National Itineraries, Itinerant Nations: Israeli Tourism and Palestinian Cultural Production

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At the end of an unpaved village road in western Galilee, in the Bedouin tent he has assembled behind his two-story house, Omar Hasan caters to Jewish Israeli tourists. The tent isn’t easy to find, but determined visitors follow the hand-painted Hebrew signs (TO THE PEACE TENT) nailed to telephone poles in the center of ‘Arabi village. A nine-by-twelve-inch photograph of late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, framed under glass, greets them near the entrance. At the time of my visit in the spring of 1996, it is a familiar image: one of a series of popular reproductions that comprise the field of postassassination memorial symbols. Hasan has selected a photo of the older Rabin, the statesman, the “peacetime” prime minister, solemn of profile and casual in attire, seated next to the national flag, eyes averted from the camera.

Rabin is not alone. He shares a wall with a traditional coffeepot, a locally produced poster of Bedouin women’s folk clothing, and a photograph of Hasan, standing with then minister of tourism, Uzi Baram. These images do not compete for symbolic primacy. Rather, a set of national meanings and market strategies coheres precisely in their concurrent display. Like the quality of the meal and the availability of toilets, these simultaneous images are built into the tent’s infrastructure as a means of safeguarding market success. They create a decor of multiple fidelities, through the recognizable props of both the Israeli nation-state and Arab culture, broadly construed. In this dual aesthetic of Arab ethnicity and the nation-state, tourism is creating new political possibilities at the borders of Israel’s national geography.

In 1992, after the Rabin Labor-led government came to power, Israel’s Tourism Ministry expressed an unprecedented interest in developing the tourist infrastructure of rural Palestinian villages inside the state for an explicitly Jewish Israeli tourist population. Although significant state budgets for planning and development were implemented only in 1995, local Palestinian and Jewish entrepreneurs began developing this infrastructure, and catering to its small, pioneering clientele, in the early 1990s. Yet even prior to its fiscal investment, state sponsorship of the market had national effects that local initiatives, in isolation, did not. By publicly endorsing Jewish tourism to these villages, even in the absence of significant budgets, the government effected a revision in the dominant map of the nation-state, historically predicated on forced Palestinian
absence—materially from their land, and figuratively from official Israeli histories and public discourses. For the first time, Israeli tourism policy offered up rural Palestinian communities to Jewish tourists for reincorporation into a state-authorized national geography. This reincorporation was achieved not only in the changing vocabularies of government and commercial literature, but also in the movement of Jewish tourists through Palestinian villages qua tourist spaces, as sites once deemed hostile were repackaged as places of Jewish leisure.

In this essay, I explore the emergence of rural ethnic tourism in Israel’s so-called Arab sector tourism market and suggest ways in which tourism enables a state-sanctioned reconfiguration of the Israeli nation-state through the reinsertion of its historically repressed term, the Palestinian Arab. I argue that this reconfiguration is made possible by tourism’s respatialization of the nation-state in and through its rural Palestinian communities and by the market’s commodification of “authentic” Arab ethnicity. While Israeli state and popular practices of commodification are not new, I am suggesting that their postpeace incarnations have new political resonances and effects. The counterhegemonic politics I imagine is complicitous with power, emerging through the marketplace and the commodity form, not in spite of them, in sites made available by state policy. I suggest that even as Arab-sector tourism is articulated through symbols and markets sanctioned by the Israeli government, it participates in a revision of the dominant axiomatics of the nation-state.

This essay considers tourism in the broadest theoretical terms as a field of national production. By this, I refer to a dialectic of mutually constitutive processes: the production of the nation as imagined collective and political-juridical unit (nation-state), and the productive work (material and ideological) done in the name and/or sanctioned spaces of the nation and its resultant products (commodities, discourses, symbols, aesthetics, and so on). I am suggesting that shifts in the dominant meanings of the nation affect the parameters of national production—its heterogeneous sites of possible production, and the range of products to which the designation national can apply. Conversely, shifts in the registers and technologies of production affect the terms of the nation(-state). The nation of national production thus obeys a performative logic as it is made and remade through its constitutive discourses and practices. As a field of national production, Arab-sector tourism allows for shifts in the meaning of the Israeli nation, offering new maps and idioms through which its notion of “the people” might be thought.

This essay, and the fieldwork on which it draws, is framed by the tenure of the Rabin/Peres Labor-led government (1992–96). Arab-sector tourism, and its performative role in re-marking the political designation Arab sector, is the focal point of my inquiry, but it also serves as a lens
through which to investigate the political culture of the Labor years, the shifts in domestic and foreign policy enabled by the Oslo Accords (September 1993), and the changing place of Palestinian Israelis within the nation. My work is also intended as a political history of the Palestinians of Israel, who comprise nearly 20 percent of the current population of the state, and some 23 percent of Palestinians globally. This history has been distressingly neglected by both the Western academy and activist organizations working in the Middle East, obscured by a polarized narrative of the (so-called) Arab-Israeli conflict in which Israelis are cast as a homogeneous ethnic-political constituency (Jewish, European, Zionist) and Palestinian histories of the West Bank and Gaza are privileged over those of both Israel and the Diaspora. The temporal address of my project is thus twofold: in the past tense of Labor Party culture and politics, and in the present and future tenses of the ongoing political contest between Israel and the Palestinian communities that live within its borders.

The larger history toward which my text gestures is that of the state of Israel itself: its emergence from a legacy of European anti-Semitism, the indigenous population of Palestinian Arabs on whose backs and in whose forced absence the state was formed, and the state’s self-fashioning as a “democracy.” Some fifty years after the state’s founding, Palestinians inside Israel continue to suffer state-sponsored discrimination and the effects of decades of repression and underdevelopment. These histories can only begin to be redressed in the dismantling of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, in which the Palestinian Authority is now partner, and the removal of the legal, economic, and social obstacles to Palestinian equality inside the state. The political slogans and solutions imagined during the intifada years are no longer available: the structural inequalities of the Oslo Accords, coupled with the annexationist policies of both Likud and Labor administrations, have rendered a two-state solution a virtual impossibility, and a single binational state remains a utopian alternative. In the absence of definitive macroresolutions, and refusing a liberalizationist paradigm of political change, this essay points toward Arab-sector tourism’s cultural-political possibilities in the “difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably impure.”

**The Bedouin Tent, 7 May 1996**

Representatives from the Tourism Ministry have been invited to lunch in the Bedouin village of Tsalme. After nearly seven months of fieldwork, I have become a familiar presence in the halls of the Jerusalem Tourism Ministry as researcher, Jew, and Hebrew speaker. My request to accompany them is not denied.
This is our third stop on an itinerary of prospective tourist sites in the western Galilee, including visits with local Palestinian authorities, restaurant owners who want to expand their businesses, and families with rooms to rent, all vying for government aid. We sit in the backyard of a two-story house in a large tent lined with brightly colored woven rugs; nonindigenous patterns provide the requisite markers of ethnicity, despite issues of locale. Tsalme is a drab panorama of cement houses, products of the state’s 1960s relocation project which forcibly concentrated Bedouin communities of the Galilee and the Negev into several modern “villages.” The government cited the need to maximize public lands.

The owner of the tent, in jeans and a T-shirt, presents his case to the ministry as we bend over elaborate platters of chicken and rice.

“The story is simple,” he says in fluid Hebrew. “We are Bedouins.” He illustrates his vision of a tourism initiative behind their house, including traditional coffee, local music and stories, flatbread made on the premises. This tent will be its mainstay.

The ministry representative is unimpressed. The government has already funded a Bedouin cultural center in the south, he says, and now every village wants one.

“I have many alternatives to this Bedouin tent,” he continues, “a lot more attractive than this.” He turns his signature bravado to the ministry’s local Jewish representatives who have joined us from a neighboring kibbutz. “Instead, you take me to a village that isn’t even pretty, where I can’t even see the mountains! They built the village without thinking of the way people might make a living from tourism.” His narrative easily elides the state history of coercive modernization. “Look at Taybet Zman. Now that’s a Bedouin village.” He refers to a popular Jordanian tourist site near Petra, emptied of residents and rebuilt as a hotel and model village for its visitors.

He redirects his comments to our Bedouin host. “Look, you want tourism here, you have to have Bedouin hospitality, not this Ashkenazi stuff. Put on a kufiya. Someone who comes here with a camera isn’t going to want to photograph you.”

He turns to me. “Am I right? You’re a tourist. Would you photograph him?”

**Israeli Difference and the New Middle East**

In the spring of 1996, at the time of our visit to Tsalme, the presence of officials from the Tourism Ministry in western Galilee villages was not unusual. As the Labor administration neared the end of its tenure, the tourist market in rural Palestinian villages was beginning to expand and
Figure 1: "The Jordan Rift Valley": The contiguity of regional topography is offered as the logic of the "New Middle East" and its markets. The typographical equation between cities and countries belies the structural inequities of the Israeli blueprint. From "Regional Tourism Cooperation Development Options," Israeli Ministry of Tourism, Jerusalem, 1995.
Figure 2: "Middle East and East Mediterranean [sic]—Main Tourist Attractions": In keeping with most government publications, the 1967 armistice line demarcating the borders of the West Bank does not appear. National borders are also sublimated. From "Regional Tourism Cooperation Development Options," Israeli Ministry of Tourism, Jerusalem, 1995.
Figure 3: Galilee Tours, Tel Aviv, 1995.
boast modest revenues. Significant state budgets for development were being made available to local authorities for renovation of village centers with touristic promise and to entrepreneurs, Jewish and Palestinian, with the “right sort” of tourist vision (bearing a recognizable aesthetics of Arab ethnicity and a public face of political conciliation). As the Labor Party neared national elections in late May, the Tourism Ministry sent its officials into the field to woo “the Arab vote” with fiscal promises.

The emergence of the Arab-sector tourism market in the early 1990s must be considered alongside the history of the Labor administration (1992–96), particularly the shifts in state policy and popular culture that both followed and enabled the signing of the Oslo Accords of 1993, establishing the political blueprint for the government’s subsequent years. I am arguing that the market was made possible, in part, by postpeace shifts in foreign and domestic state policy and new popular curiosity about the Arab world and “things Arab.” Although I mark Oslo as a critical juncture in state policy and popular Jewish and Palestinian politics, I do so with a critique of the accords’ multiple failures to initiate substantive change for the region’s disenfranchised populations. By situating cultural tourism here, at the nexus of government policy, private-sector development, and popular political culture, I aim to bridge what is a largely divided literature on tourism, split along the axes of political economy and ethnographic cultural analysis. By linking issues of revenue and planning with questions of discourse, I aim to suggest the ways in which the props of state power can be mobilized in the service of counterhegemonic cultural politics.

The Oslo Accords aimed to resituate Israel at the nexus of an emerging regional economy, a political blueprint celebrated euphemistically as “the New Middle East.” Even as this regional reconfiguration relied on fierce Israeli policing of bodies, commodities, and nationalisms at the borders of the state, the maps produced by the state and private sector to illustrate this economy were euphemistically stripped of borders, or presented sublimated borders as the background of transnational market links between cities and sites (figs. 1 and 2). As a 1995 advertisement for Galilee Tours suggests, the imagined Israeli traveler in this cartography enjoyed unimpeded movement through a seamless regional territory with Tel Aviv at its epicenter (fig. 3). Tourism was at the center of strategies for regional realignment, and joint tourist projects between Israel and the Arab world (particularly Jordan) were repeatedly heralded as the first fruits of new diplomacy. With income from the Israeli tourism market representing over 30 percent of national service export revenues, the development of regional tourism promised growth to an already critical Israeli market. This regional blueprint produced not only new diplomacy and new markets (with Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Qatar),

Rebecca Luna Stein
but a multiplicity of new national cultural concerns, in which the symbols
of Arabness and Islam were revalued as state-sanctioned tropes of regional
difference.

The new place afforded the Arab world and Arabness in regional
policy and popular epistemology also affected domestic categories,
although reluctantly. While it was undoubtedly easier, and safer, to valorize
Arabness outside the discrete spaces of the state of Israel, dominant
Jewish culture (European, urban, upwardly mobile) began to reconsider
the Arabness in its midst. Changes in Israeli domestic policy toward the
(so-called) Arab sector were both product and progenitor of these popular
shifts. State budgets for sector development increased significantly
between 1992 and 1996—particularly in the areas of education, health,
and tourism—climbing from New Israel Shekel (NIS) 141.2 million in
1992 to NIS 480.1 million in 1996, in an actual growth of 240 percent.17
Under the previous government, led by Likud prime minister Yitzhak
Shamir (1989–92), the sector had been virtually ignored, with infinitesimal
budget allocations for planning and development.18 While budgetary
gains under the Labor Party were significant, they did not substantively
compensate for years of forced underdevelopment; many of the state’s
discriminatory policies, particularly those related to land-use planning and
education, remained in place.

Yet shifts in tourism policy toward the Arab sector also obeyed a
broader logic of tourist development. The Tourism Ministry’s unprece-dented interest in Arab-sector villages was made possible by a two-part
shift in touristic development under the Labor government, which radically
de parted from previous policy directives: Arab population centers
and rural locales were revalued as potential markets, the former commodified as sites of ethnic tourism, the latter reimagined as places of
country hospitality to compete with the metropolitan sites (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Eilat) that had historically monopolized government budgets.
As part of the new interest in Arab centers, the Tourism Ministry inaugurated projects in three Palestinian cities and waterfronts. The development of Nazareth, with a project named “Nazareth 2000,” was granted
top priority with an $80 million project to renovate the “old city”19 and
to expand its tourism infrastructure, crippled by a legacy of government-
tal obstacles and land expropriation, in preparation for the millennial
anniversary of the birth of Christ and the magnitude of anticipated pil-
grimage.20 In tandem, but with more modest budgets, the government
pursued renovation projects for the “old city” of Acco (of which the
gentrification and subsequent demographic shift of Jaffa was imagined as
precedent)21 and the Jisr a’Zarka beachfront (initially hailed by the gov-
ernment as the first tourist development aimed explicitly at an Arab clientele).22

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National Itineraries, Itinerant Nations 99
As these examples suggest, ministry interest in Arab population centers as ethnic markets initially corresponded to a largely urban blueprint. The move toward budgets for the Arab village was made possible by a shift in ministry priorities toward rural tourism (tayarut kafrit). The etymology of rural (kafrit), with its roots in the Hebrew word for village, is important here. The slide from noun to adjective, from village (kfar) to rural (kafrit), performs an unmarked erasure in colloquial Israeli usage, in which traces of the village are heard but unacknowledged. Even as it passes as rural in ministry terminology, popular and market usage favors a more vernacular definition, in which kafrit carries the rather ambiguous significance of “country style” (of potato chips, interior design, and so on). As the village was, historically, a place of Arab dwelling, this rendering invisible of “the village” in “the rural” is the site of a deracination, a symbolic deterriorializing of Palestinians from the Israeli countryside. Ministry designs for rural tourism initially accorded with this colloquial norm by ignoring the Palestinian village, targeting instead kibbutzim and moshavim, which were turning to tourism after a gradual decline in agricultural revenues.23 The subsequent success of this market led the ministry to consider villages as sites of rural development late in the Labor tenure: in 1995 and 1996, budgets were approved for development projects in the historic centers of some dozen northern Palestinian villages (including Dalal El Karmel, Yerka, Pekein, Dayr Hanna, and Sakhnin), sites with radically different histories of tourism and government support. While budgets for these villages were approved concurrently, ministry officials interviewed for this study would not discuss them as part of a single policy directive: Sakhnin and Dayr Hanna are deemed “Arab” villages, while the others (with Bedouin and Druze populations) are not.

The violence of government terminology deserves attention here. The term Arab sector participates in a state taxonomy of Israel’s non-Jewish citizens that obscures the national history of the indigenous Palestinian population and diminishes its oppositional potential as a unified body by fracturing its communities. According to this taxonomy, Christians and Muslims are marked as “Arabs,” while Bedouins and Druze are not; “Arabs” are potential state foes, while the “non-Arab” minorities are its tenuous allies and members of its armed forces.24 The term is also a spatial marker, which functions to radically delimit the national territory currently deemed Arab and to obfuscate the state history of violent Palestinian deterritorialization. When used in this essay, the term Arab sector inhabits the rhetorical/political norms of government policy as a means of marking the parameters of my investigation and the historic politics of state nomenclature. By simultaneously naming these populations as Palestinian, an appellation that is largely refused by government and popular Jewish Israeli discourse, I aim to refuse state strategies of fracture and to
emphasize their shared histories and political potential as a single constituency.

Tourism policy has obeyed the logic of this state taxonomy. For while a small number of Bedouin and Druze villages have been places of internal tourism since the 1950s, and even selective recipients of government aid, Christian, Muslim, and mixed villages have been largely absent from the map of state and popularly endorsed tourism. The criteria for inclusion on this map are multiple (including issues such as proximity to main thoroughfares and the quality/quantity of historic spots), but the political histories of prospective sites, even beyond their ethnic-religious particulars, are critical. Population centers with a legacy of collaboration with the state have been favored candidates for governmental and popular support as tourist locales (for example, Abu Ghosh, Jisr a’Zarka), while villages with a history of opposition have been consistently deemed less attractive.

The new, albeit inadequate, attention to the Arab sector under the Labor administration was linked to broader reconfigurations of the Israeli nation and its constituents. The vocabularies of official policy, and the discourse on the floor of the Israeli parliament, moved toward a more heterogeneous articulation of the nation-state that began to gesture toward some of its disenfranchised populations, including Ethiopians and gays and lesbians. Commentary in the popular media also began to change, hinting at the relationship between different histories of state discrimination. Some modalities of difference were more difficult to recognize. While the simultaneous Arabness and Israeliness of Christian and Muslim citizens came more sharply into focus, other modalities of Arab identity within the state remained obscured. The Arabness of Israel’s Arab-Jewish population (Mizrahim), which immigrated to Israel from Arabic-speaking countries, remained virtually unthinkable; the terms of the dominant Ashkenazi-Israeli episteme continued to obstruct both contemporary discourses of Arab-Jewish identity and cultural practice, and the “collective nostalgia” for an Arab-Jewish cultural past.

The Music and Nature Festival,
6 April 1996, 9:00 A.M.

On a hot spring morning I join a group of Israelis on their walking tour through the Galilean village of ‘Ilabun. We are thirty-seven Israeli Jews, including families and young couples, and one American Jewish researcher, lingering in ‘Ilabun’s narrow streets in sunglasses, baseball hats, and video cameras. Our local guide, Akram, has led a tour only once before, at the first annual Olive Festival the previous fall. At twenty-seven, he’s studying to be a dentist and hopes that guiding could augment his income.
We are participating in the Music and Nature Festival, held in the western Galilee every May since its inception in 1988. This year, for the fourth consecutive spring, visitors had a choice: they could enjoy the festival’s unique three-day combination of concerts and nature walks through the area’s Jewish settlements and national reserves, or they could join an organized tour through an Arab, Bedouin, or “mixed” village (thus differentiated by festival organizers). This year, the village of ‘Ilabun was added to the itinerary, joining Dayr Hanna, Kawkab, ‘Arabi, and Sakhnin, which participated in previous seasons. Visitors attested that they had been to Arab villages before: at weddings of workers, for emergency shopping on Shabbat, as soldiers. But to come as tourists was something new.

Our first stop is a house visit. The group makes its way into the central room of a small one-story house. We sit on the floor on mattresses as Akram describes the traditional Arab living room and demonstrates the art of coffee grinding, pounding rhythmically, like a musical instrument, as a way of welcoming guests. It’s an ad hoc performance, he assures the group. They correct the errors in his Hebrew.

The group is engaged, asking many questions about his family, about local burial customs and the number of students pursuing higher education. The role of females is of particular concern.

“That’s big progress,” the woman next to me whispers as Akram describes the aerobics class for girls, now offered locally.

“Isn’t that a traditional debke rhythm?” asks a man from Kibbutz Nesher, as Akram continues his musical improvisation. The crowd is well educated and concerned about cultural preservation.

Outside again, we continue our tour. “This looks just like Jaffa,” says a woman to her daughter, walking a German shepherd in streets nearly empty of residents, places accustomed to neither Jewish tourists nor their dogs. Akram narrates the history of particular buildings, explaining which religious groups live where, why houses are built as they are. We ascend to the top of someone’s roof to look out over the valley. Akram tells the story of the expulsion of villagers to Lebanon in 1947, but, unaccustomed to guiding, he speaks too softly, and much of the narration is lost.

“It’s a big performance,” says a woman in her mid-forties, eager to be interviewed. Like many festival visitors, she lives in a neighboring Galilean moshav. “They don’t really drink out of one cup.” She refers to the shallow cup of bitter coffee Akram offered in the living room in the tradition of welcoming guests. Everyone shares one cup, he had said, as a symbol of togetherness. “It’s just less dishes that way. In Arab houses, when they come to visit, everyone gets their own cup. They just do it for the tourists.”

From the heights above the small commercial center, we look down on the expansive valley below, premium agricultural land that used to
belong to the village for farming and development reserves. “Actually, I like the traditional ways,” she says, as we turn back toward the center. “As long as they aren’t fanatics.”

**Ethnographic Tourism**

The Music and Nature tourists, armed with camcorders and a passion for local practices, are representative of the clientele of this emerging market. They bring an anthropologist’s interest in culture, in social rituals shifting over time, taking pleasure in the late-night conversations in the living room of their bed-and-breakfast proprietor and in the village histories that are a staple of the guide’s narrative. Their more cosmetic desire for folk commodities and performances are easy to satisfy, and local entrepreneurs comply, as tourist dollars are at stake. Bedouin tents, often in the absence of Bedouins after a history of forced relocation, are a staple of the market. Elders in traditional clothing tend silently to the coffee. Young women in traditional dresses of the region display local embroidery, posing for journalists in the costumes and handwork of their grandmothers, performed as their own.

At this stage in the market’s development, the tourist population has a relatively homogeneous profile. The vast majority are upwardly mobile, Ashkenazi Jews (of Eastern European descent) from the center of Israel. Many of them are professionals: doctors, lawyers, and professors. They’ve studied in the States (“My wife and I met at Columbia”) and have traveled through Europe and “the Far East.” They’ve visited the Bedouins in the Negev, the Druze villages near Haifa, Jerusalem’s Muslim and Christian quarters, save during intifada years. But many understand this as their first social visit to an Arab village inside the state. Catalyzed by popular peacetime knowledges about the Arab world, they come with an interest in local culture. Most agree that peace has made their visit possible, and a majority support the left-wing parties (Labor, or Meretz) that have delivered it. But leftist political affiliation and folkloric interest frequently translate into support for local infrastructural and land-based struggles. Some are well versed in the legacy of local resistance and express sympathy for ongoing political contests and critiques (“everyone has the right to fight for his land”). Many chide the history of political activism in these places (“they were fanatics then”) and attribute underdevelopment to local “primitivism.” Even after the Oslo accord, these visitors represent a minority of Israeli Jews in their willingness to come as tourists to places popularly marked by histories of hostility.

Their visits to western Galilean villages are not restricted to the three days of the Music and Nature Festival, but take several forms: as festival
tourism, particularly two annual events, of which Music and Nature is one, that bring from twenty to two hundred tourists daily to area villages; as organized group tours, led by a growing number of private guides, many of whom are Israeli Jews who specialize in the Arab sector, with as many as two buses daily to select village sites; and as private weekend visits, made possible by bed-and-breakfasts in some fifteen private homes booked primarily during festivals and peak season and offering a proliferation of home attractions (traditional meals, local crafts, fortune-telling). While this yet embryonic market draws largely on an elite, Ashkenazi clientele, local entrepreneurs and government officials are already planning for audiences two and three: tourists from Europe and the United States and, later, from the Arab world.

Tourists at the Music and Nature Festival walk through villages that have been subject to decades of forced underdevelopment, massive land confiscation, and explicit state policies of neglect and containment. Portions of the villages still lack sewage systems, many roads are dangerous and unpaved, and houses are crowded as building permits are difficult if not impossible to obtain. Local interest in market development, and its coextensive promise of infrastructural improvement, is widespread. In 1996, the Tourism Ministry attested to daily entreaties from village entrepreneurs seeking fiscal assistance for home-based tourist developments. During the same year, five western Galilean villages payrolled a tourism official in their local council to manage tourism affairs. The local popularity of tourist development is largely attributable to its promise of capital gains for villages with little agricultural land and almost no industrial infrastructure, this despite the fact that local tourism will yield business opportunities to a relatively small segment of local investors, due both to the modest size of the expected tourist population and to the multiple limitations of small villages. At this stage, wide popular interest in market development speaks more of local hopes for the future of a broad-based tourism economy than it does of significant revenue flows from current market endeavors.

For local entrepreneurs, tourist visits are also valued as exercises in situated diplomacy, as means of furthering contact between Jews and Palestinians inside the state in the spirit of the ongoing regional peace talks. That these political-symbolic gains might translate into economic capital is clear, as the future of the growing market is inextricably linked to the proliferation of the discourses and practices of coexistence. For Palestinians who live and work at these sites, the market value of a coexistence ethos encourages a muted public politics in which critique of state policy is largely reserved for the private spaces of Arabic conversations, out of tourist range.
National Authenticity

Following the dictates of Israeli planners and a growing international market in the culture of "the periphery," these emerging tourist sites are explicitly staged through the trope of authenticity. The word *authentic* (*otenti*) circulates constantly in and around this market, proliferating in planning documents from the Tourism Ministry and private developers and reiterated locally, in Hebrew, by entrepreneurs, guides, and residents as a means of marking local value.

What *authentic* modifies is a polyvalent notion of Arab culture that perpetually slides between the local and the supralocal, between reference to things Palestinian and things Arab. For while the market traffics in Palestinian folklore and practices, the semiotics of Galilean culture are consistently read by tourists and enunciated by planners and hosts as instances of a broader, desituated notion of Arabness. Authenticity is often staged by hosts and marked by tourists precisely at these sites of translation, where prototypical markers of Arab culture overwrite those of Galilean or Palestinian particularism. At moments, then, the discourse and semiotics of authenticity perform a radically dehistoricizing function.

To translate *Palestinian as Arab* is to sanitize and rewrite a threatening history, making Galilean places and practices more available to Israeli Jews as occasions for leisure through a symbolic deterritorialization. Authenticity's logic is thus critical to the Arab sector's very condition of possibility as a state-sanctioned tourist site: in translation, its political threat is mitigated and its symbolic field rendered broadly intelligible. Yet authenticity's vector of translation has another, more attenuated axis. Etymology is critical, as literal usage of the term *authenticity* relies on an adaptation of the English (*otenti*), not on its colloquial derivation from the biblical Hebrew (*amiti*). Here, in the Latinate resonances of *otenti*, the genealogy of a delocated ethnicity is audible: *otenti* carries the legacy of Western traffic in cultural difference, of a generalizable market desire for local "elsewheres."

As in the Western market, this desire coheres precisely in the seemingly democratic breadth of its scope, in which nativeness and "the local" are marked as virtually interchangeable components of a landscape of difference. Thus, even as the tourism market depends on the semiotics of Palestinian and/or Arab culture, a broader, supraregional notion of "the ethnic" is also in circulation. It is this aesthetic of a desituated ethnicity that renders comprehensible the presence of nonindigenous folk motifs as ornamentation in a touristic Bedouin tent; in keeping with tourism's translation logic, a departure from Arab origins need not disrupt the market's symbolic comprehensibility. As the term itself has been imported, the semiotics of elsewhere are internal to its mechanism.

Historic or cultural particularism is not, then, critical to the enuncia-
tion of authenticity, as its referential map shuttles between the situated and the radically desituated. The same is true of its temporal register, as marketplace meanings cohere and gain value across a temporality that is irreducible to that of the Palestinian cultural present. The “truth” of the homology between the traditional ethnic dress and the Palestinian girl who models it for tourists, between the ethnic object/display and its 1990s currency, is not necessarily at stake as the definitive measure of touristic value. Rather, value lies equally in the performance of an ethnic difference, which has been virtually absent from the tourists’ map of the nation and the culturally thinkable. Following the logic of translation, performance value coheres in historicity or culture itself, not in local Palestinian particularities that might threaten either with illegibility (unrecognizable as an instance of Arab culture), or with the political claims that can arise from Galilean specifics. That the market value of performance overwrites the need for cultural fidelity to contemporary practices accords with the modalities of tourist pleasure: the unveiling of local lies (“they don’t really drink out of one cup”) need not diminish enjoyment in the visit. In part, what is at stake for tourists is the force of the performance itself, its mimed verisimilitude to a legacy of cultural or historic practices, be they of the place or imagined of the place in translation.

Authenticity has other material incarnations. For the state, the imperative to construct authenticity has translated into policy directives that prioritize renovation of historic structures (mud houses, ancient walls, stone walkways), leaving other portions of villages virtually untouched, despite areas of extreme neglect. In this way, authenticity’s temporal register is further complicated, as development and beautification priorities threaten to remap the social and commercial topographies of the village, placing new emphasis on historic spaces and structures, even if community needs demand that development proceed elsewhere. (It is on the basis of such development priorities that local opponents to tourism projects have stressed the dangers of its “museumification” of contemporary Palestinian life.) Thus, the Palestinian present is being rewritten as practices of state “allochronism” remap the village as a site of an imagined pre-modern. Such places offer tourists “a taste of the past” (t’a’am shel pa’am), yet an insistently metaphoric one, as dominant state histories have rendered the imagination of a pre-Zionist Arab Palestine virtually unthinkable.

For tourist planners and policymakers, the demands of authenticity also discourage state development. Broken roads and antiquated drainage and water systems—signs of disuse—can do the work of the picturesque. For Jewish visitors to such village sites, marks of underdevelopment are understood multiply: as testimony to a legacy of Arab primitivism, as indications of state discrimination, and as traces of the simpler, truer life that they have come to the Galilee to enjoy.
The Palestinian Heritage Museum, 15 March 1996

I am drinking coffee with Adnan Farajallah in the crowded room that serves as both exhibition hall and office for the Palestinian Heritage Museum in the Galilean city of Sakhnin. Behind us, arranged according to date of use, are shelves of historic cooking implements, gathered from Palestinian families in the area, labeled with handwritten Arabic placards. Upstairs are cases of embroidery, women’s jewelry, and traditional dresses, patterns varying according to city of origin: Ramallah, Nazareth, Jericho, Beersheba. There is no Hebrew here, and little English, save the return address on the museum brochure. It’s an issue of fierce contention, Farajallah concedes, for local Jewish guides and tourist agents who organize visits to the museum as part of a tour of the western Galilee. “There are no Arabic explanations at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem. Why should there be Hebrew here?”

Farajallah tells the story of the museum’s history: its growth from three dilapidated basement rooms in 1990, advertising limited to word of mouth, to six rooms and a dramatic rise in the number of tourists in 1996, aided by local festivals and the growing popularity of village tourism among Jewish Israelis. Leafing through his meticulous, handwritten log of visitors since the museum’s opening, he notes the radical shift in demographics. Beyond the general sixfold rise since 1990, Jewish Israeli visitors (student groups, weekend visitors, festivalgoers) now constitute the overwhelming majority at nearly 85 percent, up from 30 percent in 1992; Palestinian Israelis are the new minority. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza have yet to arrive.

Over a repast of strong coffee and cigarettes, Farajallah speaks a Hebrew that is rapid and intricate. “What are the political implications of being seriously introduced to Arab culture, tradition, customs, tools? You can find these in many places in Israel. If the Israeli public wants to see authentic tools, they can go to any moshav with a museum of [Jewish] settlement... But these tools are Palestinian. That is what we are trying to introduce into their consciousness, even though it makes some visitors shudder with discomfort. To hear the word five years ago was very worrisome for all of the [Jewish] visitors. Today, with normalization, it has become natural.”

He concedes that tourism threatens to primitivize, but he believes in its possibilities as cultural education, beginning each organized visit with a lecture on Palestinian culture, history, and contemporary politics. “People are coming to learn about Arab culture, not just to spend leisure time. They sit, listen to every word they hear, and ask a lot of questions. There is a gap [in their knowledge]. They’ve always heard those stereotypes about Arab culture, that Arabs are screwed up, uneducated, underdevel-
oped. But the tourist that comes here hears the truth. I expose all of the pain that exists after land confiscation, even though it hurts. Because the confiscation of my land happened for your good, and today you visit as a guest.”

**Geographies of “Peace”**

The Jewish Israeli visitor to the Palestinian Heritage Museum has seen Sakhnin before: from a car window on a shortcut between Jewish centers, on a stop for cheap vegetables and fresh bread, or as a younger soldier on obligatory three-year service, monitoring *intifada* demonstrations and arresting those responsible for political leaflets and Palestinian flags. Many male tourists, over fifty, remember the village streets from dark, evening patrols. “It’s the first time I have been here during the day,” I was frequently told. “It’s different to come without a weapon.” It’s an uncanny memory, resonating with uncomfortable histories of violence and hatred that can’t always be told in these places.

Although the market’s emergence must be historicized through the new priorities in *domestic* tourism policy, its allure among Jewish Israelis rests beyond the terms of this domestic cartography. Following the logic of translation, these village sites appeal as elsewheres that connote more than merely the rural, with an intrigue that cannot be measured simply in terms of their distance and difference from the Jewish metropolis. As sites of explicitly cultural/ethnic tourism, their appeal also lies in the sites’ supradomestic allure, that is, an allure whose object exceeds the boundaries of the nation-state. These sites appeal as less clearly mappable *elsewheres* to which national Jewish culture and epistemology correspond as *Here*. They acquire market value through a complex double move at the intersection of spatial proximity (“only an hour and a half from Tel Aviv”) and national-cultural distanciation, in the distance/difference from dominant Jewish culture.

The streets have changed when the Jewish Israeli returns to Sakhnin as a tourist, carrying the memories of nonanalogous visits. Peacetime discourses have shifted the contours of Israel’s “imaginative geography,” once measured not in terms of territorial proximity (of the eleven-minute drive between moshav Yodfat and ‘Arabi village) but through the coordinates of political alliance and enmity. Like the distance between Amman and Tel Aviv, just over an hour by car, these proximities were once hypothetical, overwritten by a history of ideological and diplomatic distanciation between Israel and the Arab world. Post-Oslo discourses of coexistence introduced “new conditions of neighborliness.” As a family from Tel Aviv booked a weekend in Sakhnin, the 1996 Hebrew press readied its
peacetime readers for their impending visits to Damascus, Beirut, and Tunisia ("Oasis in the Sahara")—describing, in the idiom of the tourist guide, the local food, historic sites, and codes of propriety. As Jewish Israeli leisure travel, these nonequivalent journeys were once unthinkable in analogous ways.

The geographic configurations of marketplace translation are thus multiple. Tourism depends on a cartography of Arab culture and place as selfsame, in keeping with an Orientalist logic in which the particularities of local sites are cast as placeholders of a delocated Arabness. Yet it also takes shape through the "peacetime" geographic imaginations of the "New Middle East," which reinflect and add specificity to the Orientalist map. Following the Oslo Accords, which enabled Israelis to disaggregate and particularize the Arab world, the Galilee’s allure rests also in its intimation of situated regional elsewheres, be they cities or nations. The link between Sakhnin and Tunisia is not merely one of simultaneous touristic mystique. Rather, following an Orientalist epistemology, these mystiques are critically intertwined, as the allure of Sakhnin, as an "Arab" instance, foretells that of Tunisia. Yet in the post-Oslo logic, the vector of translation is not monodirectional. As the peacetime vogue in regional Arabness rebounds domestically, reinflecting and revaluing Arab spaces and subjects inside Israel, the imagination of Tunisia also foretells Sakhnin and enables the growth of its tourist market. What this peacetime translation retains of its Orientalist legacy is the ability to move, unfettered, between different sites of Arabness, as inter-national likeness (Sakhnin foretells Tunisia) and intra-national likeness ("this looks just like Jaffa") are articulated together. True to Orientalism’s pan-Eastern cartography, the attraction of the Arab sector is also bolstered by the popularity of Israeli tourism to the "Far East" and its composite portrait of exoticism that Galilee can mimic. ("Why should they go to Nepal," remarked a Jewish Arab-sector guide, "when they can find this stuff in their backyard?") Regional or asituated translation builds consumer confidence, easing the tourist discomfort of a new Jewish Israeli intimacy with "the enemy within."

Yet even as Sakhnin and Tunisia can be thought of together in a post-Oslo logic, some Arab places cannot be imagined in tandem across national and armistice lines and the more fluid lines of memory and ideology. Many imaginative geographies shifted under the terms of "peace," while others remained relatively entrenched, particularly those of Palestinian culture, persons, and places. The Oslo Accords have enabled provisional links between Tel Aviv, Sakhnin, and Amman—in the development of joint Israeli-Jordanian markets, in Israeli state-authorized tourism to both Jordan and the Arab sector, and in the vogue of the Arab ethnic, which encouraged these trips to be selectively analogized. Yet the same
allowances were not made for Sakhnin, Hebron, and Jerusalem, for links between Palestinian places/histories in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. Even following the Oslo Accords, the Labor government continued to restrict Palestinian movement between Israel and the territories and to obstruct the growth of an explicitly Palestinian Arab culture within the nation-state—balking, for example, at curricular reforms to strengthen Palestinian history in Arab-sector classrooms, and upholding the popular discourse that refuses to name Arab Israelis as Palestinian. Inside the state, Arab-Jewish culture was still popularly excluded from the new Israeli imagination of Arabness, making class- and gender-based coalitions between Mizrahi and Palestinian communities nearly impossible, beyond the parameters of the nationally thinkable.

The Palestinian Heritage Museum makes its intervention here, by refusing the ahistorical homogenization of Arab cultures and the reductive translation of Palestinian as (selfsame) Arab, providing instead an alternative Palestinian cartography that writes against state interdictions on inter-Arab alliance. Farajallah’s map of Palestinian culture spans the geography of historic Arab Palestine, linking West Bank heritage with that of Galilee. Even as this cultural cartography returns to prestate “facts,” to the cultural contiguities of Palestine before 1948, its resonances as a 1996 articulation are transgressive, refusing a history of Israeli cultural repression that has sought to erase these historic diacritics from the contemporary face of the nation-state.

Like the memories of Sakhnin from army patrols, the cultural artifacts Farajallah presents are not unfamiliar to Jewish Israeli visitors. They have seen them in the homes of their grandparents, for sale in Israeli boutiques, and on display in kibbutz museums of early Jewish settlement. What has changed is their context. Again, the complicated temporality of Arab-sector tourism is manifest. The excitement of the tourist visit is explained, by many visitors, as a first encounter: indeed, the visit is new, in the terms of its incarnation, as Palestinian cultural artifacts and subjects are experienced as touristic sites in unprecedented ways. What lingers in the visit is a sense of the uncanny, the memories of other first encounters in these sites, often less pleasant ones, in which the practices and epistemologies of cultural tourism were largely unavailable. The thrill of the “I am here” depends, for many visitors, on a complicated forgetting—or, rather, on a rewriting of the site (people and places) as new. Farajallah complicates this revision, shifting its vector, such that Jewish histories of Israel are also being rewritten in the defamiliarization project: “If the Israeli public wants to see authentic tools (kelim otentiyim), they can go to any moshav with a museum of [Jewish] settlement. . . . But these tools are Palestinian.” What is being rewritten are the terms of the hegemonic Israeli discourse on authenticity. The artifacts themselves are not in ques-
tion; rather, Farajallah rewrites the historical-political map to which their authenticity can correspond. At stake in Farajallah’s narrative is a contestation of both the dominant national modalities of authenticity and the authenticity of the nation-state itself, the truth of its historic claims to Jewish primacy and the discriminatory practices such truth claims enable. In a performative reworking of state-sanctioned rhetorics and market practices, Farajallah reinscribes Palestinian cultural history, and a Palestinian political present, onto the map of Israel.

**Itineraries of Struggle**

Farajallah’s reterritorializing of Palestinian culture emerges out of a history of exclusion far greater than this text can accommodate. Its violences include the 1948 war and the dispersion of some 770,000 Palestinians from the territory subsequently designated as Israel; the systematic Israeli military destruction of as many as 418 Arab villages whose lands were later redistributed to Jewish communities by the Jewish National Fund; Israel’s control of the Palestinian population by means of a military government for nearly two decades following state formation, in which militant policing of the population and vast campaigns of land confiscation delimited territory for community expansion, hindered the development of metropolitan centers, and undercut the Palestinian economic base.

The Galilee is critical in this history. Even after the flight and violent expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in 1948, and the subsequent scramble to settle Jews in “abandoned” villages, the Galilee remained the state’s densest area of Palestinian Arab habitation, which far exceeded the scale of local Jewish settlement. In the late 1950s, in response to this territorial and demographic threat, governmental and nongovernmental agencies inaugurated a policy of Jewish settlement in the region and a coextensive campaign of Galilean land confiscation for future infrastructural development. The policy’s public appellation made its politics clear: the Judaization of the Galilee (Yehud haGalil) sought to build a Jewish majority in the north of the country and undercut the Palestinian hold on land and economic resources. In keeping with policy dictates, the government sought to woo Jewish settlers to isolated population centers in the midst of Arab settlement in an effort (in the words of veteran political hawk Ariel Sharon) to “stem the hold of foreigners on state lands.”

This history is also marked by struggle. In May 1976, in response to government plans to expropriate vast tracts of Palestinian-owned land in the western Galilee, communist-backed village committees organized a
general strike and day of protest. What resulted was a series of violent clashes with a heightened army presence instructed to repress protest at any cost, leaving several Palestinians dead and hundreds more wounded and under arrest. In the reassessment of national policy that followed, Israeli ministers asked not how histories of discrimination might be redressed, but how the Palestinian population might be more effectively controlled. While Land Day has been commemorated annually in subsequent decades by popular demonstrations and strikes, both the intensity and mass appeal of the late 1970s and 1980s have waned. In the post-Oslo era, burning tires and symbols of Palestinian nationalism have been largely replaced by support for the peace process and by calls for regional reconciliation.

Even as the language of Judaization has given way to a less volatile, euphemized discourse of national development, state-sponsored Jewish settlement of the Galilee continues. In 1982, the government established the regional council of Misgav in the western Galilee, enabling the expropriation of massive land reserves from neighboring Palestinian villages. In an effort to alleviate the burden of servicing their nearly two hundred thousand residents, only the reserve lands of these villages were incorporated into the council’s map of jurisdiction while their population centers were excluded. As a result, Misgav (with some seven thousand Jewish residents) enjoys grossly disproportionate land holding, at nearly twenty-five times (per capita) that of adjacent Palestinian communities. The generous government budgets allocated to Misgav are exponentially larger than those provided to neighboring villages, and the council’s growing industrial district, which employs many of the area’s Jewish residents, effectively bars Palestinian employees through discriminatory hiring practices. State zoning restrictions prevent parallel industrial development in village centers.

How does tourism intervene in this history? Among the villages that have joined the state-sponsored map of domestic tourism are Sakhnin, ‘Arabi, and Dayr Hanna, victims of both the 1976 and 1982 confiscations, and (in)famous centers of Land Day commemoration in recent decades. Given the state’s propensity to develop tourism in places/communities with collaborationist histories, the political legacy of the western Galilee is a critical anomaly that complicates an assessment of state and (Jewish) private-sector interests in local tourist development. The majority of tourist ventures within these villages are orchestrated by Misgav, including the biannual festivals, and the weekend visits organized by a growing number of Jewish entrepreneurs and tour guides. In turn, the Tourism Ministry relies on Misgav council members and local Jewish consultants to plan and develop village tourism in neighboring sites. Misgav and its affiliates are, in short, used as mediators with the Palestinian Galilee, whose
political history is still understood as a liability. The fact of this mediation, defended as an interest in “consumer confidence,” forewarns of limited revenues for the Palestinian market.

The political climate in western Galilean villages has also changed significantly since the late 1970s, therein facilitating the development of the tourist market. In recent years, Palestinian demands for greater socio-economic mobility have necessitated a shift in political discourse and affiliation away from the oppositional politics of the late 1970s and toward increased state identification—a trend catalyzed by the end of the intifada in 1993, as Palestinian political priorities shifted from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza to local issues of national (Israeli) affiliation and status. The lure of tourist revenues also creates political effects. The demands of the market necessitate that local histories of struggles and opposition be minimized, at least publicly, so that Jewish Israeli tourists will feel comfortable spending leisure time in places once identified as centers of internal enmity. Tourist dollars are at stake.

The Music and Nature Festival,
6 April 1996, 11:30 A.M.

In ‘Ilabun’s late morning sun, we continue our walking tour, winding our way to the courtyard of the local church where brightly colored plastic chairs have been arranged for a concert by village musicians. Akram explains that the traditional Arabic wedding music they play is experiencing a renaissance in the Galilee. We follow the lyrics on photocopied Hebrew translations. A middle-aged man from north Tel Aviv gets up to dance, joining a young woman from the village in her T-shirt and jeans. His partner sits down and is replaced by several Ashkenazi women from our group. They wave their arms above their heads in a rendition of traditional Arabic movements as local teenagers watch from the sidelines.

There is a motion from the audience; someone from the tour wants to sing. The musicians pass the microphone to a woman from Kfar Shmaryahu. She begins “Shir haShalom” [The song of peace]. The tune and words have the familiarity of a national anthem, recalling the song’s feverish repetition on the radio through seven months of public memorializing. This was the song sung by Yitzhak Rabin from a political podium in Tel Aviv moments before his assassination by one of Israel’s own. The song sheet, stained with his blood, has already been filed in the national archives.

Some sing with her. Others sit quietly. The player on the traditional folk instrument tries to strum along from the musicians’ table, but the tune is somehow incompatible.
This scene of Rabin memorializing is as overdetermined as the assassination itself, the period of “tolerance” and public soul-searching that followed, and the popular calls to revisit national myths. Israelis lamented not only the loss of a leader and the fiction of Jewish unity, but the potential future of the peace process, of which Rabin was heralded as both architect and martyr. The performance in ‘Ilabun participates in this lament, inscribing the village onto the map of postassassination political revisionism, marking the tourists’ collective visit as an effect of the peace process. More pointedly, in the broader logic of Rabin memorializing, the song performs allegiance to the state. In the weeks following the assassination, public mourning worked to (re)inscribe the mourner into the Israeli collective—through candles on Israel’s streets, bumper stickers, political banners, and graffiti—in a sorrow and outrage that, according to the Hebrew press, knew no party lines, no political divisions save the secular/religious divide. Public sites of commemoration were rendered exalted national places, witnessed daily across the country on the evening news. To mourn from a place was to mark it as a site of national fidelity. To mourn and be witnessed publicly was to be interpellated as a national subject. By staging a memorial in ‘Ilabun, Jewish Israeli tourists marked the village, and the Arab sector by extension, as a place in and of the nation-state.

The ritual practices and emblems of nationalism are not foreign to western Galilean villages, brought in by tourists from the outside. Many Palestinian restaurant owners, shopkeepers, and families experimenting with bed-and-breakfasts in their homes adorn their public spaces with some of Israel’s most familiar national artifacts, rendered uncanny in these incongruous spaces: photos of Jewish Israeli statesmen, Hebrew posters endorsing the peace process, emblems of Zionist parties. Because of the political history of the Palestinian Galilee, these artifacts play a critical role in the market and are, at times, its very condition of possibility. Familiar artifacts of national allegiance overwrite the history of (presumed) internal enmity, marking rural locals as loyal and safe, readying the ground for state and private investment and for Jewish clientele.

Authenticity has, then, another critical register of enunciation. Success in this market requires the recognizable props of folk culture: stone walkways, hosts in traditional clothing, dinner in a Bedouin tent. But equally insistent, although absent from the explicit directives of the government and private sector, is the market’s demand for local proof of national Israeli allegiance and, by extension, the ability of tourists and planners to perform the rituals of the nation at these sites. Galilean authenticity thus takes shape through both the semiotics of ethnicity and/or Arab culture and those of the Israeli nation, its artifacts and dis-
courses. These semiotic systems do not compete for symbolic primacy but are articulated through each other, building a viable market at their intersec-
tions.

Yet there is a potential for duplicity in this coupling that rests in the logic of iterability.\footnote{49} While national policy and private-sector directives have scripted authenticity as double (of the Arab ethnic \textit{and} the Israeli nation-state), the enunciation of this doubleness cannot be stabilized. I want to suggest that it is precisely the production of authenticity \textit{as} double that allows for a critical reterritorializing and rethinking of the nation-state in and of Palestinian places, persons, and histories, frustrating state desires for a declaration of national allegiance. Of course, the Arab-sector market is not homogeneous, and not all reiterations of authenticity frustrate ministry desires. Yet in ‘Ilabbun, authenticity’s dual semiotics have enabled tourists to stage a national memorial on the grounds of an Arab cultural performance—a memorial that functions as a respatialization of the nation in/of its Palestinian spaces and subjects. In the Palestinian Heritage Museum, authenticity’s doubleness has rendered Farajallah’s (counter)narrative of Israeli history the appropriate second term in a tourist display of Palestinian culture, enabling an alternative cartography of the Israeli nation, articulated through its Palestinian places, artifacts, and memories.\footnote{50} In these sites, through tropologies sanctioned by the state and private sector, tourism has allowed for a rethinking of Palestinian history as an “authentic” component of the Israeli national narrative. To disrupt the national narrative thus is to rupture Israel’s spatial and cultural order, unsettling the fictitious homology between (Jewish) nation and (Israeli) nation-state.

\textbf{Traveling Authenticities}

The interrogation of authenticity has, of course, been integral to the ethnographic and theoretical literature on tourism.\footnote{51} Recent work by James Buzard has traced this trope, and its companion motifs, through nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century discourses and literatures on tourism and travel (the mutually constitutive dyad around which his text circulates), arguing that it is through a semiotics of authenticity that modern identities and epistemologies were staged and differentiated.\footnote{52} The pioneering work of Dean MacCannell, and his notion of the “dialect of authenticity,” is the almost mythic referent for even recent theorizations of tourism. In his 1976 work \textit{The Tourist}, MacCannell suggests that the quest of the tourist (and the “modern” subject by extension) is predicated on a search for the truth of experience, for “real” places, subjects, and artifacts.\footnote{53} Yet this quest is conditioned, indeed enabled, by its own impossi-
bility. “Authenticity” is rendered visible, MacCannell argues, when marked as such. But markers—be they signs, labels (HAND MADE IN NEPAL), or the presence of other tourists—strip the site/commodity of its truth, propelling the tourist to look elsewhere. This elsewhere is the mythic realm of MacCannell’s “back-region.” As authenticity is always deferred, the back-region he imagines is a place of infinite differentiation, boundless subregions, each refusing to satisfy.

MacCannell’s early work has been overwritten by more recent scholarship, including his own. The tourist as subject has left the unwitting haze of tourism’s infinite deferral, reborn into the postmodern condition where desire is consummated at the very site of simulacra. John Urry has written of the posttourist who takes pleasure in all things inauthentic, delighting in the knowledge “that the apparent authentic local entertainment is as socially contrived as the ethnic bar, and the supposed quaint and traditional fishing village could not survive without income from tourism.” Yet Urry’s revision of the scene of tourism, in this and other instances, translates the experience of posttourism into a homogeneous tableau of the postmodern, in which authenticity is exposed either in its fraudulence (“as socially contrived”) or as a placeholder, the site of value whose truth (“income from tourism”) it represents in absentia.

Without denying the market value of “authenticity,” I want to move beyond notions of fraudulence or metonymy to consider the trope and its props as sites of national-cultural negotiation, told in stories, displayed in museums, performed by the body. I am suggesting that the production of cultural authenticity, in the sites of tourism’s commodity culture, be thought of as a performative contest over meaning that has the potential to “exceed [the] boundaries of its enframing discourses,” enabling a dissimulation of national mythologies through the terms of state logics themselves, in which “the very process of ratification becomes itself the site for the subtle de-authorization of state power that takes place through its authorizing rituals.”

What I am arguing then is that the performance of a commodified “authenticity” can allow for transgressive cultural enunciation. This is not to deny that “peace-process interest” in Arab folklore returns, in instances, to the atavistic tropes of Orientalism and its legacy of violence and discrimination. But by bringing Palestinian culture into circulation through the seemingly recalcitrant discourses and artifacts of the Israeli state, tourism’s “authenticity” can complicate the traditional terms of national belonging, as the state of Israel is reconfigured in and through its Palestinian spaces and subjects. Alternative modalities of authenticity both mark the villages as familiar sites of the national home and defamiliarize the terms of “home” itself.

Yet nationalism is recalcitrant. Not all narratives or places can be
party to emancipatory revision. The possibilities and effects of alternative authenticities are radically contingent. Histories of colonial discourse suggest the tremendous variability of nativist authenticity as trope, as technologies and rhetorics of nativism were both mobilized by imperial regimes as tools of subordination and redeployed as the terms of anti-imperialist struggle. That the rhetorics of decolonialization often returned to the terms, the categorical claims, and the binary logic of imperial taxonomies is clear. Yet, as Benita Parry argues, this truth of decolonization’s “impurity” is not adequate grounds for the dismissal of its counterdiscourses, their political effects and possibilities. I join Parry in insisting that such discourses are irreducible to a “repetition of the canonical terms of imperialism’s conceptual framework.”

As a study of tourism practices, this essay also joins the critique of travel as trope within cultural studies scholarship, in which images of traveler, migrant, and nomad have been problematically mobilized as figures of late-capitalist displacement and the postmodern subject. To its credit, such scholarship has tried to theorize culture and subjectivity at points of flux, by interrogating nation, community, and identity through displacement, transience, and movement. In an age of increasing transnationalization, these tropologies have challenged spatial incarceration of the subject within the boundaries of the nation-state and unproblematic “home,” offering a critical departure from modernist epistemologies of fixity and finality. Yet James Clifford’s caveat, that “there is no ground of equivalence between two ‘travelers’,” has been insufficiently heeded. Edward Said’s often cited “general condition of homelessness,” Arjun Appadurai’s celebration of the possibilities of deterritorialization, Stuart Hall’s “general feeling which more and more people seem to have about themselves—that they are all, in some way, recently migrated”—have slipped too easily into allegorized universalisms. As Caren Kaplan and others have suggested, this celebration of movement as metaphors often obscures the conditions of travel, belying power inequities among travelers and histories of movement and the violence that may attend them. The itineraries of the Palestinian refugee, the American anthropologist, and the Ashkenazi tourist offer no easy equivalents.

**Tourism’s Threat**

The election of a Likud-led government in May 1996 brought a dramatic decline in funding for the Palestinian sector. State discourses shifted from the Labor emphasis on “the New Middle East” and its attendant economies and cultures to a heightened rhetoric of “Islamic terror” and “the historic enemies of the Jewish people.” While fiscal support from
the Tourism Ministry for Arab-sector development has dropped significantly with the Likud administration, the ministry’s suprafiscal endorsement remains intact, as state celebration of Arab-Jewish coexistence through tourism coarticulates with the hawkish policies of Likud territorialism. While the private sector continues to develop the market, its effectiveness and longevity in the virtual absence of government aid is as yet unclear. As the peace process falters from Israeli aggression and intransigence, as countries in the region revisit their economic boycott of Israel, as tourists become targets of antinormalization violence, popular Jewish Israeli interest in “things Arab” has the potential to wane dramatically.

The cultural terms of Palestinian national belonging are, of course, being challenged beyond tourism’s spaces. The 1996 elections also brought a new six-member Palestinian Jewish party to the Knesset, formed in the merger of Hadash and al-Tajammu. The party’s political program calls for “cultural autonomy” for Israel’s Palestinian population, to be realized (in part) through greater Palestinian involvement in curricular programming, the establishment of Israel’s first Arab university and independent Arabic-language television station, and, of admittedly less importance, cultural tourism in Palestinian centers. Although the party’s potential as a voting block is limited, its political vocabularies are circulating daily in the Hebrew media, with unprecedented attention granted to its most prominent spokesman, Azmi Bashara, who recently announced plans to run for prime minister as the nation’s first Palestinian contender. While Hadash/al-Tajammu may not provide the political blueprint for Israel’s secular-democratic future, its role in the Knesset and popular media points to the new centrality of a Palestinian cultural agenda in dominant spaces of Israeli national culture.

While the Likud coalition has the power to radically delimit budgets for Arab-sector tourist development, Palestinian entrepreneurs from the Galilee have ambitions that the government cannot easily control. They dream of stages two and three: of tourists from Europe and America, and, later, from the Arab world, their entry into Israel eased by new interregional diplomacy; and the promise of Israeli capital gains in the Middle East economy. The imminence of stage three has some Israelis concerned:

We are going to gain in this peace, but maybe, at the same time, lose everything: our country, our Jewish identity, and, in the end, the opportunity to live in what we once called the land of Israel. . . . They expect millions of tourists from the whole world. The foreigners will fill the streets of our cities in masses, until it is no longer clear who lives here and who is a tourist.64

This narrative of the tourist mob, told by the founder of Israel’s Society for the Protection of Nature, foregrounds questions of national belonging. Beyond a fear of numbers alone, these anxious questions respond to the

Rebecca Luna Stein
profile of the anticipated future visitor. They are Muslims and/or Arabs from Asia and the Middle East, who will mingle at Israeli sites with the more familiar European and North American travelers, and with Israel’s Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Collectively, these tourists will unsettle the cartography of the New Middle East, turning the vector of transnational movement inward on Tel Aviv, from Damascus, Cairo, and Amman. When they arrive, Galilean villages, as tourist sites, have the potential to become important places of cross-regional contact. In the comingling of Sakhnin Palestinians, Ashkenazi Jews from north Tel Aviv, and Diaspora Palestinians on a visit home, tourism might foretell a very different Israeli future.

Notes

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1. The names of persons discussed in the text have been protected with pseudonyms, save those of national political figures.

2. My geographical map of Israel accords with the 1949 armistice line (Green Line). When used in this essay, the term Arab sector invokes the ideological parameters of state discourse.


5. I am drawing on Homi Bhabha’s discussion of the “complex strategies of cultural identification and discursive address that function in the name of ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ and make them the immanent subjects and objects of a range of social and literary narratives.” Homi Bhabha, “Dissemination: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 292.


8. Intifada is the Arabic term that refers to the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation that began in December 1987. The periodization of the uprising is a subject of controversy, for although Yasir Arafat officially declared its end in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords, organized resistance had largely dissipated by 1991.


10. For a history of this policy see Jirjis, Arabs in Israel, 121–26.

11. As an adjective, Ashkenazi refers to Eastern European Jewish culture.


15. Then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was architect of this blueprint. See Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1993).


19. In Hebrew colloquial usage, the term *old city* often refers to places of current or prior Arab dwelling within cities. While historically accurate, it functions as a euphemism (*old* standing in for *Arab*) that situates Palestinians, and Palestinian urban spaces, in historical time, obscuring their contemporary presence.


21. “We’re not going to expel the Arabs like we did in Jaffa, but if they want to move, they can,” I was told by an employee of the Israeli Government Tourist Development Office in Acco. This gentrification project has already begun to raise real estate values in the “old city,” forcing many lower-income Palestinian families to move.

22. See Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt*, for an ethnography of Palestinian cities, villages, and places in Israel that, reconstructed as tourist sites, are stripped of reference to a Palestinian past.

23. The ministry's initial refusal to consider Palestinian villages within rural tourism development was exemplified by Israel's 1995 Annual Conference on Rural Tourism, where no mention was made of Arab-, Druze-, or Bedouin-sector development.

24. Druze citizens of the Galilee are conscripted into the Israeli army, while Bedouin citizens serve on a volunteer basis. This state taxonomy does not apply to Druze of the Golan, the majority of whom refused to accept Israeli citizenship after Israel's annexation in 1981. See Lisa Hajjar, “Israel’s Intervention among the Druze,” *Middle East Report* 26 (summer 1996): 2–6. For a discussion of state strategies aimed at fostering Palestinian division see Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, 82–149.

25. The villages of Abu Ghosh and Jisr a’Zarka’ were spared violent expulsion in 1948 due (in part) to political collaboration with Zionist forces and neighboring Jewish communities. Today, Abu Ghosh hosts a biannual music festival and has become a restaurant center for Jewish Israeli visitors. Under the Labor administration, Jisr a’Zarka’ was partially developed for coastal tourism.

26. The terms *Mizrahi* and *Sephardi* are contentious ones in both scholarly and colloquial usage, and definitions often conflict. Considered in total, the Israeli population of non-Ashkenazi Jews represents some 70 percent of Israeli Jews, and 54 percent of Israel's citizenry. Although Ashkenazi Jews comprise only 23 percent of the population, they dominate Israel's political, cultural, and economic spheres. For discussions of Mizrahi cultural oppression in Israel see Ella Shohat, “Reflections of an Arab Jew,” *Emergences* 3 (fall 1992): 41–42. See also the work of Smadar Lavie, particularly “Blow-ups in the Borderzone: Third World Israeli Authors’ Geopings for Home,” *New Formations* 18 (winter 1992): 84–105.

27. *Debke* is a traditional Palestinian folk dance.


29. Market “authenticity” is often articulated through icons of “the female.” For a Japanese version of this articulation see Marilyn Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
30. Edward M. Bruner makes a similar argument about the importance of performance ("Tourism in the Balinese Borderzone," in Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Identity, ed. Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996], 157–80). I differ from Bruner in my suggestion that authenticity is also at stake, but that its referent is neither singular (the truth of "x") nor stable.

31. In the early stages of market development (1992–94), Muslim religious institutions voiced their opposition to such initiatives with concerns about cultural intrusion. Yet in 1995–96, such criticism was muted by the market’s fiscal promise. Ongoing political disputes over state land expropriation have obstructed the growth of select tourist initiatives in the western Galilee, but popular opposition to tourism on these grounds is extremely limited.


33. This is true of the majority of the Israel Museum’s exhibits. Even those that showcase Arab documents and artifacts (such as the Geniza exhibit, summer 1997) lack Arabic placards.

34. See Lavie and Swedenberg ("Introduction: Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Identity," in Lavie and Swedenberg, Displacement, 1–25) for a brief but incisive discussion of Western notions of "here" as the undifferentiated Occident.


40. By 1966, Israel had expropriated half of the land of remaining Palestinian villages; a decade later, the percentage rose to two-thirds. See David McDowall, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). As Lustick reminds us, such numbers are only estimates, as "there are no official government figures available for the total extent or percentage of Arab lands expropriated since 1948" (Arabs in the Jewish State, 178).

41. According to Jiryis, Arabs in Israel, Prime Minister Ben Gurion began implementation of this plan in 1959 following proposals by the Jewish National Fund in 1953. For the history of its geographic impact on the Galilee see Ghazi Falah, Galilee and the Judaization Plan (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993).

42. Qtd. in Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, 258.

43. For a history of the Land Day struggle see Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, and Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt.
44. As Lustick notes, “Because of the rhetorical inconvenience of this stress upon Judaization, Labor government spokesmen tended to substitute other phrases, notably Lichloos Ha Galil [sic] (to populate the Galilee) and Lifoach ha-Galil [sic] (to develop the Galilee). Nevertheless, the crucial concern remains making and keeping the Galilee Jewish” (Arabs in the Jewish State, 333). I would argue that it is only recently that popular discomfort with the term Judaization has led to persistent state euphemisms.


47. The kfar of Kfar Shmaryahu is another example of the euphemistic use of the term village in the Hebrew geographical lexicon. Kfar Shmaryahu is an affluent Ashkenazi suburb north of Tel Aviv.

48. This song has a long political history. It was written and performed by the Israeli army choir in the mid-1970s, subsequently banned by the army for its subversive potential, adopted by the Israeli Jewish “Left” in 1979 as a protest anthem, and, following the Rabin assassination, rewritten by the left-wing Ashkenazi party Meretz as a campaign jingle.


56. Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing, 17.


64. Rami Rosen, “HaShalom HaShahor HaZe” [That black peace], *Ha’aretz*, 9 September 1994, 50–52.