Culture in the Age of Biopolitics:
Migrant Communities and Corporate Social Responsibility in China

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Cultural Anthropology in the Graduate School
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the conjuncture of Corporate Social Responsibility and migrant social life in the urban space of Beijing as a problematic of what Foucault called biopower, where distinct logics of market and state power deploy techniques of civil society and culture in the form of public-private partnerships. The unique effect of this conjuncture is an expanding logic of power that obfuscates lines of antagonism between capital and labor, requiring new theoretical and methodological insight into how power, resistance, and antagonism might be conceived in the biopolitical era.

Drawing on recent work on biopower and new theories of antagonism and subjectivity, I argue (following Badiou’s work) that both power and resistance must be articulated in their divided tendencies, which allows us to work through how certain tendencies may be contradictory and complementary, and to redraw the lines of antagonism at the level of subjectivity in terms of these divided tendencies. These lines of antagonism don’t fall between public/private, market/state, or civil society/state, but along a process by which subjectivities are produced and sustained at a “distance” from the logic of their placement in society, or integrated into power by various strategies of civil society and culture. The practices and theoretical productions of one migrant cultural organization in Beijing, whose project centers on the production of new migrant subjectivity and culture in the transformation of self and society, provides insight into how we might conceive of politics as new forms of “distance” from the logic of biopower.

Through over twelve months of intensive fieldwork and follow up trips on the intersection between Corporate Social Responsibility and migrant social life in Beijing, I trace the techniques by which antagonistic subjectivity is intervened upon. First, I examine the surrounding discourses, logics, and conditions of knowledge production on
culture that inform the projects of migrant subjectivity from a historical perspective, and reveal a theoretical impasse in the displacement and disavowal of revolutionary culture to grapple with how to re-think antagonistic contradictions in the pervading market logic of difference. The continuation of this impasse into the biopolitical era is brought into focus through the state and market turn to “culture industries” that include, mirror, and delimit migrant social life in Beijing. Problematizing the rise of self-articulated migrant subjectivity and migrant culture amidst these public-private projects, I then turn to the practices of one migrant organization whose project draws upon a legacy of struggle for self-organized and self-run migrant collective practices to successfully confront and block a situation of forced demolition and displacement. Analyzing how elements from state, market, and “civil society” interacted through public-private partnerships in the situation of daily migrant struggles, I identify the importance of the rise of Corporate Social Responsibility in the urban space of Beijing and the growth of biopolitical practices of intervention upon the migrant issue. I argue that the effect of the diffusion of Corporate Social Responsibility as a social practice is to enroll migrants as active participants in a social life that makes their subjectivities and productive activities visible to the public sphere. Lines of antagonism can thus be drawn by taking up distinctions between subjectivities oriented toward “the public,” “self-governance,” and the CSR “community,” versus collective self-organizing. I conclude by arguing that if biopower seeks to mirror practices of resistance and power by drawing upon the self-activities of cooperative subjects, then thinking about the self-organized and self-run migrant organization as a new form of “distance” may shed light on how antagonism and political struggle might be redefined today.
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1. Introduction: Biopower and Antagonism

“Everyone, including the Maoists, is after all called upon today, after the Cultural Revolution and May ’68, to take a stance, to discern the new with regard to the meaning of politics in its complex articulation, its constitutive trilogy: mass movement, class perspective, and State...Such is clearly the question of any possible philosophy today, wherein we can read the primacy of politics (of antagonism) in its actuality.” (Bosteels 2011, 138)

1.1 The Figure of the Migrant and Corporate Social Responsibility

In the summer of 2008 and 2012, I was coordinating a group of Duke University students who were volunteering their entire summer at a middle school for migrant children in a southern “urban village” of Beijing’s Daxing district. One particular night left a deep impression on me. I still remember vividly looking across the small faces in the school courtyard, and seeing mixed expressions of genuine and fake smiles, tired, angry whispering and shuffling of dozens of feet. That night, it had been almost two hours now, that over 100 middle school children out of over 500 who boarded at the school had been kept outside to pose for a photo shoot with a young Chinese celebrity, who herself was growing impatient. The photographer was also frustrated, and couldn’t quite capture the migrant children in the configuration that he wanted—which he described as a mix of joy and longing. I could feel that familiar sense of overprotection and self-righteousness that came so often, too easily, during my time at this school. Just a week before, an American family had visited as well, taking up the students’ time to honor the family’s presence—the typical performances and songs. The American family was on a three-month cross-continental journey in honor of their deceased son, visiting the places where their son had volunteered his time for others. Even though only a few students who had interacted with their son remained, the fifth graders patiently dedicated the precious week leading up to exams to allow the grieving family to undergo their healing process by engaging with the students in light-hearted games and
songs. A week before that, a physician from Chapel Hill, NC brought his family to the school for an “educational vacation,” where the typical tourist destinations of Beijing now included a stop by the migrant school to learn about “China’s inequalities.” Those memories converged to lend this night’s photo shoot with a sense of unmeasured frustration for the participant-observer turned spectator. The Duke student volunteers under my supervision were particularly indignant, as they were shaken by past experiences of young students fainting during long events in the dry heat of the Beijing summer. When the actress finally finished her photo shoot close to midnight, the students, along with their exhausted teachers, were allowed to return to their dorms.

That night served to capture a growing puzzlement that I was watching a specific phenomenon in which the figure of migrants functioned within an economy of production and consumption. This was one of the few legally registered migrant schools in Beijing that was attempting to address how migrants could become integrated into mainstream society through the existing education system, which is perhaps why such spectacles are tolerated by school staff. In addition to the use of public media to offset the political sensitivity of creating institutions for migrants, or at least certain instantiations of institutions, there was the pervading belief by school staff that exposing disadvantaged migrants to “the world” by encountering cosmopolitan citizens may somehow change the “fate” of migrants, revealing to me the multilayered dynamic of imagination, subjectivity and affect, and material reality that complicate the social inequalities of migrants in China. Over the course of the following ten weeks, I couldn’t quite grasp what I was witnessing, and indeed implicated in. With such instances of public attention and concern, migrants had become vehicles for an emotional catharsis, or an empty placeholder for various affects and desires—the healing process of the grieving family, the social compassion of the celebrity, the “social problem” to be
rendered transparent by the student researcher or the journalist, the transformative experience of the corporate volunteer or the visiting donor, etc. As I watched how these affective burdens were assumed and grappled with by migrant youth, I wondered how these various forms of immaterial production and consumption have come to occur in the name of migrants, yet were at the expense of, even removed, from their materiality. In other words, migrants had disappeared in the production of their effect.

1.2 Biopolitical Challenge

This particular migrant school and the struggles it faces in the complex spotlight of public and global concern has become a common experience shared across many of Beijing’s migrant schools and their surrounding migrant settlements in the aftermath of the 2008 Olympics. It soon became clear to me through my time spent volunteering with different migrant social organizations now proliferating in Beijing that in this urban space, at least on the surface, instead of widespread injustice and discrimination leading to moments of eruption, there was general mainstream concern and interest in integrating Chinese migrants into urban society. Rather than finding capital or the authoritarian state against labor in a clear-cut antagonism, I found the blurring of these categories in a maze of public-private partnerships. There were many reasons for this situation, including the unique social space of Beijing, simultaneously more open and closed to different possibilities in comparison to the regimes of control in the factory. Nevertheless, I was unprepared for the well-intentioned, good hearted, and dedicated people who became outraged and mobilized around migrant social injustices in mainstream society, as well as the making of celebrity migrants. My ethnographic experience of the popularization and spectacularization of the figure of the Chinese migrant immediately posed a challenge at the level of theory and method.

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1 For more on the unique geopolitical dynamics of Beijing, see Li Zhang 2001, Xiang 2005.
The confluence of factors that have propelled the figure of China’s peasant migrants to celebrity status inside and outside of China in recent years must enter into an analysis of how both capitalism and migrant organizing is taking place in a distinctly urban social context. Within this context, the figure of migrants as a social cause circulates easily across spaces of art galleries, charity dinners, celebrity photo shoots and American family vacations, while new intense struggles take shape through forced demolitions and removals. Alongside a new face to capitalism gaining foothold in China called Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), supported by a set of discourses and apparatuses of public-private “partnerships” pushing ethics and inclusion in the pursuit of sustainable development, there is simultaneously the rise of “the migrant issue” in public life—the specific orientation of a population in a social space in which their organized activities and subjectivities become delimited and visible within those public-private networks. The way in which capital and labor are being framed structurally and subjectively in non-antagonistic and mutually dependent terms through this conjuncture of CSR and migrant social life in Beijing, presents a fundamental challenge to critical studies that seek to make sense of how power and resistance operates, and thus what an antagonistic political project would entail, within these logics of biopower.

The emergence of the era of biopower proposed in the work of Michel Foucault has increasingly captured the attention of scholars as the primary paradigm of our contemporary moment. Various described as the moment when “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1978, 138), or when “life and its mechanisms are brought into the realm of explicit calculation” (ibid, 143), scholars drawing upon the attendant arsenal of concepts from Foucault’s diverse investigations into biopower have proven the

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2 One source of disagreement over the definition, tendencies, and programs of research of biopower among scholars stems from the complex and unstable definitions within Foucault’s work itself.
paradigm to be a complex, dynamic, and resilient framework of analysis to capture the contemporary era in ways that orthodox Marxism and “classical” anthropology have been said to fail (Rabinow 2003). Not only is biopower a global condition that explains the new mode of production of capitalism (Hardt and Negri 2009) and the recent trends of globalization driven by humanitarianism, neoliberalism, new technologies and the life sciences (Ong and Collier 2005; Rabinow and Rose 2006; Sunder Rajan 2006; Rose 2007; Di Muzio 2008), the theoretical concept accommodates “emergent” techniques of governing in situations as diverse as western liberalism (Fassin 2001 and 2009) to Chinese “authoritarianism” (Zhang and Ong 2008; Ong 2006), the state of exception that produces bare life (Agamben 1998), to the sovereign power that enacts war and killing (Mbembe 2003). Perhaps more importantly, the paradigm of biopower seems to capture all possible units, scales, paces, and processes that troubled the globalization debates of the recent past, from the most abstract to the most intimate, the global to the molecular. That the general turn to biopower remains marked by such multiple, unstable, contradictory and contested interpretations while providing a unifying discourse amenable to all investigations attests both to its analytical strengths and weaknesses. The seemingly endless applicability of biopolitics and the attendant analytical tools to capture diverse situations produces an effect, a generalized mode of thought that posits the astonishing capacity for power to reconstitute itself and pervade everywhere, and the inoperative presupposition that resistance is found in the given diversity of responses (heterogeneous techniques of the self, values of life, regimes of living, etc).

In the case of capital and labor, where exploitation and antagonism should be most fundamental in the era of global capitalism, biopower seems not only to pose systemic, but strategic problems for how to distinguish between power and resistance. Taking the conjuncture of CSR and migrant social life in Beijing as a situation of
biopower, what the anecdote of the migrant school in Beijing reveals is a glimpse into a situation in which biopower operates strategically by blurring the lines between “power” and “resistance” by way of public-private partnerships: co-optations, obfuscations, re-direction, displays in public life, and enrollment in a space of active participation. The challenges of the biopolitical moment are thus brought into sharp focus by this ethnographic conjuncture: How does one intervene in biopower when investigating this blurring of capital and labor as a strategy of power, if the investigative paradigm mimics that activity? How does one move beyond a tactical back and forth between power and resistance, and come to understand the construction of a decisive political position? Finally how does the assumption of resistance in given responses allow one to analyze strategically, rather than tactically, difference within asymmetrical contradictions and multiple logics of power, including the uncanny logic of capital to accommodate difference as equivalence?

The problem of biopower (both of the era and of the analytical paradigm) can be posed at the methodological level. By ethnographically tracing these uncertain politics of CSR and migrant struggles outside the factory and into the urban space of Beijing, without recourse to the structural antagonisms of “semi-proletarianization” that give rise to or block consciousness of “worker-subjects” (Pun 2005; also see Pun and Lu 2010, Pun and Chan 2013), one finds that both “migrant” and “labor” are subjectivities that are being produced through different techniques of “culture” in the form of partnerships of state, market, and civil society, obfuscating who constitutes “up” and “down,” “us” and “them.”

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3 It is truly striking how the methodological study of biopower mimics the theoretical conception of biopower, as George Marcus has described of Paul Rabinow’s The Anthropology of the Contemporary Collaboratory at UC Berkeley, in which ethnographic research is designed and implemented, as well as closely observed on a second order of observation for internal innovations, by subsuming vast amounts of data and heterogeneous studies into an ever refining, reassembled, and redeployed conceptual framework. Not only is innovation in fieldwork fed into the growth and transformation of a paradigm of “biosecurity,” it serves to provide a strong control over the paradigm rather than truly accommodating “critique from the margins” (George Marcus, Notes on the Contemporary Imperative to Collaborate, http://creativecommons.org/license/by-sa/2.5/)
“them,” “included” and “excluded.” The effect of this remapping of capital and labor continues to pose an impasse for those interested in the “site” of antagonism, and therefore of politics today, if both power and resistance are dispersed across society. The openings provided by the period of intense theorizing on globalization have irreversibly pushed anthropologists from attention to the internal constitution of difference to the multiple, heterogeneous and contingent forces that construct difference from the outside (a radical reworking of the topology of inside and outside to conceptualizing every inside in terms of its constitutive outside). The importance of multi-sited, interdisciplinary, and collaborative ethnographies derives from the efforts to capture within globalization how scales, units, and paces are produced heterogeneously, contingently, and in contestation (Tsing 2000), the disjunctions between multiple cultural “scapes” (Appadurai 1996), the multiple interconnected grids that produce spatial difference (Gupta and Ferguson 1997), the inside/outside of transnational networks (Riles 2000), and recently, the heterogeneous elements which compose assemblages of biopower (Rabinow 2003, Ong and Collier 2005). Indeed, the anthropologist herself has become as mobile, flexible, and fragmented as her objects of study, where the mutual sensitivity to the “outside” becomes the shared condition for the researcher and informant/collaborator, necessitating a “circumstantial” or “partial” activism that constantly re-negotiates who is us/them, up/down (Haraway 1991, Marcus 1995). While the freeing of anthropology from formerly divided roles of the West and its Other may not cause scholars to lose sight of the “subaltern,” and indeed bring unique skills and insights to produce richer studies by “tracking” and constituting multi-sited studies, there has been less success in critically reflecting on whether these legacies adequately confront the more intimate nature of biopower, which constitutes our very subjectivity—the distribution of sensibilities, affects, desires, orientations, and
the materiality of our thought. When our very subjectivity is a crucial part of labor struggle within biopower, what are our analytical tools for understanding what constitutes meaningful difference, or what poses an antagonism, to the logics of power, when we systematically attribute subject positions to those very logics of power? How can different subjectivities emerge fully within biopower, perhaps not from the “outside” or “innocently,” but at a “distance” to those logics (Toscano 2004)?

In parallel to these works on biopower in anthropology, Marxism has also been revived through Foucault by emphasizing that biopower is an economy of power emerging from the 18th to the 19th century completely articulated on the development of capitalism, “which entails a total investment of life insofar as the constitution of a labor force, on the one hand, and the requirements for profitability of production on the other, require it” (Negri 2004). In the legacy of Autonomist Marxist research on class recomposition from fordism to post-fordism, the wave of labor struggles which culminated during the upheavals of ’68 are seen to cause capitalism to reconfigure a new order of work based on social life (language, communication, immaterial labor, affect), therefore making life an object of interest to power—the very definition of the real subsumption of labor by capital anticipated by Marx. In bringing together Foucault and Marx to theorize contemporary capitalism as biocapital, there is a creative re-formulation of Marxist terms of labor, exploitation, antagonism, and politics, centered on the struggle over the production of subjectivity (Hardt and Negri 2009; see also Guattari 1995, Read 2003, Gulli 2005, Lazzarato 2006). The controversial framing of antagonism through the ontological difference between multitude and empire, might share similarities with the impasse of a social science of biopower—the principles by which power and resistance can be said to be heterogeneous, and how the new (to existing logics of power) comes forth fully within power (Bosteels 2011).
While there have been other influential contributions to the re-reading and revival of Foucault, this dissertation is interested in the question of antagonism that has continued to plague scholars over the hegemonic shift from revolution to resistance, or from socialism/capitalism to totalitarianism/democracy (Bosteels 2011). Well into the biopolitical turn, there is a persisting gap between the microphysics of power and resistance in daily life to the attempt to retain a concept of antagonism that is critical to situating any analysis of creative production within global capitalism (Harootunian 2001). This gap is evidenced by the persisting rejection of Hardt and Negri’s work on biopower by anthropologists, who deem it too general and totalizing to capture the complexity of “actually existing” struggles (Rabinow and Rose 2006, Ong 2006, Tsing 2009), and the instigative proposal by Rey Chow that, following the symptomatic logic of dualism in biopolitical capitalism to one end, every resistance becomes “the reasons capitalism flourishes” (Chow 2002, 48). While all scholars may not concur with Chow, her reading perhaps illustrates an impasse and political ambivalence that can be symptomatic of a dualism between power and resistance, that by itself is inoperative as a model for social change. Bringing to light the consequences of the open question of antagonism and difference in contemporary investigations on biopower, allows us to see certain patterns persisting in contemporary ethnographies of China as well.

In a situation that seems constantly to anticipate Marxist sensitivities, ethnographies of migrants and subjectivity in China fall between two analytical frameworks: First, migrants invoke teleological conceptions of the proletariat and the structural antagonism between capital and labor, where scholars argue that the proletarianization of migrants is what contributes to the rise of a coherent class interest that leads to labor protests (Lee 2007; Pun 2005, 2013). Thus, migrant studies are often associated with a related constellation of labor categories of union or trade reform,
supply chains, industrial restructuring and discipline that either facilitate or block the rise of class consciousness (Chan 2011, Unger et al. 2011, Pringle 2013). Second, looking at the biopolitical turn in China, studies have overwhelmingly posited a dualism whereby new techniques of governmentality are both the totalization of state power, as well as resistance through the art of living “in the last instance.” This dualism holds true—with methodological asymmetry privileging the organizational capacity of power on the one hand, and the individualism of resistance on the other—whether scholars are looking at how new social spaces are produced among migrants (Zhang 2001), how a new value-coding captures migrants in technologies of the self that capitalizes on subjectivity (Anagnost 2004, Yan 2008), how middle class healthy lifestyle and body practices articulate native Chinese beliefs into state control (Farquhar 2005), the emergence of new “healthy” subjectivities in population management (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005), or the multiple imaginaries and discourses that map onto and form HIV populations (Hyde 2007). In a major study of migrants outside of the factory as domestic workers, Yan Hairong attempts to grasp resistance in terms of unconscious slippages, unintended consequences of discursive power, and subjective fragmentations, in other words as the essential unfulfillment of the subject and structure, as the site where future politics may germinate (Yan 2008). Thus either antagonism emerges as the privileged figure of the proletariat in the factory, or as the structural lack that forbids any totalitarianism (and subjective intervention) in the name of open-ended possibilities.

For scholars who trace the global phenomenon of CSR through multi-sited ethnographies, the constant negotiation of boundaries and commitments between diverse social actors might provide rich insight into the larger political stakes involved in redefining antagonism where strategies of obfuscation are the norm. In cases of following open conflict, such as the ones between transnational extractive industries and
local communities, anthropologists have parsed apart the moral and ethical commitments of various actors that reinforce inequalities by excluding community views or selectively including village elites (Welker 2009, Coumans 2011). In the cases of seemingly “win-win” scenarios, anthropologists have sought to define antagonism through attention to alienation, inclusion/exclusion, and marginalization. This method of critique, in which CSR is deconstructed according to “who is and who is not included in the moral fold of CSR” (Dolan and Rajak 2011; also see Lawrence 2007, Cross 2011, Schwittay 2011), coincides with the studies of biopower in a sharp ability to locate “situated claims” alongside regimes of power, but according to how subjectivities are shaped by logics of inclusion/exclusion. Defining antagonism according to the diversity of claims, which is either included or excluded, fails to address how “difference can be turned into an amenable and governable fact not by reducing the significance of pluralism, but by exaggerating it” (Strathern 2005, 76). Thus, Anna Tsing, in analyzing “supply chain capitalism” to understand the centrality of difference in structures of power, illustrates how diversity, “with all its promises and perils” becomes a source of “super-exploitation” and “self-exploitation” (Tsing 2009, 159). In Tsing’s study, by conceiving of difference only as historical legacies (national and postcolonial), diversity “gets in the way” of total exploitation only by guaranteeing different forms of capitalism(s), or the possibilities of difference in “non-capitalist spaces” (Gibson-Graham 2006). While attention to the construction of difference by principles of history and forces of capitalism is certainly important, there is less attention to how the organized production of differences by antagonistic subjectivities can be conceived fully within but not a byproduct of power. In the case of the migrant school in Beijing caught in the spotlights of a celebrity photo shoot, the display of difference on the bodies of migrants is fully “recognized” and included within the networks of CSR, suggesting that the
given topology of who is included or excluded in the logics of power, even if to critique the overall management of inclusion/exclusion, still relies on a politically ambivalent notion of difference that can always go either way (Tsing 2009).

In the case of the biopolitical conjuncture between CSR and migrants in urban space, where the contradictions between capital and labor become both obfuscated and displayed in public life, confronting the question of antagonism (or the lack thereof) in biopower becomes the central problematic of this dissertation. In order to do so, the dissertation draws on the insights of both contemporary Marxists thinkers and the insights from the anthropology of biopower, as a productive juxtaposition of different tools of analysis in search of the question of antagonism. Rather than try to pose one theory or disciplinary reading as a correct reading of biopower, I try to take up an experimental practice of Maoism (by way of Badiou), a critical reading of antagonism by way of a transformation and a theoretical intervention to think the present in terms of Mao’s logic of scission. Understanding dialectics as scission rather than mediation recasts politics as the subjective invention of new modes of dealing with the impasse between dualisms: structuralism and anarchism, power and resistance, the state of things and their tendencies, the old and the new among the masses (Bosteels 2011). In other words, the controversial return to Mao through Badiou’s work (whose perhaps equally controversial status is exacerbated by his connection to Maoism) is justified on the basis that Mao, for Badiou, provides an attempt to read empire and multitude, power and resistance, by way of diagonals, “to reflect both and at the same time the scission and the reciprocal action of the two categories in the general movement of a process, without excluding that the subjective factor may be the key to this movement”
Methodologically, a confrontation with biopower requires ethnographically tracing both the processes of “self-negation” (Casarino and Negri 2008) or “self” and “super-exploitation” (Tsing 2009)—or ways in which subjectivities are made productive for power—and the ways in which antagonistic (collective) subjectivities are produced at a “distance” from power.

My central argument is that Corporate Social Responsibility, conceived of primarily as a deployment of market and state logics of power through public-private partnerships, is operating in the urban space of Beijing on migrants through techniques of civil society and culture. Through the examination of different spaces of CSR and its intersection with migrant struggles, I argue that both power and resistance must be articulated in their divided tendencies, which allows us to work through how certain dualisms may be contradictory and complementary, and to redraw the lines of antagonism at the level of subjectivity in terms of these divided tendencies. These lines of antagonism don’t fall between public/private, market/state, or civil society/state, but along a process by which subjectivities are produced and sustained at a “distance” from the logic of their placement in society. The practices of one migrant organization, the Migrant Workers Home, a political project specifically centered on the production of new migrant subjectivity and culture in the transformation of society, provides insight into how we might conceive of politics as new forms of “distance.”

This experiment with politics as immanent thought is also an exploration of what it means to be an anthropologist fully within and implicated in the situation of biopower. Perhaps anticipated by but far exceeding the era of writing culture where

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4 The relationship between Badiou’s work and Maoism in the US is received through complicated registers, involving both the complexity of Badiou’s thought and the critiques that often suppress Badiou’s own conclusions. In one assessment, Badiou’s thought “advances” by making a break with Maoism and dialectics somewhere between the Theory of the Subject and Being and Event (Toscano 2004). In another assessment, Badiou’s work maintains a consistent link with Maoism as a post-Maoism, both critical and productive as a problematic (Bosteels 2011).
subjectivity and authority are problematized, the stakes involved today are the concrete networks by which biopower links living labor through immaterial and knowledge production to capitalism as dead labor. The intervention into daily life as an actor within these networks means making a non-objective decision to distinguish and select lines of inquiry as political action, as well as opening oneself as a space for those who struggle within those unequal networks. With this orientation in mind, an important part of carrying out this ethnography was to commit to the perspective of CSR from “the bottom,” and to offer my skills to the organizations I was ethnographically interested in as a resource, selecting for necessary tools to co-produce knowledge that aids in the daily work of the organizations rather than lines of inquiry that are defined apart from these commitments. Consequently, the knowledges captured in these commitments articulate ongoing relations and vulnerabilities between diverse actors in Beijing, and thus necessitate anonymity in some ethnographic sections. This constitution of a “multi-sited” investigation into CSR by following different forms of organizing around the migrant issue, both domestic and international, is an attempt to piece together how, in addition to the effects of knowledge/power, discourse, and history, self-authorized subjective interventions are important to the construction of space, social relations, and forms of life irreducible to biopower.

1.3 Chapter Outline

Through over twelve months of intensive fieldwork from 2010-2011 and ongoing trips to Beijing the following year tracing the intersections of CSR with migrant social life, the aims of this work are two-fold: First, I attempt to explain the crystallization of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the urban space of Beijing, according to logics and techniques of “culture” distinct from the factory. Second, I ground CSR in the daily experiences of local organizing around the issue of migrants, and trace how migrant
organizing through the multiple and complicated tendencies within the space of “culture” produce two fundamentally antagonistic subjectivities—one oriented toward integration, and the other oriented toward antagonism. In both cases, the production of subjectivity necessitates an intentional space of intervention rather than a pre-given condition. I argue that “culture,” as a theoretical formulation, a practice, and a deployment of force, is important to understanding both the operations and co-optations of biopower, as well as the co-existence of radical migrant projects such as the Migrant Workers Home that take the autonomous production of new subjects and culture as their political goal. Parsing apart how culture potentially operates for power and resistance thus necessitates a careful understanding of the multiple and competing discourses on culture taking place in the social life of migrants in Beijing.

Chapter two thus begins here, with an attempt to parse out the complicated and cross-continental influences that have shaped contemporary understandings of “culture.” Juxtaposing the major configurations of the culture concept in the western social sciences with the concept of revolutionary culture which took hold through Maoism across multiple continents, thinkers, and radical movements during the 60’s reveals the necessity to account for the persisting taboo which hides the influence of Maoism on post-68 thought. Reclaiming this legacy through the work of Badiou, as a thinker who poses fundamental challenges to contemporary scholars working in the lineage of Foucault’s investigations while also searching for a new ethics of political subjectivity, allows us an understanding of the political stakes involved in distinguishing the multiple deployments of culture that produce and obfuscate antagonism. The rise of migrant subjectivity in China since the reform, or the specific

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5 It is important to keep in mind the specific relationship Badiou has to the concept of “culture,” having asserted, “Politics itself is a-cultural, as is all thought and all truth. Comical, purely comical, is the theme of a cultural politics, as is that of political culture,” while also affirming his foundational subjectivity in the
construction and orientation of discourses targeting the subjectivity of migrant populations, will be traced through contemporary migrant literature, as well as the formalization of “migrant literature” and “migrant culture” in Chinese society, and finally the formal recognition of migrants in state discourse in the turn to CSR and “culture industries.” The rise of a specific instantiation of the culture concept in state and market discourses in China, which finds its collaborative intersection in CSR, will contextualize and problematize the emergence of migrants’ self-articulated identity and provide the complicated context within which migrant social organizations operate in Beijing. This line of investigation into biopolitics via a scission of the “culture concept” seeks to intervene on the literature of biopolitics and migrants by confronting directly how the struggle over subjectivity by labor necessitates the capacity to strategically articulate different forms of production (that otherwise seem to mirror each other) by working out their complementary and contradictory tendencies. This mode of thought, practiced during the struggles of ’68, make room for a subjective intervention that is irreducible to the given logic of biopower or its attendant topology of diversity.

Chapter three examines how one migrant organization, the Migrant Workers Home, practices this mode of thought in the process of making subjectivity and culture central to their political struggle. By tracing the concept of autonomy and political events of the Cultural Revolution (Bosteels 2005, 2011). Unpacking this question in various writings, Bosteels clarifies that Badiou’s polemics refers to a “culturalist approach,” in which “culture” is unrigorously yet generously defined as an objective sociological sphere or domain ideologically sutured onto politics without actually drawing out the different trajectories and conjunctures of contradiction and struggle; Badiou thus attempts to re-found the category of culture, with an inspiration from the Cultural Revolution on the dialectic between knowledge and truth, pondering whether “culture” can be the name of the “network of various forcings, that is, at any given moment in time, the manner in which the encyclopedia of knowledge of the situation is modified under the constraints of various operations of forcing, which depend on procedures that are different from one another. There is indeed the tying together of various procedures, but on the other hand, there is also the fact that knowledge is changed under the blind or unperceived pressure of these truth-procedures. Thus, I will have to pick up this question of the binding, or knotting, both on the level of forcing and on the level of the procedures themselves. This might signal my path toward a reconstruction of the concept of culture.” (Bosteels and Badiou 2005, 260; also see Bosteels 2011)
subjectivity that emerges in their projects and their self-theorizations, the lessons arising out of their practice and struggle pose a set of problematics to contemporary left scholarship and its own relationship to the legacy of Marxism. I argue that the attempt to construct a “life world” at multiple levels that address the daily needs of migrants provides the basis for which “distance” can be constantly practiced, and new subjectivities produced irreducible to biopower. The chapter ends by reflecting on the situational meaning of “autonomy” which takes shape in the narratives of the Migrant Workers Home.

Chapter four introduces Corporate Social Responsibility in Beijing with an ethnography of how the Migrant Workers Home’s self-run migrant school encountered the threat of demolition in the summer of 2012. The event reveals the various interests that are invested in migrants at the level of government, corporate, and public life through complex, unstable, yet persisting public-private partnerships. A closer look at the incident shows how the concepts of “public” and “private” are deployed selectively through these partnerships of CSR according to different techniques of civil society and culture. I argue that the incident reveals how the social space itself is being shaped by CSR, and the consequences of these transformations for migrant organizations is a delimitation of possible field of actions. The chapter then steps back to contextualize the origins and rise of Corporate Social Responsibility in Beijing among a mix of international and domestic, market and state actors. I argue that the global CSR movement is a capitalist restructuring in response to global and domestic movements against neoliberalism that gave rise to the Hu Jintao era, and thus draws upon distinctly neoliberal traditions and new techniques of “civil society” to address unstable elements in society including migrant self-organizing.
Chapter five explores how CSR involves both the market and the state as two thickly embedded but distinct deployments of power that shape the context in which migrant organizing takes place in Beijing. In order to capture the confluence of these two logics, I juxtapose three short ethnographies—(1) a CSR partnership organized by white-collar women working at a multinational corporation, (2) a local Chinese NGO that sought to expand a project for “self-governing, sustainable urban communities” for urban residents to migrant workers, (3) and an international migrant NGO focused on the “community center” model. The experiences of CSR through three different ethnographic spaces reveal that understanding the impact of CSR on migrant organizing requires holding in tension the multiple forces which come into play in contemporary Chinese society marked by diverse and experimental formations. What these ethnographies of CSR in Beijing reveal is that the “activist capitalism” captured in the spirit of CSR is less an alternative to neoliberalism than it is a shared nexus, a scission of capitalism that must be understood as such. The rise of new “social forces” through CSR and so-called “civil society” introduce another technique of power that can both impede or aid migrant struggles; the question is how those unequal relations of force captured in CSR are deployed, and for whom. At the same time that populations are induced to certain economic freedoms through civil society, there is a concomitant function of security, discipline, and control. As migrants find room for autonomous self-organizing in the sanctioned category of culture, public-private partnerships offer up distorted mirrors of community self-governance and cultural capital.

Chapter 6 concludes by drawing together the ways in which antagonistic subjectivity is intervened upon as both power and resistance. This split terrain involves a set of strategies that look similar to each other, relying on the same resources of cooperative subjects: “the public,” “self-governance,” and the production of the migrant
“community” versus collective self-organizing. I provide some entryways for understanding how the practices of migrant organizing suggest lines of antagonisms can be drawn between these divided practices through the notion of “distance,” as well as how contemporary struggles over thought and practice might be situated ethically within biopower.
2. The Production of “Migrants” and “Culture”

2.1 Introduction

“There those people who are poor are those who dont have dreams, dont have the courage to
dream. I always believe that if there is a dream, there is a future.”—Anzi, celebrity
migrant

“They are the main force of urban economic development, they are the builders of this
era, they are the most adorable people of this era.” —Xinhua on the first New Years Gala
for Migrants 2010

Leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, international media became interested
in covering the plight of migrant workers in China. While intertwined with the nature
of global media and the various sharp reactions to China’s growing role globally, the
“migrant issue” took on a specific function in the “rise of China” narratives. During that
time, a common narrative circulated among left and right publications, which
highlighted the injustice of how Chinese peasant migrants were treated in the cities,
most dramatized in Beijing because the very migrants who built the Olympic stadiums
were effectively barred from attending such a symbolic global showcase of national
achievements. Since then, the migrant issue has become such common knowledge that
in 2009 Time Magazine nominated Chinese migrants as runner up for the Person of the
Year issue, described as “an increasingly influential group in one of the world’s most
powerful economies” (Time, December 16, 2009). Unlike the other issues that captured
media attention on China, and unlike the way that these major news media discussed
the struggles of migrants in other national narratives, this population in China became a

1 Ian Ransom, “Beijing Recyclers Discarded in Beijing’s Security Sweep,” Reuters, July 27 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/27/idUSPEK353762;
Catherine Sampson, “Behind the Scenes in Beijing,” The Guardian, August 3, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/03/china.olympicgames2008;
George Walden, “Beijing Olympics: A Successful Games Would be Good for the World, not just for China,”
successful-Games-would-be-good-for-the-world-not-just-for-China.html
mainstream global cultural signifier of the entire nation, capturing all the contradictions and possibilities of global capitalism, a figure of the era of internal exclusion. In a different but complementary register, the two quotes above—the first by a famous migrant self-help celebrity and the second by a commercial advertising the first national New Years Gala dedicated solely for migrants—illustrate how migrants are endeared and included in Chinese projects as well. The sudden visibility of the migrant to multiple interests at the domestic and international level has fundamentally changed the situation in which migrant struggles take place. What scholars intimate of these processes as an epistemic shift from the migrant’s exclusion to its inclusion by way of neoliberal techniques (Anagnost 2004, Yan 2008), I argue is more critically analyzed by paying attention to the simultaneous production of “migrants” and “culture” in ways more complicated than the principles of the self-enterprising neoliberal individual or as bare life. Without understanding how different deployments of culture determine different forms of collective subjectivity, or how subjective self-productions are identified, objectified, and subjected to biopower, we also fail to understand how culture is being used as a form of collective subjectivation as well.

This chapter is interested in the rise of “migrant culture” in China—that is, how has the emergence of this new population since the reform been treated by government, media, experts and scholars as a cultural phenomenon? How do these different deployments of culture relate to different subjectivities? What kinds of subjectivities are being proposed for this population by different sectors of society through culture? Historicizing the major discourses and their attendant projects that shape “the migrant issue” in China will contextualize and problematize the emergence of migrants’ self-articulated identity, which I argue is currently taking place along two key lines, and in antagonism to each other. The centrality of “culture,” as a theoretical formulation, a
practice, and a deployment of force, to understanding both the operations and co-optations of biopower, as well as the co-existence of radical migrant projects that re-imagine the legacy of Maoism in the creation of new subjects and new culture as political practice, necessitates a careful understanding of the multiple and competing discourses on culture taking place through domestic and international sources.

Thus, chapter two first provides a more careful analysis of the complicated and cross-continental influences that have shaped contemporary understandings of “culture.” Juxtaposing the major configurations of the culture concept in the western social sciences with the concept of revolutionary culture which took hold through Maoism during the 60’s reveals the consequences of the persisting taboo in the US and in China which hides an unresolved impasse on post-68 thought, and which continues as a legacy for understanding the Migrant Workers Home as a break with common frameworks of analysis. Revisiting this legacy in the face of a double disavowal is an attempt to bring to light an alternative practice of a concept of culture in history whose excision from memory prevents an adequate confrontation with the biopolitical challenges we face today in the relation between power and resistance. In other words, reclaiming the legacy of an other concept of culture is not aimed at reviving a sequence of events that may be recognized as saturated, but is aimed at addressing why, despite this saturation of politics, there continues to be considerable difficulties, in thought and in practice, to go beyond this saturation (Bosteels 2011). It seems critical, given how the concept of biopolitics is used in almost universal scope, that we subject the concept itself to a periodization “that localizes it in relation of the space and time of its own determination” (Revel 2009, 46), which I argue can be productively illuminated by way of the legacy of Maoism and culture. Once laying this common foundation of what may be new or ongoing issues in the current biopolitical era and attendant methodologies of
inquiry, I then turn to examining the rise of migrant subjectivity in China since the reform, or the specific construction and orientation of discourses targeting the subjectivity of migrant populations. Tracing these discourses through the formalization of “migrant literature” and “migrant culture” in mainstream society, as well as the formal recognition of migrants in state discourse will contextualize and problematize the emergence of migrants’ self-articulated identity and their divided tendencies. The rise of a specific instantiation of the culture concept in state and market discourses in China, which finds its collaborative intersection in CSR, provide the politically ambiguous context within which to explore the emergence of migrant social organizations operate in Beijing in chapters 3, 4 and 5.

2.2 Historical Background: US Disavowal

“Marxism is the practical discourse for sustaining the subjective advent of a politics...Marxism seeks to change the real of revolutions through the symbolic grip of which it assures the political subject of such a real, a subject for which, as we know, it reserves the name ‘proletariat,’ which is neither more nor less appropriate than the (dubious) word ‘unconscious.” (Badiou, 2009, 129)

2.2.1 Legacies

In an introduction to a conversation between George Marcus and Paul Rabinow on the future of anthropology, Tobias Rees recalls his educational journey through the canons of American anthropology as a student in Germany during the 1990’s. Though playful in its nostalgic gloss, his summary provides a common starting point for the inherited legacy of the culture concepts (though certainly not capturing the re-evaluations and debates that make this legacy unstable if not itself symbolic), but more importantly the common narrative of its major changes through a drastic jump from decolonization to the 1980’s:

“The story we encountered was—on the level of concepts and methods—full of ruptures. And yet it was—on the level of the theme around which it evolved—a most coherent one: anthropology was the science of the far-away other, of the “premodern,” the “primitive.” We moved from various forms of evolutionisms, such as the work of Edward Burnett Taylor, Louis
Henry Morgan, or James Frazier, to Franz Boas’ historical particularism and the social ontology of Durkheimian sociology. Next we followed Bronislaw Malinowski’s invention of ethnography as social science and studied in detail the difference between his functionalism and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism, which inspired E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Meyer Fortes, who dominated British anthropology up until the 1960’s. We turned toward culture and personality, got obsessed with the intellectualist approach of Claude Levi-Strauss’s structuralism, and fell in love with interpretive and symbolic anthropology in the work of Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner, and Marshall Sahlins. And finally, along with the critique of anthropology’s involvement in colonialism and the emergence of dialog—or polyphonic—ethnographies, we read Writing Culture” (Rabinow et al. 2008, 2).

The conversation continues between the two major figures of the 1980’s “rupture” with “classical anthropology” to discuss Rabinow’s turn to an anthropology of the contemporary, or emergent biopolitical apparatuses—itself explicitly posed against “culture”—as a more adequate framework for today. Later, Rabinow’s work provides an entryway for thinking through the differences being proposed for the ethnographic turn to biopolitics that have defined China scholarship since the 80’s, compared to the turn registered in the struggles of ’68, and what insights might be gained from these disjunctures. Disrupting the common account of the decline of the culture concept via a radical jump between decolonization and the writing culture of the 80’s fails to account for is how a generation of militant intellectual thought just prior to writing culture, which commonly cited Althusser, Lacan, and Mao among its inspirations, becomes completely taboo on the subject of Maoism. I argue that there was also a political struggle over culture as a revolutionary concept and a mode of thought that is completely absent from the disciplinary history of social sciences.

As an immediate example, while Althusser persists as an important intellectual figure in contemporary scholarship, there is little attention to the role of Althusser in a critical conjuncture of global Maoism that inevitably influenced his thought. The complexity of upheavals that signaled the crisis of the Western subject must be seen in light of decolonization struggles starting in 1949, with the subsequent proliferation of struggles of those thought to be incapable of self-determination reverberating through
Europe in ways worth elaborating. Althusser’s role at the intersection of the intensification of struggles by non-proletarian subjectivities in Europe and the Third World is critical. In scholarship, these ruptures manifested in lines of inquiry that revealed a central and unresolved issue of the era regarding the relation between base and superstructure, and the related question of where to locate alternatives to economistic and teleological accounts of “global diversity.” Althusser’s well-known attempt to claim Marx for dialectical materialism through the operation of science/ideology, which underwrote a program of a theory of history and its various modes of production, structure, development, and transition, has been recognized as both an attempt to break with economism, as well as the ultimate assertion of economism “in the last instance.” Harry Cleaver, in historicizing the politics of Althusser, argues that in response to the attacks on the Old Left, Althusser launched a two-pronged intervention to reconcile the French Communist Party with the emergence of revolting non-proletarian subjects. First, he redirected the conversation away from the revolutionary struggles of the Third World to one of categorizing modes of production in non-urban regions, so that peasant struggles outside of the proletariat were categorized as “pre-capitalist modes of production” under the banner of historical materialism. Second, Althusser’s combination of Mao’s concept of conjunctural dominance along with Freud’s overdetermination, allowed structural space for the possibility of culture as an institutional practice of ideology to have relative autonomy from the base, and thus allowed the French Communist Party to nod at these non-proletarian struggles while remaining committed to economic determinants “in the last instance.”

\[^2\] Borrowing from Mao’s theory on contradiction, Althusser’s attempt to account for conjunctural contradictions describes how, depending on the conjuncture at any given moment in the history of society, the dominance of one contradiction may be politics, economics, culture, etc. Given this multiplicity of contradictions, a situation may erupt through the condensation of structural antagonisms rather than through the fulfillment of a general contradiction in history. At the same time that this opening is provided in structuralism for subjective possibility, the structural causality of change is located in the last instance in economy, which never comes.
instance” (Cleaver 2000, Bosteels 2011). It is necessary to examine Mao’s own concepts, as will be explored in further detail, because Althusser’s own complicated relation to revolt is revealed in the way that the concept of culture either leads to the recomposition of the party for Althusser, or its scission for Mao. Whether this theoretical difference becomes the “historical failure” of Mao (as suggested by Liu Kang) or Althusser (as suggested by Cleaver), is unfair to both complex and complicated thinkers. But what is clear is that increasingly, for the West and for the Third World, the concept of culture was structured in relation to the question of revolt taking place among non-western subjectivities.

Meanwhile within western centers ranging from France, Italy and the US, the investigation into actual conditions and social relations of struggle by alternative Marxist projects revealed the need to account for struggles based on creating new social relations and forms of being beyond resisting capitalism, the reformulation of Marxism to include non-waged or non-traditional struggles (women, minorities, lumpen-proletariat, welfare struggles, peasant and Third World struggles), and the way that these struggles pushed a new form of social control and struggle beyond the factory (Cleaver 2000). C.L.R. James’ analysis of the Fordist mode of production as a “social system” responding to the creativity of non-unionized organized black struggles in the US auto factories as well as outside the factory (James 1950), the studies of similar patterns in Soviet bureaucratic capitalism posed against unmediated worker and non-worker communities by the French Socialisme ou Barbarie group (1949-1965), and the work of the Italian New Left such as Antonio Negri and Mario Tronti’s analyses of capital as social control or the “social factory” that accumulates class relations through the cultural sphere against the self-activities of workers to free themselves from work (Tronti 1973, Negri 1991), and the analyses of feminist Marxists such as Mariarosa Della
Costa and Selma James on the importance of the cultural sphere as both the space of the reproduction of classes as well as the key site for the division of labor into waged and unwaged (Dalla Costa and James 1972), etc. all formed a growing generation of unorthodox Marxists that broke with economic determinism in analyzing capitalism and militant struggles across the base/superstructure paradigm.

In order to understand the conjuncture of global Maoism with these radical breaks with Marxism-Leninism, I turn now to revisit the notion of culture which took place in three locations—China, France, and Fanon’s Algeria, where it becomes clear the material conditions for the critique of culture which took place in the western social sciences post ‘68, at the same time that these conditions become disavowed.

2.2.2 Maoism and Culture

“...the contradiction in each form of motion of matter, the contradiction in each of its processes of development, the two aspects of the contradiction in each process, the contradiction at each stage of a process, and the two aspects of the contradiction at each stage—...” (Mao Zedong, 1971, 106)

I argue in this section that Mao provided a unique and radical concept of culture, which was taken up by third and first world thinkers alike. The global force of Mao Zedong Thought, inseparable from his concept of culture, became a crucial site of struggle, whose legacy continues through today’s intellectual inquiries and aversions.

One of the seminal texts of Mao Zedong Thought is considered to be his 1937 essay “On Contradiction,” in which through a complex investigation into the nature of contradiction, Mao fragments space and time, opening it up to undetermined possibilities. The political consequences that followed this opening are manifested in the Third World theoretical and practical interventions to Western Marxism and Socialism. Concretely, these interventions were: (1) Breaking the universalizing and homogenizing
spatial-temporal narrative of Western Marxism which gave a privileged role to the proletariat and to the industrial stage of capitalism, (2) Giving the “superstructure” a determining influence in revolution, (3) Introducing the question of strategy and subjectivity in the question of revolution. In addition to these interventions, Mao’s essay “On Contradiction” is seminal for modeling a method of analysis, or a mode of thought, which he used to generate critique of post-revolutionary China. It is understanding Maoism as a mode of thought rather than a set of ideas that Mao was able to make a unique intervention in the history of “actually existing socialism,” this time into breaking the Socialist teleological narrative that privileged the vanguard party and their historical transcendence from political and economic determinations. Through the concept of continuing revolution, Mao argued that both capitalist tendencies and new socialist contradictions persist in the practices of daily life (subjectivity, or culture) even after revolution. Capitalism, when understood as subjectivity and practice rather than an economic system, has the possibility of relapse to the pre-existing order even after revolution of the material structure. Mao’s position is commonly attacked by Chinese and Western intellectuals alike, who characterize Mao as possessing a fetish for ahistorical revolution (Liu 1995, 603). Even today, leftist intellectuals making the same critique as Mao of the formation of an elite bureaucratic capitalist class within the party-state are sensitive to the taboo that continues to erase Mao’s early analysis (Wang H. 2011).

It is through Mao Zedong Thought as a question of strategy for how to get to revolution that the role of culture takes on specific importance for Chinese society and for the Third World. In his essay “On Contradiction,” Mao breaks contradiction down into key analytical categories: universal contradiction, the particularity of a contradiction, the particularity of a contradiction in each process of its development, and
the particularity of the two aspects of a contradiction in each process. With these analytical categories, he shows how at each level, there is always the question of struggle and force (or politics):

“...In the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist conception. True, the productive forces, practice, and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role...When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive.” (Mao 1971, 116, emphasis mine)

While many scholars focus on this essay to show how Mao argued for the “decisive” role of culture, Badiou argues that in fact, what is critical and revolutionary in Mao Zedong Thought is Mao’s question of how the two asymmetrical terms of a contradiction come to change place (Badiou 2009, 25). For example, with a dialectic such as Proletariat/Bourgeoisie, affected by structural and historical contradictions, the nodal point between these brings in the issue of what Badiou calls the subject as process, or what Mao called struggle. In other words, rather than supporting a form of “objectivism” which elevates a reified notion of culture above an equally reified notion of economy, or supporting “volunteerism” which elevates a reified notion of agency over a reified notion of structure, Mao focused more on the question of the conditions necessary for changing the relations of force in society between the dominant element and the weaker element. This required an “ethnographic” analysis displacing class as a pre-given structurally determined category in relation to production, in place of concrete material and political contradictions in their empirical manifestations, as exemplified in his astonishingly complex analysis of peasant society in 1926, later inspiring Fanon in analyzing Algerian society (Dirlik 1983, 196). While Chinese Aesthetic Marxists focused
on culture as a pure aesthetic realm of experience (Liu 1995, 620), Mao was interested in culture as a process of struggle for liberation, particularly for what was subjectively and objectively the weaker element in the given situation (peasant society in relation to industrialized society, colonized people in relation to colonizers, labor in relation to capital, etc). In this sense, is it fair to say that Mao subjected culture to “politics,” when politics is understood as strategy and the capacity to change the relations of force.

Having laid the theoretical foundation for the possibility of politics at every level of contradiction, Mao articulated specifically the strategy for revolution through culture in Chinese society in his 1940 speech “On New Democracy” and his 1944 speech, “The United Front in Cultural Work.” During this stage of the war, the communist party saw themselves engaged in battle on multiple fronts: (1) globally, to bring about socialism in the face of expanding capitalism, (2) nationally, to bring about national liberation from Western imperialism; (3) locally, to bring about communist revolution in the face of a bourgeois democratic Guomindang party. This immediately imbued Chinese Marxism with specific socialist and anti-imperialist characteristics, with determining effects on how culture was conceived in China. Arif Dirlik provides a succinct articulation of Chinese Marxism as (1) Universal Marxism: sharing the same basic principles of Marxism; (2) Third World Marxism: Having a different relation to capitalism than Europe or the Soviet Union; (3) National Marxism: Accounting for China’s own historical/cultural characteristics; (4) Vernacular Marxism: Recognizing local peasant cultures in China that can’t fit into uniform national cultural space (Dirlik, 1994, 31).

More specifically, due to the lack of a developed urban proletariat in the manner of the Russian context, Chinese Marxists focused on rural transformation as key to China’s modernity, instead of urban cities. What this meant was a different strategy to bring about revolution and resolve the contradictions proliferating on multiple levels—namely
through the creation of a new national and popular culture to mobilize largely uneducated peasants.

In his articulation of “Chinese culture,” Mao makes clear that what is meant by “culture” is neither “tradition” nor “western modernity,” but the necessity for a new culture to be created according to the values of popular democracy:

“The only yardstick of truth is the revolutionary practice of millions of people. This, I think, can be regarded as the attitude of Chinese Culture.”…We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the earlier cultures of other nations, for example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlightenment. However, we should not gulp any of this foreign material down uncritically, but must treat it as we do our food -- first chewing it, then submitting it to the working of the stomach and intestines with their juices and secretions, and separating it into nutriment to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded -- before it can nourish us. To advocate “wholesale westernization” is wrong. China has suffered a great deal from the mechanical absorption of foreign material. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Marxists who make a fetish of formulas are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. Chinese culture should have its own form, its own national form. National in form and new-democratic in content -- such is our new culture today (Mao 2009, 166).

Immediately distinct from Western Marxism is Mao’s conception of culture as constructive, rather than deconstructive. Whereas culture played a critical function for Western thinkers and remained bourgeois (in the critique of modernity, civil society remains the primary space of politics), it played a constructive function for China (Liu 1995, 596). However, the nature of Mao’s conception of culture is often interpolated into Western theory. I argue that the recent moves to redeem Mao by showing his similarity to Althusser or Gramsci in fact contributes to the misunderstanding of what culture meant for Mao. More than the association of culture with superstructure, ideology, or hegemony, culture for Mao referred to a strategic project in which Chinese society breaks with the existing structure of domination to produce a new subjectivity and a new society. Whereas Gramsci and Althusser saw culture as ideological domination, Mao
saw culture as the possibility of an alternative source of social production not attributable to capitalism or its structure of domination (Badiou 2009, 29-36).

The differences between Mao’s concept of culture and Western Marxism becomes clear in the spread of Mao Zedong Thought in Europe, the US, and in the Third World. Maoism itself became a global culture of resistance, whose diversity should be understood contextually, but also as the material conditions for a break with Marxism-Leninism. In the next section, I seek to touch on some of the forms of Mao Zedong Thought, to show its diversity, its innovations, and its global impact, as well as the anticipation if not full articulation of critiques of the culture concept that manifest in scholarship during the ‘80’s. Finally, grasping these expressions and reformulations of culture will reveal continuities between the ruptures of ‘68 with the conceptual difficulties of the biopolitical era, lost in the terminology of newness and “emergent” apparatuses.

2.2.3 Global Maoism

What can we say constitutes a culture of Maoism during the 60’s? For the Third World and for people of color struggles in the US: (1) The affirmation of elements of native culture integrated into the goal for liberation, (2) the articulation of that native culture through the terms of Marxism, (3) the affirmation of a new culture in the search for an alternative modernity to global capitalism. For Maoism in the West (specifically France), it was truly a cultural phenomenon, becoming a popular discourse capturing the general sentiment of rebellion, but also becoming disconnected from a concrete struggle. Whatever the historical judgments that are passed on Marx and Mao for their affinity or deviation from Western philosophical tradition and its pitfalls, Marxism and Maoism was overwhelmingly taken up by people of color struggles around the world as a discursive support for a subjectivity of rebellion against impossible odds, and for that
reason alone some generosity needs to be given, in the midst of the wave of critiques against Marxism and Maoism, which also warped into critiques against these struggles of the 60’s. For this reason I leave the critiques to what already is in abundance out there today of the struggles which took violent and devastating forms in the rhetoric of Maoism, and focus on those liberation struggles which have been intentionally grouped together under these critiques.

2.2.3.1 French Maoism

Richard Wolin’s recent work on the influence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution on French intellectuals deserves close attention, if only (or especially) because of the scarcity of English-language literature on the topic. In The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960’s, Wolin provides a historical and intellectual account of how Maoism influenced French society during the tumultuous 60’s. To begin with, Wolin provides his account of the “real” Chinese Maoism and the Cultural Revolution (in a breathtaking 5 out of 370 pages), read as an ideological cover for Mao’s “naked” political power grab within the communist party. He attributes “violence” and bloodshed” to Mao, and as the damning evidence for its ideological and anti-democratic basis (Wolin 2010, 110). He ultimately argues that the French were not dealing with “real” Chinese politics (which was “really” mass anarchy, violent, anti-democratic, and ideological), but were motivated by utopian perceptions of Chinese Maoism and the Cultural Revolution, to coincidentally create their own more plural, “libidinal” politics of ‘68, and eventually a more democratic humanist politics of the 90’s (Wolin 2010, xii). It is unfortunate that the rare American academic voice willing to acknowledge a relation between Maoism and French intellectual thought sets out to reproduce the stereotype that equates Chinese intellectual thought with totalitarianism and ideology, and Western intellectual thought with democracy and creativity. To make
this argument, Wolin must bracket even the self-articulated indebtedness to Maoism made by French thinkers.

In contrast, Badiou’s account of French Maoism takes seriously both French and Chinese thought in relation to the complexity of upheavals by old, ongoing, and new contradictions in French society during the 1960’s. For Badiou, French Maoism took on three tendencies: (1) The conservative interpretation of the PCMLF, which consisted of actual working class activists who wanted to rebuild a genuine communist party of class struggle, in rejection of the revisionism of the French CP and the USSR; (2) The ultra-left interpretation of the GP which “launched bold attacks, set up stunts, made ‘revolution in the head’, ‘melted into the masses’, always with a very keen eye to the media. The organization was highly centralized—in secret; in public it dissolved itself every five minutes in order to ‘liberate’ the energy of the masses”; (3) Badiou’s “center-left organization” the UCFML:

“There were three essential points of Maoist provenance that we practised: the first was that you always had to link up with the people, that politics for intellectuals was a journey into society and not a discussion in a closed room. Political work was defined as work in factories, housing estates, hostels. It was always a matter of setting up political organizations in the midst of people’s actual life. The second was that you should not take part in the institutions of the bourgeois state: we were against the traditional trade unions and the electoral mechanism. No infiltration of the so-called workers’ bureaucracies, no participation in elections; that distinguished us radically from the Trotskyists. The third point was that we should be in no hurry to call ourselves a party, to take up old forms of organization; we had to remain very close to actual political processes. As a result of all this, we found ourselves sharply opposed to the two other main currents. Our founding pamphlet attacked both the PCMLF on the right and the GP ‘on the left’. A struggle on two fronts” (Badiou 2008).

Badiou articulates his position as center-left, “in the sense always advocated by Mao, who described himself as a ‘centrist’.” But how does one account for such a drastic disparity between Wolin and Badiou’s account of Maoism, such that for Wolin, Mao is culpable of both extremes of mass anarchy and totalitarianism, and for Badiou, Mao is seen as a center-left to these two extremes?
First, one must understand Badiou’s method of analysis, which draws from Maoism, to analyze political tendencies during the 1960’s. Just as Mao constantly warned against both leftist extremism (individualistic anarchy) and rightist extremism (bureaucratic dogmatism), both undergirded by political opportunism, so too does Badiou critique two extreme tendencies of the left during the 1960’s. If Wolin believes French intellectuals to have idealized Chinese politics, then in the same sense he himself idealizes a utopian French politics that is unable to distinguish between its own leftist and rightist extremes. In fact, the very same two political extremes that Wolin denounces in Chinese politics are resignified as “democratic” and “plural” in French politics. What Wolin interprets as a “more humanistic” politics of the 90’s, Badiou interprets as the integration of two political opportunisms in the recomposition of capital through the conservative market notion of individual rights (Badiou 2009, xli, 181). Badiou calls this method of analyzing “leolist” and “rightist” tendencies within a contradiction and example of “one divides into two,” which refers back to Mao’s article “On Contradiction” where the essence of contradiction is not synthesis and resolution by integration, but transformation and scission3 into a new contradiction. For Badiou, a militant philosophy must analyze contradiction as scission, rather than synthesis, as a political commitment to periodization and opening (the new), rather than circularity and closure (the Whole) (Badiou 2009). So, within both the Cultural Revolution and May 68’ in France, the contradiction between leftist and rightist extremism necessitated a “center-

3 Reading Mao as a theory dialectics as scission rather than mediation, Badiou explains that scission refers not to Lacan’s lack, in which the subject is tragically split by the structure of lack, but a form of thinking that accounts for subjective intervention and splitting of both the subject and the structure as rupture, producing new contradictions. “This means that the question of dialectics today is ultimately a question of politics; that is, it is a question of an active and organized invention of new modes of dealing with the Two. What is being sought after today is a thinking of politics which, while dealing with strife and thus having the structural Two in its field of intervention, does not take this Two to be an objective essence. Or rather, to the objectivist doctrine of the Two (classes are transitive to the process of production), the political innovation under way attempts to oppose a vision of the Two in terms of historicity, which means that the real Two is an evental production, a political production, not an objective or scientific presupposition. (Bosteels 2011, 17)
left” commitment to struggle on two fronts in the working out of concrete problems through political process (what is called a dialectical critique of dialectics).

Second, while Wolin indiscriminately assigns both tendencies of “mass anarchism” and “totalitarianism” to Mao, Badiou sees these two elements as precisely the key global contradiction of 1968 that the Cultural Revolution was the first to attempt to resolve: the relation between mass politics and the State. In other words, “the Cultural Revolution was the historical development of a contradiction centrally debating the total saturation of politics based on the party-state. Its failure and political significance is to mark the historical shift to an entirely new political situation in which neither mass action nor organizational form adheres to logic of class representation” (Badiou 2005, 487). As recent new research on the popular workers Shanghai Commune illustrates, politics in the form of the proliferation of autonomous democratic organizations exceeding the form of the party-state revealed the saturation of the state as a central site of politics and innovation (Badiou 2005, 485-486). For Badiou, the open question of politics without the State is the legacy that the Cultural Revolution leaves with us today. Bruno Bosteels elaborates on this open question of how to do politics without the State as Badiou’s remaining tie to Maoism—what Bosteels calls “post-Maoism.” Badiou is post-Maoist in the dual sense of a critical engagement with Maoism as an unfinished project repressed within society today, and a struggle to resolve the open question of politics that Maoism posed as the next stage in Marxism. Also, without understanding the open question that the Cultural Revolution failed to resolve, we also fail to understand the conditions surrounding the next form of revolt we see in places like Latin American today so inadequately addressed by the state-centered theories of “social movement” theory (Bosteels 2005, 576, 582; also see Kaufman 2010, Reyes and Kaufman 2011).
According to Badiou, given the question of how political revolt runs up against the reconstitution of the State, he presents the following periodization: (1) whereas Marx presented the first stage of this question in which politics is made equal to History (the unfolding of class struggle in history); (2) whereas Lenin presented the second stage of this question in which politics is guaranteed to lead to History by the party-state; (3) Mao presented the third stage of Marxism which politics is none other than the concrete conjuncture without fusion. If Mao’s Cultural Revolution was a failed experiment of providing an organizational form to a post-Leninist mode of politics (organization outside the party-state), then our task today is to investigate the organizational form adequate to a post-Maoist mode of politics (Bosteels 2005, 585).

French Maoism was thus influenced by the events of the Cultural Revolution as a generalized rebellion against the capitalist and socialist State. In addition, Badiou describes the Maoist form of “investigation” that was taken up by French groups such as the GP and later, Foucault’s Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons (Wolin 2010, 289; Bosteels 2011, 113).

“The Maoist investigation is not a simple observation of facts [un simple constat], not even the enthusiastic observation of the consequences of our interventions. It solves a problem. Which problem? That of the takeover of the effects of the intervention by the workers...The investigation must not only bear on the search for a new objective in the struggle, it must propose the putting into place of lasting practices, set off the ideological struggle. Before and after the struggle, something has changed, we must know how to make this live on.” (Bosteels 2005, 579)

In the same sense that Mao discussed the technique of investigation in his 1937 speech “On Practice,” the process of investigation itself changes the conditions of the struggle. For Mao, knowledge comes only through the struggle to change a situation. How does knowledge come from practice?

“The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws and of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws, and of the internal relations between one process, and another, that is, to arrive at logical knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate aspects, the
Mao explains that there are two “leaps” in knowledge: In the process of social practice, the practice of changing what one is trying to know, one gains phenomenal knowledge; eventually through repetition, there is a sudden change (leap) that takes place in the brain and concepts form. This is a quantitative and qualitative leap. This stage is the stage of rational knowledge where one grasps the internal contradiction of things, or theoretical knowledge. The second leap is from theoretical knowledge back to practice. Badiou describes this process in terms of “torsion.” Elaborating on Mao’s concept of practice, “there is a circle, since the point of departure of truth is practice, which is its point of arrival as well, and theory is the mediation by way of a curve from p1 to p2. There is torsion by a double unhinging that, as an integral part of truth as trajectory, grounds the practical novelty, the local index of p as a division into p1 and p2, which is not a temporal division but a cognitive one: the law of placement” (Badiou 2009, 123). So, for Mao there must be TWO discontinuities, two leaps of knowledge: from sensible to rational knowledge (a leap in the practical identity of the trajectory, you leap from the plane of totality-repetition), and from rational to revolutionary knowledge (a leap whereby p divides itself, you move horizontally along repetition-coherence) (Badiou 2009, 123).

The convergence of Mao’s revolutionary concept of practice and theory with the interest among French intellectuals to redefine the relation between intellectuals and emancipatory struggles is witnessed in the work of the Prison Investigation Group (GIP). The GIP published four journals through their work with prisoners, including one on “The Assassination of George Jackson.” The circulation of Maoism across liberation
struggles during the 60’s is a much-needed study beyond the scope of this work.⁴ However, there has been some work showing that the political openings made possible by Mao through his work on contradiction allowed both Fanon in Algeria and the Black Panther Party in the United States to creatively envision a new politics (Kelley 2002; Reyes 2009). For example, a key aspect of Mao’s essay “On Contradiction” for non-proletarian struggles was Mao’s insistence that universal contradiction can only be grasped in its particularity (and visa versa). Whereas racial struggles in the US had been dismissed by orthodox socialist groups as secondary to the struggle of the (white) proletariat, Mao Zedong Thought insisted on understanding the concrete identity of struggles in different contexts, both the universal in the particular and the particular in the universal, and affirmed that racial struggles in the US could take on primary importance in the contradiction.

For both the Black Panthers’ struggles in the US and Fanon’s struggles in Algeria, Maoism allowed two formulations to be made: first, that capitalism posed at the level of superstructure clarifies the internal scission of the struggle between the persisting return of capitalism through culture, and the search for an alternative value system; second, that the struggle for an alternative to capitalism intimately involves creating a new culture, and a new value system. Concretely, both the Black Panthers and Fanon explicitly articulated their struggle on two fronts, just as Badiou articulated his Maoist organization in relation to the other Maoist organizations in France: on one front against the right tendency of black capitalism, and on the other front against the left tendency of cultural essentialism. It is through this struggle on two fronts that the Black Panthers and Fanon speak of culture as a new value system. In the next section I look briefly at

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⁴ Some recent work on global Maoism include Rothwell, Matthew, Transpacific Revolutionaries: The Chinese Revolution in Latin America, Routledge 2012; Fabio Lanza’s work on Maoism in France and China, and Samir Amin, “The Implosion of Global Capitalism: The Challenge for the Radical Left”
how Fanon, in taking up Maoism, envisioned the role of culture in decolonization struggles, which was inextricable from revolution. Furthermore, in addressing his contemporaries in the social and human sciences, Fanon’s insights reveal how much of the “self-critiques” of the culture concept during the 80’s and 90’s might have benefited from engaging with the ideas of those struggling during the 60’s but continue to be displaced today.

2.2.3.1 Maoism and Decolonization

Written in 1956, Fanon gave a speech called *Racism and Culture* in explicit engagement with social scientists and intellectuals, articulating the contemporary constructions of culture according to changing dynamics of power:

“There is first affirmed the existence of human groups having no culture; then of a hierarchy of cultures; and finally, the concept of cultural relativity. We have here the whole range from overall negation to singular and specific recognition. It is precisely this fragmented and bloody history that we must sketch on the level of cultural anthropology” (Fanon 1967, 31).

Fanon argues that, despite democratic jargon, the recent intellectual turn from “biological racism” toward cultural relativity is a more refined form of racism, a “cultural racism,” resulting from the evolving means of production and its new forms of exploitation, in reciprocal action to ideological change and the disruption of the existing racial structure. The new balance made between ideology and economy does not signal the progressive elimination of racism, but its mystification. For Fanon, because racism was one element in a larger structure of domination, cultural relativism persists alongside a new structure of domination.

How does Fanon see cultural relativism functioning as a form of domination? The Boasian movement sought to affirm the singularity of cultures by documenting their particular historical trajectory, primarily by “institutionalizing” culture. This process of institutionalization is the process of objectification, or the process by which subjectivity is removed from community life, not to mention political struggle against domination.
Fanon’s discussion of culture at the level of subjectivity begins with the process of “de-culturation” or “destruction,” whereby a set of existing values is violently destroyed, followed by the process of the construction of a “dead culture,” which is the imposition of a new set of values functioning through the reified elements of “native” culture (Fanon 1967, 31-44; Fanon 2004, 178-179). Because communities have already undergone a process of “de-culturation,” Fanon’s analysis of struggle within the colonial situation does not take place along lines of affirming traditional native culture versus colonial, or even of hybridity and ambivalence, all of which are shown in Black Skin White Masks to be unsustainable subject positions for both the individual and collective struggle for liberation (Fanon 2008; Reyes 2009). Having already been irreversibly destructured and restructured by the colonial structure, Fanon argues that social scientists not only study, but participate in the process of objectification that makes “dead culture”:

“The culture with which the intellectual is preoccupied is very often nothing but an inventory of particularisms. Seeking to cling close to the people, he clings merely to a visible veneer. This veneer, however, is merely a reflection of a dense, subterranean life in perpetual renewal. This reification which seems all too obvious and characteristic of the people, is in fact but the inert, already invalidated outcome of the many, and not always coherent, adaptations of a more fundamental substance beset with radical changes. Instead of seeking out this substance, the intellectual lets himself be mesmerized by these mummified fragments which, now consolidated, signify on the contrary, negation, obsolescence, and fabrication. In essence, it is the very opposite of custom, which is always a deterioration of culture. Seeking to stick to tradition or reviving neglected traditions is not only going against history, but against one’s people. When a people support an armed revolution or even political struggle against a merciless colonialism, tradition changes meaning. What was a technique of passive resistance may in this phase, be radically doomed. Traditions in an underdeveloped country undergoing armed struggle are fundamentally unstable and crisscrossed by centrifugal forces. This is why the intellectual often risks being out of step. The peoples who have waged the struggles are increasingly impermeable to demagoguery, and by seeking to follow them too closely, the intellectual turns out to be nothing better than a vulgar opportunist, even behind the times.” (Fanon 2004, 160-161)

“Thus we witness the setting up of archaic, inert institutions, functioning under the oppressor’s supervision and patterned like a caricature of formerly fertile institutions. These bodies appear to embody respect for the tradition, the cultural specificities, the personality of the subjugated people. This pseudo-respect in fact is tantamount to the most utter contempt, to the most elaborate sadism. The characteristic of a culture is to be open, permeated by spontaneous, generous, fertile lines of force. The appointment of ‘reliable men’ to execute certain gestures is a deception that deceives no one.” (Fanon 1967, 34)
Even before the postmodern critiques take hold within the university, Fanon has already provided a succinct critique of the culture concept, which makes communities static and bounded, mapped onto tradition and purity. However, unlike the post-critiques, which turn against Marxism and humanism in the generalized critique of all universalizing paradigms, Fanon maintains that the solution to the processes of objectification must involve a project of constructing a new humanism, by the decisive action of a community to restructure themselves. The role of culture is crucial to this process insofar as a new humanism requires a new set of values, and a new subject:

“What is the relationship between the struggle, the political or armed conflict, and culture?...We believe the conscious, organized struggle undertaken by a colonized people in order to restore national sovereignty constitutes the greatest cultural manifestation that exists. It is not solely the success of the struggle that consequently validates and energizes culture; culture does not go into hibernation during the conflict. The development and internal progression of the actual struggle expand the number of directions in which culture can go and hint at new possibilities. The liberation struggle does not restore to national culture its former values and configurations. This struggle, which aims at the fundamental redistribution of relations between men, cannot leave intact either the form or substance of the people’s culture. After the struggle, there is not only the demise of the colonizer, but the demise of the colonized....This new humanity, for itself and for others, inevitably defines a new humanism. This new humanism is written into the objectives and methods of the struggle. A struggle which mobilizes every level of society, which expresses the intentions and expectations of the people, and which is not afraid to rely on their support almost entirely, will invariably triumph. The merit of this type of struggle is that it achieves the optimal conditions for cultural development and innovation. Once national liberation has been accomplished under these conditions, there is none of that tiresome cultural indecisiveness we find in certain newly independent countries, because the way a nation is born and functions exerts a fundamental influence on culture. A nation born of the concerted action of the people, which embodies the actual aspirations of the people and transforms the state, depends on exceptionally inventive cultural manifestations for its very existence...We believe that the future of culture and the richness of a national culture are also based on the values that inspired the struggle for freedom. (Fanon 2004, 178-179)

I argue that Fanon provides a deep articulation of Mao’s concept of culture, which fought against two fronts of tradition and western culture, to affirm the creation of a new culture and a new set of values. Unlike the cultural turn of the 80’s and 90’s in the US and in China, these values were non-negotiable when it came to collective liberation and popular struggle.
2.2.4 Backlash

Given the global formulation of culture in explicitly revolutionary and political terms outlined above, how do we account for its sudden absence in the aftermath of ‘68 and the Cultural Revolution? In addition to the changes taking place under the heading of “globalization” which self-consciously displaced the culture concept, there is also a political twist that complicates this narrative of transition that frames contemporary discussions of biopolitics. In what follows, I trace the intentional investments in the concept of culture in the broader social field that were made by elite institutions in the US before and after ‘68. This is not to argue simplistically that elite ideological manipulation always produces its intended effect, or that capitalism operates primarily through ideological hegemony; in fact, tracing these investments reveals not only the remarkable consistency of a global capitalist class over time, but the traces of biopolitical techniques of governing in the conditions of knowledge production from censorship to enrollment, exclusion to inclusion. Thus, it is important to establish this legacy in my dissertation for two key arguments: (1) The way in which culture is conceived now is based on eliding the ruptures which occurred in thinkers during the 60’s, in the general shift from revolutionary hegemony to neoliberal hegemony, necessitating an understanding of the conditions of knowledge production that currently address the “migrant” issue through culture; (2) This legacy of struggle over culture by a network of academic, non-profit, and private foundations is also part of the legacy of the CSR movement, and will help in understanding its contemporary structure later in chapter 4 and 5. Making clear the continuities between the conservative backlash following the radical movements of ‘68 and the contemporary deployment of culture by elite institutions reveals the political stakes involved in critically examining the turn from culture to biopolitics.
As scholars have noted, despite the disjunctures, heterogeneity, and contingency of contemporary logics of power, the consolidation and remarkable consistency of a global capitalist class reveals surprising commonalities in shaping social space today. Relevant to this dissertation is the ongoing presence of foundations in the history of knowledge production in the US and in China. The origin of private foundations is distinctly tied to American industrial capitalism, and for this reason has long been a symbol of cultural imperialism for the Third World. The relationship between area studies and foreign policy interest is well known (Appadurai 1996; Price 2008). However, in the area of critical research on private philanthropy, Donald Fischer shows how the role of private philanthropy (as a distinct logic from the state) was intimately involved in the growth and direction of the social sciences and area studies such as anthropology in ways irreducible to and sometimes in conflict with state interest:

“From an examination of the impact of Rockefeller funding upon the development of the social sciences in Britain it becomes clear that these foundations determined to a significant extent who would teach and conduct research in the social sciences; where this teaching and/or research took place; what was to be taught and which research questions were to be answered; and finally how all this work was to be done. First, the control over individuals was demonstrated in the fellowship programs and in those cases where academics were defined as allies because of their potential to exert a national influence on the social sciences. For example, Beveridge, Malinowski, Carr-Saunders, and Jewkes all fit into this second category. Second, the control over institutional development was demonstrated by the support given to the London School of Economics, Oxford, and Manchester rather than to other universities. Third, the control over the content of the social sciences was illustrated throughout the interwar period because of foundation emphasis upon research and training that was “scientific” and “practical” rather than what they perceived to be the more traditional theoretical and philosophical approaches. Further, within this broad framework the Rockefeller foundations exerted enormous control over the expansion of some subjects rather than others, that is, economics, statistics, anthropology, and international relations. Fourth, the control over methodology was apparent in almost all the funding relations discussed above but was especially noticeable in the emphasis upon empirical economics and functional anthropology” (Fischer 1982, 255).

The relation between intellectual trends and western political-economic domination has long been an important part of anthropologists’ critical reflective period during the 80’s. In fact, due to the public outcry over such explicit ideological manipulation by private foundations, especially in 1967 when it was revealed that the foundations operated the
CIA’s cultural programs abroad (Roelofs 2003, 11), scholars suggest that the major foundations began to change their strategy for cultural intervention.

Scholars agree that an important milestone of foundation history is when the Rockefeller and Ford foundation jointly organized a closed-door meeting called the Bellagio Conference at Lake Como in 1974. At this meeting, representatives from all the major donor agencies reconsidered their approach to the Third World in the wake of the crisis of modernization projects brought on by decolonization. After the conference, while the strategy of developmental aid established in the 1950’s continued as a foundation inroad into managing Third World countries, education, specifically universities, emerged with new significance. The foundations’ recommitment to focusing on education included a domestic and international component, with crossover strategies. Domestically, foundations intensified and replicated the successful model of the Social Science Research Council in response to public protests over ideological control (Seybold 1982, 287). The intention of the SSRC, when created by the Rockefellers in 1924, was to have a mediating institution (what Arnove calls “academic holding companies”) in between the private foundations and academic research for the appearance of neutrality, while simultaneously distributing priorities set by the foundations (Slaughter and Silva 1982, 74; Berman 1983,105). Through this model, these mediating institutions avoided the kind of direct ideological intervention that characterized their programs during the Cold War era. In fact in the 1980’s foundations even allotted support to research by neo-Marxists, as efforts diversify from ideology to the very structure of research itself (Cleaver 2000, 27-28; Berman 1983, 105). The establishment of a complex private-public network between private foundations, NGO’s and universities led to a more innovative and effective practice in the late 1960’s. Internationally, foundations would continue to develop universities in Africa, Asia and
Latin America to set up a network of elite Third World intellectuals, the effects of which Dirlik has critically examined as well (Dirlik 1998, 62).

The Ford Foundation also played the main role in creating Chinese studies along similar strategies. While Sinology, among other area studies, was on the decline during the McCarthy era of the 1950’s (Price 2004), what is less known is how the Ford Foundation single-handedly launched a China Program in 1955 that sought to revive and bring to prominence Chinese Studies in the US. With over $30 million in funding from Ford Foundation from 1952-1969, Chinese research was re-directed from classical history and culture to contemporary problems of politics, economics, culture and society; meanwhile, major Chinese research centers were established in “brand” universities as a base for producing experts, Chinese studies disciplines were formalized and developed, China and area studies were expanded into other disciplines and other countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Britain and India, and social science methods were unilaterally pushed. Marking another major shift in practice, in 1979 Ford Foundation began to shift their funding from US based Chinese studies to China based research institutes such as the Chinese Academy of Social Science, development projects, and supporting Chinese people in the long-term opening and reform process through economic management, law, and international relations. Han argues based on his research of the China Program that, rather than operating by direct ideological intervention or censorship, the Ford Foundation operates successfully as a leading “consensus-builder” in the perspective of the world capitalist system, characterized by long-term interests, guiding the general direction of fields, and integrating multiple approaches through the power of knowledge (Lin 1983, Han 2004). As an example, in 2011, Ford Foundation has disclosed on its website $3 million invested in research
institutes and think tanks, including the State Council and the Rand Corporation, that are focused on addressing the problems of urbanization and or migrants in China alone.

As global discontent grew during the 60’s and 70’s, the specific interventions made by foundations took on a situated and tactical nature based on those struggles. While the post-WWII War-Peace Studies Project between the CIA and private foundations had long prioritized distributing the idea of evolutionary change over revolutionary chaos through the growth of social sciences domestically and internationally, by 1960’s their interventions were more specific (Berman 1983, 48). Research on these theoretical interventions in the US gives insight into how the “culture concept” became a key site of struggle:

**Multiculturalism versus movement solidarity:** Despite the common portrayal of struggles during the 1960’s as essentialist and separatist, the threat of solidarity among movements made fragmentation an urgent priority for elites. Roelofs documents how alarms were raised in 1971 when the Black Berets, a militant Chicano group in New Mexico, had been meeting with the Black Panthers, the Young Lords, and the American Indian Movement and expressing solidarity with Cuba. Foundations were able to fragment such unified dissidence “through the creation of organizations for blacks, Hispanics, gays, lesbians, the disabled, Native Americans, and even poor people who are considered just another minority in need of rights” (Roelofs 2003, 44). In India, the encouragement of identity politics was used as an explicit tactic against communism (Roelofs 2003, 87). **Litigation and professionalization versus liberation:** A concomitant strategy to foster identity politics was the funding of public interest law, publications, institutes, and university programs. Foundations created legal organizations, such as the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Women's Law Fund, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, in order to redirect social
movement activists toward institutional professions such as researchers, managers, and litigators of particular interests. **Black capitalism vs. Black Power:** The Ford Foundations’ leading role in the pacification and destruction of black community organizing is well documented (Allen 2007, 61). In response to the civil rights ferment, foundations created the National Urban Coalition in 1967, which “channeled support and status to moderates and refined ‘black power’ as "black capitalism" (Roelofs 2003, 25). **Tying Marxism to Stalinism:** Since 1951 the Ford Foundation invested efforts to discredit academic Marxism. Faced with the fact that "the non-Communist left in Europe is anti-Stalinist but also pro-Marxist," they sought to fund scholarship that argued, "There was little to distinguish Marx from Lenin and Stalin. It was the theory itself, not just those who implemented it, that led to corruption" (Berman 1983, 31). Berman’s research yielded a remarkable internal document on the type of study and the type of scholar that the Ford Foundation sought to fund: 

“A major descriptive analytic study of Marx’s political record and the code of his political conduct, undertaken by a scholar or an institution above suspicion of partisanship and known for strength of liberal convictions, might substantially contribute to disabusing the European non-Communist left of its traditional belief in Marx as a great man in the history of radical progressivism. Such a study might help close the present gap between Marx and Stalin and identify the former, as well as the latter, as the ‘Machiavellian’ he was. Marx could be left to the Communists, and the non-Communist left could reinforce its anti-Stalinism by anti-Marxism, thus ridding its ideology of its present paralyzing ambivalence” (Berman1983, 31).

Taken together, these institutional, structural and ideological interventions impacted the ties between culture, mass politics, and collective solidarity that characterized movements around the world. What is immediately of interest is the biopolitical nature of these interventions, coming from non-state and non-market elements, and directed toward shaping a space of social relations and the conditions of knowledge production rather than direct ideological control.

Francois Cusset’s examination of the curious localization, or invention, of “French theory” in the American university provides another entry point into my
argument, to the extent that French theory provided the basis for postmodernism and
the rise of cultural studies from the 1980’s to the 1990’s. The puzzle of the nature and rise
of French theory in the American university, which takes on the distinctly “American”
characteristic of “turning writing into reading, the mystery of late capitalism into the
enigma of cultural identity, and the question of micropolitics into the very different
question of symbolic conflicts,” is explained as such:

“Foucault, Deleuze, and even Derrida enjoyed such a success within American, but also many
third-world, universities, precisely because of their distance from classical Marxism, or because of
what was even seen as their anti-Marxism; meanwhile, they were banned from their home
country under the charges of a perverse collusion with the worst of leftist Marxism…In any case,
the denial of market forces, of capital and its strategies, helps explain what has been done with
French Theory in many universities in the United States for the past twenty-five years under the
general label of cultural studies:…pointing at symbolic discriminations without analyzing the
culture industry as a whole, with its endless ability to absorb negativity, exploit margins,
swallow and recycle criticism, and gradually shift from mass promotion to a more timely
marketing of differences—as it precisely chose to do around the end of the 1980’s” (Cusset 2008,
xv)

Cusset argues that the American reading of French theory, a productive translation
more than “inaccuracy,” is intricately tied to the decisive context of the 1980’s, in which
a conservative backlash took place in the restructuring of American universities, along
with the rise of culture industry, the commodification of knowledge, and the
“deployment of a global discourse on micropolitical resistance and subalterity that was
deliberately textualist,” ended in the cultural rise and political triumph of
neoconservatives. For Cusset, the roots of the synthesis of “French theory” take place in
1966 at Johns Hopkins, with support from the Ford Foundation, to bring together major
French thinkers who would give a didactic presentation of “structuralism” to American
audiences. The concluding formulas of the conference which become canonical in the
US—where “anti-human” structuralism, including Marxism, should be left behind in
order to move toward a more playful “post-structuralism”—were institutionalized in
the “golden triangle” of American deconstruction, between Johns Hopkins, Cornell, and
Yale (Cusset 2008, 31). Outside of the conference, the solidification of “French theory” was aided by the already corporatized logic that foundations used to manage the university during the 50’s, and its specific restructuring in the 70’s. Working through Cusset’s analysis is helpful for understanding the scission that underwent American left politics during the 60’s, and which has lasting consequences for contemporary politics.

Beginning in 1965, Cusset argues there was a widening gap between a minority of radicalized students, linked with the Black Power movement explicitly challenging the “capitalist university,” and “the majority of students made up of sporadically involved activists interested in ‘alternative forms of life.’” These two tendencies can be seen in the way that much of student activism evolved from an organized political opposition to spontaneous modes of behavior whose aims were “existential—from militant anti-capitalism to a mystical celebration of ‘free bodies.’” By 1968, a series of double splits (the split between Black Power and SDS, and within SDS between reformists and radicals) led to growing militancy and protests in American universities that ended in violent military suppression. Cusset argues that while the radical elements of the 60’s were suppressed, the existential enthusiasm that grew out of the period continued in the form of middle class values—individual freedom and personal growth. Meanwhile, the displacement of struggles onto the terrain of discourse, and romanticism of liberated forms of life, are complicit in the turn to identity politics and radical multiculturalism of the 1980’s. After the years of student protest, as the American university entered the 1970’s, universities were restructured to reflect neoliberal values of profitability, productivity, faster results, downsizing, competition, performance indicators, and market niches that could integrate critique of ideology, discourses of opposition, and the absorption of difference for the purpose of turning its energy to profit. Cusset’s extensive arguments, made through an examination of French Theory,
provide an important insight into the “scission” which occurs in the US among the left, and the specific reading of culture that takes place through cultural studies during the rise of neoliberalism. The impact of these historically specific changes in US society and the university inevitably impacts our reception and legacy of thought that continues today in the rise of biopolitics.

Clifford Geertz, (who indeed is a historical figure in re-founding the “culture concept” after the struggles of ’68), while reflecting on the significance of the Third World revolutions for anthropology in 2005, reiterates the common narrative that “map changes,” and the “irregular and miscellaneous dynamics of this altered landscape,” caused the need to re-think “the conceptual equipment we use to explain them” (Geertz 1990, 324; Geertz 2005, 35). For Geertz, through his experience in post-colonial Indonesia and Morocco shortly after liberation, the way that liberation struggles had forced a rupture of modern political terms is not seen in the challenges third world thinkers posed to western scholars through alternative conceptions of culture or modernity, in other words as the material condition of possibility for a break with modern thought, but in the aftermath of revolution, once the “symbology” of liberation has worn away and revealed the “disciplinary rule” that imposes these political terms on the “diversity of interests, the variousness of the histories, and the incoherence of the worldviews it was designed to contain” (Geertz 2005, 35-36). In other words, while certainly there existed the “imperial imaginary” for Geertz, his main thrust is to argue that the third world revolutions themselves were and are perpetuators of a homogenizing vision of modern political categories that explode in the “divergence and irregularity, plurality and overlap, the derangement of categories and the confoundment of loyalties” that “seem here to say” (Geertz 2005, 39). It is this post-revolution discourse on the “decline
of the culture concept,” in which western ideas adequate to map changes, while post-colonial states perpetuate those seemingly outdated categories through disciplinary rule, which brings to light the political stakes of reclaiming the history of the internal repression that was necessary within the US following the ruptures initiated during the 60’s.

While the global restructuring following decolonization, the formation and fragmentation of new territories, and the resulting dynamics of urbanization, migration, capital, citizenship, etc. certainly impacted disciplines and their methodological and theoretical categories in ways naturalized by Geertz, these explanations leave untouched the specifically Maoist concept of culture that remains taboo, despite its lasting influence through a critical historical conjuncture in radical thought. In fact, Dirlik recalls how the attention to culture that arises in the theoretical debates of the 80’s, for example in EP Thompson’s seminal and influential study on working class culture in The Making of the English Working Class, is a strange re-presentation of Maoism or Fanon’s concept of revolutionary culture by way of other thinkers, formulated through the spirit of the 80’s posed against “homogenizing” theoretical categories such as “class” (Dirlik 1987, 21-27, 41-45; also see Dirlik 1983, 205). Re-claiming these historical links, Dirlik is thus able to divide the rise of Culturalism post ‘68 into its hegemonic practice (culture abstracted from its social and political context and presented as a timeless attribute of peoples that primarily determines the relationships and conflicts of contemporary era), and it’s legacy as a liberatory practice (revolution as a dialectical process where culture and society are structurally interrelated, but also dependent upon human activity that is at once the product and the subject of history). Recalling how the critiques arising out of postmodernism and postcolonialism were part of a legacy of Maoist inspiration and reflexivity begs the question “why such critiques have acquired a plausibility that is
unprecedented in recent history...what it is under contemporary circumstances that may help account for the attack upon it not just from the right, which is to be expected, but from left intellectuals” (Dirlik 2007b, 16). As with the rise of postmodernism, the rise of culturalism in its hegemonic form must not only be situated in a specific restructuring of social relations involving the first and formerly third worlds, but also within the changes between society and the university, after the radical movements of the 60’s (Dirlik 1987). While it is certain that the very existence of disciplinary consensus on the definition, characterization, and reference to any one “culture concept” is highly debatable, its is worthwhile to capture some of the authoritative lines of influence in the aftermath of the 60’s in order to trace an ongoing impasse that informs the biopolitical turn in anthropology.

2.2.5 Cultural Turn

Returning again to Geertz, as a key transitional figure explicitly interested in the uses of the culture concept, the immediate post ‘68 atmosphere is captured by Geertz’s interpretive program for anthropology. Rabinow and Marcus recall that Geertz and his site of postcolonial Indonesia became a testing ground for a program arising from Harvard, MIT, and the Ford Foundation’s projects of the 1950’s to work out a multidisciplinary project of research, re-oriented from modernization to development. Simultaneously, Geertz advanced a theory of the culture concept where culture is articulated as a text to be “read,” a semiotic web of meaning that implicitly makes meaningful collective conduct (Rabinow et al. 2008). Without rejecting the valuable work arising from Geertzian inspired studies, and acknowledging that anthropology may have been marginal to development programs largely dominated by economism, the post ‘68 efforts to re-orient anthropology toward inter-disciplinarity and culture (and later, post-structuralism) marks a set of diverse governing strategies whereby
intellectuals can reject economism as a totalizing notion of social change on the one hand, yet still participate in a geopolitical intervention into post-colonial states by affirming culture and daily life as an agent of social change on the other hand. In other words, neither propositions offer insight into the actual struggles for practices accountable to daily life in the colonial or post-colonial context, nor an assessment of the continuities or discontinuities of the legacies of colonialism and capitalist restructuring in the production of differences in daily life. With Geertz’ concept of culture, where collective conduct is “read” from the given situation, the anthropologists’ task of “situating social change in local culture” is not incompatible with a radical omission of collective subjective intervention (antagonism) in the turn from revolution to the reproduction of the given situation (Geertz 1984, 524). The politically ambivalent positioning against economism that is highlighted in Geertz’ essay “Culture and Social Change,” and extends into contemporary anthropology of biopolitics, reveals how the affirmation of culture (and later, contingent and heterogeneous differences) carries a complicated twist of value coding whereby difference is linked to a more democratic position, and Marxism to a totalizing, if not totalitarian, one. This is only possible if the actual nature and problems of struggles leading up to ’68, through the alternative reformulations of Marxism within movements, are radically forgotten.

5 The backdrop to Geertz’ political positionings of culture against economism is the continued emphasis on political-economy in Marxism, notably in the rise of world system analysis among non-western thinkers, ironically the major challenge to modernization projects and their underlying culturalist teleological assumptions pushed by the very same elite institutions (the “brand” universities and the Ford Foundation) that will support Geertz’s development projects and later, globalization projects (Dirlik 1999, 2007; Tsing 2000). Taking capitalism as the main structuring force in modernity, world-system analysis shifts Marxist analysis from the internal development of capitalism to the spatial constitution and reconstitution of relationships among core/independent and periphery/dependent areas of the world produced from and for capitalism. The problems identified in World Systems theories, overlapping with the critiques of the culture concept, include the analytical unit of analysis that seeks to account for ongoing concentrations of power (and strategies of emancipation), but fail to address new configurations of power and dynamics at different scales and units (Tsing 2000)
Geertz’s re-formulation of culture as a text, the orientation of anthropology toward interdisciplinarity, and the politically ambivalent tendencies within the “culture concept” in the aftermath of ‘68, provide a transition to the program of writing culture and cultural critique amidst the backdrop of postmodernism, postcolonialism, and poststructuralism. In Marcus’ own narrative, writing culture emerges from the “short-lived turbulence of the 60’s,” students both impacted and alienated from social struggles and the rising “narrative” about anthropology and colonialism that carried an activist orientation into elite universities (Marcus 2004). The specific impact of the era on the concept of culture, however, is not easy to grasp, as both culture and anthropology became dispersed across agendas of other disciplines (as well as receiving lasting influences from other disciplines), culture becomes an experimental site through the text, and anthropologists face old and new concepts of culture emerging among globalized media apparatuses. Boggs provides a succinct account of the seemingly contradictory “left” and “right” critiques of culture arising from the 80’s and early 90’s that reveal its complex relation as a foundation and a challenge to modern thought:

“(1) Critics on the left view culture as a tool of modernist hegemony—a malignant development of scientific rationalism that wields truth as power in order to distance, control, and oppress others. Discounting the integrity of scientific inquiry and its process, left critics relinquish the emancipatory potential of knowledge. The positive expression of this critique is defense of the subaltern against oppression. (2) Critics on the right view culture as an outgrowth of romantic nationalism, now clothed in the stylish language of postmodernism, that subverts rational universalism and science. Protecting truth, they inadequately confront its complicities with power. The positive expression here is defense of science, democracy, and human rights” (Boggs 2004, 190-191).

Without diminishing the importance of these debates and the articulations of global transformation, there is a sense that these critiques drew from an atmosphere that targeted a representation of “foundational concepts” such as the culture concept while

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6 Postmodernism is a First World challenge to a Eurocentrically conceived modernity and its universality and teleological mapping of the world; postcolonialism is an articulation among those formerly colonized who render modernity an unfinished process of hybridization between Europe and its Others; poststructuralism refers to the canon of French thinkers consolidated into canon in American universities beginning in the 1980’s, which included Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard (Dirlik 1999, Cusset 2008).
eliding actual intellectual practices (Brightman 1995). Thus, in the shift to the 90’s, the entrenchment of media and externally driven debates on cultural relativism, multiculturalism, and cultural homogenization, in addition to the consolidation of neo-conservative power, reveal less rupture than is originally thought in the 80’s, as the tools to investigate culture seems to be re-applied to new terrain (Rabinow et al. 2008, 36), or to address seemingly reactionary public opinions on naturalized/essentialized difference with long-standing anthropological insights.

The complicated relationship between cultural studies and anthropology may be marked by one important legacy of ’68— the dialectical relation between re-founding Marxism in contemporary configurations of power and emancipation, and desires to find alternative theorizations to Marxism on “global diversity.” Compared to the revival of Boasian culture\(^7\), in which culture and difference are reconstructed through their distinct historical trajectories (Stocking 1968, Handler 1998), even recently articulated as a Foucauldian “history of the present” (Bunzl 2004), William’s affirmation of culture as “a whole way of life” resisting a defining historical event of industrialization traced through an English literary tradition (Williams 1983) explains the attention to the class politics of culture and of stratifications of culture in cultural studies (Handler 1998). However, even the subsequent studies inspired by Williams’ and Gramsci’s work, whose similarities to Maoism have provoked many comparisons that often end in culturalist dismissals of Maoism (Dirlik 1983, 187), dance around the more radical insights that are to be drawn by the practices arising from liberation struggles and decolonization:

“Class and class consciousness are overdetermined not just by location but also by other social affinities, as well as culture. This was understood very well by Mao Zedong, for example, who insisted on close examination of localities in order to grasp social and political relationships that

\(^7\) George Stocking identifies Boasian culture as “historicity, plurality, behavioral determinism, integration and relativism.” (Stocking 1982, 230)
characterized these localities. What Mao advocated may well be described as an ethnography of revolution, or a reading of localities as social texts, which were by no means immune to the forces impinging upon them from their various contexts, but nevertheless had an inner logic of their own in the interaction between the local and the extra-local” (Dirlik 1999, 12).

Despite the similarities between Maoism and the work of Williams and Gramsci, which filters through the university in clearly discriminate ways (the former delegated to “area studies” or “history,” and the latter two delegated to “theory”), Williams nevertheless departs from Maoism in important ways, namely the difference between a dialectic of creative individuality and established cultural patterns that transform into new culture, thus advocating for a cultural democracy with equal access to cultural self-expression (Williams 1989), and the centrality and plurality of contradiction (including those among the masses and radical intellectuals) in building a new collective culture and subjectivity for political emancipation. The liberal tendencies of the former perhaps is revealed by the way that the affirmation of given subaltern cultural identities and subcultures without a radical redistribution of social relations mirrors the growth of the culture industries and an increasingly pervasive market logic based on such individual creative self-expressions. With regards to the often commented similarities between Gramsci and Mao in the attention to culture and education as a site of political struggle, I would argue that Maoism in fact poses a much more radical break from Marxist-Leninism than Gramsci speculated, the latter whom in the end, saw cultural conquest in civil society (itself inherently democratic) as one step on the way to taking state power.

The shift to taking account of global capitalism through a set of critiques of the culture concept function to mark a “consciousness of conceptual transition” from an old

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8 As Brightman underscores in categorizing the type of critiques emerging in the 90’s, without denying the importance of their insights in a more complex analysis of culture and globalization, there is an emerging pattern to the mode of thought of these critiques: culture is reified abstraction or idealist meaning versus practice, action, and interaction (Bourdieu 1977, Abu-Lughod 1991); behavioral execution and legalism versus agency, strategy and improvisation (Bourdieu 1977); objectivism versus constructivism (Wolf 1982, Appadurai 1990); generalization and timelessness versus individuals/events (Abu-Lughod 1991); holism versus fragmentation (Clifford 1992); homogeneity versus intracultural variability (Rosaldo 1989, Abu-
concept of culture to a new set of conceptual tools appropriate to new dynamics of globalization. Increasingly, the concept of “culture” is substituted for Foucauldian terms and concepts by the late 80’s and 90’s. Foucauldian concepts, which migrated and circulated through underground countercultures of the 60’s, from the French departments to literary theory in the 70’s, postcolonial and gender studies, and anthropology in the mid 80’s to early 90’s, entered the discipline at a conjunctural turning point characterized by Clifford Geertz’s idea of culture as a text with mobile meanings, the work of Levi-Strauss, and the sociology of science arising from Bruno Latour’s work. It is interesting, then, how Foucault once again becomes a powerful force within a discipline to study the contemporary era of biopolitics that seemed from Geertz’s perspective, riddled with “evasive” formulas and lack of empirical research in the 70’s, and survived the declining charisma of French Theory and poststructuralism in the 90’s (Cusset 2008, 95). As suggested by Clifford, and later forcefully reiterated by Abu-Lughod, and consolidated by Rabinow, the discontents with the culture concept seem to be remedied by Foucault’s work:

“It may be true that the culture concept has served its time. Perhaps, following Foucault, it should be replaced by a vision of powerful discursive formations globally and strategically deployed. Such entities would at least no longer be closely tied to notions of organic unity, traditional continuity, and the enduring grounds of language and locale. But however the culture concept is finally transcended, it should I think, be replaced by some set of relations that preserves the concept’s differential and relativist functions (Clifford 1988: 274)

which to frame other influential attempts to grapple with the contradictory phenomena
of “globalization.” For anthropologists, lesson coming from the study of globalization
that influence the current formation of a social science of biopower, include the attention
to disjunctures and chaos between cultural flows rather than isomorphisms of cultural
shapes (Appadurai 1996), how differences are produced by multiple grids of power in a
world of interconnected spaces (Gupta and Ferguson 1997), the situated and
conjunctural nature of globalization including re-territorialization, heterogenization, and
dislocation (Inda and Rosaldo 2002), as well as maintaining a critical distance from
“global visions” by showing them to be multiple, heterogeneous, contingent, and
situated as well as how they produce objects and subjects of various scales (Tsing 2000).

One of the explicit articulations of a disciplinary shift to an anthropology of
biopolitics, (variously called an “anthropology of the actual,” an “anthropology of the
contemporary,” an “anthropology of the near future/recent past”) is the work of Paul
Rabinow. Explicitly against “culture” and all its “old tools” of analysis, as well as against
the crimes of modern thought such as “the hard authoritarianism of communism” and
its recent articulation by Hardt and Negri “as a space of epochal change driven and
shaped by a ghostly transhistorical force” (Hardt and Negri 2004, 28), Rabinow seeks to
re-invent anthropology in two key ways: (1) to shift tools of analysis from the culture
concept to “problematizations,” “assemblages,” “apparatuses”; (2) To shift the purpose
of anthropology from studying total ways of life, how the system impacts lived
experience, representations as semiotic systems, or underlying codes that shape thought
and behavior (Rabinow’s own survey of the culture concepts), to identifying and
analyzing new problems and emergent rationalities, the singularity of events
understood as the establishment of self-evidence, and to make these emergent
phenomena available for thought and critical reflection (2003, 58).
Through his new set of tools articulated through the Foucauldian terms “problematizations,” “apparatuses” and “assemblages,” the newness of which is qualified by an affirmation of Foucault’s similarities to an anti-Marx Weber, Rabinow seeks to address the numerous analytical challenges that have emerged with a globalization he sees driven by the three key processes of capitalism, life sciences, and humanitarianism (Rabinow 2003, Rabinow et al. 2008). His three conceptual tools for a study of biopolitics, attempt to forefront analysis of what is already given and directly accessible in the situation, understood as heterogeneous elements, constructed and reconstructed, deployed strategically and contingently, at different scales, temporalities, and functionalities, which in turn create new conjunctures and new dynamics. With the complex analysis of the situation as the multiplicity of constraints and responses, the anthropologist’s politics is to reveal different and diverse solutions and responses to any given situation. While certainly not uncontested (through vast creative interpretations, as well as various internal battles over legitimate and illegitimate uses of “Foucault,” internal ruptures that purify or compromise his thought, etc.), Rabinow’s project nevertheless gains influence in shifting discourses to this terrain. The seemingly universal applicability of biopolitics and the attendant analytical tools to capture diverse situations (Revel 2009, 46), both the astonishing capacity for power to reconstitute itself and the awkward presupposition that resistance is given in existing differences, may attest to its effectiveness over modern concepts such as culture, or to the possibility that there is a homology between the logic of biopolitical investigations, and the era of biopolitical production.

The continuing uses of Foucault in an increasingly formalized and institutionalized way such as through Rabinow’s Collaboratory, also formalizes determinations of knowledge production from the post ’68 backlash. For example,
Rabinow’s paradigm draws from a distinct privileging of knowledge/power as the key to Foucault and the key to an entire intellectual outlook. This outlook, whose attention to conceptual shifts and historical discontinuity has raised concerns among those such as George Marcus (1994), also continues a tradition whose purpose is to show how universalism and rationalism are discourses of conquest by attending to exclusion as the production of norm, resulting in an ambivalent politics as the de-legitimization of norms. Continuing with this tradition means also continuing with certain interrelated determinations, such as the difficulty of constructing or re-inventing a decisive position for political struggle, the methodological back and forth between power and resistance, and the assumption of perspectives of difference without a way to analyze strategically, rather than tactically, difference within processes of contradictions in order to make room for subjective intervention.

These legacies and determinations which create, maintain, and obfuscate an impasse between western practices and conceptions of “culture” and those ruptures practiced and experimented on during the events of ’68, form the genealogical background to which contemporary literature on migrants in China are perceived and analyzed. Below, I turn to these literatures, overwhelmingly influenced by Foucault, which seeks to understand new subject formations alongside shifting modes of state power and capitalist exploitation. These ethnographies are invaluable to me in tracing how the “migrant issue” has changed since the reform through the framework of subjectivity, at the same time that they remain inadequate in distinguishing and working out how the emergence of migrant self-articulated subjectivities might break with the determinations of the biopolitical paradigm, nor be complicated by the rise of “culture industries.” For this reason, after a review of the relevant scholarly work on
migrants in China provide a sense of the changing modes of subjectivization, I then turn to a complicating the discourse of newness surrounding the so-called “second generation” migrants by examining the rise of migrant literature and migrant culture. In this state and market turn to the production of “culture” and “migrants,” my articulation of the context determining migrant social life in Beijing allows us to turn to the practices and struggles of the Migrant Workers Home in chapter 3, and those of Corporate Social Responsibility in chapters 4 and 5 with a critical lens as to what constitutes meaningful difference to logics of biopower.

2.2.6 Literature Review: Migrant Subjectivity

Dorothy Solinger’s privileged access to Chinese government officials and private documents (Solinger 2006) gave her study on migrants in the 80’s and 90’s an invaluable insight into the institutional and structural changes occurring in China since the reform, thus privileging the framework of inclusion/exclusion from citizenship (understood as exclusion from public goods and social normativity). Her work documented the new forms of social and distributive inequality and discrimination that the first wave of migrants faced from government and urban residents (political exclusion at that time was a situation shared by rural and urban residents alike). In other words, for Solinger and her informants, the problem of migrants, both economic and social, arose from not having a proper place within state sovereignty. The resulting social discrimination by urban residents against migrants were reactions against “outsiders”—fear of their “unrooted” and “chaotic” nature, denigration as criminals, and the belief that their moral and cultural inferiority brought about the withering of urban standards and customs. Consequently, the overwhelming experience of migrants from the 80’s and 90’s was that of an “outsider,” with no possibility of integrating into urban society (Solinger 1999, 104). Officially the government refused to publicly acknowledge the “floating
population,” and policies focused on blocking or expelling migrants from the city. This history of exclusion is important for understanding the top down prescriptions for inclusion now endorsed by multiple domestic and international institutions, as well as the significance of migrants demonstrating a critique of mainstream society and culture, which questions whether the issue of migrants (both their self-articulated demands and the new modes of regulation) is captured by the framework of inclusion and social normativity.

The most famous and well-studied migrant group has been the community of wealthy migrant entrepreneurs (“petty capitalists”) making up “Zhejiang Village” in the southern fifth ring of Beijing. Li Zhang’s ethnography of Zhejiang Village examines new forms of governance in relation to the new social spaces produced by migrants (in Lefebvre’s sense of social relations and subjectivities), in which the self-constructed migrant institutions led to a “battle over space, power, and social order” with the government, and resulted in the demolition of the migrant village in 1995. Through this case, she argues that the state is still relevant in this period of globalization, and the new clientelist social spaces enabled by the commodification of space and the state are not the autonomous democratic civil society that stands against the state, but perhaps a new form of governmentality appropriate to a mobile floating population. This era of migrant subjectivity and organization is defined by the migrant dream “to make money and get rich” (Zhang 2001, 1), which drives the formation of non-state, hierarchical, commodified (privatized) community institutions that persist through existing and new power relations. According to Li, the “floating population” is a new subject created by the state, characterized as an inferior, uneducated, powerless, and aimless group to be civilized and transformed by higher moral codes set by permanent urban residents and government regulation (Li 2001, 29-30). Li argues that this subject-making rests upon
homogenizing, de-historicizing, de-humanizing, and abnormalizing techniques, which contrast with the complexity of this class of migrants and their agency through re-coding the dominant signifiers assigned to them. As I show later in the chapter, these ethnographic critiques reach a limit in the new liberal discourses surrounding migrants in China, indicating an important shift in the way that biopower relies on difference and inclusion rather than homogenization and exclusion.

Xiang Biao’s work as a native Chinese ethnographer studying the migrant Zhejiang Village ten years after Li Zhang’s study is itself representative of a shift in how migrants are being perceived in China from negative to positive associations in the national narrative. He argues that the increases in mobility internal and external to China are inevitable and irreversible, leading to what he calls a “mobility regime,” the constellation of policies, cultural norms, and networks that condition or restrain mobility. Through an impressive study of the economic flows that tie the informal entrepreneurial activity in Beijing’s Zhejiang Village to major formal economic nodes throughout the entire country, Xiang Biao shows how migrants and their self-organized economic networks are integral to the formal national economy. He works against previous scholarly work that treat migrants as a negative phenomenon to be reduced, arguing that it can be a managed, non-chaotic, positive influence in China’s economic development (Xiang 2005).

Ann Anagnost’s ethnography on the new national subjectivities emerging out of the reforms in the 80’s and 90’s (Anagnost 1997) is complemented by her reflections on the new forms of capitalist exploitation based on the circulation of value between migrant and middle class subjectivities (Anagnost 2004). Anagnost traces the emergence of a discourse on civilization to define national subjects, and how the nation’s transcendence from its subaltern global positioning is inscribed on peasant bodies,
whose ambivalent position as a new agent of the market yet backwards and negatively valorizing of other elite subjects (urban, intellectual) reflects new modes of discipline and subjectivization. This national discourse of civilization overlaps with the international discourse on civil society, inflecting the conversation to become a question of whether “the people” or “the population” can become civil through the market, or through the state tutelage? The burgeoning market creates another site of national construction, in the search for an agentive subject of History (1997). Later, Anagnost argues that migrants are being produced as bare life through the discursive effects of “suzhi” (quality), which hides the extraction of surplus value for the making of the middle class subject (Anagnost 2004). Anagnost’s work provides an important perspective on how analyzing migrant subjectivities must be grasped in relation to the urban actors of the middle class and the international “civil society.” As I will discuss below, my ethnography shows that there is now competing techniques of subjectivization by both state and international actors, including ones in which migrants are affirmed as the primary agents of the economic reform, and the new creative and moral spirit of the future of China. The significance of these new techniques requires re-thinking biopolitics not based on negation and lack, but affirmation and the activation of potential.

Lisa Rofel (2007) suggests similar shifts from negation to affirmation taking place since the 1990’s where the national neoliberal project is to produce desiring subjectivities as membership into a global cosmopolitan humanity. Looking at various new subjectivities in urban life (gay bars, television dramas, legal events, WTO), she locates this process of subjectification in the public sphere rather than the individual body, and highlights the experimental nature of this social field of desires (regulation of which desires are to be unleashed/suppressed). Rofel’s insights into the intersection of
international cosmopolitan and domestic public space shed light on the discourses that migrants are now drawing upon in Beijing to articulate their own demands.

In sharp contrast to Rofel’s study of middle class urban life, Pun Ngai’s intense ethnography of female migrant factory workers in the coastal industrial export processing zones and construction sites argues that there is a new working class in formation, due to the “semi” or “incomplete proletarianization” of migrant workers (2005, 2010). Pun argues that China’s current transition from socialist state system to global capitalist system marks the party-state-market as the form of power operating on new worker subjects through a triad of oppression: capitalism, state-socialism, and patriarchy. Through a process of proletarianization, a silent “social revolution” is taking place as peasant migrants turn into gendered waged factory workers. Their struggles are not reducible to class struggle, but involve desires and dreams, psychological and cultural resistances. Pun’s work challenges the perspective of biopower as a subtle “being made and self-making” technique by showing the co-existence of crude and disciplinary techniques of subjection among migrants. Pun’s recent interest in CSR and the nature of the Foxconn suicides indicate a similar questioning of the role of liberal or progressive discourses in advancing migrant worker rights (Pun and Yuen-Tsang 2011); however, while Pun examines the dubious and duplicitous nature of CSR in the factory, my ethnography shows how second generation migrants are negotiating with CSR and its networks of international actors in complicated ways for survival in the public and cultural spaces in Beijing.

Yan Hairong’s extensive ethnography of different generations of female migrant domestic workers from the Mao era and the post-Mao era leads her to argue that there has been an epistemological shift in how migrant subjectivity is actively produced and negotiated in China according to different national projects for modernity. Through an
impressive grasp of the “discursive constellations” forming “peasant,” “woman,” “domestic worker,” and “migrant” subjectivities, Yan’s periodization is based on the shift from the negative and anxiety filled signifiers fixing migrants as “rootless” and “backwards” to the new neoliberal project to discursively form them as positive agents of reform (posed against the backwards laid off SOE workers), exemplary of the individual free agents of the market (Yan 2008, 37). Her ethnography shows that migrants slip between the subject positions assigned to them, as peasant, dagongmei, or the new neoliberal subject of self-discipline, in a struggle over the legacy of socialism between migrants and the state. Yan’s work argues that grasping capitalist exploitation today requires understanding the role of subjectivity in creating value, which operates on the differential between migrants and their potential within the neoliberal project for capitalist integration.

In addition to these ethnographies of migrants, because this investigation is also about the political struggle over subjectivity and self-making by migrants in a complex cultural field, I take inspiration from the legacy of work by anthropologists in China on ethnic minorities and the complicated question of the subaltern when difference becomes a part of national and market projects. Schein’s ethnography of the Miao in China’s southwest shows how the Miao move from savage to exotic/backwards, to active agents in the “recovery” of tradition, as they accept the status of minority as a claim to modernity (Schein 2000). Litzinger’s work on the politics of discursive formations and representations surrounding the Yao ethnic minority in China during the 1980’s and 1990’s, including that of Yao elite intellectuals, reveals how Yao intellectuals wrote their tradition and culture into the project of modern China, as a global and national fascination with the ethnic margins were mobilized to critique the Maoist era for “repressing” them (Litzinger 2000). These politics of subalterity or
marginality help to ground the question of the political stakes involved in the role of the production of difference today as both a practice of power and resistance (Litzinger 2002). I draw on these works to deal with the complicated yet complementary way in which a new “disadvantaged population” arises alongside the workings of an “activist capitalism” and imaginaries of being global.

I emphasize the consistency between these ethnographic works on migrant subjectivity to understand the ongoing attention to biopower in shaping the rise of a new population, while also bringing out an internal periodization of state and market discourses: since the reform, state discourses shift from treating migrants as outsiders, to attempting to fold them first into the project of development in the 80’s, and then global neoliberal capitalism by the end of the 90’s, and finally the project for a “harmonious society” since 2002. Past ethnographies have shown how the techniques of governmentality (attempts to create governable subjectivities among those clearly out of place subjects) have changed alongside larger national and global projects from above. Below, I trace both the movement of integration and the movement of antagonism from the perspective of migrant self-representation and self-organizing through migrant “culture,” and show in later chapters how these two subjective tendencies among migrants are grounded in different material practices and value systems. In other words, these alternative modes of life provide consistency for alternative subjectivities. In the next chapter, I look at one migrant self-run organization that pushes the scholarly understanding of subjectivity tied to modes of discipline imposed from above and individual resistance from below, and suggests the possibility for the production of subjectivity to be a collective political project from below.

In order to understand how these competing projects on culture and subjectivity operate differently, and to take seriously the return/invention of Maoism as a political
project, it is important to historicize the current state and market discourses on “culture industries” in the second disavowal of global Maoism—in China. Below, I trace the “cultural turn” in Chinese intellectual thought post-Cultural Revolution, to show that the way in which the culture concept changed in China after the Cultural Revolution follows similar determinations of global capitalism that marked the US disavowal. This will introduce the contemporary atmosphere in which my ethnographic study takes place, bringing to light the legacies that the CSR movement and migrant struggles are drawing upon, as well as their mutual constitution.

2.3 Historical Background: China Disavowal

2.3.1 Post-Mao Culture

However one evaluates the local or global legacy of the Cultural Revolution, tracing how the culture concept changes through China’s own transition to global capitalism reveals larger trends within global capitalism, despite the frequent claim to exceptionality made by China scholars. I argue that both in the US and in China, the main way in which the concept of revolutionary culture is neutralized as a disruptive social element is the moment it is delinked from mass collective struggle, the “truth process” for Mao, which allows for its reification and dispersal as a “floating signifier” that becomes re-mapped onto the concerns of elite intellectuals and the party-state during capitalist restructuring. During the aftermath of the events of ’89 at Tiananmen, Arif Dirlik and Maurice Meisner called attention to the convergence of interests by multiple entities—the US, the post-Mao Chinese government, conservative and progressive scholars—to appropriate and rewrite China’s history to fit particular ideological agendas. In a common narrative proliferated during this era, the Cultural Revolution is repudiated in its entirety as a mistake or deviation, and the post-Mao
government is praised for setting China on the “proper” course to modernization (Dirlik and Meisner 1989:9-10; Hai 2010:111).

After Mao’s death and the formal proclamation of opening up/reform in 1978, the concept of culture became divorced from politics, and elevated as a primary element shaping society and economy, rather than as its integral restructuring in pursuit of an alternative value system to capitalism. Jing Wang’s *High Culture Fever* provides a detailed account of the “Culture Discussion” during the mid 1980’s, a period of “unmitigated optimism” characterized as two utopian projects: one put forward by the Party to coincide with their modernization program emphasizing a scientific and technical approach to modernity; the other put forward by intellectuals, emphasizing “culturalism” as a liaison between cultural “tradition” and reason (enlightenment). It is under this “culturalism” that the rise of neo-Confucianism took place with support from intellectuals and the Party, which Dirlik has called “the articulation of native culture into a capitalist narrative” (Wang J. 1996). What Dirlik implies is that the oppositionality of East versus West was an ideological construction rather than a meaningful opposition to western values.

The 1980’s “Culture Discussion” and Enlightenment movement drew from the legacy of Maoism through their aim to create a new culture, but this time in the self-fashioned vanguard intellectual’s space of textual experimentation rather than practically among peasants, and with capitalist modernization as its new goal (Wang J. 1996). Once culture became de-linked from the criteria of truth called mass politics that lay at the heart of Mao Zedong Thought, the culture concept ironically became reconstructed in categories born of capitalist modernity—civilization and nation—at the moment of global capitalist restructuring. The result was not only the limitation of imagination to the contours of capitalist modernization, but also the confusion among
leftist intellectuals between the types of individual freedoms undergirding the market, and the freedoms that must be achieved collectively for social justice (further complicated by the role of the state transitioning from welfare state to market promoter). The contradictions of the New Enlightenment movement that lead up to the events of Tiananmen Square are evident in the complexity of demands taken to the streets, including the new middle class seeking more protection of private property, workers protesting the new forms of social inequalities arising from privatization, and intellectuals seeking freedom of speech (Wang H. 2003, 54-55). Due to the fundamental antagonisms and contradictions between these interests and their exacerbation over time, the New Enlightenment movement’s scissions into the Liberal and the New Left intellectual trends post Tiananmen exhibit similar ambiguities between them.

Paralleling the Culture Discussion was the discourse on postmodernism in China in the late 1980’s. Popularized in China by Fred Jameson in 1985, the discourse on Chinese postmodernism was quickly halted after the 1989 crackdown, but resumed quickly in 1992 with Deng Xiaoping’s encouragement (Wang J. 1996). Jing Wang’s articulation of the transition from the New Enlightenment movement of the 80’s to mass culture and postmodernism in the 90’s is complementary with Wang Hui’s argument that the violent repression of 1989 was the necessary precondition for the rise of neoliberalism in China. Similar to the way in which the movements of ‘68 were followed by a conservative backlash denouncing those struggles, so too were the 1990’s in China marked by the attempt to denounce the radicalism not only of the Mao era and of the 1980’s Democracy movement, but of all of Chinese modern history (Zhang 2001, 14-15). This self-disciplining which prefigures the rise of neoliberal thought and postmodernism among Chinese intellectuals marks the decline of the culture concept in China as a global project for an alternative modernity to capitalist globalization.
It is important to note, however, that the post-Mao regime continues to draw on the language of socialist goals and culture to promote capitalist goals (Dirlik 1989, 28). This creates an incoherence that almost hides the important substitutions that have been made in party rhetoric since the Mao era. For example, official central committee declarations speak of being led by the “masses” and the “people,” which elide notions of the proletariat or class (Pun and Chan C. 2008). This seemingly innocuous discursive substitution has been followed by the official integration of corporate and middle class interests into the party structure as new members of “the people”, while actual working class and migrant voices continue to be marginalized in the workplace and in society. Hai Ren, in analyzing the transition of the Chinese state to a neoliberal state, discusses the key ideological shifts that had to be made:

“In 2000 Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” changed the theory of the CCP’s political representation from the proletariat to “the developmental requirements of the advanced productive forces in China,” “the progressive direction of the advanced culture in China, and “the fundamental interest of the vast majority of the people.” In 2003 the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China formally incorporated this theory; Meanwhile, the Chinese government changed its name from the Chinese Communist Party to the Communist Party of China (CPC), marking a shift of the status of the party from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. Therefore, the formal institutionalization of the three represents and property rights completes the transformation of the Communist Party-led state from a state of the working class to one that may legitimately represent historically excluded groups such as the capitalist class. (Hai 2010, 111)

The self-articulated role of the party to construct “advanced socialist culture with Chinese characteristics” is meant to signify, in Yu Keping’s analysis, “the national spirit, value system, knowledge system, literature, and arts of China, which are compatible both with China’s socialist market economy and democratic politics, as well as the nation’s reality” (Yu 2008, 176). Chinese scholars attempting to decipher this language suggest that the concept of culture construction for the CPC suggests:

“First, China must carry forward the adaptable essences of traditional culture. Second, it must keep active the strategy of opening up and engaging in cultural globalization, by learning and absorbing the advanced ideas, values, and knowledge of foreign cultures and integrating them into Chinese culture. Third, China should combine traditional culture with the better elements of Western culture in an attempt to develop and transform its culture. Culture must “go out into the
world” and be integrated with the global culture. By so doing, Chinese culture will become an organic constituent of global culture” (Yu 2008, 176).

Thus, culture becomes remapped from the terrain of a new value system to capitalism during the Mao era, to the national and elite imaginary during the early stages of reform, and the subsequent tying of culture to tradition and civilization (Chinese and Western) in the attempt to become strategic players in global capitalism.

2.3.2 Culture Industries

The return of culture as an explicit political-economic project in China takes place under a distinctly different set of national and international desires than that articulated during the Cultural Revolution. While this difference may seem obvious, I argue that the current investment in “culture system reform” at the state and party level is a key element shaping migrant struggles in China. Understanding the details and language of the current concept of culture in the CPC will help to both elaborate the complexity of the situation in which migrants are organizing in China, as well as the tensions that exist between ideologies put forth by the Chinese state and the international public and private entities that make up the Corporate Social Responsibility network. I argue that it is in the slippage of what is meant by culture between different state and non-state entities that migrants find their political space in Beijing.

At the 6th Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee on October 18 2011, the party passed a major document articulating why culture has become an official national priority for the next ten years:

“World multi-polarization and economic globalization are intensifying, science and technology are changing rapidly, the frequency of ideological and cultural exchange with the consequent blending of and clashes between cultures is increasing, culture has assumed a more prominent role in competition in overall national strength, the task of safeguarding the country’s cultural security has become more difficult, and the need to increase the country’s cultural security has become more difficult, and the need to increase the country’s cultural soft power and the international influence of Chinese culture has become more urgent...Culture is increasingly becoming an important source of the nation’s cohesiveness and innovativeness, an important
factor in competition in overall national strength, and an important pillar of economic and social development, and having a rich intellectual and cultural life is increasingly becoming an ardent hope of our country’s people.”

In a complex response to international and domestic cues, the Part locates culture as the crux of political economic change once again. Concretely, these political economic changes can be summarized as: (1) The pressure for China to take on a different role within global capitalism, from an export-oriented, labor intensive capitalism to a consumer-driven high technology capitalism; (2) The self-articulated desire to develop soft power as a way to influence global political-economic decision-making by displaying “an image of China as being culturally advanced, democratic, open and progressive”; (3) A necessary strategy for domestic stabilization in the face of a crisis of legitimacy and social unrest. It is under these pressures born of capitalist crisis that culture is re-constructed in the categories of “civilization” and “nation” with constant references to “bloodline” and “tradition,” the very notions that were critiqued during the 1960’s in favor of a notion of culture oriented towards new political imaginings. Just as Arif Drilik noted of China during the 1990’s, the invocation of western imperialism in the current Chinese context reveals a capitalist strategy rather than a struggle for cultural autonomy. While it is still early to grasp the effects of this new cultural turn, there are two particularities to this ideological discourse that merit discussion in order to understand the confusing and often contradictory ways in which the state relates to migrant organizing in Beijing.

The first important aspect is what specifically is meant by “culture system reform.” From the perspective of one policy analyst, the significance of the recent culture discussion in CPC official documents compared to the Deng Xiaoping era is the

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9 “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to the Deepening Reform of the Cultural System and Promoting the Great Development and Flourishing of Socialist Culture,” which can be read online at: http://www.cctb.net/bygz/wxly/201111/t20111117_30877.htm

10 “Guojia shierwu shiqi wenhua gaige fazhan guihua nayao,” document can be read online at: http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-02/16/content_24647982.htm
formalization and systematization of a coherent “theory on culture reform” with a narrative integrating existing theories of “scientific development” and “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In official narrative, culture system reform is the third and lagging element in the construction of socialism in China, following economic and political construction. In the 1990’s culture system reform referred generally to the creation of a “culture market” in the transition from a planned to a market economy, which led the way to mass culture. The 16th National People’s Congress in 2002 marked a key moment when the party, under the new leadership of Hu Jintao, explained the significant role of culture in the contemporary era and thus the need to prioritize “culture construction” in the coming decade. By the 17th National People’s Congress in 2007, after a period of theoretical and policy experimentations at the provincial level, Hu Jintao presented the official party theory and policy on national culture reform in the seminal document “Party and State Opinion on Deepening Culture System Reform”, and by 2010 comprehensive guidelines on developing “culture industries” became solidified and implemented at all levels of government. These national policies aim to further change the relation of the state to society from state-owned enterprises to public-private partnerships focused on providing culture products, services, and activities. Specifically, non-profit entities are encouraged to direct their efforts towards “culture.” These policies resonate in both the CSR movement and the direction of migrant organizing in Beijing in ways that I will elaborate in the proceeding chapters.

The second important aspect of the current emphasis on culture is the surprising reference made to “21 Century Socialism” in the CPC’s official party news channels. The term is famously related with the Latin American Marxist scholar Heinz Dietrich at the Mexico City Autonomous Metropolitan University and consultant to Venezuelan
president Hugo Chavez, and has been an integral part of the discussion on left
alternatives to neoliberal policies in Latin American movements. Its reference in China
takes place among various intellectual movements that have emerged in response to the
decline in neoliberal ideological hegemony. Cheng Enfu and Ding Xiaoqin from the
Chinese Academy of Social Science Center for Research on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics identified four distinct intellectual movements proposing alternatives to
neoliberalism in the wake of the 2008 crisis: (1) financial system reform (2) wealth
redistribution (3) long-term nationalization, and (4) 21st Century Socialism. The 21st
Century Socialism movement represents the more radical and theoretically creative
intellectual movement in China. There are several important characteristics about the
way that “21st Century Socialism” is discussed by Chinese scholars: (1) China is seen as
part of the “global socialist movement” most exemplified by the ones taking place in
Latin America; (2) The movements taking place in Latin America, in turn, are read as
“socialist” movements; (3) “21st Century Socialism” is affirmed as a form of socialism
appropriate to local conditions in Venezuela, and therefore “Socialism with Chinese
characteristics” is affirmed as a form of socialism appropriate to China’s conditions.
While there is much to be gained by analyzing the actual policies that have been carried
out in the name of “socialism” in China, and to what extent China’s “socialism” shares
commonality with the distinctly non-state nature of the movements that brought Chavez

12 Cheng Enfu and Ding Xiaoqin, “Xin zhuzhang Xin Yaoqiu cengchu bu qiong,” Renmin Ribao, January 16
13 Chai Shangjin, “Lamei Zuoyi he 21shiji shehuizhuyi de xingqi,” Dangjian, October 25 2009,
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/10253183.html;
Sun Jinsong, “Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi yu dangdai shijie shehui zhuyi,” Zhongguo Gongchandang
Liu Zhiming, “Jinrong Weiji hou shehuizhuyi zai shijie de xiyinli juzeng,” Hongqi wengao, June 27 2012,
http://www.npopss-cn.gov.cn/GB/n/2012/0627/c230175-18391218.html;
Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan, “Shehuizhuyi: 21shiji zuiqiang jin liliang,” Zhongguo shehui kexue bao,
Zhao Yao, “Shijie geju Xiaoran iasheng Zhongda Shenke Bianhua,” Hongqi Wengao, January 13 2012,
into power (Hardt and Reyes, 2012), what is clear is that the Chinese state and Chinese intellectuals have been attentive to the revolutionary changes taking place in Latin America in response to neoliberal policies. The response of the Chinese state to their own domestic unrest no doubt draws from a refined understanding of both the decline in neoliberal hegemony and the new role of culture in society.

Laying out the context in which the culture concept in China becomes depoliticized, re-mapped onto the imaginary of the nation-state and global capitalism, and revived with a capacity to accommodate both radical notions of social change alongside market driven goals, I argue that this current ambiguous space of “culture” must be accounted for in the recent rise of the migrant issue in China. In the last section of the chapter, I turn to how the rise of migrant literature and culture since the reform coincides with these state and capitalist narratives of culture. This conjuncture of both migrant self-articulated culture and the public-private interests in migrants through CSR suggest how culture begins to operate both as a space of subjection and subjectification.

2.4. Rise of “Migrant Literature” and “Migrant Culture”

Despite the common portrayal of China’s migrant population as unskilled, low quality labor, scholars have noted how the social policies prior to reform provided, on the contrary, the conditions for a relatively educated and skilled labor force that benefited the new logics of the factory (Arrighi 2007, 351; Wang H. 2011, 245). With this socially redistributive legacy, China has witnessed a unique phenomenon called “migrant literature.” Immediately following the first wave of migrants in the 80’s who predominantly headed toward the southern coastal regions to work in factories, migrants began to document their own life stories through poems, prose, songs, fiction and non-fiction writing. While past ethnographies have drawn upon these migrant writings as research material to show the double-edged nature of the political project for
self-subjectification (by showing the disjunctures or overlaps in discourses of identity and subjectivity between the state and the individual), I want to critically trace the development of this phenomenon over time and its formalization. The rise of “migrant literature” and “culture” is an important part of the process by which “the migrant population” becomes a constructed object of scientific study in China, but also the process by which migrant self-productions are actively integrated into state and market projects. At the same time, this process of subsumption reveals the crystallization of two tendencies: (1) the process of integration works by encouraging migrants to articulate their own stories, dreams, and desires to society as capable subjects representing their own interests, rather than by internalizing negative signifiers of lack and backwardness to become the state’s subject; (2) the process of integration itself carries two different tendencies, toward integration into mainstream society through their creative productions, and toward the creation of alternative society and culture at odds with mainstream society.

The letters and writings of the first wave of migrants began to be published in a Shenzhen magazine in 1984, and by 1985 the term “migrant literature” was proposed by Yang Honghai in his capacity as a researcher for the Shenzhen Chinese Academy of Social Science and a member of the Shenzhen Culture Ministry. With government support, in 1988 the first migrant literary magazine Da Pengwan in Shenzhen’s Baoan was created. When it became clear that there was a market for consuming such brief but emotionally intense pieces of writings in the 90’s, commentary on migrant literature proliferated by intellectuals and literary critics in the formation of a proper genre to be studied and taught. Recently, particularly after the Olympics of 2008, there have been countless short stories written by migrants online that became “viral,” such as Hong Chenji’s 2008 “Migrants With Chinese Characteristics” and Wang Ziqun’s 2010
“Temporary Husband and Wife.” In the common narratives of intellectuals such as Yang, who has built a career as an “expert” on migrant literature, the development of migrant literature is broken into two generations. The first generation is characterized as “crude,” and lacking a “collective self-consciousness,” but filled with important social critiques of China’s modernization process through their experiences of suffering, and the articulation of their dreams and desires. The second generation of literature is characterized as more artistically sophisticated and experimental, focused on the anxiety of precariousness, the protection of migrant rights, and the clear self-awareness of a collective experience and identity among migrants (Yang 2009).

The famous representative of the so-called first generation is Anzi, frequently called “China’s first migrant sister” and arguably the first migrant celebrity to reach national status. Her rise as a celebrity in the 90’s began with the publication of her collection of personal stories in Youth Station, also translated into Korean and Japanese, and soon propelled into radio and television as a host showcasing the personal stories of migrants. Her personal narrative in public media always includes the key benchmarks of progressing from a lowly migrant to a masters educated student, to a social entrepreneur in charge of her own company, and now to a Shenzhen citizen with formal hukou and a family. With her famous motto “everyone has a chance to shine under the sun,” she now provides classes and trainings to companies and their employees at a fee of 1000 yuan a course (about $158 USD), which include a mix of inspirational speeches, self-affirmation workshops, and charity work.14 Yan Hairong’s study of the shifting discourses composing the “migrant subjectivity” in the 90’s read the case of Anzi’s rise to fame as evidence of the post-Mao neoliberal project to create self-enterprising laboring subjects. In this state-led project, Yan argues the state began to positively...

14 Television interview with Anzi on CCTV-7 Wenruan Zhongguo Nongmingong Jiangshu Jiemu, September 2007
construct migrants as the agents of development, as models of free labor able to survive without social welfare, compared to the backwards and outdated laid off SOE workers (Yan 2008, 189). Yang Haihong’s “expert” writings on migrant literature also seems to confirm Yan Hairong’s argument in the way that the very articulation of a “migrant” and a “migrant culture,” (as opposed to the more common invocation of “peasant” identity in the 80’s) that is deemed more sophisticated once they become self-aware of their own collective identity is itself a recent discursive formation among intellectuals. However, by also locating Anzi’s story within the rise and co-optation of migrant self-productions beginning in the early 80’s, one begins to see not only the post-Mao neoliberal project and its co-optive techniques, but also the prior forms of self-affirmation and subject-making among migrants not reducible or attributable to the subsequent state projects. For example, while Anzi fits into the national dream of reform and urbanization during the 90’s by “conquering the world from scratch,” there is a distinctive shift toward urban dystopia in which migrants become romanticized as the new creative source for a fresh alternative to urban consumer society. It is in this context that I suggest intellectuals begin to articulate the “migrant” as exemplary of the struggle for dignity, as a “lost Cinderella story within the cultural hegemony,” or a “Chinese style Harlem Renaissance” (Yang 2009). This indicates a shift toward acknowledging the self-productions of migrants as such, which opens the door for new forms of exploitation and contestations.

The gap in the way that one famous migrant literature differs from its later film adaptation reveals the necessary labor to subsume migrant self-productions into a particular neoliberal narrative. Guo Jianxun’s book “Sunken Paradise” is typical of the types of short stories written by migrants about their personal experiences during the 90’s, sharing the common themes of being cheated the first time leaving home (often by
fellow home-town acquaintances), the experience of being harassed by official and unofficial security personnel for permits, the underlying corruption and violence of the construction industry, the persistence, dilemmas and uncertainties of relying on native place ties, and the sense of ironic humor with the surrounding injustices, particularly facing women. For example, in Guo’s short story, the main character De Bao and his fellow construction workers watch helplessly as their construction boss forces a migrant shopkeeper’s daughter to become his mistress, while De Bao is later plagued by nightmares that his own hometown sweetheart in Hunan will end up with the same fate. It is through these common experiences that Shenzhen becomes a paradise without an entry door for migrants (the characters of the book title are a playful inversion of the common phrase for “paradise,” becoming a negated paradise).

When the short story is adapted into a movie in 2009, it takes on several elements that become a generalized public portrayal of migrants. The movie has become a light-hearted comedy about De Bao’s migrant experiences in Shenzhen over 30 years of reform. De Bao is depicted as a chubby, simple-minded, naïve, but adorable country bumpkin who transforms into an urban citizen enjoying a “xiao kang” life (relatively well off, middle class) through his unwavering dedication to hard work. The movie becomes a national narrative about China’s success story, through Shenzhen’s transformation from an undeveloped sleepy fishing town to a cosmopolitan city with worldwide cultural capital. De Bao represents the ideal subject of reform, hard working, honest, and never complaining, in sharp contrast to his two other migrant friends who represent the wrong kind of migrant subjectivity. The first negated subject is De Bao’s hometown buddy who dreams of getting rich quick through schemes to cheat other people, but constantly ends up penniless; the second negated subject is a female migrant who dreams of escaping China for Paris, but ends up as a depressed mistress to a
foreigner. In one generously re-worked part of the original story, a senior official visiting Shenzhen’s construction site interrupts a cheerful De Bao singing folk songs while operating a bulldozer:

Senior official: Where are you from?
De Bao: Hunan
Senior official: Oh, home of the great revolutionary! How many years have you been in Shenzhen?
De Bao: 13 years
Senior official: Thanks for the hard work!
De Bao: Not at all
Senior official: Are they treating you well?
De Bao: Good, they pay me 3,722.23 yuan every month
Senior official: Great! Hard work will turn into wealth. Did you know that the words Shenzhen mean bright prospects? Do you have any advice?
De Bao: Speed up the pace of progress so we can have higher pay

The subsumption of migrant struggles into the national narrative of development—where injustices are unavoidable but temporary side effects of China’s positive reform, and migrants are thanked for their hard work as the main subjects responsible for China’s 30 years of reform “achievements”—becomes repeated in mainstream media without variation. The growing public sympathy and admiration for migrants, to the extent that they are seen as simple/naïve/adorable, honest, hardworking subjects, is reinforced in the national program focused on migrants, Guizhou’s CCTV program “Warm Stories of Chinese Migrants,” and the appearance of skits about migrants in the national Chinese New Years Gala. In 2010, a special New Years Gala wholly focused on migrants started a new tradition that has not been extended to any other population. Even the first three migrants who became national representatives in the 11th National People’s Congress in the 2008-2012 term (hardly representative in proportion to population size) were commonly portrayed in media as simple, endearing folk unaccustomed to urban culture let alone politics.

This generalized endearment of the migrant figure through the humor that arises out of rural-urban “cultural” misunderstandings overlaps with the rise of discourse on
“migrant culture” among intellectual spaces. The term “migrant culture” refers to a distinct cultural formation that is neither rural nor urban, but the culture of a new labor class integrating into modern life. The development of migrant culture includes: (1) Literary writing beginning in the 1980’s; (2) government supported or corporate collaborated cultural activities and organizations, such as Migrant Art Festivals, libraries, free movie showings, writing contests and scholarships; (3) Independently operated migrant public welfare cultural organizations. The distinct characteristics of “migrant culture” are: (1) the rich description of hard survival circumstances, and the raw emotional complexity of migrant youth; (2) the migrant as the main subject, consciously aware of a collective voice demanding respect and recognition from society; (3) filling a cultural gap left by mainstream society, which allows them to be a rare spiritual resource for a contemporary society overrun by the logic of money and superficiality. It is important to note how migrant culture is now praised and valued above mainstream (urban) culture by intellectuals, indicating a larger shift in how migrant subjectivity is being constructed in society.

In both the state and intellectual discourse, migrants have become positive subjects of creativity and self-activity, and the source of society’s re-composition. I argue that this tendency toward integration is what Badiou refers to as the process by which the new is folded back in the re-composition of the structure. The attempt to place migrants within a narrative that reproduces the structural dialectic, in which migrants appear outside of society, only to be subsumed into the Whole, itself is a political project that requires constant labor by the state, intellectuals and public media. I argue that there is a second tendency among migrants in the cultural sphere, which also requires a certain labor to “force” a different subjective consistency. The following ethnography of

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the Migrant Workers Home organization in chapter three poses a set of challenges to both mainstream conceptions of migrants, as well as to the problem of culture as a potentially radicalizing and neutralizing space. Specifically, how does one self-organizing community of migrants articulate their place in Chinese society? How is the migrant subjectivity understood in relation to politics, and how is it sustained?

2.5 Conclusion

Chapter two was an attempt to trace the culture concept from its radical and politicizing practices during the struggles of ’68 in western and colonial contexts, to its disavowal and displacement through specific biopolitical investments in the conditions of knowledge production that shift from censorship to enrollment, exclusion to inclusion. While the irreversible influences of what Cusset calls the American invention of poststructuralism on contemporary scholarship, including the recent biopolitical turn, provides creative insights and important critiques alternative to modernity, it is also important to grasp what impasses and value codings might persist despite the radical dualisms of “old” and “new” that mark the self-conscious shift to globalization. The biopolitical moment, caught between a mirror of power and resistance based on certain historical determinations outlined in the chapter, might benefit from recalling the legacy of practices that tried to hold in tension power and resistance by working out how they might be complementary or contradictory, in order to make room for a subjective intervention irreducible to an epiphenomenon of principles of capital or biopower. The turn to culture in recent state and market discourses, alongside the rise of migrant self-articulated identities and culture, provide a politically ambiguous space that produces different tendencies among migrant subjectivities.

Making room for subjective intervention through culture by way of an alternative legacy provides the necessary tools to understand the project of the Migrant
Workers Home organization in the next chapter, which depart from common Marxist frameworks of analysis in western scholarship and pushes the scholarly understanding of subjectivity tied to modes of discipline imposed from above, and suggests the possibility for subjectivity to be a collective political project from below. Exploring the construction of migrant social life and subjectivities through the organization’s projects suggests how a rupture and consistency can be provided at a “distance” from biopower. In chapters four and five, I explore both the movement of integration and the movement of antagonism from different practices of urban migrant social life in the context of CSR, and argue that these two subjective tendencies among migrants are grounded in the production of different material practices and value systems.
3. Migrant Workers Home Organization

“All people ask, brother, what is the use of culture? It can’t be eaten, it can’t be worn; [you’re] so busy groping around blindly, what kind of cultured person are you pretending to be? According to proverbs, trains are not for pushing, and culture is not for boasting. Our culture comes from our wandering livelihoods; it comes from our blood and sweat! It brings us the strength to search for hope in directly facing reality! Without our culture, we don’t have our history. Without our history, we don’t have our future.” --New Workers Art Troupe, Culture and Arts Festival for Migrants 2009, “Our World, Our Dream”

3.1 Introduction

I first encountered some members of the Beijing-based organization Migrant Workers Home at their rock concert in the winter of 2010. The infamous underground music venue located in an area under heavy revitalization efforts to display “Old Beijing” culture alongside youth subcultures, filled with young middle class hipsters and their chain-smoking coolness, usually prove insufferable to me. That night I joined the crowd in listening to the New Workers Art Troupe sing “All Labor Under the Sky is one Family” in a benefit concert for their Beijing Migrant Workers Home Culture and Development Center. The overtly communist political messages squeezed somewhat awkwardly into rock-pop-folk songs seemed kitsch amidst that crowd, like the bobble-head figurines of Mao and Jiang Kai Shek holding hands sold just across the street from the music venue, next to the pet grooming shop. After the concert, with the lyrics “Labor is most glorious” stuck in my head, I knew I had to visit the celebrity migrant group at their Culture and Development Center about two hours bus ride outside of the city center (around 20 kilometers).

In disturbing contrast to the cultural Disneyland where the music venue was located, the “village-in-the-city” in which the migrant organization was based betrayed the underbelly of urbanization. Picun, literally, Leather Village, is one of Beijing’s fairly new but typical “migrant settlement” areas, with currently 1000 local residents, and
between 10,000-12,000 migrant residents. According to the Migrant Workers Home, the name “Picun” comes from the tale that a long time ago, someone dug up stone tablets whose surface resembled leather or skin, and thus the village became known as Picun. Not even reaching 3 square kilometers, the former rural village became a primarily migrant settlement since the mid 2000’s. In the transition from village to urban administration, local rural hukou residents who used to engage in agricultural work sold their land to small factories, or currently rent them to migrants as their primary source of income. Currently Picun has about 205 small factories employing 4000 workers. Picun’s migrants either work in these factories, run their own small businesses, or spend around four to five hours a day in transportation to and from the city center working in the service or construction industry. With the constant noise of airplanes from the Beijing Capital Airport, the smell of live chickens and the sewage which ironically pools in front of the local government’s sanitation building, and a hint of the nearby landfill, the relatively low rent for migrants range from 400-700 yuan a month ($64-$112 USD) for an average living space of 4 to 5 square meter rooms. It is the relatively low living costs in Picun that draw migrants from all industries and all regions of the country, though many come from Sichuan, Hebei, Jiangxi, and Henan.

I became a volunteer for the organization for three consistent months, performing odd jobs for the organization’s many projects. (One role that I played for all the NGO’s that I volunteered with was to offer my skills as a researcher to gather information on topics of their own interest, create presentations, and communicate my findings to them in open meetings). Within China, and especially in Beijing, the Migrant Workers Home is well known for their celebrity member Sun Heng and his migrant rock band. More recently in the summer of 2012, the organization’s self-run Tongxin Experimental School for migrant children was in the news as one of the schools being
targeted for forced closure and demolition by local village government. In a rare occurrence (discussed in detail in chapter 4), following the letter of support for the Migrant Workers Home and their school signed by professors and researchers at elite academic institutions, and even a celebrity member of the national Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, the Picun township’s administrative department of education allowed the school to continue running in the fall. Meanwhile, the two other migrant schools, including the New Citizens School in the same township, funded by elite Chinese and international foundations, had already been demolished.

In fact, the key backdrop to understanding the daily struggles of migrants in Picun, and many of Beijing’s outlying migrant settlements, is the fundamental antagonism between migrant self-organization and the current form of market led urbanization, most explicitly manifested in the spatial politics of migrants’ living situation. The term “village-in-the-city” (chengzhongcun), standardized in scholarly literature only after 2000 (which also uses the terms city village (dushi chengzhuang), marginal community (bianyuan shequ), urban-rural connector zone (chengxiang jiehebu), non-local population settlement area (wailai renkou jiju qu)), refers to the absorption of outlying villages into the administrative zone of cities during China’s rapid urbanization, without the city government providing any political, economic or social support to integrate these zones in the benefits of urban welfare. In other words, these zones persist as a system of exploitation by the urban government to reap the benefits of rural land without adding to its costs of social reproduction. As such, these zones on the outskirts of the city are neither city nor countryside, but a unique state in between the two. As in the case of Picun, the former villagers maintain a rural hukou, but become property owners who make a living off of rent to migrants (Liu M. 2010).
Because of its outward appearance as a set of disorganized buildings, lacking public facilities or social security, and the predominance of migrant populations, western observers (as one foreign migrant NGO in Beijing discussed in chapter 5) are tempted to compare these “villages-in-the-city” to slums or shantytowns. Chinese scholars are careful to note that these terms are complicated in China, and may not map onto the same social hierarchies or local specificities. While shantytowns often refer to illegal self-constructed dwellings by marginalized populations in other countries, migrants are clearly strictly forbidden from building their own housing without proper residential permits or leases of land (it is taboo for the government to formally acknowledge an illegal settlement, as it would be immediately forbidden). So the shanty dwellers are technically associated with the rural hukou property owners (who may in fact be wealthier than urban hukou residents), who build even worse shanty dwellings on their property to rent to migrants (Qin 2011). Further causing confusion, migrant dormitories such as those found in factories or construction sites are not counted as slums in UN Habitat studies (which refers to old, dilapidated living quarters lacking services, formerly rich areas now occupied by poor), but many shantytowns (occupied by legal residents) are considered slums by the UN, based on the criteria of having no private bathrooms, no private running water, etc. (Jiang, Pang and Zhang 2005). So, the inadequacy of the existing concepts of urban marginalization to grasp both the history of urban collective management in China, and the complexity of overlapping socialist and neoliberal hierarchies in contemporary urban cities, has meant that there is not an adequate way to collect large-scale quantitative data on migrant living conditions, requiring instead localized case studies of specific cities known to have large migrant populations. In Chinese literature, “villages-in-cities” are either seen as undesirable zones of the city that need to be demolished and the local rural villagers
integrated in urban administration, reflections of the “three rural problems” (the problems of the countryside, the peasant, and agriculture) that need a rural solution, or not a problem at all as a space where migrants and villagers can “learn” to be urban citizens. In all cases, migrants, particularly those who want to stay in the city, are completely secondary considerations.

Picun village lies within the jurisdiction of the Jinzhan township, itself a sub-jurisdiction of Chaoyang district in eastern Beijing. Yet despite the three levels of administrative government, the relationship between migrants and the government is quite fluid and un-formalized, with neither the Picun village committee, the Jinzhan committee, nor the Chaoyang district seeing themselves as directly responsible for migrant governance or welfare. Since the reform, urban residents have fallen under the social management of street level administrative offices, while rural residents have fallen under management of village committees. Migrants, however, lack a formal corresponding administrative unit in the outskirts of the city, with governance responsibilities dispersed across multiple departments in an ad hoc fashion. As such, this creates room for migrant self-run organizations such as Migrant Workers Home to co-exist in very uneasy but nevertheless tolerated relationship to local government. In 2008, the Beijing city government put forth a plan called “The Beijing City Communist Party Committee Views On The New Patterns for Leading the Integration of Rural-Urban Economic Social Development” (Beijing shiwei “Guanyu shuaixian xingcheng chengxiang jingji shehui fazhan—yitihua xin geju de yijian) to deal with several “villages-in-the-city.” According to the proposed timetable, by 2010 fifty of Beijing’s villages-in-the-city would be demolished, impacting 620,000 households and 2,800,000 migrants. The targeted districts were identified as Haidian, Chaoyang, Changping, Shijingshan, Fengtai, and Daxing district. Chaoyang district alone, where my
ethnographies took place, has 22% of Beijing’s seven million migrants; 88% of Beijing’s migrants living in one of the targeted districts.¹

Figure 1: Targeted districts with high concentrations of villages-in-the-city in the 2008 plan “The Beijing City Communist Party Committee Views On The New Patterns for Leading the Integration of Rural-Urban Economic Social Development” (map edited from official website of Beijing Tourism Administration to show relevant districts)

Chaoyang district and its Jinzhan township is infamous for problems with forced removals and demolitions, which often lead to public showdowns with residents refusing to leave. In April of 2009 the Jinzhan township announced it would be building one of Beijing’s key financial services industrial parks just seven minutes near the airport. The park will serve as a key site for international financial services in the Asia-Pacific area, including finance data processing, financial outsourcing, off-shoring, and R&D, with global investors such as Deutsche Bank already lined up.² By November of

that same year, the township government announced that 26.2 square kilometers of land
would be taken for “land reserves” and “rural development.” The first wave of
demolitions would take place in 5 villages; in 2010 the next five villages would be
demolished (Lei Zhuang, Beimafang, Louzizhuang, Cuigezhuang, Changdian; the next
five villages were Magezhuang, Shawo, Dongcun, Xicun, Xiaodiancun). According to
the “Jinzhan Township Land Reservation Residential Demolition and Evacuation
Compensation and Resettlement Method,” rural residents will be allowed to enter into
the urban social security system after paying the required fee. Tens of millions of
residents will be relocated, with the option of receiving monetary compensation of up to
160,000 RMB or of purchasing resettlement houses at favorable market rates.3 There is no
mention of the impact or effect of the demolitions on migrants.

It is almost no surprise then, that due to disputes over demolitions,
investigations in 2012 of the Beijing Chaoyang vice district deputy led to his conviction
on corruption activity over profiting off of demolitions from 2008 to 2010. The
government official had used his position in several of Chaoyang’s rural areas such as
the Dongba township committee party vice secretary, Jinzhan township committee party
secretary, Chaoyang district committee farmer party secretary, rural committee director,
Chaoyang district committee director, the district standing committee, and the
government district vice director to profit from activities in the name of “rural-urban

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Cheng Xu, “Chaoyang Jinzhanxiang Dazao Shoudu Jinronghoutai fuwuyuanqu,” Qianlongwang, April 28
3 Xia Ping and Chen Jiakai, “Yangbanfang xinxian chulu cumin xianduweikuai-Jinzhanxiang tudi chubei
xilie baodao,” Beijing Chaoyang Xinwen Wang, November 16 2009,
http://www.chynews.cn/today/8a24f09524798ee20124f746b8f01b8.html;
Xia Ping and Yao Chun, “Jinzhanxiang Zhuzhai chaiqian tengtui gongzuo jijiang zhankai,” Beijing
Chaoyang Xinwen, November 18 2009,
http://www.chynews.cn/today/8a24f09524798ee2012509f265e201e1.html;
Zhou Chao, “Jinzhanxiang Changdiancun jinqi chaiqian tengtui,” Fazhi Wanbao, March 25 2010,
http://news.163.com/10/0325/15/62KNCO45000146BB.html
integration.” According to the Caijing news source, during the demolition process, some methods of corruption included budgeting relocation and compensation costs consistently above 1600 hundred million yuan, and siphoning off 200 million each time toward a slush fund in the rural committee. In addition, fake contracts with development companies would also provide channels to take money from the demolition fund.\(^4\) Concurrently, the effect of demolitions on migrants became publically acknowledged when in June of 2011, 30 schools for migrant children in Beijing received notice to shut down their school due to inadequate facilities, with 24 of them ultimately closed. School numbers dropped from 302 schools in 2008 to 170 in 2012 following the second wave of closures in the summer of 2012.\(^5\)

The interweaving of global financial capital, state-led market driven urbanization, and the transformation of daily life for Beijing’s migrants was articulated by Brett Nielson as three forms of migration taking place in urban China: (1) that following gentrification and displacement of urban residents; (2) that of rural migrants as the predominant labor force re-constructing the city; (3) that of a cosmopolitan creative class. For Nielson, urban change, encompassing these three migrations, is driven by the constant manipulation of risk that creates value (Nielson 2008). Grounding this analysis in the struggles of migrants, I argue that the contradiction between capitalist urbanization and migrant organizing bring to the forefront the political stakes of migrant subjectivity, which is heavily directed toward the desire for urban cultural integration (which may do nothing to address the forces of displacement). As the struggles surrounding the wave of migrant school closures illustrates in chapter 4, the


mix of government, corporate, academic and public media attention on the Migrant Workers Home marks the incredibly new and complicated environment in which migrants find themselves in Beijing. Departing drastically from the situation that Solinger, Li Zhang, and Xiang Biao witnessed among the first generation of migrants organized by native place bonds, political guanxi, or loose interest based gangs in Beijing during the 90’s, the so-called “second generation” of migrants are explicitly engaging in self-organizing in the complicated sphere of culture with ties to a publicized life.

The Migrant Workers Home has long fascinated scholars and researchers in Beijing since their inception in 2002, resulting in the organization members’ fully justified sensitivity to “being studied.” Unlike the many migrant-focused NGO’s that I had come across, this one critiqued clearly and forcefully the exploitative nature of elite intellectuals who were interested in studying “migrants.” I myself, having been a part of a grassroots organization in the US that is often receiving requests to be studied, had always felt uncomfortable with ethnographic work that attempted to “deconstruct” migrant self-representations of their subjectivity by pointing to internal conflicts and slippages. In trying to take seriously the struggle of migrants to collectively propose their own subjectivity, through their own negotiations, I try to keep my ethnography at the level of organizational self-representations, the differences between organizations, and how these discursive differences are grounded in different day-to-day practices. While acknowledging that this removes one of ethnography’s strong points (capturing the internal conflicts, contestations or disjunctures that reveal how power works at the individual level), I believe there is much to be gained by seeing how these collective self-representations are themselves a political battle toward cohesiveness in the face of intentional strategies to fragment political struggle into various “interests” and “issues.”
3.2 Subjectivity and Politics

What does subjectivity have to do with politics? Chapter 2 discussed the historical legacy of global Maoism that tied the two together through the creation of new culture in diverse struggles for liberation. Here, a review of the rise of “post-Mao” studies of subjectivity and power to understand society reveal a continuing struggle to question the legacy of Marxist and humanist frameworks of the subject. The Migrant Workers Home, operating under conditions of contemporary capitalism in China, offers challenges and insights for those interested in anti-capitalist struggle today through a certain practice of Marxism that engages directly with the question of subjectivity and politics.

The proliferation of social and human science research on the subject and subjectivity in relation to reformulating modern concepts takes shape during the 80’s and 90’s through multiple interacting traditions, with attention to language, signs, and discourse as the site where the subject is formed. Through the framework of Foucault, which has become predominant, there is a shift away from re-founding a theory of the subject as such, to the formation of subject positions through the materiality of multiple and historically contingent discursive practices of power/knowledge. Similar and interconnected critiques of both the culture concept as well as the Western notion of the autonomous pre-formed subject bring about rich ethnographies of alternative personhoods as dynamically formed and transformed processes. For example, Joao Biehl cites how anthropologists have shown how subjects are formed through interaction with institutional practices, are internally divided and in conflict, and utilize multiple voices in everyday speech, are open to reconfiguration or permeability, engage in performance
of multiple identities, and inseparable from social relations that exceed subject/object relations (Biehl et al. 2007).

Sherry Ortner perceptively argues that subjectivity as feelings, experience, or affect is distinct from the analysis of “subject positions,” and is crucial for a critical anthropology when agency requires a particular subjectivity which delimits what is possible through desires, intentions, feelings, thoughts, and meanings (Ortner 2005). Complementing Ortner’s argument, Blackman argues that the source of agency and difference of subjectivity are unaccounted for in the current Foucauldian inspired studies, which make the subject and subjectivity (the feeling and experience of self-regulation) a subsidiary effect or epiphenomenon of discourse, power, and history (Blackman et al. 2008). The problem that this gap presents is articulated eloquently by Feltham and Clemens:

“If the subject—right down to its most intimate desires, actions and thoughts—is constituted by power, than how can it be the source of independent resistance? For such a point of agency to exist, Foucault needs some space which has not been completely constituted by power, or a complex doctrine on the relation between resistance and independence” (Feltham and Clemens 2003, 4).

In a problem that becomes important for Badiou, “Foucauldian theorizations thus appear to foreclose the possibility of subjectivity as a viable resource of resistance, something that a new and distinctive ontology of the subject might make possible” (Blackman et al. 2008, 9). The attention to subjectivity as its own proper object of study in anthropology helps to highlight the gap between agency and the subject, rather than taking agency for granted as something natural or given, yet secondary to power. Two major contributions to Marxist work on subjectivity—Hardt and Negri’s work in Commonwealth, and Badiou’s work in The Theory of the Subject—directly think about subjectivity, resistance, and the increasingly complex blurring between subversion and subjection in contemporary capitalism. Putting the two works in conversation sheds light on the challenges that we face in the impasse identified in Foucault’s work.
In *Commonwealth*, Hardt and Negri argue that because the current mode of capitalist production is biopolitical (based on the localized productive powers of life), not only is our terrain of struggle today control over the production of subjectivity, (immediately political as a struggle for self-determination in the process of becoming), but capital has also created the conditions or opening for labor to produce another world based in the common. Anti-capitalist struggle thus takes the form of bolstering our own capacities and alternative democratic projects rather than fighting “against” capitalism (Hardt and Negri 2009). This materialist grounding of subjectivity in the capitalist mode of production means, however, that we are constantly faced with the problem that our productions are productive for ourselves as well as for capital. Furthermore, not only must we deal with capitalist exploitation (the cooptation of surplus common), we must also deal with the issue of “self-negation,” our own desires and subjectivities oriented toward bolstering capital rather than our own collective productions and self-government (Casarino and Negri 2008). In the face of this intimate, biopolitical, relation between capital and labor, Hardt and Negri propose the necessity for political organization, in the form of the multitude, in order to realize the political subject (Hardt and Negri 2009, 166).

It is here that Hardt and Negri address Badiou directly, along with the questions of other contemporary thinkers that have arisen about whether the multitude can offer a viable resistance to biopolitical capital. At heart, the problem of the multitude is arguably the same problem that Badiou articulates about the un-resolved legacy of the Cultural Revolution—how to negotiate the multiplicity of creative singularities and the necessity for political consistency or intensity to orient the multitude toward common democratic goals? In other words, what is the organizational form appropriate to a “post-Mao politics,” when these self-activities exceed the organization of the vanguard
party or the party-state? Using Foucault’s work to frame the situation of the multitude results in the problem articulated above—that resistance, or the political subject, will always be a mirror of power, as an epiphenomenon of other ontologies. There needs to be an alternative theory of the subject and an ethical practice that doesn’t come about by way of another primary principle (such as the capitalist mode of production or various “assemblages” of power). The political stakes of Badiou’s critique perhaps lay in the experiences of ’68 recounted by Badiou in France and Cusset in the US, and the (in)capacity for the radical left to distinguish within itself its “left” and “right” tendencies. In response, Hardt and Negri offer guiding principles for the political orientation and organization of the multitude based on autonomist Marxist work on constituent power, exodus, autonomous production already found in practices of the common, and the primacy or surplus of resistance.

Judith Revel’s work on Foucault is one eloquent exploration of the relationship between the common and resistance in the framework of biopolitics. Beginning with Foucault’s turn in the 1980’s, life is seen in a new light that can asset its own capacity or force that cannot be “owned” by biopower (Revel 2009, 52):

“For me, this notion of way of life is important...A way of life can be shared amongst individuals of different ages, statuses, social conduct. It can give rise to intense relations that are nothing like those which are institutionalized, and it seems to me that a way of life can generate a culture and an ethics. To be gay is not about identifying oneself with the psychological traits and visible masks of the homosexual, but to seek to define and develop a way of life” (Foucault 1994, 165; cited in Revel 2009, 48).

Similar to Hardt and Negri, Revel insists that resistance cannot be theorized outside of power, but fully within its webs. Thus, by reading the possibility of resistance through Foucault as a process of becoming, in which the becoming of singular differences articulate relations of common without mediation (both singular differences and the common are political projects rather than the given), there must be an asymmetry between biopower and the power to act, such that the latter is in excess of the former
(Revel 2009). What is reiterated to break out of the mirror between power and resistance is the possibility for a radically constitutive power, an ontological force (as opposed to negative works of bare life or deconstruction), and its principled collective nature in rejection of the individualism, essentialism, and naturalization of biopower (the inclusion/objectification of given identities).

Badiou’s work is immediately relevant as a thinker who is grappling with the unresolved legacy of ’68 in addressing how, who, or what is the political subject if one deals with the implications of a structure/logic/world that “captures” the new, which he articulates as “backsliding into bourgeois politics,” “repetition,” or getting “pushed onto the mirage of the Whole.” In the face of the theoretical taboos that mark the backlash to the radical politics of ‘68 in France, Badiou argues that rather than “defend” Marxism, the task is precisely to re-found Marxism with a theory of the subject. In fact, Badiou defines the object of Marxism as none other than its political subject, or political actualization and mass politics by providing a (symbolic) support for a subject; “Everything else is academia.” Drawing on a complex divided reading of seemingly opposed thinkers such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Hegel, Marx, Mao, and Sartre, Badiou begins with the premise that “there is no subject” (2005, 434), but there is the “splace,” the name for the given situation or society, with all its perversions and neuroses, which is the “primordial element of the subjective” (2009, 141). It is because the social is precisely the splace, the situation of repetition from which we are trying to break, that Badiou says ”the social is the neurosis of politics.” For example, the trade union as the social organization complicit with the State, seeks legitimacy, and remains within the splace of repetition. In contrast, politics, rather than a search for legitimacy or recognition, would bring about the self-destruction of its legitimacy (the way that the proletariat seeks to destroy itself), or the destruction of the splace. The subject for Badiou
is only that (process) which emerges when there is a break with the splace, with repetition, and its emergence is divided between the part of itself that is subject to repetition and the part of itself that interrupts the repetition. Because there is always scission, there is no guarantee that the multitude emerges as a democratic force against Empire; thus Badiou’s work tries to grasp at something else that is needed in political actualization besides common production. For Badiou, the political subject is a process of constant purging, not just the multiplicity of revolts, involving various rigorous “truth” processes not attributable to the structure but having to confront what is old, ongoing, and new, and not fully intelligible within an analytical framework where the subject and subjectivity is understood as outcomes or byproducts of other forces.

Despite their differences, the work of Hardt and Negri and Badiou to bring Marxism and subjectivity together may share important commonalities even in what seems to be opposed methodologies and subjectivities. For Badiou, there is the asymmetry and scission of the terms of the dialectic, the primacy of force over the splace, and the destruction of the splace rather than recognition or representation; for Hardt and Negri, there is the antagonism of two subjects based on the capacity of labor to create beyond capitalism, the primacy or surplus common, and exodus rather than traditional notions of political confrontation. Furthermore, it is important to draw from these two contributions that the possibility for a break from biopolitical control necessitate some form of distance, a space for the political subject, or process of a collective, procedural, and organized nature.

Below, I try to understand how the Migrant Workers Home practices Marxism, by explicitly taking subjectivity as a collective political project. Their work is fascinating as much as it is puzzling, for it sits uncomfortably in many analytical frameworks, and challenges scholars to re-examine their own subjectivity in relation to Marxism, Maoism,
theoretical aversions to political notions of “consciousness” or “ideology.” Liu Kang’s readings of both western and Chinese texts show that in China, the intellectual understanding of “subjectivity” ironically moves in the opposite direction than western academic trends, from a Marxist understand of the material practice of labor power that develops subjectivity (including sensuous and bodily experience, desire and potential) that can be transformed through struggle in the 1920’s, to a neoliberal understanding of the self-determining, autonomous, free subject (Liu 1992). This chasm reveals the rare and precarious nature of the Migrant Workers Home in a political context where Maoism remains out of sight, and thus allows one to discover it anew.

Through their own experiences, the Migrant Workers Home has come to understand the indispensible elements of political struggle, with the struggle over subjectivity at its heart:

“First we need the capacity to hold our position (aodezhu). China’s labor NGO and migrant populations have the same plight, everyone needs to first let go of fantasy, to recognize their identity as labor, to recognize their labor value, to recognize identity and self-awakening, they need to construct migrants’ own culture. Only after having their own culture will their identity (shenfen rentong) come into being. Next we need to be unfinished/never-ending (sike), not impetuous, start out from reality, forever creating, not tied to existing models, create new organizational form, and constantly popularize our experience. Next we need to be steady/reasonable (kaopu), need to work with the times, need to unite and integrate all resources that can be united, not radical or conservative.” –Sun Heng, Migrant Workers Home member

Taking these three components of their political struggle as organizing themes— (1) capacity to hold a position (torsion), (2) to be unfinished/never-ending, (opening to the new); (3) to be steady/reasonable (consistency)—I explore the particular place of subjectivity in migrant struggles by looking at the different projects and organization of the Migrant Workers Home, and the historically and culturally specific meaning of “autonomy” which comes out of their self-articulations.

3.3. Capacity to Hold a Position (Torsion)

“(Actor 1): Beijing people say I am an outsider, while people from my hometown say I am a Beijing person.
(Actor 2): Then what side are you really from?
(Actor 1): I’m in the middle!”
–Comedy skit, Migrant Workers Home, 1999

The comedy skit written by one of the founding members of the Migrant Workers Home articulates the common experience of what it means to be a migrant, neither fully in the countryside nor in the city. This subjective experience and its consequences for the formation of political subjects has been explored and articulated by various anthropologists as an “incomplete proletarianization” in the emergence of a new working class (Pun 2005), or a failure to fit into any existing category, neoliberal or subaltern, which may be the space for a new politics (Yan 2008). It is intriguing, then, that the first important aspect of political struggle identified by Sun Heng is having the capacity to “hold a position,” which means neither a politics of ambivalence nor an orthodox proletarian politics:

“First we need the capacity to hold our position (aodeshu). China’s labor and migrant populations have the same plight, everyone needs to first let go of fantasy, to recognize their identity as labor, to recognize their labor value, to recognize identity and self-awakening. They need to construct migrants’ own culture. Only after having their own culture, will their identity (shenfen rentong) come into being.”

There are two conceptual disruptions that are of interest. First, to “hold a position” means to affirm one’s identity as “labor” through some process of “self-awakening.” Second, this process of recognizing or self-awakening occurs through the construction of a migrant culture. So, to “hold a position” is a decidedly active process of constructing a culture and transforming an identity. At the heart of this process for the Migrant Workers Home is a struggle over being able to articulate for them selves what is meant by “migrant” and “labor.”

3.3.1 What Does “Migrant” Mean?

“If we could change ourselves, what kind of words would we use to describe ourselves?” —Migrant Workers Home
The Migrant Workers Home organization’s struggle over self-representation is articulated as one of their key political projects. While ethnographies of migrants in China have articulated extensively the way in which migrant subjectivities are constructed by state-led neoliberal imaginaries in relation to tradition and modernity, rural and urban, peasant and cosmopolitan orientations, there has been little attention to the fact that the word “migrant” itself has multiple synonyms in the Chinese language beyond the neoliberal reference to temporary workers as “dagong.” Only recently have certain terms become standardized in academic literature and mainstream media, which provides a key insight into how the “migrant issue” has been worked on and perhaps becoming wrapped up in “post-neoliberal” projects.\(^6\) In a poem written and displayed on the walls of the organization’s Migrant Culture and Arts Museum, called “The Name of Migrants,” these various terms for “migrant” are reflected upon by the organization and its members:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>本名 民工</td>
<td>Original name: migrant workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>小名 打工仔/妹</td>
<td>Nickname: sister/brother temporary workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>别名 进城务工者</td>
<td>Alternative name: entering city laborers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>曾用名 盲流</td>
<td>Once-used name: roaming riff raff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>尊称 城市建设者</td>
<td>Respectfully named: city builders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>小称 农民兄弟</td>
<td>Nickname: peasant brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>肆称 乡巴佬</td>
<td>Common name: Country Bumpkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>述称 游民</td>
<td>Nickname: vagrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>爷名 无产阶级同盟军</td>
<td>Grandfather’s name: allies of the proletariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>父名 人民民主专政基石之一</td>
<td>Father’s name: Foundation of people’s democratic dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>临时户口名 社会不稳定因素</td>
<td>Temporary hukou name: Unstable element of society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>永久宪法名 公民</td>
<td>Constitution name: citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>家族封号 主人</td>
<td>Family granted name: head of household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>时髦称呼 弱势群体</td>
<td>Fashionable name: Disadvantaged population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The poem barely begins to deal with the range of terms found in academic and news media sources, reflecting the ongoing challenges to theorize and accurately identify the

\(^6\) I borrow the term “post-neoliberal” from Latin American scholar Ana Esther Cecena (2009) in reference to the re-composition of state and capitalist strategies after upheavals brought by capitalist crisis and social unrest since 2008.
boundaries of a population born of neoliberal capitalism. In addition to the ones in the poem, the following terms are commonly circulated: “floating population” (liudong renkou), “temporary resident population” (zanzhu renkou), “outsiders” (waidi ren), “peasant migrant workers” (nongmingong), “workers from outside” (wailaigong), “part time workers” (linshigong), etc. Recently, there has been a distinct effort by the state to introduce the term “second-generation” or “new generation” peasant migrant workers (xinshengdai nongmingong) through various state owned institutions.

The term “new generation of migrants” first appeared in a Chinese Academy of Social Science report at the beginning of 2010. In the report, the “problems” of the “new generation” must be a key focus of government work, and was going to be addressed by integrating them as “urban people” (shiminhua). Later in the year, Tsinghua University conducted a major study that authoritatively established the differences between the “first” and the “second” generation of migrants. The second generation, those born after 1980 and which composed more than half of the total migrant population in major cities, was described as having: (1) a higher level of education, (2) longer experience with city lifestyle and little or no experience with agriculture, (3) more pro-active demands and willingness to participate in collective protests (4) different value systems and goals, specifically wanting to remain in the city for self-development rather than to make money and return home, (5) high consumption patterns similar to urban youth. Due to these defining characteristics, the “problem” of the new generation was precisely cultural: their existence in a liminal state between rural and urban space, and the attendant emotional, psychological, and social problems that arise from this position.

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While the ultimate goal was now widely articulated as integrating migrants into the city, in practice the form of this integration would be primarily cultural. Public and private spheres of society were now to direct their efforts at providing “cultural services” to migrants. In an unstable mix of liberal and socialist discourses, the state and local governments spoke in terms of “protecting the basic cultural rights and interests of disadvantaged populations” (baozhang wenhua ruoshi qunti de jiben wenhua quanyi), providing “minimum cultural subsistence” (wenhua dibao), meeting the cultural-spiritual demands of the population (jingshen wenhua), etc.9

It is important to emphasize that the problem of migrants is conceptualized differently: it is no longer commonly being articulated through an elitist judgement that migrants lack suzhi (“quality,” suggesting culture or civility) in relation to urban residents; instead, the problem of migrants is that they themselves are identifying as urban subjects, demanding access to mainstream society, and therefore must enjoy the same “cultural rights” as urban residents. The roots of this discursive inflection may be the 2004 Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council’s “Opinions on the policies for facilitating the increase of farmers’ income,” dramatically announcing that migrants were the new industrial workers of the country, and the main army for the construction of socialism, which followed a peak in the national wave of migrant protests (China Labour Bulletin 2007; Pun and Chan 2008). The state narrative now explains that it is natural for problems to arise in the process of transforming the economic base, and after thirty years of economic progress, the superstructure now lags

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behind and requires attention. This de-politicized, evolutionist discourse is paralleled and reinforced by global discourse on civil society, which also suggests the eventual improvement of migrants lives through the growth of a friendly space for public-private partnerships working to integrate migrants into urban life. In the face of these state and market narratives, studies show that in fact, the “second generation” of migrants objectively and subjectively work and live under worse conditions (more work injuries, less pay in wages, and worse treatment) than the first generation of migrants (Tsinghua 2010). The proliferation of studies on the “second-generation of migrants” indicate a distinctly biopolitical turn to the “migrant issue,” where a population is to be studied according to the rationality of the governed themselves.

The poem reveals both the discursive shifts that have surrounded the characterization of migrants, as well as the particular political intervention made by the Migrant Workers Home in the struggle for self-representation. Through ongoing working group discussions held at their community center, the members collect news and media clippings to discuss how the media portrays migrants, whether they feel it is accurate, and “if we could change ourselves, what kind of words would we use to describe ourselves?” I was present during one conversation about the portrayal of migrants in the CCTV New Years Gala by the actor Wang Baoqiang (who now represented migrants in the public imaginary because of his role in the movie “Lost on Journey,” in which comedy arises out of the very cultural clashes between an urban businessman and a peasant cow-herding migrant stuck travelling home together for the holidays). Out of these discussions, the organization is collectively writing a “new workers dictionary” that collects all of the terms in society that are relevant to the migrant experience and their political and cultural meanings. For the Migrant Workers Home, both the terms peasant worker (nongmingong) and second-generation peasant
workers (dierdai nongmingong) are rejected, because as one young member Liu Na told me, “this term indicates third, fourth, fifth generations, that forever we will not stand up. These words were forced onto us, those officials, elites, specialist academics who research us and stamp us with labels. ” When I asked whether the objection was because of not wanting to be associated with peasants or the countryside, she explained to me, “this term peasant worker is so absurd, not accurate, and very discriminatory. If we’re peasants, then we have peasant social security. If we’re urban employees then we have a set of urban social security system. But if you’re peasant workers you don’t get anything.” She was politely scolding me, in the nicest way possible for a younger person to scold someone older than her, for framing the issue as one of cultural discrimination, when in her articulation the issue was a question of material inequality purposely maintained and manifested in the slippage between peasant and worker, and therefore a question of politics.

Liu Na met her husband Wang Dezhi in Picun, who came to Beijing from Inner Mongolia in 1995 and became one of the founders of the organization. Her husband of 34 writes, acts, and makes films, as well as teaches drama classes, for many of the organization’s movie and theater productions, while Liu Na is a teacher at the kindergarten. After the working group discussion, we went back to her home near the school to prepare for dinner. It was already cold enough to see one’s breath indoors, and the kitchen barely fit the two of us in our puffy jackets and three layers of pants. I kneeled on the ground wielding a large butchers knife chopping cabbage while Liu Na prepared heating the wok for tomato and egg. In the small room adjacent to the kitchen, there were three bookshelves filled with books, including a complete set of Capital and Mao Zedong Selected Readings. Liu Na admitted that at first she was frustrated with her husband’s involvement with the Migrant Workers Home, coming home late for dinner,
exhausted, spending little time with the family. She would often feel compelled to intervene somehow. “Busy all day, and we don’t have anything, no money, nothing. Nobody else even gives you any acknowledgement.” She explained how their daily lives soon became adjusted to the organization, when she became a teacher for the organization’s migrant school. She began to identify more with her husband. “I don’t complain that that person has a car, that person has a house. I don’t think about those removed material things. I think what he’s given me spiritually/intellectually (jingshen) has been much more.” So she began to go with her husband to the weekly meetings with eight or nine of the tirelessly committed members where they talked about short and long-term issues of the organization. Though the other members did not have families, Liu Na found it easier to balance their lives once she got more involved. Part of this balance also came from the fact that she found support in the growing ecology between the organization’s programs, which provided solutions to things that occupied her mind on a day-to-day basis. Over time, she became an active member, learning together through the programs. Continuing with the previous conversation of the meeting that night, she said, “We prefer the term new workers (xin gongren) or fellow workers (gongyou). When everyone talks about society’s culture, they seem to be talking about workers, but have forgotten about subjects. Everyone is talking about how corporations should behave, how the public should behave, but have forgotten about subjectivity (zhutixing). Workers are subjects, and they need to become aware of their rights and interests, spiritual and cultural demands; we can’t say just give it to us and all is fine, but we need to consider is it appropriate for me, what you give me isn’t appropriate for me, and doesn’t meet my demands.”

The name Migrant Workers Home is thus an insufficient translation to communicate a specific political intervention that is being made. Migrant Workers
Home (gongyou zhijia) in light of this conversation is technically translated as “fellow workers home.” Not only are migrants intentionally aligned with the class of workers, they furthermore must become new workers (xingongren) rather than a sociological category or a historical reference to the proletariat. In the impasse often manifested among political intellectuals, caught between one end (in which differences must be privileged to struggle against oppressive homogenization) and the other end (in which political commonality must be achieved against fragmentation), the Migrant Workers Home seems to bring in the invaluable insight of Mao’s third option of strategy, in which difference and commonality must be active and situated political decisions (and thus, beyond the ethical limits of the intellectual who forms opinions at a distance from politics as embedded process of collective decision making).

The community discussions over the signification of “migrant” shows how the struggle over their self-representation takes place through a practical process aimed at creating “awareness” of what kind of meaning is being created in mainstream media, and creating a proposal about what they want it to mean. This self-articulated subject is explicitly a part of labor, specifically new or fellow workers, who are subjects that can decide what they want and need rather than being passive recipients or effects of change enacted by others. However, their redefinition of migrant as labor or worker does not mean a rejection of particular experiences or struggles of being a migrant, an affirmation of “proletariat” over “migrant.” In fact, in the process of recognizing oneself as “migrant,” there is a new conceptualization of both “migrant” and “labor” imbued with new value that differs from how they see migrants and workers are currently valued in society. In this way, self-representation does not signify a pre-existing sociological category or a perceived essential identity, even less as a relation to a mode of production or history, but a process of becoming in the intentional construction of another
subjectivity, or politics as a process of subjectification. Below, this process of becoming is tied to the capacity to “hold a position.”

### 3.3.2 Becoming Migrant

“I discovered, life is not some distant elsewhere, meaning is not freely in one’s own space; meaning in life is in the concrete reality, in the midst of a crowded population. We aren’t high above the masses, a self-important artist, we are laborers who need to rely on our two hands to live, migrants. From elite artists, to recognizing the self as the common "migrant," this process includes our fresh experience, and rational thinking after recognizing our identity, manifest new consciousness toward society and our lives.” —Migrant Workers Home member

“I feel that I have a personal connection to this issue of migrants in China because I myself am a migrant, as someone who comes from Hong Kong, lived in America, and now works in China. So I feel deeply for them.” Wang Yuanqiong, JP Morgan China, Corporate Social Responsibility

The two quotes from very disparate social and economic actors in China embracing “migrant” as an identity illustrates the extent to which the social capital of the migrant identity has changed in mainstream society, at least at the level of superstructure, or civil society. Throughout my encounters with grassroots activists, young college graduates volunteering with migrant organizations, and the expat corporate-philanthropic community, there is an eager identification and affective register with the subject of the “migrant.” While the differences between an Asian-American finance capitalist and a young worker from the countryside should be obvious, the generalization and ambiguity about who exactly constitutes a migrant becomes a source of intentional and unintentional exploitation and consumption of the migrant identity, an obfuscation of inequality between different historical and social causes for mobility (Ong 1999).

The material reality of various claims to migrant subjectivity is unmistakably stark. For example, since 2008 there were several news reports in international and
domestic media about provincial governments granting urban hukou to migrants in China, which was widely celebrated as a signal toward better treatment for migrants.\textsuperscript{10}

In Beijing, the permit regulation system made clear to migrants in Picun the reality of these claims, and the daily oppression that grounds a particular collective experience. Based on the personal experiences of many migrants in Picun, any non-resident 16 years and older staying for more than a month must apply for a temporary residence permit (and re-apply every year with a fee non-transferable to other cities). There are three classes offered: C class for those staying less than a year for non-work; B class (staying for 1-5 years with no criminal record), and A class (for those staying more than 5 years). However, the people who qualify for the A permit or even urban hukou are those who possess large sums of money (in Beijing at least 300,000 yuan, about 48,000 USD) or have purchased real estate, employees who have been sent to Beijing to work in a subsidiary business (large enterprises), husband and wife reunions for long term residents, and honorary or distinguished persons. In reality, those “migrants” able to apply for urban hukou represent a wealthier mobile class. Meanwhile for many in Picun, in addition to this tight system of control based on capital, many have had to purchase some combination of the following, none of which are transferrable to other cities: border management documents (bianjing guanlizheng), marriage and childrearing permits (liudong renkou hunyu zhengming), migrant work permits (waichu wugong zheng), employment registration card for outbound workers (waichu renyuan jiuye dengjika), a labor manual (laodong shouce), a health certificate (jiankangzheng), a probationary certificate (shiyongzheng), a factory card (changpai), a labor security card (laodong baozhang ka). One 20 year old young construction worker who came to Picun when he

was sixteen described the endless process of applying for permits “like a knife cutting away your pride and dignity.”

The consumption of the migrant identity and its deployment as affective capital by different social actors marks an important element of the biopolitical era, in which difference or subjectivity is directly productive for capital. This requires a level of investigation beyond the celebration of new techniques of the self or the problematization of newly emergent apparatuses. The key question in the biopolitical era is what constitutes meaningful difference in capitalism, or what constitutes the political subject? It becomes an important part of political struggle to distinguish oneself from “one’s negation in capital” (Casarino and Negri 2008), which means distinguishing between the migrant subjectivity that is affirmed by participating in the state and market narrative of development, and the migrant subjectivity that affirms the construction of something else unmistakeably different, rather than the difference consumed as equivalence. The Migrant Workers Home thus grounds the affirmation of migrant subjectivity in a particular shared experience, such as the undeniable experience of surveillance in all aspects of daily life, yet also exceeds this experience as migrant subjectivity becomes a process of becoming. For this reason, in practice migrant youth, artists and students may identify as “migrant,” but also, sociologically defined persons who labor as temporary workers may not embody “migrant subjectivity” as is understood by the organization.

The complexity of the Migrant Worker’s Home’s understanding of “migrant” is illustrated in the common self-narrative of the members of the organization in a recollection of their self-empowerment by identifying as a “migrant.” As one member, Xu Duo, elaborates on his experience of leaving his village in Zhejiang to come to Beijing:
“People like us who live on the border of the city and the village, after recently arriving in Beijing, have a strong feeling of humiliation. Living in the village-in-the-city, we fear the most someone coming to check temporary residence permits. Sometimes when sleeping in our room, we need to keep the door locked and pretend no one is there. Going out to sing, we also fear getting penalized, even more fear getting detained. In the very beginning, I used an artistic sense to digest these emotions of humiliation, to use an individual, rock and roll rage to vent, to use the identity of the artist, a spectator's perspective to look at the world, but this only let me immerse in a self-serving artistic pleasure. Over time, even the anger dilutes, just leaving sadness and confusion. And when we broke the phantom of “artist,” really returned to a laborer, a recognition of migrant identity, we found in concrete reality a fresh and live subject, established a real and powerful position. With this subject, we established our position, we found a seed in the soil, roots going into the ground, wheat leaves growing upward; we have a new consciousness of reality.”

Xu Duo’s recollection articulates the experience of identifying one’s self as a migrant laborer as a stabilizing effect, compared to the state of confusion that arose with embodying an “artistic sense.” Recognizing ones’ self as migrant is empowering precisely because it allows one to establish a position and to decidedly orient oneself in a particular way. In this sense, “becoming migrant” is tied to “holding a position.”

Wanting to reproduce that experience of empowerment, Xu Duo helped to found a migrant performing arts group. He recalls visiting migrant work sites throughout the city to sing songs such as “Unite Together to Collect Our Wages,” (which often resulted in being chased off by the bosses or the police):

“When performing for migrant workers, we construct together with workers their own culture. We bring real life into songs, try to break the brainwashing of mainstream culture, hope they break through the fantasy of their daily life, directly face reality, recognize the value of labor, recognize their self-value, mutually cooperate, and maintain their rights.”

Ironically, it is the undercurrent of Marxism and the notion of subjectivity as ideology or consciousness running through the Migrant Workers Home that sets them apart from the predominant discourse surrounding NGO work among migrant communities in post-Mao China. Their articulation of the “fantasy” of daily life, which is a “brainwashing of mainstream culture,” that is opposed to the realization of self-value, and the “value of labor,” contrasts sharply with the liberal discourse of integration. As Yan Hairong’s observations of Beijing’s first migrant organization reveals, the predominant discourse since the rise of neoliberal hegemony in China has been to tie
migrant subjectivity to their integration into mainstream culture. Yan articulated this process of integration as part of the neoliberal promise that self-development according to the demands of the market would lead to individual social mobility and national development (Yan 2008, 194). The maintenance of antagonism to “mainstream culture,” or more specifically “capital’s cultural products,” becomes a key foundation to the type of subjectivity that the Migrant Workers Home seeks to foster in the process of “becoming migrant.” This complicated relationship between consciousness and the construction of new migrant culture, as opposed to the unveiling of a subject transitive to history, also troubles the immediate grasp that we have of existing Marxisms. Then, what kind of Marxism is this, and thus what kind of political struggle is being proposed?

At first glance, the Migrant Workers Home seems to draw upon the familiar Marxist-Leninist concept of consciousness-raising, which has become a well-developed object of critique in scholarly work. In this tradition, Marxism was seen to be confined to the economy, with only a critique of the self (illusions, ideologies) and a teleology of consciousness tied to history. If this were true, because capital was seen as self-developing (due to its own internal dialect, autonomously of working class struggle), then capitalist domination was complete, and economic struggles by the working class would not spontaneously lead to revolution. The necessity for politics, rather than history, takes the form of the vanguard party who could take the state, speed up development and get to communism. This meant that organization of struggle to gain consciousness of one’s self as a class against capital required the party, somehow external to historical and economic determinants, to guide scattered interests into a whole (Cleaver 2000, 52).

At second glance, the organization might recall the politics of Western Marxism in their emphasis on working class culture. In this tradition of thought, total capitalist
domination in the economic realm was extended to the realm of culture through state planning. With the extension of the commodity form to all aspects of life, the working class was understood to be integrated into bourgeois society by their cooptation. Here, consciousness became a problem in the face of bourgeois cultural hegemony that manipulates the working class, and inculcates their consent through institutions. The political struggle in this tradition, takes the form of revealing the ideological domination in our daily lives and to affirm already existing cultures of subordinated groups, or to build a broad consensus across civil society in the process toward political (state) power.

During China’s revolution, the distinctly agrarian and peasant society, which prompted theoretical and practical experimentation, gave the Chinese Communist Party a specific task of mobilizing the peasantry, and through the peasantry the creation of a new politics and a new society. Wang Hui argues that in this interaction, it is important to acknowledge both how the Party became rooted as an extremely grassroots social movement in contrast to Eastern European socialist countries, and how peasant initiative and creativity figured greatly in the revolution (Wang H. 2011). This is because for Mao, revolutionary consciousness was not just a reflection of social reality (the set of guides for everyday activity shaped by social and material circumstances as well as inherited cultural traditions), but a mode of thinking it anew and changing it, a dynamic material moment in revolutionary activity making theory and practice, concrete needs of the immediate situation and the creation of something else beyond reproduction, inseparable processes necessary for both intellectuals and peasants (Dirlik 1983). Thus, there is no pre-existing culture or subjectivity to be affirmed, but the necessity to create a new culture and new subjectivity.

The Migrant Workers Home, it will seem, identifies with many of these strands of thought and historical practices. Departing from post-modern aversions to the legacy
of Marxist-Leninism in affirming the importance of organization and consistency, there is also an analysis of “hegemony,” and perhaps even “counter-hegemony,” as well as a dynamic notion of culture and subjectivity. Rather than seeing how the Migrant Workers Home has been influenced by various Marxisms, itself a complex set of traditions with different orientations on economic determinism, vanguardism, categories of class and labor, it becomes clear that the Migrant Workers Home poses a problematic to the contemporary left scholarship and its own relationship to Marxism as theory rather than a practice of struggle. Perhaps the open and non-ideological nature of the Migrant Workers Home’s projects, while certainly making use of theories of consciousness and culture, are a result of being shaped and developed by their daily practices and needs, which opens a door to tie consciousness to both existing conditions and the “impossible Real.” Xu Duo explains:

“These steps weren’t led by ideas, but constantly in accord with real demands, formed out of actual practice. At the same time, every step of our development, all have been in the midst of China’s existing social order, in the framework of reality, to expand a space. So, this is the freshest example, most concrete vital practice, most expandable experience. This time’s global economic crisis has shattered many migrant workers fantasies. Our simple, hard, actual living labor (shenghuo de laodong), will be our existing force. We’re not moving forward through ideals, we shape ourselves and seek hope in the midst of collisions with reality.”

In fact, one way to negotiate the constant slippage between the attention to consciousness by the Migrant Workers Home and the existing Marxist analytic frameworks is to think about how “consciousness” here is being used more expansively than the traditional reference to existing conditions (economic or cultural). It is precisely the tie between existing conditions and unknown possibilities through the decisive political subject, in other words Marxism as nothing other than the possibility for politics, which is so often lost in intellectual critiques.

It is through the demands of daily life that the Migrant Workers Home is led to experimentation and strategy, which is articulated as the second important element of sustaining a political subject. In re-defining what it means to be a “migrant” and
“worker,” including both the affirmation of a new subject and a rejection of mainstream society, the Migrant Workers Home seeks to create a migrant culture. What does it mean to create a migrant culture? How does this activity relate to their political struggle? Below, I look at how the project to create migrant culture provides a concrete practice of what the organization calls being “unfinished/never-ending.” This subjective orientation toward the new constitutes the second important element of political struggle for the Migrant Workers Home.

3.4 Opening to the New

“If memory is constitutive of identity and self-representation, this kind of conscious forgetting may be an act of leaving memory and identity open to future re-membering, a refashioning of self-representation and membership by re-articulating one’s memory... In this sense, remembering or memory opened up to re-articulation is also a potential process of ‘re-membering,’ or forging a new membership.” (Yan H. 2008, 5)

The Migrant Cultural Arts Museum (dagong wenhua yishu buowuguan) was opened by the Migrant Workers Home organization in Picun in 2008. The museum lies off the main road of Picun north of their elementary school, right next to the local governments’ own cultural arts center. The government-run center includes typical leisure activities for local residents, as well as a recent project to document Jinzhan’s “culture” before the large-scale plans for demolitions are carried through and its residents have disappeared. The concept of a museum has occupied a critical place in anthropologists’ reflections on the discipline’s involvement in salvage anthropology, and the appropriation, construction, and destruction of native culture (Starn 2011). In Foucault’s 1967 essay Heterotopias, the museum is one of those spaces proper to western

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culture of the nineteenth century, in the spirit of modernity that seeks to capture infinite time in an immobile place. One could imagine, then, my fascination with the concept of a migrant museum, run by migrants themselves. While most Beijing reporters who visit the museum for the first time are interested in the cultural artifacts on display, common daily life items such as wooden carts that function simultaneously for collecting trash and for sleeping in, and metal container boxes stacked on top of each other as common construction site dormitories (which later becomes commodified as a “migrant community center model” by another NGO in Beijing), I was immediately drawn to a large red banner on the wall of the museum that said, “Without our culture, we don’t have our history; without our history, we don’t have our future.”

Wang, a skinny, small man of 64 year-old wearing a Che Guevara t-shirt let me sit with him during the day when most members and local residents were away at work. Wang’s own family of two daughters all lived in Beijing now, having left the countryside in 1993 because agricultural work wasn’t sufficient to provide a living. When he left, his first daughter was only sixteen before she started to work in an electronics factory, while he worked selling produce on the street in Beijing’s south ring road of Daxing. He moved to Picun when his younger daughter returned to Hebei to go to college, who eventually returned and now also lives in Beijing. Now retired, Wang sits behind a desk providing information to visitors who drop by.

The importance of the museum to the organization was explained to me by one of the founders:

“The museum started because in mainstream media and cultural history, elites are shown, not the labor which pushed social development. There was no way to let people hear our voice, and see our culture. At the same time, we thought we cant just give our culture to those specialists, elite so called artists and professionals, because they already no longer speak for us, they have departed from this population. So we thought, why can’t we record our own cultural history? History needs its carrier, to become words, files, things you can see in order to transmit. If we

12 Not real name
don’t have this “history,” even if we create history we won’t enter history. This is the way it’s been for so many thousands of years. Like the Great Wall, we can’t see the labor of that period. Recording history requires skill, like words in olden times, but this power is concentrated in the hands of the political class. Today, with social and technological development, everyone at the basic level have elementary or high school education, everyone can read and write, along with social networking sites, cell phones, etc. every worker can capture a part of their work, lives, put on social networking sites, for everyone to see. So, today we already have workers recording their own cultural historical circumstances. So, we can create our own cultural history museum, record our own history.” Sun Heng, Migrant Workers Home

In creating a new workers culture, the museum plays a key role in an explicit struggle over representing/creating a certain historical narrative. While government and news media have sought to acknowledge migrants to the extent that they are subsumed into the narrative of development, in which migrants are born of and responsible for the “great achievements” of China’s economic growth and urbanization since the reform, the museum represents a different historical memory. Through a series of exhibits, the history of migrants in China is laid out from the perspective of the organization.

The first exhibit of the museum begins not in 1978, but in 1958 when the national household registration was legalized and systematized, “splitting society into agricultural residency and non-agricultural residency permit.” The next exhibit explains that the rural reforms of the 70’s dissolved the people’s communes and resulted in massive surplus labor in the countryside. While at first the village and township enterprises that evolved out of collective enterprises provided local employment for peasants, the “crushing” of these village and state owned enterprises created the massive wave of migration to the coastal cities. In the last exhibit of the series, a timeline of the state management of migrants highlights the cruel effects of policies such as the detention and repatriation policy instituted in 1982, the permits “industry,” and the notorious plain-clothed city gangs (chengguan) charged with policing migrants.

Key milestones of “migrant history” are the collective memory of two specific events. The first is the 1993 factory fire in the Kuiyong Zhili toy factory in Longgang, Shenzhen, where 87 migrant women died in a fire and 47 injured after being locked
inside overnight by the factory owner. The second milestone is the 2003 Sun Zhigang incident, in which a college student out after curfew after just arriving in Guangzhou was detained for not having a residence permit, and then sent to a detention center (shourong qiansong zhongzhuanzhan). After three days in the detention center, his boss and friends arrived to bail him out, only to find that he had died in a hospital after being beaten. Such incidents of migrant deaths in detention centers and asylums had become commonplace by 2003, with many stories circulating about even more horrific, unreported, fates for women. The memory of systemic violence in the self-narrative of migrant history marks an intentional rejection of the national narrative. Creating their own culture through the museum means recalling a different history and demarcating a different time and space other than the national space. More explicitly, two years ago following the Beijing Olympics, Liu Na’s husband Wang Dezhi wrote a play for their annual Migrant Cultural Arts Festival called “Our World, Our Dream,” in which he juxtaposed the major events in China’s triumphant national narrative reproduced in mainstream media, to the major events that marked migrant history. Despite the celebration of the “achievements” of reform and opening—Deng Xiaoping’s Shenzhen tour, the return of Macau and Hong Kong to the motherland, the national opera house, the Bird’s Nest, and “Shenzhen spaceships”—the characters of the play interrupt this narrative by singing in chorus, “We’ve had 30 years of reform, but after so many years, we continue to endure.”

The museum, however, was not about representing one’s self to authorities for recognition, but to objectify their own lives as a way of problematizing the normalization of inequality, and highlighting contradictions in daily life. The organization makes clear that the museum’s main audience is the migrants who live in Picun. Sun Heng explained to one reporter from the Contemporary Art and Investment
magazine (in the polite form of scolding and critique that I had also received from Liu Na and many others over my time with them):

“To change daily life, first we need to reflect on our life. Just because we live like this everyday, doesn’t mean we can see our own lives, to be awakened, aware of its problems and contradictions. We organize workshops, encourage kids to use cameras to capture their own lives, use art to describe their own lives. One kid drew a picture of his house, and he said the house was being demolished, asked ‘where will I go to school’? This event in our daily lives is too common. If we don’t go and think about it, you might think this is a normal thing: people demolish then we have to move. But if we start to think about this event, you become aware of this society’s very unjust phenomenon: Why during city planning, they don’t consider all of the people living here? Why is it that only local residents can receive compensation, but residents from elsewhere are excluded? This demolishing has what effect on our kids? What effect for our families? For us, this is real life, which needs to be faced, to be reflected on, to consider how to change our lives. Our culture and our art doesn’t depart from our lives, but to be at the service of our lives, to change the part of our lives and work that is not just.”

After the interview, I asked Wang about the subtle critique that was communicated to the journalist, an unusual emphasis on the practical use of art. He explained that it was in response to the way in which the organization’s cultural productions were constantly being evaluated by “professional artists and intellectuals,” according to its distance from daily life struggles. Just as scholarly work on migrant literature praised the sophistication of “second-generation” work that began to approach mainstream culture by embracing individual artistic expression, the work of the Migrant Workers Home was often suggested to be crude in media because of its relation to concrete migrant demands. Not only did the organization respond by affirming culture as a vehicle for changing the collective injustices faced in daily life, the organization did not shy away from a critique of those migrants who embraced and identified with mainstream culture. Wang recalled the story of one fellow youth from Hebei that had heard about the Migrant Workers Home on TV, and traveled to Beijing with dreams of becoming a celebrity with the help of the organization. Wang laughed heartily, in between violent wet coughs, that the young man was told point blank by one musician member, “your songs don’t have anything unique about them. They all sound like what’s already out there. I can teach you how to sing, but I can’t teach you what to say.
What do you want to transmit with your music? What message do you want to convey? This is something you get through experience in society. Don’t get trapped in a kind of individual space.”

The Migrant Cultural Arts Museum is an attempt by the organization to deal first with something like consciousness. By putting daily life on display, the Migrant Workers Home hopes to bring about an awareness of collective struggles faced by migrants in society. This requires a recollection/construction of history as a dual system, rather than harmoniously unified, continuously unjust rather than progressively developing. At the same time, there is a particular conception of “migrant” that is being advocated, in which the “individual space” of mainstream culture must be rejected. In other words, the subjectivity of the migrant as a collective subject oriented towards their own creations rather than mainstream society becomes an intentional area of work for the organization. Second, the museum is also a project of something like cultural hegemony, in which “through the museum a new culture can transmit, a culture which reflects the values of labor, a culture that can radiate across the country.” When asked what is meant by “mainstream culture,” one member and teacher at the school Hao Zhixi responds:

“What is mainstream culture? TV, commercials, Literature, these things, of course we can’t say they are all nonsense, they are things that exist. Why are there so many of these things? Why does the TV have so many commercials? Refrigerators, LCD TV’s, computers, these things are too expensive, we can’t even afford them. We definitely can’t afford them, because the products have nothing to do with us. We can only yearn, we can only yearn these beautiful things. The more we fantasize, the harder it is for us to face the difficulties in front of us. I think the culture of us coming out as migrants is very important. If we didn’t have our culture, we would be lost in a sort of daze brought to us by mainstream culture.”

The rejection of mainstream society thus allows for a space, some distance, whereby a new culture can develop. At the same time, the difficulties of how to conceive of “distance” must be addressed, and how the construction of subjectivity and culture
adequately allow for something new to come forth within the constraints of mainstream culture.

Arif Dirlik, in critically reflecting on the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, insightfully articulates the concept of revolution as a question of invention within the structure, or of hegemony:

Herein lies the predicament of revolution, and of socialism. The problem of language for the revolutionary is not simply the problem of acquiring a new skill, but a problem of discovering new ways in which to think about the world, its constitution and purpose. It is, in a fundamental sense, a problem of what Antonio Gramsci described as “Hegemony.” The struggle to create a new language of revolution is but a struggle to assert the hegemony of revolution over its historical inheritance. (Dirlik 1989, 28)

When revolution is posed in terms of the materiality of language and thought which conceives of another world, Dirlik gives indication to the continuity of Mao’s thought from the Chinese Revolution to the Cultural Revolution, confronted with the inevitable (structural) antagonism that arises out of the problem of creating a new world within the constraints of the world that is rejected. Dirlik comes to propose that the Cultural Revolution can be described as an attempt to create a new language of revolution, which failed in part because Mao failed to account for the incompatibility of the egalitarian values that the Cultural Revolution professed to promote, with the hierarchical political structure of a vanguard party.

While Dirlik is influenced by Mao and Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony in thinking through the problem of how the new comes forth within a structure, Anne Allison is influenced by Althusser’s theory of Ideological State Apparatuses to think through how culture works to complement state domination through the production of the normalized subject in Japan. In Allison’s ethnographic analysis, through the daily cultural practice of making and consuming boxed lunches (obentos), Japanese nursery school children and mothers are produced and self-produce themselves according to the state ideology of the proper mother and the proper Japanese student. While Dirlik sees
an opening within the structure as a problem of asserting one hegemony over the other in a way that the organizational form matches the new values, Allison suggests that there is an opening to the process of state subjectivization by the pleasure and desire that can also arise from the cultural practice itself, or the alternative practices of re-designing obentos (Allison 1991). Both Dirlik and Allison’s work inform my understanding of the Migrant Workers Home’s attempt at creating migrant culture, through a mix of creative acts and their intensification through self-run institutions and organizations.

The Migrant Workers Home, in attempting to create their own institution aimed at their own subject-making, unabashedly re-inserts the question of the political subject into the discussion on culture and subjectivity at a level of conscious intensity that most social scientists find uncomfortable. Below, I look at the third element of political struggle that the Migrant Workers Home identify in their work, which is the necessity to “be steady / reasonable,” by looking at the organization itself and how it provides a material basis for consistency for the process of cultural production and becoming “new workers.”

3.5 Consistency

The Migrant Workers Home exists at multiple levels, and I found by accompanying them on their Corporate Social Responsibility engagements or their public talks that its members often provide multiple conceptualizations of the organization depending on its audience. The organization is often invited to give presentations to university students or other NGO’s, and thus a formal narrative is part of the organization’s self-representation. The discourse of the organization has also changed over time, primarily through being told by foundations, scholars, or other organizations that their work is “actually” called “NGO” work or “civil society.”
3.5.1 Social Space

The self-articulated history of the organization began with the formation of the Migrant Youth Art Troupe in 2002, which changed its name to New Workers Art Troupe, and expanded into the Beijing Migrant Workers Home Culture and Development Center. Originally the organization’s early members travelled to migrant work sites and migrant schools to perform. They gained much experience in Beijing Haidian’s Xiaojiahe community (outside the northwest fifth ring road) and the Dongba community (east fifth ring road) working out a feasible three-pronged organizational model of a migrant neighborhood association, a community migrant school, and a culture and education community center, which allowed them to successfully register with the ministry of civil affairs as the Xiaojiahe Community Migrant Culture Education Association. Registering with the ministry of civil affairs is a difficult issue for all NGO’s in China, but particularly with sensitive issues such as migrant focused work that must register under the ambiguous category of “education” or “culture.” It is here that they learned how to relate to the local government, making sure to first gain the support of the grassroots government, the neighborhood association, which eventually penetrated upward to the street government, and the municipal government, eventually becoming an important strategy of their work model. In the words of Sun Heng, the organization’s relationship to the government is informed by an analysis of neoliberalism and its effects on the Chinese state:

“The organization started out asking for funds from government, but the government didn’t pay any attention to them. Now the scale is bigger, and the government has given them awards. In China you can’t do any work without government support. The organization has always been eager to work with the government. We’re not automatically against government. We figure out what we want, and don’t have a problem asking government to help us. Why shouldn’t we use that money? The government’s future problem is that government will get smaller and move toward the market which won’t take on social welfare, and we’ll get more and more of the third sector. The government takes our taxes to purchase social services. This is a future trend we need
With the practical experience of a feasible working model, the organization felt the next crucial step was to establish a more “autonomous base” (juyou gengduo zizhuxing de genjudi). They decided to start strategically with a self-operating (ziwo yunzhuan) migrant school for children, in order to: (1) address the major issue that migrant parents are concerned about, thus providing a common gathering point for migrants; (2) to actually find a desirable path for community development and growth specific to migrant children, rather than just merely “going to school” where current methods are incapable of addressing the fragmented realities of migrant children’s education; (3) have a concrete base from which to launch more autonomous activities (“yici wei genjudi kaizhan juyou gengduo zizhuxing de huodong”). With the profits from the art troupe’s first album “All Labor Under the Sky is One Family” (750,000 RMB, about 119,000 USD), the members of the art troupe rented a piece of land from the Picun village government in 2005 and constructed the Tongxin Experimental School for migrant children between kindergarten and 6th grade. During the day the space functions as a school for children, while during the night it functions as the Beijing Migrant Worker Home Cultural Development Center offering night classes for adults, movie showings, a library, ping-pong competitions, legal workshops, as well as an experimental community union. This time, the organization was registered as an enterprise (gongshang), a common way for grassroots organizations to register with the government without a major sponsoring government NGO to support them. Xu Duo reflects, “With this base, our activities became more autonomous.”

With this recurrent theme of autonomy, the organization started a “social enterprise” (as one professor from Tsinghua informed them of its proper name) in 2006 called the Tongxin Huhui Store, in which the organization receives donated items from
collection points throughout the city that are sold at low affordable cost to migrants in Picun. With the establishment of a Social Enterprise Training Center, the two projects not only provided a key source of independent funding and self-employment, they also provided a way to have the graduating youth feed back into and help sustain the migrant community through social enterprises rather than the individuating neoliberal project of self-development commonly found in migrant schools across Beijing. As one graduate from the Tongxin Experimental School, Rui Liao commented, "Right now I’m preparing to go to… a migrant middle school. But compared with public schools, that one emphasizes our skills/talents, the development of our physical work capacity [the emphasis on manual and material labor]. But the equipment and surrounding environment might be a bit worse." Rui Liao’s mother lives in Beijing working for a public welfare organization, and sees her daughter once a week or sometimes once a month due to the long distance and time of public transportation. In Rui Liao’s eyes, education is not necessarily to change her fate, as is the common purpose stated by other migrant schools. She talks quickly, excitedly, that she wants to provide public service for migrants:

“I know a lot of those bitter migrant stories, where they think their differences with white collar workers is very big. We need to let them know that they are the most glorious, that actually labor is the most glorious. Without them, how would city people live in big skyscrapers; without them, how would city people eat food? I support my mom in providing these achievements for them. Even though these achievements don’t add to our family wealth, but I don’t believe that we’re poor. We may be even wealthier than those big CEO’s because our inner world is very rich.”

The unmistakable influence of the Migrant Workers Home on Rui Liao’s orientation toward the migrant community points toward a sort of “forcing” that Badiou articulated, a process by which the capitalist reproduction of social relations is interrupted, and provided consistency somehow. In Sun Heng’s words, “Our idea is to organize our vitality, not based on individual development, but our collective organization.”
By 2008 the Migrant Cultural Arts Museum opened north of the school, and in 2009 the New Workers Theater stage was built next to the school, where they held the first Cultural Arts Festival in 2009, and the Migrant New Years Gala in 2011. These festivals double as a national networking space for migrant self-run organizations across the country, to share ideas and discuss the development of “migrant culture.” A banner hangs above the entrance to the New Workers Theater with their motto “Building our own stage, performing our own songs” (ziji datai, ziji changxi). This is a cheeky twist on the typical saying in China, “Government puts up the stage, and common people perform” (you zhengfu lai datai, baixing lai changxi). When I asked why it was so important for the organization to have this motto, Sun Heng said, “Because when you don’t have your own stage, you don’t have a place from which to express your own voice. You can only go to someone else’s stage to give objections.”

One of the organization’s experimental projects that brought a representative of the party magazine snooping around was the establishment of a community-based union for the migrants in Picun. The community union raised alarms because it did not fall under any existing organizational form (either the state union or the neighborhood association). With donations and funding from Hong Kong based foundations, the union was set up in 2011 as an attempt to address the concrete problems facing migrant membership in the traditional state-run union, including not staying on a job long enough to qualify for union membership or justify paying the fees, the inability for the union to address migrants not working in big enterprises or working multiple odd jobs, the non-transferability of various social welfare and labor protection schemes to other work sites. These problems underscore how the current interest among left scholars and activists to reform the state union to “include” migrant workers remains heavily focused on factories, leaving out the growing experience of migrants working in urban cities.
Sun Heng explained, “We hope there will be a community union, because many workers in small enterprises don’t have power. But maybe if they return to their community, if there is a union in the community, beyond the gaps of the enterprise. This is what we are experimenting in Picun now.” Currently the community based union influences about 50% of the Picun migrant community, working separately but carefully parallel to the local government. For the Migrant Workers Home, the project is not so much about unions, as it is seen as another component of a larger project of finding an effective organizational form for migrants.

Together, the range of projects constituting the Migrant Workers Home is an intentional creation of a larger ecology of migrant institutions. For this reason, Sun Heng explains the significance of a “home” for migrants:

“The community activity center’s important meaning is to provide a home for migrants. In the rural village, we have a family, brothers and sisters, dad and mom, classmates and hometown. When you run into trouble, there’s someone to help you. But when we individually go to the city, the city doesn’t have an organization for us, doesn’t have anyone to care about us. When we run into trouble, it’s hard to face as an individual. For example with no schools, our children cant learn; with no activity center, library, theater, if we want to read books, see movies, we don’t have any place to go. If we didn’t have the Worker’s Art Troupe, we wouldn’t have a place to sing. This home is a social support network, so if an individual runs into problems, we can go through this family and mobilize resources, mobilize the power of mutual support, mutual help. The number of these migrants is so large, and don’t have their own organization, so they don’t have a method to form an effective community. Everyone just lives together, but don’t have contact, and don’t recognize anyone. Our work on cultural educational organizing can unite everyone to get social resources. Actually our museum and library, theater, all come from existing unused social resources, furniture, facilities, a lot we picked up. But with this platform, we can mobilize community residents to participate in community construction. So every year we organize every kind of practice, education, culture, activity, for everyone to use as a platform, to bring closer everyone’s communication.

The constant experimentation with finding alternative organizational forms for producing collective social relations pervades all the projects constituting the Migrant Workers Home. The construction of a migrant community does not happen spontaneously nor does it exist naturally; furthermore, each experimentation and creation does not automatically exist as a radical or liberating alternative in itself.

Without a doubt, the lessons of the Migrant Workers Home point to the need to imagine
and strive at the level of imagining other world spaces—new sensations, perceptions, a space and time, images and concepts, language and rationality, theories and social practices. This subjective “distance” created and given consistency in various experimental forms, also changes the circumstances that first defined the tensions between mainstream culture and migrant culture.

3.5.2 Global Space

The final major element to the Migrant Workers Home is their virtual existence, the active utilization of micro-blogs, web space, videos, live discussion rooms, and other social media. Recently they have been involved in a larger campaign to build a virtual space under the title of “New Workers” which must be elaborated in order to understand its distinction from other kinds of projects targeting migrant subjectivities and deployed by different NGO’s (elaborated more in the last two chapters). The New Workers (xin gongren) website was launched in 2011 by the Migrant Workers Home as a space for grassroots theorizing and learning, but also a distinct intensification of their own theoretical positions and pedagogy. The theoretical and pedagogical interventions that they make can be articulated as the following: (1) the concept of “new workers” is posed as a question by providing space for analyzing and discussing the state of class today, the conditions of labor, the history of migrants, and contemporary workers; (2) encouraging analysis of contemporary workers to encompass understanding of the “three rural problems,” macroeconomic movements, people’s livelihoods, and national government policies; (3) encouraging strategy as a mode of thought, which requires an analysis of history, geopolitics, social transformation, and theoretical debates on Marxism, socialism, and capitalism; (4) by tying new workers to global socialism, including specific attention to Africa-Latin America research, Europe-American research,
global social movements, and the history of workers; (5) providing a cultural space for a “people’s dictionary” and mass art arising out of migrant experiences.

This active use of social media has implicated them in complex webs including the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) world. As with many grassroots organizations that I spent time with, from the bottom up the daily impact of CSR on the Migrant Workers Home is disconnected, ad hoc, and selective. With the rise of the organization’s visibility, they have been partnered with large multinational corporations to collaborate in limited CSR projects. I was present when the Migrant Workers Home’s Tongxin Huhui social enterprise store initiated a small project with Microsoft at their corporate headquarters in Wangjing, Beijing in the fall of 2011. The project consisted of setting up a donation collection point at the Microsoft headquarters where employees could bring items from home to donate. The profits from re-selling the items were then used to fund other community projects or directly support migrant families facing economic hardship. During these limited CSR engagements, white-collar employees (mostly female employees) dropped off clothes and household items in Zara or Apple shopping bags.

Afterward, as part of common practice in the Chinese NGO world, the Migrant Workers Home put on a performance featuring migrant children who attended the organization’s Tonxin Experimental School for the white collar employees. With banners reading “Cherishing Migrant Children, Compassionate Donating Ceremony,” and nine students dancing to Lou Bega’s mambo beats in “I’ve Got a Girl” and Britney Spears’ “Oops I Did it Again,” I couldn’t help but ask Xu Duo after the show, who had MC’ed the ceremony in his favorite Che Guevara t-shirt, whether this wasn’t a bit frustrating to him? I had been in enough spaces like this with other Chinese NGO’s to know that these types of performances were part of a tacit code of politeness and giving good
appearances for both “sides” (the recipient and the giver), but particularly for the giver (who is always given a space to speak and to perform).

I asked whether the organization found these CSR gigs useful to their project, and how they related to it? Xu Duo explained that for them, the point is that the migrant issue is not an individual issue, but a social problem. “As a social problem, society is made up of many levels, and its not resolvable on any one single level.” These include corporate responsibility, government responsibility, public responsibility. But I think the most important is workers for them selves (gongren qunti zishen). The corporations, the governments, the public, are external conditions.” At the same time, Wang Dezhi admitted that since their rise in the public eye, “eventually people started to pay attention to us, to ‘explain’ us, especially some experts explained us; we can reflect ourselves as well.” While he saw their creations arising out of “our own lives as migrants,” people began to “explain” to them that their organization was engaging in a “non-profit,” a “social enterprise,” or “civil society.” So over time their public presentations began to integrate these terms as well because it might help to translate their work to faculty and donors who create and circulate these discourses.

These words were to stay with me in thinking through how this organization dealt with the “external” conditions including the elite world of CSR, and government demolitions taking hold around them, and how to strategize given the openings and closures that came with it. It was through these public networks built over time that the Migrant Workers Home was able to keep their school from demolition in the summer of 2012, and these networks became critical in the dissemination of their own information when it became clear that the forced closures were being presented falsely by government news sources, as independent decisions made by the migrant schools to close themselves. Having cultivated relationships with news media, university
professors, researchers, student volunteers, weibo (microblog) followers, with donations from Renmin Ribao and CCTV, the Beijing Volunteer Organization, China Youth Development Foundation, Oxfam, Siemens, Bayer, China Construction Bank, and many other public and private entities, the public familiarity of the organization made it an automatic sympathetic feature story of news media during the time of the threatened school closure, including feature stories by such high profile sources as Caixin, CCTV, and the China Youth Daily. I argue in the next chapters that the space produced by CSR, as well as the current national take on “culture,” has allowed the Migrant Workers Home organization a historically contingent space to operate; at the same time, the opening to “civil society” introduces new logics of power that the Migrant Workers Home and other migrant organizations increasingly face on unequal terms. The importance of “autonomy” for the Migrant Workers Home, then, differs from “civil society” both theoretically and in practice. Understanding this difference allows one to see how the “migrant issue” must be grasped as scission between integration and autonomy.

3.6 Conclusion: Autonomy?

“The autonomous elaboration of new ways of being, of new social relationships, alternative to those of capitalism...struggles that go beyond resistance to various kinds of positive, socially constitutive self-activity...In the history of traditions that I call ‘autonomist Marxist’ we find an evolution toward an extension of the political appreciation of the ability of workers to act autonomously, toward a re-conceptualization of crisis theory that grasps it as a crisis of class power, toward a redefinition of ‘working class’ that both broadens it to include the unwaged, deepens the understanding of autonomy to interclass relations, and also recognizes the efforts of ‘workers’ to escape their class status and become something more.” (Cleaver 2000, 18)

Given their embeddedness within complicated webs of local and global power structures, including the growing moral imperative for “public-private partnerships” that is variously called CSR, what does the Migrant Workers Home and its members
mean by “autonomy,” then? Throughout my time with them, I have come to learn the historically and culturally specific meaning of “autonomy” for the Migrant Workers Home.

The issue, or the term “autonomy,” is particularly charged for China scholars. Aihwa Ong, for example, who is prolific about ethnographic driven theorizing of “global assemblages,” “neoliberalism as exception,” and “governmentality,” has often targeted the work of Hardt and Negri as “sweeping” and “decontextualized” theory about both capital and labor. In particular, because Empire and Multitude are read by Ong as a “claim that the mobile multitude of working people across the world can be subsumed under a united front to confront globalized capital,” the work of ethnography is to show both the incredible power of capital and the state to be flexible, heterogeneous, and far reaching in daily life, as well as “the actual, multiple, and segregated conditions of workers in the Empire’s networks” (Ong 2006, 121). In response to an autonomist Marxist reading of globalization, whose distinct analytical contributions show how capital restructures and responds to working class self-activity rather than operating by capital’s own internal logics, Ong ironically positions anthropology to show how agency always lies in the state and capital, in relation to the fragmentation of living labor. In addition to this specific rejection of the work of Hardt and Negri, China is often seen as a foil for claims to “autonomy” in its broader use in political theory. Here, the term is conflated with a constellation of related debates about state sovereignty and independence, the self-contained individual of the western political subject, civil society, the withering of the state, and the free, self-managing and self-enterprising neoliberal subject.

Among Chinese scholars on the mainland, the term “autonomy” (zizhuxing) and “self-governance” (zizhi) is highly taboo when referring to grassroots workers
initiatives. Both terms are rejected on the analysis that they come from western political ideologies originating in the rise of capitalism, based on individual rights and property relations safeguarded by a limited state and a free society. In mainstream Chinese scholarship, “autonomy” is unequivocally in reference to state autonomy—complete sovereignty, political independence, and economic self-sufficiency (Wang H. 2011). In this case, the significance of autonomy is inflected with the Chinese Marxist-Leninist history of the dual goals of national independence from imperialism and social revolution, and persisted in the question of China’s internal development needs in relation to the needs of global capitalism (Dirlik 1974).

During the Cultural Revolution, autonomy uniquely took on the reference to popular needs and aspirations rather than state needs, through the autonomy of culture in producing society. In addition, the Cultural Revolution crystallized the notion of Third World autonomy from both Euro-American capitalism and Soviet-style socialism, and de-linking from the global capitalist system in order to remain committed to public values and overcoming internal divisions and hierarchies between class, gender, mental and manual labor. While such national aspirations seem quaint in the era of global capitalism and its global crises, Dirlik reminds us that the legacy of Maoism leaves us with a notion of autonomy that includes the active participation of popular people in their own and collective development:

“No longer to be left in the hands of experts, development conceived along these lines brought the ‘people’ into the center stage of the developmental process. In order for such a process to work, it was necessary also to prioritize collective values over private ones, for cooperation and everyday negotiation were crucial to the achievement of social goals. Politically, the process required participation in collective decision making on a daily basis, creating unprecedented possibilities for grassroots democratic participation in social life. The laboring population—that is to say the majority of the people—would be responsible also for managing its own productive life. At the most fundamental level, the insistence on self-reliance was premised on a recognition of the subjectivity of the people, and their ability to manage their subjectivities in accordance with social goals.” (Dirlik 2003a, 248)
The Cultural Revolution thus not only created a multi-layered sense of autonomy—collective self reliance and democratic management as a means to national formation, as well as community formation—but also introduced a contradiction between the vision of autonomous communities and the existence of a hierarchical Party-state bureaucracy. It is only through the erasure of these aspects of Mao Zedong Thought can we come to understand the current hegemony of the state and the market in capturing all imagination and meaning of the term “autonomy.”

Adding to the sensitivity and complexity of the term in the wake of China’s integration into global capitalism and the growth of a capitalist class among party officials is the political and ideologically charged interventions of U.S. media on the issues of the Chinese state-owned union, the uprisings in Tibet, or Taiwan, which entrenches the term in a false opposition between western freedom/Chinese authoritarianism, or capitalism/socialism. By the 90’s, “autonomy” became associated with the debates of social and individual autonomy in relation to the state, in other words the notion of “civil society,” as neoliberal policies and the creation of waged labor became hegemonic. The reception of autonomist Marxism by Chinese scholars, far from presenting a political challenge, is acknowledged as a major post-World War II development in Marxist thought on the study of advanced capitalism (Sun 2010, 2011).

Treated primarily as a methodology for analyzing capital-labor relations in understanding the different forms of capitalist modes of production, Autonomist Marxism is neutralized by becoming a theory of political economy. For this reason, “workers autonomy” is seamlessly folded into the neoliberal state narrative of “independent innovation,” which is incredibly traced through the lineage of Marx, Mao, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao (Peng and Qin 2011).
As Dirlik suggests, the shift in Mao’s thought from the party-state to the “people” as the site for collective development and democratic self-management resonated with the struggles taking place during the 60’s in Euro-American contexts. From the early work of the Johnson-Forest Tendency with the independence movement in Trinidad, the struggles of American blacks in the South and auto factories in Detroit, to the French Socialisme ou Barbarie group and the Italian New Left, a set of analyses and experiences took hold which share commonalities with the Chinese context. As Harry Cleaver articulates in the quote above, in the specific tradition of autonomist Marxism, the concept of “autonomy” arose from close studies of working class struggle in Italy and the US and the rise of state capitalism, which revealed the proliferation of working class struggles independent of both the party and the state. Additionally, “autonomy” referred to how workers’ activities were often oriented towards creating alternative forms of social relations and ways of being rather than purely in response and in resistance to capitalism. “Autonomy,” then, is posed specifically against the Marxist-Leninist narrative of the party or the state as the privileged site of politics, and the over-attention in Marxist scholarship to the internal logics of capitalism and its complete domination in social life (Cleaver 2000). Chapter 2 of this dissertation attempted to trace the influence of Maoism in global struggles signified by May ’68, which disrupts the argument that this tradition of Marxism and its specific political interventions is foreign or unnatural to the Chinese context. As Wang Hui and Badiou have both argued, the current form of China’s party-state, which figures so prominently in scholarship on workers struggles as an all-pervasive force, must itself be understood as arising out of a history of popular struggle over the possibility for another political imaginary that might include alternative organizations, social life, and subjectivities outside of the party-state (Dirlik 2003, Bosteels 2005, Wang H. 2011). I argue that it is
possible to analyze the presence of the Chinese state in daily life without rejecting the tradition of autonomy arising from the conjuncture between Maoism and the 60’s, which I see contributing a sensibility and commitment to making visible the creative and cooperative aspects of living labor in forming alternatives to state and capital.

Once “autonomy” itself is historicized, the possibility for understanding the Migrant Workers Home is expanded beyond the discourse of the state and the market. In their own narrative of the growth of Migrant Workers Home, expressed through the organization’s motto “Constructing for ourselves, performing for ourselves,” autonomy took on the following meaning: First, autonomy was articulated as the necessity for the organization to move beyond “objections,” in Sun Heng’s words, by practically establishing their own territorial and institutional space alternative to the ones already in existence. In this sense, the “capacity to hold a position” through this alternative space is also the process of “torsion,” where something else can emerge besides “mainstream society.” Second, this space allowed the Migrant Workers Home to constantly experiment with new forms of organizations that matched the needs of migrants’ daily lives. This orientation toward being “unfinished” and “never-ending,” a subjective orientation towards the new, is captured in institutional form. Third, those experiments that seek organizational form to meeting daily needs developed into a series of institutions that reinforced the creation of new collective subjects with new needs, as well as new contradictions. In this sense, being “steady” and “reasonable” means providing consistency for the entire process whereby antagonistic subjects re-shape their conditions, and in turn are re-shaped as well.

At the same time, the Migrant Workers Home experimented variously with how to act in the highly grassroots reach of state surveillance and control. Rather than take ideological stances toward an increasingly market oriented party-state, Sun Heng
articulated the organization’s relationship to local government as strategic decisions given the particulars of the situation and the project, as well as larger trends in the transformation of state-society relations. While the realities of the state and market shape the field in which migrants struggle for a dignified life, the Migrant Workers Home in various articulations still see capitalism as the primary force in the degradation of migrant lives. Sun Heng comments:

“For the majority of workers capitalism isn’t the direction; communism is. We need to go through organization to improve our power and living standards. Workers originated and self-run organization. We can’t just say the problem is society, the problem is government. We need to raise our own consciousness and knowledge first, because government is a reflection of a type of people. Why do we particularly emphasize cultural education? Because it’s easy to destroy and get rid of things, but what’s much harder is to construct something, and cultural education is about long-term transformation in thought, so that’s why we emphasize labor and worker’s cultural education, to transform a person’s development.”

In contrast to the homogenous image of an authoritarian party-state portrayed by many scholars, the Migrant Workers Home must operate and differentiate within contradictions, as well as create their own space for popular politics. Echoing the sentiments of scholars such as Wang Hui and Nonini, the party is experienced as a distinct force and logic in relation to that of capital, a distinction that has implications for political practice more than empirical scholarship. While it is an open question for many the extent to which inclusion and representation via the party is even a possibility, the Migrant Workers Home orients their struggle not to fight for independent parties, freedom of speech, or other state-oriented forms of democracy, but to bolster the capacity for new subjects to construct and “reflect” something else besides what is given in society.

As CSR increasingly constitutes the social space of non-governmental organizations, the Migrant Workers Home selectively chose partnerships and small projects that allow them to maintain relative control over the process and the outcome. However, as they confront the growth of new forces through CSR that impose a new
logic and practice, organizations and its members become transformed as well. Not only is there pressure to adopt a new language of “civil society,” but also the logic and orientation of their work is pressured as well. For example, Sun Heng recalls the constant pressure by university students and corporate volunteers to “leverage their resources for greatest impact,” for example as a labor dispatch organization to connect migrant workers to the job market. According to the logic of donors, the rate at which the Migrant Workers Home was able to create employment was not as successful compared to other organizations that specialized in “employment.” In fact, none of the Migrant Workers Home’s programs could be considered “specialized” in the typical CSR areas of “education,” “labor rights,” “youth,” or “culture.” This is because the programs, according to the logic of the organization, are focused on a collective subject of “new workers,” which is irreducible to these various significations.

The kinds of negotiations and struggles that take place in the encounter with state and market logics on a day to day basis for the Migrant Workers Home suggests that in practice, autonomy is always a constant collective struggle over the subjective and material conditions for creativity and decision-making. Creating the conditions for autonomy takes intentional collective planning and strategizing, studying, discussing, debating, experimenting, and overall, discipline. These lessons perhaps mark the specifically metropolitan nature of these migrant struggles where modes of control differ from those found in the factory. In the space of the city, where multiple logics of power operate, and momentarily coincide in the discourse on culture, the Migrant Workers Home must also struggle for the production of antagonistic subjectivities.

The projects for self-organization discussed in this chapter provide the possibility that the conditions of struggle, the contradictions, and the tools of resistance are changed before and after sites of confrontation. In the next chapter, I introduce
Corporate Social Responsibility with an ethnography of how the Migrant Workers Home’s self-run migrant school encountered the threat of closure in the summer of 2012, which begins and ends with a different dynamic between state and market actors. The event reveals the various interests that are invested in migrants at the level of government, corporate, and public life through complex, unstable, yet persisting public-private partnerships. A closer look at the incident shows how the concepts of “public” and “private” are deployed selectively through these partnerships of CSR according to different techniques of civil society and culture. I argue that the incident reveals how the social space itself is being shaped by CSR, and the consequences of these transformations for migrant organizations is a delimitation of possible field of actions. The chapter then steps back to contextualize the origins and rise of Corporate Social Responsibility in Beijing among a mix of international and domestic, market and state actors. I argue that the global CSR movement is a capitalist restructuring in response to global and domestic movements against neoliberalism that gave rise to the Hu Jintao era, and thus draws upon distinctly neoliberal traditions and new techniques of “civil society” to address unstable elements in society including migrant self-organizing.
4. Corporate Social Responsibility from “Above”

4.1 Migrant Schools, Demolitions, and Social Responsibility

“We must still completely rely on our own hard work and our striving”
—Sun Heng commemorating the start of the Tongxin Experimental School’s fall term September 3, 2012

4.1.1 Tongxin Experimental School

On June 19 2012, the Beijing Chaoyang Jinzhan Township Education Health department (Jinzhaxiang jiaoyuweishengke) sent two employees to the Migrant Workers Home’s self-run migrant school Tongxin Experimental School, and without explanation, handed the principal the dreaded notice to shut down the school. The Migrant Workers Home had been expecting this day for a while, and the rapidly changing commitments among all levels of government necessitated a constant habit of strategizing multi-pronged initiatives and experimentations. They had begun dialogues with various migrant schools and experts years ago, and had also been attempting to apply for a formal operating license with the Chaoyang District Education Committee (Chaoyangqu Jiaowei) since 2007. Since then the District Education Committee would send someone to do regular checkups on the school, but formal recognition was never granted. Because this perpetual non-decision on the legal status of migrant self-run schools is common across the city, local Picun village government took the continued checkups as tacit, albeit non-final approval by the Chaoyang Education Committee for the school to continue operating. As with other migrant schools, the notice for immediate forced closure came suddenly, citing the ambiguous reasons of “safety” and “sanitation” risks as their legal justification. I stood in the school courtyard two weeks later after the Migrant Workers Home decided to go public with what was taking place through their social media channels in a widespread call for support. I was shocked to find the atmosphere so energetic, with old volunteers dropping by throughout the week
to show support—university students, professors, white collar employees from former corporate social responsibility gigs, Hong Kong exchange student association, music bands, etc. Before going public, the teachers and school staff, the parents, and the advisory committee from the Migrant Workers Home had decided together to continue on with finishing the school term and beginning summer classes, while the organization consulted with lawyers and wrote a response to the Jinzhan government for open dialogue. Attached to the response was a large stack of hundreds of wrinkled handwritten letters from students and their parents, many written in crayon, all of whom vouched to stand by the school and support its continued existence to the end (“women jianchi daodi”). Throughout these meetings with parents, everyone felt that if the school was demolished and families were forced to leave, the organization would have to leave as well; “there’s no point in staying here without our community,” Principal Jinhua relayed her feelings. Jinhua herself was barely 29 years old, a recent college graduate of social work from Hunan, and dedicated member of the organization.

The response letter to the Jinzhan government took the route of suggesting that the forced closure was an illegal exercise of power by the local township government, requiring the decision of county level government or above according to recent laws passed on the management of privately run migrant schools. They asked for open discussion with the local township and district government, with the goal of ensuring the migrant childrens’ legal right to education. As Principal Jinhua recalled, the response from the township committee was, “don’t talk so much nonsense, talk more realistic demands.” Despite the rudeness of the response, she said they knew that there was some anxiety behind the scenes of the township government, because in the past experience of migrant school closures, nobody is even able to reach someone at the government office let alone get a response before demolition occurs.
As summer classes started, donations began to pour in from all over the city, from bookstores, individual donors, and news agencies. Almost as if planned, the new documentary of Picun filmed by CCTV last year aired for the first time on national TV. The effect of these domestic and international displays of support seemed to give the parents and children an intense, infectious energy that sometimes came out in some student misbehavior in class. I was keeping one student company one afternoon on July 23, who had gotten in a fight with his classmate in the third grade after school. I admitted to the principal long ago that I did not naturally enjoy spending large amounts of time with children, which was quite unfortunate for someone who is interested in migrant struggles in Beijing. Nevertheless with the anxiety of impending demolitions running through my mind, I tried to ground myself in Xiao Feng’s universe and what he was going through. Apparently he had tried to exact revenge on his classmate for not paying attention in English class, to teach his classmate a lesson for his English teacher. As we sat in the courtyard throughout his punishment, we both noticed some noise in the front of the school.

When we reached the school gate, we saw on the other side six security men (baoan), in blue and black uniforms sent from the local village committee. Most migrant youth will be able to tell you that there are at least three very different kinds of policing personnel, telling you if you should run or not: (1) actual police (gongan or zhian), which are the ones that have the broadest power, and can put migrants in detention, jail, or repatriation; (2) auxiliary security (baoan), who are to be less feared and usually found in small communities or hired by private companies to protect a set area, and (3) those in charge of keeping urban order (chengguan), but usually experienced by migrants as gangs of men who use violence to break up migrant businesses, harass them for permits, or worse. My third grader thankfully told me that these six men were the
second category (baoan). By then, the head of the six security men had ripped off the sign “enrolling students” on the front of the school gate, and had posted a closure notice stamped by the Picun village committee and the Picun party while the other men took photos of the school and prevented parents from entering the school courtyard. The notice was a termination of the land contract between the school and the village committee, due to “illegal construction” without proper approval. The school had 10 days from the date of receiving the notice to shut down. For the next week, everyday the security personnel sat at the entrance to the door from 8am to 5pm preventing people from entering the school. The village committee even refused to accept the monthly rent. Meanwhile, various parents received phone calls from the village committee spreading misinformation that the school had already closed down. The Migrant Workers Home worked hard to maintain communication with parents through the spaces built by their other programs, facilitating the exchange of information about such tactics.

As the number of students dropped in attendance, the organization had been mobilizing the help of six high profile faculty and public figures to write an open letter (including the national CPPCC member and celebrity CCTV host Cui Yongyuan, professor of history and literature at the Central Party school Liu Chen, Chinese Academy of Social Science researcher Bo Wei, Tsinghua University Sociology faculty Shen Yuan, and the big-hitters Renmin University Agricultural and Rural Development professor Wen Tiejun, and China’s Rural Construction Planning Academy Li Changping to the minister of the National Ministry of Education. The celebrity CCTV host Cui Yongyuan stepped up the support through an open call for public pressure on his micro-blog. In the next few days, they were able to get a meeting with the city and the Chaoyang district education committees, where they pushed the need to ensure the migrant childrens’ legal right to education, which was much easily guaranteed by
keeping the school open than addressing the concrete barriers of re-assignment to public schools. The actual process of re-assigning migrant students after their schools were shut down was coming under heavy scrutiny from news media as a non-option for most migrants, who were finding unwillingness from public schools to accept the migrant children, and unreasonable expectations for migrant children to obtain seven kinds of certification before they were allowed to register for continued education, and hiked tuition prices. Nevertheless, during the meeting they faced another typical government strategy, in which the district and township government each denied responsibility for the actual closing of the school and its resolution.

After the unprecedented and anticlimactic chance to speak with government officials during the process of forced closure, on August 2 the school’s water supply was shut off, and a small bulldozer was sent to dig up a massive trench in front of the school. This time, a representative from the Picun village committee, the much scarier police (paichusuo minjing), and security personnel (zhian lianfang renyuan) were sent. When I arrived that afternoon after receiving their microblog, a piece of the long road to the school down the main street of Picun was indeed completely dug up. Students and parents were carefully gripping the sides of building walls to get to the school, while volunteers were carrying loads of bottled water to the school staff in a show of support. Everyone was preparing for the worst, as this childish tactic was a common way in which residents were forced off their land. Professor Li Changping, famous left rural activist, also rushed over upon hearing of the bulldozer. However, the rest of the afternoon passed quickly helping volunteers to carry water in to the school, while others sat in classrooms talking through their options. In the afternoon, they decided that members of the Migrant Workers Home would visit the Jinzhan township government for open discussion, who reiterated to them “we’re not responsible for disputes in the
village.” By evening everyone was huddled around the classroom sharing information and talking through their next steps. Expecting panic and the need to provide moral support, I found instead a resolve and energy amongst the parents and the organization, a subjectivity, that remained open in the face of what seemed to me impossible odds. I decided to not stay overnight, in order not to provide any excuse as a source of security concern for the school.

When I returned early the next morning, the Picun vice mayor and the major were surprisingly already at the site along with some workers to fix the trench and turn on the water (later the Jinzhan government claimed it was “for pipeline maintenance”). Whatever happened behind the scenes of the government overnight, the suddenness of the change in attitude of the local government suggested that pressure had been applied to let the school continue running. Since then, the Jinzhan government hasn’t brought up the closure notice again, and advised the school to maintain better communication with the village committee (supposedly the cause of the whole misunderstanding). The school was ultimately allowed to remain open for the fall 2012 term, the only one remaining out of the four schools that received notice to shut down that summer. At the opening ceremony of the fall term, a member of the Migrant Workers Home said to the new students, “we still must completely rely on our own hard work and striving.”

### 4.1.2 New Citizens School

“If we don’t resolve the issue of migrant children’s education, the consequences will be severe. This has happened all over the world. Especially these past few years, such as the 2005 incident that shocked the world, the Paris riots, the North African youth who engaged in beating, smashing, looting, torching and killing; the Arab country’s second and third generation migrants, who used Arabic to sing La Marseillaise, during their vandalism; Germany’s middle school terrorists were largely second generation migrants; the 2007 Korean student who killed 32 people in the US, who also committed suicide; Americans also lit a candle for him, because he was also a victim, he was also a migrant child who didn’t integrate into society, or society didn’t treat him well, so he produced the mood to revenge society.” Founder of Narada Foundation and New
Citizens migrant schools, Xu Yongguang, talk in 6/16/2009 on “The Third Way for Migrant Children Education”

Meanwhile, just 7 kilometers away from the Tongxin Experimental School, in the same township of Jinzhan, one of the schools that had already been demolished lay in rubbles. The Jinghua Hope Magezhuang New Citizens School had been one of the four schools to receive notice of closure that summer of 2012. Of the four migrant schools, this one and the Migrant Workers Home Tongxin Experimental School were run on a non-profit model, while the other two were privately run, for profit schools. This New Citizens School arguably exceeded the Tongxin Experimental School in celebrity status, with deep historical political connections. The New Citizens School was part of a new project for migrant children put forth by the biggest of Chinese foundations, Narada Foundation and the China Charity Foundation, and perhaps the biggest international foundations, the Ford Foundation, the Gates Foundation, as well as JP Morgan Chase, and the World Bank Group.

The background to the Narada Foundation and its New Citizens School has an intriguing and critical place in China’s own history of NGO and foundation development, as well as China’s history of neoliberalism. The founder of the Narada Foundation, Xu Yongguang, was also the founder of the China Youth Development Foundation and Project Hope, set up only months after the suppression of student struggles in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Project Hope is China’s most famous “GONGO” (government-affiliated NGO), whose goal was to bring education to rural children through charity means. The overwhelming support for Project Hope from the top echelons of political leadership since its inception (including Deng Xiaoping, Party Secretary General and President Jiang Zeming, and Premier Li Peng), has led to some

conjectures about the political importance of Project Hope for (1) drawing attention away from the recent crackdown on student movements, and (2) drawing attention away from the neoliberal changes which saw the government shifting its responsibilities onto market mechanisms. Up until the end of the 1990’s, Project Hope was used domestically as a measure of social progress, and internationally as a measure of China’s human rights (Wang S. 1999). The famous Chinese director and producer of the Beijing Olympics, Zhang Yimou, directed his first government-funded film about Project Hope in 1999.

Even before the Project Hope scandal broke in 2001, there were rumors about mismanagement, corruption, and overall failure of the Hope School systems to address their own stated goals. However, the incredible political connections and vested interests in Project Hope overdetermined the situation. (One Hong Kong newspaper was sued and forced to pay $500,000 USD to Xu Yongguang when it attempted to publish this information in 1994). In 2001, journalists tracking down a tip by a Chinese company complaining that Project Hope had deceived them about the allocation of funds given for sponsorship of children as part of a corporate community initiative, resulted in a tempered expose about individual corruption at the local offices of Project Hope (the original expose actually documented systemic and widespread problems such as intentional policy changes made to internal accounting that made it easier for the misappropriation of funds at all levels of Project Hope, but these parts were cut in mainland media). Finally in 2002, whistleblowers from within Project Hope implicated Xu Yongguang personally in the larger process of misused funds for personal investment.²

Incredulously, the Hope legacy did not stay out of the media after that. Xu Yongguang’s China Youth Development Foundation sponsored another branching project called the China-Africa Project Hope, which dominated news in what is now called the “year of the scandal” (a wave of corruption uncovered by Chinese netizens in the charity sector). Just as the previous wave of migrant school closures was hitting Beijing in the summer of 2011, netizens discovered that the China-Africa Project Hope, in addition to being run by a 24 year old “second-generation rich” (a term referring to the children of the first generation of China’s wealthy class), was implicated in a web of entrepreneurial activity and misuse of funds (as had been charged against the Red Cross earlier that year). Chinese netizens explicitly expressed anger over the fact that the charity was building schools in Africa while migrant children in Beijing were being forced out of schools.

In the midst of these scandals, Xu Yongguang left the China Youth Development Foundation and Project Hope, and founded the Narada Foundation in 2007, specifically focused on improving the growth environment of migrant children. The majority of Narada Foundation’s board members are also founders of the Shanghai Narada Group, a company whose wealth comes primarily through transfers of state-owned real estate to an array of Narada affiliated companies. In 2008, the Narada Foundation publicized their New Citizens Plan, which immediately won the China Charity Award for greatest impact (the same year of its implementation). The plan sought to improve “the growing environment” of migrant children by supporting NGO’s who went through a competitive bidding process, but more importantly by establishing a brand of privately run, publically funded non-profit schools. The New Citizens Schools would teach

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3 Internal company document of Zhejiang Nandu Dianyuan Dongli Gufen Youxian Gongsui, 2010 January 29, “Confirmed opinion of issuer regarding explaining the changes in capital, board members, board of supervisors, and upper level management since the company’s establishment” (faxingren guanyu gongsi sheli yilai guben yanbian qingkuang de shuoming ji qidongshi, linshi, gaoji guanliyuan de queren yijian)
migrant children to “develop their potential, nurture a citizen consciousness, and take-up the responsibility of citizens to become the country’s high quality citizens.” The New Citizens brand of schools have the following “special characteristics”: (1) using public resources to fund the school, being run by carefully selected NGO’s who must compete for the commissioned job, and being controlled by the Foundation’s private board; (2) a migrant education approach that focuses on developing reading skills, as something that migrant children can take with them in the face of a precarious life circumstance, as well as providing regular access to social workers to address emotional and psychological needs. In practice, the Foundation acquires schools by takeovers (jieguan guolai), of both already existing private migrant schools and public schools; otherwise local government provide the land, facilities, and the majority of capital for the Foundation to build new schools. These takeovers led to conflicts in Shanghai by struggling migrant schools that refused to be bought out by the Narada Foundation when the local government required all private run migrant schools to transition to non-profit schools, as well as conflicts in Beijing when the school “restructuring” intervened in the existing complex interpersonal relations of the school staff and the local migrants.4

In 2007, with active encouragement from the Chaoyang District Education Committee, former Hope Schools began to be turned into New Citizens Schools, beginning with a school in Chaoyang District, Jinzhan township, Beimafang village. In 2008 the government once again pushed the Narada Foundation to turn another school in Magezhuang village into the second New Citizens School. While only the first school had successfully obtained a license to operate from the government, the second school was seen as going through the approval stages. Then in 2009, the Chaoyang district government slated Beimafang as one of the villages to undergo demolition for land

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reservation, forcing the closure of the first New Citizens School. Meanwhile, the other New Citizens School in Magezhuang received notice that it would be accepted for application of license to operate pending some recommended changes in safety. The Narada Foundation then invested heavily to make those changes, and at the start of 2012 received notice that they were almost finished with the approval process by the Chaoyang District Education Committee.

Suddenly in May of 2012, the Magezhuang New Citizens School received the first notice from the Jinzhan township government requiring the school to shut down. The interests guiding the route by which the Narada Foundation sought to resist these closures were distinctly different from those guiding the Migrant Workers Home. From the beginning, the Narada Foundation decided to keep the issue completely internal, from the school staff, its students and parents, and their public media platforms. The Foundation’s first step was to write a letter to the Chaoyang Education Committee asking to continue their support for approval, but they received no response. When they received the official notice to close down immediately, the Narada Foundation sent their secretary-general Liu Zhouhong to meet with the relevant township and district level governments. Despite being able to gain immediate access to government officials, the Narada Foundation was met with the refusal by all departments to accept responsibility for closing the school, and was told that the decision was already made at the upper-levels. The Narada Foundation wrote another letter to the next level of administration, the Chaoyang district government, putting forth several requests in order of preference: First, they requested that the school continue to remain open and in the process for approval to be run privately; (2) second, if the first option was no longer feasible, then they requested that the New Citizens School be allowed to run as a government commissioned school (the importance of which will be explained later); (3) third, that all
the donors and the Narada Foundation that invested in the New Citizens Schools (both the Beimafang and the Magezhuang schools) be compensated in the case of the school’s closure, and (4) finally, to make sure that all students and teachers were properly reassigned. In return for being receptive to these requests, the Narada Foundation promised to cooperate with the government, to not actively seek trouble or go to the media (in tacit reference to “other” trouble-making NGO’s, the sign of an internal disciplining among unequal social organizations). The letter ended by stating that if their legal demands were not met, the Foundation would take legal recourse to secure their compensation and to protect their property rights (both material and immaterial property). The failure of their negotiation process was only made public after all decisions had been made. By July 16, the government and the Narada Foundation were cooperating to inform the teachers and students of the school’s closure, but it was clear that the other demands were ignored. In the aftermath of the closure, the Narada Foundation moved forward with legal action to compensate their donors.

Despite the troubled legacy of China’s first non-profit and foundation and its recent re-birth amongst new relaxed regulations on social organizations, the Narada Foundation is widely praised as one of the “good” (non-state) foundations on the international stage, and one of the key players among those interested in building “civil society” in China. The complicity of “civil society” in the obfuscation of concrete political struggles is manifested in the way that the Narada Foundation is painted as a brave force seeking litigation to “protect public assets,” rather than a narrow interest in re-claiming the private wealth of its investors (with little thought to the struggle over compensation for migrants). In much NGO news coverage, history is completely erased by posing the founder of the Narada Foundation as a positive force against the state or government-affiliated NGO’s.
Furthermore, the Narada Foundation’s request to become a government commissioned school is not just a strategy to remain open, but more importantly an endorsement of the main strategy by which the government is forcing other self-run migrant schools to close, most notably in Chaoyang district. What is distinct about the “Chaoyang model” of forced migrant school closures is that the government has taken up a strategy of dispossession and displacement through a new form of public-private partnership in education. In Beijing, these schools are called “government-commissioned schools” (zhengfu weituo banxue xuexiao), in which public funds are used to support privately run schools. The Chaoyang District Education Committee not only uses public resources to give the organizers of these schools free public buildings, free utility usage, and special funds for equipment and teacher insurance costs (more generous than the subsidies owed to licensed private-run migrant schools), the organizers of the school are still allowed to charge tuition based on the private school model while enjoying the non-profit status. Many principals of other migrant schools have done the math, and know that there is huge profit being made through this “partnership.” In a pattern that is becoming the Chaoyang “brand” of migrant school demolitions, the district government will use these commissioned schools as re-location for the migrant students forced to leave after their school has been demolished, which provides business to the operators of the government commissioned schools (who will hike tuition costs immediately after a wave of migrant school closures well beyond the average private school costs), as well as justifying further demolitions by gesturing at the fulfillment of their responsibility to ensure migrant childrens’ education.5

Contrary to how the migrant school closures are now commonly framed in media as a battle between two equally legitimate “interests,” between migrant children’s

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the construction of a delimited “public” sphere with designated resources to be carved up between interests does not map onto how a much larger scope of public wealth is being fed into private hands by shaping and re-shaping the very terrain of “public” and “private.” While the Narada Foundation’s attempt to bank on the private use of public funds through a government commissioned school was not met in that instance, their new project to take legal recourse to “protect charity assets” is a similar battle to claim access to public wealth from the state by pushing the strategic and non-transparent deployment and maintenance of private wealth (through the legal vehicle of the foundation) as “public interest.” Knowing full well that “public assets” is unstable and yet to be defined in Chinese law, the Narada Foundation sets out to return the investments of their largest private donors by laying claim to the New Citizens School and all the public or non-profit resources that went into its historical construction as “charity assets” that should be owned and managed by the Foundation. Ironically, due to the difficulties of registering grassroots NGO’s for migrants in China and the sensitivity of the work done by the Migrant Workers Home, the Migrant Workers Home is not officially registered as a non-profit or social organization, but a business, and therefore would not be able to make a similar claim to “charity assets,” let alone the resources put in by migrants in Chaoyang who have no “right” to compensation under this paradigm. A closer investigation into the aftermath of that summer’s wave of demolitions reveals the way in which “public resources” are manipulated and redirected for private interests through both state and “civil society” actors, in the name of

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migrants. The new complex social forces shaping the field of migrant organizing is neither a democratic force nor a force homologous to the state, but encapsulates existing social inequalities and deploys them as one relation of force alongside that of the state.

4.2 Corporate Social Responsibility and Public-Private Partnerships

The incident involving Beijing’s two famous non-profit migrant schools serves to show the need to carefully distinguish between the connections and interconnections of different logics of power in “civil society,” and how grassroots migrant organizations must deal with a growing form of public-private power that I articulate as the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) apparatus. The CSR phenomenon is a global movement, gaining prominence within the last 20 years that generally proposes market actors as the solution to environmental and social change (Dolan, Garsten and Rajak 2011), though I argue that in the urban space of Beijing, the primary form of CSR is through public-private partnerships. In this convergence of state and market interests, “sustainable development” is pushed through the blurring and redistribution of responsibilities that seek an optimal combination of social welfare and profit. The web of global and local interests involved in migrant welfare described above disrupts clean boundaries between “civil society,” “the market,” and “the state,” posing several questions of scholarly interest about the systematic impact of CSR on the ground: (1) Does CSR challenge existing inequalities as it claims, and what are the forms of inequalities implicated through its processes; (2) What does the practice of CSR in Beijing reveal about the struggle over the “public” and the “private,” and how do their “partnerships” demand new theories of exploitation and discipline (3) In what ways does CSR bring new forms of governance, and what is the nature of this governance? I argue the following in this chapter: (1) Corporate Social Responsibility is a pre-emptive elite social
movement to recompose capitalism in the face of global struggles (2) CSR draws upon distinctly neoliberal traditions and new techniques of civil society to address unstable elements in society including migrant organizing; (3) CSR shows how “thickly-embedded” logics of power are expressed through public-private partnerships, which makes up the battlefield in which migrant organizing currently takes place in Beijing.

I use the term CSR, itself a fashionable yet unstable discourse, to reference the recent manifestation of an ongoing process in which the state, market, and civil society are being blurred through public-private partnerships in new forms of control and exploitation. The term CSR as it has been ethnographically deconstructed serves to capture the important components of this process—NGO’s, foundations, academic institutions, corporations, and the state—as distinct from other complexes such as the military or police, prisons, bilateral or multilateral aid industry, though researchers have already begun to hint at these interconnections.8 The dangers of using the term CSR to describe these broader processes of contemporary capitalism include the traditional association of CSR with philanthropy or purely corporate activities. Nevertheless, within a very short but distinct period, it is widely understood that CSR has become “common sense” in China, has occurred in conjunction with the forces that are shaping and naturalizing an instantiation of the “migrant issue,” with political consequences for migrant organizing.

For anthropologists, studying the way in which a phenomenon becomes naturalized is part of an important political struggle to remove the veil that hides the history of the living labor necessary to maintain the current condition. At the same time,

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8 For example, there is much needed research on the mutual rise of CSR in China with the unprecedented spending on “public security” apparatuses—police, state security, armed militia, courts and jails, reaching 701.8 billion yuan in 2012; Chris Buckley, “China boosts domestic security spending by 11.5 percent,” Reuters, 4 March 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/us-china-parliament-security-idUSTRE82403J20120305
I try to be critical about the way in which CSR is framed in mainstream discourse, which asks us to accept either a moral capitalism or to dig up its underlying scandal. In rejecting this framework along with other ethnographies of CSR, my investigations are not looking to prove or disprove a “good” capitalism, but to show how its recent manifestations operate and impact the day to day for migrant organizing in the urban city. However, locating CSR in daily life presents a set of challenges methodologically and theoretically that must first be addressed.

4.2.1 Methodological and Theoretical Issues

Overwhelmingly, studies of CSR in China show that from the perspective of the daily lives of migrants, CSR is experienced at a distance, in the sense that decisions and projects are predominantly made outside of their purview (Chan A. 2006, Pun and Yu 2008, Pun and Yuen-Tsang 2011, Han D. 2011). Part of the difficulty of materializing CSR at the level of daily life is its contradictory existence in highly exclusive yet highly publicized spaces, simultaneously elusive yet widely circulated in the media. These challenges of multi-layered visibility within one “site” coincide with the ongoing challenges of doing an anthropology of “the corporate form” in contemporary capitalism, increasingly dispersed and delocalized, a multi-sited and multi-disciplinary challenge (Nash 1979, Foster 2008, Benson and Kirsch 2010). While other ethnographies of CSR have taken scholars to UN conferences and commissions, advertising agencies and trade associations, corporate headquarters and government agencies, as well as offshore sites of production and testing, within the limited scope of my study, I committed to the perspective of Beijing’s urban migrant communities and the related grassroots organizations. While not single sited in the sense of one committed engagement for a long period of time, it is also not fully multi-sited in the sense of following the flows of people, things, stories, or life histories across spaces (Marcus
1995). Due to the combination of unequal power relations among layers of CSR that give it a slippery presence in daily life, this study proved the continuing significance of sustained long-term engagement with “life worlds” for those interested in intervening in daily life.

In addition to the ethnographic challenges of studying CSR, popular discourse on CSR immediately forces a theoretical position on the status of “civil society” in China, a sticky and controversial issue for many scholars. The situation is complicated because: (1) “civil society” in China is historically seen as a western ideology specific to a stage of capitalist bourgeois society and notions of market freedom (2) Chinese scholars remain polarized on the issue, with one extreme denying the existence of civil society in China, while the other extreme fully embraces the rise of civil society; (3) China scholars (those based outside the mainland) attempting to critique both American neoliberalism and Chinese authoritarianism tend to avoid the term, and speak instead about new forms of state-led neoliberal transformations; (4) Market driven organizations and institutions within China really do push explicitly for developing “civil society,” along with a rising popularity in discourse on governance and networks. This study takes a Marxist and Foucault inspired approach when using the term civil society, and focuses on the living labor behind the struggle over the “public” and the “private” in order to reveal what is being exploited and disciplined within the “partnerships” of CSR (including subjectivity). The way that CSR has brought widespread media and global attention to “migrants” as a productive subjectivity that can variously express other classed desires suggests the new logics of control that exceed normalizing functions (Hardt 1998), while also suggesting that “civil society” operates as a scission between neoliberalism and liberalism, or a crisis between two logics of power, to be grasped in its contradictions (Foucault 2008).
In addition to the ideologically loaded and politicized nature of the term “civil society,” the co-optation of activist discourse and the push for public-private partnerships by the CSR movement reveals the necessity for new conceptual and analytical tools for those interested in distinguishing between capitalism and social struggle in the era of biocapital. While this will be addressed more in the next chapter, it is a methodological and theoretical challenge to refer to the distinction between those activities “from below,” and those “from above” without reproducing an idealized and romanticized notion of “community” (as organic, essentialist and essentially good, posed in relation to tradition or civil society, etc) as it becomes complicit and functional for capitalism (Joseph 2002). Equally unsatisfying is the term “grassroots,” which further suggests an organic passiveness that requires NGO’s for mobilization, and an orientation of political struggle toward affirmation of the very structures of hierarchy involved in exploitation. Yet, even as community work and its actors become recast, co-opted, and oriented toward market principles, this ethnography finds that there is still a distinction between migrant communities, activists, NGO’s (and among these, the range of government, consultancy, think tank, corporatized, and community-based), “the public,” and “civil society,” though these distinctions may not be fixed. For the specific findings of this ethnography, I resort to the term “community-based” to refer to those entities that retain some critical distance to the culture and value system of capitalism, even as I explore new ways of differentiation in the deliberately blurred lines of biopolitical logics. It is also important to note that in China, the term “NGO” is sensitive because it connotes an organization that is against the government. As a result, terms like non-profit organization, charitable organization (cishan zuzhi) or public welfare organization (gongyi zuzhi) are often used in place of NGO. The slippages between these terms provide useful insight into the political stakes at work in CSR.
4.2.2 Literature Review

In recent years, there has been a consolidation of work that can be called the anthropology of Corporate Social Responsibility. These rich and diverse works share a curiosity about the rise of a coherent capitalist movement that claims profit in social change, an “activist capitalism” in Partridge’s terms, and have brought to bear the instruments of the discipline to investigate these claims on the ground (Partridge 2011).

Perhaps the earliest investigations grappled with the interaction between consumer activism and global supply-chains, as transnational companies were forced to enact codes of conduct regulating their outsourced production sites (Pun 2005b, Pun and Yu 2008, Lawrence 2007, De Neve et al. 2008, Foster 2008, Cross 2011, Partridge 2011). The manifestation of CSR in extractive industries like mining and forestry necessitated an understanding of its close relation to the development industry and the repositioning of market actors to occupy roles traditionally identified with the state (Lawrence 2007, Welker 2009, Coumans 2011, Rajak 2011a). Studies into the more recent developments in CSR that explicitly tie corporate profit-making to poverty reduction in what is called the “bottom of the pyramid” approach have revealed how poor communities become re-fashioned into neoliberal entrepreneur/consumer subjects, often in contradiction with the goals of development or empowerment (Dolan and Johnstone-Louis 2011, Schwittay 2011). In addition to the contestations or new forms of attachments between corporations and the communities impacted by its activities, anthropologists have had to study the other spaces and actors involved in the “CSR industry,” including NGO’s, shareholders, academic and industry conferences, and policy forums (Coumans 2011, Rajak 2011b, Welker and Wood 2011). CSR has also necessitated a look at its main techniques of knowledge production through websites, annual reports, trade

Scholars have further consolidated an anthropology of CSR by setting a critical research agenda posed against the limitations of current critiques of CSR in the social sciences. Drawing on his work in South Africa and the recent transformation from development to CSR, Sharp proposes that anthropologists study the complex, fragmented processes and unintended effects of CSR rather than remaining focused on confirming or disproving CSR’s self-articulated goals (Sharp 2006). Encounters with CSR from labor studies and global production chains compel scholars to argue for the necessity of perspectives from “the south,” in order to grasp four key areas of CSR: “(1) the relationship between business and poverty reduction; (2) the systematic impact of CSR initiatives; (3) power and participation in CSR; and (4) governance dimensions of CSR” (Prieto-Carron, Lund-Thomsen, Chan et al. 2006, 979). As CSR becomes a more coherent global “ethical regime” of business, Dolan and Rajak draw on studies in India, South Africa, the UK, Chile, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to highlight common anthropological interests in CSR: (1) How is ethics “practiced” by companies, (2) What new forms of inequality and power arise, (3) the blurring of boundaries between morals and markets and the affective effects; (4) Relation between global discourse and local practice (Dolan, Garsten and Rajak 2011).

In an ambitious multi-sited study of the CSR “apparatus” inspired by Ferguson’s own analysis of the development apparatus, Rajak presents the most comprehensive ethnography of CSR’s “global architecture” to date, in my opinion. Tracing CSR from its discursive formation and social life in cosmopolitan and exclusive policy and forum spaces in London, to Anglo-American’s corporate headquarters in Johannesburg, to its local practices of “community development” in a small South African mining town,
Rajak argues that CSR indicates a shift in global capitalism from hard-line neoliberal values of free-market and self-interested individual to incorporating new values of community and solidarity. By integrating these social and moral values, CSR supports global capitalism by providing a moral authority for capitalism to be extended to the social world, through a more powerful field of corporate practice. She finds that CSR provides companies with access to invaluable social and moral resources while maintaining flexibility and authority to define the terms of “responsibility” and “community” according to the company’s changing needs (Rajak 2011a). Rajak’s study provides some key insights into the nature of CSR in the global south, where the power of CSR lies in its capacity to claim universal values (sustainable development) while articulating itself through specific national agendas (in her case, the state vision for a New South Africa).

Critical studies of CSR in China arising out of Pun Ngai’s ethnographies of migrant labor in southern coastal factories have provided invaluable insight into the predominant and early form of CSR encountered in China. Her research on corporate codes of conduct implementation at two Chinese factories in the early 2000’s reveals a large absence of government concern, and transnational corporate driven CSR to be a top-down nominal process of labor rights protection with little real change in workers lives (Pun 2005b). As CSR converged with China’s own adapting methods of control over migrant labor, Pun and Yu’s study of the state-backed “dormitory labor regime” in Walmart’s supply chain shows how CSR is shaped and ultimately fails due to a growing complicity between the state and transnational corporations to maintain a precarious, cheap, and mobile labor force (Pun and Yu 2008). The concentration of attempted suicides by 18 young migrant workers at Foxconn factories in 2010 further confirmed the repressive state-capital system of labor control which exploits both migrant and student
labor (Pun and Chan 2013), while noticing that multi-stakeholder CSR programs are beginning to bring together capital, transnational and local labor NGO’s, and social workers, to promote labor rights (Pun and Yuen-Tsang 2011). The dual movement of expanding migrant labor experiences to other social classes, and the expansion of responsibility for social welfare to multiple sectors of society both hint at the generalization of CSR across society in China.

Mobilizing the insights from a newly consolidated anthropology of CSR, which stress ongoing legacies of development and neoliberalism in addition to the critical role of the state in non-western sites, I trace in the following section the broader historical development of CSR in China with specific attention to national concerns domestically and globally, which reveal how the global phenomenon is embedding in the specific context of Beijing through close interaction with migrant struggles. I argue that in addition to these historical determinations, the conjuncture of CSR and migrant social life must also be grasped by the mobilization of domestic “social forces” and techniques of civil society. Turning attention to the networks of elite actors and institutions created though CSR, I then argue that CSR operates by creating a social space where migrants are enrolled as active participants in public life.

4.3 Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Capitalist Restructuring

“The global movement to enforce labor, and environmental, and economic standards is clearly picking up steam, and we as companies still have the ability to shape that movement and to take control of that movement before it takes control of us.” (Carly Fiorina, CEO of Hewlett-Packard (HP) from 2000-2005, speech at Business for Social Responsibility Annual Conference 2003)

4.3.1 Workers Struggles

In Chinese scholarship, CSR is articulated as a western movement coming from the “outside,” and in particular from American pressure for trade advantages leading
up to China joining the WTO at the end of 2001. For this reason, CSR was manifested early on as external codes of conduct for factories in China’s Special Economic Zones (Pun and Yu 2008). As with the self-narrative of CSR within corporate circles, this presentation of CSR from the state perspective elides the fact of CSR’s crystallization in the wake of diverse struggles throughout the 90’s in response to neoliberalism (Foster 2009). In China, eruption of protest by both the traditional working-class and other sectors of society took place every year beginning in the 1990’s, and reached peak numbers in the first half of the 21st century:

“Nationwide, the Ministry of Public Security recorded 8,700 such incidents in 1993, rising to 11,000, 15,000, and 32,000 in 1995, 1997, and 1999 respectively. In 2003, some 58,000 incidents were staged by three million people, including farmers, workers, teachers, and students. Among them, the largest group consisted of 1.66 million laid-off, retired, and active workers, accounting for 46.9 percent of the total number of participants that year. The surge in social unrest continued from 2004 to 2005, as the Ministry of Public Security announced a hike from a total of 74,000 to 87,000 cases of riots and demonstrations during these two years” (Lee 2007, 6).

While the country stopped publishing statistics on “mass incidents” in 2005, there have been quotes of 127,467 in 2008, and researcher Yu Jianrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimated around 90,000 in 2009 (China Labour Bulletin 2009 and 2011). The dual process of State-owned enterprise restructuring and privatization form a major background to Chinese protests in the past decade, as protests shifted from laid-off SOE workers in the 1990’s to migrant workers beginning in 2000. In addition, protests spread beyond factories to the education and transport sector, which took the form of city and village based revolts. Protest issues were diverse, including wages and working conditions, social security, corruption, employment, taxes, land removal and demolitions. It is important to note that these protests often took corrupt local officials or corporations as their target rather than the central government, meaning that the party-state could use this discrepancy to gain moral authority for CSR more so than foreign or domestic corporations (China Labour Bulletin 2012).
These self-initiated protests taking place outside traditional state organized channels, across all sectors of society, led to a generalized crisis of stability and restructuring not reducible to the causes identified by the Chinese state (western national and multilateral entities) or transnational corporate (poor victims of bad governance and poverty) narratives. This is important to emphasize because while CSR on a global scale has been framed through neoliberal logic to pose the market as a leader in social change specifically against the capacity of the state, CSR in China operates through temporary convergences of interests between transnational corporations and the party-state to maintain control over social stability. Furthermore, both the official Chinese state narrative on CSR and global CSR literature coincide to erase the history of global and local struggle from this distinct turn to “activist capitalism” in recent years. It is due to the nature of widespread social unrest in China and the need to control it, that CSR was seen as appropriate to the “current historical needs” of China’s economy in transition (Pun and Yu 2008, Zhong et al. 2010).

4.3.2 Capitalist Restructuring

Globally, with strong influences from the U.S., the CSR movement is defined first and foremost by the concerted and strategic effort by corporations to shape the new playing field in the face of global unrest by making CSR a private, voluntary corporate initiative with minimal state or multilateral regulations. However, with the shifting roles and capacities of the Chinese state in the wake of its own neoliberal policies, the “localization” of CSR in China occurred through the distinct interests and regulations of the state to shift social welfare onto market mechanisms. For this reason, Chinese researchers often look to CSR cases in European countries where state regulation is more present than in American cases. In fact, European countries such as Sweden and Germany market themselves to China as CSR consultants, offering expertise on how to
make CSR a national strategy for “sustainable economic development” that can confer agency to domestic corporations and the nation on the global stage. The commensurability of European discourses on CSR with China’s own ideological narratives of “harmonious society” thus facilitated the “localization” of CSR in the Chinese context.

As explored in chapter 2, the rise of concepts such as “harmonious society,” “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” “scientific concept of development,” and a “people first economy” in party-discourse occurred at the moment of the party-state’s legitimacy crisis and the wave of unrest during the first half of the 21st century. These terms, once used to justify rapid economic growth, become re-fashioned in the language of CSR, such that CSR comes to signify: (1) a scientific concept of development in which China shifts from an economic-growth oriented development to sustainable development, (2) the desire for China to become globally integrated and globally competitive, (3) the government interest in shifting welfare onto “social forces” while retaining political control (4) the goal of developing new creative industries, and (5) the desire for China to have the power to influence global policies. These self-articulated desires through the language of CSR coincide with the recent discourse on “culture industries,” which then shapes the way in which CSR and the migrant issue takes place in China through “cultural services.”

The cultural reference point for CSR in China is the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, when the donations multinational corporations were giving according to the CSR guidelines of their corporate headquarters were deemed “insufficient” to the standards of Chinese citizens. Those who did not give enough were dubbed "iron roosters" after a famous Chinese idiom meaning cheap, referring to the difficulty of getting a single feather out of an iron rooster. An online campaign tracking the amounts of foreign
company donations resulted in a new situation where foreign companies felt pressured to abide by different, domestically determined standards. Chinese companies and philanthropists, as well as Chinese citizens, were praised widely in media for their charity efforts in relation to multinational corporations. The mobilization of Chinese citizens around the cause of the Sichuan earthquake is commonly identified as the founding event of Chinese CSR, civil society, and philanthropy.

Political support for CSR was manifested in speeches of top political leaders even before the earthquake, including those by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. The official motto for CSR is “the government guides, industries push, enterprises implement, and society participates” (Chinese Academy of Social Science 2010). In 2006 following the release of the new Company Law, Chinese companies began revitalizing their role as a source of community and environmental support. The law required corporations to "abide by the laws, regulation, social and business morality and good faith rules, accept supervision by government and the public, and undertake social responsibilities." In 2009, the first major state council report on CSR clearly stated that in three years, all state-owned enterprises must publish a CSR report. The resulting proliferation of CSR think tanks and research institutes, consultancies and experts across the nation with the explicit goal to “push” CSR provided an engine for knowledge production on the state of CSR in China. By 2010, the Chinese Academy of Social Science published their CSR bluebook, the first national index ranking China’s 100 strongest companies in CSR, in which large state-owned enterprises were upheld as leaders in comparison to foreign enterprises. In these publications, the term Corporate Social Responsibility (qiye shehui zeren) is slightly modified in Chinese to mean Corporate Social Duty (qiye fuxing shehui zeren),

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further indicating the strong presence of the state in Chinese CSR and the suspicion that CSR has become an extension of government work.

The number one ranked state-owned enterprise and shining model of CSR, State-Grid Corporation of China, the largest electric utilities company in the world with programs in India, the Philippines, Portugal, Brazil, and increasingly Africa, produces highly professional CSR reports that mimic the discourses of reports published by foreign multinational companies. In their 2009 CSR report, they depart from the predominant discourse on traditional areas of CSR (product safety, management, paying taxes, consumer rights, employee satisfaction) to the discourse on “triple value creation”:

SGCC is the first to determine CSR as a social resources allocation mechanism which improves social welfare by giving full play to the company’s and stakeholders’ subjective initiative, and promoting effective operation of the market mechanism, the governmental regulation & control mechanism and the social governance mechanism. And this indicates that the CSR theory and practice is undergoing major change from “triple basic obligation” to “triple value creation” (State Grid 2009 CSR report)

At the same time that these rankings were being released to position State Grid Corporation as a model for social responsibility, the China Labour Bulletin published an article on a case that revealed the way that CSR now allows corporations to re-define “responsibility” through juridical and market terms. According to the report, in January of 2010 temporary worker Li Shikuan was dropped off at the train station in State Grid work clothes by his employers. Minutes after arrival, he lost consciousness. His daughter rushed him to the hospital, and discovered that he had been poisoned by carbon monoxide, and was now suffering from cerebral disfunction, and completely hospitalized and bedridden. In the following year, his daughter sought assistance from county, municipal, and as last resort, the central government, as well as the labor contractor subcontracting from State Grid. The Beijing government granted her financial assistance contingent upon documentation of employment and injury. What the daughter found was a systematic denial of “responsibility” at multiple levels of
government and corporation, with documentation of employment and hospital records completely vanished. When the subcontractor finally paid a small sum of money to the family, the amount was as insufficient as it was arbitrary. While the realities of temporary subcontracted labor reveal the consequences of allowing “responsibility” and “stakeholder” to be defined contingently and according to juridical and market principles of the labor contract, the incident nevertheless shows how CSR can exist at the level of multiple social realities (the public life and the private matter) and serve multiple functions for the state and corporation.

While independent NGO’s and scholars have only begun to evaluate the actual impact of CSR in these model Chinese companies, it is important to think the proliferation of CSR documents beyond an ethical skepticism. Instead, the proliferation of documents is a key part of the materiality of CSR, and an important component for creating the very phenomenon of CSR in China. In fact, China is known in international circles to have excelled in reporting CSR efforts, which subsequently and curiously decreased the “value” of reporting in the eyes of CSR experts. Since joining the World Trade Organization, the number of sustainability reports issued by Chinese companies has risen from just one in 2001 to 898 in 2011, according to the China WTO Tribune. In 2009, China was highest in number of new environmental certifications, with more than 55,300 Chinese companies registering for the ISO 4100, an accepted global standard for environmental management. The number of newly certified companies in China was higher than the rest of the top 10 countries combined. At the same time, the value of reporting is tied to embedded cultural constructions of China as “ethically less developed” within a global “ethical mapping,” where the very measure of “ethics” through CSR reporting is interrupted by China’s very participation (Hao, dissertation

forthcoming; also see Hao 2012). In other words, CSR reporting is seen to be an accurate reflection of ethical conduct except when that reporting is done by countries already marked as “ethically less developed.” It is even suggested that China is inherently “disposed” toward “low CSR” due to its “level of economic development, institutions, and culture,” with culture articulated as low levels of “harmony, egalitarianism, autonomy, and individualism” (Cai, Pan and Statman, 2012).

The proliferation of CSR in China through the CSR reports published by state owned companies coincided globally with what western media noted as an “explosion” of commentary on CSR in 2010 beyond “niche” sites and blogs, to traditional business spaces (e.g. Harvard Business Review, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Forbes) as well as mainstream media (e.g. The Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post). With the widespread public anger directed toward corporate behavior in the wake of the US financial collapse and the BP oil spill, CSR began to be framed as a “social movement.” As noted by Bill Baue of CSR Wire:

"The biggest CSR development of the year was not readily visible, as it was an idea: that CSR represents not just a trend or professional discipline, but a social movement. In other words, CSR is not a random collection of ad hoc, discrete actions to revise corporate behavior, but rather a coherent aggregation of sustained, widespread efforts to reform (or even revolutionize) the role of corporations, shifting from negative to positive impacts on society, environment, and economy” (Newell 2010).

The putative “social movement” took on a discourse among think tanks about a new, enlightened CSR, in which corporations moved “beyond” philanthropy and reputation, compliance and regulations, to fully integrating CSR within “core” business operations to create “shared value,” largely by turning attention toward those at the “bottom of the pyramid” and their “unmet needs” (Prahalad 2010, Porter and Kramer 2011). Many have noted how the discourse on “enlightened” capitalism and its new concern for poor

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11 Shared value is defined as a business approach whereby companies generate economic value while simultaneously producing value for society by addressing social and environmental challenges (Stanford Social Innovation Review, Kramer and Stania 2011)
communities invoked familiar North-South relations in development discourse, in which developing countries became the object of interest to be worked on as “less ethically developed,” but never present in dialogue (Chan 2006, Rajak 2011b, Hao 2012).

These geopolitical “trends” in CSR and its attendant claim to “enlightened” capitalism did not fall on deaf ears in China. At a major Sino-European CSR conference that I attended in Shanghai in the fall of 2010, officials from the Shanghai Municipal government demonstrated awareness of why local Chinese governments are pushing CSR. In the words of Gefei Yin of the China WTO Tribune, there was a clear “global establishment of standards” that required China to “demonstrate responsibility,” to be “aware” of environmental and human standards rather than making profit from cheap products, and to “fight corruption.” Explaining the inequalities of this pressure for China to multinational corporations and consultancy NGO’s present at the forum, Deputy director of the Shanghai Municipal Commission Mingzhao Yuan spoke almost sarcastically about the way in which these global standards often translated into the right for certain nations to collect money from foreign companies on behalf of wider multinational “transgressions” (he cited the example of the $1.15 billion dollar fine Siemens paid to the US SEC for paying bribes to secure government contracts in China and elsewhere), and how the very creation of these standards are set by the size of the company and the capacity “to be first” in the industry. Chinese government officials articulated a clear understanding of the way multinational corporations are backed by or contingent upon political power creating unfair competitive advantages, and seek to strategize within that reality.

Despite these realistic and practical reflections by Chinese officials on how China is to participate in the global arena by increasing access to the decision-making process of global standards, representatives from the Swedish embassy and major Swedish
companies such as IKEA persisted in promoting themselves as idealized models for China to emulate, those who have successfully integrated CSR as a way of thinking creatively about the economy and possessing “harmonious” state-society relations through cooperative governance. Sean Gilbert, director of climate change and sustainability for KPMG Advisory (China) commented to the audience of largely business reps, trade associations and for profit CSR NGO’s, "Standards are very good at helping people to avoid problems, talking about what not to do. They're [China] not nearly good at the creative side of the question, what could you do? Or should you do?" Gilbert expressed a commonly heard opinion that China is still not at the stage of fully understanding what exactly CSR is, with some Chinese companies “not even realizing environmental issues fall under the remit of social responsibility.”

As the different perspectives from the conference revealed, CSR in China is being taken up by various state and market actors as a tool to re-model themselves as well as a new economic and cultural playing field. At the same time, CSR becomes part of a narrative about development, in which the Chinese state seeks to discipline state-owned enterprises to meet global standards of proper corporate conduct, while international companies claim to offer China an enlightened capitalism and “good governance.” Despite the subtle gap between international discourse and Chinese state reception of CSR that may exhibit a new global hierarchical ethical mapping, there is an alternative source for driving CSR in China that comes from domestic actors not reducible to the state. In order to grasp how CSR has moved beyond the factory and codes of conduct to set up shop in Beijing, the rise of CSR in China must be accompanied by another historical trajectory—the growth of private foundations in China.
4.4 Neoliberal Traditions and Technologies of “Civil Society”

4.4.1 Neoliberalism and Development

Ethnographies of CSR in the “global south” have revealed the deep connections between CSR and the problems of the development industry based on the work by James Ferguson (Sharp 2006, Welker 2009, Rajak 2011a). Ferguson’s important work on the development industry in Lesotho revealed “instrument effects,” the simultaneous expansion of state power and the de-politicization of poverty and political struggles despite planners’ intended effects (Ferguson 1990). In the midst of critiques of development during the 80’s, the turn toward “bottom-up” and “locally owned” development programs in international discourse coincided with the turn toward neoliberal doctrines that preferred to channel funds toward “civil society” rather than government. Further complicating the development industry, US neoliberals during the Reagan administration began to invest in the growth of university research and training institutes, think thanks, and private consulting companies in the turn toward the specialization of social change (China Development Brief 2011). In other words, despite the widespread critique of Chinese “GONGO’s” (government run NGO’s) as an inauthentic “civil society,” the development of GONGO’s in fact is paralleled American neoliberal history.

The distinct character of CSR in China draws on its own history of keeping international donors and their neoliberal agendas in check by maintaining state control and relative independence from aid, which contributes to the persisting underlying discourse that China needs “good governance” through “civil society” among corporate CSR circles. In his ethnography of government workers in North America, Stefano Harney reminds us that the larger trend in the proliferation of governance and network studies poses neoliberal political arrangements against a constructed enemy of
“bureaucracy,” itself a code for the labor of social production allotted to the “public sector” (Harney 2002 and 2006). Chinese scholars are well aware of the false and loaded oppositions being posed between “bureaucracy” or “freedom,” and this visceral suspicion of “civil society” meant that international aid went not to leverage political change, but to “technical assistance” in areas that would protect Western investments. In this way, stability became a shared interest among multinational corporations and the Chinese state in the mid 1990’s. Thus, the precedence for Chinese CSR lies in this history of channeling foreign aid to stabilizing projects such as poverty reduction projects, re-training and job creation programs, social security, health, etc. (China Development Brief 2011). The strength of the global environmental movement, which resulted in new forms of collaboration between international conservancy organizations and state led neoliberal and development programs is a crucial history that also forms the backdrop to contemporary CSR in China (Litzinger 2006).

The changes taking place in the international development industry, the specialization and commodification of social change, and the introduction of new players in development such as research institutes and quasi non-profit companies are important elements to the current manifestation of CSR in China. Following the changes that occurred in elite social change institutions in response to struggles domestically (outlined in chapter 2), the biggest US foundations in China operate either by leveraging large quantities of money to government, multilateral, or university partners, or channeling many smaller grants to “civil society” partners as possible. The maintenance of traditional structures of hierarchy through decentralized networks and mediatory institutions, particularly in the rising discourse of public-private partnerships, becomes an important part of the challenge of studying CSR ethnographically.
4.4.2 Domestic “Social Forces”

At the same time that familiar players in the international development industry become re-fashioned through the more “grassroots” language of CSR, CSR is intimately tied to the growth of China’s own internal network of elite foundations and NGO’s distinct from the era of government-sponsored organizations of the 1980’s. Since the central government’s Ministry of Civil Affairs changed regulations in 2004 to allow fully private, grant-making foundations, these private foundations have grown at an astonishing rate, from 253 foundations in 2005 to 900 foundations in 2009 with a 30-40% annual growth rate (Chen J. et al. 2010). Among those in the industry, the growth of Chinese private foundations in the image of the US is seen as the crucial step to growing civil society in China at the moment, and indeed since 2004 there has been consolidated efforts for a private foundation self-regulation movement (China Development Brief 2004).

Following the rise in Chinese public donations after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, Americans seized upon the opportunity to organize a private study seminar tour in 2009 for fourteen of China’s top foundation players. With funding from the Ford Foundation and organized by Mercy Corps, the tour provided Chinese foundation delegates with a chance to personally tour the structural backbone of civil society in the US, including academic institutions, private foundations, community foundations, and intermediary and infrastructure organizations. The seminars provided practical information on US foundation models, governance, and business models, as well as arguments about the uses of foundations in society. According to the notebooks from the Chinese delegates during one presentation by the Ford Foundation, the overwhelming lesson they learned is that the non-profit sector helps to stabilize American society:

“In reality, America’s non-profit industry lead the US government in implementing social development and social wealth in a capitalist society, and from every level guard against labor’s
social resistance, preventing social-political change, maintain social stability, developing an irreplaceable function.” (Yang Ping, Sun Yefang Foundation, Secretary General 2009)

The delegates were particularly attracted to the investment business model and the advantages conferred to the specific category of a community foundation, and how American foundations played the role of the “R&D department in social development.”12 While the Chinese delegates were well aware that there were key differences between the US and Chinese context in which foundations operate, their attention to the specific theme of community foundations necessitates an understanding of the social, historical and political context to US foundation activity. In the 1960’s, community foundations gained prominence out of growing public distrust with the direct involvement of private and family foundations in community development, particularly with poor urban (racialized) neighborhoods. After Congress commenced hearings on the activities of the entire foundation industry in 1969 in response to widespread public accusations, they deemed community foundations (grant-making public charities focused on a region or community) as more publically accountable in comparison to private foundations (Lowe 2004, 224). After the Tax Reform act of 1969, community foundations offered the greatest tax advantages than all other foundations, and a wider range of giving options beyond cash, including personal and real property, stocks, bonds and other assets, to be invested in an endowment. Several studies have shown how the major private foundations then created a downstream network of community foundations and community development corporations as part of a dual strategy of real estate development and social welfare during the Reagan era, with precedence in the Ford Foundation’s strategies to mitigate/mediate social unrest in the wake of the foundation’s urban renewal programs (the expansion of downtowns into


While learning about how the blurring of for-profit and non-profit activities evolved through de-centralized activity in the US, itself a Ford-inspired change in the tax code (Liou & Stroh, 1998), Chinese foundations (both public and private) were hit with a wave of media exposure over misuse of funds and investment schemes in 2011. That same year, Chinese foundations were once again invited to the US in what has become an annual exchange between elite foundations in the US and in China, this time under the theme “effective philanthropy.” The establishment of this long-term social network proved to be key as the Chinese government began to tighten regulations on international organizations operations in the Mainland, and encourage the growth of domestic organizations beginning in 2010.

Since that first delegation to the US, the “founder of non-profit organizations in China” Xu Yongguang set up the China Foundation Center in 2010 in the image of the US Foundation Center (whose own establishment in New York in 1956 followed a series of congressional hearings into abuses in private foundation activities and spending, and the subsequent multi-foundation conference in Princeton, New Jersey for the necessity of foundation-commissioned research (Troyer 2000)). Meanwhile, the China Foundation Center is praised widely in media, even named “one of the biggest events in China’s philanthropic sector since 1949” (China Development Brief 2011b). Concretely, the China Foundation Center plays the role of gathering and publishing data on the foundation industry and grants, as well as providing for-profit services to non-profits, donors, and other foundations. In the words of the Center’s CEO Zhuang Ailiang, the Center is an “information supermarket” offering information commodities more than on the ground support. Sponsored by 15 public (government affiliated) foundations and 20 private
foundations\(^\text{13}\), 9 of which sit on the board of directors, the Center receives annual donations from the major Chinese foundations (Narada Foundation, Amity Foundation, China Youth Development Foundation, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, Chinese Red Cross, Youchange Foundation, Vantone Foundation, Tencent Charity Foundation), as well as the Ford Foundation and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. One key service provided by the China Foundation Center is a “Foundation Transparency Index” that ranks foundations according to a checklist of 60 “indicators,” which refer to a set of information that is made public by the foundation itself. Through the Foundation Transparency Index and various “trend reports,” the China Foundation Center positioned itself as the major authoritative and disciplining figure shaping the new field that brings together Chinese foundations, corporations, non-profits, and grassroots organizing.

The China Foundation Center is a key node within the network of elite actors constituting the CSR industry because it functions as a consolidation of wealth and decision-making among the top players. The key “linchpin” tying this network together is Xu Yongguang and the Narada Foundation. The term “linchpin” has been used in power structure research to refer to interlocking directors among corporations, or across sectors of society, revealing networks of social, political, or economic power (Davis, Yoo, and Baker, 2002; Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt et al. 2002). Xu Yongguang, the chairman of the Narada Foundation and the China Foundation Center, is also on the board of directors of at least four other organizations (the Shanghai Narada Group Company, the 21\(^{st}\) Century Education Research Academy, the New Philanthropy Partners Corporation, and the China Private Foundation Forum). Meanwhile, the Narada Foundation has three overlapping directors with the Non-profit Incubator, and has founded or commissioned

\(^{13}\) In China, “public” foundations refer to government-sponsored foundations that can raise funds publically, while “private” foundations refer to independent foundations that cannot raise funds publically.
at least two of the organizations that receive grants from the Narada Foundation (the New Citizens Social Work Development and Education Center, and the Beijing Recende (CSR) management advisory company). The majority of Narada Foundation’s grants from 2007-2011 either go towards subsidiary organizations barely one step removed from its founder and its board, or toward Narada initiated and directly benefited, high-publicity or networking events such as the annual China Private Foundation Forum, the China Hundred People Charity Forum, Caring World Public Welfare Innovation Award, the China-Europe Research Forum, the Foundation Tax Research Forum, Private Foundation Leadership Training, and the Social Enterprise Training and Award. In other words, through the network of foundations, subsidiary organizations, and forums, tied together by the Narada Foundation, both capital and decision-making remain within a closed circle of elite players. Not surprisingly, the Narada Foundation is ranked at the top of the China Foundation Center’s “transparency index.”

The attention to foundations and their power structure is not to suggest a static, self re-composing structure that inevitably leads to domination of grassroots organizing. In fact, the forced closing of the Narada Foundation’s New Citizens migrant school shows that the Narada Foundation is constantly strategizing and adapting within an embedded network of relations among state interests distinct from their own networks of power. By bringing to light the intentional formation of networks in the rapidly developing social space of foundations, corporations, and non-profits, one can highlight how foundations are key elements in shaping CSR in China and grassroots migrant organizing, as well as destabilize the narrative of an organic or a democratic “civil society.” I argue that foundations play a key role in creating the very phenomenon of CSR, or what has been called the construction of an “organizational field,” a “socially constructed arena” of self-referencing, mutually dependent organizations that enroll
grassroots actors into a defined set of social relations (DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2001, Bartley 2007). While most foundation and power structure research have focused on the way in which foundations impact grassroots organizing by mitigating radical elements (Arnove 1982; McAdam 1982; Haines 1984; Roelofs 2003) or by changing NGO’s over time (Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Jenkins and Halcli 1999; Earl 2003; Brulle and Jenkins 2005), social movement research such as Bartley’s study of the rise of forest certification in Brazil suggest that foundations “build an arena that brings a number of different actors into routine contact with one another, under a common frame of reference, in pursuit of an at least partially shared project” (Bartley 2007, 233). In this way, NGO’s and other grassroots groups are enrolled into collective projects within this new field as participants of a new social life rather than antagonists. The Narada Foundation, by directing their grants toward forums, research institutes and universities, awards, trainings, and networking spaces, are creating a model for social life which involves a new discourse, coded meanings, behaviors, and shared values.

By thinking about CSR as a new form of collective social life, anthropologists studying CSR have been able to shift the study from institutions and organizations to what Marx called the living labor behind the phenomenon. This has been an important perspective to bring as the highly-exclusive nature of attending the multitude of annual CSR conferences in Beijing, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, as well as the integral role of social media in CSR, have led to widespread suspicion about CSR as primarily a form of publicity or branding. While there is no doubt that many newly created CSR positions in multinational companies come from former public relations, marketing and communications positions (though interestingly, CSR personnel in China are coming from former NGO’s), the articulation of CSR as a “band-aid” or a “smokescreen” (Jones
1996, Sharp 2006) have been unsatisfying and inadequate as CSR becomes a pervasive and unavoidable force for domestic and international NGO’s in Beijing.

Anthropologists have been able to provide multiple entry points into the study of CSR to show broader political, economic, and social effects while taking into account the undeniably evasive social and linguistic constitution of CSR’s existence. Rajak’s study of the upper echelons of CSR in circuits of policy forums and conventions leads to an insightful discussion of these spaces as the “social life” of CSR, a highly ritualized “theatre of virtue” that serves concrete functions beyond branding, defining the terms of “partnership” such that NGO’s become internally self-disciplining rather than combative (Rajak 2011b). Benson and Kirsch have argued that CSR fully banks on the circulation of “corporate oxymorons,” openly contradictory terms such as “healthy cigarettes,” to create a politics of resignation, or a structure of feeling that looks upon corporate power as inevitable and un-challengeable (Benson and Kirsch 2010a and 2010b, Foster 2010).

While anthropologists have shown how the public practices of CSR have concrete and consequential effects “beyond public relations,” there has been less success in theorizing how these findings relate to a broader shift in capitalist restructuring. While the anthropology of CSR is explicitly premised on the curiosity about a new form of “activist capitalism,” ethnographic studies often collapse the phenomenon onto neoliberal or development agendas without dealing with internal periodization or multiple logics of power that depart from neoliberalism. In trying to grasp how CSR relates to capitalist restructuring, which involves a crucial relation to “the public,” there is much to be gained from situating CSR in a new relation between capital and the changing nature of public/private life.
4.4.3 CSR and the “Public”

There have been many attempts to grapple with the newfound significance of the public realm within capitalism, first with the industrial revolution, mass production and mass media, then with post-modernity and the technological dimensions to circulation and consumption. Does CSR work through ideological domination of the ruling class as emphasized in the Frankfurt school, through the masking of hard reality through mass media (Debord 1967), through the simulation of another reality through self-referential signs (Baudrillard 1994), the imagined community (Anderson 1983), or through the exploitation or negation of social production based in subjectivity (Hardt and Negri 2009)? In looking at the specific social life forming through CSR in China, attention to how “transparency” is being pushed by foundations reveals a central problematic about how to distinguish the material difference between such commonly circulated terms as “civil society,” “the public,” “the common,” or “sociality.” In other words, the problem that an ethnography of CSR reveals is not a tension between ideology and reality, which were both equally concrete for past thinkers, but between different forms of cooperative subjects.

As the China Foundation Center and the Chinese Academy of Social Science both generate their CSR rankings according to the company’s own self-disclosed information, there is an uncomfortable conflation of “transparency” with self-presentation activities such as annual reports and CSR reports, displays of quantitative data, and the repetition and circulation of the organizational self in public. As the CEO of the China Foundation Center Zhuang Ailiang commented, “For those who push for information transparency, the CFC needs high-profile appearances to arouse the concern of the community. At our July 8 launch, 30-40 media outlets came and, within 2 weeks, released nearly 5000 different news reports online [about CFC]. I predict when the Beijing University Center
for Civil Society Studies names the "top ten civil society events in 2010", the CFC opening will be somewhere among the top three.”

In linking the implementation of transparency to media coverage, “transparency” comes to signify not a relation to “fact” or “truth,” but the willingness to be in public. In order for a foundation to be a part of the transparency index, one must learn to be aware of a public and to orient oneself to the public, by writing reports about oneself, constructing a public self, and displaying that self repeatedly.

The call to self-presentation that the “transparency index” requires takes on a ritualistic nature, as this practice of being in public becomes a gateway to gaining “public trust.” For example, at the 2011 Private Foundation Forum, in which scholars, government officials, and foundation leaders held several thematic discussions on how to develop the foundation industry, conversations centered on questions of how much transparency should foundations display, what kinds of information do their audiences want, and how to “reflect back to the audiences what they want to see.” The call for “transparency” by the China Foundation Center, no doubt through public pressure, thus becomes a matter of determining what the audience wants to see, and “disclosing” oneself according to certain ritualistic practices of writing reports, speaking and presenting a “concerned” self in public. As one reads these CSR reports, which are largely indistinguishable from each other in terms of language, aesthetic, and presentation, it becomes clear that the point is not so much the content of what is spoken, or the ideological charge or meaning of knowledge being produced, but the demonstration of willingness to “speak” as such.

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In trying to grasp CSR’s fundamental relation to sociality besides “public relations” by articulating it as a ritual, I draw from Charles Piot’s interesting insight into the way that initiation ceremonies of Kabre boys and girls in Northern Togo as well as the public spectacles of post-colonial state cultural apparatuses seem unnecessarily redundant, but in fact are crucial to demonstrate attitude and willingness to participate in a relationship. Equally important, Piot finds that the public ritual “has to do with making visible actions and statuses that are not considered achieved until they are ‘seen’ by others...What we have here is an everyday epistemology that relies on making things known by making them visible” (Piot 1999, 101). Being visible to the public may open oneself to critique by those who bear witness, but the larger process by which the “power of spectacle” and “the spectacle of power” become inseparable suggest how CSR can make double use of “the public” for both a willingness to be in public as well as the impoverishment of the “public” according to different forms of social cooperation.

As transparency becomes a tenet of the new ethical capitalism, and transparency becomes coded as a willingness to present oneself in public, the consequences for community-based organizations required to act by the new rules is a subjective re-orientation away from community-determined needs to “becoming transparent” to civil society (dominated and structured by elite players). In other words, “disclosure” and “transparency” become vehicles for communities to become “intelligible” or “visible” to capital not as an unveiling, but through a subjective re-casting of “community” in the terms of capitalist logic. This suggests that there must be a conceptual distinction and intervention into how these qualitatively different forms of cooperative subjects are made equivalent through the space of “civil society.”

A possible framework with which to understand the intricate relation between CSR and sociality is through the work of Stefano Harney, whose thought-provoking
discussion on “civil society” in terms of the subjective orientation of social production towards capital suggests how the call to “transparency” represents an important shift in capitalist operations today. Working through the traditions of autonomist Marxism and Black Radical Thought, in which the self-organization of labor is both necessary for capital and disowned through various techniques of discipline, repression, and exploitation, Harney argues that understanding capitalist exploitation in the age of biopolitics requires a careful distinction between several terms, specifically “the public” versus “being in public,” “civil society” versus “the common,” “the general intellect,” and “the social.” These conceptual distinctions help to shed light on my analysis of CSR, because of the intentional way in which many terms are conflated in the seemingly virtuous push for “public-private partnerships,” which hides the very process of exploitation and discipline taking place.

Harney first returns to Marx in The Jewish Question to argue that the collective labor that makes and remakes the world, what Marx called “social power,” is distinctly different from the anti-social form of organization in capitalist society such as the state or civil society, which separates and poses labor’s social power against itself. Autonomist Marxists have argued that labor’s socialization, the expanded cooperative ability that Marx called “mass intellectuality,” allows for the conditions of “the common,” “those results of social production that are necessary for social interaction, and further production, such as knowledge’s, languages, codes, information, affect” (Hardt and Negri 2009, viii). For Harney, “civil society” is one form of state-thought, always constructed, and through the struggle to carve up what is produced in common through the formation of “the public” and “the private.” In other words, the privatization of socialized production occurs through the formation of both “the public” and “the

\[15\] For more on Black Radical thought and its relation to Autonomist Marxism, see Harney and Moten 2004; Reyes 2009; Hardt and Negri 2009
private.” Harney explains how historically these two formations have been shaped differently alongside different techniques of exploitation:

“Sovereignty establishes the public and private. Governmentality makes this establishment of the private productive, through the production of the public. Governance today marks the emergence of the public as directly productive” (Harney 2008).

Along with the history of struggle to privatize social production through forming “the public” and “the private,” there has always been an attendant disciplining and criminalizing of certain labor whose self-organization suggested alternative forms of collectivity besides that allowed by capital’s formation of “the public.” Here, Harney provides a crucial distinction between “being public” and “being in public” that sheds light on the inseparable relation between CSR and its necessity for “self-presenting” activities. For Harney, “the public” refers to that constructed category historically used to secure private exploitation, while “being in public” refers to those whose collective self-organization made visible to power had to be tightly controlled (through prisons, police violence, rendition, social censure, etc.) as a threat posed to “the public.” Harney argues that today, the growing socialization of labor that leads to the conditions of Empire or biopolitics as proposed by Hardt and Negri, has provoked a reorganization of “the public” and “the private,” a radical shift in capitalist exploitation and labor discipline that now occurs directly in “the public.” Specifically, if the problem for capital today is to “locate” the social production that is already taking place, and to “harness it,” then it does so by encouraging labor to be “the public.” Elaborating on the mechanisms of this process, Harney identifies the techniques of civil society:

And what does governance look like? I would say in large part it looks like the continuous production and exhibition of self-generated, intelligible public interests. This is not just our interest in the public, but our interest in generating the public through the production of more interests, more politics if you like, even more politics of difference, as long as this difference is public, and therefore not different. The exhibition of willing labour-power in the form of public interests is increasingly what composes the public. And it is the exhibition that governance seeks to organize. And why public interests? Because public interests are a way to capture all the social cooperation, all the social interests, that reside in the general intellect, and that are, as Michael Hardt and Toni Negri have taught us, the chief source of capitalist wealth today. Governance that provokes the production and exhibition of public interests therefore mines the wealth of the
general intellect for what it cannot reach without the aid of all those who identify, volunteer, and offer up their public interests... The laboratory of the production of public interests is the NGO. The ethos of the NGO is that populations must be provoked into identifying and volunteering their own public interests. The NGO regards it as counter-productive to speak for the illegal migrant. Only the illegal migrant knows the contours of her own public interests. An illegal migrant ought to know her rights, says the NGO. In this boiling cauldron of neoliberalism and civil society was this new meaning of governance born, and from there has it spread. (Harney 2008).

What Harney offers the study of contemporary manifestations of capitalism such as CSR, in which the traditional notions of “public” and “private” are intentionally blurred, is a set of badly needed conceptual and political tools to articulate the new forms of exploitation and discipline occurring through the cooptation of cooperative subjects. This cooptation can be made clear by a scission of terms between “the public,” or the social space that CSR creates through self-referencing institutions, discourses, values, and social relations, and cooperative activity that is not yet objectified within these public-private partnerships. At the same time that community based organizations are enrolled into a new space being created by elite actors as active and willing subjects, the process of becoming intelligible to capital allows existing social life to become an innovative and productive resource for capital.16

4.4.4 The Wealth at the Bottom of the Pyramid

“A lot of NPOs [non-profit organizations] say that they can survive without foundations. But if foundations don’t have NPOs, they will lose their existing value. Foundations should reflect on this point.” -- Dou Ruigang, Executive Secretary-General Tencent Public Charity Foundation at the second Private Foundation Forum, October 2010

While studies of CSR in supply-chains and corporate headquarters have shown how CSR tends to select for big business and big NGO’s (Rajak 2011a, Chinese Academy of Social Science 2010), other studies of CSR show the movement outside of factories is driven by the growing interest in the value among the grassroots, or “the bottom of the

16 Miranda Joseph’s ethnography provides a similar argument that NGO’s are sites of capitalist subject production through the volunteering of needs, desires, self, identity, community (Joseph 2002)
pyramid.” The term “bottom of the pyramid” (BoP) refers to C.K. Prahalad’s 2004 publication *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid*, hailed as the more enlightened and developed form of CSR in which capitalism seeks to expand its scope to the four billion men and women who live on less than two dollars per day. While ethnographic studies of corporate BoP schemes have focused on how poor communities are re-defined as self-enterprising neoliberal subjects, and poverty becomes marketized and de-politicized (Schwittay 2011, Dolan and Johnstone-Louis 2011), there has been less attention to how methods of organizing and organizations are changed as well. In China as well, there is a distinct attention to the way that “grassroots NGO’s,” as opposed to governments or corporations, are the site of creativity and innovation. The Narada Foundation in particular, leads the way in expressed interest in the energy and creativity of local organizations throughout China.

Starting in 2010, the Narada Foundation launched the pilot program ”The Gingko Partner Support Plan,” in which the selected “leaders” of grassroots organizations received 100,000 RMB (about 16,000 USD) every year for three years as well as specially tailored “learning plans.” As the awards are intended to “support young leaders to break through the bottleneck of development to become forces behind the development of public space”, it is highly suggested that the money goes toward personal use rather than organizational or community support. Unlike other CSR awards that often amount to self-congratulating among large foundations and corporations, the recipients of the Gingko award were drawn from young NGO’s across the country. The most visible co-founder of the Migrant Workers Home, Sun Heng, was selected as a recipient during the pilot year. He reflected on the nature of the program, and the way in which it set a particular narrative about social change. He remarked that he himself wasn’t particularly affected by his selection for Ginko’s program, even
though the program focuses on individual support rather than on the level of program or organizational support. Since many of the Migrant Workers Home members earn less than 2000 RMB a month, he refused to use the Gingko funds to pay himself the considerably higher salary suggested by the foundation. Instead, he uses the money to subsidize other programs in the Migrant Workers Home that have yet to find stable funding sources. Sun noted that despite the rhetoric of leadership development, the selected community leaders are not created by the Gingko Plan, but rather, "the development of such people started long before they were selected by Gingko; on what grounds could you say that all their success is due to Gingko? That wouldn’t be fair" (China Development Brief 2011c). Sun recalls that the “tailored learning plans” set up by the Narada Foundation included tours to the UK to learn about business management, “brand building,” and the general specialization and professionalization of community-based work. They also visited other “model” NGO’s, all social enterprises, in a similar way that the private foundation delegates were shown “best practices” on their exclusive tour to U.S.

The Gingko award program and its relation to the Migrant Workers Home reveals much about the new field or social space that private corporate foundations are shaping for NGO’s in China, and its relation to subjectivity. The funds that are given to Sun Heng are expected to be for “personal use,” which recasts social relations between the organization and its members as one between the leader and his organization rather than how decisions and the division of labor is practiced in the Migrant Workers Home. While there is a core group of members who meet consistently to run the organization, with both student volunteers and the migrant residents of Picun forming a broader circle of support on a project and event basis, the constant attention to social relations through the intentionally constructed spaces of daily interactions also create responsibility
between the different social actors. Sun Heng himself lives in a men’s dormitory in Picun along with other single migrant men, a daily reckoning of the material reality of the community. Furthermore, the organization is currently working to address the sustainability issues that arise with over-relying on key members who bring certain skills and talent such as Sun Heng, which runs counter to the logic and social relations that the Narada Foundation’s Gingko Program implements by searching for “leaders” who effectively delimit their responsibility to others as a model of sustainability.

In the process of developing a “leader,” the Narada Foundation recasts value and ethics in their own specific terms. Meng Weina participated in Narada’s Gingko Partner candidate selection meetings for two years, and articulated the selection committee’s ideal leader:

Narada is looking to cultivate future leaders in the public service sector, but the current group’s “weight class” is generally lightweights. They are passionate, but these future leaders are not very aware of their own problems, always talking about the structure, talking about “things” and not “people”, or of people’s gratitude and the like, but never allowing a clash of ideas. It is important to ask the recommended candidates how they see the relationship between their own developmental constraints, their “sense of ethics” (dao) and their “skills?” As China’s public service sector develops, each organization’s leader has had many professional development opportunities to develop their “skills” but not necessarily their “sense of ethics” (China Development Brief 2011d)

In addition to these individual reflexive “techniques of the self,” Meng Weina went on to emphasize that joining the Gingko Leadership Program was about creating high-level leaders who are able to deal with a changing social environment, and with different or contradictory opinions. “Essentially, it is about elevating your sense of ethics and becoming stronger through the Gingko Program, not about boosting your ego and reputation.”17 In the articulation of ethics and personal development as an internal dialectical struggle and transcendence from the particularities of “different opinions,” the Narada Foundation ironically creates a subject that stands separate from the social

relations that constitute and embed members of the organization ethically. In other words, the techniques of the self are also techniques of relating to self and others as individuals. In turn, through the tailored learning plans, these social relations becomes an object of technical intervention to be managed, and run according to market principles, rather than a mutually constitutive collective project for different social relations. Sun Heng, in refusing to separate himself from the material circumstances of the organization and its members, affirms another ethics inseparable from deep embeddedness in social relations. The Gingko program may suggest a neoliberal ethics of creativity arising from the self-contained individual, but it is important to also see the effects of this on the organizational level, where the very conception of “personal” and “organizational,” or the relation between self and others, is itself a political struggle.

At the same time that the Narada Foundation casts itself as the creator of leaders and talent, the Gingko program allows the foundation to become exposed to new ideas and activities taking place on the ground. The roots of this strategy lie in the Narada Foundation’s emergence from a CSR partnership with JP Morgan Foundation in China (whose expressed CSR focus areas are “children’s education, community development, and culture/arts,” but in practice are major actors in the issue of migrants). In fact, the very cornerstone of the Narada Foundation’s new “brand,” as Xu Yongguang calls it, was taken from a project that originated with the Migrant Workers Home. Before the Narada Foundation’s “New Citizens Plan” for migrant children was put forth in 2007, the Migrant Workers Home was running a New Citizens Children Activity Center out of their Center in Picun. The free program provided children in Picun with classes on photography, painting, acting, dancing, and weekly workshops to help youth process their emotional worlds. The success of the New Citizens Childrens’ Activity Center led to the establishment of similar centers in 8 other migrant schools throughout Beijing.
Though the program was originally run by the Migrant Workers Home and funded by JP Morgan, Xu Yongguang’s formation of the Narada Foundation and a “New Citizens Plan” eventually led to a new partnership and a new arrangement. Now, JP Morgan commissioned (weituo) the newly formed Narada Foundation to manage their financially supported migrant programs in Beijing and Shanghai, including the Migrant Workers Home’s New Citizens Childrens’ Activity Center.\textsuperscript{18} Additionally, beginning in 2007 with funding from JP Morgan, the Narada Foundation began installing permanent social work offices in their New Citizens migrant schools where professionally trained social workers would provide services 3-4 days out of the week for migrants dealing with emotional, psychological, and social problems. Under the “commission” of the Narada Foundation, the Migrant Workers Home continues to call their annual youth arts festivals “New Citizens Childrens’ Art and Culture Festival” despite having turned their focus toward developing migrant culture and theory in terms of “New Workers.”

The transfer of knowledge, ownership, and experience from the Migrant Workers Home to the Narada Foundation took on the distinct quality of specialization and reproducibility that the Foundation now expects of their grant recipients. As Chairman of the SEE Foundation Wang Weijia commented during the second Private Foundation Forum, “Like a company, a [non-profit] organization can only accumulate experience and develop a team in a specific market niche” (China Development Brief 2010). To this end, the social knowledges and technologies produced within a specific context and struggle become commodified and reproduced as expertise in a creative approach to “migrant education” for the Foundation. The Foundation then sells this brand to government, corporations, and donors as reason to invest in their project with

national aspirations. For the Migrant Workers Home, however, the children’s culture and art festival is but one element among an entire range of projects necessary to sustain a workers self-run and self-oriented organization (gongren ziwuzu ziwufuwu tuanti), particularly in the face of concrete struggles around demolitions. Perhaps drawing insight from the aftermath of the demolition of Narada Foundation’s First New Citizens School in Chaoyang while their close neighbor the Migrant Workers Home was able to save their school, the Foundation expressed that the New Citizens Plan will turn more attention to “community” and “community based mechanisms” beginning in 2012.  

The dual role of the Narada Foundation as a specialist in resolving the “migrant issue” and a specialist in providing “civil society” data and information services on foundations, NGO’s and corporate donors, underscores how migrants are integral to an immaterial economy, and how their integration occurs primarily through the mechanisms and actors of “civil society.” Part of the Narada Foundation’s intervention into civil society through the China Foundation Center was to “showcase” grassroots NGO’s to big donors, rather than the large-scale and entrenched NGO’s that are often selected for by government and corporations. In addition to the “industry-wide” data and reports on non-profits published by the Narada Foundation, they direct specific studies of migrant self-run communities and migrant education models through the various research institutes they established, such as the 21st Century Education Research Academy and the New Citizens Social Work Development and Education Center, as well as through partnerships with existing universities and think tanks. The

commodification of this knowledge translates into “market data” as the Foundation provides “tailor-made philanthropy solutions” to paying customers. The Narada Foundation thus intentionally seeks to provide a link between “the grassroots” and donors looking to “leverage” their investments for greatest impact. The opening up of community organizations to the logic of finance capital and speculation means that community organizations take on the risk, while its successes are then co-opted by capital.

4.5 Conclusion

The rise of CSR in the urban space of Beijing, inseparable from the history of neoliberal policies and the protests against it, is due to its double articulation through a national narrative and imaginary about sustainable development and globalization in which the Chinese state seeks to discipline domestic entities to become global players, and the global market narrative that offers an “ethically underdeveloped” China an enlightened capitalism and “good governance.” In addition to these global and national dimensions of market logic, the distinct growth of a capitalist class interest within China brings to light the intentional formation of networks in the rapidly developing social space of foundations, corporations, and non-profits. Chinese foundations are key elements in creating the very phenomenon of CSR as a socially constructed arena of self-referencing, mutually dependent organizations that enroll NGO’s and other grassroots groups into collective projects within this new field as participants of a new social life rather than antagonists.

In looking at the specific social life forming through CSR in China, the attention to the importance of “the public” for CSR reveals the need to distinguish between different forms of cooperative subjects. What Harney’s distinction between “the public with interest” and “being in public” offers the study of contemporary manifestations of
capitalism such as CSR, in which the traditional notions of “public” and “private” are intentionally blurred with the “common” (Harney 2008, Hardt and Negri 2009), is a set of badly needed conceptual and political tools to articulate the new forms of exploitation and discipline occurring through the cooptation of cooperative subjects. At the same time that community based organizations are enrolled into a new space being created by elite actors as active and willing cooperative subjects, the process of becoming intelligible to capital allows existing social life to become an innovative and productive resource for capital.

The effect of CSR as an “industry standard” for local organizations working in the name of “migrants,” by seeking to create experts in cooperative production, is seen in the way that NGO’s whose explicit target is “migrants” nevertheless market themselves through distinct niches—Art, Education, Youth, or Community. My interest in the relation between CSR and different forms of cooperative subjectivities led me to investigate organizations that were engaged explicitly in the business of community. The following ethnography of three distinct spaces of CSR—the corporate headquarters of a multinational corporation and its CSR community engagement program, the Chinese domestic NGO Green Living Center and its “urban participatory self-governance” project, and the international NGO CMC21 and its “community center” model to migrant organizing—reveals how CSR forms a generalized space of social relations through which middle class interests can be mapped onto migrant bodies, and how migrants become an absent cause of Chinese CSR.

21 Not real name
5. Corporate Social Responsibility from “Below”

5.1 Urban Self-Governance

As global CSR discourse persists in pushing CSR “beyond philanthropy” to become integrated into the “core business,” I argue that CSR is tied up in Beijing to experiments with new forms of social control for a highly mobile and spontaneous population. The mutual rise of CSR alongside the rise of the migrant issue from the perspective of state policy is undergirded by the fundamental problem that migrants pose to the party-state—how to address the self-organization occurring among migrants, and how to control it? In the city of Beijing, this takes the form of migrant settlements and their internal economies and institutions such as Picun, which consistently fall outside urban and village administration, and lead to such “illegal” organizing as the migrant schools.

The state is well aware of this high level of self-activity among migrant settlements, and explicitly experiments with new forms of social control through non-traditional ways (Lu X. et al. 2008, Lu G. 2010, Chen and Wang 2012). In the past, concentrated zones of migrants have been managed through a mix of temporary residence permits (registration, permit checks, and confiscation), housing managers (registering rented rooms), employers (registering at the site of employment through the work unit manager), and individuals (specifically designated people with security responsibilities). These diverse and un-centralized approaches may explain the seemingly schizophrenic relation between government and social actors, as the incident with the Migrant Workers Home and the Narada Foundation reveals. Just as other scholars have sought to understand how new and existing systems of social reproduction facilitate migrant exploitation (Pun 2005, Yan 2008), I suggest that “civil society” is starting to fulfill a need for the social control of migrants. Rather than
thinking about civil society as a space of democratic freedom in relation to the state, or a state-dominated space of control, it becomes clear that both the market and state actors have vested interests in creating a specific social space of interactions, but whose effects are incomplete and experimental, sometimes complementary and sometimes antagonistic. In trying to describe the contours of this space, I hope to show concretely the new forces involved for migrants organizing in this context, including the rise of middle class subjectivities, the experiment with urban self-governance, and the ecological tie between “community” and CSR.

In order to capture the confluence of these important factors, I juxtapose three short ethnographies—(1) a CSR partnership organized by white-collar women at a multinational corporation, (2) a local Chinese NGO that sought to expand “self-governing, sustainable urban communities” for local residents to migrant workers, (3) and an international migrant NGO focused on the “community center” model. The relationship between these three stories is contingent, happening through a chance encounter through a corporate CSR program, while also showing the pervasiveness of CSR for organizations in Beijing.

5.2 Green Living

“You’re not allowed to take photos,” Dandan said to me, as she walked into the corporate meeting room of Qualcomm’s headquarters in the central business district (CBD) of Beijing Chaoyang district. Right outside the window of the American digital wireless telecommunications company’s meeting room was the famous CCTV building designed by Rem Koolhaas. During the 1990’s, Beijing’s city government set aside Chaoyang district as a special zone for finance, insurance, domestic and foreign trading, communication, consultancy, and cultural service activities, significantly marking
Beijing’s shift from a socialist to a capitalist city.\textsuperscript{1} I met Dandan while volunteering with a Chinese NGO, The Green Living Center, stationed in the heart of Beijing’s old city (to which I’ll explore in the next section). The 34 year old, well educated, and quite frankly bossy native Beijinger had come to the Green Living Center seeking an NGO partner for Qualcomm’s CSR program. Dandan’s intensity first comes across as aggressive, and a bit disrespectful, speaking to the woman running the Chinese NGO, Wumin, as if she should be thankful for this opportunity. It seemed to me from Dandan’s demeanor and attitude that this was a business transaction.

With Qualcomm’s designated funds for CSR at the Beijing office, Dandan had organized an entire day of educational activities for Qualcomm’s employees provided by the NGO partner. Ranked among the top 10 in the widely accepted CSR ranking index ESG (environmental, social and corporate governance), Qualcomm’s CSR activities in China are one of those cases where “poverty alleviation” and “community development” become blurred with activities for gaining market entry into the next largest source of consumption—the rural countryside.\textsuperscript{2} Similarly, the use of CSR funds to provide a “green living” workshop to Qualcomm employees didn’t seem to me then as much a good hearted “responsibility” to drive social change as it seemed a re-categorization of basic corporate functions such as employee welfare through the terms of CSR. In fact, CSR studies were showing that such programs as “Qualcomm Cares” which provided socially conscious activities and volunteer events for their employees were an important factor in employee recruitment and retention, productivity, efficiency, and loyalty, particularly for female employees. For Qualcomm as with many

\textsuperscript{1} More than 60\% of Beijing’s heritage sites, including some on UNESCO’s World Heritage list, were used for offices or new housing in the construction of CBD (ebeijing, 2005)

\textsuperscript{2} In Qualcomm’s case, their Wireless Reach Initiative “donates mobile phones to farmers as poverty relief,” but in reality provide only a one-year subsidy, and contingent upon the individual applying for a loan. http://www.chinasr.com/en/2006/05/11/466-china-unicoms-cdma-goes-rural-with-qualcomm/
companies, “community” became a signifier for corporate employees and their welfare. In this case, a community based NGO was solicited to provide cultural enrichment and educational activities for the benefit of Qualcomm’s employees as part of their corporate “community involvement” program.

Far from the world of migrant demolitions, I stood in the meeting room made of glass walls and leather chairs, preparing to lead a portion of the workshop for twenty-five Qualcomm employees, all Chinese women in their late twenties to early thirties. As the well groomed and fashionably dressed women walked into the room, Dandan handed each a free t-shirt that said “Qualcomm Cares—Qualcomm Community Involvement.” Their chatter filled the room as they circled around one by one to pick up their free lunch—pizza from Papa Johns with an unfamiliar mayonnaise sauce drawn in crosshatch patterns on top. For the first half of the day, Wumin introduced her work with the Green Living Center for the urban residents of the Shichahai Community Service Center, explained the responsibility of Chinese citizens as part of the largest nation on earth to decrease global warming and environmental destruction, and detailed Beijing city’s award winning approach to this government directed agenda by educating urban residents on the practices of “green living.” The women were attentive and cheerful, often looking to Dandan when they asked questions during the presentations, and whom they called affectionately “mom.” For her part, Dandan’s demeanor was distinctly different from the way she spoke to Wumin, even laughing every now and then with her group of women.

After Wumin finished speaking, I got up to give my presentation, which Wumin had asked me to prepare earlier that month in order to save her time while she worked on the community-based CSR event held at the community service center by Chinese companies and local officials. Despite my hesitations, Wumin had insisted that I share
my knowledge of “green living” techniques in the US, even after I warned her that I lacked formal or direct experience with environmental activism. My real reluctance came from not wanting to play the role of the “American” who was to teach Chinese citizens about environmentally-friendly practices. The irony of this situation was not lost on the Qualcomm women. As I attempted to explain the class-based effects of industrial food production and the organic foods movement in the US, I realized that in fact, I had once again misidentified my audience. Just as I had mistakenly tried to explain the “critical mass” urban biking movement to the aging or retired urban residents of Shichahai who had always biked or walked their entire lives, I was trying to explain the problems of industrialized food to these women who, despite the Pappa Johns lunch, were part of the new middle class force behind CSR growing concerned about the quality of their food, water, and air. These women were clearly proud of their work in the heart of Beijing’s swanky business district, and the status it afforded them to live up to a new expectation on life. Dandan, I later learned from her gossipy colleague Fiona, once tried to hide her humble background from her boyfriend (presumably humble because her father was a taxi driver, and her mother a school teacher), and often came to work with the newest Apple products and Zara clothes as part of the expectation of life in the CBD. As I finished my presentation, after taking the many light-hearted but pointed comments about “American culture of pollution and waste,” and the obviously politically motivated logic that Chinese citizens should decrease their “carbon footprints” rather than American companies, I thankfully let Wumin take over the tough crowd, refusing to play the defender of American environmental politics. The rest of the afternoon was spent on more lighthearted activities such as how to make soap from leftover cooking oil, and growing one’s own edible grass species at home, which they all enjoyed.
After the workshop, I sat around talking to Dandan and some of the women who lingered around to finish the pizza and lay claim to leftover giveaways to take home. “We like to spend our CSR funds on these practical things,” Dandan said, “Chinese CSR is not like American philanthropy where money is spent on art and culture.” (Later, I learned from Chen Ayi who cleans the office that this is the first time Qualcomm has done anything like this in the ten years she has worked here.) Nevertheless, it seemed important to Dandan that her efforts for the day meant something significant, compared to the seeming frivolity that “art and culture” signified. In reality, Qualcomm only began to implement “social responsibility” structurally in 2010 with a committee that reported to the board of directors. It was clear that the “Qualcomm Cares” CSR program, the philanthropy and volunteer program that “helps build communities that are healthier, more culturally vibrant, and better educated,” came up suddenly in the Beijing office in the form of earmarked funds. Normally, employees were less involved in CSR as annual donations of wireless computer labs were made from the head office in California to various rural schools in China through their “Wireless Reach” project, including Beijing’s Xingzhi Experimental School for migrant children (which is run by one of Beijing’s legendary migrant entreprenurs, who is rumored to control most privately run migrant schools in Chaoyang through kinship ties).

Dandan said she took the new found responsibility for heading up the local CSR funds seriously, despite not having a formal title or position for this aspect of work (the Beijing office also lacked a formal CSR office, with activities falling under Human Resources). One motivating reason for her sense of responsibility, to my surprise, was her annoyance that “netizens” often posted cynical comments about Qualcomm on the company’s Chinese blog, particularly following the publicity of a CSR “community involvement” activity. One blogger compared Qualcomm to the infamous Foxconn
Corporation (whose trouble with migrant labor unrest brought media attention to Apple’s supply chain during the summer of 2010), and posted underneath a photo of Qualcomm employees wearing “Qualcomm Cares” t-shirt, asking, “What is Qualcomm doing for China?” For Dandan, this put her in a defensive position to be identified not as a Chinese citizen doing good for China, but as a multinational company assumed to have dirty secrets behind PR stunts. Perhaps this defensiveness underlay how Dandan related to me as an “American” and Wumin as a seemingly less educated “Chinese,” balancing subjective orientations toward a new-found status working and living in the center of corporate Beijing, and different receptions from society on the rising middle class. As Wumin and I finished packing up, Dandan gave us her assessments of the day. “You need to bring more fun materials that the employees can take home with them, like soaps and plants. The presentations were acceptable, but we are more educated than the people you normally deal with, so you should keep that in mind. We also don’t need to hear about the work that you do in the community center, because this day is focused on Qualcomm, so just focus on what’s relevant for our people.” Wumin, in turn, thanked Dandan for the opportunity to participate in this day, in the more typical humility that I was expecting.

After the event was over, I sat with Wumin in the Green Living Center office back in the Shichahai community service center filling out an assessment report of the CSR event. I had more doubts than ever about the benefits of CSR for NGO’s and community-based work, and I finally had to confide in Wumin about my reservations. I asked whether I was wrong to feel so put off by the experience and the way that this corporate-NGO “partnership” had felt more like a free gift to a large corporation, and

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3 Such opportunistically nationalist accusations against the company were also made by the former Qualcomm China president, who suggested that Qualcomm uses its monopoly of CDMA technology to monopolize the Chinese market and bank off of exorbitant license fees, leading to the reduction of competition and local innovation.
rather disrespectful of the NGO? I felt that I was missing something—why would CSR, even at its worst as a feel-good spectacle—come across like a demand, an entitlement to service? How did this benefit the work that Wumin envisioned for the Green Living Center and the Shichahai community center? Wumin immediately nodded, “yes, these women come in here and talk as if they’re better, they’re more educated, and deserve something from us.” Even though Wumin worked often with Chinese enterprises and local government in a relation more like an assignment from a boss than a partnership, she too was caught off guard by the unequal nature of this relationship with Qualcomm. She shrugged, “this is something that the Green Living Center hopes to turn into as a for-profit service in the future. I hope to develop these corporate partnerships and provide ‘green living’ workshops as a source of funding.” Even though her NGO did not receive any monetary benefit this time, the event was helpful to see what corporations are looking for in CSR partnerships, and how she can tailor these workshops to make them attractive to other large multinational companies. Wumin said, “it is difficult now with these foreign NGO’s, because they are already doing this so well [these CSR workshops].” Learning how to become attractive to corporations as an NGO had suddenly become a part of her responsibility at the Green Living Center.

It was certainly true in my own encounters of many foreign NGO’s in Beijing, that publicizing “consulting services” under the license of CSR had become ubiquitous. On the website of one successful Beijing based NGO well funded by both the Ford Foundation and the Narada Foundation, which used the philosophy of Paulo Freire and popular education to “unleash the potential of migrants through theatre,” NGO’s now
operate through explicitly market-oriented discourse. On this NGO’s website⁴ is the following advertisement:

“We run a range of different consulting programmes for both corporations and other non-profit organisations. We create tailored activities designed according to client needs, to help corporate employees gain soft skills and improve team-building through creating interactive theatre methods. If you would like to find out more about how we can work with your company or organisation to develop team-work and communication skills, please contact us.”

Underneath the list of services that the NGO provides to companies, ranging from employee skills training, marketing corporate conferences through specific socially themed topics, and providing volunteer opportunities for corporate CSR departments through the NGO’s community networks, a testimony is given of how the “migrant issue” has proved a successful market. A quote by one corporation praises the NGO for their CSR partnership:

“The lessons that you learn through character and narration live longer in the memory than what you learn in the classroom. Through the story of the Western CEO and the young migrant girl who works in the factory that produces the socks for his company, you gain an insight into the connectivity of these two worlds, distilling the big issues down to the individual human level. A very effective way of bringing to life the human impact of the macro-issues.”

Not unique to this particular NGO, the integration of CSR into community-based work creates an economy and ecology where NGO’s become re-oriented toward maintaining the CSR industry itself, a consuming operation of managing short term volunteerism, inconsistent and unequal corporate partnerships, self-marketing, and much more. For grassroots NGO’s with limited resources, it becomes unclear whether corporations help sustain community work, or community work helps to sustain corporations. At a practical level, Wumin and many NGO’s in Beijing see CSR as a new funding opportunity in an increasingly “competitive” operating field. In practice, the “community” in focus shifts to corporations and their needs as NGO’s begin to compete with each other for corporate partnerships. Furthermore, the management of CSR funds

⁴ Website of Hua Dan NGO in Beijing
through the evocation of middle class affects and imaginaries—whether through sympathies for Chinese migrants or demands for environmentally conscious consumerism—hints at how CSR is tied to an economy in which subjectivities are produced, circulated, and consumed.

5.3 The “Self-Governing Community”

“Actually we must count on the masses, because the local police force is limited, while the power of people is without borders.” Resident of Liuhai Hutong

While the CSR workshop organized for Qualcomm was the Green Living Center’s first such event with a large multinational company, Wumin was already an expert when it came to Chinese CSR to the extent that government, enterprise, and society have shifted responsibilities for social welfare in the wake of neoliberal policies. The Green Living Center non-profit organization arose in 2008 from a “public-private” collaboration involving four Chinese NGO’s and the Shichahai grassroots government office (shichahai jiedao banshichu), with funding from Siemens, to serve the Shichahai community at their Center right in the heart of Beijing’s large-scale revitalization and historical culture protection projects. Beijing’s inner city was designed according to rigid grid street systems for political administration, dividing the city into square blocks that are subdivided into long and narrow residential quarters by lanes called hutongs (Sit 1995, Fan 2002). The hutongs, first built during the Yuan dynasty, are lined with traditional Beijing courtyards called siheyuan, which housed extended families during feudal society, but over time became subdivided to house as many as five to ten unrelated households (Sui 2006). During the 1990’s, these largely dilapidated courtyards and their urban residents become objects of interest to be worked on through the dual desires for “cultural protection” and the construction of a global city. The increasingly
market-driven and real-estate funded urban renewal since the 1990’s has been one key source of urban revolts (Chen and Zhang 2010).

The self-articulated mission of the Green Living Center is to preserve the culture and environment of the Shichahai community by establishing a sense of belonging and identity, while simultaneously creating a sustainable democratic and participatory self-governing community. Specifically, the Green Living Center identifies the following goals: (1) Advocate environmental protection, letting “green choice” enter everyday lives of residents; (2) Popularize the community’s culture and characteristics, raising the community’s “ecological value”; (3) Strengthen social capital, develop community economy and employment through ecological tourism; (4) Push community equality and a sustainable participation model where residents can decide on the future of community development. “Community,” then, was an explicit target for the Green Living Center to both collect and formally display existing “capital” or culture—knowledges, ways of living, and local productions—and to create a new kind of community that was culturally in line with the global imperative for “sustainable” and “responsible” development.

Undergirding the Green Living Center was a national network of scholars and universities, NGO’s, and local actors linked through the Urban Communities Participatory Governance Network (CCPG) (chengshi shequ canyu zhili ziyuan pingtai) formed in 2005 with the support of the Ford Foundation to encourage community innovation projects for sustainable development of urban communities. In addition to holding national conferences and workshops, the CCPG’s website is a major site of exchange for ideas, research, and experience of grassroots community projects around the world from South Africa’s shack-dwellers movement to the struggles of South

5 http://www.ccpg.org.cn
Korea’s post-displacement urban residents. As part of this network, the Green Living Center participated in the CCPG’s annual conferences to share their experiences in Beijing’s Shichahai community. During the summer of 2011 Wumin asked me to attend the five-day annual CCPG conference in Weihai, Shandong as a representative of the Green Living Center. The over 50 attendees included scholars, grassroots government, and CCPG members from NGO’s in China’s major urban centers. The focus of the conference was on showcasing local examples of social innovation and community self-governance. Interestingly, two of the three major cases involved the integration of migrants into communities: Chengdu’s "Urban-rural Integration New Communities Participatory Governance," and Shanghai’s "Urban New Migrant Communities Integration" projects. These projects highlighted the experimental methods of identifying the needs of a population, teaching communities the capacity to articulate their needs, and to encourage communities to resolve their problems through their own organizations. There were several workshops on these open issues, of how precisely to form community “consciousness,” how to develop a “community service mentality,” etc.

The seemingly radical language of grassroots self-governance may seem at odds with the common perception of Chinese political conditions. However, the CCPG is actually one experimental direction arising from a state-initiated national movement for urban community construction (chengshi shequ jianshe yundong) during the 1980’s. Intricately tied to China’s turn toward capitalism and the new social problems that arose with privatization, the urban community construction movement sought to address the need for a new state-society relation. Prior to the reforms, most urban residents were absorbed under the management and supervision of a work unit or danwei that corresponded to a state owned enterprise, which in turn were subordinate to the state.
Through these work units, the government was both the main governing body as well as the main provider of social welfare. As the government pushed marketization, the separation of government from society resulted in new crisis with large-scale unemployment, retired populations without social welfare, the emergence of new disadvantaged populations suffering under market mechanisms, and migrant populations moving to cities without social welfare. Under this situation of social unrest, it became clear that the mass petitions taking place had the distinct nature of “community-ness” (shequxing).

Along with the rise of social movement theory in Chinese think tanks to study these forms of unrest, the state also put forth the goal of constructing urban communities, as a distinct counter-mobilization of these social movements (Huang 2010). As one scholar from the CCPG conference explained to me, self-governance in China thus refers to the intentional state devolution of power to local level, whereby power is passed down to authorized self-governing organizations. After selecting 25 experimental areas to gain experience in self-governance models in the 1990’s, the government formally issued a call in 2000 to establish widespread legal self-governance (renmin yifa guanli ziji de shiqing), and the concept of community construction (Yan D. 2010). The proliferation of entities involved in the new space of grassroots self-governance converges in the Shichahai community center where I spent three months volunteering at the Green Living Center, during which there was an initiated and failed attempt to incorporate a program for migrant social welfare. As urban residents become the target for new public-private experiments in building self-governing communities, the issue of migrant organizing is delimited into certain sanctioned categories that both invoke and make taboo the notion of migrant self-governance.
Getting to the Shichaihai Community Center in Beijing’s Xicheng district inevitably requires some route through the hutongs. Depending on which route you take, from the west you may pass by the newly constructed Shichahai Boutique Hotel built in the style of imperial times and going at the same rate as the Hilton; from the south you may pass by a massive construction zone called the “Xicheng old city protection and residential housing improvement project,” where 2000 urban households were evicted earlier in 2011. Right next to the construction zone is Project 629 where further evictions were soon to follow for the expansion of the political space of Zhongnanhai. Estimates from the Legal Evening News said 75,000 residents in Xicheng district – which includes the area Project 629 and has a population of over a million – would be moved by the end of 2011 due to “improvement” projects. I always chose the western route, which passed by a construction site where migrant workers often squat on their ankles outside during breaks. I can catch them during lunchtime eating their large bowls of rice, bread, and a chopstick-full amount of pale vegetables; otherwise the construction site is heavily guarded and surrounded by solid metal fences and security personnel preventing entry (lunch is always early, around 11:00am, since work started at 5:00am). The residents of the Liuhai Hutong believe the construction is for telecom infrastructure, but as the scale of the site grows, doubts and worries arise as the construction drags on for two years now.

According to the 2005 population census, Beijing’s migrant population is around three million, mostly concentrated in manufacturing (60% of industry workers are migrants), construction (80%), and service industries (50%) (Lu et al. 2008). Though most of the migrants working at the site in Liuhai Hutong did not know it, they were working for one of China’s largest state-owned construction companies, upheld as a model

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company for integrating migrant workers into “communities,” according to the China WTO Tribune. The company claims to be the world’s largest real estate construction company, and was listed among the top 100 strongest companies in Fortune 2012. According to their public communications office, in China, for every 25 people, 1 person uses a building built by this company; globally, the rate is 300 to 1. Employing 15 million a year, mostly migrants, the company’s CSR representative spoke cheerfully at the Sino-European CSR Round Table in 2011, “the topic of migrants seem like such a serious issue, but when we think about it, it’s lighter!” He then proceeded to show a video of the company’s migrant CSR programs. “The footage is real,” he assures us. The video shows migrants marching in line to patriotic music (common in Chinese public service announcements), cooking in a clean living quarter, and enjoying the company of their family. The company’s CSR programs include the basics of right to wages, joining the company’s union, protecting employment safety and health, protecting education rights by providing night school, and providing a migrant living area for leisure activities. Knowledge of this, however, was minimal at the Liuhai construction site, as migrant workers were employed by a series of subcontractors twice removed from the company. In practice, the realities of subcontracting and the labor dispatch system made it impossible for the company to guarantee even wage payment. To this problem, the CSR representative responded, “We’ve encountered many frustrations, like ensuring wage payments on time. But is this the company or the state’s responsibility? The state needs to strictly enforce the law so wages are paid on time.”

Passing by the construction site and the perpetual heavy cloud of dust at the entrance of a small alleyway to Liuhai Hutong, there is the Shichahai Community Service Center fashioned after the colorful painted courtyards of the Forbidden City. Walking through the gate past the security office and a large poster commemorating Hu
Jintao’s visit to the Center, past the public-private community health station, the computer room donated by Microsoft’s Unlimited Potential CSR program, the disabled persons employment office and the Meals-On-Wheels kitchen for elderly residents, the Green Living Center occupies two small rooms at the far northeast corner of the courtyard. Because the Green Living Center was a tour site for government officials during the 2008 Olympics, the district mayor had personally come to approve the content and exhibitions of the Center, rehearsing presentations with each department. The Green Living Center was thus carefully organized to communicate and showcase the different projects of the Green Living Center: the Folk Knowledge Workshop where local stories and handcrafts of “old Beijing residents” were recorded and reproduced, recycling sewing and craft projects, and various techniques to grow food and gardens within limited urban space. After funding from Siemens ran out in 2008, Wumin hoped these projects could become profitable. “Hopefully I can go to Shichahai’s nearby bars, restaurants, to partner, to use leftover oil for soap, and sell to enterprises at a low price. Residents also recommended Shichahai as a brand, to push hand crafted art products as Chinese specialty art products for foreign tourists.”

Recently during one of the Green Planting Resident Exchange events, the issue of migrants came up. On the surface, the exchange is a chance for residents to learn new “green living” and “low carbon living” techniques, such as wall planting, planting in plastic bottles, sponge water seed planting, etc. The deeper purpose, Wumin explained, was to encourage the self-run resident organization to participate in community welfare. A step by step instruction manual that Wumin got from the CCPG explained the process: (1) Organization members, when encountering problems with green planting, can ask for mutual help; one person’s problem becomes everyone’s problem, and the problem can quickly be solved; (2) After residents go through participation in the
organization’s activities, deepen their understanding of the neighborhood, everyone works together, not only to discuss green planting, but to discuss their daily lives; (3) With the growth of the organization’s members and activities, the content of the organization will become richer, the scope will increase to the entire community, so everyone can experience participation in public welfare, and experience “self-value.” Wumin said, “The activities are not just about exchange, but in the midst of exchange the residents cohere, and in the midst of coherence form resident’s own small organization, and use the force of teams to serve themselves, serve the larger masses, in order to develop the community service mentality.” At this meeting, when Wumin encouraged residents to speak about some problems they were facing with planting, it came up that one person’s plant had been stolen from his window. Quickly, it came up that many residents had similar experiences. The residents began to get anxious about their plants being stolen from the hutongs, and soon, the conversation turned toward the presence of migrants at the construction sites. Without quite knowing what had happened, Wumin was suddenly charged with addressing the problem of “migrants.”

Wumin herself is not from the Shichahai area. A jaded looking woman in her late forties, Wumin was a middle-class professional in the world of the third sector. She lived in the suburbs within the southern fourth ring road, taking an hour to commute to the Green Living Center every day by car. “These people in the community actually are not of high quality (suzhi),” she said to me one day, as we prepared for a major community event on “Low Carbon Living” jointly sponsored by the local Women’s Federation, the Shichahai grassroots government, and several Chinese enterprises. Liuhai Hutong is governed by the community residence committee (shequ juweihui), itself underneath the direction of the Shichahai grassroots government (jiedao banshichu). The community residence committee has a strong local base, but due to the professionalization of
community work, the grassroots government sends people such as Wumin into the community to work. Wumin had extensive international experience through working with the UN in Beijing, and due to the high profile nature of Shichahai among tourists, she was chosen to lead the social innovation and self-governing communities projects at the Shichahai community center. Wumin received a small salary from the street level government, but reported weekly to the community residence committee. For her, the residents of the hutong were not the “typical” Beijing population today, and the “old Beijing” culture so intentionally displayed in the area seemed as distant and unfamiliar to her as the Apple culture of her daughter’s generation.

Shichahai block is responsible for 35 communities and 171 hutongs. The Shichahai block was made one of Beijing’s six major project areas for cultural tourism and cultural protection in 1992, and arguably the most important of the city. The area has become a brand for “old Beijing culture,” (which includes a mix of imperial, government, and folk culture), contemporary youth and consumer culture, along with a growing culture of bars and coffee shops; thus the development of the area is heavily oriented toward cultural tourism and leisure. There is a large percentage of residents older than 60 years of age (22%), with many living in high poverty, live on one meal a day, or without a caretaker. For this reason the Community Center’s main focus was on elder resident welfare rather than migrants. There are about 300 licensed bicycle tourist carts driving up and down the small alleyways day and night, though there can be as many as 1800 when considering unlicensed carts, and many non-hukou residents who rent rooms from local property owners. In the Liuhai hutong alone, there are 5000 people, and 1,936 households. There is a voter participation rate of 93%, an important measure of the level of “community self-governance.” However, only 3000 people are residence holders, while 2000 people living in the Liuhai community are “foreigners”
without urban residence permits and thus, without the right to participate in local self-governing mechanisms.

In terms of governing migrants in the context of the push for urban community construction, the devolution of power from the central government to local government diversified the bodies and interests involved in managing migrants. The local education bureau is responsible for providing and managing migrant children who receive compulsory education in the city; the labor bureau and social security bureau are responsible for migrant labor rights protection and skills training; the grassroots government office is responsible for frontline work such as temporary residence registration, child disease prevention, migrant training, birth planning, labor rights protection, direct management, registration, coordination, and reporting to higher officials. More recently, due to the financial and resource strain on government offices, self-run resident organizations or non-profits have been allowed to initiate programs for migrants.

It was with this understanding that Wumin began to create a proposal for a migrant psychological intervention and self-enterprise program to be presented to the neighborhood committee. After the approval of the neighborhood residence committee, she would seek approval from the street level government. Wumin sought the help of professors and masters students from universities and state research think tanks, the local women’s federation and the labor bureau to lead classes for migrants on various topics such as living in the city training, helping migrants understand the city, city life, the transportation system, banking service, the community service system, sanitation and health. The project, however, didn’t pass the first stage of approval. Wumin recalled that the meeting with the community residence committee had resulted in a standoff with local residents, mostly older residents over 60, afraid of attracting more migrants to
the neighborhood. Over time, residents had become wary of migrants at the construction site, though there was no interaction between the residents and the workers. It seemed the atmosphere of demolitions and relocations had also made the local construction site a sensitive point. The neighborhood committee members also worried about the financial and governance strain on local government, which might mean less funds for the retired or laid off workers in the neighborhood.

After much discussion, a new proposal was put forth by Mister Wang, a former principal of a high school and part time volunteer at the Shichahai Community Center. Wang himself might be considered a “migrant,” a non-urban hukou resident from Shanxi who came to Liuhai Hutong nine years ago and has been living there ever since. His relative economic stability afforded him at least a surface entry into urban communities, where the migrant construction workers could not. He proposed that focusing on the abundance of migrants in the community, the residence committee make use of each courtyard owner as a resident volunteer. These owners would be responsible for reporting on the presence of migrants. Furthermore, there should be two managers of migrants, whose work is everyday at a set time to walk around and interview each community courtyard resident, obtain an overall and realistic situation and control of the migrant situation. Wang finished with a heartfelt comment, “Actually we must count on the masses, because the local police force is limited, while the power of people is without borders.”

While Wumin listened to the residence committee’s opinions, she offered to speak to the grassroots government office about the issue of funding and to find potential partnerships. However, later that week, a member of the public security bureau came to give Wumin “a talk.” This was a first-warning sort of talk, a common

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7 Not real name
way for organizations to know that they were transgressing on sensitive issues. Wumin recalled that during the talk, the public security officer reminded her that the scope of her work “should stay within the target population of youth, unemployed, special care, disabled, and low-income residents. Furthermore, the area of work should focus on employment, philanthropy, disability support, senior citizens and boys centers, environmental protection, civil mediation, and community education.”

When Wumin recalled the conversation for me, we puzzled over the strange non-presence of the very topic at hand—migrants. Certainly migrants can also be considered any of these categories—youth, unemployed, low-income, disabled, etc. In fact, though the issue of migrants is identified as a pressing issue by the government, one is never sure when it is okay to address the category of “migrants” directly when it comes to organizations. Many CSR programs, though locally known to be working with migrant populations, are always described through a set of significations—“community,” “youth,” “culture,” “education.” Speaking about migrants through signifiers becomes both a way for organizations to survive strategically in a political field, as much as it is a way to de-politicize and fraction a common experience of being “migrant” underscored by the Migrant Workers Home. The dual tendency of this feature of CSR brings to light the political stakes involved in migrants struggle over their own subjectivity. It also brings to light that the state distinguishes among the population those that are to self-govern, and those who cannot. As urban residents become the target for new public-private experiments in building self-governing communities, the issue of migrant organizing is delimited into certain sanctioned categories that both invoke and make taboo the notion of migrant self-governance.
It is not clear to Wumin and I what happened in the process of Wumin’s failed attempt to create a social space for migrants in the community. Perhaps residents had spoken to the public security bureau, or perhaps the local government was not willing to shoulder the financial responsibility for non-hukou holders. Wumin said, “Local government never really cared about migrants, they only care about their private matters, or tasks assigned by upper level government.” There were also rumors of recent “problems” at the construction site, where workers threatened the public image of the company by stopping work if wages were not paid; perhaps the high presence of tourists in the area had led the local government to pressure the company to resolve the issue promptly. Knowing the political characteristics of Beijing, where the state expends more effort to prevent mass incidences and public unrest from occurring, means it is more difficult for migrants to organize compared to other cities (Chendgu, Shanghai, and Guangdong, for example, have relatively progressive policies and programs for migrant organizations), as well as more pressure for local government to search for fast resolutions when conflicts arise (Pringle 2013). CSR thus can be taken up strategically by multiple forces, and for multiple aims, in what Foucault described as a complex strategical situation, where power is defined “as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in various social hegemonies (Foucault 1978, 92).
The fluid way in which CSR is used to invoke the specific target of “community” reveals how the concept has become both productive and strategic for political and economic interests. In the case of the construction company, migrants are “integrated into the community” as waged laborers, subjects who can supposedly participate in society through the union, investments in labor skills, and the receipt of wages. However, when the realities of subcontracting show the nature of this governing technique and the extent to which surplus is extracted from migrants, the company invokes the party-state and its failure to integrate both migrants and companies as citizens. In the case of the public-private investments in urban “community development,” even as urban residents become targets to adjust human populations to capital (through the collection, production and reproduction of “old Beijing” culture, knowledges, and ways of living for economic development), their new-found freedom for self-governance become a new form of inequality between those who can self-govern, and those who cannot. For Wumin, as CSR becomes a pervasive logic working in tandem with these strategic yet fluid definitions of “community,” her energy shifts away from migrants and toward corporations in the struggle to be “competitive.” The grassroots government, who profits off of low and unpaid labor as well as land privatization in urbanization projects, the definition of community explicitly relies upon a manipulation of what is public and private.

In the end, Qualcomm decided not to continue working with the Green Living Center on their future CSR workshops, in favor of another NGO focused on migrant populations, the CMC, whose success in self-branding and networking results in higher purchase among the international circles of CSR in Beijing. Moving to the CMC, the themes of migrants and community become explicit, as this particular organization seeks to address migrant populations through the “community center model.”
5.4 The “Migrant Community”

“It’s exciting that today we have a unique opportunity, government, business, and civil society come together and re-imagine the future that can best serve our children.” CMC founder

“The whole of space is increasingly modeled after private enterprise, private property, and the family—after a reproduction of production, relations paralleling biological reproduction, and genitality.” (Lefebvre, 1991, 376)

The CMC non-profit organization may be headquartered in Beijing, but it is typical of many international migrant NGO’s, with a registration outside the mainland, and run by a foreign board of directors and managing director with little sustained contact with daily migrant lives. The founder and director of CMC, Jonathan, is a middle-aged American man often called “The Foreigner who Helps Migrants” in local news coverage. He is fond of recalling the first time he visited a migrant children’s school in Haidian district, and felt compelled to stay in Beijing after finishing his studies to help migrant children. Drawing on his experience volunteering in urban slums in the US, Jonathan is animated by the urgency of addressing the problem of global slums, and particularly “migrant slums” in China. The goal of CMC is “large-scale development,” to build 100 migrant community centers across China, and more recently expanding to Nepal. To meet these goals, Jonathan prides himself in running CMC “like a business,” putting great emphasis on “key performance indicators” based on quantitative data, such as employment rates of graduating students, income growth, and rate of formal labor contracts used.

The “community center model” that CMC markets as their unique approach to the migrant issue is described as providing a holistic platform for supporting “migrant communities” through a range of programs that build social connections. These programs primarily consist of family education (sanitation and nutrition classes) in the
morning, after-school tutoring and leisure space during the afternoons, migrant teacher trainings at night, creative learning activities during the weekend, seasonal camps for children during school breaks, and “life and vocational skills training” for youth who drop out of school and seek employment. In practice, the CMC offers many of the same services that many non-profit migrant schools offer in Beijing, suggesting how the “community” that CMC is interested in consists of a limited ecology of relationships surrounding the nuclear family and the existing education system--migrant youth, migrant teachers, and parents.

The CMC is one of the more successful organizations to adapt to CSR, and it does so readily. The organization partners with corporations such as Subway and other chains in the food and service industry to employ the graduates of the CMC’s Life and Vocational Skills Program. The partnership is such that the CMC provides a guarantee of well-adjusted employee who can “smoothly integrate into work,” while the companies offer employment opportunities abiding by labor laws. As one employed manager of the CMC’s community centers comments:

“Why would these enterprises be willing to work with us? Because compared to other talent seekers, at the first 5 months we emphasize training life skills, including conflict management, work communication, sanitation, clothes, etc. Our goal is to let these youth become higher quality employees. When employers see us doing this, they are willing to give us a chance.”

In return, companies share media light with the CMC:

“Our partnership with CMC is an important one because it’s more than just writing a check and then disappearing. Through employment opportunities in our restaurants, we are helping to provide a sustainable solution for migrant youth. Our existing employees also benefit greatly from this program as they feel like they are playing an active role in addressing an important issue.” Subway franchise owner

In contrast to the wide media coverage in English language press, and the privileged access to funding from multinational companies such as JP Morgan Chase (Shanghai) and Deutsche Bank, the CMC fares less well among Chinese circles. As microblogging has become an industry standard for Chinese CSR, foreign NGO’s and
companies still struggle to get into the habit of using this social media platform to reach Chinese netizens. The CMC’s Chinese blog, as with Qualcomm’s, is either inactive or superficially “transparent,” with posts occurring randomly when someone remembers to advertise some event or publicity. The CMC, much like the multinational company, has yet to catch up to organizations such as the Narada Foundation, who actively treats their blog as a display of their “transparency.”

Nevertheless, with their brand of addressing the migrant issue, CMC opened in 2006 with their first community center in Beijing Chaoyang district’s Cuigezhuang township, Dawangjing village. While the CMC eventually opened four more community centers in Beijing, and one in Shanghai, the first community center in Dawangjing was eventually demolished in 2009 to make way for an office complex. In the face of demolition, the logic of a business-run NGO driven by responsibilities to “investors” and the desire for “large-scale development” led the CMC to propose the idea of a new model of mobile community centers built from shipping containers. Because “development is inevitable,” from the perspective of the director, "We can just put the center on a truck and move with the community. Donors are … very concerned about the sustainability of their donations. We can’t be sustainable if we keep getting demolished." When Jonathan first proposed the idea of the mobile community centers, it did not sit well with one of the Chinese volunteers at CMC. Jonathan recalls the first reaction of his plans:

“I began to reach out to top architects across the continents to see how we could reimagine shipping containers as creative and inspirational spaces of hope. I took this idea to my colleague thinking he would be excited about a solution that could be moved with the community if it needed to be moved, yet at the same time retain a sense of the quality and dignity that we feel our migrant friends deserve. His immediate reaction was kind: That’s ridiculous, it’s never going to work. He carried these feelings to our other colleagues: This is what you get for having a crazy foreigner as your boss…They weren’t going to roll over just because I told them to. So I did what any sane individual in my place would have done: I fired him. Okay, not really. That was at a later time and for a different (and valid) reason. Over three months I slowly and quietly began building my case. I reached out to architects to try and conquer our team’s reluctance with the weight of expert opinion. I became the assistant and prepared PowerPoint slides to convince
them into submission. Though refurbishing shipping containers is now in vogue, this was several years ago and at that time, there were very few models globally that were actually built. But I found enough pictures to build a case. Finally this insurmountable tsunami of evidence (and my considerable personal charm!) brought them over to my side, and we launched what was to become our first community cube idea that is alive and thriving to this day.”

The use of expert knowledge to overcome local resistance to the idea of the mobile community centers was proudly displayed as a story of perseverance and social innovation. I had heard of reservations of the CMC model from other Chinese NGO’s working with migrant populations as well. A thesis study carried out by another Chinese volunteer suggested that the community center model was un-reproducible and inappropriate for the needs of migrants due to its unnecessarily high costs of construction and operations (Tang 2010). This intrigued me in how an organization and its surrounding migrant community were affected when the CSR industry begins to structure the logic and operations of daily life.

The CMC’s first “vitality cube” community center is located in Beijing Chaoyang district, Cuigezhuang township’s Heiqiao village. About 13 kilometers away from the Migrant Workers Home’s Tongxin experimental school, Heiqiao village is another typical migrant concentrated settlement also facing demolitions due to urban-rural integration or harmonization⁹ (chengxiang yitihua). Ironically, these new injustices facing migrants arise from the central government’s new policies gaining prominence since 2007 to eliminate the well known discriminatory treatment associated with the urban-rural hukou system that is often identified as the source of inequalities faced by migrant workers (Solinger 1999, Wu 2010). The urban-rural integration policies allow

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⁹ Scholars have noted the inadequate translation of yitihua into “integration” or “harmonization,” neither term accurately reflecting the diverse and experimental nature of these policies across the nation, and even within cities (Shi 2012).
local government to experiment with new boundaries of social benefit distribution, regardless of rural or urban hukou (Shi 2012).

The site of CMC’s first community center, in Chaoyang district’s Cuigezhuang township Dawangjing village, was the first experimental zone for the city’s urban-rural integration policies. One year before demolitions occurred, the district government had visited the site and warned local township and village government that there was not to be any petitioning or forced removal. Indeed, the entire process of demolition and removal took only 25 days, with 99 households completely relocated without a single mass demonstration, petition, or forced removal incident. This “miracle” was widely publicized as the “Dawangjing model,” which consisted of key effective strategies: (1) all of the 2998 villagers with rural (non-agricultural) hukou were given compensation, subsidized housing, and the opportunity to enter urban social welfare by changing to urban hukou; meanwhile each villager was turned into a shareholder of previously collectively owned land; (2) prior to demolitions, the villagers were relocated across different housing units far from the demolition site; (3) the demolitions took place simultaneously while construction took place for the new housing compounds that villagers could move into. There is no coverage or tracking of the over 30,000 migrants (non local, rural hukou) who also populated the village (Zhao 2009, Lei 2011). As of 2010, Cuigezhuang township plans to demolish 20 of its migrant schools, impacting 1000 students.10 Many of the migrant schools in nearby villages that received the students from Dawangjing village’s demolitions have also been demolished in 2010. This incident reveals the key strategies taking shape to undercut both villagers and migrants from resisting the privatization and transfer of land in urban cities. First, rural residents

become mediators between the government and migrants, as landowners who kick out
migrants well before demolition takes place. Second, rural residents themselves are
prevented from organizing by first scattering residents across various locations during
demolitions. Third, rural residents are offered incentives to maintain a division between
villagers and the migrants that rent from them through dreams of getting rich off of the
land transfers.

Located in the same township, Heiqiao Community Cube Center is just 3
kilometers away from the CMC’s first demolished community center, and could easily
be mistaken for one of the art installations found in the trendy 798 Art District just 2
kilometers away. Heiqiao village is a major base for Beijing’s culture and arts industry,
as well as the burgeoning organic foods industry, though the artists that have taken up
residence there often complain about unsafe environmental practices of locals. Upon
entering the village, there is a golden sign that says, “Art district nursery”; underneath
that sign, there is a smaller sign in bold red letters that says, “Non-residents do not enter
inside.” Due to the fact that the 1732 local rural hukou residents who mostly rely on rent
for income continually build rental units for migrants on the strained pieces of land, the
village committee retaliated and said there was insufficient space to build a public
bathroom for the entire village. Walking down the main dirt road, there are carts on
both sides of the road with migrants selling everything imaginable, from food to art
trinkets. Behind the carts are low residential buildings, and a dried up river littered with
trash. The community center is an assembly of five container boxes rising above the
surrounding neighborhood, each painted a different color to correspond with different
grade levels. Nearby, there are two migrant schools, the Xinghuo Elementary School and
the Red Banner Elementary School, both with student enrollment wavering drastically
between 300-600 students, both privately run and funded by various enterprises. The
Samsung Beijing office has built a long-term relationship with the Red Banner Elementary School, holding an annual “social welfare activities month” where white-collar employees volunteer for a day at the school doing odd short-term jobs.

On a typical day at the community center, the migrant youth arrive after school at 4:30pm, and stay the first hour for homework help, and the other for sports or creative classes. There are about 100 students, split up between 20 volunteers according to education level. The volunteers come from high schools nearby, and generally choose between a Monday-Friday shift, a weekend shift, or two weeks of concentrated camps during the summer and winter. The creative classes allow for volunteers to experiment with teaching methods, such as reflecting on the students’ personal lives through acting classes. During the weekends, largely foreign volunteers come and teach ad-hoc lessons of English or play games. By 6:30pm the students have left for home. The center is well managed compared my own experience with other migrant organizations, with a clear system to train volunteers, and clear lines of responsibility leading up the chain to managers and the director. Nevertheless, there are some noticeable patterns of difficulty that have become common across all migrant schools, particularly CSR driven ventures, such as dealing with the high mobility of migrant families that lead to classes with mixed education levels and high drop-off rates, the highly fluid and young volunteer population that prevents building long-term relationships with the surrounding migrant families, student volunteers periodically dropping off according to school priorities, constant and eventually burdensome visits by enterprises, media or celebrities interested in offering very short term and limited contributions, and the ad hoc nature of in-kind donations which result in rather expensive but illiquid piles of stationary, computer software, badminton racquets, etc. One company, for example, offered to provide one year’s supply of their rice product to the community center, provided that they were
allowed to collect data throughout the year from the migrant youth. Such problems often overwhelm the manager, but the community center has an advantage over other organizations in recognizing the need to commit full time staff to dealing with the CSR industry.

I walked home with one young student of ten, Xing Xing\(^1\), who plays a big sister role for many of the students at the center when she can actually make it there (the students are encouraged to call each other “brother” and “sister”). When we reached home after twenty minutes of walking, past a forest of trees and a towering trash heap, we arrived at her home nearby a nursery. Her mother, Mei Chen\(^2\), was a lovely, perpetually smiling woman who was an independent domestic worker (not affiliated with a company or a labor dispatch company) in the city. She, her daughter, and her two year-old son lived together in a small room of about 6 square meters, while her husband had just left for home after a serious work injury prevented him from finding work.

When I first met Mei Chen, she was extremely diplomatic, always saying what I think she thought a foreigner like me wanted to hear; as if there were a certain savvy about the symbolic purchase of migrants to foreigners. She made it personal policy to “only” work for foreigners,“ because in her opinion she found the treatment better. Her small home was clean, but cluttered with somewhat miscellaneous, sometimes expensive things, items that her employers had given her over the years—luxurious couch throws, heaters and humidifiers without any place to plug them in, paintings, a guitar with a broken string, etc. She once joked with me, “At first, I thought the community center was a dormitory! In Hefei we have these container box housing (zhuren jizhuangxiang), so the first time I passed by, I went to ask how much the monthly rent was!” In the south of China, these kinds of container box dormitories for migrants were common, but recently

\(^1\) Not real name
\(^2\) Not real name
I recalled an article in the news about its growing popularity in China. New vocabulary was popping up such as “ant family” or “cabinet family” to describe these low cost “affordable housing” solutions for low income families. Actually Mei Chen had passed by the center several times, but wasn’t aware of what it was for. Once she learned that it was a community center for migrants, she was happy that her daughter could drop by after school for homework help, though she wasn’t sure what the schedule was or what the larger goals of the community center were. “After the closures of two nearby migrant schools, the students all went to the migrant school where Xing Xing attends classes. Then many migrants moved to Heiqiao to take advantage of the school.” Xing Xing added that there were many new students at the community center as well. Mei Chen herself has moved more than five times across Beijing, but generally further and further away from the city. She recalls, back then (six or seven years ago) many migrants were selling vegetables and had three wheeled carts, so parents would help move the school tables back and forth when a school got demolished. During the day the traffic police wouldn’t let them move, so they moved at night, all the chairs and desks. But once they got to the new location, the police would come, and chase them away. In some cases, when the parents felt that they were being cheated by the migrant school’s principal, they would no longer continue supporting the principal in the endless search for a school site.

The community center seemed to occupy a particular role within the ecology of the larger education system for residents and migrants. In other words, the Center specializes in functioning as a supplement to the time/space of the transparent and non-transparent parts of the education system. For example, the Center’s manager makes formal presentations to the migrant schools to introduce their services and thus guarantee migrant students in their after-school programs. With the mobility of the
container box classrooms, the organization chooses locations according to the presence of local high schools, makes presentations to them as well to guarantee a local supply of volunteers. Even the closure of nearby migrant schools seemed to benefit the center, as students are gradually pushed further and further from the city toward a diminishing number of schools, local government is happy to lease land to a social organization as a short term solution to the problem of migrant children’s education. But as mobility takes shape as a crucial strategy to undercut migrant settlements in the urban city, the mobility of the community center, then, does less to stabilize or “fill a gap” in the surrounding migrant population than it does to facilitate their forced relocation. The ease with which the CMC markets their mobile community center as a sustainable and innovative solution “to pick up and move with the migrant community” contrasts with realities of existing operations of power. Additionally, as the work of the Migrant Workers Home reveals, not only does the creation of a migrant “community” require a multitude of projects intentionally creating spaces of sociality and new relationships, but the existing forms of community which exist among migrant settlements are often experienced as parasitic or hierarchical. Mei Chen recalls, as often-circulated local knowledge, the legends of major players in the “migrant school industry,” where certain kinship circles centering around one migrant couple from Henan control most migrant schools in Chaoyang. Depending on who tells the story, this couple is either a tale of self-less perseverance for migrant children, or entrepreneurs who specialize in profiting off of migrants. Without understanding the logics that are driving the movement of migrant populations across Beijing, the gesture of helping the “migrant community” provides a social “license” for the CMC to operate in the eyes of deciding players such as multinational corporations, while inadvertently facilitating the formation of new practices of social control and inequality.
In thinking about CSR and demolitions as a specific configuration of time and space, Lefebvre’s conception of space as social relations tied to a specific mode of production, and the particular characteristics of “industrial” and “urban” space, provide insight into the implications and stakes of linking migrant organizations to the ecology of CSR. As with Harney’s attempts to distinguish between “the public with interest” and “being in public,” Lefebvre is similarly troubled by a political challenge brought by a new logic to capitalism that necessitates distinguishing between urbanism/urbanization, and “the urban.” For Lefebvre, when the (re)production of social relations become the primary commodity and goal of capitalism, our challenge is to separate out the “false new” (where difference is reduced to “induced” difference, which remains within and constitutes the system) from the production of new relations (“produced difference” that shatter the system). Urbanism/urbanization, then, is defined as the existing capitalist form of control, which has an ideology of producing new social relations but maintains relations of production to realize surplus value; the “urban,” in contrast, argues for the strategic orientation of struggle toward a generalized form of self-management and the “right to the city.” CSR, which operates fluidly across logics of market-driven demolitions and existing state logics of education and labor, and can be articulated as a form of urbanism that is caught between “particular interests and political interests, between those who decide on behalf of private interests and those who decide on behalf of higher institutions and powers. It lives off the compromise between neoliberalism (which participates in planning and activities that are referred to as voluntary or consensual), and neo-dirigisme (which leaves afield of action open for free enterprise)” (Lefebvre 2003, 158). The possibility of something else happening, besides demolition and forced mobility, as perhaps the case of the Migrant Workers Home battling against their own closure illustrates, lies in the possibility of creating another time/space that
operates “autonomously,” or at a distance, though certainly not impervious, of these logics.

5.5 Conclusion

“The public, which is a crucial notion in the eighteenth century, is the population seen under the aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behavior, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements; it is what one gets a hold on through education, campaigns, and convictions. The population is therefore everything that extends from biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public.” (Foucault 2007, 75)

The experiences of CSR through three different ethnographic spaces serves as a sharp reminder that understanding the impact of CSR on migrant organizing requires holding in tension the multiple forces which come into play in contemporary Chinese society marked by diverse and experimental formations. Tracing CSR through the corporate headquarters of a multinational company and the rising middle class consciousness for social and environmental responsibility, to the micro-politics of grassroots urban self-governance and community development, and finally to the syncing of non-profit community work to the ecology of the state and market logic, one finds a complex and nuanced battle-field in which migrants must strategically encounter different public-private dynamics at the level of subjectivity and the public.

What these ethnographies of CSR in Beijing reveal is that the “activist capitalism” captured in the spirit of CSR is less an alternative to neoliberalism than it is a shared nexus, a scission of capitalism that must be understood as such. The principle tying my ethnographic cases together is the conjuncture following a period of intense privatization, the reconstitution of social control through public-private experiments. These experiments make use of an economy of middle class subjectivities oriented toward social responsibility, the subjective delimitation and fragmentation of the migrant subjectivity into certain sanctioned categories that both invoke and make taboo
the notion of migrant self-governance, and the production of communities amenable to
the spatial and temporal logics of the market.

Thinking about CSR as a juncture between neoliberalism and liberalism rather
than a new neoliberal governmentality led by the Chinese state allows us to return to the
work of Foucault with a different insight that brings biocapital back into focus as a
contradiction. Lazzarato reminds us that Foucalt’s fascination with liberalism was a
fascination with the emergence of a politics of multiplicity. Liberalism, (and
Neoliberalism, with their notion of investing in human capital), is a politics that aims to
constitute capitalist subjectivities through the management of heterogeneous powers
(Lazzarato 2006). In Foucault’s two part series of lectures published in Security, Territory,
Population and The Birth of Biopolitics, the investigation into biopower, or the new set of
practices of power in which life becomes the object of politics, centers on the crisis of liberalism. The logic of liberalism (which says man is a naturally social being, who must
be left alone to play out his own interests and laws of movement), posits the role of
government as needing to know the nature of man-as-species, in order to set regulations
that make sure this population doesn’t veer off course, that this population continues to
operate according to its own laws. Security, then, is the set of mechanisms that ensure
that the population as natural phenomenon continues to work itself out. This apparatus
requires a police instrument that is primarily repressive (the police is an instrument that
is specific to the problems of urbanization and the market), and a legal system that must
respect certain freedoms. Taken together, Foucault argues, these define the
characteristics of civil society.

Civil society thus is proposed as a new technology of governmentality, where
governmentality is the larger economy of power, within which state and civil society are
different technologies and episodes (Foucault 2007). This game of freedom and security,
in which the government intervenes “only when it sees something not happening according to the general mechanics of behavior, exchange, and economic life,” produces three consequences: (1) individuals being conditioned to live and experience the logic of danger; (2) the increased techniques of disciplining the individual; (3) producing freedom through additional control and intervention. These seemingly contradictory consequences characterize a crisis of the liberal apparatus of governmentality. Within this crisis of liberalism that emerges in the form of state-phobia, neoliberalism takes shape within different national contexts.

Yet the challenge which liberalism produces remains: what will be the role of government (in which the subject of right submits to a juridical contract) in relation to a space inhabited by an economic subject (the subject of irreducible, non-transferable interest who must be left alone)? Foucault proposes that a new domain is created, that of civil society, as a technology of a governmental rationality whose objective is self-limitation insofar as it is pegged to the specificity of economic processes. In other words, civil society and the neoliberal economic man are two inseparable elements, belonging to the same ensemble of technology of liberal governmentality, but a new technology of government, in which the government is modeled on the rationality of the governed themselves (Foucault 2008).

As Foucault traces the emergence of biopower to the site of civil society, there is neither a clean break nor is there a resolution to the crisis of liberalism that gives birth to neoliberalism (contradiction understood as unity). Understanding the shifting techniques of power in terms of two distinct rationalities grounded in key changes and crisis to capitalism allows us to see that as the global economic crisis forces transformations in capitalism, the rise of CSR as a “sustainable” capitalism that offers social change through public-private partnerships reveals the scission of capitalism
between neoliberalism and liberalism (contradiction understood as scission). In China, the rapid changes taking place between the Chinese party-state and society are undergirded by the neoliberal policies of the 90’s, where massive social unrest caused the shift toward social policies during the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao era experimenting with new forms of social welfare and social control. The rise of new “social forces” through CSR and so-called “civil society” introduce another technique of power that can both impede or aid migrant struggles; the question is how those (unequal) relations of force captured in CSR are deployed, and for whom. At the same time that populations are induced to certain economic freedoms through civil society, there is a concomitant function of security, discipline, and control. As migrants such as those involved in the Migrant Workers Home find room for autonomous self-organizing in the sanctioned category of culture, public-private partnerships offer up distorted mirrors of community self-governance and cultural capital. The challenge for migrant self-organizing is how to distinguish between the forms of self-organizing that occur through capitalist logics, and the form of self-organizing that allow for meaningful change.
6. Conclusion

“It’s been 30 years since the reform! China’s migrant population has already exceeded 200 million! While we were creating material wealth for society, we were also creating migrants’ own culture.

Some people ask, brother, what is the use of culture? It can’t be eaten, it can’t be worn; [you’re] so busy groping around blindly, what kind of cultured person are you pretending to be?

According to proverbs, trains are not for pushing, and culture is not for boasting. Our culture comes from our wandering livelihoods; it comes from our blood and sweat! It brings us the strength to search for hope in directly facing reality! Without our culture, we don’t have our history. Without our history, we don’t have our future.

Our culture is like a knife, cutting through the illusion that lets people feel stupefied and inferior. The times have changed, but reality is still cruel. We must create our own accurate analysis and our own expression.”

In the last line of the skit, the actor Xu Duo is rocking an imaginary guitar, as the Chinese character for “expression” (biaoda…da da da da…) trails into the Migrant Workers Home’s signature song, “Labor is Most Glorious.” The disjuncture between the articulation of culture as history and future, and the creation of communist rock music marks the comedic irony that pervades the organization’s plays, perhaps a self-consciousness of what it means to speak in Maoist language in contemporary capitalist society. Halfway through the play, the actors break character and ask the audience, “This play is not about politics. It is nothing like the New Year’s Gala for fashion stars…” Then in another instance, “We are now all more or less affected by the economic crisis. What do you think is the fundamental cause of the global economic crisis? Is it American imperialism? Is it the capitalist system?...But this play is not about politics, so lets not talk about this subject full of ideological thoughts!”

At the time that this play was performed by the members of the Migrant Workers Home in 2009, which expressed the political project that they wished to carry out
through culture, the global crisis of capitalism had already begun to be felt as at least
15% (20 million) of migrants lost their jobs.\(^1\) Coinciding with this massive layoff,
statistics showed that the central government spent a total of 514 billion yuan on the
maintenance of social stability, accounting for 47.5 percent of growth in public security
spending, far exceeding the annual military outlays. The shift noted by Foucault in the
time of biopolitical capitalism, which brings together unstable alliances between capital
and security apparatuses in the generalized logic of control across society (Foucault
2007), was not met with acceptance, but a rise in migrant conflict since the crisis, whose
militancy has been made legible to the state by the term “second generation migrants.”
Thus, the proliferation of this term throughout media, scholarship, and state discourse
must be understood above all, as an attempt to make visible the new subjectivity that
undergirds this militancy and thus, how best to intervene at the level of subjectivity.

The intersection of CSR and migrant struggles at this conjuncture of a cultural
turn in China both allowed the Migrant Workers Home to practice a radical concept of
culture, while also enrolling them in new networks and logics of power. In the
preceding chapters, I have tried to explore the terrain in which capital and labor are
placed in a relation of weak difference, to borrow a term from Badiou, or non-
antagonistic contradiction, in Mao’s terms. This terrain involves a set of strategies
including “culture,” “the public,” “self-governance,” and “community,” which are
deployments of force that I tried to analyze in terms of their two tendencies—toward
integration into the existing order of control, or toward a break with this order, or the
possibility for antagonism. Drawing together the insights from these ethnographic
investigations, I try to summarize and speculate what might be helpful for those

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interested in the challenges that biopower poses to politics, social struggle, and intellectual thought.

**6.1 Lines of Antagonism**

The formal inclusion of the figure of the migrant as a representative category in the Chinese National People’s Congress beginning in 2008 is one way in which the qualitative difference posed by migrant struggles is flattened into the minimal difference of positions, or interests that can be captured and mediated through public-private partnerships. Concurrent with this process, there is the continual glimpse of a politics in excess of the logic of inclusion, which is the self-organizing of migrants (whether in the case of constant demolitions of migrant settlements or the negated possibility for state-sanctioned urban self-governance programs to be extended to migrants). In other words, it is not the migrant figure that is illegal and excluded from the perspective of the existing order, which is how the migrant is encouraged and supported to display their “rights and interests,” and becomes increasingly included in new schemes for social welfare and surveillance. What these ethnographies reveal from different levels of urban subjectivity is that what is illegal to one logic of power is the collective self-organizing among migrants. The constant need to disrupt the consistency of migrant settlements through cycles of displacement, and the foreclosure of possibility to include migrants in projects of urban self-governance all mark the illegal excess, and thus a new political subject, that threatens the current logic of biopower (Bosteels 2011). However, from another logic of power, the self-organization of migrants becomes co-opted rather than forbidden through the increasing privatization of existing migrant institutions, cultural productions, and sociality by a host of public and private networks. The activities of elite market actors that create an organizational field and a new social life to enroll grassroots organizations have benefited from researching and privatizing the knowledge produced
in the different models of urban migrant life. In this second operation, the principle of tracing political subjectivity by way of an illegal excess to the current representation of places fails to capture the way that capital accommodates difference and the common in unprecedented ways (Toscano 2004; Hardt and Negri 2009). Through these competing registers, we are provoked to re-think how political lines can be drawn in constant practice.

One common theme that traverses the ethnographic insights of the Migrant Workers Home and these theoretical formulations on antagonism is the necessity for consistency, or a sustained organizational support for “forcing” a subjectivity that inevitably faces co-optation, but also new possibilities as both the structure and the subjects are changed. The constant practice of forcing and new possibilities is what allows a “distance” to be maintained from the current logic of placement of migrants in society. In the case of the Migrant Workers Home and their confrontation over the demolition of their self-run school, this consistency arose from the range of institutions—from the school, to the cultural center, the community based union, the self-employment institutions that offer migrant youth a direct link between vocational schools, employment, and community welfare, all provide another space and time, another “life world,” where something else could happen besides the logics of biopower. Rather than think about this “distance” as isolation (like the communes during the 70’s or the national project of de-linking), this “distance” traverses subjectivity and material conditions to create new social relations with an analysis of “short-term” and “long-term” contradictions. What may not have seemed possible only two years ago, the rallying support of parents in Picun around the government-led market-driven demolition, may be possible because of this consistency or distance created by the continued self-organizing of the Migrant Workers Home. At the same time, quite
distinct from a dialectical recuperation, neither the logic of power, the tools available to
the organization, nor the contradictions themselves were the same after the
confrontation, as the domestic consolidation of class interests through foundations
emerged from the demolitions with new strategies, enrolling local organizations with
the “necessity” for market logics of social life, while simultaneously monitoring
alternative forms of life and its innovations. This in turn requires a new analysis, and a
new line of antagonism to be drawn.

Another way to think about lines of antagonism as constant practice is how the
Migrant Workers Home defines “migrants,” which is grounded in a politicizing
experience of surveillance in daily life, but certainly not tied to that as an essentialist
notion of identity from which to mobilize claims. Many of the youth who come to the
organization may not necessarily see themselves as migrants, perhaps they understand
themselves as students, musicians, or artists, but are welcomed to immerse themselves
in the construction of another set of relations in order to not get “caught in that
individual space” (as one migrant youth was told). Thus, the importance of creating a
new culture helps to confront the subjective individualism of capitalism with an
alternative collective practice. This internal scission among migrants thus occurs by a
principle determined through practice which must take into account the qualitative
differences between antagonistic contradictions, and contradictions among “the people.”
In this sense Maoism is a constant reminder of the necessity to see multi-faceted conflict
among both resistance and power not as a principle of difference as democracy itself,
but as one step in the process of creating a new antagonistic subjectivities that can
effectively struggle for collective freedoms by devising strategies of commonality
around the “principal contradiction.” Without both a “short-term” and a “long-term”
analysis of biopolitics, there will always be “left” and “right” “opportunism” (Dirlik
1983), where the dominant logic of individual subjects is to take advantage of the social
capital of the figure of the migrant as much as to be manipulated by them (as often
poignantly illustrated in the plays written by the Migrant Workers Home).

**6.2 Life Beyond Bare Life**

As the play above articulates, subjectivity as a political project involves an
understanding of labor that resists reduction to “bare life.” Subjectivity, in practice,
involves a dynamic notion of the material and immaterial, consciousness and ideology,
collective discipline and creativity, as well as the given and the “impossible-Real.” In the
process of trying to grasp the ethics of their practice, I found that my archive of existing
theories and discourses, particularly when fed through historically and politically
contingent disciplinary debates, always fall short of what is taking place in the practice
of politics. Against Badiou’s disdain for the empirical given to the situation (the disdain
for the administration of reality), there is the daily organizing around mundane needs
that produces something else besides what is given; against the Foucauldian articulation
of the subject as an epiphenomenon of heterogeneous articulations of knowledge and
power, discursive and non-discursive effects in history, there is the illegal excess of a
subjective politics, or a hole that is un-decideable from the existing encyclopedia of
knowledge power, that is not captured by existing names and representations; against
the illegal excess of Maoism in post-modern common sense, there is the continued use
and usefulness of a Maoist politics for migrants which seeks to “think the place in which
the new present is constituted,” particularly when the terms of the struggle are grossly
asymmetrical (Badiou 2009, 496). The Migrant Workers Home, well justified in their
depth suspicion of scholars whose collection of data on self-theorizing migrant
organizations becomes inseparable from the privatization of collectively produced
knowledges (Riles 2000), is not hinting at an anti-theory or anti-intellectualism (as
evidenced by the organization’s attempt to build rigorous analyses through popular theorizing), but at the persisting gap between Marxism as the practice of the social redistribution of political emancipation, and Marxism as the foreclosure of politics through a structural distance from the consequences of knowledge production.

It is through this critique of “specialists” and “experts” from the Migrant Workers Home that the question of intellectual work and the deeply engrained intellectual habits in the biopolitical era can be revisited via Mao’s slogan of “red and expert” and “no investigation, no right to speak!” Both slogans served to communicate Mao’s concept of contradiction between theory and practice through revolutionary subjects, understood not simply as Gramsci’s “organic intellectual” who works among the people to build hegemony among broad social classes (dialectical integration), but the radical transformation of subjects, knowledges, and the very conditions under investigation in a process where the new and the old are made known (Bosteels 2005, 2011). Thus, the organizational value given to the “mass line” is not a fetish of the people or mobilizing the masses, but an ethical practice for “testing” intellectual thought by transforming oneself as much as one transforms others. As Dirlik articulates so eloquently, “In coming to terms with the cluttered realities of class relations and consciousness in a complex social existence, Marxists must face the possibility of being absorbed into the very social existence they seek to transform” (Dirlik 1983, 205). For anthropologists, who seem at the forefront of studies in biopower, the consequences of a “truth process” that “the masses think justly” means that thinking and acting must be a process fully within the situation, not even leaving room for a distance by which politics is conceived of as the molding of “public” opinion (Bosteels 2011). The simultaneous rejection of the reproduction of mental and manual labor, or the “public” and the
“private” on the one hand, and the production of new relations and subjectivities on the other, highlights the ongoing relevance of Maoism for the biopolitical era.

In addition to the necessity for intellectual work to be experimented and worked on in relation to ongoing practice, the Migrant Workers Home’s success in building a consistency capable of with-standing the threat of demolition, or from another perspective forcing a breakdown of the existing rules governing daily life in migrant settlements, is grounded in a positive dimension, an entire world that had been created, discursively, ideologically, materially, and institutionally, to support (force) a collective subjectivity. Without this constituent dimension, the Migrant Workers Home realized their politics would remain limited to “objecting on someone else’s stage.” Tracing the ways in which the Migrant Workers Home’s project has built this world, rather than the limit or excess of the structure, brings to light the intentional and disciplined nature of living labor behind such an immense project. Thus, resistance turns out to be a poor articulation of an expansive concept of subjective productions of new practices of daily life that traverses contemporary conditions of knowledge production that would place that activity as a secondary or conflated phenomenon to biopower, or the administration of daily life.

At the end of the Migrant Workers Home’s play, One World One Dream, whose skits interweaved personal stories of the injustices faced by migrants from multiple perspectives (from women who work in the city or factory to support their brothers and families back in the village, the long-term and chronic separation of families, the depression and seeming insurmountable village life of left behind youth and elders, the brutality of hired security mobs (chengguan), etc.), the actors finally line up in a straight line facing the audience, alternating between female and male actors, and chant in unison:
Tear apart the veil of this world, and don’t just see power oppressing us.

No, we need a new world.

I hope that each every migrant brother and sister will get compensated for their blood and sweat. We will not be paid one cent less for overtime work. We will stick to the labor law until the end of the day.

I hope that the fellow workers down at the mine will not gamble with their own lives, that the work injuries and diseases will no longer erode our bodies.

I hope that the cities that depend on our work will no longer look down upon us, and give our children equal opportunity to go to school regardless of whether we are local or not.

I hope that fellow workers from all across China will unite as a big family, everyone mutually organizing and helping each other out, working together, making great efforts for a common future.

I hope that we will all live and work with dignity, without the separation between boss and worker.

We are all subjects, we are all proud labor.
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Biography

Jennifer Chien was born in Santa Barbara, California, February 2, 1984. She received her B.S. in Biology from Duke University, Durham North Carolina in 2006 and her master’s degree in Cultural Anthropology from Duke University in 2010. She has been involved in the creation, editing and publication of Beyond Resistance, Everything: An Interview with Subcomandante Marcos by El Kilombo. She has received the James B. Duke Fellowship from 2007-2010, the Wenner-Gren Foundation award for dissertation research from 2010-2011 and the Duke University dissertation fellowship for 2011. She is a member of the American Anthropological Association since 2012.