made at all. The activities of a given kingdom’s rulers and armies differed dramatically over time, and thus so too did the military institutions of the kingdoms. Again this seems obvious, but the converse has often infiltrated the historiography. On the other hand, one may observe a general hesitancy to identify many comparisons between the activities of the Hellenistic kingdoms, so that they are each approached as individual states with little in common. I seek to demonstrate that the Hellenistic kingdoms faced many of the same challenges to recruitment, mobilization, and operational success, and employed a number of similar methods to shape and strengthen their military institutions. This is particularly significant in the case of Ptolemaic Egypt. It and its trove of documentary papyri have traditionally been treated as exceptional among the Hellenistic kingdoms. My analysis shows that these tendencies have been overwrought, and that there were in fact many similarities between the three major Hellenistic kingdoms.

In that sense, I endeavor in this study to present revised narratives of key episodes and aspects of Hellenistic history by prioritizing documentary sources and approaching interpretive issues with a methodology informed by military, social, and
cultural history. While a steady accumulation of primary texts from the Hellenistic world has increased our knowledge of the period, modern narratives still rely heavily on the ancient narrative sources. There is a tendency to keep the documentary texts separate from the narrative, because the former were too selective and so not necessarily representative. Papyrologists, in particular, have been reluctant to connect their texts to historical events when the texts do not explicitly do so themselves. But the volume of documentary texts only increases, and once crucial feature of the unstable or contingent nature of Hellenistic state institutions is that they consisted not only in a king’s laws but also in the lived activities of individuals, which oftentimes constituted the lived reality of the Hellenistic state. In that sense, it follows that their activities contribute not only to the structure of a state’s institutions, but also to the narrative. Analysis of these documentary texts allows us to be more critical with the ancient narrative sources. Of the latter there are several, of varying quality, but these leave large gaps in the third century between the wars of the Successors and beginning of Polybius’ narrative.9 As primary sources have grown more abundant, it is increasingly possible to revise narratives of major events and offer histories of the construction and operation of institutions, two of the chief aims of this work.

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The study begins with the emergence of kings and non-mercenary armies in the period of civil war that followed Alexander’s death in 323 BC. Several significant factors appeared in the waning years of the fourth century and remained important throughout the third. The Hellenistic model of kingship depended, originally, on military victory and the support of the army. The role of the army as key to and keeper of legitimacy persisted in changed forms throughout the period. It can be traced to the army’s large share in coercive power, the individual soldier’s desire for money and booty, and the cultural traditions of Macedonia. The army, of course, was not a single entity, just as the kingdom was not a coherent whole. One of the key stories from 323 to this study’s end, in about the 160’s BC, is the place and prominence of the principal contingents of a Hellenistic army: the king’s Friends, who were often, among other things, high-ranking officers; the cavalry, militarily and socially valuable, and generally honored; and, the infantry of the phalanx, the only group of the three that tended to claim Macedonian identity and, by that claim, a special relationship with the king. The final common thread is the struggle to recruit ideal armies at manageable cost. The popularity of tactics treatises, influenced by philosophical trends, meant that the ideal army was not always necessarily the largest army possible, but effective recruitment and mobilization of highly-trained, well-organized, and still-sizeable armies nonetheless incurred enormous costs. This study follows these developments and the broad history of the military institutions of the Hellenistic kingdoms in a series of seven chapters, from the
establishment of the first kings and armies, to the key developments in state formation and army-building in the early third century, to the wars and continual developments in the late third century. The final chapters and conclusion approach a period of change that began in the late third century, with the appearance of Rome as a new major power in the Hellenistic world, and the Ptolemaic struggle with insurgency in Egypt.

The first chapter analyzes the origins of the Hellenistic kingdoms, and argues that certain critical factors heavily influenced the eventual dynamics of Hellenistic military institutions. The chapter features two studies, the first of economics and warfare in the Successor period (323-301 BC), and the second of Macedonian manpower in Asia after the death of Alexander. The first study argues that the mercenary-heavy armies of the Successor generals were unsustainably expensive, and required that plunder figure prominently in a general’s revenue. For that reason, the Successors had to develop institutions that would permit them to recruit armies at less cost and with less difficulty. The second study argues, against most scholarship on Alexander’s army, that his Macedonian forces must have suffered heavy casualties and that well-trained, Hellenized Asiatics were incorporated into the Macedonian phalanx to replace losses. This manner of supplementing Macedonian manpower provided a model for the Hellenistic kingdoms, which relied upon large and ostensibly Macedonian contingents for legitimacy and battlefield effectiveness.
The second chapter considers the construction of Hellenistic kingdoms and armies in the first half of the third century. It begins with a demonstration of the kings’ need for and acquisition of legitimacy, featuring a study of the Galatian invasions (280-270 BC) and the kings’ propagandistic use of Galaterschlacht, signal victories over Galatian armies, to shore up their legitimacy. The larger portion of the chapter focuses upon the construction of large and reliable systems of military mobilization. The examination of the Antigonid kingdom emphasizes their incorporation of the Greek populations of major cities in Macedonia into the pool of Macedonian people eligible for military conscription. The Seleucids and Ptolemies, lacking a critical mass of Macedonian manpower—or even of Greek manpower in general, developed systems of settlement and acculturation that contributed both to the appearance of Greco-Macedonian states abroad and to the functioning of effective military institutions.

The third chapter assesses the stability and proficiency of the military institutions developed by the Hellenistic kingdoms within the context of the Third Syrian War. This war, fought between 246-242 BC, was the first major conflict after the building period in the first half of the third century. The Ptolemies had expanded the size of their settler army to curtail their reliance on mercenaries, and the Seleucids had, in the largely successful Second Syrian War, consolidated their hold in parts of Asia Minor and strengthened their own settler populations in Syria and Mesopotamia. The war is important for an evaluation of Hellenistic military institutions, yet the evidence for the
war is poor and scattered. The chapter begins with a reconstruction of the war that
draws together previous scholarship and scattered primary documents. The second half
of the chapter evaluates the capabilities and limitations of the respective institutions of
the Ptolemies and Seleucids, focusing on mobilization and logistics for the Ptolemies and
loyalty and stability for the Seleucids.

The fourth chapter considers the state of military institutions in each of the three
major Hellenistic kingdoms in the second half of the fourth century, with sub-sections
devoted to each of the kingdoms. The Ptolemaic army comes first. Scholarship on the
Ptolemaic army during the long reign of Ptolemy III Euergetes (246-222 BC) is virtually
unanimous in assessing his reign as a period of languor and deterioration. I argue that
his reign saw extensive organizational reforms within the Ptolemaic army, likely
intended to increase the effectiveness of command and control, both in mobilization and
on the field of battle. I propose that the Hellenistic kingdoms began adopting, within
this period, military philosophies that had a comparable influence on mobilizations and
tactics to total manpower. Next, I describe the expansion of Macedonian identity, and
therefore of Macedonian conscription, with a view to offering a new description of
reforms in the Antigonid army. The remainder of the section demonstrates the
effectiveness of Antigonid mobilizations, and the capacity of Macedonian military
institutions to sustain large and repeated mobilizations, contrary to much scholarship.
The final section evaluates the weaknesses in the Seleucid system made evident during
the long period of civil war and rebellion down to 219 BC. The weaknesses of the periphery and the throne prove the stability of the Seleucid center, which remained loyal and militarily effective despite repeated reverses.

The fifth chapter serves a sort of companion piece to the third, in that it uses the context of the Fourth Syrian War to assess Seleucid and Ptolemaic military institutions. This assessment involves an entirely new narrative of Ptolemaic preparations for war, based on documentary evidence, as opposed to the prevailing narrative which has been derived primarily from Polybius. This revised narrative emphasizes the importance of the infantry phalanx, and the Ptolemaic invention of a massive concentration of Macedonian manpower. This Ptolemaic innovation relates late third century developments to the concerns of the earliest Successors. The narrative of the Fourth Syrian War also demonstrates the Seleucid success in developing core territories in Syria and Mesopotamia, from which Antiochus III mobilized large forces—over thirty thousand men—throughout the conflict. The resiliency of the military institutions of the core Seleucid territories enabled Antiochus, though defeated in the war, to recover and even extend Seleucid power and authority in the waning years of the third century.

The sixth and seventh chapters function as a pair. The late third century was a time of transition for all of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Antigonid kingdom and Seleucid kingdom each, near the height of their power, encountered the expanding Roman Republic in a series of wars that ended the former and severed Asia Minor from
the latter. Because the story of their decline has been covered admirably in a number of works, these concluding chapters focus on interesting and under-covered developments in Ptolemaic Egypt. Chapter six looks at the narrative of Ptolemaic decline and shifts the emphasis to changes in the institutional structure of the military and its relation with the land, the economy, and the king, and to the emergence of a native insurgency. Sometimes called the “Great Revolt,” a movement led by Egyptian soldiers forced the Ptolemaic army to respond to a manner of warfare wholly unlike that normally waged by Hellenistic kingdoms. The Ptolemaic response is the subject of chapter seven. While the Ptolemaic kingdom has generally been considered insignificant in Hellenistic military history, I argue that the Ptolemaic response demonstrated remarkable innovation and strong indications of strategic thinking; moreover, Ptolemy V and his army were successful in ending the Revolt and pacifying the country for decades. This is significant today as case study of a successful counterinsurgency.

By studying the acquisition of legitimacy, recruitment, settling, and mobilization of armies, and the employment of force in the field in the Hellenistic kingdoms, I hope to contribute to our understanding of a) the central importance of war-making and military institutions to all the Hellenistic kingdoms, and b) the nature of those military institutions and points of contact between the respective kingdoms. These contributions may encourage or facilitate further comparisons between the kingdoms and their various neighbors, both in the corners of the Hellenistic world writ small, but especially
in comparisons with the major powers of the Western Mediterranean and Central Asia in the same era.
Chapter 1: The Origins of Hellenistic Military Institutions, 323-301 BC

Alexander, king of Macedonia, leader of the Greek League, conqueror of Asia, was dead. His death followed close upon the conquest of the lands formerly ruled by the Persian Empire, closer still upon a ripening conflict between the conqueror and his army over the shape of military institutions in the empire. The Macedonian king had led tens of thousands of Macedonian citizen soldiers to Asia. Ten years had passed, and while many veterans yearned to exchange the dusty roads and endless canals of Mesopotamia for the hills and greens of Bottaia and Eordaia, they nevertheless feared to leave their king to the resplendent palaces and dutiful subjects of Asia. Concern for their fading part in his grand acquisition ignited mutiny in 324 BC, when the king had discharged many of his veterans to return to Macedonia. In the last months of his life, from the mutiny at Opis to his death at Babylon in 323, Alexander orchestrated the dismissal or dispersal of his Macedonians, many of whom had already begun their journey home. But then he died, his project incomplete.

His generals, nearly all of them prominent Macedonians themselves, saw in the Macedonians the key to political legitimacy and battlefield supremacy. The conquests were parceled amongst them at Babylon soon after Alexander’s death, but prolonged peace and order were unlikely. The absence of a legitimate male heir and a half-wit half-
brother for king in an undefined interregnum left too little central authority for a sprawling empire divided among veteran generals and their men. While war was practically inevitable, and indeed developed within months, the Successor generals’ path to succession, that is, to kingship, was by no means clear. The Macedonians were few in number, scattered across the empire, and insistent in their loyalty to the Argead royal family. Mercenaries were abundant, but fickle and expensive. Yet within two decades generals were proclaimed king, and with some reshuffling, their kingdoms persevered and flourished for more than one hundred years.

The Successor Wars were waged, with occasional lulls, from 323 to 301 (or 281) BC, ending with the elimination of most of the contending generals and the establishment of three major kingdoms. This chapter focuses on the systems of mobilizations and supply that sustained the generals’ armies, and considers the linkages between the Successor system of warfare and the origins of Hellenistic kingship, in the period ending about 301 BC. The Successor model of warfare was rooted foremost in

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1 Alexander ordered the dismissal of all Greek mercenaries in 324 BC (Diod. 17.106.3) and most of the satraps, at least in the western satrapies, complied (17.111.1). While neither Diodorus nor other ancient Alexander historians gave an account of the number of mercenaries, Pausanias put the number discharged from service about that time at nearly 50,000 (8.52.5).

2 By 301 BC, the remaining Successors had been declared king and had begun establishing core territories, marking two decisive transitions toward the Hellenistic system. For recent overviews of the Successor Wars, see Waterfield (2011) and Romm (2011), which provide general narratives of the Successor period (323-301 BC), though both are often too credulous toward the main literary sources, eg. Diodorus Siculus, whose 18th-20th books cover the period of the Successors from 323-302 BC. See also the essay by Wheatley (pp. 53-68) in Heckel (2009) for a short summary, or Will (1984: 23-61) for a classic treatment of the Successor wars down to 301 BC. There are on-going arguments of chronology, for a defense of the traditional view see Wheatley (1998) and for recent challenges, Anson (2006).
legitimacy, which by various means facilitated the acquisition of kingship. The
coronation of kings and foundation of kingdoms corresponded to a growing interest in
the sustainability of Successor military institutions, making qualities like stability and
proficiency increasingly important. Legitimacy was attained through the support of
Macedonian soldiers and other key demographics within the fragmented empire, and
their support secured through significant victories and conquests.\(^3\) The mass of
Successor armies were mercenary soldiers, and even Macedonian and other allied or
subject contingents were often kept in active service, running up enormous military
costs for generals.\(^4\) These costs may be reckoned all the greater when naval forces,
fortifications, and other construction programs are added. Absent strong institutions for
income collection, military conquest and plunder acquisition were critical to economic

\(^3\) See in particular Bosworth (2002: 246-277) for an analysis of Macedonian manpower, military victory, and
kingship in the early Successor period, but also Papazoglou (1983: 3.195-210), Mooren (1983: 205-40), and
Anson (1991: 230-47), the last of which focuses directly upon the period in question. See also Ducrey (2002:
51-60) and Chaniotis (2005: 57-65) for interactions between generals and their armies, and the links between
armies (particularly Macedonian forces) and kingship, and Carney (1996: 19-44) and Heckel (2009: 69-82) for
Alexander’s relationship with his Macedonian forces, much of which was sustained in altered ways into the
Hellenistic period. For territorial conquest (the ideal of “spear-won land”) and kingship, see Mehl (1980: 1-
172-212) and Hammond (1988: 382-91). For the Macedonian assembly and its relationship with the king, see
Errington (1978: 77-133), Hammond and Griffith (1979: 2.161-2), Anson (1985: 303-16), and Hammond (2000:
141-60).

\(^4\) See Launey (1949:725-80) for the early Hellenistic reliance upon mercenary forces, and 763-4 in particular
for the costs involved in paying mercenaries. Aperghis (2003: 189-205) examined costs as related to the
Seleucid army in particular, and more recent scholarship has followed his numbers, e.g. Fischer-Bovet (2009
diss.). The classic work on Hellenistic mercenaries is Griffith (1935), with discussion of cost pp. 274-306. See
also Parke (1933: 207-8), Cavaignac (1951: 141-2), Ducrey (1970: 653-6), Pritchett (1971: 1.22-3), and Chaniotis
(2005: 78-101) for further discussion of the numbers, role, and expense of mercenary armies.
well-being. Thus the key components of warfare and eventual kingship in the Successor period fed into (seeking legitimacy, seeking funds) and out of (gaining kingship and kingdoms) military success in a large economy of men and materiel.

This chapter examines the economy of men and material in the era of the Successor wars. It consists of three parts. In the first, a calculation of expenses in men and materiel for continuous war-fighting in the mercenary model demonstrates that an alternative model of recruitment was necessary. The Successors were compelled by financial necessities to construct sustainable military institutions. The second part examines Macedonian manpower, the backbone of Successor armies and key to Successor legitimacy. Their limited numbers and enduring importance explain the Successors’ approach in constructing sustainable military institutions. The third and final part examines the Successors’ approach to establishing sustainable military institutions, and places the assumption of kingship within the broader context of pursuing political and military sustainability. While the story of acquiring kingship may long have seemed the more engaging storyline, the shift in military practices during the Successor period explains much of the pursuit and acquisition of kingship and clarifies the purposes of the generals’ activities during the process of kingdom-building.

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5 See Garlan (1975: 183), Mehl (op. cit.), Finley (1985: 204-7), Chaniotis (2005: 115-42), and most importantly Austin (1986: 450-66), who demonstrated clearly the centrality of war-fighting to the activity of the Successor generals and Hellenistic kings, and the close relationship between war-fighting, plunder, and the economy. For the Hellenistic economy and state more generally, see Rostovtzeff (1941: 2.1134-1301), Bikerman (1938), Lévêque (1968: 261-87), and Préaux (1978: 1.183-201).
1.1. The Successor way of war: the costs of mercenary armies

The military philosophy of the Successor generals prioritized decisive battle, and borrowed from future plunder to pay the costs of war. This attitude is best observed in a stratagem recorded in Polyaenus: “Demetrius, though lacking money, doubled his army by new mercenaries. Astonished, one of his Friends asked how he expected to pay them, when he could hardly afford even the smaller force. He replied: ‘the more powerful we are, the weaker we shall find our enemies and the more easily conquer their country. Then both plunder and tribute will come in from the many who already fear my soldiers’”(4.7.1). In fact at most times most of the generals had a good bit of money, yet their expenditures exceeded their normal revenue, as two studies below will show. They were therefore dependent on plundered wealth to fund their campaigns, a risky strategy in any case, but particularly when plundered wealth is the object of the campaign rather than the basis for it. But while plunder could only run out, the costs of fielding armies and building navies and fortresses remained; this was an unsustainable cycle. The largest acquisitions of plunder occurred between 323 and 312. Few conquests after that time yielded sums as great as those raised in earlier years from plunder, nor was the field of Successor generals vying for power significantly diminished. Because warfare did not slow after that time, but in many ways accelerated, it was necessary to institute
recruitment and mobilization systems that avoided or alleviated the two weaknesses of the mercenary-heavy system: the instability of mercenary power, and its exorbitant cost.

Two cases here show that the Successors generally followed the mercenary-heavy system, and that it was untenable. The first examines Ptolemy I of Egypt, one of the more conservative and best-provisioned of the Successors. The second examines Antigonus I Monophthalmus of Asia, father of the Demetrius from Polyaenus’ stratagem, and the most powerful, wealthy, and aggressive of the Successors for much of the fourth century BC. The case studies compare estimated yearly revenues to expenditures related solely to soldiers’ pay and upkeep and naval costs, the two largest and most costly components within military expenditures year-to-year.\(^6\) Naval maintenance costs will be discussed in the first case, but an important figure to establish at the onset is the cost of the paid soldiers in the Successor armies. Since most troop figures are given in thousands, the optimal way to evaluate potential costs is to calculate the yearly cost of a thousand infantrymen (called a chiliarchy) with their officers, which I have calculated at a little more than 69 talents.\(^7\) The expense to pay a thousand cavalrymen would have been more than double this rate.

\(^6\) For entire expenditures for Successor kingdoms, see Aperghis’ analysis for Seleucid expenses in the early third century BC, which indicate non-military expenses for the court, administration, capital improvements, and other building projects at generally 70-90% of peacetime military expenses, or about 5,000-8,000 talents in the Seleucid kingdom (2003: 205-11).

\(^7\) This standard rate in Hellenistic armies was one senior officer for sixty-four men (though that particular rank was called by different names: {\textit{taxiarch}, lochagos, tetrarchos}), or sixteen officers, paid at least double the normal infantry, in a unit of one thousand men, which actually numbered 1,024 men at full strength. I am excluding the increased pay for lower-ranking officers, who numbered between 48 and 117 men in a
1.1.1 – The Revenues and Military Expenditures of Ptolemy I

Upon entering Egypt, Ptolemy seized the treasury, which held 8,000 talents.\(^8\)

Beyond the cash on hand, Egypt was almost certainly the wealthiest satrapy of Asia, per capita. Justin reported the yearly income of Ptolemy II Philadelphus as more than 14,000 talents and 1.5 million artabas of grain per year, though these numbers have been heavily criticized.\(^9\) The yearly grain revenue, under a well-administered regime that had extended crown exploitation of most types of land and expanded the amount of land under cultivation, has been estimated between six and eight million artabas of grain.\(^10\)

Strabo (17.1.3) gave the royal revenues of Egypt under Ptolemy XII Auletes solely in coin at 12,500 talents silver. If this figure included the value in silver of a projected eight chiliarchy, simply because it complicates the calculation and is unnecessary to prove my point. I have assumed a conservative ten-month pay season rather than twelve (following OGIS 226), and calculate an average infantryman’s monthly wage as one drachma per day and ten drachmas per month for rations and other supplies, following the low estimate from Launey (1949: 750), and the “normal” rate of Griffith (1935: 305), also accepted by Pritchett (op.cit.), Bar-Kochva (1977: 173) and Aperghis (2003: 201-2). This calculates as \((16 \times 750) + (1,008 \times 400) = 12,000 + 403,200 = 415,200 = 69\) talents, 1,200 drachmas per year.

\(^8\) Diod. 18.14.1. Green (1990: 13-4) suggests this may have been the treasury compiled by his predecessor, Cleomenes, from 331 to 323, or about one thousand talents saved every year. See Paus. 1.6.3 for the murder of Cleomenes, and Ps.-Arist. Oik. 2.52.10-53.15 for anecdotes of Cleomenes’ shrewdness with money as satrap of Egypt.

\(^9\) Justin (Comm.Dan. 11.5) put Ptolemy II Philadelphus’ annual income at 14,800 talents silver and 1.5 million artabas of grain, while Strabo (17.1.13) put Ptolemy XII Auletes’ annual income at 12,500 talents silver. Préaux (1979: 310-1, 364-6), after rejecting Justin’s figures, suggests grain income around eight million artabas (worth approximately 2,700 talents), and coined income much less than Justin’s figure. Muhs (2005: 10-1) followed Préaux’s emphasis on grain taxes, and suggests they may have represented an even higher proportion of revenue, especially in the first century of Ptolemaic rule. Manning (2003: 135, n.21) estimated grain income nearer six million artabas, but monetary income much lower (no actual estimates given).

\(^10\) Following the estimates of Manning and Préaux above.
million artabas in wheat, it represented no more than 9,800 talents in money taxes. This begins to approach Aperghis’ estimates for Ptolemaic revenue, about nine to eleven thousand talents per year, though Aperghis’ estimate represents total revenue.\(^{11}\) Ptolemy’s yearly income as satrap of Egypt was without doubt much smaller. If calculated at the roughly standard rates in Alexander’s empire and that of the Achaemenid Persian,\(^{12}\) he may have averaged revenues of approximately 5,000 talents, and up to 8,000 per year while he controlled Cyprus and Cyrene.\(^{13}\) Revenues likely grew over time, particularly during the long period of peace that followed the defeat of Antigonus’ invasion in 305 BC, though Cyprus had been lost in 306.

Ptolemy augmented his internal revenue with foreign plunder. In this, Ptolemy was not as successful as some of his competitors. Ptolemy’s two greatest victories were in defense of Egypt, offering little opportunity for plunder, especially since neither enemy suffered a decisive defeat.\(^{14}\) Ptolemy twice gained control of the Phoenician coast,

\(^{11}\) Aperghis (2004: 248-9) accepts exploitation of the population essentially triple that of most regions (roughly three talents per thousand people beginning around the middle of the third century), and with a population estimate of three to three and a half million, about nine to eleven thousand talents per year.\(^{12}\) Aperghis, loc. cit.\(^{13}\) Calculating 3-3.5 million people in Egypt (3,000-3,500 talents), and approximately 1-1.5 million in portions of Syria, Cyprus and Cyrene at different times, for between 4 and 5 thousand talents. Grain income, as well as trade in lumber and precious metals, may have added value worth 1 to 3 thousand additional talents. Calculations in what follows assume yearly income for Ptolemy between 5 and 8 thousand talents. The possession of Syria and Cyprus do not coincide, since the former was held (in part) from 319 to early 315, while the latter did not come under full Ptolemaic control until 313 BC, and remained in Ptolemaic control for only seven years.\(^{14}\) Perdiccas, the regent of the realm, launched an invasion in 321 that ended in his death as the army encountered logistical difficulties and a lack of military success (Diod. 18.33-6). Antigonus, the general of Asia, led an enormous army against Egypt in late 306 (Diod. 20.73-6), encountered insurmountable logistical difficulties due in part to his large army, and was forced to withdraw.
but there is only limited evidence for significant plunder in either case. Most of Ptolemy’s opportunities for plunder came from raiding expeditions along the coasts of northern Syria and southern Asia Minor, and chiefly between 313 and 309 BC. In those five years, Ptolemy gained the treasuries of several deposed or executed Cypriot kings and sacked three key cities in northern Syria and Cilicia, gained several towns in Cilicia Tracheia formerly garrisoned by Antigonus, and conquered several towns in Lycia and Caria as far as Myndus. The most successful raid seems to have been that in 313, and Diodorus expressly notes that the money gained was used to keep his army well-paid.

Much of Ptolemy’s expenses would have been military. His army may have only had about ten thousand men in 323 BC, but he rapidly increased its size by hiring mercenaries. Through the fourth century, his army relied heavily on mercenaries.

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15 First in 320/19, when he pushed Laomedon, satrap of Syria, from power and through benevolence (bribes, especially) brought most of the Phoenician states over to his side (Diod. 18.45, App. Syr. 264-5, Paus. 1.6.4), though there are indications he plundered some of the interior towns (Jos. AJ 12.1). The second time came in 311 after his victory at the battle of Gaza in 312, when as he was withdrawing into Egypt, Diodorus says that he razed and plundered several cities: Akko, Joppa, Samaria, and Gaza (19.93.7). For the Battle of Gaza and the war of 312-11, see Winnicki 1991: 147-201.

16 In 313 BC, see Diod. 19.79. In 79.6-7 in particular, Diodorus emphasizes the plunder gained from the sack of Malus, built up by Antigonus in previous years, see Diod. 19.56.5, and distributed among his soldiers for payment.

17 In 310 BC, see Diod. 20.19.4. The narrative does not mention plunder, but as garrisoned cities, plunder is more likely, though the acquisitions were lost to Demetrius within the year. In 312-1 Ptolemy was occupied in Syria (see above).

18 In 309 and into 308 BC, see Plut. Dem. 7.5 and Diod. 20.27, 37.1. Ptolemy captured, several Lycian cities, and may have plundered Xanthos in particular, before besieging Kaunos and plundering part of the town, failing in a siege of Halikarnassos, and wintering at Kos and Myndus.

19 Arr. An. 3.5.1-7 and Curt. 4.8.4 describe Alexander’s arrangements for the government of Egypt: several Macedonian commanders and a couple of Greeks, over at least four thousand soldiers posted as the garrison of the country, along with thirty triremes as a naval force. Suda B’154 attests that six thousand Egyptians were trained as Macedonian-style soldiers following the conquest. Only one of Alexander’s posted generals,
Literary sources permit estimates of about thirty-six thousand total: up to sixteen thousand men in Cyprus, and more than twenty thousand in Egypt. By that time, the original ten thousand and some other troops may all have been given allotments in Egypt, curbing some of Ptolemy's costs. If Ptolemy was paying full-price for the other twenty-five thousand or so men, his yearly expenses were likely between 1,700 and 2,000 talents. Mobilizing the other forces, for example before the battle of Gaza in 312 BC, would have produced significant temporary increases in expenses. Under relatively peaceful conditions, and assuming annual income around 5-8 thousand talents, paying and feeding the large mercenary component of the army required 21-40% of yearly revenue.

The other major component of the Ptolemaic military was the navy. Fischer-Bovet calculated the annual operating cost of the Ptolemaic fleet in the age of Philopator, based on widely-accepted but suspect figures for the size of the Ptolemaic navy, at 5,600 to 7,800 talents per year in the 250’s, roughly equivalent to estimated yearly revenue in the fourth century. Re-calculating these numbers for a fleet of about two hundred,

Peukestes, is known from the papyrological evidence, SB 14.11942, but the fragmentary papyrus provides little detail.

Diod. 18.28.5-6.

Diod. 19.62.3-4, 80.3-4.

The difference in cost involves considering up to three thousand mercenary cavalry.

Fischer-Bovet (2009: 143). This number is calculated from the 336 warships of Philopater accepted by Van't Dack and Hauben (1978: 73) and Casson (1994: 93) from Athenaeus 203.c-d.
generally smaller ships, with only three-quarters in service for ten months, equates to roughly two hundred talents per year in upkeep costs, and as many as 1,900 to the reduced number of sailors for the reduced year. Ptolemy may have kept costs low on his initial fleet by avoiding having to build many ships, having captured many of the fleets of the Phoenician cities and taken them back to Egypt (Diod. 19.48.2). Thus military expenses for Ptolemy probably ran between 3,600 and 3,900 talents per year, based on fairly conservative estimates, from about 323 to 306, or 45-78% of yearly revenue.

By 306 BC, it was clear that spending, even at those levels, was insufficient to compete with Antigonid power in the eastern Mediterranean: he lost half his out-matched fleet in the battle of Salamis, as many as twenty thousand soldiers and the island of Cyprus in the war with Demetrius. With such heavy losses, Egypt lay exposed to an invasion from Syria by Antigonus the next year. At the same time Ptolemy had

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24 This estimate could be too low. Seleucus was said to have sailed with one hundred ships in 315 BC (Diod. 19.58.5), and an additional hundred ships in 314 sent to meet Seleucus in Cyprus (Diod. 19.62.4), and many still likely remained in Egypt. But Seleucus’ fleet remained on active service for upwards of two years. Of course, Diodorus or his sources could have grossly exaggerated the numbers in the fleet, considering the round numbers used for the Ptolemaic fleet: aside from the two fleets of one hundred ships, the other Ptolemaic fleet in book 19 had fifty (62.5). In 306 BC, Ptolemy’s fleet is said to have numbered approximately two hundred ships (Diod. 20.49.2-3, Plut. Dem. 16.1). As for operating costs for the fleet, Gabrielsen (1997: 96-100) supplies approximately ten thousand drachmas per month of operation for a trireme (from the treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna, see Syll. 3 581), smaller than many ships in the Ptolemaic fleet, and suggests (1995: 240) nearly the same amount in estimated yearly cost for upkeep. In the case of the treaty, about eight thousand drachmas would have gone toward payroll, leaving two thousand for upkeep in a combat context, or up to two talents per year in upkeep under strenuous campaign conditions. 25 Diod. 20.47-53, Plut. Dem. 15-7.
invested heavily in building projects, particularly those in Alexandria.\textsuperscript{26} Expanded mercenary recruitment would have been expensive and difficult, and Ptolemy began, it seems, a more decisive shift toward developing a larger system of military settlement.

\textbf{1.1.2 – The Revenues and Military Expenditures of Antigonus I}

Antigonus and his generals could bring overwhelming force to bear against Ptolemy and the other Successors, often waging near-simultaneous campaigns, with large armies operating in multiple theaters simultaneously. But these campaigns and the large armies and navies required for them came at tremendous cost, rapidly draining a treasury stocked in plundered wealth. Antigonus Monopthalmos had developed his position in Phrygia for about ten years by the time of Alexander’s death, but did not regain his core territories there until the summer of 320 BC after Perdiccas and his allies moved against Antigonus in 323. Yet he led an army in 319 BC estimated at nearly seventy thousand men by Diodorus (18.50.3).\textsuperscript{27} Whether the army was that large, or even half that size, Antigonus was behind in paying them when he seized Ephesus and captured a ship carrying six hundred talents from the royal treasury (Diod. 18.52.5). The

\textsuperscript{26} Fraser (1972: 1.305-34), see also Erskine (1995: 38-48), Green (1985: 151-63). To do so likely meant spending the remainder of his yearly income, and much of the wealth from the Egyptian treasury.
\textsuperscript{27} An evaluation based on numbers described in Diodorus puts his army closer to forty thousand, but perhaps mercenary additions could have increased the size of the army by some thousands. Still, Diodorus’ seventy thousand seems highly suspect, an increase of fifty thousand in the span of a single year.
funds were distributed immediately among the army.\textsuperscript{28} This implies that Antigonus was essentially borrowing on future plunder to cover costs in the early years of the Successor period. Elsewhere Diodorus (18.50.2) states that he recruited as many soldiers as he could, believing that his planned conquest of Asia could support at least as many, confirming that interpretation.\textsuperscript{29} Had his military campaigns faltered, his army may well have evaporated. With consolidated control over Phrygia and successful campaigns across Asia Minor, Antigonus could expect two or three thousand talents in income the next year.\textsuperscript{30} This income could not have paid for his army alone in that year.\textsuperscript{31}

Antigonus paid his army with plundered coin for several consecutive years, sustained by a series of victories. As in the case of Ephesus in 319, Antigonus again released hundreds of talents from a captured treasury in 318/7 after falling into arrears.\textsuperscript{32}

After defeating Eumenes and capturing the royal treasuries at Ecbatana and Susa, Antigonus came into a windfall of wealth: five thousand talents in plunder, five thousand talents of un-coined silver, and fifteen thousand talents of gold and silver

\textsuperscript{28} If the army were truly about seventy thousand men, with ten thousand of them cavalrymen, the average infantrymen could have received about forty drachmas, little more than a month’s pay.

\textsuperscript{29} Diod. 18.50.2: ὑπελάμβανε γὰρ αὐτὸν κρείττω δύναμιν ἔχοντα τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν θηραμών κύριον ἐσοθαι, μηδενὸς ὅντος τοῦ δυναμένου πρὸς αὐτὸν αντιτάξασθαι. It is immensely important that this statement immediately precedes the tally of his large army, and very shortly precedes the statement that Antigonus was then behind in pay. This statement was not, as some have taken it, an indication that Antigonus already had gained so much plunder (Austin 1986: 460), but that he intended to seize sufficient plunder to pay for his army in the coming campaign.

\textsuperscript{30} Not that he did necessarily. The estimate of three thousand is high, if anything, based on his eventual income in 316 BC of eleven thousand talents (discussed below), which represented revenue from Syria and Mesopotamia, and probably Media and Susiane as well.

\textsuperscript{31} Projected expenses for an army of sixty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry (this does not even include the 30-70 elephants said to have been in Antigonus’ army) are over five thousand talents.

\textsuperscript{32} Diod. 19.19.7.
Another ten thousand talents seized from the royal treasury at Kyinda in Cilicia rounded out Antigonus’ treasury by the end of 316 BC. With a much-expanded territory, including Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Media, and Susa in addition to much of Asia Minor, Antigonus received, Diodorus claims, eleven thousand talents revenue. Thus total revenue from taxes and plunder from 318-316 BC may have reached fifty thousand talents or more, some of it in gold as well as silver, with military expenses closer to fifteen thousand. The net profit, estimated at thirty-five thousand talents, is impressive.

Antigonus began spending all of it the next year. He planned massive building operations in Phoenicia, maintained large armies in multiple theaters, and began building what he intended to be the most impressive navy in the world. At the start of the year Antigonus ordered the preparation of 4.5 million rations of wheat, and an undetermined amount of barley, to feed the people and animals for the coming year’s military and labor expenses (Diod. 19.58.2). The cost of 4.5 million artabas of wheat

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33 Diod. 19.45.6, 48.5-8. The obvious problem with these numbers is their roundness, raising the likelihood that they were exaggerated estimations on the part of Diodorus or his source, Hieronymus of Cardia. 34 This number has generally been accepted, Billows (1990: 107), Aperghis (2003: 248). Herodotus gives Darius I’s revenue from the regions at that time controlled by Antigonus as little more than 5,300 Attic talents, including in that tally portions of regions that were not under Antigonid authority at the time (Hist. 3.89-95). The regions included are: Greater Persia: 600, Media: 450, Susa and Elam: 300, Mesopotamia: 1,000, Hyrcania: 200, Syria and Palestine: 350, Cilicia: 360, Central Anatolia: 360, Southern Anatolia: 400, and Western Anatolia: 500 = 4,520 Babylonian talents = 5,300 Attic talents. Antigonus did not control components of all three nomes of Anatolia, parts of Palestine and Phoenicia, and was said by the generally pro-Antigonid sources for Diodorus to have had very limited control over the Upper Satrapies (19.48.1-2). I suspect that this estimate also seeks to incorporate otherwise unmentioned taxes-in-kind, which we know were paid based on Diod. 19.58.2.
would have been about 1,500 silver talents. It would have provided monthly grain allowances for 375,000 people, and so may represent projected costs for the land army, naval personnel, and an enormous labor force for ship-building. The costs of ship-building are not at all clear, but some estimates of wages may be given. Antigonus, in ordering this grain preparation, estimated a fleet of five hundred ships, both decked warships and lighter ships, which would have required no fewer than 100,000 crewmen. Antigonus’ army, if Diodorus is at all to be trusted, included at least eighty thousand men. This means Antigonus calculated approximately 180,000 military personnel, and thus an estimated labor force of as many as 195,000. That his navy was less than half his initial projection means an actual sailor force closer to 50,000 that year, and may imply difficulties in recruiting and retaining such a large body. Even so,

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35 This, and a corresponding amount of barley partially missing from the text, very likely represent a portion of the estimated eleven thousand talents revenue from the preceding year. In that sense, Antigonus did not buy them, but they likely figured within Diodorus’ estimate of his revenue.

36 See Préaux 1978: 1.364-5 for the calculation of rations by grain units.

37 See Diod. 19.58.6 for Antigonus’ estimate. If anything this hypothetical number should be higher, given the size of some of the ships built, deceres and enneres with crews of more than 600 men apiece. Most of the ships, however, were triremes, tetreremes, and undeked ships, so I have simply multiplied by five hundred the estimated crew of a trireme, which is about two hundred men between rowers and sailors = 100,000. Diod. 20.112.4 puts the crew of a hexere at five hundred men, which given the context likely included some marines, cf. Polyb. 1.26.7, the crew of a Roman quinquereme was 300 men, plus 120 marines. For crews of Hellenistic polyremes, see Casson (1995: 203-8), Williams (2012: 271-286).

38 Diod. 19.58.2-4 says Antigonus organized four shipyards at his own expense, three in Phoenicia and one in Cilicia, and exported lumber to Rhodes, which built additional ships with Rhodian manpower but Antigonid materials. Diodorus describes the specialized labor needed as wood-cutters, sawyers, and shipwrights, and states that Antigonus actually organized a eight thousand men as wood-cutters.

39 Diod. 19.62.7-8: 240 warships were gathered by the end of 315: 90 tetreres, 10 penteres, 3 enneres, 10 deceres, and 30 aphracts. The disparity in numbers could be explained with the inclusion of 90 triremes.

40 It is worth noting, however, that the fleet fielded several years later for campaigns against Greece and Cyprus included at least twenty-seven large warships (greater than four-deck tetreres) that had not yet been built in 315 (Diod. 20.50.3). Tarn (1939: 127) suggested amending Diodorus’ text so that the hexeres and
basic pay for just 130,000 soldiers and sailors, subtracting grain provisions which apparently were handled separately, would have amounted to approximately 7,280 talents in a ten month period, and even a substantially reduced labor force of 100,000 men, paid at a reduced 4 obols per day, would have cost over 11 talents per day, or nearly 3,500 talents over ten months. Payroll alone, at approximated real manpower, not even accounting for Antigonus’ hypothetical manpower, would have more than consumed the entire year’s revenue. While it is not possible, based on available evidence, to make a good estimate for the cost of building large Hellenistic warships, doing so must have been extremely expensive. Additionally, Antigonus dispatched his Friend, Aristodemus of Miletus, to Greece with one thousand talents, instructing him to

hepteres were built in 327, rather than enneres and deceres, which would resolve the incongruency between Antigonus’ fleet in 315 and Demetrius’ in 306.

41 Following the estimate above of 52 talents per year without including provisioning expenses, and calculating ten thousand cavalry among the whole (Diod. 18.50.3).

42 Estimating 2,000 talents in provisioning and at least 10,500 talents in payroll, the estimated total in personnel costs would have been 22% above the previous year’s revenue.

43 See IG II² 1628-31 for projected costs for some of the materials required for outfitting tetereus and lighter ships in the 320’s BC, cf. Gabrielsen 1995: 240, where he, after evaluating the evidence from Athens, suggests the upkeep cost of a trireme was between four and ten thousand drachmas per year. The construction costs for lumber and rope for a tetereus’s gear seem to have been about one talent (1629.636-56), but surely varied with the availability of materials. This does not include the ship itself, though other elements of the construction cost are also listed, such as the ram, which cost about 130 drachmas (1629.1144-7). Gabrielsen estimates (1994: 129-43) that Athenian trirenes likely cost between two and three talents on average, but emphasizes that prices likely shifted dramatically with the availability of materials. Antigonus may have had better access to building materials, but also built many ships that were much larger.
raise mercenary forces to free the cities of Greece.\textsuperscript{44} It is not unreasonable that Antigonus could have spent twenty thousand talents in 315 BC, his largest single-year expenditure.

In the years that followed, Antigonus’ mainly mercenary army and naval personnel likely ran expenses of approximately ten thousand talents per year, while estimated upkeep on his large and active navy would have, on Gabrielsen’s numbers, added between 320 and 400 talents per year.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, average yearly expenditures on the military likely consumed nearly all regular annual revenues.\textsuperscript{46} But Antigonus generally spent far more, maintaining a lavish court, establishing cities and building fortifications (though surely the fortifications were paid in part by local communities), and launching major campaigns with prolonged sieges.\textsuperscript{47} Most importantly, Seleucus returned to Mesopotamia at the start of 311 BC, and soon stripped the Antigonids of the wealthy

\textsuperscript{44} Diod. 19.57.5. He raised about eight thousand mercenaries, whom he could have paid for nearly two years with one thousand talents.
\textsuperscript{45} The estimates derive from calculating ten thousand drachmas annually for two hundred ships or two hundred fifty. Cavaignac estimated annual upkeep costs for an 80-100 ship fleet, roughly half \textit{polyremes}, at about two thousand talents (1923: 118), so my estimate may be \textit{too low} by 2-3,000 talents. For the army, the estimate derives from calculating standard pay for one-hundred and thirty thousand men, between the field armies, garrisons, and naval crews, which comes out to 8,970 talents, assuming payment only during a ten month campaign season, or 9,960 if ten thousand cavalry are assumed, and 11,592 talents if computed for twelve months and ten thousand cavalry. Milns (1987: 254) estimated that Alexander’s military expenditures in the last years of his reign, with about 120,000 men under arms, were likely between ten and fifteen thousand talents per year. Aperghis (2003: 205) and Fischer-Bovet (2009: 145) estimate probable military expenditures in war-time for the Seleucids and Ptolemies, respectively, at 9-10,000 talents and 9-12,000 talents per year.
\textsuperscript{46} Assuming payment for ten months out of the year and ten thousand cavalry (9,960) plus ship upkeep, the yearly estimate would range between 10,280-10,710 talents, or 93-97\% of annual revenue from 318 to 316 BC. I offer the lower range out of skepticism toward the size of the Antigonid army. Antigonus’ possessions changed little after 316 for several years, so his yearly income may have grown over time, and military expenses may have dropped closer to 80\%.
\textsuperscript{47} 313 BC: Diod. 19.74.2 – Telesphorus’ army in the Peloponnese bribes garrisons or besieges them to free cities; 77.4-5 – simultaneous sieges of Miletos, Tralleis, Kaunos, and Issos (I suggest reading “Iasos”); 312 BC: 78 – sieges of Chalcis, Oropos, the Kadmeia of Thebes, and Lokrian Opus.
Eastern provinces of Mesopotamia, Susiane, and Media. The effect was very likely the loss of half of his yearly revenue, such that his military expenditures after that date would far exceed his annual revenue.

Antigonus likely understood how unsustainable his military expenditures were, and responded in several ways. He waged a long and unsuccessful war against Seleucus from 310-308 BC in an attempt to restore control over the wealthy region of Mesopotamia. Failing that, he turned his attentions toward Greece, gave his son Demetrius a large army and navy and five thousand talents, and ordered him to free Athens, achieved late in the spring of 307 BC. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the Antigonid courtship of the Greek cities. Athenian and other Greek allied troops—not mercenaries—became important parts of most Antigonid operations from that point on, culminating in the foundation of the Hellenic League in 302. Notably,

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49 Based on analysis of Herodotus’ report of Darius’ income by region, e.g., revenues from Mesopotamia, Media and Susiane exceeded those from all Asia Minor, Cilicia, and Syria.
50 This war, little-discussed in the narrative sources (Diod. 19.100, Plut. Dem. 7), is much better known from a Babylonian cuneiform chronicle. BCHP 3.4r.14-17 indicates an Antigonid siege lasted from August 310 to January 309, when Antigonid forces entered the city in late January. There was street fighting within Babylon until Antigonus withdrew at the end of February (4r.23-5). Lines 32-41 imply a renewed siege in late 309 into 308 BC.
51 Diod. 20.45-6, Plut. Dem. 8-10.
52 Beginning with at least thirty Athenian polyremes in the war with Ptolemy over Cyprus in 306 BC (Diod. 20.50.3). See also 20.46.5 for Antigonus’ creation of a council of symmachia with the freed Greek cities, and intent on common planning for warfare. Billows (1990: ) offers an extensive overview of Antigonus’ interactions with the Greeks, but sees a steady policy from his declaration at Tyre in 315/4 to the end of his reign, though the overwhelming majority of evidence for actual symmachia with Greeks falls after 307/6 BC, e.g., IG II² 563, which speaks of symmachia between Antigonus and Demetrius, and Athens, the Boiotians, and Chalcidians. For the Hellenic League, see Plut. Dem. 25, IG II² 467.10-1, and especially IG IV² 1.68 for a full text of the founding treaty, and Simpson (1959: 385-409) and Billows (1990: 228-30).
The Hellenic League called for the member cities to field troops for the Antigonid army when called upon, and to contribute financially to the pay of soldiers. The last must be understood within the context of Antigonus’ inability to sustain his mercenary force at such scale. It is also likely no coincidence that Antigonus’ largest city foundation came at about this time: Antigoneia in Syria, founded in 306 BC. Though he would lose his lands and his life five years later, the foundation of his alliance with the Greeks, increased emphasis on settlement, and assumption of kingship (in 305 BC) marked the beginning of a transition away from the untenable pattern of mercenary warfare and plunder-based economy. The early Successor system of warfare was unsustainable and also unstable, built upon the division of land and Macedonians on the one hand, and widespread availability of plunder and mercenaries on the other. In the following section, Macedonian contingents, the core element in effective field armies and essential to the development of Hellenistic kingship, are linked to the foundation of Hellenistic kingdoms and armies.

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53 IG IV 1.68.95-99 calls for the payment of fifty drachmas for a cavalryman (and likely officers), twenty for a hoplite (and likely marines), and ten for light troops and sailors by those states not called upon to dispatch their own troops, total sums well above estimated daily rates. I suggest amending the text to ἐκάστης ἡμέρας [δέκα] as a solution to the over-payment, bringing the pay of a line infantryman down to two drachmas per day, the amount also specified at line 94 as a penalty rate for absent soldiers during a mobilization. The text: καὶ ἀν τις πόλεις μὴ ἀναστείλη τὴν δυνάμην τὴν συντεταγμένην, ἥταν παραγγελ[λ]ῆ, α[πο]τιν[ε]το ἐκάστης ἡμέρας [- - - - - κατὰ μέν] τὸν ἱππέα ἡμι[ναίον - - - - καθα δὲ τὸν οὐλ[η]ν ἐκοισὶς δραχμάς - - - - κατὰ [δὲ τὸν ψεύδων δέκα δραχμάς - - - - καὶ καθα τὸν ναύτην [δέκα?] δραχμάς, ἐως ἃν πίσαιν ἔλθῃ ὁ χρόνος τῆς στρατεύσ[η]ς ἅλλως Ἐλλησιν]. Lines 100-15 seem also to refer to the soldiers actually dispatched by the parties of the treaty, but are illegible. The reference in line 107 to mercenaries may even indicate that Antigonid mercenaries dispatched into the neighborhood of alliance members were paid by the Greeks rather than the kings.

54 Diod. 20.47.5, Malalas 8.201. See Billows (1990: 292-305), and Cohen (2006: 76-9) for Antigoneia.
1.2. The Macedonian military population and the Successor armies

The Successors to Alexander would have each fielded an army approximating
that of Alexander, had such a thing been possible. A cadre of Macedonian soldiers
provided a source of political and cultural legitimacy. The Macedonian soldiers were
also the most accomplished and respected warriors in the territories ruled by Alexander.
Unfortunately for the dead king’s generals, there were not enough Macedonians for each
to field a full phalanx of the accomplished citizen soldiers. A study of manpower will
show that there were not enough Macedonians left in Asia in 323 BC for Alexander even
to have fielded the army with which he initially crossed in 334. While the remaining
Macedonians were not particularly numerous and were strewn across Asia, they
remained very valuable for any army or would-be king. Macedonian manpower was
complemented by a steady trickle of Hellenized Asian soldiers. Yet the power,
prominence and privilege enjoyed by Macedonian soldiers depended upon their
Macedonian identity and their own insistence upon the maintenance of Macedonian
traditions. Despite the addition of non-Macedonians among the ranks, the Macedonian
units remained stridently conservative, and in battle and in councils helped decide
which Successors died, and which became kings.

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55 The best parallel for this is to be found in the early modern era, when Swiss mercenary regiments,
renowned for Swiss prowess, particularly in pike formations not wholly unlike those of the Macedonians,
replaced Swiss attrition with local recruits from their place of service. These local recruits often constituted
more than half the manpower of a Swiss regiment, for which, see Casparis (1982: 593-642).
The problem of Macedonian manpower begins with two questions of numbers. First, whether there was a crisis of manpower in Macedonia proper, and second, whether there was a sufficient mass of Macedonians to power the armies of the Successors in the wars of the waning decades of the fourth century. A number of ancient historians have posited that, at just the time the Successors each wished for himself thousands of Macedonians, the wartime losses and general diffusion of manpower across Asia had produced a crisis of Macedonian manpower. Others have argued differently, that Macedonian manpower was never really seriously depleted. From the latter, the core argument has been, first, that campaign losses were not very high, and second, that most of the soldiers in Alexander’s army had produced offspring before departing. In Billows’ estimation, demographic models indicate that the loss of older fathers and some young men can be recovered in a generation. His caveat is that the family units, absent fathers and some sons, must remain intact, and enjoy relative peace, for new generations to fill the gap.

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56 Walbank (CAH VII: 125) describes a state of “military emergency” in Macedonia proper, such that an emergency mobilization of all Macedonian manpower totaled less than fifteen thousand men in 323 BC. This crisis perspective was espoused earlier by Rostovtzeff (1941: 1136) and Launey (1949: 290-2). The most complete discussion of this view is Bosworth (1986: 1-12).
58 He cites the example of Macedonia between the Second and Third Macedonian Wars, wherein a period of comparatively remarkable peace between the wars allowed the Macedonian population to recover, such that Perseus could mobilize twenty-six thousand soldiers against Rome in 169 BC.
An example from Classical Greece will illustrate the importance of a prolonged peace for population recovery. Argos is said to have suffered six thousand casualties, nearly all of its military-age citizens, in a Spartan trap at the battle of Sepeia in 494 BC (Hdt. 6.83.1-2, 7.148.2.8-9). Two generations of child-rearing (lasting about forty-five years) were necessary for a full and stable recovery of manpower. Argive non-participation in the Persian Wars was attributed to Medizing in some traditions, but also reflected the population emergency (See Hdt. 7.148-52, Arist. Pol. 5.1303a.6-8). The Argives, by then the military-age sons of the citizens killed in 494, requested a thirty-year peace with Sparta, so that their own sons could grow to adulthood (Hdt. 7.149.1.5-6). The largest Argive military forces for a span of forty years were one thousand men apiece (Thuc. 5.50), but large Argive levies returned by the Peloponnesian War (Thuc.

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59 Billows in the above passage uses an example from Ancient Greece as well, Athens after the Peloponnesian War, which involved probably a greater number of military casualties and many deaths within the general population as well. What he fails to notice is that, while the Athenian citizenry recovered, Athens refused to risk, ever-again, the greatest part of its manpower in battle. The largest-attested Athenian hoplite force after the end of the Peloponnesian War was that at Nemea in 394, given by Xenophon (4.2.17) as six thousand men, cf. Anderson (1970: 97, 143-5). Otherwise the largest known Athenian hoplite force was in 378, when "as large a force as possible" meant only five thousand hoplites (Diod. 15.26.2, 32.2, 16.37.3) and no larger force is clearly attested in any of the ancient sources on fourth century Athens. Even down to the Lamian War, the Athenian's total mobilization (Diod. 18.10.2) meant only five thousand hoplites for the field army (18.11.1), though another passage (18.18.5) indicates that the citizen body in 323 numbered over twenty thousand military-age men, indicating a general unwillingness to hazard more than one-quarter of the citizen body in battle.

60 The rise to adulthood of the boys of the slain would have provided a large class, between three and four thousand, of young citizens, many still childless, within twenty years. But a full recovery would require a second cycle of sons.
This recovery was not even solely through generational renewal, but also required the active conscription of new citizens from several nearby towns (Paus. 8.27.1).

The families of Macedonia did not enjoy a generation or more of peace or overall family stability in the decades after Alexander’s campaign. Eight years of peace followed the war with Agis in 331 BC (Diod. 17.62-3), before the Lamian War, which broke out in 323 when news reached Greece of Alexander’s death (Diod. 18.9.5-24.1). The Macedonians spent the remainder of the fourth century, with scarcely a respite, at war. More importantly perhaps, additional thousands of Macedonians were led across to Asia in those years, beginning with no fewer than five thousand in 322 BC. While five thousand men may not seem like an enormous number, one must bear in mind that they represented one-third or more of the men called to arms in the emergency mobilization the previous year. While the Macedonian situation may not have been a crisis, the sources do indicate that the robust population expanded by the warfare and unifying policies of Philip II had been weakened through the mass emigration and frequent warfare.

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61 The first, clear mobilization of most of the Argive citizen body for a military campaign was in 418 BC, Thuc. 5.58, 72, which seems to have mobilized, with imported citizens of two cities, about five thousand men, nearly the six thousand hoplites mobilized at Sepeia. Before this, the only likely large mobilization for the Argives came in the battles of Tegea and Dipaia in the late 470’s, by which time the sons of those slain at Sepeia would have largely had sons of their own. Though there is no account of either battle, Argos may have again suffered significant casualties, for they agreed to a fifty-year peace with Sparta.

62 This may be seen from the force of 8,500 Macedonian infantry left in Asia with Antigonus in 321, but who had originally crossed to Asia with Antipater in 322. Only 5,000 of these remained into 320 BC after more than 3,000 mutinied in the winter of 322/1 and were allowed to return to Macedonia, see Diod. 18.40.5-8, Arr. Succ. (FrGH 156) 11.32-4.
1.2.1 – Calculations for Macedonian Manpower in Asia

The situation in Asia was more complex, for two reasons. First, the ancient sources rarely furnish tallies of manpower. Second, when they do, or otherwise give impressions regarding numbers, their rosy reports should be treated with skepticism. Nevertheless, we can attempt calculations of reasonable estimates for Macedonian manpower in Asia. There were twelve thousand infantry and eighteen hundred cavalry from Macedonia in Alexander’s army at the start of the war, the core of an army that included, according to most sources, a little more than thirty thousand infantry and four to five thousand cavalry. This army crossed into Asia with Alexander, and at some point linked up with the advance force that had been sent by Philip II before his death, which, judging by its three commanders, most historians have estimated to have included three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry of Macedonia among the total ten thousand. Another nine thousand Macedonian infantry and eight hundred Macedonian cavalry joined Alexander’s army between 334 and 331 BC. First, three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, all Macedonians, joined Alexander at

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63 Diod. 17.17.3.
64 Alexander left behind twelve thousand Macedonian infantry and fifteen-hundred cavalry fit for service under the command of Antipater (Diod. 17.17.5). Justin (11.6.2) says the army was 32,000 foot and 4,500 horse, Arrian (1.11.3) about 30,000 foot and 5,000 horse. Plutarch’s summary (Alex. 1.3, 15.1) indicates that Arrian used Ptolemy’s numbers, that Diodorus may have used Aristobulus’ numbers, and also mentions that Anaximenes described the army as having 43,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, easily the largest estimate. Polybius reported (12.19.1) that Callisthenes’ count of the army was 40,000 infantry.
65 Diod. 17.7.10.
Gordion in Phrygia at the start of 333 BC. Polybius relates that Callisthenes had said that five thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry had joined Alexander in Cilicia shortly before Issus. These reinforcements could have elevated Macedonian numbers to as many as twenty-three thousand infantry and thirty-two hundred cavalry. While other reinforcements arrived sporadically, only one, which met Alexander at Susa, included any notable contingent of Macedonians. Six thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry met the king there in 331 BC. Arrian’s account implies that the men were dispersed among the battalions to bring the phalanx up to strength, and may also have allowed the creation of a seventh taxis, or battalion of the phalanx, in addition to the original six of Alexander. These additions, the final significant additions to Macedonian manpower in Asia, brought the army to as many as twenty-nine thousand infantry and thirty-seven hundred cavalry.

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66 Arr. An. 1.29.4. These were the newlywed men who had not joined Alexander at the start of the campaign.
67 Polyb. 12.9.2, Callisthenes FrGH 129.35.43-5. While most calculations have accepted this number, Milns (1966: 162) does not and argues that the numbers are a reference to the 3,300 Macedonians at Gordion, with allied and mercenary contingents added to reach 5,800.
68 Note that I am not yet accounting for casualties or men assigned to garrisons.
69 Bosworth (1986: 6) and Billows (1995: 187 and n. 7) suggest a few thousand Macedonians among the reinforcements who arrived in India in 326 (Diod. 17.95.4), though Diodorus calls them allies and mercenaries. Curtius’ version (9.3.21) has a more credible air, with eight rather than thirty thousand reinforcements, a thousand cavalry from Thrace and seven thousand infantry sent from Harpalos in Babylon. These infantry would more likely be trained Mesopotamians than Macedonians or Greeks.
70 Arr. An. 3.16.10, Diod. 17.65.1, Curt. 5.1.40.
71 For the seventh taxis, see Milns (1966:159-66). In the two earlier cases, it seems that the troops were simply added to existing battalions. This also implies a minimum of 10,500 phalangites and an upper limit around 12,000, besides the hypaspists.
72 This comes to a total of 32,700. Billows (1995: 187) suggests 35-40,000, Bosworth (1986: 8) estimates a minimum of 30,000 and a likely number nearer 40,000. Brunt (1983: 527-30) suggested the total must have been nearer 50,000 to accommodate Brunt’s more reasonable casualty calculations.
Such numbers, though, were never gathered in the field. Fighting, disease, settlements, and garrisons assured steady attrition. For example, Arrian’s account of the reinforcement at Susa and the seventh taxiś indicates a Macedonian infantry force of certainly no more than twenty-four thousand, likely around seventeen thousand, and perhaps as little as thirteen thousand five hundred. This implies losses to mortality or garrison duty of between five and fifteen thousand Macedonians. Milns estimated Macedonian losses from 334-331 in the range of 2,800 infantry. He then estimated one hundred in casualties and nearly five thousand in settlements and garrisons as Alexander’s army moved through Babylon, Susa, and Persia. His conservative estimates indicate the loss of as many as ten thousand men by 331 BC, leaving a maximum of twenty-three thousand Macedonians in Alexander’s field army. This

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73 I offer the first number simply as a liberal estimate that, flush with soldiers, Alexander doubled the size of the normal taxiś. In fact, the arrival of the three thousand newlywed men implies that the taxiś was normally two thousand strong anyway. Therefore seventeen thousand infantry may be the optimal number of the three. Hammond (1989: 64) suggests “at least thirteen thousand five hundred” infantry and two thousand cavalry. Seven phalanx taxiś at full strength, and three chiliarchies of hypaspists, with officers, would actually number 17,408 men.

74 Most modern historians, in offering calculations of Macedonian manpower, have avoided grappling with the manpower indicators given in the known detachments of the army, perhaps since doing so necessitates embracing a rate of attrition they are unwilling to accept.

75 See Milns 1966: 163 for his table of estimates, which includes men left on garrison duty in addition to those killed, amounting to a little more than 2,800. He calls his estimate “very conservative” (n.21), and he takes generally among the smaller casualty estimates from battles. Cavalry casualties could easily have amounted to several hundred, and whole estimate should probably be closer to four thousand, eg. Curt.3.11.27 gives 452 killed at Issus and 4,500 wounded, but Milns uses the 300 from Diodorus, and accepts Arrian’s 400 at Tyre despite narratives that indicate much higher casualties (Diod. 17.43-6, Curt. 4.4), and ignores the violent siege of Gaza altogether (Curt. 4.6).

76 Ibid., 164. Curtius is our best source on the settlements around this time. He gives one thousand Macedonians settled at Susa (5.2.16) and Milns suggested at least a similar number among the more than four thousand in Egypt (4.8.4), then seven hundred in Babylon (5.1.43) and three thousand left in Persia (5.6.11), of whom many were invalided soldiers, likely from the wounded of Gaugamela.
accords fairly well with the infantry strength of seventeen thousand suggested by the use of the reinforcements in 331 BC, which itself indicates a maximum Macedonian manpower of about twenty thousand men.\textsuperscript{77}

The fighting from 330 to 324 was in many respects bloodier than the battles against Darius’ Persian army, though none of the battles was so large. The ancient historians chose to include casualty figures for only a handful of these battles, complicating any estimate. After a series of battles in Hyrcania, Sogdia and Aria, for which no figures are given, Spitamenes began an uprising in Sogdia in which many soldiers were killed, called Macedonians by Arrian (\textit{An.} 4.1), though mercenaries likely constituted the greater part of the garrisons. Soon after, more than one thousand infantry and three to five hundred cavalry were killed in an ambush.\textsuperscript{78} However, there were only sixty Macedonians in the entire detachment, and many may have been among the several hundred survivors. In the dozen or more engagements in Sogdia and Bactria, Arrian alone included casualty figures, and for just two engagements, in which thirty-seven and twenty-five Macedonians fell (\textit{An.} 4.17, 27).\textsuperscript{79} At the Hydaspes two sources indicate significant casualties among the largely Macedonian combatants, seven-

\textsuperscript{77} Seven phalanx battalions over-enrolled to two thousand, three hypaspist brigades fully-enrolled at three thousand, and three thousand cavalry in the companions and lancers.

\textsuperscript{78} Arr. \textit{An.} 4.3.7-5.7, Curt. 7.7.39.

\textsuperscript{79} Curtius’ details are sparse as well, but he mentions the death of “about 50” Macedonian cavalry near the Jaxartes (7.6.17-8).
to nine hundred infantry, and two to three hundred cavalry. Eight hundred and fifty casualties is perhaps a safe estimate. Though there was much fighting during the remainder of Alexander’s campaign in India, casualty figures are never included, save for the hundred Macedonians who fell at Sangala (Arr. An. 5.24.5). On the return from India, Alexander’s army suffered heavy casualties while crossing the Gedrosian desert, according to some anecdotes within the ancient narratives. The casualties suggested seem exaggerated, and the initial statements by Arrian (6.22.3-24.1) and Diodorus (17.104.4-7) give little indication of major attrition, suggesting that the horror stories of massive casualties were drawn from less credible sources like Cleitarchus. With continual attrition from dozens of minor battles, combined with disease and further settlement, it is difficult to imagine losses of less than five thousand. This leaves the Macedonian force at fifteen thousand by 324 BC. While this seems a sizeable force, it

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80 Diod. 17.89.3 gives the first set of figures, the second set are from the Metz Epitome from Late Antiquity. The infantry at Hydaspes were almost exclusively Macedonian, but the cavalry were only half Macedonian.

81 Arr. An. 6.24.4, Diod. 17.105.6, Curt. 9.10.11-16, Arr. Ind. 26.1. Note that these sources tell varying stories, and insist that the casualties were worst among the camp followers and pack animals.

82 Suggested by Hammond (2007: 274-6), who observes that in Arrian in particular the claim of massive casualties lies outside the main narrative, within a series of largely spurious sayings about the crossing.

83 Taking the eight hundred and fifty killed at the Hydaspes, and an average rate of thirty dead (perhaps too little) in more than two dozen engagements in Central Asia and India, accepting Koinos’ statement that losses from disease were greater than from combat (Arr. An. 5.4.6), and allowing only for one thousand settled wounded. Launey (1949: 351) estimated Macedonian settlers numbering at least two and as many as five thousand in Central Asia alone. Billows (1995: 188 n.11) accepts these numbers.

84 Two of the few statements on Macedonian manpower late in Alexander’s reign are Curt. 7.3.4 and Arr. An. 7.4.8. The former says that Alexander received six thousand Macedonians, two hundred Companions, and 5,600 Greek troops from the army of Parmenion in 329 BC, and these were robur omnium virium regis “the strongest of the king’s forces,” though they totaled less than twelve thousand. The latter says that “more than ten thousand” Macedonians had taken Asian wives by the time of the great wedding ceremony between eighty top Companions and Medo-Persian maidens in 324 BC. This number included men
must be split between the discharged veterans with Craterus and the active Macedonians with Alexander, the former contingent described by ancient historians as no less than ten thousand strong. This would suggest that the phalanx, hypaspists, and companions left with Alexander in the field army in 323 were only five thousand strong, or no more than ten thousand, if we imagine that the discharged ten thousand included former settlers.

Another way to look at manpower is to calculate the impact of attrition. The generally warm and dry climate may have provided some help, food may have been in ready supply through much of the conquest as far as Persia, and in a foreign land with a citizen army desertion from the Macedonian ranks may have been less likely. Yet many of the men on campaign were not young when it began, but veterans of Philip’s wars, and they were all certainly exposed to foreign pathogens on their journey. Antony’s fighting withdrawal from the same regions in the first century BC ended with a reported thirty-two thousand casualties, mainly from disease. In early modern Europe, during

throughout the army, and so likely included most of the men still living who had been settled in the colonies.

Arr. An. 7.12.1, Diod. 17.109.1, 18.4.1, and indicated by Diod. 18.16.4 to include 1,500 cavalry, which Brunt (1983: 489) and Billows (1995: 188) accept as additional soldiers, for a total 11,500 Macedonians discharged from service. Their total is supported by Justin Epit. Trog. 12.12, which gives the number of discharged veterans as 11,000.

Justin Epit. Trog. 11.6.4.

Plut. Ant. 50.1, 51.1. Plutarch’s narrative posits an incredibly large army of 113,000 men (Ant. 37.3), counting allies, and includes at least 13,000 desertions and at least 13,000 casualties before the army began to withdraw. In the fighting withdrawal and subsequent peacetime march to Roman territory, the army
the Wars of Religion, attrition rates averaged around twenty but could surpass fifty percent per year. With few lengthy sieges and fewer army-destroying pathogens, the

suffered the remaining 32,000 casualties, in spite of winning, according to Plutarch, all eighteen engagements during the march. The largely disease-related casualties during the withdrawal represent 30% attrition from the initial force, part of overall attrition of 50% in a campaign that lasted less than a year. Parker (1996: 53-60, 2004: 177-9) calculates the attrition rate among well-trained, professional, and even elite units at about 20-25% per year on average, with the rate for desertion-prone units (defeated or besieging armies in particular, p.58) far higher. He notes (2004: 142-3) that as many as half of those invalided temporarily or permanently by disease were infected with venereal diseases, unreported in Alexander’s campaign, and Parker and Adams (1997: 172-3) note the high mortality from combat during the Thirty Years War and Eighty Years War, from which most of the information had been gleaned. Wood (2002: 229-35) calculates French attrition as averaging 36% per year, and Wilson (2009: 330, 433, 483) calculates the Swedish rate at about 20% per year under normal conditions. Bucher’s study of Swiss mercenary regiments (1974: 123-5) indicates yearly attrition of about 15% under good conditions: roughly 3% mortality, 7% desertion, and 8% debilitating illness or injury. Ayton’s study of English records in the Hundred Years War (1999: 142-55) indicates similar rates, but also indicates that many of the attrited soldiers returned to their units within two months, dropping the actual attrition rate. Storr’s study of attrition in the Spanish Imperial army (2006: 328-32) indicates that attrition from infirmity amounted to about 10%, but was a rotating attrition where many men were not permanently lost. Later, the British Imperial army suffered an attrition rate no less than 10% throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, as shown by Gilbert (1980: 557-8), and as much as 28% per year among units overseas in wartime, according to Stone (1994: 14). The British Imperial forces in India and other tropical regions are particularly instructive, and Burroughs (1994: 165) notes that the army in India, in the first half of the nineteenth century, suffered median 8% attrition per year, with 3% mortality, the latter considerably higher than in other imperial posts. Notably, desertion was less a factor for British troops in India than in many other regions. Corvisier’s study of the French army (1979: 682, 737) in the same era indicates a roughly 6% rate in peacetime and 12% in war. Still later, Livermore (1900: 45-50) tabulated Union and Confederate attrition in the American Civil War that amounts to rates of about 23% and 35%, respectively, over the course of the war, excluding men discharged at completion of service, or 6% and 9% per year. Even in the First World War, the German army suffered temporary attrition near fifty percent in the first months of the war due to casualties, sickness, and garrisons and security detachments, for which see van Creveld (2004: 135-6). Estimates for the ancient world are necessarily unwieldy, but Scheidel estimates (2007: 425-8) annual attrition in the Roman Imperial army at about 6% per year, with reference to troops at local bases in relative peace, while attrition in campaigning units was considerably higher. Rosenstein’s study of the mid-Republican army estimates annual wastage from mortality alone (2004: 130-6, and notes on 271-87), without consideration of debilitation or desertion, at 4.75-5.45% or 4.9-5.7% per year based on variant calculations, and potentially as high, in wartime, as 8-10% (p.109). He emphasizes (p.133) the importance in the Roman army of relocating camps as a boon to sanitation, and doubts (p.132) that ancient pathogens posed so great a threat as those that contributed to such high attrition rates in the early modern era.
greatest danger to Alexander’s army, aside from enemy forces, was effective supply. The speech of Koinos in 326, recorded in Arrian (An. 5.27.4-6 in particular), indicates that the Macedonian army had lost many men since crossing into Asia, from both death and the settlement of the wounded (27.4-5), that an even greater number had died of disease, and that only “a few” were still alive and in good health (27.6). Allowing for some exaggeration, Koinos’ speech still implies an overall attrition rate (including settlers) of approximately fifty percent by 326 BC, or about seven percent per year. Table 1.1 below shows averaged attrition rates within the Macedonian army down to 323 BC, indicating a surviving population a little more than sixteen thousand in 323 BC, comparable to the above estimates derived from casualty and settlement figures.

Table 1.1 - Macedonian Attrition Estimate – 7%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>334</th>
<th>333</th>
<th>332</th>
<th>331</th>
<th>330</th>
<th>329</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Pre-Attrition</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>16884</td>
<td>24879</td>
<td>23251</td>
<td>28229</td>
<td>26382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Attrition</td>
<td>3084</td>
<td>15779</td>
<td>23251</td>
<td>21729</td>
<td>26382</td>
<td>24656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additions</td>
<td>13800</td>
<td>9100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New total</td>
<td>16884</td>
<td>24879</td>
<td>23251</td>
<td>28229</td>
<td>26382</td>
<td>24656</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Engels (1978: 18-35) for logistics in Alexander’s army. Engels’ estimations are in some places exaggerated, particularly regarding his dismissal of supply wagons, acceptance of very large army numbers, and acceptance of modern American military supply as the standard provisioning for Alexander’s army (Van Creveld 2004: 244 puts the standard ration in the Napoleonic era more than one pound lower per man). Nonetheless it is on the whole a good indication of the immense challenges posed to the Macedonian army, and helps explain why Alexander so frequently split his forces for the purpose of resupply through forage and pillage. Van Creveld (2004: 34-8, 76) argues that forage as a means of supply increased the likelihood of small-scale casualties, which are generally ignored in the sources on Alexander’s campaign, and the opportunity for desertion. Yet Alexander’s army relied heavily upon forage, particularly in the upcountry campaign from 330-324, according to Engels (104-7).

This would leave more than sixteen thousand dead or debilitated in colonies. This low attrition rate may be acceptable based on the diminished likelihood of desertion, the relatively low number of lengthy sieges, and assumed return to the army of some injured or ill soldiers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>328</th>
<th>327</th>
<th>326</th>
<th>325</th>
<th>324</th>
<th>323</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Pre-Attrition</td>
<td>24656</td>
<td>23042</td>
<td>21534</td>
<td>20125</td>
<td>18808</td>
<td>17577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Attrition</td>
<td>23042</td>
<td>21534</td>
<td>20125</td>
<td>18808</td>
<td>17577</td>
<td>16427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New total</td>
<td>23042</td>
<td>21534</td>
<td>20125</td>
<td>18808</td>
<td>17577</td>
<td>16427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attrition of seven percent fits some elements within the Alexandrian narratives well. The estimated force strength in India in 326 is just over twenty thousand, providing sufficient manpower for the thousands of Macedonian veterans partially dismissed from service after the near-mutiny at the Hyphasis without leaving Alexander without an army. It also is only slightly larger than Rosenstein’s mortality calculations for the legions of Republican Rome, which reckoned mortality from combat and disease using younger soldiers fighting (generally) closer to home. Further, it is precisely the same rate as Rathbone’s calculation on campaign mortality in the Roman army in the third century BC. There is a problem, however, in that the 28,229 men at the end of 331 is considerably larger than the estimate above of a maximum number around twenty

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[91] They were, after all, in India, and did not in fact officially depart for Macedonia until 324 BC, and so while they were at this point termed ἀπομάχους, discharged veterans, they remained with the army (Arr. An. 6.17.3) about halfway down the Indus, before marching overland with Craterus and other forces back to Persia, where they met again with Alexander’s forces.

[92] Rathbone’s heuristic calculation of 7% (1981:18-19) is based on manpower and casualty figures and incorporates a study of land retention in Italian military colonies in the third century to cross-check his estimated mortality rate as way of explaining manpower crises within the colonies at the start of the second century.
thousand. That number is based on attested detachments within the army, and in that sense is more reliable than the big, round numbers offered by historians.93

A possible solution is to treat the surplus as the aged and wounded Macedonians settled in colonies in Anatolia, Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Iran, referred to by Koinos in his speech (Arr. An. 5.27.5). Table 1.2 shows nine thousand settlers removed into settlements by 331 BC, bringing the total at the start of 330 BC to a more compatible twenty-thousand men in the field army. Settler attrition is calculated at only three percent based on estimated yearly mortality between ages 45 and 55 according to Coale-Demeny Model West Level 4, with one percentage point added for habitation in foreign climate and mortality from battle wounds.94

Table 1.2 – Macedonian Attrition Estimate, with Settlers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>334</th>
<th>333</th>
<th>332</th>
<th>331</th>
<th>330</th>
<th>329</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Pre-Attrition</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>16884</td>
<td>23028</td>
<td>19724</td>
<td>20107</td>
<td>18791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93 The most obvious example is the myriad of discharged veterans, which, while meaning ten thousand, can also simply indicate a sizeable number. Seven battalions of the phalanx, and three chiliarchies of hypaspists, and the several cavalry commands provide specific commands. In probability they would not have been enrolled with Macedonian manpower to the number of twenty-three thousand, but the commands do provide an upper limit, which is my main intention here.

94 Curtius describes the settled soldiers as, by and large, aetate gravibus (5.2.16), they also must necessarily have been in this age range to qualify for discharge from service. The Coale-Demeny Model West Level 4 assumes life expectancy at birth of 26 years, for which see Coale and Demeny (1983). I have chosen it to provide a maximum estimate of Macedonian manpower. Most calculations for the ancient world using Coale-Demeny tables utilize Level 3, with life expectancy at birth of 25 years, see Parkin (1992: 80-8), Saller (1996: 23), and Rosenstein (2003: 86), but Scheidel (2001) uses Level 4 for males in Roman Egypt, following Bagnall and Frier (1994: 100-9), while offering cautions based on critiques of the Coale-Demeny model for populations with high infant mortality (Woods 1993: 195-219) and the absence of any calculation for tuberculosis, known to have affect ancient Mediterranean populations like the Macedonians (Sallares 1991: 237), cf. Golden (2000: 23-32). These criticisms matter little here, since we are seeking to establish a theoretical maximum. An accurate number would, based on these criticisms and others, surely be lower.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Pre-Attrition</th>
<th>Post-Attrition</th>
<th>Additions</th>
<th>New total</th>
<th>Settlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>323</td>
<td>17561</td>
<td>16412</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16412</td>
<td>8318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>324</td>
<td>16412</td>
<td>15338</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15338</td>
<td>8318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325</td>
<td>15338</td>
<td>14334</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14334</td>
<td>8318</td>
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<tr>
<td>326</td>
<td>14334</td>
<td>13396</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13396</td>
<td>8318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>13396</td>
<td>12519</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12519</td>
<td>8318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>328</td>
<td>12519</td>
<td>11700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11700</td>
<td>8318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures would leave over seven thousand Macedonian settlers, perhaps themselves a portion of those Macedonians discharged from service.\(^{95}\) Identifying a portion of the discharged soldiers as former settlers also makes sense of another occurrence. Most of the principal sources attest that many of the discharged Macedonians had sons by Asian wives, and that Alexander ordered that the boys should be retained, paid, and trained as Macedonian soldiers.\(^{96}\) Furthermore, Arrian’s version says that the boys would remain in the military settlements, necessarily implying that many of their fathers had been settlers. The number of Macedonians left in service by this calculation would have been less than eight thousand, assuming approximately four thousand from the field army were discharged along with most of the settlers. This also

\(^{95}\) Diod 18.16.4 says that six thousand of the discharged veterans were from the Macedonians who initially crossed to Asia (i.e., among the initial seventeen thousand from Parmenion’s advance force and Alexander’s own army).

\(^{96}\) Diod. 17.110.3, Plut. Alex. 71.5, Arrian An. 7.12.2, Justin 12.4.6.
means a maximum figure for Macedonian manpower in 323 BC, before the veterans were discharged, just shy of nineteen thousand.

While nineteen thousand Macedonian survivors, of the original number of as many as thirty-three thousand, implies a very successful campaign and astounding feat of force retention, it is too small by most ancient and modern standards. Most historians of Alexander have accepted the ancient figures for Macedonian manpower in Asia in 323 BC: at least twenty-five and as many as thirty-three thousand men.\(^7\) The attrition rate required to supply that number of Macedonians is 2.5-2.75\%, which is simple fantasy.\(^8\) Alternatively, one can assume thousands of additional recruits, and in fact Brunt, Milns, Bosworth and Billows have all assumed inflow of at least 5,000 unobserved by ancient sources.\(^9\) However, five thousand additional men is insufficient to justify the posited manpower at the barely-realistic attrition rate of 7\%. Instead, we would have to assume

\(^7\) Taking the 10,000 to 11,500 veterans with Craterus, plus the 15,000 active duty Macedonians incorporated into Alexander’s plans for the permanent garrison of Asia and field army for his western expedition (Curt.10.2.8), or calculated by contingent: the 6,700 Macedonians required for the mixed phalanx (Arr. An. 7.23.3-4), 2,000 Companions, 3,000 Silvershields and 3,000 hypaspists (Diod. 19.28.1). These figures are accepted and staunchly defended by both Hammond (1989: 64-8) and Billows (1995: 188-9). Hammond (68) says “Thus there were perhaps 26,800 [Macedonian] citizens alive in Asia in 323 BC” while Billows (188) estimated that, settlers included, “30,000 to 33,000 Macedonians… survived Alexander’s campaigns.” The lower estimates include Schachermeyer’s tally (1970: 14-5), which estimated a Macedonian force in Asia of six thousand in the phalanx and no more than ten thousand total, with as many as ten thousand returning home, thus 20,000 in all, and Bosworth’s estimation (2005: 81) of at least 20,000 total.

\(^8\) It only barely exceeds the estimated mortality of a settled civilian population in Coale-Demeny Model West Level 4. Yet even lower rates were accepted at Hammond (1989: 68) and Billows (1995: 188). In fact Billows estimated attrition at 1.2-2\% per year, and Hammond at less than one percent.

\(^9\) Milns (1966: 109), Billows (1995: 187), Brunt (1983: ii.488-90), though note that this is in part because Brunt did assume a relatively high rate of attrition. Bosworth (1986: 7-8), while rejecting Brunt’s suggestion of large reinforcements in India in 326, endorsed invisible additions in small reinforcements of 2-7,000 men (“it follows that…nearer 40,000…were taken out of Macedon between 334 and 331”).
the arrival of *more than eleven thousand* Macedonians with the reinforcements that arrived at the start of 326 (Diod. 17.95.4). Moreover, since those soldiers would have spent at least two years traveling to Alexander’s position, a simple travel attrition of three percent means that the initial force departing Macedonia would have numbered almost twelve thousand. This, again, is simply impossible. In short, in order to calculate a number of native-born Macedonians alive in Asia in 323 roughly equivalent to those given in ancient sources, one must posit either impossibly low casualties or large numbers of unattested reinforcements.

These calculations indicate that the number of native Macedonians alive in Asia in 323 was at least six thousand (24%) fewer than the ancient estimates, and likely much smaller. And yet the ancient sources are fairly consistent between themselves that the Macedonians numbered about twenty-five thousand men. How to explain this? Perhaps there were nearly twenty-five thousand Macedonians in Asia in 323, but a large number of them, at least six thousand and likely more, were not native Macedonians. After the army turned into the upper parts of the former Persian empire in 330/29 BC, it did not receive additional Macedonian reinforcements. The phalanx’s seven over-size

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100 This number would represent the size of the reserve left in Macedonia with Antipater at the start of the war, and would surely have left Macedonia utterly emptied of soldiers, yet Antipater mobilized more than thirteen thousand Macedonians in 323 according to Diod. 18.12.1-2. Bosworth (2002: 76-7) suggests a fault in the text, and that in fact Antipater’s army had either ten—or more likely three—thousand Macedonians, and three, ten, or thirteen thousand mercenaries.

101 The ten thousand discharged veterans, the more than six thousand Macedonians in the mixed phalanx, the hypaspists and companions, and Alexander’s calculation of fifteen thousand remaining in service (Curt. 10.2.8). A similar picture of roughly twenty-five thousand surviving Macedonians emerges from each of the principal ancient narrative sources.
battalions could have compensated for some level of attrition for several years: men
could have been promoted into the ranks of the hypaspists to keep the latter at three
thousand, and the seven battalions eventually returned to normal strength at fifteen
hundred men apiece. Such shuffling of the phalanx could have been managed,
according to the above attrition calculations, until 325 BC, by which time the seven
battalions would have likely dropped below fifteen hundred men apiece. Possible
errors in attrition rates aside, the heavy fighting, increased rate of illness, and discharge
of veterans would have required major supplements in Macedonian manpower after
that year in order to maintain the fighting strength of the sub-units of the phalanx. This
would have seemed more alarming after the large discharge of veterans at Opis in 324.

1.2.2 – Supplementing Macedonian Manpower in Asia

Alexander’s phalanx did not receive additional reinforcements from Macedonia
after 331 BC, but it did receive additional reinforcements. When Alexander had
returned to Persia and Media from his eastern campaign, he collected a large force of
Asians trained for nearly six years in his absence. These thirty thousand young men had
been selected as youths for their admirable qualities, and trained as Macedonian soldiers

102 Calculated for 14,336 (seven over-strength battalion with officers) from 330 BC onward at 7% attrition.
The estimated number of remaining fighting men drops below 10,752 (seven full-strength battalion with
officers) by the end of 325 BC, to 10,219 men.
and in the Greek tongue. Arrian tells us that they were called both Persians and *Epigonoi*, “Descendants” or “Successors,” but both his and Curtius’ accounts clearly indicate that the men were not solely Persian, but drawn from the many satrapies of Asia. In Curtius’ account, they had been trained in Macedonian weapons and the Greek language in the new cities established by Alexander. Trained for four to six years in Greek military colonies, they would have been about twenty or nearly so, and fairly Hellenized, in 324 when they joined the camp of Alexander. With their addition, Alexander’s army reached its height, throughout his empire, of perhaps one hundred and twenty thousand men. During the crisis at Opis in 324, Alexander began organizing a Persian counter-force to his Macedonians, complete with Asian officers but Macedonian unit names and panoplies, including *agema*, Companions, hypaspists, and the phalanx. The men for these units likely came from the newly arrived thirty thousand trained men. While these men constituted additions to the phalanx, there is no evidence that they were used to buttress the manpower of the Macedonian battalions.

103 Arr. An. 7.6.1, 23.4; Diod. 17.108.1-2, 110.2; Plut. Alex. 47.5-6, 71.1. Arrian mentions thirty-thousand *Epigonoi* phalangites selected from noble families after passing a physical inspection; Plutarch calls them Persians, trained in the Macedonian war of war and taught the Greek tongue, and Diodorus tells a broadly similar story to both. The men were not exclusively Persian, but instead the appellation was applied to picked young men selected from “omnia provinciae” (Curt. 8.1.6). See Badian (1965: 160-1) and Bosworth (1980: 1-21).

104 Curtius’ narrative places Alexander’s order in the beginning of 327 BC, but the others place the order in later 330 BC.

105 Plut. Alex. 66.5 says that at its height, Alexander’s army was 120,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, set in contrast to the several thousand survivors who completed the crossing of the Gedrosian desert with him; Curtius, in an aside (8.5.4), states that Alexander’s army had 120,000 men, presumably during the Indian campaign, but that is unclear; he and Plutarch seem to have used the same source.

106 Arr. An. 7.11.3, Diod. 17.108.3, 110.1.
Instead, these units are very likely to be identified with the thousands of *pantodapoi* infantry attested in the Successor Wars.\(^{107}\)

The following year additional reinforcements arrived, and in that instance there is solid evidence for troops enrolled into the Macedonian ranks. In the intervening time, the near-mutiny at Opis had been resolved, and Craterus had departed the king’s camp with some ten thousand veteran Macedonian soldiers. Following their departure, additional Asiatic reinforcements arrived: from the East, twenty thousand archers and skirmishers, called Persians but drawn from a number of tribes, and from the West, two super-battalions of Anatolian infantry.\(^{108}\) Both groups were enrolled into new battalions with the remaining Macedonian manpower.\(^{109}\) Scholarly attention has focused upon the Persian troops, because they were brigaded in a novel formation with four highly-paid

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\(^{107}\) *Pantodapoi* means, roughly, “multi-national troops,” drawn from across Asia. They and other phalangites sometimes called “Persians” are known in large numbers from the war between Antigonus and Eumenes in 317-5 BC, see Diod. 18.30.5, 19.14.5, 27.6, 29.3; there were thirteen thousand of these *pantodapoi* pikemen at Paraitakene in 316 BC. They were kept mobilized apart from the Macedonian contingents, and were especially common from Mesopotamia eastwards, where there were few Macedonians.

\(^{108}\) Arr. *An.* 7.23.1. Diod. 17.110.2 places this event in 324 BC, does not mention the Anatolian troops, and calls the Persians “archers and slingers.” I prefer Arrian’s account, as it is difficult to image effective use of slingers from within a Macedonian phalanx formation. Arrian calls the Persian troops archers and javeliners, and also seems preferable in that he mentions recently conquered tribes among the twenty-thousand, whereas Diodorus places this reinforcement prior to the conquest of the Cossians. The Anatolian detachments, from Caria and Lydia, are each called a στρατιὰν, indicative of sizeable forces.

\(^{109}\) Arr. *An.* 7.23.2-4. Most coverage of this event has focused upon the light troops from the Persian highlands, but the text is quite clear that the Anatolian troops were enrolled into Macedonian regiments as well, 7.24.1: καταλοχίζειν μὲν αὐτὸν τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν σὲν Πευκέστα τε ἐκ Περσῶν καὶ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐνὶ Φιλοξένῳ καὶ Μενάνδρῳ ἡμοίουσιν ἐς τὰς Μακεδονικὰς τάξεις. Part of the problem in the historiography is that Arrian describes the mixed phalanx first, in 7.23, and then notes that his source, Aristoboulos, described the brigading of the Anatolians as well at the start of 7.24.
Macedonians bracketing twelve Persian archers in each file of the phalanx.\textsuperscript{110} This phalanx seems to have been disbanded soon after Alexander’s death and the Macedonians returned to traditional phalanx battalions.\textsuperscript{111} Meanwhile, the infantry from Lydia and Caria, led to Alexander by their respective satraps, had presumably been in training for six years, and were likewise enrolled in Macedonian phalanx battalions. Most scholarship has ignored this addition entirely. The likeliest interpretation is that they were enrolled as pikemen within these battalions.\textsuperscript{112} This enrollment functioned to reinforce the manpower of the phalanx battalions following the dismissal of the veterans the previous year, and demonstrates that non-Macedonian infantry, trained in Macedonian warfare, could be enrolled into the Macedonian battalions.

The pattern of Asian supplements to Macedonian manpower was not a new innovation in 323 BC, but instead had been used for several years to reward service and maintain manpower in the Macedonian cavalry regiments. In 324, the Macedonians mutinied at Opis in Mesopotamia, due to their mounting frustrations with Alexander’s

\textsuperscript{110} Partly because of the novelty, and partly because it invites estimates of Macedonian manpower, if one assumes that all twenty thousand were so enrolled. The text does not make this clear. In fact, if twenty-four chiliarchies, or eighteen \textit{taxeis}, were formed from the Persian troops and Macedonian low-grade officers at a 12:4 ratio, 6,250 Macedonians would have been required. Most scholars have instead followed the number twenty thousand and estimated 6,700 Macedonians, see Schachermeyer (1970: 14), Bosworth (1986: 3-4), Hammond (1989: 64), Billows (1995: 190), contra Milns (1976: 127), who estimates that only twelve thousand Persians were enrolled in this mixed phalanx.

\textsuperscript{111} To be surmised from the appearance of thousands of Persian archers, separate from the phalanx, in the armies of Leonnatus and Craterus (see Diod. 18.16.4-5). And again with Arrhidaeus at Diod. 18.51.1.

\textsuperscript{112} Like the Persian/\textit{Epigonoi} phalangites, they too had been trained for several years, and by their local satraps. Arrian’s fascination with the ranged weaponry of the eastern troops indicates that the western troops were conventional and thus unexciting, unworthy of note for their arms, but only for their mass-brigading into the ranks of the phalanx. Bosworth (2002: 80) accepts that this is a possibility in addition to the mixed phalanx, but does not push the implications.
preferential treatment of Persians and his own adoption of Persian customs. The list of their grievances, in Arrian’s *Anabasis* (7.3), includes the recent events that represented proximate causes of the mutiny, as well as long-standing trends. The text begins with most recent events, and then seems to move backward in time. So the first (most recent) of the offenses to the Macedonians was the arrival of the thirty-thousand *Epigonoi*, then Alexander’s Medizing dress, worn since returning from the East, and then the Macedonian-Persian weddings celebrated since the return from India. The next grievance is the Medizing dress and speech of Peucestas, which had begun immediately after the army’s arrival in Persia from Gedrosia. The final grievance given is the enrollment of a number of Asiatic cavalrymen into the Companion cavalry. In this case, men who “had demonstrably proven their worth and strength and virtue” had been enrolled into the hipparchies of the Companions. Seven high-born Asians were even added into the ranks of the royal *agema*. All of these promoted cavalrymen were equipped with Macedonian panoplies rather than the Asiatic panoplies retained in the ethnic hipparchies. At first the promotions may have been intended to compensate for attrition in the Macedonian cavalry, but eventually there were so many that a fifth

113 Arr. *An*. 7.6.2-5, for which, see Hammond (1983: 139-44).
115 Arr. *An*. 7.6.3: καὶ οἱ Βακτριανοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ Σαχαγγοὶ καὶ Άραχωτῶν ἵππείς καὶ Ζαραγγάν δὲ καὶ Άρειων καὶ Παρθιανῶν καὶ ἔκ Περσῶν οἱ Εὐνάκαι καλούμενοι ἵππείς καταλαξισθέντες εἰς τὴν ἱππίαν τὴν ἐπαμφιέσθην δόσι αὐτῶν κατ’ ἀξίωσιν καὶ καλλεί τοῦ σώματος ἢ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ὑπερφέροντες ἐφαινοντο.
hipparchy of Companions was created, composed of a mixture of Macedonians and
Asiatics like the rest. While the description of this practice appears within Arrian’s
prologue to the mutiny at Opis, its placement among the grievances indicates that the
promotion of valorous Asian cavalrymen was a long-standing trend rather than a one-
time occurrence.117

Evidence for western Asiatic infantry in the earlier years of Alexander’s
campaign is the key to locating potential reinforcements to Macedonian manpower prior
to 323 BC. If Arachosian and Sogdian cavalrymen could be added to the Companions
before 324 BC, and Anatolian infantry were added to the phalanx battalions in 323 BC,
then perhaps Asiatic infantry likewise could have been promoted into the phalanx at
earlier dates. Before the army of thirty thousand “Persians,” infantry detachments were
trained in Lydia, Lycia and Pamphylia, Cilicia, Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia.118 If any
Asiatics were enrolled among the phalanx battalions prior to 323, they could have been
drawn from these units alone. The infantry raised in these places received no less than
two and most nearer four years of military training overseen by the local Macedonian
satrap before being dispatched to join Alexander.119 Roughly twenty-two thousand such

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117 At 7.6.3, the promoted cavalrymen ἐφαίνοντο their virtue, implying at least that their record of service
over previous years was considered in the promotions.
118 Lydia: Curt. 6.6.35, Arr. An. 7.23.1; Caria: Arr. An. 7.23.1; Lycia: Curt. 7.10.12; Cilicia: Curt. 5.7.12; Syria:
119 The least training was that of the Cilicians (Curt. 5.7.12), at roughly two years. Unlike the other
reinforcements, the Cilician troops are not mentioned as having been trained by, sent from, or commanded
by their satrap. See, for example, the Lydian troops trained and sent, and a second detachment commanded
by, Menander, or the Lycian and Pamphylian troops trained and commanded by Asander (Curt.7.10.12).
infantry joined the army of Alexander in a five-year period between late 331 and early 326 BC. The nature of their training is not explained clearly, but two examples indicate that they were, like the thirty thousand Epigonoi, trained in the Greek tongue and Macedonian warfare. First, one of the largest of these detachments was a unit of four thousand infantry from Lycia and Pamphylia. Contingents of “Lycian and Pamphylian infantry” were prominent parts of the Antigonid phalanx, arrayed just left of the Macedonian units in the battle line, before the pantodapoi. Second, the only of these training programs described in an ancient source is that in Egypt, though troops from Egypt are never known to have reinforced Alexander’s army. They were called “royal pages” and were six thousand in number (thus second-largest after Mesopotamia), and were by Alexander’s order “trained in the Macedonian art of war.” As Hammond has noted, this description compares very well with the training of the thirty thousand Epigonoi. This suggests, then, that in the five years after Macedonian

120 Five thousand from Cilicia, four thousand each from Lycia and Pamphylia, and Syria, twenty-six hundred from Lydia, and seven thousand from Mesopotamia. Six thousand were trained in Egypt, but are never clearly recorded joining Alexander’s army, unless they were themselves a part of the Epigonoi.
121 First attested at Paraïtakene in 316 BC, three thousand strong, and thus slightly smaller than the unit initially dispatched to Alexander (Diod.19.29.3), but also at Gaza (19.82.4). Diod. 20.113.3 lists eight hundred who deserted Lysimachus in 302 BC. These could either have been in Lysimachus’ service since the distribution of forces after Babylon in 323, or enrolled from surrendered Antigonid forces in Thrace in 313 BC (Diod. 19.73.10).
122 Suda B’154: Βασιλείων παιδες ἐξακολυθίας οἵτινες κατὰ πρόστασιν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος τὰ πολέμια ἔξοδουν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ.
123 It is also possible that the thirty thousand included the six thousand Egyptians, a possibility further discussed below. See Hammond (1990: 275-9). Hammond (279) assumed that the men trained in this manner were intended to live as a new generation of core citizens in the cities of Asia, and serve in units that used Macedonian weaponry, though he did not express a belief that the men thus trained would have been used to reinforce Macedonian manpower within the Macedonian units.
reinforcements ceased, Alexander received upwards of twenty thousand men trained as potential supplements to his Macedonian battalions.

The attrition models offered above indicate that he would not have needed so many reinforcements to keep his Macedonian infantry at full strength. Instead, he could have selected, as he did with the Companion cavalry, only those who had proven themselves over time. And these replacements would have been required only in place of casualties. Approximately three thousand Hellenized Asian phalangites could have been added in the years 329-325 BC, approximately six hundred per year, to overcome attrition and keep the battalions full-strength even in constant combat. This practice would have constantly replenished the Macedonian phalanx with Asians trained in Macedonian warfare and Greek language, perhaps given suitable Greco-Macedonian names, and proven in some manner as good soldiers. The average *dekad* (file of the phalanx, with sixteen men) might have included three or four Hellenized Asian replacements by 324. Their slow and small-scale intrusion over several years would have neutralized much serious grumbling, particularly since the Asiatic conscripts had been acculturated to Macedonian customs for nearly a decade. With the addition, over

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124 That is, at least fifteen-hundred men per battalion.
125 The three thousand additions would allow, at 7% attrition and a separate category of settlers, the phalanx to maintain a slightly over-strength number near twelve thousand men, and the Asians less than one quarter of the phalanx’s manpower (in early 324, based on attrition models, 22%).
126 Consider as well that the most likely sources for replacements were Lydians and Lycians, whose native cultures were considerably more familiar and more similar to the Macedonians than the cavalrymen from the steppes promoted into the ranks of the Companions.
several years, of roughly three thousand proven and Hellenized Asian soldiers, the phalanx would have remained predominantly natural-born Macedonian, and appeared and acted much like a wholly Macedonian unit. Table 1.3 shows the effect of the addition of three thousand men from 329-325 BC, as well as the impact of the dismissal of ten thousand veterans in late 324 BC.

Table 1.3. Supplementing Macedonian manpower over time, 329-325 BC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>334</th>
<th>333</th>
<th>332</th>
<th>331</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total Pre-Attrition</td>
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<td>16942</td>
<td>23083</td>
<td>19776</td>
<td>20156</td>
<td>18837</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Attrition</td>
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<td>15983</td>
<td>21776</td>
<td>18656</td>
<td>18837</td>
<td>17604</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additions</td>
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<td>9100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New total</td>
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<td>23083</td>
<td>19776</td>
<td>20156</td>
<td>18837</td>
<td>18204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlers</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3941</td>
<td>8826</td>
<td>8568</td>
<td>8318</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>326</th>
<th>325</th>
<th>324</th>
<th>323</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Pre-Attrition</td>
<td>18204</td>
<td>17613</td>
<td>17060</td>
<td>16543</td>
<td>16060</td>
<td>11009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Attrition</td>
<td>17013</td>
<td>16460</td>
<td>15943</td>
<td>15460</td>
<td>15009</td>
<td>10288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additions</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New total</td>
<td>17613</td>
<td>17060</td>
<td>16543</td>
<td>16060</td>
<td>11009</td>
<td>10288</td>
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<tr>
<td>Settlers</td>
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<td>8075</td>
<td>7839</td>
<td>7610</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>1347</td>
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</table>

Documentary evidence supports the slow inclusion of Hellenized Asians within the phalanx. The rank-and-file of Alexander’s army and those of his successors, in spite of their historical significance, are nearly invisible in inscriptions and other documentary sources. However, trends in third century Ptolemaic Egypt, during the reign of Ptolemy II, shed some light on developments in the last decades of the fourth. In the fighting in
the early decades of the third century, the Ptolemaic army acquired the services of numerous, prominent men from cities of southern Anatolia. Chrysermos, Aetos, Andromachos, Tlepolemos and others joined the Ptolemies in the first half of the third century. Intriguingly, though they were not Macedonians, or even Greek in the conservative sense of that word, each of them, or their descendants, commanded units, and even entire wings, of the Ptolemaic Macedonian pike phalanx. While this does reflect the general perception that the Ptolemaic court incorporated a broad spectrum of the Hellenizing world, it is striking that southern Anatolians, prominent in the Asiatic infantry of Alexander, also held prominent positions in the Ptolemaic army and court. For a Successor kingdom that generally struggled to acquire a significant population of Macedonians, heirs to the Macedonian military tradition may have been more accessible among populations in southern Anatolia than from Macedonia itself.

The same observation may be applied, in a different way, toward the general military population of Ptolemaic Egypt. The class of men known as Persians in Ptolemaic military and legal language is not well understood and has generated

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128 At the battle of Raphia, the largest Hellenistic land battle save possibly Ipsos, the Ptolemaic phalanx of Macedonian foot-soldiers was commanded by two Aspendians, Andromachos and Ptolemaios, the grandson of Aetos. The grandson of Tlepolemos, of the same name, commanded phalanx units from the Ptolemaic military base at Pelousion, and Chrysermos was the eponymous officer of large infantry units settled in Egypt after the Second Syrian War (ended 253 BC).
considerable debate.\textsuperscript{129} While more information about the tax status of the Persians and the number of them has steadily become available, the third century Persians are still in many respects a curiosity, and the most recent scholarship has minimized their connection to the army.\textsuperscript{130} Their names are not at all Persian names, but fairly standard Greek ones. The exception to this is a small number of Persians with Egyptian names, known from demotic papyri.\textsuperscript{131} According to the \textit{Prosopographia Ptolemaica}, of about sixty Persians attested in the third century, many had names common among Macedonian populations, e.g. Parmenion, Leontiskos, Neoptolemos, Antigenes, Seleukos and Perdikkas.\textsuperscript{132} Common explanations have included that they were pre-Alexandrian Greeks living in Egypt, or war captives from the early Diadoch wars.\textsuperscript{133} While these may

\textsuperscript{129} Pestman (1963) suggested that the Persians were a class of soldiers or potential soldiers, while Oates (1963) suggested that the Persian class had no direct association with the military and was primarily a civilian ethnic for Hellenizing Egyptians. Clarysse and Thompson (2006: 157-8) contrasted the Greek names of Persians in most papyri with the Egyptian names in their tax records for the class of “tax Persians,” a class with slightly fewer tax privileges than the Greeks. Vandorpe (2008: 87-109) sees in the Persians of the third century a “Greek second-class” but in the second century “Hellenizing Egyptians” who served in the army. Fischer-Bovet expressed (2009: 91) the \textit{communis opinio} as “the origin of this ‘ethnic’ is unknown.”

\textsuperscript{130} See Clarysse and Thompson (2006 = \textit{P.Count}) for tax records. In Fischer-Bovet’s 2009 dissertation, she argued (95-99) that the Persian pseudo-ethnic took on largely but not exclusively military associations during the second century, and had only circumstantial associations with the military in the third century.

\textsuperscript{131} The exceptions to this are the small number of \textit{Mdy ns n Kny}, “Medes (Persians) born in Egypt” from demotic papyri of the last quarter of the third century, who had Egyptian names within the demotic context, but likely possessed Greek names in Greek contexts (PP 2309-11).

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Pros.Ptol. (PP)} 1972, 2027, 2084, 2092, 2150, 2176. It may not be a coincidence that these are not only predominantly Macedonian names, but also the names of several of Alexander’s highest-ranking officers. At least some of these had double names, like Seleukos in \textit{SB} 20.14524, who was also named Sokonopis.

\textsuperscript{133} Oates (1963: 109), speaking mainly of the second century, called it a fictive ethnicity for Hellenizing Egyptians, but said little of the third century meaning. La’da (1994: 187-9) suggested that the “Persians” was derived from demotic \textit{Mdy = Mty} referring to Nubian mercenaries in the New Kingdom era, and that the ethnic marker Persian might have referred to those or other former mercenary groups settled in Egypt during the early Ptolemaic period, and thus was a “fictive ethnicity” (189). Clarysse and Thompson (2006: 159) took the position that the Persians were Greek settlers in Egypt from the time of Persian rule, and were
in some sense be true, it is most plausible to identify them as the descendants of the six thousand Egyptians trained in Macedonian warfare during the reign of Alexander, or of later Egyptians with whom Ptolemy I did likewise. This would explain both the appearance of Macedonian names and the survival of dual names, and might clarify their peculiar status as men who possessed most but not all of the privileges of the Greek population of Egypt. This interpretation has the benefit, which the other interpretations cannot claim, of according perfectly well with the usage of the Persian status in the second century. In the second century, Egyptians who entered Ptolemaic military service in standard army units were given the ethnic marker Persian, and passed it on to their descendants. Instead of assuming this was innovation, suddenly calling Egyptians “Persians” in the second-century on account of their service in

forced into a subordinate (yet still privileged) position for their past collaboration. See Fischer-Bovet (2009: 86-95) for a review of the literature. A handful of scholars have suggested that they were actually Medo-Persians: Lesquier (1911: 89, 118), Goudriann (1988: 18-20), and Hammond (1996: 108-9), the last of whom suggested that they were the descendants of the thousand Apple-bearers of Alexander’s funeral guard. From Suda Β’154. A considerable number of Egyptians were said to have served in the Ptolemaic phalanx at the battle of Gaza in 312 BC (Diod. 19.80.4).

134 This interpretation corresponds fairly well with P.Cair.Zen. 1.59003 (259 BC), in which two of the three klerouche of the local warlord Toubias were Persians, probably not of Egyptian descent, but judging by the one man named Ananias, of local Palestinian descent. The origins of the moniker “Persians” may also be reflected in Diodorus appellation of the thirty thousand strong pantodapoi phalanx as Persian (17.108.1-2), in spite of Arrian’s clear testimony that the soldiers were drawn from all the satrapies (An. 7.6.1). These Hellenized Egyptians would have constituted a different set of Egyptians than the non-Hellenized machimoi.

135 From Vandorpe (2008: 90-2) contrasts the second-century use of the status Persians with that of the third century, since in the second century Persians “of the epigone” could attain military status and then revert to “of the epigone” civilian status. My suggestion is that the difference Vandorpe identifies is not between the meaning of Persian, but significant changes in the Ptolemaic army and its utilization of manpower.

standard military units, surely it is more reasonable to conclude that the nomenclature has roots in the fourth century, when the multinational *Epigonoi* were collectively called “Persians.” In conclusion, the case of Ptolemaic Egypt provides evidence of substantial Hellenization among the small classes of well-trained Asiatics. Such a cadre was accessible to each of the Hellenistic generals in Asia, and permitted some flexibility in reinforcing their Macedonian manpower and expanding in some respects the notion of who qualified as a Macedonian.

1.2.3 - Distributing Macedonian manpower after 323

The scenario sketched above would have meant that the only entirely Macedonian units left in the army in Asia were the former hypaspists, by then known as the Silver-shields, and the approximately ten thousand veteran Macedonians making their way across Asia to Greece. The remaining Macedonian forces, perhaps the two thousand Companions and ten thousand infantry of Curtius,\(^{138}\) either numbered far fewer than the numbers given by ancient sources, or were in fact at least one-third Hellenized Asians.\(^{139}\) The Silver-shields served under Perdiccas after Alexander’s death,

\(^{138}\) Curt.10.2.8. is the source for the fifteen thousand Macedonians. The forces in the royal army in Asia were augmented by as many as twenty thousand Persian ranged troops, the thirty thousand *Epigonoi*, and various other allied regiments of smaller size. This also implies that, based on table 1.3, the Anatolians brigaded into the phalanx battalions in late 324 BC numbered approximately four thousand men.

\(^{139}\) While the study above indicated that two to three thousand Hellenized Asian soldiers would have been sufficient to maintain Macedonian numbers, the dismissal of ten thousand veterans in 324, even assuming that more than half of those came from the colonies, could have been compensated solely by the
then under Eumenes from 319 to 316 BC. Their insistence on holding to the lore that, to a man, they had crossed to Asia with Alexander and won every battle as his leading troops illustrates the capacity for Macedonian military units to propagate fictions with powerful force.140 While the hypaspists likewise had numbered three thousand, they suffered many casualties, so that other men must have been added to their ranks to maintain their strength. Yet the discourse of the Silver-shields, at least as recorded by Justin, Plutarch, and Diodorus, claimed long cohesion and shared glory. Notably, the few who had been hypaspists since the beginning shared their glory with those promoted into that position, recognizing the power they wielded by their cohesion and rhetorical claims. The Silver-shields were bested by stratagem at the battle of Gabiene in 316 BC, and distributed to dangerous posts and remote settlements in the Upper Satrapies.141 It is likely that some of them were also enrolled in Antigonus’ army at that time, though ancient sources disagree on this point.142

The ten thousand veterans, supposedly on their course home, figured prominently in the earliest Successor wars. Six thousand crossed back into Macedonia introduction of another two to three thousand (thus five or six thousand total) Hellenized Asians, i.e., the reinforcements from Lydia and Caria brigaded into the phalanx battalions prior to Alexander’s death.140 See Justin, Epit. Trog. 14.2-3, Plut. Eum.13.2-4, 16.3-4, 18.1, and Diod. 18.59.3, 60.3-61.3, 19.41.2 141 Plut. Eum. 19.2, Diod. 19.48.3-4. 142 Justin’s Epitome, 14.4.20. Igitur Antigonus donitores illos orbis exercitui suo diuidit, or, “then Antigonus divided these conquerors amongst the units of his own army.” Diod. 19.48.3-4 agrees with Plutarch on the fate of many, whom Diodorus said were sent on what amounted to suicide details on the farther frontiers, but Diodorus earlier said that the Macedonians took oaths and were enrolled in Antigonus’ army (19.43.8). And so perhaps a significant number of the three thousand remained in Antigonid service.
with Craterus, but returned to Asia at the end of the Lamian War (Diod. 18.16.4, 30.4). Those six thousand joined Antipater and participated at Triparadisus. Three thousand of them then disappear from the sources: they either were settled near Triparadisus, perhaps at Pella in Syria, or returned to Macedonia with Antipater and the royals. The other three were part of the Macedonian force bestowed on Antigonus, and Polyaenus (4.6.6) records that they mutinied and were allowed to return to Macedonia. The other four thousand, it seems, were dispatched under command of Neoptolemus, and served with him in Cappadocia and Armenia. They were coerced into joining the force of Eumenes when Neoptolemus attempted to desert to Craterus, and eventually supported Eumenes heartily, even drawing lots to staff his bodyguard. In 319 BC Eumenes’ army was defeated by Antigonus, eight thousand of his soldiers slain, and

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143 Strabo (16.2.10) says that Apamea of the Seleucis was originally called Pella after its settlers, who were among the “first Macedonians, and the majority of those who made the expedition took up their abode there,” c.f. Cohen (2006: 121-4), Billows (1997: 299). This makes it attractive as a settling place for the aged veterans after the conference at nearby Triparadeisos.

144 This is less likely, since Arrian, in his History of the Successors, said that the Macedonians with Antipater and the royals mutinied over the bounties promised to them but not paid, whereas the ten thousand had been paid their bounties (FrGH 159.11.44-5).

145 This rests upon accepting the argument in Hammond (1984: 51-61), where he interpreted Diod. 18.16.4 to mean that Craterus crossed to Macedonia with only six thousand of the veteran Macedonians, thus supposing that the remainder were the Macedonians with Neoptolemus. If he has misread the text, then the full ten thousand followed the career of the six as given above, and different troops (those from the remaining phalanx) must have been among the troops of Neoptolemus. The text in question could be interpreted either way: ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς μὲν τῶν εἰς Ἀσίαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνδιαβεβηκότων ἑξακισχιλίους, τῶν δὲ ἐν παρόδῳ προσειλημμένων τετρακισχιλίους, “he led six thousand infantry who had crossed to Asia with Alexander, and four thousand enrolled during the march.” The key word is παρόδος, used once by Diodorus for Alexander’s journey (17.24.1) along a specific route, not for the overall campaign. Thus Hammond’s interpretation seems correct.

146 Diod. 18.29 reports that Neoptolemus’ contingent added Macedonian infantry to Eumenes’ army, repeated in Plut. Eum. 1.3 and 5.2-3, which add that Neoptolemus’ forces were added only after a battle. This detail is also found in PSI 12.1284.82-3 (=Arr. Succ.), which says that Eumenes used his advantaged in cavalry and light troops to harass the phalangites into submission.
many of the rest taken into Antigonus’ army. The four thousand Macedonians likely
counted as some part of both groups, but we may surmise that as many as three
thousand were added to Antigonus’ army, which possessed eight thousand
Macedonians when it next fought Eumenes in 316 BC.147 Having traversed Asia with
Alexander, and campaigned after his death with Neoptolemus, Eumenes, and
Antigonus, whatever remained of them were undoubtedly settled in one or another of
Antigonus’ foundations.148

As for the phalanx of 323 BC, it served mainly under Perdiccas, and had played
an important role in the conferences at Babylon and Triparadisus. Some may have fallen
into Ptolemy’s hands in 321 during Perdiccas’ campaign, when many men deserted to
the Lagid side.149 Others remained loyal to Perdiccas, and joined themselves to Attalus,
who eventually raised about ten thousand men, though there is very little evidence how
many Macedonians were among his army.150 Some of the oldest or those suffering from

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147 Diod. 19.29.3 puts the Macedonian force in Antigonus’ army at “nearly eight thousand” and describes
them as the troops Antipater had given him. This would have described five thousand of them well, and so
perhaps was applied to the whole.
148 For which, see Billows (1997: 291-303). Billows attributed Carrhae, Pella, Rhagae, Potami, Celenae,
Docimion, and of course Antigonia to the foundation work of Antigonus.
149 From the Heidelberg Epitome = FrGH 155.4. See also Arr. Succ. 9.28-9, Diod. 18.36.1-2. Polyaeus (4.19)
described a large quantity of prisoners, as opposed to deserters.
150 Arrian 6.17.3 records that Attalus was still a taxarch, or battalion commander, in 325/4 BC. He then
commanded naval forces on behalf of Perdiccas in 322/1 (Diod. 18.37.3-4), which allowed him to take
leadership of troops still loyal to the Perdiccan faction during the fallout from the failed Egyptian campaign.
Though supposedly a wanted man, he is said to have appeared in person at Triparadeisos and stirred up
That Macedonians are nowhere clearly mentioned among his forces may imply that there were few of them.
His compatriot Alcetas is often assumed to have commanded Macedonian infantry based on Plut. Eum. 8.3,
wounds may have been settled in Syria after Triparadisus, but most seem to have been distributed among the generals. The treaty of Triparadisus (Diod. 18.39.5-7) allotted Cilicia to Philoxenus, who had already raised troops trained in the Macedonian manner and enrolled in the phalanx. Macedonians were also to be found in Cilicia, in addition to the Silver Shields, when Eumenes went there in 319 BC (Diod. 18.60.3-4). Laomedon in Syria may have overseen settled veterans. There may have been Macedonians in the eastern satrapies, but sources only mention the pantodapoi battalions. If Arrhidaeus received one thousand Macedonian infantry (Diod. 18.51.1), it is reasonable that Cleitus in Lydia and Asander in Caria may have commanded some as well, though their respective regions had also produced infantry trained in the Macedonian manner.

While several thousand may have been thus disposed throughout Anatolia and the Levant, most returned to Macedonia with the royal army under Antipater. Between all of whom estimated, with curious Macedonophile glasses, that Alcetas commanded two to four thousand men. But a fragment of Arrian’s Successors clearly indicates that he possessed perhaps one hundred Macedonian cavalry, but no infantry (Goteberg Palimpsest 50, see Dreyer (1999): 39-66). As veteran Companions, Alcetas’ personal guard, and seemingly the only cavalry in his army, they carried weight well beyond their numbers.

151 Especially the army list at Diod. 19.14.5-8.
152 Cleitus’ position in Sardis was well-fortified, and his possession of some Macedonians is likely. The prosopography of men in Asander’s service is small, but includes Iranian and Carian names more often than Greek ones (see Robert: Amyzon 2 = SEG 35.1080 (Iranians), I.Stratonikia 501 (Carian) and 503 (Greek), and I.Mylasa 21 (Greek, possibly Macedonian).
153 Arr. Succ. 11.44-5. If the royal phalanx only ever numbered ten thousand from 323 on, and was nearly half Asiatic to begin with, perhaps Antipater took mainly the remaining native Macedonians home, and distributed the remaining five thousand “Macedonians” among loyal satraps.
these and the three thousand sent home by Antigonus, perhaps eight thousand Macedonians returned home from Asia.\textsuperscript{154}

If there were twenty-five thousand Macedonians in Asia in 323, of whom five or six thousand were Hellenized Asiatics acculturated into the Macedonian ranks, by the beginning of 320 BC there were, it seems, no more than twenty-two.\textsuperscript{155} Antigonus controlled the largest number, as many as six thousand, mainly drawn from Macedonia after the Lamian war.\textsuperscript{156} He gained three to four thousand more within a year’s time after defeating Eumenes, and perhaps a hundred or more after defeating Attalus and Alcetas in 319.\textsuperscript{157} Over the ensuing year Arrhidaeus in Hellespontine Phrygia and Cleitus in Lydia were defeated, and their Macedonians generally either dispersed, killed, or taken into Antigonus’ army. Antigonus’ collection of Macedonian manpower continued following his campaign against Eumenes in Asia, at the conclusion of which (316 BC) he added a portion of up to six thousand Macedonians.\textsuperscript{158} By that time, more than fifteen of

\textsuperscript{154} Their return contributed to the restoration of manpower in Macedonia, never as great as in the time of Alexander, but Polysperchon could march out of Macedonia with twenty thousand Macedonians in 318 BC (Diod. 18.68.2-3).
\textsuperscript{155} If roughly eight thousand returned to Macedonia, but five thousand new Macedonians had come to Asia.
\textsuperscript{156} In addition to the infantry, he also seems to have acquired five hundred to one thousand Companions, depending upon one’s interpretation of Photius’ confused transmission of Arrian’s description of the army (FrGH 156.11.43).
\textsuperscript{157} For the defeat of Eumenes, and enrollment of much of his army into his own, see Diod. 18.41.1-4, and for the defeat of Alcetas and Attalus, and enrollment of their army into his own: Diod. 18.45.4.
\textsuperscript{158} Now, the fate of the Silver-shields has been discussed above. Antigonus is unlikely to have added more than two thousand to his own field army, and perhaps less. There were other Macedonians in the army (Diod. 18.60.3-4), some likely in the cavalry, and a curious unit: the three thousand “from the hypaspists” (Diod. 19.28.1 τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν. This has the sense, not that they were hypaspists themselves (the Silver-shields were) but had been produced by or taken or drawn from the hypaspists in some sense. Hammond (1978: 133-5) suggested that they were the Macedonian-born sons of the hypaspists, and about 72
the twenty-two thousand were in Antigonid hands or otherwise slain or dispersed.

Another three thousand may have been settled at Pella in Syria, which in 315 was controlled by Antigonus. Thus, fewer than four thousand Macedonian infantry and cavalry were distributed among the armies of Ptolemy in Egypt, Asander in Caria, and the few satraps of the East not entirely under Antigonus' control.\textsuperscript{159}

The only reasonable calculation of manpower that allows as many as four thousand Macedonians for the Asian Successors not named Antigonus must assume the promotion of meritorious, Hellenized Asiatics into the Macedonian ranks. Even then, it is unlikely that more than ten thousand native-born Macedonians were active in the armies of Asia after 315 BC, and nearly all of them would have served in the armies or dwelt in the settlements of Antigonus. The Successors mobilized armies of close to and sometimes well over twenty thousand. With Greek mercenaries, \textit{pantodapoi} phalangites, and Asiatic levies abundantly available, why devote such attention to the loyalty of the Macedonians? There are several reasons, of varying quality. The first is that the thirty by 317 BC. As the hypaspists in 334 would not have been particularly old men (likely in their thirties or low forties for the most part) it is unlikely that many could have been accompanied by sons old enough to serve as their pages. Instead, since this cohort of three thousand is never called Macedonian (noted by Bosworth (2002: 83), they may represent pages taken on by the wealthy Silver-shields and trained in warfare under their tutelage (compare \textit{Eum.} 3.5). This is consistent with other uses of τοις ἐκ structures by Diodorus. Thus may have been multi-national. But considering their training, Antigonus may have incorporated them into his army as Macedonians.\textsuperscript{159} Seleucus in particular may have had several hundred Macedonians in his company. Few of those further east were likely to have had many, save perhaps some settlers and their offspring, and most of the rest had come under Antigonus' authority. Most of Asander's forces had surrendered to or been captured by Antigonid forces by the end of 312 BC (Diod. 19.68, 75).
Macedonians were the preeminent soldiers of their day, not by virtue of their ethnic
descent, but rather as a result of their many years under arms.\textsuperscript{160} Their presence
provided a measure of assurance of military effectiveness.

Perhaps the most powerful reason, however, for the importance of Macedonian
manpower in Successor Asia was the measure of legitimacy attained through the
support of Macedonians. When Curtius narrated the beginning of Alexander’s
Medizing, he noted that the Macedonian soldiers “could not bear, not one, to part with
the smallest part of their native customs” (8.5.7). Their insistence on rigorous
conservatism and dutiful allegiance to the royal family, combined with their military
value, compelled generals to placate the Macedonians,\textsuperscript{161} or risk their desertion.\textsuperscript{162} And
so in the years before the remaining Successors began claiming they were kings, they
regularly turned to Macedonian councils, seeking to manipulate the soldiers rather than
command them.\textsuperscript{163} At the same time, these councils, particularly that of Antigonus in 315

\textsuperscript{160} The most famous example of this is the Silver-shields, who boasted they had never been defeated but had
won scores of battles and conquered Asia (Diod. 19.15.2, 30.5-6, 41.1-2), and who at Gabiene in 316 BC slew
five thousand mercenary and \textit{pantodapoi} opponents without a single casualty, or so it was said (Diod.
19.43.1).

\textsuperscript{161} An inscription from Athens describes Arrhidaeus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, as “duly-appointed
satrap by the king, Antipater, and all the Macedonians” referring to the Macedonian assembly at
Triparadeisos.

\textsuperscript{162} As happened to Cassander and Eurydice in 318 BC when the Macedonian army was asked to fight
Olympias, the mother of Alexander (Diod. 19.11.2).

\textsuperscript{163} Antipater at Triparadeisos: Diod. 18.39.4, Eumenes in Cilicia and Mesopotamia: Diod. 18.60-1, 19.15.4,
Antigonus in Syria: Diod. 19.61. Antigonus’ Macedonian assembly ended in condemnation of Cassander
and the promulgation of a call for the freedom of the Greek cities. In it, Antigonus manipulated Macedonian
feeling by emphasizing Cassander’s foundations at Thebes (contrary to Alexander’s activity) and at
Kassandreia (contrary to Macedonian security). Ptolemy issued a similar decree the next year, though it is
unclear whether he did so through a Macedonian assembly (Diod. 19.62.1). The Successors began claiming
BC, ended in decrees comparable to those of a Macedonian king, wherein the general and the Macedonians made pronouncements, as if they were a national body and national leader. The desire to secure and further concentrate Macedonian support is also illustrated in the courtship of Cleopatra, daughter of Philip II and sister of Alexander the Great, by all of the great Successors. Yet the limitation of royal power is also evident, for those who remained, mainly women and children, had all been slain in secret by 308 BC.

1.3 – Conclusion: Macedonians, kingship, and establishing Hellenistic armies

The eradication of the royal family increased the potential legitimacy for any Successor general willing to claim the royal diadem for himself. According to Diodorus, the Successors began recognizing their respective territories as “spear-won kingdoms” after the last of the Argeads were killed in 311. The claims of kingship followed

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164 For this council, see Billows (1990: 113-6), who does not recognize it as a Macedonian assembly, contra Diod. 19.61.1, the decree “of the Macedonians assembled with Antigonus,” evaluated by Hammond (2000: 147) correctly as a Macedonian assembly conducted without the presence of the royal person.

165 In Diodorus’ words (20.37.4), ἕκαστος γαρ τούτω τῷ γάμῳ συνακολουθήσειν Μακεδόνας ἐλπίζων ἀντείχετο τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκίας ὡς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχὴν περιείχες εἰς ἑαυτόν, “for each of them, believing that the Macedonians would align themselves with the wedded couple, was striving to be joined to the royal family, in order to gain the whole empire for himself.”

166 App. Sync. 277 draws a direct connection between the eradication of the royal line and the willingness of the armies to acclaim their generals as kings.

167 Diod. 19.105.4: τινὰ βασιλέαν δοξίκητον.
several years later, in 306 and 305 BC, first Antigonus with his son Demetrius, then Ptolemy, Cassander, Seleucus, and Lysimachus. Ancient sources offer little detail on the latter proclamations, but several versions exist for Antigonus and Demetrius. They respective versions indicate that they were acclaimed as kings by their army.\footnote{Plut. Dem. 17 indicates that even in the ancient world, some believed that the army’s cry had been orchestrated by Antigonus and some of his Friends.} Appian says that for both Antigonus and Ptolemy their armies recognized (ἀνέλειπεν) their respective generals as king,\footnote{App. Syr. 275-6: ὁ στρατός ἀνέλειπεν ἄμφως βασιλέας, Ἀντίγονόν τε καὶ Δημήτριον... ἀνέλειπε δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαῖον ὁ οἰκεῖος αὐτῶν στρατός βασιλέα. Notably, Appian indicates that the full army joined in proclaiming Antigonus as king, while the household troops of Ptolemy were responsible in Egypt.} indicating an appropriation of the functions of the Macedonian assembly.\footnote{Hammond (2000: 144-5) argues that the word choice of both Appian and Plutarch affirm that the decision reflected traditional practices of a Macedonian assembly in acclaiming a new monarch.} The recognition of the new monarchs by assemblies of their Macedonian soldiers provided a link with the Macedonian past, and a basis for established kingdoms.\footnote{The rulings of these councils had only limited effect. When Demetrius eventually became king of Macedonia, the Macedonians did not accept his prior kingship, but in assembly declared him king of the Macedonians (Plut. Dem. 37.2).}

The system that replaced that dominated by mercenary armies and plunder for revenue was by no means in itself internationally stable or peaceful.\footnote{The classic rejection of such a view is Austin (1986).} For financial reasons most of all, it was necessary to end the cycle of mercenary service and achieve some exit from the cycle of continual warfare. The Hellenistic kingdoms of the third century were organized for warfare, yet engaged in it less frequently than the Successors did from 323-301. The Successors intensified development of core territories, settling
them with military populations, who through an exchange of privileges and responsibilities supported the Macedonian royal identity of the Successors and filled the ranks of their armies. These core characteristics supported military institutions designed to meet the three criteria set forth here in the introduction: legitimacy, stability, and proficiency.

The Hellenistic military system rested upon extensive administrative developments. A kingdom “requires an administrative structure of some complexity and the evolution of systems promoting the authority of the king and fostering loyalty to the central power.” The most effective way for the Successors to achieve this was through the concentration of Macedonian identity and dissemination of Greco-Macedonian culture. As section 1.2 demonstrated, this was not strictly possible. As many historians of the Hellenistic era have observed, the citizenship patterns, governing institutions, military tactics, clothing, and prosopography of the administration and armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms indicate the importance—and even dominance—of Greco-Macedonians. The difficulty in theorizing the prominence of Asians and Greeks in the Hellenistic kingdoms lies within the particular sort of inclusivism evident in the work of the Successors. In placating the Macedonians and Greeks, who were essential to

173 For an examination of these developments and review of the literature on Hellenistic state formation, see Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993: 120-3).
174 Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993: 120-1)
175 Often cast in contrast with Alexander’s inclusive governmental policies, see Habicht (1958) and Walbank (1981: 65).
legitimacy and battlefield success, they projected an image of ethnic exclusivism and abandoned Alexander’s rhetoric of equality. In practice that image was a façade, and proven Asiatics were enrolled, not only in administrative roles, but first and probably foremost in military roles. The following chapter examines the policies of settlement, citizenship, and military responsibility as developed in the kingdoms of Macedonia, Asia, and Egypt.
Chapter 2. Founding and Strengthening Military Institutions, 300-250 BC

The previous chapter demonstrated that the expenses of mercenary-heavy armies were unsustainable, and that while Macedonian manpower was insufficient to serve as an alternative, the Successor generals had access to an alternative in the Hellenizing populations of the larger Hellenistic world. This chapter examines the transition, from 300-250 BC, toward structured states with core territories and well-developed military institutions. This transition was neither simple nor rapid. Legitimacy remained a problem for the kings, both with their armies, and with their subjects. The first section of this chapter examines the wars and rumors of wars that helped the Antigonids in Macedonia, Seleucids in Asia, and Ptolemies in Egypt establish lasting legitimacy. Sustainable legitimacy was tied to both the Macedonian identity of the kings and to their power and authority, these last two demonstrated most effectively through military victories or conquests. The second section examines each kingdom’s activities toward developing and strengthening its capacity to recruit large and effective armies, which was a central aspect of early Hellenistic state formation. In each case this involved the transition from mercenary armies to settled armies, either of landed soldiers bound by oath to give military service, or by conscription from citizen populations. In differing measures, all three kingdoms employed both methods.
2.1. Legitimacy, War, and Politics in the Early Hellenistic Period

2.1.1. The Throne of Macedonia, 301-272 BC

Macedonia, homeland of Alexander and the kings, was torn by war and political instability for much of the first three decades of the third century. The throne was not for the taking solely by military conquest, but by the support of the Macedonian assembly. The acclamation of the gathered citizen soldiers made many men king in the space of thirty years, some more than once. Cassander returned to Macedonia in 301 BC, victor at the battle of Ipsos, but died a few years later. Upon his death, two of his sons vied for power, and the younger called upon Pyrrhus and Demetrius for aid. Pyrrhus was the young king of Epirus, who had been helped to the throne by Ptolemy I. Demetrius, after the defeat at Ipsos, had difficulty finding a base of operations, and was busy establishing himself in Central Greece when the call for help came. Pyrrhus came more quickly, and, in return for his aid, required the cession to his own kingdom of Tymphaia and Parauaia, two regions of Upper Macedonia, as well as Ambrakia, Akarnania, and Amphilochia in western Greece.¹ His intervention and the diplomacy of Lysimachus resulted in the uneasy division of the country between the brothers, while assuring that Pyrrhus would continue to play a role in the politics of Macedonia.

¹ Plut. Pyr. 6.2-3. Tymphaia and Parauaia were probably recovered to the Macedonian kingdom in about 262 BC, but until that time furnished the Epeirote kingdom a source of Macedonian manpower, see Tarn (1966: 311-2).
Within this context, Demetrius arrived, and soon assassinated the younger brother, Alexander, to whose supposed aid he had belatedly come. When the Macedonians with Alexander learned of his death, Demetrius managed to call the Macedonians into assembly. There, he defended his fidelity to the royal line as opposed to Cassander, who had been behind the murders of most of the royal family. Swayed by his arguments rather than his arms, the Macedonians hailed him as king; he ruled Macedonia and much of Greece for nearly nine years. This was the first of at least six occasions on which a Macedonian assembly proclaimed a new king in a span of roughly twenty years. The later acclamation of Sosthenes indicates that the acclamations were followed with oaths of loyalty. The ritual of acclamation and oath-taking served to identify a new king and bind the gathered Macedonians to him. About 289/8 BC Demetrius began marshaling his forces throughout Greece, and constructing a navy of five-hundred ships at shipyards in the Piraeus of Athens, Chalcis, Corinth, and Pella. Plutarch reports that he planned to raise 110,000 men for his armies and cross to Asia with many of them.

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3 Demetrius, Pyrrhus, possibly Lysimachus, Ptolemy Keraunos, Antipater son of Philip, Sosthenes, possibly Ptolemy son of Lysimachus, and Antigonus Gonatas.
4 Justin 24.5.14. Justin included the description of oath-taking in Sosthenes’ case because Sosthenes refused to be recognized as king within the oath, unlike earlier men, and instead required the assembled army to take oaths to him as general: et cum rex ab exercitu appellatus esset, ipse non in regis, sed in ducis nomen iurare milites conspulit.
5 This total should arouse considerable suspicion, not only in scale but also in the roundness of the figures: one hundred thousand infantry, and ten thousand cavalry. It is important to bear in mind that it also represents large levies throughout Greece, and only a minority from Macedonia itself.
In response to Demetrius’ mobilization, Pyrrhus and Lysimachus invaded Macedonia, well before Demetrius could concentrate his own forces. Pyrrhus, in particular, managed to sway the Macedonian army to abandon Demetrius and side with him. The importance of the battlefield to royal legitimacy is particularly evident in the case of Pyrrhus, who, though he was not himself a Macedonian, was esteemed and admired by the Macedonians, and likened by them to Alexander himself. This is not to say that legitimacy was simply a popularity contest; rather, Pyrrhus, with his record of personal achievements and a formidable army, managed to sway whole Macedonian armies to his side on at least two occasions. In 287 the army proclaimed him (ἀνηγορεύθη – Plut. Pyr. 11.14) king of Macedonia as Demetrius fled to Kassandreia and then to Greece. Lysimachus, however, who had campaigned with Alexander, posed a threat to Pyrrhus’ position, and the latter made peace with the former because he lacked confidence in the Macedonians’ faithfulness. His suspicions proved correct, for

6 Plut. Pyr. 11, Justin 16.2.2-3.
7 Plut. Pyr. 8.1: Ο δ’ ἀγών οὗτος οὐ τοσοῦτον ὀργῆς ὅν ἐπαθον οὐδὲ μίσους ἐνέπλησε τοὺς Μακεδόνας πρὸς τὸν Πύρρον, ὅσην δόξαν αὐτοῦ καὶ θαύμα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ λόγον ἐνεργάσατο τοῖς ἰδίοις τὰ ἔργα καὶ συνενεχθέοι κατὰ τὴν μάχην, Dem. 41.2 (also about Pyrrhus): μέγα καὶ λαμπρὸν ἐσχέν ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης ἐκείνης ὄνομα παρὰ τοὺς Μακεδόνας καὶ πολλοὶ ἐπεί οὐ χρύσοις καὶ πολλοὶ ἐπεί οὐ δύναται τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὡς ἐν μόνῳ τούτῳ τῶν βασιλέων εἰδωλον ἐνόφητο τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τόλμης, οἱ δ’ άλλοι, καὶ θάλαμα Δημήτριος, ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνής τὸ βάρος υποκρίνοιτο καὶ τὸν ἄγκον τοῦ ἀνδρός.
8 First in the above-mentioned invasion of Macedonia in 287 (Plut Pyr. 11.14), and again in about 274 BC (26.2-4). Five thousand Macedonians surrendered to him in Aetolia in about 293 BC, the occasion for Plutarch’s two statements on Pyrrhus’ popularity, and Plutarch reports that many deserted to Pyrrhus on his march through Upper Macedonia in 290 (πολλῶν δὲ καὶ προστιθεμένων καὶ συντρατευόντων), so that his army met no resistance as far as Edessa in Bottaia (Pyr. 10.2). Note, however, that only in the instance in 287 does the textual evidence indicate that Pyrrhus was declared king in a Macedonian assembly.
Lysimachus took Macedonia wholly for himself in 285 BC with widespread popular support.¹⁰

Lysimachus enjoyed sole rule over Macedonia for four full years, but was slain in 281 at Kyroupedion. When Seleucus marched into Europe to re-unite much of Alexander’s empire, he was assassinated by Ptolemy Keraunos, a son of Ptolemy I.¹¹ Keraunos ruled for less than two years, much of it contentious, and was slain with part of the army in the first invasion of the Galatians, in 280 BC. The period of upheaval that began in 281 lasted until about 272. Following Ptolemaios’ death, and while the Galatians pillaged the countryside, two men, Meleager the brother of Ptolemaios, and Antipater the nephew of Cassander, ruled for just a few months.¹² An army officer, Sosthenes, deposed Antipater and mobilized what he could of the army, inflicted a defeat on the Galatians, and ruled Macedonia as general rather than king for about two years, when he was killed in battle against Brennus’ army in the second Galatian invasion in early 278 BC. No king or leading general of Macedonia is known from 278 to no earlier than 276 BC, when Antigonus Gonatas, the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes,

¹⁰ Plut. Pyr. 12.9-12, Justin 16.3.1, Eusebius, Schoene 234.
¹¹ Keraunos was hailed as king by the army of Seleucus (Memnon 8.3), reluctantly, or even by coercion: δεχομένων αυτόν ύπό τῆς ανάγκης, καὶ βασιλέα καλούντων. Eusebius (Schoene, 235) gave his reign over Macedonia as one year and five months, from 281-280 BC. Within Macedonia, Ptolemy likely claimed the region as spear-won, following his victory over Antigonus Gonatas (Justin 24.1.8), but still celebrated a large ceremony of marriage with the widow of Lysimachus (his sister) before the assembled army (uocato exercitu), in which she, and presumably he as well, were recognized by the Macedonian assembly as rulers of Macedonia (Justin 24.3.2).
¹² The main, meager source for their brief reigns as king is Eusebius (Schoene, 236-7).
ascended. Stability did not return until 272 BC, when Antigonus regained control of Macedonia from Pyrrhus, who had invaded in 274 and secured the defection of the entire Macedonian phalanx.

The instability of the throne of Macedonia highlights two problems of the early Hellenistic era: the difficulty in establishing and retaining legitimacy among the newly-minted kings, and the considerable collective agency exerted by Macedonian citizen-soldiers. The final shift between 276 and 272 BC, after which Antigonid kings safely ruled Macedonia for one hundred years, due more to two external factors than any active policy of Antigonus. First, the vicissitudes of warfare and politics (the latter often more deadly for monarchs) eliminated most of the other contenders for the throne. Second, the Galatian invasion fundamentally altered the political landscape of the eastern Mediterranean in a way that would not be equaled or surpassed until the more drawn-out Roman interventions in the second century BC. The Galatian invasion afforded kings the opportunity for signal victories and more lasting legitimacy. Victories in the Successor wars proved competence to the men of the armies, but for the cities of

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13 According to Eusebius (Schoene 236) three factions, led by Antipater Etesios, Ptolemy son of Lysimachus, and an unknown man named Arrhidaeus, vied for control of Macedonia during the two-year “anarchy.” Antigonus was hailed as king following a victory over an army of Galatians, after suffering an earlier defeat in a war for Macedonia against Ptolemy Keraunos (Memnon FrGH 434.8.4-6, Justin 24.1.8) and an inconclusive war in the Hellespont against Antiochus, the son of Seleucus (Memnon 10.1-2, ).
15 Lysimachus and most of his family were killed, save for his son Ptolemy, who retreated to Lycia. Pyrrhus died in 272, and while his surviving son continued to pose a threat to Macedonia, Pyrrhus’ death effectively ended Epeirote attempts at the throne of Macedonia. And the family of Antipater and Cassander was effectively, if not entirely, eradicated.
the Eastern Mediterranean, the wars merely saw one Macedonian general replaced with another. The Galatians posed, or were believed to pose, an altogether different threat, an existential threat to Greek civilization, like that posed by the Persians two hundred years earlier. The following section examines the kings’ attempts at acquiring legitimizing cachet through victories over the Galatians. The elimination of other potential rivals, and the political manipulation of the Galaterschlacht, inaugurated a more stable era for the Hellenistic kingdoms, which lasted until the second century.

2.1.2. Galaterschlacht and Royal Legitimacy

The Galatian invasions of Greece and Asia Minor began in 280 BC and remained at their highest intensity for nearly ten years. Following Ptolemy Keraunos’ antagonistic treatment of Galatian emissaries, an army under Bolgios defeated the young king and paraded his head around on a pike. With a dead king, the throne passed quickly through the hands of Meleager and Antipater, until Sosthenes carried out an emergency mobilization of Macedonian youths, and with a surprise victory

16 Walbank (1993: 59) actually describes this moment, in the mid-270’s BC, as the time when “the Hellenistic world of territorial states was now in being.” See also Will’s essay in CAH VIF 1.101-17, and Heinen (1972).


18 See Justin 24.5.1-11, Diod. 22.3.
purchased a temporary peace.\textsuperscript{19} He fell in battle about two years later, in late winter of 278 BC, against the army of Brennus.\textsuperscript{20} Brennus’ army invaded and plundered Thessaly, and from there launched attacks on Thermopylae, Aetolia, and Delphi. The most important points within this narrative are the sack of Kallion and the attack on Delphi.\textsuperscript{21} Most of the Greeks sent contingents to Thermopylae, but were horrified by the tales of cannibalism, rape, and necrophilia from the sack of Kallion, the largest and best-developed city in Aetolia.\textsuperscript{22} When an elite contingent of the Galatian army, led by Brennus, made an assault on Delphi, a largely Phokian relief force was aided, it was said, by a winter storm at least, and turned back the raiding party, which was almost entirely annihilated. After the shrine’s seemingly miraculous preservation stories quickly spread that earthquakes, massive hailstones, and lightning contributed to the route, and that Apollo and many of the other gods had intervened to protect the sacred precinct at Delphi and inflict judgment on the invaders. The invasion produced a profoundly dangerous, different, and disgusting barbarian enemy, a threat to Greek civilization unlike any since the Persians, and so became a source of immense honor and goodwill for those who most contributed, alongside the gods themselves, to the salvation and victory of the Greeks.

\textsuperscript{19} Justin 24.5.12: \textit{Desperantibus omnibus non uotis agendum Sosthenes, unus de Macedonum principibus, ratus contracta iuuentute et Gallos uictoria exultantes compescuit et Macedoniam ab hostili populatione defendit.}

\textsuperscript{20} Justin 24.6.2.

\textsuperscript{21} On the entire campaign and these particular events, see Paus. 10.19.4-23.12. For Kallion see 10.22.3-4, and for Delphi see 10.23.1-11. See also Justin 24.6.

\textsuperscript{22} For this city, and the impact of the sack on the Aetolian League, see Scholten (2000: 30-37).
The earliest text mentioning the Galatian invasion comes from Kos, off the coast of Caria in Asia Minor, where the people published a decree at the start of summer in 278 expressing their jubilation and thanks “for the salvation and victory of the Greeks.”\textsuperscript{23} The text makes no mention of the theophany at Delphi, but does indicate that by then, a few months at most after the fighting at Delphi, the temple of Pythian Apollo was already decorated with the arms of the fallen foemen.\textsuperscript{24} In the ensuing months, the Aetolian League made the most of the situation, dedicating Galatian spoils at multiple shrines, asserting their own role in the protection of the shrine at Delphi (though Aetolian troops were not in fact there in any significant number), issuing the first major coinage of the Aetolian League, marked with a pile of Galatian shields, and organizing a festival of remembrance, called the Soteria, the Festival of Salvation.\textsuperscript{25} Aetolian propaganda and political maneuvering was so effective that the Athenians, who had helped lead the armies at Thermopylae, hardly contested Aetolian leadership or the Aetolian narrative in matters of the Soteria and praised the Aetolian contribution to the

\textsuperscript{23} Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 398.40: ἐπὶ τὰς Ἑλλάνων σωτηρία καὶ νίκαι. 
\textsuperscript{24} Lines 8-10: τὸ δὲ ἑαυτὸν διαπεφυλάξατε τε καὶ ἐπικεκομήσθαι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιστρατευόντων όπλως. These spoils were dedicated by the Aetolians, based on SEG 28.496 from Delphi, for which see Amandry (1978: 571-80). 
\textsuperscript{25} For the Aetolian role in the invasions and political manipulation of Galatenschlacht, see Scholten (2000: 29-95) and Grainger (1995: 313-43), and Champion (1995: 213-20 and 1996: 315-28). On the multiple Aetolian dedications of spoils, see Scholten (2000: 40-1). On Aetolian coinage with Galatian shield motifs, see Reinach (1911:177-240). On the limited role of the Aetolians at Delphi and their assertion of greater significance, see Strootman (2005: 110-2), who points out, rightly it seems, that the apparent unwillingness of the Phokians to assert their own role allowed the Aetolians to usurp it with little difficulty.
defense of Greece in public decrees.\textsuperscript{26} Several years later, when Galatian armies attacked cities of Asia Minor, at least one of those cities, Erythrai, inserted its own defense into the narrative of the Galatian threat and Greek victory by identifying their part as a subsidiary of the role played by the Aetolians.\textsuperscript{27} And much of this seems to have preceded the growth of the theophany mythology, which first appears in inscriptions after the first \textit{Soteria}, in the mid-to-late 270’s BC.\textsuperscript{28} The Aetolians, who suffered significant casualties in the fighting and the loss of their most developed city, capitalized on the victory to expand their influence throughout Central Greece. The Aetolian League played a key role in Greek politics for much of the next century. As for the great Macedonian kings, none was on hand to turn back the Galatian armies and win glory in the great \textit{Galaterschlacht} of 279/8 BC. Even so, each strove in some way to claim a share of the fame and honor bestowed on those who shielded Greek civilization from the barbarians by pursuing their own signal victories, a \textit{Galaterschlacht} for each, in addition to the \textit{Galaterschlacht} for all Greece.

\textsuperscript{26} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 680 = Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 408, 275/4 BC, in preparation for the first observation of the \textit{Soteria}. \textit{FD III} 481 is a nearly identical inscription from the perspective of the Delphic Amphictyony. While it is true that the Athenian account inscribed a place for the Athenian forces involved in the campaign, it wrote them into the Aetolian-dominated narrative.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{FD III} 514: \textit{α ἐπί τῶν Ἑρυθρών ἀντέχηκεν ἀρετὰς ἔνεκει} καὶ εὐνοίας τὰς εἰς αὐτούς, ἐθέσαντας τὰν πόλιν.

\textsuperscript{28} The later literary sources for the theophanies are Paus. 10.23.5, Diod. 22.9, and Justin 25.6.8, but the active intervention of the deities is attested in \textit{I.Smyrna} 574, which correlates Artemis’ aid at Smyrna against the Galatians with the aid of Artemis and Apollo at Delphi, and in \textit{FD III} 483, an inscription from Delphi, where the belief in τὴν τε ἑπιφάνειαν τῶν θεῶν (line 6) is employed to expand the significance of the \textit{Soteria}.
Their propagandistic efforts often met or exceeded the military expenditure involved. Antigonus Gonatas was not in Greece or Macedonia when the Galatians invaded, but in the region of the Hellespont, waging war against Antiochus I. This war ended in about 277 BC, and Antigonus crossed over into Europe, intending to conquer Macedonia (Justin 25.1). En route, he crossed paths with an army of eighteen thousand Galatians, said by Justin to have made their way toward Macedonia after plundering the people who lived along the Danube (25.1.2-2.7). By a stratagem he surprised the Galatians and inflicted a defeat on them, though apparently it was not the massacre Justin described. In the following years, the Galatians of southeastern Thrace established a powerful kingdom at Tylis, and thousands of Galatians immediately enrolled in Antigonus’ army as mercenaries. This victory is thought to have occurred near Lysimachia, based on Diog.Laert. 2.140-2, where we learn that Antigonus,

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29 Justin, Epitome prolog. 24 indicates that this war began in late 281 or early 280, and lasted until about 288 or 287. Memnon 10 mentions the same war, and his narrative fits the same dates: Antigonus fought Keraunos, then Antiochus (so no sooner than late 281 BC); afterwards Antiochus waged war on Nikomedes of Bithynia, which occasioned the latter’s symmachia with the Galatians, who crossed over in 277 or 276. The war is seemingly referenced in OGIS 748, an inscription from Pergamon, which in lines 8-15 references a state of war in the vicinity of Pergamon in 279/8 and 278/7, two years before the Galatian invasion.

30 Justin 25.2.7: tantaque caedes Gallorum fuit, ut Antigono pacem opinio huius victoriae non a Gallis tantum, uerum etiam a finitimorum feritate praestiterit. Note, however, that even within this text, Justin mentions peace with the Galatians (and others beside), and that the “opinio” of his victory secured the peace, reinforcing the importance of rhetoric, rather than the victory itself.

31 Polyaeus 4.6.17 describes Antigonus’ use of nine thousand Galatian mercenaries under Kiderios in the conquest of Macedonia in 277/6 BC. While Polyaeus did not give the total number of soldiers, he says they were paid a Macedonian gold stater each, and pay for the soldiers was equivalent to thirty talents (silver). At twenty silver drachmas per stater, thirty talents would pay nine thousand soldiers. Polybius mentions the Galatian kingdom at Tylis at 4.45.9-46.4, and Justin’s Epitome prolog. 25 seemingly makes reference to the same kingdom, instead calling it Tylenus. The structure of the prologue places the foundation of Tylenus/Tylis after Antigonus’ victory, and closer in time to the Galatian raids in Asia Minor.
following the victory near Lysimachia, proceeded toward his homeland of Macedonia. This harmonizes both accounts with one of Polyaeus’ stratagems, wherein Antigonus hired nine thousand Galatians to augment his army for his war against Antipater for the throne of Macedonia. So Antigonus, following the end of his war with Antiochus in 277, began moving toward Macedonia. En route, he defeated a Galatian army, but far from massacring the soldiers, he enrolled many of them into his own army for his campaign against Antipater in Macedonia. Though Galatians served in his army, he and his allies used the cachet of his Galaterschlacht to strengthen his position in Macedonia and Greece. The anecdote in Laertius related to a decree promulgated on Antigonus’ behalf by Menedemus of Eretria, which mentions his victory over the barbarians and his conquest of Macedonia, but ignores the importance of Galatian manpower within his conquering army. Antigonus himself issued coins commemorating his victory and his conquest of Macedonia. A lesser bronze series, they nevertheless depict on the reverse a battle trophy crowned by Pan. The trophy includes an unmistakably Galatian shield, and thus touted his victory over the terrible barbarians.

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32 Walbank (1993: 59) described the victory as “much publicized” and Tarn saw in it Antigonus’ principal argument for acclamation as king of Macedonia by the Macedonian army in assembly (1969: 189).
33 Münzen & Medaillen GmbH 17.546-7; see SNG Copenhagen 1205-9 for several other good examples. See also ANS IX (1960: 50-2) for an argument for the association of a series of Pan-headed tetradrachms with the victory at Lysimachia and conquest of Macedonia, though the Galatian-related symbolism is less clear. Instead, Pan was believed to have intervened on Antigonus’ behalf during the battle, throwing the Galatians into confusion (Paus. 10.23.7). Aratus of Soli wrote a Hymn to Pan in honor of Antigonus to celebrate the victory over the Galatians (Suda A’3745 Aqoroc).
Pyrrhus gained his *Galaterschlacht* by unusual circumstances as well. He only returned to Greece from Italy in 274 BC, well after the Galatian invasions. But when he invaded Macedonia late that year, or perhaps early in 273, his army annihilated a body of Galatians serving as Antigonus’ rear guard.\(^{34}\) In celebration of the victory, Pyrrhus issued coins with a Galatian shield held in hand of a Nike, a favorite emblem of the Epirote royal family, and in the other hand a wreath of Zeus Dodona.\(^{35}\) He also dedicated many of the spoils from his victories in Macedonia, and the Galatian spoils in particular. Those he dedicated at the temple of Itonian Athena in central Thessaly.\(^{36}\) Later, it seems likely that he helped rebuild the plundered city of Kallion, and in that sense found another means to insert himself into the narrative of the Galatian invasions.\(^{37}\)

After the Galatians turned back from Greece, thousands crossed over into Asia Minor as allies of Nikomedes of Bithynia and plundered the cities of Anatolia.\(^{38}\) Resistance to the Galatians was not offered at first by Antiochus I, who left Asia Minor at the conclusion of his war with Antigonus, and so very near the time of the Galatian crossing. He did not return for at least two years, and according to some sources, closer

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\(^{34}\) Plut. *Pyrrhus* 26.5. Plutarch says that Pyrrhus chose to dedicate the Galatian arms in particular because those particular trophies “conducted the most to his glory.”


\(^{36}\) Paus. 1.13.3. He dedicated Macedonian shields at Dodona in Epeiros. It is noteworthy that the Galatian weapons were dedicated in a traditionally Greek context, while the Macedonian spoils were dedicated in an Epirote-Greek sanctuary.

\(^{37}\) IG IX.1 154, and see commentary in Scholten (2000: 49).

\(^{38}\) Livy 38.16, Strabo 12.5.1, Paus. 10.23.14, Memnon 11, Justin 25.2.8-11, Will (1982: 1.141-2) and Launey (1944: 217-34).
to six. In the meantime, the cities offered their own resistance. Philetairos of Pergamon led a defensive campaign in Mysia and the Hellespont, coordinating aid for several cities. At other cities across Asia Minor prominent citizens and mercenary captains gained favor for their own efforts in diverting Galatian attacks. In Antiochus’ absence, Philetairos was the foremost hero of the resistance, and received honors at Delphi and Delos, and was honored in hymns and victory monuments. Antiochus eventually crossed over the Taurus mountains, and soon engaged all or part of the Galatian forces.

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39 SEG 47.1739 indicates that Antiochus’ war against the Galatians only took place around 270 BC; see Wörrle 1975: 59-87.
40 OGIS 748.19-20 records the assistance of Philetaerus, *dynastes* of Pergamon, to Kyzikos during the Galatian invasion, in 276/5 BC. IG 11.4.1105 (=SEG 38.776) is a dedication at Delos in honor of Philetaerus, noting his signal defeat of the Galatians. See Strabo 8.4.1 for Philetaerus and the start of Attalid rule at Pergamon. Philetaerus had been a Greco-Paphlagonian eunuch of Dokimos, a long-serving general of several Successors. After Lysimachus’ victory in Asia Minor, the new king entrusted Philetaerus with the citadel and treasury at Pergamon, and he passed it on to his nephew Eumenes in the late 270’s.
41 OGIS 765 (=I.Priene 17) praises a citizen general of Priene who led mercenary and citizen forces that repulsed Galatian activity in the vicinity of the city. Syll. 410 praises the citizen generals and apparently-Ptolemaic mercenary forces who defended the city of Erythrai from Galatian attacks by troops under Leonnarios, see also I.Ery 28. FD III 514 is an Erythraian dedication at Delphi associating their own victory with that of the Aetolians. I.Magn. 46 references the attack on Delphi and identifies the Magnesians’ trials with the Galatians (though perhaps later in the third century) with the assault on all the Greek by the Galatians. Note that this latter text clearly expresses the belief in the *epiphaneia* of multiple deities at Delphi in 278, lines 8-10: τὰς Ἀρτέμιδος ἐπιφάνειας καὶ τὰν γεγενημένην ὀνομασίαν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἁπάλων πολέμον ἀναστάτων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἱερὸν τὸν Ἐλευθέριον, τινῶν Ἰσραήλ ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Πολύκλεος ἔπατον πολέμον ἀναστάτων ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἰούδα, τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν Ἰουδαίων, τοῦ Ἁπάλων (I.Μagn. διὰ πολέμον τοῦ τοῦ Ἱερονοτομείου καὶ τοῦ τοῦ Πολύκλεος). Syll. 322, from Thyateira, is dated by the Seleucid era, but is an offering of thanks to Apollo for a son’s escape from Galatian raiders. The dedicant or his son may have been Seleucid settlers, but the text offers no indication of activity by the royal army, see lines 9-11: τοῦ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ διώκοντος σωτηρίας, ὡς ἀποκάλυψαν τὸν Γαλατικόν ἐυθεῖαν, Syll. 3 322, from Milete, contains a list of religious officials in the city, but left gaps, filled only with the name of the god Apollo, for several years marked by war or instability, including 276/5 and 275/4, at the height of the Galatian raids.
42 IG 11.4.1105 concerns the erection of a victory monument at Delos, probably after Philetaerus’ death, see Allen (1983: 30-33). It also mentions (line 4) that hymns had been composed in honor of his victory over the Galatians. Philetaerus and his family were also honored at Delphi, *FD* 3.1.432.
in a decisive battle that has since been known as “Battle of the Elephants.” The effect of the victory was said by Lucian to have inspired the Macedonians in Antiochus’ army to raise shouts of acclamation for their king. Terracottas produced in the aftermath of the battle, of which several whole examples are known, depicted an Indian elephant throttling a Galatian warrior, and so served to memorialize Antiochus’ victory. Though late to the war, Antiochus’ advantages in materiel allowed him to expand his influence in the Greek cities. From Erythrai in Ionia, a city that was nominally Ptolemaic and defended itself from the Galatians, an inscription of the 260’s recognizes Seleucid authority and commits Erythrai to pay money into the Galatian defense funds, τὰ Γαλατικὰ.

Ptolemy’s position in Egypt shielded him from Galatian plunderers, but also from the glory of a Galaterschlacht. Pausanias’ narrative contains no reference to

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44 Lucian, Zeuxis 11.4-6: οἱ Μακεδόνες δὲ ὡσιοὶ σὺν Ἀντιόχῳ ἕσαν, ἐπαινώνιον καὶ προσιόντες ἀλλός ἀλλαχόθεν ἀνέδουν τὸν βασιλέα καλλίνικον ἀναφορώντες. App. Syr. 65 also says that he received the appellation “Soter” (Savior) after the battle.
45 Reinach and Pottier (1885: 485-93). Suda Σ’443 Σιμωνίδης indicates that a Magnesian poet wrote an encomium in honor of Antiochus’ victory in the Battle of the Elephants. It says that the poem concerned the battle, wherein he defeated the horse with his elephants, ὅτε μετὰ τῶν ἐλεφάντων τὴν ἱππόν αὐτοῦ ἐφθάσεν.
46 OGIS 223 = RC 15. Antiochus confirmed the Erythraian’s autonomy and untaxed status, even as the Erythraians committed to paying into a major tax. While Antiochus points out that those privileges had been granted under Alexander and Antigonus, Erythrai had in fact enjoyed the additional statuses of freedom (eleutheria) and democracy a few years earlier, under the Ptolemies (Syll. 3 442.12). One of the officers praised in the earlier decree, Bottas, served in the embassy to Antiochus in the later decree. See also OGIS 222, regarding the relations between the Seleucids and the Ionian League in the 260’s BC, for signs of expanded authority within the broad context of the Galatian threat.
Ptolemaic assistance during the invasion of Greece, and after the Galatians crossed to Asia Minor, there was only a short skirmish in Lycia between Ptolemaic forces and Galatians. A year or so later, perhaps about 276, Ptolemy acquired some four thousand Galatian mercenaries to assist him in his war against Magas of Cyrene, who had betrayed his half-brother and aligned himself with Antiochus I (Paus. 1.7.2). The mercenaries were dispatched to Ptolemy with an embassy of friendship from Antigonus, reported only once in any source, among the scholia to Callimachus. Ptolemy’s interaction with the mercenaries is known from three sources: Callimachus’ *Hymn to Delos*, the scholia to the hymn, and Pausanias. According to these sources, the mercenaries plotted to plunder their employer, and when Ptolemy found out, he led

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47 Steph. Byz. 1.33.5-10 is our surviving source, quoted from Apollonius lost Histories of Karia (*FrGH* 740.14), describing a Galatian attack in Lycia and plunder of several Ptolemaic naval vessels, but see also Mitchell (1993: 18) for the monument at Lymyra indicating a victory for Ptolemaic and Lycian forces against Galatians, dated to the 270’s. See Robert (1990: 242-58) and Barbantani (2001: 93-4) for this episode, and its possible connection to Neoptolemos, a Ptolemaic general in Lycia who defeated an army of Galatians, Pisidians, and Agrarians, concerning which I find it more likely refers to events in the First or Second Syrian War, following a suggestion made by Strobel (1996: 125-6). At least one Ptolemaic possession in Asia Minor also encountered the Galatians, Erythrai in Ionia, confirmed as Ptolemaic in *Syll.* 2 210 (279/8), and in *Syll.* 3 410 (Erythrai), and shows that it was a Ptolemaic possession at that time. In fact, the text may contain references to Ptolemaic forces (line 18: μαϊκοῖς) and mercenary troops (line 18-19: μισθοφόροις), which would also likely be Ptolemaic.

48 Scholia in Callimachum (Pfeiffer 1949) 4.175-87: ἀλίγων οὖν παραλειφθέντων αὐτόγονος τις φίλος τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου Πτολεμαίου προέξειν αὐτούς αὐτῷ ῥώτε ἐπὶ μισθῷ στρατεύεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἔχρηζεν ὁ Πτολεμαῖος τοῦτον τοῦ στρατεύματος, οἱ δὲ ὁμοίως ἤπωζον καὶ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον ἀρεσκάτῳ τὰ χρήματα. γνοὺς οὖν λαμβάνει αὐτούς καὶ ἀπάγει πρὸς τὸ στόμιον τοῦ Νείλου τὸ λεγόμενον Σεβεννυτικὸν καὶ κατέκαυσεν αὐτούς ἐκείσε. Barbantani (2001: 188-203) rejects the identification with Antigonus Gonatas; whoever helped Ptolemy acquire the soldiers matters rather little. Barbantani’s argument is based on the description of Antigonus as τις φίλος τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου Πτολεμαίου, which is a reasonable argument, while Antigonus position at the time of Magas’ revolt (c. 277/6) fits the sequence of events perfectly.

49 For the *Hymn to Delos* (Callimachus *Hymns* 4), see Barbantani (2002-3: 29-47).
them to an island in the Delta near the coast, and stranded or slew them there.\textsuperscript{50}

According to Callimachus and the scholiast, the shields were taken and used as a public trophy by Ptolemy.\textsuperscript{51}

For Ptolemy, the \textit{thureos} shield, representing the defeated Galatians, became a symbol of his right to rule; that is, a symbol of victory and authority that was his own, and not inherited from his father.\textsuperscript{52} The central importance of the shield is further reinforced by Callixenus’ description of the so-called Grand Procession at Ptolemy II’s Ptolemaia festival. According to Callixenus, there was a central platform within the main arena for the festival. The upper sides of this platform were decorated with \textit{thureos} shields, inlaid with gold and silver.\textsuperscript{53} No one has as yet emphasized the importance of the prominent placement or type of the shields on the central platform. But these two factors are essential in dating, and show that the Grand Procession could not describe

\textsuperscript{50} The sources all agree that the men were stranded on the island, but provide flooding, burning, and starvation as manners of death. The tale is very neat, and perhaps for that reason suspicious. Ptolemy needed the mercenaries to fight Magas, but Magas withdrew. The following has only been true a handful of times, and in this case it was: they (the Galatians) were of more use to him (Ptolemy) dead than alive.

\textsuperscript{51} Callimachus, Hymns 4.185-7: τέων αἱ ἠμὲν ἐμοὶ γέρας, αἱ δ’ ἐπὶ Νείλῳ ἐν πυρὶ τοὺς φορέοντας ἀποπνεύσαντας ὑδόται κείσονται βασιλῆς ἀέθλια πολλὰ καμόντος. Apollo speaking, says “some of these will deck my walls (that is, at the temple of Apollo at Delphi), but others, having seen their bearers destroyed with fire beside the Nile, shall make a prize for a king who has labored much.” \textit{Scholia in Callimachum} 4.187: ταῦτα οὖν, φησί, ἐνον ἀγώνα ἐσεσθαι, “These [shields], he says, decorated the general arena.” It has not been suggested elsewhere, as far as I can tell, but we should not discount the possibility that Ptolemy slaughtered the mercenaries for the political gain associated with such a victory, knowing full well that in his own context (and apparently in our own) few would doubt that greedy Galatians would turn on their paymaster.

\textsuperscript{52} The importance of early victories, particularly those gained against the Galatians, has been emphasized by Barbantani (2011: 178-200), related to Ptolemy in particular, but also Will (1982: 1.105-9), Hammond and Walbank (1988: 252-9), Strootman (2005: 101-39), and Boteva (2010: 33-50) for the importance to the second (or third in the case of Gonatas) generation of Hellenistic kings to establish legitimacy of their own.

\textsuperscript{53} Callixenus, \textit{FHG} 3, 2.50-1. Ὕπεράνω δὲ τούτων θυρεοὶ περιέκειντο ἐναλλαξ̄, ἀργυροὶ καὶ χρυσοὶ.
the Ptolemaia of 279/8, as has often been assumed. Instead, the festival of 275/4 is more likely, following close upon the victory over the Galatians, and thus justifying the prominent place given to the embossed Galatian spoils. The importance of the *thureos* as a central decorative item in Ptolemy’s main display has been oft-overlooked due to ignorance of shield types and their relative importance, but when other kings decorated shields with gold and silver, they were usually the *aspis* shields used by Greek hoplites and pikemen. But Ptolemy, by using *thureos* shields, must have been making a reference to the defeated Galatians, just as the Aetolians, Athenians, and Pyrrhus had.

Ptolemy used his peculiar *Galaterschlacht* to strengthen his position as ruler, and even employed the Galatian shield as badge of his own victory for many years. The *Hymn to Delos* illustrates the political cachet available through these sorts of triumphs, as it associates Ptolemy’s own episode directly with the Galatian advance through Greece.

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54 This is not the date accepted by most scholars, but the following argument will defend this date. Tarn (1928: 703 and 1933: 59-60) dated the Grand procession to 279/8 BC, a date that has since been widely supported, see Walbank (1996: 119-30), Thompson (2000: 381-8), and McKechnie (2008: 49-56). Shear (1978: 37) has shown conclusively that the first Ptolemaia was celebrated in 279/8 BC, but that does not mean the Grand Procession was the first Ptolemaia. Otto (1931: 414) dated it to 271/0 to correspond with the end of the First Syrian War, followed by Heinen in *CAH VII* 1.417. Rice (1983: 135-50) considered the possibility of separating the procession from the Ptolemaia (the only scholar to do so other than Fraser (1972: 1.228-32), but like Fraser eventually retained a date before 275/4. Foertmeyer (1988: 90-104) is the only recent scholarship to support dating the Grand Procession of Callixenus in 275/4 BC, from December 275 to February 274. Hazzard (2000: 28-32, 60-6) dated the Grand Procession of Callixenus to January 262 BC, on the basis of the appellation of Ptolemy I as Soter during the Procession and his identification of Ptolemy the Son at the Procession, but his interpretation has yet to gain major support. In fact, my analysis shows that the earlier dates cannot be correct, and 274 or 270 are more likely.
and upon Delphi. In that sense, Callimachus’ hymn inserted Ptolemy’s accomplishment within the narrative of Greek salvation. This fit within the overall trajectory of Ptolemaic ideology, which combined beneficence toward all the Greeks with a number of particularly Macedonian and Egyptian elements, bound within a fundamentally personal ideal. His victory over the Galatians demonstrated his personal power, and his spectacular contribution to the common struggle against a terrifying foe.

Following the victory, Ptolemy II incorporated the Galatian shield into much of his coinage. As with the Grand Procession, the coinage of Ptolemy II has regularly been mis-dated due to poor analysis regarding the significance of the Galatian shield. Barbantani and others dated the first Ptolemy II coins with Gaulish shields to 285, following Svoronos, but these must be in error. The Gaulish shield, with its oval shape and distinctive spine and midrib, was not known in the Hellenistic world before 280

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55 See Callimachus Hymns 4.170-88 for the text on the Galatians. The text sets up Apollo and Ptolemy as parallel heroes, who both intervene for the sake of the Greeks against the impious, ultimately doomed, “Latter-day Titans.”


57 See Barbantani (2011: 178-200) and scholarly literature at 198, n. 65. Svoronos (1904-8: 79-85, nos. 558-602) related the correspondence of the Gaulish shield badge on some Ptolemaic coins with the appearance, at the same time, of numerals, which were marked between the legs of the Ptolemaic eagle. Svoronos and later commenters like Barbantani have seen in the shield an echo of a legend that Ptolemy I was exposed by his father Lagos upon a shield, and then nursed by an eagle (Suda 1’25 Λάγγος). This is clearly in error: it is not known when the legend first arose, but the text says he was exposed ἐπὶ ἀσπίδος χαλκῆς, upon a bronze round-shield. While modern classicists can mistake an aspis and a thurros, the ancients knew the difference between the pervasive, Greek round shield, and a foreign, oval shield, the latter never bronzed as the former often was. Note, however, that several authors, beginning with Devesne (1989: 275-7), have seen the markings as control marks rather than regnal years, see also Lorber (2000: 67-92) and (2005: 135-57) and Metcalf (2012: 214-6).
Their dating method follows letter numerals placed on the coins, from Alpha to Phi, or from one to twenty-two. But this is without doubt an unusual way in Hellenistic practice to write dates, and later coinage of Ptolemy II used the traditional method.

There were several different shield series, in bronze diobols, silver tetradrachms, and gold staters. With the exception of the gold staters, the shield series were discontinued following the Ptolemaic currency reform in the late 260’s.

The removal of the Galatian shield as a royal marker on all but gold staters should not be taken as an indication of fading interest in the king’s victory over the Galatians. A papyrus from about 257 BC, P.Lond. 7.2057, records that a man Philinos managed to purchase five of the Galatian shields in Aetolia, though Aetolia was by then practically emptied of shields, and forwarded them on to Egypt, to the functionary Zenon in the Arsinoite nome. The Aetolians dedicated Galatian shields decorated in gold at the temple of Apollo in Delphi.

Now, one could imagine that Philinos sought to purchase *thureos* shields for general use, but there is no reason one could find to explain

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58 See Gunby (2000: 359-62) for a collection of sources on the earliest appearance of the oval shield in the Eastern Mediterranean. The *thureos* had been used by many Italic peoples, as well as Gauls, since about 500 BC, and had spread into Pannonia through Celtic contacts by about 400 BC. But representations of the *thureos* in surviving Greek art, or mentions of it in Greek sources, appear only after the Galatian invasions, when the *thureos* became increasingly common.

59 Phoenician mints produced coins throughout the thirties of Philadelphus’ reign, see Svoronos (1904-8), nos. 732 – year 30, 736-7 – year 31, 777 – year 33, 807 – year 34, 748 – year 36, 833 – year 37, 700 – year 39. The traditional method used a the letters beginning after *iota* as factors of ten, thus, *lambda-alpha* signified “thirty-one” on Svoronos 736.


61 P.Lond. 7.2057.2-6: ἀπεστάλκαμεν σοι τοὺς πέντε θυρεοὺς πεφιλοτιμημένους όπ’ ἐμοὶ ἔστη μηδὲ ἐν τῇ Αἰτωλίᾳ εἶναι τ’ ὁμούς.

62 Paus. 10.19.4: ὁπλὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστυλίων χρυσά.
the “emptying of Aetolia” of the shields. Instead, it is far likelier that Philinos traveled to Aetolia for authentic Galatian trophies, twenty years after the Galatian invasion, to augment public monuments in Ptolemaic Egypt, or possibly the private collections of Zenon’s powerful boss, Apollonius, the dioiketes of Egypt.

2.2. Creating Stable and Proficient Hellenistic Armies

The acquisition and retention of legitimacy was essential for Hellenistic monarchs, both in relation to their armies and to those they ruled. The remainder of this chapter examines instead the latter two categories of analysis, stability and proficiency. The previous chapter demonstrated that mercenary-heavy armies were unsustainable due to their expense, particularly on the much larger scale of the Hellenistic kingdoms. In the place of the early Successor system of mercenary armies, the second- and third-generation kings established institutions of military service within their spear-won land. In Macedonia and parts of Asia, this system relied heavily upon conceptions of Macedonian identity and the responsibilities of local communities associated with the monarch and his army. Elsewhere in Asia, and particularly in Egypt, settlement structures connected individuals with the monarch through the exchange of land for military service. The development of these structures was not orderly; neither do the sources indicate that they were developed rapidly. Instead, these structures, meant to stabilize military recruitment, only stabilized over successive generations.
2.2.1. Macedonia

The Antigonid kings controlled Macedonia for a little over one hundred uninterrupted years following the end of the Anarchy and the Galatian invasions. There are no significant accounts in the various ancient histories for Macedonia for the fifty years after the late 270’s. It is necessary instead to rely on scattered bits of history and a generally meager epigraphic record. Walbank’s summary of the state of affairs circa 270 in CAH VII is as helpful a starting point as any.63 His summary problematizes Macedonian stability in two ways, both related to military manpower. First, he notes the disruptions of the preceding twenty-five to thirty years, when Macedonia “had been devastated by Gaulish invasion and torn apart by successive attempts” to seize control of the country (see above, section 2.1.1). This period of pillage, warfare, and instability involved significant casualties and may have encouraged emigration. This would have exacerbated the population drain from the time of Alexander and the First Diadochi War, when of Alexander’s 32,000 Macedonians perhaps five thousand ever returned to Macedonia, and Antipater left fresh levies of at least five thousand Macedonians with Antigonus in Asia Minor (see Chapter 1, section 2). This demographic loss is Walbank’s

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second problem. Yet his summary moves from these daunting prospects to paint a
relatively rosy picture of Antigonid strength.  

Walbank’s answer to the demographic problems facing Macedonia is the
homogenization of the people, who had coalesced around Macedonian identity by the
time Antigonus became king. This applied to the Thracians, Illyrians, and Paionians
incorporated into the borders of Macedonia in the fourth century, and to the several
powerful Greek cities on the seaboard. Walbank described “a growing national
consciousness of being Macedonian” in the cities and lands formerly subjugated by the
Argead kings and their Macedonian armies. As evidence, he noted that “during the
Antigonid period citizens of all Macedonian cities, whatever their origin, now style
themselves Macedonian.” If so, the inclusion of formerly subject populations
constituted a complete remedy to the manpower difficulties Macedonia faced. The
following examination shows that the expansion of Macedonian identity took place
much more slowly.

The expansion of Macedonian identity in the third century BC is not particularly
surprising, as it had steadily expanded since the fifth century. In the late fifth century,
the Macedonians were the inhabitants of territory from Eordaia in Upper Macedonia,

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64 For these two problems, see pages 224-5. On page 225, Walbank remarks that Antigonus Gonatas followed
a “cautious policy in Greece” to allow Macedonian manpower to “recover from exhaustion” and when war
came, “deliberately spared his national troops” and instead “relied chiefly on mercenaries.”
65 On the Balkan populations, see p.224-5; on the Greek cities, see p.227-8.
66 See p.227-8.
down into Bottaia in Lower Macedonia past Pella to the towns on both sides of the Axios River, south to Pieria, and east to include some of the settlements in Mygdonia as far as the Strymon River. At that time, the Lynkestians and Elimeiots of Upper Macedonia were transitioning into Macedonian identity, a process that lasted several generations, while much of the Chalcidian peninsula, Krestonia, and Bisaltia, these last all located east of Lower Macedonia, were considered subject peoples rather than Macedonians.

Lands within those regions were bestowed on Macedonian colonists, as confirmed by inscriptions, as late as the end of the fourth century. In the early fourth century, a couple of decades after Thucydides’ description, a treaty between the Chalcidian League and king Amyntas of Macedonia bound the Macedonians from friendship with the Bottians and Anthemians of the Chalcidian peninsula, or with the Mendesians of Pallene, or the Amphipolitans of Edonis. This actually indicates a contraction of

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67 Macedonian territory in the late fifth century is described in depth by Thucydides at Peloponnesian War 2.99.
68 Thuc. Peloponnesian War 2.99.2-3 for Upper Macedonia, and 2.99.6 for Anthemous and Chalkidike in the peninsula, and for Krestonia and Bisaltia north of Mygdonia. Mygdonia itself was a recently conquered land, and only partly settled with Macedonians. Strabo 7.7.8 says that the population of Upper Macedonia was originally related to the Molossians of Epirus, who dwelled on the western slopes of the Pindos mountains.
69 Meletemata 11.k31 = SEG 36.626 confirms that Alexander himself gave Kalindoia in Mygdonia, and the three villages in its chora, to Macedonian settlers, see also SEG 48.783 and 51.796 from the reign of Antigonus II for Mygdonian estates bestowed on prominent Macedonians. A cavalryman’s stele found at Kalindoia may indicate that the settlers there, as those at Amphipolis and in other eastern regions, either were originally, or were given land grants sufficient to serve as, cavalry in the Macedonian army (Hatzopoulos 2001: 54). This followed the policy of Philip II in distributing large estates in the conquered regions of the kingdom to the Macedonian nobility. For this policy, see Griffith (1979: 411-2), Develin (1985: 493-6), Errington (1990: 242-4), and Hatzopoulos (2001: 32-3). See also Theopompos, FGrH 115.225.2, for the vast landed wealth of Philip II’s hetairoi, “as much land as the wealthiest ten thousand in Greece.”
70 Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 1, treaty between Amyntas III and the Chalcidian League, 393/2 BC.
Macedonian authority compared to Thucydides’ description. Some expansion of the Macedonian population must have occurred during the reign of Philip II, by the end of whose reign Macedonian military manpower had well more than doubled.71 Most of this expansion likely came from Upper Macedonia, whose cantons provided most of the Macedonian manpower in Alexander’s army.72 There is no clear evidence, literary or epigraphic, that the rural populations of eastern Macedonia, from the east bank of the Echedoros river to the far side of the Strymon valley, considered themselves Macedonians or were enrolled in Macedonian military units.73

This means that, with the tribes of Upper Macedonia already incorporated, and no evidence that the tribes of Eastern Macedonia ever were, the greatest opportunities for expanding Macedonian manpower were the key Greek cities of Macedonia:

Kassandreia, Thessalonike, and Amphipolis. The former two were established in the reign of Cassander out of synoecisms of Greek cities.74 The latter held mainly Greek (including many former Athenians) and Thracian settlers, but had received some

71 Philip’s major mobilization in 359 BC, against Bardylis of Illyria, allowed him to enter the field with a Macedonian phalanx of ten thousand men (Diod. 16.4.3). Yet, as shown in Chapter 1, the Macedonian infantry serving under arms in 334 numbered approximately twenty-seven thousand men.
72 Bosworth (1971: 97-105), Geyer (1930: 11-15). At the battle of Gaugamela, half of the phalanx battalions were considered Upper Macedonian (Diod. 17.57.2). Several regions of Upper Macedonia were only annexed by a series of wars and marriages during the reign of Philip II, see Bosworth (1971: 99-100).
73 The best evidence, which is very weak, is a metrical inscription from Egypt (Bernand, Inscr.Métr. 9), wherein a Ptolemaic soldier identifies himself as a Macedonian from Mygdonia, yet it is notable that he identifies himself as a cavalryman (line 4: παριππεύων), and so his service is not inconsistent with the settlement of cavalry in eastern Macedonia, nor should one read too much for the Antigonids into the Ptolemies’ open arms-approach to recruiting.
Macedonians who were allotted land in the city after Philip captured it.\textsuperscript{75} Indications are that the each of the three cities steadily became Macedonian over the course of Antigonid rule, although the evidence is meager.\textsuperscript{76} Moreover, if the citizens of these cities had assumed a primarily Macedonian identity, as Walbank suggests, such would be reflected in the epigraphic record. Instead, citizens of Kassandreia, Amphipolis, and to a lesser extent Thessalonike, are well-attested in Hellenistic inscriptions, and only occasionally as Macedonians. The evidence for Macedonian identity in Thessalonike is the most consistent, which is not surprising considering its importance to Antigonus and its proximity to Lower Macedonia.\textsuperscript{77} The evidence for Kassandreia, on the other hand, would be entirely non-existent but for the Kos Asylia decree and military conscription decree from that city, both of which prove that the city was included in the Macedonian

\textsuperscript{75} On the founding of Amphipolis, see Plut. \textit{Perik.} 11.5, Thuc. 4.102, Diod. 12.32.3. The sequence of events is unclear, but Alexander raised a squadron of cavalry from Amphipolis (Arr. \textit{An.} 1.12) and one of these was honored in the games at Tyre (\textit{SEG} 48.716) while another was made captain of the garrison at Babylon (Arr. \textit{An.} 3.16.4). On the other hand, see the example of Erygios and Laomedon (Diod. 17.57.3, Arr. \textit{Ind.} 18.4), Mytileneans whose good service earned them Macedonian citizenship and two of the Macedonian allotments in Amphipolis. See Hammond (1998: 404-25) for the settlement and recruitment of Macedonian cavalrymen in the regions of eastern Macedonia, particularly in and around Amphipolis.

\textsuperscript{76} See Walbank \textit{CAH VII} 1.227-8 on the Kos Asylia Decrees, to be discussed further in chapter 4. See also Alexander (1970: 127-46).

\textsuperscript{77} On Thessalonike, see Tarn (1913: 186, n.62), though several examples of Thessalonikeans have been added since then. One of the earliest attestations of a Thessalonikean citizen is \textit{IG X} \textsuperscript{II} 1.1032, which likely dates to the reign of Antigonus II, and makes no mention of Macedonian identity. By the reign of Antigonus III, the famous epigraphic dossier of Admetos from Delos (\textit{IG XI} \textsuperscript{II} 665 and \textit{IG X} \textsuperscript{II} 1053) describes the man in question as a Macedonian, and one of the citizens of Thessalonike, implying that some, and perhaps all, of the Thessalonikean citizen body were considered Macedonians. From then on, through the first century BC, the overwhelming majority of attested Thessalonikeans were styled “Macedonian, from Thessalonike”: \textit{SEG} 3:364, \textit{IG VII} 2482, \textit{IvO} 325, and \textit{FD III} 1.577.
nation, for political and military purposes, by late in the reign of Antigonus II. The process in Kassandreia may have taken place slowly over decades, since it was an independent city when Antigonus became king of Macedonia. The evidence from Amphipolis lies in the middle: a number of Macedonians from Amphipolis are known, but more simple Amphipolitans. Yet by the late third century the Amphipolitans were recruited into the phalanx, just as the Kassandreians. The limited source record will not permit a conclusion more specific than this: the large Greek cities of the Macedonian littoral possessed only a limited Macedonian identity when Antigonus II became king.

He and his descendants made it their policy, for political and military reasons, to include those citizen bodies in the larger Macedonian nation, with eventual success.

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78 Of thirty-five Kassandreians attested in inscriptions by their ethnics in the Hellenistic period, none are styled as Macedonians in the text. Only Asylia 25 (= Meletenata 22, Epig. App. 47, approximately 243 BC) provides clear evidence that the Kassandreians could be considered, or could consider themselves, Macedonian.

79 In fact Kassandreia had been independent several times, and generally severed from Lower Macedonia, since the bifurcation of Macedonia between Pyrrhus and Lysimachus in 287. After Antigonus became king, he was forced to lay siege to Kassandreia, which was ruled by the tyrant Apollodorus (Polyain. 4.6.18). This Apollodorus had strengthened the position of Kassandreia by settling the city’s garrison, likely to have been mercenaries formerly under Lysimachus’ command, in Pallene and making them citizens of the city (Polyain. 6.7.2). Kassandreia was probably in Antigonus’ possession by the end of 274 BC at the latest.

80 Macedonians from Amphipolis: FD III 4.391, IG IV 1.97, IG IX,1 3:639, and from Asia: I.Eph. 1429 and 1434, and probably I.Iasos 60, a “Macedonian from Amphipolis.” The vast majority, however, are simply identified as Amphipolitans: IG II 421, 8076-87, IG IX,1 1.17, IG XI 1349, ID 2598, SEG 32.290, 43.549, 49.520, SGDI II 2588. An inscription at Kolophon distinguishes an Amphipolitan from two Macedonians: SEG 19.698, cf. AJP 1935, pp. 359-72. See lines 139 and 149 for the Macedonians, and 143 for Stephanos of Amphipolis. Other Amphipolitans known from Asia: SEG 23.616, IK 3.34, and from Egypt: BGU 14.2397.31, P.Petr.2 3.3, 17.20, 47.28, and 74.1.

81 See the conscription regulations, SEG 49: 722 and 855, from Kassandreia and Amphipolis, respectively. These regulations, discussed at greater length in chapter 4, governed conscription for service in all Macedonian components of the kingdom’s army.

82 Consider, even, that Antigonus’ grandfather and the Macedonians in his army had demanded the destruction of Kassandreia, as the city empowered the Olynthians and Chalcidian Greeks, bitterest enemies of the Macedonians, who populated the city (Diod. 19.61.2).
2.2.2. Asia Minor

Seleucus I, after defeating and killing Lysimachus at Kyroupedion in 281 BC, ruled Asia Minor for about seven months before Ptolemy Keraunos assassinated him (Justin 17.2.4-5). His son Antiochus I took his place and strove to solidify Seleucid authority in what he considered a rightfully inherited, spear-won kingdom. In fact, Asia Minor featured numerous powerful city-states, wealthy and nominally independent dynastai with petty kingdoms of their own, and several small kingdoms, two of which, Bithynia and Pontus, had to that point avoided submission to Macedonian kings. The arrival of the Galatians several years later only complicated matters in Asia Minor. For much of the third century the Seleucids found themselves fighting for control in Asia Minor: with local dynastai, kings, tribes, and cities, and with the Ptolemies. The activities of the Seleucids in Asia Minor, and to some extent those of their chief competitors, the Attalids from Pergamon and the Ptolemies, can be best analyzed by examining their interactions with the established Greek cities of the western coast on the one hand, and their military settlements and re-foundations on the other.

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2.2.2.1. Interactions with Established Poleis

The interactions of the kings with the Greek cities of Asia Minor followed patterns of negotiation between privilege and domination, as kings sought to balance benefits bestowed and received. On royal recognition of *eleutheria*, *autonomia*, *demokratia*, *aphrouria*, *aphorologesia* and the like much has been written.84 The present study concerns military institutions, and so is primarily concerned with the military benefits gained from the kings’ relations with the cities. The general treatment of the cities was softened by the multi-polar competition for access to their ports and markets, or the desire to keep warships in their harbors or garrisons in their citadels. For those strategic rights, the kings sacrificed, in general, a great deal. There is very little evidence that the Ptolemies or Seleucids could ever conscript forces from the citizens of the cities, or even expect significant troops from allies in times of war.85 And this was not because the cities were not militarized. Epigraphic evidence proves that they were, and also organized for contribution to city defense or for efficient conscription.86 Even under those conditions,

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85 For example, in the descriptions of the Seleucid armies in the Fourth Syrian War (Polyb. 5.79) and Roman War (Livy 37.37) there is no mention of Greek allied troops. Capdetrey (2007: 204) can only state that it “n’est pas impossible que, dans certains circonstances, l’alliance du roi séleucide ait formé une sorte du réseau régionale de cités engagées à défendre les intérêts de la dynastie.”
86 I.Smyrna 613a-c, dated third century, specifying three of the avenues and defense districts. CIG 3064, from Teos, provides evidence of similar arrangements there. The polis was organized internally by πύργος, or tower, rather than by mythological tribes or other methods. In several significant Ionian towns, Ephesus, Samos, and Kos at least (Syll. 1853, IG XIIb 1.53, 148), the subdivision of the tribes was the χιλιαστός,
the kings benefited from the cities by coercing them to enroll new citizens, dispatching colonists to royal foundations, and enrolling citizens as mercenaries.

There are only a few sources that could be taken as indications that the Hellenistic kings either conscripted soldiers or received allied contingents from the Greek cities. Between 279 and 261 BC, Antiochus I made a treaty of alliance, *symmachia*, with Lysimacheia, the former capital of Lysimachus, which was located on the Thracian coast of the Hellespont. But this alliance was asymmetrical in terms of military obligations. Antiochus swore to the Lysimacheians not only to honor the city’s full set of privileges, but to bring military aid in a time of war. The Lysimacheian oath only committed them to maintain their alliance, but included no provision to offer military aid. This is the only known alliance treaty between the Seleucid kings and a single city. The interactions between the king and the Ionian League in the 260’s give even less indication of *symmachia*, though in the context of Galatian raids and war with perhaps intended to represent one-thousandth of the town, which also could serve effectively as a basis for citizen recruitment. For the military activities of the towns, see Chaniotis (2005: 18-42).

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89 45.29-32: καὶ ἐὰν τις πολεμῇ αὐτῶι συμμαχήσω καὶ ὅσο ἐγκαταλείψω τὴν συμμαχίαν ἦν [π]ρὸς βασιλέα Ἀντίοχον. The word συμμαχήσω could be taken to mean that the Lysimacheians should send troops or materiel, but that is by no means clear, and it certainly was not specified in the text. The purpose of the alliance, from the perspective of Antiochus, was to put some pressure on Antigonus in Macedonia by supporting one of the largest cities in southern Thrace.
Ptolemy, those Ionians who sided with Seleucus seem to have paid what was basically a tax to fund Seleucid operations against the Galatian threat, and may also have been more accepting of garrisons. The Ptolemaic evidence indicates that treaties of symmachia were used to bypass the “un-taxed” privilege and receive tribute toward defense funds in place of actual military service.

The best evidence for military collaboration between the Greek cities of Asia Minor and the Hellenistic rulers is actually from dynastic-era Pergamon. A text from Kyme, dated about 278 BC, contains a request sent to Philetaerus, the semi-independent ruler of Pergamon and founder of the Attalid dynasty, as well as Philetaerus’ reply and a conclusion from Kyme. The Kymaians requested from Philetaerus six hundred peltai for use by the citizens of the city, fifty for each of the twelve tribes, to enhance their capacity to defend themselves during an on-going crisis, which must refer to the war between Antigonus and Antiochus, as it is too early for the arrival of the Galatians in Asia Minor. Philetaerus’ response notes that the arms factory (ergasterion) at Pergamon

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91 See OGIS 222 and 223 for Seleucid interactions with the Ionian League, and with Erythrai in particular, respectively. OGIS 222 contains a request for Antiochus’ endorsement of the League cities’ privileges of eleutheria, demokratia and autonomia, but makes no mention of freedom from either garrisons or taxation. That this was not an accident of the decree is indicated by the text of OGIS 223, wherein the Erythraians submit to pay the Galatian tax and accept a garrison.

92 See I.Lasos 3, from about 304 BC for that city’s payments into a defense fund pursuant to the city’s symmachia (line 3) with Ptolemy and his agents. Lines 4-9: διελέγωντο δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ συντάξεως ἵνα τὴν [κ]αλός ἐχούσιν εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας συντελούσιν, τὸν δὲ λιμένα καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν προσδόδου ύμᾶς κυρίους εἶναι ὑπὲρ μὲν ὄν τοῦ λιμήνος συνκεχωρήκαμεν αὐτοῖς, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς συντάξεως εἰδόκει μοι ἀνενέχας εἰς τὸν [βασιλέα].


94 Gauthier BE 2001: 373 suggested re-dating the inscription closer to 270 to fit the Galatian context.
was out of commission, but had produced one thousand *peltai*, which we may assume
were stored shields, not those in active use by Pergamene or garrison troops. He
provided six hundred as requested. This gift is significant because of the type of shields,
and the Kymaians’ treatment of them. The shields bestowed by Philetairos were
ἐπιχάλκοι, “bronze-faced,” indicating that they were the shields of Macedonian
infantry.\textsuperscript{95} Two partial bronze *peltai* covers produced in the Pergamon *ergasterion* are
known.\textsuperscript{96} At line 22 in the text, part of the Kyme’s response to Philetaerus’ gift, the city
called for selected citizens to be equipped and trained to wield the *sarissa*, confirming
that the shields were phalangite shields.\textsuperscript{97} The city also imprinted upon each shield an
inscription: the tribe to which it was assigned, and the name of Philetaerus.\textsuperscript{98} This is the
only Hellenistic confirmation for phalangite units fielded by the Greek cities of Asia
Minor. Trained in phalangite warfare and carrying Philetaerus’ name upon their shields,
these men may have served in his army under certain conditions, but the text says
nothing of it.

The most obvious and frequent way that the armies of the kings benefited from
the Greek cities was through the enrollment of mercenaries. A list of mercenaries from

\textsuperscript{95} *Peltai* generally just meant shields smaller than Greek aspides, but bronzed *peltai* were the standard
shields of the Macedonian phalanx. For this distinction, see Launey (1949: 354) and Anderson (1976: 1-6).

\textsuperscript{96} Peltz (2001: 331-43). Additionally, a later inscription (*OGIS* 338, from 133 BC) attests the presence at
Pergamon of a Macedonian military population (line 14).

\textsuperscript{97} The word used at line 22 is *ψαρισσαμένω*, a *hapax legomenon*, unless the *Psi*
replaced the standard *Sigma* in
*sarissa*, the Macedonian pike. The men were, therefore, trained in wielding the *sarissa*.

\textsuperscript{98} See lines 30-1. This is particularly interesting in that Philetairos was at that point still a private man, or at
least no more than a local *dynastes*, and was in theory still loyal to Antiochus I.
Tralleis, a city controlled by the Seleucids for much of the third century, includes men from twelve cities of Asia Minor or the nearby islands, including seven prominent Greek cities. Many of these mercenaries would have been deployed into the garrisons of the cities. This body of men is likely well-represented among the many gifts of dual citizenship recorded in the cities. This activity seems to have developed out of the earlier and more common practice of awarding citizenship and other honors as part of proxeny and other decrees for men who had performed services on behalf of the city while in the service of one of the kings. These grants of dual citizenship to prominent members of the king’s court eventually led to grants of dual citizenship to mercenary soldiers and others associated with the kingdom’s military presence in a city. From Miletus in particular a large number of these grants have survived. The addition of mercenaries

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99 I.Trall. 33 = CIG 2919. Men are attested from Kyzikos, Mylasa, Aspendos, Pitane, Kalymna, Lymira, Kolophon, Kos, Theangela, Herakleia, Magnesia, and Miletos; there are men attested by region from Thessaly, Chalcis, and Aetolia in Greece, Pisidia in Anatolia, and the cities of Corinth in Greece, Kydonia in Crete, Thera, Perinthos and Lysimacheia in Greek Thrace, and Antioch, presumably the one in Syria.

100 See CAH VII.308-11 for the changing perspectives on and approaches to citizenship in the Hellenistic period. For examples of these honorary decrees see: I.Eph. 1405, 1419, 1427, 1431-3, 1444, 2009; Clara Rhodos 9.183. Even the Macedonian dynast Eupolemos, who operated in Caria, was awarded citizenship by Iasos, I.Iasos 32, in the late fourth century. I.Ilion 3, an award of citizenship at Ilion bestowed on an Amphipolitan doctor who healed the wounded king Antiochus after a battle around 275-268 BC.

101 See von Gaertringen (1932: 1602-3) and Gunther (1988: 383-419) on the subject of such decrees.

102 I.Milet. 1.3.40-45, 50-53, 63-7, 70-2, 79-89. The men awarded citizenship included Phoenicians, Syrians, Macedonians, and assorted Greeks from both Asia Minor and Greece. Of course, the most famous citizens added to the rolls in Miletos the many Cretans enrolled in 228/7 BC, see SEG 1.435 and 13.498. The addition of new citizens was fairly common in the Hellenistic era, see previous note, but the addition of individuals or small families from around the Hellenistic world is likely indicative of involvement with the armies of the kings.
to citizen rolls is attested in several early Hellenistic inscriptions, demonstrating the intervention of kings (or prominent generals) in polis affairs to add the new citizens.\textsuperscript{103}

The final way that the royal armies and military institutions benefited from the Seleucid’s relations with the cities of Greek Asia Minor was demographic support for military settlements further east. While the cities themselves were not subject to conscription, most or all of the foundations in the East were. Mercenaries in the royal army may have been settled in the cities at the conclusion of their service, though there is only limited evidence for this.\textsuperscript{104} The cities could also contribute colonists to the Seleucid foundations, as is attested in the foundation of Antiocheia-in-Persis, which involved colonists from Magnesia-on-the-Maeander.\textsuperscript{105} In the text (OGIS 233), it is clear that Antiochus I had requested colonists from the Greek cities, and the Magnesians happened to be a city that complied, though it is certainly possible that many did.\textsuperscript{106} Magnesian colonists also contributed the majority of the settlers at Antioch near Pisidia,
which may also have been founded about this time.\textsuperscript{107} Thus the cities were useful for the military institutions of the kings for their fortifications and harbors, for the recruitment of mercenaries, and occasionally for the acquisition of colonists for military foundations. For the purposes of recruitment, then, it is necessary to turn to those royal foundations, both in Asia Minor and further east.

\textbf{2.2.2.2. Military Foundations in Asia Minor}

The Seleucids gained Asia Minor from Lysimachus who gained it from Antigonus, and both prior lords of the region had invested in new settlements in the region. The Seleucids inherited this practice with the land. There is a large and growing body of scholarship on the settlements of the Seleucids in Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{108} These settlements are divided into city foundations (nearly all were re-foundations of existing cities) and communities that are often referred to as κατοικίαι. A fundamental aspect of this scholarship is a controversy over the military role of these settlements, at heart of which is the question whether either type of settlement carried military obligations.\textsuperscript{109} It apparent now that many of the settlements that have been identified in the past as

\begin{footnotes}
\item[107] Strab.12.8.14.
\item[108] For a synthesis of recent work and overview of the whole with comprehensive bibliography, see Cohen (1995). For the parameters of a discussion of colonies and κατοικίαι as opposed to existing cities, and updated bibliography, see Savalli-Lestrade (2005: 9-35).
\end{footnotes}
Seleucid military settlements likely were not, and that there is a lack of good evidence for the military role of those Seleucid settlements that can be confirmed. There are several broadly-accepted ways to identify military settlements, from epigraphic evidence of actual soldiers to confirming the presence of plausibly military populations, like Macedonians. The following analysis shows the weakness in these evaluations, and offers an alternative interpretation for Seleucid recruitment in Asia Minor.

The word κατοικία did not appear in inscriptions from small towns in Lydia and Phrygia until the Roman era. There is little evidence, as with the Greek poleis, to indicate any connection between residence in these lesser settlements and an obligation for military service. To compensate for this, scholars have sought evidence for Macedonian populations, in inscriptions, or in a town’s coinage. This method has worked well with early evidence, providing convincing evidence for the existence of ten military colonies in Lydia, making eleven total from Lydia.¹¹⁰ It is more problematic with evidence later in date. It apparently became fashionable to assert Macedonian heritage in Asia Minor in the second and third centuries of the modern era. This was popular for whole

¹¹⁰ Thyateira is the best attested, see Cohen (1995: 238-42), see TAM V2 910 and 1166, the first of which (= OGIS 213) dates the foundation of Thyateira to the months between Seleucus’ victory at Kyroupedion and his assassination at the hands of Ptolemy Keraunos. The others are Akrasos, Amphissa, Dechtheira, Doidye, Kobedyle, Ladnissa, Hyrkanis/Agatheira, and –espoua known from inscriptions (OGIS 290 and 314, BCH 25: 234-5, TAM VI 221, and TAM V2 1188, 1190, and 1307), and Apollonis and Philadelphae from second-century coins with Macedonian shields (SNG München 32 and SNG Cop. 343) and inscriptions with Macedonian names. The eleventh is Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos, confirmed as a military colony in the treaty between the colonists and nearby Smyrna, OGIS 229.
settlements and for families. The latter is illustrated well enough in the popularity of the names Makedon and Makedonikos in that period.\textsuperscript{111}

The proliferation of such names should encourage anyone to approach any town’s claims of Macedonian descent with a level of skepticism. Several authors have seen in imperial-era coinage of Selge in Pisidia evidence that Macedonians had been colonized in that place.\textsuperscript{112} Several corrections can be made to this observation. A common series of coinage from the third century BC featured an apotropaic Medusa on the obverse and various types of helmeted Athena on the reverse. These are at least indicative of a militarized population, but in Pisidia that should not hardly be surprising. The symbols are in no respect indicative of a Macedonian presence in particular. The coinage used to “prove” Macedonian settlement dates centuries later, when the Selgeans minted coins with the typical Macedonian-style shield.\textsuperscript{113} However, that series was neither the only nor the first Selgean series to prominently depict shields. The most common coins of Selge from the Hellenistic period also featured a shield. The shield, however, was a hoplite shield (the \textit{aspis}) rather than a Macedonian one, with the \textit{episema} (blazon) Pi-Omicron. The Macedonian symbology was an innovation hundreds

\textsuperscript{111} A search of the Packhum Epigraphic database, <epigraphy.packhum.org/inscriptions/main> provides evidence for well over one hundred men (and a few women) with variants of the name Makedon or Makedonikos, all of them from the Roman Imperial period, see also the database of Greek names in the Oxford Lexicon of Greek Personal Names (LPGN), accessible at <www.lgpn.ox.ac.uk/database/lgpn.php>. 
\textsuperscript{113} The type is represented by \textit{SNG Paris} 2030, \textit{SNG von Aulock} 5323, and \textit{Righetti} 5.833.
of years later, reflective perhaps of ancient military service in Hellenistic armies, but no proof of Macedonian colonization.

The other way to approach Seleucid settlement in Asia Minor is to start with the limited records of settlements. Antigonus and Lysimachus established some of the earliest military settlements in Asia Minor, but at least by the time of Seleucus I several of these settlements are better-attested, and established by him. Soldiers, both Macedonians and mercenaries, were settled in towns with both civic and military administrative structures, and which could develop two qualities over time: the status of a polis, and Macedonian identity, for those who did not at first possess it. Stratonikeia, for example, was probably founded by Antiochus I, but certainly existed in the reign of Antiochus II, when it had adopted the worship of Zeus Seleukeios, and like Thyateira showed some evidence of Macedonian settlement. Stratonikeia was said by Strabo to have been a Macedonian colony. Inscribed markers from Stratonikeia attest the division of the city into military precincts, though the primary purpose of the division was to assigned sections of wall to different neighborhoods. The inclusion of a specified symbol for the precinct, which only really makes sense if the men carried

115 (Cohen 1995: 232-7)
116 Strabo 14.2.25 says it was a κατοικία Μακεδόνων and that it’s people ὄντες τοῦ Καρικοῦ γένους, though the settlement was situated in the heart of Caria.
117 I.Stratonikeia 1003-4. The city was divided into sectors, each called a pyrgos. We know that the second pyrgos (1004) was named for Herakles, and had the symbol (ἐπίσημον) of the rhopalon, the club of Herakles. Another pyrgos had the epimenon of Herakles himself (1003), unless that marker belongs to another subsection of the second pyrgos. The mention of an epimenon is indicative of a military role, since the word is most-often used for the blazons in the central field of a shield.
shields with that symbol (e.g., Herakles’ club, or Herakles himself), is an additional evidence for the military structures within the settler town. However, while Stratonikeia may have contained some Macedonians and included military administrative structures, onomastic evidence from the town indicates that it retained a largely Carian population.118 This should not be surprising, considering the appropriation of Macedonian identity for phalanx soldiers in the Hellenistic era, as shown in the previous chapter. The population could have been predominantly Carian, and yet still asserted a Macedonian identity.

Perhaps the best way to demonstrate potential or partial conversion into Macedonian identity is through the evidence for the Carian cities of Mylasa and Caria, which in the late fourth century took on aspects of Macedonian identity, but in the absence of heavy royal patronage for the project, abandoned it. Late fourth and early third century coin issues from both cities depicted a Macedonian shield with the traditional Carian bipennine axe (associated with Zeus Labraundos) in the central field of the shield.119 The symbolism weds Macedonian identity: the phalangite shield, with local Carian culture: the bipennine axe. And in comparison to Stratonikeia, Kaunos

118 I.Stratonikeia 1002, from the second quarter of the third century, includes the names of about a dozen men of Stratonikeia with patronymics. All of the patronymics are particularly Carian, but several of the names are common Greek names: Leonides, Menekrates, Diogenes.

119 See Ashton (2004: 33-46) for a review of the relevant bibliography and evidence that the bipennine axe, and less often a trident, also associated with local, Hurrian-descended cults of Zeus, appeared on Macedonian style shields in coinage minted under Asander, Eupolemos, and Demetrius I Poliorcetes. For evidence of military settlement at Kaunos and Mylasa, see Cohen (1995: 50-2, 256-64). It is tempting to connect the bipennine axes and tridents of these cities with the structure of defensive districts and episema at Stratonikeia.
possessed several strongpoints in the city defenses, and one of these precincts was called the Herakleion.\textsuperscript{120} Finally, a word of caution on the use of martial symbols in coinage as indications of military identity. Stratonikeia’s well-attested second-century coinage featured military equipment in most issues, but Anatolian daggers with Celtic influences, cavalry helmets, and cavalry sabers rather than a Macedonian shield.\textsuperscript{121} Thyateira’s coinage featured the bipennine axe of the Hurrian-descended southern Anatolians in almost all known issues.\textsuperscript{122} The interpretation of the evidence most fitting with the sources is that Macedonians and other veterans were at times settled, either in their own military colonies, or in Hellenizing cities (like Kaunos) or royal foundations (like Stratonikeia). The non-Greek populations of Caria, Lycia, Pisidia, and elsewhere were liable for military service,\textsuperscript{123} and for many there was little reason not to adapt some elements of Macedonian identity.

2.2.3. Syria and the East

Seleucid military institutions are something of a mystery, miserably attested by comparison to those in Macedonia, or in Egypt in particular. In the general absence of

\textsuperscript{120} Diod. 20.27.2.
\textsuperscript{121} See von Aulock (1967: 8-16) and Meadows (2002: 82-86). For the Galatian dagger, see BMC 12 and 149. The Galatian influence is in the three-lobed (trilobite) pommel and single-angle, pointed blade. For the cavalry k\textit{opis} blade see Meadows (2002: 85, fig. 21), and for the cavalryman’s helmet, see Meadows (2002: 83, fig. 20).
\textsuperscript{122} See BMC 292.6, 293.9, SNG Cop. 570-1.
\textsuperscript{123} Bar-Kochva (1976: 48-51) and Launey (1949: 471-6).
evidence, much has been left to speculation. The settlement activity of the Seleucids, in Syria and Mesopotamia in particular, but throughout their trans-Taurus empire, reflected a style of rule that was both personal and Macedonian. The kings founded, in the first half of the third century, numerous colonies and cities, some with dynastic names, others with names that reflected Macedonia itself, as if they sought to create in northern Syria a new Macedonia. The settlements in Syria, as in Asia Minor, built upon prior settlements established by Alexander or the Antigonids, including at least four colonies that claimed to have a Macedonian population.\textsuperscript{124} As with Asia Minor, much has been written on the Seleucid foundations of trans-Taurus Asia.\textsuperscript{125} The purpose of what follows is to sketch the institutions that fed Seleucid manpower and mobilizations. The nature of the problem is this: Seleucus marched to Ipsus in 301 BC with no more than twelve thousand infantry.\textsuperscript{126} In 217 BC, his descendant Antiochus III marched to Raphia with over thirty thousand phalanx infantry, and fifty thousand total infantry,

\textsuperscript{124} Antigoneia (Strabo 16.2.4), Pella (Strabo 16.2.10), Bottia (Malalas 199-202), and Karrhai (Diod. 19.91.1).
\textsuperscript{125} The most recent and important works are Capdretrey (2007: 51-84) and Cohen (2006: 21-31, 71-197). See Capdretrey 63-5 for the particularly Macedonian nature of Seleucid settlement, thought to have reflected in part the makeup of the settlers but more importantly to have been a projection of royal ideology. See Sartre (2001: 111-52) for a detailed discussion of the foundations, Aperghis (2004: 89-99) for the economic underpinnings of the settlement agenda, Sherwin-White and Kurht (1994), 14-21 for foundations in Syria and Mesopotamia, and 161-79 on colonies and Seleucid colonial policy; Balty (2003: 211-21) on the pre-Seleucid settlements, and Seyrig (1970: 298-307) for the influence of Antigonid settlement patterns and perhaps Antigonid partisans in the eventual pattern of settlement under the Seleucids; Tarn and Griffith (1952: 148-50) on the military aspect of the colonization program, and again Griffith (1935: 148-52), and for the place of the cities within the Seleucid empire and administration, see Tscherikower (1927: 51-64), and for the distinctions between the cities and the colonies, see Tscherikower (112-37).
\textsuperscript{126} Diod. 20.113.4.
recruited from territories very similar to those of Seleucus I in 301 BC. So the purpose of the following study of Syria and the East under Seleucid control is to explain how the Seleucids more than quadrupled their infantry force, and organized what was for a time the largest (theoretically Macedonian) phalanx in the Hellenistic world.

Seleucid settling activity was centered on northern Syria, and particularly in the region termed the Seleukis, which included the four major dynastic poleis Antioch, Seleucia, Apamea, and Laodicea, and perhaps as well the outlying regions of Kyrrh sustike, Kommagene, and Chalkidike. The four poleis were built by Seleucus I around 299 BC, but were built over a generation or more. They had Greco-Macedonian institutions, but were also dominated by powerful magistrates, comparable to the Antigonid epistates, who were in all likelihood Friends of the king. Moving further east, numerous colonies are known, most with Macedonian or dynastic place-names, out

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127 Polyb. 5.79. In fact the auxiliary troops included five thousand pantodapoi phalangites, so the total phalanx was closer to thirty-five thousand men. It would have been even higher had full the six thousand phalangites from the Kyrrh sustike been included in the total (Polyb. 5.50.7-8). The total settler phalanx from Syria and Mesopotamia, including the Kyrrh sustai, may have numbered about twenty-four thousand men. This total does not include soldiers from Asia Minor.

128 The largest Antigonid phalanx was that at Pydna in 168 BC, twenty-five thousand Macedonians in the phalanx and agema. The largest Ptolemaic phalanx was technically that at Raphia in 217 BC, with as many as thirty thousand men in the phalanx and agema, but it required extraordinary efforts on the Ptolemaic side, described in chapter 5.

129 On the so-called Seleucis, see Musti (1966: 61-81). On the cities of this region, see Strabo 16.2.4-12.

130 For example, Strabo says (16.2.4) the completion of the initial construction of Antioch only came in the reign Seleucus II Kallinikos (246-228/7 BC). As the largest city, it may have been developed for longer than the others, and in fact Strabo in the same place says that additional quarters were added to the city in the second century.

to the Tigris near Babylon.\textsuperscript{132} There Seleucus I built an eastern capital for his Hellenistic kingdom. Seleucus founded Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris in about 290 BC with colonists from Babylon, namely the Greco-Macedonian and Hellenized Asiatic soldiers who had been settled in Babylon since 331 BC.\textsuperscript{133}

Seleucid settlement across the Tigris included foundations in Assyria near Seleukeia.\textsuperscript{134} Further north, where the Tigris emptied into Mesopotamia, the region of Adiabene was renamed Mygdonia, a reference to the hill-country east of Lower Macedonia, and the kings founded or re-founded several towns within it.\textsuperscript{135} Further east, into the foothills toward the Zagros range and southwards toward Susiane, the region known as the Sittakene or Apolloniatis were also settled with Greco-Macedonian or otherwise Hellenizing populations.\textsuperscript{136} Settlers were likely installed at Seleukeia near the Eulaios (ancient Susa), or at least retained, since it had been settled and garrisoned with

\textsuperscript{132} App. Syr. 57 gives the names for 15-17 lesser settlements of Syria.
\textsuperscript{133} Pausanias (1.16.3) said that Seleucia was populated with the colonists from Babylon, which was assumed to have meant Babylonians, until the publication of BCHP 5, which indicated (recto, lines 6-9) that the Greco-Macedonian colonists settled at Babylon by Alexander were transferred to Seleucia by Antiochus son of Seleucus. See Curt. 5.1.43 and Diod. 17.65.5 for Alexander’s settlement, which initially included about 1,000 men, but those transferred to Seleucia forty years later would likely have been mainly their descendants, whose numbers may have been augmented with Hellenized Asiatics or other settlers over time. See also App. Syr. 58 for the foundation of Seleucia, and Capdetrey (2007: 52-7) on the Seleucids interactions with native Mesopotamians and emulation of Macedonian kingship during the foundation of Seleucia.
\textsuperscript{134} Pliny, NH 6.117.
\textsuperscript{135} The main city was Antiocheia-in-Mygdonia, a significant settlement, discussed at Pliny 6.42, Polyb. 5.51, and Plut. Luc. 32.4.
\textsuperscript{136} Strabo 11.13.6, Pliny, NH 6.132. The chief city of the region was apparently Apollonia, probably equivalent to ancient Sittake, mentioned as a military settlement by Polybius at 5.43.7 and App. Syr. 57.
Greek and Macedonian troops by Alexander.\textsuperscript{137} Further north, there were four Greco-Macedonian towns in the region of Media Rhagai.\textsuperscript{138} The most significant settlements in Media, however, were those for the cavalry, essential to Seleucid armies, and attested in several Parthian-era documents.\textsuperscript{139} Settlement was less common further east, and the troops of those regions were local contingents far more often than settlers.

In spite of the pervasive Macedonian or dynastic names for the cities, there is good reason to believe that some of the cities had little or no Greco-Macedonian population.\textsuperscript{140} Various non-Macedonian, and even non-Greek, populations were settled into the royal cities and the military colonies of Syria and Mesopotamia, enjoyed most or all of the privileges and responsibilities of citizens, and contributed to the development of local identities as Antiochians, Apameans, Kyrrhestaians, and so on.\textsuperscript{141} After all, the study of Macedonian manpower in the previous chapter demonstrated the dearth of

\textsuperscript{137} Curt. 5.2.16. Hellenistic-era inscriptions from Seleukeia/Susa attest the presence of military men, and possibly military settlers, \textit{IKEO} 183, 190, 192.
\textsuperscript{138} Strabo 11.13.6: Rhagai-Europos, Laodikeia, Apamea, and Herakleia. The original settlements in Rhagai were apparently the work of Antigonus, who after defeating Eumenes settled a large number of men and installed a permanent garrison force of 3,500 men, see Diod. 19.44.4-5, 46.5.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{IKEO} 454-5=\textit{JHS} 35 (1915: 22-65).
\textsuperscript{140} The population of the great city Laodikeia is never mentioned in any source. When small settlements of Macedonians merited attention, it is difficult to shrug off the sense that the city was populated mainly with local Syrians and Phoenicians, and perhaps a number of Seleucid military veterans. The only evidence is the presence of \textit{pelignes} in the city government (\textit{IGLS} 1261), an institution common to Upper Macedonia (Strabo 7.12). Similarly, Antioch’s original population included those living at the village Bottia (Malalas 199), which clearly possessed a name referencing a region of Macedonia, but the local population is not described or mentioned as significant.
\textsuperscript{141} Seleucus relied heavily upon native Babylonian manpower early in his rule (Diod. 19.91.3). The settler population at the capital, Antioch, included Cypriots (Malalas 202) and Kurds (Strabo 12.2.5). See Jos. \textit{AJ} 12.119 for Jewish soldiers, perhaps from Babylonia, enrolled in the early Seleucid army and awarded a status probably comparable to \textit{isopoliteia} in Greece, or perhaps \textit{Persai} in Egypt, in the cities and colonies.
available Macedonians. The settlements of the Seleucids may have had core populations of Greek and Macedonians, used Greek and Macedonian political institutions, and held to Greek and Macedonian customs, but the populations of the cities necessarily must have been composed primarily of Hellenizing Asiatics.\textsuperscript{142}

The question remains whether the Seleucids recruited and mobilized their army via conscription from the cities and regions under their rule, in a manner similar to the Antigonids in Macedonia, or drew upon military settlers for their army, in a manner comparable to Macedonian cavalry or most of the Ptolemaic army. Scattered pieces of information illustrate aspects of Seleucid recruitment, and contribute to offering a hypothesis for Seleucid military institutions.

First, several sources give indications of the presence of military customs, and possibly conscription, in the major city foundations. Polybius offered the figure of approximately eight hundred for the \textit{ephebes} of Antioch in the second century (30.25.12), which implies a military age citizen body about 16-20,000 men. Antioch was divided into \textit{plintheia}, city blocks, which in Hellenistic foundations in Asia Minor were used to facilitate military mobilization.\textsuperscript{143} These divisions may have served a similar purpose in...

\textsuperscript{142} If Seleucus had an army of a little over twenty thousand infantry and cavalry at Ipsos, most of those men must have been Asiatic. He may have acquired fifteen thousand surrendered phalangites and other soldiers from Antigonus’ army. Even if we imagine thirty-five thousand soldiers, all Greco-Macedonian (which they certainly were not), these would have been divided between several dozen settlements in his reign. Perhaps he could have averaged fifteen-hundred veteran soldiers per foundation. Yet his four royal cities were each 450-550 hectares, and would eventually support populations well over one hundred thousand.

\textsuperscript{143} On the \textit{plintheia}, see Feissel (1985: 95-103).
Antioch and other Seleucid foundations, which were built on very similar models.\textsuperscript{144} Pliny says that Seleucia-on-the-Tigris used the laws and customs of the Macedonians.\textsuperscript{145} Now, some institutions of the Macedonians were used in most of the settlements, but Pliny’s statement indicates a substantial adoption. If so, the adoption likely included Macedonian laws and customs regarding military service.\textsuperscript{146} At Antioch and Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, and potentially at Laodicea, Apamea, and Seleucia-in-Pieria as well, the evidence supports the presence of a militarized citizenry, significant borrowing from Macedonian culture, and the possibility of conscription from citizen rolls.

Second, several sources indicate the presence of military settlers, military settlements, and obligations of military service. The settlement of Larissa was a suburb of Apamea, was founded by Seleucus Nicator with Thessalian colonists, whom Diodorus reports constituted the greater part of his cavalry agema.\textsuperscript{147} Apamea had a number of suburban dependencies, of which Larissa was a more distant one, and all may have been, like Larissa, military colonies.\textsuperscript{148} The Thessalians who settled at Larissa

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\textsuperscript{144} See Perkins (1974) on city planning in the Seleucis. He considers (p.20) that the similarity in general planning extended beyond the four royal foundations to cities like Beroia, Dura Europos, and even Damascus.

\textsuperscript{145} NH 6.122.

\textsuperscript{146} The best example of this type of levy are the conscription regulations from late third century Macedonia, see SEG 49.722 and 855, on which see Hatzopoulos 2001: 91-8, 157.

\textsuperscript{147} Diod. 33.4a.1. Diodorus says that the Thessalians had been \textit{symmachoi} of Seleucus, but how they came into his service is unknown.

\textsuperscript{148} Strabo 16.2.10. The others were Apollonia, Kasiana, and Megara. The foundation of Apamea had subsumed the earlier settlements Pella and Chersonesos, which may have become neighborhoods of the city proper.
in Syria continued to serve in the *agema* of Seleucus I, and under the later Seleucids.\footnote{See line 11 of the text from Diodorus, their service was in the “first” *agema*. Sekunda (1994: 24) suggests that the Larissan cavalry were only enrolled in the *agema* after the loss of Media to the Parthians, but it is more likely they served in Seleucus’ *agema* much earlier, and may have served in the *hetairoi* at later points, and Diodorus has confused his terminology.}

This proves that at least some of the local settlers held a military obligation. Larissa was one of thirty known Seleucid settlements in Syria with Greco-Macedonian place names, and similar responsibilities may have been attendant on those. The sub-region of Syria known as Kyrrhestike contributed six thousand men for the Seleucid phalanx.\footnote{Polyb. 5.50.7.} This is the *only* evidence for contributions to the phalanx from specific cities or regions, but could be indicative of either settler soldiers who possessed land in return for service, or of the existence of conscription from the regions of Syria, as well as the cities. The Seleucid settlement at Dura-Europos was divided into *kleroi*, land allotments, which were grouped by eponyms, perhaps officers from the founding of the settlement, and the *kleroi* themselves seem to have been named, presumably for the original settler.\footnote{*P.Dura* 15. A much later text, *P.Dura* 12, contains a fragment of an older law regarding the *kleroi*, the *κληρονομία*, which specifies that allotments, in the absence of a suitable heir, would be returned to the crown. This system corresponds closely to the klerouchic system in Ptolemaic Egypt. The *kleroi* were grouped into *eikadi*, twenties, perhaps a reference to double-ranks in a phalanx, since the single rank was often called a *dekania*. On the settlement at Dura, see Downey (2000: 157-62).} If this system were followed in the cities of Kyrrhestike, or of other regions, many of which were closer in size to Dura-Europos than to Antioch, the Seleucids may have drawn much of their phalanx from military settlers.
Based on these pieces of evidence, it seems most plausible to consider that the Seleucids set customary levies from the sub-regions of Syria and Mesopotamia, as they did with the Kyrrhestai. The levies may have been filled within these regions according to two different methods. The first, which may have been followed at Larissa and Dura-Europos and other military settlements, would have involved compulsory service for military settlers on the basis of their possession of kleroi. The second, perhaps followed at the major dynastic foundations like Antioch and Seleukeia, would have involved conscripted quotas from the residential blocks of their well-organized cities. Depending on the extent to which the Seleucids incorporated Asiatics into citizenship in the cities and settlements, making them eligible for conscription, the Seleucid foundations should have been able, given a generation or so for the incorporation of new citizens, to field thirty thousand soldiers for the royal army with little difficulty.152

2.2.4. Ptolemaic Settlement in Egypt

The Ptolemies lacked a large Greco-Macedonian population already settled in cities, and so took an entirely different approach to military recruitment. The klerouchic system wedded military service and agricultural productivity, while minimizing the

152 It is telling that the pantodapoi of the Successor wars, Asians trained in Macedonian warfare and at least partially trained in the Greek language, disappeared by the time narrative histories pick up in the later third century. Considering the limited Greco-Macedonian manpower, it is far more likely the Seleucids incorporated pantodapoi into their citizen or military settler communities than that they simply dismissed them.
importance of cities or citizenship. The individual *klerouch*, so-called for the land allotment (*kleros*) that he received from the king, owed military service to the king as the condition of his tenancy on the land. The army was the total of men granted allotments in return for oaths of loyalty and commitments to military service, rather than a theoretical levy of citizens from scattered cities. The management of such a direct system advanced the development of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy in Egypt. A complex system of land management developed in the third century BC to accommodate the steady expansion of the Ptolemy’s *klerouchic* army. The following study demonstrates that the construction of a *klerouchic* army followed inconsistent patterns and lasted for decades, yet trended toward greater uniformity, consistency, and control.

### 2.2.4.1. The army of Ptolemaic Egypt, 323-270 BC

There are only a handful of scattered reports on the size of the Ptolemaic army in Hellenistic literary sources. For example, in 314 BC Ptolemy maintained a military force based in Cyprus and operating into southern Anatolia of about thirteen thousand men.\(^{153}\) In 306 BC, the main army of Cyprus, some garrison forces excluded, was still about thirteen thousand men.\(^{154}\) This implies a relatively stable military force in that region, but Cyprus was lost in 306 BC, with the entirety of its army, and not regained

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\(^{153}\) Diod. 19.62.3-4.

\(^{154}\) Diodorus (20.47.3) puts the Ptolemaic army of Cyprus at twelve thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry.

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until 294 BC.155 The field army of Egypt numbered twenty-two thousand men in 312 BC for the battle of Gaza, following what Diodorus described as a near-total mobilization.156 Ophellas, governor of Cyrene, commanded as many as ten thousand men in about 308 BC.157 While various troops were gained and lost in those years, these numbers suggest a Ptolemaic army, spread across its possessions, of perhaps forty-five thousand men.158 This army suffered heavy casualties in 306 BC on Cyprus and in the naval battle of Salamis. Historians’ estimates of captured Ptolemaic troops total between 12,800 and 16,600 men, with several thousand more killed.159 This, paired with the loss of Ophellas’ Cyrenaian army in 308/7 BC on his ill-fated expedition into Libya,160 meant the probable loss of half the Ptolemaic army in the span of two years.

From those dire straits Ptolemy I seems to have recovered his manpower and handed down to his son an army comparable to that under his command around 312 BC. The beginning of the shift was the windfall of deserters who came over to Ptolemy during Antigonus’ miserable invasion of Egypt.161 Even with those, Ptolemaic losses may help explain Ptolemy’s token reinforcements during the siege of Rhodes and his reluctance to venture further than the Phoenician coast during the coalition war against

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155 Plut. Dem. 35.5.
156 Diod. 19.80.3-4.
157 Diod. 41.1.
158 For example, see Diod. 20.27.3, where the army of Polemaios, nephew of Antigonus I, was enrolled into the Ptolemaic army, which might have meant an addition of five to eight thousand men.
159 See Diod. 20.47.3 for casualties in an earlier battle, but for men killed and captured in the naval battle of Salamis and the subsequent surrender of Cyprus, see Diod. 20.52.6 and 53.1, Plut. Dem. 16.4 and 17.5.
160 Diod. 20.42.
161 Diod. 20.76.7.
the Antigonids from 302-1 BC.\textsuperscript{162} Over the following decades the Ptolemaic army likely grew, but there is no solid evidence for its size, or even its activities, for Ptolemy I seems to have avoided major war for the remainder of his reign. The next evidence comes in the form of several statements on the size of the Ptolemaic army during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus. Theocritus’ \textit{Idylls} refer several times to Ptolemy’s army, though he does not give specific numbers. He remarked on the pervasive Macedonian dress worn by the heterogeneous mass of soldiers in Alexandria, on the general desirability of mercenary service in Ptolemy’s army, on Ptolemy’s successful conquest and recruitment from southern Asia Minor, and the overall quality of his army.\textsuperscript{163}

Two other sources provide numbers, though both have dubious credibility. In Callixenus’ description of the Grand Procession at the Ptolemaia, he reports that the army totaled 57,600 infantry and 23,200 cavalry.\textsuperscript{164} The cavalry are obviously too many, since the Ptolemies were only ever otherwise reported to have had four to five thousand cavalry at Gaza (312) and Raphia (217) respectively, which in both cases included

\textsuperscript{162} During the siege of Rhodes, Ptolemy eventually sent two thousand troops (Diod. 20.88.9 and 98.1) but far more in terms of materiel (20.96.1, 98.1). In 302, Ptolemy advanced with what Diodorus calls a considerable army, though he does not detail the size of the force, but only as far as Sidon (20.113.1-2).


\textsuperscript{164} Callixenus, \textit{FHG} 3, 2.385-6: Πεζοὶ μὲν ἐς πέντε μυριάδας καὶ ἐπτακοσιείδους καὶ ἕκασιούς, ἵππες δὲ διαμύριοι τρισχίλιοι διακόσιοι.
recently contracted mercenaries. The infantry numbers are somewhat more reasonable, though still perhaps a little large. If the numbers are to be taken as giving any indication of Ptolemaic manpower, one should at least elide δισμύριοι from the text in describing the number of cavalry, for an army totaling a little more than sixty thousand men. The other statement of manpower from the reign of Philadelphus is even less credible. Porphyry (\textit{FGrH} 280.42) claimed to have learned from court histories that the Ptolemaic army had “two hundred thousand infantry, twenty thousand cavalry, two thousand war chariots, and four hundred elephants.” These figures make those of Callixenus looks a little more attractive, but in general one must look with skepticism upon most sources for Ptolemaic manpower in the first half of the third century.

2.2.4.2. Early settlement patterns

There is only limited evidence for Ptolemaic military settlements down to about the 260’s BC, but from scattered sources it is possible to trace the patterns of early settlement. In the literary sources there are only two, maybe three pieces of evidence. Following the battle of Gaza in 312, Ptolemy I settled up to eight thousand prisoners of war in Egypt. At some point he took several thousand Judeans and settled them as

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\(^{165}\) Gaza: Diod. 19.80.4, including the retinue of Seleucus and mercenary horse; Raphia: Polyb. 5.79.2, including two thousand mercenary cavalry.

\(^{166}\) That is, 57,600 infantry and 3,200 cavalry.

\(^{167}\) Diod. 19.85.3-4.
soldiers in Egypt as well, and this may have taken place around the battle of Gaza. The final piece of evidence is less direct. In the Antigonid conquest of Cyprus in 306 BC, Demetrius tried to incorporate several thousand war captives in his army, a common practice in the early Successor period. The men immediately began deserting, because, Diodorus says, all their possessions were in Egypt. It may be that some of these men were settlers from Egypt, with land and family there. Documentary evidence from the reign of Ptolemy I is rare as well: the only Greek settlements well-attested in Egypt down to about 280 BC are at Elephantine in extreme Upper Egypt. The community there, more than a thousand miles from the Mediterranean coast, included men of Temnai in Asia Minor, even after the destruction of their home city, and others from Kos, Cyrene, Gela in Sicily, Crete, the Peloponnese, the Greek islands, Phocis, Chalcis, and Rhodes, Magnesia, Sidon, and Alexandria. In short, this community of soldiers on the southern frontier of Egypt included men from all corners of the Greek world. A few texts survive from Middle Egypt in the 280’s BC as well, and also reflect a diverse settling population. Whether at Elephantine or in the Oxyrhynchite nome (a province

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168 Aristaeus 13 claims that thirty thousand Jews were transported to Egypt, and some of them settled as klerouchs, in 311 BC, see also Jos. AJ 12.1.7-8.
169 Diod. 20.47.4: διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀποσκευάς ἐν Αἰγύπτω καταλελοίηναι παρά Πτολεμαῖοι.
170 See P.Eleph. 1-4.
171 These texts date between 311/0 and 284/3, many of them focused on Temnite families, but business dealings and witness lists provide a window into the ethnic background of the community.
172 See in particular P.Hib. 1.84 (= Chr. Mitt. 131), from 285/4 BC.
of Middle Egypt), the Greek settlers are simply present in the papyri, with little or no mention of military status, property qualification, or even patronymic.

The ordering of the Greek population in Egypt began under Philadelphus it seems, but was not completed until the reign of Ptolemy III. The larger body of documentary papyri from 275-260 BC, though hardly large, provide an early glimpse of Ptolemaic military institutions and settlements in the reign of Ptolemy II. Though the sources are limited, it seems that settlement was focused upon the Nile Valley in the region known as Middle Egypt. The earliest evidence for military settlement and military structures comes from the Herakleopolite nome, may date as early as 282 BC, and attests the presence there of an eponymous unit of Alexandros, staffed mainly with Macedonians.\footnote{173} The men of the unit bear military ranks, and from that time on the growing number of papyri attest an explosion of so-called eponymous commanders in the 260's and into the 250's BC: Antiochos in the Herakleopolite, Zoilos in the Oxyrhynchite, Telestes and Philagros in multiple nomes, and Lykophron in the Memphite.\footnote{174} The structuring of settlers under officers may have begun much earlier, but the eponymous commanders may in some instances have been Friends.\footnote{175} The

\footnote{173}{P.Hib. 1.30, dated 282-74. The papyrus also attests a Koan man among the unit’s members.} 
\footnote{175}{Van’t Dack (1983: 103-123) has demonstrated that units could have the same eponymous commander for many years, and seem to have high commanders other than the eponymous commander, implying that the eponymous commanders were perhaps Friends of the king rather than local officers. But there is also}
presence of the officers, along with ranks or land-holding status, served to create order within the army, and enabled the Ptolemies and their administrators to better control both the army and the land of Egypt. Philadelphus issued a law, perhaps first promulgated in the late 280’s BC, that laid out the requirements for how soldiers and citizens would identify themselves. This law and those like it contributed to the construction of administrative control over the settled army.

The development of Ptolemaic control over men and land in the reign of Philadelphus is best illustrated in the famous Revenue Laws papyrus. The document is actually a series of laws promulgated by the king in the 260’s and into the 250’s BC related to tax farming revenue from several types of agricultural land and produce. As such, many of the laws would relate to the military settlement system, and several address revenue from the klerouchs directly. The Revenue Laws papyrus frequently deals with the regulations on lands and villages held within gift estates, or δωρεάι, which the following section explains served, particularly in the reign of Philadelphus, to facilitate eventual military settlement. It also deals several times with the extraction of revenue from klerouchic allotments. For example, section 24.1-10 specifies that wine

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evidence that this was not always the case; both Zoilos and Antiochus are attested in command of their respective units in the field (BGU 10.2003 and P.Hib. 1.110, respectively).  

176 P.Humb. 2.168.  

177 See Grenfell and Mahaffy (1896) for the original publication, P.Rev. 1 and 2, and for a more recent treatment, Bingen (2006: 157-188). Much of the text concerns the king’s regulations on tax farming.
produce from the allotments of klerouchs should be charged at one-tenth, a privileged rate compared to the sixth paid by most vine-growers. The wording of the law also sheds some light on the management of the klerouchic system in 259 BC. Klerouchs were generally expected either to be on military duty, or farming their own kleros.\(^{178}\) This may imply the existence in 259 of a system more evident in the Third Syrian War, where Ptolemaic local administrators oversaw the management of allotments when klerouchs were called to military duty. A earlier law in the same papyrus, from 264 BC, reiterates unnecessarily that klerouchs’ allotments ultimately belonged to the king.\(^ {179}\)

The settlers were entitled to residences near their allotments, and were garrisoned among the local population. This residence was called a *stathmos*, and royal regulations forbade soldiers from letting them out, or ejecting the tenants of the house, or making other changes to the *stathmos*.\(^ {180}\) The grounds for these regulations is that the *stathmoi*, like land allotments, belonged to the king, not the soldiers. Other regulations governed the provision of rations to settlers when they were performing military services, such as duty at a garrison post, which was coordinated through granary officers known as sitarchs, who were associated with local granaries.\(^ {181}\) The soldiers did not always abide by these regulations. In Upper Egypt, around Apollonopolis (Edfu),

\(^{178}\) 24.5-7: παρὰ δὲ τῶν κληρούχων τῶν στρατευομένων καὶ τοῦ κλήρους πεφυτευκότων.

\(^{179}\) 36.13-14: ἐν τοῖς κλήροις οἷς εἰλήφασι παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. The nature of the kleros had already been made clear, and so the clause functions as repetition.

\(^{180}\) SB 6.9454, dated about mid-century, probably later in the reign of Ptolemy II.

\(^{181}\) P.Amh. 2.29 (=C.Ord.Ptol. 19 and 20), dating to a 23rd year, and so probably about 262.
garrison soldiers had taken to simply seizing residences from townspeople, rather than filing for a *stathmos* with the local *oikonomos*, a general administrative officer. In addition, there had been reports that soldiers, upon leaving (perhaps on elephant hunts, which often departed from Apollonopolis) would board up their billets until their return. Ptolemy called for the end of such arrangements, and for the soldiers stationed on the west bank of the Nile to build their own temporary shelters so as not to trouble the Greek settlers there.\(^\text{182}\)

While the many laws of Philadelphus began imposing order on the settlement system, it was also still under construction during his reign. A prominent feature of klerouchic settlement in the first half of the third century was irregular allotment sizes. In the absence of a clearly defined system for measuring land to different types of soldiers, the settlers received allotments of wildly varying sizes. For example, one of the earliest detailed documents for Ptolemaic kleruchs, *P.Cair.Zen*. 1.59001, dated 274/3 BC, provides information on seven Thracian settlers who were in the command of Lykophron. Of the seven, three are described as forty-aroura men, and one each described as sixty-, seventy-, and one-hundred-and-ten-aroura men. The last man, the son of the one-hundred-and-ten-aroura man, is called *synkleros*, which in this case likely meant heir or joint-holder to the *kleros* of his father. There is no clear evidence at any other point in Ptolemaic history for such a broad variation within allotment

\(^{182}\) *P.Hal*. 1.Fr2, dated about 259 BC.
classifications for men in the same unit. Broad ranges in allotments are attested elsewhere. For example, a cavalry unit known from several texts from the 250’s averaged forty to fifty arouras per klerouch, but the commander possessed over seven hundred. In other cases the size of the allotment may not be known, but several men possessed a single kleros.

The extreme disparities in allotment sizes seems to have been particularly acute among the misthophoroi hippeis, a class of former mercenary cavalrymen settled sporadically within Egypt. Their mercenary route to Egypt, and the ad hoc nature of their settlement, may have contributed to the wide array of allotments observable in the record. Chomatikon (dike tax) rates, which normally charged one obol per aroura, allow for rough calculations of taxable land within an allotment. P.Sorb.inv. 371, a collection of tax receipts, lists the dike tax paid by seven misthophoroi hippeis and a larger group of hekatontarouroi, the regular cavalry force of Ptolemaic Egypt, who generally paid, as their name indicates, dike taxes for one hundred arouras of land. The ex-mercenaries, on the other hand, paid more for the chomatikon, indicating arable land in their allotments.

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183 For the horsemen of Alkippos, see in particular P.Cair.Zen. 4.59726, which provides a list of kleroi for part of the unit (perhaps even the whole?) with kleroi of 52, 3x 43, 38, and 62 arouras, before the text breaks off, then provides a total 808 arouras, sufficient for perhaps sixteen riders, then lists the kleros of Alkippos himself: 708 arouras. For more on this unit, see PSI 4.399 and 6.570, and note in particular the Thessalian Aischinas had the rank of pentakosiarchos, commander of five hundred, though the kleros list in the first text implies that the unit may have only had sixteen to twenty men, unless many, many more were settled in other places.

184 See, for example, P.Hib. 1.39, where four klerouchs, Alexandros, Bromenos, Nikostratos, and Pausanias possessed the same allotment.

185 Therefore 16 drachmas 4 obols, paid at precisely that rate by almost twenty cavalrymen in the text.
from roughly one hundred twenty to well over three hundred aoruras.\(^{186}\) These are odd and varying amounts, certainly, but not without parallel. In the papyri \textit{P.Lille} 1.31-35 and 38, a local administrator oversaw planting for the allotments of five senior cavalry officers, with more than one hundred twenty and as many as 350 aoruras to each of them.\(^{187}\) In ensuing decades, after Philadelphus had laid the legal foundation, kings and their administrators began to steadily restructure the settler system into a more an ordered set of coherent institutions, sufficient to field large armies while also making substantial contributions to the Ptolemaic economy.

\subsection*{2.2.4.3. Gift estates and Military settlement}

In the reign of Ptolemy II, the pattern of settlement is clearer. The king rewarded prominent Greeks and Egyptians with gift estates. These δωρεᾶι seem to have measured, in several cases at least, roughly ten thousand aoruras. Due to this general size, the administrators of many gift estates and other developmental land were known as \textit{myriarouroi}.

\(^{188}\) The most famous gift estate was that of Apollonius the dioiketes.}

\(^{186}\) The actual amounts are 119.25, 118.5, 196.5, 325, 130.5, 334.5, and 156 obols = aoruras.

\(^{187}\) \textit{P.Lille} 1.31 – \textit{Ilarch} with over 145 arable aoruras, 1.32 – \textit{hipparch} with 228 arable and 288 total, 1.33 – \textit{hipparch} with about 329 arable and over 341 total, 1.34 – \textit{hipparch} with a little more than 312 total, 1.35 – the rank is lost, but at least 121 arable aoruras; 1.38 – frK indicates an allotment with 307.5 arable aoruras, while frH and frI record the payments from 1.32 and 1.35.

\(^{188}\) Though the name resembles that of klerouchs, the \textit{myriarouroi} seem to have held an administrative office (\textit{P.Petr.} 2.42), though it is possible and even likely that some, even many, of them were also involved with the army. The \textit{myriarouros} Andromachos was a prominent Friend of the king (\textit{P.Zen.Pestm.} 338), but several \textit{myriarouroi} were Egyptians with little information about any possible military career, Senteus (\textit{P.Sorb.} 1.30) and Panouphis (\textit{P.Zen.Pestm.} 338). In \textit{P.Sorb.} 1.30 the local \textit{nomarch} Diogenes ordered Senteus to perform
beginning in late 256 BC was administered by Zenon, a native of Kaunos in Caria. His estate was divided into four basins, irrigated by a network of canals and dikes. Thousands of people lived within the estate, most of them recent arrivals in the Fayum basin from other places. Because the Fayum basin was, in the reign of Philadelphus, still in the process of being recovered for agricultural use, many new settlements were built during his reign. While the dorea of Apollonius is best known, and may have been the largest or among the largest, gift estates proliferated throughout the Fayum, facilitating the recovery of land for agriculture. From the abundance of papyri related to this estate and the development of the Fayum, it is clear that the possession of a dorea was not simply a reward for service, but carried attendant expectations of investment and development. Numerous documents relate to the expansion of irrigation works throughout the Arsinoite nome and in the dorea of Apollonius in particular.

several administrative tasks and addressed him alongside the local village scribe, implying a largely administrative capacity.

The chief text on the estate of Apollonius and career of Zenon is still Rostovtzeff (1922), but see Bingen (2006: 229-39) for a study of the administration of the estate in its early years, before Zenon took over. Apollonius also possessed a dorea near Memphis (PSI 5.511), and the two estates may have joined one another, since his estate in the Fayum was located around Philadelphia, on the northeastern edge of the basin, in the direction of Memphis.

See P.Lille 1 for the original outline of development, including an actual sketch of the proposed irrigation system.

On these other estates, see Rostovtzeff (1922: 43-51, 142-5) and the several examples in section 2.2.4.4.

Irrigation infrastructure was top priority in the Fayum, as demonstrated by the activity of the architect Kleon (see P.Petr. 2.13 in particular), and the activities of Apollonius’ agents within his estate (P.Lille 1, PSI 486 and 488, P.Cair.Zen. 1.59109), see also P.Petr. 2.42 and 3.39 in other parts of the Fayum. See Rostovstzeff (1922: 60-4).
The preparation of land in the δωρεά functioned as a middle step toward klerouchic settlement. The centralized control of estate administrators facilitated the construction of infrastructure, which in turn made military settlement possible.\textsuperscript{193} That the land was being prepared for klerouchic settlement may be indicated by the hundred-aroura plots leased in about 256 BC, several years before the major settlement of hundred-aroura klerouchs began.\textsuperscript{194} In fact, this is made perhaps more evident if one looks at Apollonius' other estate, in Memphis, which included several sets of settlers.\textsuperscript{195} Even before major settlements or leases of large allotments, managers of estates were charged with coordinating seed schedules, infrastructure projects, and assisting in collections of produce for rent and tax.\textsuperscript{196} \textit{P.Lille} 5, a text from 260/59, records seed distributions across a very wide area in what seems to have been the dorea of Antisthenes.\textsuperscript{197} The text includes twenty-three Greeks among the distributions, most with multiple men per allotment, but most of the allotments of standard sizes for either infantry or cavalry klerouchs.\textsuperscript{198} As for the estate of Apollonius around Philadelphia,

\textsuperscript{193} See Rostovtzeff (1922: 136-9) and Lesquier (1911: 202-5).
\textsuperscript{194} SB 14.11659, \textit{P.Col.Zen.} 3.54.
\textsuperscript{195} \textit{P.Cair.Zen.} 2.59179 from 255/4 BC pertains to Apollonius' vineyards near Memphis, claimed by neighboring klerouchs. \textit{PSI} 6.627 (c.250 BC) contains a seed distribution to a contingent of military veterans on allotments within the Memphis dorea.
\textsuperscript{196} See Rostovtzeff (1922: 49). \textit{P.Lond.} 7.1953, \textit{P.Cair.Zen.} 2.59292, and \textit{P.Sorb.} 1.30 all describe coordination of seed schedules in different parts of Apollonius' estate, and in the case of the last text, the estate overseen by the myriarouros Sentheus in the precinct of Polemon in the southern Fayum.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{P.Enteux.} 1, from 259 BC, helps establish the owner of the estate, and identifies Nikostratos of \textit{P.Lille} 5 as Antisthenes' manager.
\textsuperscript{198} In the absence of further evidence, the Greek men could be interpreted as independent farmers or klerouchs with their family or contracted farmers. The mention of the jurisdiction of the monarch Maimachos
men were definitely settled in the estate at the end of the Second Syrian War.\textsuperscript{199} The largest military settlement in Ptolemaic history seems to have occurred at the end of the war, by which time the many δωρεᾶι had recovered sufficient land, and more importantly built up sufficient infrastructure, to settle thousands of new soldiers in the Fayum.

### 2.2.4.4. Military mobilization and settlement in the Second Syrian War

The Second Syrian War began in about 260 BC, following soon after the death of Antiochus I. Initiated by Antiochus II, the war lasted about seven years, and was fought in the Aegean, Asia Minor, and Syria.\textsuperscript{200} It ended in 253 BC, and was not a particularly successful foray for Ptolemy II. Though the war began more than sixty years after the first Ptolemy gained control in Egypt, documentary evidence indicates that Ptolemy lacked a sufficient number of klerouchs to handle the pressures of a lengthy war. Unable to sustain his war effort through klerouchs alone, Ptolemy II was forced to rely upon \hfill\hfill

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\textsuperscript{199} PSI 5.513 and 536 describe allotments for high-ranking officers and a group of cavalry, respectively, while 
mercenaries and men conscripted from the population in Egypt. This system seems to
have been undesirable to Philadelphus, because multiple waves of major military
settlement followed the conclusion of the war.

There is limited evidence for mobilization during the war. A dossier of texts from
the Oxyrhynchite nome, from the office of Apollonides the nomarch, confirms the
mobilization of troops from that province (BGU 6.1226-30). One of the responsibilities of
a nomarch was the management of kleroi on behalf of the crown while klerouchs were on
campaign. The texts date between 259 and 256 BC, and cover several military units: the
men of Antiochos, Spartakos, and Zoilos, all cavalry, and of Philagros, infantry. The
other level of wartime administration that seems to have existed at this point is within
the military unit. In documents 6.1227 and 1229, men from the unit served as
intermediaries between the office of the nomarch and local farmers to coordinate the
acquisition of seed and planting of the unit’s kleroi. Aside from this, there is little other
clear evidence for the war.201

While there is only limited evidence for mobilization in the Second Syrian War,
there is abundant evidence for military settlement after the war. No fewer than four

201 The best of these is PSI 5.495, from November 258 BC, which concerns the recruitment of men and horses
for the hipparchy of Spintharos, which was deployed in Syria. Spintharos, coincidentally, could be the same
man as the Antigonid officer who commanded the citadel of Athens prior to the city’s independence in 287
BC (IG II* 666). Other texts are less clearly associated with the war. For example, SB 14.11659 is a 256 BC
loan contract for one hundred arouras arranged by an Arsinoite nomarch, Damis, with several Egyptian
farmers, which might provide a window into the process whereby the nomarchs oversaw the planning of
kleroi. P.Lond. 7.1938 from 257 BC records the passage of soldiers through Leontopolis on the Pelousiac
branch of the Nile.
significant groups of soldiers were enrolled into the klerouchy at the end of the war.

Veteran cavalry and infantry were settled after what was presumably lengthy service.

About the same time, some thousands of infantry seem to have been settled, particularly in the Arsinoite nome, after having been recruited for military service from the sons of existing klerouchs. The crowning achievement, however, of the development of the Fayum basin and military settlement at war’s end was the settlement of what may have been near two thousand heavy cavalry, the hundred-aroura man, who came to constitute the dominant class in the Arsinoite nome after 250 BC.

The first two groups of settlers were the veterans of the cavalry and infantry, called presbyteroi. Three papyri attest settlements of presbyteroi in the Arsinoite and Memphite nomes at or near the end of the war. An undetermined number of presbyteroi hippeis, veteran cavalry, were settled in the Arsinoite within the δωρεᾶι of Apollonides and Ptolemaios. Apollonides was an oikonomos, a high-level local administrator. Soon after the end of the war, a papyrus fragment records his dispersal of seed grain to three villages: Anoubis, Ptolemais, and Lysimachis, sufficient to plant 4,500 arouras of arable

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202 Regular infantry, pezoi, may also have been settled about this time, see P.Lond. 7.1980, dated 252 BC, referring to recently settled infantry. But it is also possible this is just an example of the use of one suitable word, infantry, in place of a more specific word, in this case, either the “veterans” or the “sons.”

203 See Polyae. 5.2.11 for the clearest example of presbyteroi used for “veteran” soldiers. When used in Polyaeus it has the meaning not only of experienced soldiers, but also older soldiers (the word means “elders”). It is impossible to state with certainty the length of their service, but twenty years or more, since the start of the First Syrian War, is a possibility.

204 P.Sorb. 1.18.
land. The large, consolidated seed distributions might have been related to the same settlements. The settlement of the presbyteroi pezoi, veteran infantry, is clearer thanks to more complete texts. In the Memphite, a group of veterans were settled within Apollonius’ estate. In the Arsinoite, a text records the measurement of land from two myriarouroi, Andromachos and Panouphis, for about twenty or twenty-five settlers. The text describes their allotments, which were generally in the neighborhood of twenty arouras, and the non-arable portions of their allotments due mainly to irrigation infrastructure. The sizes of the allotments may indicate that the presbyteroi were the beginnings of the class of settler infantry later known as twenty-aroura men.

The third group of settlers was the epigonoi, the sons of Ptolemaic settlers. Their name has caused considerable confusion in scholarship on Ptolemaic Egypt, due mainly to presuppositions that Ptolemaic settlement practice and administration were consistent across time. The class of epigonoi has generally been accepted as the overall classification for the many individuals identified as τῆς ἐπιγονῆς in papyri, and this seems correct. They have been interpreted as the sons of military settlers. This too seems

205 P.Petr. 3.80.frB.
206 PSI 6.627.
207 P.Zen.Pestm. 38. Another text, P.Lond. 7.2008 attests the settling of a group of presbyteroi in the dorea of Dinneus, which was near Kerkesoucha in the northern Arsinoite.
208 It is also interesting that Panouphis’ “ten thousand arouras” had been reduced to a little more than 436 arouras after the land was measured. Either his estate had been much smaller to begin with, or the total provides evidence for earlier settlements within his lands.
209 See, for example, P.Gurob. 18.
Generally correct. Confusion has arisen from the enrollment of *epigonoi* in military units, and even more from the settlement of units of *epigonoi* in klerouchic allotments, as at the close of the Second Syrian War. In dealing with these texts, which will be discussed below, the assumption by scholars that all activities were in some sense regular or normal leads to the conclusion, practically unchallenged for nearly a century, that the *epigonoi* constituted a normal part of the army, served for a wage, and then inherited their father’s land. This interpretation forcibly systematizes irregular practices. There is in fact no evidence that widespread military service by *epigonoi* was normal, but there is evidence that some *epigonoi* did serve, and that those who did obtained *kleroi*. As demonstrated below, the documentary evidence lends itself better to the following interpretation: the settled *epigonoi* were wartime conscripts given *kleroi* of their own, not

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210 Perhaps better described as the descendants of settlers or other soldiers, since some men remained τῆς ἐπιγονης their entire lives, and their sons were τῆς ἐπιγονης as well. In that sense, it is simply the broad class of non-military, Hellenistic men in the interior of Egypt.

211 Wilcken (1920: 367-9) considered that *epigonoi* service may have functioned as a Ptolemaic equivalent to the Greek *ephebeia*, a training regimen for young men that prepared them to assume the military responsibilities they might one day inherit with the father’s *kleros*. Meyer (1900: 73-5) read the status of second century *epigonoi* units into the third century, as privileged active duty units of the main army. Lesquier (1911: 52-5) considered the *epigonoi* active duty soldiers as well, but sons of *klerouchs*, who eventually succeeded to the place of their fathers. See Scholl (1987: 111-5) for a summary of broad scholarly perspectives on the *epigonoi*, that they bore some relation to the military through their fathers, but could also as *epigonoi* serve in the military and receive allotments. La’da’s analysis (1997: 569) is probably the best thus far: that the *epigonoi* and *tes epigones* are equivalent groups, sons of the soldier-settlers, and themselves eligible for military service, though he expresses doubt about the conditions for conscription. Clarysse and Thompson (2006: 464) suggest that the *epigonoi* provided much of the Ptolemaic infantry, while *klerouchs* provided mostly cavalry. This last interpretation seems to assume a system reminiscent of the lands bestowed on *hetairoi* in Macedonia, while the phalangites were drawn from the regular population of the cities.
inherited from their fathers, at the conclusion of their military service, as a way to
reward their service and expand the Ptolemaic army.

The documentary evidence reinforces the interpretation of the *epigonoi* as
wartime conscripts settled at the conclusion of the war. Though they received
allotments, the name *epigonoi* stuck, not because they were still only the sons of
klerouchs, for they quite obviously possessed their own allotments. Instead, the name
likely remained with them because the circumstances by which they became klerouchs
was unusual: that is, it was generally normal for a son to inherit his father’s *kleros*, but it
was abnormal for a large number of sons to be conscripted and then given new lands.

Bearing in mind that the Ptolemaic army may only have numbered fifteen or twenty
thousand klerouchs, an addition of even a couple thousand of these *epigonoi* would have
marked a significant development in the settler system. The settlement of the *epigonoi*
began in 254 BC, when a large group received allotments in the Arsinoite nome.212 As
settlers, they were referred to as the twenty-five aroura *epigonoi*, sons of settlers made
settlers themselves.213 This serves as a simple proof that their service was exceptional. If,
as most commentators have assumed, the *epigonoi* obtained their father’s *kleros* upon
conclusion of their own military service, then we would not expect to find them in

212 P.Mich. 1.33.5-8: τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ εἶναι τῶν ἐπιγόνων τῶν καταμετρημένων ἐν τῷ Ἀρσινόειτι. The
text concerns a father who traveled to the Arsinoite nome to see to his son’s new holding. Not only does this
definitively prove that the *epigonoi* in this particular case were not inheriting from their fathers, but may also
indicate that the land was measured while the *epigonoi* were still away from Egypt.
213 P.Lille 1.39.3: εἰκοσιπενταρούροι ἐπιγόνοι.
receipt of their own allotments.214 These soldiers received new allotments at the conclusion of their service and became klerouchs themselves. A dossier of papyri from the southern Arsinoite records the local nomarch’s coordination of distributions for the new settlers, who seem to have been scattered in villages across the precinct of Polemon, though they were concentrated so thick around the village of Ibion that it was thereafter known as Ibion “of the twenty-five aroura men.”215

The capstone to Ptolemaic settlement in the Arsinoite at the conclusion of the Second Syrian War was that of the hekatontarouroi, the hundred-aroura cavalry, who from then on served as the mainstay of the Ptolemaic cavalry. The settlement of the cavalry in the Arsinoite reflects, perhaps unlike those before it, a planned development. Irrigation infrastructure had been erected with the location of existing and future cavalry-sized allotments in mind.216 Already in 255 BC the dioiketes and the official overseeing the settlement of the cavalry in the Arsinoite can be seen coordinating the

214 Wilcken’s interpretation (1920: 367) has been followed with little deviation in this regard. He established the interpretation of Μενέδημος Μενάνδρου Θεσσαλὸς τῆς ἐπιγονῆς τῶν κεκληρουχημένων τῆς κάτω τοπαρχίας τῆς ὑπὸ Τηλέμαχον in BGU 6.1278.32-4 as “man of the epigone, having succeeded to the kleros of his father.” But that papyrus shares a significant similarity with those from 252-0: they both follow immediately after a major war, in this case the Fourth Syrian War. And if Menedemos had succeeded to his father’s klerouchy in a normal transition, there would have been no reason to continue referring to him as one of the epigonoi. Instead, the best interpretation is that in the aftermath of large-scale mobilizations, some epigonoi were settled on additional allotments in Egypt, increasing the total number of klerouchs.

215 P.Lille 1.39-42, 51, from 252-250 BC. The epigonoi settlers are also mentioned in PSI 6.588, from the Zenon archive, which indicates that epigonoi were also settled in the north-eastern Arsinoite. A later document attests the presence of settled epigonoi at Kerkesoucha in the northern Arsinoite (P.Enteux. 76).

216 P.Petr. 3.37, 258 BC.
implementation of taxes on the new allotments. Most of the settlers seem to have arrived after the end of the war, however, when a brief flurry of activity can be detected in the documentary evidence. In 252 BC, the measurement of land for klerouchoi led the local farmers to abandon the land en masse. The same year, Phanias wrote to Zenon concerning lodging when he came to the Arsinoite to inspect the cavalrymen and administer their oaths. The following year, Phanias wrote to administrators in the Arsinoite on behalf of the new settlers, asking what types of grains they were to plant, in which amounts, and in which parts of their allotments. By 250 BC, the Arsinoite nome had added several thousand new klerouchs, and Ptolemy II and his successors would be in a better position to rely primarily upon their settled army in warfare. The first real test of this army was in the Third Syrian War, just a few years later. The stability and effectiveness of the Ptolemaic settler system in that war is the primary focus of the following chapter.

2.3. Conclusion

The period from 300-250 is not well-attested in sources, but the differences between the rough kingdoms patched together by warring generals before

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217 PSI 4.344. The text was forwarded by Phanias, the official, to the nomarch Maimachos, known to have overseen hundred-aroura cavalrymen earlier in the 250’s.

218 P.Cair.Zen. 2.59245.

219 P.Cair.Zen. 2.59254.

220 P.Freib. 1.7.
300 had progressed a great deal by mid-century, when more sources slowly began to appear. In the second or third generations of rule, the surviving Successor dynasties ruled established kingdoms as legitimate sovereigns, supported by powerful armies, settled and recruited from heartland territories. The growing stability of the recruitment systems developed over the first half of the third century sustained the three kingdoms of Macedonia, Asia, and Egypt through another fifty years of wars. The preceding study has shown several key similarities and differences between the three kingdoms as the kings pursued political and military sustainability. The kings established their legitimacy as Macedonian kings (particularly in the case of the Antigonids) and as protectors of the Greek and victors over the barbarians. The relationship between the kings and their soldiers, particularly the Macedonians, influenced the types of settlement pursued by each. The importance of cities and a citizen population in some sense Macedonian figured prominently in Antigonid and Seleucid developments, where non-Macedonian and even non-Greek inhabitants of the large, key cities were over time incorporated into the Hellenizing citizen population. In Ptolemaic Egypt these were less important, and settlers instead were scattered across the land, embedded in local culture and society, an asset to Ptolemaic dominance and a potential source of unrest. The continuing refinements of military institutions, and an evaluation of those institutions’ success in handling the stresses of warfare, are the primary subjects of the following chapters.
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Map 2.1. Infantry Settlers in the Arsinoite Nome, Egypt
Chapter 3. An Evaluation of Military Institutions in the Third Syrian War

In the summer of 244 BC, the merchant Theodoros, son of Kallikrates, transported a shipment of wine from the Arsinoite nome to Alexandria. Of the pay that he received, he deposited twenty drachmas into an account at the royal bank. The account was called “the distribution for the soldiers.” While much in Egypt may have gone on with seeming normalcy, Theodoros’ donation provides a window into a chief concern among the people of Egypt and Asia: armies of both the Ptolemies and Seleucids had been warring across stretches of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia, since the start of their latest war almost two years earlier.

The Third Syrian War, begun in late summer 246 BC, was the first significant test of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic settler systems following their construction over the first half of the third century. The preceding chapter described the piece-by-piece development of the two military systems, which the Third Syrian War first tested for the first time. Study of this war poses considerable historiographical difficulties, and as Heinen has pointed out, the result has been a wide range of scholarly reconstructions.

1 P.Col. 4.89.6-7: εἰς τὴν ἀνάδωσιν τῶν στρατιωτῶν.
3 The most significant objects of obfuscation and disagreement are: dating the battles of Andros and Kos, the career(s) of Ptolemy the Brother, Ptolemy the Son, Ptolemy Andromachou, and Ptolemy son of Lysimakhos, and the Thracian rebellion at Ephesus. All of these have at some point been related to the chronology of the
By careful comparison of the narrative and documentary sources pertaining to the war, a coherent narrative and, more importantly, examination of the performance of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid settler systems during the conflict can be presented. Even the most recent examinations of the Third Syrian War have failed to examine all the sources. I shall argue that the war lasted longer than normally thought and that it exposed both the limited sufficiency of the Ptolemaic system and the inherent dangers of the Seleucid. The Ptolemaic system won a handful of early victories and thereafter managed a largely defensive struggle, without paying a heavy price in men or materiel. The Ptolemaic army reached a pinnacle, successfully waging a two-front war, while one army successfully campaigned for lengthy periods deep in Asia. Since Ptolemaic military institutions functioned effectively, the operational limits reached during the war mark the limits of the system itself.

The Seleucid system demonstrated its potential weaknesses before the fighting began, when a murky struggle for succession rapidly developed into defections, rebellions, and civil war. Nevertheless, the weaknesses of the Seleucid system lie with the contingent loyalty of powerful local authorities. If all acted loyally and in concert, it

Third Syrian War, and it may be possible that Ptolemy Andromachou should not be understood as the same person as the other three, who may well have been one and the same, and it may also be that the two naval battles between Antigonus and the Ptolemies were fought during the Third Syrian War. For an overview of the extensive literature, see Gygax (2000): 353-366 and (2002): 49-56, Huss (1998): 229-250 and (2002): 232, and Tunny (2000): 83-92.
is difficult to imagine the Ptolemaic army achieving the same successes. But the
succession struggle divided even those loyal to the Seleucids, and the weakness of
division encouraged others to rebel. Thus the Seleucid military institutions functioned
during the war far below their ideal capacity. On the one hand, Seleucid monarchs and
generals might hope to one day reach operational capacities far surpassing those
achieved during the war. On the other hand, the weaknesses inherent to the system cast
doubt on the likelihood that the Seleucid military’s ideal capacity could ever be reached.

This chapter will address the narrative sources, from which modern historians
have drawn the majority of their own accounts and test them against documentary
evidence: official Ptolemaic accounts, Seleucid official accounts and epigraphic and
documentary evidence, and Ptolemaic epigraphic and documentary evidence.

3.1. The Narrative from Historical Sources

Polybius (5.58.11) makes only a passing reference to the Third Syrian War,
Seleukeia-ad-Piereia held a Ptolemaic garrison at the onset of the Fourth Syrian War,
having been seized by Ptolemy Euergetes, “when that prince, owing to his indignation
at the murder of Berenike, invaded Syria and seized that town” (5.58.11).

The longest narrative of the war belongs to Justin’s Epitome of Pompeius Trogus,
Bk 27, where he casts the war as a cautionary tale of the murderous Seleucus and his
greedy brother, Antiochus Hierax, and the woes that befell them for their crimes.
Seleucus II, upon taking the throne, immediately commenced murderous intrigues, orchestrating attempts on the lives of Berenike, Antiochus II’s second wife and Ptolemy III’s sister, and her son. After the boy’s death, Berenike took refuge at Daphne, a city of the Syrian Tetrapolis, where she received support from many of the regions of Asia and sent a plea for help to Egypt. Pace Justin, Ptolemy left Egypt, hastening to her aid “with all his men.” He arrived too late however, for Berenike was slain by treachery. But he was not too late to gain the submission of many of the cities and regions of Asia, whose governors and leading citizens, moved by the plight of Berenike, opted to side with Ptolemy. According to Justin, Ptolemy could easily have made himself master of all of Asia, but withdrew to Egypt on account of a rebellion. Seleucus then sought to recover his lost territories and embarked with a fleet to recover the cities that had deserted him. A storm wrecked most of his fleet, but he was able to recover most of his possessions, according to Justin, on account of the pity of the people. Having consolidated most of his possessions, he made war upon Ptolemy, presumably in Syria, but was defeated in a battle, and fled to Antioch. Justin elsewhere dates the Parthian rebellion under Andragoras to the beginning of Seleucus’ kingship and during the time of the First Punic War (41.4), and the revolt of Theodotos of Baktria shortly thereafter.4 These satrapal rebellions damaged Seleucid coffers and access to Indian elephants, but

4 These dates are debated. Grainger dates the rebellion of Andragoras a decade earlier, because Justin dates the rebellion to the consulships of Vulso and Regulus in 256 BC. I consider it more likely that Justin associated the rebellion with the wrong consuls, than
probably did not have a major military impact. He does not specify the various years in which events occurred, but says that Seleucus’ brother was fourteen the year of the battle, and that the civil war between the brothers began shortly thereafter.  

The unknown year of Antiochus’ birth must date between 260 and 254: the former, if he were fourteen upon the death of his father, the latter, because of his repudiation of his mother in anticipation of Antiochus II’s marriage to Berenike. His fourteenth year and the conclusion of the war could have fallen between 246 and 240.

Appian (Syrian Wars 65) relates that Laodike, not Seleucus, presided over the assassination of Antiochus II, and his former wife and her son, Berenike and Antiochus. Laodike was later killed by Berenike’s vengeful brother, Ptolemy III, when he invaded Syria and conquered as far as Babylon. Appian mentions in the same place that the turmoil in the Seleucid territory provided the occasion for the Parthian revolt, by which we may take him to mean either the revolt of Andragoras or the invasion of Arsakes and the Parni, most likely the former. Appian is the only source who mentions the death of Laodike during the conflict, and contemporary evidence demonstrates that was not the case, and particularly not at the hands of Ptolemy himself.

Polyaenus (Stratagems 8.50) also provides a narrative of the war. Polyaenus attributes the success of Ptolemy during the war to a ruse: by proclaiming that his sister

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5 The only secure date Justin gives that is relevant here is his dating of the rebellion of Andragoras to the consulships of Vulso and Regulus. This must be at least ten years too early, for Vulso and Regulus were consuls in 256, but he dates the rebellion of Andragoras to the beginning of Seleucus II’s reign in 246, exactly ten years later.
Berenike still lived, Ptolemy gained the submission of whole regions, from the Taurus to India, without a single battle. Polyaeus also provides details of the sequence of events at the outset of the war. His version omits Laodike’s complicity in the death of Antiochus, but asserts she orchestrated from Ephesus the assassination of Berenike’s son in Antioch, where Berenike was striving to establish support for her son as the rightful heir. After the assassination, Berenike withdrew to her citadel, protected by Gallic mercenaries and surrounded by her female attendants. Although the people of Antioch swore allegiance to her, she was assassinated soon thereafter, presumably at Daphne, if we can trust the narrative of Justin. Polyaeus’ strategic emphasis in the narration is that one of her attendants was then disguised as Berenike, supporting a false claim that she had survived the attempt on her life, and providing the basis for Ptolemy’s peaceful conquests as a brother supporting the rights of his sister.6

Jerome’s fragment of Porphyrius’ critique of Daniel (FGrH 260 fr.43) agrees with some of the essential details from other sources: Laodike orchestrated the assassination of Berenike and her son; Ptolemy conquered Cilicia, Syria, and much of Asia across the Euphrates; and he was forced to return to Egypt because of a rebellion. Porphyrius, only the second source to mention the rebellion in Egypt, offers one of the clearest statements

6 Grainger (2010: 159) finds this account preposterous, figuring that, unless the attackers were also killed, they would know whether or not they had killed her. But Polyaeus’ description emphasizes that multiple women fell during the assassination attempt, and one of the wounded women took Berenike’s place. It is reasonable to think that the assassins could not be sure if they had succeeded in killing Berenike, or had only wounded her, and they and others were fooled by the imposter Berenike.
of Laodike’s hand in the death of her husband, by persuading his servants to poison
him. He also mentions that Ptolemy returned after plundering the temples of Asia,
particularly for those statues and implements taken from Egypt during the invasion of
Cambyses, c. 525 BC. Porphyrius concludes that Ptolemy kept the conquered parts of
Syria for himself, but gave the farther regions to a general named Xanthippos, and
bestowed Cilicia on his “friend” Antiochus, perhaps Hierax, who was engaging his
brother in civil war.7 The general Xanthippos, left in command of the territories east of
the Euphrates, is only mentioned here.

Eusebius’ Chronicle also describes some aspects of the Third Syrian War,
although unlike most other sources it focuses mainly on the emerging conflict between
the brothers and ignores the plight of Berenike and Ptolemy’s invasion of Asia.8 Here
Antiochus Hierax, erroneously called Antigonus, revolted against his brother and fought
several battles with him in Anatolia. Seleucus defeated him in Lydia, but was unable to
retake either Sardis, controlled by Hierax and Alexander the brother of Laodike or
Ephesus, which was held by Ptolemaic forces. Later, Seleucus and 20,000 of his men fell

7 The leading candidates for this Antiochus, aside from Hierax, are known Philoi from the court at
Alexandria: Antiochos, son of Kebba, was eponymous priest in 257/6 BC, and Antiochos son of Kratides
was eponymous priest in 247/6. Another Antiochos was a prominent military official in the Apollonopolite
late in the reign of Philadelphos (P.Hal. 1.166-184); another, or perhaps one of these, was a prominent
eponymous commander of cavalry in the Herakleopolite and Arsinoite in the middle of the century (BGU
6.1228.9, P.Col. 4.85.3, PSI 4.389.9, P.Sorb. 1.10.1), while another was strategos of the Herakleopolite at
the war’s end (P.Hib. 1.72.14, 241 BC), though he may have been strategos as early as 245 BC (P.Hib. 1.71.4-12),
likely eliminating him from contention for the command of Cilicia. Antiochos son of Kratides and Antiochus
Hierax are the most likely suggestions.
8 Schoene-Petermann (1866-75): 252-253.
in a battle against Mithridates. This event, surely out of place both historically, and within the chronicle, assumes a living Seleucus II for several more lines. The battle was likely at Ankyra, c. 239 BC. After the battle, Ptolemy laid siege to Damascus and Orthosia in Syria, but Seleucus’ armies arrived to lift the sieges. The chronicle dates this last encounter, the only event of the Third Syrian War related, to the third year of the 134th Olympiad, or 242 BC. The end of the war c. 242 BC may be corroborated by Eutropius (ARH 3.1), who recounts that a Roman embassy to Ptolemy III at the end of the First Punic War (241 BC) offered assistance in ending the war with Antiochus, but Ptolemy turned them away, since the war was already over.

Catullus (66.12) describes king Ptolemy as having departed to lay waste the borders of Assyria, implying yet again that a great deal of the fighting took place in Mesopotamia rather than Syria. He further mentions (66.20) that by grim battle (inuisente…proelia) Ptolemy soon added Asia to the realm of Egypt. Catullus likely elaborated from a lost poem of Callimachus (Aetia, fr. 110, the “Coma Berenices”), which related the story that Berenike, wife of Ptolemy III, devoted a lock of her hair to the gods in hopes that her husband would return safely from the war. The very fragmentary text from Callimachus may also have contained some narrative of the betrayal and murder of the other Berenike, daughter of queen Arsinoe, but too little survives to be much use.9

9 The fragment concludes with a few words regarding Berenike daughter of Arsinoe, and a reference to the Persian canal dug through the promontory of Mount Athos, through which the Persian warships sailed during the invasion of Xerxes. The meaning of allusion is lost due in the fragmentary text, but it may be an
3.1.1. The Narrative Supplements from Official Ptolemaic Documents

Three Ptolemaic documents lie in a murky area between documentary evidence and history. Together, these corroborate and extend many of the details from the literary sources. The three documents are: a short chronicle of the history of the Ptolemaic dynasty, *Papyri Haunienses* 1.6; a Ptolemaic account of the war's early operations, *Chrestomathie Wilcken* 1; and a monumental inscription erected by Ptolemy's agents on the coast of the Arabian Sea, *OGIS* 54, the so-called Adoulis inscription. The first, composed no earlier than the end of the third century, is later than the others, and in many ways resembles the ancient narratives. It provides a brief record of the dynasty, into at least the reign of Ptolemy IV. The latter two documents date to the reign of Ptolemy III, (246-222 BC), and are official accounts of the war.
The document as a whole treats several episodes of Ptolemaic history, possibly beginning with the Second or Third Syrian War, and provides brief biographies of members of the royal family. The first section concerns the life of Ptolemaios, the “so-called ‘Son of Andromachos,’” the naval battle at Andros, and his death in the revolt of the Thracian mercenaries in Ephesus. This section likely belongs to the period of the Third Syrian War, though the relation of his career to the general Ptolemaic chronology is debatable. The brief biography of how Ptolemaios, presumed to have been an illegitimate son of Philadelphos, but officially recognized as the son of Andromachos, a little-known personage of the Alexandrian court, tells how he captured Ainos on the Thracian coast, met defeat in a naval battle, probably at Andros, and later, besieged at Ephesus, was betrayed and murdered. The second section, lines

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11 This particular subject has been much-discussed in attempts to make sense of the several third-century Ptolemies. For the literature, see supra n. 3. His name is written as Ptolemaios Andromachou, or son of Andromachos, though the text also says that he is Ptolemaios ἐπίκλησις Andromachou, which might imply that he was only called the son of Andromachos, when he was in fact an illegitimate son of Philadelphos.

12 P.Zen.Pestm. 38.6-7, from 253 BC, identifies an Andromachos who possessed a ten-thousand aroura gift-estate.

13 Athenaeus (13.593a-b) also records the murder of a Ptolemaios, son of Philadelphos, commander of a garrison at Ephesus, by Thracian mercenaries. An inscription from Ephesus, SEG 41:963, (Engelmann and Büjükkolanci 1991: 140-142), contains a list of mainly Thracian soldiers only with difficulty identified as mercenaries. This text has frequently been associated with this episode and thus dated to the period of the Third Syrian War. Most of the men listed are idiotai “private soldiers” (probably very similar “privates” in the modern military sense, in that they did not exercise command over anyone else) and diakonoi “attendants,” perhaps to high-ranking officers, analogous to the squires (hippokomoi) of the army in Egypt. There are also several officers, from lower-ranking dekanikoi to a high-ranking syntagmataires. Perhaps most interestingly, one and perhaps two are identified as hypaspistai, elite infantry, and in the Hellenistic period guards and attendants to royal personages. The presence of hypaspistai in particular may most strongly associate the text with Ptolemaios Andromachou.
14-22, concerns the reign of Ptolemy III Euergetes, and 14-17 likely briefly recount events of the Third Syrian War. The part of the text in question is produced below:

Line 14 contains most of the genitive form of the “Euphrates” and a monogram, pi-rho, the meaning of which is unknown. It probably set the stage for Ptolemy’s reign by remarking that he led armies across the Euphrates. Line 15 has excited more interest. The surviving letters plausibly spell out the phrase “were there not at that time a revolt of the Egyptians,” before which the text may have indicated that Ptolemy would have conquered Asia, a counter-factual intoned by a number of the ancient sources. This provides considerable support to the sparse reports that a rebellion at home ended Ptolemy’s campaigning. The text’s αἰγυπτίων ἀπόστασις corresponds well to the plural genitives used in the second century to describe the tarachai of the Egyptians.

Line 16 could likely be reconstructed if there was a greater context: “long ago” “in faith” and “Seleukos” are legible, but as it stands, it seems to refer to an agreement, perhaps related not to Seleucus II Kallinikos but to Seleucus I, his friendship with Ptolemy I, and

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14 Oikonomides (1978) very plausibly reconstructs the last line as dating the death of Ptolemy III to the Athenian archon Euxenos. Lines 18-21 refer to Ptolemy’s role in the Aetolian-Macedonian war, for which see Schwartz (1978).
15 Justin Epitome 27, Porphyry FrGH 260.43.
his possession of Mesopotamia. The end of line 17 likely mentions Ptolemy’s return to Alexandria, and thus the end of the war narrative. Line 17 may plausibly be translated: “and after securing the country with garrisons, he returned to Alexandria.” For present purposes of this study, this line is significant, as it implies that Ptolemy’s return, whenever that may have been, did not end his army’s activity in Asia and thus corroborates the tradition in Porphyrius of the continued activity of the Ptolemaic army under Xanthippos. A significant part of his army may have continued on, perhaps even across the Euphrates, for months or years after the end of the war.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Chr.Wilck. 17} - This text of four fragments narrates the early stages of the war from the dramatic palace intrigues after Antiochus’ death to Ptolemy’s entry into Antioch. In the first fragment, lines 4-5 refer to letters to the cities and rulers of the Seleucid realm and to her brother “relating what things had transpired.” Line 6 implies that Ptolemy III, speaking in the plural first person, led out the \textit{stratiotai} as an immediate response to the letter. This propagandistic account probably exaggerates the rapidity of Ptolemy’s response. Even so, one must assume a relatively hasty departure by ship, limiting the extent of settler mobilization. The remaining lines likely narrate the conquest of Seleucid possessions along the Mediterranean coast as far as Seleukeia-ad-

\textsuperscript{16} The following lines refer again to war in Asia, plausibly reconstructed by Huss (1977:188-190) to refer to an expedition of Magas, son of Ptolemy III and Berenike, to Asia, likely Asia Minor, in the 220’s after the death of Seleucus III. The period following the death of Seleucus II seems equally plausible to me, as in either case the death opened the way for renewed war, and both deaths occurred within the context of fighting in Asia Minor between the Seleucids and either Seleucid rebels or Anatolian dynasts.

\textsuperscript{17}Piejko (1990: 13-27).
Pieria. Lines 15-21 describe the peaceful surrender of the city, as the local garrison commander (possibly the Andriskos of l.13) surrendered the citadel and city to one Epigenes, perhaps a local citizen leader or the commander of an advance force representing Ptolemy and/or Berenike, both of whom are mentioned ll. 18-19.\textsuperscript{18} The description of garrisons surrendered to the siblings reinforces the picture of a generally peaceful conquest waged by a brother championing the just treatment of his sister.

The second fragment, after relating how Seleucid forces loyal to Berenike seized parts of Cilicia and 1,500 talents, which the Seleucid satrap was attempting to transport to Laodike, returns to the progress of Ptolemy’s naval armada, which in a two-day sail (likely from Laodikeia) reached Seleukeia and an enthusiastic welcome. The Ptolemaic royal narrative emphasizes the presence of the Seleucid officers and soldiers in the welcoming crowd alongside the citizens. In the third fragment, Ptolemy departed Seleukeia for Antioch, accompanied by the high-ranking military officers and administrative officials who had met him in there, and those soldiers not assigned to garrison the city. After an even more splendid welcome in Antioch, in the fourth fragment, Ptolemy mentions seeing his sister at evening. The wording at the end of the surviving text reads: “we went straightaway to our sister, and afterward managed some important affairs, holding audience with the officers and soldiers and others in that

\textsuperscript{18} This could also have been Laodikeia, further south in the Pieria, allowing for the two day sail required to reach Seleucia described in the second fragment.
country, taking counsel regarding the whole situation.”

Hence a permissible assumption, that Berenike was still alive, as if Ptolemy chose to disguise her death, may also imply that the first draft of this document was meant for consumption in Seleucid territories immediately following the events it narrates. The text likely concluded with the decisions reached in counsel and any official proclamations before Ptolemy’s continued march through Asia. Not least, this text corroborates Polyaenus’ stratagem.

Ptolemy’s narration of the conquest of Syria implies only three days for travel from Laodikeia (or possibly Herakleia) to Antioch a similarly brisk pace for the whole of the campaign up to that time. Simultaneously, his fleet moved not much more than twenty miles on any of its final days of travel, and even if we assume a more rapid progress along the Ptolemaic coastline further south, it is difficult to imagine Ptolemy could have reached Antioch within a month of getting the news of his sister’s predicament, even if he had moved as quickly as his account claims. Unfortunately, the text includes no major details on the dates of his campaign or the men in his army. If the text was in fact meant to serve as propaganda to Seleucid subjects, the many names of high-ranking Seleucids surrendering or joining the Ptolemies served a much clearer purpose than the details a historian might desire.

19 δή 20 ήλιων περὶ καταφορὰν ὄντος εἰσέλθομεν εὐθέως[ε] 21 πρὸς τὴν ἀδελφήν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς τὼ[ι] 22 πράσσειν τι τῶν χρησίμων ἐγινόμεθα
OGIS 54. This stele, inscribed at Adoulis near the strait separating the Red and Arabian seas, offers another official Ptolemaic account of the war. After describing Ptolemy III’s heritage, even including his paternal link to Herakles and his maternal link to Dionysos besides the lands inherited from his father, the text describes the progress of the war into Asia. Ptolemy “campaigned into Asia with his forces of infantry and cavalry, and his naval fleet, and his elephants, both Troglodytic and Ethiopian, which his father and he were the first to hunt from those lands, to lead them back to Egypt, and to train and equip them for war.” The emphasis on the elephants taken to war is likely related to the location in distant regions reached by Ptolemaic elephant-hunting expeditions. The text also suggests that Ptolemy mobilized the full army of Egypt, including infantry, cavalry, and elephants, for his campaign into Asia. If elephants were involved, they and much of the army of Egypt must have marched by land, perhaps joining Ptolemy in Syria after he and a first wave of forces had traveled quickly by sea.

The text relates his conquest of all the lands west of the Euphrates, including Cilicia, Pamphylia, Ionia, the Hellespont, and Thrace, and how all the military forces in those regions recognized Ptolemy’s rule. Further, this text corroborates several of the literary sources: he crossed the Euphrates and "mastered" (κυριεύσας) Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Susiane, Persia, Media, and all the other lands as far as Baktria. The verb κυριεύω may not actually imply traveling to any of those places, although the text does specifically claim that Ptolemy crossed the Euphrates. Ptolemy could well have become
lord of the lands beyond the Euphrates by virtue of supporting the “rights” of his (presumed alive) sister in the absence of the Seleucid monarch. His conquests in Asia Minor may have functioned in a similar way, although the Ptolemies already maintained a presence in many of those regions. For example, Ptolemy could claim the conquest of Cilicia through the activities and loyalties of Seleucid forces there, which the narrative in Chr.Wilck. 1 describes as supporting Berenike against Laodike and her sons.

The inscription concludes, first with a quintessentially Egyptian report of returning Egyptian temple goods formerly plundered by the Persians, and second, with a report that Ptolemy led his forces back to Egypt through the canals in the rivers. The document breaks off at that point, but seems to have been near the narrative’s end. The canals in the rivers may be those between the Tigris and Euphrates, which is more faithful to the Greek than assuming a passage through the canals between the Nile and the Red Sea. This text implies that a large force crossed the Euphrates and operated along or beyond the Tigris under the leadership of Ptolemy before returning to Egypt. Like the other Ptolemaic texts, it makes no clear reference to major combat, although it

\[\text{εἰς Αἴγυπτον δυνάμεις ἀπέστειλεν διὰ τῶν ὀρυχθέντων ποταμῶν.} \]
\[\text{Note the actual wording is “the dug out rivers.” I take this to mean rivers through which canals had been dug.}\]

\[\text{Polyb. 9.43 refers to the canals of the Euphrates and Tigris, going so far as to say that the canals were so extensive that the Euphrates ceased to actually empty into the Persian Gulf. The text, which likely originally served as a portion of the narration of Antiochus’ anabasis between the conquest of Armenia in book 8 and of the farther east in book 10, tells how the whole army was transported on canals—a good parallel to the reading I suggest.}\]
does provide the best evidence for a large-scale mobilization of the settler army during the war.

3.1.2. The Documentary Evidence from the Seleucid Side

The Seleucid documentary evidence consists of Babylonian chronicles and a small number of inscriptions from Asia Minor. The Babylonian chronicles are extremely helpful for dating the beginning of the war, its pace, and its extent. The astronomical chronicle (BM 132276) for year 66 of the Seleucid Era (246-245 BC), after mentioning a visit by the royal family to Egasila earlier in the year, records for the fifth month, Abu, that “on the 20th of the month (August 19), news arrived in Babylon [of the death of King Antiochus] and fear was in the land.”\(^{22}\) The news of the king’s death may be supplied safely in this lacuna based on another fragment of the same text, which lists Antiochus as king from the first month, Nisannu, to the sixth month, Ululu, and his son Seleucus as king from Abu to the end of the diary in the sixth month, Ululu. The Babylonian king list (BM 35603) corroborates the date: news of Antiochus’ death reached Babylon in the month Abu, August of 246 BC, and his son Seleucus II ruled in his place, his first full year of rule in the 67th year of the Seleucid era. Thus his rule began in the 66th year. It is also significant that the chronicle’s concluding words: “and fear was in the land”

\(^{22}\) Van der Spek (1997/8): 167-175. Many of the texts discussed in this section are being actively edited by Robertus van der Spek and Irving Finkel, who have made texts, translations, and brief commentaries available on the internet at <www.livius.org/cg-cm/chronicles>. 

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indicate that by the end of the month news had reached Babylon not only of the king’s death but of the beginning of a war.

Two documents provide evidence of the war itself. The first and best known of these is BM 34428 (= BCHP 11), generally known as “the Ptolemy III chronicle,” which mentions Ptolemaic military activities in Mesopotamia. Recent doubt about the value of this text is unjustified. The reading offered by Finkel and van der Spek, while preliminary, constitutes the most extensive narrative of the war from an eyewitness source, apart from, arguably, Ptolemy’s account of the war’s opening scenes. The chronicle follows the latter part of Ptolemy’s invasion of Asia, beginning in the month Kislimu (late November-late December 246), and continuing into the eleventh or possibly twelfth month of the Seleucid year 66, or as late as mid-March 245. The entry for Kislimu indicates that Ptolemy besieged first Seleukeia-on-the-Euphrates-and-the-Royal-Canal, and that the forces at Babylon prepared their defenses as Ptolemy’s army arrived, with Ptolemy among them. The entry for Tebetu (late December to late January) describes the arrival of Hanii troops (Macedonians) before Babylon in the middle of the month. Their arrival, along with battle equipment and siege engines,

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23 Grainger (2010: 162) considers it unlikely that Ptolemy could actually have advanced so far, and more likely focused on Syria and Asia Minor. Grainger’s account generally carries a pro-Seleucid bias, and so his rejection of Ptolemy’s advance into the interior of Mesopotamia is understandable.

24 The text, on obv. 3, 7-8, refers to a city, Seleukeia, the royal city, located on the Euphrates and on the Royal Canal. Other Babylonian texts refer to this city, and were it not for the reference to the Euphrates, it would easily be thought the city of Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, which truly was a royal city, complete with a royal residence, and also on the Royal Canal. The Royal Canal connected the Tigris and the Euphrates, the former at Seleucia, the latter several miles north of Babylon, near Sippar. Line 4 refers specifically to the presence of Ptolemy outside Babylon.
marked the true beginning of the siege. Although the term Hanii was used of
Macedonians generally, the chronicler used several additional phrases to ensure that
they were not mistaken for Seleucid forces. They are described as men “who did not fear
the gods” and “were clad in iron panoply.” The chronicler’s frequent references to the
iron panoply and iron weapons of the Ptolemaic Hanii may give some indication of their
high-quality armor, if many of the soldiers were clad in iron cuirasses rather than
bronze, and is also good evidence for the presence at Babylonia of some portion of the
Ptolemaic phalanx.

The "Ptolemy III Chronicle" (BCHP 11) also narrates the bloody fighting in
Babylon and Mesopotamia during the war, corroborating the sharp conflict found in
Catullus rather than Polyaenus’ peaceful conquest. The fighting began in earnest on 19
Tebetu (12 January 245) with an assault on the Bêlet-Ninua citadel, thought to have been
on the northern and western side of the city. The chronicler reports that the Hanii
slaughtered the people with their iron weapons as they fled the citadel for the royal
castle. The conquest and plunder of the portion of the city on the west bank of the
Euphrates likely followed. Five days later, 24 Tebetu, a large number of reinforcements
arrived under the command of an unnamed general from Egypt. The reinforcements are
again described as clad in iron panoply. These reinforcements, who came downstream
from Seleukeia, could have been sent following a successful siege, or might have been
fresh troops from Egypt. On 26 Tebetu he (presumably the unnamed general) entered
the Esagila. The remainder of the obverse is either missing or illegible, but possibly the
reverse of the chronicle begins in the last days of Tebetu or narrates events of the
following month. The first lines, six in all, describe the performance of Greek sacrifices
in Esagila, even within the inner temple of the Esagila, where it says that he (again
presumably the unnamed general, possibly Xanthippos) “ate bread in it,” a symbolic
desecration. Fighting continued. The garrison troops from the palace on the north of the
city were continually slaughtered by the Ptolemaic troops concentrated around the
Esagila. The weeks of urban combat are unparalleled in the Hellenistic period. The next
month, either Shabatu or Addaru, continued much the same, with more garrison troops
slaughtered, until about the sixteenth day, when Seleukos, the epistates of Seleucia,
arrived in Babylon.25 His troops were slaughtered, much like the Babylonian garrison
troops, inside the city, fighting against the troops of the Ptolemaic general. Later that
month, the Ptolemaic Hanii made another attempt on the palace of Babylon, again
slaughtering the garrison, but again failing to take the citadel. The remainder is lost, but
the chronicle provides clear evidence for Ptolemaic conquests in Mesopotamia,
uncertain evidence for the general Xanthippos, and a strong indication of the presence of

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25 Seleukos the epistates will appear again (BCHP 10). It seems that he was the governor of Seleukeia-on-the-
Euphrates, but the circumstances of his arrival in Babylon from a city either under siege or conquered is a
mystery. Line 11, which refers to “the troops appointed (ma-nu-u) to him in the city” may indicate either
that he had withdrawn from Seleukeia-on-the-Euphrates with the city garrison, and appeared about the 16th
of the month hoping to effect a reversal of fortunes in Babylon, or that he had fled from Seleukeia-on-the-
Euphrates, where, as line 12 indicates, his men may have all been slaughtered, and taken command of new
troops assigned to him at Seleucia-on-the-Tigris.
the Ptolemaic settler army in Babylon. Ptolemy could, in theory, have departed Babylon as early as January to make his way back to Egypt in the event of a revolt.

The picture of the conclusion of the war is lost, although some additional documents help complete the picture. A tablet from Uruk (BRM II.17), from the third month of year 67, refers to the kingship of Seleucus, establishing a *terminus ante quem* for a strong Seleucid presence in the area in early July of 245 BC. At the same time, this account must not be counted too heavily. After all, *BCHP* 11 clearly shows the presence of powerful Seleucid loyalist forces in Mesopotamia, so it is not beyond doubt that Uruk itself may have passed the war relatively unscathed by Ptolemaic attacks. Another chronicle, the so-called "Seleucid accession chronicle," *BCHP* 10, contains punctuated histories of the accessions of several Seleucid rulers. Although the fragmentary chronicle remains unpublished, it includes a report of Seleucus’ accession to the throne.26 This report follows a section break, above which, in the first line of the reverse and the whole of the obverse, a chronicle-like narrative relates events that preceded the accession by weeks or by whole years. The report declares that news reached Babylon that Seleucus had taken the royal throne at Sattike, the principal city of the Apolloniatis, north of Babylon and Seleucia-on-the-Tigris in the hill-country of Assyria. As a region of military settlement, the Apolloniatis would serve as the starting point for Antiochus III’s later conquest of the East against Molon (Polyb. 5.51). It seems to have functioned in the

same way for Seleucus II as he campaigned to drive the Ptolemaic army out of Mesopotamia. The date of his accession is not given, but the fragmentary narrative on the obverse of the tablet ends in the sixth month, Ululu, perhaps of the previous year, which would have been 66 of the Seleucid Era, or September of 245 BC.\textsuperscript{27} We might then posit that Seleucus’ coronation at Sattike, signaling the renewal of his kingship over Asia, took place between September and early March of 245 BC, in the last six months of the 66\textsuperscript{th} year of the Seleucid Era. The text implies that the war had largely ended by that time, as Seleucus’ coronation concludes the narrative or rather, starts a new one.

Seleucus may have taken the crown in Ephesus as early as July, and was recognized as his father's successor in Babylon by late August. Actually ascending the throne in reconquered regions, as he did at Sattike, would have marked the beginning of his effective kingship over local places. It may also be significant that he did so in the Apolloniatis, likely a bastion of support, rather than in one of the more important cities of Mesopotamia, which may have still been contested by Xanthippos' troops into the 67\textsuperscript{th} year of the Seleucid era.

\textsuperscript{27} The key interpretive question here is whether the obverse actually relates the events that transpired between the death of Antiochus II and the accession of Seleucus II. On the reverse, the chronicle passes quite quickly from the accession of Seleucus to his death and the accession of his son, which has led previous commentators to look for a similarly rapid passage of events in the whole of the text. Van der Spek has noted that the mention of Seleucus, epistates of Seleucia-on-the-Euphrates, on the obverse must move that text closer to the Third Syrian War, since Seleucus was epistates of Seleucia during that war. If the conflict(s) narrated on the obverse took place during the time that Seleucus was governor of Seleucia but do not concern the Ptolemaic invasion, we must either allow Seleucus a very long governorship or invent new conflicts. The simplest solution is to read the obverse as an account of the war.
Accepting the obverse of \textit{BCHP} 10 and the first lines of the reverse up to Seleucus’ coronation in lines 5-6 as a record of the Third Syrian War permits some additions to the evidence from the other Babylonian sources. If Ululu as the month at the end of the text is correct, then the entire text on the obverse treats the two months from the death of Antiochus II in late July or early August to the end of Ululu (September). Following a possible reference to the death of the king in line 2, line 3 mentions the “siege engines in great number,” which were also described in \textit{BCHP} 11, and the next line Antioch in Syria, which implies a hasty start for Ptolemy at the onset of the war. Lines 5-6 refer to Seleukos the epistates of Seleukeia-on-the-Euphrates-and-the-Royal-Canal, the man who brought reinforcements to Babylon in \textit{BCHP} 11, and the city that \textit{BCHP} 11 implies was seized by Ptolemy as his base of operations for the attempted conquest of Mesopotamia. Nothing can be said of his activities. Lines 7-8 contain unclear references to a Menes and an “Antiochus son of,” the latter possibly Antiochus Hierax, son of Antiochus, who remained in Ephesus after the start of the war, or Antiochus son of Berenike, murdered at Antioch. Line 9 refers to a slaughter with the sword of many people, in language similar but not identical to that of \textit{BCHP} 11. It probably refers to a defeat, if we may judge from the mention of a lamentation by a priest from the temple in the Egasila in the next line. On the obverse, lines 3-4 refer to the capture of the Lamassu-Rabi Gate on the southern side of the Egasila and subsequently of the temple of the Egasila. The fighting at the temple complex and
between the complex and palace in the early months of 245 occupies much of BCHP 11, and lines 3-4 may refer to that series of events. If so, word must have arrived in Babylon of Seleucus’ coronation at Sittake late in the winter of 245 BC, perhaps in the midst of the stalemate between the Ptolemaic forces in the city and the Babylonian garrison in the citadel.

A few inscriptions from Asia Minor can enlighten the conflict in that region, just as the Babylonian chronicles improve understanding of the eastern campaigns. IG XII.11, a decree of honors for Boulagoras from his fellow citizens at Samos, dating to the reign of Ptolemy III, sometime after c.242 BC. The text recounts contemporary and earlier instances of Boulagoras’ extraordinary work on behalf of the Samians. Some years earlier, before the start of the Third Syrian War, the Seleucid king Antiochus, almost certainly Antiochus II Theos, seized from the Samians. The Aniitis, a large plain on the coast of Asia Minor, furnished much of the farmland for Samos. Many Samians, displaced when Antiochus seized it, were upset to see the land given to local administrative officials and military settlers. This in itself is noteworthy, as it provides an indication that Antiochus was establishing katoikic settlements even on the western

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28 This inscription and others others discussed below are difficult to date. Although historians may be tempted for the sake of narrative to apply very specific dates to this and other inscriptions (I single out no author in particular, because it has been done regularly), they may only be dated generally to their most plausible context(s).
coasts of Ionia amid the large and oft-honored poleis of that region. Boulagoras, according to the decree, went off to Ephesus to meet with Antiochus and lobby for the return of those lands to the people. He left with Antiochus and his army, traveled with him as far as Sardis, and won the return of the citizens’ property. Was this Antiochus Theos or Hierax? The former resided at Ephesus only late in his reign and may never have campaigned from there; the latter was never a king. He did march, however, from that city to go to Sardis, controlled by his uncle, to offer aid to his brother in the war, and then waged war against him. A few years later, Samos had come under Ptolemaic control, probably during the latter years of the Third Syrian War, during which time Ephesus too was under Ptolemaic control. Boulagoras provided the polis with the funds necessary to send theoroi to Alexandria. This latter act and Boulagoras’ history of many other benevolent acts toward the city constituted the proximate causes of the decree. For the present inquiry this text attests Samos’ change of hands during the war, the intensification of Seleucid settlement in Ionia during Antiochus II’s reign, and the plausible embassy of Boulagoras to Hierax in the early years of the Third Syrian War.

Not all results of the war were losses for the Seleucids. The archive of inscriptions from Mylasa in Karia concerning the temple of Zeus at Labraunda (I.Labraunda) attests Seleucid conquests during the latter years of the war.\(^{30}\) I.Labraunda 3

\(^{29}\) In the context of Hellenistic favors to the cities in previous generations the seizure itself is understandable, as Samos was before, and would be again, a significant site of Ptolemaic power and activity.

that Mylasa had been under Ptolemaic influence earlier in the third century, when it had received correspondence from both Ptolemy the Son (identified in the text as the brother of the present king, Ptolemy III) and from Sophron, a commander who at times served both the Seleucids and Ptolemies. The main body of the text is a letter from Olympichos, a local Karian dynast given military command by Seleucus II over the army camps and forts of the region.\textsuperscript{31} Seleucus II authorized him to confirm the \textit{eleutheria} and \textit{demokratia} of the city and to grant it rights over the temple at Labraunda. The local dynast likely made an excellent ally for maintaining titular authority over the region, although one must question the diminishing returns and implications for long-term stability of allied petty kings and free cities, particularly the former. The cities of Asia Minor often had an advantage in interactions with the monarchs, and many may have used the war to negotiate improved honors from the competing monarchs. The Mylasa decrees probably resulted from such a process, as did many others.\textsuperscript{32}

Finally, the famous treaty of \textit{sympoliteia} between Smyrna and Magnesia under Sipylos (\textit{OGIS} 229.1-3) provides insight into the consolidation of Seleucid control in Asia

\textsuperscript{31} See \textit{I.Labr}. 3, a letter from Philip V, for a description of Olympichos’ status under Seleucus II. See also Walbank (1942), Virgilio (2001), Isager and Karlsson (2008) for more on the career of Olympichos.

\textsuperscript{32} Ma (1999): 44. We might add to this the decree from Smyrna, (see next note), which certainly resulted from multiple embassies to the king (\textit{cf.} the example of the Samians), who lobbied the Seleucids before rejoining the Ptolemies, or Miletos, which seems also to have lobbied Seleucus for grants and privileges in exchange for loyalty (\textit{RC} 22, \textit{OGIS} 227). Miletos had been taken by Antiochus II and must have either fallen back to Ptolemy III earlier in the war or been at risk of doing so.
Minor following or near the end of the war. The treaty, which dates to the end of the war, and therefore likely around 242-240 BC, concluded a series of hostilities between local military factions and provides significant details, not necessarily about the course of the war, but about the Seleucid military institutions in Asia Minor around the time of the Third Syrian War. Ptolemaic forces are not explicitly mentioned in the text, although there is a reference to an invasion (τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔφοδον, 1.3), the presence of enemies in the vicinity of Smyrna, and a time of war, during which the conflict between the Magnesians and Smyrnaeans had arisen. Seleucus had crossed over to the Seleukis (northwestern Syria) and in his absence the conflict had broken out (1.1-2). This can be dated to the winter or early spring of 245. The embassy to the king that produced the sympoliteia occurred when the king had again crossed over into the Seleukis (1.13), thus about the time of his expedition to raise the Ptolemaic siege of Damascus. The date should then be c.242 and, like other decrees near the end of the war, functioned to strengthen Seleucid ties to major cities while honoring and strengthening the loyal cities themselves.

In the treaty, Smyrna acted with royal backing to reconcile with the soldiers and settlers at Magnesia and incorporate them within the citizenry of Smyrna. The Magnesians also reconciled with the king and pledged their renewed loyalty, and then the process of sympoliteia began. The Smyrnaians seem to have remained loyal during the fighting and suffered property losses because of it (1.4-5). The relationship between the invasion and the Magnesian rebels is unclear. If Seleucid forces aligned with Ptolemy conquered Cilicia at the onset of the war, it is also possible that the disloyal forces described in the text were also operating in the name of Berenike and Ptolemy. There may not have been any Ptolemaic invasion. They may also have operated with the backing of an unnamed local dynast or on the behalf of Antiochus Hierax. Even if their primary allegiance were to one of these latter two, the Ptolemies may well have considered both extensions of Ptolemaic operations in the region. Instead, all of the military forces mentioned in the text are Seleucid, although many fought against one another during the Third Syrian War.

The text’s description of the military forces involved in the treaty furthers understanding the contemporary Seleucid military system in Asia Minor. Three parties

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34 Smyrna had earlier received a grant of benefits from Seleucus mentioned at line 1.6-12, much like those awarded to other poleis, honors and vows of protection of their autonomia and demokratia, and a decree of asylia for both the city and its chief sanctuary, the temple of Aphrodite Stratonike.

35 E.g. P.Haun. 6 refers to the bestowal of operations and strategia in Cilicia on Antiochus, quite possibly Antiochus Hierax; the extent to which the perspective of the Ptolemaic chronicle reflects Ptolemaic strategic thinking must be considered in terms of the Ptolemaic memory of the conflict, which would retain some elements of the strategic perspective of the Ptolemies during the course of the war as the frame within which the memory would have been created over time.
appear in the text, most with various subdivisions among them. First, the Smyrnaians, whose military forces probably included both citizens and possibly mercenaries who defended the city during the war. Another example of forces from Smyrna is the detachment sent to Magnesia-under-Sipylos as a garrison (3.99). One may only speculate what potential relationships these citizen troops had with the Seleucid monarchs.36

Second, the forces of Magnesia-under-Sipylos, which fought against the people of Smyrna on the side of Ptolemy and/or Hierax. The Magnesians are described as katoikoi (settlers) at the town, and the hypaithroi stratietai (encamped troops) in the choria, both infantry and cavalry. The katoikoi would be soldier-settlers according to the standard model, possessing allotments according to their military status.37 The stratietai, contrasted with the settlers, were likely active-duty troops of some sort, and yet sufficiently connected to the land and to Magnesia to have been included in the sympoliteia. The katoikoi, among whom cavalry are not mentioned, may have been Macedonians and served as a reserve for the phalanx. The hypaithroi troops may have held allotments (at least some of them did not, however: 3.102-3), but were deployed in a

36 We can only speculate about the nature of these troops. They may have helped provide the Greek troops in Seleucid armies and may even have been numbered among the mercenaries of Antiochus’ army at Raphia, or may have comprised contingents of thorakitai and thureophoroi, known in Seleucid armies, and represented visually in western Asia Minor, see e.g. Burr (1934: 112) for a thorakites terracotta from Myrina, or Eberhard (1959: no. 227) for another thorakites. A number of grave stelai held in archaeological museums in Istanbul, Iznik, and Izmir depict both Galatian and Hellenic troops with thureoi, though I do not have inventory numbers for these, though I observed them while traveling Turkey in 2007.

37 They are also described as free from taxation. If the model described in RC 51 for Pergamon is any indication, kleroi ranged between 137.5 and 55 plethra of farming and garden land, the larger for cavalry and the smaller for infantry; note that these kleroi are significantly smaller than those given to equivalent troops in Egypt.
comparatively active role, which we might imagine involved patrolling the broad plains to the north and south of Sipylos. It did not reflect well on the Seleucid settler system that, in wartime the settlers and local forces played turncoat.

Third, the garrison of Palai-Magnesia, at that time a fortress, consisted of three units: infantry detached from the phalanx to strengthen the guard over the *chora* under their commander Timon, a contingent of Persians under Omanes, and a contingent from Smyrna under Menekles—the latter most likely a former garrison of Smyrna, since the soldiers were granted citizenship as a result of the treaty. Timon’s command, the only epigraphically attested unit of the Seleucid phalanx, implies that some portion of the phalanx operated on a semi-active basis, more like the *hypaithroi* than the *katoikoi*. The treaty ensured that the *katoikoi* and *hypaithroi* from Magnesia and the men of Timon from Palai-Magnesia received citizenship at Smyrna and *kleroi* somewhere in the *chora* below

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38 The role of the fort garrison in the fighting is unclear, and it is possible they were included in the treaty simply to be comprehensive.

39 The unit of the Seleucid phalanx widely recognized to have served in an active capacity was the *peltastai*, also called, in some places, the *argyraspides*, see Bar-Kochva (1976): 59-66. A unit of the elite *peltastai* stationed in Old Magnesia would certainly have helped to stabilize the situation militarily and in Seleucus’ favor. Nevertheless, the text identifies the unit as a detachment from the phalanx, which some historians usually distinguish from those elite regiments, like the *argyraspides/peltastai*, which at times operated as *phalangites*. What did it mean for an active-duty detachment from the phalanx to be given citizenship at Smyrna? This question has not been seriously considered. Conceivably, they, like most Ptolemaic klerouchs, had not possessed full citizenship and the treaty effectively settled them into the military reserve. On the other hand, one might consider whether the inclusion of so many military troops in the citizenship of a protected and honored city might eventually pose serious complications to Seleucid military mobilization.
Sipylos, thus gradually eliminating any obvious distinctions between the groups, and providing the basis for a larger settler system.\(^{40}\)

### 3.2. Ptolemaic Documentary Evidence

#### 3.2.1. Conquests

Numerous inscriptions from Asia Minor confirm and extend understanding of Ptolemaic operations in that region. A few examples will illustrate the point. Many only confirm Ptolemaic conquests, for example, a gymnasia dedication in honor of the royal family at Gulnar in Cilicia Tracheia,\(^{41}\) honors to a Ptolemaic official at Priapos in the Hellespont,\(^{42}\) and the later activities of Ptolemy III’s generals in Samothrace and the Hellespont.\(^{43}\) Others confirm the return of Ptolemaic power, whether at Arsinoe-Nagidos

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\(^{40}\) The contingents under Omanes and Menekles were not included in the entirety of the gifts, but were given citizenship, and a promise that the people of Smyrna would ensure that they continued to receive their *metremata* (rations) and *opsonia* (pay), just as they had formerly received from the crown. Although the soldiers of Magnesia-under-Sipylos and Old Magnesia received the rights of citizens at Smyrna, their connection to kleroi and tax-free status would have preserved (in theory) their military relationship with the crown. Those without kleroi were given *hippikon kleroi*, allotments suitable for cavalry. These are unknown as such elsewhere in Seleukid sources, though we might imagine a relation to Persian cavalry allotments for settled Medians, or to the 70-100 aroura allotments given to Ptolemaic settlers.

\(^{41}\) SEG 31:1321; similar language is used in an inscription from Ainos in southern Thrace, *Asylieurkunden 8*, dating c.242 BC, as part of a grant to Koan ambassadors.

\(^{42}\) SEG 34:1256; Sahin EA 4 (1984):5.

\(^{43}\) IG XII.8.156 is the most important document on the career of Hippomedon, son of Agisalaos, a Lakedaimonian in the service of Ptolemy III as strategos of “the Hellespont and the regions of Thrace.” The text, dated to the latter years of Ptolemy’s reign, suggests that Hippomedon may not have even been the first strategos of the region after the Third Syrian War. The text honors Hippomedon for providing infantry, cavalry, and artillery for the defense of the mainland territories attached to Samothrace. The other decree is for Epinikos, strategos of Maroneia and also concerns local defense; see Gauthier (1979: 76-89). For discussion of both see Bagnall (1976): 160-165 and Ma (2002): 45.
in Cilicia Tracheia, Telmessos in Lykia, or Samos in Ionia (above). The epigraphic and
numismatic evidence for major Ptolemaic gains in Asia Minor is large and growing.

The earliest Ptolemaic inscription following the onset of the war is a letter of
commendation to the people of Kildara in Karia from Tlepolemos, a Lykian dynast in
Ptolemaic service. One might compare Tlepolemos to the Seleucid-friendly
Olympichos, although Tlepolemos had been active in Egypt (PP 5288, 17243) as well as
Asia Minor and was directly involved at the Alexandrian court, where he served as the
priest of Alexander and the deified Ptolemies from 247-245. His Alexandrian service
would almost certainly have overlapped with the timing of the letter inscribed by the
Kildarans. He thanked the Kildarans for their loyalty to Berenike and her son Antiochus,
the rightful heir of Antiochus, thus confirming Ptolemy’s stratagem to gain power

44 SEG 39:1426; Jones and Habicht (1989). Ptolemy II’s general Aetos, first of a long line of prominent
Aspendians to serve the Ptolemies, had established Arsinoe on the coast of Rough Cilicia, probably during
the First or Second Syrian War. His son Thraseas, who fathered the Ptolemaios who would later command
part of the phalanx at Raphia before defecting to the Seleucids, became strategos of Ptolemaic Cilicia. Aetos
may still have been in Ptolemaic service as well, or a son by the same name: Aetos is the name of an
eponymous commander in the Koite of the Herakleopolite nome in 241/240 BC, over a unit of horsemen
(P. Frankf. 7). On the family, see Habicht ZPE 112 (1996) 92 and Sosin ZPE 116 (1997) 141-146.

45 OGIS 55, TAM II.1. The text mentions that the city had fared badly during the wars, although it is unclear
to which war(s). Ptolemaios son of Lysimakhos had taken possession of the city (possibly either c.259 BC or
c.243 BC) from King Ptolemy, son of Ptolemy, and ruled it until the month of Dystros in the seventh year of
Ptolemy III (early 240 BC). The prominence of Ptolemaios son of Lysimakhos at Telmessos can be
established as early as 259/258 (cf. Clara Rhodes 9:183-85), but his treatment of the people in time of crisis
after a harsh war and the cause of the honors given him in the text most likely came in the years before the
decree, i.e., during and after the Third Syrian War. Ptolemaios son of Lysimakhos and his descendants ruled
Telmessos as minor dynasts for several generations.

46 In addition to the locations mentioned above, Larisa and Lebedos were renamed as new Ptolemaic
settlements and unpublished inscriptions (noted in Robert, OMS IV (1974): 143, 183-4) indicate that
Kolophon, Teos, and Ephesus were all captured by Ptolemaic forces during the Third Syrian War. For a

47 Blümel, AE 20 (1992), 127-33; SEG 42.994; BE 94, 528.
through advocating on behalf of his sister and nephew. If one adds the common
assumption that Ephesus, too, fell to the Ptolemies during the war, then the list of
conquests offered by both the Ptolemaic monuments and the ancient narrative sources is
largely corroborated.49

3.2.2. Unrest

The war’s course, as reconstructed from the narrative sources, saw Ptolemy’s
rapid victories in Syria and possibly beyond the Euphrates, before hastily withdrawing
to Egypt to deal with a real or rumored domestic sedition and then returning to the war
mainly through attacks in Asia Minor, where he consolidated and extended his
territorial gains along the coast. As only Porphyrius and Justin mention the domestic
unrest or rebellion, some commentators dismiss these accounts as a convenient fiction
that excused Ptolemy III’s hasty retreat from Asia after the inhabitants of Syria finally

48 Based off of two pieces of ancient literary evidence: a passage of Phylarchus, quoted by Athenaeus, 13.593,
tells how the Seleucid governor of Ephesus, Sophron, who is also named in the inscription discussed above
from Mylasa, was targeted by a plot of Laodike when the latter had her court at Sardis, which would have
occurred during the progress of the Third Syrian War. He fled back to Ephesus, and is assumed to have then
turned Ephesus over to the Ptolemies. Some date to the course or aftermath of the Third Syrian War that
period of Ptolemaic occupation at Ephesus that ended in the murder of Ptolemaios Andromachou by his
Thracian mercenaries as Seleucid forces besieged the city (Huss (1998): 242-244, Bagnall (1976): 169-170,
Syrian War, then Ephesus must have fallen into Ptolemaic hands earlier, perhaps through the help of
Sophron.

49 Though one must bear in mind, conquering a handful of cities in a region could constitute conquering the
entire region, for the purpose of narrative history and honorific inscriptions.
realized that Berenike was dead and began turning their support to Seleucus. Others suggested that the sedition was actually orchestrated by the dioiketes Apollonios, who disappears from the papyrological record around 246/245 BC, or referred instead to a sedition in Cyrene among inflamed Greek subjects. Still other early commentators, like Mahaffy, considered the sedition an Egyptian uprising, perhaps related to the crisis referenced in the Canopus decree of 238 BC. According to the decree, when the populace was terrified as a result of a severe drought, the king wisely released stored grain and purchased additional grain overseas, averting the crisis and assuring the stability of the realm. Although one might question the scant mention of revolt and interpret Porphyrius and Justin in a variety of ways, P.Haun. 6 has changed that perspective, providing an account of a specifically Egyptian rebellion in a document.

52 Mahaffy (1895): 202-205 the Canopus decree is OGIS 56, lines 9-15; Bagnall and Derow offer the following translation of the relevant lines: “[Ptolemy] has maintained the country in a state of peace [ἐν εἰρήνηι διατετήρηκεν], fighting wars on its behalf against many peoples and those who rule among them; and they provide law and order [τὴν εὐνομίαν] for all those in the country and for the others who are ranged under their rule; and when the river once overflowed its banks insufficiently and all those in the country were terrified at this happening and were thinking upon the destruction that had taken place under some of the former kings, in whose reign those dwelling in the country met with droughts, exercising provident care over those in the temples and the others inhabiting the country, by exercising much forethought and forgoing not a little of their revenues for the sake of the safety of the people, and by sending for grain for the country from Syria and Phoenicia and Cyprus and many other places at rather high prices they saved the inhabitants of Egypt, leaving behind an immortal benefaction and the greatest record of their virtue both for contemporaries and for future generations; in return for which the gods have granted them their kingdom peacefully established [εὐσταθοῦσαν].” [emphases mine]
from Ptolemaic Egypt. So now it is generally accepted that some form of Egyptian uprising took place while Ptolemy was absent.

Documentary evidence for the revolt is scant, however, and it is difficult to provide any clear account of the revolt or unrest from Egyptian sources. For example, a Zenon papyrus from the beginning of year 4 (244 BC), includes a set of orders for “Lykophron and the machimoi under his command” as subordinates to aid the operations of Eukles, the latter the successor to some of the affairs of Zenon, who was seeking to collect debts. The use of machimoi as a sort of paramilitary force in the vicinity of Memphis would seem at least a little unusual in the immediate aftermath of the first Egyptian revolt, although no strong conclusions may be drawn from that point. A Petrie papyrus may be helpful, if undated. It contains several reports of violence, all between Greeks and Egyptians, and then a seizure of property from an Egyptian to be handed over to a Greek. Asklepiades, a royal scribe identified in the text as serving in the nomarchy of Maimachos, dates the text to the early years of Ptolemy’s reign, but it can be dated no more securely than that. One of the conflicts related to a nighttime skirmish between a handful of people at the sluices of a dike, and the Greek party

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53 Huss (1978: 151-156) has laid out both the historiography of the revolt and suggested the reading of the papyrus that describes the revolt. His reading has since been accepted by later writers; the plates accompanying Bulow-Jacobsen (1977) confirm the reading.
54 P.Zen.Pestm. 49
55 P.Petr. 2.23.1
accuses one of the Egyptians of tampering with the sluice-gate.\textsuperscript{56} If Mahaffy’s conjecture that drought and near-famine lay at the root of the near-rebellion, vigilante vandalism of irrigation works would constitute early acts of rebellion on the part of concerned farmers. This may be further strengthened by a near-contemporary document, from the harvest season of 246 BC, \textit{P.Petr.2.37}, detailing a series of orders for the amounts of water to be released through the irrigation works at Ptolemais, presumably Ptolemais Hormou, at the entrance to the Fayum depression, and the management of canals, dikes, and other waterways throughout the nome.\textsuperscript{57} The several orders also include emergency release of grain rations by one Arsinoite nomarch, Aristarchos, and an order that all the other nomarchs should do likewise. Another order mentions the deployment of \textit{chomatophylakes}, the guards of the dykes.\textsuperscript{58} The whole document consists of a range of orders which, taken individually, would not necessarily suggest crisis, but taken together may very well indicate the actions of administrators busily working to salvage the harvest. Within the context of a very bad harvest, one might easily imagine rising suspicions that the Greek administrators of the Fayum, and presumably of other areas as well, were not doing all they could to achieve proper irrigation, perhaps even hoarding much-needed grain. In such circumstances, the progression from suspicion to subterfuge and sedition was not necessarily a large one. Drought conditions may have continued

\textsuperscript{56} Lines 7-9: \textit{συνεστήσαμεν δὲ καὶ Σοκέα(*) αὐτῶι ἵνα ἦι μεθ’ αὐτοῦ / \textit{-ca.?-} τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ στόματος τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐγβατηρίας / \textit{-ca.?-} ἡμεῖς δὲ ἰδόντες τὴν κακίαν τῶν
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{P.Petr.} 2.13 and 3.44 also feature parts of this overall correspondence.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{P.Petr.} 3.44.4-5
for more than one year, exacerbating a problem that began at roughly the same time as the Third Syrian War, eventually producing the unrest that drew Ptolemy, but not the entirety of his army, back to Egypt.

3.2.3. Mobilizations

One of the most significant questions about the Third Syrian War for present purposes is the extent of the involvement of the Ptolemaic settler army. Ptolemy’s hasty departure may have emphasized mercenaries and the small permanent military forces at Alexandria or serving in the navy. Similarly, his scattered conquests in Asia Minor are likely to have relied heavily upon naval forces, mercenaries, Seleucid loyalists to Berenike, and cooperative local dynasts. What role, then, if any, did the settler army, the focus of so much recruitment and settlement during the reign of Philadelphos, play in the Third Syrian War? There is little direct evidence for large-scale mobilizations, which we might expect to be reflected in extended land leases or loans transacted by soldiers departing on campaign, or requests to home from men at camp, such that one could

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59 It is hardly conclusive, but concerns over lack of water are voiced again in SB 12.10853, in the Spring of the 4th year, and about the same time, a Thessalian horseman charged that his contract had not been enforced by the nomarch Aristarchos and he had not received the rents owed him by his farmer. Since Aristarchos is named several times as releasing stores of grain during the apparent crisis, it may not be the fault of the farmer but of the local administration that the horseman did not receive his grain. The horseman is called a chersanippos, a hapax legomenon, but since his unit, commanded by Alkippos, had served in the Limne (PSI 6.570) in the 250s, they may have been the forebears to the eremophylakes of later generations.

60 P.Enteux 48 (217 BC), P.Frankf. 7 (215 BC), P.Genova 3.103-6 (219/8 BC), P.Tebt. 1.137 (217 BC), and SB 12.11061 (218 BC) all either discuss activities at or originated from military camps, or refer to leases related
even wonder whether the domestic unrest might even have been caused by an under-utilized army left at home while the king and his mercenaries conquered abroad.

There is, however, sufficient indirect evidence for the settler army’s role in the war to provide at least a faint sketch of its actions: significant portions of it mobilized, saw significant combat, and returned to Egypt in several stages. Further, the settler army was in some ways expanded as a result of the war, even before the war had ended. The evidence for these surmises derives from information about deceased soldiers, prisoners of war, and the presence or absence of military units. A set of documents dealing with the allotments of deceased soldiers furnishes the most direct evidence for mobilization. Of these, we may consider documents dealing with the repossession of kleroi by the crown from deceased klerouchs as one type, and documents relating to the management of the kleroi of orphans as another.

Repossession of kleroi is attested in *P.Petr*. 3.105 and 106, and *P.Lille* 1.14. The two Petrie papyri are not standard orders for the repossession of a kleros, but rather, supplementary instructions intended to reconcile recent repossessions with pre-existing sub-leases. Unlike standard repossession orders, such as *P.Lille* 1.14, these do not

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61 Klerouchs often sub-let their allotments to farmers. Other klerouchs served as *syngraphophylakes*, guardians of the contracts. The sub-leases allowed klerouchs to farm smaller portions of their land or avoid agricultural work entirely.
clarify the reason for the repossession. The orders are directed to the local nomarch and all follow the same formula: “After the kleros of so-and-so located near such town had been repossessed to the crown following the planting in the 4th year, the syngraphophylax so-and-so has come and presented to us a sub-lease contract negotiated between previously-named-klerouch and the farmer so-and-so.” Administrators had transferred kleroi to the royal account without first dealing with the farming contracts soldiers had made. Soldiers often made farming contracts, either before going to war, or simply to free themselves from the burden of agriculture, with Egyptians, men of the epigone, and occasionally other klerouchs. The orders were meant to ensure that the harvest, presumably that amount of the harvest that normally went to the klerouch, ended up in the royal granaries, and not pocketed by the farmers. Because these orders deal with the business following repossession, the reason for repossession mattered little to the parties concerned. The death of the soldiers, however, during the war is the most likely explanation. After the army’s return, one chief order of business would be the management and redistribution of the lands of deceased combatants. The period after the planting in the 4th year would correspond to the spring of 243 BC, a good bit later than Ptolemy’s likely return to Egypt about the summer of his third year, 245. The orders contained in the papyri were issued even later, in June of the 5th year. Excepting the possibilities that royal repossession orders were suspended in bureaucratic procedure for a year and a half or that a large number of klerouchs passed away nearly
simultaneously, the orders contained in the Petrie papyri provide evidence of a large klerouchic mobilization and of the return of much of the army, having suffered numerous casualties, at some point during the 4th regnal year. Additional evidence will point toward the likelihood that a significant portion of the army returned during the 4th year. The implication of this is that a large force, drawn from the Ptolemaic klerouchs, operated in Syria and Mesopotamia for approximately two years, a remarkable operational and logistical achievement, far outstripping the actual territorial conquests achieved during the war.

_P.Petr. 3.105_ orders reallocated to the royal account the klerouchic allotments of Kallikles and Lysanias, the former at Kerkesoucha, the latter at Hiera Nesos. Both allotments measured twenty-four arouras and were called “infantry allotments.” We might presume that these were equivalent to the more commonly known category of the _triakontarouroi Makedones_, but the use of a different term here only reinforces the _ad hoc_ nature of the earlier generations of the klerouchic system. Furthermore, while the repossession orders exist in the surviving text for the kleroi of Kallikles and Lysanias, the papyrus also contains incomplete portions of two other, nearly identical, repossession orders. Furthermore, each of the orders was addressed to a nomarch, of
whom the most commonly named is Achoapis, the nomarch of the northern nomarchy of the precinct of Herakleides in the Arsinoite nome.\textsuperscript{62}

\textit{P.Petr. 3.106} orders reallocated to the royal account the klerouchic allotments of an unnamed \textit{triakontarouros}, Lysimakhos, a \textit{hekatontarouros}, and two other men, whose names, military status, and allotments are missing. The infantryman was settled near Bubastis and the cavalryman near Hephaistias. Although he is called a \textit{triakontarouros}, rather than simply one of the infantry like the men in 105, his allotment also measured twenty-four arouras. Lysimakhos, on the other hand, possessed the full one hundred arouras indicated by his title. Unlike the other three, he was almost certainly a member of the klerouchic cavalry, all of whom received one hundred arouras at this point. The fourth order in 106 was likely for another infantryman, as the surviving text more closely corresponds to the other infantry orders than to the order regarding Lysimakhos.

Although Lysimakhos may well have been the only cavalry casualty among the surviving repossessions orders, there is other evidence that the cavalry of the Arsinoite departed in large numbers for the war. Theodoros, the chief architect of waterworks in the Arsinoite nome at the time of the war, received a large number of orders contained in \textit{P.Petr. 3.43}, for large-scale works within the lands of the klerouchoi hippeis of the


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Arsinoite nome from 246 to 243 BC. The absence of the cavalrymen from the land would have provided an excellent opportunity for large irrigation projects.

To these we might add *P.Petr.* 3.104, which originated in the same archive and has essentially the same date and a very similar format. It orders the seizure of the grain harvest from the allotment of Alketas, who is described as “one of the prisoners from Asia,” from his kleros around Psinharpsenesisis, which had been transferred to the royal account. As with many of the orders regarding the presumably deceased soldiers, this order was addressed to Achoapis, and like the others refers to a farming contract, suggesting that even this prisoner-of-war did not farm his own land, although perhaps not for the same reason as the klerouchs. Heliodoros was scheduled to keep 30 artabas from the land he farmed, but the order states he had been paid, and that the full harvest should be transferred to the royal account. It is impossible to guess the size of Alketas’ allotment from the 30 artabas kept by Heliodoros. In the klerouchic contracts, the farmer kept between one and three artabas per aroura, and if we allow the same range, Alketas could have possessed as little as ten or as many as thirty arouras. Listing the overall total rather than a per-aroura rate may imply an unconventional allotment size, like the

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63 Theodoros inherited the position from Kleandros, who was chief architect over irrigation projects until c. 250 BC. Intriguingly, the mysterious circumstances that ended in Kleandros’ resignation or removal from office involved a high-ranking official named Xanthippos (*P.Petr.* 2.42). The name Xanthippos is not attested often in Ptolemaic Egypt, and it very well may be that the honored Xanthippos of the Kleandros affair was the same Xanthippos who commanded Ptolemy’s troops after the king’s departure for Egypt.
sixteen-and-seven-sixteenths-aroura allotments of the later Asiagenes.\textsuperscript{64} Whatever the size of the allotment, clearly Alketas received nothing from the harvest. This heavy taxation may have been the price for the possibility of eventual inclusion among the Macedonian infantry of the Ptolemaic king. For Alketas to already have an allotment, he and other prisoners from Asia must have returned earlier than the segments of the army that reported the death of the men in 105 and 106.\textsuperscript{65} The order for the seizure of Alketas’ allotment exists just below the bottom fragments of another seizure order.

\textit{P.Lille} 1.14, last of the repossession orders, was written in early June, 243 BC in Pharmouthi of the fifth year of Ptolemy III. Unlike the Petrie papyri, it is an actual order for the repossession of the allotment of a deceased klerouch.\textsuperscript{66} The papyrus reads:

“Ammonios to Aristarchos, greetings. Artemidoros, an aide in the company of Stratios, has written to us concerning the death of one of the men from the mercenary horsemen that have been settled around Pharbaitha, Theodoros son of Phanokles, a Salymbrian, an \textit{epilarches} of the men of Eteoneus. Repossess this man’s allotment to the crown, and take thought concerning the harvests, in order to secure everything for the crown.” Since this notice dates to about the time of the letters to Achoapis, it necessarily relates a later

\textsuperscript{64} See \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.2.1001 and \textit{P.Köln.} 10.411, Uebel nos. 650-59.
\textsuperscript{65} See below for more regarding prisoners of war from the Asian campaign. Alketas could conceivably have been a prisoner from the Second Syrian War as well, although the same archive of Achoapis contains specific references to prisoners of war from Asia taken during the Third Syrian War. The reason for the seizure of Alketas’ allotment is unclear, and we may only speculate as to his fate.
\textsuperscript{66} It is mistakenly read as a status transfer in Lewis (2001): 164, a mercenary becoming a klerouch and receiving an allotment.
death, since this is the initial repossession order and the others were issued before the planting of the fourth year. The date of Theodoros’ death belongs, most likely, to spring 243 BC and may correspond to the fighting in Syria around Damascus, mentioned in Eusebius. The addressee of the latter, Aristarchos, was a nomarchos like Achoapis. He is well known from the first volume of Lille papyri and was involved with the allotment of soldiers into the former *epoikion* of Metrodoros near Pharbaitha in the Arsinoite nome. He is also known to have overseen management of the settlers’ affairs, particularly relating to grain deliveries and irrigation. The higher-ranking officials who delivered news of the death cannot be traced to particular offices. The deceased soldier, although not attested elsewhere, fits into the puzzle of the Ptolemaic army in the Third Syrian War in interesting ways. Theodoros was an *epilarches*, a high-ranking officer within a hipparchy. But far from being just another example of a *hekatontarouros* cavalryman, Theodoros was one of the previously unattested *misthophoroi hippes*, or mercenary cavalry and an officer in the command of the previously unmentioned Eteoneus. The papyrus describes him as one among the mercenary cavalrymen who had (recently?) been settled in the vicinity of Pharbaitha. It is probable that the mercenary cavalrymen

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67 For his initial role overseeing the allotment of *hekatontarouroi* in the *epoikion* of Metrodoros, see *P.Lille* 1.12, where his role in overseeing transfers of grain to the royal granaries is also mentioned as in *P.Lille* 1.13 (244/243 BC). He is identified as a *nomarches* over a region with cavalry settlement at *P.Petr.* 2.39.a.19-20, cf. *P.Petr.* 2.37 and PSI 4.399 and others. For his involvement in irrigation, see the section above on evidence for the insurrection.

68 Pharbaitha was one of the towns in the *epoikion* of Metrodoros, within which Aristarchos had been involved in settling conventional cavalry troopers during the years after the Second Syrian War, although as recently as 252/251 BC much of the land had not been allotted to klerouchs, cf. *P.Cair.Zen.* 2.59252, 3.59361.
were settled on the land following their participation in the war and had then returned to the war, where Theodoros was killed. Theodoros, a Selymbrian, hailed from a small town in the Propontis, one of the regions targeted by Ptolemaic forces in the Aegean theater of war. Eteoneus, his commander, perhaps came from the same region and his father (or brother) was the Hyperbassas, son of Eteoneus, honored with a statue by the Samians after their return to Ptolemaic allegiance during the war.\textsuperscript{69} Eteoneus and Hyperbassas may have sided with Ptolemy at the onset of the war, helping secure early gains and building a force of mercenaries, including Theodoros. For their service, Eteoneus and his mercenary cavalrymen were then rewarded with allotments in the Fayum. That these mercenary cavalry under the command of Eteoneus were settled, much like other cavalry, in the region of the Fayum during and after the Third Syrian War is easily demonstrable: they are unattested beforehand and plentiful afterwards.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{69} MDAI 1960.113; about the same time, the daughter of Hyperbassas, Iamneia, was kanephore of Arsinoe, in 243/242 BC.

\textsuperscript{70} Eteoneus went on to command one of the numbered hipparchies, as did his son Ptolemaios. For the settlement of the mercenary cavalry, see \textit{P.Petr.} 2.29.a.6-10 and 3.82, both from the later 240s BC. \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.2.937, a command from 243/242 BC, orders assistance for one of the staff officers in the command of Eteoneus. Note that this interpretation of the mercenary cavalry runs contrary to the interpretation proposed by Clarysse and Thompson (2006), \textit{P.Count.} 1, a salt tax record for the \textit{misthophoroi hippeis}. I find it a more convincing reading that a number of mercenary horsemen were settled at once. Although they became klerouchs, their particular command retained its original name. Later units of \textit{misthophoroi hippeis} may well have operated as mercenaries, of course, but the \textit{misthophoroi hippeis} of the Arsinoite, originally commanded by Eteoneus, are better understood as settled mercenaries rather than an odd middle-ground class of troopers. These troops also seem to have been the first to receive seventy-aroura allotments, except for a strange and irregular case from the 270s. This size allotment, attested in both \textit{P.Petr.} 2.29 (actually 69 arouras) and \textit{P.Heid.6.377}, would become standard later in the reign of Ptolemy III for the “ethnic” hipparchies.
The case of these mercenary cavalrymen is thus not evidence for the mobilization of the settlers, but of the continued expansion of the settler system during the war.

The records of repossessed kleroi provide a picture of the prolonged warfare in Asia following Ptolemy’s return, providing evidence for troops, perhaps commanded by Xanthippos, who returned to Egypt late in 244 BC, and soldiers who served first in the Aegean theater, before receiving allotments in Egypt, and transferring to the Syrian theater. The admittedly sparse repossesson records do emphasize the role of the heavy infantry in the war. An important class in Ptolemaic Egypt and the backbone of the Ptolemaic army, the heavy infantry of the phalanx are not represented in great numbers within the papyri, yet if the repossesion records are any indication, many mobilized for the campaign. They would have joined Ptolemy, accompanied by elephants and cavalry and siege machines, somewhere in Syria, before proceeding across the Euphrates, where the likes of Kallikles and Lysanias may have fallen in the streets of Babylon, casualties among the hated iron-panoplied men of the Babylonian chronicle. Yet more evidence can be marshaled for the settler mobilization from tax records.

Determining the absence of men on a military campaign through tax records is a difficult task, for there are many possible reasons for inconsistencies in taxation. The overall picture during the war years, however, reveals that a large number of men were absent with the army and that yet more were killed, leaving behind complicated tax situations for the inheritors of their kleroi. The files of Achoapis, who like other
nomarchs oversaw klerouchs, their settlement, and their harvests, include *P.Lille* 1.30, which concerns the kleros of a cavalryman, Daipates. Achoapis administered this *kleros* from 5 Tubi (late February, 245 BC) of the 2nd year of the king until 7 Mecheir of the 4th year (late March, 243 BC) and oversaw the planting of Daipates’ 100 arouras, the harvest, and the taxes from the harvest from the planting season of the second year until after the planting of the 4th year. Despite possible alternative interpretations, if viewed beside evidence, 1.30 strongly suggests that Daipates was among those mobilized for the campaign and had his affairs managed by the local nomarch from the following planting season until his return, about the same time as the forces that returned and reported casualties. *P.Lille* 1.31-38 belongs among the same archive of planting, harvest, clearing, and taxation records, nos. 31-34 record large allotments that Achoapis administered on behalf of other high-ranking cavalrymen, all beginning in the second year and carrying through into the third or fourth.

A related document, *PSI* 4.388, concerns tax records for klerouchs at the end of the fourth regnal year in the spring of 243 BC. The first section of the papyrus provides a detailed account of the taxes of three cavalry klerouchs, an unnamed Macedonian, and two other men, also likely Macedonians, Leontiskos and Laagos.71 The document records

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71 The men are judged to be cavalrymen based on *chomatikon* taxes of about sixteen drachmas per year, but even in that regard their tax liabilities vary by year and by klerouch. For example, Laagos paid a different amount each year, between 7d10 and 13d20, which, if we assume the general assumption of one obol per aroura for the *chomatikon*, would relate to a kleros of 43 to 80 arouras. Leontiskos paid the 16d40 standard for a 100-aroura cavalryman in the 4th year, and the unnamed Macedonian paid between 11d40 and the

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the taxes of a first unnamed man and for Laagos for the 39th year of Ptolemy II through
the 4th year of Ptolemy III, but for Leontiskos only the 4th year. The taxes are fairly
standard, save that the first man and Leontiskos both paid in-kind taxes for collections
for Alexandria and for the Thebaid, otherwise unattested, while Laagos paid a very
large anippias in the 39th and 2nd years. Although a period of lax tax collection could
occur under other circumstances, the prolonged omission in this case and the
resumption of regular taxation during the fourth year, simultaneous with the return of
the army, indicates that the text documents the tax records for the kleroi of men who
had been, in the case of the first and third men, absent from the land for several years.

*P.Tebt. 3.1.746* reinforces this picture and may in fact provide the context for the
records contained in *PSI 4.388*. In May 243 BC, at the very end of the fourth year of
Ptolemy III, Menedoros, who may have been an agent in the office of Phanias, the
epistates of the klerouchic cavalry or one of its constituent branches, distributed orders
to the logeutai of the Arsinoite nome to organize the tax collections from the klerouchic
cavalry. The text implies that much of the grain had already been stored and further
states that portions of many allotments, called half-kleroi (ἡμικληρίων) were being

standard 16d4o. The variations in liability may be related to the varying amounts of uncultivable land from
year to year. See *P.Petr. 3.109* for further evidence of the standard klerouchic cavalry rate of 16d4o.
72 There were no taxes for the 1st year, which lasted only a few months.
73 Phanias is better attested under the previous king; see *e.g.*, *PSI 4.344*, *P.Cair.Zen. 2.59254*, *P.Zen.Pestm. D*,
and *SB 1.5942*, all from the last years of the reign of Philadelphos. Phanias resided in Alexandria, but
oversaw cavalry settlements.
accounted as royal allotments. Menedoros advises caution in dispersing various taxes or releasing leftover grain to klerouchs, needing clarification on proper procedure from Phanias. These royal half-kleroi were unusual and Menedoros’ uncertainty on procedure implies that the tax collection of the fourth year was a significant event. The situation described in the papyrus makes sense only if understood within the context of the other papyri examined thus far regarding the mobilization: with the army away for an extended period of time, royal agents, like the nomarchs, managed the affairs of cavalry allotments. Due to both their work, which would normally have been the responsibility of the klerouch, and the (possible) agricultural crisis of the period, much of the harvest each year was transferred to the royal account. The “half-kleroi” system, seemingly introduced by Phanias when the cavalry returned, provided a systematic way of handling the land and harvests of the years while the army was gone. PSI 4.388 examplifies the tax records drawn up after these orders were dispersed. The royal half-kleros would, I suspect, disappear in the fifth year, when the cavalrymen returned and could manage their own allotments. The royal half-kleros was used in later years as a sort of absentee management system, but for individual klerouchs. The broad usage of the system before the taxes of the fourth year provides decisive evidence for the general mobilization of the Ptolemaic cavalry.

See, e.g., P.Enteux. 55, the complaint of an eighty-aroura cavalryman against a Macedonian infantryman, arising from the handling of his affairs after the infantryman had rented the cavalryman’s royal hemi-kleros while he was in Alexandria and absent from his land for a prolonged period.
Another piece of evidence dating to the fourth year is the first of the royal decrees of Ptolemy III, *P.Hib.* 2.198.r.1, dated to the Macedonian month Loios of the fourth year, (c. September 244 BC). Here the king announced a series of promotions, listing men by their name, new rank, and eponymous unit.\(^5\) The list, apparently organized by nomes, may have also included details about the officers’ allotments. There is little evidence for large-scale settlement after this war, thus distinguishing the Third clearly from the Second Syrian War and even from the later wars. The settlement of the *mismatch* hippoc of Eteoneus and the possible provision of new or enlarged allotments for the officers in this royal decree constitute most of the evidence for new settlement. We might add to that number the settlement of some prisoners of war from Asia, such as Alketas, and others mentioned in another list comparable in some respects to the first decree in 2.198. Besides Alketas, *P.Petr.* 2.29.e, a small fragment of a letter, dated to the very end of the second year, treats the handling of prisoners of war from Asia. Here a superior provides orders for the management of a group of prisoners of war. The tenor of the note is generally positive, encouraging the subordinate to monitor the situation of these remaining prisoners, to provide for their needs, and to encourage them toward their *synapokatastasis,* which might be read as “repatriation” or “rehabilitation,” with very different implications for treatment of prisoners. The note

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\(^5\) There may be other suggestions than a list of promotions, chief of which, and not at all mutually exclusive, a decree that the men on the list should be given allotments corresponding to their status.
closes, however, with an admonition to ensure that none escape.⁷ Alketas and other suitable prisoners may have been settled on land as eventual additions to the settler system. The other name list, SB 16.12858, begins with a royal dating formula for May of 243 BC, in the vicinity of the other activity late in the 4th year. What remains of the fragmentary papyrus appears to plunge from the dating formula directly into a list of names, all of Greek men, without ranks, eponymous units, or ethnics. No other list quite like this exists, although it has parallels to the decree in P.Hib. 2.198. The beginning of the body of the text, now lost, may have provided an essential identity: perhaps “of the infantry,” since the heavy infantry were all, in theory, Macedonians and specifying real or imagined ethnicity for each soldier would have been unnecessary. In the 4th year, settlement may have been the most likely reason for the list of nineteen men, but the text offers only possible evidence for settlement. The general picture of the war is that Ptolemy III and his Friends did not feel particularly inclined to initiate any large round of settlements.

Evidence of tax collection during the first year of the war includes allotments either rented out by their klerouchs or assigned to farmers by the local nomarch. The clearest example, which may be dated conclusively to the first year of the war, is P.Petr. 2.39.E, a record of tax receipts for the kleroi of orphans. As many as eight cases are

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⁷ Prisoners from Syria are also referenced in P.Col. 4.87 (summer 244 BC). They had been assigned to work in orchards around Memphis, but had since been transferred elsewhere. They may have arrived in 245 when the king returned, thus about the same time as the orders regarding war prisoners in the document in question. A hostage from Babylonia is mentioned in P.Lond. 7.2052, from about 241 BC.
covered, in which the actual or projected harvest is listed, followed by the taxes for the second year, and the amount remaining afterwards. The document must date from the end of the second or beginning of the third year like most of the other tax documents and is late enough to provide for the return of the king and part of his army before that date. The situation of these orphan klerouchs is not at all clear.\textsuperscript{77} The right to inheritance of a kleros was not established until 218 BC during preparation for the Fourth Syrian War, and plentiful evidence exists (much of it produced above) that the crown readily seized the allotments of deceased klerouchs. The orphans may have been granted rights to the kleroi upon the deaths of their fathers in battle, which may have been reported after the return of the king. There is little other rationale for finding a whole group of orphans as klerouchs in 245 BC.

Fragment A of the same papyrus likely dates to about the same period. Although it lacks a date within the text, it refers to the nomarchs Achoapis, Philippos, Maimachos, and Aristarchos and so should date to c.245. It records the taxes in kind taken from the farmers of various kleroi. It is unclear whether the farmers would have been those assigned by the nomarchs, or whether they farmed the land through contracts with the absent klerouchs.\textsuperscript{78} The allotments include twenty-aroura allotments of the \textit{presbyteroi},

\footnote{77 The evidence for orphan klerouchs is reviewed in Criscuolo (1981): 259-65. As surprising enough as the situation is, one of the surviving fragments proclaims “NN. is not an orphan, but the son of Daiphantos”!}

\footnote{78 The document is, however, sent to one Herakleitos of Mytilene, perhaps a member of the epigone who was making a business out of organizing the farming of the allotments of campaigning klerouchs. This}
probably early settlers in the Fayum, a fifty-aroura allotment, and a one-hundred-aroura allotment. These are likely allotments sub-let from klerouchs or the nomarchs themselves, and the amounts listed are the dues owed to the local nomarchs and sitologoi.

3.3. Conclusions

Ptolemy III was joined, probably in Syria, by a substantial portion of the settler army developed by his father and grandfather. The entire army was not mobilized, as demonstrated by a number of papyri showing klerouchs engaged in everyday activities. But a substantial portion was and returned to Egypt in at least three stages: alongside the king in the spring of 245 BC, in a large-scale return in late 244 or early 243 BC, and in a final group from Syria or overseas about 242. The second wave of returning soldiers may have signaled the end of major operations in the Asian theater, although the Ptolemaic navy and supplementary forces may have continued operations in the Aegean would make sense of the text, which features scattered holdings of different sizes across the Arsinoite nome and four separate nomarchies.\textsuperscript{79} E.g., the hipparchy of Zoilos, which would mobilize later for the Fourth Syrian War, does not seem to have participated. The evidence is inconclusive: a soldier from the unit may be found in \textit{P.Hib.} 1.102 from 247/246 BC, but none is attested again until 244/243 (\textit{P.Hib.} 1.91, \textit{SB} 12.11059, 14.11376), a gap of several years large enough to allow the unit to have gone to war and returned. The eponymous command of Antiochos is an even clearer case, as men are attested from that unit in February 245 (\textit{P.Hib.} 1.32), at the time of the fighting in Babylon, and 245 (\textit{P.Col.} 4.85). In the Arsinoite nome, \textit{P.Cair.Zen.} 3.59350 tells of a complaint against the local cavalrmen and provides clear evidence that in the fall of 245 a sizeable number of cavalrymen had either returned from the war or never departed.
for another year and some sporadic skirmishes may have taken place in Syria. During the war, the Ptolemaic administrative institutions that helped build and maintain the settler army also maintained the structures of the system in the absence of much of the army. This feat seems to have been managed in spite of a potentially disastrous drought, which may also have forced the return of Ptolemy from Mesopotamia.

Although the Ptolemaic army had successfully campaigned in Mesopotamia, it owed much of its early progress to the confusion in the Seleucid realm following the death of Antiochus II and the willingness of some governors, generals, cities, and military units to remain loyal to Berenike instead of Laodike. In reality, the weaknesses of the Ptolemaic settler army were demonstrated during the war. It was slow and cumbersome while operating overland far from home and lacked the manpower to assert decisive Ptolemaic control over weakened and disorganized Seleucid regions. It excelled at operations in Koile Syria and along the coastlines of Asia Minor. Ptolemy III would devote time in the remainder of his reign to increasing the organizational efficiency of the army, but would not try to expand it significantly. He may have been confident in both the perpetual disunity of the Seleucid realm and the general reliability of his army and navy for defending the Ptolemaic heartland in Egypt.

The Seleucid political and military systems succeeded only inasmuch as Ptolemy did not become sole ruler of Hellenistic Asia. Both the political and military systems nearly collapsed. Governors and military commanders had divided loyalties and the
military units of the Seleukis, which undoubtedly were sizeable, failed to act against the passage of a large Ptolemaic army through the heart of Syria. Farther east, the stiff resistance and abiding loyalty of Mesopotamia shines for the Seleucids among an otherwise dismal showing. Still farther east, this period of confusion very likely corresponds to the revolts of Andragoras and Diodotos. Any attempt to restore Seleucid control over those eastern regions after the end of the war was forestalled for nearly a decade by the civil war that broke out between Seleucus and Hierax. Seleucid institutions were, ruling over such a large area, necessarily decentralized, and the history of the Third Syrian War demonstrates how, in a time of central weakness, the many local nodes of power could easily act on their own initiative. In Asia Minor, the allotment of lands to settler-soldiers caused tensions with local cities accustomed to honors rather than appropriations, and yet, as in the case of Magnesia, the settler-soldiers, the supposed backbone of the Seleucid military, became seditious themselves at the first sign of royal weakness. Neighboring kings, local dynasts, and sizeable poleis all constituted potential help or detriment and during most of the reign of Seleucus II all three tended to undermine Seleucid authority. Although the Third Syrian War demonstrated the inherent weaknesses of the Seleucid system, it also provided evidence of its resilience and promise of the astounding military capacity a powerful Seleucid king might one day mobilize for his purposes.
At the same time as the Third Syrian War, the First Punic War was drawing to a close. In that war, the two sides mobilized hundreds of thousands of men over twenty-three years of warfare. Although the Seleucids in particular ruled over territories with enormous potential reserves of manpower in the poleis of Asia Minor, the Seleukis, and in the great cities of Asia, they and the Ptolemies mobilized smaller militaries for their war. Through competition for the loyalty (and tax revenues and continued growth) of those cities, the Seleucids (and the Ptolemies as well) forfeited most of their rights to draw contingents of soldiers from those cities. Men from those places did serve in the militaries of both kingdoms, but their participation, particularly in the case of Asia Minor, was seldom extensive or systematic. The treaties and decrees passed between kings and cities did not stipulate military service and forged a decisive gap between the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Republic. This resulted from the contingency of each kingdom’s power, and their competition against one another for local support. This difference in manpower reserves would constitute just one of the several decisive distinctions between the Republic and the Hellenistic monarchies, and contributed to the triumph of the one, and the demise of the others.
Chapter 4. Recruitment and Reform at the Height of Hellenistic Power, 240-220 B.C.

With the close of the Third Syrian War, the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms took very different roads, before resuming direct warfare in the Fourth Syrian War, almost thirty years later. This war culminated in the battle of Raphia (217 BC), which was quite possibly the largest land battle of the entire Hellenistic era. This general period saw the maturation of Hellenistic military recruitment, organization, and settler systems, beginning with the Ptolemies, whose early apogee was eclipsed by Antigonid and Seleucid achievements in the twilight of the third century. Polybius has influenced the historiography of the late third century Ptolemaic army with his narrative of Ptolemaic war preparations. His declaration that “all military preparations had been neglected” (5.62.8) has colored historians’ views of the Ptolemaic military ever since.

While Ptolemy IV Philopator has been subject to almost universal opprobrium for more than two millennia,¹ scholars have tended to locate the purported downturn in Ptolemaic military readiness in the generally peaceful reign of Euergetes.² Polybius’

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¹ On the other hand, Huss (1976) has sought to revise the history of Philopator’s reign. The effect of his revision is to rehabilitate some aspects of Philopator’s administration, rather than Philopator himself. ² Van’t Dack (1988: 33) suggests that the military readiness of the klerouchy began declining already in the third century; Bar-Kochva (1976: 47-48) locates the onset of decline more specifically within the reign of Euergetes, who, with other Ptolemaic kings, put agricultural expansion ahead of military readiness. Manning (2003:233-4, speaking more about the economy than the military, but in general about the state, locates decline in this era. The issue of decline is a matter of multiple categories of analysis: military readiness or military power may be opposed to income or to economic stability. Clearly in terms of
narrative of the Fourth Syrian War is often said to have been derived from pro-
Ptolemaic sources, and subsequent scholars relying on this text have been similarly
biased. The documentary sources bear out a different story: military reforms and new
settlements, aimed at increasing the size and efficiency of the Ptolemaic army, occurred
late in Euergetes’ reign and continued in the years leading to the decisive battle of
Raphia. In Macedonia as in Egypt, successive monarchs labored to establish larger and
better-organized armies as they warred against the Leagues of Greece. Only in the
Seleucid kingdom does the story of progressive improvement falter, for in the decades
following the Third Syrian War the kingdom seemed poised to disintegrate and unlikely
ever to seriously trouble the other Hellenistic kingdoms. Yet the decades of seeming
decline ended in an astounding reversal, such that Antiochus III’s kingdom more than
caught up to the achievements of the other two kingdoms. Ptolemaic progress, in
particular, planted the seeds of change from within, but none of the three kingdoms,
whose armies had by the end of the third century attained impressive stability and
operating capacity, would evade major change in the following decades.

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3 See Bar-Kochva (1976: 128-9) for both the scattered literature on this topic and his own particular
perspective on the “pro-Ptolemaic” source.
4.1. Taxonomy of the Settler System: The Organizational Reforms of Ptolemy III

The Ptolemaic military, at the end of the Third Syrian War, was in a good position. The military forces had operated successfully on both land and sea, and the agricultural and land tenure system had survived the prolonged absence of many settlers. The remainder of Euergetes’ reign has often been cast as a time of decay for the Ptolemaic military. This conclusion is derived from the army’s need for reform at the onset of the Fourth Syrian War, according to the Polybian narrative, and the absence of any major military campaigns. Instead, the Ptolemies exchanged a military orientation for a preoccupation with agricultural expansion and neglect of military readiness. While the army was not tested by a major mobilization for over twenty years, the years were not a period of inactivity. Instead, Ptolemy reformed the organization of the army. The army that accompanied Ptolemy to Asia in the Third Syrian War was the result of ad hoc settlement in the previous generations. The army that he passed to his successor was comprehensively-organized: the structured army of an established kingdom. The Ptolemaic army engaged in minor actions during the remainder of his reign; this light activity provided the leisure to organize the cavalry and infantry better than before.

Ptolemaic military actions in the remainder of Euergetes’ reign consisted of two types of minor actions: southerly hunting expeditions, and Aegean operations. Elephant

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4 Van’t Dack (1988: 33) pinpoints the reign of Euergetes as the beginning of the decline of the Ptolemaic army. He and Lesquier locate the dissolution of their military quality in the economic emphasis built into the klerouchic system.
hunting expeditions (1) functioned as small military campaigns, but did not constitute major tests or exert significant stress upon the settlers system. The hunts likely constituted the principal peace-time military action for Ptolemaic cavalrymen, who escorted the expeditions through hostile territory and may have participated in the hunts themselves. The Adoulis inscription (OGIS 55) establishes that a Ptolemaic elephant corps of some size existed before the Third Syrian War, but historical, archaeological, epigraphical, and papyrological evidence confirms the continuation of multiple elephant-hunting campaigns during Euergetes’ reign. The founding of several cities on the Red Sea—Berenike upon Dires and Berenike near Saba (Adoulis)—are thought to date from that era. These settlements facilitated inland expeditions by strengthening Ptolemaic positions along the coast.\(^5\) There is not extensive evidence for elephant hunts during his reign, but what evidence exists is adduced below. A papyrus from Thebes, UPZ 2.157, records compulsory services to the crown, including ten men dispatched on an elephant hunt in the fifth year of Euergetes (243/2 BC). A dedication at Philai, Thebes à Syene 309, may belong to the same period. Hunters give thanks to several deities for their safe return from an elephant hunt, and their inclusion of Harpokrates

\(^5\) Cohen (2006: 305-44) and Mueller (2006: 152-6); These foundations also had the effect of increasing Ptolemaic economic exposure to the incense trade route with Arabia and, by extension, India.
among the deities thanked finds its only parallel at Philai in the dedications made there during the visit of the royal family, early in the reign of Euergetes.6

The evidence for elephant hunts in Euergetes’ reign is best in the last years of his reign, by which time it was apparent that war was coming: Seleucus II was already dead, and Ptolemaic forces were increasing their activities in the Aegean region. In Euergetes’ twenty-fourth year, 224/3 BC, multiple elephant hunts took place, providing a steady elephant-hunting presence in the years before war. Chr.Wilck. 452, from that year, is an urgent letter from Manres to the citizens of an unidentified town along the canal route from Heroonpolis to Berenike. A new hunting expedition under its strategos was heading toward the hunting grounds, while elephant transports carried captured animals toward the Nile and grain was in short supply because an elephant transport had sunk. The hunters on the new expedition are described as having been drafted, or literally, called up for service, οἱ κυνηγοὶ ἐπιλελεγμένοι. In this period, and perhaps earlier as well, Ptolemaic cavalry were drafted for the hunts. The hunts then could serve as small-scale trial mobilizations, in addition to maintaining readiness. One of the stations established on the Red Sea for hunts was the “Hunting Ground of Pythangelos” (Strabo 16.4.14), north of Deire, and P.Petr. 3.114, from 223 BC, records a number of cavalrymen called up for service or mobilized for elephant hunts. Of the latter group,

6 Ἰσιδί Σαράπιδι Αρησοχάτον Αμιμων Θεοίς Σωτήρας ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἐλεφάντων σωτηρίας; for the dedication at Syene, see Bingen (2006: 34).
both men mentioned are under the eponymous command of “Pythangelos and Ptolemaios his son.” The same year, the text published in *Chr.Wilck.* 451 concerned wages for men of Peitholaos departing on an elephant hunt, including 231 men under their commander Andronikos. Peitholaos, too, bestowed his name on hunting grounds and bases along the coast, and set up altars, just like his contemporary Pythangelos (Strabo 16.4.14-15). These voyages involved the transportation of small armies of men and materiel, traversed adverse terrain with poor supply, and covered more than two thousand miles round-trip, further than the campaign of Ptolemy’s army in the Third Syrian War. In short, the elephant hunts were essential activities, not only to maintain the Ptolemaic elephant corps, but to maintain the logistical and operational readiness of the Ptolemaic army.

In (2) the Aegean, Ptolemaic forces consolidated and expanded their control over newly-won territories. Ephesos may have returned to Seleucid control briefly at the end of the war, following the betrayal of the Thracian mercenaries and death of Ptolemy Andromachou, but if so, it was retaken and remained a significant Ptolemaic possession for the remainder of the third century.\(^8\) With its recapture, the other inland cities of Ionia

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\(^7\) Command of the elephant hunts coincided with prominence for Pythangelos at court: his daughter Berenike was a court priestess in 223-222 (SB 18.14013, 20.14107), and he was eponymous priest in 213 BC (BGU 6.1246). The troops under his command were probably settled mercenaries, and like the men under the command of Eteoneus, were a secondary section of the Ptolemaic cavalry, after the hundred-aroura cavalrymen, the mainstay of the Ptolemaic cavalry.

\(^8\) Bagnall (1976): 170-171. The story of the Thracian mercenary revolt and their murder of the “son of Andromachos” is set within the context of a Seleucid siege. Whatever may have transpired at that moment,
would almost certainly have returned to Seleucid control in short order. But elsewhere, Ptolemy remained in control of scattered出posts from Ionia to Cilicia, and in the northern Aegean, Thasos, Samothrace, and some of the cities of coastal Thrace and the Hellespont. From those positions, Ptolemy gave support to the Aetolians in their wars against Demetrius II and Antigonus III of Macedon, mentioned in the Ptolemaic Chronicle (P.Haun. 6.18). The Ptolemaic navy had suffered defeats against the Antigonids at Kos and Andros, both of which may have been fought in the late 240’s BC. Assisting Aetolian resistance to the Macedonians in the 230’s figured into a strategy oriented toward reestablishing Ptolemaic dominance in the Aegean. The war began in about 236,9 but may not have seen heavy fighting until about 229/8.10 Although the Ptolemaic Chronicle describes Ptolemy’s support as an active symmachia, Ptolemaic assistance may have been solely financial.11 These wars did not seriously weaken Macedonian strength, but led to an infusion of Aetolian military talent and personnel.

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Ephesos was later used as a royal mint (Bagnall: 211) for Ptolemy III, the only royal mint outside Egypt in the second century, and was not taken by Seleucid forces until the Fifth Syrian War (Justin Comm.Dan. 11.15-16).  

10 Grainger (2006): 240; Frontinus 2.6.5. The naval battle of Andros may have taken place about this time.  
11 Ptolemaic involvement is confirmed by an honorific dedication at Thermon in Aetolia, IG IX,1 1.56, a large inscription of Euergetes’ family tree. It’s presence in the Aetolian capital makes most sense within the context of Ptolemaic assistance. The Aetolians also named a new settlement in honor of Ptolemy (Cohen 1995: 33-34).
during the latter years of Euergetes’ rule. Late in his reign Euergetes dispatched one of his sons, Magas, on a campaign against Seleucid possessions in Syria. Magas likely campaigned with a force composed mainly of mercenaries from Greece, since Polybius (5.36.3) attributes Sosibios’ assassination of Magas to the latter’s popularity among the mercenaries. *P.Haun.* 6 lines 28-34 likely relate some information about this campaign, but the fragmentary nature of the text is sufficient only to place the activity in Syria, after the death of Seleucus (probably Seleucus II), and before the death of Ptolemy III. Line 32 refers to Theodotos the Aetolian, who may have joined Magas in operations in Syria.

In Euergetes’ operations in the Aegean, and even in Magas’ campaign into Syria, the military settler system would have played only a small role at most. However, some of the men recruited and originally stationed in those regions eventually made their way into Egypt. *CPR* 18.18 (231 BC) records a mercenary horseman, Arkas, of Alexandria Troas. He is described as a *taktomisthos*, and “of the recruited mercenary cavalry”, providing strong evidence that although he had relocated to Egypt he was an active mercenary. And some Egyptian residents were active in the overseas garrisons in small

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12 Aetolian officers, and presumably a great many Aetolian soldiers, populated the army of the province of Syria and Phoenicia, of whom Theodotos is only the best known.

13 This scenario explains a great deal: if Theodotos arrived in the Ptolemaic court as a *condotierre* in the company of Magas, then Theodotos’ command in Syria is simply succession in command, and his wariness of the Sosibian faction at court is particularly understandable, since his original “patron” Magas had already been slain.

14 Σενολογο[[υμένων]] μισθο[[φόρων]] ἱπ[[πέων]].

15 The rank *taktomisthos* is very likely the mercenary analog to a standard *klerouchos* in a unit among the settler army, and the mention of his recruitment, from a region conquered by Ptolemaic forces no more than fifteen years prior, would also imply that he was still receiving a wage for service.
numbers. It is notable that neither type of Ptolemaic activity in the reign of Euergetes after the end of the Third Syrian War was ever particularly likely to mobilize large portions of the settler army, and may not have involved the phalanx at all.

4.1.1. Ptolemaic Cavalry Reform, 235-222 BC

4.1.1.1. The Numbered Hipparchies

Ptolemaic interest in the further systemization and maintenance of the cavalry is clearly demonstrated in the papyrological record. The cavalry contingents in Ptolemy’s army in 240 BC were of several sorts: the royal squadron, attested in a mid-century papyrus and said to have been seven hundred strong at Raphia; the settler cavalry, well-known from papyri in Middle Egypt, and in mid-century generally possessors of hundred-aroura allotments; and the mercenary horse, including both former mercenaries settled into the klerouchy, and active mercenaries, though of the latter many would have been stationed outside Egypt. In the second half of Ptolemy’s reign, the settler cavalry were restructured into a core cavalry contingent built around several numbered hipparchies, and augmented by several “ethnic” hipparchies of lighter

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16 Inscriptions at Samos (Samos 178 - Robert, et.epig. 113-118) and Ras Ibn Hani (J.P. Rey-Coquais (1978: 313-325), SEG 27:973) contain lists of mercenaries in Ptolemaic service. The latter is almost certainly from the reign of Ptolemy III, and the former likely is as well. The Samos inscription places a Pharbaithite, a resident of a nome in the Delta, among the garrison, while the Ras Ibn Hani list includes a Philetaireian, a citizen of one of the demes of Alexandria. It is highly unlikely, however, that either man was a klerouch. Instead, both were more likely mercenaries in Ptolemaic service, in spite of their Egyptian origin.

cavalry. These divisions did not entirely supplant the previous eponymous command system, which remained the primary system for recording the activities and affairs of Ptolemaic cavalrymen. They did, however, provide a clear tactical structure for the Ptolemaic cavalry, which before that time lacked clear organizational principles across the cavalry.

The Ptolemaic cavalry in the era before Euergetes’ reform were organized around eponymous commanders and lacked clear command structures. In the Arsinoite, where the cavalry had been settled in large numbers only later in the reign of Philadelphos, at least a dozen eponymous commanders are attested in the early years of Euergetes. These eponymous commanders seem generally to have been prominent court officials, and are more likely to have helped recruit or equip the men than to have served as their military commander after they were settled.18 Officers abounded among the settler cavalry. The surviving papyri provide, for the Arsinoite alone, before the reign of Ptolemy IV Philopator, the names of eight chiliarchs (commanders of thousands), six pentakosiarchs (commanders of five hundred), six hipparchs (commanders of a hipparchy), eight epilarchs (commanders of two ilai of cavalry), nine ilarchs (commanders of an ila), four epilochagoi (commanders of two lochoi), eight lochagoi (commanders of a lochos, likely about sixteen men), and nine dekanikoi (the lowest-

18 As an exception, the commanders of the misthophoroi hippeis seem to have commanded their men at least part of the time. For example, the men of the eponymous command of Pythangelos were connected to elephant hunts above, and Pythangelos himself led several elephant hunts.
ranking officer, commander of as many as ten men, but probably eight).\textsuperscript{19} Forty of the fifty-seven Arsinoite cavalry officers known from the papyri were high-ranking officers who would have, in theory, commanded dozens if not hundreds of men.\textsuperscript{20} The proportion of known officers to known cavalrymen is also very high, especially considering the large proportion of high-ranking officers among the cavalry. On the one hand, the officers may have been more likely to appear in papyri, particularly in, for example, the Petrie wills, many of which were by officers with fellow officers acting as witnesses. On the other hand, if the actual cavalry force structure corresponded—even remotely—to the structure at which the officer ranks hint, then the Ptolemaic cavalry force must have numbered many thousands. There is also no clear relation between chiliarchs and pentakosiarchs, numerical commands, and hipparchs, epilarchs, and ilarchs, all major organizational commands within a cavalry unit. The royal ila, for example, numbered seven-hundred men at Raphia, and the ilai in Alexander’s army frequently numbered several hundred men, yet it would be, presumably, the fifth largest rank among those attested for the Ptolemaic cavalry. In tax records and horse distribution lists, which are official records of all the cavalrymen, high-ranking officers

\textsuperscript{19} Of the chiliarchs, three may reasonably have been infantry commanders. The tally of pentakosiarchs does not include several men of the agema, but of the six, only four were necessarily cavalrymen. The hipparchs do not include two from the Zenon archive, Alexandros and Spintharos, who were probably in the Memphite or Aphroditopolite. Another six hipparchs in other nomes are known from \textit{P.Hib.} 2.198, as well as a handful from the Oxyrhynchite. Almost all of the epilarchai and epilochargoi are known to have belonged to the misthophoroi hippeis.

\textsuperscript{20} The lochos should have included between sixteen and thirty-two men, depending on the organizational pattern the unit was following. The ilarchs and all above them would have, in theory, commanded large units of cavalry, or more than one hundred men.
constitute an astounding percentage. The record of eighteen cavalry horses distributed to mercenary horsemen in *P Petr. 2.35* includes at least eight and probably ten cavalry officers, including two ilarchs and a hipparch, and only five men who definitely held no rank.\(^{21}\) Surely if the papyrus were complete officers would not constitute more than half of the men, but even so, the surviving record provides clear evidence of the superfluity of officers in the pre-reform settler army.\(^{22}\) Another record, *P Petr. 3.54*A.Fr4.2, is a little clearer. A record of fifteen soldiers from the hipparchy of Demeas begins with a hipparch, Demeas himself, and includes a dekanikos, epilochagos, ilarch, and, if the abbreviation has been read correctly, a chiliarch. Here the officers account for one-third of the troops, but four of the five officers are senior commanders, all of whom should, in theory, have commanded dozens if not hundreds of men.\(^{23}\) Such an abundance of commanders must have complicated command and control. The most reasonable conclusion is that, within the context of recruiting and settling an army, military ranks were invented and inflated, and may have corresponded better with an imagined

\(^{21}\) The two possible officers are Eubiotos, a Larissan, at A,3,9, whose rank abbreviation ended in sigma, and the Argive, Hermion, at D,r,6, for whom the scribe appended a now-illegible character before his name, presumably to indicate his rank.

\(^{22}\) If the record is taken as an accurate sample, the officer corps outnumbered the regular troops, and senior commanders constituted a third of the officer corps.

\(^{23}\) The fragmentary papyrus held many more names in at least two columns, but could not contain sufficient men to justify the several high-ranking officers. Additionally, line 6 of *A,Fr4,2,ms* probably contains another officer rank, originally read as “hipparch,” which would have made for two hipparchs in the hipparchy of Demeas.
cavalry force, like the twenty thousand purported to have been in Philadelphos’ parade at the 274 Ptolemaia festival in Alexandria, than with the actual settler force.24

Ptolemy’s reform replaced the previous system with numbered hipparchies, and reassigned ranks. There were at least five numbered hipparchies, all of which are attested at some point within the Arsinoite nome, though the third and fourth hipparchies are best-attested in the surviving documents. The full system of numbered hipparchies likely extended over the Arsinoite, Aphroditopolite, and Memphite nomes, where regular cavalry settlement had been common in the previous decades.25 Settlers were assigned a numbered hipparchy, and seem to have retained an eponymous command as well, though the numbers of eponymous commanders may have been consolidated at the same time. The dozen or so eponymous commanders in the 230’s and 240’s contract to about eight after the reform, and of the eight, three seem to have been commanders of the mercenary cavalry, which was not affected by the reform. The eponymous commanders of the men in the numbered hipparchies were Hippokrates, Ptolemaios son of Nauta, whose father was an eponymous commander of cavalry as well, Ptolemaios son of Eteoneus, whose father remained an eponymous commander of

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24 The promotions distributed in P.Hib. 2.198.r,1 at the end of the Third Syrian War to settlers in the Herakleopolite (l. 6), Memphite (l. 11), and probably Aphroditopolite (l. 3c) offer some indication of how this oversupply of officers came about, as a result of settlement and honors at the conclusion of wars. The men included there represent a small subset of the men given promotions, yet include six hipparchs, one ilarch, two chiliarchs, and three pentakosiarchs.

25 See the major settlement order in P.Petr. 3.21 for settlements throughout the regions in the neighborhood of Memphis, PSI 8.976 for cavalry settlement in the Aphroditopolite, and P.Hib. 2.198.Fr1, P.Cair.Zen. 3.59325, and P.Lond. 7.2015 for the Memphite.
mercenary horse, Andriskos, and Menelaos. These five contracted the number of eponymous commanders to the same number as the reform hipparchies. Remarkably, though there were five of each, there was not a complete correlation between eponymous commander and numbered hipparchy, and neither were the men grouped geographically. The number of officers also shrank considerably after the reform: the ranks of chiliarch and pentakosiarch never appear in the numbered hipparchies, and of the handful of officers attested in the papyri, most were simply titled hyperetes, junior-officers of the hipparcy. The tax records in P.Petr. 3.112 include records for dozens of hundred-aroura men of the numbered hipparchies, mainly the third and fourth, and include just a handful of hyperetes. After the reform, junior officers were less abundant than senior officers were before it.

The timing of the reform seems to place it within an era of peace, several years after the conclusion of the Third Syrian War, prior to the end of any ten-year truce, and about the time that Seleucus’ armies suffered their horrific defeat at Ankyra against

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26 Most men under an eponymous commander were in the same numbered hipparchy, e.g., all but one of the men of Hippokrates were members of the second hipparchy. The men under an eponymous commander may at times have been transferred to different hipparchies, e.g., the men of Menelaos, the firsts of the Hermoupolite, were all in the fifth hipparchy prior to 226 BC, after which all were in the fourth. The men of Ptolemaios son of Nauta, the least-attested of the eponymous commanders, were all in the same hipparchy, the fifth. On the other hand, cavalrymen from the eponymous command of Andriskos are attested in the third, fifth, and fourth hipparchies.

27 Of the hyperetes, only one seems to have possessed an allotment larger than one-hundred arouras, Philoxenos of the fifth hipparchy, who possessed, according to his chomatikon tax, a per-aroura tax, two-hundred and fifty-five.

28 The ten year truce appears in Justin (27.2.9), but has been widely doubted for lack of comparable treaties.
Hierax and his allies. The evidence for the date has already been adduced elsewhere.\textsuperscript{29} P.\textit{Petr}. 2.18, from late in year 12 (236/5), pre-dates the reform, while \textit{Chr.Mitt}. 28, from year 15 (233/2), is the earliest definitively dated text testifying to the reform.\textsuperscript{30} P.\textit{Petr}. 2.22, however, dated to year 13, contains in its second fragment the word ἵππαρχίας as part of an identification formula. The first fragment is dated to the year 13 on the basis of Berenike, daughter of Ptolemy, serving as kanephore for Arsinoe, and in the Petrie Wills, multiple testaments were kept on the same papyrus and in chronological order. Thus the reform seems to have been implemented in about 235 BC.\textsuperscript{31}

The reform was focused mainly upon the hundred-aroura cavalry settlers of the Arsinoite and neighboring nomes, who were settled in large numbers in the Fayum and its vicinity in the 250's BC, and were the centerpiece of the settlement operation studied in chapter 2.2.4.4. These hundred-aroura men may not have been the only men included in the numbered hipparchies. Other cavalrymen in the Arsinoite received allotments of eighty arouras, and seem to have been classified as the settled mercenary cavalry, under their eponymous commanders Eteoneus, Pythangelos, and Sosipolis. There is scattered evidence that, while at least two of the eponymous mercenary cavalry units remained

\textsuperscript{29} Kramer (1991: 79-80) presented an argument for a date around 235 as part of the edition of the Theogonis papyri, with their many mentions of the numbered hipparchies, in \textit{CPR} XVIII.

\textsuperscript{30} It mentions Sosos, of Kos, a hundred-aroura man of the fifth hipparchy.

\textsuperscript{31} The first fragment has, however, the last papyrological mention of the eponymous command of Licha, in the person of a pentakosiarch. The reform was either instituted shortly after that document, or did not include the men of Licha, who may well have been mercenary or settled mercenary cavalry, and whose eponymous commander, like Pythangelos, is a well-known commander of elephant hunts in the reign of Philopator (OGIS 82).
intact (those of Eteoneus and Pythangelos), other former members of those units were included in the numbered hipparchies with eighty-aroura allotments. These eighty-aroura allotments would become both much more common and fairly standard for the men of the numbered hipparchies from the beginning of the second century, but seem to have been a small minority after the initial reform. Few of the sources describing the men in the numbered hipparchies describe the true size of the allotments, but from a handful of sources it seems likely that the men under at least one of the commanders, Ptolemaios, son of Eteoneus, sometimes held eighty-aroura rather than one-hundred-aroura allotments.32

These two divisions (the settled mercenary cavalry and the numbered hipparchies) were located chiefly in the Arsinoite nome, and did not account for all the mounted units in the Ptolemaic settler army. The royal squadron was a separate institution, the Oxyrhynchite cavalry do not seem to have been affected. The Oxyrhynchite cavalry, under their hipparch Zoilos, remained a last vestige of the earlier Ptolemaic system. Located as they were within a single nome, their further organization may not have been so pressing a concern, nor does officer rank inflation seem to have

32 Men from this eponymous command are called at times hekatontarouroi, hundred-aroura-men, e.g., CPR 18.19.1-2, P.Enteux. 22.7, P.Hamb. 1.24.5, but the latter text, while describing the soldier as a hundred-aroura-man, describes his allotment as being eighty arouras (lines 8-9). However, CPR 18.3 provides a counter-example of a man from the same eponymous command, with an allotment of one-hundred arouras. Eighty-aroura men are rare in the papyrus until about the start of the Fourth Syrian War; the earliest likely appearance of one is the tax record of Laagos son of Euchares, whose maximum payment for the chomatikon (for arable land in his kleros) over a four year period was thirteen drachmas and two obols, payment for an eighty-aroura allotment (PSI 4.388.27-33, 243 BC).
been so extreme. One might question the necessity of the reform; after all, it was not carried out comprehensively throughout Egypt. Its usefulness is best understood within the context of providing a long-standing organizational basis for the most numerous collection of Ptolemaic cavalry in Egypt. This reform, and the others that accompanied it, seem aimed at providing order, and mathematical precision, to the Ptolemaic cavalry both in its settlements and in the battle-line.

4.1.1.2. The Ethnic Hipparchies

By the end of Euergetes’ reign, the numbered hipparchies were supplemented by several ethnic hipparchies, further categorizing the Ptolemaic cavalry and providing a stable sort of diversity. That of the Thessalians and Other Greeks is best attested, but we know that several others existed: that of the Persians, of the Mysians, of the Thracians, and of the Macedonians. Fischer-Bovet has suggested that the ethnic designations reflected the original ethnicity of the hipparchies, and may also have born some relation to the panoply of each hipparchy. The earliest ethnic hipparchies are the “Thessalians and Other Greeks” and “Persians and…”, from CPR 18.10 and 15, respectively, both dated to late May-early June of 231 BC. The first of the ethnic hipparchies, then, followed no more than a few years behind the creation of numbered hipparchies. However, we should note several oddities of the papyri. First, they could alternatively be dated to 206 BC, though the earlier date is more likely because of the eponymous command of
Andriskos, mentioned in the text of CPR 18.10, and unattested after 223 BC. Second, the cavalryman in the hipparchy of the Thessalians and other Greeks was a Thracian, and the cavalryman in the hipparchy of the Persians was a Macedonian. These ethnic incongruities provide good evidence that the named hipparchies, though named after ethnic groups, were not organized along ethnic divisions in reality, and never were, contrary to the general supposition of most writers. As for the panoplies of the troops, there is no evidence for this. Nor is there even a clear basis for distinguishing between the cavalry armaments of the four hipparchies. Evidence from painted tombstones and terracottas indicates that the Ptolemaic cavalry in the later third century, in Egypt, included only lancers. It is still possible that some contingents of cavalry could have been shielded, and it is possible that these “ethnic” hipparchies constituted the shielded contingents within the Ptolemaic cavalry. Even if that were the case, however, there would be no real basis for differing panoplies between the hipparchies.

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33 The overall picture from the texts of CPR 18 accords far better with the late 230’s BC than with the last years of the Philopator’s reign: many of the eponymous commands in it are known from the Petrie Wills and other documents.
35 The Thessalian cavalry were famed in the fourth century as lancers, but in the third century, cavalry across Greece were adopting large shields, and carrying throwing spears, javelins, or multi-use spears rather than lances, see Nefedkin (2009). The many funerary stelai from Bithynia and Mysia depict an identical shift in panoply in those regions as well, see Post (2010). Thracians likely followed a similar trajectory, though that is more difficult to confirm.
36 For unshielded cavalry, see Brown (1957): nos. 16, 21, and 34. Both shielded and unshielded cavalry terracottas are known from Ptolemaic Cyprus, for which, see Young (1955): nos. 2032, 2214, and 2935. Evidence for shielded cavalry in Egypt itself is rare; the only evidence of which I am aware is a terracotta figurine depicting Bes on horseback, with an aspis, for which see Török (1995): no. 19, and it is dated to the late second century. To this one might add a painted glass vase from Bagram, Afghanistan, thought to have originated from Ptolemaic Alexandria, which shows cavalrymen with shields, but it would, like the Bes, have a late date, and probably later than the terracotta.
The men of the ethnic hipparchies received smaller allotments than those in numbered hipparchies, seventy arouras. Until the appearance of these new hipparchies, seventy-aroura allotments were very rare in Egypt.\textsuperscript{37} There is some evidence of the preparation of allotments for the seventy-aroura men prior to their arrival.\textsuperscript{38} Men from the Thracian hipparchy may be referenced in another mid-220’s document, which contains details about the management of klerouchic-sized allotments under royal control, allotments of these Thracians, and the allotments of at least twenty-three men, seemingly Macedonians, who were registered by the local administrator because their lands were generally unproductive.\textsuperscript{39} The seventy-aroura men were also found after this period in the Oxyrhynchite nome, in small numbers, and without ethnic hipparchies.\textsuperscript{40} From this information, the ethnic hipparchies seem to have first appeared in the late 230’s BC, as part of the Ptolemaic era of reform under Euergetes, but also seem to have been expanded and developed over the whole course of the 220’s.

The ethnic hipparchies raise interesting questions, the most important of which is this: where did the Ptolemies find them? The simplest answer is that they were the

\textsuperscript{37} The earliest appearance of 70-aroura allotments is in \textit{P.Cair.Zen.} 1.59001, (274 BC) a record of allotments given to Thracian soldiers. The allotments varied considerably, but two men received seventy arouras. The only other 70-aroura allotment is that of a Lykian cavalryman in the command of Nikanor in 252 BC, within the estates of the \textit{dioiketes} Apollonios, in \textit{P.Zen.Pestm.} 20.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{P.Hamb.} 3.202 (220’s BC) has an Egyptian family farming a seventy-aroura plot of land around Techtho Nesos, perhaps in a temporary role prior to the assumption of the \textit{kleros} by a soldier.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{P.Petr.} 2.30.A, (about 225 BC), refers to the Thracians around Sebennytos, though none of the surviving names are particularly Thracian: Telekles, Magnes, Eubios and Attinas. The klerouchic allotments include thirties, eighties and tens.

\textsuperscript{40} BGU 10:1959 - Ptolemaios, a Bithynian, in the eponymous command of Nikomedes (also a Bithynian?) in 215/4 BC.
remainder of the mercenary cavalry who were not transferred to the numbered hipparchies. But the Petrie military tax record confirms that the mercenary cavalry under Eteoneus were unaffected by the reform.\textsuperscript{41} Instead, as late as the second year of Ptolemy IV, the mercenary cavalry under Eteoneus were still a separate entity within the Ptolemaic cavalry.\textsuperscript{42} Instead, the mercenary cavalry seem to have been slowly folded into the numbered hipparchies, such that their eighty-aroura allotments were the standard size in the Ptolemaic cavalry in the second century.\textsuperscript{43} The strongest remaining hypothesis, then, is that the seventy-aroura ethnic cavalry were, for the most part, newly recruited during the kingship of Euergetes and settled in Egypt throughout the latter half of his reign. A number of documents, most from the \textit{Enteuxeis}, indicate that these \textit{ebdomekontarouroi} were being arranged on their allotments during the last years of Euergetes. In fact, their new settlements were accompanied by additional settlements of men from the phalanx, increasing the size of both the main battle line and the auxiliary cavalry. Improvements to the mobilized army necessitated some discomfort amid the fields of Egypt, and so one document contains instructions regarding the apportionment

\textsuperscript{41} P.Petr. 3.112.G.16-25.
\textsuperscript{42} The mercenary cavalry seem to have been deployed that year, as none of their taxes were paid directly by the soldiers. For an attempted examination of the mercenary cavalry, see Scheuble (2009: 213-222).
\textsuperscript{43} Eighty-aroura allotments were the standard allotment of newly-settled cavalry in the first half of the second century, see, for example, \textit{P.Freib.} 3.23-24, 36-37, 4.52, all dating to the early part of the reign of Ptolemy VI, and attesting eponymous officers Galestes and Parthenokles, or \textit{P.Heid.} 8.417, from the reign of Ptolemy V, which attests the eponymous officer Antimachos; \textit{P.Mich.} 3.182 identifies an eighty-aroura cavalryman as a soldier in the second hipparchy in 182 BC, while \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.1.818, from 180 BC, identifies several men as belonging to the first hipparchy, the eponymous command of Dositheos, and eighty-aroura men.
of lands for the newly enrolled seventy- and thirty-aroura men, and leading soon after to a complaint from a hundred-aroura man that the business of all the new seventy- and thirty-aroura klerouchs had negatively affected his neighborhood, and was somehow assuredly related to the hard time he was having with his own leasers. Further evidence of the progressive expansion of the seventy-aroura men and their enrollment in the ethnic hipparchies is in the Petrie military tax roll, which contains records for several seventy-aroura men without a hipparchy. The papyrological evidence consistently indicates that, rather than languishing, the Ptolemaic military was both organizing and expanding during the late years of Euergetes’ reign.

4.1.2. Ptolemaic Infantry Reform, 231-222 BC

The military reforms were not restricted to the cavalry. The infantry were far more numerous and less organized than the cavalry. The operations of the phalanx required arraying thousands of men in a tightly-ordered formation and orchestrating their movements on the battlefield. Settling the men of a phalanx required surveying and maintaining allotments for thousands of men. The Ptolemies accumulated

41 P.Sorb. 1.41, 222 BC.
42 P.Enteux. 63, 222-218 BC. P.Enteux. 11, 221 BC, contains an Egyptian farmer’s complaint that a 70-aroura klerouch, likely another newcomer, had ejected him from his abode in Polydeukia, an otherwise little-known village that may not have had klerouchs before about 222/1 BC.
43 P.Petr. 3.112.G.6-15. P.Petr. 3.72.D, a roughly contemporaneous document, orders the collection of taxes from the cavalry settlers of the Arsinoite in accordance with the records of the epistles of each hipparchy, both from the hundred-aroura men, and from the seventy-aroura men. This indicates that the Ptolemaic administration aimed to develop two well-organized, parallel cavalry wings.
Macedonian and other infantry from 323 to 252 BC, and in those seventy years developed the military force that Ptolemy III deployed to good effect in the Third Syrian War. Papyrological evidence indicates that Euergetes sought to provide equivalent organization for the infantry as that achieved for the cavalry. In many ways, the infantry reform was actually the more meaningful of the two. Out of the mass of ethnicities and mess of settlement patterns, the army Ptolemy III left at his death featured a large and unified phalanx, the *triakontarouroi Makedones*, unified by settlement pattern and, more importantly, ethnicity, and organized into numbered chiliarchies. The thirty-aroura Macedonians and their chiliarchies, like the numbered and ethnic hipparchies, provided a coherent organizational pattern for the infantry both in Egypt and on the battlefield. In addition, the forging of this class around Macedonian ethnicity created a national body, however imagined it may have been, associated with the throne as the people of the king, who was also Macedonian.\(^\text{47}\) When the left wing fell apart at Raphia, the king’s appearance among the Macedonians spurred them to victory. When court intrigues nearly ended the dynasty at the end of the third century, the stubborn non-cooperation of the Macedonians, who sailed down to Alexandria and encamped at the city during the crisis, preserved the dynasty for several more generations.\(^\text{48}\) While the infantry were not as prestigious or wealthy as the cavalry and the men of the elite units or the

\(^\text{47}\) For more on the role of Macedonian bodies in Hellenistic kingship, refer back to chapter 1.2.3 or chapter 2.1.1.

\(^\text{48}\) The annihilation of many of these men on the slopes at Panion may also be an under-estimated factor in the struggles of the Ptolemies in the second century, as shown in chapter 6.
Alexandrian court, only the infantry of the phalanx were automatically styled as Macedonians. This implies that Ptolemy sought, in addition to better organizing his army, to shore up his support among the larger infantry class, as a way to weaken, in some sense, the cavalry and elite units that fed the ranks of the court aristocracy in Alexandria. Therefore the infantry reform served a political purpose, in addition to the military-bureaucratic purposes it and the cavalry reforms fulfilled.

The infantry in the Third Syrian War were the product of haphazard recruitment, with a diversity of classifications and troops of many ethnicities. As a simple example, consider the repossession orders from the office of Achoapis, covered in the previous chapter (*P.Petr. 3.104*-5). Only one of the men was specifically identified as a *triakontarouros* and while all possessed twenty-four aroura allotments, the other two men for whom we have clear records are simply identified as possessing infantry allotments. This likely resulted from different waves of settlement. Their classifications were born out of their sporadic recruitment and local settlement. Nothing in the texts gave indications of how the men would have been formed into military units.⁴⁹ While classifications like *triakontarouros* imply standardization in the sizes of allotments, this was not often the case.⁵⁰ As another example, the class of klerouchs known as the

⁴⁹ And while “ethnics” were not given in those administrative papyri (after all, what did ethnic monikers account for in dealing with the former property of the dead?), none of the names are traditional Macedonian names.

⁵⁰ Several Petrie papyri (3.99-102) comprise land records in the eastern Arsinoite and western Herakleopolite. In some instances, lands were carefully surveyed, farmed by Egyptians, and handed over,
prebyteroi stratiotai, or veteran soldiers, attested in the last years of Philadelphos, is not attested after the first years of the Third Syrian War. Their allotments were in the vicinity of twenty arouras, but the reports in several papyri indicate that the allotment sizes were not particularly consistent. Other men, originally members of the epigone, received twenty-five arouras, which actually seems to have been a fairly standard allotment size even for the triakontarouroi. The settlement of these men occurred throughout the 250’s. Those soldiers were recruited from the non-military population presumably to new klerouchs, such as the five allotments of twenty-and-one-quarter arouras in document 101, in either 269/8 or 231/0 BC. In other documents, like 102, the surveys were more haphazard, and allotments ranged from twenty to thirty-five arouras. However, even in these instances, some organizing principle may guide the seeming inconsistency: officers may have received more land, or the larger allotments may have included non-arable or less-desirable types of land, or public works. For example, P.Rain.Cent. 40 (257 or 223 BC) records that two allotments measured a little more than twenty-four and a little less than twenty-eight arouras apiece, yet each had exactly twenty arouras of arakos land.

51 Last attested in a record of public service in 241 BC (UPZ 2.147), where a cohort of prebyteroi was assigned to guard irrigation works in the Thebaid. The class of troops is not well known, but would presumably have been veteran soldiers with lengthy careers in Ptolemaic service. Their late settlement may imply that their earlier service had been as mercenaries or standing troops. The penultimate attestation is an enteuxis from 242 BC (P.Enteux. 12) from one of the prebyteroi, Bithus, likely a Thracian, who had been given a kleros and a house as stathmos by the king, as part of the unit of veterans commanded by Kardendos. Kardendos is a Thracian name, though known elsewhere only as Kardenthos (e.g., IG Bulg I: 53; III.1: 1312, 1420, and 1473).

52 At least some of these settlements occurred during the Second Syrian War; others may have been earlier. P.Zen.Pestm. 38 (253 BC) records the allotment of five hundred arouras to prebyteroi stratiotai from two myriarouria allotments, with allotments ranging from eighteen to twenty-two arouras, fairly standard for infantry, but irregular. P.Cair.Zen. 3.59325 (249 BC) records rental payments to klerouchs, some of whom resided on the former myriarouria of Andromachos, whose lands were used for the prebyteroi in the previous text. The rental payments correspond to kleroi of approximately twenty-four arouras, though they range larger and smaller. The smallest, fifteen, may indicate a partial rental, while larger payments may indicate that a handful of klerouchs drove a harder bargain with Zenon. P.Lond. 6.1996 (250 BC) describes seed distributions for twenty-three other prebyteroi inhabiting 356 7/8 arouras of cultivable land, or an average of a little more than fifteen arouras. P.Petr. 2.39, from the time of the Third Syrian War, records several prebyteroi with allotments of twenty arouras.

53 Settlements are known from 257/6 (P.Yale 1.31), 254 (P.Mich. 1.33), and 252-1 (P.Lille. 1.39-42, 51). The men are referred to as epigoni in the texts, in spite of their allotments, e.g., from P.Mich. 1.33.6-8: τῶν ἐπιγόνων
of Egypt, seemingly during the Second Syrian War, and settled on allotments of their own during and after the war. The addition of *epigoni* to the klerouchy expanded the size of the army, with the usual stresses that imposed in providing for their agricultural and military needs. Sporadic evidence for other klerouchic classes gives further evidence for the mosaic pattern of infantry settlement under the first two Ptolemies.

In addition, many of the infantry in Ptolemaic service were not, in fact, Macedonians, even if they were trained and equipped to serve in the phalanx. Of the *eikosipentarouroi*, only one bore a name that seems remotely “Macedonian”: Nikanor. The remaining names range from the generic to the exotic, but most seem suspiciously Central Greek. Eponymous commanders of infantry are also known, though they

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τῶν καταμεμετρημένων ἐν τῷ Ἀρσινοεῖτη. This may have serviced to differentiate them in some way from other twenty-five aroura men, or even given royal testimony that new soldiers could be raised locally, without the need to rely on mercenaries. The earliest of these mentions, *P. Yale* 1.31 (257 BC), records the seed distribution for a group of at least four *eikosipentarouroi*, not identified as *epigoni*, near Ankyron Polis in the Herakleopolite nome. The *eikosipentarouroi* may have existed in that and other regions for some time prior. A soldier and settler identified as a member of the *epigone* is known from those regions at that time, but the Thracian Spokes was a horseman (*P. Sorb*. 1.17). Generally, the *epigoni* in military roles seem to have been related to the infantry, see Clarysse (2006: 464), though this is likely a simple function of the infantry being the more likely branch of the military to be enlarged in wartime: effective cavalrymen required years of training, and were by far costlier per soldier than the infantry.

54 *PSI* 6.588 refers to the provision of weapons for the *epigoni* within the context of the Second or Third Syrian War. Most of the documents in *P.Lille* 1.39–51 capture aspects of administration for the new settlements.

55 A twenty-one aroura klerouch is known from *P. Col*. 3.49 (252 BC) and twenty-aroura klerouchs from *P. Cairo. Zen* 4.59715.16 (c. 252 BC) and *P. Gurob* 18 (likely Ptol. III). In other places the infantry are simply referred to as that, infantry (*P. Lond*. 7.1980 – 252 BC, *P. Petr*. 3.105 – 244 BC).

56 *P. Lille* 1.39.

57 The generic and theophoroic, eg, Theodoros, Dionysodoros; the Central Greek names: Menetos, Theochrestos, and Meniskos (also common in Ionia); finally, the very rare: Bromenos, a name as likely to be Galatian as Greek.
disappeared soon after the reform. The handful of men known from the command of Philinos included a Methymnian, an Ephesian, and a Persian.\textsuperscript{58} The men of Nikanor are known before and after the reform, and were termed Macedonians in both cases.\textsuperscript{59} Macedonian names are attested better at times, however. After the reform, Krateruas of the triakontarouroi Makedones had a good Macedonian name, along with almost the entirety of the surviving portion of a list from about 225 BC, whose names include Nikanor, Arridaios, Perdikkas, Amyntas, and Korragos.\textsuperscript{60} While the Ptolemies had surely managed to recruit a core of truly Macedonian manpower, the phalanx of Euergetes must have depended mainly upon a great variety of Greek and Asiatic soldiers armed and trained in emulation of Alexander’s phalanx.

The reform forged from the scattered elements of the Ptolemaic infantry a single whole, bound together as the class of triakontarouroi Makedones, unified by klerouchic classification and ethnicity. This class was then subdivided by chiliarchies, which were, like the settler hipparchies, assigned numbers. The exact date of the reform cannot be placed, but must have been in the vicinity of the cavalry reforms. The earliest sources for thirty-aroura Macedonian and for the numbered chiliarchies are CPR 18.10 and 32, in

\textsuperscript{58} PSI 5.513 (252 BC); at least two of the men originated from Asia Minor, and the command of Philinos may have begun as a mercenary command, and men were only settled from it in 252.

\textsuperscript{59} Pre-reform: Peritas, a chiliarch, from P.Petr.2.3. Post-reform: Spartakos, from CPR 18.13. Another Macedonian from the eponymous command of Nikanor is known from 254 BC (P.Mich. 1.34), but was probably a different Nikanor, and cavalry commander, who also had Lykians in his command.

\textsuperscript{60} P.Petr. 2.30.B (about 223 BC). There is also a Teiridates among the names, one of the handful of good Medo-Persian names in Ptolemaic Egypt.
232/1 BC. These two documents include two soldiers, both syngraphophylakes: in 18.10 it is Zenon, a Macedonian triakontarouros of the 3rd chiliarchy “of those without a hegemon.” The editors amended a gap in the text to read hipparchy, but it should be amended instead to chiliarchy, for two reasons: first, the man in question was a thirty-aroura Macedonian, and therefore part of the infantry, and second, he was “without a hegemon,” a status given only to infantry. The status “without a hegemon” is fairly common in the papyri among infantrymen, but never securely attested among cavalry. Cavalry without an eponymous officer were instead described as “without a hipparchy.” Of all the men “without a hegemon” in the third century, only one, in CPR 18.19, was not certainly classified as a thirty-aroura man. He was, however, a Macedonian, and while his classification is lost, the most likely supposition is that he was, like the others, a thirty-aroura man. Interestingly, two of the four men described as thirty-aroura men without a hegemon were assigned to a chiliarchy: Zenon to the third, and the un-named Macedonian in 18.32 to the second. Of the other two, both were almost certainly also assigned to a chiliarchy, but in both cases, the papyrus breaks off in the genitive article, before supplying the number. Aside from these, the seventh

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61 Lines 7-8: τῶν οὐκ ὑπὸ ἡγεμόνα.
62 Prior to the Fourth Syrian War, the status of lacking a hegemon is applied to four men, three from CPR 18 (10, 19, and 32), and one from the Enteuxeis (37). All of the men given that status were Macedonians, and the three whose allotments are known all possessed thirty arouras. Editions of papyri have assigned most of these four men to cavalry units, mainly out of habit, and in spite of several clear indications that they were infantrymen.
63 See, for example, CPR 18.18.382, P.Cair.Zen. 3.59340.19, P.Petr. 2.1.85, 2.16.47.
64 The latest Ptolemaic soldier described as lacking a hegemon is in SB 5.7632, a taktomisthos (paid soldier) from Larissa, in 159 BC.
chiliarchy is attested twice. A bit of evidence in the first of the sources on the seventh chiliarchy may provide some insight into the organizational system wherein Ptolemaic klerouchs could be assigned a chiliarchy and yet remain “without a hegemon.” Petalos, according to the Petrie tax record, was of the triakontarouroi Makedones, and of the seventh chiliarchy. The text then provides, after his chiliarchy, the number “34.” One hypothesis might be that this was Petalos’ age, but it seems an odd place to list it, and ages were not given for anyone else in that record. A more convincing hypothesis is that “34” was Petalos’ lochos, or sub-unit of the chiliarchy. With sixteen men per lochos, there would have been sixty-four lochoi per chiliarchy. Unfortunately, no other text includes a comparable sign, and so it is impossible at present to make a final judgment on this hypothesis.

The royal move to identify the triakontarouroi Makedones as a specific class did not involve any noticeable changes in land tenure. This should be expected, since a triakontaroulos infantryman in the Third Syrian War possessed the same twenty-four arouras possessed by men holding a standard “infantry kleros.” P.Köln. 8.345, from 230/29 BC, provides evidence for one of these triakontarouroi Makedones, Mikkos, but his kleros near Theadelphia in the Arsinoite nome was still a twenty-five aroura kleros. Similarly, the tax records in P.Petr. 2.112, which include only two infantrymen, list their

65 First, in P.Petr. 3.112.D.Hrp.2 (222 BC), and second, in P.Tebt. 1.137.
payments for the *chomatikon* tax\textsuperscript{66} as four drachmas and an obol (*Hrp.*1-6). The standard rate for the *chomatikon* was one obol per aroura, which means the so-called “thirty-aroura” infantry in that document actually possessed twenty-five arouras. The reform did not affect land tenure, but the overall organization of the Ptolemaic infantry. The smaller kleroi of twenty, twenty-four, or twenty-five arouras continued as stable units deep into the second century BC. Twenty-four-aroura allotments frequently wound their way into private possession or as the allotments of *ephodoi*.\textsuperscript{67} Several allotments of twenty and thirty arouras around Kerkeosiris passed into the hands of *machinoi hippēs* in the reign of Physkon.\textsuperscript{68}

I suggest that the work of classification done by Euergetes may have produced an “ideal” phalanx of sixteen chiliarchies. The phalanx of sixteen thousand was considered an organizational ideal in the tactical manuals, and was mobilized for battle by both Philip V and Antiochus III in the early third century. Euergetes, spending his reign reorganizing his army, may have been the first to pursue an ideal army.\textsuperscript{69} There are many possible sources for a well-ordered, mathematically ideal army. Demetrius of Phalerum was said to have written a two-book tactical manual (Diog.Laert. 5.80), and spent the last years of his career in Alexandria at the court of Ptolemy I. His near-

\textsuperscript{66} A tax which contributed to the maintenance of agricultural waterworks.
\textsuperscript{68} *P*.Tebt. 1.60.
\textsuperscript{69} This ideal army would then be considered less than sufficient by Sosibios and the advisors of Philopator, who would seek to more than double the size of the phalanx.

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contemporary Klearchos of Soli, originally of Cyprus, spent many years in Seleucid territories and was also said to have written a tactical manual (Arr. Tactica 1.1.4).\textsuperscript{70}

Arrian also mentions a Pausanias and Evangelos as tactical writers between Klearchos and Polybius. The tactical manual of Evangelos was said to be a favorite of Philopoimen’s in the time of his training, the 230’s BC (Plut. Phil. 4.4). The manual would have chiefly concerned phalanx tactics, based on Plutarch’s description of Philopoimen’s interaction with the text.\textsuperscript{71} Polybius’ own statements on tactics indicate that the measure of terrain influenced the ideal figure of sixteen thousand men in a phalanx, and that indeed, in his own day, sixteen thousand was considered the theoretical ideal.\textsuperscript{72}

The other Successor kingdoms engaged in considerably more and longer wars while the Ptolemaic army was reformed in relative quiet, yet the crucible of continual warfare, and even civil conflict, produced, by century’s end, armies generally considered superior to that of the Ptolemies. The study will turn now to examinations of

\textsuperscript{70} Wheeler (1988: 153-84).
\textsuperscript{71} Plut. Phil. 4.5: καὶ γὰρ τῶν τακτικῶν θεωρημάτων, τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς πινακίοις διαγραφὰς ἐὼν χαίρειν, ἐπὶ τῶν τόπων αὐτῶν ἐλάμβανεν ἐλέγχον καὶ μελέτην ἐποιεῖτο, χωρίων συγκλίνιας καὶ πεδίων ἀποκοπάς καὶ ὅσα περὶ ῥείθροις ἢ τάφροις ἢ στενωποῖς πάθη καὶ σχήματα διασπωμένης ή στενοχώρως καὶ πάλιν συντελελομένης φάλαγγος ἐπισκοπῶν αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐν ταῖς ὀδοσφορίαις, καὶ τοῖς μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ προβάλλων. Loeb translation: “Indeed, he would ignore the charts and diagrams for the illustration of tactical principles, and get his proofs and make his studies on the ground itself. The ways in which places slope to meet one another, and level plains come to an abrupt end, and all the vicissitudes and shapes of a phalanx when it is elongated and contracted again in the vicinity of ravines or ditches or narrow defiles, these he would investigate by himself as he wandered about, and discuss them with his companions.”

Pyrrhus also wrote a tactical manual, and it is likely that either his or Evangelos’ had a major influence on Antigonid military, which followed a different organizational structure than the Ptolemaic army.

\textsuperscript{72} Polyb. 12.9.7: “One stade will hold, of men properly arrayed in a phalanx, sixteen deep, sixteen-hundred men, and so ten stades are required to hold sixteen thousand.”
Macedonian and Seleucid military institutions in the heyday of the Hellenistic kingdoms, before returning to a study of Ptolemaic reforms and mobilizations prior to the Fourth Syrian War.

4.2. Antigonid Military Institutions, 242-205 BC

Antigonus II Gonatas passed away in 239 BC, having established the Antigonid Macedonian kingdom after the many reversals of previous decades. The threats that hounded Antigonid control of Macedonia in his reign and that of his father had faded by the time of his death. The military institutions by which he ruled, raised armies, and waged war are poorly understood. Narrative sources provide a more coherent picture of the activities of his predecessors, while epigraphic evidence is more abundant for his descendants, particularly Philip V. The abundance of epigraphic material relating to Antigonid Macedonian military institutions published in recent years has dramatically increased modern understanding of the Antigonid army. Many of these inscriptions have been dated to the reign of Philip V, the monarch whose career is fairly well-known, courtesy of the narrative accounts of Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch, and whose war with Rome after 200 BC has been seen as a catalyst for military reforms. In many cases, however, the inscriptions reflect institutions put into place before the reign of Philip V,

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73 By these threats I mean, most importantly, the long struggle with the Aiakid kings, for which, see Chapter 1.
74 For these, see Hatzopoulos (1996, 2001, 2006) for editions of almost all of the key texts. For the history of Macedonia, see Hammond and Walbank (1988).
and indeed a number of these inscriptions should be dated to earlier reigns. Together, these sources, in comparison with the ancient narratives, depict the development of a robust military apparatus. These developments relate to the organization and recruitment of armies, the relationship of the king to his soldiers, and of the king and army to the major cities of the Macedonian region. The Macedonian kingdom also developed and deployed well-defined and capable military institutions in this period, but as this study will show, Antigonid recruitment and organization were considerably less static than their Ptolemaic counterparts.

4.2.1. The Leukaspides and the Antigonid Answer to Macedonian Manpower

Of the inscriptions dating to the late reign of Gonatas, the Kos asylia declarations offer some insight into the relationship between the king and the cities at a point when Antigonid control of Macedonia had finally stabilized. Within the context of the end of the Third Syrian War, Ptolemaic-allied Kos dispatched theoroi (sacred ambassadors) to many of the cities and kings of the Hellenistic world, seeking declarations of asylia for their new temple to Asclepius and recognition of their new festival, games, and sacrifices in celebration of the new cult center. A pair of theoroi visited at least four cities in the region of Macedonia as part of their embassy to Greece: Pella, Kassandreia, Amphipolis, and Philippoi. The four resulting documents granting asylia share several

75 Rigsby (1996).
common traits. First, the towns describe the embassy as having been to the king and the other Macedonians, in addition to their own city, features peculiar to the Macedonian decrees. Second, the grants clearly were made in recognition that Antigonus supported the diplomatic gesture: the Kassandreian decree describes their declaration as being “in accordance with the decision of the king” and the Philippian decree describes it as following “the directive of king Antigonus.” Finally, while all of the decrees functioned as local enactments of a royal decision, each reflected the structures of the local polity: the Kassandreian decree was from the strategoi and nomophylakes, the Amphipolitan and Philippian both from their respective ekklesia. However, the dating formula for the Amphipolitan decree makes clear that Amphipolis was governed by an epistates; the Philippian decree instead makes reference, like Kassandreia, to the strategoi, but not to nomophylakes. Only the decree from Pella lacked a local governing body approving the order. Instead, it is dated by the eponymous priest, and the embassy described originally

\[\text{In fact, all but Philippoi list the king as the primary addressee; similarly, Philippoi is the only to list Hellenes alongside Macedonians as the general addressees of the embassy.}\]

\[\text{Line 10: κατὰ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως βουλὴν. The Philippoi decree includes similar language in lines 14-15: ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος προσκυνεῖται.}\]

\[\text{The rule through strategoi and nomophylakes is also known from the Antigonid city of Demetrias in Thessaly, } IG IX2: 1108. The presence of an epistates may be confirmed in the third century for Thessalonike (IG X: 1.2, 7th year of Antigonus Doson), Beroia (EKM I Beroia.29, fourth century), and Mieza/Leukadia (SEG 53:613). The institutions of Demetrias and Kassandreia, which may have existed in Philippoi in some measure as well, reflect a Platonic theory of governance, for which see Hatzopoulos (1996): 159-60.}\]

\[\text{The Amphipolis decree was dated by the Macedonian regnal year, governing epistates, and eponymous priest, but lines 5-6 imply that the decree was a result of the theoroi’s audience before the ekklesia at which they presented their case and the earlier ruling from Antigonus. See Hatzopoulos (1996: 158-162) for all the literature on the status of the various cities. He suggested (p. 164) the theoretical independence of an allied Kassandreia gave way during the reign of Gonatas to an allied status and finally to Macedonian status.}\]
as having been to “the Macedonians.” As the leading city of the Macedonians and home of the king, we may presume that the Pellan decree, more than the others, reflected the judgment of Antigonus himself, as well as the Macedonian people. The importance of local strategoi implies the absence of a royal epistates at Kassandreia and Philippoi. The strategoi at Philippoi exercised military powers in the narrative of the decree, providing a military escort to the port of Nea Polis for the theoroi at the conclusion of their mission in Macedonia, drawing the escort from the mercenary garrison of the city.

The asylia decrees indicate several types of relationships, imagined and structural, between the king and these significant cities. Pella and the cities of Lower Macedonia, of Amphaxitis and Bottiaia, were Macedonian cities, and presumably fielded the majority of the soldiers in Antigonid levies at mid-century. Amphipolis, though a Greek foundation, was made a center of Macedonian state activity under Philip II and partially re-settled with Macedonians. It was simply the largest and easternmost of a number of cities and regions in Mygdonia, Edonis, and Chalkidike that were brought into an expanded Macedonia in the fourth century. Apollonia in Mygdonia provides a

80 Line 4.
81 From lines 19-20: τοὺς στρατηγοὺς συμπέμψαι αὐτοῖς τοὺς ξένους στρατιώτας τοὺς παρὰ τὴν πόλει μισθοφοροῦντας. The strategoi of Kassandreia and Demetrias may have had similar responsibilities and powers.
82 Hatzopoulos (1996: 181-184) lays out much of the evidence for this transition. New citizens are known Upper Macedonia, Bottia, and from regions and towns of “New Macedonia.” Philip and Alexander minted many, if not the majority, of their coins at Amphipolis.
clear picture of this transition: its chief magistrates in an early second century decree belie a prominent Macedonian population, and it provided a squadron of cavalry in the army of Alexander. Amphiopolis, too, provided a squadron of cavalry in Alexander’s army, and it may be that the settled Macedonians were generally given cavalry allotments, which could have been a royal policy, or merely the byproduct of replacing prominent members of the community who had been killed or exiled for resisting the Macedonians. These regions were quickly incorporated into “Macedonia” but full acculturation would have lagged for generations, and in places like Amphipolis, pre-Macedonian institutions survived alongside aspects of Macedonian culture. Amphipolis—and presumably it would have been the case for comparable cities—may not have been incorporated into the region of Macedonia subject to full military levies until the third century. The final category of cities is the Hellenistic foundations, with idealized Macedonian-Platonic institutions, generally Greek populations, and supposed

83 Meletemata 22, Epig.App. 26; Arr. Anab. 1.12.7. Additional squadrons of hetairoi were recruited from Anthemous, further south of Apollonia in the heartland of the Chalkidike (Arr. Anab. 2.9.3), from Bottike on the southwestern coast of Chalkidike (Arr. Anab. 1.2.5) and from Lete in western Mygdonia (Meletemata 22, Epig.App. 79), implying a pattern of this sort across the region. Hatzopoulos (1999: 193) critiques the analysis of Griffith (1979: 367-70) and Bosworth (1980: 211) concerning these cavalry units from these regions. The latter authors attribute these units to a policy of settler mobilization rather than city recruitment, which Hatzopoulos refutes on the basis of the city-based conscriptions described in the Amphipolian and Kassandreian decrees (discussed below). His point seems reasonable and even likely, though it is unclear that Alexander and Philip used the same system the later Antigonids used. The settlers in these new regions seem to have been fully included in local governance, but also would have figured prominently in any military mobilization. In fact, there is a glaring disparity in these regions: while hetairoi squadrons were drawn from many of these cities, infantry are unknown from the same locales.

84 Laomedon, a Mytilenian by birth given Amphipolian citizenship (Arr. Anab. 3.6.6), and Antigonus son of Kallas, winner of the hoplite stadion in the games at Tyre (SEG 48:761, AD 26A (1971): 120).

85 The military codes from Amphipolis, from the reign of Philip V, are the earliest clear evidence of infantry recruitment from that region, though it is possible it had taken place at earlier dates.
allied relationships with the Macedonian monarch. This category included, at times, Kassandreia and Thessalonike in Macedonian territory, Demetrias in Magnesia, and Philippoi and Lysimakheia in Thrace. Thessalonike had, in the third century, an *epistates* and was probably incorporated into Macedonia rather quickly.\(^86\) The Kos *asylia* decree implies that the Kassandreians maintained a sort of Macedonian identity in the reign of Antigonus, and Demetrias possessed a Macedonian court.\(^87\) The Kassandreians were subject to full conscription by the late third century, and epigraphic evidence indicates the populace of Demetrias likely was as well.\(^88\)

The addition of the manpower of these additional cities served as a considerable asset to Macedonian manpower and military strength in the time of the Antigonids. While the men of Kassandreia, Amphipolis, Demetrias and elsewhere may have served in the Macedonian contingents of the Antigonids, it also seems clear that citizens of those places maintained their local identity alongside some aspects of Macedonian identity.\(^89\) A brief examination of a famous inscription from Demetrias in Magnesia will illuminate these patterns. Antigenes, son of Sotimos, died in a battle against the Aetolians, presumably within the context of the Social War, which involved frequent conflicts.

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\(^86\) IG *X* 1.2  
\(^87\) Polyb. 5.29.6.  
\(^88\) For the Kassandreians, see SEG 49:722; for Demetrias, some evidence is examined below, but references to civilian mobilizations are also known from Livy’s narrative of the Third Macedonian War (44.12-13).  
\(^89\) The Macedonian identity may have been related mainly to military service and political identity within the broader Macedonian nation, which enjoyed a closer relationship with the king than allied states, and so would have been desirable.
fighting between Antigonid and Aetolian forces in Thessaly. The funeral monument depicts Antigenes in his role as auletes, flute-player for the infantry.\textsuperscript{90} He wears the kausia, the Macedonian hat. The accompanying inscription describes, in heroic terms, his death in an infantry battle against the Aetolians in Phthiotic Thebai, where he fell bringing aid to the lochos of ephebes.\textsuperscript{91} Though a citizen of Demetrias, capped in kausia, and fighting for the honor of Alexander the Great (line 12), the text carefully emphasizes his Magnesian origins.\textsuperscript{92}

The expansion of Macedonian institutions and identity in the Greek and pre-Macedonian regions east of the Macedonian heartland should have produced a relative expansion of Antigonid recruiting potential. There may be some sort of correlation between the expansion of Macedonian conscription into the regions east of the Amphaxitis region and the appearance in the Antigonid period of a class of phalanx

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\textsuperscript{90} The monument is located in Volos Archaeological Museum. Our understanding of the role of musicians in Hellenistic warfare is woefully incomplete. Polybius (4.20.12) mentions that the Arkadians conducted military training to flutes during his day, but does so to set them apart from others. We know from Athenaeus (15.238) that at least some flautists accompanied Alexander’s army, though we do not know what military role they may have had.

\textsuperscript{91} Thess.\textit{Mnemeia} 128; no. 10: Ἀντιγένης Σωτίμου εἰς μακάρων νήσους μὲ κατήγαγεν ἄγχοθι Μίνως, / θερμὰ κατ’ ἐνεκφάλου τραύματα δεξάμενον / καὶ δέμας ἐκ καμάκων πεπαλαγμένον, ἀνίκ’ Ἐννῦ / 5 πεζῶν ἀπ’ Αιτωλίων ἀμφορόθυνεν Ἀρη / Ἀντιγένης Μάγνης δὲ δόμος καὶ πατής ἐπολύσε / ἡ Δημητριέων οὐ μὲ κατωκτισάτο, / νῦν Σωτίμου τὸν γνήσιον οὐδὲ μὲ Σωσίω / μήτῃ οὐ γὰρ ἔβην θήλυς / ἐπ’ ἀντιπάλους / 10 ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤρθην σωζόν λόχον — — ἱστορὰ τῶν — — / Ζήνη καὶ ὀπλῆτην αὐλὸν / Ἑνυκίου, / καὶ τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου χθόνιον τάφον, οὐ μὲγὰ θάρσος, / ὀνόμανος, Θῆβης ἀμφεκάλυφα κόνιν.

\textsuperscript{92} One might question whether Antigenes would have fought in a Macedonian military unit at all, but the kausia indicates that he did. The idea of coming to the aid of fellow soldiers under attack also seems difficult to fit into the tightly-packed ranks of Macedonian phalanx warfare, but as an auletes, Antigenes would have been one of the officers outside the formation, and so one of the few men in a phalanx formation with the freedom to change position and provide aid to the pressed ephebes.
infantry known as the *leukaspides*, or “white shields.” The standard phalanx infantry of the royal army were known as *chalkaspides* in the same era, for the bronze shields that they carried, and which were standard in most of the Hellenistic armies, including Alexander’s. At some point prior to the Social War, Antigonus Doson, or perhaps Demetrius II, introduced a supplemental wing of the phalanx, the *leukaspides*. Though a Byzantine writer claims the unit had its origins with Alexander, Plutarch’s *Cleomenes* strongly implies that the “white-shields” were a new and hitherto unexpected extension of the Antigonid phalanx. The enfranchised *helots* Cleomenes raised to oppose the *leukaspides* may indicate some sense of inferiority in terms of equipment or training between the *leukaspides* and *chalkaspides*. There is no indication in epigraphic sources that there were two broad divisions of the phalanx. The conscription decrees from Kassandreia and Amphipolis only distinguish between the detachments of the

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93 Alexander issued several series of coins with the bronze shields, with a pattern of ellipses surrounding a central *episema*: a gorgoneion, winged thunderbolt, or Herakles in lion-skin cap. A number of bronze-faced shields from the Hellenistic period have been recovered: several Antigonid shields, a Pergamene, and one from the Pontic kingdom, as well as smaller models of the shields or, in Egypt, the armory mold for making the bronze covers. An Athenian inscription (IG II².1487) mentions a dedication of a bronze-faced Macedonian shield. For discussion of these shield types, see Liampi (1998), Adam-Veli (1993), Markle (1999), Hammond (1996), and Hatzopoulos (2001).

94 Nicephorus Gregorus (3.83.4) relates a Byzantine tradition that one of the contingents levied from the Macedonians by Alexander were called *leukaspides*, but the contingent is not attested in historical narratives until the Social War. Plutarch (*Cleomenes* 23.2-3) says that Cleomenes allowed *helots* to purchase their freedom, raising funds, and enrolling “two thousand of them, armed and trained in the Macedonian manner, whom he raised as a counter to the white-shields of Antigonus.”

95 The shields of the *chalkaspides* were, of course, bronzed, as were, it seems, the shields of the *agema*. The shields of the *leukaspides* seem to have been covered in leather, and painted white with a painted blazon, according to Diodorus (31.8.10) who describes the twelve hundred shields from that section of the phalanx of Perseus as “white, rough shields,” λευκὰς καὶ τραχείας ἀσπίδας. I would speculate that the latter adjective would refer to the battle scars upon the leather-covered shields, which might have suffered more severe and more observable damage than those faced in bronze. It is unclear whether any examples of these shields are known from archaeological sources (though see following footnote).
Macedonian *agema* and recruitment for the phalanx. The most reasonable hypothesis, then, is that the *leukaspides* were recruited from different regions than the *chalkaspides*. If certain regions were mobilized to form the *leukaspides*, and the *leukaspides* were a new, expanded wing of the phalanx in the reign of Doson, the likeliest explanation is that they were recruited from the regions of expanded Macedonia: Chalkidike, Mygdonia, and the regions around the Strymon valley. The expansion of the phalanx recruitment in these regions significantly expanded the potential size of the Antigonid phalanx.

4.2.2. Documentary Evidence for Antigonid Conscription Regulations

Antigonid military institutions differed from those in Egypt, and to a considerable degree as well from those in Asia. Based on the citizen population of urban

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96 The strongest argument against this proposition is probably the painted shields on several Macedonian tombs. The Hagios Athanasios tomb, located east of the Axios near ancient Heraclea and dated to the early third century, depicts, on either side of the doorway, two young Macedonian men holding sarissas. Above them were painted two shields: on the left, a bronze-faced shield with a painted *episemon*, and on the right, a leather-faced shield, painted, albeit in blue and red rather than white. Intriguingly, the frieze above the door shows three prominent infantrymen attending a Dionysiac banquet. Their shield-bearers carry bronze-faced shields. These shields feature the common pattern of embossed ellipses and central fields with embossed Macedonian starbursts. The latter shields may be related to contingents within the Macedonian *agema*, but one must wonder whether the former shields, one bronze-faced, the other leather-faced (but not painted white), might bear some correlation to the *chalkaspides* and *leukaspides*. The so-called Lyson and Kallikles tomb, located at Mieza in Bottaia and dated to about 200 BC, depicts two life-size shields, one an embossed bronze shield of the traditional style, the other extensively painted, mainly in reds and blues, with a white Macedonian star at center. Again there seems to be evidence (the painted shield may have been bronze-faced, there is at least a band on the shield showing a yellowish-metallic color) of leather-faced shields alongside the traditional bronze-faced, embossed shields of the Macedonian army. In neither case, however, do we find a leather-faced shield painted white. But the multiple types of shields raise questions of their own: perhaps they were family shields, as opposed to shields from state armories, used in reservist duties.

97 For a study of Macedonian manpower, see below. The Antigonid army in the reign of Gonatas, though poorly sourced, clearly relied heavily upon mercenaries, and the largest number ever given for the phalanx of Gonatas is only five thousand men (*Plut. Pyrrhus* 7.5, though not all of them *necessarily* Macedonians of the phalanx), though surely his army was larger.
centers and tribal village networks, the Antigonids mobilized most of their army through institutions they and their predecessors had developed with the population centers of Macedonia. Thus the Antigonid negotiation of legitimacy with the Macedonians included negotiation over the mobilizations of armies, whereas the Ptolemaic system utilized a separate negotiation of military service from a klerouchic population to advance the stability of the Ptolemaic state over the place and broader population of Egypt. A decree from Beroia provides some insights into Antigonid military mobilization, and the military potential of the various cities of the kingdom.\(^98\) The decree, dated to the seventh year of an un-named monarch, either Doson or Philip V, could belong to the late summer of 223 or 215 BC. It confers on a group of veteran officers from Beroia freedom from citizen liturgies as thanks for their labors during the campaign.\(^99\) Hatzopoulos has proposed that the sixty men listed in the decree belong to three speiras (companies) of phalanx infantry levied from Beroia.\(^100\) In support he notes that the men are grouped in twenties, and that a speira would have contained twenty


\(^{99}\) The freedom from politikoi leitourgoi, the civil duties of citizens, would have at least included civilian duties, but, given the city-based military institutions of the Antigonids, almost certainly included compulsory military service.

\(^{100}\) See Hatzopoulos (2001: 402-403). A speira was the smallest autonomous unit in the phalanx, composed of four platoons, called tetrarchies, each likewise composed of four files (lochoi) of sixteen men, making for a total of 256 men, or, with the staff officers of the unit, 260 or 261. Additionally, the existence of the speira as the primary tactical unit of the phalanx signals that a reform had taken place in the Antigonid army either earlier in Doson’s reign, or in that of Demetrius II, to remodel the army after a tactical theory other than that previously employed by Alexander and the Successors. Based on the similarities of Asklepiodotos and the Antigonid evidence, the original source for Asklepiodotos was likely also the inspiration for the Antigonid reform. Given that the first phalanx to definitively deploy in the speira was under the command of Pyrrhus, the tactical treatise of Gonatas greatest foe may have been the basis for his descendant’s reforms.
subaltern officers: three tetrarchai, twelve lochagoi, and probably five officers ἔξω τὰ ἔξων, outside the formation. The twenty men in each group leave no room for the speirarchs themselves, concerning whom Hatzopoulos suggests that they were not locally-appointed officers. The implication of his interpretation is that Beroia, one of the principle cities of Bottaiia, fielded three speiras for the Macedonian phalanx from its citizenry, not far short of eight hundred men. The Macedonian field army for the latter half of the third army seems to have comprised about ten thousand men in the phalanx, and thus about forty speiras. This text, interpreted in this manner, depicts Macedonian military conscription tied to the cities within the various regions of Macedonia, which corresponds to the descriptions given by Livy during the Second Macedonian War.

A close examination of the text demonstrates that the text belongs to an earlier reign, and that it does not describe in such simple terms the officers of three speiras from the phalanx. Hatzopoulos has already observed the apparent prominence of at least some of the men in the first group of officers. In fact, several of the men seem to be from families that fed into the Philoi, the leading men of Macedonia. The first man in the list, Polemaios son of Hippalos, is thought to have been the son of an epistates and the father

101 These officers are not clearly attested in the Antigonid army, but are known from the tactical treatise of Asklepiodotus, which shares many commonalities with other aspects of the organization of the Antigonid army.
102 Indeed, the Macedonian phalanx, as a part of the royal army on campaign, would have included at least forty or as many as sixty-four speiras in the period in question, from 222-217 BC, and thus the Beroians alone constituted as much as 7.5% of that force.
103 Livy 33.3.1, 33.19.3.
of Perseus’ ambassador to Rome in 170 BC. The following two men, Timokles and Hippostratos, were sons of Kallippos; the latter was almost certainly the father of the politarch Kallippos known from the Beroia gymnasium decree, who may also have been the junior admiral in the fleet of Perseus.\textsuperscript{104} The first group is also the only group with brothers and, seemingly, fathers and sons, at least one and perhaps two of each.\textsuperscript{105} Considering the prominence of at least some of the families represented in the first contingent, it may be more advisable to view the first twenty names as belonging to officers of the peltastai.\textsuperscript{106} The last group of names on the text was also separated from the first forty by the engraver, and written in a smaller but similar hand. While this has avoided much comment, it seems reasonable that the last contingent was added to the list at a later date, perhaps after the Sellasia campaign. The inscription then provides a picture, not only of phalanx recruitment, but of the broader recruitment of military personnel in the Macedonian army, and the patterns of civic awards bestowed by the king in reward for exemplary service.

\textsuperscript{104} EKM I Beroia 1.4-5, and Livy 44.28.1.
\textsuperscript{105} The afore-mentioned Timokles and Hippostratos, sons of Kallippos, as well as Paramonos and Alkimos, son of Paramonos, are listed consecutively, making their identifications more likely; Nikanor, Euthenous, and Zoilos were all sons of Alexandros, but are not listed consecutively, and neither are Pausanias and Nikanor, both sons of Nikanor. Alexandros and Nikanor may have simply been common names.
\textsuperscript{106} The peltastai were to be recruited from the wealthier families (\textit{εὐπορωτέρους}), and surely those fewer families would also be more likely to contribute more than one member of the family to military service, and surely the families that produce such notable Beroians in the second century would have been \textit{εὐπορωτέρους} a generation earlier. The criticism of this interpretation might be that the peltastai are often supposed to have been permanent troops in the company of the king, but that does not actually seem to be the case. The conscription decrees from Amphipolis and Kassandreia indicate that members of the agema, of which the peltastai were the largest component, were conscripted on the same basis as the phalanx. They may simply have been called to service more often, or retained for longer terms.
The date for the Beroian army dedication should also be re-examined. It dates to the seventh year of an un-named king, and more specifically, is dated 17 Gorpaios, around mid-August, at the end of the campaign season. Hatzopoulos has suggested that it should be dated to Philip V, who sent a letter at almost the same time, and also presumably from his army camp, to the people of Larisa in Thessaly, urging them to follow his instructions about enrolling in the citizenship men who had probably been stationed at Larisa by Philip or his predecessors. Now, the seventh year of Philip V should be 215 BC, when in fact Philip is said to have conducted no considerable campaign as he awaited word on his alliance with the Carthaginians. The text implies a situation in which a major war and mobilization had taken place, and the war seems to have been on-going. In 215 BC, Philip was in the process of commencing a possible invasion of Italy, after launching a short, medium-sized naval campaign the previous year (see below, Table 4.1). By late summer, it is certainly conceivable that he had already returned to Macedonia. Antigonus Doson, on the other hand, spent the campaign season of his seventh year (223 BC) fighting against the Spartans and Cleomenes in the Peloponnese, accompanied by a large army. That army had come to the Peloponnese with Antigonus at the start of the campaign season in 224 BC, and wintered in the Peloponnese with the king. He sent many of those men home in late

107 The other letter, Syll. 3 543 (IG IX 2 5171), is dated 31st Gorpaios, and in it Philip says he will hear cases of any questionable new citizens after he returns from campaign (lines 37-38: ἐώς ἀν ἐγὼ ἐπιστρέφως ἀπὸ τῆς [στρατείας] ἐμῆς διακοίνω). Hatzopoulos (2001: 19) has himself re-opened the possibility that the text dates to the reign of Doson.
summer of 223, probably around August, while he remained in the Peloponnese with his mercenaries. The return in late summer of veterans from a full mobilization, a king writing home from a military camp, and the context of a major war, fit the circumstances of the inscription better than those from the reign of Philip.

This text is also significant for pronouncing a policy that seems to have been standard in the reign of Philip V. The king, most likely Antigonus, freed his officers from the duties of citizens, which likely included compulsory military service. Such a gift, freedom from conscription and other duties, indicates that Antigonus could afford to play politics and distribute such gifts, in the midst of an on-going war, because the Macedonian population was sufficient to provide his manpower needs. On the one hand, only the *hegemones* (officers) received the grant, such that it affected a smaller number of men. On the other, the officers were vital to military operations, and what amounted to a grant of retirement would require that Antigonus rely on new, or at least different, officers in the next year’s campaign against Cleomenes. In addition, a copy of the letter was sent to the administrative center of Bottaia (perhaps Edessa, but this is not known), and presumably was accompanied by similar letters for officers from other towns in Bottaia, and perhaps to other regions of Macedonia. Indeed, while the letter of Antigonus to Beroia represents a solitary grant, the conscription regulations from

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108 It may be that this grant was, at first, a sort of unofficially negotiated compensation for the extended and exemplary service of Antigonus’ army, which campaigned for two consecutive seasons without returning to Macedonia.
Kassandreia and Amphipolis indicate that the royal decree had over time become a royal policy.\textsuperscript{109} The Amphipolis regulation provides (and presumably a missing section of the version from Kassandreia would have the same words) a special category for “the officers who have previously been released from service.”\textsuperscript{110} This indicates that precisely the process Doson used in late 223 for the Beroians became a fairly common compensation for military service during the late third century. Incidentally, it also indicates the limitations to the grant: the specialized regulation stipulates that released officers (and former members of the royal cavalry as well, the \textit{hetairoi}) who were still able-bodied could still be assigned to the reserve force.

These conscription regulations provide the best evidence for military mobilization in the entire Hellenistic world. It is unclear to what extent the regulations it describes would resemble those used in Asia Minor or Syria, or even perhaps in Alexandria, nor is it entirely clear how the regulations would have been applied in Upper Macedonia or rural areas of Macedonia near the borders with Paionia and Thrace.\textsuperscript{111} Recruitment was overseen in the cities by the local \textit{epistates}, the agent of the king in that locale, often selected from the city itself. The \textit{epistates} was given a conscription order, which would have, presumably, specified the required levy in terms

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{109} For the conscription regulations, see Nigdelis and Sismonides (1999), Hatzopoulos (2001:153-160).} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{110} SEG 49.855.B. 25-27: ἐὰν μὴ τινες ἤγεμονες καταλελυκότες ἢ ἔταρσοι, ἐπιτίθεσιν φαίνονται ἐκ τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπιθύμουσι ἐκ τῶν βοηθῶν.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{111} Within other regions of Macedonia, one might imagine a more dispersed version of the conscription regulation from the cities, whereby smaller detachments might be recruited from individual towns to collectively constitute \textit{speiras} and eventually, larger units.}
of the number of men needed from the city for each contingent of the army: the phalanx, the cavalry, the *peltast*, the *agema*, and even the *hypaspistai*. The regulations must have been, in part, much older than the ones posted at Amphipolis and Kassandreia, for they consist of extensive rules to cover all sorts of irregularities and possible attempts at draft-dodging, and fines for residents and administrators who violated the regulations.\textsuperscript{112} The essential rule for mobilization was quite simple: that from each household within the conscription registry, every able-bodied man between fifteen and fifty was eligible to serve, provided he had passed inspection.\textsuperscript{113} Most likely, men potentially eligible were gathered on a parade ground (the likeliest meaning of τῶι ὑπαίθρωι here\textsuperscript{114}), and after undergoing an inspection, were conscripted by the *epistates* and *grammateus*. Much of the code is devoted to the various types of households the royal agents might encounter in drafting troops for the infantry. The codes for the elite units are far simpler: the *agema* and *peltastai* were to be drawn from the wealthier

\textsuperscript{112} Hatzopoulos (2001:96) notes that the regulations seem at place to have been styled to prevent various types of abuses of the conscription system by the citizens. He also notes that there are indications of city-by-city variations, based on the laws of each particular town.

\textsuperscript{113} SEG 49.722.11-13: λαμβανέωσαν δὲ ἐκ τῶν κατακεχωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς πολιτεύματι καθ’ ἑκάστην πυρόκαινην τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐπιτηδεῖους εἶναι μένειν ἐν τῶι ὑπαίθρῳ ἀπὸ πεντεκαδεκαετοῦ ἕως πεντηκόσιατέτοις.

\textsuperscript{114} Hatzopoulos (2001: 99) follows Billows (1996:174, n.82) in translating ὑπαίθρος as “apt for military service.” I would instead translate the term as an open-air field near the city, likely the same place where city militia trained, upon which the men were marshaled for examination of their competence for service and eligibility for conscription, prior to the actual conscription process.
εὐπορωτέρος homes, and within general age restrictions. The conscription of these elites alongside the infantry is rather surprising, as their frequent presence in the company of the king on campaign has long indicated that they were semi-professional. More shocking, then, is the regulation for the hypaspistai, the bodyguard of the king, who were drawn from the same households over time. In fact, the families who contributed troops to the elite units were all probably customarily eligible for those conscriptions, and the simplicity of their regulation is another indication that earlier versions of the conscription code were probably considerably shorter. The infantry were drawn from the poorer (ἐλαχίστην) households, and the regulations make clear that no more than one man should be taken for active service from each household. The regulations protect young fathers who are heads of households from service, but otherwise the regulations tend to emphasize service from the young men. The effect of these regulations was that, even in the case of a military disaster, families could not be outright obliterated. Those men eligible to serve who were not mobilized for the campaign were enrolled as τοὺς βοηθούς, the military reserve. Because at least two men had to pass inspection on

115 These age restrictions have no parallel in Ptolemaic Egypt, where the klerouchic system seems, for most of the third century at least, to have left the head of household eligible for service until his death (or possible retirement), so long as he remained in possession of the allotment.
117 In households where a father and son were both of-age (twenty and older, fifty and younger), the son was conscripted. Fathers less than fifty years old with sons less than twenty were eligible for conscription, but only if at least one of the sons was old enough to oversee the business of the household. This meant that a father was only eligible for conscription for about five to ten years after becoming head of the household. This provided protection for new fathers, and would have tended to put the burden of service upon young adult sons.
the ὑπαίθρος in order for a household to be eligible for conscription, the military reserve was necessarily at least double the size of even a full mobilization.\footnote{For example, even in households with multiple eligible sons, only one was to be taken. This was even the case in multi-generational households, provided the household had passed scrutiny and been properly enrolled. This rule may not have been followed in the elite units.} For these reasons, the conscription decrees should not be understood, as they almost universally are,\footnote{The suggestion of the original editors, repeated by Hatzopoulos (2001: 24-25, 88, 100) and Sekunda (2010: 469-70), but questioned by Errington (2002: 22).} as elements of emergency mobilization at the start of the Second Macedonian War, but the product of continual refinement by the Antigonids of their mobilization institutions.

The comprehensive—and in many respects invasive—detail of the Macedonian conscription regulations place the Antigonid “citizen” army in an interesting position. The army was drawn from the regions, their cities, and their citizens, but organized and conscripted through the agency of the king. The royal organization and control of the army extended to the regulations imposed on soldiers called to active duty, as indicated in the famous Amphipolis military code.\footnote{For the military regulations from Amphipolis (Melet. 22 Epig.App. 12), see Roussel (1934: 39-47) and Feyel (1935: 26-68).} This inscription likewise belongs to the late third century, and is often thought to reflect conditions in Philip’s army about the time of the Second Macedonian War. At the same time, Philip is never said to have engaged in any significant reforms in the way his army was trained or regulated, so the contents of the regulations would likely have been similar, if not outright identical, to those of
Doson, and perhaps of Demetrius II as well. The regulations deal with the inspection of the camp of the king’s army, and of the units and sub-units encamped there, and the proper panoply and comportment of the men in the army. The royal ephodoi, inspectors, had the power to levy fines upon both men and their officers, and appear to have been part of the supra-regional structure of the royal army. The mass of the army had a strongly “citizen” flavor: individual units, including their subaltern officers, were drawn from the citizens of the same town. But the superior officers, from the speirarch to the strategos in the chain of command, and the grammateus and ephodoi in the military administration, constituted the royal, and semi-professional, backbone of the Macedonian army. The complex regulations exhibited in these various codes serve as evidence of the means by which the king and his officers exerted control over the cities, citizens, and citizen armies towards fielding a relatively uniform and effective fighting force.

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121 In some respects the regulations reflect both requirements imposed on the army in the time of Philip II (Polyaen. 4.2.10), and customs familiar to Macedonian armies for generations.
122 Records of their findings were in fact handed over to the hypaspistai, who in turn could consult the king on matters of army discipline and resultant fines (Melet. 22 Epig. App. 12.A.2.3-4). Some cases could be brought before an assembly of the Philoi of the king, who judged the matter (A.3.2-4).
123 In fact, the Macedonian army receives regular praise from Polybius for their industrious behavior, pugnacious valor, and, most of all, capacity for rapid marches. See, for example, Polyb. 5.97.4.

255
4.2.3. A Study of Antigonid Mobilization

The effect of involving the cities in the military recruitment of Macedonia substantially increased the potential capacity of the Macedonian levy. This is evident in a study of Macedonian mobilizations from late in the reign of Antigonus Doson down to the beginning of the Second Macedonian War. From about 229 BC and for several years after, Doson led armies on campaigns into Thessaly against the Aetolian League, and conducted naval campaigns in the Aegean, including a short but successful foray into Karia. There is little historical evidence to judge the size of the mobilizations for these wars. However, beginning in 224 BC, there is a period of thirteen consecutive years with detailed information on Macedonian mobilizations. The evidence for these years is collected in the following table.

Table 4.1. Mobilizations of Macedonian Manpower, 224-212 BC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army Size</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Contingents</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>15,300-21,400?</td>
<td>Late Spring</td>
<td>Up to 20,000 Macedonian infantry, up to 1,400 cavalry</td>
<td>Kleomenic War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wintered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

124 Plutarch claimed (Aratus 43.1) that Antigonus army included twenty thousand infantry, all Macedonians, and fourteen hundred cavalry, concerning whom he says nothing. We may presume that the cavalry contingent numbered, like those in future deployments, between three and eight hundred. The other cavalry would have been from the Central Greek allies and Antigonid mercenaries, who together added six hundred cavalry for the Sellasia campaign and may counted at least as many in 224. Then, if the allied and mercenary cavalry were in attendance, it may be that other allied and mercenary troops, the infantry, were accidentally included in Plutarch’s count. Including the mercenaries and the Central Greek and Illyrian allies from Sellasia, who numbered 10,600 men, drops the contingent of phalanx and peltasts to less than ten thousand. I think the Illyrian allies and mercenaries should be included, but not the other contingents, 6,600 men, leaving 13,400 for the Macedonians, or a phalanx of ten thousand and three thousand peltasts, precisely the same number deployed for Sellasia. The Hellenic League had not been formed until the course of the campaign in 224, and so there is little basis for assuming the presence of the five thousand men from Central Greece. The two thousand Agrianians and Galatians in the army at Sellasia might be removed as
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>10,000 Phalanx, 3,000 Peltasts, 300 Cavalry</td>
<td>Unknown, Boethoi and Cleomenic veterans, Illyrian War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Contingents of Phalanx, Peltasts, and Cavalry</td>
<td>Achaean Congress/Social War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>10,000 Phalanx, 5,000 Agema, 800 Cavalry</td>
<td>Social War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>3,000 chalkaspides, 2,000 Peltasts, 300 Cavalry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>&gt;11,400</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>≥6,000 Phalanx, 5,000 Agema, ≥300 Cavalry</td>
<td>Army of Chrysogonos in Thessaly (probable levy of Upper Macedonia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~3-4,000</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>&gt;2,300</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>Unknown (at least the company of the king: the peltasts and guard cavalry)</td>
<td>Bylazora Mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

well, as Polybius (2.65.2-5) implies that those two contingents were new elements in the Macedonian army in the Peloponnese. In that case, the army that accompanied Antigonus in 224 may have included either the full levy of the agema, five thousand strong, otherwise unattested until 219, or a phalanx of twelve thousand men.

125 This war technically carried into the year 221, or at least into late autumn of 222, since Philip’s first regnal year was 221 BC.

126 Livy (26.25) tells us that four thousand men, also mainly from Upper Macedonia, were used to deployed under Perseus to defend Thessaly in 212 BC; we may presume that the force under Chrysogonos was of a similar size.

127 The co-commander with Chrysogonos (Polyb. 5.17.6) was Petraios. Petraios may have been the prominent Larissan of the same name (Syll. 3 543) and same era. Chrysogonos was honored at Larisa about this same year (SEG 27.202). Petraios may have commanded Thessalian auxiliaries in Macedonian service.

128 Polyb. 5.97.1-4. If the levies later in the year are any indication, the Bylazora mission may have included levies from Chalkidike-Mygdonia, and/or Parastrymonis. Also, if the above hypothesis regarding the regional recruitment of chalkaspides and leukaspides is correct, the summer recruitment overseen by Chrysogonos mobilized a full levy of the chalkaspides. The regions mobilized for the summer campaign were
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crew</th>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>5,000-8,000</td>
<td>Early Summer</td>
<td>Unknown (likely three phalanx levies, and the company of the king) - Illyria Naval Expedition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-Stalled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>6,000-13,000</td>
<td>Early Summer</td>
<td>Unknown - Apollonia Naval Expedition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the same regions from which Alexander could mobilize more than twelve thousand phalangites for his conquest of Persia, while keeping the same number under arms in Macedonia. The royal cavalry attending upon the king is always at least three hundred cavalry, and as many as four hundred (Polyb. 4.67.5).

129 Polybius (5.97-100) informs us that, while Philip was engaged in the Bylazora mission, Chrysogonos was conducting a thorough levy of the three regions, from which he likely mobilized between eight and twelve thousand men. The target of this campaign was the Aetolian position in Phthiotic Thebes of the Thessaly, and the Demetrian Antigenes may have died within this same action. This is, notably, the only incontrovertible instance wherein Polybius or any other source informs us that the Macedonians mobilized troops from particular regions for particular campaigns, and additionally the only source that names the actual regions. These three regions were the regions of “Old Macedonia.”

130 Polybius (5.109.1) tells us that Philip built one hundred lemboi for his operation in the Spring of 216 against Illyria. The lower calculation of five thousand allows fifty men per boat, the estimate used by Hatzopoulos (1996: 455) for this same campaign, drawn from the five thousand Illyrian soldiers transported by one hundred lemboi at Polybius 2.3.1. The higher calculation assumes, based on the use of Macedonian infantry as rowers (Polyb. 5.109.4), that the fifty per boat was an average transportation contingent, and should be added on to a Macedonian crew of at least thirty. The number could in fact be higher, but we should also bear in mind that the fleet would almost certainly have included cavalry transports and mercenary contingents.

131 Livy (23.39) tells us that Philip spent the whole spring and summer of 215 BC waiting for word on his treaty with Hannibal, and never set sail, and may not have even departed Macedonia. Appian (Macedonica fragmenta 1.3) mentions that Philip attacked Kerkyra while he waited for news of the treaty.

132 Livy (24.40) tells us that Philip took 120 bireme lemboi to transport his army for operations against Apollonia. The estimates follow the same process as the numbers for 216 BC. The higher calculation assumes, on a bireme lemboi, roughly sixty oarsmen and a minimum of fifty passengers.

133 Operations followed in the Peloponnese, culminating in Philip’s intervention at Messene. The descriptions of Philip’s actions in the Messene affair (Polyb. 7.10-14, Plut. Aratus) indicate that he was
This table provides a picture of a very active and reliable system of military recruitment. Hatzopoulos has calculated that, as part of the Antigonid kings’ relationship with the Macedonians, they never mobilized large levies in consecutive years, and recruited detachments from alternative regions for campaigns in consecutive years. He also argues that the last Antigonids, in the context of war with Rome, actively sought means to increase the potential size of the army, from a phalanx of ten thousand under Doson, to one of twenty-four thousand under Perseus. To some extent, accompanied by only a small force. The failed expedition against Apollonia was likely the only significant operation of 214.

134 The only part of this operation recorded is the conquest of Lissos (Polyb. 8.13). It was necessary for the army to travel nearly 400km across challenging terrain and through hostile regions. The brief narrative only provides clear descriptions of the peltastai and light auxiliaries, but Polybius’ reference to the strateia and multiple references to the Makedones may indicate a larger force.

135 Livy (26.25) provides a brief narrative of a fast-moving winter expedition, then seems to draw from a missing Polybian source in describing mobilizations of Bottaia, Pelagonia and Lynkos on Philip’s march toward Thessaly; the force with Philip was clearly larger than the four thousand under Perseus, but likely included most of the mercenaries.

136 Hatzopoulos (2001): 75-76.
Philip V and Perseus did institute reforms to increase the size of their phalanx in the second century.  

137 The description of campaign forces as the full levy of Hellenistic kingdoms is a rather common trend, and really should be done away with. In the Macedonian case, it seems to reflect Livy’s estimate that Philip engaged in an extreme mobilization to raise his army for the campaign in 197 BC.  

138 The full phalanx of sixteen thousand men deployed at the start of the third century by Philip V against the Romans simply represented a sufficient levy for the tactical units that the Macedonian army deployed. What Livy described in Book 33 was simply the execution of a comprehensive levy based on regulations already in existence. The Macedonians chose to operate with smaller detachments at most points during the late third century, but after the implementation of a second wing to the phalanx and the expansion of the Agema of the Macedonians to five thousand men, comprised of the peltastai and the agema, there is little reason to doubt that Doson himself envisaged a phalanx of sixteen thousand, and total Macedonian infantry force of about twenty thousand. The military conscription regulations from Kassandreia and Amphipolis only reinforce this point: if the regulations were followed, considerably more men were “enrolled” in the reserve than in the campaign army.  

139 So the Macedonian mobilizations should be understood, not as reflections of maximum manpower, but as reflections of Macedonian adherence to ________________________

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137 For which, see the brief study in the Conclusion.
138 Livy (33.3). This is never done with the Romans, but is regularly done with Hellenistic armies.
139 In an incomplete mobilization, which almost all were, the number of reserves would far more than double the number conscripted for duty. Not all regions would have contributed active duty regiments,
tactical theories, and conscription tailored to the particular size of military units and formations.

Table 1 also indicates that the Antigonid state enjoyed robust legitimacy and stability, such that it could mobilize large armies year after year without any real evidence of internal unrest. With the exception of 220 BC, there is clear evidence that Antigonus III and Philip V mobilized enough men to fill at least half of their total phalanx every year from 224 to 217 BC. From the same period, substantial portions of the army campaigned abroad every year except 221 BC, when the army was engaged against Dardanian invaders within or in the vicinity of Macedonia. Based on the numbers of phalanx troops mobilized at certain points, it seems reasonable that, in the Antigonid army, the sub-unit of each wing of the phalanx, the *strategia*, was a uniform unit of two thousand men, which has been suggested by Hatzopoulos and would accord fairly well with the tactical manuals.\textsuperscript{140} Instead, the mobilizations of two, three, five, or ten thousand phalangites may indicate that the Macedonian army consisted of a *strategia* from each of its constituent regions. This way, when the king ordered a mobilization, conscription orders were relayed to regional centers, like Bottaia, and then to the constituent cities of the region, like Beroia, from which a sufficient number of men were levied in order to fill the conscription order and complete the regional *strategia*.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{140} The Asklepiodotos manual (2.1-3.6) on the phalanx is the principal source for such references.

\textsuperscript{141} So, for example, the *chalkaspides* may have consisted of *strategia* of two, three, and three thousand men from the Amphaxian, Bottaian, and Upper Macedonians. The topic of settlement and resettlement, as a tool
further evidence of Antigonid strength, there is clear evidence that on at least two
occasions (224/3 and 219/8) large armies were kept on campaign and away from
Macedonia through a winter and for more than a year. While the armies of Antigonid
Macedonia never reached the sheer size of the armies that the Seleucids and Ptolemies
would mobilize at the same point in time, the Macedonian capacity to mobilize fairly
large citizen armies year-after-year reflects a level of stability, legitimacy, and
effectiveness far beyond that enjoyed by Antigonus Gonatas when he first secured the
Macedonian crown in the 270's BC.

4.3. The Structural Weaknesses of the Seleucid System: Rebellion and Civil
war, 242-222 BC

The Seleucid kingdom was a broken and shrinking state for two consecutive
decades in the late third century BC. After the armies of Euergetes withdrew, civil war
broke out. The younger brother of Seleucus II Kallinikos, Antiochus surnamed Hierax,
the Hawk, refused to give aid to this brother in the last stages of the Third Syrian War,

142 to create suitable urban concentrations of manpower for effective recruitment, has not received sufficient
attention in this section, but is covered more completely in the following chapter.

Additionally, if at least or more than ten thousand phalangites were in Doson’s army from 224 to 223, and
he then mobilized ten thousand phalangites for his campaign in 222, either he mobilized many of the same
men after the winter, or the Macedonian manpower was sufficient for a different ten thousand to be
conscripted. I suggest that many of the men, though perhaps not all, were in fact different men than those in
the previous campaign.
and then declared his own kingship from Sardis in Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{143} The territories from Syria to Mesopotamia were the only regions that remained loyal during those years. They are notable, and distinguishable from other regions, for their geographical continuity and more direct royal rule. Other regions were separated from the center by impressive mountains, ruled by powerful local families (and even kings), and rarely obedient to the Seleucid monarch for more than a few years consecutively. In spite of the fractious nature of the empire the Seleucids ruled, the constituent provinces seem to have maintained their functions, and at the close of the period under discussion here, Seleucus II’s youngest son, Antiochus III, would be the aggressor in a new war in Syria, even while Seleucid Asia Minor lay in a usurper’s hands, and all the lands beyond Mesopotamia as well.

The civil war between Seleucus II and his younger brother should be understood within the context of the politics of Asia Minor. It provides additional evidence for the instabilities of Seleucid control in that region. At the outset of his reign, Seleucus, probably guided by his mother Laodike, oversaw the marriage of his sisters to the rulers of Pontus and Cappadocia respectively. Both kings possessed Persian heritage, and Seleucus chose to strengthen his ties with them rather than attempting to strengthen his ties with the kings of Pergamon or Bithynia, the most powerful of the Greek lesser kingdoms of Anatolia. Seleucus himself married into his mother’s family, the powerful

\textsuperscript{143} Justin 27.2.7-8.
Achaids of Asia Minor. An inscription from the aftermath of the Galatian War suggests that the first Achaios held considerable authority (κυρίων τού τοπου, I.24-5) in the borderlands of Lydia and Phrygia, with his capital as one of the dynastai of Asia at Laodikeia in Phrygia. His daughters married into both the Seleucid and (pre-)Attalid royal families. Grainger has suggested, plausibly, that Achaios was related to Antiochus I, and may have even been another son of Seleucus I. The daughters of the Achaids linked the royal families of Asia Minor, and the sons held considerable political and military authority, especially in Lydia, as subordinates of the Seleucid kings.

When Antiochus Hierax and Seleucus went to war against one another, they did so while leveraging their positions in relation to the various small powers of Asia Minor in order to raise armies.

When the war began, Antiochus Hierax, positioned in Sardis, had the support of at least part of the Achaids, since Alexandros, one of Achaios’ sons, is said to have commanded the troops at Sardis who repelled an attack by Seleucus in about 240 BC. The war that unfolded is poorly documented, but reveals the importance of mobilizing military support from the many powers of Asia Minor in order to gain victory. Eusebius

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144 Polyb. 4.51.
145 Ik Laodikea am Lykos 1, cf. Worrlie (1975): 59-87. When Achaios’ grandson of the same name revolted against Antiochus III after his accession, he was crowned at his ancestral capital, Laodikeia in Phrygia (Polyb. 5.57.5).
146 Laodike, wife of Antiochus II, mother of Seleucus II (Euseb. 1.251), and Antiochis, mother of Attalos I of Pergamon (Strabo 13.4.2).
149 Euseb. 1.251.e-f.
adds that Hierax enjoyed support at that time from Galatian armies and—at least
circumstantially—the Ptolemaic forces at Ephesos. Antiochus seems, in the course of
over twelve years of intermittent fighting, to have won at least three more victories, each
of which must have been due in large part to the aid of allies. First, in about 239 BC,
Hierax and a largely Galatian army defeated Seleucus' army in the battle of Ankyra.
That particular episode illuminates particularly well the precarious coalitions developed
in wartime Anatolia, for when word passed (falsely) of Seleucus’ demise, Antiochus was
forced to purchase peace with his own allies to keep them from turning on him as
well. Second, a few years later, Antiochus lost his own army when it went over to
Seleucus (one might read into this the defection of the Achaids), but won a victory after
allying with Ziaelas of Bithynia and Ptolemaic forces, likely the Ptolemaic garrison
forces in the Hellespont. After the victory, he formed a marriage alliance with the
Bithynian king. Shortly after this, however, it seems that Attalus of Pergamon (called
Eumenes of Bithynia by Justin) entered the war, and began his campaign in the Phrygian
Hellespont, where he defeated Antiochus, and forced him to flee to the east.

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150 While the Ptolemaic forces may not have officially joined the side of Hierax at this point, they successfully
defended Ephesos against Seleucus, which denied the latter the two chief cities of Seleucid Asia, in spite of
his victory in battle.
151 Justin 27.2.10-12.
152 Euseb. 1.251.1-9. Ziaelas was killed by Galatians (Athenaeus 2.59) in 228 at the latest.
153 Justin 27.3.1-2. If Eumenes waged any of the war at all, and it was not carried on exclusively by Attalus, it
must have begun in 241 BC at the latest, the year of his death; most likely, the entire war was carried on by
Attalus. Attalus claimed a victory over Antiochus Hierax, making no mention of Galatian allies of
Antiochus, in Hellespontine Phrygia. Antiochus’ location, the absence of Galatians, and the position of the
Antiochus enjoyed few victories from that point, but having sought aid in Cappadocia and Sophene, with Artamenes and Arsames, respectively, he managed to inflict at least one defeat, and perhaps two or more, on the Achaid generals of Seleucus while threatening to invade Syria and Mesopotamia. But the aid he enjoyed from his Orontid in-laws also eventually gave way, and fearing an intrigue, Antiochus fled, probably around 230 BC, making his unsuccessful last stand with the Galatians again by his side.

Seleucus had an even more difficult time gaining allies in the war. The Achaid seems to have supported Antiochus in the first year or two of the war, but returned to Seleucus’ side. The other dynastai of Seleucid Asia, Lysias of Phrygia and Olympichos of Karia, remained loyal. Lysias seems even to have led a Seleucid army against Attalus, but been defeated, probably in the later 230’s. The general support of the dynastai and enmity of the surrounding kings is fitting in the war between the legitimate heir and a usurper. After securing the support of his dynastai, and following his brother’s defeat at

victory as Attalus’ first, all indicate that this should have taken place shortly after Antiochus’ successful alliance with the Bithynians and Ptolemies.

Polyaen. 4.17.1. The Seleucid generals, Andromachos and Achaios, were a father and son, uncle and cousin to the warring brothers. Trog.Prol. 27 says that Seleucus himself defeated Antiochus in Mesopotamia, after which Antiochus fled to the court of Artamenes.

Justin 27.3.7-8.

For the dynastes Lysias in central Phrygia, see Cohen (1995: 311-2), Billows (1995: 99-100), and Grainger (1997: 101, 113). For the Asian dynastai of the Hellenistic period, see Wilhelm (1911: 46-63). Lysias and his dynasty seem to have ruled a region of southern-central Phrygia near the borders with Pisidia and Pamphylia, whereas the Achaid ruled the region of southwestern Phrygia and eastern Lydia, on the borders with Karia and Lykia.
the hands of Attalus, it appears that Seleucus withdrew from that theater of war, and
launched a full-scale campaign against Parthia. The campaign forced the Pahlavan king
Arsakes to flee from Hekatompylos and Parthia, and even beyond the Jaxartes. It seems,
however, that he and his armies returned, harrying the army of Seleucus but refusing
battle, because Seleucus was eventually forced to return home, and conceded Parthia to
the Pahlavans.\footnote{Strabo 11.8.8.} When he returned, he may have defeated Antiochus’ expedition into
Mesopotamia,\footnote{Trog.Prol. 27.} and eventually crossed over into Asia about 227 BC with his Seleucid
army, intending, it would seem, to carry on the war against the lesser kings of Asia
Minor.

When Seleucus II Kallinikos crossed the Tauros again, the civil war was basically
over. Antiochus, after fleeing the Cappadocian court, sided again with the Galatians,
and either by his own ambition or the Galatian desire for vengeance, campaigned
against Pergamon. The campaign must have begun well, for when Attalus eventually
defeated the combined army, he was forced to do so outside the walls of Pergamon
itself.\footnote{OGIS 275.} Attalus claimed at least six significant victories during his reign, four against
Hierax. The first was the victory in the Phrygian Hellespont against Antiochus Hierax
several years earlier, and then, it would seem, a string of victories from 229 to 227 BC,
outside the walls of Pergamon against Hierax and the Tolistoagoi and Tektosages

\footnote{Strabo 11.8.8.}
\footnote{Trog.Prol. 27.}
\footnote{OGIS 275.}
Galatians, and battles at Coloe in Lydia and Harpasos in Karia against Hierax.\textsuperscript{160} Other sources actually indicate that Attalus won four battles in Lydia and Karia alone, the last of which finally drove Hierax out of Asia.\textsuperscript{161} Hierax took refuge with the Ptolemies, perhaps along the Thracian coast, but was confined in the same manner Ptolemy had already confined Andromachos, who may have ended up in Ptolemy’s hands through Hierax a year or two earlier,\textsuperscript{162} and escaped, but was killed by robbers.\textsuperscript{163} For Seleucus, upon crossing the Taurus, only the dynastai were loyal, and he and his sons would commit themselves to bringing the Cappadocian and Pergamene kings back into subjection. This began in 227 BC, when Seleucus fought against the combined Hellenic-Persian kingdoms and armies of Mithridates of Pontus, Artamenes of Cappadocia, and Arsames of Sophrene.\textsuperscript{164} Seleucus II died after a battle in Cappadocia against Mithridates and his allies, where, if we trust the disordered narrative of Eusebius, as many as twenty thousand of his men were killed.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{160} OGIS 273-9, Bickerman (1943-4: 76-8), Allen (1983: 28-36), Austin 231.
\textsuperscript{161} Euseb. 1.253.a-b. These battles should correspond to OGIS 278 and 279, from Attalus I’s thanksgiving dedications to Athena at the conclusion of his wars against Antiochus, the Galatians, and Seleucus in 227 BC.
\textsuperscript{162} Polyb. 4.51. If Andromachos was still commander of Seleucus’ forces in Asia in about 230, there was little time before Antiochus’ own detention for Andromachos to have fallen in Ptolemaic hands. Though we cannot construct the events entirely, Andromachos may have fallen into Antiochus’ hands during the course of the battles in the region of Sophene in 230 and 229.
\textsuperscript{163} Justin 27.3.9-11.
\textsuperscript{164} The battle is variably dated between 227 and 226 BC. The Babylonian king list (BM 35603) dates the first full year of Seleucus III to 225, implying that Kallinikos perished in 226.
\textsuperscript{165} Euseb. 1.251.g and 253.c, Justin 27.3.12, Porph. 44. From the scattered, and often poor, evidence, it seems that the Seleucid army was defeated, and in flight, Kallinikos fell from his horse, and was killed.
The lesser dynastai of Asia Minor were not as visible during the reign of Kallinikos. Olympichos, a local dynast of Karia, operated as a regional commander in the Karian interior on behalf of the Seleucids, and commanded local Seleucid forces. His position is described in various documents from Labraunda as military-governor (στρατηγὸς) of king Seleucus,\textsuperscript{166} with authority both to command the army camp (ἐξαγαγεῖν τὰ στρατόπεδα) and the soldiers in the local garrisons ([ἐπὶ] τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φρουρίων).\textsuperscript{167} These indicate that he did not rule as local ally with his own Karian forces, but as the local representative of the Seleucid Empire, not unlike the satraps and strategoi of other regions.\textsuperscript{168} The command over garrisons indicates control over Seleucid mercenary forces in the region, and over their forts and strong places. The command over the στρατόπεδα (military camp) may be analogous to a Macedonian epistates having command over the ὑπαιθρὸς in Macedonian cities: that is, Olympichos seems to have received the right and power, as part of his position as strategos, to conscript armies from the Karian cities under his rule. One may interpret his incorporation into Seleucid governmental structures and military hierarchy as sign of Seleucid strength and cohesion and of Olympichos’ subordination. But the alternative hypothesis, likelier in the context of defeat in the Third Syrian War and an ongoing civil war, is that the

\textsuperscript{166} I.Labr. 5.4-5, from about 235 BC.
\textsuperscript{167} I.Labr. 33.37-39, from about 220 BC or later. This later inscription actually gives these as a description of the powers Olympichos had whilst a servant of the Seleucids, from the perspective of the author, Philip V of Macedon.
\textsuperscript{168} Though still perhaps mainly with local Karian forces.
relationship reflects Olympichos’ local strength, co-opting Seleucid military units and local authority to strengthen his own position, forcing the Seleucids to trade off their own direct control in order to maintain their nominal control over a threatened region. The context of *I.Labr.* 33 supports the latter interpretation: Olympichos transferred his allegiance to the Macedonians after their foray into Karia in the reign of Doson. According to the inscription, he began operating on behalf of the Antigonids in the same way that he had operated on behalf of the Seleucids. One must wonder whether the Seleucid military forces under his command, referenced in the inscription, switched sides like their commander, and what additional benefits Olympichos may have gained from his new, nominal lords.\(^\text{169}\)

While Olympichos is never mentioned in the record of fighting in Asia during the 230’s and 220’s, the Macedonian dynasts of Phrygia were in the thick of the fighting. The Achaids have already been mentioned, and Lysias son of Philomelos as well. These powerful, local representatives of Seleucid rule provided a more direct Seleucid force in Asia when the monarchs were in Syria and the East. Like Olympichos, they likely had the power to levy forces from those cities liable to military service, and were the local commanders of most Seleucid garrisons, mercenary detachments, and military settlers throughout Asia Minor. This military power allowed the Seleucid dynasts to hold their

\(^{169}\)The obvious advantage for Olympichos was distance: the Macedonian strategos in Karia was the Macedonian presence in the region, for the most part.
own when the king and his army ventured into Central Asia in the middle of widespread warfare in Asia Minor, but the institutions that helped preserve the Seleucid presence in Asia during the twelve year War of the Brothers also facilitated another reversal to Seleucid unity. Following the assassination in 222 BC of Seleucus III by two Galatians in his army, Achaios continued the slain king’s campaign against Pergamon, and after a spectacular success in that venture, soon seized power in Asia Minor.170

While Achaios pondered taking the crown in Phrygia, the brother of Seleucus III came to the throne in Syria. Antiochus III was young, about twenty, when he became king. Polybius (book 5) provides a detailed narrative of the Fourth Syrian War, which began soon after his accession. Seleucid manpower must have recovered considerably in the 220’s BC, because enormous armies must have been deployed in the year 221 alone. Antiochus, under the influence of the advisor Hermeias, campaigned against Ptolemaic positions in Syria. A year earlier, his father’s army had crossed over the Taurus, and remained under the control of Achaios. Surely the royal army recruited for the war against Attalus was sizeable.171 At the accession of Antiochus, the satraps of Media and Persia, Molon and his brother Alexandros, respectively, rebelled.172 Molon was

170 Polybius (4.48) tells that Seleucus III organized a sizeable army to continue his father’s unwaged war against Attalus I, who after Kallinikos’ death only increased his acquisitions in Asia Minor. Seleucus was assassinated in the Tauros by two Galatians, Apaturix and Nikanor. Achaios put the assassins to death, then waged a very successful campaign against Attalus, and eventually took the crown.

171 Achaios’ army likely numbered at least thirteen thousand, since Garsyeris’ force is said to have been about half his army (Polyb. 5.76.2), and numbered 6,500 men (Polyb. 5.72.2).

172 Polyb. 40.6-41.1. Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993: 189) put the rebellion in terms of dynastic instability at that particular moment in Seleucid history, and emphasize that the rebellion was most significant because it
proclaimed king quickly, and launched campaigns into Mesopotamia, first against the settler region of Apollonia, and then against the region of Babylonia, whose Seleucia and Babylon constituted the principle Seleucid cities of Mesopotamia. The loyalist forces of Babylonia, Susiana, and the Persian Gulf, under Zeuxis, Diogenes, and Pythiades, were tied down by Molon’s advance, and two armies were dispatched from Syria against the rebel. Drawing only from Syria, the Seleucids were able to dispatch three significant field armies simultaneously.

When Antiochus’ army advanced toward Syria, the Ptolemaic garrison met them in the south of Koile Syria, between the Lebanon and Antilibanon ranges, at Gerrha. The strength of the Ptolemaic position and determined resistance of the Ptolemaic troops, under their commander Theodotos of Aetolia, checked the Seleucid advance. About the same time, Polybius (5.46.1-5) tells us that news arrived of the catastrophic defeat of Xenoitas. News continued to come in as Antiochus contemplated withdrawing from Syria: Seleucia-on-the-Tigris was lost, Zeuxis and his remaining forces had fled to Syria, all but the citadel of Susa was lost, and Molon had advanced as far as Dura-Europos on

targeted Babylonia, one of the centers of Seleucid rule, which had proved a stable and secure bastion since Kallinikos resecured that area in about 244 BC.

173 Polyb. 5.43.5-8 and 45.1-3.
174 The first army withdrew without casualties, and the second army may have contained many of the men who had fled as part of the first army, as well as the garrisons of the Mesopotamian districts. The second army, under overall command of Xenoitas, took heavy casualties in a surprise attack (Polyb. 5.48.2-10).
175 Though the financial stress of such a mobilization may have had something to do with the mutinous army at the close of the campaign season.
the border of Syria. The king and his troops turned to the north, and would not return until 219 BC. While the Ptolemaic army seems to have been unprepared for the confrontation, the Seleucid army seems rather to have had an opposite malady. Governor-generals in both the eastern and western reaches of the Seleucid Empire rebelled against the young king, and, supported by their substantial, mobilized military forces, began preparing to carve out their own successor kingdoms, precisely as Diodotus had done in Bactria during the reign of Seleucus II. The loss of Bactria and Parthia and the other Upper Satrapies hurt the Seleucid state, but the possible loss of all Medo-Persia and Asia Minor would do far greater, possibly irrecoverable, damage. To make matters worse, Syria itself seems to have suffered unrest arising from the crown’s inability to pay all the soldiers mobilized for the campaigns in 221. Even after Hermeias had paid the soldiers out of his personal account, the soldiers from Kyrrhestike entered into their own revolt. Kyrrhestike was one of the four regions of the Seleucid Syrian heartland, home to several major Greco-Macedonian settlements, and an essential component in the Seleucid army. For these reasons Antiochus returned to the north, wisely electing to consolidate his crumbling inheritance than enlarge it by

176 Polyb. 5.48.11-16.
177 Polybius (62.7-8) gives this impression at least. The garrison of Syria, under Theodotos, was sufficient to stop Antiochus’ advance in 221.
178 When the Seleucid kingdom did eventually lose these regions, Asia Minor after the Treaty of Apamea in 189 BC, and Medo-Persia to the Parthians nearer mid-century, the Seleucids were plunged into minor power status. Had the rebellions at the start of Antiochus’ reign succeeded, the Seleucid kingdom may very well have become a minor power like Pergamon or Bithynia.
179 Polyb. 50.1.
180 Polyb. 50.7-8.
conquest. The Ptolemies had little real fear in Egypt of strategoi of nomes leading large armies in rebellion, since none of them commanded actual forces of any significant size, but instead a great mass of potential military power. Neither system worked perfectly: the Seleucids faced serious rebellions, while the Ptolemies encountered difficulties in mobilization. This seems mainly to have been a function of Egyptian territorial cohesion, for the Ptolemies used a similar military governorship for major overseas possessions. In the Fourth Syrian War, Antiochus’ difficulties allowed Ptolemy and his advisors the opportunity to prepare their army.

In the west, the general Achaios led a rebellion in Asia Minor. This sizeable territory, separated as it was from Syria by the formidable Taurus range, and holding by far the longest tradition of Hellenic culture and population of any Seleucid region, had been simultaneously vital and unwieldy in Seleucid history. In the previous generation, the successors to Antiochus Soter had waged war across Asia Minor, at times allying with Pontus, or Pergamon, or Bithynia, or even the Galatians as Hierax and Seleucus sought advantage against one another. The relationship of Asia west of the Taurus with the Seleucid lands on the far side of the Taurus had been tenuous for some time; when civil war had broken out the Taurus range had divided the two sides. Seleucid Asia Minor was at times called the Makedonike for its many Macedonian settler-towns, and with so many pre-existent Greek cities in the region and non-Greeks beside, it was a politically complex region with enormous military potential. In the context of the
division of the Seleucid Empire during Seleucus’ reign, Achaios began distancing himself from Seleucid rule, but did not enter into outright rebellion until the succession of Antiochus III. He began minting his own coins, seems to have won support from many of his subjects, and was able to raise large armies for his own wars, whether against Antiochus or against his many neighbors in Asia Minor. Antiochus could have used the thousands of troops his forebears had raised from Asia Minor, and the many colonies of Phrygia and Lydia, but Achaios had a powerful position, and, separated from Syria by the imposing Taurus range and surrounded by hostile kings who preferred a distant king in Antioch to a local king in Sardis, posed little immediate threat to Antiochus’ hold on Syria and Mesopotamia.

The scenario in the east was different, where the rebel Molon, while he may have lacked the support and abundance of resources Achaios enjoyed, was already poised with a large and victorious army on the border of Syria. Antiochus could not afford to leave Molon alone, as he could possibly afford to do, for a little while, with Achaios.\footnote{Though Molon had reached Dura and Europos (treated as separate cities by Polybius, because the settlement lay on both sides of the Euphrates) at the close of the 221 campaign season, at the start of the season in 220, he was before Babylon (5.51.3).}

The next year, Antiochus marched east with a sizeable force and confronted Molon’s army along the Tigris. Polybius provides little insight into the army of Antiochus, save that it included a sizeable detachment of cavalry, probably to counter the Median strength in cavalry, as well some part of the phalanx, a body of Greek mercenaries,
Cretan allies, a tribe of Galatians called “Rhigosages,” and a contingent of elephants. After defeating Molon in a pitched battle, Antiochus oversaw the re-ordering of affairs in Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau, consolidating his control over those regions. After the initial, public violence meted out on the body of Molon, Antiochus offered clemency to those involved in the rebellion, and appointed trustworthy friends to prominent positions in the East. Returning to Syria, Antiochus prepared to return to the Fourth Syrian War. In spite of the long civil war, and in spite of the rebellions along the entire Seleucid periphery, the core territories developed by the first kings in Syria and Mesopotamia remained staunchly loyal. The development of those regions alone provided sufficient military forces to resolve most of the internal wars, and contest Ptolemaic authority in Syria.

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182 Polyb. 5.53.2-4.
183 Polyb. 5.54.6-12. Molon’s body was crucified on a hill along a major highway in Media, but Antiochus levied light fines on rebel cities, and welcomed the rebel soldiers back into his army.
Chapter 5. An Evaluation of Military Institutions during the Fourth Syrian War

With the reprieve granted by the fractious nature of Antiochus’ empire, Ptolemy’s advisors embarked on a major military reform. Polybius’ narrative in book 5 has served as the chief source for the Ptolemaic reforms. Most criticism of Polybius’ narrative has been leveled at his description of Seleucid affairs. These critiques do seem to indicate that Polybius’ source was neither particularly friendly towards nor well-acquainted with affairs at the Seleucid court. At the same time, a close examination of Polybius’ narrative, and thorough testing of it against papyrological material, reveals serious problems in the Polybian narrative. Parts of his narrative have been accepted too readily by scholars, particularly Polybius’ narrative concerning the reforms of the Ptolemaic army prior to, and indeed in the midst of, the Fourth Syrian War. While Polybius’ narrative seemingly takes a pro-Ptolemaic slant, it might be better to describe it being more familiar with Ptolemaic than with Seleucid affairs. At the same time, it demonstrably inflates the importance of Old Greek influence and overseas troops, and in a classicizing style, embellishes the narrative of military mobilization and training

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1 Bar Kochva (1976: 128-129) collects much of the literature on this point, and evaluates several of the suggested sources: Zenon of Rhodes and Ptolemaios of Megalopolis (Jacoby, FrGH 2.B.4) chief among them, and the latter Bar Kochva’s favorite because of his pro-Ptolemaic yet anti-Philopator history, and Polybius’ professed disdain for Zenon’s battle narratives.
with a grand tale about a reorganization of the army based on ethnicity. An examination of the papyri will show that this reform simply never happened. Other reforms were implemented, and so, after a deconstruction of the Polybian narrative of this grand Sosibian reform, those reforms will instead be laid out.

5.1. The Ptolemaic Reforms from the Polybian Narrative

The Polybian narrative begins (5.62.7-8) with a statement on the dissolute state of the Ptolemaic military at the onset of the war: “Ptolemy whose obvious duty it was to march to the help of his dominions, attacked as they had been in such flagrant defiance of treaties, was too weak to entertain any such project, so completely had all military preparations been neglected.”\(^3\) Apart from the direct evidence of new enrollments of military settlers discussed in section I.A.2, this will be examined more below. The narrative continues that Agathocles and Sosibius established themselves in the interior at Memphis to host embassies, and established the army at Alexandria to keep the military preparations hidden from the diplomatic activity.\(^4\) This is an unreasonable story: those embassies headed to Memphis would surely put in at Alexandria before traveling upstream. Documentary evidence will also contradict this information. In fact, the embassies were in all likelihood hosted at Alexandria, and the army preparations

\(^3\) Emphasis mine.
\(^4\) Polyb. 5.63.7-8.
were managed in the vicinity of Memphis, at Boubastis on the Pelousiac branch of the Nile. Polybius’ source changed the locations to emphasize the importance of the Mediterranean for military preparations: mercenaries recalled from overseas garrisons, recruiters dispatched overseas to bring in additional mercenaries, and military preparations handed over to about seven newly-arrived officers from Greece, “in whom the spirit of Hellenic martial ardor and resourcefulness was still fresh.” The heart of the reform follows, in Polybius 5.63.14-64.2:

Taking the troops in hand they got them into shape by correct military methods. First of all they divided them according to their ages and ethnicities, and equipped them with panoplies suitable in each case, paying no attention to the manner in which they had previously been armed. In the next place they organized them as the necessities of the present situation required, breaking up the old regiments and abolishing the existing paymasters’ lists, and having effected this, they drilled them, accustomed them not only to the word of command, but to the correct manipulation of their weapons.

This extensive military reform involves several components. First, the entire body of the Ptolemaic army was divided into groups based on age and nationality. This would mean Macedonians were separated from Thracians, and Cretans from other Greeks, and the southern Anatolians from the Anatolian Greeks, and so on. Second, the Ptolemaic soldiers were re-armed with ethnically-suitable and age-appropriate panoplies. This would mean, presumably, that true Macedonians served in the phalanx, 

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5 Polyb. 5.63.8-13, 64.5. Polybius’ source, or Polybius himself, emphasized the several of these officers had war experience in the armies of Demetrius II and Antigonus III, whose wars had been waged in the previous two decades, when Ptolemaic military mobilizations were both limited and small in scale.
Thessalians in the cavalry, Thracians in the light infantry, and Cretans as archers, and so on. Third, in entirely re-organizing the Ptolemaic army, all of the old units were disbanded and replaced with new units. Even without testing this narrative against documentary evidence, the story in its particulars is highly suspect. In a pragmatic sense, dissolving Ptolemaic military institutions and redrawing them would have been immensely difficult. Even more, the narrative reflects attitudes of Greek exceptionalism, repeats the common refrain of inferior Egyptian and Oriental forces, and tells a fanciful story of an ethnographic military reform, which should evoke memories of Herodotos’ ethnographic catalog of Xerxes’ army,6 or Homer’s Catalog of ships.7

In testing this reform with documentary evidence, there are several places to look. First: were old units disbanded and replaced with new units? Second: were men re-grouped in units based on their ages and ethnicities? The documentary evidence shows that this was not the case; instead, the opposite occurred in some cases.8 The phalanx, comprised entirely of Macedonians, was only expanded, and new men, some of them verifiably not Macedonians, were added to the rolls as Macedonians. The military units of the Ptolemaic army remained, with the exception of the phalanx, as diverse as ever, and the military “Macedonian” ethnicity continued to be ascribed to those who served in the phalanx.

6 *Histories* 7.61-80.
7 *Iliad* 2.494-759.
8 The best test for the reform would be an examination of the relatively new “ethnic” hipparchies, but there is too little evidence to say anything.
5.2. War Preparation and Military Reform in the Papyri

There are a number of indications in the papyri, from 222-219 BC, that the population of Egypt was aware of an impending war. Some klerouchs endeavored to improve the quality of their equipment at personal expense. One of the examples is known only because the money used by a cavalryman to purchase heavy body armor (κατάφρακτα) was borrowed from an officer in the infantry agema, but never repayed him. Interest in acquiring heavy armor is reflected in another wartime text as well, which seems to show that, with war approaching, those likely to serve took steps to procure high-quality armor. Others prepared differently. A Sikyonian man living in Egypt, from a wealthy and aristocratic Sikyonian family, had two sons, presumably of military age. When war became imminent, he sought to secure positions in the police for his sons. As members of the epigone in Egypt, they would have been eligible for conscription when the army was expanded. Enrolling his sons in the police served as a type of draft-dodging, and may indicate the general tenor of feeling in Egypt, that in a

9 *P.Enteux*. 45 (222 BC). The appearance of heavy armor for cavalrymen in third century Egypt is shocking in its own right, and references to it in the context of the Fourth Syrian War have gone largely unnoticed.
10 *P.Enteux*. 32 (218 BC).
11 The father in the texts in question is Krates of Sikyon. A Krates of Sikyon acted as a naopoios for the sanctuary at Delphi at the end of the fourth century, a prominent philanthropic position (*CID* II.32, 97, 99, 120). The father of that Krates was Timokrates, and one of the sons advanced into the police force before the war was likewise named Timokrates. The scion of the family, in addition to donating considerable funds at Delphi, was also awarded Eretrian citizenship (*Eretria XI* 29.1, *SEG* 51.1106).
12 *P.Genova* 3.101, 102 (221 BC).
renewed major war, many new soldiers might be enrolled. Beyond these responses in
the society of Egypt, the questions under consideration here deal with possible reforms,
which will require studies of whole units or sections of the army.

5.2.1. Evidence from the Oxyrhynchite Hipparchy: a Prosopography

The regiments of Zoilos and Philon, the cavalry contingents of the Oxyrhynchite
nome southeast of the Fayum, were in active Ptolemaic service from at least 263 to 202
BC. Papyri pass along the names, and often the ranks and ethnics, of more than fifty
soldiers from the two commands.\textsuperscript{13} The following study first functions as a
prosopography of the two commands, and then offers several observations on the
nature of the surviving evidence and its relation to the Sosibian reforms described by
Polybius. Before embarking on the study, several principles should be established to
increase the usefulness of this study. First, this particular unit campaigned in the Fourth
Syrian War, and fought at the battle of Raphia.\textsuperscript{14} Second, it makes an interesting test case
because the eponymous commander of the unit changed about the time of the Sosibian
reform, from Zoilos to Philon. Third, unlike most of the cavalry contingents in the
Arsinoite nome, the eponymous commanders of the Oxyrhynchite cavalry were also the

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\textsuperscript{13} The “ethnic” was a legally-required descriptor of a person’s ethnicity, an indicator either of ancestral
origins or marker of status in Ptolemaic Egypt, e.g., the men described as Macedonian for the service in the
phalanx, or men called Persian who may have originally been Egyptians enrolled in primarily Greek units.

\textsuperscript{14} P.Frankf.7. A more extensive discussion of this text follows below.
direct commanders of the unit in the field. Philon as hipparch is known from a post-war
document dealing with deceased cavalrymen.\textsuperscript{15}

Table 5.2. Men in the Eponymous Command of Zoilos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lysikrates</td>
<td>-maieus</td>
<td>263-2</td>
<td>Phibichis, Koite</td>
<td>dekanikos</td>
<td>P.Hib. 2.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theu-</td>
<td>Ioudaian</td>
<td>263-1</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td></td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandros</td>
<td>Ioudaian</td>
<td>260-259</td>
<td>Phibichis, Koite</td>
<td>dekanikos</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikobios</td>
<td>Chalkidean</td>
<td>260-259</td>
<td>Phibichis, Koite</td>
<td>idiótēs\textsuperscript{16}</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dionysodōros</td>
<td>Krōmnian</td>
<td>260-259</td>
<td>Phibichis, Koite</td>
<td>idiótēs?</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN</td>
<td></td>
<td>260-259</td>
<td>Phibichis, Koite</td>
<td>idiótēs?</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aínias</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td>Idiótēs</td>
<td>BGU 6.1227</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polyklēs</td>
<td>Thracian</td>
<td>258-256</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiótēs</td>
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<td>NN</td>
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<td>Hebruzelmis</td>
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<td>P.Hib. 2.208</td>
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<td>Menōnidēs</td>
<td>Persian</td>
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<td>Hibe, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiótēs</td>
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<td>247</td>
<td>Hibe, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiótēs</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{15} BGU 10.1905.
\textsuperscript{16} Nikobios, Dionysodoros, and their unnamed companion are listed as witnesses in a contract, and the wording implies they all have the same rank; that there are three of the same rank strongly implies they were idiótai.
\textsuperscript{17} Hebruzelmis’ ethnic is lost from the papyrus, but the name is attested elsewhere only as a Thracian name.
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<th>Cities</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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</tr>
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<td>Oxyrhynchopolis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>SB 12.11059</td>
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<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>244-238</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchopolis, Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
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<td>SB 12.11059, 14.11376</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>dekanikos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polyainos</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>244-243</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.91</td>
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<td>Menandros</td>
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<td>Idiōtēs</td>
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<td>Diodoros</td>
<td>Kephallan</td>
<td>231-224</td>
<td>Hibeh, Oxy.</td>
<td>dekanikos</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.103-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyrrhos</td>
<td>Chalkidean</td>
<td>230-229</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td>Logeutes</td>
<td>P.Grad. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dositheos</td>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>230-229</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td>Logeutes</td>
<td>P.Grad. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zenophilos</td>
<td>Herakleotan</td>
<td>230-229</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td>Logeutes</td>
<td>P.Grad. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigenes</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>230-229</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td>Logeutes</td>
<td>P.Grad. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metrodoros</td>
<td>Thracian</td>
<td>230-229</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td>Logeutes</td>
<td>P.Grad. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karneades</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>245-229</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td>Logeutes</td>
<td>P.Grad. 5, P.Hib. 1.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eupolis</td>
<td>Athenian</td>
<td>230-224</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td>logeutes, idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 1.104, P.Grad. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herkamios?</td>
<td>Ch-?</td>
<td>228-227</td>
<td>Herakleopolites</td>
<td>Ilarches</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Anti?)-genes</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>Ptol III</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites?</td>
<td></td>
<td>BGU 10.1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alkaios</td>
<td>Korinthian</td>
<td>Ptol III</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites?</td>
<td>chiliarchos</td>
<td>BGU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

18 At least two other members of the command of Zoilos may be named here in the witnesses section with Leon, a Philon and a Dokimos, both likely Cyreneans, but neither their membership in the unit or their ethnicities can be noted with certainty. The other document for Leon also includes a witness list, but only the name Eurymedon survives.

19 The collection of correspondence between a Demophon and a Ptolemaios, of which P.Hib. 1.158 is a part, may include the names of several additional men in the same unit as Karneades, though it cannot be known with certainty; their names are Protogenes, Gastron, and Alexandros. Other texts from correspondence of Demophon and Ptolemaios include a klerouch from Barka (perhaps Evagoras), and the klerouchs Herakleides, Ptolemaios, Kydreas, and Apollonios.

20 Eupolis is also attested in the command of Philon (see table 2), and is very likely the Eupolis from P.Hib. 1.91 and several other documents from the vicinity of Tholthis. He may be the plaintiff in the complaint in P.Frankf. 7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herakleitos</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>222-212</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>P.Grad. 8,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BGU 10.1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diodoros</td>
<td>Kephallan</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>dekanikos</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kallis</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>222-218</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.90,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SB 12.11061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eup(-atros?)</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramonos</td>
<td>Chalkidean</td>
<td>222-213</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>chiliarchos?</td>
<td>P.Hib. 1.90,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SB 5.7569 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timolaos</td>
<td>Thessalian</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>Takona, Oxy.</td>
<td>dekanikos</td>
<td>BGU 14.2395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parmenion</td>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>Takona, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 14.2395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippos</td>
<td>Cyrenean</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>SB 12.11061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 The editors of the papyrus read Alkaios’ rank as “chiliarchos” but the lettering is not clearly legible, and because of gaps and curiosities in the reading, the writing read as the abbreviation for chiliarchos may not even be meant for a rank at all, but could be part of a name or ethnic. Additionally, the rank of chiliarchos is unknown in a normal hipparchy, which numbered significantly less than the thousand men commanded by a chiliarchos.

22 This document originally recorded the names of at least six soldiers from the command of Zoilos, but only one name is legible.

23 This Euagoras of Barka is very likely a relative of Nikan, son of Euagoras, a Barkan of the epigonē, from P.Hib. 1.91.

24 This Diodoros is almost certainly the same Diodoros from the command of Zoilos. The latter is attested in two papyri, the latter of which dates to 224 BC, just two years before this papyrus, one of the two earliest mentions of the hipparchy of Philon.

25 I suggest that Kallis is the son of Leon, a Cyrenean in the command of Zoilos, on the basis that, when Kallis dies late in the 3rd century, perhaps during the tarache, he is survived by a son, Leon. Thus we might date Kallis’ tenure in the hipparchy of Philon from 222-203 BC.

26 This text also supplies the name of a Lydian, Eupolis, who was also presumably in the troop of Philon, though it cannot be stated with certainty, and so his name has been withheld from this list.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth/Death</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polyainos</td>
<td>218-212</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>SB 12.11061, BGU 10.1946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipponikos</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>dekanikos</td>
<td>SB 12.11061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td>ilarches</td>
<td>P.Frankf. 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td>logeutes</td>
<td>P.Frankf. 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorimachos</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td></td>
<td>P.Frankf. 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zopurion</td>
<td>216-214</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 10.1958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kallikrates</td>
<td>216-212</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theokles</td>
<td>216-214</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 6.1278, P.Frankf. 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areios</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>SB 3.6303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kallippos</td>
<td>215-214</td>
<td>Septha, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 6.1275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drakon</td>
<td>215-214</td>
<td>Septha, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 6.1275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Cyreneans named Philippos and Polyainos are also attested in the command of Zoilos, and so these may be the same two men, approximately twenty-five to thirty years later, or their sons.
28 A Hesperitan named Hipponikos and ranking as a dekanikos is also known from a fragmentary papyrus, *BGU* 10.1956, from 200/199 BC, but his unit is lost. One of the four idiotai also listed in the document is a Cyrenean named Philip, who could be the same man listed just above Hipponikos. An *idiōtēs* named Philip and hailing from Cyrene is attested among these hipparchies for forty-five years. A Hipponikos is attested in *BGU* 6.1268, probably from 217 BC, but the papyrus offers no other evidence that might confirm that he is the same man, save for a kleros that probably amounted to one hundred arouras.
29 Zopurion, a Thracian in the command of Philon, has a father Areios, and perhaps other relatives of the same name, and also does business in his contracts with some of the same members of the *epigonē* mentioned in this papyrus. This Areios could easily be a relative of Zopurion.
30 This is very likely the same Eupolis from the command of Zoilos, attested between the two commands from 230-212 BC, hardly an over-long career in the military for a single figure. *BGU* 10.2003-4 are discarded drafts of a letter written, it seems, to Zoilos himself, though the business of the letter is unknown to us. We also know, from other papyri at this period, that he had at least four sons, Athenion, Eupolis, Demetrios and Zotichos, active in the local economy as members of the *epigonē*.
31 Drakon is named as one of the witnesses in a lease contract, along with another *idiōtai* whose name and ethnic have been lost.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ptolemaios</td>
<td>D-</td>
<td>215-214</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td>dekanikos</td>
<td>BGU 6.1276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theogonos</td>
<td>Ainian</td>
<td>215-214</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>pentakosiarchos</td>
<td>BGU 6.1277, 14.2393³²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theochrestos</td>
<td>Thracian</td>
<td>215-214</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 14.2383³³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The(-okles?)</td>
<td></td>
<td>214-213</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 6.1265³⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demetrios</td>
<td>Mysian</td>
<td>214-213</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 10.1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theokles</td>
<td>Cyreenean</td>
<td>213-212</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 10.1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diomedon</td>
<td></td>
<td>213-212</td>
<td>Tholthis, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 10.1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN.</td>
<td></td>
<td>212-211</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 10.1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philonades</td>
<td>Cyreenean</td>
<td>203-202</td>
<td>Takona, Oxy.</td>
<td>Dekanikos</td>
<td>BGU 14.2386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attias</td>
<td>Thracian</td>
<td>203-202</td>
<td>Takona, Oxy.</td>
<td>Idiōtēs</td>
<td>BGU 14.2386³⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philon</td>
<td></td>
<td>222-202</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td>hipparchēs</td>
<td>BGU 10.1905³⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diodotos</td>
<td></td>
<td>222-202</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchites</td>
<td></td>
<td>BGU 10.1905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³² His ethnic probably refers to Ainianes in Thessaly, but could also refer to Ainos, near Maroneia.
³³ This Theochrestos is likely the same person as the soldiers listed in SB 12.11060 from the command of Zoilos; based on the likelihood that they are either the same person or a direct relative, I have listed Theochrestos in the command of Zoilos as a Thracian as well.
³⁴ This could be the same Menonides from the command of Zoilos, though that Menonides is attested in a papyrus from the 260’s BC, and so it is, roughly fifty years later, considerably more likely that we are instead dealing with his son, or even grandson.
³⁵ This is likely to be either Theokles the Korinthian or Theokles the Cyreenean, but it cannot be determined which it is.
³⁶ Philonades and Attias are listed as witnesses in a contract regarding the kleros of the orphan, Leon the son of Kallis, a Cyreenean, who very well may be the son of Kallis, twice attested as a soldier in the command of Philon, and the grandson of Leon, another Cyreenean, twice attested as a soldier in the command of Zoilos.
³⁷ This particular papyrus can be dated on stylistic and contextual grounds to the later third century, but provides no other evidence to its date. It is a letter written to Philon the hipparch concerning the affairs of a recently deceased soldier (Diodotos) under his command.
Table 5.4. Origins of the Soldiers in the Oxyrhynchite Hipparchies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Zoilos</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Philon</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyrenaian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Cyrenaica</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thracian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean Greek</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judean</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the chart clearly demonstrates, while the commander of the Oxyrhynchite cavalry hipparchy did change around the time of the supposed military reforms, the unit stayed intact. The Oxyrhynchite cavalry represent one of the best-attested and understudied military units in the Ptolemaic army. While Cyrenaians constituted nearly half of the manpower in the hipparchy, they fought alongside Athenians, Thracians, Mysians, and Judeans, both before and after the Sosibian reforms. Moreover, lest one suspect that the Oxyrhynchite cavalry was an organizational structure, and the men in it might still have been restructured at camp, before the campaign, the document referenced above, *P.Frankf. 7*, contains a narrative of the war within one cavalryman’s (probably Eupolis the Athenian) complaint about the abuse of his property during the extensive wartime mobilizations. When the cavalrymen were mobilized, the *logeutai* of
the unit, who collected taxes from the men of the unit in peacetime, also oversaw the management of their estates, which meant that the plaintiff’s abuser avoided the war. The plaintiff charges that the *logeutes* abused his power and attempted to seize the plaintiff’s *kleros*. This transpired over a period of three years, when the hipparchy was levied into service each year and served in the company of the king. The mobilization of the cavalry three consecutive years into other parts of Egypt corresponds well to Polybius’ narrative of several years of training prior to the war. But the study of the Oxyrhynchite cavalry hipparchy affirms little else of the Polybian narrative, and it must cast in doubt.

In fact, a study of the infantry will provide powerful evidence, first, that the reforms did take place, and second, that they tended more toward diluting ethnicity than using ethnicity as a standard for classification. The primary calculation that Ptolemies’ advisors made at the start of their preparations regarded the strength of the Ptolemaic phalanx against that of the Seleucids. The model army of Euergetes fielded a phalanx likely to have numbered about sixteen thousand men, to which we may add

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38 Line 4: ἵνα μὴ στρατεύσηται.
39 Lines 9-12: εγὼ δ’ ἐν ἑκεῖνοις τοῖς χρόνοις ὧν ἔλαβον ἕκαράν τού κλῆρον ἀλλ’ ἢ ὁλ(ύ)ρας ἀ(ρτάβας) 500 καὶ τοῦ] 3 (ἔτους) εἰς Πη[λούσιον καὶ τ]ῷ 4 εἰς τὸν Βουθαστιτήν καὶ τοῦ 5 ἐπὶ [Συρίαν [συνεστρατευσάμην σαί.
40 The Arsinoite cavalry, normally better-attested, are known from only a handful of texts from 218-205 BC. There is no evidence of ethnic reorganization among the numbered hipparchies: a Thracian is known from the first (P.Enteux. 48), an Ainian and Herakleian from the second (P.Petr. 2.47), an Akarnanian and Ainian from the third (P.Rain.Cent. 47 and SB 18.13840), there are no surviving “ethnics” for men from the fourth, and a Mysian and Thracian from the fifth (P.Heid. 6.383, SB 20.15068, P.Petr. 3.34). While the data is too small to be conclusive in any sense, the presence of Thracians in two hipparchies, and Ainians in two hipparchies gives at least some sense that men were not in fact re-organized according to ethnicity.
five thousand elites from the peltastai and agema, mercenaries, and a scattering of other troops. These should have amounted to between thirty and thirty-five thousand men.\textsuperscript{41} The Seleucid phalanx alone could reach such numbers, even without the men of Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{42} Considering that the Ptolemaic infantry at Raphia numbered seventy-two thousand, the Ptolemies more than doubled their battle-line military manpower in preparation for the war. Many of these could have been added to the army for Raphia from lesser military forces, like the mainly Egyptian machimoī, who had been seldom used in battle, and indeed Polybius’ account emphasizes the decisive addition of twenty-thousand Egyptians armed in the Macedonian manner. After the arming of the Egyptians, Polybius emphasizes the importance of mercenaries and generals from the Greek mainland, and attributes little importance to the local troops from Egypt. An examination of machimoī recruitment and klerouchic mobilization, particularly among the infantry, will further challenge Polybius’ narrative.

5.2.2. Machimoī Recruitment

The infantry in general are a less accessible group in Ptolemaic Egypt. If the numbers from Polybius for the army at Raphia are remotely accurate, somewhere in the

\textsuperscript{41} The phalanx and elites amount to twenty-one thousand, the Peloponnesian and Cretan mercenaries are said to have numbered at least four thousand, and were augmented by another force, probably of comparable or slightly larger size, of Asiatic mercenaries.

\textsuperscript{42} Bar-Kochva estimates a recruitment potential from the Seleucis and Mesopotamia in the neighborhood of twenty-five thousand men. In truth, the number could have been even larger.
neighborhood of fifty-thousand Macedonian and Egyptian phalangitai were mobilized with the royal army in the Fourth Syrian War. Of these, more than half—including twenty thousand Egyptian machimoi—were likely recruited or promoted to the phalanx in the period of reform, and would only appear in the papyri prior to the reform as everyday Egyptians or as members of the epigonē. Polybius describes the recruitment of twenty thousand Egyptians to serve in the phalanx, which was likely an enrollment of machimoi doing other types of service into a sarissa-armed phalanx (5.65.9). These higher-status machimoi are unattested prior to the Fourth Syrian War, and can only be found in a small number of sources afterwards. The epilektoi machimoi (picked Egyptian soldiers) and seven-aroura machimoi known in the second century were not known before the reign of Philopator. Instead, most or all machimoi held five arouras in the third century. Their holdings are not particularly well-attested, but there is a clear pattern of machimoi settlement even in regions like the Arsinoite, when most of the machimoi would likely have been located in the Delta and Thebaid. Large numbers are

43 τὸ δὲ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πλῆθος ἦν μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους φαλαγγίτας, ὑπετάττετο δὲ Σωσιβίῳ.
44 For the epilektoi, we must note the possible exception posed by the Mendes stele (I.Cairo 22181), which notes that Philadelphos chose a palace guard from among the Egyptians (presumably the machimoi), and picked their officers from the Mendes nome, For the extensive literature on this stele, see Thiers (2007: 64-5), Clarysse (2007: 201-6), Derchain (1986: 203-4), Winnicki (1985: 49, n. 41), De Meulenaere and MacKay (1976: 175), and Sethe (1904: 42). Derchain has criticized the prevailing reading of the text, and offered (1986:203) an alternative reading that the guard was selected from the children of the settler army. However, the recruitment of captains from the Mendes nome and the use of the term mnfyt for “the people” both provide better evidence for the recruitment of an Egyptian guard. This guard could rightly be referred to as epilektoi, since the soldiers were selected from the whole of the nation (or of the machimoi) for service.
45 UPZ 1.110 provides some indication that many machimoi were settled in the Saite nome, near the Mendes nome, the two of which may have provided a great many of the Ptolemaic machimoi from the Delta. The
known from several surveys and tax records.\textsuperscript{46} Others are attested in military, para-
military, and civilian functions in various parts of the Heptanomis of Middle Egypt.\textsuperscript{47} The seven-aroura machimoi are not attested until nearly halfway into the second century (\textit{P.Mich.} 3.190, from 172 BC), and so are not particularly likely to be the phalangetes of Raphia.\textsuperscript{48} The \textit{epilektoi machimi} are, like the \textit{heptarouroi}, attested with scarcity before the second half the second century. The earliest document recording the \textit{epilektoi machimi} is worthy of mention. An inscription from the Canopus Gate at Alexandria, set up by a pair of brothers, Egyptian officers in the \textit{epilektoi machimi}, honored the new king Ptolemy V at the start of his reign.\textsuperscript{49} The dedication likely served as a tangible testament to the loyalty of at least some of these Egyptian soldiers to the new king in the midst of dynastic instability and the early years of the Great Revolt.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{P.Petr.} 3.100, which probably dates to about the 240's BC, provides revenues gained from local klerouchs, including at least eight \textit{pentarouroi machimi}, and almost certainly many more. The text could accommodate as many as one hundred from that class alone. \textit{P.Petr.} 2.39 (246/5 BC) and \textit{P.Grad.} 12 (229 BC) also provide evidence for \textit{pentarouroi machimi} in the Arsinoite nome.

\textsuperscript{47} For example, \textit{P.Yale} 1.33 (253 BC) refers to a contingent of \textit{machimi} dispatched under their captain Bithelminis to the lower (northern) parts of the Herakleopolite to provide security for harvesters in that region. \textit{P.Hib.} 1.41 (c. 261 BC) also mentions a contingent of \textit{machimi} dispatched to the lower Herakleopolite as an escort for a \textit{dokimastes} traveling with a large sum of money. Individual \textit{machimi} could be hired out as assistants (\textit{P.Grenf.} 14a.21-23, 233 BC): Αρμαυτη Των μονοθετάτων μαχίμων, cf. \textit{P.Köln.} 8.346.r.16-19.v.14-16,49-50. They often served in functions comparable to \textit{phylakites} (police), see \textit{P.Hib.} 2.248.Fr3.8-10, where both a \textit{machimos} and \textit{phylakites} are given duties related to the business of an \textit{oikonomos} (c. 250 BC), \textit{SB} 22.15237.3-4, where three \textit{machimi} arrest and hold a man at the orders of a \textit{sitologos} (grain official) in about 242 BC, and \textit{P.Zen.Pestm.} 49.19-23 (244 BC).

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{OGIS} 731. The men are titled: Λ[α]ρχα [κ]αι Ιηγεροντων των περι ανλην επιλεκτων μαχίμων, “Commanders of Egyptians, and Captains over the Picked Machimi appointed to the Citadel Guard.”
These brothers, sons of Horus, were officers in the detachment of the *epilektoi machimoi* serving around the palace, and so may represent the farthest upper echelons of the higher-status *machimoi* enrolled to fight in the phalanx at Raphia. A papyrus may refer to a detachment of the phalangite *machimoi*, but refers to them only as *machimoi*. The document, *P.Tebt. 3/2 .884*, records a wage distribution (*opsonion*) to the “*machimoi* of Ptolemaios” at an apparent rate of four obols per day, half the standard rate of a Hellenistic mercenary. Other *machimoi* were paid rates of one to two obols per day at earlier points in the third century for work as security guards and personal attendants, so the four obols represent a significant increase in salary even if inferior to Greek mercenary pay.\(^{50}\) However, the detachment’s roster is contained within the papyrus in the surviving fragment just below the section containing the payment record. Fourteen names are listed there, beginning with Ptolemaios himself:

Ptolemaios Eua-
Eisidoros, son of NN.
Aunchis, son of Athroytes
Tetosireis, son of NN.
Thaseis, son of Athroytes
Teōs, son of Pakos
Sokomes, son of Petosiris
Horus, son of Petesouchos
Petesouchos, son of Aspheus
Horus, son of Onnophris
Marres, son of Petous
Teos, son of Horus

\(^{50}\) Of course, a lower daily wage might be expected if the *machimoi* were also holders of allotments, and being made to serve on duty for a *leitourgia* as part of their conditions of possessing kleroi. For one obol, see *P.Lille* 1.58, two obols, see *P.Lille* 1.25.
Onnophris, son of Marres  
Ptolemaios, son of Bo-

What is notable about this list is that the machimoi of Ptolemaios, a detachment of fourteen men, begins and ends with Greeks. Two Greeks begin the list, the detachment commander and Eisidoros, and the list is closed with another Ptolemaios.\(^{51}\)

In the Macedonian phalanx, a file usually contained sixteen men, with officers in at least the first two ranks and the final rank. In that sense, the officers sandwich the regulars, a design meant to facilitate command and control while simultaneously providing a means of coercion, by closing off the back end of the file. This last position was called ouragos, whose primary role was to assure the cohesion of the unit, by force if necessary.

The detachment roster as given in the papyrus seems to fit the organization of a phalanx file, if the three Greeks at the beginning and end are taken to be officers. On the other hand, no ranks are given, aside from naming Ptolemaios as the detachment commander, and if this were clearly a Macedonian-style phalanx file, we would expect to find two more names. We also receive no indication in the Polybian record that Greeks were used to supply either part or all of the officers for the epilektai machimoi, though this could have been an innovation in the years after the war. Additionally, the names of the second and third Greeks’ fathers are missing from the papyrus, which might also

\[^{51}\text{Note, additionally, that the Greek names are very Hellenistic Egyptian names: Ptolemaios, in honor of the dynasty, and Eisidoros, “Gift of Isis,” a reflection of the infiltration of Egyptian cult into Hellenistic culture.}\]
preserve the possibility that they were Hellenizing Egyptians, perhaps identified as “Persians.”

5.2.3 Infantry Recruitment

Polybius makes no mention of it, but a considerable portion of the Ptolemaic reforms preceding the Fourth Syrian War must have been an expansion of the Macedonian phalanx. Within his narrative, ethnicity drove reform within the Ptolemaic army. This simply was not the case. In fact, the opposite was true, as men of diverse ethnic backgrounds were added to the ranks of the thirty-aroura Macedonians to enlarge the phalanx before the start of the war. Now, it should be little surprise that the Ptolemies would do this, since the study earlier in this chapter showed that the diverse ethnicities and classifications of the Ptolemaic infantry were unified into the triakontouroi Makedones about a decade before the start of the Fourth Syrian War. Regarding the Macedonian phalanx, though it was the largest component of the Ptolemaic army, it is at the same time one of the least visible parts of the army in the papyrological record. The Macedonians of the phalanx formed an ethnically distinct military-class within the Ptolemaic kingdom, and were treated as such. This was, however, all imagination, as thousands of Greeks, Thracians, and other peoples were enrolled in the phalanx, always as a Macedonian. In Ptolemaic Egypt, the most straightforward path to inclusion in elite ethnic status was to find a way into the pike phalanx.
The Ptolemaic phalanx may have been enlarged by fifty percent or more in preparation for the war with Antiochus III, from about sixteen to as many as twenty-five thousand. Such a large expansion of military manpower, drawn primarily from the epigonoi, represented a considerable social disturbance. To counteract any negative responses to widespread conscription, Ptolemy, or his advisors, decreed new regulations concerning klerouchs. The most important of the new regulations was the heritability of the kleros. The *prostagma* for this regulation is referenced in a document containing a series of communiques following the death of two Macedonian infantrymen at the end of the Fourth Syrian War. The official letters provide unparalleled insights into the Ptolemaic military bureaucracy in the late third century. But first, another papyrus may contain some codification of Philopator’s *prostagma* as a regulation for new klerouchs. It includes a list of privileges, obligations, and regulations related to the possession of a kleros, in this case, seemingly one in the vicinity of Lysimakhis. The first surviving line refers to a military uniform, and the following line to wages. For the present purposes, the most important material is in the clauses, from lines 11-22, concerning the death of the klerouch. After regulations concerning the distribution of the man’s property among family members and the proper registration of any retained slaves, lines 17-22 concern

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52 P.Lille 4.26-27: ὑπήρχεν γῆ αὐτῶι καὶ ἐκγόνοις, τελευτήσαντος (έτους) ε Τύβι ει and 32-33: ἐάν ὑπάρχοσιν αὐτῶι υἱοί, ἐπιγραφήσαν ταῖς κατά το ἐπίστασαν ἡμέραις
53 SB 20.14656. This document is undated, but since it contains clauses related to the aforementioned decree, it must be later than the decree. But the letter forms support a third century date. It is safe to date it generally to the reign of Philopator.
54 Line 2: ταγήν ἰματισμον; line 4: ḏφον.
the kleros. The klerouch was encouraged to name his successor at death, and given permission to leave the kleros to his successor.\textsuperscript{55} The military bureaucracy papyrus, \textit{P.Lille} 4, contains a series of communications between the hyperetes over the planting of the kleroi of the triakontarouroi Makedones in the Arsinoite, the grammateus of the klerouchs, the oikonomos over the Arsinoite, the hegemon who oversaw the deceased klerouchs, and several others whose official titles did not survive in what remains of the papyrus.\textsuperscript{56} The business covered in the text included, in addition to instructions about what to do with their land, orders related to the rations the deceased men would have received.\textsuperscript{57}

The recruitment of new men for the phalanx was accompanied immediately by surveying and agricultural projects to provide allotments to the men. Six documents from the first volume of Sorbonne papyri (\textit{P.Sorb. I}) refer to new settlements of 70-aroura and 30-aroura soldiers in the Arsinoite from 222 to 219 BC, and the various labors and difficulties encountered as part of the settlement process.\textsuperscript{58} Document 41 specifies the context for the others. In it, an official, Herakleides, communicates an order, almost all of which is missing, regarding the provision of new allotments to seventy- and thirty-

\textsuperscript{55} Lines 17-19: περὶ τοῦ κλήρου· οὐκ ἀξιοὶ ἐπιγραφῆναι αὐτῶι τῷν κλῆρον ἦς ἀν ἐμῆς· ἐάν δὲ τι ἀνθρώπινον, καταλείψεις αὐτῶι.
\textsuperscript{56} The grammateus of the klerouchi, Stratokles, is almost certainly known from a dedication (\textit{SEG} 8:356), from Stratokles son of Stratokles, ὁ γραμματεὺς τῶν κατοί[κων ἱππέων]. The editors’ suggestion should be changed to simply ὁ γραμματεὺς τῶν κατοί[κων].
\textsuperscript{57} What is significant about this is that a comprehensive military administration seems to have developed in place of the civil and military systems at the time of the Third Syrian War, when nomarchs managed the allotments of klerouchs on campaign.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{P.Sorb.} 1.41, 43, 49, 50, 51, and 55.
aroura men in the villages that the addressee, Thesenouphis, oversaw. Herakleides to Thesenouphis, the settlements are in regions overseen by Thesenouphis. One document refers to a ten-aroura allotment, and it may be that machimoi were settled in the same region as well, at Hephaestion. Another is a grain procurement request to plant an infantry allotment at Philopatoris. Another announces the release of workers who had been assigned to dike maintenance, presumably to facilitate the irrigation of new kleroi. On the other side of the business of establishing new klerouchs, another document contains a complaint from a Greek on behalf of an Egyptian whose land has been seized, presumably to accommodate new military settlers. An essential observation here is that the order for new settlements actually came at the end of Euergetes’ reign. Rather than ignoring the military after his initial success in the Third Syrian War, the documentary evidence indicates that Euergetes entered into a series of reforms in his last years, intending to leave his heir a larger military.

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59 Document 41, 222 BC. Lines 4-7: τὰ μεμετρήμενα τῶν [δανε]ϊῶν τοῖς (ἐβδομηκονταρούροις) [καὶ (τριακοντ)](αρούροις) ἐν τοῖς [κατὰ] σὲ τόποις.
60 Document 43, from 220/219 BC.
61 Document 49, from 221 BC, concerning the release of 24 artabas of seed for a kleros at Philopatoris. Considering the standard artaba per aroura in seed, the request very likely concerned a standard-sized infantry allotment.
62 Document 50. P. Sorh. 1.42, another letter from Herakleides to Thesenouphis, may provide the front-end to this same order, and while it is very fragmentary, Herakleides can be determined to have ordered a roster of men eligible for public duty building agricultural works.
63 Document 51, from Pelousion. The Greek, Nikanor, complains that the Egyptian, Timopsisis, had farmed the land for many years, and then his land was suddenly seized. Document 55 may reflect a similar concern (the seizure by the state of a farmer’s land) though it is fragmentary and the content is impossible to determine with any certainty.
Still, few of these Macedonian infantrymen are found in the papyri. Fortunately for the purposes of this study, the vast majority of those few individuals who are attested lived and acted in the period of the Fourth Syrian War. This seems to be related to the mobilization and recruitment process during the lead-up to the war, processes which unsettled the system and sent evidence of the Macedonians in the phalanx bubbling to the top. The Genova papyri include four documents from the archive of Heliodoros, who helped oversee distributions of rations to mobilized soldiers.

Heliodoros himself was in the Arsinoite nome it seems, and responsible for soldiers from that nome, although they were not present there, but presumably at the army camp at or in the vicinity of Memphis.\footnote{Polybius' sources located the camp at Alexandria, but \textit{P.Frankf.} 7, which will be discussed in more detail below, implies that the camp may actually have been located just below Memphis, on the Pelousiac branch of the Nile, in the Boubastite nome.} \textit{P.Gen.} 3.103-5 all regard requests made by thirty-aroura Macedonians, while \textit{P.Gen.} 1. 106 contains a similar request from hundred-aroura klerouchs serving in the 4\textsuperscript{th} Hipparchy. The Macedonian infantry listed in 103, 104, and 105 total nineteen individuals, a considerable portion of the larger list in the original documents. The soldiers gave their names and their home towns, and so nine towns are listed in the documents in addition to the nineteen names, as shown in Table 5.5:
Table 5.5. The Macedonians from *P.Genova* 3.103-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Nome</th>
<th>Papyrus Record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Menandros</td>
<td>Demetrios</td>
<td>Philoteris</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Herakleides)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philipppos</td>
<td>Demetrios</td>
<td>Philoteris</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Herakleides)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philotas</td>
<td>Philotas</td>
<td>Arsinoe</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Herakleides)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartakos</td>
<td>Ptolemaios</td>
<td>Kerkeēsis</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Polemon)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokēs</td>
<td>-amios</td>
<td>Oxyrhyncha</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Polemon)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristomachos</td>
<td>NN.</td>
<td>Oxyrhyncha</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Polemon)</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariston</td>
<td>Theot-?/Theos?</td>
<td>Oxyrhyncha</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Polemon)</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephanos</td>
<td>Stasikratēs</td>
<td>Euhēmeria</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Themistos)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrōn</td>
<td>Theodōros</td>
<td>Euhēmeria</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Themistos)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrōn</td>
<td>Ptolemaios</td>
<td>Kanōpis</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Themistos)(65)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ptolemaios</td>
<td>Demeas</td>
<td>Kanōpis</td>
<td>Arsinoite (Themistos)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dioklēs</td>
<td>Moschos</td>
<td>Lower Phnebiesis?</td>
<td>Herakleopolites?</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menandros</td>
<td>P-</td>
<td>Gomon(66)</td>
<td>Arsinoites (Herakleides)?</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN.</td>
<td>NN.</td>
<td>Gomon</td>
<td>Arsinoites (Herakleides)?</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philipppos</td>
<td>Apollōnios</td>
<td>-ios kōme</td>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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65 Though the village Kanopis is attested only twice in the Ptolemaic period, the single other papyrus (*P.Gur*.28) regards settlements around the village. It lists invoices of grain from settlers there, including several settlers with clearly Macedonian names, corroborating a Macedonian presence there.

66 The village Gomon is otherwise unattested, but judging from the name may well have been located in the precinct of Herakleides, along the main shipping routes out of the Fayum and toward the Nile, if not in the Herakleopolite nome itself.
The men of the phalanx were scattered, then, around the Arsinoite (and surely other nomes as well), and pulled together at mobilization to form the phalanx. The dispersion of men, presumably part of the same unit in the field, across so many different towns must have impaired the military readiness of the phalanx: if the men were to gather together for training locally, they did so mainly with men who were not in their own unit. This may not have been the case for all soldiers, but seems to have been fairly common. This dispersion may be related to the dual strategy of a klerouchic army: to have a large manpower reserve of potential soldiers, and to assure the recovery, planting, and harvest of arable land. This latter goal may have been a greater priority in the management of the dispositions of klerouchs, with men from the same field unit settled, one in Philoteris and one in Theogonis, for the purposes of expanding the agricultural activity of the klerouchs, at the expense of military readiness.

Because the Macedonian phalanx itself was considered insufficient to contest that fielded by the Seleucids, the Ptolemies also added to their numbers. The most famous of these tactics was the promotion of twenty thousand Egyptians to form the *epilektoi machimoii*. Polybius also mentions that Ptolemaic agents hired thousands of mercenaries from overseas, to the number of eight thousand infantry, fielded on the right flank at
Raphia as phalangitai, or perhaps as hoplitai. The papyrological evidence supplies a third means of expanding the phalanx, in addition to hiring mercenaries or promoting *machimoi*: enrolling members of the *epigonē*, even men who were not Macedonians. A great many of these, and perhaps some of the former mercenaries, were settled on brand new klerouchic allotments in the neighboring Oxyrhynchite and Herakleopolite nomes during and at the close of the war.

The sixth volume of the *BGU* papyri contains more than a dozen papyri from the Oxyrhynchite nome that mention thirty-aroura Macedonians. Of the men listed, I want to draw attention to two in particular, Straton and Hermias. Straton, a thirty-aroura Macedonian, is attested in *BGU* 6.1265 (214/213). In the document, he and his brother lease the *kleros* of a horseman in Philon’s hipparchy. His brother, however, was not a Macedonian, but the well-known Thracian farming middle man Aristolochos. Their father was Stratios son of Straton, also a Thracian, and not a military man. It is clear, then, that Straton was born a Thracian, and was enrolled in the infantry as a Macedonian during the recruitment drive at the start of the Fourth Syrian War. Hermias, a thirty-aroura Macedonian, is attested in *BGU* 10.1943 (215/214) and *P.Frankf.* 4 (216/5). He loans out his allotment as part of the usual land tenure system. But *BGU* 10.1946.15 (213/2) names a man, Agathinos, son of Hermias, as a Mytilenian. There is no way to securely identify Agathinos as the son of Hermias, but the community at Tholthis was not very

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*P.Hib.* 1.37 (235 BC).
large, and many of the soldiers (like Hermias) and members of the epigone (like Agathinos) bore relations to one another. The evidence is inconclusive, but given the case of Straton, and the absence of any other Hermias attested in the third-century Oxyrhynchites, it is likely that Hermias, too, was given Macedonian ethnic status upon his recruitment into the phalanx.

In spite of the obstacles to military readiness, the Genova papyri do indicate that mobilization took place, and over a couple of years the troops at camp were able to achieve their guaranteed rations, in spite of the occasional delays that provided the surviving evidence of that enormous military camp and the logistical operations that must have been involved in sustaining it through several years of training. To the extent that Polybius described a period, lasting several years, of mobilization and training, his narrative seems to have been accurate. The overall picture from the infantry, however, emphasizes a very different story from that of Polybius. Ptolemy’s decrees facilitated a massive expansion of phalanx manpower. The major story of Ptolemaic war preparation was neither a sweeping ethnographic reorganization of the army, nor the revitalization of incompetent soldiers through the hand-holding of valorous Greek aristocrats. The major story was the addition of as many as thirty thousand men to the phalanx, and that reform changed the course of the battle of Raphia.
5.3. The War in Papyrus

The Fourth Syrian War lasted from about 221 to 217 BC, with a hiatus from 220 to 219 BC while Antiochus dealt with Molon and the Ptolemies began mobilizing the klerouchs, recruiting new troops, and training or retraining those in need of it. Polybius (5.57.1) notes that Antiochus distributed his troops to winter quarters, in the fall of 219 BC, and began marshaling them in the spring of 218 for the campaign against Egypt. In 218 BC Antiochus returned to Syria kai Phoinike with a formidable force, and met with yet more defections from the Ptolemaic side, including Theodotos the Aetolian, the supreme military commander for Ptolemaic forces in the Syrian theater. The Polybian narrative focuses in 218 upon the activities of Antiochus, who fought his way through northern Palestine and down through the Dekapolis as well, where he fought a siege and pitched engagement around Rabbath-ammon. In all, thousands of troops defected to his side, and Arab tribes from the Hawran region joined his side against the Ptolemaic-aligned settlers of the Dekapolis and their Arab allies further south. Polybius (5.62.4) asserts that after Antiochus joined Theodotos at Akko, he considered a push for Pelousion, until he heard that Ptolemy was at Memphis and much of the army at Pelousion.68 The forces at Pelousion were prepared for a prolonged siege, essentially eliminating the option of a rapid march into Egypt. Antiochus drew back for the winter.

68 The presence of the army at Pelousion only reinforces the critique posed above against the Polybian narrative of the Sosibian reforms. If the army was re-organized and trained at Alexandria, it would not have been able to deploy rapidly to Pelousion.
From the Ptolemaic side, a small amount of papyrological evidence can be marshaled to supplement the Polybian narrative. *P.Frankf.* 7, so important to our understanding of the history of the commands of Philon and Zoilos, also contains a narrative of the mobilization and campaigns leading up to the war. Because the complaint concerned the tenure of a klerouch’s land while he was away in the military, and probably because a good military record might curry favor, the plaintiff recites his absences from the land. In the second and third regnal years, 220 and 219 BC, he departed to Pelousion. Pelousion was, of course, the Egyptian frontier. In the first year, Antiochus was warring against Molon, although the Ptolemies must have deployed troops around Pelousion in the event that he pushed instead against Egypt. The second year (219), Antiochus made forays into Koile Syria and along the coast. Forces at Pelousion would not have seen combat, neither is that the location given by Polybius for the military reforms. In the fourth year, 218 BC, he went to the Boubastite nome. The Boubastite nome, located along the Pelousiac branch of the Nile, was located just east of Memphis. The military camp may actually have been located in the Boubastite, rather than Memphis itself. If, as Polybius claimed, Ptolemy’s advisors desired to disguise their military preparations, locating the camp in Boubastis rather than Memphis would have helped. Finally, in the fifth year, 217 BC, the plaintiff says that he went to Syria, campaigning in the company of the king. Another cavalryman, Olympos son of Antipatros, a Mysian in the Fifth Hipparcy, also made sure to mention, the year after
the battle, that he had been among the horse mobilized from the Arsinoite to campaign with the king. Yet another soldier, a Macedonian infantryman from the Oxyrhynchite nome, Theophilos, leased his allotment at the start of the campaign season in 217 BC. Leasing land is not a sign of anything significant, but in the lease, his status is described as being τῶν ἐν τῇι …[-15]τ[-10]…” Now, few words used to describe the status of Ptolemaic klerouchs will fit in the available spaces. The likeliest word to conclude the phrase should be a plural genitive, and στρατευομένων is one of the few possibilities. This would leave about a dozen characters or so in the remaining space after the dative article. Possibilities for the first section of the phrase begin with a similar phrase from the Pithom stele honoring Ptolemy’s victory in the battle: ἐν τῇι στρατείᾳ, but also include a numbered unit, which has parallels in Macedonia. Even with this evidence, the Ptolemaic evidence for mobilization in the Fourth Syrian War is generally comparable to that for the Third.

Polybius (5.79) provides a fairly thorough accounting of the armies on both sides at the battle of Raphia. These figures, as the most detailed army list for the Ptolemaic army from any source, and one of the more complete lists for the Seleucid army, have been studied repeatedly. However, examinations of these figures have never managed

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69 SB 20.15068 (217/6 BC).
70 Another promising options is τεταγμένων.
71 Meletemata 22 Epig.App. 17 includes a very similar phrase, used to describe the men serving in the front rank or first lochos of a troop of men from Upper Macedonia.
a satisfactory correlation of the Ptolemaic forces at Raphia with the Ptolemaic army in Egypt, either before or after the Fourth Syrian War. This has been done more successfully on the Seleucid side. Table 5.5 constitutes an attempt at correlating the information in Polybius’ account with the military institutions known from the papyrological record.

Table 5.5. The Hellenistic Armies at Raphia, 217 BC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Class</th>
<th>Seleucids</th>
<th>Ptolemies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>4,000 horse under Antipater</td>
<td>700 household cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000 horse under Themison</td>
<td>2,300 from Libya and Egypt^73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000 from Greece and mercenaries^74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Infantry</td>
<td>10,000 “mostly” argyraspides^75</td>
<td>3,000 royal agema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000 peltasts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Infantry</td>
<td>20,000 phalangites</td>
<td>25,000 phalangites^77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,000 euzonoi phalangites^76</td>
<td>20,000 Egyptian phalangites</td>
</tr>
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</table>

^73 These cavalry likely represent, among other units, the five numbered hipparchies of the Arsinoite and Herakleopolite nomes. To those we might add the Oxyrhynchite cavalry and these “Libyans,” who might have been Libyans, cavalry patrolling the desert, or Cyrenaians. The five hipparchies should have amounted to between twelve and sixteen hundred, leaving seven hundred to eleven hundred men to have come from other sources: the hippeis of Philon chief likely chief among them. It is also worth remembering that some klerouchs probably were not drafted for the campaign.  
^74 It is worth remembering that Polybius is likely working from a Ptolemaic source, at least in parts of this document. His description of the two thousand cavalry as being “those from Greece and the mercenaries” is intriguing: although these two thousand are often taken as new arrivals in Egypt, such a conclusion does not seem at all necessary. Instead, these could, conceivably, include the ethnic hipparchies and misthophoroi hippeis, in addition to some overseas contingents. The four ethnic hipparchies might have provided close to one thousand men, if they were at full strength by the time of the war.  
^75 These should likely be identified with the “picked men armed in the Macedonian manner” at (5.82.2 - τοις ἐπιλέκτοις τοις εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καθωπλισμένους) and the “picked men of the Syrians” at (5.85.10 - ἐπίλεκτοι τῶν Συριακῶν). The original description of them calls them “the men called up from the entire kingdom” (5.79.2: ἐκλελεγμένοι τῆς βασιλείας, καθωπλισμένοι δ’ εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον). Perhaps the cities of the Seleucis in Syria provided most of these troops, while the remaining men were drawn from Macedonian cities across the empire.
| Light Infantry                        | 5,000 Greek mercenaries | 8,000 Greek mercenaries\(^{78}\)  
|                                     | 10,000 Arab *symmachoi* | 3,000 Libyan phalangites\(^{79}\)  
| 5,000 Iranian infantry             |                            |  
| 3,000 *euzonoi*, consisting of     |                            |  
| 2,000 Persian and Agrianian        |                            |  
| missile infantry, and 1,000        |                            |  
| Thracians \(^{80}\)                |                            |  
| 2,500 Cretans and Neo-Cretans      |                            |  
| 1,000 Kardakes\(^{81}\)           |                            |  
| 3,000 Cretans and Neo-Cretans      |                            |  
| 6,000 Galatians and Thracians\(^{63}\) |

\(^{76}\) Polybius identifies these five thousand men, a mix of Cilicians, Dahae, and Carmanians, commanded by a Macedonian, Byttakos, as *euzonoi* at 5.79.3 but as armed in the Macedonian manner at 5.82.10. Their placement in the battle between the Greek mercenaries and the *argyraspides* should weaken any doubts that they were not phalangites. However, their ethnic origins may remain debatable: while Cilician phalangites are not unreasonable, the Dahae were from the steppes, and would represent a truly remarkable ethnic group armed in the Macedonian fashion, especially when the Dahae were not under Seleucid authority in the first place. Carmanians are numbered among the Iranian infantry as well. The Successor’s tradition of *pantodapoi* may not have died out entirely, and it may be best to conclude that these were phalangite infantry drawn from the native populations of several satrapies.

\(^{77}\) The Ptolemaic phalanx would have included the estimated sixteen chiliarchies formed in the reign of Euergetes, augmented with as many nine new chiliarchies recruited and organized from the last years of Euergetes, when settlements of new *triakontarouroi* are attested in the midst of war preparations. The total of twenty-five thousand more likely reflects eight new chiliarchies, rather than nine, in spite of the difference of nine thousand men. A chiliarchy, with staff officers, is estimated to have comprised 1,040 men (in the Macedonian army, four *speiras* of 260 men apiece). Sixteen chiliarchies would add to 16,640 at full strength. Adding eight chiliarchies, four in each wing of the phalanx, would bring the total strength to an even 25,000.

\(^{78}\) These need not all have been recruited prior to the war. If overseas garrisons were recalled, the Alexandrian mercenaries enrolled, remnants of the Syrian garrison reconstituted, and the mercenary troop of Krateros or Endios in Middle Egypt called to service, the Ptolemies may not have needed to recruit new troops. Now, in all likelihood new troops were recruited, so as not to leave Egypt, Thrace and Asia Minor entirely denuded of garrisons.

\(^{79}\) These are in some respects a greater conundrum than the Egyptians; it may be that Sosibios did with some Libyans the same thing he did with the Egyptians, but it is at least as likely that this is a contingent of troops from the Cyrenaica.

\(^{80}\) Polybius places three thousand *euzonoi* on the left flank of the Seleucid army under the command of Menedemus (5.82.10), though Menedemus commanded three thousand Persian, Agrianian, and Thracian troops in the initial army list (5.79.6). If Thracian peltasts, Persian archers, and Agrianian archers could all be described as armed in the manner of *euzonoi*, that particular designation lacks any technical precision, and would be indistinguishable from *psiloi*.

\(^{81}\) This contingent is often incorrectly associated with the Lydians based on proximity in Polybius’ text (cf Bar-Kochva (1976): 50). They, and not the Lydians, were commanded by a Galatian officer. While Bar-
Kochva’s assertion that they were most likely Kurds rather than Median Kardakes, it is quite plausible that these were Median thureophoroi, trained and commanded by a Galatian, and participants on the side of Molon in the previous war (Polyb. 5.53.8), though it is also possible that both contingents truly were light javeliners (akontistai) under the joint command of a Galatian.

Thracians are mainly known in Egypt as members of heterogeneous units, but perhaps a specifically Thracian unit was settled somewhere and unattested in the papyri. Galatian settlers are rare in the papyri as well, but inscriptions and burial monuments in particular indicate that large numbers were settled around Alexandria, cf. Brown (1957): nos. 3, 7-10.

Bar-Kochva (1976: 50) casts doubt on this contingent as well, for two reasons: first, Lydians had a reputation for infantry of the line, not light troops; second, Lydia was then under control of the usurper Achaios. Bar-Kochva suggests that they are Ludim from Atropatene.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>500 Lydian akontistai(^2)</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>102 elephants</td>
<td>70,000 foot, 5,000 horse, 73 elephants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>102 elephants</td>
<td>73 elephants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62,000 foot, 6,000 horse, 102 elephants</td>
<td>70,000 foot, 5,000 horse, 73 elephants</td>
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5.4. Conclusions

The Fourth Syrian War dealt a serious blow to the Ptolemaic approach to empire. Antiochus’ ability to dismantle, by force or coercion, the core of Ptolemy’s military forces in the province nearest to Egypt itself illustrated the difficulties of the Ptolemaic system. Though Theodotos’ replacement Nikolaos had commanded a large defensive force, he had been unable to hold off Antiochus for very long, particularly after the first reverses. Removed from Alexandria and proximity to the king, the commanders of the garrison units in Syria kai Phoinike lacked the oversight or mechanisms for loyalty that existed closer to the throne. And while the Ptolemaic approach removed the likelihood of internal rebellion by central authorities, like the satrapal rebellions in the Seleucid kingdom, it also opened the door for the invading Antiochus to bribe away the...
individual units of the Ptolemaic garrison piece by piece. Due either to a perception of inevitable defeat or to the hope of rewards in the camp of Antiochus, commander after commander joined the side of Antiochus. We know the names of seven high-ranking military commanders who went over to Antiochus’ camp during and immediately after the Fourth Syrian War: Theodotos,\textsuperscript{84} Keraias,\textsuperscript{85} Hippolochos,\textsuperscript{86} Nikolaos,\textsuperscript{87} Lagoras,\textsuperscript{88} Bolis,\textsuperscript{89} and Ptolemaios son of Thraseas.\textsuperscript{90} Three of the four belonged to the elite court hierarchy, and even the lesser four commanded hundreds of men. Ptolemy’s loss was Antiochus’ gain, as many of the seven played prominent roles in Antiochus’ successful conquests in the following decades. Polybius attributes the defections to the instability and outright perils of the Alexandrian court. Whatever biases may have taken hold, the record of defections provides a clear indication of the challenges to the stability of the Ptolemaic state and legitimacy of the kingship. The military institutions enabled the Ptolemies to win quite possibly the largest pitched battle of the Hellenistic era, but faced challenges of its own. As the Ptolemies established the internal networks of settlement to support their enlarged army, their activities would create new instabilities within Egypt itself.

\textsuperscript{84} Polyb. 5.40. \\
\textsuperscript{85} Polyb. 5.70. \\
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{87} Polyb. 10.29. \\
\textsuperscript{88} Polyb. 7.15. \\
\textsuperscript{89} Polyb. 8.16-17. \\
\textsuperscript{90} OGIS 230.
At the close of Euergetes’ reign, the Ptolemaic settler system contained roughly 30,000 men. This estimate is based on sixteen thousand men in the phalanx, five each in the infantry *agema* and the cavalry, and approximately four among the non-phalanx infantry: Cretans, Galatians, and Thracians. This number, derived from a study of the organizational strategy of Euergetes and the numbers at Raphia, corresponds well to the estimates offered by other scholars for the military manpower of third century Ptolemaic Egypt. Most of these estimates are derived from studies of the Raphia account or of land tenure patterns in the Fayum and other regions. The reforms before the Fourth Syrian War added or expanded the military role of approximately 30,000 additional men. Their incorporation into the army swung the balance of power on the battlefield at Raphia, but introduced significant stresses to the Ptolemaic settler system, which nearly doubled in size. What follows is a study, not of generalized land tenure or population ratios, but of estimates of agricultural land required for the various components of the Ptolemaic army.

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91 The numbers for the *agema* include both the *agema* and the *peltastai*. Five thousand was the standard number for the *agema* in the Macedonian kingdom as well, and the Seleucid ten thousand featured, essentially, two of these units. The numbers for non-phalanx infantry includes two thousand Cretans, though it is possible that the majority of them and the Neo-Cretans were mercenaries, and two thousand Thracians and Galatians, since Polybius describes the four thousand as raised from the settlers and their descendants.

92 See Fischer-Bovet (2009: 57-75) for a review of the literature, and several hypothetical models, or for individual computations, see Rathbone (1990: 123), Schiedel (2001:220-223), Manning (2003: 47-49), all of which hover around four million, and see Clarysse and Thompson (2006:2:101) for a model based off the Fayum with a lower total.
In the last years of Euergetes, before the recruitment reforms involved in the Fourth Syrian War, the Ptolemaic settler army consisted of men who received, broadly, two types of allotments: infantry and cavalry. The cavalry consisted of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 men. Approximately 2,000 of them, from the ethnic hipparchies and *mischphoroi hippéis*, were seemingly in the process of being settled during the course of his reign. The standard cavalry allotment at mid-century was one hundred arouras. The enrollment of *mischphoroi hippéis* in the settler system introduced the eighty-aroura allotment, and the seventy-aroura allotment was standard among the ethnic hipparchies. Because hundred-aroura allotments were more common in the third century, the three thousand men of the royal squadron, numbered, and other regular hipparchies should have possessed approximately 300,000 arouras. The ethnic hipparchies and *mischphoroi hippéis* I estimate at 2,000 men, at an average of 75 arouras, for 150,000 arouras. The total for the cavalry then amounts to 450,000 arouras, though the settlement of the ethnic hipparchies may still have been on-going at the end of his reign.

The infantry amounted to about 25,000 thousand men: 16,000 phalangites, 5,000 elites, and about 4,000 settled, non-phalanx infantry. The average allotment for phalangites was twenty-four arouras, despite their moniker *triakontarouroi*. Settling the phalanx would have required approximately 384,000 arouras. The elite troops of the
*agema*, on the other hand, to whom the Ptolemaic *peltastai* should be added, possessed allotments of one hundred arouras, like the cavalry. If all five thousand were given allotments, they would have required 500,000 arouras. The 300,000 solely for the *agema* may be a more reliable figure. Finally, the non-phalanx infantry may have received allotments as large as those in the phalanx or smaller allotments, like the sixteen-arouras bestowed on settled prisoners and a number of detachments in the second century, or the approximately twenty-aroura allotments common among the mid-century *presbyteroi*. Taking the average twenty, the non-phalanx infantry might have accounted for 80,000 arouras. The settled infantry would have required approximately 764,000 to 964,000 arouras.

The total klerouchic land late in the reign of Euergetes should have amounted to 1,214,000 to 1,414,000 arouras. This range is well more than double the estimated size of the Fayum (544,267 arouras), and represents between 16 and 19.5 percent of the total agricultural land in Egypt. Additionally, with little military settlement in the Thebaid, klerouchic land probably amounted to between one-quarter and one-half of lands in

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93 It is also conceivable the Ptolemaic *peltastai*, like their Macedonian and Seleucid counterparts, where essentially active duty soldiers, and did not inherit an allotment until they graduated into the *agema* after some years of service.
94 Take, for example, the single Cretan *triakontarouros*, attested in *P.Köl 5 218*, though the papyrus is from the years after the war.
95 This is also, neatly, the average between 64,000 and 96,000 for either of the other two calculations.
96 For this estimate of the size of the Arsinoite nome, see Clarysse and Thompson (2006: 90). The Edfu temple gives nine million arouras as the ideal capacity of Egypt, but modern estimates place the total close to 20,000 km² or 7,258,000 arouras. See Rathbone (1990: 109-15), Scheidel (2001: 92-3), Manning (2003: 48-9), Fischer-Bovet (2009: 60-68).
most of the nomes of Lower Egypt. The density of klerouchs may have been greatest in the Arsinoite, and perhaps the Herakleopolite as well. The expansion of the army in the years of the Fourth Syrian War required expanded klerouchic settlement in Middle Egyptian nomes, at least the Oxyrhynchite, and perhaps further south as well. Additionally, in the years after the war, Agathokles and Sosibios acquired large estates, Sosibios in part of the Herakleopolite nome, and Agathokles in Upper Egypt. While these gift estates provided additional income for the king’s top ministers, they also, like other gift estates, helped prepare the land for military settlements.

Preparations for war brought 9,000 additional men into the phalanx, and it was necessary that they be settled. Settling them would make them a permanent fixture within the Ptolemaic army, and go a long way toward achieving sustainability and operational effectiveness. However, this would involve settling another 9,000 men on another 216,000 arouras or more. This addition alone would increase klerouchic land by approximately 18 percent, to which we may add lands bestowed upon the men of the Egyptian phalanx. The native infantry, or machimoi, were present in Egypt before Raphia of course, and are considerably more difficult to calculate than any other sector of the army. Prior to the Sosibian reforms, the machimoi generally held five-aroura allotments, and operated at times as police, security, attendants, and light infantry. Diodorus

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97 BGU 6.1415, O.Strashb. 1.294, and O.Wilb. 2 all provide evidence for the large gift estate of Agathokles south of Thebes, between Thebes and Hermomthis. See P.Tebt. 3.2.860 for the gift estate of Sosibios.
98 So much so that they have been generally ignored in estimations of klerouchic land tenure prior to the late second century, when machimoi holdings are much better-attested.
(19.80.4) says that a “great many” accompanied Ptolemy to Syria before the battle of Gaza, and some fought, likely as light troops: archers, slingers, and skirmishers (19.83.3).

In an army with 18,000 infantry, we might have found as many as 10,000 Egyptians. For the Ptolemies to field an Egyptian phalanx of 20,000 men, it is not likely that they were forced to enroll new troops, though that is also a possibility. It is probable, however, that the men were given more substantial allotments. There is no definite evidence, but these may have been the first of the second-century class of dekarouroi machimoi. It very well may be that, in addition to at least 216,000 arouras for new Greek klerouchs, Ptolemaic administrators were also apportioning an additional 100,000 for the promoted machimoi. If successful, the expanded settler army would have provided the Ptolemaic state with a large and proven army, quite possibly the largest in the entire Mediterranean. But a collapse of the ruling dynasty, a dangerous rural revolt, and a renewed invasion threatened to bring down the entire Ptolemaic Hellenistic state. At the same time, the ascendant Antigonids and Seleucids would move their armies on collision courses with their greatest foes: the former against Rome, which emerged

99 See P.Haun.inv. 407.95-6, P.Tebt. 1.81.32 and 1.5.44, SB 20.14106.4. For the earlier-attested dekarouroi phylakitai, see, e.g., BGU 10.1957.7, P.Erasm. 1.1.6. By the late second century (see P.Tebt. 1.5), the dekarouroi were the class of machimoi beneath the epilektoi, and there were four total classes of machimoi. In the third century, the epilektai and dekarouroi may well have been identical, and have emerged during the Fourth Syrian War out of the pentarouroi classification. The class of heptarouroi may not have developed until the second half of the second century.

100 The machimoi would likely have been located primarily in parts of the Delta or the Thebaid, not coincidentally the starting points for unrest in the late third century, cf. Winnicki (1989:227).
victorious in the Second Punic War in 202 BC, the latter against, consecutively, the
Parthians, Ptolemies, and once more, the Romans.
Chapter 6. The Near Collapse of the Ptolemaic Kingdom: Intrigue, Invasion, and Insurgency

The Hellenistic kingdoms spent most of the third century developing armies that imitated Alexander’s and were intended for conflict mainly with one another. By the waning years of that century, their forces were well-organized, dependably recruited, and proven on the battlefield. But powerful new challenges arose at the turn of the century. By 189 BC both the Antigonids in Macedonia and the Seleucids in Asia had lost wars against the Romans. Only Ptolemaic Egypt was unscarred by Rome. Instead, the Ptolemies faced not only a major defeat at the hands of the Seleucids but also an internal revolt lasting some twenty years. Historians have seen the length of the rebellion as evidence of the weakness of the Ptolemaic state and the ineffectiveness of its army. I suggest here a different narrative for Ptolemaic military developments in response to internal revolt. After twenty years of insurgency, the Ptolemaic state and army implemented far-reaching reforms that resulted in the pacification of the country. These actions do not look like the ‘weakness’ or ‘irrelevance’ suggested by modern scholarship.¹ Instead, while the other two kingdoms warred unsuccessfully with Rome,

¹ See, in particular, Van’t Dack (1988: 7-11), p. 9: the allowance of heredity possession of kleroi “conduisent nécessairement à la dévaluation progressive de l’institution clérouchique” leading to the conclusion that “le système économique a pris le pas sur l’effort militaire des rois,” a conclusion formulated in varying degrees earlier by Préaux (1939: 468-71), Lesquier (1911), Launey (1949), and Heinen (1973: 91-114). The line of argument involves tracing the decline of the klerouchic system in the second and first centuries BC and
the least interesting of the Successor armies did develop effective counterinsurgency methods to end the revolt and ensure their continued control over a stable and productive Egypt. Not only were the Ptolemies the first of the Hellenistic kingdoms to devise a comprehensive strategy for suppressing insurgent activity, but did so with greater success than most pre-modern or modern states that have faced comparable problems.

As the dust cleared from the crush of phalanxes at Raphia in the evening of June 22, 217 BC, the units that had constituted the Ptolemaic right flank were rounding up prisoners from the defeated Seleucid army. Before the battle over one hundred thousand men and beasts had entered formations several miles in width. By dusk the thousands of men retreating and pursuing, withdrawing and regrouping stretched for miles, from the Ptolemaic camp southwest of Raphia to beyond the walls of Gaza. The right flank of the Seleucid army, composed of crack mercenary contingents, the royal units and elephants, withdrew ahead of the Ptolemaic army. Although the Seleucids had maintained most of their cohesion, Antiochus himself may have barely evaded

seeking roots in the reigns of Ptolemy III and Ptolemy IV. I will argue that the decline of the system was a result of a change in military philosophy, rather than disinterest in military matters.

2 See Polyb. 5.79-85 for the narrative of the battle. His total for the two armies is 143,000 men and nearly 200 elephants. Allowing for exaggeration and attrition, and in accord with the detail and general reliability of his narrative, a number of approximately 100,000 may be generally accurate.
The Seleucid army, after a brief halt to recover and bury its many dead, took the coastline toward Syria, gathering routed soldiers and town garrisons along the way. By nightfall on June 23rd, the Ptolemaic army, victors in one of the largest battles of the Hellenistic era had gathered around Raphia, on the border of Syria. Their king, Ptolemy IV Philopator, would not push his advantage, returned to Egypt soon after, and spent the remainder of his reign at peace.

The changing nature of Ptolemaic rule in Egypt in the last years of Philopator radically altered the environment in which the Ptolemy's staff, organized, and deployed their army, and constitutes a watershed in Ptolemaic history. Poor leadership, expansion of the Ptolemaic footprint in Upper Egypt, and economic instability steadily eroded Egyptians' tolerance of the regime. In Asia, a defeated Antiochus was left to his own devices. Finally, a perfect storm of problematic royal succession, major military defeat, and widespread insurgency struck in the waning years of the third century, and changed the environment of Ptolemaic Egypt for good. The following study examines, in 6.1, the narrative of Ptolemaic decline during the reign of Philopator and in the immediately following his demise. The study builds toward the study of Egyptian agrarian revolt in 6.2, which provides the most detailed analysis of rebel violence to

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3 See Porphyrius (FrGH 260 44). This claim was originally made in the surviving demotic portion of the "Raphia Decree" found on Pithom II: 13-14, Thissen (1966:19).
4 Polybius (5.86.3-8) implies that Antiochus and his army withdrew from Raphia to Gaza on the 23rd of June, and after the burial of the dead returned to Syria. That he withdrew his garrisons as he went is indicated by the ease of Ptolemy's advance through the province (86.8), effectively conceding by the defeat at Raphia his failed conquest of Syria.
date, and conceptualizes the rebellion in terms of modern literature on rebellions and insurgency.

6.1. Decline: the reign of Philopator, from Raphia to his death in 205/4 BC

Philopator conducted a short campaign in Syria following the victory at Raphia, before returning home victorious; so the brief accounts in Polybius and in a Ptolemaic decree from Memphis, inscribed in late 217 BC. The decree was published in November, less than five months after the battle, so that the campaign can only have lasted three or four months. Polybius (5.86-7) describes it mainly as a triumphal tour of the reconquered province, for purposes of accepting gifts and re-affirming Ptolemaic rule. Two inscriptions are known from his visit to Tyre. In one, an Aetolian officer in the Ptolemaic Syrian army under Nikolaos seems to have dedicated spoils from the battle. Nikolaos had taken over military command after Theodotos’ defection in 219 BC, and may have served as strategos of the region as well during the war. Another dedication at Tyre more likely belongs to the later years of Philopator’s reign. In it, Thraseas son of

5 For discussion of these, see Walbank (1957: 610-613) and Thissen (1966: 19, 60-63). For a translation of the demotic text, see Austin (2006) no. 276. For the incomplete Greek fragments of this text, see SB 5.7172 and SEG 8.467. Like the other Ptolemaic decrees published after priestly synods, it was published in several languages, but little survives of the Greek version, while the Demotic is largely complete.
6 Polyb. 5.87.6, Pithom II: 26. The latter dates his return to Egypt to October 12, almost exactly four months after his departure from Pelousion.
Aetos, the governor of Ptolemaic Syria, honors the king and queen.\(^8\) Now, Nikolaos was replaced with Andromachos in 217 BC according to Polybius (5.87.6). Andromachos had been senior commander of the phalanx at Raphia, while Ptolemaios, Thraseas’ son, had held the junior command of the phalanx (5.65.4). The dedication at Tyre indicates that Andromachos left his position as strategos sometime after the war, and was replaced by Thraseas. Thraseas in turn was succeeded by a man who was very likely his own son, Ptolemaios, son of Thraseas, who later defected to Antiochus and handed over Syria and Phoenicia to him.\(^9\) Another inscription, from Joppa, further south along the Phoenician coast, indicates the restoration of royal cult in that city.\(^10\) These visits, along with other visits to cities and temples described in the Raphia decree and historical sources,\(^11\) functioned to restore Ptolemaic power after the Seleucid conquest. There is little indication that force was required at any of these places.

While it is only natural that Ptolemy and his forces would visit the great cities of Phoenicia—Ptolemais-Akko, Sidon, and Tyre—and while these visits have the ring of a triumphal tour, there are two indications—neither from Polybius—that Ptolemy and his army engaged in actions that conform more with a traditional concept of a military

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\(^8\) SEG 39.1596b.


\(^10\) SEG 20.467. See also Lifschitz (1962: 82-84) and Huss (1977: 131-140).

\(^11\) Polyb. 5.86.8-11, Pithom II:14-23, and is the setting for 3 Maccabees 1.6-10. The 3 Maccabees text includes several intriguingly accurate details, though much of it must be taken as fantastical. For example, the Philos of Ptolemy who saved the king from Theodotos the Aetolian’s assassination attempt (known from Polyb. 5.81) is given as Dositheos son of Drimylus by 3 Maccabees, and in no other source, and indeed Dositheos was one of the Friends of the king, and had been eponymous priest in the 25\(^{th}\) year of Euergetes (223/2 BC).
campaign. First, a dedication at Laboue in Lebanon, offered on behalf of the royal pair to Sarapis and Isis by the *archigrammateus* Marsyas, indicates the presence of the king and his army in northern Coele Syria. The official position *archigrammateus* (chief secretary) is almost certainly the military position by that name, rather than the court position, since Marsyas was the author who oversaw the casualty notifications at the end of the war. It is unlikely that one of the highest-ranking staff officers in the Ptolemaic army would have strayed too far from the company of the king. He may have been inspired to make the dedication by his presence in the company of the king in a valley called by his own name (the Marsyas valley). That he made the dedication at Laboue may indicate that the army halted there, and it may have been the furthest point northwards that the army ventured. Laboue is near the northern entrance into the valley between the Libanon and Antilibanon mountain ranges and was the last open, flat land before the final pass into Syria. Poised there, the army threatened an invasion of the Seleucid heartland, which surely contributed to the treaty that ended the war.

The Ptolemaic priestly decree published a month after the king’s return provides some insight into the activities of the army, probably after the march through Koile Syria and the initial treaty between the two powers. According to it:

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12 *SEG* 38.1571.
13 *P.Lille*. 1.4.2-4. For a similar military position (in the Seleucid army), see *SEG* 19.904.5-6.
14 Polybius (5.87.1) says that Antiochus feared an imminent invasion after the defeat. The presence of the army at the northern end of Koile Syria would have reinforced the Ptolemaic side in negotiations (though it is quite clear that the Ptolemies had the upper hand in negotiations already).
He then went to the territories of his enemies and caused a fortified camp for his troops to be built, and stayed there as long as one wanted him to. As those who repulsed his enemies wished to fight together with him (?), he spent many days outside that same place. As they did not come again (?) he let his troops loose, so that they plundered their cities. As they were unable to protect their territories they were destroyed. He made it clear to all men that this was the work of the gods / and that it was not good to fight against him. He marched away from that region after he had made himself master in twenty-one days of all their territories, after the acts of treachery which the leaders of the troops had committed.\textsuperscript{15}

The words seem in many places to have been left intentionally vague, leading some commentators to speculate that it referred to the Ptolemaic defectors during the war.\textsuperscript{16} During the war several commanders and their troops defected, and if they had been soldiers settled in the province rather than mercenaries, Ptolemy’s army may have carried out punitive attacks against their settlements. While there may be some element of truth in that interpretation,\textsuperscript{17} a more plausible enemy for this text may be the Arab tribes in the vicinity of the Decapolis, most of which defected to Antiochus’ side (5.71) and proved helpful in the Seleucid conquest of the Decapolis (71.2) and later contributed ten thousand soldiers to his army at Raphia (79.8). The ally of the decree text would then likely be the people of Rabbath-Ammon (Philadelphia), who put up stiff resistance to Antiochus’ army and waged war against the other tribes in Arabia on behalf of the

\textsuperscript{15} Pithom II:23-25. The translation is from Austin (2006).
\textsuperscript{17} Philotera and Skythopolis, both of which lay on the eastern border of Galilee, negotiated their surrenders to Antiochus (5.70.4-5) while most of the Ptolemaic cities attempted to resist.
After a 21-day punitive campaign, Ptolemy's army withdrew and returned to Egypt.

6.1.1. Economic decline and currency reform in the reign of Philopator

The remainder of Philopator's reign was quiet militarily, but is instead notable for economic developments. On his return to Egypt, Philopator incurred an enormous expense, rewarding his veterans with three hundred thousand gold staters. The ancient narratives treated the remainder of his reign with disgust and disdain but little detail. While Polybius (5.34.9-10) describes the king as too pre-occupied with his “constant drunkenness” to maintain the Ptolemies’ string of overseas possessions, Huss has demonstrated that in fact the Ptolemaic possessions overseas were generally secure and thriving throughout his reign. In fact, the Ptolemaic position in the Aegean had been weakened since the reign of Euergetes, and while few Ptolemaic bases were lost during

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18 For their resistance to Antiochus, see Polyb. 5.71.4-11. For Rabbath-Ammon = Rabbatama = Philadelphia, see Cohen (2006: 268-272). It seems to have been the home-base of the Tobiad dynasts: P. Câr. Zen. 1.59003, Jos. AJ 12.229-36. The only problem with this interpretation (or any other) is their description in the stele as “those who repulsed the enemies,” since according to Polybius Rabbath-Ammon was forced to capitulate through a stratagem, when the spring feeding the city was cut off. Since the citadel was fed by its own spring, it is possible that the citadel held out, or we may cast some doubt on Polybius' account, which follows the familiar tropos of the individual revealing secret passageways or springs leading to the fall of a fortress.


20 Polybius (14.12) preferred to summarize his reign at brief because he considered it more suitable to describe the history of Egypt through a description of the king’s “life of dissipation” rather than an account of events. Justin (30.1.7-10) expresses a similar opinion. Strabo (17.12) refers to the “prevailing lawlessness” brought about by the “bad government” of the king and his ministers. Porphyrius (FrGH 260 F 45.11) relates the decline of the kingdom to the “worthlessness” of the king and to his “arrogant and dissolute” favorites.

21 Huss (1976).
Philopator’s reign (Seleucia-in-Pieria being the only significant one), Polybius seems to be right in that there is little indication of aggressive activity in the Aegean to expand or strengthen the Ptolemaic hold there. Instead, attention seems to have been focused toward Egypt itself during the remainder of Philopator’s reign.

The evidence of activity there indicates that Ptolemaic inactivity abroad may have been related to an increased preoccupation with the interior, rather than Philopator’s lavish lifestyle. As discussed in the previous chapter, the growth of the Hellenistic settler system under his father and during the Fourth Syrian War necessarily expanded the network of internal settlements and land under cultivation by settlers.22 Additionally, the results at Raphia seemingly confirmed the value of Egyptian heavy infantry, by whose addition the Ptolemaic phalanx had been more than doubled. It is possible that Sosibios or Ptolemy himself chose to focus their efforts on Egypt rather than the overseas possessions. If those efforts were successful, the Ptolemaic kingdom would have been largely self-sufficient in Egypt, both militarily and economically. The

22 The settlement of prisoners following the war further expanded the settler system. A report in P.Lille 1.3, from 216 BC, indicates (64-69) that perhaps eleven prisoners-of-war had been assigned to allotments of roughly sixteen arouras apiece following the war. Another document (from 213 BC) complains that three prisoners-of-war have been stealing olive oil produce and selling it as their own (P.Köln. 6.261). Fully incorporated prisoners may have been the Asiagenes of late-third and second century sources, who possessed sixteen-aroura allotments. P.Teht. 3.2.1001.14-23, which is from the fifth year of Ptolemy VI most likely, refers to a plot of land that belong to nine Asiagenes at the start of the fourth year, but two of the allotments were taken by the crown. The men all possessed uniform allotments of about sixteen arouras. A text from the same period, P.Köln. 10.411, deals with another group of Asiagenes, which numbered seven men (F2.9) after Sopater son of Mithridates either passed away or had his allotment seized (F3^2.6). The same text seemingly refers to other groups of Asiagenes, one of eight men (F4^2.1-6) and another of just two (F13^2.6-9). Another Asiagenes is known from P.Erasm. 1.3.8 (166 BC) and a hegemon of “soldiers from Asia” may have been one of their officers in about 183 BC (P.Teht. 3.2.793.F6.15).
elephant hunts of Ptolemy IV’s predecessors continued in his reign as well. Two
eponymous commanders in the mercenary cavalry, who also seem to have been
involved in elephant hunts in the reigns of both Ptolemy III and IV, were eponymous
priests from 213-211 BC,\(^2\) indicating the continued court prominence of those who led
the great southern expeditions. Another eponymous commander in the mercenary
cavalry from the reign of Ptolemy III led at least two elephant-hunting expeditions
during the reign of Philopator.\(^2\) Charimortos of Aetolia, later one of the chief
companions of Skopas, also led at least one elephant expedition,\(^2\) and was succeeded in
that role by two Anatolians between 210 and 205 BC.\(^2\) This seems to represent an
increase in African expeditions in the last years of the third century. It corresponds to an
increased activity in Upper Egypt as well. In addition to the gift-estate of Agathokles,
which was under cultivation south of Thebes late in the third century, \textit{P.Bon.} 11 and 12
indicate an increase in Ptolemaic activity in the vicinity of Diospolis Mikra at the same

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\(^2\) Pythangelos in 213/2 (\textit{BGU} 10.1946), and Eteoneus for two consecutive years in 212/1 and 211/0
(\textit{P.Testi.Botti.} 1.1). Eteoneus’ priesthood in 212/1 is listed in Clarysse, van der Veken and Vleeming (1983:17),
but \textit{P.Grad.} 15 gives Diokles as eponymous priest that year, a reading the editors above of \textit{Eponymous Priests}
\(^2\) Lichas of Akarnania: \textit{Pan. Des.} 77 and 84.
\(^2\) \textit{Pan. Des.} 85 is a monument honoring the successor over the elephant hunts to Charimortos, while \textit{O.Oslo} 2
contains a reference to the expenditures of Charimortos in regard to the elephants.
\(^2\) Alexendros of Oroanna in Ionia, and Apoasis of Etenna in Pisidia: \textit{Pan. Des.} 85. \textit{Pan. El-Kan.} 8, one of the
many expressions of thanks offered near Edfu on a safe return from the coast, dates to the reign of Ptolemy
IV, and mentions the leadership of an Alexandros, perhaps the same man. The text in \textit{Pan. Des.} 85 mentions
Ptolemaios the son, and so must date from 210 or later.
time. The latter documents mention years 11 and 12 (212-210 BC), and possibly year 15 (208/7 BC) and regard the management of a sizeable area of land. They include records of business of all sorts: overseeing local agriculture, collecting taxes, making payments to banks and deposits to granaries, paying and supplying various types of garrison soldiers, feeding elephants or supplying elephant hunters, and requisitioning labor for irrigation projects. The cumulative effect of these centrally-overseen projects was an increase in the presence of the crown in the region of Diospolis Mikra, between Ptolemais Hermiou and Thebes. This expansion of royal activity can then be located with certainty in the regions immediately up- and down-river from Thebes, and may have extended through much of Upper Egypt.

In the closing years of Philopator’s reign, from about 210-205 BC, an economic disturbance of some sort occurred. There is evidence for the re-tariffing of bronze in relation to silver in setting official prices, as well as evidence of price inflation. In the

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27 The estate of Agathokles was located near Hermouthis: BGU 6.1415 (19 March 206 BC), O.Wilb. 2 (10 April 206 BC) and O.Stras. 1.294 (undated).
28 One parcel is 847.5 arouras (11.FrC.11) and both documents reference the activities of Hermophilos the local oikonomos.
30 These collections of orders are not without earlier parallels. UPZ 2.157 (243/2 BC) contains some similar records from the immediate vicinity of Thebes, leitourgies for irrigation projects, Greek settlers in the region mobilized for guard duty over irrigation projects (a result, perhaps, of acts of sabotage against irrigation works during the brief uprising during the Third Syrian War), and conscription of men for an elephant hunt. Note, however, that this and other early documents lack much evidence for tax farming and tax collection in coin.
early twentieth century the evidence was seen as an indication of price inflation brought about by the switch to bronze currency and steady devaluation of that currency.\textsuperscript{31} Documentary evidence does indicate increases in both prices and wages, which in turn seemingly indicates that the value of the bronze currency had decreased in relation to the silver standard.\textsuperscript{32} There is at least evidence that bronze currency was re-tariffed, and it may have lost value in the process.\textsuperscript{33} It is unclear whether the records of \textit{anachoresis} from this period are related to economic crisis.\textsuperscript{34} While Reekmans was confident that a period of major inflation struck Egypt during the reign of Philopator, more recent commentators have been more cautious due to the complexity of the evidence.\textsuperscript{35} It may be that a monetary reform has given the appearance of inflation. Burkhalter and Picard have presented a theory that the re-monetization was not about the relationship of bronze to silver, but rather a reconfiguration of the entire system along decimal lines and a bronze standard.\textsuperscript{36} This reform, if accepted, can be dated before 201 BC based on

\textsuperscript{32} Increased prices: silver for wheat: \textit{P.Heid.} 6.383 (209 BC), bronze for silver: \textit{UPZ} 1.149 (c.208?); increased wages: \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.2.884 (c.200). Officially, the exchange rate of bronze for silver did not change until more than a decade into the second century, Fauscher and Lorber (2010: 53-4).
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{P.Bingen} 34 (late 3c), \textit{P.Stras.} 2.111 (215/4 BC), and \textit{P.Koln.} 6.243,4 (213 BC). The \textit{Dioiketes’} instructions in \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.1.703 includes a section referring to how to deal with a wave of \textit{anachoresis} (l.215-22) in about 208 BC. \textit{Anachoresis} generally described abandonment of land by peasants, who then sought asylum in Egyptian temples to escape debts.
\textsuperscript{35} Manning (2004: 44, 2009: 158), Von Reden (2007: 69-73). Reekmans (1949) argued that inflation exceeded normal levels from about 220 to the end of Philopator’s reign, accelerating the downfall of Ptolemaic power. His interpretation is accepted in \textit{CAH} I: 164, but partly results from reading the Polybian narrative of decline into the available evidence.
\textsuperscript{36} Burkhalter and Picard (2005: 59-64).
*P.Tebt. 3.1.820*, which is the earliest definitively-dated document that seems to have utilized the new system. But it cannot be dated much earlier than 205 BC based on the retention of the previous system in the Thebaid during the Great Revolt. Others argue that inflation in grain prices took place in 199 BC, and then doubled in 197 and remained stable for over a decade, due less to re-tariffing of coinage than to the market itself, and that the value of bronze for grain slipped because grain changed more than bronze did. At the same time it is clear that bronze was steadily devalued, causing fluctuations in apparent prices, and perhaps real inflation, but the largest development in that direction followed Philopator’s death. The decline of Ptolemaic territory at the end of the third

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37 Fauscher and Lorber (2010: 50). The text dates to 22 August 201 BC, but poses some problems the authors do not mention. It deals in a round figure, two thousand drachmas bronze, which is indeed independently tariffed, but does not employ the theoretical decimal system.

38 Reekmans (1948: 22-3). The retention of the prior system there could indicate that the new system contributed to the revolt, but more likely that it was instituted after Thebes had broken away. Also there is no real evidence for inflation or monetary reform in P.Bon. 11 and 12, from the Thebaid and about 210 BC or earlier.

39 Cadell and Le Rider (1997: 24-93). Surely there are several historical factors at work here: the demand for coin to pay mercenaries to raise armies from 205-197, the concentration of silver in the western Mediterranean during the ongoing Second Punic War, the loss in 205 of grain production and tax revenue from the Thebaid, decreased production in Middle Egypt and the Delta about the same time, the loss of grain production and tax revenue from Syria following the battle of Panion in 200 BC, the devastation to the klerouchic population from the heavy losses in battle, and a continuing heavy military commitment in the rebel regions. The jump in 197 BC may be related to the return of insurgent forces following the proclamation of victory in the Rosetta decree, as well as the loss of most of the Ptolemaic possessions overseas that same year.

40 Von Reden (2007: 69-70, 111-7) and Cavagna (2010: 212-34). The size of bronze coinage dropped over time, as evident in the decline in weight of the tetrobol from 72g to 48g to 24g in the reign of Philopator, and then as low as 2g (if correctly identified as a tetrobol) at the beginning of Ptolemy V’s reign as part of the new monetary system. The currency recall prior to this last reform seems to have taken place at the end of Philopator’s reign according to Fauscher and Lorber (2010), because they were not included in the several third century Ptolemaic coin hoards, but the earlier issues were. This view receives support from Von Reden (2007: 70) and Manning (2009: 158). This last currency produced the greatest price increases, but also may not have represented real inflation, since wages increased by about sixty-fold, while the value of a bronze drachma had only fallen $1/36^{th}$ in weight from the weight in the 220’s.
century must have played a role in both the supply side of the market, and the
kingdom’s ability to mint new money. When Philopator died in 205 BC, the kingdom
seems to have been in the middle of a major monetary reform, intended to unhitch
Egypt’s bronze coinage from the silver standard.

6.1.2. Intrigue and instability in Alexandria, 205-202 BC

Ptolemy IV Philopator’s death ignited several years of intrigue and instability in
Alexandria. The activities of those years would appear to have altered the course of
Ptolemaic court activity for the remainder of that dynasty. Polybius is the only major
source for this period, although other sources occasionally help to expand the narrative.
Philopator, on his death, is said by Porphyrius (45.1) to have made Agathocles chief
minister over his realm during the minority of his child son. Polybius (15.25.5-12)
describes the tradition more in terms of a coup: Philopator may have died as a result of
his many vices, but Agathocles and his faction ordered the murder of Queen Arsinoe
and commenced a plan to seize power. The simultaneous death of both king and queen
raised suspicions in Alexandria, and from 205 to 201 BC the court and capital would
experience spasms of turmoil, violence, and upheaval.

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41 For an overview of key events, and the principal ancient narrative, see Polyb. 15.25-36.
Polybius’ narrative of Agathocles seizure of power emphasizes his attempts to secure himself against the court aristocracy and Alexandrian military garrison. In announcing the death of the king and queen he called together the ὑπασπιστὰς (bodyguards), θεραπείαν (the palace guards), and the officers of the infantry and cavalry. The first two groups likely comprised several divisions within the Ptolemaic agema, but may have also included some of the mercenary contingents in the garrison of Alexandria. The last would have been the higher-ranking officers within the settler army, whose status afforded them the ability to reside in Alexandria rather than in the regional urban centers in Egypt. These contingents represented the leading authorities over the Ptolemaic kingdom, and therefore the men whom Agathocles sought to win over or else remove. He used the coercion of oaths and cash to buy time for his regime in Alexandria.

Agathocles, hoping to consolidate his hold on power, ordered that the palace guards and mercenary detachments serving in Alexandria be enrolled in the settler army

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42 For the traditional interpretation of this passage, see the coverage in Fischer-Bovet (2009: 166-168).
43 Hypaspistai are attested only a handful of times in Ptolemaic history (SEG 31.1574, SEG 41.963, and possibly P.Stras. 8.761.v.9), and the therapeia is only known from a single 1st century inscription (Fayoum 1:13 = SB 5.7787). BGU 8.1771 provides evidence for the settlement of these guard units in the Herakleopolite, in which nome the largest island became known as “Agema,” which was subdivided in the above-mentioned text into regions related to various contingents, e.g., the Veterans, and the Palace Guards (see lines 14-16). Another possible example are “Spear-bearers” settled in the region of the Herakleopolite called the Περὶ Πόλιν (P.Tebt. 3.2.838).
44 Polyb. 15.25.11 διμήνου τὰς δυνάμεις ὠψωνίασε … ἐπεξώρκισε τὸν ὅρκον ὃν ἦσαν ὀμνύειν εἰθισμένοι κατὰ τὰς ανιδεῖες τῶν βασιλέων. Several copies of oaths of service taken by Ptolemaic soldiers are known from papyri (e.g., P.Köln. 3.845.5-9); the two months’ pay Agathocles released may have been paid only to the contingents at Alexandria itself.
and deployed into forts and settlements (katoikiae) throughout Egypt (Polyb. 15.25.16-18). The katoikiae have traditionally been interpreted as overseas settlements, but there is almost no evidence of Ptolemaic military settlements overseas, and in fact most of the settlements were in Egypt proper, the likely destination of the mercenaries at Alexandria. This only seems to have exacerbated Agathocles’ later problems, since, although Polybius’ narrative breaks off and we must assume that when the narrative resumes some months have passed, the return of these and other forces to the capital fueled the court crisis that led to Agathocles’ downfall. Agathocles’ appeals to the soldiers in the last weeks of his regime were not made to the bodyguard, as is too often supposed, but to settler soldiers who sailed downstream to the capital to be present for the coming emergency. This seems clearly indicated by the Macedonian assembly as a

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45 Polyb. 15.25.16-8: ἄλλην δὲ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις καὶ προϊστάχοντας ξένους ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρα καὶ τὰς κατοικίας ἀποστείλα, τοῖς δὲ παραγενομένοις ἀναπληρῶσαι καὶ καινοποιῆσαι τὴν θεραπείαν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν φυλακεῖα. P.Hib. 2.265, dated to the first year of Ptolemy Epiphanes, may refer to this new settlement, as it concerns a directive to mobilize peasant farmers to ensure the planting of a group of ostensibly new kleroi, totaling up to 40,000 arourai. It is possible (perhaps even probable) that the 40,000 is some sort of mistake, as the papyrus is damaged. I would speculate, based on the appearance of several allotments between 34 and 40 arouras, that perhaps some of the settled men were to be classified as tessarakontarouroi. A list of allotments or farming assignments exists in one of the surviving lines, which includes a string of ten-aroura allotments, and one forty-aroura allotment.

46 Most recently, Fischer-Bovet (2009: 167).

47 Outside Egypt, military settlements are known from Syria, but in most locales the Ptolemies relied upon mercenaries and local auxiliaries.


49 In fact, it seems that a number of these men may have come unsure whose interests needed protecting, whether the king and Agathocles against Tlepolemos, or the king against Agathocles, as indicated by the indecision among the men when Moiragenes came to them pleading his case against Agathocles (28.6).
contingent of the army,\textsuperscript{50} which can hardly refer to anything other than the phalanx, and
to the tent encampment of the soldiers who had flocked to Alexandria.\textsuperscript{51} His later appeal
to the Macedonian ἐκκλησία emphasized their duty, as Macedonian men, to the young
king, and to his father, against the threat of Tlepolemos, accused by Agathocles of
plotting to usurp the crown (15.26.1-8). The preeminence of the Macedonians in the crisis
from that point forward is indicative both of the size of their contingent and the
closeness of their relationship with their Macedonian king.\textsuperscript{52} But for the influence of the
“Macedonian” settlers, by virtue of their sheer mass and imagined association with their

\textsuperscript{50} It is contrasted with the other contingents (26.9), and in no place is there any indication that the royal
guards were exclusively Macedonian. In fact, Polybius himself indicates that the hypaspistai and
somatophylakes were not ethnically distinct (5.31.6-7 provides Aristonikos, an Akarnanian, and Moiragenes, a
hypaspist whose story (5.28) figures prominently in the events, has an Ionian name, though his origins are
not given by Polybius), and ancient sources provide similar evidence, that the court aristocracy was openly
heterogeneous, and over time adopted Alexandrian rather than Macedonian ethnicity.

\textsuperscript{51} Polyb. 15.29.1-2: καὶ πρώτας μὲν εὐθέως ἐπῄεσαν τὰς τῶν Μακεδόνων σκηνὰς, μετὰ
dὲ ταῦτα τὰς τῶν ἄλλων στρατιωτῶν· εἰσὶ δ᾿ αὐτὶς συνεχεῖς, πρὸς ἑν μέρος ἀπονενευκυῖαι τῆς πόλεως. Again, the
description of the Macedonians and others as στρατιωτῶν indicates that Polybius meant regular soldiers,
neither the mercenaries nor the guards of the capital. And that they had encamped themselves in tents in a
quarter of the city (necessarily that towards the palace, considering the story of Moiragenes) necessarily
implies their recent arrival and temporary presence.

\textsuperscript{52} Agathocles held meetings with the other systemata (26.9), the other “contingents” of the army, which have
been assumed occasionally to mean other ethnic groups in the army, but as the phalanx was the only
ethnically distinct unit in the army (and only officially carried the Macedonian distinction from c.231), the
other contingents were likely mercenary units and cavalrymen. If even a fraction of the “Macedonian”
settlers, the triakontarouroi, ventured to Alexandria in the crisis, they would have constituted the largest
group there. Compare this Macedonian assembly with that of Philip V’s army at Corinth in 217 (Polyb.
5.25.5). The triakontarouroi Makedones were serving precisely the role for which they were created: an
imagined nation of Macedonian men, among whom few were truly Macedonians by descent, but elevated in
status by decree of the boy king’s grandfather, and thus inextricably attached to the fortunes of the king as
his people.
king, Agathocles may have successfully held off Tlepolemos and usurped power from the young monarch.53

Tlepolemos, meanwhile, was courting the officers of the army on active service and settled in the places around Pelousion: hegemons, taxiarchs, and their subordinates.54 Agathocles’ charge that Tlepolemos was going to betray Pelousion to Antiochus (25.35) may be related to the defection of Ptolemaios son of Thraseas, who like Tlepolemos was the scion of an Anatolian family with a distinguished history of service to the Ptolemies. Ptolemaios’ defection to Antiochus seems to have coincided with the court intrigues. The arrival in Alexandria of men sailing down from the garrisons in the South (i.e., the Thebaid) about this same time may indicate that these events were taking place in the winter months around the end of 205 and the beginning of 204 BC.55 Eventually Tlepolemos had moved up the Pelousiac branch of the Nile to Memphis, halting the flow of supplies to Alexandria, and adding an extra dimension to the crisis (26.11). In this context, Agathocles had a suspected spy arrested, Moiragenes of

53 There is little indication that the remnants of the court aristocracy or the contingents of the palace guard were particularly interested in stopping Agathocles’ seizure of power.
54 Polyb. 15.25.31 γὰρ Τληπόλεμος, ἐξιδιάζεσθαι σπεύδων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ ταξιάρχους καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτων ταττομένους. Taxiarchs and the taxeis they commanded are poorly attested in Ptolemaic Egypt (PSI 5.513, P.Mich. 1.70, P.Dryton 1.11), but must have been the standard unit in the phalanx. Asklepiodotus’ Taktike 10.9-15 describes the taxiarch as a unit of 128 men, and 1/128th of the whole of an “ideal” phalanx of sixteen thousand men. The taxiarchs might have been the largest population in the Ptolemaic officer corps (there being no evidence for tetrarchs in the Ptolemaic army). Τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτων ταττομένους would seemingly be a reference to the junior officers.
55 Polyb. 15.26.10. ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ πολέως ἢν ὁ καταπλέων ἐκ τῶν ἀνω στρατοπέδων. This would seem to be a reference to the loss of Thebes late in the fall of 205 BC and the advance of the Egyptian rebels toward Diospolis, Mikra, Panopolis, Ptolemais, and Lykopolis in the following months. For this, see section 4 of the present chapter.
the *somatophylakes* (27.6-28.5). The latter’s escape from torture, fully naked, and his alarmed flight into the Macedonian tents was the proximate cause for the riots that brought down Agathocles. Within hours, the Macedonians and the other soldiers encamped nearby were mobilized and advancing on the palace (29.4). Early the next morning the Macedonians secured what they wanted: control over the young king, whom they transported to the stadium and seated on the throne (32.1-3). The mob also had mobilized, and stability was not re-established in Alexandria until the king, through one of his *somatophylakes*, consented to the arrest of Agathocles’ faction, which led to the massacre of them by the mob of soldiers and Alexandrians.

Tlepolemos soon arrived at the city and took charge of the king as chief minister.\(^56\) But Alexandrian politics continued to be influenced by the intrigues of the courtiers: the sons of Sosibius, the Aetolian *condotierri* Skopas and Dikaiarchos, and the Akarnanian *somatophylax* and eventual chief minister Aristomenes are those specifically mentioned in histories.\(^57\) The damage wrought by the plots, coups, and riots of Alexandria went far beyond the throne itself. The focus in those years on Alexandrian politics highlighted the instability of the regime, encouraging its enemies, and limiting Ptolemaic responses.

\(^{56}\) He continued in that capacity, it would seem, for several years, until falling from power in the aftermath of his defeat in the Fifth Syrian War. The circumstances of his fall are unknown, but by 196 he was a leading citizen again in his hometown of Xanthos in Lykia and a loyal subject of Antiochus III (REG 109 (1996): 2-3) and in 190 contributed to a dedication at Delphi honor of the Romans (Syll.\(^2\) 609/610).

\(^{57}\) Polyb. 16.21-22, 18.53-54, Diod. 28.14.
6.1.3. Military defeat and the loss of Syria

While the situation in Alexandria remained unstable, the series of upheavals at the capital and the youth of the new king incited a new round of inter-kingdom conflict. In 202 BC, according to ancient tradition, kings Philip V and Antiochus III made a secret pact to seize the territories of Ptolemy.\(^*\) The authenticity of the secret treaty aside, it is clear that both kings, and Antiochus especially, began a series of attacks on Ptolemaic interests, allies, and possessions that lasted from 202 to 197 BC. While the two kings would eventually seize most Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor and the Aegean, the earliest major conquest, and the most important overall, was Antiochus’ seizure of the province of *Syria kai Phoinike* from 201-200 BC in the Fifth Syrian War.

The Fifth Syrian War, and the Ptolemaic defeat at Panion, decisively ended Ptolemaic control of Syria and Palestine. It also struck a devastating blow against the structures of the Ptolemaic settler army. Antiochus’ conquest began, much as before, with the defection of the Ptolemaic *strategos*. In this case, the traitor was Ptolemaios son of Thraseas, scion of a prominent family at the Alexandrian court.\(^*\) With the aid of the


\(^*\) For the family, see Gera (1987), Habicht and Jones (1989), Habicht (1996), and Sosin (1997). Ptolemaios was the third generation in Ptolemaic service. For Ptolemy’s defection, see Gera (1987: 63-73). See Jos. *AJ* 12.138-144 for a letter of Antiochus to Ptolemy (presumably son of Thraseas) regarding the treatment of the Jews, and *OGIS* 230 and *SEG* 29.1613 for comparable, albeit lengthier, letters of Antiochus to Ptolemy regarding his privileges and responsibilities as the *strategos* of Syria and Phoenicia.
regional strategos, Antiochus conducted a very successful opening campaign, capturing the whole of the province with very little difficulty before encountering the stubborn resistance put up by the citizens of Gaza.\textsuperscript{60} When Antiochus withdrew to winter quarters, the Ptolemaic army invaded the region in a counter-offensive.\textsuperscript{61} Practically nothing is known of the army that launched the counter-offensive, save what can be gleaned from Polybius’ critique of Zeno’s account of the battle (16.18-19). Polybius mentions two wings of infantry, with cavalry on each side (16.18.3). The left wing phalanx and cavalry were placed on level ground, commanded by a Macedonian Alexandrian aristocrat, Ptolemaios son of Aeropos.\textsuperscript{62} As a Macedonian and a member of the court aristocracy, his command is likely to have been over the Ptolemaic forces, in this case, some portion of the settler cavalry and the pike phalanx.\textsuperscript{63} From the evidence given in Polybius’ critique of Zeno, it seems that Aeropos’ force was arrayed against the main phalanx of the Seleucids, as well as the king himself, his guards, and his new contingent of kataphraktoi, heavily-armored cavalrymen.\textsuperscript{64} The remainder of the

\textsuperscript{60} Polyb. 16.22.2-7, Jos. AJ 12.129-130, and Porphyry (FrGH 260 F 45); for the war as a whole, see Will (1967, II.108-12, 118-9).
\textsuperscript{61} Jos. AJ 12.131-2, Porph. (FrGH 260 F 46).
\textsuperscript{62} He was priest of Alexander in 217 BC (SEG 8:504, BE (1967): 336).
\textsuperscript{63} The mobilization is unlikely to have involved the entire settler force, parts of which must have been otherwise committed to security operations against the spreading revolt, concerning which, see the following section. For example, the Oxyrhynchite cavalry seem to have stayed home: BGU 10.1956 includes five cavalrymen in a witness list from the year 200/199. Even with a partial mobilization, Ptolemaios may have commanded in the vicinity of twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry.
\textsuperscript{64} For a fairly reasonable reconstruction of the battle, see Bar Kochva (1976: 146-157). The proper identification of Ptolemaios son of Aeropos, which Bar Kochva missed, strengthens some of his argument. The kataphraktoi seem to have been largely a development out of Antiochus’ anabasis in the preceding years.
Ptolemaic force would have had, it seems, a heavily Aetolian character (19.1), and was led by Skopas, the overall commander of the Ptolemaic force. This wing of the army was arrayed in a hilly region, or on uneven terrain at least (18.4). This contingent likely included the six thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry Skopas recruited earlier that year from Greece, and totaled at least ten thousand men in all. The fighting of the battle is inconsequential at present. The decisive detail is that the settler cavalry under Ptolemaios were routed, and the Ptolemaic settler phalanx enveloped and practically annihilated.  

The best evidence for the defeat at Panion and its catastrophic impact on the class of triakontarouroi Makedones is the near-total disappearance of that prominent class in the second century BC. The instances of their appearance are not many, suggesting that, after attempts to re-populate a depleted infantry class, the Ptolemies moved away from the class entirely by the 160’s BC. Following the war, Sosibios, of the men under Phyleus, a thirty-aroura Macedonian, was settled around Lysimakhis in the Arsinoite.  

65 Livy 31.43. This statement is placed near the end of 201/0 BC, but is added to the narrative at the end of the year to include other important things that had happened in Greece. After the battle, Skopas withdrew most of his wing with light losses, estimated at ten thousand men (decem millum armatorum) in the fragments of Porphyry (F 46.3-4), and took refuge at Sidon. It is possible that an army of less than thirty-five thousand men attempted battle against Antiochus’ force, but it may be that one or another wing was larger than my own estimates. 

66 Polybius (16.19.10-11) describes the “heat” of the battle only beginning after Skopas’ right wing had exited the field, when the phalanx on the left was enveloped on all sides by Antiochus, the kataphraktoi, and the Seleucid phalanx. Diodorus’ account (30.14) of the battle of Pelousion a generation later (170 BC) has Antiochus IV pleading with his men and the encircled Ptolemaic army not to see them all slaughtered, which may indicate a point of contrast between that battle and the earlier one at Panion. 

67 P.Tebt. 2.38, 198 BC.
of Phyleus are known from the late third century as well, but were mercenary infantry at that time.\textsuperscript{68} It may be that, following the slaughter at Panion, mercenary contingents were enrolled in the settler phalanx to compensate for the casualties. Triakontarouroi from the command of Phyleus are known to have been transferred to the katoikoi hippeis during the last years of the reign of Ptolemy V Epiphanes,\textsuperscript{69} perhaps a first stage in creating a new and expanded class of cavalry as the primary military class in Egypt. While the men of Phyleus were removed from the triakontarouroi by 180 BC, scattered documents continue to attest the existence of the class through the 170’s. A group of men classified as Macedonians received wine rations while performing military service at Philadelphia in 189 BC, perhaps as part of security operations.\textsuperscript{70} Another document may indicate that this practice continued in the Arsinoite as late as 171 BC.\textsuperscript{71} Two triakontarouroi, Adamas and Dionysios, are known from a report of a robbery in 185 BC, but may not have been soldiers.\textsuperscript{72} P.\textit{Köln.} 10.411, from the later 170’s BC, gives the name

\textsuperscript{68} P.\textit{Tebt.} 3.1.820, 201 BC. The man is a Paionian, and a taktomisthos, a paid soldier, as opposed to a klerouchos. \textsuperscript{69} P.\textit{Tebt.} 4.1114.24-26, from about 124 BC at Kerkeosiris, regarding the land of Dionysios son of Pyrrichos. This entailed quite a wild ride for the mercenaries of Phyleus: settled among the triakontarouroi Makedones after the Fifth Syrian War, then, as that contingent of the army steadily disappeared, incorporated into the prestigious settler cavalry, all in a space of as little as twenty years. \textsuperscript{70} P.\textit{Yale} 1.37. \textsuperscript{71} P.\textit{Tebt.} 3.2.856.131-58; the text regards grain provisions for those defending Aphrodite Berenike polis and Soknopaiou Nesos, presumably Macedonians along with eremophylakes and police forces. The presence of Macedonians is indicated, but not absolutely confirmed, through the oversight of the grammateus Makedonikou. Only eremophylakes (desert guards) and phylakitai (police) are mentioned specifically. \textsuperscript{72} P.\textit{Tebt.} 3.1.796. Adamas, and perhaps Dionysios as well, since their families shared the same house, was (were) perhaps the son(s) of an administrative officer in the misthophoroi hippeis in the third century (P.\textit{Enteux.} 62). Further, Adamas may very well be the sitologos known from an archive of texts from the same period, and likewise recovered from crocodile mummy cartonage (P.\textit{Tebt.} 3.1.750-4, 3.2.941), and Dionysios
of one man in the *triakontarouroi Makedones*, Molossos, of the men of Molossion, who was only planting a little more than four arouras, although he may have held more (fr3.2.5). The infantry of Molossion must have been transferred into the *triakontarouroi* after 174 BC, before which the group appears to have been a mercenary contingent with no particular ethnic status and deployed in forts in the vicinity of Herakleopolis. This seems to be, then, a second example of mercenary infantry transferred into the *triakontarouroi Makedones* in order to bolster that section of the army, in an apparent reversal of Epiphanes’ policy. Elsewhere in the same text (fr2.6-10) there is a thirty-aroura allotment (actually a little more than twenty-five arouras) in the kleros of a man, Phanias, attested in 176 BC and for several consecutive years, but his kleros had been reclassified among the *κατοχίμων κλῆρων*, or “sequestered kleroi,” presumably on account of debts, and the land farmed by three other men. Another Macedonian

the correspondent with Adamas in one of them (750). If these are the same man, then the text represents one of the early instances of klerouchic allotments being made over to administrators.  

73 *P.Tebt*. 3.818.11-12: Ἀγαθοκλεῖ Πτολεμαίου ουδαίωι τῶν Μολοσσίων ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεοπόλιτι τεταγμένων πεζῶν τακτομίσθω [ι]. The editors have completed the eponymous commander’s name as Molossos, but with a commander Molossion known from the same era, his name was probably intended.  

74 The evidence is not conclusive that Epiphanes had begun a strategy of creating a new primary military class in Egypt, the *katoikoi hippeis*, even at the expense of the remains of the phalanx, but the appearance of the largely Macedonian *katoikoi hippeis* and the transfer of phalangites into that new class give some indication of his intent. The reversal of that policy may be taken either as indicative of the absence or incoherence of state planning, or a new policy intent on rebuilding the army for a new war with the Seleucids. The last years of the 170’s BC coincided directly with the period when Eulaios and Lennaios were preparing the army for the re-conquest of Syria and Phoenicia in the Sixth Syrian War.  

75 For the category of *katochimos* land, see Crawford (2007: 67). It is quite likely that “Phanias” had at one point been allotted the land, and may not have even been alive at the time *P.Köln*. 10.411 was written.
thought to have been a *triakontarouros* in the 170’s is a false positive.\textsuperscript{76} The editors have supplemented the text to make the renter in a contract, Ptolemaios, a *triakontarouros* in the troop of Galestes, but “τρια” never appears in the papyrus, and Galestes is elsewhere attested, even within the same volume of papyri, as an eponymous officer for cavalry, not infantry.\textsuperscript{77} Another possible example may well date to 208 BC rather than 181 BC.\textsuperscript{78} Finally, a granary’s record of revenues (about 175-173 BC) includes those from three infantry allotments, under the general heading Μεκεδονικοῦ: one of the Macedonian *triakontarouroi*, one of the “Ptolemaic” *triakontarouroi*, and one of the *eikosiarouroi*. Because names and units are left out, it is difficult to say whether this list reflected contingents within the Ptolemaic infantry active at that time.\textsuperscript{79} Scattered evidence in the rest of the century confirms the use of phalanx allotments for other

\textsuperscript{76} P.Freib. 3.21 (178 BC).
\textsuperscript{77} P.Freib. 3.36-37.12 (179/8 BC). Also in BGU 6.1271.18 and SB 3.7188.4. The text reads, in lines 5-6, “Πτολεμαῖοι Μακεδόνι τῶν Γαλέστου τριακονταρουρωι” and, given Galestes’ command in the eighty-aroura cavalry, should be emended to [όγδοη]-κονταρούρωι.
\textsuperscript{78} P.Köln. 5.220.1-2 belongs to a fourteenth year, and so could be 208 or 191 BC. SB 22.15767 is a related papyrus, and could be dated to either 223 or 181 BC, which is surprisingly unhelpful. Both involved a man, Isidóros, who held the *apomoiria* collection contract in the Arsinoite and, it seems, in the Memphite as well. He held the contract multiple times at least ten and perhaps fifteen years apart. It is possible, however, that the *triakontarouros* from 220 does in fact belong in the second century.
\textsuperscript{79} P.Teibt. 3.2.853.40-44, line 42: εἰς τὸ γραμματικὸν (τριακονταρουρωί) Μα( ) α, (τριακονταρουρωί) Πτο(λεμαίοι) α, (εἰκοσιαρουρωί) α. The editors have assumed that Ptolemaios was the possessor of one allotment, while Μα was the abbreviation for another klerouch. But there is no abbreviation for the 20-aroura man, so it seems most reasonable to read Μα as the commonly used abbreviation for Macedonian(s). The twenty-aroura men never seem to have had a particular ethnic tag, while thirty-aroura men did (for which, see the previous chapter, section 1.3). This would then imply a class of *triakontarouroi* called those “of Ptolemy,” concerning whom nothing is known. “Mekedonikou” is almost certainly a simple misspelling for “Makedonikou.”
The overall picture from the documentary sources is that the defeat at Panion rendered catastrophic damage to the triakontarouroi. While it should have been possible for the kingdom to rebuild the flower of its army, in response to the circumstances described in the following section, the Ptolemies would instead be the first of the Successor kingdoms to steadily diminish reliance on the Macedonian phalanx.

6.2. The Great Revolt: a case study in ancient insurgency

The intrigues at Alexandria and the war in Syria developed after the start of a longer-lasting, inestimably damaging movement in the Egyptian countryside. Polybius twice mentioned the Ptolemaic war against the Egyptians, a war of “small events,” and nothing worthy of note aside from “the mutual savagery and lawlessness of the combatants.” Polybius tied the war to Philopator’s use of native Egyptian soldiers in the Fourth Syrian War. In Polybius’ telling, the soldiers were buoyed by national feeling after their victory, and sought out a “ruler and figurehead” to lead a revolt. He

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80 For machimoi cavalry: P.Tebt. 1.63.r.20, SB 22.15548.10. For ephodoi: BGU 14.2347.23,34, P.Tebt. 1.32.17-19, 61.43-46. There are several other apparent instances of Macedonian triakontarouroi in the second century: PSI Com. 11.6-7 from the last years of Epiphanes, a possible witness, P.Tebt. 3.2.882.5 from about 155 BC, an 80-aroura man and list of stratiotai along with a 30-aroura man from Samareia, and P.Tebt. 3.2.854.2, a loan of grain for a 30-aroura Macedonian in 176 BC.
83 Polyb. 5.107.3 ἀλλ’ ἐξίσου ηγεμόνα καὶ πρόσωπον, ὡς ικανοὶ βοηθεῖν ὑπὲρ ς αὐτοῖς.
described the war as beginning “directly upon those times,” referring to Ptolemy’s victory over Antiochus, due in large part to his Egyptian soldiers. While some have suggested that Polybius’ language implied an uprising soon after the army’s return from Syria, this seems unnecessary: the first outbreak of violence would occur no later than ten years after his return, and Polybius’ εὐθέως should not be taken too narrowly, since he brushes over the entire era in Egypt so lightly. Additionally, had any early troubles taken place, they had been quelled before 210 BC, when the historian could say that the whole world was at war, save Egypt.

The rebellion developed in Upper Egypt and was advancing there and in parts of the countryside at the same time as the drama unfolding in Alexandria after the death of Philopator. Polybius specifically noted that the final crisis leading to the death of Agathocles began with the arrival of the soldiers from the military positions of Upper Egypt, who “beseeched their relatives and their friends to aid them in the ongoing

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84 Polyb. 5.107.1: εὐθέως ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καρών συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὸν πρὸς τὸς Αἰγυπτίως πόλεμον.
85 In arguing this position I follow an argument of Peremans (1978: 395) which has been criticized by other scholars, for which, see McGing (1997: 279-281), though I think the answer lies in part with McGing’s analysis on 281. Before that comes into play, the most important observation to make is that εὐθέως likely reflects Polybius’ interest in causality, and that Polybius’ statement on the revolt reflects this causality more than it does chronology. This, with McGing’s observation that Polybius’ wording would allow for a sense that active resistance only emerged later, after the sentiment had been formed in the experience at Raphia, provides a sensible interpretation of the passage, though McGing himself (282) rejects the interpretation of εὐθέως in a causal sense. If Polybius had not chosen to epitomize his own narrative when dealing with Egypt, this position would not be very defensible, but due to Polybius’ abbreviated treatment, εὐθέως need not be taken too strictly. At the end of the same passage, Polybius qualifies the chronology, saying their revolt οὐ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον, which has the sense of proximity rather than immediacy.
86 Polyb. 9.11.2-3.
“crisis” and accused the party of Agathocles of blatantly abusing them (Polyb. 15.26.10). The particular crises and wrongs endured by the troops of Upper Egypt make sense only within the context of the spreading revolt: the implication is that the garrisons, having received no aid from Ptolemaic authorities, abandoned their stations; they would recruit help themselves or else see the government changed. While Polybius professed that the “Great Revolt”—as it has come to be called—was unworthy of discussion, his dismissal belies an inability to conceptualize events in Egypt within his traditionalist, Hellenistic paradigm of warfare and state formation. He lacked the capacity to understand and discuss what modern observers would likely have described in terms of unconventional warfare and insurgency.

Scholarly attention to the Great Revolt and to the wider phenomenon of Egyptian rebellion in Egypt has focused upon three main points: the causes, the onomastics of rebel chieftains, and chronology. Scholarship has tended towards attributing the origins of the revolt, contra Polybius, to socio-economic factors, and particularly to indicators of economic hardship and transition late in the reign of

87 ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ πολὺς ἦν ὁ καταπλέων ἐκ τῶν ἄνω στρατοπέδων, καὶ παρεκάλουν οἱ μὲν συγγενεῖς, οἱ δὲ φίλους, βοηθεῖν τοῖς υποκειμένοις, καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν οὐχὶς ανέδην ὑφ᾽ οὕτως αναξίων ὑφαίσθητους.
Ptolemy IV. The economic factors underlying the revolt have a complicated relationship with the numerous coin hoards from the Thebaid, which have been taken as evidence of re-monetization prior to the revolt, or an indication of the rebel advance itself. The revolt took on a largely—if not entirely—Egyptian character, but has also been considered mainly a movement of poor farmers against the king and his agents. The chronologies of the two pretender pharaohs in Upper Egypt, and the curious etymologies of their names has excited more scholarship than any other aspect of the revolt. Amid the growing body of work on the revolt, the particular types and nature of violence have not received substantial attention. Part of the reason behind this is that episodes of violence were rarely at the time classified as being instances related to the revolt, which at the time was called ταραχὴ, and so the evidence is seemingly limited. Violent episodes of various sorts occurred intermittently throughout the history of Ptolemaic Egypt, and so relating violence to the ταραχὴ itself can be difficult.

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92 Fauscher and Lorber (2010: 36) argue that, though the majority of coin hoards of about this date are from the Thebaid, the presence of a couple of hoards from Middle and Lower Egypt indicate that the hoards were meant to avoid re-monetization collections, rather than the seizure of Thebes by the rebels. But rebel activity affected all of those areas to some degree (parts of the Delta were in full revolt from c.205 to c.185 or later).
93 Note that this is contrary to Polybius, not only in analysis of the cause, but also analysis of the rebels. Polybius considered that the rebels were led by Egyptians of elevated status, “a general and figurehead,” rather than the peasant population.
94 This is understandable to some degree, as the last two native pharaohs, whose activities are known from only a handful of sources, and whose own dating of their reigns seemingly implies either that the same pharaoh took a new name in about 197 BC but kept his original dating, or that the second pharaoh considered his rule in some way to have begun with the first’s coronation in 205 BC. It is indeed a fascinating and puzzling story.
In the context of decentralized violence, the violence itself is more significant than its particular identification within the conflict. The term the Greeks applied to the phenomenon of violence and secession, ταραχὴ, is a descriptive term borrowed from the stirring of a pot and best translated as “disturbance.” Disturbance and ταραχὴ are both of limited utility in historical analysis, or even in constructing a framework for analyzing patterns of resistance. This unhelpful term has constrained understandings of the seriousness of the resistance in the period from 207-185 BC. In general it is difficult for beset regimes or later historians to properly categorize violence pertaining to insurgent activity, because it develops out of everyday resistance and is often waged by unofficial combatants, erasing most normal lines of demarcation between war and criminal activity, and leaving few sources. In order to construct a more meaningful framework, what follows will begin with an analysis of violent activity and resistance attributable to the Egyptian rebels. This will permit a better-informed diagnosis of what the ταραχὴ actually was, and how it compares to modern-day insurgencies.

6.2.1. Documentary Evidence for the Nature of Violence in the Great Revolt

Scholars see the attack on the massive Ptolemaic temple of Horus in 207/6 BC as the inauguration of the Great Revolt. The temple of Horus was being built at Edfu,

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deep in Upper Egypt, near one of the main departure points for expeditions to the Red
Sea Coast. It was nearing completion in 207 BC according to an official account of the
temple’s construction inscribed after its dedication.⁹⁶ The enormous temple attracted a
large worker population, and may have even seen a royal visit in about 210 BC.⁹⁷ Even
though Edfu (known then as Apollonopolis Megale) was home to klerouchs⁹⁸ and served
as a staging point for military and hunting expeditions,⁹⁹ rebel attacks succeeded in
shutting down construction. Attacks during the revolt frequently targeted temples,
according to the official Ptolemaic versions of events.¹⁰⁰ Temples were sites of royal
activity, often held large deposits of materiel for rebel use, and were themselves often

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⁹⁶ Edfo VII.6-7. The sixteenth year of Philopator extended from September 207 to September 206.
⁹⁷ Philae 9 is a dedication in honor of Ptolemy and Arsinoe and their son, and so must date between 210 and
205 BC. A visit by Ptolemy Philopator to Upper Egypt is otherwise unknown, but the Philae inscriptions
seem mainly to have been made upon royal visits.
⁹⁸ SB 6.9302 (late third century). SB 8.9681 (175 BC) confirms the presence of klerouchs at Apollonopolis
prior to the revolt. Line 10 confirms the retreat of klerouchs from Apollonopolis during the revolt:
ἀπεχώρει ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων.
⁹⁹ The soldiers and travelers who thanked Pan at El-Kanais were on the road between Edfu and Berenike on
the Red Sea.
¹⁰⁰ From the Rosetta stone: OGIS 90.23: ἀσεβέσιν, οἵ ἦσαν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτω
κατοικοῦντας πολλὰ κακὰ συντετελεσμένοι. “Godless, they perpetrated many evils against the temples
and people of Egypt.” The demotic version (Simpson 1996: 258-71) says in the same place that they
“abandoned the way of the commands of the King and the commands of the gods.” OGIS 90.27: τοὺς
ἀφηγησαμένους τῶν ἀποστάντων ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς καὶ την χώραν ἑνοχλήσαντας καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ
ἀδικήσαντας. “Those who began the rebellion during the reign of his father troubled the land and violated
the temples.” The demotic version refers to “the rebels who had gathered armies and led them to disturb the
nomes, harming the temples and abandoning the way of the King and his father.” From the demotic Philae
decree of 186 BC (Muller 1920: 59-88): “The rebel against the gods, Hr–wnf, he who had made war in Egypt,
gathering insolent people from all districts on account of their crimes, they did terrible things to the
governors of the nomes, they desecrated (?) the temples, they damaged (?) the divine statues, they
molested (?) the priests and suppressed (?) the offerings on the altars and in the shrines.”
thickly-built potential fortresses. The temples became battle-grounds and forts for both sides during the revolt. Priests were, from the perspective of the rebels, elite collaborators with the regime, whose complicity with the Macedonian kings had facilitated Ptolemaic control over Egypt. In the ταραχὴ temples and priests who remained complicit with the regime were frequently targeted by rebels. The priests of Thebes, on the other hand, seem to have sided with the rebels. This initial stage of the rebellion culminated in an attack on Thebes in 205 BC. The garrison fled the city late in the year, and the leader of the rebel army was proclaimed Pharoah, and took the name Hor-wennefer.

101 For royal interaction, see P.Hausw. 16 (221/0 BC), where Edfu was used as the center for royal auctions of land and other activities, even if the central office for such activities was Ptolemais, further north. For the location of large reserves of both cash and grain at Egyptian temples, and the temple of Edfu in particular, see P.Eleph. 10, from 222 BC, which discusses the presence of both banks and granaries within the temple complexes of Upper Egypt, and at Edfu in particular. For the use of temples by Ptolemaic troops themselves, see Dietze (2000: 77-89).

102 Ptolemaic use, see Diezte above, and from the demotic Philae decree of 186 BC (Muller 1920: 59-88): The king of Upper and Lower Egypt Ptolemy, loved by Ptah, has given many orders and showed considerable care for protecting the temples. He stationed Greek troops and soldiers of people who had come to Egypt, who obeyed his orders, being joined with him and being like people born with him. They did not allow the rebels, who had instigated war against him and against his father, to approach.” This probably refers, at minimum, to temples near rebel areas, which were garrisoned with Ptolemaic troops for their protection. It may also indicate that temples were garrisoned during the later Ptolemaic advance as a way to help consolidate control. For temples as battle-grounds, see Graf. Abyd. 32, from 199 BC. For rebel use of temples, see Farid (1978: 54-56).

103 From the demotic decree from 186 BC from Philae: “they molested (harassed?) the priests.” Priests targeted by attacks: P.Anth. 2.30, P.Tebt. 3.1.781.

104 Veïsse (2004: 228-240). The impression one gets from the available sources is that the Theban priesthood were not leaders of the revolt, but were not targeted as an enemy, unlike most other priesthoods.

105 The text P.Tor.Choach. 12, from 119 BC, helps establish the date of the Ptolemaic evacuation from Thebes. The plaintiff in that case, Hermias son of Ptolemaios son of Hermias, sought to reclaim a house in Thebes that his grandfather had occupied 88 years earlier, but abandoned in the first year of Ptolemy V when he and the other soldiers retreated to Lower Egypt at the start of the revolt, see 5.27-29: τὸν ἱαποῦ πατέρα μετηλθάνει έκ τῆς Διός πόλεος μεθ’ ἐπάρχον στρατιωτῶν εἰς τοὺς ἄνω τόπους εἰς τὴ γενομένη ταραχὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν βασιλέων, θεοῦ Ἑπιφανοῦς. The rebel occupation is indicated by Σίδη δέμ. Caire
In fact, at that point the Egyptian movement against Ptolemaic rule had already begun, not with spectacular attacks, but with mounting instances of popular resistance. Although the rebellion in Upper Egypt could manage some concerted action—forcing the Greek garrison at Thebes to withdraw and overwhelming the Greek presence at Edfu represented major operational successes—it and the rebellion as a whole demonstrated a limited operational and organizational capacity. There is practically no information detailing the recruitment, organization, or logistics of rebel fighters. The first acts of rebellion were not in most cases acts of violence at all, but acts of resistance, and preceded the Edfu raid by several years. The papyrus *P.Tebt. 3.1.703*, written about 210 BC, provides one of the most detailed surviving accounts of government activity. While it is often discussed as an inside look into the everyday bureaucracy of Egypt, it is instead clear that the text reflects the Ptolemaic response to a time of crisis. In it, the *dioiketes*, the powerful financial minister over the whole realm, writes to a regional administrator, perhaps an *oikonomos*, concerning the proper management of all things agricultural in the area under his oversight. The orders are a response to three problems that had together begun a crisis. The first two were faults within the regime: poor management hurt productivity, and corrupt officials hurt villagers financially and

38.258, which honors the new Pharaoh Hor-wennefer near the start of his rule, in November of 205 BC, and followed closely upon his coronation.
damaged their perception of the regime’s legitimacy. The third problem, and source of the crisis, was, it seems, the abandonment of posts, lands, and patrol ships by members of the *machimoi* class. The episodes of desertion and *anachoresis* must have been widespread to have gained the attention of the *dioiketes* and the crown, and captured *machimoi* were to be detained and sent to Alexandria. It is extremely important to observe here that those deserting were not peasants, but soldiers. The fact is, when a southern rebel army advanced upon and captured Thebes late in 205 BC, and even before the Edfu raid, a pattern of resistance was already emerging across Egypt. The Ptolemies did not recognize it, but a rebellion had already begun in a popular movement, not among the peasant class, but among the native soldier class.

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106 Directions for more effective management: lines 29-40, 49-60; Directions for dealing with graft: 40-9, 60-3. And for both, tied into a conclusion that sees effective management and reduced graft as the key to renewed stability, see 222-81. Strikingly, the *dioiketes* also ordered his subordinate to be very zealous in the proper collection of taxes and all due fees, including the high royal tariff on linen (89-117), which was one of the specific burdens absolved in the Rosetta decree.

107 Lines 215-9: έπιμελεῖς δὲ σοι ἐστι καὶ ίνα τα κατὰ τοὺς μαχίμους οἰκο[ν]ομήται κατὰ τὸ ὑπόμνημα ὁ συντ[ε]θείκαμεν τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀνακεχωρηκ[τ]ῶν σωμάτων ἐκ τῶν ἐργῶν καὶ ἀπ. […] ὡν ναυτῶν. My translation: “You should also be vigilant in handling the situation with the *machimoi*, following the instructions we set down in the memorandum concerning those persons having absconded from their work and deserted sailors.” Desertion from naval duty was a continual problem, mainly from the rowers. And the *anachoresis* of farmers occurred sporadically based on local events, and usually involved seeking asylum at a temple. It was used to renegotiate relations between peasants and owners or managers of land. This situation represents instead a broad pattern of abandonment, from land and possibly from other duties, in which the missing men had not sought asylum at a temple, but were missing.

108 Nevertheless, the official Ptolemaic narrative placed the official beginning of the ταραχή in the 16th year of Philopator, since that year marked the starting point for the era under tax amnesty after the end of the revolt (*P.Köl.* 7.313 = *P.Kroll*, line 16). The official Ptolemaic narrative also considered the *machimoi* as the most important, if not the largest, class of people in the kingdom to have joined the revolt. The first call for reconciliation in the Rosetta decree refers to τε τῶν μαχίμων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀλλότρια φρονησάντων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ταραχὴν καυσοῖς “both the *machimoi* and all the others drawn to secession in the time of the Disturbance” (*OGIS* 90.19-20).
Most of the ancient sources for—and modern analysis of—the Great Revolt locate rebel activity in Upper Egypt and the Nile Delta. A number of documents provide insight into how insurgent activity spread into parts of Middle Egypt as well. These also afford some of our best evidence for the actions of the rebels. One of the best descriptions of rebel operations is the papyrus *BGU* 6.1215. Its date and provenance are uncertain, but the document belongs among a cache of mainly late third century documents from Oxyrhynchite province of Middle Egypt. Modern opinion is that the revolt did not extend that far north during the third century, but the texts tell a different story. In the text, an un-named Greek reports a night-time assault on a village patrol, followed by an attempted assault on the town itself. The closing lines indicate that this was not an isolated incident. The Greek author fears that there are too few Greeks in the village to defend it themselves, and does not trust either the fidelity or discipline of the local Egyptians. The author anticipated further attacks, and indicates that future attacks may be successful because of failures to plan well. After explaining that he and others (presumably the local settler population and/or administrators) had attempted to

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109 For other, brief discussions of this text, see Veïsse (2004: 7), Hölbl (2001:57), Peremans (1975: 397), Préaux (1939: 529-30), wherein the text is generally accepted to reflect tarache violence toward century’s end.

110 Additionally, the name of the Egyptian found in the report, Nechtenibis, is mainly known in the region from Memphis to the Oxyrhynchite, as indicated by the instances reported in the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica*, or see <http://www.trismegistos.org/nam/detail.php?record=515> for t

111 And so most authors have been hesitant to speculate on the origins of the text in question, since the uprising is thought to have been located in Upper Egypt and the Delta, see Alliot (1951: 421-433) and Veïsse (2004: xv, 7-11).

112 Lines 17-23: \[γ]είνωσκε \[δὲ το ὺ ς\] Αἰγυπτίους μὴ φυλάσσειν τὴν κώμην καθὼς τὴν ἀρχὸν ἐτάξαμεν αὐτοὺς \[διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸν Καλλίαν \[με\]ταδιδόναι μηδ’ ἀναφορὰν ποιεῖ\[ί\]ν ἑρ’ ἡμᾶς ἀλλ[α...]

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organize local defenses, he accuses another local Greek, Kallias, of failing to relay orders to the Egyptian villagers, and accuses him of not properly recognizing the contributions of the author and his fellows. This Kallias may be a cavalry officer known from the same cache.

Kallias died, almost certainly within the context of insurgent violence, in about 202 BC. Another document records the provisions arranged by Kallias’ local community to provide for the farming of his land until his orphaned son and heir was of age. Their provisions follow customary legal language employed with almost no variation in hundreds of Hellenistic-period Egyptian land leases, with one exception. They added a provision to the clauses on rental payments, allowing for reduced payment should any losses in the harvest occur due to “the devastations of enemies.” Such a clause is without parallel in Ptolemaic documents, and provides clear confirmation that the uprising had reached the Oxyrhynchite in the late third century. Exception clauses themselves are fairly common, and follow a pattern much like that in this case, but most envisaged the possibility that the land might suffer a drought or too great a flood.

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113 The interpretation of these lines depends upon the reading of μεταδιδόναι, which could have the sense that Kallias either failed to order the defensive dispositions of the Egyptians, or in some sense did not communicate the orders to the Egyptians.

114 BGU 6.1266. The text itself, which relates to business that resulted from Kallias’ death, dates to Artemision, about March, of 202 BC. His death may have preceded the text by as little as several months.

115 The entire text in question is from lines 17-20: τὸ δ’ ἐκφόριον ἀπὸ[οδότωσιν Θέων και οἱ προγεγραμμένοι μέτοχοι τὸ καθ’ έαυτόν μέρος Πολιάνθηι ἀκίνδυνον καὶ κανυπολογονον πάσης φθορᾶς πλὴν πολεμίων ἐμ Αὐδναίωι τοῦ τρίτου ἔτους.

116 The exception clauses in second century documents were a variation on the following: ἀνυπόλογον πάσης φθορᾶς πλὴν τῆς ἐμβρόχου καὶ ἀβρόχου, e.g., P.Freib. 3.21, 22, 25, 34, and 35; P.Tebt. 1.105, 106. The
beginning of violence in that region can be dated to the months prior to the contract, which was written in late March of 202 BC, and after a tax farming directive from the summer of 204, which gives no indication of anticipated violence.\textsuperscript{117}

The details of the attack in the previous document provide valuable insights into rebel activity as it extended northward along the Nile valley. The attack took place at night, on the new moon, when visibility would have been minimal.\textsuperscript{118} The rebel force, described as “savage Egyptians,” attacked the guards from the local fort, and pursued them up to the fort itself.\textsuperscript{119} Failing to inflict much damage and facing stiff resistance, they backed away from the fort to attack nearby houses on the opposite side of the road.\textsuperscript{120} Equipped with a rudimentary siege machine of some sort, brought along for the attack on the fort, they attacked the house of an Egyptian, and although they brought down the wall in that spot, it fell upon them, and they fled.\textsuperscript{121} The operation described exhibits several traits: the use of night as cover, the capacity for some larger-scale...
operations such as an attack on a patrol or guard-post, and a general willingness, if not outright preference, for “soft” targets like houses. The un-named authors’ distrust of the Egyptian villagers’ reliability, and his description of the attackers as Egyptians, offers some insight into the ethnic character of the violence.\(^{122}\) The allegiance of the villagers, which will come up again shortly, indicates that the violence brought the legitimacy of the Ptolemaic state into question.

Evidence for the revolt also exists from the Arsinoite nome, although not before 200 BC. These scattered episodes provide some additional details for the activities of rebels in one of the most Hellenized and fruitful areas of Egypt. \(P.Mich.\) 18.776, from 194 BC, contains an intriguing report of several episodes of violence in the region around Mouchis, in the precinct of Polemon. In it, a local Egyptian official, Peteminos, perhaps the local \textit{komogrammateus}, reports that he and others, while patrolling the village near dusk, came across a wounded farmer.\(^{123}\) Hearing where he had been wounded, they proceeded in that direction, where they found another wounded farmer. Neither man admitted to knowing who assaulted them, but both said they were assaulted with \textit{kontoi}, which could mean barge poles or pikes.\(^{124}\) The people of the village and the men

\(^{122}\) At the same time, the attack on the town was launched first against an Egyptian’s house. The revolt had a largely ethnic character, but may be more accurately delineated along socio-economic lines. Egyptians, like Nechthenibis, may at times have been targeted as collaborators with the Greek occupying force.

\(^{123}\) Lines 1-2: έφοδευόντων ἡμῶν τὴν κώμην νυκτὶ συνηντήσαμεν Πασις Παωπιος βασιλικος τετραυματισμεν. Lines 5-6: ερωτώμενος δὲ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, τίνες οἱ εἶπαν, οὐκ ἔφησαν ἐπιγινώσκειν αὐτοὺς· ἀλλ’ ἔφησαν οἵτινες αὐτῶν τετραυματισμενος ὑφ’ ἡμῶν κόντοις. The \textit{kontos} in papyri is usually meant to be a barge pole, which in this case was adapted for use as a weapon. \textit{Kontos} was also used for two-handed spears,
assaulted interacted with the Ptolemaic officials in interesting ways. The men attacked
could not identify their attackers, and the text leaves upon the possibility that the
villagers at first accused the Ptolemaic guards of carrying out the attacks. The next day,
however, the people of the village gave Peteminos the names of the attackers, four men
from the village: Pasis son of Symtheus, Horos son of Onnphris, Pasis son of Manres,
and Horos son of Apunchis. By then, the men had already escaped. But they may have
been apprehended soon after. The same four men were listed together in a local list of
farmers.¹²⁵ Theirs appear to be the only names on a small sub-section of the list, under
the heading “11th”, followed by an illegible word, then their four names, in precisely the
same order as in Peteminos’ report.¹²⁶ After their names, the last line reads τοις ἐκ τῶν
ἀποστ, for which the most reasonable translation is “three from the rebels.”¹²⁷ This
document is probably a more generally accurate depiction of most low-intensity warfare
particularly those of the cavalry, though the Macedonian sarissa was a particular type of kontos. The assaults
were most likely carried out with barge poles, though we should not entirely eliminate the possibility that
they utilized actual pikes taken from weapons stores during the revolt. The text actually reads “They
claimed they did not recognize them. But some of them said he was wounded by us with kontoi.” This could
be a clerical mistake, and Petominos copied ὑφ’ ἡμῶν from the previous line accidentally. Or, it is possible
that the people of the village suggested at first that Petominos and the others on the patrol had attacked the
men, before bringing a list of the perpetrators to Petominos the next morning.

¹²⁵ P.Heid. 6.383.140-144.
¹²⁶ In fact, the record of farmers may have been written by Peteminos as well. The “11th” may refer to the
11th year of Epiphanes, also the year of the report in document 776.
¹²⁷ There are no missing characters after the τ, which indicates that the surviving characters of the last word
are an abbreviation. Three would seemingly be an error, since four names are listed. Their place on the list
could indicate either their capture and imprisonment, or their continued absence from the town following
their attack; either way, it seems that they were not present to constitute a portion of the workforce within
the village.
during the tarache than the night assault papyrus. The rebels attacked isolated farmers in the field, and may have used canals and dikes for cover in order to ambush the men. Additionally, since the men were of the same community, it is telling that the wounded men were unwilling to identify their assailants, and that the people of Mouchis, after possibly suggesting that Peteminos and his men carried out the attack, handed over the names of the assailants only the next day, allowing them time to escape. At the same time, the government response to the attacks seems to have been strong enough to label the men rebels, rather than criminals.

Other instances of violence and subterfuge from the Arsinoite follow a similar pattern of indirect attacks. Two papyri from Lysimakhis, one securely dated to 198 BC, and the other likely dating from the same period, and perhaps as little as three months apart, refer to attacks targeting agricultural materials of local klerouchs. In the earlier document, a Thracian cavalryman reports that his threshing floor was burned on the night of the 1st of Pachon (about June 8th). Before the report breaks off, the klerouch reported that help from the village saved some of the structure. In the later document, three Greeks, one a Macedonian infantryman, report that they discovered their grain stores burning during the night of the 24th of Epeiph (about August 31st). A property-dispute from the 160’s BC hinged upon a man’s testimony that a cache of contracts had

128 P.Petr. 3.34.
129 Lines 6-7: ἐπιβοηθησάντων δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς κώμης διέσωσαν...
130 P.Petr. 2.38.
been burned by Egyptian rebels ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσ[θεν χρόνοις, ἐν δὲ τῆ[ῃ γενη μένηι
ταραχῆι “previously, during the rebellion that had taken place,” when the rebels burned
down the village’s contract office. These instances provide further insights into the
patterns of violence. The rebels likely utilized the cover of night to avoid both
confrontation and identification, and the attackers chose economic and agricultural
targets related to the members (klerouchs) and institutions (contract archives) of the
regime, short of outright assaults on the klerouchs themselves, as in the earlier example
from the Oxyrhynchite nome.

These first several reports reflect isolated incidents within the larger fabric of
violence in the region of Middle Egypt. There, pockets of rebels scattered through the
heavily Greek region organized attacks that emphasized subterfuge and the cover of
darkness. The rebels there were difficult to discern from the local population, since they
seem to have come from it in some cases. Distinguishing loyal villagers from night-time
rebels was difficult. The character of the rebellion in those regions accords well with the
ugly war Polybius described, void of battles and sieges, but rife with violence. Evidence
from Upper Egypt and the Delta, although less-detailed, provides a fuller and in some
ways different picture. Sources for rebel activity in the Delta are very sparse. Polybius
twice mentions Ptolemaic campaigns that targeted cities central to the Delta rebellion,

131 P.Ainu. 2.30 (169-164 BC). Lest there be any doubt concerning the rebellion referenced in the text, it
concerns contracts made by the fathers of the men involved. For the attack on the town, see lines 28-36.
and the surrender or capture of rebel leadership from those regions. The urban, organized resistance of the Delta region provides some level of contrast with the rural “peasant” rebellion of Middle Egypt. In much of the Delta, as in Upper Egypt, the Egyptian population predominated, and having forced Greeks out of the region, the rebels could have transitioned toward a better-organized and hierarchical form of leadership. The leaders of the rebellion in the Delta are twice called δυνάσται by Polybius (22.17.1,4). This word suggests a rebel hierarchy in the Delta, and indeed their actions suggest the same, for on two occasions the rebel leadership offered themselves in surrender, seemingly in attempts to spare the mass of the population.

In Upper Egypt, the rebel leader’s coronation as pharaoh implies a larger scale and greater cohesion to rebel action. The Edfu raid and conquest of Thebes give similar indications. At the same time, general Ptolemaic control of the Nile must have hampered movement, and there are few textual or archaeological indications that the rebels under

132 Polyb. 22.16-17. This text contains two separate instances, first of the siege of Lykopolis, on the Delta coast, which we know from the Rosetta decree (OGIS 90.21-23) was captured in 197 BC, and second the capture of Sais, in the interior, which seems to have been captured in about 186/5 BC, following the surrender of the four surviving leaders of the rebels.

133 This nomes of this region, the Bousirite, Saite, and others, provided much of the machimoi military manpower for the Ptolemies, and the revolt may have taken on more the character of an armed confrontation than in Middle Egypt, where indirect violence and its suppression seems to have been order of the day for both sides. Of the nomes of the Delta, only those along the primary eastern and western branches can be confirmed as remaining loyal, at least in the early stages of the revolt, e.g., the nome(s) around Pelousion, over which Tlepolemos was strategos (Polyb. 15.25.26), and the Boubastite, over which Adaïos was strategos (15.27.6).

134 The continued rebel resistance may be taken either to reflect the popular resistance underlying the plans of the leaders themselves, or a reaction to the brutality of the Ptolemaic sack of Lykopolis. It is also significant that the official Ptolemaic sources do not use the same words to describe the leaders of the revolt; instead, the Rosetta decree refers to the rebels collectively: ἀισθεῖς πᾶντας (line 26).
their pharaohs Hor-wennefer and Ankh-wennefer operated a coherent rebel state in opposition to the Ptolemaic one. Instead, after the expulsion of Ptolemaic forces from the central Thebaid, the rebels were unable during the revolt to dislodge the Ptolemaic garrison at Elephantine or pose a serious threat to the Ptolemaic capital of Upper Egypt, Ptolemais, near modern El-Minsha. Inscriptions from the temple complex at Abydos indicate that it became a site of rebel activity, and perhaps a base for raids in the direction of Ptolemais. Ptolemais did not set a northern limit to rebel activity. It is unclear whether Panopolis, north of Ptolemais near modern Akhmim, fell under rebel control at that point. Further north, however, Lykopolis, modern Asyut, became a sort of war-zone between the rebels and Ptolemaic forces. No documents tell of the sort of fighting that took place in that region, but following the end of the revolt in 186 BC, a survey of the region had to be conducted because it had not been administered by the Ptolemies for several years. At the same time, it does not seem to have been a rebel stronghold either. The survey reported that most of the local peasant population was

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135 The Elephantine garrison seems to have remained in Ptolemaic hands the entire time, though the garrisons at Philai and Aswan fell into the hands of the rebels’ allies, the Nubian kings Arqamani and Adikhalamani. For their presence, see Farid (1976: 532-56). The alliance of the Nubians with the rebels is also attested in the demotic victory stele from Philae. The affairs of Ptolemais during the revolt are not well known, but a papyrus from the last days of Ptolemy V’s first year (SB 12.10845, September 204 BC) seemingly refers to aid sent to Ptolemais from the Arsinoite. In it, Zephyrus corresponds with a toparch and a subordinate about measures to be taken locally in response to the dispatch of men (and materiel?) to Ptolemais και τῆς ἄλλης ἄρα τῆν βοήθειαν τῶν [ - - ]. “and additional support for the succor of…”

136 The graffito P.Recueil 11 at Abydos indicates the presence there of rebel forces, a sort of forward-operating base a hard day’s march south of Ptolemais (just under 40km).
simply gone, killed or run off during the *tarache* of Chaonnophris (Ankh-wennefer).\textsuperscript{137}

The Ptolemies may have lost control of Lykopolis between 199 and 196 BC, in the early years of Chaonnophris’ rule from Thebes. The report’s claim that rebel had targeted the peasant population could be Ptolemaic wishful thinking: the next city south from Ptolemaic Hermoupolis, Lykopolis may have been targeted by Ptolemaic punitive raids in the 190’s BC. As a border zone, the local population likely suffered attacks from both sides.

Rebel operations in Upper Egypt continued to fit the general pattern of small action and indirect assault. The Ptolemaic description of rebel activities in the Philae decree of 186 emphasized their attacks on temples and priests, as in other cases. The decree also mentions their attacks on banks, government offices (probably administrative offices or contract archives), and on dikes and canals.\textsuperscript{138} Targeting irrigation works implies a particular type of subversive assault on the regime.\textsuperscript{139} The irrigation works in Upper Egypt had been, in many cases, expanded in the previous three or four decades as part of the expansion of the Hellenistic presence in those

\textsuperscript{137} SB 24.15972.

\textsuperscript{138} From the demotic Philae decree of 186 BC (Muller 1920: 59-88): “they did terrible things to the governors of the nomes, they desecrated (?) the temples, they damaged (?) the divine statues, they molested (?) the priests and suppressed (?) the offerings on the altars and in the shrines. They sacked (?) the towns and their population, women and children included, committing all kinds of crimes in the time of anarchy. They stole the taxes of the nomes, they damaged the irrigation works.”

\textsuperscript{139} See Veïsse (2004: 179-81) for the possible link between rebel destruction of irrigation works and the expansion of un-cultivated and ownerless categories of land in the aftermath of the revolt. This conclusion is derived mainly from SB 24.15972, a papyrus from Lykopolis, for which see Clarysse (1978: 243-253) and McGing (1997: 273-314).
regions.\textsuperscript{140} Irrigation works represented royal authority over the land and the people, who had been conscripted as construction labor for the works.\textsuperscript{141} Attacking them directly impacted the Ptolemaic economic system by disrupting agriculture, and impeded the Ptolemaic military by disrupting logistics.\textsuperscript{142} Targeting irrigation systems did not incur so great a risk as attacking a military garrison, but served as a symbolic demonstration of rebellion against the regime, and in a way that was quite real demonstrated the weakness of Ptolemaic power while undermining that power as well.

A later text may give some indication of the sort of larger-scale actions that rebels in the Thebaid may have employed. In 123 BC, Egyptians from the town of Hermonthis engaged in a local war against the settler town of Krokodilon polis, situated on the opposite bank of the Nile, southwest of Thebes.\textsuperscript{143} This particular conflict developed into a small war, but began with agricultural violence, and so provides a helpful exemplar of the escalation of rebel violence over time. In September, about the first of Thoth, the laoi of scattered villages near Hermonthis gathered with the people from Hermonthis for an

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\textsuperscript{140} See Manning (2010: 36-48) on the Ptolemaic state and the irrigation system in general, his statement on Ptolemaic strategy on 92, and on Ptolemaic presence in the Thebaid from 104-113.

\textsuperscript{141} For an example of this in the Thebaid, see UPZ 2.157.40-66 for major conscript labor projects on canals, dikes, and embankments in the Perithebaid during the reign of Euergetes.

\textsuperscript{142} A small example of this is contained in PSI 3.168, from 118 BC, which describes a night-time attack on a royal dike that was under guard. The guards were driven off, and the dike damaged, over-flooding the entire plain. This put the harvest at risk for several villages in the plain. While the Nile flood was the primary means of irrigation in Ptolemaic Egypt, man-made irrigation systems were essential for an expanded economy, and a strong central state was essential for a functional irrigation system.

\textsuperscript{143} For this incident and the pattern of conflict between Hermonthis and the nearby settler-towns of Krokodilon Polis and Pathyris, see Clarysse and Winnicki (2002: 42-3) and Veïsse (2004: 60-1).
\end{flushleft}
attack on Krokodilon polis. They attacked the royal embankment, wrecking and opening nine ἐκχρηματα, “sluice-gates” (l.9-10), severely flooding the land around Krokodilon polis. The lack of any effective response from the Krokodilopolitans seems to have encouraged the attackers, who made a second attack on the third of Thoth (l.10-14), in which they wrecked and opened fifteen more sluices. Those attacking the irrigation system were supported by others who were armed, and even when the force from Hermonthis was driven off, it seems clear from the greater damage inflicted that the armed component was able to skirmish with the force from Krokodilon polis long enough for others to continue the work. These initial attacks, launched from an Egyptian town and its surrounding villages against a Ptolemaic military settlement, provide an example of organization and violence in the early stages of rebellion. The forces from Hermonthis are not described in any official capacity, but instead appear, at first, as a group of individuals gathered from the town and surrounding villages. Their attacks targeted the livelihood of the settler town and the authority of the king simultaneously. A sortie by the Krokodilopolitans sent their attackers fleeing after the second attack, but

145 Lines 8-9: πρὸς τὸ ἀσπορόσαι τὰ πεδία ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀποθλιβήναι. Chr. Wilck. 11.B, a letter from local priests about the same incident, describes (l.6-9) the potential harm to the temple and to the state from the damage done in the attacks.
146 Line 12: σὺν ὅπλοις.
147 Ptolemaic soldiers were in Hermonthis in 130 BC, including Greek infantry and cavalry (P.Bad. 2.2, UPZ 2.206). These were not permanent settlers. Instead, those in P.Bad. 2.2 are described as being on campaign. Another text, from earlier in 130 BC (P.Dryton. 36) clarifies that military forces were being sent to Hermonthis to put an end to rebel activity there, under the command of Paois. The constituent offices in the administration of Paois also issued UPZ 2.206 along with several other texts related to the campaign in the Thebaid that year. I know of no other evidence for soldiers, Greek or Egyptian, in Hermonthis.
the damage had already been done. Two increasingly violent clashes occurred in subsequent weeks, and the writer implies there were significant casualties in the final one. In summary, allies for an attack were gathered through regional (and therefore likely relational) networks, early actions were focused upon targets with symbolic and economic value, and the pattern of violence over time built up toward violence against humans and the assumption of greater risk.

6.2.2. Toward a Conceptual Framework for ταραχὴ

The preceding examination of documentary evidence for ταραχὴ has identified a number of core traits in rebel activity, and several commonalities across the regions involved in the revolt. A study of common traits will demonstrate that the pattern of violence during the ταραχὴ followed rational selection criteria and group dynamics. Violence perpetrated during the revolt indicates an interest in targets with significant symbolic and real value. This is in contrast to Ptolemaic descriptions of rebel activity as generalized chaos against the people and temples of Egypt. The selection of high-value targets is a first principle. The second principle evident in the records is aversion to risk. There is no evidence that rebels threw their lives away lightly. Instead, narratives and episodes of violence indicate, with few exceptions, a generally conservative strategy that repeatedly exchanged operational gain for a safe withdrawal. After all, the ability to continually execute attacks, no matter their conventional impact in lives or materiel or
territory, allowed rebels to undermine Ptolemaic legitimacy and demonstrate weaknesses in the Ptolemaic state’s and Ptolemaic army’s capacity to provide security and stability.

The twin criteria of high-value targets and risk-avoidance eliminated many possible targets, but still provided ample opportunities for rebel action on a variety of scales. So royal peasants, klerouchic grain stores, individual irrigation works, and suspected collaborators, like priests, qualified as high value, low-risk targets for individuals and small groups. Attacks were carried out through ambushes, and often at night, in order to minimize risk. For intermediate groups, it was possible to make attacks on larger targets, like villages, guard-posts, and temples, or to make larger-scale attacks on irrigation works. The documentary evidence again indicates preference for indirect action at night. Attacks on irrigation works subverted royal power and damaged the economies of loyal towns. Larger groups could make comparatively larger attacks on settlements, temple complexes, and even forts. The patterns of violence seem to have generally followed rational and identifiable principles.

Rational resistance alone is not sufficient to describe the activities of Egyptian rebels. Group dynamics, particularly growing patterns of participation in resistance, seem to have encouraged greater acceptance of risk. This is, presumably, how the rebellion began in the first place, as a pattern of minor disobedience or dereliction emerged, and grew, first into the anachoresis of machimoi (and presumably some others as
well), then temple raids in the Thebaid, and the secession of parts of both Upper and Lower Egypt. The group dynamics of participation applied a simple, primal pressure toward greater hazard, and helps explain the rebel’s high-casualty defeats, whether in a final, locally large-scale encounter between Hermonthis and Krokodilon polis, or during the Great Revolt, in a pivotal siege at Lykopolis or in a decisive battle against a Ptolemaic field army near Thebes. With those exceptions, which seemingly resulted from inertia or desperation, the majority of violent activity in the revolt is characterized by risk-averse strategies of short engagements against soft targets.

A conceptual model for ταραχὴ should describe armed resistance to a state that builds from small action toward overthrow and secession, targets the legitimacy and response capability of the state, and follows rational patterns of resistance. It also should be a primarily agrarian model. The means by which agrarian populations can be drawn from dissent to violent rebellion has attracted considerable interest from social scientists (but comparatively less from historians) since the middle of the twentieth

148 In the absence of a good historical study of the phenomenon of irrational escalation leading to catastrophic defeats in near-conventional engagements in the recent Iraq War, I can only adduce the anecdotal evidence of the large-scale desperation-motivated diversion operations in Ramadi and Husayba in 2004, which led to hundreds of insurgent deaths, and the largely conventional engagements at Abu Ghraib in 2004, and Turki and Najaf in 2006, all of which seem to have resulted from the inertia of confidence, according to which insurgent forces broke from insurgent doctrine for conventional-style warfare and suffered catastrophic defeats.

149 It should also be suitable in a pre-industrial context. It should also be fitted to the particular context of Ptolemaic Egypt, a colonial-like environment where the colonizer’s political and population center was located in the colonized place, like England after 1066. Almost all studies on armed rebellions have focused upon either uprisings in broadly homogeneous nations (in Europe, for example) or in colonial outposts, and mainly in the post-industrial context. For the “supra-colonial” example of Ptolemaic Egypt it is necessary to adapt other models. On the other counts, models of peasant revolt generally meet the key criteria.
Much of the modern discussion of the actual activity of peasant rebellion draws from the pioneering analysis of Eckstein on “internal wars,” and particularly on rural-agrarian revolt. He described “dysfunction” between social structures and/or norms and political structures and statuses as the root cause for resistance. More importantly, he emphasized that the development of violent resistance movements depended upon elite weaknesses and errors. He suggested analyzing the extent, success, or failure of the resistance movements in terms of, on the one hand, the effectiveness of subversion tactics and availability of bases, and on the other, the efficiency of state repression and extent of conciliatory reforms. From the historical perspective, Stone then contributed several helpful correctives. The concept of dysfunction is universally applicable; latent tensions are held in check by “social norms, ideological beliefs, and state sanctions” and non-violent, dis-organized resistance must

150 It is first necessary to exclude purely modernist, often traditionally Marxist, analyses of revolution, which locate the impetus for resistance in rapid socio-economic change stemming from the implementation of new technologies, e.g., W.A. Lewis (1963: 46-60), Olson (1963: 529-52), or J. Paige (1975) and Tilly (1964) for pre-industrial but heavily Marxist analyses. Though J. Lewis (1962: 1-19) wrote in the same era, and emphasizes rapid change, he does so in a study of pre-industrial movements, and identifies revolutionaries as frustrated up-and-comers rather than a continually depressed peasantry or proletariat. See also Skocpol (1979), particularly 54-83, for a refutation of the Marxist-influenced theory that capitalization of agriculture incited peasant revolts.

151 See primarily H. Eckstein (1965: 133-63), but note also his book published the preceding year. The article cited here developed the greater part of his theoretical framework for looking at rebellion. The book (1964) is useful for its extended deconstruction of most of the prior categories of analysis, which were generally too vague and bore too many obvious internal and historical contradictions.

152 In describing elite weaknesses he means economic crisis, internal division, or military symmetry with ruled and in speaking of errors he refers excessive, ineffective, or indiscriminate violence, political intransigence, and an insufficient or poorly executed strategy of diversion, conciliation, and repression.
be accelerated into violent, organized rebellion. He criticized the usefulness of economic data as the key location for this accelerant, because of its complexity and incompleteness. He instead suggested three chief accelerants: identifiable, charismatic or even messianic leadership, a political-military core, and a major disruption to the state. The first observation in particular helped focus inquiry upon the origin of movements, chiefly, whether and in what ways they are rational or, for lack of a better term, spontaneous.

Scholarship emphasizing the rational roots of peasant rebellion provides frameworks for considering the decision to revolt that accord closely with the beginning of the Great Revolt. Wolf and Aya describe agrarian rebellion as a rational application of violent means toward broadly political ends. Analyses of the groups that first engage in violent resistance indicate that their transition into violence must first be prepared by

153 Stone (1966: 159-176). Intriguingly, he considers the likelihood of pre-industrial agrarian revolutions minimal (170).
154 In late third century Egypt for example, it is unclear in what way or to what extent inflation was taking place. Although it is certain that the royal government had made efforts to remint currency, which very likely was related to supply at one or more points along the exchange network, it is unclear that the population of Egypt felt particular economic stress. Instead, it is conceivable that Egyptians, particularly those who marched in the royal army and fought in the phalanx at Raphia, imagined an expansion of economic, political, and social position and therefore would have been frustrated even by meager gains.
155 For the major state disruptions, he suggested either a powerful internal crisis, or a major foreign military defeat. It is certainly significant that, by 200 BC, the Egyptian rebels had all four. Note, in addition, that Stone’s accelerants are developed out of the more generalized criteria described by Eckstein.
156 E. Wolf (1969); see especially pp. 277-299, where he develops a theory of “tactical” power, a combination of military potential, economic independence, and freedom of action (or from oppression). Also R. Aya (1979:39-99), though see especially pp. 73-79 where he revises Wolf’s theory.
their light repression (often a product of geographical isolation\textsuperscript{157}), and possession of tactical capital, be it military potential or political or economic bargaining positions.\textsuperscript{158} In that sense, the outbreak of violence can and mainly does result from rational choices. The revolt in Egypt seemingly underscores this development, as \textit{machimoii} played a significant role at least in the early stage of the revolt, and the revolt developed first and achieved greatest success in the region least impacted by Ptolemaic rule (the Thebaid). Scott, in his ethnographical study of a Malaysian village, makes a comparable observation; resistance was originally and primarily non-violent, and only developed into violence and revolution as growth in peasant organization and gaps in elite domination allowed.\textsuperscript{159} It seems best to describe the Great Revolt in Egypt as an episode of agrarian revolt rather than a peasant rebellion, because the evidence adduced above strongly suggests involvement by some local elites and members of the Egyptian military class.

The question then is how to describe the particular violent activities of the rebels, something which studies of peasant rebellion have shown little tendency to do. However, most of the studies noted above make reference to the wars in Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{157} The Libyan rebellion is a good example. Resistance there was concentrated in the mountains of the southwest and in the Cyrenaica, both separated from regime centers by either deserts or difficult terrain. On the other hand, the presently on-going movement in Syria generally lacks geographical isolation.

\textsuperscript{158} Aya, p. 74: “Popular movements have been led, staffed, and supported by, not the altogether downtrodden and oppressed segments of society, but groups that, while having plenty to fight for and against, had something to fight with.”

\textsuperscript{159} J. Scott (1985), see p. 299 in particular for his conclusions about the conversion of everyday forms of resistance into violent resistance. Note that this accords closely with the direction encouraged by Stone twenty years earlier.
around the middle of the twentieth century as a series of conflicts in which the dynamics of peasant resistance and rebellion played a frequent role. Not only did the long-standing current of agrarian revolt fuel the emergence of the NLF (or Viet Cong) during the American war, but the central issue of the war became, in many ways, the support, cooperation, and even participation of local village communities. Interactions of village populations with both the NLF guerrillas and the American and Republic of Vietnam forces were based on rational calculations of safety, economic security, and legitimacy.  

The combatants’ interactions with villages and peasants in the American war in Vietnam largely bear out this narrative: Viet Cong operatives, drawn from the villages themselves, used relational networks to establish their own legitimacy with the villagers, exploiting xenophobic feeling toward Americans and the record of corruption in the South Vietnam regime. They used the cover of night to infiltrate American- or Republican-held villages, and demonstrated a willingness to use ambushes, assaults, 

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160 Laid out in a study by Marando and Tuckman (1992: 249-64). The study emphasizes 1) legitimacy: partly ideological and relational, but especially an estimation of the likely victor, and 2) physical security: an estimation of the ability to protect from or inflict harm, over other factors like political preference or even material provision. Tullock (1971: 89-99) argues that popular rebellions (which he calls revolutions) offer little obvious incentive for accepting any particular risk at all, and that unless some additional calculation should be added, most of the population should be expected to attempt to maintain general neutrality, gaining the benefits of a popular revolution while avoiding the hazard of fighting it. Mason (1989: 467-92) argues that physical safety must be the primary calculus in determining resistance and risk, as an innate rationality. Risk aversion must be overcome for a revolution to take place and gain ground. Lichbach (1994: 383-418), writing about peasant rebellions, but not Vietnam particularly, argues that rebellious action is construed as a common interest, but its accompanying risks keep it from being an individual interest, which naturally hampers participation. Instead, additional, material incentives are necessary to mobilize participation in active rebellion. The most obvious material incentive for participation in the revolt, at least in the Thebaid, was freedom from taxation, though it is at present unknowable whether this was in any way used to recruit and incite participation in violent resistance.
torture, and other violence to coerce non-cooperation with American and Republic of Vietnam forces.\textsuperscript{161} This illustrates a crucial aspect of the relationship between agrarian revolt and a militarized insurgency. The NLF conducted guerrilla-style military operations with warriors largely recruited from the village population. Only a small minority of the peasant population of southern Vietnam actively fought as Viet Cong, but their operations, styled after Maoist people’s-warfare doctrine, relied upon the often-passive assistance of village communities as they carried out mainly indirect attacks against their enemy.

These same three criteria—physical safety, economic stability, and political legitimacy—have since been emphasized in recent literature regarding the dynamics of insurgent movements, particularly those drawn from agrarian or peasant populations.\textsuperscript{162} Regimes that fail to establish their legitimacy and to provide safety and economic security are more susceptible to insurgent movements, which are then able to capitalize upon those very weaknesses. This is very similar to the above analysis of the origins and

\textsuperscript{161} Tovy (2010: 217-30) analyzes the reasons for joining and deserting the Viet Cong as an analysis of peasant politics: recruitment was not driven so much by ideological reasons but concern for economic security and social stability (the protection of the interests of family), while desertion seems to have been related to altered calculations of those same criteria, with the added component of fear of American firepower, which could incentivize guerrillas to desert even when they still believed the US-RVN coalition would ultimately lose; Kalyvas (2004: 97-138) argues that terror and indiscriminate violence against non-participant civilian populations is regularly employed as a way to demonstrate the weakness of the enemy to stop it and coerce support, but also shows that these strategies regularly backfire, and suggests that it is employed as a tactic so commonly because it is comparatively uncomplicated, not because it is comparatively successful.

conduct of the Great Revolt. With certain clarifications, it is helpful to apply the term “insurgency” to the Great Revolt in Ptolemaic Egypt.

The term insurgency is a powerful word, and carries more analytical meaning than “revolt” or “disturbance.” At the same time, insurgency has received its own detractors, both in the 1960’s, when the term was first applied to Marxist uprisings, and in the modern era, when it has been widely applied to violent Islamic insurrections.163 There are two points at issue: the actual definition of the term, and its politicization. The latter is fairly simple: in Western—particularly American—discourse, “insurgency” has taken on a fairly negative connotation associated with terrorists, suicide bombs, and improvised explosive devices. However, in the 2011 conflict in Libya, news outlets used the term “insurgency” to depict positively the rebellion against Muammar Gaddafi. As for definitions, the American military in the presently defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” and “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government...while increasing insurgent control.”164 These definitions are very broad,
and overstate the unity of an insurgency, which could seemingly be composed of multiple movements. Others writing within the context of the American military’s so-called “graduate level of war”\textsuperscript{165} have added various additions to this definition: rebellious movements are considered an insurgency when they can create a salient identity in opposition to the state, articulate a particular set of causes, and secure one or more safe havens.\textsuperscript{166} Insurgent movements are likely to seek symbolic, soft targets because they represent a feasible and low-risk means to raise the profile of an insurgent movement while it is still small.\textsuperscript{167} These descriptions generally accord well with the observed characteristics of rebel activity during the ταραχὴ,\textsuperscript{168} but a clearer definition would be helpful, in order to make the term insurgency more useful.

For “insurgency” to have the most utility, its development and operations should be defined more completely. To do this, some recent work has suggested multiple categories of insurgency.\textsuperscript{169} Earlier work had emphasized the close relationship between

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by Galula (1964) and Paget (1967) decades earlier. Notably, neither of these forefather authors offered precise definitions of insurgency, Galula merely describing it as a “protracted” revolution (2).\textsuperscript{165} From the first page of the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24), published in 2006.\textsuperscript{166} Byman (2008: 165-200) lays out the criteria for a movement to develop into an insurgency, and repeats the common refrain that a poor state response is practically a necessary condition for a full-blown insurgency.\textsuperscript{167} McCormick and Giordano (2007: 295-320) describe the importance of symbolic, low-risk victories as an insurgent movement seeks to escape the overwhelming impediments to recruitment at the outset of violent resistance.\textsuperscript{168} This is clearly the case in Ptolemaic Egypt, where socio-economic concerns, unwelcome royal intrusion, suspicion of Hellenistic culture, and corrupt officials seem to have constituted, in varying degrees, both the causes for the ταραχὴ and the chief targets of rebel violence.\textsuperscript{169} A. Scott (2011), see pp. 12-27 for the several classes of insurgency, each related to their particular context.
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insurgent movements and agrarian revolt, refining insurgency to apply to anti-regime movements that develop out of peasant resistance movements, employ aspects of ideology and organization from revolutionary movements, and employ guerrilla tactics. This provides a helpful meeting point between military definitions of the movement and scholarly discussion of its broader components, peasant rebellion and revolution. Insurgency should be considered a condition of violent resistance to a governing authority, composed of one or more militarized movements, which can be said to consist in several qualities:

- origins in popular dissent, particularly agrarian resistance
- sub-state identity
- appeal among significant components of local population, leading to collaboration
- political goals, from major reform to secession or revolution
- violent means, employed:
  - to expand and solidify popular support, by championing a common cause, demonstrating a greater capacity to protect and defend the people than the state’s capacity, and/or silencing dissent
  - to weaken the state’s coercive power, legitimacy, and resolve

Desai and Eckstein (1990: 441-65). For reason of the second and third components in particular, they argue that insurgency is necessarily a modern phenomenon, but this does not seem necessary. If revolution exclusively means an entire re-working of the social order along Jacobin or Marxist lines, rather than a re-crafting of the political order and the populations assigned to the various levels of the social and economic order(s), then many possible violent conflicts are excluded from insurgency. Major political goals, up to modern revolutions, seem sufficient for insurgent movements, and while the authors are correct that most pre-modern peasant rebellions featured traditional, conservative demands, the Egyptian revolt seems to have far exceeded such concerns. A revolution is recognized as such by its goals and outcomes; an insurgent movement need not embrace full-scale revolution, but generally at least borrows comparable language or patterns of organization. “Guerrilla” warfare has not been satisfactorily defined, either, but refers warfare in which at least one of the combatant factions is a non-state actor or otherwise paramilitary and where the forces of the non-state actor (and potentially other forces as well) engage in unconventional war-fighting, which means refusing a strict war for territory with its concomitant battle lines and battles.
through protracted armed conflict, involving unconventional and indirect tactics

These four criteria distinguish insurgency from the conditions of civil war, terrorism, mass demonstration, and invasion in four ways: by its sub-state identity, its political intent and collaboration with local population, its systematic and protracted employment of violence, and its local identity. The ταραχὴ of 207-185 should be considered a period of insurgency in Ptolemaic Egypt, when multiple, loosely-related non-state actors operated against the Ptolemaic state. These movements aimed at local secession and eventual country-wide revolution. In the Thebaid in particular, the insurgent movement(s) there, having secured most of the region from Ptolemaic incursions, at the very least made some progress toward secession. The new names bestowed on the rebel pharaohs were messianic, designed to demonstrate the legitimacy of the insurgent movement, and to prompt the perception of the war as a “national” struggle, rather than a fight over economic, political, and social status. The Ptolemaic response, discussed in chapter 7, is crucial. The Ptolemies did not consent to the insurgent characterization of the conflict, and took significant steps to redefine the conflict, delegitimize the insurgent movements, and strengthen Ptolemaic legitimacy in Egypt.
Chapter 7. Ptolemaic Counter-Insurgency

In the context of dynastic instability, economic hardship, and foreign defeat, insurgent movements had developed across Egypt. By 200 BC rebels in the south, with foreign assistance from Nubian kings, had established control over most of the Thebaid region in Upper Egypt as far north as Abydos and established their own pharaoh. Several regions in the Nile Delta were under insurgent control, and insurgent activity, in the form of indirect violence, was widespread throughout Middle and Lower Egypt. The Ptolemaic military response therefore offers a rare opportunity to study an ancient kingdom mounting a domestic counter-insurgency. While other instances may be added, the asymmetric documentary advantage of Egypt is unlikely to be equaled. The eventual Ptolemaic strategy that led to the pacification of Egypt bears striking similarities to modern counterinsurgency theory, and it achieved greater success than many modern states and armies, despite the fact that the strategy was never entirely stable or even coherent. This political-military response heightens the historical relevance of the Ptolemaic state and its army, precisely at the point when it is considered to have become militarily irrelevant in the ancient Mediterranean.
7.1. Initial Ptolemaic Responses, 207-196 B.C.

The Ptolemaic army’s early handling of the rebellion was, like most conventional military operations of established states, predictably brutal. The source record does not allow more than a hazy reconstruction of events. It is necessary to start at the end of this period, and endeavor, through scattered sources, to work back. In 196 BC, in the ninth year of his reign, Ptolemy V, about twelve years old, celebrated his coronation, the analkelein, at Alexandria, and in March celebrated his coronation as Pharaoh at Memphis. While at Memphis he also presided over the execution of captured rebel leaders from the Thebaid. But the military operations that led to the coronation and royal synod at Memphis were not those against the southern rebels, but the victory over leaders of the rebellion in the Delta. Ptolemy and his army had concluded the campaign against rebels in the Delta around the end of the previous year, following the successful siege of Lykopolis, considered to have been a bastion of rebel activity. The city had been

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1 Pros.Pierre 16 = OGIS 90 line 6 indicates that the Rosetta decree was pronounced on 4 Xandikos = 18 Mecheir, the day after, according to the demotic text, the “Reception of Rule” ceremony in Memphis. The analkelein itself likely took place in Alexandria, between the first of the year and the ceremony in Memphis.


3 Pros.Pierre 16.21-23 παραγινόμενος δὲ καὶ εἰς Λύκων πόλιν τὴν ἐν τῷ Βουσιρίτῃ, ἢ ἢν κατελημμένη καὶ ὀχυρωμένη πρὸς πολιορκίαν ὅπλων τε παραθείσης δαρυλεστέραι καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ χορηγίᾳ πάση, ὡς ἂν ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου συνέπτησας τῆς ἀλλοτρίωτος ταῖς ἐπισυναχθεῖσιν εἰς αὐτὴν ἀσεβέσιν
stormed following the Nile flood (therefore in late Autumn), and the “impious” population massacred.\textsuperscript{4}

The massacre followed a larger strategy for subduing the rebellion in the Delta, which may be pieced together from several texts. First, between the capture of Lykopolis and the coronation of Epiphanes, Skopas and his companions were arrested and executed by the king’s advisors, Aristomenes and Polykrates.\textsuperscript{5} Polybius says that Skopas and his company were half-heartedly contemplating a coup when Aristomenes acted against him. Skopas’ activities between the defeat at Panion and his arrest in Alexandria are scarcely known. A statement of Polybius (16.39.2, known from a quotation in Josephus) seems to relate a small story of his career between the siege of Sidon after Panion and his arrest: τῆς δὲ πολιορκίας ὑπεμβώδους γενομένης, μὲν Σκόπας ἠδόξει καὶ διεβέβλητο νεανικῶς, “when the siege had become irregular, Skopas fell into disrepute and was exuberantly criticized.” The instance of this siege cannot be tied from either Polybius or Josephus to a particular incident. We may surmise for the following reasons that Skopas may have been allowed command of the campaign in the Delta. If his siege of Lykopolis or another place had lasted longer than the ten months his forces held out against Antiochus at Sidon, it is reasonable that others would have used the

\textsuperscript{4} Pros.Pierre 16.26 ἐν ὀλίγωι χρόνωι τήν τε πόλιν κατὰ κράτος εἶλεν καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀσεβεῖς πάντας διέφθεισεν
\textsuperscript{5} Polyb. 18.53-4.
\textsuperscript{6} Suda editors added (S’654) that by ὑπεμβώδους they meant that the operations had been ἠμελημένης (neglected).
failure to criticize the general. This would also provide context for the rumored coup attempt, if it did indeed follow upon a slowly-developing prosecution of the war in the Delta.

While the narrative of the Delta war from the Rosetta decree focused on the conquest of Lykopolis, that city was upon the coast in the middle of the region, and documentary sources indicate that a far larger war was waged by Ptolemaic forces before they were able to lay siege to the rebels at Lykopolis. A document from 197 BC (SB 20.14659), roughly eight months earlier than the final operations that led to the capture of Lykopolis, concerns the purchase and registration of an Egyptian slave, permitted in accordance with a decree promulgated in December of 198 BC. The decree seems to have been titled “Concerning the possession of Egyptian slaves from the Disturbance in the country.”

The slave, Thasion, was eighteen years old, and heavily scarred. Thasion was purchased by a Syrian woman of Alexandria, whose guardian (presumably her husband) was an officer in the θωρακιτῶν ἐπιλέκτων, or “Picked Cuirassiers.” The plainest interpretation is that Thasion was taken prisoner, suspected...
of complicity in some way with the activities of the rebels, before being sold as a slave at
the beginning of 197 BC. After paying a total 554 drachmas 4 obols for the slave, the new
owners also paid τὴν ἀνδραπόδων ὠνὴ “the tax on the purchase of slaves” 110 drachmas 5 obols. The twenty-percent tax on slave purchases connects this text to a
roughly contemporaneous text, P.Col.1.Inv. 480, which also contains information about
the various regulations regarding this tax on slave purchases. Dating about 197, it
records the tax to be levied under various circumstances. Those assessing the taxes were
to utilize the market transaction records, kept by the agoranomoi, of which the above-
referenced text is probably an example, and assess the slave tax according to sale price.

Lines 15-19 concern government auctions of slaves, and the required tax is indeed the
tax applied for the purchase of Thasion.10 Most of the other conditions refer to the resale
of slaves and the particular conditions that may have brought about their enslavement,
namely various debt crises. In addition to the government income from the sale and
taxation of slave sales, these regulations also mention a one percent tax that went toward
τὴν Δικαιάρχου δωρεάν, “the gift-fund of Dikaiarchos”, which may have been a bonus

heavy infantrymen of the second century more than Argead pikemen. Because “epilektai” is only otherwise
attested in Ptolemaic Egypt with regard to machimo, the original editor interpreted the unit as an Egyptian
unit, see Koenen (2007: 318-9). This does not seem at all necessary, though not impossible.

10 Lines 15-19: τὸν δὲ πωλουμένων διὰ ξενικῶν πράκτορός προκειμένου ἀγοράζοντας τῆς μίνας
(δραχμῶν) ιδὲ καὶ ἑκατοτετρακάτων δραχμῆν (δραχμήν) α καὶ εἰς τὴν δωρεάν γναθίσμον τοῦ σώματος
(δραχμήν) α. This calls for a total of twenty drachmas per mina in two separate tax categories, and an
additional drachma per transaction, in fact slightly more than twenty percent.
for the infamous Aetolian pirate who found his way into Ptolemaic service and was tortured and executed when Skopas was arrested and killed.\(^{11}\) The fund may also have gone toward somewhat more practical uses: for example, the fund of Dikaiarchos may have contributed to the recruitment of new mercenary forces.\(^ {12}\) Whatever its use, the phenomenon of slave acquisition is the most important issue. The Ptolemaic military response, early in the revolt, involved the massacre of at least one city that harbored rebels, and the enslavement of suspected rebels.

The crowning of Epiphanes at Memphis also involved the execution of captured rebel leaders from the Thebaid, and indicates some sort of temporarily effective operation in that region. The Rosetta text is not clear about who was executed, only calling them τοὺς ἀφηγησαμένους τῶν ἀποστάντων, “the leaders of the rebels,” though the word chosen does not necessarily imply their command, but rather their position in the vanguard of rebellion, which the text goes on to describe as having begun in the time of the king’s father.\(^ {13}\) The capture of prominent rebels south of Memphis may relate to several sources from the region. Two inscriptions from the chapel of Osiris at Abydos indicate fighting there. An Egyptian inscription, written in Greek letters, is

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\(^ {11}\) Polyb. 18.54. Not to be confused with another Aetolian Dikaiarchos, who was League \textit{strategos} two years later (\textit{SGDI II} 1994-5, 2118-23) and served as one of the Aetolian ambassadors to Flamininus in 197 BC (Polyb 18.10.9).

\(^ {12}\) On the other hand, one might imagine that Skopas and his party fell into disrepute because, as they led a campaign against rebels in the Delta, they did not press the siege at Lykopolis, but turned their attention to profitable slave-raiding against the local population, especially when one of Skopas’ fellows received one percent of all funds from their auction \textit{and} from their resale.

\(^ {13}\) \textit{OGIS} 1.90.27.
dated to the fifth year of Pharaoh Hurganophor (Hor-wennefer), which corresponds to 201/0 BC. The second, OGIS 758, is a dedication from Philokles son of Hierokles, from Troizen in the eastern Peloponnese. The inscription is dated 28 Pauni of the sixth year of the king, or about 5 August 199 BC. The text describes the military action as a siege of the temple complex. Another text may indicate that Ptolemy’s premier Aristomenes was in command of the army at Abydos, but the evidence is not conclusive. The chapel of Osiris/Sarapis was located on the northeast of the general complex, which sprawled over a considerable area. We may surmise that the operation at Abydos achieved some level of success, because Hor-wennefer disappeared as Pharaoh in the Thebaid shortly after August of his (and Ptolemy V’s) sixth year. The next native pharaoh, Ankh-wennefer, replaced him in the prescripts of contracts by or before Thoth of the next year, about two months later. The extreme proximity of the new pharaoh’s succession to the siege of Abydos is indicative of a relationship between the two events, most likely the defeat, and quite possibly death or apprehension, of Hor-wennefer in the fighting at

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14 Recueil Dem. 11.
15 OGIS 758.b-c: Φιλοκλῆς Ἱεροκλέους Τροιζηνιος παρεγενῆθην προσκυνῶν τὸν Σάραπιν. ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀβυδου πολιορκιῶς ἐτοὺς τ’ Παυνί κη.’
16 I.Memnoneion 388. The text is a dedication from a Cretan who says that he came to Abydos with Aristomenes.
17 P.Dem.Berl.Kaufv. 3142 + 3144. Like OGIS 758, this text is dated to Pauni. It concerns a sale of land.
18 P.Dem.Berl.Kaufv. 3146. If correctly dated to 199/8 BC (the seventh year of Ankh-wennefer and Ptolemy V), Thoth would cover 12 October – 10 November 199 BC.
Abydos. Thebes did not fall at this point, since contracts in Thoth are dated according to the rule of Ankh-wennefer, but the events at Abydos must have required a new leader.\textsuperscript{19}

The rebel defeat in the vicinity of Abydos was followed by the conquest of Thebes a few months later, after the coronation of Ankh-wennefer. Documents are dated by Ankh-wennefer’s name in the first two months of the seventh year, but are dated in the name of Ptolemy V from the third month (from early December 199 – early January 198) until Hathyr of the eighth year (11 December 198 – 9 January 197). Whatever the particular fate of Hor-wennefer, leaders of the revolt in the Thebaid were detained during Ptolemaic military activities in the region, from the summer of 199 until at least the winter of 197, detained for more than a year, and executed at Memphis. This Ptolemaic operation would also likely have contributed to the numbers of Egyptians auctioned by the state into slavery in the early years of the second century. The reasons for the Ptolemaic withdrawal from the Thebaid are unknown, but likely reflect the very common difficulty conventional forces face in sustaining operations against an insurgency. Ptolemaic forces captured Thebes again in 191/0 BC, but again only temporarily.\textsuperscript{20} The Ptolemaic force may have faced logistical challenges operating in the Thebaid, and may also have faced a conceptual challenge: the enemy front—the

\textsuperscript{19} The similarity of the names: Horos-Onnophris, and Onnophris-lives and the messianic tones of the latter in particular, and especially Ankh-wennefer’s continuation of Hor-wennefer’s regnal years, has led to speculation that new name indicated a revived rule, rather than a new ruler. For the present purposes, this is irrelevant: Hor-wennefer either was killed/captured or suffered a defeat serious enough to demand a new name.

\textsuperscript{20} The auction text \textit{P.Haun}. 11 dates, partly, to the brief period of occupation.
garrisoned temple complex at Abydos—had been retaken, and the enemy capital seized, but the war had not ended.

The coronation celebrations at Alexandria and Memphis should be understood both as a reflection of military accomplishments and, more importantly, as an indication of the continued seriousness of the insurgency in Egypt. The victory at Lykopolis and the incarceration of prominent rebels from the year-long conquest of the Thebaid provided positive material, in contrast to the failure of the southern campaign, and the persistence of an insurgent movement despite its military defeats. The Rosetta decree issued as part of the celebration at Memphis illustrates a shift in the Ptolemaic approach to the conflict. The decree demonstrates (1) the language that the Ptolemies chose to employ to describe the rebellion, and (2) the beginning of a Ptolemaic policy of conciliation.

(1) Ptolemaic rhetoric and propaganda in the Rosetta decree dictated the vocabulary of rebellion and established the royal narrative of past and present events. A few years earlier, a contract in the Oxyrhynchite nome had referred to attacks from πολεμίων (enemies), but this standard reference for wartime enemies was not used again during the revolt. The standard Ptolemaic description of the revolt, ταραχή, disturbance, was employed for the first time, as far as we know, in the eighth year of Ptolemy V, in the royal decree concerning slaves taken during the “Disturbance,” and then repeated a year later in the Rosetta decree. The word ταραχή implied an
impermanent, and one might even go so far as to say impersonal, condition, and characterized it as the introduction of disruptive elements to what would presumably have been a stable, orderly system. Within the text of the decree, and later decrees, Ptolemaic discourse avoided words for war or enemies. Instead, the insurgents are described as ἄσεβεῖς “impious” men, having a mind for secession, and making rebellion. Even the apostatai, rebels, of the note from Mouchis in the Arsinoite, are nowhere to be found in the Rosetta decree. The king, on the other hand, is said to have emulated Egyptian gods while protecting and honoring the temples and priests. If Epiphanes was truly the first Ptolemaic king to take Pharaonic titles, this could also be construed as a rhetorical response to the rebel Pharaohs in the south.

(2) The Rosetta decree illustrates early Ptolemaic conciliatory policies, which used concessions and mediation to defuse the causes of rebellion. Following the introductory formula, the decree began with a list of philanthropic acts designed to secure the εὐθηνίαι “prosperity” of the people during his rule. The discharge of arrears due to the crown from numerous taxes up through his eighth year applied to all Egypt, and the text even says that it was a large sum. If, as it seems, the rebel regime in the

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21 These are oblique references, preferring participial phrases to simple nouns, see OGIS 90.19-20, 26-27: τῶν ἀλλότρια φρονησάντων and τῶν ἀποστάντων.
22 His official coronation as Pharaoh is the earliest indisputably attested, but may well not have been the first. For the Egyptianizing language within the monarch’s self-description, see lines 2-4 and 6-10 of the Rosetta decree.
23 OGIS 90.12-13: ταῖς τε ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεις πεφιλανθρώπηκε πάσαις καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχοῦντων ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ προσόδων καὶ φορολογιῶν τινὰς μὲν εἰς τέλος ἀφῆκεν, ἄλλας δὲ κεκούφικεν, ὡς ὁ τε λαὸς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐν εὐθηνίαι ὠσὶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βασιλείας, τὰ τε βασιλικὰ ὀφειλήματα,
Thebaid did not collect taxes, a tax amnesty constituted a sort of competition with rebel practice. It was also likely a pragmatic move, since collecting on long overdue taxes from war-torn regions was likely to be difficult, if not impossible. The next philanthropies addressed the priests and their temples, whose lands and properties the king guaranteed and whose overdue taxes he renounced. He also dropped a range of fees, ended the burden of a yearly voyage to Alexandria, and provided other aids for Egyptian ritual. The priests and their temples represented the elite class and central institutions of Egyptian society and culture. The royal decrees were styled to secure their essential support. The final philanthropies addressed those implicated in the revolt itself. In lines 13-14 he released from their confines those who had been held in prison and brought up on charges long before, and in lines 19-20 the king decreed that “those of machimoi and the others who were hostilely disposed during the time of the Disturbance, having returned home, shall remain in charge of all their own properties.”

24 See OGIS 90.28-35 in particular.
variant of the Ptolemaic amnesty decrees, an offer to return rebels to their former status and property upon their resumption of loyalty.

7.2. Ptolemaic reform and recovery

More than ten years passed before the revolt came to an end, and almost five before there were any significant military developments. From 187 to 186 BC an army advanced into Upper Egypt, established control throughout the Thebaid, and inflicted a decisive defeat on the rebel army. A priestly decree called by the king after the battle (and recorded at Philae\textsuperscript{26}) recounted the decisive events in the campaign:

When it was announced to his Majesty through the mouth of a friend of his Majesty, who loves the king, by the chief of the cavalry Aristonikos son of Aristonikos, concerning Komanos, who is one of the first friends of his Majesty: "A battle took place in the South in the area of Thebes with the impious man, the fiend of the gods \textit{Hr–wnf} and the troops of the Ethiopians, who had united with him, slaying them, seizing as captive this wicked man alive…. On the 3rd of Mesore it was announced to his Majesty: \textit{Hr–wnf} has been captured alive in the battle against him in year 19, on 24 Epeiph. His son was killed, the commander of the army of impious men, together with the leaders of the Ethiopians who fought on his side. He was brought to the place where the king was. He was punished by death for the crimes, which he had committed, and so were the other criminals, those who had rebelled in the sedition, which they had made.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} The decree known as Philae II, for which, see Sethe \textit{Hieroglyphische Urkunden II} (1904: 214-30, no. 38).

\textsuperscript{27} Translated in Müller (1920: 59-88).
The defeat of Ankh-wennefer and his army on 26 August 186 BC dealt a devastating blow to the rebellion, and there was relative calm in Upper Egypt for almost twenty years, until the invasion of Antiochus IV in 169 BC.\textsuperscript{28} The rebel army’s departure from insurgent tactics to what seems to have been a pitched battle may be explained in several ways. First, the greater part of the Thebaid had already been seized in the initial Ptolemaic advance, and while insurgent tactics may have eventually regained the region, Ankh-wennefer may have been compelled by human dynamics (desertion or dissent in particular) to gamble his position in a pitched battle. Second, the previous successes of the rebel pharaoh’s forces in holding control of the Thebaid and advancing their power as far north as Lykopolis may have contributed to a military inertia toward pitched battle. Third, and perhaps decisively, the presence of Ethiopian armies alongside the rebel forces may have emboldened the rebels, particularly if their allies were not going to be available for long. For these or other reasons the Egyptian rebels, after avoiding lengthy sieges in defense of the key cities and temples in the Thebaid, committed their forces to a pitched battle and were decisively defeated. Loss meant the elimination of rebel leadership, the rebel military cadres, and the defeat of their allies. The end of the ταραξή in Upper Egypt was in large part due to this battle, and in large

\textsuperscript{28} For the invasion of Antiochus and the Sixth Syrian War, see Polyb. 28.18-23, 29.23-27, 30.26.9, Diod. 30.14-18, 31.1-2, Livy 44.19, 45.11-12.
part due to the military and administrative reforms that accompanied Komanos’ invasion in 187 BC.

The end of the ταραχὴ in the Delta can be known mainly from Polybius’ short account. Polybius says (22.16-7) that Polykrates of Argos, who had become the chief minister of the king by that time, after Aristomenes had fallen from favor, had conducted a conclusive campaign against the remaining rebels in the Delta. Polybius mentions that Polykrates approached the last rebel stronghold, at Sais, and as at Lykopolis the dynastai of the rebels (the final four, according to Polybius) surrendered to avoid a blood-bath. The population of Sais may have been spared, but the surrendering chieftains were tortured and executed. This seems to have taken place in 185 BC. The campaign may have been going on since the time of Komanos’ operations, however. A pair of papyri from the Arsinoite and Herakleopolite nomes describes large shipments of grain being moved on the ships of Polykrates toward Alexandria. These grain shipments may have been organized in support of military operations under Polykrates,

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29 For a discussion of the proper dating of this event, see Walbank (2002: 64-78). He originally located this fragment in 185 BC, which was later accepted by McGing (1997: 20). Walbank (fn. 38 on p. 78) suggested in the edited volume that, based on the order of fragments, it should actually be dated to 188/7 BC, the year before Aristonikos was priest of Alexander and the year Komanos first led his army into the Thebaid. But the ordering of the fragments he suggests is not so clear as he claims, and it seems best to retain his original dating.

30 The papyri are P.Petr. 2.48, from early 187 BC, and P.Tebt. 3.1.823, from late 185 BC. The correspondence of Polykrates’ shipping and Polykrates’ operations in the Delta is the only reason to consider linking these shipments to the support of military operations; the texts themselves do not make this claim. But papyri ordering or recording shipments of grain from Middle Egypt toward the Thebaid and the Delta are well-known in this period, see SB 14.1187-9, 20.14989-92 from 185-3 BC, coordinating shipments from multiple granaries to Alexandria for royal use.
which would then indicate that the operation in the Delta began by at least the spring of 187 BC and continued until 185. Operations against the last insurgents may have continued in the Delta as late as 182, if Veïsse’s interpretation of a hieroglyphic decree for Aristonikos is correct.\textsuperscript{31}

That the defeat of the rebellion came only after twenty years disguises the significance of the Ptolemaic accomplishment. The rebellion was a well-developed insurgency, and few such movements in recorded history have been defeated without widespread destruction and loss of life from a state strategy of brutal oppression. The Ptolemaic victory, particularly in the Thebaid, where the sources are much better, did not come through increasing brutality, but through a combination of reforms designed to increase Ptolemaic legitimacy, Egyptian participation in the Ptolemaic state, and general stability and security, and alleviation of the economic roots of dissent. Aside from the men killed in the battle between Komanos’ and Ankh-wennefer’s armies, there is no evidence for significant loss of life or damage to property during Komanos’ invasion. Instead, the greatest destruction took place in the vicinity of Lykopolis, which had formed the front line between the rebels and Ptolemies, probably ever since the withdrawal of Ptolemaic forces from the south in 197 BC.\textsuperscript{32} After Komanos’ army regained control of Lykopolis in 187 BC, the survey of the region reported not only the

\textsuperscript{31} Veïsse (2004: 10, 158).
\textsuperscript{32} SB 24.15972. See McGing (1997) for commentary and translation.
death of most of the peasant population, but the absence of clear records of land tenure and the dereliction of the most of the land. There were three broad areas of military reform instituted to end the insurgency. First, the Ptolemaic army continued its movement away from the Argead phalanx and traditional settler system, toward more mobile professional and semi-professional forces. Second, the Ptolemaic military constructed and maintained a pervasive presence in Upper Egypt through forts, guard-posts, and decentralized military settlements. Third, the Ptolemaic state increased the points of contact between the military and society, most visibly by increasing the Egyptian presence within, and access to, desegregated military units and opening several avenues for greater military collaboration with police forces.

7.2.1. Infantry Reform

The Ptolemaic army made a decisive movement away from the sarissa-equipped phalanx of the Argead monarchs and the Hellenistic kingdoms in the early second century. The losses suffered at Panion among the phalangites likely played some part in this shift. But for the most part, the movement seems to have been driven by a concern for combat against rebels. It may also have reflected an awareness of the panoplies and tactics commonly used by the majority of soldiers in the Ptolemaic army by that time. Unlike the phalanx, the infantry of the Ptolemaic army were increasingly armed with the thureos shield, spears, javelins, and swords instead of the sarissa. In addition to the
change in panoply, and its accompanying impact on tactics, there was also an observable movement away from the settler army toward semi-professional troops, located between the foreign mercenary and the klerouchs of the third century. This development had roots in the middle of the third century, and was modified over time down toward the end of the second.

Papyrological and epigraphic evidence supports only a very limited role for the traditional Macedonian infantry in Ptolemaic campaigns against the rebels. The class of triakontarouroi Makedones had suffered severe casualties. There is a single piece of evidence that portions of the phalanx were involved in fighting the rebels in the early second century BC, and very little else. A metrical funerary inscription from Koptos in the Thebaid commemorates a father and son who died in pitched battle there against the rebels. The father, Ptolemaios, was an officer, and his son, Metrodoros, a soldier, in the Macedonian infantry. The date of the inscription is disputed. The son is described as a standard bearer, a σημειοφόρος, which would seem to suggest a mid-second century date. However, the father and son were both within a unit classified as Macedonians (I.

33 In addition to the text discussed below, two Macedonians etched their names at Abydos and could have had a military role, see I.Memnoneion 180 and 534, but could easily have been individual Macedonians in heterogeneous infantry or cavalry units.
35 It is generally accepted as second century. Peck (1955: 1149) argued for an early second century date based on letter forms and comparable examples, Wilhelm (1946: 46) in the original edition speculated that the context could have been the revolts of Dionysios Petosarapis in 163 BC or possibly of Thebes in 88 BC.
36 The σημειοφόρος became a standard position within the Ptolemaic army in the 170's or 160's BC, cf. BGU 6.1258, and was considered one of the officers ἐξω τάξεων by the late second century, see Alex.Mus. 44a =
5), which would imply that they were part of the phalanx, since no other infantry unit constituted even primarily of Macedonians is known. In addition, the son is specifically described (l. 4) as αἰχμητὴν σημοφόρωι κάμακι, “a spearman, with the standard-bearing pole.” In the text the son is a simple soldier, bearing the standard, rather than a standard-bearer. This is important, for after 165 BC the standard-bearer was considered an officer ἐξευ τάξεων, but the text describes him as αἰχμητής and στρατιώτης (l. 5), words for regular soldiers rather than an officer. 37 Their Macedonian military unit and the son’s non-officer status as a semi-official standard-bearer supports the early second-century date suggested by Peek, and may relate to an episode of combat during the first or second invasions of the Thebaid. 38

The military reforms around the time of Komanos—paid soldiers in units more flexible than the phalanx—built upon earlier developments in the Ptolemaic army. The

SB 1.599, from Hermoupolis (second half second century BC), and SB 5.8066 and Cair.Mus. 25.2996, also from Hermoupolis (c.78 BC). See also Temple of Hibis II.17 for another, identified as generally second century. In fact the consideration of the standard-bearer as an officer seems to reflect the army reforms of the 160’s BC (for which, see Sekunda 2001).

37 The size of the unit is unknown through the father’s title simply as a hegemon, but he was of sufficiently high status to have been gymnasiarch, though in which city we cannot know with certainty. Third century gymnasia are known from major cities like Alexandria (Strabo 17.1.6), Naukratis (Inscr.Delta 1.750), and Ptolemais/Thebes(?) (SEG 8.694 = Pros.Pierre 16, thought to have belonged to Ptolemy IV’s reign originally, Ptolemy VI’s reign is also possible, and the actual find-place of the stele, which turned up in Luxor market, is unknown—Ptolemais may be more likely than Thebes), but also from several of the smaller towns of the Fayum, cf. P.Enteux. 8, P.Sorb. 3.105, and PSI 4.391. Based on Macedonian and later Ptolemaic examples, the lowest (and perhaps likeliest) rank Ptolemaios could have held would have been suntagnatarch, equivalent to the Macedonian speirarch, commander of about 250 men.

38 Peek, loc.cit. If the battle in which they died occurred during the campaign of Komanos, it might imply that the decisive battle against the rebels took place north of Thebes near Koptos, rather than further south near Syene, as is usually thought.
Ptolemaic army had a long-standing “tradition” of slowly incorporating new bodies of men and even new modes of fighting. The various sorts of mercenary cavalry are the most evident of these groups, followed by the ethnic hipparchies, which might have emerged from some of those same mercenary contingents. Paid soldiers permanently resident in Egypt were not new. There is some evidence for paid, permanently resident infantry prior to the Fourth Syrian War in Middle Egypt and among the garrison at Alexandria. The evidence increased substantially after the war. Within the Middle Egyptian nomes, six men classified as τακτόμισθοι, “paid soldiers,” are attested in the last ten years of the third century, along with four separate eponymous commanders: Phyleus, Maraioi, Endios, and Dorotheos, providing some insight into the structure of these new units. On onomastic grounds, little can be said of the name Phyleus, save that it is likely Ionian. Dorotheos is a strongly theophoric name, best-attested among the Egyptian Jewish population. Maraios is an Oscan name, and is also the name of a Mamertine buried in the Hadra cemetery outside Alexandria, who may have been the

[39 In the middle nomes, the eponymous commands of Krateros: P.Hib. 2.267, P.Lille 1.27, P.Stras. 7.642 and Agesarchos: P.Petr2. 24 are known, while in Alexandria, the city guards included Cyrenean permanently resident soldiers: P.Lond. 7.1986.

40 Phyleus: P.Tebt. 3.1.820; Maraios: P.Petr. 2.47, 3.57; Endios: BGU 6.1266, P.Grad. 10; Dorotheos: SB 4.7351. The soldiers under their command include an Amphipolitan, one Apollonian, one or possibly two Chalcidian(s), a Macedonian, a Paionian, and a Thracian.

41 A survey of inscriptions records eight men of that name in Attica, five in Ionia, and one each in Thessaly and Eretria, through the Packhum Epigraphic Database and the Oxford Lexicon of Greek Personal Names (LGPN).

42 Though not exclusively. One Thracian and one Libyan are also known with this name. Jewish: PP 0889-0891, 0944-6, Thracian 0742, Libyan 02960. The majority of instances of this name appear without an ethnic, however.

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same man. The exact panoply of Ptolemaic mercenaries is unknown, but it would not be surprising if their panoply followed generation-old trends in Greece and exchanged the round *aspis* or *pelte* for the oval *thureos* widely employed by Italic and Celtic warriors. The unit of *epilektoi thorakitai* attested in 197 would have almost certainly been equipped with the *thureos*. A late third- or early second-century painted tombstone from Alexandria depicts a Greek warrior equipped with the oval shield. Another tombstone of comparable date, for a Bithynian soldier, depicts him with a *thureos*, thrusting spear, and two javelins. Neither the new equipment nor the terms of service were entirely absent from Ptolemaic Egypt in the late third century, but instead could be found amongst a minority of (primarily foreign) soldiers within military institutions that emphasized a settled infantry armed as a Macedonian phalanx.

The reforms of Komanos cannot be understood in their entirety through present sources, but seem to have expanded the role of paid soldiers and the *thureos*-based kit.

The increased use of the *thureos* within the standard units of the army is indicated by the

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43 *SB* 417f; see also Launey (1949: 605).
44 Sekunda (2007: 339-43). The popularity of the *thureos* among mercenary and light-to-medium infantry is indicated in Arrian’s *Taktike* (4.4). The *thureos* was used as the national shield for the armies of the Boiotian League from as early as 270 BC until about 245 BC (*IG* VII.2716, *SEG* 3.351), when it seems to have been rejected in favor of Macedonian-style armament, reflecting the League’s return to the Macedonian sphere. It seems also to have been used from about 245-210 by the Achaean League by many of their troops (*Paus. 8.50.1-2, Plut. Phil. 9.1, Anderson (1967): 101-2*). It also became fairly common in Asia Minor from the middle of the third century, see Ma (2000: 354-7).
45 *Bernard, Mus. de Louvre* 40.1-2 = *SB* 1.2129, see Brown (1957) no. 23. The deceased, Aristodemos son of Kallisthenes, rests his arm upon the large shield, and is depicted in heroic nudity.
46 Brown (1957), no. 27 (*SB* 3:6241 = *Alex.Mus.* 20919).
increasing popularity of that shield in terracottas beginning about that time. Most importantly, a number of these terracottas, from the early-to-mid second century, depicted Greek-looking soldiers armed in the Galatian manner, with *thuros* shields, and swords worn, contrary to normal Hellenistic practice, at the right hip, like a Galatian warrior. Because Galatians, archetypal barbarians and perennial mercenaries, contributed most of the particulars of this new armament, it seems fitting to refer to it as being armed in the Galatian manner. The Ptolemaic borrowing during the time of Komanos seems to have extended beyond the shield to include Galatian weapons: a short sword and a throwing spear, called the *gaison*. A later Ptolemaic document refers to the weapon within the context of a military or paramilitary operation. The *gaison* was a Celtic weapon, seemingly a throwing spear made wholly or largely of iron, comparable in some sense to the *pilum*, *saunion*, or *soliferreum*. Its presence in Middle

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47 A crouched soldier model was adapted to an oval shield from the round shield about this time; see BM Terracotta 3548 and Cairo Mus. 26824 for the earlier type, and Alexandria Mus. 23200 for the latter. Armed Bes and Erotes terracottas became very popular during the Ptolemaic period, and most figurines were produced with oval shields beginning in the late third or early second century; For Bes, there are many examples, select examplars of the popular type include Bailey (2008: nos. 3098 and 3102), Ashmolean nos. 1872.1038 and 1881.187, and Fischer (1994: no. 535). For the Eros, see Perdrizet (1921: nos. 377-9) and Török (1995: no.36). See also a *thuros* shield model in Bailey (2008), no. 3300.

48 For these, see Weber (1914: no. 74), Perdrizet (1921: nos. 381-3), Stari (1981: nos. 27 and 33), and Bailey (2008: no. 3550).

49 Polybius often described troops armed in the Macedonian manner, or in the Roman manner.

50 Pollux (7.156) equated the gaison and soliferreum (the all-iron javelin of Iberian warriors) as types of “all-iron” throwing spears utilized by European barbarians; Nomius (555) describes the *gaesum* as a Celtic throwing spear; Servius (8.660) affirms the word’s Gaulish origin, while Hesychius (G 61) makes no mentions of Gallic origin, but says it means a dart or missile made wholly of iron. Mallory (1997: 537) affirms the words Gaulish origin on linguistic grounds, and notes that the family of Indo-European *ghais-o-s* words refer to throwing spears and more generally to projectiles or the act of throwing.
Egypt in the late second century is indicative of Celtic influence on Ptolemaic military weaponry. Borrowing from Galatian soldiers extended to swords as well, as a new stabbing and slashing sword appears to have become common early in the second century. The sword is not known from any archaeological examples, but the funerary stele from Sidon, for the semeiphoros Dioskourides, shows the sword, and terracotta copies of it are well known.\textsuperscript{52} The sword featured particularly Celtic decorations at the hilt and pommel, and the blade itself seems to have been modified from a type used by Galatian warriors.\textsuperscript{53} At a later point these may have been at least partially replaced by a gladius-style sword, known from two examples, one at Defenna in Egypt (Petrie Mus. UC 34339) and the other at Jericho in Israel.\textsuperscript{54} This later type of sword also seems to be

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\textsuperscript{52} Stele of Dioskourides: Mendel (1912: no. 102, though see also nos. 103-4 for similar swords, though the condition of those stelae is worse). Model swords: Petrie Mus. UC 47929 from Memphis, and from Naukratis, Bailey (2008: nos. 3288-93), of which no. 3293 very clearly demonstrates the multi-lobate pommel characteristic of La Tene swords, though these distinctive pommels are clear in each of the varieties. This last example also shows the bilobate hilt, otherwise peculiar to La Tene culture blades, while the other examples, both of the sword models and that of Dioskourides, feature Hellenic-style hilts. The models were only about 20cm long complete (most are broken), and thus probably a little less than half life-size. Six- and eight-point stars on the hilts associate the model swords with the Ptolemaic royal army.

\textsuperscript{53} Celtic warriors are more famous for their long swords, but Galatian short swords are known from several sources: the coins Leukon II minted in the third century to pay East Celtic mercenaries featured these pointed short swords on the reverse, see Zograph (1941: pl. XLII, no. 17), and again in two examples of Boii staters from Central Europe, see Gorny & Mosch 125 (2003): lot 10 and 151 (2006): lot 9. Two terracotta figurines of Galatian mercenaries, discovered in Smyrna and Cyprus, show the same sort of sword, see Bienkowski (1928: figs. 176 and 196).

\textsuperscript{54} The Defenna sword (Petrie Mus. UC 34339) and the Jericho sword, see Stiepel (2004: 229-232) have very slightly “waisted” double-edged blades, similar to the gladius hispaniensis, but with blade lengths of 75cm or more they are longer than known gladius. Additionally, the shape of the blades narrows sharply to a point in both examples, as in the Mainz gladii of the mid-1\textsuperscript{st} century BC-1\textsuperscript{st} century AD, though the latter had, generally, much shorter blades.

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depicted in some late-second-century Egyptian terracottas.55 These innovations in weaponry demonstrate a willingness within the Ptolemaic army to incorporate new or foreign designs.

The Ptolemaic panoply suggested here—a short sword, a thureos, and throwing spear—suggests a corresponding tactical adjustment. The thureos was not designed for the phalanx. It was an oval shield with a vertical orientation, fairly effective for protecting an individual soldier, but not those beside him. Throwing spears necessarily imply an embrace of ranged combat, and swords allowed for individual fighting initiative within a melee. The phalanx would have no longer been the primary tactical unit for these reformed Ptolemaic forces. The men in Komanos’ army would have had greater capacity for flexible action in the counter-insurgent environment than men armed for service in the Macedonian phalanx. The reforms seem to have been instituted, partly as a response to the losses at Panion, partly in response to the changing nature of the Ptolemaic army, and at least in some part calculated to increase the effectiveness of military units operating against insurgent forces, for that was surely their effect.56

55 They are wielded by either an armored Bes, or an armored warrior, often identified as Ares; for these examples, see Fischer (1994: no. 543), Perdrizet (1921: no. 134), and Bailey (2008: no. 3372).
56 One must also consider the possibility that the broadened availability of men equipped and trained in that style of combat, occurring precisely at the time the Ptolemies lost so many Macedonians, made the reform a practical necessity. While this should be considered as part of the story, the far-reaching institutional reforms that followed were not necessitated by the new source of manpower or new type of equipment, but only by a changed approach to military activity.
Komanos, who would later rise to further prominence as co-guardian of the Ptolemaic triple monarchy in 169–8, may have been involved in the implementation of the reform, in addition to commanding the reformed army. He was, prior to the invasion of the Thebaid, a prominent member of the court aristocracy, one of the “First Friends” of the king, and the first known in Egypt. The origins and career of Komanos have attracted sporadic interest over the past century. Even before the decisive campaign in the Thebaid he had accompanied a distinguished group of Alexandrians to Delphi, in late 188 BC. And after the Ptolemaic defeat outside Pelousion in 170 BC, Komanos became co-guardian, with Kineas, of the young monarchs (Polyb. 28.19.1) and in 162 BC served as ambassador to Rome on behalf of Ptolemy VIII (Polyb. 31.19-20). It is possible that he was the grammarian Komanos of Naukratis, who was also the chief cup-bearer to one of the Ptolemies, probably Ptolemy VIII. We must reject Welles’ argument that

57 P.Col. 8.208, from early 187 BC. The first confirmed member of the “First Friends,” or πρώτων φίλων, was Polykrates of Argos, who held the title as governor of Cyprus, see Peristianis (1910: 943, no.32). The next after Komanos were also involved in the occupation of the Thebaid, Ptolemy son of Eumenes (SB 6.9367 and Thèbes à Syène 314), and Hippalos (P.Tebt. 3.2.895 and OGIS 103), the latter of whom succeeded Komanos later as epistrategos (supreme commander) of the Thebaid.
59 Syll. 585.134-147. The list includes Ptolemaios (priest of Alexander 185/4 BC) and his son Galestes of the family of Chrysermes, one of the most prominent families at the court of Alexandria (Welles, loc. cit., 96-7), Ptolemaios Makron, who would later, as governor of Cyprus, hand the island over to Antiochus IV (2 Macc. 10.12-3), Aristonikos (priest of Alexander 187/6 BC), who accompanied Komanos on the campaign, Ptolemaios, son of Ptolemaios (priest of Alexander 194/3 BC), and Philon, son of Kastor (priest of Alexander 179/8 BC).
60 Proclus, Schol.Hes.Op. 99. Solmsen (1945: 115) and Welles (1965: 93) consider this possible or even likely. As a contemporary of Aristarchus, who was an attendant of Ptolemy VI, Welles considers the association with Ptolemy VIII likely, or at least with the era of the joint and split reigns. The principle problem with this
he was part of the Chrysermes family, as Welles’ interpretation is based off of an errant reading of the Delphi inscription.  

He is accepted as a Greek or Hellenized member of the court, but his name is odd and implies a non-Greek origin. Komanos, as a personal name, appears for the first time in the Greek world with this prominent man, and only became common after his astounding popularity, and almost exclusively in Egypt. Schmidhauser and others have been inclined to attribute Cappadocian roots to Komanos, and see in his name a theophoric reference to Komana, the Hellenistic-era name for the Hurrian-era mother deity Kummammi. But the personal name Komanos or variants of it are unknown in Anatolia, and so while this has become the standard etymology for his name, a superior one can be supplied. The earliest appearance of the name Komanos originated outside the Greek world, well before the Komanos of the

position is that the political-military Komanos was a citizen of Alexandria, according to the Delphi inscription, not of Naukratis.

Welles (1965: 97-9). He views the Alexandrians in the inscription as members of the same family, which is clearly not the case. The first entries are from the same family, of Chrysermes, but all of the entries are for separate men of the court. Several men can be separately indentified, and several even have patronymics.

Schmidhauser (2008: 332-3).

In fact, the town named Komaneonpolis, which held a temple for Komana (Imperial era: Ma), is unknown prior to the common era (REG 1895: 86–IGR 3.107, SEG 40.1166, 41.1107, 42.1133), though they surely existed before then, but may not have been incorporated in the Hellenizing world until later. There seems to have been a town or fort near Pergamon called Komania in 400 BC (Xen. Anab. 7.8.15) but nothing is known about it save that it held a garrison of Assyrian soldiers. Strabo mentions three towns named Komana, one in Upper Cappadocia (11.12.2), one in Cappadocia-Cataonia (12.2.3), and one in Phrygia-Pontica (12.3.15, 32-6), the Komaneonpolis of inscriptions. Cassius Dio (36.10-1) mentions one of these Komana in Cappadocia during his narrative of the Second Mithridatic War in about 73 BC. While these towns are fairly well known, no man or woman bearing the name of these towns is known from Asia or elsewhere, unless we take the several men named Komanos in Egypt to have been named for these towns. There are coins bearing the names of the towns earlier than the inscriptions, from the end of the second century BC (SNG Tübingen 2069).
Thebaid campaign. Comanus was the leader of the Segobrigii Gauls and of a confederation of neighboring Gallic and Ligurian tribes in the sixth century BC. Based on its Gaulish etymology, some have speculated that “Comanus” was actually a title, referring to a confederate leader, as well as a personal name. The legend “Comanus” is also known from a number of early Gallic coins. Comanus was the name of one or more kings of the Allobroges and/or Voconces in the late second into the early first century BC, known from several dozen coins that bore the name. Who better to oversee Galatian-influenced military reforms in the Ptolemaic army than a prominent Galatian?

Galatian influence within the military reforms is also evident within the new units. An inscription carved at Abydos, probably in about 188/7 BC during the campaign of Komanos, describes the activity of four men who describe themselves as τῶν Γαλατῶν, or “of the Galatians.” Of the four men named, only one has a seemingly Celtic name: Akannon. But the others, Thoas, Kallistratos and Apollonios, do not. In fact, Thoas is a fairly uncommon Central Greek name, and poorly attested outside Central

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64 Justin EpiTrogPomp. 43.4: Mortuo rege Nanno Segobrigiorum, a quo locus acceptus condendae urbis fuerat, cum regno filius eius Comanus successisset.

65 See B. Post (1848: 34) and (1861: 8, 38-40), written “COMAN.” The Voconces resisted Hannibal in 218 BC (Livy 21.31) and later became allies of Rome. See also Oldfield (1953: 107-116), where he associates the names and coin legends COM(M) (Commius) and COMA(N) (Comanus) as having similar Gaulish roots, and Kroll (1963: 131). Whatmough (1970: 39, 154), produces an East Celtic inscription that reads: κιμενουλο and which he speculates could be a possessive form related to Gaulish Coman(us). Linguistically, the Coman- route refers to leadership over a group.

66 The Voconces were located at the foot of the Alps, and the Allobroges adjacent to them, near the territory of the Segobrigii. The coins are associated with his rule over several cities or sub-tribes: the Cosegudes, the Vediantii, and the Brigantes. De Witte and Longperier (1856: 74-86).

67 OGIS 757 = I.Menn. 174.
Greece. Kallistratos and Apollonios have no regional tie, and it is feasible that second- or third-generation Galatians could have had such names. Of the Galatians buried at the Soldiers’ Tomb outside Alexandria, two (Pyrrhos and Isidoros) seem to have taken Greek names, while most retained Celtic ones. The identifier τῶν Γαλατῶν more likely refers to a military unit or association, many of which followed that pattern, rather than an ethnic group, which would normally be presented in the nominative case. The presence of a Galatian, and probable presence of Greeks or other members of the general Hellenistic population of Egypt, in the same unit, named for the Galatians, may indicate the implementation of Galatian weaponry, and would also indicate that Galatians were enrolled in the unit alongside Greeks, which may have helped speed the transition to new weaponry and tactics.

The unit of “The Galatians” may not have been the only of its type. As new units were established, the Ptolemaic army in the 180’s BC and 170’s BC followed the patterns that had been common almost a century earlier, naming units after loosely associated ethnic groups or their eponymous commander. A unit called “The Pisidians” is attested in 170 BC, but the two men known to have been in the unit were from Halikarnassos in Karia and Arsinoe in Lykia. The Pamphylians may also appear in an inscription from

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68 This is standard for visitor’s ethnics at the Memnoneion at Abydos. See, for example, I.Memn. 152, for a Galatian, Demetrios, with the ethnic, as usual, in the nominative. On the other hand, a list of soldiers in the command of Eudamos (I.Memnon. 163) begins in precisely the same way as that for the Galatians.

69 P.Ryl. 4.583. Nikomachos, the Halikarnassian, seems to have been in the same unit, though the place in the papyrus that would confirm this is lost, based on the information the document gives about the other
the Fayum.\textsuperscript{70} There may or may not be some link to the \textit{koinon} of the Lykians, who set up an honorary stele for Ptolemaios, son of Ptolemaios the son of Eumenes, who with his father commanded troops in the Thebaid.\textsuperscript{71} These preceded some later ethnic military units, and may have been direct antecedents to the eventual \textit{politeuma} organizations that developed later in the second century.\textsuperscript{72} This does not mean that the units were at all homogeneous; the case of “The Galatians” should demonstrate that well enough. A handful of other dedications at Abydos have military contexts and may belong to the same era, either to Komanos’ campaign or that of one of his predecessors. Of the several military texts preserving multiple names,\textsuperscript{73} only one gives ethnics (\textit{I.Memnon}. 292), and indicates diverse origins for men in the same unit: Syria, Oitaia, Magnesia, Herakleia, and Crete.\textsuperscript{74} An Arsinoite record of dispersed infantry and their \textit{hegemon} includes nine Persians, six Macedonians, two each of Cyreneans and Judeans, and one each soldier, Krates, the Arsinoeitan: lines 4-5, 47-8: Κράτητι Φειδίμου Αρσινοείτης άπό Λυκίας τών καθ’ αὐτούς Παμφύλων τακτομίσθωι.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{I.Fayoum} 3.199 = \textit{SB} 8.9819, a dedication by “the Pamphylians” to Artemis of Perga, dated to the second century BC.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{OGIS} 99. The stele was erected in Alexandria near the end of Ptolemy V’s reign. Two Lykians inscribed their names at the Memnoneion (\textit{I.Memnn.} 468), but the inscription gives little indication of the nature of their visit. A \textit{politeuma} of Lykians is attested in the Imperial period (\textit{Pros.Pierre} 61 = \textit{IGR} 1.1078).

\textsuperscript{72} Ethnic units included the Bithynians (?\textit{SEG} 8:357, later 2\textsuperscript{nd} c.) and Mysians (\textit{P.Gen.} 1.131, 146 BC). The earliest definite example of a Ptolemaic \textit{politeuma} is that of the Cretans in the Arsinoite nome (\textit{P.Tebt.} 1.32.17, 145 BC). \textit{Politeuma} are mentioned in several of the Sidon stelai, which, if Ptolemaic, are roughly contemporary to \textit{P.Tebt.} 1.32. See also \textit{P.Polit.Iud.} for the Judean \textit{politeuma} in the Herakleopolite; the earliest texts from that archive indicate a similar date in the mid-to-late 140’s BC for that association as well.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{I.Memnn.} 32, 163, 180, 292, 388, 534, and 583.

\textsuperscript{74} There were multiple Herakleias, but it is most probable that the large Herakleia Pontica is meant; likewise there were multiple Magnesias, and it is difficult to say whether the region Magnesia in Greece or the Asian city Magnesia-on-the-Maeander is meant.
Alexandrian, Arkadian, Libyan, Lokrian, Byzantine, and Thracian. There is no evidence for any attempt made, following this reform, to recreate the mythological Macedonian ethnicity of the prior era.

The reformed units were, for the most part, the incorporation of mercenary medium infantry, with Galatian influences, into the regular army of the Ptolemaic rulers. The poor organization of the units in the first couple of decades suggests novelty, and evokes comparisons with the early Ptolemaic army. Officers were simply called *hegemones*, literally, “officers,” until the 160’s BC. The soldiers continued to hold the status of *taktomisthoi*, “soldiers serving for pay” or collectively simply as *pezoi* “infantry.” Recruits from the Arsinoite may have been concentrated at Theogonis prior to their expedition to the Thebaid, for training, as was done before the Fourth Syrian War. The number of new soldiers enrolled for the Thebaid campaign may have

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75 P. Tebt. 3.1.793, 186/5 BC. The soldiers are settled or stationed in or near scattered towns, mainly but not exclusively in the precinct of Herakleides in the Arsinoite nome.

76 The first reference within the papyri to the class of *hegemones* as a specific group within Ptolemaic military institutions is in one of the first documents regarding Komanos, P. Col. 8.208.8-9, in late February or early March 187 BC. As for later examples, individual *hegemones*: P. Tebt. 3.1.793. Fr. 6.15: Τίμώνος ἡγεμόνος τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ασίας, P. Mich. 18.781.49: Ἐθεώδωρος Ἐθεώδωρου ἡγι(εμον) τε(γον); the class of *hegemones*: P. Hauen. 1.11. ext. 2.7: τῶν μὲ θεοῦ ἰππαλῶν ἱγεμόνων.

77 For the continuation of former term, see P. Hels. 1.2 (late 190’s BC), P. Tebt. 3.1.816 (192/1 BC), P. Tebt. 3.1.818 and P. Dryton 1.11 (174 BC), and P. Giss. 2 (173 BC), and for the latter, see P. Dryton 1.33, which, while the text itself dates from 136 BC, refers to a conquest-era grandfather as a soldier in the *pezoi* of Diodotos.

78 In the document P. Hels. 1.2, a man complains about harassment from soldiers around Theogonis. Theogonis is described as an army camp in both P. Kohn. 5.221 (189 BC), which regards wine distributions as part of logistical efforts for a military campaign, probably the preliminary steps of Komanos’ campaign, and in P. Tebt. 3.2.856 (170’s BC), where infantry and desert guards were based.
exceeded four thousand. To recruit so many, they were likely conscripted from the *epigonoi*, the sons of klerouchs and other Greek inhabitants of Egypt. A slightly later text reinforces this notion, referring to the standing troops at Memphis as *epigonoi*.

Provisioning an army on campaign was a complicated matter, and provisioning permanent, paid troops laid only further stress upon the system. During the initial invasion of the Thebaid, Komanos’ army was supported by a massive logistical operation. A document from Lykopolis, recently recaptured from rebel forces, contains a report through military officials to local administrators, regarding the transport of an immense amount of coin and the purchase of grain rations for the army advancing further into the Thebaid. The coordination of these expenses was managed through local officials and military administrative officials who were classified as officers τῶν ἔξω τάξεων, essentially, non-combat military officials. In Mecheir 187 BC the Ptolemaic army began the process of coordinating provisions for thousands of men. Based on an exchange rate of thirty to fifty bronze drachmas per artaba of wheat, the

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79 Four thousand men who campaigned in the Thebaid would later receive land allotments as a group (P.Tebt. 1.79), while others (cavalrymen – P.Tebt. 3.1.793) were settled separately, and still others remained in the Thebaid in new bases (for examples, see P.Dryton 1.11).
80 UPZ 1.14.
81 P.Mil. 2.22.
82 See Lesquier (1911: 87) and Holleaux (1942: 1-14). This classification was extended in the Ptolemaic army in the middle of the second century to the several subaltern officers who stood outside the military formation: standard-bearers, secretaries, etc.
83 The exchange ratio fluctuated in the second century, but is given as fifty drachmas per artaba in a direct purchase (the rarest but most reliable form of exchange data) in 189 BC: P.Heid. 8.417.21-2: χαλκοῦ νομίσματος δραχμὰς μυρίας ὀκτακοσίας [τῇ] μη[η]ν τιρών αρταβῶν τριάκοντα ἐξ. The exchange rate is
money (162 ½ talents) would have been sufficient to purchase 19,500 to 32,500 artabas of wheat. The outlay was sufficient to provision, in the lower case, as many as 15,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry for a month, while the upper number could have provisioned an army of 8,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry for three months.84

The transition to a standing army was costly, and bureaucracy developed around provision of monthly pay and rations, and around the maintenance of muster rolls for a standing army. The best insight into these expanding institutions comes from a document that dates twenty years after the revolt and describes the admission of a deceased klerouch’s son into a standing regiment at Memphis.85 The new soldier would receive 250 drachmas per month as pay, and one artaba of grain.86 The registration of the soldier, Apollonios, involved the commander of the unit to which he was assigned, Dexilaos, and a host of other officials. Following the initial petition written on behalf of Apollonios by his brother, someone wrote to Sostratos, the grammateus for the affairs of the prostetagmenoi, the secretary over the standing soldiery, whose office was probably located in Alexandria. He in turn wrote an enrollment request to the highest grammateus given at a lower thirty drachmas in a penalty clause from 186 BC: P.Heid. 8.412.13-14: δανείου τιμῆς πυρῶν ἀρ(ταβῶν)  tốλθμον τοῖς ἱπποῖς.87 The barley used by horses was cheaper, but the horses consumed more, for a ration of about 5:6 in calculating the cost of a horse’s feed compared to a soldier’s daily ration. The sizes of armies are simply examples of calculations based on reasonable figures for Komano’s army. I find the smaller size more convincing; an army that size could have been provisioned for most of two months with the lower grain estimate.

84 UPZ 1.14, 158 BC.
86 Lines 43-9.
of the military, that of the *dunameis*, Secretary of the Army, Demetrios, who was, presumably, Sostratos' superior. Demetrios approved the motion and forwarded it to the *dioiketes*, Dioskourides, the chief financial official in the kingdom, who approved the order. Dioskourides then wrote authorizations for the enrollment to the *strategos* of the Memphite nome and to the *epimeletes*, the top local administrative official below the *strategos*, and probably the “governor” of Memphis. Demetrios wrote letters to the *strategos*, sent another as a copy to the *dioiketes*, and two more to local military officials in Memphis, the *archyperetes* and *grammateus*, the executive officer and secretary of the command of Dexilaos. The latter letters, we learn from the papyrus, also made their way to the offices of the *logisterion*, the Paymaster’s office, and the garrison commanders at the Memphis citadel. These positions are outlined in Figure 7.1. The key expansions in this system from the third century military-administrative bureaucracy are the addition of the Secretary for the Standing Troops, and the increased importance of the *logisterion* for provisioning and paying units of standing troops.

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<tr>
<th>Military-Financial Bureaucracy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
<td>Dioiketes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of the Standing Troops</td>
<td>Memphite Nome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemon Logisterion Aulen (Barracks)</td>
<td>Stragets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memphis Archyperetes Grammateus</td>
<td>Memphis Epimeletes</td>
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The new units were simply referred to as “infantry” in papyri down to the 160’s BC, when a second reform took place. This reform, which has been recognized previously while the first has not, implemented more detailed organizational structures, possibly borrowing some components from Roman institutions. This follows the same pattern observed in the development of Ptolemaic military institutions in the third century, toward greater complexity and specificity over time. In this case, almost thirty years passed before the beginning of significant organizational reforms. The commands, which remained under the authority of a hegemon, were organized into semeia (banner-units), which were themselves constituted from one or more hekatontarchiai (commands of one hundred) or pentekontarchiai (commands of fifty). The earliest evidence for commands of hundreds and fifties is restricted to the eponymous command of Polykrates, which in one of the sources is also called the Macedonian Agema. It may not have been extended throughout the army for another decade or longer, while the semeia may have spread more quickly through the standing contingents of the reformed Ptolemaic army.

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87 For this, see Sekunda (1996) and (2001) for Romanization reforms in the Hellenistic kingdoms.
88 The first semeia is attested in UPZ 1.18.4-5 from 163 BC.
89 The first hekatontarchia (unit of 100) is found in P.Tebt. 3.1.742.18-9, from about 157 BC. The first pentakontarchos (commander of fifty) is found in P.Tebt. 3.2.910.1-2, from 162 BC. Both of these refer to men in within the eponymous hegemonia of Polykrates, which the latter document implies was considered the whole or part of the agema. The elite agema may have been reformed first.
90 P.Tebt. 3.1.742.19: ἄγη(μα) μακεδονίκου. The current edition of the text does not make this reading (see SB 1.4318), leaving out ἄγη, but it is visible in photographs of the papyrus.
7.2.2. Reformed Settlements and Garrisons

The reformed infantry provided more flexible and permanent manpower for the counterinsurgency, deployed within a strategy of new settlements and garrisons that saturated the Egyptian countryside with traces of military presence and concentrated military manpower and defenses at essential positions. The military operation to seize the Thebaid from the rebels and defeat them ended with Komanos’ victory in August 186 BC, but the operation to stabilize and reincorporate the Thebaid had barely begun. This aspect of the campaign depended upon several steps: establishing control over the land and agriculture, establishing forts and garrisons, and establishing structures of political and military control. The Ptolemaic army began establishing a pattern for conquest in the Lykopolite nome after retaking it from the troops of Ankh-wennefer in about 191 BC.  

Subordinates conducted an extensive survey of the land, paving the way for managing future harvests. A fragment of this survey is known. It reports the obstacles facing the progress of stabilization: much of the peasant population had fled or been killed in fighting, fields were fallow, records of tenure were poor, and those who remained had assumed control over fields that were not their own.  

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91 An army advanced from Lykopolis to Thebes in 191/0 BC, but almost nothing is known about the campaign, but it is unlikely it retained possession of territories south of Ptolemais. This meant, however, that Ptolemaic forces were in control of Lykopolis for perhaps three full years before Komanos’ campaign.
92 SB 24.15972.37-45: πρὸς ἀναλημπτείας εἶναι τοῖς τῆς φορολογίας [ . . ] Ἰβ . οἰς μέχοι τοῦ τὸ πᾶν ἐδάφος τοῦ νομοῦ γεωμετρεῖται. ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Χαοννώφριος παραχθῆναι καὶ χερσὺς | οἰς πλείονας τῶν λαῶν δῆσφανον καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐπιθέας ἐπὶ τῆν τὴν προσκυνοῦσαν τῇ
were dead or gone were classified ἐν τῇ ἀδεσπότῳ, “among the ownerless land,” in an initial survey, and should then have been auctioned off. Instead, neighbors had planted on ownerless land and not paid taxes for it. The text indicates that stabilization operations had functioned more successfully in other regions, meaning that land was properly registered, planted, harvested, and taxed. Since earlier surveys had already taken place and the local population begun to respond and cultivate land, this document probably dates to in or after 189 BC. In response to the problem of ownerless land, one of the Ptolemaic responses was to settle military men in the region. A group of men were assigned twenty-five-aroura allotments in the Lykopolite. The economic recovery was sufficient to provide roughly twenty-to-thirty thousand artabas to the Ptolemaic army from the Lykopolite granaries in the spring of 187 BC.

Ptolemaic leaders implemented a similar strategy throughout the Thebaid even as the army continued operations against the rebels. The advance into the Thebaid began in Mecheir of 187 BC, when Komanos and his forces sailed upriver into the

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93 See Swarney (1970: 26-31) for the category of ownerless land under the Ptolemies.
94 SB 24.15972.46-8: τῆς δὲ σπορίμου μηθὲν παρορᾶσθαι τῆς γεωμετρίας τῶν σπειρομένων καθ’ ἕτος γινομένης καὶ τῶν ἐκφορών ἀπαιτοῦμένων.
95 SB 10.10224, an early second century request to the king regarding allotments and leases in the Lykopolite, probably dating no earlier than 190 (the reconquest) and no later than 169 BC (the joint monarchy). Thus it is entirely possible the allotments were distributed at a later date, but the pattern of distributing klerouchic allotments can be seen in the immediate aftermath of the reconquest throughout the Thebaid.
96 P.Mil. 2.22. The provision may not have been a simple thing, however; the two letters in P.Mil. 2.21 (probably 187 BC) indicates that there were concerns over late harvests and the eminent arrival of the army.
Herakleopolite nome, where they met other forces under the leadership of Hakoris, a wealthy Egyptian.\textsuperscript{97} The passage of the army through the Lykopolite seems to have taken place in Mecheir as well.\textsuperscript{98} More troops may have been collected at Ptolemais, from whose bank the purchase of grain at Lykopolis had been arranged.\textsuperscript{99} The army moved partly by boat up the river, but columns moved overland in support as well.\textsuperscript{100} The distance to Thebes from Lykopolis is about 300 kilometers, requiring a march of ten to sixteen days, plus any necessary fighting.\textsuperscript{101} By the end of the month Pharmouthi, about two months after the army passed through Lykopolis, the army had secured Thebes and administrators had established oversight of local granaries. The spread of Ptolemaic authority over means of supply is indicated in a collection of texts regarding grain distributions in support of the Ptolemaic garrison at Syene in extreme Upper Egypt.\textsuperscript{102} In the surviving fragments, agents in the office of Protarchos, described as in charge of

\textsuperscript{97} P.Col. 8.208; Mecheir: line 6; Hakoris, line 10.

\textsuperscript{98} The correspondence in P.Mil. 2.22 refers to the month Mecheir (lines 4 and 7), but could conceivably refer to the harvest and grain distributions in that month from the following month. P.Mil. 2.22.6.

\textsuperscript{99} P.Col. 8.208 may refer to overland escort for part of the shipped forces, or more likely, some of the coin and materiel used in support of the army. P.Mil. 2.21.b3 implies that a portion of Komanos’ army, under the command of Komon, was marching overland.

\textsuperscript{100} Engels (1980: 16-20, table 7) estimates the marching speed of Macedonian armies as 13-19.5 miles per day under normal conditions for a field army. Modern estimates tend toward 12-18 miles per day for armies, see Neuman (1971: 196-8) and Milns (1966: 256). For Roman speeds, see Luttwak (1976: 80-84), averaging 15 miles per day, or up to 25 per day for smaller contingents or under special circumstances. The range of ten to sixteen days is based on a maximum of 31 and minimum of 19 kilometers per day.

\textsuperscript{101} SB 6.9367. The garrison there may have survived the entire revolt. A document dated on the first decade of the second century (BGU 6.1470) gives Sokrates as the strategies at Elephantine and the names of a number of men in the garrison and residents in the area. The men around Syene likely included garrisons at Syene, Philai, and Elephantine, once Ptolemaic control had been re-established over each of those places. A similar conclusion is reached by Vandorpe (1986: 297), though her suggested date for conquest (early April) as far south as Latopolis is too early: Latopolis and Pathyris are not mentioned in the texts until late June at the earliest.
affairs in the Thebaid,\textsuperscript{103} coordinated shipments of grain from granaries in Thebes (Diospolis Megale), Koptos, Dendera, Pathyris, Diospolis Mikra, Abydos, and Latopolis to support military operations in the vicinity of Syene. For the relation of these places to Syene, see figure 3.2.2 below. The surviving fragments describe shipments for the purpose of supply from the beginning of Pachon through the end of Epeiph, about three months. None of the shipments individually was particularly large, but altogether were sufficient to provision no less than twenty-five hundred soldiers, likely more than twice that number, and as many as triple that number.\textsuperscript{104} These distributions suggest that a similar process was taking shape throughout the Thebaid as that implemented in the Lykopolite nome.\textsuperscript{105}

The coordination of recovery efforts and army supply across so many nomes, separated by hundreds of miles, was only possible by a restructuring of Ptolemaic state

\textsuperscript{103} Fr4, lines 7-8: Πρωτάρχου τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Θηβαίδα.
\textsuperscript{104} Twenty-seven fragments of shipment letters survive, but only ten are fairly legible. Of these ten, the smallest shipment was 350 and the largest either 1800 or 1300. Depending on how the numbers are interpreted, the ten shipments averaged between 778 and 853 artabas. Of the remaining seventeen, several have dates placing them within the same three months, and none can be dated outside of them. Multiplied out to twenty-seven orders, the averages above lead to a total estimate of about 21-3000 total artabas over three months, sufficient to provision seven thousand to seven thousand, five hundred men. More shipments in the surviving fragments were made in the first of the three months, Pachon, than in the latter two, amounting to 4,030 artabas, or 4,750 if the shipment dispatched from Thebes on the 29\textsuperscript{th} of the previous month, Pharmouthi, is included in the total.
\textsuperscript{105} These granaries altogether supplied less toward a military effort than those in Lykopolis, a war-torn province in about its third year of recovery. The presence of any stores at all in the granaries may be a little surprising given the context of revolt. Small harvests may have been gathered as the army advanced in the spring—hardly optimal conditions, and other stores of grain collected from various sources by the occupation forces, either private stores, rebel stores, or stores kept in temples. But for the scarcity in the recently-conquered Thebaid, collections from seven nomes would not hardly have been necessary to supply soldiers at Syene.
institutions in the Thebaid. The office of epistrategos was established to coordinate authority over the entire Thebaid.\textsuperscript{106} Hippalos, the successor to Komanos, definitely held the title.\textsuperscript{107} Komanos' status among the First Friends may indicate he carried that title as well, as has usually been assumed.\textsuperscript{108} Furthermore, the existence of region-wide administrative structures as early as 191/0 BC indicates that the leader of that expedition, Ptolemaios, possessed similar powers, if not the same title. Ptolemaios is known from a pair of receipts of sale at auction for a piece of property around Pathyris. In them he is described as διαδόχου τοῦ πρὸς τῇ στρατηγίᾳ.\textsuperscript{109} That this first conquest ultimately failed is indicated by the auction text itself, wherein the sale was abruptly halted in 190 BC, and not completed until 186, after the army of Komanos had moved into the Thebaid.\textsuperscript{110} This Ptolemaios may be identical with the man of the First Friends in the

\textsuperscript{106} See Thomas (1975: 25-53), Van't Dack (1988: 247-71, 288-313), Mooren (1973: 115-32) and (1975: 84-8), and Vandorpe (1988: 47-50). Most discussion of the office of epistrategos in the Ptolemaic period has concerned the extent to which it involved military as opposed to administrative duties, when clearly it was both. The bifurcation of Ptolemaic roles between military and administrative function in modern scholarship at times reflects modernist conceptions of civil-military relations and spheres. The epistrategoi were, in theory, chief of the officers of the various military units within the Thebaid, while also overseeing administrative affairs. That the area under their administration included the whole Thebaid may be adduced from texts like \textit{P.Tor.Choch.} 8, which describes (lines 35-7) the region extending from Panopolis in the north to Syene in the south.

\textsuperscript{107} He also held an eponymous command over mercenary klerouchs, as indicated by \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.2.853.16-7, from 173 BC and the Arsinoite. It is unclear how his eponymous command and epistrategia would have inter-related; he may have simply been the eponymous “sponsor” for the unit, or commanded it formerly, prior to his epistrategia, or may have held the two positions concurrently. \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.2.895 (c.175 BC) indicates that Hippalos had some level of jurisdiction, or at least influence, within the Arsinoite nome.


\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Chr.Wilck.} 162.11, and the duplicate in \textit{SB} 1.4512. The title diadochos was employed in several different manners during the second century, but it may also be used here to mean “successor” to the position of strategos, which would imply the recent transition of power.

\textsuperscript{110} In the text, \textit{P.Haun.} 11, a soldier, Proitos son of Stasikrates, purchased 31 arouras of land around Pathyris. He did not complete the sale until the new regime in 186 BC, roughly four years later. He sold the land in
Syene logistics text and who took command of the forces in the vicinity of Syene. In addition to the epistrategos, and perhaps earlier than it, an economic position was created, and manned by Protarchos, τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Θηβαίδα (προσόδων), the official “over the revenues in the Thebaid.” The title, if it may be called such, reflects the spirit of reform in its imprecision, though it is not without broad parallels in the Hellenistic world. Protarchos coordinated grain shipments from Thebaid granaries to troops at Syene, but also implemented the various reforms previously implemented in the Lykopolite to restore land tenure and productivity, essential elements to a stable and productive region post-conquest. These projects advanced, it seems, more quickly than the military campaign against Ankh-wennerfer.

Protarchos and the administrative officials in the company of the conquering army oversaw land surveys and auctions throughout the Thebaid. His office was involved in both the survey of adespotic land and the registry of new owners on auctioned land. His successor, Ptolemaios, was still involved in auctions of adespotic land.

184 BC (see P. Schreibertrad. 30 and 115) to the wife of a Hellenized machimos, Thrason alias Patous, whose father and brother were also soldiers, and whose niece Apollonia alias Senmonthis would later marry the cavalry officer Dryton.

In SB 6.9367 he is described (Fr2.2) as leading ships to Syene in the month Pachon. Thèbes à Syène 314 is a dedication to Ptolemy V, his wife Cleopatra, and Isis on behalf of Ptolemaios son of Eumenes of the First Friends and Head of the hunt, and his son Ptolemaios, Chief body-guard and Head of the hunt, from the garrison commander at Philae. It likely dates from the latter half of 187 or early 186. The father and son are also known from the aforementioned OGIS 99. Ptolemaios’ son of the same name was later also of the First Friends and Strategos of the lands around Syene in the 130’s, see Thèbes à Syène 243.

112 Protarchos’ career could later have involved a promotion into the ranks of the Friends and involvement in what may have been the office of the dioiketes, known from BGU 6.1214, from the late 180’s or early 170’s.
in 182 BC. The land auctions do not seem to have served an explicit military purpose, but the presence of Greek men in the Thebaid likely indicates a military and/or administrative role.\textsuperscript{113} The auctions themselves had a distinctive military flavor, presided over by a mix of officials that included a range of high-ranking officers: hipparchs, staff officers of the \textit{epistrategos}, garrison commanders, and police chiefs. The auctions were conducted through army heralds. Additionally, the two surviving examples of Greek auction purchases are related, the earlier to the location of a military settlement (at Pathyris) and the latter perhaps to a military position around Karnak and Chrysopolis on the northern side of Thebes. Both recorded buyers in these cases were military men.\textsuperscript{114}

With these, and the garrison located at Thebes itself,\textsuperscript{115} the Ptolemaic implementation of control in the Thebaid becomes clearer. With land surveyed, the way was open for both auction and settlement, both of which were employed toward two ends: to restore economic activity and to increase the Greek presence in the Thebaid.

\textsuperscript{113} The buyer in \textit{P.Haun.} 1.11, the other auction text, was a military man of some sort, in the eponymous command of Ptolemaios son of Pausanias. The command is otherwise unknown, but the sale was for property in Chrysopolis near Karnak on the north side of Thebes. The eponymous commander may be \textit{Ptolemaic strategos} over the Perithebaid region in a recently published ostrakon, see Gorre (2010: 230-9).

\textsuperscript{114} Though the text itself makes no mention of the military status of Proitos son of Stasikrates, \textit{P.Giss. 36.FrB.16} indicates that he was a \textit{misthophoros} (wage-bearing soldier, likely equivalent to \textit{a taktomisthos}) in the eponymous command of Nikanor. His commander, Nikanor, may be the chief of the transport vessels in \textit{SB} 6.9367, in orders no. 3 and no. 5. The military status of the buyer in \textit{P.Haun.} 11, Damon son of Apollonios, is indicated by his membership in the eponymous command of Ptolemaios son of Pausanias.

\textsuperscript{115} As indicated by the presence of the \textit{phrourarch} Megisthenes at the auctions in Thebes, both in 191 (\textit{Chr.Wilck.} 162.11) and 182 (\textit{P.Haun.} 1.11.ext2.7).
The land surveys and subsequent auctions must have been conducted on a wide scale over a broad region, though not without complications. While only two of the Greek auction texts survive, other texts, related to disputes over auctioned land, indicate the breadth of the auctions. These conflicts arose when land, identified as ownerless, was auctioned to new owners, but the sale was later contested by the original owners or their descendants. One of these claims exists from Diospolis Mikra, and another from Pathyris.\textsuperscript{116} In spite of the difficulties encountered in re-establishing land tenure, the Ptolemaic administrators were able to establish land records and begin collecting taxes.\textsuperscript{117} These reforms may have been intended, on the part of those who ordered and carried them out, to establish control over the land and its people by making records, and thereby to ensure income from taxation. They had the added effect, however, of encouraging the stabilization and recovery of the economy and regular economic activity, essential elements to undermining the causes of dissent. Cataloging land tenure was a mainly secretarial matter, while auctions and tax collection were administrative functions. The greatest difficulty the Ptolemies encountered was in the lived activity of farming, which could not be governed so easily as the other three. Later documents

\textsuperscript{116} Both texts were filed with Daimachos, the \textit{strategos} at Thebes, seemingly a subordinate to Hippalos the \textit{epistrategos}. Both were filed in 182/1 BC. The Pathyris text is \textit{Chr.Mitt.} 32, the Diospolis Mikra text \textit{SB} 5.8033. Skeat (1973: 172-3) has argued that the latter text refers to a land survey and auction conducted \textit{by the rebels} during the revolt, but the text does not require this, and the pattern of surveys and auctions by the Ptolemaic forces supports understanding the survey and auction as having taken place under Ptolemaic authority, between 191 and 182.

\textsuperscript{117} For a brief survey of this related to the Pathyrites nome in particular, see Vandorpe (2000: 405-35).
indicate that half-hearted and illegal planting, as well as irrigation sabotage, remained intermittent problems through the second century.\footnote{These are the central concerns in a memorandum from a dioiketes concerning agriculture, from 165 BC, \textit{P.Genova} 3.92. The letter recommends forced labor to ensure complete planting. Concern for the safety of canals is reflected in the title of a garrison commander in the Delta, \textit{SB} 5.8956, from the 170's, and \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.1.706 from the Arsinoite in the 170's.}

The Greek presence in the Thebaid was primarily military. It revolved around, most importantly, military bases and garrisons, and secondarily, military settlements. Ptolemaic forces based at a major camp (\textit{hypaithron}) outside Ptolemais coordinated the occupation of the several nomes in its vicinity, at least as far upstream as Diospolis Mikra.\footnote{The regions around Thebes, and further south, were administered through local centers. When troops were dispatched from the military center at Ptolemais to areas further south, like Thebes or Hermonthis, those troops came under local jurisdiction, for which see \textit{UPZ} 2.208.} A text from 169/8 BC, composed shortly after Antiochus IV's invasion of Upper Egypt, includes several details about the patterns of Ptolemaic deployment.\footnote{\textit{Chr.Wilck.} 447. The text must be treated with some caution because it reflects conditions in war-time. However, the central idea of the text does not reflect emergency conditions, but the administration of military positions in a broad area from a central location.} The authors of the text are a contingent—composed wholly or exclusively of paid cavalrymen\footnote{μισθοφόροις ἱππεῖς, not to be mistaken for foreign mercenaries, but instead the semi-regular troops in Ptolemaic service.}—serving in Diospolis Mikra, but whose true home base was at Ptolemais. The text is their request for pay, which itself gives some indication of the centralization of affairs at Ptolemais, over eighty kilometers downstream. More importantly, the soldiers couched their plea in a comparison to the proper pay received by other contingents. These include both the other paid cavalrymen still stationed at the
Ptolemais camp, a contingent of cavalry garrisoned or settled in the Chenoboskion,\textsuperscript{122} across the river from Diospolis Mikra, and the cavalry and infantry contingents garrisoned in other places. These paid troops, based out of Ptolemais, provided dispersed garrison forces throughout the region, and could be shipped to areas of need from their central base. This same pattern may be identified in later texts involving the dispatch of units downstream to Panopolis and upstream to Hermonthis.\textsuperscript{123} In addition, settlers were given allotments, as in Lykopolis, in both Panopolis and Diospolis Mikra.\textsuperscript{124}

Further south, from Thebes to Syene, local garrisons and settlements provided security, with little surviving evidence of central coordination between the several locations. A strong military settlement was developed at Pathyris, and later strengthened with the addition of another nearby at Krokodilon Polis.\textsuperscript{125}

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\textsuperscript{122} Near the eventual site of Nag Hammadi, the Chenoboskion held settlers at some point, but precisely how early is unknown; the troops here could be settlers or misthophoroi.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{UPZ} 2.209 describes the deployment of a unit of 84 misthophoroi pezoi, under command of Inaros, to Panopolis as a garrison force in 129 BC. This text, as above, concerns dispersal of the sitonion and opsonion for the troops, reckoned at 350 drachmas per month. \textit{P.Dryton} 36, on the other hand, describes the movement of a large number of troops from Ptolemais as far south as Hermonthis during the rebellion therein 130 BC. That campaign eventually led to the deployment of a contingent to the Memnoneion outside Thebes from the troops based out of Ptolemais. \textit{UPZ} 2.208 (summer of 130 BC) contains the order for their provisions to be provided locally through the administration at Thebes, at least until the soldiers might receive settlements in the area, see also \textit{UPZ} 2.212.

\textsuperscript{124} Inscriptions indicate the presence of settlers at Panopolis by mid-2\textsuperscript{nd} century (\textit{Pan du désert} 1a = \textit{SB} 1.286), while papyri attest their presence in the second half of the century, see \textit{P.Stras.} 8.742. A fragmentary text from Lykopolis, \textit{P.Mil.} 2.25, which most likely dating to the 180’s BC, describes the movement of settlers in route to kleroi in Diospolis Mikra. The settlers in Diospolis Mikra seem to have been Greek, while those at Panopolis seem to have been Egyptians, perhaps cavalry based on their allotments, with Hellenizing names, of which Paniskos seems to have been particularly popular.

\textsuperscript{125} Fischer-Bovet considered that there was some limited settlement of klerouchs from the Hermopolite through the Thebaid in the second and first centuries (2009: 198-200); Winnicki located the origins of major klerouchic settlement in the Hermouopolite with the importance of military operations into the Thebaid (1978: 25).
then became the more important of the two militarily. Other settlers were located at
Edfu, Itos, and Kom Ombo, and the Ptolemies maintained a large military presence in
the vicinity of Syene.\textsuperscript{126} In the latter location, a \textit{strategos} of high-rank (one of the First
Friends no later than 187 BC) commanded administration of the region, the three
garrisons at Philae, Elephantine, and Syene, and probably an outpost at
Parembole/Debod a little further south.\textsuperscript{127} By the end of the second century, there were
about forty garrisons of varying sizes and at least six significant military settlements in
the Thebaid.\textsuperscript{128} The effect of this pattern of occupation was to saturate the region with a
Ptolemaic military presence. Located, as many of the forts were, in each major city and
often within the major temple complexes, the Ptolemaic military secured essential
locations and asserted control over the very places that had more easily fallen into
insurgent hands during the rebellion.

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{SB} 8.9681 indicates the settlement of Greek and Egyptian troops in Apollonopolis Magna (=Edfu) in the
immediate aftermath of Komanos’ campaign. \textit{P.Tor.Choach.} 12.9-15 indicates the presence of soldiers in the
Ombites nome, but it does not make clear whether there were settlers there at the time. It also dates in the
second half of the second century. An earlier inscription (\textit{Thèbes à Syène} 188 = \textit{OGIS} 114), from the late 170’s
or late 160’s, places contingents of infantry and cavalry there, and quite possibly stationed within the temple
complex. A fairly large garrison seems to have been positioned near Thebes at Itos, but is known only from
texts in the 130’s and 120’s, \textit{P.Lond.} 2.220, \textit{P.Würzb.} 7-\textit{I}, and \textit{SB} 18.13848.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Thèbes a Syène} 272, 302, 314, and 320, and \textit{SB} 5.8461 (=\textit{OGIS} 101) are the best sources for the garrison
structure of the region about Syene. All but no. 320 portray the leadership of the \textit{strategos over phourarchis} in
each of the three/tour locations, whereas 320, dated to 116 BC and so decades later than the other three,
features a single \textit{phourarch} over all three military sites. \textit{OGIS} 101 does not specify military units or forces
involved, but Diehl (2000: 81) has argued convincingly that the temple was used as a base by Ptolemaic
forces, who also commissioned the temple inscription.

\textsuperscript{128} Tally conducted in Winnicki (1978: 100-2). Some of the forty \textit{phouria} may have passed in and out of use
during that time, but is still a roughly reliable number. The major settlements were at Ptolemais, Pathyris,
Krokodilon polis, Edfu, Kom Ombo, and Euergetis, but there is evidence for settlers in Panopolis, Diospolis
Mikra, Koptos, and Thebes as well.
The emphasis in the Thebaid on *misthophoroi*, wage-bearing troops, both infantry and cavalry, represented a significant departure from regular Ptolemaic practice. Even the troops inhabiting the military settlements at Pathyris and Krokodilon polis, for example, were more often *misthophoroi* than traditional settlers.129 This in part reflected changes within the overall military institutions of the Ptolemaic kingdom, but also reflected the realities of controlling the Thebaid. Parts of Komanos’ army returned north, and while their arrival was accompanied by the increased importance of wage-bearing troops and military camps, many of them were settled. In the military settlements following the war, and in little else, the campaign resembles earlier Ptolemaic and Hellenistic wars.

The provision of land allotments to thousands of military veterans at the conclusion of the campaign followed earlier Ptolemaic practice, but also accelerated changes within the system. The largest settlement was for a group known as “The Four Thousand who campaigned into the Thebaid.” They received allotments in at least the Arsinoite and Oxyrhynchite nomes. The earliest witness to this group dates to 178/7 BC, and indicates that at least one of these men possessed an allotment of approximately

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129 Katoikoi are rare in the papyri from the two locations, but *misthophoroi* units and men with the status *taktomisthos* are very common. In SB 18.13168, the six witnesses given in the document are all *taktomisthoi*, both infantry and cavalry. SB 6.9366 gives one of the only *katoikoi hipeis* (settler cavalry) from Upper Egypt, and the only one from Pathyris. Klerouchs are known from Thebes itself (O.Wilck. 758, 1022, 1024, 1077, UPZ 2.216), as well as Edfu and Panopolis (P.Stras. 8.741). UPZ 2.217, from the Perithebaid, is the part of the enrollment paperwork for an infantry klerouch in about 131.
fifty arouras along a stretch of “coast-line,” in the southern Arsinoite nome. Another man, from Kerkeosiris in the Arsinoite, possessed an allotment of only sixteen arouras. Most of the known settlers from the Four Thousand were from a settlement that seems to have been located in the Oxyrhynchite nome, near the border with the Arsinoite, along an area with coastline. The text that describes them dates to 148 BC, and records new settlements made within the dorea of Komanos of Alabanda that year: several men with allotments of forty arouras, registered in the katoikia, the register of settlers, and perhaps the settler cavalry. The text includes the other men who had been at times settled within the same stretch of land: other forty-aroura men, cavalrymen with eighty to one-hundred arouras, and the men from the Thebaid. Of the latter, eight or nine are named, among whom allotments were roughly fifty arouras. Two observations may be made here: in all three instances, the ethnics of the soldiers are not given, which is uncommon, and the sixteen-aroura allotment at Kerkeosiris seems out of place. For the latter problem, it may be that the men of the Four Thousand were of varying statuses:

130 P.Tebt. 3.2.998.3-6, the unnamed son of Sopater, 177 BC. No ethnic is given. The settlement was located near Berenike Thesmophorou, and in total was about fifty-two arouras.
131 P.Tebt. 4.1108.1.6-7, Kallikrates son of Ptolemaios, 124 BC.
132 P.Tebt. 1.79.
133 Komanos of Alabanda is too late, in 148 BC, to be the leader of the campaign against the Thebaid, who sided with Physkon, not Philometer, and so would have been away from Egypt in 148 BC, were he still alive. This Komanos could be identified with several prominent men of that name who were operating in the second half of the second century, by which time Komanos had become a popular name.
134 P.Tebt. 1.79.69-85.
135 Kasher (1985: 54) and Gorre (2010: 238) argue that they are Jews on onomasticon grounds, but the argument is very poor: Seuthes, for example, is far more likely Thracian than Jewish, and Egyptian Thracians, like Jews, often had names that used -theo- as a component. More likely the men were of mixed ethnicity, like most Ptolemaic military units, and likely included several Jews among their number. Why their ethnicity is not given is unclear.
sixteen aroura allotments were very common in the late third and early second century for some military groups, likely mobile, light infantry.\textsuperscript{136} This might indicate that those who received larger allotments were more along the lines of heavy infantry.\textsuperscript{137}

The Four Thousand were not the only men who received allotments in the aftermath of the war however. Even if they had been the only ones, it would have been one of the largest military settlement operations undertaken by Ptolemaic administrators in the history of the kingdom. \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.1.793 is central to our limited understanding of Ptolemaic settlements in the 180’s BC. Part of the archive of the \textit{epistates} Mikion, it includes petitions related to new settlements in the region. On the one hand, sections of the text refer to disputes over the settlement of eighty-aroura cavalrmen, who in the second century became very common within the numbered hipparchies.\textsuperscript{138} The cavalrmen expressed their concerns to Mikion and lobbied for his assistance on the grounds of their shared military service.\textsuperscript{139} Less conventional is a part of the text that describes the seizure of harvests over two years, and the subsequent cannibalization of a

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\textsuperscript{136} In particular, the so-called Asiagenes and an un-named set of troops, nine of them settled around Andromachis in the Arsinoite nome in \textit{P.Köln.} 10.411 from about 180-178 BC, and in 177 BC in \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.2.1001, which describes two groups of seven to nine men, one of them “Asiagenes” and all with sixteen arouras apiece. The un-named group could, theoretically, be members of the Four Thousand; like the Four Thousand, none of the sixteen aroura men are listed with their ethnics, but all with their patronymics.

\textsuperscript{137} By comparison, Roman infantry colonists settled about this time received 50 \textit{jugera} (Livy 37.57), about 44 arouras. The size of the allotments may also indicate cavalry, but the evidence instead indicates that they were not considered part of the Ptolemaic cavalry settlers, who in \textit{P.Tebt.} 1.79 were treated separately.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.1.793. Fr3.19-Fr4.23.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{P.Tebt.} 3.1.793.Fr4.22: τοὺς τῶν παρ᾽ ἑμῶν συντρατιμώσαν.\end{flushleft}
hundred-aroura allotment to provide allotments for two village officials and two policemen.\textsuperscript{140}

In addition to new military settlement, the changed priorities of the Ptolemaic military, in the counterinsurgent environment, led to changes in settlement patterns, as more and more land was distributed to police and para-military forces tasked with providing security within Egypt. These para-military auxiliaries, the \textit{ephodoi} and \textit{eremophylakes}, as well as police, began receiving former military allotments immediately after the war ended.\textsuperscript{141} The \textit{ephodoi} received former phalangite allotments of twenty-four arouras, and probably functioned as a mounted security force within and between nomes,\textsuperscript{142} while the \textit{eremophylakes} (desert guards) conducted mounted patrols in or along the wilderness, and possessed smaller, ten-aroura allotments.\textsuperscript{143}

The lines between the various pieces of Ptolemaic martial and security institutions was further blurred by their grouping within klerouchic lands and the overlap of activities between the police and para-military forces on the one hand, and

\textsuperscript{140} P.Tebt. 3.1.793.Fr2. It is conceivable that the previous klerouch had died; another example exists from the end of the revolt regarding a deceased klerouch, P.Tebt. 3.2.918, wherein the soldier had passed away in 186 BC, and the man who had held the lease on the land at the time had retained it for ten years without interference by the soldier’s family or the state, until the suit that produced that document.

\textsuperscript{141} P.Tebt. 3.1.793.Fr4.14 for \textit{ephodoi}, and Fr11 for \textit{eremophylakes}, and 3.2.854 and 856 for all three.

\textsuperscript{142} P.Lond. 7.2190, from April 169 BC, proves that \textit{ephodoi} played a role in the military, as a detachment of them traveled through the Arsinoite to reach the army of the king during the invasion of Antiochus. P.Petr. 3.128 indicates that they could also serve in the retinue of the \textit{epistates} of police.

\textsuperscript{143} The best places to observe the growing importance of these branches of the Ptolemaic security apparatus are: a) the Kerkeosiris land surveys, eg., P.Tebt. 1.63, a very detailed record, or 4.1104, the earliest, and b) the Herakleopolite land surveys, eg., BGU 14.2437, a mid-century survey text, wherein large numbers of former phalangite allotments had passed into the hands of local administrators, \textit{ephodoi}, and private owners.
the wage-bearing military forces on the other. Within the Arsinoite, a large contingent of infantry provided security within the region from their base, a hypaithron.\textsuperscript{144} The same or another camp was located at Theogonis, which had been used as a staging ground for Komanos’ campaign, and remained in use for at least a decade after the campaign.\textsuperscript{145} Similar structures seem to have existed in the Herakleopolite nome as well, where episodes of violence were not entirely quelled until after the revolt in the Thebaid had ended.\textsuperscript{146} In both locales, and probably throughout Egypt, semi-professional, wage-bearing troops became increasingly important, and were stationed, it seems, under the command of local garrison commanders, phrourarchs. Several of these garrison commanders from Middle Egypt are well known, and the documentary evidence indicates a marked increase in the number of fortified positions and paid troops throughout Middle Egypt.\textsuperscript{147} The restructuring and redeployment of the army prepared it for combating and suppressing insurgent activity. These new structures became relatively permanent: throughout the 170’s BC, there is little evidence that the Ptolemies

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\textsuperscript{144} P.Tebt. 3.2.856.145-8, see also P.Tebt. 3.1.722.10-1, regarding provisions τοῖς ἐν τῶι νομῶι πεζοῖς ὑπαίθροις, for the infantry encamped in the nome.
\textsuperscript{145} P.Köln. 5.221.44-5 and P.Hels. 1.2 for its earlier use, see P.Tebt. 3.2.856.155-8 for its use in the 170’s as a base for infantry and the eremophylakes.
\textsuperscript{146} P.Tebt. 3.2.920 dates to the later 180’s, and describes the actions of a patrol from or to a hypaithron and an attack they suffered from a band of attackers. The same or another hypaithron is mentioned in P.Gen. 3.128 with reference to events during the revolt of Dionysios Petosorapis.
\textsuperscript{147} See Cowey et al. (2003: 11-5). The best example is Dioskourides, a phrourarch in the Herakleopolite nome (P.Diosk.). Scattered phourria had existed in earlier days, such as that at Techtho in the Herakleopolite nome, the garrison of which numbered about 70 men in 210 BC (P.Stras. 2.103-4). In the second century, the number of phourria in the Herakleopolite and Arsinoite increased markedly, with posts known at Hiera Nesos (P.Hels. 1.6), Soknopaiou Nesos (P.Amh. 2.43, P.Tebt. 3.2.856), in the vicinity of Syron Kome (P.Tebt. 3.1.706), in two positions around Herakleopolis (P.Diosk. 1, P.Berl.Zill. 1), Oasis (P.Gen. 3.128), Skru (BGU 6.1216), and Techtho (SB 24.15896).
and their chief administrators ever considered a return to pre-Revolt norms. The paid
soldier, dispersed in small garrisons and camps throughout Egypt, was by the 170’s the
rule rather than an exception.

7.2.3. – Reformed Interactions between the Army and Egyptian Society

The Ptolemaic military reforms constituted remarkable shifts toward defeating a
dangerous insurgency and suppressing present and future unrest throughout Egypt.
The Ptolemies went further, however, than military reforms, significantly redrawing the
types of interactions the regime had with the native Egyptian population, economically,
politically, and militarily. These reforms may be examined in several dimensions:
increased opportunity for Egyptian elites within the Ptolemaic military-administrative
structure, the introduction of Egyptian soldiers into multi-ethnic military units with
accompanying Hellenizing status, the support of temples and priesthoods, and the
employment of royal decrees of amnesty and debt forgiveness to ameliorate some of the
causes of revolt.

The Ptolemaic response to the revolt provided an opportunity for advancement
for those Egyptians who remained loyal. In particular, those Egyptians, who through
pre-Ptolemaic positions or through military or administrative service to the crown were
already powerful and wealthy locally, could elevate themselves into the court hierarchy
by facilitating the Ptolemaic re-conquest. The best example of this is Hakoris son of
Hergeus, a wealthy Egyptian from a prestigious family in the Hermoupolite nome. Between 196 and 193 Hakoris commissioned a large monumental inscription that celebrated the anaklateria of Ptolemy Epiphanes, which we may read both as an affirmative response to the pro-Egyptian rituals and pronouncements conducted at Memphis in conjunction with the anaklateria, and as a declaration of loyalty. Similar declarations are known at an earlier time from prominent Egyptian military officers in the Delta. During the invasion of the Thebaid under Komanos, Hakoris facilitated the movement of troops as a high-level officer or administrator, from his home town of Tehna. He may have led troops or ships in the actual operations in the Thebaid as well. Tehna was later known as “the town of Hakoris” and then simply Akoris, and was settled with a large number of military men by the middle of the second century. The eventual military settlement and the renaming of the town may indicate that Hakoris received, in return for his services, a grant of land, which was eventually

149 OGIS 94 = I.Akoris 1: ὑπὲρ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου θεοῦ Ἐπιφανοῦς, μεγάλου, Εὐχαρίστου Ἀκῶρις Ἑργέως Ἴσιδι Μωχιάδι Σωτείραι. “On behalf of king Ptolemy, the great god manifest and beneficent, Hakoris son of Hergeus [commissioned this] to the savior goddess Isis.”
150 OGIS 731 = SB 5.8925.
151 P.Col. 8.208. Clarysse (1991:252) suggests that he was strategos of either the Kynopolite or Hermoupolite nomes.
152 In SB 6.9367, the Syene logistics papyrus, one of the ships that transported grain to Syene was that of Hakoris, commanded by Harmiusis. Many of the other transport ships can be associated with eponymous officers and high-ranking Ptolemaic officials within the conquest of the Thebaid, this was likely the case for Hakoris as well.
153 Drew-Bear (1979: 291-6) for the changing names of the town, and in particular P.Lugd.Bat. XXII.2, p.70 for the Ptolemaic-era possessive name, the town or settlement of Hakoris. For the settlers, see P.Dion. 10, 19, and 20, from the late second century. Most of the texts in P.Dion. are from Tenis-Akoris.
developed for military settlement. His services to the crown in the revolt saved the fortunes of his son, Euphron, the Greek translation of Hergeus, when the latter sided with the Seleukid faction during the Sixth Syrian War.\footnote{P.Köhn. 4.186 (169 BC) describes the outcome of a vicious fight outside of a phrourion held by Seleukid-friendly forces and attacked by Ptolemaic forces. Many prominent figures were captured in the fighting, though in the network of canals outside the fort, many were trampled and slain. Of those captured, the only one released was Euphron, on account of the serviced rendered by his father. Returning home, Euphron eventually rose to positions of military-administrative prominence like his father, and may have served as strategos of the Kynopolite nome, for which see Sijpesteijn and Hanson (1989: 133-45) and Clarysse (2005: 129-34).}

Within the ranks of the Ptolemaic military, several Egyptians were able to achieve high-level commands during the early second century, and access to the court aristocracy. A Herakleopolite military officer named Harmiusis seems to have held a conventional military command rather than a specifically Egyptian command.\footnote{P.Hels. 1.12 (163 BC). His title, hegemon, indicates a distinction from the machimoi commanders, who were known as laarchs, native-commanders. It is tempting, but hardly necessary, to associate him with the subordinate of Hakoris in SB 6.9367. A little later, about 155 BC, a Fayoum inscription (I.Fayoum 83) provides evidence for an Egyptian chiliarchos named Horos.} A Hellenizing Egyptian, Alexion son of Harmachoros, held the title hegemon like Harmiusis, and led forces upstream against rebels at some point near the end of the revolt.\footnote{P.Tebt. 3.2.919. A son of Alexion, Eukrates, held an eponymous command in the fifth hipparchy in 158 BC (SB 16.12373); the rarity of the name Alexion, the correspondence of military command, and the correspondence of dates (a generation between the two, roughly) strongly supports the conclusion that Alexion’s military command allowed his son to hold a high military command as well, if not the same command.} Perhaps the most famous of the Hellenizing Egyptian officers of this era was Dionysios, also called Petosorapis, who in the middle of the 160’s led a revolt against the kings.\footnote{Diodorus 31.15.} Diodorus described Dionysios as an experienced and senior military official,
which likely indicates that he, like these other officers, rose into command positions
during the close of the Great Revolt.

The soldiers who helped pacify the Egyptian rebellion were often Egyptian
themselves, most of whom served in multi-ethnic *misthophoroi* units in the Thebaid
rather than predominately Egyptian *machinoi* units. The wage-bearing units of infantry
and cavalry are particularly well-attested at Pathyris and Krokodilon polis, just
upstream of Thebes.\(^{158}\) Most of these soldiers possessed the pseudo-ethnic status
“Persian,” which in the second-century context primarily meant that they were
descended from earlier *misthophoroi*, and were eligible for comparable service. The
soldiers bore double names, one Egyptian and one Greek.\(^{159}\) The same situation seems to
have been the case in much of the Thebaid, and into Middle Egypt as well.\(^{160}\) These
military communities were not so much locations for Hellenization, as places where
Graeco-Egyptian military societies were formed, with strongly Egyptian characteristics,
but close associations, through military service, with the Ptolemaic state. The use of
these “Persians” connects Ptolemaic military institutions in the second century with
activities as far back as Alexander, when Egyptian and various Asiatic peoples were

\(^{158}\) Vandorpe (2008: 87-108) is the best recent work on the Pathyris military communities and their real and
imagined ethnic status. She suggests that many of the soldiers were Nubians rather than Egyptians, based
on their preference for herding. While plausible, this does not seem strictly necessary.

\(^{159}\) Fischer-Bovet (2009: 96-9, 266-74) extends the analysis of Vandorpe, and suggests that soldiers, often with
Egyptian, Nubian, or Libyan background, could, by serving as *misthophoroi*, increase their socio-economic
prospects, while choosing to what extent they would pursue Hellenization.

\(^{160}\) Fischer-Bovet (2009:98) finds similarities between the status and background of *misthophoroi* at Hakoris
and Pathyris. The popularity of the Graecizing Egyptian name Paniskos at Panopolis likely indicates a
similar story for that city.
partly Hellenized, enrolled in Greco-Macedonian military units, and broadly referred to as Persians. In all probability the practice never died out in Egypt, but the institutional changes in response to insurgency made this practice much more visible to papyrologists and historians.

These infantry, along with their Greek counterparts, often within the same units, and their commanders, patronized Egyptian temples, further associating Ptolemaic military institutions with core Egyptian cultural sites. Diehl and Fischer-Bovet have shown how this patronage served, on the one hand, to build up the temples (which often doubled as barracks and fortifications for local Ptolemaic troops), and on the other, to implant the Ptolemaic forces within the local life of the temples. As primary benefactors, Ptolemaic officers and military units hedged against the likelihood that temples would be used to stir unrest in the future. The Ptolemies also supported the temples, granting privileges in their decrees and financially supporting temple-building operations throughout Egypt, but particularly in the Thebaid.

The final component of the Ptolemaic recalibration of the relationship between the king and the Egyptian people was through the royal decrees promulgated from synods with the priestly associations. These synods were called by the king at the

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161 See Diehl (2000), but especially Fischer-Bovet (2009: 297-359) for Ptolemaic involvement in temple-building and temple activities. Fischer-Bovet tracks the eventual convergence of temple benefaction and military service through the emergence of Ptolemaic officers who were also temple priests (308-10, 19-22).
conclusion of revolts, and provided the opportunity to promulgate new decrees. The earliest of these, the Rosetta Decree, followed the supposed end of the revolt in 197/6 BC. Another followed in late 186 BC, after Komanos’ victory and Ankh-wennerfer’s death in battle, but is known only from a papyrus rather than a monumental text. The decrees offered amnesty to those rebels who forsook the rebellion, and allowed those who had left their homes (whether as rebels or as refugees) to regain their property. These stipulations were aimed particularly at the machimoi Egyptian military class. The Egyptian population as a whole benefited, however, from the promise to restore land, and even more, the king wrote off the debts of, in some places, twenty years of unpaid taxes. The combined amnesty and debt forgiveness represented the king’s attempt to reconcile with the population. These represented concessions to the people following their mass, armed negotiations with the king: decades of taxes forgiven, with no subsequent indemnity, aside from the damages done in the fighting. On Ptolemy’s side, there was no realistic likelihood of ever recovering the lost taxes, and it was better instead to offer conditions that might restore political stability, physical security, and economic productivity to Egypt.

162 For this phenomenon, borrowed from ancient Pharaohs, see Veisse (2004: 171-7).
163 The full text is in P.Kroll.
165 Veisse (2004: 123-6) and Fischer-Bovet (2009: 169-70) argue that the description of the rebel soldiers as machimoi indicates nothing about their ethnic origin. While some Greeks could be found among the machimoi, and while the demotic text of the Rosetta decree simply uses the word for soldiers, the vast majority of machimo were Egyptian, and the default demotic “soldier” was an Egyptian as well, whereas Greeks were generally specified as such.
7.3. Conclusion

The Counterinsurgency effort altered or accelerated changes within the Ptolemaic kingdom. The Macedonian infantry, vital to the imagination of a Macedonian monarchy in Egypt, faded from prominence, replaced by infantry of generally lower status. This shift was a necessary component of the counterinsurgency equation, but had repercussions well beyond the strategy of stabilizing a rebellious countryside. The Macedonians had played the crucial role in preserving the monarchy against the machinations of Agathokles, and as klerouchs, had sufficient leisure to travel to Alexandria when that crisis took place. Permanent soldiers possessed significantly less capacity, in wealth or time, to engage in the politics of Alexandria, effectually isolating the Ptolemaic rulers from broad military support, and leaving a succession of young kings in the company of the Alexandrians and the powerful court aristocracy. In turn, the power of the court aristocracy seems only to have grown in the minority of Ptolemy V.166

These infantry lacked the coherent ethnic identity of their counterpart from the late third century, and were increasingly drawn from the class of “Hellenizing”

166 The origins of the system of aulic titulature lie in the minority of Ptolemy V, before which there seems only to have been a loose conception of the Friends of the king as a loosely-described group at court. The specific hierarchy and distribution of titles helped to structure and empower the court aristocracy while associating them with the Crown. For this, see the foundational study by Mooren (1975), as well as Huss (2001: 524-5).
Egyptians. This change reflected at least the necessities of counter-insurgency and the realities of the aftermath of the Fifth Syrian War. In the Ptolemaic response during the reign of Epiphanes, it may also be possible to find—in his pharaonic coronation, his several councils with the priests of Memphis, and the increasing role for Egyptians in the military and even high command—the beginning of a shift in the activity of state formation. Rather than striving to shape the Egyptian context into an imagined imperial Macedonia, the Ptolemies, however reluctantly, began shaping the contours of a local state. This era marks the germ of the military-social developments that would lead Caesar to remark on the motley martial culture and ethnicity of the Ptolemaic army in the middle of the first century (BC 3.110), a stark contrast with Theocritos’ description of the army as all krepides and chlamydes in the early third century (Idylls 15.6). While Caesar described the Ptolemaic army in negative terms, the developments that took place laid the foundation for a long-lasting, prosperous Ptolemaic state in Egypt by involving a much broader population base in more levels of governing activity.

This evolved Hellenistic state never really came into existence. The counterinsurgency reforms and their attendant consequences for the Ptolemaic state were hampered both by dynastic instability, which would involve an assassination, regime changes, coups, foreign invasions, and multiple civil wars, and by incomplete alleviation of some of the underlying tensions behind the Egyptian insurgency. The dynastic instability may be connected to the reforms to some degree, since they isolated
the monarchy and may have helped increase the power of the aristocracy, relative to both the king and the army. In the rebellion, the economy, and agriculture in particular, had taken a central place, both in the causes of the rebellion and in the landscape of violence. Agricultural activity had been disrupted across broad swaths of Egypt, and in spite of increased security and forgiven debts, agricultural recovery was slow. And ultimately, the Ptolemaic dynasty was still mainly Greek, and its capital at Alexandria practically a foreign city to the Egyptian populace.

The counterinsurgency effort should also be analyzed for its particular effectiveness, absent the weaknesses that increasingly crept into the Ptolemaic state. The Ptolemaic response was multi-dimensional, as demanded by modern counterinsurgency thinking. The more flexible military defeated rebel forces and established a pervasive presence throughout Egypt to provide greater security. Collaboration with priests, support of temples, and increased opportunities for Egyptians involved in the military and administration established a pattern for reconciliation. The priests and the temples were the most powerful people and places in the Egyptian countryside, and the Ptolemaic investment in each advanced the effectiveness of Ptolemaic control. Modern counterinsurgents have been hesitant to invest directly in the religious institutions of a host nation. This disparity, and the frequent failure of modern counterinsurgencies, may indicate an area of weakness in modern counterinsurgency. Whether in twenty-first century Afghanistan or second-century BC Egypt, religious leaders, institutions, and
sites have embodied, produced, and protected culture and identity. Modern ideals, often seemingly antithetical, have produced attempts at counterinsurgency theory that have largely avoided direct engagement with these places. Christian exclusivism on the one hand, and secularism on the other, are likely to either balk at the notion of directly patronizing a foreign religion, or to refuse to recognize the power that religious institutions have, in most places and times, possessed. The Ptolemaic case suggests that a successful counterinsurgent will get beyond such barriers.

The Ptolemaic response to the rebellion was successful through its employment of methods endorsed by modern counterinsurgency theory. Twenty years of peace would pass by before another outbreak of rebellion, under the leadership of a Hellenized Egyptian, the previously-mentioned Dionysios Petosorapis, who attempted a coup at Alexandria during the uneasy co-rule of the young kings Philometor and Physkon. When his coup failed, he was able to raise part of the countryside in rebellion, and the armed insurrection was put down only after a long siege of the city of Panopolis. The king issued another set of beneficent decrees in hopes of reconciling and pacifying the countryside, with general success. The dioiketes’ call for forced labor to ensure the proper planting a couple of years later (P.Genova 3.92) indicates that, while the armed rebels had been stopped, the people remained unconvinced of the legitimacy

167 The revolt is only attested in Diodorus 31.15. Dionysios must have been also called Petosorapis, indicating that he was truly an Egyptian, with a Greek name reflecting his involvement in the Ptolemaic army, administration, and court. For this revolt, see Veisse 2004: 28-32, 92-110.
of the king and their security from threat and pillage, whether by rebels or government agents. Even then, and in spite of the split between the brother kings, Ptolemaic Egypt reached another period of stability in the 150’s BC, and in the 140’s Philometor was even able to lead his armies into Syria, gaining successes and pushing farther than any Ptolemaic king had done since Euergetes a century earlier. The problem for the Ptolemaic kingdom was not in its reformed army and more-involved Egyptians, as Greco-Roman bias implies, nor was it in the revolts that sprang up in the countryside from time-to-time in the last 150 years of the Ptolemaic dynasty. These were hardly avoidable, and most were resolved quickly. The problem for the Ptolemaic dynasty was the instability of the dynasty itself, wracked by civil wars and betrayals for most of its later history.
Map 7.1 – Key Sites in Upper Egypt during the Ptolemaic Counterinsurgency
Conclusion: Continuity and Change in the Twilight of the Hellenistic Kingdoms

The previous two chapters told the story of the Ptolemaic response to insurgency, because the Ptolemaic military has often been regarded as irrelevant outside Ptolemaic studies, and the successful, innovative Ptolemaic response in fact represents a significant and under-appreciated story. At the same time, from 200-168 BC, the armies of the Antigonid and Seleucid kingdoms each twice encountered the armies and agents of the expanding Roman Republic, and were four times worsted. The military institutions of both armies failed to bring them victory against Rome, resulting in the extinction of the Antigonid kingdom in Macedonia and the Seleucid loss of Asia Minor and of Mediterranean ambition. The history of their defeats is well-known, but in the context of offering concluding remarks, it is helpful to identify several of the reasons for their failure, and situate those reasons within the broader analysis presented in the previous seven chapters. The most obvious factor, but least important for this study, is that the Hellenistic kingdoms lost the decisive battles. But this does not actually tell the entire story, and two very important factors are investigated below: 1) weak authority over allied and subject states, related to the multi-polar Hellenistic world, and

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168 In 197 BC, Philip V was defeated at Cynoscephelae, ending the Second Macedonian War. In 190 BC, Antiochus III was defeated at Magnesia, ending the Roman-Syrian War. In 168 BC, Perseus was defeated at Pydna, ending the Third Macedonian War, and the same year, Antiochus IV was coerced into abandoning the siege of Alexandria by the mere implied threat of war with Rome.
2) insufficient mobilization capacity, when compared to the military institutions of the Roman Republic.

8.1. The Hellenistic Armies against the Roman Republic, 201-168 B.C.

8.1.1. The Loss of Subject States

One of the recurring themes of this work has been the Hellenistic kingdoms’ treatment of Greek cities and federations. The cities of Asia Minor drifted between nominal independence and nominal obeisance to one or another of the kingdoms. They and the local dynasts of Asia Minor exerted their local strengths to negotiate their relationships with the competing regional powers. The situation in Greece was much the same, though the influence of the Seleucids and Ptolemies meant less than the local strength of the leagues and great states, which all at various times put Antigonid dominance to the test. The partial fictions of *eleutheria* and *autonomia*, bestowed by kings on loyal and cooperative cities, improved the cities’ positions when Rome imposed itself on Hellenistic politics. There are two cases worth investigating that make this general point most clear: that of the Achaean League in the Second Macedonian War, and that of Smyrna shortly before and during the Roman-Syrian War.

The Achaean League had been a dependent and ally of the Antigonid kings since the reign of Antigonus III Doson in the 220’s BC. The League had, in about 200 BC, voted out the general Philopoimen and the pro-Macedonian faction, elected pro-Roman politicians, and soon found themselves suffering the pillaging and sieges of the tyrant
Nabis of Sparta. The nature of the Achaean’s oaths to Philip and Macedonia were such that, when Philip himself appeared with his army in the Peloponnese that year, he could not simply demand auxiliary troops. Instead, he bargained with his ally, offering to lead his army against Nabis in return for the service of Achaean troops at Chalcis and Corinth, but the Achaeans refused and remained neutral for the next year of the war. Following Roman naval and land operations in central Greece in 198 BC, the consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus moved that the Achaeans break their alliance with Philip and side with Rome, offering the return of Corinth and the Akrokorinthos, which were at that time controlled by Philip. In a decisive moment, the Achaean League, having been a subject and ally of Antigonid Macedonia for more than twenty years, defected to the Roman side, and mobilized their full levy in support of the Roman war effort. This turn of events illustrates the weakness of the Hellenistic kingdoms’ authority over the Greeks: while allies might offer assistance and even troops in local conflicts, the local aspect of Greek military responsibility was essential. There is no clear evidence that any king, by virtue of an alliance or the subject status of a Greek city, campaigned with whole levies of allied Greeks in his army since the Hellenic League of Antigonus Monophthalmos and Demetrius Poliorketes in the late fourth century.

169 Plut. Phil. 12.4-14.1.
170 Livy 31.25.
171 Livy 32.19.
172 For active Achaean participation in the war on the side of Rome, with the full levy of the League, see Livy 32.23 and 33.13-4, 18.
The city of Smyrna was a faithful friend of Seleucid kings for much of the third century, but in the civil wars of Kallinikos and Hierax, in the invasions of Attalid kings, and in the rebellion of Achaios, the city somehow found itself more generally free and independent for absence of a monarch to bestow such privileges than it had been under the Seleucid blessings. In 198/7, Antiochus III, having crushed the Ptolemaic army at Panion and captured Syria and Phoenicia, moved his armies through Asia Minor, bringing into subjection those lands along the coast that had been aligned with the Ptolemies, or independent, or aligned with the Attalids. Smyrna, which by then had been independent for approximately thirty years, balked at the king’s return, and with Lampsakos and other cities resisted the king.173

The language of resistance from the cities and even more the language adopted from them by Roman delegates was that of the royal benefits. In the council at Lysimacheia in 196 BC, the Roman envoys invoked the *autonomia* and *eleutheria* of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and by styling those rights as inherent to the cities themselves abrogated the prerogatives and jurisdiction of Antiochus.174 The king’s perspective was that “the autonomy of some cities of Asia Minor should not derive from

173 Livy 33.38. On Antiochus III’s interactions with the cities of Asia Minor, and the relation between his subjugation of them and the beginning of his war with Rome, see Ma (1999), pages 53-104 on Antiochus’ campaigns of conquest (styled as rightful recovery) in Asia Minor, and 150-73 on the typologies of royal privileges and their bestowal on the cities.

some mandate of freedom from the Romans, but from the grace of the king.” The Roman position set the stage for war, and encouraged Greek cities in Anatolia to continue resisting Antiochus, though he promised to bestow grants of freedom and autonomy upon the cities’ submission. The total absence of Greek mercenaries in the army of Antiochus III is indicative of the widespread difficulties Antiochus encountered. The rebellion of the cities denied access to new mercenary recruits. What Greek mercenaries he may have had must have been committed to sieges or garrisons, and away from the battlefield at Magnesia, where he could muster about sixty thousand men, about half of them Iranian, for the decisive battle with Rome.176

8.1.2. The failure of Hellenistic mobilization

The second important factor in the failure of Hellenistic military institutions against Roman arms is mobilization. The Hellenistic kingdoms were unable to match the mobilizations of the Republic, contributing to the context of the decisive battles lost by the kings. The Roman Republic, in the three wars fought against the kings, saturated the combat theater in Roman manpower. The Roman armies deployed in the wars only

175 Polyb. 18.51.9: τὰς δ’ αὐτονόμους τῶν κατά τὴν Ασίαν πόλεων οὐ διὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπιταγῆς δέον εἶναι τυγχάνειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ χάριτος.
176 While Livy says the army numbered 72,000, the detailed breakdown of the numbers at 37.40 comes out to only 45,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, with the number of argyraspides missing. The massive numbers of horse are suspicious, particularly the 2,500 Galatian horsemen. The Iranian contingents comprised two-thirds of the cavalry and about one-third of the infantry. The Anatolian contingents were limited to 5,500 medium infantry from the provinces of the southern coast.
grew over time, from year to year with each war, and from war to war. The kingdoms, on the other hand, had difficulty, as shown in the chapters of this dissertation, expanding the size of their mobilized armies, or sustaining large-scale mobilizations year after year. This was related both to the diffusion of military manpower, and particularly to the identification of particularly military manpower within the general population, a byproduct of conquest and kingship.

The Second Macedonian War has been probably the most-studied of the wars, attracting considerable attention as the first war between the Romans and the Macedonians.\textsuperscript{177} In the Second Macedonian War, the Republic dispatched approximately forty thousand men for service in the consular armies, supplemented by thousands of additional soldiers attached to the fleet.\textsuperscript{178} Over four years, this did not represent any overwhelming mobilization of force, yet with many allies from the Aegean world, the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{177} On the wars as a whole see Errington (1989), from CAH 8 244-89. See Walbank and Macdonald (1937), Meadows (1993), and Eckstein (2005) on the origins and context of the Second Macedonian War, Hammond (1966) and (1988) on the key battles of it, and the recent monograph by Warrior (1996) on the war as a whole, complete with a larger bibliography of works on the conduct of the war.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{178} Sulpicius raised a full consular army for the war, and while Livy gives no specific numbers (31.8), this is like to have meant about twenty thousand infantry and about one thousand cavalry. He also took at least two thousand of Scipio’s veterans who were volunteered (impressed) into his army (31.14, 32.3), for an army of no less than 23,000 men. Even less specific is Livy 32.1, which says the Villius, inheriting command from Sulpicius, was given authority to bring the army to whatever strength he felt necessary. I assume Villius’ reinforcements simply kept the army at strength around 23,000, and perhaps consisted of at least three thousand men, as you will find no smaller consular reinforcement in any second-century account. Additionally, Sulpicius’ army endured some hard campaigning and fought several sharp engagements in Upper Macedonia (Livy 31.27, 35-7, and 39), so the numbers dispatched with Villius may have been even greater. Quinctius Flamininus raised eight thousand soldiers and eight hundred cavalry (32.8-9), and in 197 received another six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry (32.28). Thus it seems very likely that at least 40,000 men were conscripted and deployed to Greece during the Second Macedonian War. This does not include the large number of soldiers in the fleets of Apustius, and Lucius Flamininus, for which no numbers are given, but all commanders with their soldiers engaged in land campaigns as well.}
Roman faction was able to spread key Macedonian forces throughout the theater defending cities and still outnumber Philip V’s army at the battle of Kynoskephelai.\textsuperscript{179} Of course, Philip also mobilized a very large army by Antigonid standards: the sixteen thousand phalangites in his army may have represented the largest concentration of phalanx manpower from Macedonia since the death of Cassander. Livy commented on Philip’s conscription of youths down to sixteen and men past normal service age to fill the ranks of the phalanx.\textsuperscript{180} As shown in chapter 4, recruitment from both categories of manpower was actually written into Antigonid conscription laws, but under normal circumstances should not have occurred with the frequency implied in Livy’s narrative.\textsuperscript{181} Notably absent from Philip’s army are three thousand of his peltasts, his elite soldiers, whose absence, along with other soldiers, is best explained by the many Macedonian contingents then besieged by Roman and allied forces.\textsuperscript{182} Even so, it is

\textsuperscript{179} Livy 33.4 and Plut. \textit{Flam.} 7.1-3 are our two main sources on the battle, the former gives the Macedonian army as eighteen thousand heavy infantry, fifty-five hundred mercenaries and allies, and two thousand cavalry, for 25,500 men. Plutarch said that the Macedonian army was of similar size to the Roman, which was “more than 26,000,” including two Roman and two allied legions, sixty-four hundred Aetolians, and two thousand allies, for a total perhaps closer to twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand.

\textsuperscript{180} Livy 33.3: “Under these circumstances he even enrolled youths of sixteen and recalled to the colors men who had served their time, provided they had any stamina left.” Livy’s “circumstances” are both the long-term diminishment of Macedonian manpower since Alexander and the heavy casualties of the previous several years under Philip V.

\textsuperscript{181} For the Conscription Laws, see SEG 48.855, and Nigdelis and Sismanides (1999: 807-22). The conscription of able-bodied men fifty to fifty-five and of youths fifteen to twenty would have applied for house-holds with at least two men, but none between twenty and fifty (see lines 13-22).

\textsuperscript{182} Livy’s narrative mentions 1,500 Macedonians among the troops at Corinth (33.14), as well as a “Macedonian garrison, large and elite” at Atrax (32.17.7: \textit{Macedones, qui in praesidio erant et multi et delecti}). The Atrax garrison because of its description, and the Corinth garrison because of its size and importance, are possible locations of these missing Macedonian elites. Ennius (\textit{Annales} 10.331-2, see Skutch 1985)
difficult to imagine the missing troops making any significant difference in the outcome of a battle so foolishly engaged and poorly managed.\textsuperscript{183}

The Roman mobilization advantage is far clearer in the Roman-Syrian War and in the Third Macedonian War. In the Roman-Syrian War, which lasted from 192-190 BC, Roman mobilization escalated, providing a large supply of troops annually in the consular armies, but also providing a steady supply of seasoned men through reserve forces stationed in Bruttium, a restive region of southern Italy. The forces deployed in Bruttium by the Romans functioned as a strategic reserve, deployed to strengthen the Roman armies in the East each year, and supplied an enormous addition to Roman manpower that has generally gone unnoticed in analysis of the war.\textsuperscript{184} Scarcely mentioned in Livy’s narrative, the reinforcements sent to Greece from prior service in

mentioned a corps of 8,000 hardy and celebrated infantrymen in Philip’s army at Kynoskephelai, but this is almost certainly a reference to the Macedonian \textit{chalkaspides}, the lead wing of the phalanx proper.

\textsuperscript{183} It was necessary for the Macedonian troops to climb about 150m and descend nearly 200m, traversing nearly a kilometer, to reach the battlefield, which was just outside the Roman encampment. In addition, the path over the Dog’s Heads (the “Kynoskephelai”) was restricted to single units in column formation, which then had to re-group into the phalanx before attacking.

\textsuperscript{184} At Livy 35.20, the praetor M. Baebius received a Bruttium guard of twenty-five thousand infantry and approximately nine hundred cavalry, which were transferred under Baebius’ command to western Greece in late 192 (35.24). At 35.41, L. Quinctius’ forces raised the previous year were made the Bruttium guard under A. Cornelius for their second year of service, totaling about thirty thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. They were transferred to Greece for their third year of service at the start of 190 BC (37.2). At 37.2, roughly twenty-five thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry replaced them as the guard of Bruttium and Apulia under M. Tuccius, and likely would have been sent along to Asia had not the war ended. In all, fifty-five thousand infantry and about 2,100 cavalry served in the Bruttium guard during the war before being transferred to the combat theater. The forces in the Bruttium reserve were generally City legions with one or two years of service prior to going to Bruttium, and a fresh levy of Italian allies, so that the Romans were in the third or fourth years under arms and the Italians in their second year before they reached a combat zone.
this Bruttium guard amounted to nearly sixty thousand men. Livy’s treatment of numbers emphasized the classical Roman army, with two Roman legions and a consul, but the testimony within his own text illustrated the actual scale of Roman mobilization. For example, in his account of the decisive battle of Magnesia in 190 BC, he says, and Appian’s account agrees with him, that the Roman army had four full-sized legions, a standard war-time consul’s army, with five thousand men apiece, for twenty thousand men. This number lacks any consistency with Livy’s previous statements on the campaigns, ignoring not only the Bruttium reinforcements, but veteran volunteers as well. In fact, the neat army of four legions bears little resemblance to the forces sent to Greece during the war, which amounted to more than eighty thousand men. Now, based on Scipio’s army of 13,500 men at Livy 37.4, it is possible that thirty-one thousand men were kept in Epeiros to hold the Aetolians in check, which still leaves about twenty-

186 Livy 37.4 attests five thousand volunteers added to Scipio’s army at Brundisium in early 190 BC.
187 This total includes Baebius’ 25,900 and 3,000 soldiers assigned to the fleet with Atilius (35.20); for Acilius: his initial levy of 10,700 (35.41), five hundred Numidian cavalry (36.4), though note 36.14 gives the total with Acilius as 12,000 rather than 11,200, though note also that he constituted the first and third legions once in Greece from his and Baebius’ troops; and for Scipio: 8,300 newly-levied troops (37.2), 31,200 from Bruttium (37.2), and five thousand volunteers (37.4), though his army is described 13,500 at Livy 37.6, implying the addition of only two hundred cavalrmen from the army of Bruttium, either an error from Livy, or more likely an indication that much of the force in Bruttium remained in western Greece to suppress the Aetolian army. This amounts to 84,600 men, including 3,600 cavalry. This does not include the infantry attached to naval forces after 192 BC. In 192, the Republic had mobilized a consular army for an anticipated war with Antiochus, numbering approximately 31,800 men (35.20), but when the war was slow in developing sent the army elsewhere. In fact, another 12,400 men were conscripted in Sicily that year for defense against a rumored Seleucid invasion of that island (35.23). This means that in 192 alone, in anticipation of the war with Antiochus, the Republic mobilized approximately 74,000 men for the purposes of a future war, exclusive of the tens of thousands conscripted for other purposes, both in Italy and Spain.
eight thousand infantry unaccounted for.\textsuperscript{188} The key to these men may lie in the cavalry, for Livy says that there roughly 2,400 Roman cavalry at the battle of Magnesia.\textsuperscript{189} A normal set of two Roman and two allied legions should not have had more than 1,000-1,200 cavalry. In fact, the 2,400 Roman cavalry at the battle squares very well with the figures given for the entire forces handed over to Scipio early in 190 BC.\textsuperscript{190} If Scipio’s entire cavalry force was present at Magnesia, it is likely that much of his infantry force was present as well, since thirty-one thousand men seem to have been left in Greece to secure his rear. If a similar rate of attrition is applied to the infantry as that that seems to have occurred among the cavalry, there should have been about forty-four thousand Roman infantry at Magnesia. The Roman mobilization went even further, however, as 22,000 thousand troops were concentrated in Bruttium and Apulia, near the port at Brundisium, and another 25,000 newly-raised to accompany the new consuls to Greece and Asia.\textsuperscript{191} The sources indicate that the Romans mobilized 128,800 men for the war with Antiochus alone and deployed more than 105,000 to Greece from 192-189 BC. The Roman forces mobilized and deployed for the Third Macedonian War were even

\textsuperscript{188} This figure results from subtracting from the 78,000 infantry in the previous note the twenty thousand in Livy’s narrative of Magnesia, and the thirty thousand with A. Cornelius in Epeiros.

\textsuperscript{189} Livy 37.39. There were twenty-three hundred on the right wing, and four turmae (about 128 men) on the left.

\textsuperscript{190} To field 2,400 cavalry, the Roman component must have included practically all the survivors among the five hundred with Scipio, the five hundred Numidians, and all the cavalry of Baebius and Acilius. To field 2,400 cavalry would also require attrition of only 8% to the whole cavalry force over 1-3 years of service in Greece.

\textsuperscript{191} Livy 37.2, 50.
Plutarch (Aem. 12.7) reported that in 168 BC the Romans had more than one hundred thousand men under arms in Greece, and the evidence in Livy confirms this account. Though Livy’s account is basically missing for the year 170 BC, the Republic mobilized and deployed approximately 114,000 soldiers in 171, 169, and 168 BC. The scale of Roman mobilization far out-stripped the capacity of Macedonia or even the Seleucids it seems, since in these latter wars the Hellenistic kingdoms fought a number of indecisive but successful engagements before eventually losing major engagements. It is difficult to imagine what would have constituted a decisive victory for the Hellenistic kingdoms against a Republic that, in these latter wars, sent twenty to thirty thousand fresh troops to the combat theater every year.

Livy 42.27 gives 8,500 men mobilized under Attilius Serranus and C. Lucretius to serve as a marine force with the fleet prepared for the war, and 9,600 dispatched to Greece under Cn. Sicinius; 42.31 gives 29,400 dispatched to Greece under P. Licinius in 171, another 38,200 Italians raised as a reserve in Italy (not counted in the total), and 4-6,000 Illyrians, Cretans, and Numidians added to Licinius’ army; 42.37 lists another 2,000 volunteers; 42.56 gives 10,000 marines in the fleet of M. Lucretius in the Aegean. Between books 42 and 43 of Livy, a large army was also raised for Hostilius, consul in 170 BC, but we do not know of how many men, nor do we know how Appius Claudius and various armies came to be in Illyria. Livy 43.9 lists 6,000 troops in the part of the army of Appius Claudius in the Dassaretis, augmented with 8,000 Illyrians, though the latter force was wiped out in battle (43.11) and 5,500 of the Italians killed or captured by Perseus (43.18); 43.21 indicates Claudius still had about 2,000 Romans in his army of 6,000, though he lost about 1,200 of them (43.23), and that an army under L. Coelius was also active in Illyria, the strength of which is uncertain; 43.12 gives 12,550 raised to accompany the consul Marcus Philippus to Macedonia in 169 BC, and another 40,000 men conscripted to form a reserve in Italy if reinforcements were needed; 44.1 indicates 5,000 additional troops joined Philippus on his was to replace Hostilius in Thessaly, perhaps drawn from the reserve, but also possibly volunteers; 44.21 attests 15,200 sent with Aemilius and 10,600 with Anicius at the start of 168 BC. The field army of Aemilius was intended to be 23,400 men, and any surplus reinforcements were, according to Livy, to be used for garrison duties and the like. This incomplete account, which lacks any data for 170 BC, indicates the mobilization to Greece of at least 114,000 men from 171-168 BC, with nearly 80,000 reserve troops mobilized as well. Whatever troops crossed in 170 BC may have been a portion of the 38,200 reserve forces from 171 BC.
8.2. Contextualizing and Evaluating the Military Institutions of the Hellenistic Kingdoms

The Hellenistic Macedonian armies, which emphasized settled or citizen troops well-trained as phalangites and styled in imitation of Alexander, lacked the capacity to defeat an enemy that mobilized a seemingly inexhaustible supply of competent soldiers. But for more than a century the style of army produced from the military institutions of the several kingdoms reinforced the legitimacy of new dynasties as inheritors of Alexander’s legacy, and dominated the battlefields of the eastern Mediterranean. These institutions, whether the klerouchic system in Egypt, the cities and katoikiai of Asia, or the expansion of the role of cities in Macedonia, contributed significantly to the form and function of the monarchies as a whole. The participation of individuals in these institutions as soldiers, and particularly as members of the phalanx, spread Macedonian identity as a militarized, fictive ethnicity. The partially-fictive qualities of being Macedonian in Egypt or Syria have long been recognized, but this study has shown that the expansion of Macedonian-ness began far earlier than has generally been assumed, during the reign of Alexander, and extended further west than has generally been assumed, affecting the populations of Amphipolis, Kassandreia, and other cities and regions of eastern Macedonia.

The structure of the military institutions served to mobilize limited, well-equipped, semi-professional armies. In Egypt, for example, the largest part of the army
was drawn from soldiers settled according to their units at mobilization. This system differs considerably from conscription, contributing to the professionalization of soldiers (at least in theory) but also limiting the size of the army. Even in the Antigonid and Seleucid kingdoms, where conscription was more important, regional and even family customs set parameters to mobilization. The Hellenistic armies were in general designed to field “ideal” components to the army. This was particularly true with the phalanx. It is indicated by the Ptolemaic numbering of phalanx chiliarchies, by the 16,000 man phalanxes deployed by the Antigonids and Seleucids in the wars with Rome, and taught in the tactical manuals of the Hellenistic age. Structures of privilege met well with military philosophy. It should be remembered that the Hellenistic model for military success was Alexander, who with fifteen thousand Macedonian infantry, two thousand Macedonian cavalry, and various allied troops conquered Achaemenid Persia. The Ptolemies discerned the limits of this method more quickly, more than doubling the phalanx for the Fourth Syrian War and including Egyptians in it, and beginning a slow movement away from the klerouchic system after Panion and the Great Revolt. Yet in general, the purpose of Hellenistic military institutions had been to provide efficient mobilization of a royal army. As a royal army, there was no real need for a multiplicity of manpower, simply for sufficient manpower through sustainable institutions. And until the coming of Rome, the system functioned fairly well.
The kingdom that departed farthest from the general model of Hellenistic military institutions was Egypt. The Macedonians and Seleucids, when faced with Roman manpower, made no major adjustments. The Seleucid Romanized infantry from the parade at Daphne have been mentioned often enough, but represented a single elite component taken from the Seleucid *peltastai*. The Seleucid imitation of the Republic did not extend, therefore, to mobilization, but solely to the panoply of a sub-set of the army’s soldiers. In fact the most interesting story is that of Ptolemaic Egypt. The Ptolemies largely abandoned the large Macedonian phalanx and much of the settler army, the deterioration of which authors have interpreted as the deterioration of Ptolemaic military institutions. But Ptolemy V, under whom the reforms discussed in Chapter 7 began, was said in his own day to have been an incessant driller of his army. And the reforms remade Ptolemaic military institutions, laying the groundwork, through conscription of Greek and Egyptian populations alike, for a more unified populace and greatly expanded recruitment pool. Dynastic instability, not the failure of military institutions, doomed Ptolemaic Egypt. A relatively stable Egypt offered an

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193 The Daphne parade is described at Polyb. 30.25.1-11, and the Romanized infantry at 25.3. The *argyraspides*, the Seleucid peltasts, numbered only five thousand in the parade rather than the usual ten, and the five thousand Romanized infantry, splendidly equipped and in the prime of life, very likely represent the other half of that body. The phalanx, even absent these five thousand, yet numbered twenty thousand men, not far short of the thirty thousand at Raphia or twenty-six at Magnesia.

194 Plut. Phil. 13.3: “When certain persons were extolling [King Ptolemy] because he carefully drilled his army day by day, and carefully and laboriously exercised himself in arms, ’And yet who,’ said Philopoemen, ’can admire a king of his years for always practicing but never performing anything?’”

195 Ptolemy V, assassinated in a court conspiracy in 180 BC, followed by the civil wars of the siblings in the next generation, between Ptolemy VI, Ptolemy VIII, and Cleopatra II.
enormous source of manpower and wealth, and the counterinsurgency-style reforms implemented in the reign of Ptolemy V opened the way to a more complete exploitation of both.

In the case of Ptolemaic Egypt, with its far-reaching reforms and squandered opportunities, the instabilities underlying the military institutions of all the kingdoms are readily apparent. The armies and kingdoms rested on constructs: soldiers became Macedonians by standing in the pike-line of the phalanx, generals became kings at the applause of the soldiers, and men by living in royal cities or serving in royal armies appropriated a place within an imperial project. These constructs expanded and became more real over time because the kings in different ways managed to strike balanced approaches generally beneficial to the most significant groups in the kingdom. It may be useful to consider Antiochus’ perspective on grace: out of his goodwill rather than a city’s just merits, he bestowed privileges of dubious value. But when the cities questioned the king’s right and power to bestow or withhold such privileges, parts of the state faltered, particularly when the king could not bring due punishment upon them. In Egypt, Ptolemy V’s reforms and training were limited by the aristocracy’s acceptance of pervasive changes, and when they found the limit, the king was assassinated. Diod. 29.29 mentions that Ptolemy’s military expenditures led him to seek money from the court aristocracy, his “money-bags,” inspiring an assassination plot that sought to avert taxes and another Syrian
balance the needs of the court, the battlefield, and the king’s purse. This study has shown that the institutions were constantly changing, fraught with challenges, and yet for many years functioned effectively to shore up the monarchy and preserve and extend the authority of the Hellenistic kingdoms.

war. This brief tale from Diodorus should be read in terms of the increased honors and material privilege bestowed on the Friends of the king in Ptolemy V’s reign, discussed in chapter 7.
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Biography

Paul Johstono was born on May 27, 1983, in Athens, Georgia, to Donald and Susan Johstono. The eldest of three children, he grew up in several different towns in Georgia. After high school he attended Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina. After graduating from Furman in 2005, he moved to Durham, North Carolina to attend Duke University as a graduate student in the history department. International research grants allowed him to participate in archaeological surveys and digs in Turkey and Bulgaria in 2006. He completed his MA in 2007, and began working on his dissertation. He began teaching at Duke University in 2008, and was twice commended for excellence in teaching. The same year his work was funded through the Steel Family Fellowship. He is a member of the American Historical Association and Society for Military History, and while in Durham participated in the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies. In 2011 he married Laura Ruckel, and began teaching at Georgia Southwestern University while completing his dissertation. He accepted a tenure-track position in military history at The Citadel, in Charleston, South Carolina, and will begin teaching there in the fall of 2012 after completing his Ph.D. at Duke.