In the Shadow of Rivalry: Rebel Alliances and Civil War

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University

2013
ABSTRACT

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Abstract

How does competition and rivalry within alliances affect outcomes and processes in civil wars? Towards addressing this inquiry, this dissertation presents a formal theory of alliance formation that takes into account both internal and external threats. The theory, presented in Chapter 2, focuses on how allying parties make decisions regarding resource mobilization for conflictual purposes, in the presence of both internal and external hazards. The model indicates that intra-coalition division should serve not only as a source of instability but also as a wellspring of strength for aligning militant groups. This leads to a peculiar result, whereby the internal factors enabling groups to overcome the problem of collective action may also contribute to the “conflict trap.” Testable implications are derived and examined empirically via a new dataset on alliances between rebel groups during civil wars from 1944 to 2001. The series of logistical models in Chapter 3 indicates that alliances marked by rivalry and competition are indeed more likely to lead to rebel victories. Yet, the analysis also demonstrates that these types of arrangements are also significant predictors of war recurrence. The latter result holds irrespective of how the original conflicts terminate. Additionally, Chapter 4 of this dissertation presents a comparative analysis between two cases of civil war marked by competitive alliances. In addition to other factors, the cases suggest the relative size of alliance members, the influence of external actors, and the presence of electoral institutions may either exacerbate or mitigate competition issues within alliances.
Dedication

This dissertation is warmly dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, Atilano Correa Alvarado.
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1. Introduction

When Rhodesian rebel leaders Robert Mugabe and Joseph Nkomo formally joined their respective movements, the ZANU and ZAPU, into an alliance called the Patriotic Front in 1976, it was not what could be described as an amicable arrangement. Outright hostility and rivalry between the two black liberation movements had for more than a decade prevented them from making concerted efforts against the Rhodesian government. Divisions had persisted along both ideological and ethnic lines, sometimes sparking open fighting between supporters of the two groups. One observer to these internecine disputes would describe the whole situation between the black coalitions as “struggles within the struggle.”¹ Given this complex and violent history, it is altogether unsurprising that relations between the two wings of the Patriotic Front remained tense after 1976. The eventual cover of a formal alliance did not prevent clashes between the two organizations’ military units as early as 1978 (Preston, 2004; Kriger, 2005). What is more puzzling, however, is that despite the infighting, the Patriotic Front succeeded in its bid to win independence for Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe episode raises interesting issues regarding alliances and civil war outcomes.

Can potential or even realized conflict between allies be beneficial to the cause of their coalition? Does internal competition – the “struggle within the struggle” – somehow promote rebel victory in conflictual settings? If so, what are the potential tradeoffs? These may seem like strange questions to ask, given the general premise of alliances.

That is, members of an alliance come together to face off against a common foe—not one another. Familiar complications associated with alliances tend to include stability, coordination, levels of commitment, and degrees of cooperation. Failure to overcome these common impediments, however, does not necessarily imply that parties of a coalition will resort to open conflict among themselves. But very often, and even in the presence of common danger, the capacity among allies to pool common strengths is eclipsed by even greater division, animosities and mutual fear among them.\(^2\) Certainly, reciprocated distrust and intra-party competition can destroy an alliance. That such competition can also effectively enable allies to overcome the problem of collective action in the presence of an external threat is the alliance paradox.\(^3\) This result has implications for a variety of coalition settings—not least of which is civil war, the central focus of this dissertation.

As it relates to internal conflicts, the theory elucidated here is motivated by two outstanding puzzles in social science—one general, the other more specific. First, if collective action problems pose an acute obstacle to cooperation, why do civil conflicts prove so intractable and produce such high levels of violence? The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq are recent instances of internal strife resulting in increasingly murderous counterinsurgencies. The Arab Spring also reveals the surprising intensity and

\(^2\) While not uncommon now, the 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) centuries offer a plethora of historical instances. For example, the Napoleonic wars produced no less than a series of four shifting coalitions from 1793 to 1815. See McKay and Scott (1983) chapters 10-12 for a good historical discussion.

\(^3\) This premise holds true in most situations where competing groups come together for various purposes and then may be forced to eventually disband. Examples where such dynamics potentially come into play include interstate alliances, voter turnout, electoral coalitions, interest group politics, joint ventures between firms, rival gangs and finally, factions in civil wars.
swiftness with which groups are able to mobilize, even when government repression is widely anticipated. And in Mali, Islamist rebel movements joined with Taureg separatists to overtake two-thirds of the country by force. Why does the freerider problem not prevent factions in these countries from participating in such efforts against governments or other rivals?

Although various efforts have offered differing theoretical solutions to this classic problem, some of the proposed mechanisms have given rise to new puzzles. Lichbach (1998) authoritatively surveys many of the means by which actors may overcome issues complicating collective rebellion and dissent. One potential solution to freeriding is to increase team competition among allies. Lichbach puts the questions thus: “How does competition among allied dissent organization affect the Rebel’s Dilemma? Will intense competition among numerous dissident organizations who pursue essentially the same cause encourage collective action and facilitate group success?”

Competition and rivalry are certainly distinguishing features of most, if not all, civil wars. And yet the manner and ways they are thought to impact conflict outcomes and civil war processes is still very much an open debate.

In tandem, these puzzles suggest that current thinking in the social sciences regarding internal conflict and collective action requires some revision. The collective

4 These questions are in no way limited to civil wars or other conflictual settings. Coalition dynamics and government formation are subject to precisely the same kinds of internal and external forces. For instance, Moar (1995) begins his essay with the following statement: “The central question this article seeks to answer is what impact intra-party conflicts have on coalition bargaining and the government formation process.” And more recently, Chambers (2008) offers a similar query: Under what conditions might parties or factions play a role in cabinet or coalition durability (p. 299)?
action paradigm (Olsen, 1965) is the axiomatic theoretical foundation for influential research on internal conflict and other issues in the social sciences. It is a recognized insight among scholars that rebel groups face a collective action problem that must be surmounted in order to initiate and conduct effective campaigns in civil wars or revolutions. This assumption applies to both arguments about “greed” and “grievance” in promoting civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) as well as opportunity theories of internal conflicts and social movements (Skocpol, 1979). In short, the conventional wisdom is that the ‘rebels dilemma’ essentially redounds to a problem of collective action and collective dissent (Lichbach, 1998).

Moreover, according to traditional theory, civil wars and counterinsurgencies should be difficult to initiate and sustain. Rebellion should be rare; and recruitment for these activities should be challenging.

The aforementioned complications are expected to operate independent of alliances, which may be present to varying degrees in many conflict settings. But the formation of alliances also raises the issue of collective action. Shared defense is a burden especially prone to the kinds of difficulties associated with freeriding (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Because defense is a classic instantiation of a non-excludible good, shirking is not an uncommon expectation in many alliance arrangements. The general

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5 Kalyvas and Kocher (2007, pp. 178-180) provide a thorough discussion of the literature related to civil war and collective action in both qualitative micro-level research as well as large-N econometric studies.

6 The collective action problem in civil conflict is the analytical result of two basic premises. The first is the public-goods nature of shared aims. Individuals or groups value goods that are procured only via collective action. In the context of civil war, collective defense is the paradigmatic instantiation of such a good. The second tenet of the collective action paradigm is that participation is costly or at least involves some risk to participants. Many empirical investigations have sought to understand how parties overcome what appears to be a rather insuperable dilemma. Central examples include Tullock (1971), Tarrow (1998), Lichbach (1998) and Wood (2003).
premise is that as one member of an alliance increases defense contributions (say, in response to an increased threat), the other members are motivated to reduce their own allocations. Defense burdens are seldom equitably distributed, as smaller or less powerful members shelter under the defense offered by larger allies.

Thus both civil conflict and alliance interactions are, to varying degrees, intrinsically prone to the hitches stemming from collective action issues. Embedding alliances within internal conflicts, moreover, confounds an already complex rebel’s dilemma. Indeed any discussion of alliances and civil war necessarily involves the addition of more players, which may complicate analytical endeavors. The further extension of allowing allied groups to appreciate degrees of internal discord between them, contributes yet another layer of complexity. But civil conflicts are very often complicated affairs with multiple or even shifting coalitions (Cunningham, 2006). The shadow of rivalry between groups can significantly alter decisions regarding optimal allocation of resources between productive and conflictual purposes. And ultimately this form of dual rivalry—between groups and within them—has important implications (Cunningham et al., 2012) not only for the collective action problem but also for civil war outcomes. It is the coordination and conflict within an alliance that proves critical for results it is able to effect outside the alliance. While a high degree of cooperation between allies obviously redounds to more successful outcomes for coalitions in civil wars, so too can conflict and mistrust—for this discord can dissuade members of an alliance from freeriding. That is, even the mere possibility of competition between allies can encourage them to overcome the collective action problem.
1.1 Précis: Intra-Coalition Dynamics and Inter-Party Competition

Before delving into the intended subject of civil wars and alliances, it will be useful to highlight a couple of the complications associated with the study of alliances in general. From local cartels to state parliaments, coalitions and alliances are prominent features in a wide array of socio-political settings. Depending on the issues at hand, such coalitions are marked by varying degrees of internal cohesion and, at times, discord. The general wisdom in such matters is that unity, while very often difficult to achieve, is preferable to division. That is, dispute, defiance, recrimination and uncertainty are the sources of gridlock and ineffectiveness within coalitions. Or so it is presumed. A principle aim of this dissertation is to emend this traditional thinking; for this straightforward interpretation suffers various deficiencies. The first is what may be described as the exclusion principle. Coalitions do not operate in isolation, independent from external threats, actors and other forces. The implication is that collective action dynamics in coalition settings are sometimes triangular in nature. The second shortcoming of this interpretation is that it is not entirely accurate. This is a more serious deficiency. In fact, competition within an alliance may serve as a source of strength as well as weakness. Coalition divisions and the insecurity they entail may serve to both enable and prevent various outcomes.

When individuals, groups and other factions elect to form associations or broader coalitions, they generally do so because they have something in common. It may be that

7 Unless specifically indicated, the terms alliances and coalitions are used interchangeably to avoid repetition.
each group possesses a similar interest in solving a particular problem, perhaps equitable allocation of collective goods or resources. Participants aim to improve their welfare by acting collectively. They therefore form associations, leagues, lobbies, political parties and other cooperative organizations. This is the traditional Olsonian (1965) explication. Issues of coordination and cooperation are important under such circumstances. But they generally remain internal to the organization. By contrast, it is not uncommon that what brings groups together is a mutual enemy, or some foreign actor. In such instances, groups may share very little, save an external common foe. This distinction in alliance motivation is not trivial. When external factors, rather than internal ones, promote coalition formation, the difficulties associated with cooperation and coordination may become more manifold. The introduction of a third force—the external threat or common enemy—is an obvious source of complication, for it is not an exogenous factor, and should not be treated as such. There is little insight to be gained from investigating coalition interactions alone, when coalition decisions are conditioned by shared threats. In these cases, the triangulation of actors becomes highly relevant in understanding interactions, and to exclude any axis is to misrepresent the holistic aspect of the system as a whole.\(^8\)

Some illustrations and observations are enlightening in their ability to inform the theory we seek to outline. Domestic politics is highly prone to the inter- and intra-coalition dynamics noted above. For example, party discipline is especially sensitive to

\(^8\) To do so would be akin to examining the relative motion of two planets without any consideration of the sun.
outside influences. The American two-party system offers a good example. Discipline, or what is often described as party loyalty, is generally thought of as an internal affair. Members of, say, the Democratic Party – be they legislators, governors, or other elected officials – remain under pressure to represent the Party in a manner befitting of the larger Democratic regime. Negative campaigning, for instance, is a tactical move that may attract adverse and damaging attention within the party. Candidates in a primary election may expect to be punished internally for “going negative” in their election efforts. But it is clear that the factors that dictate a candidate’s decision to employ attack ads against an opponent are not limited to within party considerations. The likelihood and degree of punishment a candidate anticipates from negative campaigning must be weighed against the need to do so. And the need to do so will depend largely on the strength and vulnerability of external opponents. Party discipline is thus impacted by external obligations and is not, therefore, exclusively an intra-party issue.

A similar idea applies to understanding how and when legislators elect to go outside the party to sponsor legislation. Reaching across party ranks rather than within them is sometimes preferable for drafting bills and amendments. Dissention and wrangling within the rank and file of a party may hinder effectively proposing and drafting legislation strictly along party lines. It is precisely under such circumstances that between party deals may be most likely to arise or become more attractive options. The current internal debate within the Republican Party over the prospect of higher taxes for the wealthiest citizens offers another example of intra-and inter dynamics at work. Some Republicans are shifting their tone, suggesting it may be preferable to “give in” to
Democratic demands if Barack Obama is reelected. The Republican position on taxes cannot be divorced from the occupant of the White House. The implication of this discussion and these observations is that internal contests are highly influenced by external forces, and vice versa.

The U.S. case aside, parliamentary governments are acutely sensitive to the influence of internal and external impulses. Under various conditions, political parties join coalitions to form governments with other parties whose positions are seemingly at cross-purposes with their own. Opposition parties may possess incentives to strike bargains and form grand coalitions, or they may defect. Furthermore, these political parties are not necessarily unitary actors. Factionalism and intra-party conflicts directly impact numerous factors, including coalition bargaining, the durability of cabinets and parliaments, and government formation. Protracted government formation negotiations are a natural consequence of both disputes between rival factions within parties and competition between them (Luebbert, 1986). And even relatively few constraints or restrictions on bargaining, both internally and externally imposed, can dramatically affect the range of coalition options in many parliamentary settings (Strom et al., 1994). The life expectancy of cabinets is not independent of party factionalism.

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9 This section was drafted prior to Obama’s reelection. And in fact, a sufficiency of Republicans did “give in” on the issue of tax increases to make their passage a reality in January of 2013.
10 The literature related to this topic is vast. But for specific insight related to internal competition as a boon to coalitions, see Chambers (2008).
11 Laver (1999) offers a good discussion of the difficulties associated with intra-party politics when modeling inter-party competition in parliamentary government systems.
One need not look only to domestic politics for exemplification of the interactions described above. This pattern of internal and external linkage finds repetition throughout international politics as well. Recent evidence suggests a very similar process of internal division brought on by external influence is currently taking place within the government of Iran, as economic sanctions are proving increasingly problematic. Strikes and street protests by merchants and traders in early October 2012 were the result of a deteriorating economy and a freefall in the Iranian rial. But opponents of the regime are believed to have exploited the strikes and protests in a direct effort to undermine the Ahmadi-Nejad government. A power struggle within Iran looms ahead of elections scheduled for June of 2013. In a clear reference to his domestic rivals, Ahmadi-Nejad described “the sabotage” against his government as being perpetrated by “devils.”\(^{12}\) In a curious twist of fate, the “devils” to which Ahmadi-Nejad referred were of no relation to the “Great Satan.” It looks as though a national unity government in Iran may be difficult to forge under the continued weight of international sanctions. Given the obvious signs of discord within Iran, the U.S. and other countries may be increasingly disinclined to loosen sanctions. What is clear, however, is the endogenous relationship at work between external influences and internal rancor in Iran. Any assessment or analysis of Iranian domestic political divisions would be incomplete without factoring in the international forces at work within Iran. It would be similarly inadequate to gauge the association between Hamas and Fatah, two Palestinian political organizations, without consideration of their

\(^{12}\) As reported in the *Financial Times*, 8 October 2012.
respective relationships with Israel. Moreover, the complicated and at times violent relationship between Fatah and Hamas raises acute difficulties for Israel. Although the Palestinian factions share some common objectives, the rift between them is habitually the defining feature of their association. It is clear that Palestinian unity, or a lack thereof, is a variable of critical importance to all of the concerned parties of the conflict. It is no accident that the schism and often-destructive interaction between Fatah and Hamas has not translated into purely diplomatic or strategic gains for Israel. If anything, it has increased the intractability of the situation.

This observation highlights the second point noted above regarding traditional alliance thinking. An alliance of perfect concord is not uniformly preferable to more brittle coalitions. Indeed the potentiality for disunion may – inadvertently or otherwise – add value to alliance arrangements or mitigate punishment, should they falter. The latter point is easily demonstrable. Consider a group or political organization faced with the basic decision of either entering into a coalition with one or more other factions, or to maintain its independence by not entering into the alliance. Should the group elect to remain unaligned, it can expect a certain payoff \( m \). If it joins the coalition, the group must divide any winnings \( w \) or mutual coalition benefits between all groups of the alliance. However, should the alliance fall apart, the group expects to incur a cost \( c \) for having joined a failed endeavor. For simplicity, we may assume that the group’s percentage of coalition winnings is simply \( \rho(n) \in [0, 1] \), a function of the number of coalition members. For instance, if coalition earnings are simply divided evenly among all \( n \) groups within the coalition, then \( \rho = 1/n \). And finally, because alliance harmony is
not guaranteed, we represent the likelihood of alliance disintegration as \( \theta \in [0, 1] \). From this elementary setup, it is easy to see that the group will elect to join the coalition, provided that the expected benefit for doing so is greater than their certain payout for going it alone:

\[
(wp)(1 - \theta) + (w - c)\theta > m.
\]

The inequality above may be easily manipulated to show that committing to the alliance only makes sense if a group’s anticipated share of spoils is greater than the certain payout for non-alliance plus the expected failure cost: \( wp > m + \frac{\theta}{(1 - \theta)}c \).

Consistent with expectation, a larger payoff, or share of the pie, induces participants to choose the alliance option, as is evident from the left-hand-side of the inequality. But a more interesting, and less intuitive, insight also emerges from the opposite side of the inequality. The right-hand-side reveals how the potential for alliance collapse interacts with the associated cost of alliance failure. The coefficient on the cost of alliance failure suggests that the possibility of coalition fracture is not entirely bad. Plainly, when the hazard of alliance collapse (\( \theta \)) is high, this serves as a strong motivation against joining the alliance. This is because the expected costs associated with alliance failure are greatly amplified. For instance, when \( \theta = \frac{3}{4} \), the expected costs associated with alliance failure are precisely tripled. However, exactly the opposite is true when the hazard rate is low: the expected cost of failure diminishes. For example, when \( \theta = \frac{1}{4} \), expected failure costs are reduced by two-thirds. This greatly lessens the side of the ledger arguing against joining the alliance. When groups expect to incur a punishment for
failed coalition pursuits, the potential for alliance disintegration can both exaggerate and mitigate negative consequences. While a coalition acting with total integrity may represent an unattainable ideal, the risk of division and collapse is not without its upside.

This brief précis has independently identified and discussed at least two important issues related to alliances – triangulation and internal division. Both are integral to the theory of this dissertation. However, there is a need to address both issues simultaneously, as the two issues are obviously interactive. When third parties influence coalition calculations, internal alliance complications do not suddenly disappear. In fact, they may be exacerbated. Likewise, issues internal to alliances can have bearing on elements outside of them. The goal is to develop a theory sufficient to encompass both. And while the theoretical component of this project pertains to alliances in a general sense, it seeks empirical validation in a specific social context. Namely, civil wars. Internal conflicts offer an ideal environment to study alliances, as so many civil wars are characterized by coalitions – many of which exhibit remarkable cleavages and intragroup competition. And while the study of civil war continues to grow, very little attention in this expanding field has been given to coalition considerations.
1.2 Questions in Civil Conflict and Coalition Studies

The study of alliances and internal conflict represents a relatively new area of scholarly intersection. A paucity of effort has gone into bringing insights from the study of alliance formation into analyses of intrastate conflict.\(^{13}\) One explanation for this research gap is that scholars of alliances and civil wars tend to come from distinct camps. Traditionally, the study of alliances in political science has taken place within the subfield of international relations, a research program favoring state-centric analyses.\(^{14}\) Moreover, the vast theoretical literature on alliances from this field has little to say about how internal coalition dynamics interact with external threats.\(^{15}\) The conventional wisdom is that alliances are oriented around the prosecution of conflict with an outside party. Recent work in this field has expanded the theoretical frontier, but it still lacks a persuasive account of inter-alliance competition that simultaneously addresses the influence of intra-alliance interactions. Scholars tend to examine each of these issues in isolation. For instance, the prominent discourse in this research program still focuses primarily on the motivations for alliances. Structural realists favor *external* factors—e.g., power (Waltz, 1979), threat (Walt, 1987), or system polarity (Snyder, 1997)—as the primary determinants of alignment constellations. Other scholars focus exclusively on *internal* objectives over external ones in alignment and cooperation calculus. Research in

\(^{13}\) Very recent exceptions to this are Bapat and Bond (2012) and Christia (2012). Unfortunately, the latter piece was released only after the majority of the work presented in this dissertation was conducted. Future work stemming from this project will engage Christia (2012) more thoroughly.

\(^{14}\) Scholars from this field have examined questions related to alliances and the likelihood of war, the motivations for alliance formation, and the reliability of alliances. Empirical inquiries in this area tend to center around the link between state alliances, war and peace (e.g., Singer and Small, 1968; Vasquez, 1987).

\(^{15}\) A noted exception is Niou and Tan (2005).
this area incorporates nuanced strategies for managing conflict within groups (Schroeder, 1976). This includes restraining coalition partners from engaging in undesired actions (Pressman, 2008) and tethering adversaries to neutralize reciprocated threats (Weitsman, 1997). Other studies in this vein of work have gone so far as to argue that alliances may even make conflict more intense (Krebs, 1999), or that allies are more likely to fight one another (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). But as noted, linking internal factors with external environments remains understudied.

Students of internal conflicts, on the other hand, tend to come from the comparative sub-discipline of political science. Much of the scholarly work in this area has tended to concentrate on a couple of longstanding debates. The occurrence of civil wars represents an enduring puzzle in the study of conflict and comparative politics. The puzzle can be stated rather simply: the theory of collective action suggests episodes of collective violence should be both rare and difficult to sustain, but historical evidence says otherwise. Scholars estimate that from the years 1945 to 1999, over 16.2 million battle participants were killed in roughly 122 civil wars across 73 different countries, most lasting for about six years. By contrast, inter-state conflicts during the same period killed 3.33 million in battle and involved only 25 countries (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Wars within states are clearly more prevalent than wars between them. The recent and ongoing events in parts of North Africa belie the notion that civil unrest, conflict and even revolutions are infrequent vestiges of the past. And the last decade of cartel violence in Mexico indicates that competition among and within groups can unleash unimaginable levels of violence, even in places where government legitimacy is not in question.
Embedded within this finding on the outbreak and prevalence of civil conflicts is another empirical regularity, often described as the “conflict trap” (Collier et al., 2003). Once a country falls into a civil war, its likelihood of relapsing into a new war is significantly greater than the odds for most countries to experience any civil conflict at all. This war recurrence phenomenon means that there are more civil wars than countries that have had them. The uneven distribution of internal conflicts across states is a prevalent feature of civil war datasets. The 108 cases of civil war from 1944 to 1997 in the Correlates of War dataset span only 54 nations, and as few as 26 countries in the dataset experienced only a single war. Furthermore, the 124 civil wars listed in Doyle and Sambanis (2000) occurred in 69 nations.16 Similarly, the Fearon and Laitin (2003) list of civil wars spans 73 countries; and 31 of those countries experienced more than one conflict.

In spite of this consistent pattern across multiple data sources, civil war recurrence and conflict transformation remain very much open issues. Certainly, studies of peacekeeping operations and peace duration (e.g., Hartzell et al., 2001) indirectly address the process of war renewal. But the treatment of war recurrence in these settings is limited in scope because such studies generally restrict the analysis to cases of conflict ending in negotiated settlements. The preoccupation in most of this work is with the nature and features of the settlements themselves. By contrast, the limited but growing work specifically dedicated to war recurrence tends to emphasize characteristics of

16 As reported in Quinn et al. (2007).
previous conflicts—e.g., how they ended or why they began—to explain why follow-on conflicts do or do not transpire. A strain of this literature emphasizes that military victories are generally more stable than other outcomes.

It is generally accepted that how civil wars end impacts the likelihood of war recurrence in the post-conflict setting. However, the nature of post-war circumstances and the mechanisms linking it to stability or renewed violence is highly debated. A common theme in the literature is to focus either on the character of negotiated settlements or, in their absence, on the impact of military outcomes. Concerning the consequences of military outcomes, scholars also tend to make a distinction between the likely impacts of rebel victories and government victories. A separate and related topic weighs the differing impacts of settlements against military victories on the chances for preserving peace.

Concerning the last issue, Wagner (1993) argues that civil wars ending in negotiated settlements may facilitate renewed violence because settlements allow parties to maintain organizational capacity and identity after the war, even if they are disarmed. The ability of any side to resume hostilities in the future is thereby generally preserved after negotiated settlements. Conversely, a military victory results in the defeat, disarming, and sometimes the destruction, of the enemy. The capacity of the losers to renew combat under such circumstances is significantly curtailed, especially when the winning military preserves its ability to repress. Analysis by Licklider (1995) generally supports the Wagner hypothesis that negotiated settlements are more likely to generate
new civil wars than are conflicts ending in military victories.\textsuperscript{17} More recently, empirical work by DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008) is in line with the finding that military victories are associated with longer peace.\textsuperscript{18}

Even if outright and absolute destruction of losers is rare, when control of the state apparatus is among the spoils of victory, winners are more capable of consolidating their power. This process itself can greatly exacerbate power asymmetries and raise the costs for any “would-be” challengers to the new status quo. Such a process is thought to clarify the balance of power existing between governments and groups entertaining rebellious activities. Relatedly, balance of power arguments have been used in support of those advocating the separation and partition of populations after civil wars fought largely along ethnic lines (see Kaufmann, 1996; 1998).\textsuperscript{19}

Nested within the military outcomes issue is a related question: which type of military victory—rebel or government—is more stable, and why? A small but growing group of researchers is dedicated to this query. The majority of this work argues that victories achieved by rebels are more likely to yield sustainable peace after the conflict than are government victories. An effort by Toft (2010) supports this claim, arguing that rebel victories are not only the least likely type of outcome at the end of a war to lead to a recurrence of violence, but they should also generate the greatest levels of

\textsuperscript{17} Although this hypothesis was only supported in wars fought over identity issues. Additionally, civil wars ending in military victories were also more likely to be followed by acts of genocide.

\textsuperscript{18} Work by Toft (2010) supports this claim as well.

\textsuperscript{19} For a discussion of these works, see Toft (2010), which takes issue with the theory. Relatedly, Walter (2009) argues that partition and the division of territory is likely to trigger more new wars, not fewer. And for a large-N empirical investigation of the partition and civil war debate, see Sambanis (2000).
democratization in the long-run postwar environment. Also exploring the distinction between rebel and government victories, research by Quinn et al. (2007) supports the hypothesis that rebel victories are more likely to produce durable peace because governments are less able than rebels to maintain a claim to state sovereignty in the wake of defeat. And a related effort by Mason et al. (2011) refines this argument somewhat, suggesting that while it may take time for rebels to consolidate their victory, once they do, peace is more likely to be preserved. Conversely, Kreutz (2010) finds that it is government rather than rebel victories that primarily reduces incidence of war recurrence. The debate is thus ongoing.

Separate from the military outcomes literature is a robust research agenda dealing specifically with negotiated settlements and peacekeeping. Certainly, asking what aspects of settlements or peacekeeping operations promote more lasting peace is a more specific question than asking if settlements produce more or less war relapse than do military outcomes. Clearly, not all negotiated settlements are equally likely to deteriorate into new wars. Hartzell (1999) argues that institutions related to distributive policies, political power and the use of force are essential for mitigating the security dilemma in post conflict settings. Others focus on third party involvement and the characteristics of the intervention strategy (Regan, 1996; Findley and Teo, 2006) or on security guarantees

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20 More specifically, the authors note that the odds of peace failure following a rebel victory are relatively high in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, but this effect diminishes substantially to the point that after about three years, the odds of war recurrence are substantially lower than they are following a government victory.

21 Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) build on this insight by emphasizing the importance of institutional designs that specifically promote power sharing. See also Hartzell et al. (2001) for an examination of various factors likely to impact the duration of peace after wars.
they do or do not offer (Walter, 1997). Still others argue more straightforwardly that negotiated settlements supported by peacekeeping in various forms can be a positive contributor to lasting peace (Fortna, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).

And finally, additional work examining peace duration and the recurrence of war emphasizes various factors specifically related to a country’s previous wars. This often concerns the issue over which the dispute originates. For instance, internal conflicts fought over identity issues are thought to be particularly intractable (Licklider, 1995; Gurr, 2000). Some have argued that wars erupting along ethnic lines fall into this category as well (Kaufman, 1996, 1998; Downes 2004). Rebel objective and capability are also thought to bear significance for the likelihood of conflict onset and repetition. Buhaug (2006) argues that distinguishing between territorial and governmental conflicts is critical because each type of civil war may be marked by differing causal mechanisms. Rebels with revolutionary aims or demanding the overthrow of incumbent regimes may be less willing or able to bargain and compromise than groups seeking separation or increased autonomy. This is because rebels engaged in the former type of conflict contest the legitimacy of the government itself, taking on a total and exclusive commitment to rebellion (Zartman, 1993). Also belonging to this class of influences are covariates addressing levels of violence in previous wars, and the length of these conflicts (Smith and Stam, 2004).

The literature on sustaining peace after civil wars contains several related branches, none of which can claim a monopoly of explanatory power. Work emphasizing the nature of negotiated settlements is critically dependent on the environment in which
the agreements come together. This environment is in turn affected by so many variables that it is difficult to parse out the effectiveness of the settlement from the permissiveness of the environment in which it is crafted. This work also tends to ignore the propensity of military victories to procure lasting peace. By contrast, research focusing on war outcomes is wanting in precision. Epistemologically, it is unsatisfying only to be able to claim that a particular outcome (e.g., military victory) is less likely to regenerate war. Ideally we want to know when and under what conditions a given outcome is more or less likely to generate stable scenarios.

Ironically, while much of this work has productively advanced the debate, it has almost totally ignored an innovation recently paying dividends in other research related to civil wars: disaggregating conflicts into the multiple actors that often comprise them. Students of civil wars have only recently expanded the rebel-versus-government conceptualization of civil conflict to account for alternative and even dynamic constellations. This extension is useful and long overdue, since civil wars often exhibit rival factions and multiple parties competing for common and sometimes conflicting goals. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo/Uppsala Armed Conflict database identifies 288 incidents of internal war since 1945, of which 30% include more than two combatants; some contain up to 10 participants. The multiple actors finding is not merely an artifact of the PRIO-Uppsala data. Combining data from Cunningham (2006) on “veto players” in civil wars with the Doyle and Sambanis (2000) dataset reveals that

22 This fact is reported in Cunningham (2006).
just shy of 40% of the civil wars coded by Doyle and Sambanis involve three or more “veto players,” as identified by Cunningham (2006). For example, civil wars in Liberia, former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo were all multiparty affairs.

Relaxing the assumptions that civil wars are two-player arrangements and that rebels are unitary actors has proven fruitful, speaking to a whole host of important factors in civil war. This list includes conflict duration (Cunningham, 2006), outcomes (Nilsson, 2008; Cunningham et. al, 2009) rebel fragmentation (Cunningham el al., 2012; Cunningham, 2011; Findley and Rudlof, 2009; Bakke et al., 2012), ethnic defection (Staniland, 2012), inter-rebel violence (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012) and spoiler effects (Kydd and Walter, 2002; Stedman, 1997). Additionally—and important to this project—a small subset of this work has sought to unpack both the conditions for alliance formation amongst rebel groups (Bapat and Bond, 2012) and how alliances affect conflict transformation after negotiated settlements (Atlas and Licklider, 1999). In spite of these advances, the current research approach is somewhat fragmented, examining dependent variables in isolation from others. And as noted, very few efforts have been made to develop and link alliance theory with civil conflict. Uncovering the role alliances may play in generating civil war outcomes and the likelihood of conflict recurrence remains almost wholly unaddressed.

23 Cunningham (2006) examines the impact multiple actors have on civil war duration. The essay introduces a new dataset that identifies the multiple “veto players” who have participated in civil wars since World War II.
This project attempts to bridge these divides by bringing a formal theory of competitive alliances to bear on the empirical study of civil war. The model demonstrates how conflict between allies can contribute to the alleviation of the collective action problem within the broader alliance. The results generate the somewhat counterintuitive proposition that competitive alliances, which are characterized by intraparty rivalry, improve the likelihood of rebel success. Intraparty competition confronts rebel groups with the potential negative consequences of freeriding in a coalition. When commitment to the coalition is in doubt, the incentive to freeride declines. Consequently, the ‘unstable’ or ‘brittle’ alliance presents a more effective challenge to the government it aims at defeating. However, there is also a tradeoff between alliance strength and alliance stability. Alliances marked by high degrees of internal competition should, ceteris paribus, be associated with a greater frequency of war recurrence than more stable alliance arrangements. Once coalition divisions are realized and reprisal becomes the norm, conflicts should be more difficult to effectively resolve in the long run. Like closing Pandora’s box, putting the lid on internal alliance competition is not easily achieved. This dissertation develops these theoretical insights and tests them on new data on alliances and civil wars.

1.3 Alliances in Civil Wars

Alliances can help shed light on the issues detailed above. This subsection draws on empirical instances of alliances in civil wars to demonstrate variation in internal coalition divisions. It illustrates that the shadow of rivalry between groups can significantly raise both the stakes at hand as well as the likelihood of new wars under a
multitude of circumstances. It also reveals that intra-alliance competition does not necessarily portend disaster for the likelihood of alliances success. That is to claim, rivalry within an alliance may not be as baleful to each party as is generally assumed.

At the international level, alliances are generally thought of as a means for at least two actors to augment or pool their defensive capabilities and resources against a common external threat. Consider the following definition offered in Snyder (1997): “Alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances against states outside their own membership.”24 Based on such a description, it is tempting simply to transfer this view from the international arena to the domestic realm. The straightforward implication of such an exercise would be an increase in the overall fighting capacity of rebel groups after alliances form, and thereby higher incidences of rebel success. Unfortunately such a direct transformation will not suffice: coalitions formed in the nettle of rebellion are generally less formalized arrangements and often marked by an elevated level of ambiguity. Worse still, in the highly anarchic environment characterizing many internal wars, alliance dynamics and the outcomes they produce are seldom neat.

Alliances do not necessarily imply cooperation, especially during civil wars. Uncertainty about alliance commitment means that groups possess opportunistic incentives to improve their security at the expense of their allies (Bapat and Bond, 2012). Moreover, an alliance seldom operates with the efficiency of a unitary actor. Members of

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24 See p. 4 in the original text, emphasis added.
an alliance may share a common objective to deter or expropriate, but they are likely to disagree on how best to achieve this goal. The internal relations of the alliance itself condition the choices allies make. The presence of a common enemy may initially drive groups together; but external threats do not operate independently of the discord often present within alliances. The two forces combine and interact, leaving actors no choice but to deal with both simultaneously. Rebellious groups and other allies must deal with antagonistic allies as well as enemies. Under such circumstances, exploitation is a rational course of action and parties have distinct incentive to freeride. The result is that even in the presence of a shared enemy, allies cannot fully commit to one another. These issues confound the traditional pursuit of revolt.

If we permit that the ‘rebels dilemma’ is fundamentally one of collective action, then inserting alliance calculations into this array complicates an already difficult problem for groups pursuing the task of rebellion. Clearly, alliances and collective action go hand-in-hand. This is owing to the very public goods nature of defense efforts and deterrence. Defense contributions within an alliance are generally assumed to be perfectly substitutable (Sandler and Hartly, 2001), and hence, to benefit all members of the coalition. The result is that freeriding is a common feature of alliance arrangements, depending on threat levels and the relative strength of alliance members.\(^\text{25}\) But civil violence being what it is, exploitation means more than mere shirking. Where uncertainty

\(^{25}\) In general, as one member of an alliance increases its defense contribution (say, in response to an increased threat), the other members are motivated to reduce their own efforts or contributions. Defense burdens are seldom equitably distributed, as smaller or less powerful members shelter under the defense offered by larger allies.
reigns supreme, the more pressing ‘dilemma’ for rebel groups entertaining alliance strategy is one of pure survival: today’s ally is potentially tomorrow’s enemy. This very extant possibility colors coalition dynamics in civil wars.

The irony of exploitation and civil conflict is that the two are practically joined at the hip. Civil wars are most likely to occur where political culture is weakest, or where “normal politics” (Zartman, 1993) no longer addresses grievances and discontent. A civil war in any country is an obvious and discriminate indication that the institutions of the state are unable to offer the proper channels to voice and carry out reforms and, when necessary, normal transfers of power. If change is to come to such an environment, how else except by violence and a resort to force? But seizing power by way of arms has a way of legitimizing the use of force. Under such circumstances, violence begets its own consequences. Alliance calculations, moreover, are not immune from such consequences. The proverb, ‘who rides the tiger can never dismount’ expresses the logic of the situation. The way by which a faction comes to power—violence, in the case of civil war—validates oppositional forces, either from without or within, to seek power by similar means. If competitive coalitions should prove successful, they suffer from what Finer (1975) calls “the vice of origin.”

While the sources of exploitation in civil war are many, we concentrate here on internal rivalry or competition—for which there are numerous wellsprings. In an ideal coalition setting, all groups would share identical preferences over the same set of issue

26 While I am unaware of the origin of this expression, it appears in Finer (1975).
outcomes. The result of such homogeneity would be that alliance members would agree to jointly maximize payoffs and benefits associated with the alliance. However, it is highly unlikely that factions in civil war will share preferences, particularly when it comes to which group should assume power in the wake of potential success against a rival. To varying degrees, civil war coalitions are marked by mutual suspicion and general distrust at very low levels, and outright animosity with the intention to harm at the other extreme. The most severe cases of internal discord entail at least a minimal expectation that allied groups may fight one another in addition to their common foe. Conceptually, the degree of internal competition present in any alliance may be thought of as a continuum, where at one extreme the preferences of allies perfectly align. At the other extreme, schism and dissent are so pronounced as to make outright conflict between coalition partners a near certain inevitability. It is along such a continuum of uncertainty that groups are forced to make decisions regarding alliance commitment and resource allocation.

Observationally, it is clear that rebel factions appreciate the difficulties and extant dangers associated with the scale of internal strife. Certainly, some coalitions are marked by minimal internal discord and rivalry. The National Convention (NC) in Namibia was a fairly cohesive coalition between the SWAPO, SWANU and NUDO elements (Udogu, 2011). When a negotiated settlement ended the civil war in Namibia in 1989, there was little to no residual violence in the post-conflict setting. But such unity is more often the exception than the norm. Elsewhere, slightly higher levels of internal animosity are evident, often motivated by differing ideology. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas (FSLN) was
a revolutionary movement founded against the Somoza dynasty. However, strategic and tactical differences over how to achieve power escalated to such a point during the 1970s that they were in reality not so much internal disputes as outright conflicts between rival movements. On occasion, this animosity resulted in the conscious exclusion of one member or another from the FSLN by one faction or another that considered itself the only legitimate bearer of the movement’s name. The fighting among the three branches of Sandinismo became so bitter that unity was reestablished only under pressure in a series of meetings with Cuban leaders in 1979.\textsuperscript{27} Other degrees of exploitation include instances of freeriding, as was the case with the National Liberation Front of Chad (FroLiNat), a highly disputatious coalition of eleven loosely organized rebel forces. Some of the FroLiNat groups were bought off by the government in the early 1970s, knowing that others would actively keep up the rebellion against the government in N’Djamena. When FroLiNat finally overthrew the government in 1979, the various factions immediately fell into fighting among themselves, as one leader after another evicted his predecessor only to meet further rebellion (Zartman, 1993). These internal disputes would produce the paradoxical effect that the factions could not rule together, but no one of them could rule alone (Zartman, 1986).

Extending this theme to its extreme, fear of exploitation implies that rival groups, even when they come together in a common cause, understand there is a distinct possibility they may have to fight one another—and not infrequently they do. In fact,

\begin{center}
\textsuperscript{27} This summary is taken from Miranda and Ratliff \textsuperscript{1} (1993, pp. 12-13).
\end{center}
some alliances are comprised of groups having already engaged in violence amongst themselves. This was the case in East Timor in 1975 when FRETILIN forces fought a mini civil war against the UDT, its former coalition partner. The two groups would later re-coalesce into a united front in the 1980s (Pinto and Jardine, 1997). Similarly, Kurdish groups in Iraq were determined to eliminate each other in the late 1970s. By 1980 there was a de facto war between the PUK and KDP, with other various factions also involved.\textsuperscript{28} But by 1986, while the KDP and PUK continued to denounce one another, there was growing recognition that they could no longer afford such internecine conflict. In 1986, their respective leaders met in Tehran to form a coalition. By 1987, a formal alliance was announced. In May of 1987, the unification of forces was achieved, with the formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF).

Internal conflict being what it is, parties can never be fully confident in the integrity of their coalition, especially once the violence begins. That is, the nature of internal wars works against the conditions necessary for attaining failsafe coalitions, where allies never take advantage of allies. The case of Somalia reveals a harsh truth: there are no such things as permanent loyalties. The war in Somalia demonstrates some of the most intense instances of feuding factions and hostile coalitions in civil war. This failed state has shown precisely the kind of susceptibility to the war trap—where various groups and clans come together, break apart, remove the government and then fight anew to replace it. The fighting against the Barre regime in the late 1980s devolved into a

\textsuperscript{28} The most relevant among the other groups were the KSP, KSM, ICP, and KDPI. And in a curious twist of events, Iran was openly supporting the KDP in Iraq while engaged against the KDPI in Iran. See McDowall (2000) for an in depth and modern historical review of the Kurds.
broader war fought between the government and a *loose coalition* of rebel organizations (including the SNM and SSDF). It escalated until the Somali army was eventually defeated. However, instability and rivalry within the victorious coalition precipitated a new round of fighting and insurrection among the tribal factions that continues to this day. As would be expected in cases where internal rivalry is at its most pitched levels, no alliance is taken for granted. Under such pronounced conditions of mutual suspicion and open hostilities, members of allied coalitions must ready themselves accordingly.

The Ethiopian civil war, from the 1970s until the early 1990s, bears this out as well. What originated as a mission for succession from Ethiopia by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), transformed into a full-scale removal of the Mengistu Haile Mariam, known as the Derg. But the TPLF’s success on felling the Derg regime in Addis Ababa was greatly aided by its uneasy and sometimes hostile association with another separatist movement, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). While the EPLF often trained TPLF recruits, the EPLF’s support for the TPLF failed to match the latter’s expectations. The two movements achieved a unity agreement, which served to greatly enhance their combined military capacity in the north of the country (Reid, 2011). However, their relationship was marked with mistrust and even hatred. Reid (2011) notes: “Tigrayans believed—with some justification, it must be said—that Eritreans looked down on them, even despised them, and regarded themselves as vastly superior in every respect.” The end of the war produced the uncontested assumption of power by

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29 Shay (2008) lists the five major rival factions in 1991 as the USC, SNM, SPM, SSLF and the SDM. The movements were generally divided up into two main groups: North Somali movements, headed by the SNM; and Central Somali movements, headed by the USC.
these two groups. Animosities between the EPLF and the TPLF would eventually give way to a new round of war in 1998 as relations completely unraveled. Notwithstanding the relapse of violence, the uneasy association between the two separatist movements was an essential component of the defeat of the Derg regime.

What are we to make of this somewhat anecdotal discussion? At least a number of regularities invite further exploration, both empirically and theoretically. An unexpected and underexplored consequence of rivalry between allies in civil wars is its impact on levels of preparation and fighting capacity. How do groups strike balances between coalition commitments with potentially hostile partners, on the one hand, and the need for survival in a highly anarchic environment, on the other? Resources cannot be simultaneously employed for fighting endeavors and for sustaining group livelihood.\[30\] Tradeoffs are inherent. The Somalia episode reveals in its starkest form that freeriding within a highly tenuous alliance is not a costless strategy. In fact, it can be suicide. It is precisely under such unpredictable and capricious conditions that the costs of nonparticipation and freeriding may equal those of participation (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). In the presence of overt alliance competition, allied groups are incentivized to respond in kind to any increases in strength or capability on the part of their partners. Should a coalition collapse, being caught unprepared in an “every man for himself” situation is a state of affairs rebel groups can ill afford. But even in the absence of outright coalition disintegration, boosted levels of defense and armaments for any one

\[30\] Pertinent to this tradeoff, it is worth noting that in 1975, the EPLF was spending 20 percent of its total budget on medicine, four-fifths of which was being dispensed to the civilians within its jurisdiction (Pendergast and Duffield, 1999).
member of an alliance serve to exacerbate intra-coalition commitment problems (Fearon, 1995) in post conflict settings. When discord and mistrust pervade, allies are less able to credibly convey assurances they will not take advantage of more vulnerable partners.

Furthermore, it is plain to see that divisions within coalitions do not automatically translate into military defeat at the hands of governments. Internecine tendencies and the potential for alliance fracture complicate joint endeavors and modalities of cooperation, but there is certainly not a one-to-one correspondence between alliance division and the loss of wars. Oddly enough, the opposite pattern appears closer to the truth. In Nicaragua, Ethiopia, East Timor, Chad and Somalia, ‘rivalrous’ coalitions all succeeded in overthrowing incumbent regimes. The more appropriate question, then, is how these rebel associations won, in spite of themselves. Why did division and discord within rebel coalitions not defeat their endeavors? A second and related issue relates to war renewal. The recurrence of conflicts appears more likely when alliances are characterized by hostility. Of the five instances of conflict just noted, four were marked by a return to war. Moreover, these violent encores always involved predecessors from previous conflicts.

From the perspective of internal conflicts, the challenge is to develop a theory capable of addressing such a puzzle: how do coalitions of rivals defeat regimes that generally enjoy a monopoly of force? Linking such a process to war renewal is also desirable, as follow-on wars are not likely to be independent from those preceding them. And at a higher theoretical level, an added criterion is that the theory also fit within the broader paradigm of collective action. Theories of collective action and rebellion are foundational in explications of civil conflicts. Therefore, without engaging them, any
theoretical account of internal wars will certainly be found wanting. The formal model
developed here meets this list of requirements. It helps account for both of the empirical
regularities noted above. It suggests that the internal factors enabling groups to overcome
the problem of collective action should also contribute to the “conflict trap.”
Furthermore, the theory helps advance issues of collective action as they relate to internal
competition. The latter result has implications that extend beyond the study of civil wars.
2. A Model of Alliances in Civil War

Conceptually, it is useful to set out some basic premises about group incentives and initial conditions. The idea presented here does not push aside the rationalist assumptions of the collective action problem or claim that it somehow mis-describes the nature of certain conflicts (Kylvas and Kocher, 2007). Indeed, the groups discussed here are assumed to be forward-looking “utility-maximizers” operating within the usual constraints of their endowments or limited resources. The choice they must make is how much of their finite resources to devote to fighting and how much to keep for other purposes. The decisions they make directly impact both their own likelihood of prevailing in conflict and, where applicable, the potential success of the alliances they join. Moreover, within such alliances, players may certainly possess incentives to freeride. The analysis extends the traditional theory of civil conflict and collective action by embedding it within an alliance setting. The effect is to create a kind of nested game (Tsebelis, 1988) where at one level the allies appreciate competition with each other, and at another level their alliance faces a common external threat.¹

The model probes the calculated interaction between three players—two militant groups and a nonaligned government—treating the mobilization of defensive resources as the key strategic choice variable. The model is based off of a working paper by Niou and Tan (1997). In certain ways, where the Niou and Tan effort stops, this analysis begins. It

¹ This line of thinking is motivated by influential research on the dynamics of within-group and between-group interactions in social dilemmas. Hausken’s (1995) two-island tax system, where agents may either pay (cooperate) or not pay (defect) for public defense is paradigmatic. Competition between islands tends to induce more cooperation within them. See also: Rapoport and Amaldoss (1999); Gunnthorsdottir and Amaldoss (2006).
therefore takes as a point of departure some of the analytical constructs from that paper, employing them as building blocks in a new game-theoretic setup. For this reason, and for the benefit of comparative statics, preliminaries from the Niou and Tan analysis are reproduced below, with some notational modifications. To appreciate the potential positive impact of a conflictual alliance, it is advantageous to first understand the expected utility associated with ‘normal’ alliance outcomes and the incentives created in the absence of internal strife. Establishing a baseline case, against which comparisons can be made, will be useful analytically. Towards this effort, a baseline model examines equilibrium defense allocations for all three players in two different states of the world—first, in the absence of any alliances between factions (multipolar); and second, in the presence of an alliance between two rebel groups (bipolar). A final section extends the alliance analysis of the two-versus-one model to include the possibility that, in addition to combatting the government, both of the allied parties appreciate the likelihood that they may also have to fight one another. Equilibrium defense allocations are once more determined to reflect this more uncertain state of affairs.

Berkeley (2002) characterizes much of Africa’s civil wars as a “Hobbesian playground.” This anarchic condition is the first state under consideration. In the stand-alone system, alternatively referred to as the “Hobbesian” state, no alliance emerges between the militant groups. In this “every man for himself” state of nature, each group must fend for itself against all other factions, including the government. In civil wars, this is generally the result of rapid disintegration of any alliance structures between warring factions. Civil conflicts of this type tend to be brutal instances of a Hobbesian struggle of
all against all (Hirshleifer, 1995). Examples of this type of civil war during the 20th century include Bosnia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Liberia.

When rebels are faced with an all-versus-all state of nature, the prospects for any single group can be rather grim. The difficulties of engaging in rebellion become manifold under such dire circumstances. Groups whose original animus may have been aimed at the government must now contend with the enmity of competing factions. The focal point of hostility is no longer a singleton. Under such circumstances, violence is not only uncontainable; it becomes contagious. Warlordism, turf wars and battles for influence are not infrequent occurrences in these types of conflicts. This chaotic condition marked much of the civil war in Liberia, where the NPFL and IPFL simultaneously fought both one another, as well as remnant government forces in Monrovia. By the end of 1994, 80 percent of Liberia’s population had been displaced as a result of the conflict, in which no less than seven main factions vied for supremacy (Adebajo, 2002). As previously discussed, the multiparty war in Somalia in the late 1980s was similarly characterized by a total collapse in order. Even before the Barre regime had fallen, rivalry within the victorious coalition precipitated new fighting among the tribal factions that continues to this day.

However, an alternative and generally less dire scenario arises when the militant groups elect to form a coalition against the government. This is the second arrangement the model formally investigates. Under this two-versus-one scenario, both groups must determine the level of resources to commit to their alliance, but they are not forced to concern themselves with the “total war” scenario of the stand-alone system. Many civil
conflicts exhibit the formation of larger coalitions comprised of smaller ones. For instance, Afghani Mujahideen units often formed alliances during the 1980s in their fight against the Soviet puppet regime.\(^2\) And in El Salvador’s civil war, numerous rebel factions came together to form the FLMN, a united coalition aimed at increasing coordination and fighting capacity against the government. Elsewhere in Central America, four left-wing guerrilla groups—the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and the PGT—combined forces to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)\(^3\) in 1982. While these sorts of coalitions do not characterize all civil wars, their formation is not uncommon.

### 2.1 The Baseline—Stand-Alone System

Each party has initial resources \(w_i\), where \(w_i > 0\), for \(i=1,2,3\). For instance, if parties 1 and 2 represent the two militant factions, then group 3 is the government.\(^4\) The total amount of resources available in the system is normalized to 1. Formally, \(w_1+w_2+w_3=1\), where, without loss of generality, \(w_i\) represents group \(i\)'s share of the total initial resources. In general, governments may enjoy resource advantages over the other two players; but this need not be the case analytically.\(^5\) The strategic issue facing each player is how much of the initial endowment \((w_i)\) to convert to defensive capabilities \((q_i)\). Once a share of resources is converted into fighting capacity (for simplicity, in the ratio

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\(^2\) The most prominent of these often shifting coalitions was the IUAM.

\(^3\) Acronym is Spanish.

\(^4\) Alternatively (and in sections that follow) the aligning parties are referred to as \(i\) and \(j\) respectively.

\(^5\) Nor is it the case empirically. See the non-state actor dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2012).
of one-to-one)\textsuperscript{6} it cannot be reverted to any productive use other than to defend the group against aggression or to commit aggression against other factions. The mobilization of resources is an important component of civil war strategy and critically related to how conflicts proceed (Weinstein, 2007). For instance, resources that groups keep for productive purposes are important bargaining factors in potential “power sharing” agreements.\textsuperscript{7} Sustainability in protracted conflicts demands that both sides of the front be maintained. It is therefore assumed that each group must maximize its economic resources and is concerned with fighting capacity only to the extent that it influences its ability to defend its own economic base or to secure it by way of expropriation from others.

The choices groups make are contingent upon against whom and with whom they expect to fight. The first scenario under consideration is the most anarchic, where there are no alliances or mutually beneficial coalitions. This state of nature is marked by conflict between all parties. Formally, the all-versus-all state of affairs is reflected as follows. Any faction \(i\) has the following payoff function in the stand-alone system:

\[
U_i(q_1, q_2, q_3) = \frac{q_i}{Q} (1 - Q),
\]

for \(i = 1, 2, 3\), where \(q_i\) is the level of resources allocated to defense by group \(i\) and \(Q = q_1 + q_2 + q_3\), the sum of all such expenditures. In equation (1), \(q_i/Q\) captures the probability that party \(i\) will prevail in the conflict, and \((1-Q)\) reflects the spoils of victory, should it

\(\textsuperscript{6}\) These results are consistent with any rate of transformation between zero and one.

\(\textsuperscript{7}\) The model does not formally investigate power-sharing arrangements, but allows that they may transpire. Commitment problems, however, may render them infeasible. See Fearon and Laitin (2007) for this discussion.
do so—that is, the unconverted resources remaining in the system. As is typical in the rent seeking and contest literature, the probability of victory for any group is represented as the ratio between its fighting capability and the total fighting capacity of all groups (Tullock, 1980; Skaperdas, 1996). Such a form preserves the desired tradeoff, whereby an increase in military expenditure simultaneously raises the likelihood of victory but is offset by a decrease in productive assets.

In the stand-alone system, equilibrium is determined such that each group chooses its defense allotment, $q_i$, to maximize its payoff function as specified in equation (1). But it does so, given the investment choices of the other groups. Taking the derivative of $U_i(q_1,q_2,q_3)$ with respect to $q_i$, yields the following first-order condition for an interior solution:

$$(2) \quad \frac{q-q_i}{q^2} - 1 = 0,$$

for $i=1,2,3$. The second-order condition is clearly satisfied. Summing equation (2) over $i=1,2,3$ generates $Q=2/3$. It then follows from (2) that $q_i=2/9$. Therefore, in equilibrium, each faction in the stand-alone system spends $q_i=2/9$ and receives the payoff $U_i=1/9$, provided that the resource constraints are not binding.\(^8\)

---

\(^8\) Here, the non-binding resource constraints require that $2/9 \leq w_i \leq 5/9$ for all $i$. When some of the constraints are binding, the equilibrium must be recalculated, taking into account the corner solutions. Corner solutions are not examined in Niou and Tan (1997), nor are they investigated here.
2.2 The Baseline Model—Two-Versus-One

When coalitions form between rebel factions, the strategic landscape of the conflict shifts, forcing all parties to adjust accordingly. This subsection examines those adjustments more precisely. As noted, the two-versus-one arrangement results when any two groups unite against the third in an alliance. For simplicity, this alliance between parties 1 and 2 is refereed to as A.\(^9\) The non-aligned group—the government in this case—is G. Let \(w\) denote the level of initial resources of the government, and \(1– w\) reflect the level of resources under the joint control of the allied factions. The value \(q_G\) denotes the government’s spending on defensive capabilities, such that \(0 \leq q_G \leq w\). If alliance A should defeat G, the allies divide all resources G has not already converted into military capacity. Furthermore, after victory, each member in the alliance receives a share of G’s resources proportional to its own contribution to the alliance’s fighting capacity, \(q_i/Q_A\), where \(q_i\) represents group \(i\)’s military contribution, \(0 \leq q_i \leq w_i\), and \(Q_A\) is the total defense spending by the alliance. The proportional distribution rule is motivated by the idea that groups contributing more to an alliance expect increased influence and reward in post-conflict settings as a result of their extra efforts.\(^10\)

By these specifications, the spoils of victory to each group \(i\) in the alliance consist of two parts: each group’s own remaining resources, \((w_i - q_i)\), plus a portion of G’s

\(^9\)The alliance is alternatively described as consisting of member \(i\) and member \(j\).
\(^10\)Additionally, the booty and trafficking in contraband frequently associated with civil wars are very often private goods, excludible from other groups. Other sharing rules are obviously possible. For instance, Ueda (2002) considers a sharing rule that is the weighted average between equal sharing and sharing proportional to effort contributions. An egalitarian division rule may be more or less appropriate depending on context. For a thorough technical analysis of both distribution rules, see Rapoport and Amaldoss (1999).
remaining resources, \((w-q_G)q_i/Q_A\). And finally, each group in the alliance has an expected net income that is positively associated with the alliance’s overall fighting capability but negatively related to its adversary’s. This is reflected in the probabilistic contest rule, where the probability of victory is expressed as a ratio\(^{11}\) of war-fighting capabilities: \(Q_A/(Q_A + q_G)\). The following payoff function for each member \(i\) in \(A\) captures these distinctions:

\[
U_i^A(q_i, Q_A, q_G) = \frac{Q_A}{Q_A + q_G} \left( w_i - q_i + \frac{q_i}{Q_A} (w - q_G) \right),
\]

provided \(Q_A > 0\) and \(q_G \geq 0\).\(^{12}\) The payoff function for the government is analogously specified as:

\[
U_G(q_G, Q_A) = \frac{q_G}{Q_A + q_G} (1 - Q_A - q_G),
\]

if \(Q_A \geq 0\) and \(q_G > 0\).\(^{13}\)

It is worth highlighting an important feature of equation (3). Military expenditure \((q_i)\) is simultaneously a private and public good within the alliance. An increase in fighting capacity by group \(i\) in the alliance has two effects. First, it improves the alliance's overall chance of winning the conflict. In consequence, both members in the alliance have better protection for their own resources. However, they also share an incentive to freeride. In this regard, military spending by an alliance member amounts to a non-

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\(^{11}\) As discussed, employing the ratio of military capabilities for this purpose is common throughout the literature on conflict and alliances (e.g., Garfinkel (2004), Powell (1999) chapter 5). Other functional forms are discussed in the literature on conflict and rent-seeking. See Hirshleifer (1989), Skaperdas (1992), and Neary (1997).

\(^{12}\) Otherwise, \(U_i^A = w_i\) if \(Q_A = q_G = 0\), and \(U_i^A = 0\), if \(Q_A = 0\) and \(q_G > 0\).

\(^{13}\) Similarly, \(U_G = w_G\) if \(Q_A = q_G = 0\), and \(U_G = 0\), if \(Q_A > 0\) and \(q_G = 0\).
excludable public good. But an increase in \( q_i \) also raises group \( i \)’s claim to the winnings, should the alliance prevail in the conflict. In this regard \( q_i \) is also a private good, as each faction has an individual incentive to contribute more.\(^{14}\) Thus, in the two-versus-one alliance system where spoils are proportional to efforts, military contributions to the alliance are actually “mixed goods.”

### 2.3 Equilibrium Analysis

Equilibrium is again determined such that each group \( i \) in alliance A chooses \( q_i \) to maximize its utility in equation (3), subject to its resource constraint, \( 0 \leq q_i \leq w_i \), and given the investment strategies of the other players. Similarly, the government chooses \( q_G \) to maximize its payoff in equation (4), subject to its own resource constraint \( 0 \leq q_G \leq w \), given the investment strategies of the alliance it faces. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium—given the information at hand, neither the alliance members nor the government has an incentive to alter its provisions of conflictual and productive assets. Computationally, this means simultaneously identifying the critical points associated with each of the payoff functions. Taking the derivative of \( U_A^i \) with respect to \( q_i \) and simplifying to eliminate fractions generates the following first-order-condition for an interior solution:

\[
q_G(w_i - q_i) - Q_A(Q_A + q_G) + (Q_A + q_G - q_i)(w - q_G) = 0,
\]

for each group \( i \) in the alliance. It can be verified that the second-order conditions are satisfied. Aggregating equation (5) over the two alliance groups produces:

\[
-2(Q_A + q_G)^2 + wQ_A + (1 + w)q_G = 0.
\]

14 Relatedly, Sandler (1977) and Sandler and Forbes (1980) also extend traditional models of alliances to allow that national security expenditures render both public and private benefits to allied members.
Analogously, the first-order condition for the government yields:

\[(7) \quad -(Q_A + q_G)^2 + Q_A = 0.\]

Equations (6) and (7) simultaneously determine the interior solution for total military expenditures by alliance A and government G. They are given by the following two equations:

\[(8) \quad \tilde{Q}_A = \frac{1}{9} (1 + w)^2, \quad \tilde{q}_g = \frac{1}{9} (1 + w)(2 - w).\]

It is straightforward to show that the total spending on war-fighting in the two-vs.-one system is less than in the stand-alone system. This outcome reflects the public nature of defense contributions within an alliance.

From (5) and (8) we can calculate the defense spending in equilibrium for each group \(i\) in alliance A as:

\[(9) \quad \tilde{q}_i = \frac{1+w}{9w} [(2 - w)w_i + 2w - 1].\]

Given the equilibrium levels of investment in (8) and (9), we can further determine the equilibrium payoff for each faction:

\[(10) \quad U_A(w_i, w) = \frac{(1-2w)^2}{9w} + w_i \frac{w^2 + 8w - 2}{9w}.\]

Similarly, the payoff for the government is:

\[(11) \quad U_G(w) = \frac{(2-w)^2}{9}.\]

The above represents the baseline model—where the integrity of the alliance is not in doubt. While numerous results come out of the baseline analysis, the two most relevant to this endeavor are briefly noted. The first is the propensity for alliance members to take advantage of one another via freeriding. The second—in many ways a
consequence of the first—is that the government always expects to fare better than its allied opponents.

Given the constraints outlined above, a collective action problem exists within the alliance. Freeriding and unequal burden sharing are expected features of equilibrium alliance contributions. Under various conditions, at least one member of the alliance will “exploit” the other. Even as committed partners in their pursuit against the government, the two allied factions have an incentive to shirk. Specifically, when the alliance enjoys a resource advantage, the weaker member of the alliance always “shelters” under the security of its stronger ally by committing a lower proportion of resources for fighting.\textsuperscript{15} And when the alliance is relatively weaker than the government, it is the other member that shirks. The shared nature of the prize contributes to the effect. This result also obtains in part owing to the public-goods nature of defense contributions. And sometimes the outcome is attributable to disproportionately sized allies.\textsuperscript{16} Not even the private goods aspect of the model is sufficient to override this result. When a member of the alliance increases contributions, both factions of the coalition stand to benefit, inducing freeriding. In fact, the public good aspect imparts a kind of prisoner’s dilemma to allied parties, where both are inclined to shirk in their levels of preparation.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, if those resources not offered to the alliance ($w_i$) are also highly productive, it becomes

\textsuperscript{15} Formally, this means that $\theta_i/w_i$ is increasing in $w_i$.

\textsuperscript{16} Sandler (1977) includes a brief discussion on the degree and sources of sub-optimality associated with defense provisions in the Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) paradigm.

\textsuperscript{17} This result assumes that even minimal levels of effort will not result in disastrous outcomes. If this is the case, then the game is better described as one of Chicken. See Bruce (1990) for a brief discussion.
more attractive for factions to withhold them from the coalitions they join—thereby worsening the shirking result within alliances.

The dilemma facing each alliance member is easily abstracted into Table 1. The problem for both members of the alliance is that shifting from the equilibrium strategy of \( q \) is punished, or payoff degrading—even when it may increase the chances for contest success. The incentive structure of the alliance conspires against making any deviation from the equilibrium path. Should, for example, either faction elect to increase defense contributions any amount \( \epsilon \), two factors confound such a move. First, if the other faction fails to similarly adjust contributions, then the shirking group is rewarded at the expense of the other coalition member. This “sucker’s payoff” is reflected in the off-diagonal quadrants of Table 1. And even when both alliance members simultaneously boost their contributions above \( q \), their expected utility jointly falls because they have less productive assets to utilize (for example, in power-sharing or other economically viable activities). Thus, both alliance members are disincentivized to making extra defense efforts. Consequently, the alliance, as a whole, suffers a kind of sub-optimality, on account of purely self-interested behavior by each alliance member.
Table 1: Freeriding alliance dilemma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\hat{q}_i$</th>
<th>$\hat{q}_j$</th>
<th>$\hat{q}_j + \epsilon$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(+, +)$</td>
<td>Utility Maximizing Optimum</td>
<td>$(++, -)$ Higher probability of victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{q}_i + \epsilon$</td>
<td>$(-, ++)$ Higher probability of victory</td>
<td>$(-, -)$ Highest probability of victory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second important result to emerge from the baseline model reveals the advantages governments enjoy in fighting allied factions. For every possible interior solution of the model, the utility of the government is always greater than the expected payoff to any faction within the alliance. Formally, this means $U_A^I < U_G$, for all allowable distributions of initial resources amongst the three players.\(^\text{18}\) The government *always* enjoys the highest expected utility in the two-versus-one arrangement. This outcome is very often the result of freeriding within the alliance. It is also not unexpected, given the asymmetric distribution of power between governments and rebels in most civil wars. But it is worth drawing attention to the fact that this result obtains *even* when the government controls the least amount of initial resources—i.e., is the weakest player. Governments facing allied oppositions stand to benefit from problems associated with collective action.

\(^{18}\) Proving this statement is essentially a linear programming problem combining the equilibrium payoff inequality ($U_A^I > U_G$) with the non-binding resource constraints ($2/9 \leq w_i \leq 5/9$) for all $i$. Both inequalities cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
2.4 Intra-alliance Competition—Introducing Adversarial Coalitions

The two results noted above indicate there is a certain amount of ‘sub-optimality’ associated with the baseline equilibrium outcome. Given this basic setup and its inherent freeriding incentive within the alliance, it is natural to seek means by which groups may overcome the collective action problem. The question is how might alliance arrangements induce increases in defensive efforts that simultaneously generate increases in expected utility, as well as the likelihood of contest success? That is, under what circumstances is it economically viable for groups to seemingly “over” invest in defense measures, when they also must preserve resources for economic viability and potential power sharing agreements? This inquiry goes beyond mere private “selective incentives” common in civil conflicts and rebellions. The mitigating medium discussed here deals directly with rivalry and competition—two core components of internal conflict. The straightforward scenario described above assumes a certain and perhaps unlikely amount of clairvoyance about the nature of the contest. Simply put, factions know with whom they will ally and, once so aligned, how the conflict shall proceed. It is overly strict to assume that allying groups operate exclusively either in a Hobbesian state or a stable bipolar world. In this sense, the baseline model is a caricature of two extremes. There is likely to be more semblance of reality somewhere in the middle.

19 The trivial solution to this problem would be to assign zero utility to all non-converted resources, \( w_j \). This is similar to the last period in multi-period consumption models, where agents are assumed to consume all resources in final periods (e.g., Carroll, 2001). But we are obviously interested in nontrivial solutions. Moreover, this is not an economically sustainable strategy.

20 Certainly, selective incentives are already partially addressed via the private goods aspect of distribution rules. But as indicated, even with this private incentive, freeriding is still a feature of equilibrium outcomes.
Cooperation, as has been pointed out, does not imply harmony (Wallander et al., 1999). And alliances, it should be added, do not necessarily imply cooperation. Alliances are very often no more than pacts of expedience whose members worry about exploitation. Divisions and mutual suspicions within coalitions make internal and outright conflict between allies a distinct and very possible exigency. Moreover, as information becomes noisy, intentions more concealed, and perceptions increasingly blurred in the ferment of civil conflict, fractures in alliances are likely to emerge. Incorporating the possibility of such coalition fissures is a practical extension of the baseline model. Adding this refinement is in line with Hirshleifer’s (2001) important classification that among the possible causes of conflict is perception. Rival groups, although they may have a common enemy, may (correctly or incorrectly) perceive the intentions of their allies as hostile. This potentiality changes drastically the expected levels of their cooperation and effort.

Under such conditions of mutual suspicion, members of an alliance must ready themselves accordingly. The easiest manner of demonstrating the new quandary is to redescribe the sort of ‘dual’ game potential allies play. Rivalry between allies and the possibility of conflict it entails is a contingency that cannot be ignored. The new conflict is one where allies understand that they may find themselves together “in the same boat” or they may be forced to go it alone. The latter instance implies an “every man for himself” state of affairs. While a common external threat drives allies together, rivalry between them can make for wary bedfellows.
Allowing for the potentiality that coalitions can break apart permits a more realistic reflection of their dynamics. Even when players may prefer unity to fractionalization, very often they are unable to prevent the latter. Empirically, fragmentation and alliance break-ups are fundamental to internal conflict processes. Findley and Rudloff (2012) estimate that roughly 44 percent of civil wars since World War II have experienced some form of group fragmentation. The nature of conflict being what it is, parties can never be fully confident in the integrity of their coalition, especially once the violence begins. Groups may form alliances and yet still find themselves in Hobbesian-like conflict environs. This was certainly the case in civil conflicts in Liberia and Somalia. In an effort to reflect this potential reality, the following section expands upon the baseline model outlined above by considering that in any alliance, uncertainty reigns supreme; there exists at least a minimal expectation that allied groups may fight one another in addition to their common foe. Coalitions between known adversaries presuppose at least some degree of mutual hostility, and therefore cannot be taken for granted. Members within them appreciate this contingency and respond accordingly. This modification to the model is an explicit acknowledgment that security dilemmas (Jervis, 1978) may actually emerge or transpire within alliances (Snyder, 21

For insights on conceptualizing the nature of fragmentation in civil conflicts, see Bakke et al. (2012). Certainly, examples at the intrastate level are not difficult to uncover. Divisions and outright conflict continue to plague Palestinian groups Fatah and Hamas. In the 1970s, the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, having formed an alliance with Prince Norodom Sihanouk at the domestic level and with the North Vietnamese at the international level, broke ranks with both former partners—prompting a new round of war between Cambodia and Vietnam in the late 1970s (Etcheson, 1984). Similarly, a Muslim-Croat alliance in the newly independent country of Bosnia-Herzegovina successfully fought off Serbian forces from the Bosnian and former Yugoslav armies in 1992. However, by the end of the year, relations between these two allies had begun to deteriorate at an ever-accelerating pace. These erstwhile allies fought a civil war amongst themselves that would last for another three years (Shrader, 2003).
1984). The act of aligning does not in itself obviate the concern that an ally’s defensive capabilities may be employed either for or against another member of the coalition.

Formally, we embed the potential for adversarial relationships between allied parties by introducing a new parameter $\theta$, which represents the probability of intra-alliance conflict, such that $0 \leq \theta \leq 1$. By implication, $(1 - \theta)$ reflects the probability that the alliance will hold. This added factor alters the payoff function of alliance $A$. Each group within the alliance now must take into account the added possibility of conflict with its ally, in addition to the extant dispute with the government. Accordingly, the payoff function for each member in the alliance is specified as follows:

\[
U_A^i(q_i, Q_A, q_G) = (1 - \theta) \frac{q_A}{Q_A + q_G} (w_i - q_i + \frac{q_i}{q_A} (w - q_G)) + \theta \left[ \frac{q_i}{Q_A + q_G} (1 - Q_A - q_G) \right].
\]

The two terms in equation (12) combine the alliance payoff in the absence of intra-alliance fighting with the all-against-all system. In both instances, the probability of victory is once more represented as a ratio of defensive expenditures. The spoils of victory are resources not converted for war-fighting use. The functional form of equation (12) preserves and combines all the characteristics of the payoff functions in the stand-alone and two-versus-one systems. Furthermore, if there is no possibility of intra-alliance fighting ($\theta = 0$), the alliance payoff function reduces to equation (3). The payoff for the government remains unchanged from equation (4).

\[23\] This is a simplifying assumption. It is assumed that if an alliance between $i$ and $j$ falls apart, that neither $i$ and $G$ nor $j$ and $G$ form a follow-on coalition. That is, coalitions with the government are not possible.
Given the specifications above, it is again possible to determine the equilibrium levels of investment and expected payoffs. The derivations are similar to those in the previous section and are therefore omitted here. In equilibrium, the total contribution by the alliance and the expenditure by the government are represented by the following two expressions:

\[
Q_A^* = \frac{1}{9}(1 + w - w\theta + \theta)^2, \quad q_G^* = \frac{1}{9}(1 + w - w\theta + \theta)(2 - w + w\theta - \theta)
\]

Both of the equilibrium expressions are functions of intra-factional uncertainty (\(\theta\)) as well as initial endowment distribution (\(w\)). And both expressions reduce to the baseline values when \(\theta\) is equal to 0. Additionally, if \(\theta=1\) and intra-alliance conflict is certain, then \(Q_A^* = 4/9\) and \(q_B^* = 2/9\). Once more, this result reproduces those generated in the stand-alone system, where fighting takes place between all players.

The precise equilibrium defense expenditures for each group within the alliance can be derived from equations (11) and (13), yielding:

\[
q_i^* = \frac{K+1}{9w} [(2 - K)w_i + 3w - K - 1] - \frac{\theta}{(1-\theta)w} \left[\frac{1}{9} (K + 1)(2K - 1) - q_j \right],
\]

where \(K = w - w\theta + \theta\). The security dilemma, now internal to the alliance, is evident in equation (14). In addition to the \(\theta\) parameter, a critical distinction between equations (14) and (9)—the equilibrium contributions of each alliance member—is the inclusion of \(q_j\). In the baseline model, the equilibrium contribution for any group within the alliance is

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24 While the calculations are more tedious and the equations somewhat lengthier, the process is identical: summation of the first order condition over each alliance member.

25 This result again requires that the resource constraints are not binding. Furthermore, it can be shown that the resource constraints are “stronger” or more severe in the stand-alone-system than in the 2.v.1 scenario. Thus we can continue to restrict our discussion to \((2/9 \leq w_i \leq 5/9)\) for all \(i\).
strictly a function of only $w$ and $w_I$. The relative strength of faction $i$ in the baseline scenario is exclusively a relationship between the government endowment ($w$) and its own initial resources ($w_I$). In the presence of intra-coalition rivalry, however, relative capability is twofold. The government endowment ($w$) remains a strategic factor in determining optimal levels of defense for group $i$ of the alliance. But now member $j$’s defense contribution ($q_j$) also comes into play as a key strategic component. In the event of alliance collapse, resources converted for fighting by faction $j$ will not be used for, but against player $i$. This is a formal reflection of the strategic dynamic between alliance partners in the presence of intra-coalition competition. Defensive contributions within the alliance are thus double-edged, offering both security for the alliance and potential insecurity for mutually suspicious allied parties.

Substituting $Q_A^* - q_i$ for $q_j$ in equation (15) generates the following simplified expression:

$$q_i^* = \frac{(1-\theta)(K+1)(2-K)}{9K} w_I + \frac{(K+1)(2K-1)}{9K}.$$

Once more, this equation reduces to equation (9) when the probability of alliance collapse is negligible. That is, when $\theta=0$, the equilibrium defense allocation for each group within alliance $A$ is exactly the same as the baseline case: $q_i^* = \bar{q}_i$.

Substitution of equation (13) into the alliance member objective function produces the following expected payoff in equilibrium for each group in $A$:

$$U_A(w_I, w; \theta) = \frac{(2K-1)^2}{9K} + w_I (1 - \theta) \frac{(8K + K^2 - 2)}{9K},$$
where again $K = w - w\theta + \theta$. The same may be done for the government, yielding an expected payoff of:

$$U_G(w; \theta) = \frac{(2-w+w\theta-\theta)^2}{9}.$$  

Equations (16) and (17) determine defense expenditure in equilibrium for all groups.

2.5 Analytical Results and Implications

The introduction of $\theta$ has various and differing impacts on both the alliance and government defense allocations. Before examining the precise intra-coalition aspects of the model with implications for civil conflicts, there is insight to be gained from a look at the general results and how they differ from the baseline model. Determining which side (A or G) allocates more resources for fighting, and why it does so, is less straightforward when internal competition animates alliance interactions. Table 2 summarizes the new equilibrium allocations for the alliance ($Q_A^*$) and the government ($q_G^*$) against the original model equilibrium outcomes ($\hat{Q}_A$ and $\hat{q}_G$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Equilibrium defense allocations under various parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta=0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parity ($w=1/2$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. stronger ($w&gt;1/2$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance stronger ($w&lt;1/2$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first row of the table indicates that when the two parties are of equal endowments, intra-alliance competition occasions an increase in equilibrium defense contributions above the baseline model. Formerly, parity in resources produced parity in expenditures. This is no longer the case, as the alliance now outspends the government. However, when the government enjoys a resource advantage (second row), the alliance outspends its opponent under both scenarios \((\theta=0 \text{ and } \theta>0)\). By how much is not yet evident. And the third row suggests that in those instances when the alliance is stronger than the government, the critical factor in determining its fighting allocation is the degree of intra-alliance tension. In such cases, the alliance may spend less than \(G\) (as it does in the baseline model) or it may spend more. The following proposition reflects the equilibrium allocations for this scenario.

**Proposition 1**: Suppose \(w < 1/2\). In the two-vs.one system \(\exists \theta^* \in (0,1/2)\), such that \(Q_A^* = q_G^*\). If \(\theta < \theta^*\) then \(Q_A^* < q_B^*\); and if \(\theta > \theta^*\), then \(Q_A^* > q_B^*\).

Proposition 1 indicates that particular levels of internal discord may tip the balance of defense capabilities in favor or against either side.\(^{26}\) In words, it states that when the alliance is stronger than its opponent, there is always a critical value of intra-alliance competition \((\theta^*)\) for which it matches \(G\)’s defense allocations. Moreover, for values below \(\theta^*\), the alliance contribution is less than the government’s \((Q_A^* < q_G^*)\); and for values greater than \(\theta^*\), the alliance contributes more than the government \((Q_A^* > q_B^*)\).

The implication of proposition 1 is that when the alliance enjoys an endowment or size

\(^{26}\)This proposition is easily shown by manipulating the relevant inequalities and employing the assumption that \(w < 1/2\).
advantage, it leverages its relative strength by willingly spending less on defensive capabilities than its foe, provided the risk of alliance collapse is sufficiently low. Conversely, when such a hazard is appreciably high, the alliance will always outspend its foe. It appears, then, that the security dilemma within the alliance induces such increases. Furthermore, proposition 1 demonstrates that even relatively low values of $\theta$ are sufficient to effect changes in the balance of capabilities between the alliance and the government. Specifically, in proposition 1, $\theta^*$ is always between 0 and $\frac{1}{2}$, the lower half of the parameter’s distribution. Even a comparatively mild security dilemma within a rebel alliance may alter equilibrium outcomes.

While Table 2 compares alliance spending in equilibrium against the government, it does not address a key question pertaining specifically to the alliance. How does the imposition of a security dilemma upon the allied parties affect equilibrium values relative to the baseline model, where no such dilemma transpires? More precisely, what is the general relationship between $\hat{Q}_A$ and $Q_A^*$, if one exists? Fortunately, it is straightforward to show that so long as $\theta$ is greater than zero, $Q_A^*$ is always more than $\hat{Q}_A$. This is a basic, yet key distinction of the revised model. When rebelling groups appreciate a positive possibility their alliance may fall apart, their defense allocations collectively rise. The total alliance contribution is unequivocally greater in the face of uncertainty than in the baseline case. The result obtains specifically owing to the heightened sense of instability now associated with the alliance, i.e., the internal security dilemma. Freeriding in a less than stable coalition is no longer the costless strategy it once was. Put differently, being
cast into the Hobbesian state of nature is not a contingency factions can generally afford to take lightly. Consequently, defense preparedness rises.

In this regard, alliance instability translates into alliance strength. From a collective action stance, this result is imperative—the significance being that doubts and internal tensions have an unintended consequence of considerably mitigating the freerider problem within the coalition. There is a distinct disincentive to freeriding in a coalition of rivals.\textsuperscript{27} When today’s ally is potentially tomorrow’s foe, freeriding can be a costly option. This outcome casts the classic Rebel’s Dilemma in a whole new light. Active participation in internal conflicts marked by multiple actors may be a preferable strategy to freeriding if uncertainty and friction is sufficiently high.\textsuperscript{28}

Figure 1 offers a sense of how equilibrium defense expenditures increase for any one group as the chances of alliance collapse also grow. It depicts equilibrium alliance contributions over the entire domain of $\theta$, for a faction with initial endowment $w_i = 1/3$. The bottom line shows the fixed level of contributions in the baseline model ($\theta = \theta$). As is evident in the figure, contributions rise as the security dilemma becomes more protracted. The result is a surplus of defensive capabilities over and above what was contributed in the baseline case. This surplus area is labeled “Freeriding” in the figure, since it reflects precisely the amount of resources withheld from the alliance when its integrity was ensured.

\textsuperscript{27} The argument developed here runs parallel to the logic articulated in Metternich et al. (forthcoming), which posits that freeriding between agents is inversely related to their social proximity, or that incentives to freeride are stronger among groups with similar social ties.\textsuperscript{28} This result assumes that the impediments to the ‘first mover’ problem have been overcome.
The essential, if unexpected, consequence of embedding a security dilemma with the alliance is a coalition that is better equipped to wage war. This, in turn, produces the following result:

**Theorem 1: The Alliance Paradox.** If $\theta > 0$, then $\frac{Q_A}{(Q_A + q_B^*)} > \frac{\hat{q}_A}{(\hat{q}_A + \hat{q}_B)}$. **Alliance friction—in the form of uncertainty—always improves the likelihood the alliance will prevail in the conflict.**

Theorem 1 is a direct response to Lichbach’s (1998) longstanding question regarding increasing competition between dissent organizations. The potential for intraparty fighting generates an alliance with more resources dedicated to joint defense than alliances where fractionalization is a negligible contingency. Consequently, the

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$^{29}$ Proof of this claim comes from a direct comparison of the ratio of defense contributions under the two equilibria, combined with the conditions: $w_i < 1$, and $0 < \theta < 1$. 

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probability of victory increases. The implications of this result for civil conflict are discussed in the following subsection.

The general structure of the model permits a more detailed investigation into collective burden sharing within the alliance. Notably, it allows for the quantification of freeriding. As indicated, a “surplus” in fighting capacity, vis-à-vis the baseline model, results from intra-alliance competition. As demonstrated, the introduction of intra-coalition uncertainty serves as a motivating factor, prompting more, and not less, defense spending when all players are of equal strength. However, this monotonically increasing relationship between $\theta$ and $q_i^*$ need not always obtain. In fact, it is possible to generalize the relationship depicted in figure 1 for all values of initial resource endowments. That is, we can capture fully the shaded area corresponding to freeriding.

The freeriding function for member $i$ within alliance $A$ is defined as follows:

(18) \[ F_A^i(w, w_i; \theta) = q_i^* - \hat{q}_i. \]

Equation (18) is the simple difference between group $i$’s defense contributions to the alliance in the presence and absence of alliance stability. Or as has been described, with and without a security dilemma. When $F_A^i$ is greater than zero, faction $i$ is said to have been freeriding in the baseline model—spending relatively less than it does in the presence of intra-alliance competition.

The freeriding function, $F_A^i$, permits the novel examination of a hypothetical counterfactual. What would member $i$ have offered to the alliance with complete confidence in member $j$’s commitment? That is to ask: how would member $i$ behave in the absence of the internal security dilemma? The illustration offered in figure 1 suggests
that the answer is usually by offering less to the alliance—the $q^*_i$ curve remains consistently above the baseline equilibrium value. However, the impact of increased tension within an alliance is not unambiguously positive in individual contributions. That is, $q^*_i$ is not strictly increasing in $\theta$. Although the total alliance defense contribution is always greater in the presence of a security dilemma ($Q^*_A > \hat{Q}_A$), one player may actually invest less, not more, in the face of intra-party competition. This novel result is called reverse-freeriding (RFR).

**Theorem 2: Reverse Free Riding.** If $w_i > \mathcal{T}$, then there are $(\theta, w)$ combinations for which $\mathcal{F}_A^i < 0$.

In words, Theorem 2 states that if a coalition member $i$ is ‘sufficiently strong,’ then various combinations of $\theta$ and $w$ make reverse-freeriding the payoff improving strategy for this player. More specifically, in the face of various degrees of uncertainty and opponent strength, this actor will contribute less—not more—to the alliance than in the baseline case. This produces the somewhat counterintuitive result whereby the security dilemma within an alliance prompts one of the allied parties to lower defense preparations. A corollary to this result is that such sufficiency of strength for any member implies their coalition partner is always weaker from an initial endowment perspective.

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30 ‘Sufficiently strong’ is defined in terms of $w$ and $\theta$ as: $w_i > \frac{(w+1)(2w-1)/w-(2K-1)(K+1)/K}{(1-\theta)(K+1)(2-K)/K-(w+1)(2-w)/w}$, such that $K = w - w\theta + \theta$. We define $\mathcal{T} \equiv \min \left[ \frac{(w+1)(2w-1)/w-(2K-1)(K+1)/K}{(1-\theta)(K+1)(2-K)/K-(w+1)(2-w)/w} \right]$ for $0 < \theta < 1$ and $2/9 < w < 5/9$, which can be numerically shown to be approximately 0.45.
**Corollary 2: Reverse exploitation.** $w_i > F \Rightarrow w_j < w_i$. If group $i$ in alliance $A$ is strong enough to reverse-freeride then group $j$ is always smaller than group $i$.

Corollary 2 helps clarify the relative relationship between allied groups when theorem 2 obtains. A sufficiency of strength to encourage group $i$ to reverse-freeride implies precisely the opposite from group $j$. In the presence of intra-party competition, the stronger member actually takes advantage of its weaker partner by contributing less to joint defense than in the baseline scenario. Recall that a key difference between the intra-alliance competition model and the baseline model is that $Q_A^* > \hat{Q}_A$. The implication of this result and Corollary 2 is that the smaller partner in the alliance must bear the entire brunt of joint increases to the alliance. Moreover, the RFR result runs counter to the longstanding *exploitation hypothesis*, initially formalized by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), whereby larger alliance members bear a disproportionate share of alliance burdens. In the case described by Theorem 2 and its corollary, an internal security dilemma favors the strong because they are, *ex-ante*, more prepared for the ‘every man for himself’ state of affairs.\(^{31}\) The result is a reduction in coalition contributions by the endowment-rich player for various ranges of $\theta$. The intuition behind corollary 2 is that it is the smaller and thereby weaker members of any alliance that stand to suffer the worst outcomes from sudden alliance collapse. Sufficiently larger allies can thus take advantage of this vulnerability afflicting their smaller coalition partners by cutting back in shared

defense. Should the alliance rupture, the stronger member—on account of being stronger *ex ante*—is hardly worse off for the turn of events.

The dynamic aspect of the RFR outcome is easily illustrated in figure 2, depicting $q_i^*$ for $w_i = .46$ and $w = \frac{1}{4}$. The horizontal line marks equilibrium contributions when $\theta = 0$, such that all $q_i^*$ values below it indicate RFR, and those above it are indicative of freeriding. Alliance contributions for member $i$ decrease for values of $\theta$ from 0 until roughly 0.23. Moreover, for all values of $\theta$ up to well over $\frac{1}{2}$, player $i$ reduces alliance contributions below those allocated in the baseline case. It is not until the shadow of intra-alliance rivalry is significantly large that the dominant player is prompted to increase defense expenditures and abandon the RFR strategy.

![Figure 2: Freeriding and reverse freeriding in $\theta$](image)

Figure 2: Freeriding and reverse freeriding in $\theta$
The greater are the initial endowments of an alliance member, the more likely RFR is to be a utility promoting strategy. Put another way, the RFR region is strictly increasing in $w_i$. Figure 3 depicts four iso-curves for which player $i$ is just indifferent between freeriding and reverse-freeriding, given various endowments: $w_i = 17/36$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $19/36$, and $5/9$. The horizontal axis is $\theta$ and the vertical axis is $w$. Above and to the right of each curve, $F_A^i > 0$—meaning RFR is not the optimal strategy. Below and to the left of each curve $F_A^i < 0$—implying RFR takes place in equilibrium. As both $\theta$ and $w$ increase, the RFR space clearly shrinks, meaning stronger nonaligned players (in this case, the government) and higher degrees of intra-alliance uncertainty reduce the incentive to reverse-freeride. Also evident in the figure is that there is a smaller and smaller region of RFR as $w_i$ decreases to the limiting value of $F$. The more initial endowments favor a player, the more likely is that player to reverse-freeride within an alliance.
The final issue to highlight from the equilibrium results is perhaps the most interesting from a theoretical perspective. Insecurity and uncertainty regarding alliance commitments has been shown to generate coalitions with more resources dedicated for conflictual purposes. A particular, if unexpected, consequence is a higher likelihood that the alliance will prevail in conflict. However, the desirability of seeking out such tenuous arrangements remains an open issue. Unintended benefits may accrue from “brittle” coalitions, but do parties possess any incentive to seek them out? This is essentially to wonder if antagonistic parties and groups historically opposed to one another may not find it mutually beneficial to comingle, not in spite of their mistrust but because of it. This inquiry leads to one of the most unexpected results attributable to intra-party conflict. Allied parties may be better off from willingly subjecting themselves to the hazards of competitive coalitions.
The following example offers an illustration of precisely this dynamic at work. When all players are of equal relative strength \((w = w_i = 1/3)\), each alliance member considerably raises its respective payoff above the baseline level, even when the internal security dilemma is at fairly protracted levels. Figure 4 depicts graphically the utility of alliance member \(i\) for all values of \(\theta\). Once more, the horizontal line reflects the payoff in the baseline case \((\theta = 0)\). For all values of \(\theta < \frac{1}{2}\), player \(i\) strictly prefers an alliance whose stability is not certain. Only when the threat of intra-alliance collapse is particularly severe (greater than .5) does a shift in strategy take place. Alternatively put, it is utility promoting for factions to join coalitions they understand to be inherently unstable ex-ante. There is an explicit and unequal tradeoff between the direct loss of utility when any alliance member (in response to internal competition) raises defense expenditures \((q_i)\), and an indirect gain in utility, which is the result of an increase in the likelihood of victory (produced by the same rise in alliance contributions). The result is a direct consequence of overcoming the freeriding problem associated with usual defense sharing arrangements. This counterintuitive outcome is in many ways a companion insight to Bruce’s (1990) result that cooperative treaties to increase defense spending in alliances may actually make them worse off.
This example makes evident that there are circumstances under which the security dilemma may be leveraged to the advantage of the alliance. The permissive conditions generating this type of outcome are rather pervasive.

**Theorem 4: Existence claim.** For all $\frac{2}{9} \leq w_i \leq \frac{5}{9}$, $\exists (\theta, w)$ combinations such that $U_A(w_i, w_1; \theta) > U_A(w_i, w; \theta \equiv 0)$.

Theorem 4 is an existence claim, postulating that for all values of $w_i$ (in the specified range) there is certain to be a neighborhood of $(\theta, w)$ combinations that makes a coalition between rivals preferable to one among friends.³² Alternatively stated, there are certain conditions when allied factions prefer non-zero values of $\theta$. However, while existence of these equilibria is straightforward to show, such equilibria are sometimes

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³² The term *friends* is employed loosely, only to mean members of a coalition who will not willingly back out of the alliance arrangement once committed. Freeriding, as shown above, is of course a different issue.
highly subject to perturbations. While $U_A$ is approximately quadratic in $\theta$, it also contains a small non-polynomial term. Practically, this means small shifts in either $w$ or $\theta$ can sometimes alter drastically the desirability of entering into tenuous alliances. That is, the inequality is easily reversed. This is reflective of the high risk associated with this strategy. Any group entertaining the prospect of joining forces with an adversary faces a genuine strategic dilemma. While there are certain to be neighborhoods of $w$ and $\theta$ for which such an alliance makes sense, the neighborhoods may be precariously small.

Notwithstanding these computational complications, the “existence claim” is an important contribution to the understanding of coalition formation. It offers a utility-based explanation for seemingly irrational behavior. Groups may have considerably more to gain by joining alliances they know may fall apart. That is, there may be good reason for groups to flirt with or court enemy alliances rather than friends. Viewed from another perspective, this result offers insight as to how parties, groups and other allying entities may find common cause with their rivals or ideological adversaries. Under certain circumstances, members have more to gain by reaching out to opponents than to friends. Thus intra-party rivalry, in spite of obvious dangers, is not without its upside.

These adversarial interactions also have consequences for the government. Recall that in the baseline model, it was the government that unequivocally enjoyed a payoff advantage over the aligned parties, irrespective of the initial distribution of resources in the system. This is no longer the case. In fact the government is unambiguously worse off by the introduction of a security dilemma within the alliance it faces:

**Corollary 1:** If $\theta > 0$, then $U_G(w; \theta) < U_G(w; \theta \equiv 0)$.  

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Corollary 1 states that in the presence of alliance instability, the government utility is always lower. The baseline utility for the government is always preferable to a circumstance where it faces an alliance marked by internal rivalry. Stated differently, governments prefer situations of certainty. The logic driving this outcome is straightforward: In equilibrium, intra-party competition prompts the government to shift more resources to defensive efforts because its opponents are jointly increasing their fighting capabilities as well. The net effect is always payoff degrading for the government—the implication being that friction in a coalition does not necessarily translate to improved outcomes for the government. Indeed, states, governments and other groups may have cause for concern (not encouragement) precisely when rivalries threaten the unity of opposition alliances.

2.6 Empirical Implications

Although the model is intentionally general in design – the scope of which is aimed at informing alliance theory more broadly – it is not without implications for internal conflicts. The most important implications of the model relate to the collective action problem and, relatedly, conflict outcomes. Secondary inferences of the model deal with war relapse and levels conflict violence. Each are disused in turn.

The first, and most basic, insight to emerge from the modeling exercise is that military alliances differ in their capacity to deal with the problem of collective action.

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33 Proof of this corollary again follows directly from a simplification of the inequality and the assumption that $\theta > 0$. 

Freeriding is the optimal course of action under most alliance arrangements. Indeed, as the baseline model shows, it is precisely confidence in an ally’s commitment that induces freeriding behavior. In the absence of a punishment mechanism, shirking and sheltering by at least one party are to be expected. However, when alliance obligations cannot be taken for granted, the results can change dramatically. Counter-intuitively, a certain degree of mistrust between allied groups imposes its own form of resolution to the intra-alliance freeriding problem. Uncertainty serves as its own punishment mechanism, by confronting allies with the potential negative consequences of freeriding. This prompts a direct increase in coalition contributions. The general result is to leave the alliance in better stead vis-à-vis its common external threat and to make each member within it more prepared to go it alone, if need be.

This peculiar twist to alliance dynamics is not without its own implications related to civil wars and how they end. The literature on civil wars generally assumes that once wars begin, they either end in a military victory (by either the government or rebels), or they may end in some form of negotiated settlement. Short of one of these more discrete outcomes, conflicts may be punctuated by truces and temporary ceasefires, or languish on at low levels of violence in a quasi-stalemate. However, understanding the strategic interactions underlying conflict onset is essential for determining how conflicts are likely to proceed and eventually end. Moreover, the most important strategic concern to parties in civil conflicts is their estimate of the probability they will achieve victory (Mason and Fett, 1996). Parties have little incentive to back down or seek negotiated settlements if their chances of prevailing militarily are high (Mason et al, 1999).
With straightforward logic, the model presented here speaks directly to these considerations. Internal competition within coalitions produces alliances with relatively more resources dedicated for external conflict. The balance of military capability is a straightforward determinant of the probability of victory. All else equal, an increase to joint alliance fighting capabilities will raise the chances the alliance will prevail militarily against the government. As internal competition induces such increases, it thereby becomes an unlikely mechanism for promoting military success.\(^\text{34}\)

**Hypothesis 1:** Civil wars characterized by competitive alliances among rebel groups are more likely to end in rebel victories.

This analysis also gives rise to a key second-order expectation related to the “conflict trap” (Collier et al., 2003). Specifically, competitive coalitions may also affect the recurrence of wars or residual violence. Internal rivalry or competition is an obvious source of exploitation in civil war. As alluded to in the introductory section, groups do not share identical preferences and therefore do not jointly maximize the payoffs and benefits associated with the alliance. Completely harmonious relations among dissident factions are unlikely. Violence and the high stakes involved in act of rebellion naturally imbue groups with mistrust. The model abstracted such internal distrust by introducing the \(\theta\)-parameter within coalitions, and allowed that parties may appreciate higher or

\(^{\text{34}}\)‘Foes fight tougher together’ is a domestic level variation to the ‘democracies fight harder’ aphorism at the international level (e.g., Reiter and Stam, 1998).
lower levels of $\theta$. While there was an unanticipated upside to uncertainty and mistrust between allies, there is also an attending downside.

While internal rivalries may play a profound part in coalition successes, they may do so only at a significant cost. There is an unambiguous tradeoff between alliance strength and alliance stability. By definition, coalition disintegration is also more likely to ensue when uncertainty prevails. Highly contentious alliances may be more likely to prevail, but they are also more likely to fall apart. The analysis points to a delicate balance between collective capability and cohesion in the presence of an internal security dilemma. Fear of exploitation paradoxically engenders both success and instability. The anticipation of victory may even precipitate potential alliance collapse. This process – Finer’s (1975) “vice of origin” – may help explain the recurrence of internal conflicts. Coalitions of rivals, while formidable against common threats, may find it difficult or impossible to avoid struggles amongst themselves.

The potential to abuse and seize advantages wherever they exist is never fully eclipsed under the varied outcomes of civil war. Defection is always among the menu of options within an alliance marked by at least a minimal degree of internal discord. The more protracted are the differences within any alliance, the more unstable is the overall conflict. Internal rivalry and fear of reprisal in civil conflicts tend to raise the stakes considerably. If competition within a coalition is sufficiently high, dual sovereignty (Tilly, 1978) may arise within it. Inasmuch as freeriding is dissuaded among groups within competitive alliances, it may also increase and preserve the potentiality for these factions to renew conflict as the conditions of the war evolve. Internal divisions will also
exacerbate commitment problems (Fearon, 1995) between disaffected allies. This leads to the result that rival factions may engender highly effective coalitions in civil conflicts, but very often such arrangements, while they may precipitate the end of one war, can generate others.

**Hypothesis 2**: Civil war recurrence is more likely after wars characterized by competitive alliances.

Internal rivalries among coalition groups are an obvious source of war relapse. However, the results of conflict and the various ways they may end—truces, victories, and stalemates—will also interact with incentives to exploit opponents and allies. This acknowledgment inevitably brings up the relationship between war outcomes and war renewal. To extend and clarify hypothesis 2, it is useful to interact it with the generally accepted wisdom regarding military outcomes civil war recurrence.

As previously cited, the Wagner (1993) hypothesis posits that military victories are less likely to facilitate new wars than are negotiated settlements. And a refinement to this theory argues that rebel victories, in particular, are least likely to produce violent encores. And the literature on settlements highlights the importance of the environments in which parties interact. But when an alliance environment is hostile, commitment and defection problems may transcend each party’s capacity for consigning to peace. Even in victory, defeat of the enemy does not in and of itself ameliorate the malignity and sometimes dissilience characterizing the allies’ internal relationship. Quite the contrary, triumph over a common foe is more likely to exacerbate problems held in abeyance.
during original conflicts. These submerged differences are now able to resurface with a vengeance, even, and especially, if dissidents win. While the model suggests that competitive factions may leverage the security dilemma to their initial success, they may not ultimately escape it. Paradoxically, factions may not expect to prevail alone, but they may be unable to rule together. The idea is not so much a continuation of conflict but a transformation, based on the internal dimensions of the fighting coalition. Were the postwar outcomes highly stable in the aftermath of a military victory, internal alliance divisions should render them highly unstaid. Table 3 characterizes the expected outcomes.

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<tr>
<td>No Competitive Alliance</td>
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<td>Less New War</td>
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<td>Competitive Alliance</td>
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Table 3: Predicted post-conflict outcomes
3. Research Design and Data

The aim of this chapter of the dissertation is to present and investigate an understanding of civil war processes and transformation that highlights the importance of alliances and internal competition as motivated by the model. It does so via a series of quantitative tests using a newly collected dataset on alliances in civil wars. However, case selection is an important factor for any quantitative effort attempting to gain insight into a process as complicated as war. The growing interest in internal conflicts has spawned numerous datasets on civil wars covering the post World War II era—e.g., Correlates of War (COW), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Licklider (1995), Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006), Uppsala/PRIO, Regan (1996). There is, however, a high degree of variation between them. For example, Lockhart (2012) notes that the COW and the Doyle and Sambanis (2006) datasets jointly contain only 43 cases with matching start and end dates. Moreover, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) include 33 additional cases of war not in the COW database. Certainly, each dataset contains important information; but some are more appropriate than others for addressing the issues outlined here.

For the purposes of case identification, this study employs the Doyle and Sambanis (2000) database on peacekeeping and civil wars, with appropriate updates from the 2006 version and elsewhere (subsequently referred to as D&S). The original dataset includes 124 events of civil war occurring from 1944 to 2000, defined in accordance with the following criteria: a) the war has caused more than one thousand battle deaths; b) the war represented a challenge to the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; c) the war occurred within the recognized boundary of that state; d) the war involved the
state as one of the principal combatants; e) the rebels were able to mount an organized military opposition to the state and to inflict significant casualties on the state. The modified dataset employed here contains 125 episodes of war covering the same time period. However, wars that were ongoing in 2000 and ended in the next decade were updated accordingly. The data were also changed to reflect instances where the authors revised their original coding because they deemed it to be wrong, based on further research.¹

This database was selected for various reasons. First, its creators partially relax the arbitrary 1,000 annual deaths threshold commonly employed in the COW and Licklider (1995) datasets. The D&S coding scheme does not require that the war cause 1,000 deaths annually, but rather uses the 1,000 deaths threshold for the entire war as long as the war caused 1,000 deaths in any single year. Doyle and Sambanis note that in fact most of the conflicts identified in their database have caused 1,000 or more deaths annually, but they are able to include various episodes that do not, provided the overall amount of violence and nature of that violence warrant such inclusion. Such flexibility is useful where various episodes may not meet strict criteria. Second, while the D&S definition of civil war is also similar to the one employed in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the latter relaxes the minimum death threshold all the way to 25. That is, UCDP/PRIO data includes all conflicts where only 25 battle-related deaths occurred per year, per dyad. Given the discussion of alliance formation presented here, this

¹ A codebook describing the alliance data (according to each conflict episode) appears in the appendix.
threshold is deemed too low to accurately distinguish alliance dynamics in conflict settings from low-level skirmishes lacking the characteristics of larger conflicts.

Third, while the revised (2006) dataset is somewhat more comprehensive than the original (2000) version, the latter is better suited for the purposes of these analyses. Because the focus of the D&S (2000) database is peacekeeping and peace building efforts, it includes important variables on war recurrence for 2, 5 and 10 years after the end of each conflict episode, as well as the recurrence of low-level residual violence up to 2 and 5 years after a conflict. In fact, the war recurrence and residual violence variables form two of the three crucial components to the original (2000) dependent variable on peace building. Some of these variables are dropped from the 2006 version. Additionally, as the original data emphasize peacekeeping processes, they therefore include more short-lived cease-fires and are more sensitive to government turn over. The new version combines episodes of fighting in stop and start war into single cases. In examining coalition dynamics, such stop and start distinctions are important, as they allow for alliances to shift in response to any changes in power. And finally, the Doyle and Sambanis dataset contains a fairly descriptive and comprehensive codebook outlining each episode of conflict, the sources for the coding decisions in each conflict, as well distinctions between their coding and other datasets. For these reasons, the D&S (2000) dataset is best suited to test the implications of the theory drawn upon here.

2 Fortina (2008) makes precisely the same points about the two versions of the D&S data in her codebook.
In addition to the theoretical insights generated by the formal model, the effort of collecting new data on civil war alliances is also motivated by a general assessment that episode specific information is sorely needed to advance the study of civil war. While quantitative studies of civil wars have blossomed in the past 15 years, so many of them focus on aggregate national assessments – such as economic development, regime type, political institutions, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, natural resources, terrain, etc. (e.g., Collier and Hoffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). A focus on national-level attributes, however, conveniently leaves unaddressed much of the strategic interaction often at play in conflict settings. Consequently, efforts have been made to move beyond the aggregate cross-country approach by identifying more episode specific considerations – such as the relative balance of military capacities between rebels and governments (Cunningham et al., 2009). The new information on alliances brought to bear here is very much in line with this new approach. Each alliance identified in the dataset is uniquely associated with an episode of conflict, not necessarily with a specific country. Moreover, the approach taken here moves beyond consideration of the existence of multiple rebel-government dyads in a single civil war.

3.1 New Data and Coding the Independent Variable

In examining the propositions outlined above, this study brings to bear new information about alliances during civil wars. More specifically, it identifies not only instances of military alliances during the internal conflicts identified in Doyle and Sambanis (2000), but varying degrees of internal rivalry within each coalition. The process of gathering the information and constructing the dataset was threefold. An initial
task involved identifying the multiple actors and parties involved in each dispute. Although the D&S dataset includes a variable listing the number of factions relevant to each conflict, it does not identify or specifically list the parties pertaining to this variable. For this reason, every case in the data was cross-referenced with data from Cunningham (2006). The Cunningham dataset has the advantage of identifying and explicitly listing the multiple “veto players”—both internal and external—involved in each war. In this manner, a detailed list of actors for each case was compiled as a useful point of departure for identifying potential coalitions. This list was also double checked against other sources on civil war: PRIO/Uppsala, Fearon and Laitin (2005) “Random Narratives,” and Toft (2010).

The second task involved identifying alliances pertinent to each conflict episode. The following coding rules were employed to classify such coalitions. First, an alliance was coded for a particular war episode if there was a formal declaration of joint support between two or more groups. Because many civil war alliances lack such overt and official sanctioning, further identification mechanisms were required. Second, an alliance was coded if there was documented evidence of resource sharing between groups. And third, in the absence of either of the first two criteria, an alliance was coded if there was evidence that two or more factions “simultaneously engaged” the same enemy. It is important to clarify that the “simultaneous engagement” rule does not pertain to separate movements fighting the same government in differing regions (often over distinct issues). To qualify as an alliance under this rule, the factions involved had to engage in fighting at the same time and same place against the same third party (government). And finally, the
coding effort is sensitive to the timing of coalition formation and conflict episodes. The alliance had to be in meaningful existence sometime within the precise timeframe of each conflict episode, as specified in Doyle and Sambanis (2000). This means that the alliances are not merely country-specific indicators.

An important theoretical aspect of the model deals with internal alliance divisions. Pertaining to this insight, a distinction regarding internal competition within an alliance must be made. Accordingly, at least one of the two following criteria had to be satisfied in order for a coalition to be characterized as “competitive.” If the allied groups fought one another either before or during their alliance, internal competition was coded for that alliance. This infighting is strictly limited to episodes occurring before the end date of the civil war, as identified by Doyle and Sambanis. Imposing this requirement helps to avoid endogeneity problems, whereby poor war outcomes may presumably lead to internal tensions. And finally, if factions were known adversaries for ideological or other contentious reasons, they were also listed as competitive arrangements. Additionally, if either the alliance or the competitive nature of that alliance is what may be considered a borderline case, it is labeled ambiguous and dropped in a second set of analysis. By these coding rules, the study identifies 52 instances of alliances, 37 of which are marked by some degree of competition. When ambiguous cases are dropped, the total number of alliances falls to 37, of which 26 are characterized as competitive.3

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3 The few instances where more than a single alliance is observed for a particular conflict are treated identical to the other alliance episodes. Accounting for multiple alliances may enrich the analysis in some ways. Importantly, there are no instances of both competitive and non-competitive coalitions identified in any single conflict episode.
It is important to point out that alliance rivalry or competition is never coded on the sole basis of ethnic differences between allies. Moreover, the theory informing this coding schema should not be misconstrued as a theory of group fractionalization. The splintering of rebel groups, which is not uncommon in civil conflict, does not constitute or necessarily reflect a competitive alliance. Indeed, there need not be an alliance present for a dissident organization to fracture or break into numerous entities. Alliances may certainly form these entities; but fractionalization itself is not a sufficient condition to identify tenuous coalitions. The coding enterprise, therefore, went to great lengths to treat as separate and distinct group fractionalization from divisions within meaningful alliances.  

While the theory implies internal competition should be a useful way to classify alliance arrangements, it is agnostic as to how to represent the degree of competition present in any given coalition. For this reason, the study treats alliances and internal competition in two ways, categorical and ordinal, utilizing the latter as a robustness check. The former allows for three categories of rebel forces: 1) unified forces not involving any alliances; 2) alliances marked by little or no internal rivalry, and 3) competitive alliances characterized by marked internal competition. These categories are operationalized in the following fashion. The variable \( \text{competitive ally} = 1 \) if a coalition was characterized by internal rivalry according to the criteria set out above, and is otherwise set to 0. The \( \text{competitive ally} \) covariate is thus a dummy variable reflecting the

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4 As mentioned previously, the literature on fractionalization in civil war is a growing enterprise. For a current take on this debate, see Bakke et al. (2012) and Christia (2012).
most contentious coalitions (when equal to 1). The next category, ally, is a proxy for alliances not marked by internal rivalry and competition. The variable ally = 1 for any alliance not identified as competitive and 0 otherwise. The omitted category in this coding arrangement is no ally.5

Classifying alliance constellations in this manner has its advantages and disadvantages. This arrangement conveniently avoids problems of collinearity that would arise by coding all alliances—competitive or otherwise—on the basis of a single indicator and then adding a second (collinear) indicator to distinguish between competitive and non-competitive alliances. Additionally, the categorical coding does not impose a linear interpretation on the competitive nature of alliances. However, the theory outlined above may equally imply an ordered (but not necessarily linear) effect to alliance competition. An alternative coding mechanism, therefore, treats competition within coalition arrangements in an ordinal manner. The alliance variable is coded as 1, 2, or 3 according to the following design: alliance = 1 if there is no alliance for the war episode; alliance = 2 if there is an alliance not marked by competition; and alliance = 3 if there is a competitive alliance during a given conflict. The defining criteria for both alliances and competitive alliances are identical to those noted above. However, because this

5 Any alliance not classified as “competitive” is automatically placed into the ally category. The variable no ally = 1 if no alliance is coded for a particular episode of conflict and it is set to 0 otherwise.
arrangement is strictly linear in construction, it is transformed slightly by taking the natural log of the variable.⁶

### 3.2 The Dependent Variables (Outcomes)

D&S (2000) characterize four distinct outcomes for any given war: victory by the government; victory by the rebels; formal settlement; and informal truce / ceasefire. They also identify wars that were ongoing as of 2000. After updating conflicts that ended since 2000, the analysis conducted here combines ongoing conflicts and those originally coded as informal ceasefires into a single category reflecting ongoing / low-level violence. This modification is necessary for two primary reasons. First, there are too few instances of informal ceasefires (14) and ongoing conflicts (8) in the dataset to generate meaningful statistical results by treating them as unique categories in multinomial regressions. Second, the distinction between informal ceasefires and ongoing conflict is at times highly arbitrary, especially when the ceasefires lack official sanctioning. For this very reason, other studies of war outcomes similarly utilize a separate category reflecting low levels of violence (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2009).⁷ By this coding schema, the distribution of the dependent variable (outcome) is as follows:

---

⁶ Because the alliance variable takes on only three values, the impact of taking the natural log is not large. Consequently, there is little to no substantive change to any of the analytical results when the variable is not logged.

⁷ As pointed out by Cunningham et al. (2009), there is obviously some ambiguity as to what precisely constitutes an outcome consistent with “low activity / ongoing.” The analyses were therefore conducted separately without making this distinction. There is little change to the meaningful results regarding rebel victory, government victory or negotiated settlements.
Table 4: Distribution of conflict outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated Settlement</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Victory</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Victory</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Level / Ongoing</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 The Dependent Variables (Conflict Recurrence)

Doyle and Sambanis code instances of war recurrence separately for 2-years, 5-years, and 10-years after the end of any conflict. More accurately, they code “no war recurrence” up to 2, 5 and 10 years after the end of the first war in any state. So their coding scheme has been reversed here, such that positive coefficients will be associated with war recurrence. Because their data originally ended in 2000, there are some missing data for the 5 and 10-year indicators. Where information was available, these variables have been updated. If there was uncertainty over levels of violence constituting continuing war, a case was left unchanged from the original coding. (Doyle and Sambanis also code a similar variable for residual violence 2, 5 and 10 years after a war.)

This study employs the 5-year and 10-year war recurrence indicators as dependent variables. By limiting episodes of war recurrence to no longer than a decade, the approach here is distinct from other work on war recurrence that may include any and all subsequent war as equal instances of civil war returning to a given country (e.g., Quinn et al., 2007). Furthermore, by the coding offered in Doyle and Sambanis (2000), repeated wars within such a comparatively limited timeframe are related to the previous conflict. The war recurrence variable, it should be emphasized, was used as an implement for
assessing peacekeeping efforts in the original conflict. This makes it an excellent tool for testing the theory presented here and examining conflict transformation. The 5-year variable contains 40 instances of war recurrence, meaning the unconditional probability of war recurrence within five years is just shy of one third. The 10-year variable indicates that 43 of the conflicts renewed up to 10 years after their original end, or an unconditional recurrence probability of nearly 35 percent.  

3.4 Control Variables

To the theoretical insight developed here, may be raised the reasonable objection that political environments that cause social and organizational fragmentation should impact war outcomes and may also lead to war recurrence. There is undoubtedly a kernel of truth to this claim. Environments rife with social, political and economic grievances are also where one may expect to observe internecine coalition rivalries. To avoid omitted variable bias, it is therefore imperative to control for weak state structures, potential class cleavages, meddling international actors, and other socio-political factors. Therefore, control variables include external intervention by 3rd parties, an ordinal measure of UN involvement ranging from least intrusive (0) to most intrusive (4), and

---

8 Incomplete data drops the total number of wars in the 10-year set to 123.
9 The UN covariate is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and defined as follows: 0 = No external intervention of any kind; 1 = Mediation of the dispute, including submissions of proposals on how to end the fighting and promote reconciliation; 2 = Deployment of neutral military and/or civilian observers; 3 = Traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping (military and civilian personnel); 4 = Peace enforcement, either multilateral through the United Nations or by a third party or coalition of parties, acting under a multilateral, UN-sanctioned mandate.
military participation by *major* powers.\textsuperscript{10} To control for levels of democracy in the recurrence models, the *Polity 2* index is employed.\textsuperscript{11} Also employed are measures of *illiteracy* and *life expectancy*, along with an *ethnic heterogeneity* index and a *Gini* index of *inequality*.\textsuperscript{12} A proxy for wars taking place during the *Cold War* is also used in the tests of war outcomes. Not shown here—but included in robustness checks—are controls for economic development, population size and region-specific dummy variables. Specifically, the latter includes: *Africa, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and Asia*.

To address the cost and intensity of conflicts, the models use a per capita measure encompassing total deaths and displacement produced by the war (*Cost per capita*). And to account for potential time dependence of the outcomes, an additional covariate capturing the log of *duration* (in months) of each conflict is added. Also in tests for war recurrence are covariates reflecting the nature of the *outcome* of a conflict. This includes truces, military outcomes and rebel victories. As many of the covariates listed here are collinear, they are not all folded into the same model simultaneously.

Conflict dynamics among and between rebel groups are not independent of each group’s capacity to face off against governments, and by implication, one another. While

\textsuperscript{10} The variable *major* measures direct major power military participation or extensive political support for one or more of the parties to the conflict. Major powers are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. If a major power participates in a UN peace operation, this is not coded as a major power involvement. Given the argument laid out, it could matter if major power participation is coordinated with alliances or works against them. The latter may aggravate intra-alliance dynamics (e.g. Spain 1936-1939). While this information is not currently available, it is an obvious follow-on project to the work presented here.

\textsuperscript{11} Polity scores are lagged two years after the end of each conflict.

\textsuperscript{12} Unless otherwise noted, the source for all control variables is Doyle and Sambanis (2000). The *ethnic heterogeneity* index ranges from 0 (minimum heterogeneity) to 144 (maximum heterogeneity). *Illiteracy* rates are listed as the percent of illiteracy in the adult population.
rebel strength is an obvious influence on conflict outcomes, it also is a prospective factor in determining if a rebelling faction will form an alliance, making it a critical control variable for this study. To account for this characteristic, a control for the fighting capacity of rebels, vis-à-vis the government, is employed. This rebel-specific indicator, taken from the non-state actor dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2012), is an ordinal measure of military strength relative to the government. Because this variable is originally coded in a dyadic fashion (between governments and specific rebel groups), each rebel group was matched to specific conflict episodes in the Doyle and Sambanis dataset. Similar to Cunningham et al. 2009, the variable (rebels strength) rates the relative strength of the rebels as either “strong” (3), “at parity” (2), or “weak” (1), in terms of their ability to wage conflict.13 If more than a single rebel group was identified within a specific conflict episode, the final coding reflects the highest rating any one of the groups received.

The analysis here also includes two distinct and equally crude measures of war type or conflict motive. The first, taken directly from Doyle and Sambanis (2000), distinguishes “ethnic / religious / identity” conflict (1) from “ideological / revolutionary / other” war (0). Because this identity classification does not differentiate wars fought over autonomy and separatist aims from those targeted specifically at control of the state apparatus, a new indicator of war type sensitive to distinctions in rebel demands is included for this purpose (1 = state war, 0 = autonomy / self-determination). This distinction is in line with what Fearon and Laitin (2007) describe as ‘center seeking’

13 There was a surprising degree of overlap between the two datasets. There were only 13 missing values, which the author was able to estimate upon reviewing each episode specifically.
versus ‘autonomy seeking’ conflicts.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{3.5 Models \& Results}

The series of models below primarily address two distinct questions: do conflictual alliances make rebel victories more likely, and do such alliances also raise the likelihood of civil war recurrence? The first deals with how civil wars end; the second, with the process of their renewal. Given the nature and coding of the dependent variables under consideration, the essay employs both multinomial and binomial logistical analyses, as well as simulations, to address these issues. The principal explanatory variables are the alliance covariates. The theoretical expectations are that both the competitive-ally and alliance variables will be positively associated with rebel victory (and negatively associated with government victory), and that these same covariates will also help predict civil war recurrence.

\textbf{3.5.1 Civil War Outcomes}

The multi-categorical nature of the war outcomes variable requires a multinomial logit estimator. These models utilize a pairwise comparison between a baseline or reference outcome and the other possible outcomes. More specifically, coefficients in multivariate logit models reflect the impact of their respective covariates on the log odds of a given outcome against the baseline category. This implies that all outcomes should

\textsuperscript{14} Certainly some wars exhibit characteristics of both. For instance, what begins as a push for autonomy or separation from the central government evolves into complete state takeover (e.g., Ethiopia 1974-1991). Because the two war type covariates are highly correlated (0.49), they are not simultaneously employed in the same model. Such high degrees of correlation reflect just how crude such distinctions are. Licklider (1995) expresses similar reservations about the inelegance of these measures.
be interpreted relative to the comparison outcome, not as marginal impacts. While other studies of civil war outcomes often and quite arbitrarily use “ongoing conflict” or “low levels of violence” as the baseline category, the models presented here use government victory as the reference outcome. They do so for precise reasons. The model informing the hypothesis being tested specifically examines the strategic interaction between rebelling militant groups and governments. It is specific in its prediction. When internal competition engenders stronger coalitions, it is their opponents who stand to lose the most—in this case, the governments. Thus the pairwise comparison of primary interest is rebel victory against government victory.

Table 5 displays the results from the multinomial logistical model on the multinomial variable “outcome.” Positive coefficients are associated with increases to the log likelihood of a respective outcome vis-à-vis the baseline outcome (government victory). Robust standard errors, clustered on same-country observations, are in parentheses. This approach allows that episodes of war are independent across countries but not within them. “N/A” indicates a ‘separability’ problem—where too few instances of a given outcome mean there is insufficient variation to produce meaningful results for a particular covariate. The first model in each table captures alliances by using the categorical dummy variables (ally and competitive ally), where no ally is the omitted category; the second model employs the ordinal specification of coalition competition (alliance). Both models have an ‘a’ and ‘b’ version, such that the ‘b’ models replicate the

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15 As there are 70 clusters in the 5-year models, most clusters contain only one observation. Unsurprisingly, the results are only moderately changed when not clustered on country. The variables of significance remain significant, but sometimes at altered levels.
‘a’ models but discard all ambiguous instances of either alliances or internal competition within them.

As the multinomial model’s comparison category is government victory, we are able to more readily assess the validity of the hypothesis relating rebel and government successes in war from Table 5 – specifically, in the middle section of the table (under “Rebel Victory”). But because all coefficients are interpreted against the base category – and do not necessarily reflect estimated marginal impacts of their associated variables – it is also desirable to examine the probability of each outcome for given values of the model’s covariates. This information is presented in Table 8, which also includes how particular changes in each variable influence the mean probabilities of the different civil war outcomes.\(^{16}\)

As the game-theoretical treatment emphasizes factors influencing rebel success, the discussion in this section focuses primarily on the central third of Table 5 under ‘Rebel Victory.’ As indicated in both models 1 and 2, competitiveness within rebel coalitions is in fact victory promoting for rebel groups. In model 1, the competitive ally covariate is significantly associated with improved rebel outcomes. This result holds in both the ‘a’ and ‘b’ version of the model. In fact, when ambiguous cases are dropped (model b), the estimated coefficient increases and the standard error decreases. The ordinal alliance arrangement (models 2a/b) offers a similar conclusion. The positive and statistically significant estimate for the alliance covariate indicates that coalitions do play

\(^{16}\)The calculations in Table 8 are from model 1b. They were computed using the CLARIFY program. See Tomz et al. (2003). The results from model 1a (not shown) are similar.
roles in determining rebel victories. Moreover, competitive alliance arrangements are superior to noncompetitive ones from a victory-promoting standpoint. And since the baseline category is government victory, success for rebels comes directly at the expense of the governments they face.

The impact of competitive alliances on war outcomes is also highly substantive. As much is evident in Table 8 (predicted probabilities). Holding all else constant, a change in competitive alliance status increases the average probability that rebels win by a factor of more than two. It also raises the likelihood of reaching settlements. Moreover, the mean probability of government victory falls precipitously to less than ten percent in the presence of competitive alliances. This is considerably less than the roughly 33 percent unconditional probability of government victory shown in Table 4 (distribution of war outcomes).
Table 5: Multinomial logit estimates of war outcome (baseline = government victory)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Truce/ Ongoing</th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 1b</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-0.776</td>
<td>2.258**</td>
<td>(0.929)</td>
<td>2.774***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive ally</td>
<td>2.517***</td>
<td>3.090***</td>
<td>(0.889)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (ordinal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.882***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War duration</td>
<td>1.073***</td>
<td>0.903***</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>0.879***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per capita</td>
<td>5.383 (3.843)</td>
<td>5.665* (3.298)</td>
<td>6.225 (3.823)</td>
<td>5.958* (3.350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>-0.608</td>
<td>-0.379 (1.198)</td>
<td>-0.292 (1.108)</td>
<td>-0.245 (1.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StateWar</td>
<td>-1.269 (0.891)</td>
<td>-0.869 (0.811)</td>
<td>-0.984 (0.770)</td>
<td>-0.863 (0.813)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-2.622</td>
<td>-2.372*** (0.916)</td>
<td>-2.314** (0.955)</td>
<td>-2.401*** (0.919)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Intervention</td>
<td>1.439***</td>
<td>1.320***</td>
<td>(0.464)</td>
<td>1.280***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-1.564**</td>
<td>-1.482**</td>
<td>(0.702)</td>
<td>-1.405**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.531</td>
<td>-2.417 (1.585)</td>
<td>-2.393 (1.558)</td>
<td>-2.458 (1.556)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Victory</th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 1b</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>0.105 (1.164)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive ally</td>
<td>2.754**</td>
<td>3.206***</td>
<td>(1.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (ordinal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.410***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War duration</td>
<td>0.302 (0.237)</td>
<td>0.344 (0.230)</td>
<td>0.311 (0.226)</td>
<td>0.377* (0.227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per capita</td>
<td>5.537 (3.715)</td>
<td>6.140** (2.970)</td>
<td>5.811 (3.691)</td>
<td>5.994 (3.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>1.504**</td>
<td>1.592***</td>
<td>(0.606)</td>
<td>1.536***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StateWar</td>
<td>0.871 (0.685)</td>
<td>1.113 (0.765)</td>
<td>0.851 (0.692)</td>
<td>1.136 (0.743)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-1.532*</td>
<td>-1.689**</td>
<td>(0.789)</td>
<td>-1.498*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Intervention</td>
<td>-0.044 (0.472)</td>
<td>-0.155 (0.486)</td>
<td>-0.063 (0.476)</td>
<td>-0.128 (0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>0.418 (0.792)</td>
<td>0.536 (0.799)</td>
<td>0.357 (0.796)</td>
<td>0.447 (0.800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.762*** (1.284)</td>
<td>-3.965*** (1.252)</td>
<td>-3.918*** (1.254)</td>
<td>-4.195*** (1.231)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 1b</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>2.388*** (0.853)</td>
<td>3.102*** (0.816)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive ally</td>
<td>2.523**</td>
<td>2.715**</td>
<td>(1.090)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (ordinal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.292***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War duration</td>
<td>0.778***</td>
<td>0.928***</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>0.873***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per capita</td>
<td>7.398**</td>
<td>7.505**</td>
<td>(3.139)</td>
<td>7.486**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>0.427 (0.979)</td>
<td>0.553 (0.970)</td>
<td>0.395 (0.963)</td>
<td>0.486 (0.941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StateWar</td>
<td>0.785 (0.704)</td>
<td>0.868 (0.692)</td>
<td>0.713 (0.670)</td>
<td>0.976 (0.697)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-1.880**</td>
<td>-2.127**</td>
<td>(0.807)</td>
<td>-2.036**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Intervention</td>
<td>0.990***</td>
<td>1.010**</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
<td>1.039**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-0.572 (0.773)</td>
<td>-0.555 (0.771)</td>
<td>-0.552 (0.735)</td>
<td>-0.519 (0.760)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.357*** (1.258)</td>
<td>-4.711*** (1.322)</td>
<td>-4.407*** (1.218)</td>
<td>-4.612*** (1.240)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parenthesis. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01. N = 125
But to more accurately assess the substantive conditional impact of competitive alliances, simulated predicted probability differences (with and without them) are presented in Table 6 for the “b” version of the data and in Table 7 for the “a” version. The mean effect of the competitive ally covariate and the associated 95 percent confidence intervals for each outcome are shown. As is evident in Table 6, the mean probability of a government victory falls by roughly 46 percent. The confidence interval for this estimated outcome does not include zero. Conversely, the effect on rebel victories is an increase in its probability by 28 percent. Again, the associated confidence interval does not contain zero. By contrast, we are unable to clarify the role of competitive coalitions (with a high degree of confidence) on the other two outcomes (settlements and truces) in Table 6. The impact appears positive for likelihood of both outcomes, but the 95 percent confidence intervals suggest a negative outcome cannot be ruled out.

**Table 6: First difference effect of competitive ally on probability of war outcomes (b version)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truce/Ongoing</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth pointing out that the substantive results from Table 6 – a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of rebel victory and statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of government victory – do not change in Table 7, which includes the ambiguous codings. The marginal impact of competitive alliances is nearly identical across all four outcomes. The results are thus robust to both versions of the data.
Table 7: First difference effect of competitive ally on probability of war outcomes (a version)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truce/Ongoing</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also influencing the odds of rebel victories are a number of the control variables. Their estimated impacts are highlighted in Table 8. High degrees of death and displacement per capita significantly raise the likelihood of rebel victory in model 1b. Since the cost per capita for any conflict is partially correlated with conflict duration, the analysis was rerun using each variable separately. When duration is dropped, the cost per capita variable is a positive and significant factor in predicting rebel victory in all four models. Moreover, it also independently and significantly raises the likelihood of the other two outcomes—settlements and truces/ongoing. This outcome offers support for Mason and Fett’s (1996) argument that the likelihood of settlement should rise with the costs of conflict. By contrast, when cost per capita is omitted form the model, war duration significantly raises the log odds of both settlements and truces, but not rebel victory. These results suggest a mixed verdict when it comes to war weariness. For

17 It is necessary to point out that given the collinear relationship between cost per capita and conflict duration, omitting the duration covariate is most likely the best estimation approach for the various multinomial logistical models here. The improved results across all four models in Table 5, when dropping duration from the estimations, are likely a reflection of this observation. Furthermore, in future work, it may be more appropriate to treat duration as a dependent variable, and not an independent variable – especially when examining the potential impact of competitive alliances. Competitive coalitions may be associated with higher incidence of rebel victories (as demonstrated here), but also with quicker victories.

18 Interestingly, the authors did not find evidence to support their hypothesis and suspected measurement problems may have accounted for this null result (p. 562).
governments, the impact of raising the cost per capita variable from the 25th to the 75th percentile is negative, but not overwhelming. Even at the 75th percentile, governments still expect to win more than 50 percent of the time. By contrast, rebels appear to improve their chances of winning as costs mount, suggesting that as grievances and the human toll associated with war increase, so too may rebel resolve.19 But while longer wars tend to work against governments, they are not necessarily good for rebels. The outcomes that become increasingly likely over time are formal settlements and truces, not rebel victories. However, these results should be interpreted with due caution. A noted problem with these types of per capita variables is that they reflect costs and casualty rates to both sides of the conflict, and are not given separately for governments and rebels. It would be ideal to be able to parse out the potential differing impact of conflict intensity using disaggregated data.

19 These results partially reconfirm findings by Mason et al. (1999) that higher battle death rates work in favor of rebels and against governments.
Table 8: Predicted probabilities for war outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Truce / Low Violence</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Rebel</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>.08 (.01, .25)</td>
<td>.54 (.25, .81)</td>
<td>.22 (.06, .47)</td>
<td>.16 (.06, .35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Competitive Alliance</td>
<td>.08 (.01, .27)</td>
<td>.54 (.25, .81)</td>
<td>.21 (.06, .48)</td>
<td>.16 (.05, .36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance</td>
<td>.16 (.03, .44)</td>
<td>.08 (.01, .27)</td>
<td>.50 (.21, .79)</td>
<td>.26 (.07, .56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration 25th</td>
<td>.05 (.00, .20)</td>
<td>.68 (.34, .91)</td>
<td>.19 (.04, .49)</td>
<td>.08 (.02, .21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration 75th</td>
<td>.15 (.03, .40)</td>
<td>.35 (.13, .64)</td>
<td>.20 (.05, .46)</td>
<td>.30 (.11, .56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per capita 25th</td>
<td>.09 (.01, .29)</td>
<td>.53 (.25, .81)</td>
<td>.21 (.05, .46)</td>
<td>.17 (.06, .36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per capita 75th</td>
<td>.09 (.01, .27)</td>
<td>.54 (.25, .82)</td>
<td>.21 (.06, .49)</td>
<td>.17 (.05, .37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels weaker (1)</td>
<td>.09 (.01, .27)</td>
<td>.54 (.25, .82)</td>
<td>.21 (.06, .49)</td>
<td>.17 (.05, .37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels stronger (3)</td>
<td>.03 (.00, .21)</td>
<td>.13 (.01, .51)</td>
<td>.69 (.16, .97)</td>
<td>.15 (.00, .71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War type (Autonomy)</td>
<td>.19 (.06, .43)</td>
<td>.63 (.38, .83)</td>
<td>.09 (.02, .23)</td>
<td>.08 (.03, .20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War type (State)</td>
<td>.08 (.01, .28)</td>
<td>.53 (.26, .82)</td>
<td>.21 (.04, .48)</td>
<td>.17 (.05, .35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>.20 (.04, .50)</td>
<td>.17 (.03, .50)</td>
<td>.29 (.08, .56)</td>
<td>.34 (.11, .63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>.08 (.01, .30)</td>
<td>.55 (.25, .81)</td>
<td>.21 (.06, .47)</td>
<td>.16 (.05, .32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No UN</td>
<td>.08 (.01, .27)</td>
<td>.54 (.25, .81)</td>
<td>.21 (.05, .47)</td>
<td>.16 (.05, .35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full UN</td>
<td>.53 (.09, .92)</td>
<td>.05 (.00, .25)</td>
<td>.01 (.00, .05)</td>
<td>.41 (.06, .86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Major Influence</td>
<td>.19 (.06, .43)</td>
<td>.63 (.37, .83)</td>
<td>.09 (.02, .25)</td>
<td>.08 (.03, .18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Influence</td>
<td>.05 (.01, .16)</td>
<td>.70 (.31, .93)</td>
<td>.18 (.02, .56)</td>
<td>.06 (.01, .20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with expectation, the relative strength of rebel groups is significantly associated with their chances of defeating incumbent governments. This result is consistent across the two versions of both models 1 and 2 and is also in line with findings by Cunningham et al (2009). Furthermore, Table 8 suggests that an increase in rebel strength offers the single greatest boost to the mean probability of rebel success out

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20 Mean probabilities based on CLARIFY, after multinomial logit, and using the ‘b’ version of alliance data. Variables not being manipulated are set to mean / median / mode. Probabilities may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
of all the variables in the model. This result, while uncontroversial, is important for this study. The rebel strength covariate is perhaps the most critical control variable in the analysis because it speaks both to the likelihood of war outcomes as well as alliance formation. Even though they may stand to benefit from them, stronger groups may be disinclined to seek out alliances; and weaker factions may not enjoy the luxury of strict independence.

The war type variable distinguishing state versus autonomy wars offers little evidence that rebels are more likely to win conflicts over the control of the state than over separatist issues. Switching the two war type variables in robustness checks offered only partial evidence suggesting that identity wars (ethnic, religious, ideological) are more difficult for rebels to win. In at least one robustness check, negative and statistically significant estimates for the identity war coefficient suggested that ethnic or ideological conflicts are more difficult for rebels to win. This result is consistent with findings by others (e.g., DeRouen and Sobek, 2004) but it is highly sensitive to model specifications. These largely mixed results suggest that rather than focusing exclusively on particular categories of conflict as causal factors, research should aim at unpacking the conditions under which rebels are more or less likely to win either type of war (e.g. Cunningham, 2011). As has been noted, the distinctions between ethnic and other wars are very crude and an aggregated research design may not capture important causal relationships applying only to particular kinds of conflicts (Buhaug, 2006).

The Cold War coefficient estimates suggest that time period may have affected relationships within states as much as between them. By these results, the Cold War
appears to have heavily favored governments and hindered rebels in civil wars. In contrast, the end of the Cold War appears to have aided rebels and hurt governments, in terms of their likelihood of victory. This outcome adds support to the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) claim that the end of the Cold War marked an important transformation for internal conflicts. Additionally, the Cold War effect is not limited to rebel victories. Governments fighting civil wars during the Cold War were not only more likely to defeat the rebel factions they faced, they were also significantly less likely to reach negotiated settlements or strike informal truces. Table 8 suggests that the unambiguous losers from the end of the Cold War were governments. Furthermore, the transition occasioned by the passing of the Cold War world has not only raised the odds that rebels win, but increased the likelihood of settlements as well as informal truces and ongoing conflicts – all apparently at the expense of government victories.

The intervention of the UN has a negligible estimated impact on the likelihood of rebel wins. However, the higher the degree of UN involvement, the greater is the prospect for informal truces and ceasefires as well as formal settlements. More specifically, government wins are less likely, while settlements and truces more probable, when the UN becomes implicated in conflicts. Although selection effects cannot be completely ruled out, the impact of UN engagement is also quite strong on the outcomes. This result resembles those of DeRouen and Sobek (2004). But as these authors note, this may be because the UN is more likely to involve itself in the most protracted of conflicts. And finally, the involvement of major third parties in conflicts does not greatly impact the chances of rebel success. Table 8 indicates that military involvement of major third
parties partially tips the balance in favor of rebels and (or) governments and lowers the likelihood that any conflict is either ongoing or at low levels of violence. This appears to come at the expense of reaching settlements, making it more likely that one side or the other attains a military victory.

Taken together, the results from Tables 5 and 6 and 7 and 8 are strongly confirmatory for Hypothesis 1, stated at the end of Chapter 2. Competitive coalitions amongst militant groups are strong predictors of rebel success, even when controlling for numerous other complicating factors and dropping ambiguous cases from the dataset. However, the model also implies a tradeoff between strength and stability. It indicates that factors making alliances better prepared militarily might also make them more volatile and likely to produce the recurrence of conflict. We turn to this second implication in the following subsection.

3.5.2 Recurrence

Table 9 displays the results from the two binary logistical models on the variable war recurrence within 5 years of the end of a conflict. Table 10 displays identical results for the 10-year dependent variable on war recurrence. In both tables, positive coefficients are associated with increases to the likelihood of renewed war. As in previous models, robust standard errors, clustered on same-country observations, are in parentheses.21 This approach allows that episodes of war are independent across countries but not within them. The first model in each table treats alliance variables as categorical (ally and

21 Once more, most clusters contain only one observation. And as in the previous section, the results are changed very little when not clustered on country.
where no ally is the omitted category; the second model employs the ordinal measure of coalition competition (alliance). Again, all models have an ‘a’ and ‘b’ version, such that the ‘b’ models replicate the ‘a’ models but drop all ambiguous cases of either alliance or competitive alliance.

Table 9: Logistical regressions of war recurrence within 5 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 1b</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-0.492 (1.327)</td>
<td>1.961 (1.570)</td>
<td>1.602* (0.900)</td>
<td>1.764*** (0.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive ally</td>
<td>1.845* (1.013)</td>
<td>1.899*** (0.692)</td>
<td>1.889*** (0.692)</td>
<td>1.764*** (0.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (ordinal)</td>
<td>1.602* (0.900)</td>
<td>1.764*** (0.692)</td>
<td>1.889*** (0.692)</td>
<td>1.764*** (0.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Gov.</td>
<td>-2.673*** (0.917)</td>
<td>-2.438*** (0.865)</td>
<td>-2.484*** (0.878)</td>
<td>-2.442*** (0.864)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory rebel.</td>
<td>-2.914*** (1.022)</td>
<td>-2.524** (1.092)</td>
<td>-2.533** (1.008)</td>
<td>-2.593** (1.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>-1.752 (1.243)</td>
<td>-1.856 (1.651)</td>
<td>-1.826 (1.272)</td>
<td>-1.721 (1.475)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel strength</td>
<td>-0.485 (0.616)</td>
<td>-0.534 (0.639)</td>
<td>-0.503 (0.633)</td>
<td>-0.522 (0.624)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State war</td>
<td>1.665** (0.778)</td>
<td>1.516* (0.850)</td>
<td>1.522** (0.770)</td>
<td>1.583* (0.817)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-1.632* (0.878)</td>
<td>-1.739** (0.759)</td>
<td>-1.746** (0.866)</td>
<td>-1.692** (0.733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per capita</td>
<td>3.769* (2.070)</td>
<td>5.104** (2.220)</td>
<td>3.958** (2.011)</td>
<td>4.943** (2.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
<td>-0.163*** (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.164*** (0.053)</td>
<td>-0.161*** (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.164*** (0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>-0.101*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.103*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.093*** (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.100 (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity</td>
<td>.0264** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.026** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.025** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.026** (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.966 (2.104)</td>
<td>3.034 (2.133)</td>
<td>2.540 (2.002)</td>
<td>2.835 (1.965)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parenthesis. *p<.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01. N = 125.

A number of fundamental results emerge from Tables 9 and 10. First, there is strong evidence that coalitions—and in particular, competitive coalitions—increase the likelihood of war recurrence up to both 5 and 10 years after wars. The competitive ally
covariate is a strong and statistically significant predictor of war recurrence within both the 5 and 10-year models. The coefficients are consistently positive and highly significant in both the ‘a’ and ‘b’ models. Interestingly, the other alliance category, ally, is also a significant indicator of new war in the 10-year model, but only when the ambiguous cases are dropped (‘b’ version). The ordinal coding scheme, reflected in models 2a/b, largely reconfirms the categorical results. The coefficients for the alliance variable are positive and highly significant in both the 5 and 10-year models. And once more, the impact is stronger in the ‘b’ versions, when the borderline instances are dropped.

There is strikingly little difference in the impacts of the alliance variables on the probability of war recurrence within 5 years and on the probability of recurrence within 10 years.\footnote{Although missing data in the 10-year analysis drop the number of cases to 123.} Regardless of whether the alliance covariates are measured in categorical or ordinal terms, the involvement of competitive alliances in civil wars raises the likelihood of war recurrence, both 5 and 10 years after a war. But importantly, separating competitive from non-competitive alliances appears to matter in the sense that non-competitive alliances show little or no impact on generating renewed conflict. The competitive versus non-competitive alliance arrangement is thus a valid distinction, at least concerning war recurrence. Furthermore, the omitted category (no ally), when included in alternative specifications of the models, is a significant predictor of less war recurrence (not shown). The implication is that alliances themselves are indicators that
war recurrence is more likely. But competitive alliances are the best indicators for heightened chances of new conflict after original wars end.

Table 10: Logistical regressions of war recurrence within 10 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 1b</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>1.243</td>
<td>3.856***</td>
<td>1.960***</td>
<td>2.407***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.261)</td>
<td>(1.249)</td>
<td>(0.704)</td>
<td>(0.730)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive ally</td>
<td>2.159***</td>
<td>2.516***</td>
<td>2.407***</td>
<td>2.762*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.752)</td>
<td>(0.811)</td>
<td>(0.704)</td>
<td>(1.612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (ordinal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Gov.</td>
<td>-1.652**</td>
<td>-1.650**</td>
<td>-1.648**</td>
<td>-1.616**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.761)</td>
<td>(0.832)</td>
<td>(0.759)</td>
<td>(0.820)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory rebel.</td>
<td>-0.820</td>
<td>-0.578</td>
<td>-0.799</td>
<td>-0.864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.915)</td>
<td>(0.951)</td>
<td>(0.963)</td>
<td>(0.886)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>-1.975**</td>
<td>-2.680**</td>
<td>-1.987**</td>
<td>-2.276**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.982)</td>
<td>(1.222)</td>
<td>(0.955)</td>
<td>(1.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel strength</td>
<td>-1.557**</td>
<td>-1.834**</td>
<td>-1.552**</td>
<td>-1.813**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.769)</td>
<td>(0.815)</td>
<td>(0.751)</td>
<td>(0.752)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State war</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.694)</td>
<td>(0.673)</td>
<td>(0.681)</td>
<td>(0.642)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>-0.472</td>
<td>-0.329</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.660)</td>
<td>(0.657)</td>
<td>(0.704)</td>
<td>(0.641)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per capita</td>
<td>3.524***</td>
<td>5.849***</td>
<td>3.552***</td>
<td>5.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.337)</td>
<td>(1.864)</td>
<td>(1.342)</td>
<td>(1.618)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
<td>-0.132***</td>
<td>-0.153***</td>
<td>-0.133***</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>-0.066***</td>
<td>-0.083***</td>
<td>-0.066***</td>
<td>-0.071***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.433</td>
<td>3.252*</td>
<td>2.401</td>
<td>2.762*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.541)</td>
<td>(1.700)</td>
<td>(1.506)</td>
<td>(1.612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R² = .50</td>
<td>Pseudo R² = .53</td>
<td>Pseudo R² = .50</td>
<td>Pseudo R² = .52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parenthesis.
*p<.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01. N = 123.

In fact, the substantive increase in the likelihood of new war as alliances become more conflictual arrangements is quite large. In the 5-year model, switching the competitive ally variable from 0 to 1 in model 1b, while holding all over variables at their mean, median or mode, raises the expected likelihood of recurrence 30 percentage points above simulated baseline values. Moreover, the estimated effect is roughly three times
the unconditional probability. For war recurrence over 10 years, a similar change in the competitive ally variable in the same model raises the expected probability by a factor of 2.4 times the unconditional probability. In sum, these models provide strong evidence in support of the claim that higher levels of internal rivalry are likely to promote new civil wars. The results are fairly consistent across all eight of the models and are also robust to controlling for rebel strength. Influenced by the possibility that these recurrence results merely reflect higher incidence of war renewal in multiparty conflicts, an alternative model was specified—one including a covariate specifically reflecting the number of “veto” players engaged in each war, i.e., the overall number of parties involved in the conflict. Although the veto variable and various alliance indicators are highly correlated, the number of veto players in an original war is never a significant predictor of follow-on conflict. Recurrence is not a proxy for wars of many players.

A second major result to emerge from the models above is some support for the Wagner (1993) hypothesis, which argues that military victories are more stable outcomes than negotiated settlements. This is particularly evident in the 5-year models. In these models, both government and rebel victories are significantly associated with less war recurrence, as indicated by consistently negative coefficients. This strong result is highly

23 Similarly, moving from the middle to the maximum value of the alliance variable in model 2(b) raises the expected probability of renewed war within 5-years from .64 (standard error 0.13) to .79 (standard error 0.11), holding all other covariates at their mean, median or modes. All predicted probabilities are calculated using CLARIFY (King et al. 2000).

24 This variable corresponds to Cunningham (2006) “lenient veto players,” which includes the total number of parties involved in a conflict (both state and nonstate) on either side of the war.

25 The correlation coefficients between the veto measure and the alliance covariates are as high as .46. This is not at all surprising, given that the veto list was a key component in identifying the various alliances.

26 In fact, coefficients for this veto variable were consistently negative in all robustness checks.
robust across each of the four models in the 5-year test. Moreover, the substantive reduction in conflict recurrence within 5 years after military victories is quite high. In model 1b, government and rebel victories reduce the expected probability of war recurrence from the simulated baseline by 48 and 49 percentage points, respectively. Wars won by one party or the other are more likely to remain ended in all of the 5-year models. While the coefficients for the settlement covariate are also negative in all 4 models of Table 9, their impact never reaches the level of statistical significance.

The 10-year models (Table 10) suggest slightly different conclusions regarding civil war outcomes and war recurrence than the 5-year analyses. More specifically, there is some attenuation in the soundness of military victories for preventing more conflict. Wins by governments maintain their negative and statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. Rebel victories, on the other hand, are no longer significant predictors of fewer new wars. The standard errors for this variable are also quite large in each model. However, the biggest difference to emerge between the 10 and the 5-year analyses is the effectiveness of negotiated settlements in preventing new wars in the former. In each of the four 10-year models, the settlement covariate is shown to significantly reduce incidence of war recurrence. The substantive impact of negotiated settlements is to lower the probability of war recurrence from 40 percent to almost 5 percent, all else equal. By comparison, government victories reduce the expected probability to 15 percent. Taken together, the 5 and 10-year models offer mixed results for the Wagner hypothesis.
As indicated in the theoretical portion, the aim of this work is not to adjudicate the Wagner hypothesis, but to refine it by embedding it within a more nuanced theory of coalitions. As such, interactive models are required to further probe the conditional impact of competitive coalitions. Before turning to such analysis, it is worthwhile to highlight some of the results from the control variables, as they help provide a more comprehensive understanding of post conflict environments most likely to sustain peace. They also suggest that in addition to attributes of the previous war, higher quality of life and greater access to political participation lowers the likelihood for more wars. This result is largely consistent with those of Walter (2004).

We begin with the war categorization covariates. Of the two war type indicators, only the state war covariate is a significant indicator of conflict renewal, and only in the 5-year tests. Employing the alternative indicator (ethnic / religious / identity versus ideological / revolutionary) in robustness checks yields indeterminate results in every model. This implies that while “center-seeking” wars are more likely to reignite once they have ended than are wars fought with secessionist aims, the effect declines over time. These mixed results suggest that rather than focusing exclusively on particular categories of conflict as causal factors, research should aim at unpacking the conditions under which rebels are more or less likely to win either type of war (e.g., Cunningham, 2011). As has been noted, the distinctions between ethnic and other wars are very crude and an aggregated research design may not capture important causal relationships applying only to particular kinds of conflicts (Buhaug, 2006).
Related to identity issues, there is good evidence, however, that *ethnic heterogeneity* contributes to the probability of renewed conflicts. This variable is significant in each model of both Tables 9 and 10. It is not an overwhelming impact, as coefficients are small, relative to those of other variables. But it is consistent across the multiple analyses. While the *war type* results indicate there is no reason to believe that greater diversity of ethnic mix is any way a cause of these wars, it does appear to be an exacerbating factor for their recurrence. This may be owing to ethnic identities and related grievances becoming more protracted as wars develop.

Also related to war recurrence are socio-political factors. Lessening the potential for recurring wars is the life expectancy covariate, which is negatively related to war recurrence in each of the 5-year models and again in all of the 10-year models. This result supports work by Walter (2004), arguing that war recurrence is, in part, a function of the quality of life. Because the life expectancy values are measured at the end of the war, they were replaced using similar measures for life expectancy at the start of the war. Doing so produced only nominal differences. Alternative specifications for the quality of life included a measure of illiteracy. In a few of the robustness checks, lower levels of illiteracy were sometimes associated with less new war, but the results were inconsistent and always at low levels of significance. And because life expectancy variables may reflect economic wellbeing, a measure of GDP per capita at the end of the war was also employed in robustness checks. The GDP covariate had little impact on war recurrence. As expected, the sign of the coefficient was negative, but the value of the coefficient was zero when rounded to the nearest thousandth. Also consistent with the Walter (2004)
argument, greater levels of democracy (*Polity 2*), measured two years after the end of a conflict, are highly predictive of fewer instances of war recurrence. This result is robust across all analyses.

Against these socio-political results sits a curious outcome on the impact *cost per capita* has on war recurrence up to 5 and 10 years post conflict. This variable, a per capita measure of the deaths and displacement, is very much a reflection of the war’s intensity. In both the 5 and 10-year models, *cost per capita* is significantly related to renewed conflict. Moreover, the impact is quite large. In the 5-year model, a shift from the 25 to the 75\(^{th}\) percentile in the *cost per capita* measure raises the expected probability of war recurrence to more than 60 percent, holding all else constant. This result offers evidence in support of the “revenge” hypothesis (Balcells, 2010; Kalyvas, 2006) and against the alternative “war weariness” theory. Because the costs of war are not independent from the duration of war, the analysis was rerun after replacing the *cost per capita* indicator with a measure of *war duration* in months. The effect of war duration is quite similar to *cost per capita*—war recurrence becomes more probable the longer is the conflict episode.\(^{27}\) The lengthier and more violent are the conflicts, the more unsettling are the ramifications for sustaining peace. A minor caveat to these results is again necessary; the

\(^{27}\) A high correlation between the *cost per capita* and *war duration* variables (coefficient = 0.38) prohibited including them together in the same model. Doing so results in abnormally large standard errors. See footnote 17 as well.
The cost per capita variable does not distinguish between deaths on the government side and deaths on the rebel side.\textsuperscript{28}

The influence of major powers involvement also has a striking impact on war recurrence within 5 years, significantly reducing the likelihood of relapse. But the effect all but vanishes in the 10-year models. The short-term impact of major powers involving themselves militarily into civil conflicts is in some ways not altogether surprising. While evidence from Regan (1996) indicates external military interventions often fail as a means of promoting conflict cessation, the data here indicate they may succeed as a means of preventing conflict renewal. Employing alternative specifications of third party involvement, including external intervention by any third party, UN involvement, or peacekeeping operations, does not yield comparable effects.\textsuperscript{29} None of these three factors proves to be a significant influencer of war recurrence, suggesting that when major powers choose to go it alone, their capacity to shape events is at its greatest. This interpretation also allows that peacekeeping operations and UN participation in civil wars may be most necessary when major powers fail to act, when conflict is at its most intractable levels, or when they become protracted in duration.

To fully address the hypotheses laid out regarding the interactive nature of alliance constellations and war outcomes, the analysis was further extended to account for possible conditional effects. Final robustness tests were conducted to include

\textsuperscript{28} This issue is clearly of less relevance to war recurrence than it is in the prior section detailing war outcomes. Moreover, the “displacement” component of the cost per capita variable likely includes individuals loyal to both sides.

\textsuperscript{29} Doyle and Sambanis (2000) include measures for all of these factors respectively: Interven, uninterven, and peaceop.
interactions between the competitive alliance indicator (competitive ally) and various outcomes. These tests are designed to more specifically address the premise that ‘rivalrous’ alliances may upset the stability normally associated with military victory or the capitulation of losing sides. More precisely, the extended models test the proposition that a decrease in the likelihood of war recurrence is associated with military victories or negotiated settlements only in the absence of competitive alliance arrangements. Unless otherwise noted, only the ‘b’ versions of the data are employed, meaning they include no instances of ambiguous coding. Table 11 presents three pairs of models—the first model in every pair employs the 5-year dependent variable, and the second uses the 10-year variable. The first pair includes the interaction between competitive ally and military victory. This new binary variable, military victory, is created by combining all incidences of rebel victory and government victory into a single variable, such that 1 = military victory and 0 = any other outcome. The second pair of models in Table 11 presents the interaction between competitive ally and rebel victory. The third pair incorporates an interaction between competitive ally and negotiated settlement.²¹

²⁰ As a check on all the interaction results, the ordinal coalition measure (alliance) was also employed as the conditioning variable. All outcomes are highly similar, irrespective of the alliance indicator used.
²¹ An insufficiency of interaction variables (government victory * competitive ally) prevented conducting similar tests with the government victory outcome. While unfortunate for the purposes of statistical analysis, this result offers further (if indirect) support for the hypothesis that competitive alliances favor rebels and not their government opponents.
Table 11: Logistical regressions on war recurrence within 5 and 10 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 5-year</th>
<th>Model 1 10-year</th>
<th>Model 2 5-year</th>
<th>Model 2 10-year</th>
<th>Model 3 5-year</th>
<th>Model 3 10-year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive ally</td>
<td>2.032 (1.637)</td>
<td>0.150 (1.656)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel victory*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive ally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive ally</td>
<td>0.767 (1.315)</td>
<td>2.749* (1.521)</td>
<td>0.362 (1.141)</td>
<td>1.617 (1.254)</td>
<td>1.746** (0.888)</td>
<td>1.874*** (0.575)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>1.726 (1.589)</td>
<td>3.862*** (1.520)</td>
<td>1.509 (1.633)</td>
<td>3.881*** (1.329)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory</td>
<td>-2.735*** (0.921)</td>
<td>-1.794** (0.713)</td>
<td>-2.852*** (0.996)</td>
<td>-1.767** (0.837)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Gov.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel strength</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>-1.566 (1.427)</td>
<td>-3.443** (1.744)</td>
<td>-1.792 (1.363)</td>
<td>-2.556** (1.099)</td>
<td>-2.662 (2.361)</td>
<td>-4.829*** (2.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State War</td>
<td>1.353* (0.740)</td>
<td>0.356 (0.671)</td>
<td>1.723* (0.888)</td>
<td>0.114 (0.767)</td>
<td>1.354** (0.660)</td>
<td>0.430 (0.693)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-1.704** (0.692)</td>
<td>-0.300 (0.593)</td>
<td>-1.815** (0.762)</td>
<td>-0.606 (0.714)</td>
<td>-1.628* (0.855)</td>
<td>-0.064 (0.605)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per capita</td>
<td>5.246** (2.453)</td>
<td>5.955*** (1.996)</td>
<td>5.244** (2.430)</td>
<td>6.227*** (2.150)</td>
<td>3.706* (2.066)</td>
<td>3.618*** (1.431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
<td>-0.184*** (0.069)</td>
<td>-0.153*** (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.185*** (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.176*** (0.048)</td>
<td>-0.170*** (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.144*** (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>-0.104*** (0.033)</td>
<td>-0.081*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.105*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.089*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.102*** (0.036)</td>
<td>-0.071*** (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity</td>
<td>0.028** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.029** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.029** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.026** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.030*** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.033*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.780 (2.235)</td>
<td>2.917 (1.794)</td>
<td>2.980 (2.440)</td>
<td>3.487* (2.091)</td>
<td>2.824 (2.294)</td>
<td>2.269 (1.838)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parenthesis.
*p<.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. N = 125 for 5-year, and N = 123 for 10-year.
The results offer challenge to the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of military victory on war reoccurrence, and especially rebel victory. They also call into question the stability of negotiated settlements. We begin with the first pair of models. Consistent with the literature arguing that military victories are more stable than settlements, the independent effect of a military victory is to significantly lessen the probability of renewed warfare in both the 5 and 10-year tests. Yet, as these are interaction models, the negative coefficient for the military outcome covariate only captures the effect of military success when the variable of interaction is zero (competitive ally). The sign of the interaction variable (military victory*competitive ally) however, is positive in both models. This intimates that when military victory is accompanied by tenuous alliances, the chances for preserving peace are less than is otherwise expected after military capitulation by either side.

However, to correctly assess the substantive conditional effects, it is necessary to simulate predicted probability differences. Table 12 reports the mean effect of military victories in the 5-year model and the associated 95 percent confidence intervals with and without a concurrent competitive alliance. And because an interaction term always implies a conditional effect for the “conditioning” variable, it is important to assess the symmetric effect on this variable (Berry et al., 2012). Hence, the table also shows the effect of competitive alliances with and without military victories on civil war recurrence.

---

32 To avoid confusion regarding the conditional estimation technique, it is worth citing directly from Berry et al., (2012): “The inadequacy of many empirical tests of conditional theories can be traced to the tendency of scholars positing interaction between two variables to conceive of these variables as having different roles within the theory. One variable, Z, is typically viewed as the “conditioning variable,” the role of
Table 12: Conditional first difference effects on war recurrence in 5 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory,</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>-.723</td>
<td>-.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Competitive Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory,</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.290</td>
<td>.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance,</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.216</td>
<td>.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Military Victory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance,</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in the first row, in the absence of a competitive alliance, a military win lowers the expected probability of conflict renewal by just over 50 percentage points. Moreover, the 95% confidence interval is bounded away from zero. In the presence of a competitive alliance (second row), however, the expected probability of recurrence after a military victory falls (from 50) to four percent. But the confidence interval indicates the joint impact of these variables may in fact be positive or negative. The tenuous alliance certainly erodes the confidence in military victory as an effective means for preventing new violence. An opposite pattern emerges when military victory is treated as the conditioning factor; this variable serves to reinforce and exacerbate the instability which is to modify the impact of the other variable, X, on the dependent variable, Y. Certainly, when X and Z interact, it is reasonable to conceive of Z as conditioning the effect of X on Y. However, it makes little sense to view X and Z as having fundamentally different theoretical roles by designating one of the variables as a “conditioning variable” and the other as not. This is because, logically, all interactions are symmetric… In other words, if Z modifies the effect of X on Y, then X must modify the effect of Z on Y” (p. 653).
associated with tenuous coalitions. In the absence of military victory, a competitive alliance occasions a positive probability of new conflict (third row) of 5 percent; but the 95% confidence interval includes zero. However, when military victory transpires in the presence of competitive alliances (fourth row), the effect is resoundingly in the direction of more war, and the confidence interval is bound away from zero. The 10-year results, shown in Table 13, reflect a very similar outcome. Military victories are much less likely to recur within 10 years, unless they are accompanied by competitive alliance constellations.

Table 13: Conditional first difference effects on war recurrence in 10 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory, No Competitive Alliance</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>-.636</td>
<td>-.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory, Competitive Alliance</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.307</td>
<td>.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance, No Military Victory</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance, Military Victory</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second pair of models of Table 11 unpacks the military outcome even further by disaggregating the event into government and rebel victories. Again, the independent effect of both rebel and government victories is to lessen incidence of war recurrence. The signs of both covariates are negative and their influence is significant in the 5-year model; and in the 10-year tests, government victory is significant. But once more, we observe a sign change for the interaction variable (rebel victory*competitive alliance) in both models. The sign is positive and significant (p-value = .054) in the 5-year test, evidence of a meaningful interaction. Examining the marginal effects of the joint variable
reveals similar patterns to those described in the first pair of models. Table 14 reports the first difference impacts of rebel victories in model 2 (5-year) and the associated 95 percent confidence intervals with and without a concurrent competitive alliance. The table indicates clearly that rebel victories by themselves lower the likelihood of war recurrence by approximately 65 percentage points (first row). This overwhelming impact falls precipitately, effectively to zero, when competitive alliances occur jointly with rebel success (second row). Switching the constituent and conditioning variables in the model indicates once more that the interaction of competitive alliances with rebel victories raises the expected probability of war recurrence (fourth row). The impact is strongly positive and the confidence interval does not include zero.

| Table 14: Conditional first difference effects on war recurrence in 5 years |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Rebel Victory, No Competitive Alliance | -.65 | -.921 | -.193 |
| Rebel Victory, Competitive Alliance | -.01 | -.252 | .248 |
| Competitive Alliance, No Rebel Victory | .03 | -.183 | .303 |
| Competitive Alliance, Rebel Victory | .67 | .258 | .899 |

The 10-year results, shown in Table 15, reveal a similar pattern concerning the interactive nature of rebel success and competitive coalitions; although in the 10-year model, the independent impact of rebel victory (first row) is not overwhelmingly stable.
Table 15: Conditional first difference effects on war recurrence in 10 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Victory, No Competitive Alliance</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.695</td>
<td>-.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Victory, Competitive Alliance</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance, No Rebel Victory</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.152</td>
<td>.594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance, Rebel Victory</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the final two models in table 11, the ‘a’ version of the alliances was employed, on account of an insufficiency of interactions in the ‘b’ version, and should therefore be interpreted with caution. This last pair of models reveals that negotiated settlements are also prone to the destabilizing nature of alliance rivalry. The 10-year model especially bears this out. Settlements are on average less likely to relapse into conflict in the absence of complicating alliances. The sign for the settlement covariate is negative in both models and highly significant for the 10-year dependent variable. However, the interaction coefficient (settlement * competitive ally) is again positive for both the 5 and 10-year tests, suggesting settlements are more likely to fall apart in the presence of competitive coalitions.

For an indication of the substantive marginal impacts on war recurrence of the interaction variable, first difference effects are shown in tables 16 and 17, for the 5 and 10-year models respectively. Table 16 indicates that in the 5-year setting, both the independent and conditional results are inconclusive. All of the confidence intervals contain zero. The results of the 10-year model, however, are somewhat more revealing. Independent of alliances, settlements significantly lower the chances for new war (first
row) with ten years. And again, this stable outcome is either weakened (second row) or completely reversed (fourth row), depending on which variable is thought to condition the other. As noted, there is considerably more uncertainty associated with the 5-year results. Taken together, the differing outcomes between the 5 and 10-year models suggest that settlements are most likely to fail earlier in a war’s aftermath, rather than later. Having reached the 10-year threshold, a settlement is not likely to give way to new war, unless, however, there are also competitive alliances characterizing the conflicts.

**Table 16: Conditional first difference effects on war recurrence in 5 years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settlement,</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>-.915</td>
<td>.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Competitive Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement,</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.244</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance,</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance,</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>.963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 17: Conditional first difference effects on war recurrence in 10 years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settlement,</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>-.904</td>
<td>-.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Competitive Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement,</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.302</td>
<td>.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance,</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Alliance,</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, the conditioning effect of alliance competition on civil war outcomes is to increase the expected probability of war recurrence. Competitive coalitions upset the stability of military victories in civil wars, especially those won by rebels. And negotiated
settlements are likewise rendered less stable when alliance animosities are high. The foremost implication of these analyses is that it is by and large insufficient to focus exclusively on types of outcomes. It is the contextual conditions surrounding victories and settlements that shape post conflict possibilities. Competitive alliances, or what may be characterized as coalitions of rivals, substantively raise the possibility of battle resurgence in the post conflict environment. The various models employed here not only offer strong evidence linking alliance competition with renewed violence, they correctly predict, on average, the war recurrence outcome 88 percent of the time.  

This chapter has made an effort to explain both rebel success in civil wars and conflict recurrence by quantitatively analyzing 125 episodes of civil wars and the alliances specific to each war. The array of logistical models offers strong support for both hypothesis one and two. The models point to the conclusion that competitive alliances are indeed a common denominator to both rebel victory and the likelihood of conflict renewal. The finding suggests that competitive factors within alliances enabling and facilitating their success may also increase incidence of future conflicts at the country level. When traditional obstacles to collective action and cooperation are overcome via competitive means, higher volatility may be a byproduct of coalition successes against governments.

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33 Each model’s predicted values were set to 1 if they were above .5 and 0 if they were less than .5. In generating the number cited above, these new binary predicted values were compared to the actual dependent variable.
What emerges, then, from the bulk of the empirical analysis is a clear association between collective action and the “conflict trap.” But these results should be interpreted with caution. So many of the civil wars under examination here are subject to revision and reevaluation, especially from a historical perspective. A quantitative approach is perhaps not the most sensitive to historical reevaluations. But moving forward, quantitative work relating to these conflicts should aim at incorporating any revisions. Additionally, we would like to expand the universe of cases beyond the 125 episodes analyzed here. This alone would help add credence, refinement, or skepticism to the theories and concepts developed herein.

And finally, while the quantitative approach helps shed light on some questions, it certainly leaves others unaddressed. For instance: when and how might internal competition lead to bad outcomes for coalitions? This inquiry lends itself more appropriately to an evaluation via case studies. And it is precisely this question that motivates the two cases under consideration in the following chapter, which aims at comparing and contrasting an instance where internal rivalry worked in favor of the alliance, against an instance where it proved to be a critical part of the alliance downfall.
4. A Tale of two Conflicts

A couple of empirical instances are suggestive with respect to the importance of intra-party conflicts and rivalries. They also make clear that any collective action issues within a given group actually operate in the context of other competing groups. Interests, even among allies, may collide. This was certainly the case during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and during Zimbabwe’s long struggle for independence (1965-1979). The Iberian conflict further demonstrates that inter-party struggles transpire not only between rebel groups, but behind the government lines as well. But rivalry in the presence of a common foe can be both a fillip and a hindrance. In Zimbabwe it proved more of the former than the latter for the rebels. Rivalry among allied insurgents colored the entirety of the struggle for liberation and was very much a source of a second war that would ultimately follow the first. And in Spain, internecine competition among various factions on the side of the government ultimately proved ruinous for the entire anti-Franco camp. What factors may have contributed to success for a divided coalition in one war and disaster in another?

This portion of the dissertation is motivated by the premise that there is insight to be gained from looking at a conflict episode very much in line with the model’s expectations as well as an episode falling clearly outside the model’s explanatory power. Understanding and identifying key differences should be enlightening. The aim of this brief chapter is not to provide a case study analysis in support of the formal and empirical
models offered above, but rather to look beyond them.\(^1\) Therefore the intent is to probe other important variables that obviously interact and sometimes exacerbate inter-alliance competition. As will be evident, one case (Zimbabwe) “fits” the models quite well; the other (Spain) does not.

4.1 Zimbabwe: “The Struggle within the Struggle”

Guerrilla war emerged within the “self governing” colony of Southern Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) in the mid-1960s. Nominally under the control of Great Britain, a white minority exercised de facto rule in Southern Rhodesia over a black majority. Rhodesian blacks, in line with other British colonies, began forming their own political parties. The first modern African nationalist party materialized in 1957; the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress passed into the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. The white response to such moves was to reinforce a political structure favoring the status quo. Political tensions increased to the eventual eruption of violence. The government responded with coercion, increasing its defense force, and a resort to counterinsurgency training. As the British began pulling out of their African colonies in the 1960s, the devolution of power in Southern Rhodesia inevitably spawned civil war—a war that would ostensibly last until 1979 and produce an estimated death toll between 30,000 and 40,000. The postwar consolidation phase beginning in the early 1980s was also a bloody

\(^1\) The data requirements regarding the relative size of defensive capabilities on the part of the actors in each war prevent a more traditional type of case study that examines key variables highlighted by the formal model.
campaign between two former allies. The long episode suggests that very often the
vanquishers do not wish to share the spoils with one another.

The guerrilla war, which began in 1965, did not initially present a serious threat to
the white leadership of Ian Smith. The movements of primary importance were the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), founded by Ndabaningi Sithole and
eventually headed by Robert Mugabe; the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU),
led by Joshua Nkomo; and the African National Council (ANC), a political party which
came to be led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Both the ZANU and ZAPU parties had
affiliated military units – Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and
Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), respectively – which often sought
refuge in neighboring countries; the ANC was more exclusively political.
Fractionalization and rivalry between the various politico-military groups prevented
concerted efforts. Divisions among liberation groups persisted both along ideological and
ethnic lines, as well as over tactics and strategy.

In fact these splits put into sharp relief just how difficult would be the formation
of any form of strategic alliance. The divides initially emerged over issues of leadership
and approach, and by the 1960s sparked open fighting between supporters of Nkomo
(ZAPU) and supporters of Sithole and Mugabe (ZANU). In fact, the original split in the
nationalist movement occurred along political lines in 1963, when a faction of ZAPU
broke away to form ZANU. The primary issue of contention was disagreement over how
best to conduct the struggle against white minority rule. And as noted, ethnic fissures
soon worsened the situation, as ZAPU began to draw strength from the Ndebele minority.
Strategic and ideological differences were an additional confounding factor. The ZANU favored guerrilla tactics, while allying with China and often seeking refuge in Mozambique. The ZAPU eschewed guerrilla warfare, preferring support from the Soviet Union and staging bases in Zambia. The conditions for cooperation were not favorable. And in spite of a common enemy in Ian Smith’s government, chances of an alliance were even less propitious.

These divisions infuriated even the international allies of both parties. Attempts to attain some form of unity between militia factions, usually for political purposes, proved futile. For instance, a Joint Military Command was formed in 1972 and a Joint Political Council the following year; but these bodies were entirely void of practical function, and usually aimed at discrediting rival nationalists rather than coordinating efforts against the Rhodesians. Infighting among the nationalist groups was practically endemic. After a temporary agreement brought some semblance of accord in 1974, the brother of Ndabaningi Sithole would describe the whole situation between black coalitions as “struggles within the struggle.” The caricature he would offer to further animate the entire affair is telling:

We must state at this point that the said declaration of unity united sheep, foxes, hyenas, and leopards. The sad assumption was that the four would realize they had many things in common: They were animals and their common enemy in the bush was the lion. All that was needed for unity was to bring them around a table, sign a piece of paper signing “Ishe Komborera Afrika!” (Lord Save Africa), and all would be well. Yet we know that the interests of leopards, hyenas, foxes and sheep do not necessarily coincide, even given their common fear of the lion.²

Indeed, a “common fear of the lion” proved an insufficient impetus to sustain cooperation and joint coordination between the nationalists. The groups were unwilling to compromise while holding the upper hand within the nationalist struggle, even at the insistence of Front Line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia). Such conflictual conditions precluded attaining an acceptable political arrangement with Ian Smith’s government. A fledgling settlement—orchestrated by South Africa and Zambia in concert with other Front Line states—ended in drastic failure at Victoria Falls in the summer of 1975. The armed struggle would continue.

It was not until October of 1976 that a tenuous alliance between the ZAPU and ZANU organizations would eventually coalesce into what was called the Patriotic Front. Nkomo had initially sought an arrangement with Muzorewa and the ANC, who rebuffed the offer. By this time Robert Mugabe was in the process of consolidating his position as head of ZANU; Nkomo remained the prominent figure within the ZAPU. By 1979, relations between the two wings of the Patriotic Front remained complex and often tense.\(^3\) The cover of the alliance did not prevent clashes between the two organization’s military units. Open fighting is known to have transpired as early as 1978 (Preston 2004; Kriger 2005). More than anything, the Patriotic Front was a tactical arrangement serving to preserve the political and military structures of its respective parties. Importantly, the integrity of each party’s war-fighting units was preserved. There was little to no integration of militia units from the respective sides.

\(^3\) Preston (2004), chapter 4.
By this time, the military position of the nationalists had also improved. So much in fact that ZANU remained optimistic that it could achieve victory by force. It enjoyed an advantage in relative strength against its junior partner, the ZAPU.\(^4\) Having completely consolidated his position of power, Mugabe intensified guerrilla operations (Stedman, 1991). Fighting on alone was now among the menu of options for ZANU guerrilla forces. Nkomo, on the other hand, faced a numerical disadvantage within the alliance. Doubtful of ZAPU’s ability to win on its own, he favored a negotiated transition. The ‘every man for himself’ situation was one he was keen to avoid in a position of relative weakness. Stephen Stedam sums up the dilemma facing the ZAPU at the time: “they saw that no coalition could win without ZANU but realized ZANU might be strong enough to win on their own. Therefore, cooperation was risky for a junior partner that had real limits on its base of support.\(^5\) But Nkomo had cast his lot with Mugabe and to auger an outright split from a position of relative weakness was to court danger.

In spite of ongoing tensions, the two-party coalition proved cohesive enough to present a bargaining force successful in attaining a favorable settlement of the civil war. Notwithstanding a key difference over the desirability of a settlement, the Patriotic Front was probably at its most unified prior to the negotiation meetings.\(^6\) Mugabe was deeply

\(^4\) While precise estimates of relative rebel strength are uncertain, it is clear that by war’s end ZANLA possessed a numerical advantage in guerrillas and intelligence scouts – or what were called mujibas. By war’s end, ZANLA claimed more than 50,000 mujibas, excluding women and children. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 2010).


\(^6\) This is according to Stedman (1991, p. 173).
suspicious of a settlement, fearing that it may strip him of his military gains. Even in the face of such apprehension, the Lancaster House Accords formally terminated the war for the liberation of Zimbabwe and paved the way for elections to take place in February of 1980. On 2 January 1980, Mugabe brought a swift and quite sudden end to the Patriotic Front by declaring the ZANU would stand alone in the upcoming elections. Mugabe’s party won 57 out of the 80 common roll seats and 63 percent of the total votes, providing him the authority to form a government. The ZAPU won only 20 seats.

There is evidence to suggest both of the former allies anticipated the period of consolidation both during the election campaign and after. Cease-fire violations during the elections were mixed with electoral violence amongst all parties. More tellingly, ZANU leaders, in direct violation of the cease-fire agreement, instructed many guerilla fighters not to gather at designated cease-fire assembly places with their arms and commanders but to remain in their wartime areas of operation. The ZANU leadership was eager to maintain a strong guerilla presence in rural areas, and used the pretext of protecting supporters to do so. It is revealing of their strategy that in December of 1979 only 17,000 ZANLA guerrillas reported to assembly points, as dictated by the settlement, when their numbers were in fact far greater. ZAPU leadership also maintained rebel presence after the negotiated settlement. And as late as 1981, roughly 900 ZIPRA cadres were still receiving training in Libya (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 2010).

Unsurprisingly, the violence in Zimbabwe did not end with the Lancaster House Accords and the subsequent elections. Intra-party competition between partners in the Patriotic Front eventually brooked a critical threshold during the elections and after. At
rallies, ZANU slogans denigrated ZIPRA, ZAPU, and Joshua Nkomo and their role in the armed struggle, including denouncing them as ‘oppressors.’ In June of 1980 a ZANU party minister told supporters at a rally that the party’s task was to “crush Joshua Nkomo.” Former ZANU guerrillas and freedom fighters were systematically excluded from the newly formed National Army of Zimbabwe. Mugabe elected to rid himself completely of ZAPU, dismissing Nkomo from the government, arresting former ZIPRA army chiefs, and confiscating all ZAPU properties.

A prolonged insurgency by the guerrillas in Matabeleland and other former ZAPU military dissidents posed a serious threat to the new regime. Moreover, some white Rhodesians who left the country after Zimbabwe’s independence aided the dissident movement in Matabeleland from South Africa. Hostilities among former allies culminated in a new reign of terror when the new Mugabe government unleashed the Fifth Brigade against remnants of ZAPU armies and civilians in a slash and burn campaign. The Fifth Brigade was a North Korean-trained counterinsurgency unit employed to root out dissidents. The encore of violence less than two years after the Lancaster Accords ended Zimbabwe’s original struggle for liberation is estimated to have left approximately 1000 dead between 1981 and 1982 (Stedman, 1993) and at least 2,000 civilians dead in 1983 (Kriger, 2005). Both sides were guilty of atrocities against local populations. The violence eventually tapered off, but is thought to have lasted intermittently until the mid 1980s.

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7 From Kriger (2005) p. 5. This piece offers a good discussion of post-election strategies (1980-2000) by ZANU.
And so it was that the first major challenge to Mugabe’s post-independence regime came from his former ally. His response was to violently neutralize it. Certainly the situation in the Matabeleland represented a real security concern to the new government, but the overwhelmingly brutal manner by which it was repressed suggests the aim was to eliminate not only the militarized threat of the guerillas, but the political organization of ZAPU as well (Weitzer, 1990). Once hostilities began, Mugabe made no attempt at negotiation and little differentiation between the political and former military wings of ZAPU (Dashwood and Pratt, 1999). The military defeat of ZAPU at the hands of the Mugabe regime was the inexorable result.

The defeat of the ZAPU army precipitated the beginning of negotiations in 1985 that might allow ZAPU political participation. ZANU, however, would not allow the vanquished party to negotiate as an equal. Shaping the agenda, Mugabe moved forward with his ambition of creating a one-party state in Zimbabwe. ZAPU would not be allowed to exist as an independent political party, nor would the name of the newly united party contain any reference to ZAPU (Dashwood and Pratt, 1999). The government did, however, provide amnesty to the ZAPU dissidents, which served to essentially end all dissident activity by 1988. In such a manner, Mugabe achieved a government of “national unity.”

4.2 Spain: “The Civil War within the Civil War”

That historian Hugh Thomas (2001) would choose to describe Barcelona on 7 May 1937 as a “city at war,” is, at first blush, unremarkable. At the time, Spain was in the throes of one of the 20th century’s most violent and bitter civil wars. The Republican
Government was fighting General Franco in what is often depicted as an ideological struggle between democracy and fascism. But the Barcelona violence to which Thomas refers was entirely free of fascist forces: Franco’s Republican enemy was engaged in a state of war—against itself. The internecine violence is estimated to have left thousands dead and wounded by the time it ended. The forces at work in Catalonia were the culmination of political, revolutionary, economic and military developments very much at cross-purposes. Jose Peirats would describe the region as possessing the greatest concentration of anarchist membership and, therefore, the greatest revolutionary élan. Consequently, it was also the region where the frictions between the several trade unions and political factions and between the central government and the autonomous regions were most stark. And finally, according to Peirats, Catalonia summed up all the grandeur and the misadventure of the revolution.8

In order to put the Catalonian episode in some limited relief, it is necessary to understand the array of participants, and how they came into the alliances that animated the conflict. The tenuous years between the 1931 fall of the Spanish monarchy (to the left) and the 1936 rise of the generals (against the left) set the stage for the conflict that would follow. In the municipal elections of 1931 the candidates supporting the monarchy were defeated. On 14 April 1931 the Republic was proclaimed and the Spanish monarchy was officially over. It could be safely claimed that in 1931 Spain was primarily Republican. Such a resounding margin of victory, however, only encouraged the defeated

8 See Peirats (2005 [1936]) volume 1, chapter 9.
side to mount more effective opposition. Conspiring on the right began almost as soon as the monarchy had fallen. By 1932, anti-republican schemes were prospering. The Carlist movement was revived in the wake of the republican victory. It allied itself with the Catholics, after republicans initiated legislation limiting Catholic education. The Carlists, moreover, were militantly hostile to liberalism and the intellectual spirit of the republican left. And among the military, anti-government conspiracies would produce an impulsive pitch in the summer of 1932. General Sanjurjo elected to attempt an ill-fated pronocimiento against the regime.

By 1933 the Republican government was beset with crisis. Anarchists revolts in Andalucia were an ongoing recurrence. Growing social unrest in the countryside was becoming an ever-present problem for the regime. Municipal elections in April of the same year favored the opposition's candidates, further weakening the government. By the fall of 1933, the government was forced to form a new cabinet and call for new elections. Sensing an opportunity to defeat the government, the right and center-right parties united into a single coalition called the Unioin de Derecha y Agrarios. Consequently, the left fared badly in the November Cortes elections, earning only 93 seats out of a possible 467. The remaining seats went to the right and center-right parties.

A failed revolution by the left in the following year would only exacerbate the polarization. The socialist-organized revolution of 1934 - often referred to as the Asturias revolution - resulted in the government declaring martial law and cost over 1000 lives. The military was ordered to suppress the rebellion. It did so without reservation. While the uprising was a disaster for the militants, it was a clear and frightening indication to
the nation precisely how precarious was the state of democracy. The revolution hardened mutual hatreds and reinforced extreme ideologies on both sides. The larger civil war that was to follow was in many ways a byproduct of the failed left-wing revolution of October 1934, cruelly repressed by the army and Civil Guard. An increasingly militant and rhetorical left inflamed anxieties of bolshevism and communist ideology. In the wake of the failed and violent revolution, the right, fearful of a second attempt, ultimately decided on a course of preemption. But nearly two more years would pass before the military general’s failed coup d’État would formally open the door to a protracted civil war.

As political tensions continued to increase after the failed revolution, all eyes turned to the elections scheduled for late February of 1936. The right consisted principally of an alliance between the monarchists, Carlists, and a highly concentrated Falange faction. The Catholic Church was also decidedly right-leaning and helped to finance the right’s campaign. The parties of the left and center-left—including the Socialist Party (PSOE), the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), and the Workers Party of Marxists Unification (POUM)—united into a single group, presenting a Popular Front program. In an election anticipated to be close, the left badly needed the anarchist vote. The anarchists, hoping to free many of their comrades from prison, overcame their anti-election penchant, turning out in large numbers. The results at the ballot box favored the left: the Popular Front won the February election by a margin of less than two percent. However, an electoral law encouraging coalitions, permitted a kind of ‘first past the post’

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9 The CEDA (Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right) was also a strong pre-war political alliance of Catholic parties. Its youth movement eventually went over to the Falange en mass during the spring of 1936 (Beevor, 2006).
result for the Popular Front in the Cortes, the Spanish legislative body. The Popular Front attained an absolute majority in the Cortes. Historian Antony Beevor notes: “The left, ignoring the narrowness of their victory, proceeded to behave as if they had received an overwhelming mandate for revolutionary change.”10 Less than six months later the generals revolted; Spain was at war.

During the war, the Nationalists, led by General Franco, consisted of the Alfonsine monarchists, the more Catholic-leaning Carlists and the pro-fascist Falangists. The Republican side included the Popular Front (and its affiliated organizations), the allies to the Popular Front and the Basques. As noted, the principal ally of the Popular Front were the anarchists. The primary anarchist actors were the anarcho-syndicalist trade union, known as the National Confederation of Labor (CNT), and the anarchist purists, known as the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI). The various trade unions on the Republican side fielded their own workers militias, which were gradually broken up and redistributed among units in the new Popular Army. This proved to be a highly contentious process.

In the days immediately following the coup, half of Spain was re-conquered from the insurgents in fierce street fighting. This left the country split largely along east-west lines. In Barcelona the CNT militias, aligned with the Catalanists provided critical resistance against the revolting military. Indeed for the first few months of the war Franco’s primary opponent was not so much the Government as the trade unions. And so

it was that the rising of the generals gave rise to an arrangement in half of Spain that put power into the hands of revolutionary proletariat: The anarchists were aligned with and actively supporting the socialists and communists. Political enemies before the war, these two sides faced the indelible challenge of preserving their alliance in the face of a common enemy. Could they hold it? Could they manage their own ideological divisions while together combatting the forces of Franco? The answers to these questions proved to be negative. Internal fractures and mutual suspicions produced what Antony Beevor has called the *civil war within the civil war*. Combat participant, George Orwell, would note in his war memoir that politically conscious people were far more aware of the internecine struggle between Anarchist and Communist forces than of the fight against Franco.11

The fate of the alliance reflects the dilemma of suspicious cooperation described above. The dilemma was that for the war to succeed, the communists and the anarchists, political enemies, were forced to cooperate. Together, the combined forces of each were formidable. Once the zones of control had been established, it was clear that the Republican’s advantages extended to both land and population. They also had at their disposal over 90,000 in combat forces (versus Franco’s 130,000). And indeed for a long war it appeared as if the Republicans had the advantage, in their control of industrial

manpower from large cities, mining areas, gold reserves, and two-thirds of mainland territory.\textsuperscript{12}

But the ultimate objective of both groups could not be realized during the fight with Franco. For the anarchists, the civil war and the revolution were inseparable; for the communists, the civil war was an opportunity to forestall revolution indefinitely. Austrian journalist Franz Borkenau would characterize the conundrum during the war by saying:

“The Spanish revolution, unlike the French and Russian revolutions, cannot decide its problems by armed fight between the revolutionary factions, not at present at least. Franco is too strong for that, and any open rupture in the revolutionary camp would bring his immediate victory. This is what at present keeps antagonistic groups such as the communists and the anarchists together.”\textsuperscript{13}

Both the communists and the anarchists fully expected to make short work of the other after the defeat of Franco. That is, they anticipated a struggle for consolidation. The general feeling of opprobrium was reciprocated. The anarchists made preparations to consolidate their power, strengthening their political committees, bolstering their armaments, extending their militias, expanding their control of factories, gradually extending their sphere of action, to make them able, at the decisive hour, to take over power without much difficulty.\textsuperscript{14} But in an environment of mutual dislike and distrust, the “decisive hour” never arrived. The dilemma gave way to tragedy, as a “civil war within the civil war” erupted on the Republican side. Never sufficiently capable of

\textsuperscript{12} Figures taken from Beevor (2006).
\textsuperscript{13} See Borkenau (1963) p. 111. In his own memoirs about the war, George Orwell directs his readers to this volume, describing it as no less than the “ablest book that has yet appeared on the Spanish war.” He would also add that Borkenau offers “the best account of the interplay between the parties on the Government side” (p. 57, footnote 2).
\textsuperscript{14} Borkenau (1963) p. 88.
overcoming their reciprocated hatred and fear, the Republican side descended into outright fighting between anarchists and communists.

The open warfare was most intense in Barcelona, where casualties are estimated to have reached over 1000 dead and several thousand wounded during the course of only a few days in early May of 1937. The fighting was sparked when the police, under orders from the government, attempted to wrest control of the Telephone Exchange from the anarchists. As the intensity of the conflict escalated and the city became the scene of a bloody showdown, the government issued orders to employ the full range of weapons, including planes to combat the anarchists, unless they handed over their arms. On 6 May it deployed two Republican destroyers and a battleship from Valencia armed with men. Fighting also persisted in other coastal cities. Some thirty or forty anarchists were killed in Tarragona and more in Tortosa.

The Republican side never fully recovered from the fratricidal strife to which it succumbed. Even after the bloody days of May 1937 the government—mostly controlled by the communists—not only continued its policy of arresting anarchists, it increased such efforts. They blamed the Catalonia disturbance on ‘Trotskyist-Fascist” forces. In fact, nothing short of a witch-hunt ensued as paranoia took over much of the Spanish Republic. A deep split had opened up, one from which the Republicans would not recover. Franco was the ultimate beneficiary. Consolidation for either the communists or the anarchists was never to transpire.

\[15\] Peirats (2005) p. 133.
\[16\] Thomas (2001) footnote 1 p. 641.
4.3 Comparative Analysis

How is one to account for such drastic differences in outcomes between Spain and Zimbabwe? In one case, intra-coalition competition effectively redounded to success in the initial civil war and precipitated a second phase of conflict; and in the other, it proved ruinous, contributing to the loss by the anti-Franco camp. The theoretical insight developed in Chapter 2 suggests that when the potential for conflict pervades a coalition, it can certainly prompt members to overcome an implicit tendency to freeride. Plainly, in both Spain and Zimbabwe coalition members appreciated that today’s ally was tomorrow’s enemy. And traditional impediments to collective dissent and rebellion were obviously eclipsed in both conflicts. But in Spain, historical antagonisms within the anti-Franco coalition proved irreconcilable during the war, spiraling into red-on-red violence before the contest with the Fascists was decided. And in Zimbabwe, the nationalists coalesced into a Patriotic Front and then precipitously fell apart upon a favorable settlement leading to the election of one of its members. In probing the distinctions between the civil wars in Spain and Zimbabwe—two wars where competition was the hallmark of key wartime alliances—a few prominent features emerge to help explain the fundamentally opposite fate of the two Patriotic Fronts.

The first is the actual degree and nature of rivalry inherent in the two respective alliances. While the extent or magnitude of internal competition is difficult to operationalize, there is good evidence to suggest that in Spain animosities and divisions were at their most bitter and extreme—far outpacing those evident in the Zimbabwe episode. The 1936 Cortes elections reveal just how fragmented was the Popular Front
alliance. The Front itself consisted of three primary blocs: Communists, Socialists and Republicans. Each of these blocs in turn were comprised as follows. **Communists:** PCE, BOC, POUM, PCP, and trade unionists; **Socialists:** PSOE, USC; **Republicans:** AR, RS, IR, UR, ERC, PCR, AC, PNCR, UR, ANV, IV, ORGA, EV, federalists, and independents (Colomer, 2004). This lengthy catalog of abbreviations recalls George Orwell’s comment that Spain was suffering from a *plague of initials*.\(^{17}\) The distribution of votes and seats in the 1936 elections are shown in Table 18. The margin of victory for the left was extremely narrow. And while the Popular Front emerged as the winner of the electoral contest, critically it lacked a majority. Moreover, the anarchists were not represented in the legislative body at all, on account of the CNT and FAI (Federation of Iberian Anarchists) not putting forward any candidates. The right, by contrast, was both powerful and more concentrated than the left.

The war that would ravage Spain in the wake of the 1936 elections was above all a political war, only heightened by its revolutionary backdrop. And the differences between the political parties on the Republican side were forged from competing – and possibly irreconcilable – political theories. The extant differences between the communists and anarchists were so profound they far eclipsed any potential to positively contribute to the defeat of Franco. The issue of the revolution was never resolved, nor could it continue, in the midst of the Fascist threat.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{17}\) As already noted, Orwell volunteered with an anarchist unit affiliated with the POUM during the war. He would go on to say in his memoirs about his Spanish experience: “It is a horrible thing to have to enter into the details of inter-party polemics; it is like diving into a cesspool” (Orwell, 1980, p. 149).
Table 18: 1936 Spanish Cortes election results\textsuperscript{18}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political bloc</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular front (Communists, Socialists, Republicans)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-right (Liberals)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right (Catholics, Monarchists)</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By way of comparison, in Zimbabwe political divisions were significantly less pronounced and certainly less acute at the sub-coalition level. After Mugabe split ZANU-PF from the Patriotic Front, it was able to win nearly 63 percent of the popular vote in the 1980 elections. Nkomo’s PF-ZAPU party still won over 24 percent of the votes, as well as representation in the new government. The short-lived United African National Council (UANC), led by Bishop Muzorewa won over 8 percent, while the United People’s Association of Matabeleland won just over 4 percent. Within the larger blocs (ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU) there was also considerably less infighting and component sub-factions than was evident in Spain in 1936. The outright level of division and hostility in Zimbabwe did not match those of the Spanish war. And unlike Spain, the Zimbabwe conflict was not a political conflict so much as one of liberation, at least in its motivation.

The various guerrilla movements, while differing over strategy and even ideology, shared a clear vision of their nationalistic purpose. Tribal and ethnic antagonisms may have also undermined unity efforts, but these were secondary to the fight against white

\textsuperscript{18} Source: Colomer (2004).
Rhodesia. More than anything else, ZANU-ZAPU splits and internal divisions occurred on account of a basic question: Who ought to lead the nationalist struggle against white rule? This question was so protracted because factions within the nationalist movement appreciated that those who wielded power within it would of necessity inherit power once the struggle for liberation was brought to fruition (Sithole, 1980). Political differences, although at times palpable during the war with Rhodesia, were sufficiently held in abeyance during the independence struggle. It is not until after independence that political division became more pronounced. Unlike in Spain, where the background issue of revolution remained an open question throughout the war, the question of liberation was eventually resolved in favor of the nationalists in Zimbabwe. So the nature of intra-alliance rivalry was fundamentally different in both scope and origin between the two conflicts in question.

A second obvious difference between the two conflicts relates to the nature of elections in each. In a certain sense, the 1980 elections in Zimbabwe, set forth within the Lancaster Accords, served as a focal point for the conflicting parties. With the elections in sight, each party could effectively focus on the potential political gains they promised. This is essentially what Mugabe did towards the end of the conflict as he utilized ZANU’s extensive basis of power and support to drive the political agenda, albeit from a position of relative power. Nkomo, as a national hero and figurehead to many

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19 For a sober discussion and review of ethnicity and factionalism in Zimbabwean nationalists politics during the independence struggle, see Sithole (1980). This work suggests that splits in the nationalist camp were often less motivated by tribal differences than political calculation and outright power grabs.
Zimbabweans, also held out hope that he would be part of any future government in Zimbabwe.

By contrast, the elections in Spain had precisely the opposite effect—they revealed and exacerbated extant divisions among the Spanish left. Rather than ameliorating social tensions, the characteristics of the Spanish electoral system only served to reinforce and deepen social polarization (Balcells, 2010). It was precisely the type of hybrid system that encouraged strategic voting (Lintz, 1967) and led to the over-representation of the candidates with the most votes. Voters could cast votes for between 67 and 80 percent of the candidates in each district, depending on the number of seats up for grabs in the district. However, the seats in each district were divided between the two most voted lists: the "majority" and the "minority." A qualified plurality of at least 20 percent (later changed to 40 percent) was necessary to earn the number of seats for which the voter could vote (between 67 and 80 percent) in that district. This was the majority. The minority received the remaining number of seats (between 33 and 20 percent). Under this system, it was theoretically possible for a candidacy to win as much as 42 percent of the overall votes and still garner zero seats. Thus, the narrow margin of victory, coupled with a high incentive for strategic voting, made the post-1936 election

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20 The Spanish electoral system improvised in 1931 was in many ways a response to the old plurality system which favored local bosses ('caciques'). The new hybrid system, however, preserved some undesirable criteria of the system it was intended to supplant. All the single member districts, which had been bases of traditional monarchist support, were abolished. They were replaced with small and medium multi-member districts with limited ballot - or what is called an open list system with semi-proportional (limited) rule. The new rules and the multi-member districts were even more restrictive than those they replaced; they were more likely to create artificial majorities with a minority of voting support (Colomer, 2004).
period the most opportune moment for a military strike against a fragile government with a weak popular mandate. In this regard, the generals struck precisely when the occasion suggested maximum opportunity. The division on the left was both manifest and profound.

A third factor contributing to the distinct fates of the divided coalitions in Zimbabwe and Spain relates to foreign influences. In the Zimbabwe conflict, the chief external actors were South Africa, Mozambique, and Zambia; \(^{21}\) and in Spain, while Germany and Italy both provided military support to Franco, the primary external actor on the Republican side was the Soviet Union. It would be difficult to overstate devastation brought on by Soviet intervention in Spain. While initially reluctant to become involved in Spain, after 1936, the Iberian conflict became a matter of special importance for the USSR. The eventual Soviet goal was to ensure that the Spanish Communist Party seized power and established a state that would become another Soviet satellite, or at least one favorably disposed to Stalin’s regime. Towards this end, the Soviets attempted to establish an omnipresent police force and to liquidate all non-Communist forces (Courtois and Panne, 1999). Given the highly charged state of affairs in Spain, the results of Soviet actions proved highly destructive for the Republican side.

The scope and covert means of Soviet intervention proved highly antithetical to their Republican partners. First, for any armament purchases, the Soviets insisted on payment in advance with gold reserves from Spain. Soviet credit was not forthcoming

\(^{21}\) China, Cuba and the Soviet Union also provided arms and training to the Nationalists groups.
and the veracity of their accounting methods was difficult to judge. For instance, in 1936, more than 510 tons of precious metals, worth over $518 million at 1936 values, were transferred from Spain to the Soviets. One of the first bills the Republic had to pay with its gold amounted to $51,160,168. It was for the ‘fraternal military support’ already provided (Beevor, 2006). Second, the primary tactic the Soviets employed was to occupy more and more positions in the Republican government so as to dictate policy in accordance with its own interests (Courtois and Panne, 1999) and to turn the Popular Front alliance into a platform for its own hegemony. The aim became not merely antifascist, but to liquidate all internal opposition. The persecution of political opponents began with the socialists and extended to the anarchist factions, as well as any rebellious communists. It also included labor unions and trade movements. The already protracted divisions between the communists and the anarchists within the Popular Front evolved into a new front in the war. Within the Republican alliance, the POUM (The Workers Party of Marxist Unification) became the primary political target of the government. In the summer of 1937, the POUM was officially banned and its entire executive committee was arrested. And once the POUM had been effectively eliminated, the anarchists were persecuted in turn. As the Russians moved into a position to dictate terms, power migrated to the Communists.

By comparison, while Mozambique, South Africa and other frontline states played a prominent part in the Zimbabwe conflict, their involvement came nowhere close to the ruinous role played by the Soviet Union in Spain. Mozambique served primarily as a sanctuary for the ZANLA, the ZANU army; this was especially the case after 1975,
when FRELIMO, ZANU’s main ally in Mozambique, took control of the country and opened up its border with Zimbabwe. Zambia also allowed ZAPU units to establish bases within its border. South Africa, the most influential country during the war, was Rhodesia’s economic lifeline during its liberation struggle. Its role changed considerably after 1979. Once Mugabe assumed the reigns of power, South Africa’s primary contribution to the conflict was to lend assistance to the dissidents in Matabeleland. During this time, South Africa came to represent a security threat to the new regime in Zimbabwe. Many whites fled Rhodesia for South Africa, and some even joined the South African Defense Force, where they were in a position to aid the Matabeleland rebels. This likely contributed to Mugabe’s brutal crackdown on ZAPU units. But none of the aid, training, or assistance provided by any of the regional actors of the Zimbabwe war came anywhere close to the direct management of the conflict witnessed in Spain by the USSR. In fact, many of the frontline states remained frustrated at their lack of direct influence in orchestrating nationalist unity.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, seldom lacked in its ability to sway political, and at times military, events in Spain. In fact, such an overt supervision of the war effort in Spain by Stalin’s forces reveals a final aspect of how internal divisions in each of the two conflicts produced such drastic variation in outcome. At Soviet insistence, there was an overt and direct effort by the Republicans to bring all of the various militia forces, usually loyal to their affiliated trade unions or political parties, under a unified command. For example, both the POUM and the PSUC fielded their respective and separate militias. The trade unions also armed their members. Perhaps predictably, the concerted effort to
break up party militias proved a great source of tension and agitation. Anarchist units often refused to salute and were disinclined to accept the strict rank structures imposed upon them. Party affiliation often outstripped loyalty to the Republican regime, and Soviet insistence on military discipline within the Republican ranks clashed with Spanish social and political culture. This effort also coincided with the open move to remove the POUM from all reaches of government. The inevitable result was a decrease in combat effectiveness and an increase in mutual accusations and recriminations on the Republican side.

By contrast, both training and operations of ZANU and ZAPU military wings were kept largely separate.\(^{22}\) There existed sizable variation in experience and training of the nationalist guerrilla groups operating in Zimbabwe. Insurgents loyal to both groups were trained all over Africa, as well as Cuba, China and the USSR. Consequently, there was a lack of a unifying strategy in how to defeat the Rhodesian state. There was, however, some pressure – very often politically motivated – on both groups from African countries to achieve some overlap in training between ZANLA and ZIPRA militias. Little became of such efforts, as both groups maintained covert training camps in separate countries. By 1997, the insurgent groups made no pretense of joint training. The idea of joint combat operations between ZANLA and ZIPRA units was similarly short-lived. Again under frontline pressure, ZANU and ZAPU formed the Zimbabwe’s People’s Army (ZIPA), an operational combination of ZIPRA and ZANLA under a joint military

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\(^{22}\) The section that follows (evaluating guerrilla training and operations in Zimbabwe) relies heavily on Moorcraft and McLaughlin (2010), chapter 5.
committee. ZIPA was more an outgrowth, forced by external pressures for unity, than a reflection of any organic desire to merge operations. ZIPA mounted an offensive in early 1976 into eastern Rhodesia, resulting in high desertion rates from ZIPRA members, whose command was in no way committed to a long-term offensive in eastern Rhodesia. Joint cooperation soon dwindled and ZIPA was effectively defunct by 1977. And a fleeting attempt at a military coordinating committee also faltered the same year.

It is not a coincidence that the Patriotic Front alliance, originally forged in 1976 for the Geneva constitutional conference, produced no effective military unity between the constituent parties. Almost from alliance inception, the ZANLA and ZIPRA wings of the ZAPU and ZANU parties fought their own battles and maintained separate spheres of control, base camps, and zones of operation for the remainder of the war. And on the few occasions when forces from the different militias overlapped, clashes between armies sometimes resulted. Such an institution of separation arguably preserved their respective and collective capacities to continue the armed conflict against the Rhodesian regime. Both groups were effectively able to mobilize local populations and build popular support in “liberated zones” under their influence. More than this, the military wings were able to organize their war efforts and theater of operations around their separate “war zones,” often dividing such zones into smaller provinces and sectors. This was especially true for the ZANLA militia, which broke sectors down into detachments of 100 to 200 men operating in ten to fifteen sections (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 2010).

And finally, the relative strength of allies vis-à-vis each other is another factor likely to have amplified the difficulties within the Spanish alliance and to have mitigated
them in the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. Certainly the relative weakness of the ZAPU organization in the late 1970s affected their decision to preserve their alliance with ZANU. Nkomo was simply not in a position to carry on the struggle against the white Rhodesian forces without the assistance of ZANU rebel forces. And the position of power enjoyed by Mugabe within the alliance likely affected his propensity to ultimately negotiate, even when continued violence was an open and viable option. In Spain, however, the communist and anarchist factions on the Republican side were much more evenly matched. Clearly the efforts of the armed trade unions and other anarchists in the early days of the wars preserved and took back much of the Republican zone from the Nationalists. The communists were in some sense indebted to the early efforts of the anarchists. Thus from a manpower point of view, neither side considered itself the junior partner, as both were formidable parts of the Republican war effort. Such a relatively even balance of power between the anarchists and communists did not lend itself to one side or the other lightly acquiescing to demands and requests. As both sides fully anticipated conflict with the other upon the defeat of Franco, a relative balance of strength perpetuated the notion on both sides that they would prevail in the eventual showdown. In this regard, equality of size exacerbated overt levels of competition already afflicting the Republican alliance.

In sum, the civil wars in Spain and Zimbabwe reflected a reality common to most internal conflicts. The coalitions formed during the wars were wracked with division and dissent. Such competition is in some ways a defining characteristic of alliances forged in the crucible of civil war. The theoretical insight outlined in prior portions of this project
suggests a delicate tradeoff between alliance strength and stability on account of internal divisions. Allying with the enemy is strategy laden with risk, even if the potential gains are sizable. Intraparty rivalry worked decidedly against the Popular Front in Spain. By contrast, in Zimbabwe it proved a more effective countermeasure against traditional difficulties associated with collective rebellion. There, guerrillas simultaneously prepared for dual conflicts – one against Rhodesia, the other against their ally. Certain factors amplified and interacted with alliance competition to precipitate the differing outcomes in each conflict.

In Spain, an insistence by the Soviets and their communist allies that militias allegiant to anarchist trade unions and political parties merge into government regiments proved a high source of tension, negatively impacting troop moral and combat capacity. Anarchist and communist units understood discipline in distinct ways. In Zimbabwe, the forceful integration of ZANU and ZAPU guerilla units was largely resisted. Indeed once Mugabe assumed power, the formation of a new military favoring ZANLA over ZIPRA units was a source of conflict. That it was a process put off until after the fate of their struggle with the Rhodesians, may have helped preserve their alliance during the war. This suggests that an active institution of separation between rival militias, ostensibly allied at the political level, may help manage internal divisions.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\) This is also an institution that proved fruitful for rivals Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek during their conflict with the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Enemies before the war with Japan, and fully anticipating a resumption of their bitter civil conflict after the international war, Mao and Chiang Kai-shek made conscientious efforts to keep their respective Communist and Nationalists forces separated during their joint conflict with Japan. See *The Cambridge History of China Volume 13: Republican China 1912–1949*, edited by Fairbank and Feuerwerker (1986) for more on this episode.
Elections and electoral systems also impacted the two conflicts in largely opposite ways. In Spain, electoral results, and a system offering disproportional representation to winners, served to reflect and reveal how profound were the social and political divisions in the country. This system also allowed the generals to strike precisely when the left was plainly most divided. In Zimbabwe, the elections folded into the Lancaster Accords as part of the war settlement helped the war transition out of conflict, as parties set their sights on political gains. The election results in 1980 may have reflected the relative balance of power already meted out via fighting. But as a symbolic representation of a transfer from the old regime of white rule, the elections were paramount in moving the country out of the liberation struggle.

There is not one single factor that stands out above all else as the key component in explaining the differing fates of the two Patriotic Fronts. Certainly, ideological differences played key roles in both cases investigated here. But ideology alone cannot fully explain the splits in Zimbabwe or in Spain. Indeed Mugabe proved more of a pragmatist and less of an ideologue as the civil war in Zimbabwe approached its final stages. And as the Spanish war evolved and lengthened, communist and revolutionary élan receded behind the necessity of defeating Franco. Unfortunately, by this time, much of the damage was already done. And the meddling influences of external actors proved important, especially in Spain. But the disaster that befell the Republican side during the war cannot be entirely attributed to Soviet subversion and malfeasance. At the very least, however, this discourse invites a fuller investigation of varying implications and complications of conflict within coalitions and across them.
5. Discussion and Conclusions

The analysis and larger project presented here was motivated by a basic question related to coalitions: how do actors balance the threats they face within alliances against those hostilities external to them? In an effort to address this inquiry, a formal theory of alliance formation was developed. The theory focuses on how allying parties make decisions regarding resource mobilization for conflictual purposes, in the presence of both internal and external hazards. In a game-theoretic context, the model probes the precise conditions under which actors prefer to ally with friends or foes. The results of this formal exercise suggest, somewhat unexpectedly, that rivals can at times produce superior alliances to coalitions among friends – provided they are willing to assume an inherently higher degree of risk.

The primary takeaway from this research agenda is straightforward. In coalition settings, rivalry and competition is a potential cause of both instability and strength. That is, internal division is not only a source of insecurity but also a wellspring of potency. Intra-alliance conflict can aid protagonists in overcoming classical obstacles to collective dissent and rebellion. When groups and other actors lack certainty about commitment levels from their potential allies, collective efforts and collective capacity to carry out conflictual contests may actually increase. Rather counter-intuitively, uncertainty and discord may be unlikely contributors to alliance successes against external foes.

But the theory does not point to unequivocal coalition good fortune on account of internal differences. There is a higher risk premium associated with alliances formed between rival factions. By direct implication, when the probability of coalition collapse is
appreciably high, all groups stand to collectively lose out on the benefits of cooperation. Worse yet, the instability inherent in such arrangements means that all groups may find themselves without allies in very hostile environments. This means that beyond forgoing collective benefits, groups stand a good chance of suffering actual harm when alliances between rivals fail. There is thus a delicate balance between coalition competition that facilitates collective success and coalition competition that portends collective disaster.

While the generation of and development of these concepts was carried out in a general formal setting, the empirical implications stemming from the model were tested in the coalition environment of civil conflicts. The question of civil war is certainly a longstanding problem within the subfield of comparative politics. The central puzzle emphasized in studies of civil wars is their genesis. Collective action obstacles, reinforced by governments enjoying overwhelming advantages in military might, should combine to deter rebellion. And yet, militant groups do find common cause against governments with sufficient regularity as to make internal wars more frequent than traditional theory would suggest. Current events in Africa and the Middle East reinforce this turbulent reality. Given this empirical regularity, the more appropriate theoretical question is: how do rebels ever overcome apparently dismal odds and defeat governments? The theoretical work presented here affords analytical leverage towards answering this important question by embedding it within a theory of alliance formation.

The theoretical payoffs of this line of analysis are multiple. First, the theoretical perspective developed here has offered a new way to interpret at least two outstanding questions related to conflict and collective efforts. It does so by specifically linking
internal coalition interactions with external outcomes. If groups facing collective dilemmas in civil wars lack confidence about levels of commitment to joint endeavors such as alliances, the usual freeriding scenario changes drastically. More precisely, a security dilemma emerges within ‘rivalrous’ alliances. Consequently, freeriding is no longer a risk free strategy under such conditions. By confronting factions with the negative consequences of shirking, internal competition compels them to prepare for the worst. For civil conflicts, this clearly recasts the traditional “Rebel’s Dilemma” in a new way. An unintended and direct consequence of this dynamic is the formation of coalitions more capable of taking on governments in civil wars. This led to the first hypothesis under inspection: competitive alliances promote rebel victory in civil wars.

A second order implication of the theory is that intra-party instability may also generate more civil war relapse. Dual rivalries – those between groups and within them – have important implications for the likely recurrence of war as well as its outcome. While internal divisions and mutual suspicions may at times make coalitions stronger, they may also undermine coalition unity to the point of collapse. That is, competitive alliances should also abet the conflict renewal process at the end of wars. This produced the second hypothesis under consideration: competitive alliances promote civil war recurrence after conflicts end.

That groups should appreciate a security dilemma within their coalitions in no way implies that they escape it – even in the event of coalition success. In fact, quite the contrary may be closer to the truth. Coalition victory in civil wars may actually exacerbate security dilemmas between the victors. The theory is thus able to address a
second outstanding inquiry related to civil conflict – the civil war trap. Why do countries often find themselves in the throes of civil violence multiple times within fixed periods of time? The civil war trap represents another enduring social phenomena for which a multitude of potential causes have been put forth. The theoretical portion of this dissertation, however, offers a direct link from the problem of civil war recurrence back to problems of collective action. Quite simply, internal competitive factors enabling groups to overcome the problem of collective rebellion may also contribute to the “conflict trap.”

By connecting the conflict trap with collective action, this project also addresses the varied processes of conflict transformation. Who is likely to prevail in civil conflicts? And why do civil wars start anew once they have ended? This dissertation strongly indicates that these are not independent questions. Bridging the two, this project sets out a new manner for explaining and understanding the reciprocal relationship between civil war outcomes and civil war recurrence. Ultimately, internal alliance dynamics have important implications for conflict outcomes and the likely recurrence of war. The termination of one civil war may provide fertile conditions for the start of another – and alliance dynamics provide novel insight as to how this conflictual process may play out.

The empirical evidence largely bears this out. Competitiveness within coalitions is a strong predictor of both rebel victories and follow-on conflicts. This relationship is robust to numerous other confounding factors. It also emerges in both the ‘a’ and ‘b’ versions of the alliance data. Rivalry and competition may improve a coalition’s capacity to win; but they also increase the odds of conflict renewal in the aftermath of war.
Importantly, the finding that coalitions composed of rivals is a strong predictor of follow-on wars is robust to changes in the various ways wars end, and to complicating environmental factors. This result allowed for an extension to the analysis, by also considering the interaction of competitive alliances with various war outcomes. In this regard, the research project was ultimately able to gain purchase on a question not originally asked. Specifically, this dissertation extends and refines the Wagner hypothesis relating war outcomes and war recurrence. Military victories by either governments or rebels are overwhelmingly more stable than negotiated settlements, unless they are accompanied by competitive rebel coalitions. In which case, the stable outcome is precisely reversed.

This discovery helps move the scholarly discourse beyond Atlas and Licklider’s (1999) keen but under-examined observation that one obstacle to achieving negotiated peace settlements in civil wars is “often a breakdown in relations among former allies, not former foes.” This breakdown process and the obstacles it presents to preserving peace are not limited to wars ending in negotiated settlements. They can transpire in a multitude of post conflict settings, including military victories. Moving forward, studies should aim to uncover the ways in which different war endings (government victories, rebel victories, negotiated settlements, truces) are more or less susceptible to the process of conflict renewal detailed here.

As indicated, this work has, in fact, initiated precisely this line of research for an important and much debated issue in civil war termination. The results suggest qualifications to studies extolling the virtues of military – and particularly rebel –
victories are in order. More precisely, the ‘pro-rebel’ chorus of work (arguing rebel victories are less likely to break down into renewed conflict) may be conveying a misleading and partial story. The evidence here indicates that rebel wins in the absence of competitive alliances are certainly likely stability enhancing outcomes. But rebel wins by a coalition of rivals produce precisely the opposite result—more war. It is therefore insufficient to ask which type of victory—government or rebel—is more or less peace promoting. Again, a more refined distinction is in order, one probing the precise conditions under which both government and rebel victories are more or less likely to relapse into violence. The same can be said regarding the effectiveness of negotiated peace settlements. It is not the outcome themselves that are important, but the contextual conditions under which they arise.

This study also provides support for theories emphasizing the role of such contextual conditions on war recurrence, particularly democracy and prosperity. Factors such as life expectancy and political freedoms prove to significantly alter the likelihood for new wars in ways one would anticipate. When political institutions are stronger, less war recurrence is the expected outcome. Additionally, a critical contextual factor for causing new wars relates to war costs and intensity. The longer and more brutal a war, the higher are the chances it will repeat. Thus the conditional variables speaking to war renewal at the ends of wars are many, and their impacts can be strong. Even after controlling for the influence of these important factors, competitiveness among rebel forces still emerges as a key determinant of war recurrence. This result is robust to
alternative specifications of intraparty rivalry (ordinal vs. categorical) and numerous controls for other confounding factors, including ethnic divisions.

Clearly, however, there may be alternative causal channels that could produce very similar results or help to explain variations in civil war outcomes and recurrence. Antagonistic alliances, for example, may serve as a signal that a government has experienced a loss of support across a broad spectrum of society. Such a loss of legitimacy, in turn, may indicate to supporters of the regime that its likelihood of falling is high, promoting internal defections or coups from within the government. This research effort is thus by no means the final word on alliances and competition in civil war. It does, however, present a novel and fruitful way of thinking about these issues.

This research highlights the influential role coalitions play in understanding various aspects of conflict. Alliances, being inherently strategic, help shed light on one of the most strategic of all social phenomena—civil wars. However, in addition to studies of civil war renewal and outcome, the theory articulated and data collected for this project open opportunities for addressing a host of other important factors related to internal conflicts, including war duration, levels of violence, and the effectiveness of third party intervention. It has been observed that conflict processes and outcomes emerge from the complex interplay of multiple actors (Goldstone, 2001). The study of coalitions, therefore, offers a promising way to bridge empirical observation about participation in conflictual settings with theoretical insight. If we are to maintain the rational choice assumption that carrying out acts of collective violence is an endeavor fraught with difficulty, then renewed efforts should aim at improving our understanding of how agents
surmount these obstacles. This analysis, particularly the aspect dealing with freeriding, is an important step in that direction.

The work also introduces an original dataset on militant alliances in civil wars from 1994 to 2001. The new data classify rebel forces according to a typology of internal rivalry, specifically marking instances where known rivals unite in joint endeavors. The distinction between more or less united rebel forces proves to be quite fruitful, although there clearly remains room to expand this conceptualization of alliances to other established databases of civil war, e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003), Correlates of War, PRIO-Uppsala. In fact, it would be highly desirable to increase the number of conflict observations beyond the current 125 episodes. As there is a high degree of variation between civil war datasets, the opportunity to enlarge the number of cases is as strong as it is necessary. Efforts to replicate the results generated here with other data can add credence to the theory developed herein and help to refine it. Unpacking the conditions where the theory fails to generate the expected results should also be highly informative and improve our collective understanding of violence in coalition settings.

While the implications of this insight are drawn out in civil war settings, there is room to extend them to many other research domains. That is to say, the theory articulated here is highly generalizable and equally applicable to an array of coalition or alliance situations, including empirical investigations of the study of coalition government formation, counterinsurgency, civil-military relations, gang interactions, political protest, monetary unions, and electoral studies. Internal competition and the
consequences it may impart to a whole host of social phenomena is an area ripe for future inquiry.

Related to the varied and multiplicative nature of alliance and coalition agreements, it is worth adding a brief word about the crafting of such arrangements. At both the domestic and international levels, factions, states and other actors face challenges they may be better equipped to deal with in concert with other actors. Forming unions, partnerships, associations, pacts and otherwise loose coalitions is a common way for parties to jointly face up to shared problems and collective concerns. This research project, especially its formal component, suggests rather plainly that alliance arrangements should contain some minimum form of punishment mechanism to keep parties honest. If groups or states in such unions do not appreciate the possibility of their dismissal for commitment failures or other breaches, then they may quite rationally, and without fear of consequence, take advantage of their alliance partners. The prospect of being forced into a Hobbesian world, as is the case in the formal model, is perhaps a draconian measure. But the point remains: if actors are to forfeit nothing on account of freeriding, then it is really no surprise that they would do so. This insight has potential implications for the structuring of alliances such as common defense pacts or monetary unions.

In addition to the formal and empirical models, this project studies a couple of cases of civil wars marked by highly contentious alliances. Some important interactive factors emerge from the qualitative investigation. First, elections may either exacerbate social and political divisions already present in domestic affairs, or help to mitigate them.
The role elections play in civil wars is an understudied area of scholarship. And determining when and under what conditions elections are likely to alleviate social tensions or add to them is an obvious follow-on investigation to this project. Second, the active separation of potentially hostile factions is another factor that may contribute to the success of mutually suspicious coalitions. This is but one institution among many that may help keep animosities in abeyance, at least until common threats have been eliminated or effectively neutralized. This process appears to have more or less transpired in Zimbabwe, but not in civil war Spain. During the Iberian conflict, the forced integration of militias with ideological and historical antagonisms backfired for the Republicans.

Third, the relative size of parties within tenuous coalitions may be an important reflection of competition or the potential for future conflict between them. When the distribution of power within coalitions is clarified on account of size asymmetries (as was the case in the Patriotic Front between ZANU and ZAPU), the likelihood of internal divisions escalating to the point of violence may be significantly lessened, especially in the presence of a common external threat. By contrast, when parties are of relatively equal strength within alliances (as was the case in Spain between the communists and anarchists), disagreements they share may actually be heightened. Parity may actually increase competition within divided coalitions, if not aggravate levels of uncertainty. This is indeed an inquiry that lends itself to formal investigation, as well as empirical follow-up.
Lastly, the two qualitative investigations suggest that the influence of third parties and external actors is in many regards a sizeable unknown. External states clearly have the capacity to do great benefit or harm on behalf of the parties they favor in civil conflicts. The empirical component of this project controls for both major power involvement and intervention by any third party. In light of the two cases investigated in the preceding chapter, such binary covariates come off as shabby and otherwise inadequate proxies for very dynamic engagements. It is therefore important to look beyond the statistics and formulas. Internal divisions between ZANU and ZAPU were obvious sources of frustration for front line states encouraging increased political and military cooperation between the two parties. And while they may have found Zimbabwean intra-party divisions exasperating, countries like Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania were in no way ignorant to the sources and realities of such rivalries. The Soviets, by contrast, demonstrated significantly less subtlety in dealing with and appreciating the protracted and bitter rift in the Republican left in Spain.

This observation highlights the difficulties and hazards countries face when attempting to influence and shape outcomes in civil conflicts. This invites a brief treatment of this study’s potential policy relevance. The policy implications of this study are somewhat unsettling. For instance, expediting the overthrow of regimes may invite sectarian conflict to widen, not subside. Such a risk is particularly acute when wars have already dragged on for a considerable amount of time, and participating coalitions are highly factionalized. The chances that negotiated settlements will unravel under these conditions are also uncomfortably high. But understanding precisely when such hazards
are most profound is certainly a necessary prerequisite for avoiding the escalation of conflicts.

From a policy perspective, the evidence considered here suggests that recommendations regarding involvement in any civil conflict be sensitive to grievances groups may have with one another. The literature on protest and rebellion puts much emphasis on the social grievances groups have with governments. This is certainly the case in places like Iran and Syria. But this work highlights the importance of grievances groups may have with one another as a likely source of volatility and instability. Ignoring such horizontal tensions may be tantamount to inviting the renewal of violence. And such horizontal grievances are obviously factors in the current conflicts in both Mali and Syria. These difficulties are likely to plague all involved parties. Appreciating them is a minimum prerequisite for sustaining any chances of peace moving forward.
Appendix A: Alliances in Civil War Coding Notes

Afghanistan (1978-1992)
Alliance: Mujahideen parties, IUAM
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) (D&S) code this instance from 1978 until 1992, which is a relatively long time given the situation in Afghanistan during that time. They start the war in 1978 because of the violence associated with the PDPA’s capture of the state. The Soviet invasion did not take place until the end of the following year (Dec, 1979). Some datasets code this as the onset of a new war owing to the Soviet puppet regime, the DRA (e.g., Lyall, 2010). However, D&S do not code the onset of a new war in 1979. They code the end of this war as 1992, when the mujahideen capture power “and the state changed hands and the issues of the war changed.”

It is clear that mujahideen alliances developed during this period, the most prominent being the IUAM. That there was a high degree of intra-party tension and even fighting before victory is also the case. Adamec (2005, p. lxi) notes turf battles between competing mujahideen units in July of 1989 as well as fights over control of a bridge in Helmand Province that produced lucrative toll revenues. Adamec (2005) frequently notes internal tensions between the leaders of the main mujahideen groups. For instance: “Leaders of three of the main mujahedin groups in Peshawar denounce the attempt by Add al –Rasul Sayyaf to appoint himself for another term as head of the seven-member Alliance of Afghanistan Mujahedin” (p. liv). Various elements of the mujahideen at times also backed or supported coup efforts against the government, while others did not.
Alliance: Hezb-i-Wahdat, (Taliban)
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes

D&S code a new war beginning in 1992 because the mujahideen took power. The civil war in Afghanistan during this period was in many ways a continuation of the infighting and conflicts between mujahideen groups that began during the 1978 to 1992 phase of the war. The failure of the mujahideen to achieve political unity was in many ways the cause of the continued conflict. There were numerous militias and changing alliances (Dorronsoro, 2005) during this period. There is mixed evidence that the eventual victor during this period—the Taliban—were part of an alliance. In fact, the Taliban were relative latecomers to the fighting in Kabul, as they did not play a major role until around 1994. So one could argue that it is proper to code the 1992 to 1996 phase of war as one where the eventual insurgent victors (Taliban) were not allied (tenuously or otherwise) with anyone.

This is a borderline case. By the simultaneous engagement rule, a strange alliance emerges between the Taliban and the Kabul government, which was in 1994 battling the Hekmatyar forces. Note the following from Rasanayagam (2003, 146): “[I]n Ghazni, Hekmatyar precipitated hostilities by attacking the Kabul-appointed governor, Qari Baba, who called on the Taliban for assistance. Hekmatyar’s forces were driven out… It is interesting to note that the Babbani government was not at first hostile to the Taliban who had earlier sent a delegation to Kabul requesting assistance against the Kandahari
warlords. In fact the leader of the most important of the Kandahari militias, who was their corps commander, had received instruction from Kabul not to oppose the Taliban…”

Afghanistan (1996-2001)
Alliance: Northern Alliance (United Front)
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

D&S code a new phase to this war on account of the US invasion and the fall of the Taliban. They code a new war because there is a change in regime when the Taliban take over, not on the basis of any death toll criterion. The United Front was the umbrella organization bringing together forces, many of them mujahideen, to fight against the Taliban. The pre-outcome tenuous coding is straightforward given the history of the war and infighting between these groups.

Algeria (1962-1963)
Alliance: Anti-GPRA Coalition, Pro-GPRA Coalition
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

This conflict evinces the classic winners dilemma for the various factions and centers of power within the FLN as it emerged victorious in its battle for independence from France. The consolidation phase which briefly followed independence pitted what is often referred to as the Pro-Political Bureau (Anti-GPRA) against the Anti-Political Bureau (Pro-GPRA). These alliances are also described as the Pro-Etat Major against the Anti-Etat Major. The war was the result of the fragmentation of the FLN. It is worth pointing out that the FLN itself was a loose and highly decentralized banner bringing
together various diverse groups all struggling for freedom. But independence did not bring an end to the violence.

Quandt (1969) provides an excellent account of the Algerian Revolution and the political violence which followed. He describes the post revolution crisis not as an immediate consequence of the victory but owing to long-existing divisions within and throughout the victorious coalition: “there was within the FLN a backlog of distrust and conflict, and independence merely brought the opportunity to settle accounts that had lain dormant because of the overriding goal of maintaining a facade of unity” (p. 148). The consequent consolidation of power after the revolution proved violent.

Quandt gives an account of the coalitions, which split both the military as well as the Revolutionaries. The first coalition consisted of wilayas II, III, and IV, the Federation de France of the FLN, and the GPRA. The second coalition formed around wilayas I, V, and VI, the frontier armies of the FLN and Etat Major. However, the extant tenuousness of the newly opposing coalitions is easily seen when noting that wilaya II, originally in favor of the GPRA, experienced its own coup and was brought under the sway of the anti-GPRA side. Quandt sums up the predicament and the solution of the eventual victor, Ben Bella: “As might have been expected, Ben Bella came to power in the fall of 1962 with the support of some unlikely allies. Rather than limiting himself to the army, Ben Bella had enlisted as supporters many prominent Liberals and some Revolutionaries. The logic that prompted these choices is not particularly difficult to trace. A large and heterogeneous base of support within the elite would permit Ben Bella to counter the demands of one group with those of another, thus avoiding becoming the captive of any
segment of the elite… Ben Bella’s best chances of survival in the face of bitter challenges to his authority would come from this ability to play off various factions against one another” (p. 174).

From Fearon and Laitin Random Narratives:

“Both Ben Bella and Ben Khedda saw it as essential to control the liberation army, the ALN. Ben Khedda, fearing that Houari Boumedienne of the General Staff was disloyal, released him from his duties. Boumedienne refused to obey this order, and allied with Ben Bella, bringing with him both divisions of the ALN (from Tunisia and Morocco), amounting to 45,000 troops. Losing support from the national army, Ben Khedda sought alliances among the so-called wilaya, the regional armies that were quasi-autonomous throughout the independence war. His strongest alliance was in wilaya III, the Kabylie, and the Tizi Ouzou (the major city of the Kabyle) group made up of Berbers. Berber leaders (who were more closely tied to the French), despite being well represented in FLN structure, expressed dissatisfaction with their assigned role in Ben Bella’s Political Bureau, as they received only one marginal seat. Ben Khedda was also able to get the support of wilaya IV (Algiers) under the control of Colonel Youssef Khatib and wilaya II (Constantine) under Col. Saout al-Arab. In response, Ben Bella quickly brought the remaining three wilaya warlords to his side.”

Algeria (1992- )
Alliance: Islamic Salvation Army: FIS MIA/AIS
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes, for tenuous

The following is from Fearon and Laitin “Random Narratives”:

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“What then is it? Roberts (2003, 258-9) summarizes his answer. What occurred in Algeria in 1992 and its aftermath was: (a) a thoroughly fragmented set of actors all combined into a “notionally Islamist rebellion” (b) lacking in support of its own ex-FIS electorate, or any other popular base (c) the complete non-involvement of the Algerian population into the conflict, except when dragooned into it; (d) the lack of a clear frontier of battle; and (e) the lack of any political or ideological division despite the so-called Islamic/nationalist interpretations others put on it. What this adds up to is (f) that this is another aspect of the incessant factional struggle within the Algerian power structure itself.”

The borderline question is not regarding the existence of military alliance, but rather the tenuousness of the alliance. For robustness checks, the “tenuous” outcome is dropped.

Angola (1975-1991)
Alliance: UNITA-FNLA
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no

This conflict again arose out of Angola’s independence from Portugal. The three primary parties—UNITA, FNLA and MPLA—failed to achieve a coalition government and violence ensued. The UPPSALA database notes a UNITA-FNLA alliance (see below), which may have been fleeting in nature owing to the gradual decline of the FNLA. I have not uncovered any evidence of conflict breaking out between alliance members. See also Le Billon (2001).
From Uppsala University Conflict Database: "The conflict between the government of Angola and UNITA dates back to independence from Portugal in November 1975. There were three major independence movements in Angola: MPLA (the present government), UNITA and FNLA. From the mid-1960s they all fought Portugal separately. During 1975, prior to independence, a transitional government including all three movements was set up. However, it collapsed and fighting erupted before independence. The MPLA held Luanda with Cuban support and a UNITA-FNLA alliance received help from South Africa. Major defeats of the FNLA led to its decline as western powers shifted their support to UNITA. UNITA’s leader Jonas Savimbi received substantial support from South Africa as well as US weapons and fuel, channeled through Zaire".

Angola (1992- )
Alliance: FLEC factions
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: yes

This ongoing separatist conflict is coded as distinct from the other Angola conflict (UNITA). However, given the vast presence of oil in the Cabinda region, D&S note that fighting between UNITA and the MPLA often takes place here. D&S also note that there are as many as five FLEC factions, some of which are splinter groups. This is a borderline case between alliances and fractionalization. It is therefore dropped for robustness checks.
Argentina (1955)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: NA

This episode refers to the crisis in the Peron government. The armed forces were heavily involved in the conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) describe the episode as a coup.

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: NA

No evidence of local alliances. But regional alliances play a huge role here, including Turkey, Armenia, USSR/Russia, Iran.

Bangladesh (1973-1994)
Alliance: 1
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no

This is an alliance of united tribes or what Minorities at Risk (Gurr, 1999) refers to as a “tribal defense organization” of the Bangladesh Hill People.

From the Minorities at Risk dataset: “The Chittagong Hill Tribes primarily reside in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of southeastern Bangladesh. …Also referred to as the Jummas, which indicates their historical occupation of slash and burn cultivation, the Chittagong tribes differ significantly from the majority Bengali Muslim community. The group speaks multiple languages; it has different social customs than the dominant group; a small minority follows Animist and Christian religious traditions, while the majority practice Buddhist religious traditions; and it is racially related to the
tribals in neighboring Burma, Northeast India, and Thailand. The tribals consist of 13 tribes of which the Chakmas are the largest, making up almost half of the group's population.

Since the 1970s, successive Bangladeshi governments promoted the migration of Bengalis to the hill tracts region which led the tribals to fear that they would become a minority in their traditional region of residence. Further, tribal lands were taken away and given to migrants, and the tribals were subject to violent attacks by Bengali settlers. In 1972, a tribal self-defense organization was formed: the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS or Chittagong Hill Tribal People's Coordination Association). In the mid-1970s, the PCJSS' military arm, the Shanti Bahini (Peace Force), launched an armed struggle for independence or at the very least widespread autonomy. The Shanti Bahini's violent campaign continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s."

Bolivia (1952)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: NA

Three-day coup in Bolivia, often described as a revolution. See Brogan (1998).

Alliance: 1 (many)
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes

This is perhaps the most complicated case in the entire dataset. D&S note that given the complexity of the case, it may be justifiable and perfectly reasonable to code an ongoing civil war since 1948. They opt not to do this because it would lump together
different insurgencies involving different parties and different issues. But they note that numerous insurgent groups in Burma and shifting alliances among those groups make it exceedingly difficult to get a clear picture of how many wars have started and ended in Burma since 1945.

To gain some perspective, Smith (1991) lists over 30 active insurgent organizations during the mutinies occurring in March 1989. For the year 1991, Smith notes 13 active insurgent united fronts incorporating over 70 distinct groups. Indeed diverse rebel movements continue to rise and fall with bewildering frequency. Given the country’s history of warlordism and intra-village raiding as a common feature of life, it is nearly impossible to impose strict coding rules. Internecine rivalries and spontaneous uprisings frustrate both the central government and insurgent fronts alike. “The extraordinary diversity of the various political forces that take up arms has often made it impossible for Rangoon to concentrate its resources and military strength on any single foe” (Smith, 1991, p. 96).

Provided this complex backdrop, it is completely untenable to note any existence of alliances, however fleeting or weak, without also coding them as tenuous. The three episodes D&S identify are coded as follows: During the first Karen war (1948-1951), there is clear evidence that the two primary insurgent groups, the KNU and KNDO, cooperated their military efforts on various fronts, while no formal alliance was declared. A tenuous alliance is therefore coded but dropped for borderline robustness checks. The secessionist mutinies spanning 1968 to 1982 were marked by many parties, but included overt and formal military alliances—the most prominent being the NDFU, comprised of
the CPB, the NMSP and the KNUP. Smith notes this alliance was “long and often highly effective.” This second observation (1968-1982) is therefore not coded as a borderline case. The final period of war (covering 1983 to 1995) is marked by the NDUF as well as the National Democratic front. Again, these are not borderline alliances.

From Fearon and Laitin “Random Narratives”:

“A leading commentator in fact writes of a “kaleidoscope of insurgencies” (Smith 1991, 28). In his listing of insurgent groups, he reports on thirty organizations, claiming to represent twenty-two distinct ethnic groups: Burman, Mon, Rakhine, Chin, Marung, Rohingya Muslim, Chin, Jinghpaw, Maru, Kashi, Lisu, Sgaw, Pwo, Pao, Kayah, Kayan, Bre, Shan, Lahu, Naga, Palaung, and Wa. Alliances formed and re-formed in the fifty years Smith recorded. He presents a listing of thirteen of the most important United Fronts that go from 1949 through 1989. Two of the fronts were connected to the Communist Party of Burma (the CPB). Three of the fronts were non-communist but All-Burma in that they sought to maintain central authority in Rangoon. Seven of the fronts were “ethnic nationalist” and sought sovereignty in particular regions. In the tables reporting these results, Smith listed seventy-two parties or organizations (some of them listed in different fronts in different periods) participating in twelve fronts, so there was an average of six parties per front (Smith 1979, xiii, xiv). In the first two years of the insurrections that began in 1948, 60,000 deaths were estimated to have been the direct result of insurrectionary wars, clearly classifying Burma as having a civil war onset.”
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

The first three Burundi civil war episodes are all coup-related and include genocide and ethnic reprisals between Hutu’s and Tutsis. As such, there is little evidenced of formal military alliances between fighting groups.

Burundi (1991- )
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

The final chapter in the Burundi wars, while intimately interlaced with the regional wars in the African Great Lakes Region, appears to be primarily a two-party domestic contest between the FDD and FNL, the two major armed groups. A number of small and irregular armed organizations emerged on both sides of the conflict, some of whom have collaborated with rebel groups from Rwanda and Congo-Zaire. However, there is no evidence to substantiate joint military efforts against a common foe. Sherrer (2002) notes that these groups terrorized the civilian population. And there are also many regional actors involved in the war.

This is a difficult and complicated case, usually generalized by categorizing the violence as Hutu-Tutsi conflict. Additionally, the conflicts and participants span borders (i.e., Tanzania). For instance, training and assistance for conflict in Burundi are often provided by groups outside of Burundi.
D&S coding notes the parties as: Government, Hutu Militia, and Tutsi Militia. But there is little discussion of alliances. More common is group fractionalization. Both of the major groups split at one time or another.

In its March 2000 report entitled *Burundi: Neglecting Justice in Making Peace*, Human Rights Watch stated the following: “The two major insurgent groups--both predominantly Hutu--the National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales de Libération, FNL) [the military wing of the PALIPEHUTU] and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD-FDD, or in shortened form, the FDD), continue to make war on civilians, both Hutu and Tutsi, and on humanitarian agencies which try to help them (HRW 23, March 2000).”

Cambodia (1970-1975)
Alliance: FUNK (GRUNK-Khmer), PFLANK
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The tenuous alliance between Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge was one largely forced upon Prince Sihanouk after Lon Nol assumed power in a coup. But Sihanouk’s arrangement with the Khmer Rouge brought the support of the Cambodian peasants. Before 1970, the former ruler had continually denounced the Cambodian communists as “worse than common bandits” (Etcheson, 1984, p.128). Etcheson notes further that “Until the emergence and expansion of the Kampuchean National United Front (FUNK) and Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK), as one observer noted, ‘the peasants, however much they may have regretted Sihanouk’s deposition, were ill-
equipped to translate their feelings into action.” But the KPC would find it a relatively straightforward albeit demanding matter eventually to seize control of the entire GRUNK apparatus by means of creeping administrative *coup*. And as expected, the KPC turned on Sihanouk as early as 1973. They even began to liquidate their own senior Khmer Rouge leaders who had publically collaborated with Sihanouk.

Cambodia (1979-1991)
Alliance: anti-PRK coalition (FUNCIPEC, KPNLF)
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The anti-PRK coalition was again a forced marriage of necessity between groups with a history of animosity (see Chandler (1992)). Relatedly, a media report from *Southeast Asia Globe* entitled, “An Uneasy Peace,” notes the following:

“The anti-PRK coalition was a surprising amalgamation of groups with different ideals. Its figurehead was Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former Cambodian king and head of state. His royalist party, Funcinpec, was much weaker militarily than his allies, the Khmer Rouge, who provided the vast majority of the resistance troops. Sihanouk and the ultra-Maoists had been allied already in the early 1970s, when General Lon Nol toppled the prince and abolished the monarchy. Some of Lon Nol's former supporters also joined the coalition as the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the smallest rebel group.

However, the 'partnership' between Funcinpec, the KPNLF and the Khmer Rouge (who killed hundreds of thousands of royalists and republicans earlier) was of convenience only. Only their resistance to a new common enemy united them: Vietnam's
occupation force and its puppet government in Phnom Penh, whose survival relied on Hanoi's presence in the country."

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

D&S code this mutiny-related violence as a civil war but note the battle deaths may fall under 1000.

Chad (1965-1979)
Alliance: FAN-FAP; FroLiNat
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The war in Chad is also a coding nightmare. It is revealing that the D&S codebook (2004) notes that there is very high disagreement in the coding of this war among major datasets. The internal factions were many – up to 11 is the commonly cited number. At one level, it is possible to conceive the National Liberation Front of Chad (FroLiNat) as a highly contentious alliance of eleven loosely organized rebel forces. “[I]n 1966 the rebel forces joined together in a loosely organized grouping called the National Liberation Front of Chad” (Zartman, 1986, p. 14).

But there appears to be better evidence that the principle alliance that brought its weight to bear on the outcome was a highly tenuous arrangement between the forces of Habre and Goukouni, the FAN and the FAT, respectively. The rivalry between these two leaders was longstanding and owed its origin to the Tombalbaye government’s decision to cede the Aouzou Stip to Libya in 1972. Zartman (1986) notes that this issue split the
new FroLiNat leadership: Habre opposed the cession, but Goukouni accepted the Libyan claims to the land. Consequently, Goukouni ousted Habre in 1976 with the aid of Libya and reorganized part of the FroLiNaT as the People’s Armed Forces (FAP).

But a twist of events made a coalition between the FAP and FAN an unavoidable expedience. In 1978, Habre was brought into the government as prime minister. A charter combined his forces (FAN) with the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT). But by 1979 this partnership broke down and violent skirmishes between the FAT and FAN resulted. After these clashes, Goukouni’s forces (FAP) moved to join Habre’s against the FAT in N’Djamenat in February 1979 (Azevedo and Nnadozie 1988). In May of the same year, the FAP-FAN forces turned south to cut supply routes against the Kamougue faction. But the coalition between Habre and Goukouni would prove short-lived and the feud between them turned into what is often seen as the second civil war in Chad (Azevedo and Nnadozie 1988).

In analyzing the early phase of this war (early 1970s), Zartman (1986) carefully describes how friction and freeriding may serve as counteracting forces within competitive coalitions: “Once a new generation of FroLiNat leaders come to the fore at the beginnings of the 1970’s, with different regions to represent in their grievances against the government, their rivalries actually helped keep the rebellion alive, since even when some were bought off, others would keep up the fight with foreign aid” (p. 20). Ironically, in the later half of the decade, the dilemma was precisely the opposite: maintaining a tenuous coalition after having attained certain degrees of success. “In the Malloum period (1975-1978), Libyan aid continued and the return of the French [to the
war] again proved ineffective, even with the attempt to form a Great Coalition in the Habre-Malloum government. This move was carried to its conclusion in the GUNT, where a full Great Coalition of all eleven factions was formed. But the internal conflict continued: the factions could not rule together, but no one of them could rule alone” (p. 21). This single decade of civil conflict in Chad demonstrates precisely the upside to internal rivalry—it can keep rebellion alive—along with the attending downside—ruling among rivals is highly elusive.

Chad (1980-1994)
Alliance: FANT
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

There is some uncertainty / disagreement about whether to code a new war in 1980 for Chad or simply to classify it as a continuation of the conflict beginning in 1965. There is good evidence to substantiate either claim. Azevedo and Nnadozie (1988) tend to agree with the former. “Whereas the first major (conventional) civil war, February-March 1979, was a bloody engagement between North and South, of Muslim versus Christian and traditionalist, the second civil war, February-December 1980, was a confrontation between North and North and between Muslim and Muslim” (p. 55). The “second war” was one between erstwhile allies—Goukouni and Habre. (There were also numerous other factions involved, including neighboring states.) But Habre now fought from a position of governmental power. FroLiNat victory paradoxically brought a stalemate because of the factional nature of the rebellion (Zartman, 1986).
Of this second war, Zartman notes that Habre’s FAN defeated Goukouni’s FAP and then formed its own alliance against the splinters of the GUNT. The FANT was formed by Habre from various rebel commando groups and was successful during the war raging in 1987. D&S do not code a new war based on government turnover at any time during this period. Habre was eventually overthrown by his erstwhile ally, Idriss Deby in 1990. There is no new war coded in 1990 either. So it is difficult to point to successful competitive alliances during this war, as there were many competitive arrangements, constantly shifting, and many successes and power transitions. The 1994 date seems somewhat arbitrary. D&S note the war lasting from 1980 to 1994 as the “FARF; FroLiNat” conflict. The war from 1994 to 1997 is similarly described.

China (1947)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This episode refers to the uprising in Taiwan – between Taiwanese civilians and nationalist soldiers – after the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to the island.

China (1950-1951), Tibet
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

China (1956-1959), Tibet ii
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no
China 1967-1968, Red Guards
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This is a difficult case to find information about. There may be a case that Sheng Wu Lien is a weak alliance. But I could not gather sufficient evidence to minimally substantiate such a claim.

Columbia I (1948-1962)
Alliance: Liberal-Communist; police-conservatives
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes

Hartland (1993) notes loose and very tenuous alliances on both sides. “In the most virulent period of la violencia in the early 1950s, army and police troops joined by irregular Conservative forces (and paid assassins) fought Liberal and Communist guerrillas and more apolitical “bandits,” all of whom also fought each other on occasion” (p. 40). More research is required to assess this with any certainty.

Columbia (1978-)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

There are certainly more than one leftist-insurgent group, paramilitary and narco-trafficking groups in Columbia. There is little evidence of coordinated activities or joint efforts that would suggest an alliance. Bapat and Bond (2012) reach a similar conclusion.
Congo—Brazzaville (1993-1997)
Alliance: Cobra-Ninja
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

This is a classic representation of shifting alliances, where winning parties (Cobras 1997) seek consolidations of power causing new alliances to form (Ninja-Cocoyes) and new wars to ensue. Sassou's and Kolelas' militia groups were allied against Lissouba during the period of war spanning 1993-94. But after 1997, Kolelas threw in his Ninja militia on the side of Lissouba in an unsuccessful joint attempt to defeat Sassou's forces.

From the University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center:

"The politics of Congo-Brazzaville are triangular, representing three different parts of the country. Two sides of the triangle become aligned against the third, and those alliances are constantly shifting," one analyst told IRIN.

The following is a brief description of the main militia or armed groups now operating in the country:

THE NINJA MILITIA

The Ninja are allied to Bernard Kolelas, who was former president Pascal Lissouba's last prime minister and mayor of Brazzaville until Lissouba was defeated by Sassou's forces in the June-October 1997 civil war. Kolelas remained neutral through most of the war and served as a mediator in the early part of the conflict. However, he later threw in his Ninja militia on the side of Lissouba in an unsuccessful joint attempt to defeat Sassou's forces. The Ninja then retreated into Kolelas' home region of Pool, which
surrounds Brazzaville. The security situation in the Pool region has remained uncertain since then, with clashes between government forces and the Ninja intensifying in late September 1998.

In mid-December 1998, Ninja members were reported to have "infiltrated" the southern Brazzaville districts of Baïongo and Makelekele, which are considered to be Kolelas' strongholds (and which were relatively untouched and served as safe havens for displaced persons during the 1997 war). Three days of heavy weapons fire and shelling of the two districts by government forces succeeded in driving out the Ninja from the districts, but a new incursion by Ninja took place in the Kinsoundi area of Brazzaville on 21-22 January, media reports said. Kolelas, the leader of the Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement (MCDDI), is now living in exile in Washington.

THE COBRA MILITIA

Sassou, who had been president since 1979, lost to Lissouba in the country's first multi-party elections in 1992. Sassou's and Kolelas' militia groups were allied against Lissouba during the country's first civil war in 1993/4. That conflict followed controversial 1993 parliamentary elections in which both the MCDDI and Sassou's socialist Parti congolais du travail (PCT) alleged voting irregularities. Although a compromise was reached the following year, the 1993/94 conflict militarized the Congo's political culture, with the Cobra and the Ninja emerging from the PCT and the MCDDI, respectively. Sassou's Cobra militia, supported by Angolan troops, defeated Lissouba's forces in the 1997 war.
The Cobra members are drawn from Sassou's sparsely-populated northern Congo. Since Sassou's return to power, it has been difficult to make a clear distinction between the Cobra and the regular army. Human rights groups have accused ill-disciplined Cobra militia of rape, arbitrary killings and other abuses against civilians. The number of Cobras is estimated by 'L'Autre Afrique' magazine at 8,000. While Sassou has integrated some into the regular army, many Cobras not selected for integration have retained their weapons and resorted to banditry and looting. Recent reports indicate a factionalism within the ranks of the Cobra.

THE COCOYE MILITIA

Lissouba built up his own militia when his political opponents created the Ninja and the Cobra. Since the end of the 1997 war, his Cocoye militia, also called Zulus, have remained active in the southwestern regions of Niari, Bouenza and Lekoumou (known collectively as Nibolek). In April 1998, Cocoye militia took over the Moukoukoulou hydro-electric dam near Mouyondzi, cutting off electricity to much of southern Congo including the economic capital of Pointe-Noire for weeks. The crisis was resolved following an agreement between the Cocoye and a government delegation.

More recently, Cocoye militia were reported to have at least temporarily gained control of several towns in the south, including Nkayi, Sibiti, Mouyondzi and Loudima. Electricity in Pointe-Noire was again cut off in January 1999 when Cocoye militia took control of a power station, media reports said. An attack on Dolisie took place in late January and fighting was reported to be continuing in the area. Lissouba, leader of the Union panafricaine pour la democratie sociale (UPADS), is now living in exile in
London. The Cocoye and the Ninja have recently become formally allied in the Mouvement National pour la Liberation du Congo (MNLC).

Congo—Brazzaville (1998-1999)
Alliance: Cocoye- Ninja (MLNC)
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

There is some disagreement as to whether or not parties have reached a formal peace agreement or a truce. Certainly truces have been extant aspects of this conflict. D&S appear to argue that a settlement was reached, but I have no confirmation. They note renewed fighting in 2002 and residual violence is reported as late as 2007. See globalsecurity.org for an excellent description of this episode.

Congo-Zaire (1960-1965)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

D&S lump together several (primarily secessionist) rebellions that took place in Congo-Zaire from 1960 to 1965 in Katanga, Kasai, Kwili and Eastern. Good information on each of them is difficult to find.

Congo-Zaire (1967)
Alliance: White mercenaries with Kataganan separatists
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no
This refers to the Kisangani mutiny of white mercenaries and Katangan soldiers. It was put down by Mobutu. It was aimed at overthrowing the regime but took advantage of the Katangan separatist movement as a source of firepower.

Congo-Zaire (1977-1978)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This conflict, described as the Shabba war, is in many ways a continuation of the former Congo-Zaire conflicts. FLNC is the rebel force here aligned with the Angolan regime, where it takes refuge. Regional factors play heavily into these two conflicts but there is little indication of domestic alliances.

Congo-Zaire (1996-1997)
Alliance: ADFL (Alliance of the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Congo); ADFL-Banyamulenge
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

This alliance has been described as “an incoherent group with contradicting interest” (Scherrer, 2002, p. 252). The alliance included the National Council of Resistance for Democracy (CNRD), the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MRL) and the Democratic Alliance of the People. During the conflict, the ADFL also found common cause with local Banyamulenge soldiers as well as the external Rwandan RPA. Power struggles within the rebellious regime ranks were an extant feature of the alliance and ultimately culminated in the disintegration of the first rebellion and a new round of civil and regional war (Scherrer 2002).
Alliance: MLC-RCD alliance; FAC – former ADFL (Banyamulenge) alliance; FLC
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The Second Congolese War was essentially a byproduct of Kabila’s efforts to consolidate his position after the first war (Scherrer 2002). As such, he turned on nearly all his former allies—both domestically and regionally. Alliances were nearly all redrawn and redirected to reflect this new strategic reality. This conflict blurs distinctions between borders, being both a regional and civil war all at once. The factions are obviously many, and splits were not uncommon. Alliances of note include: MLC-RCD agreement of cooperation of Dec 1999; FAC (Eastern Congo Rebels)-ADFL components alliance; FLC/CLF (formed January 2001 from MLC with two splinter groups: RCD-ML and RCD).

Costa Rica (1948)
Alliance: NLA
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes

The NLA (National Liberation Army) appears to be a loose coalition of factions from disparate ideologies—anti-communist right-wingers wary of the welfare state combined with social democrats seeking to strengthen it—but likely falls short of formal military alliance in the sense described here. Unsurprisingly the coalition collapsed immediately after the war. Clearly this is a borderline case (see Bell (1971)).
Cuba (1958-1959)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This affair, like Costa Rica before it, is ambiguous. One may argue that an informal alliance existed between the 26th of July Movement and the PSP, the Popular Socialist Party. Indeed, post-war, the PSP became part of the ORI and eventually became part of the Communist Party of Cuba. But there is no sufficient evidence to claim that there was a meaningful alliance between the groups. One was military-centric, the other a socialist political movement.

Cyprus (1974)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

There were certainly alliances in this case, but of the international kind. The players were Turkey, Greece, USA, and USSR.

Alliance: FRUD
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: yes

Another borderline case. The FRUD was the amalgamation of three Afar groups; their later split was not along similar lines (as was the case in Costa Rica). The split in the FRUD seems to be a consequence of the conflict, not the other way around. This case is therefore dropped in borderline checks.
El Salvador (1979-1992)
Alliance: FLMN-FDR
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes, for tenuous

This is another multiparty case where the numerous rebel factions clearly came together in the form of a united coalition aimed at increasing fighting capacity. The precise nature of the competitiveness between the groups is uncertain. There were clearly internal tensions between the groups for influence but not outright instances of armed conflict between the groups. In fact, there is evidence that there was a high degree of cooperation in the FLMN (see Landau (1993, p. 122; p. 93)).

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This is another case of splintering rather than allying. Interestingly, this war is marked by a “pre-consolidation” phase before eventual rebel victory. The civil war between rival groups, which usually follows their victory, occurred before it. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) split off from the Eritrean Liberation Front (EPL) and a mini civil war between the groups transpired. The EPLF proved victorious in consolidating its position and eventually winning independence for Eritrea in 1991. Alternatively, one can easily justify a coding of the TPLF-EPLF alliance (see below) for this conflict as well. In actuality, the Eritrean separatist war (EPLF) and the war for Tigrayan autonomy / separation (TPLF) were one and the same, as both disputes required confronting the Ethiopian regime.
Ethiopia II (1974-1991)
Alliance: TPLF-EPLF alliance; also EPDRF
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

This was an alliance between groups with differing aims and a common enemy in the “Derg” government of Ethiopia. EPLF often trained Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) recruits. They achieved a unity agreement, which served to greatly enhance their combined military capacity in the north of the country (Reid, 2011, p. 192). And their “simultaneous engagement” against the Derg forces characterizes them as allies also. However, their relationship was always marked with tenuousness and even hatred. Reid (2011) notes: “Tigrayans believed—with some justification, it must be said—that Eritreans looked down on them, even despised them, and regarded themselves as vastly superior in every respect.” It would come to the surface as the rivalry between the EPLF and the TPLF developed and intensified—and would return to haunt both communities with renewed war in 1998. See also Connell (1997) for a discussion of the conflictual cooperation between the EPLF and the TPLF in their fight against the Derg regime.

Ethiopia (1977-1985)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

The most important alliance in this Ogaden separatist conflict was between the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Somalia National Army (SNA). This again reflects the blurred nature of civil and international conflicts.
Guatemala (1966-1972)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) coalition that formed during the second episode of this conflict was not an extant force during this prior period. I could not find evidence of “simultaneous engagement” between or among parties either.

Guatemala (1978-1994)
Alliance: URNG
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no

There is surprisingly little in depth historical work on the URNG. Ball et al. (1999) is probably the best quantitative source. I found no evidence to suggest the URNG, composed of various guerrilla and revolutionary groups, was compromised by competition or internal violence. Much of the brutal atrocities in this conflict were conducted and organized by the military. However, this case is especially subject to revision, in light of better information.

A decent source of this conflict is also globalsecurity.org:

“Four principal left-wing guerrilla groups—the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)—conducted economic sabotage and targeted government installations and members of government security forces in armed attacks. These organizations combined to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982. At the same time, extreme right-wing groups of self-appointed
vigilantes, including the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) and the White Hand, tortured and murdered students, professionals, and peasants suspected of involvement in leftist activities.”

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

These episodes are mostly coup-related with a high degree of U.S. involvement.

India (1989-)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This episode, referring to the Kashmiri conflict, looks to be another borderline case for civil war. It is also highly internationalized, perhaps more so than any other civil conflict. Alliances obviously occur between states (India, Pakistan) and local groups (Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), JKLF). This episode also evinces more splitting up than allying. The process of the conflict has had a profound fracturing impact on more than one group. Radical elements within the HM, for instance, seek the integration of Kashmir with Pakistan; but the JKLF seeks independence for Kashmir. Such a conflict of goals arguably produced the foundation of the HM, many of whose members were originally part of the JKLF. More research should shed light on potential alliances.

A study by RAND notes that there are currently five main groups fighting in Kashmir, all of which benefit from Pakistani support: Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM);
Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LeT); al Badr; Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM); and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM).

India (1946-1948)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

The partition of India and Pakistan is another strange case that D&S 2000/6 feel deserves inclusion because of the political nature associated with much of the violence. They suggest this case is certainly ambiguous. In their coding notes, the authors cite others: “The militaristic, organized and political nature of the violence distinguished it from mere rioting. In sum, the conflict pitted the private armies and organized gangs against the largely ineffective Punjab Boundary Force. Civilians were the main victims, but the Boundary Force was also a frequent target.”

Indonesia (1956-1960)
Alliance: Permesta-PRRI
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: yes

This is a case of thin and loose cooperation between the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic (PRRI) and Permesta rebel groups. Lundry (2009) notes that the groups certainly cooperated. That they formed an alliance is less certain. One could arguably code 1 for a loose alliance and 0 for contention within the alliance. This is clearly a borderline case.
Indonesia (1975-1999)
Alliance: CNRM (FRETILIN, UDT, others)
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

This Indonesian episode refers to East Timor’s independence struggle. Pinto and Jardine (1997) give a detailed account of the “civil war” between the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) in the 1970s. The two groups coalesced into a united front in the late 1980s.

Iran (1981-1982)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This episode refers to Kurdish demands and struggle for autonomy which began shortly after the Iranian revolution. D&S 2000/6 give a brief account of the conflict in their coding notes. But they have the incident coded at a rebel victory. This must be a mistake as they refer to the rebellion being “put down with up to 400 people being killed.” See the discussion in their own coding notes. D&S also cite McDowall (2000), which claims that after the Kurds moved from Iraq to Iran, the last Kurdish border strongholds in Iran fell in July 1984.

Iran (1978-1979)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This case refers to the revolution.
Iraq (1961-1975)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This is the first episode of the Kurdish question in Iraq. McDowall (2000) describes the Kurdish forces and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) as a disparate group. “Had the Kurds been united they might have fared better in the first round of war... There was now little love lost between the northern and southern camps of Kurdish resistance” (p. 315).

Iraq (1988-1994)
Alliance: IKP
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) formed on 1 June 1975 by Talabani, Mulla Mustafa’s old adversary from the KDP. McDowall notes that Talabani was determined to eliminate KDP groups because they had ambushed and killed PUK fighters on three separate occasions. By 1980, there was a de facto war between the PUK and KDP, with other various factions also involved (KSP, KSM, ICP, KDPI). In a curious twist of events, Iran was openly supporting the KDP in Iraq while engaged against the KDP in Iran, known as the KDPI. Fighting was also noted in 1983.

But by 1986, while the KDP and PUK continued to denounce one another, there was growing recognition that they could no longer afford such internecine conflict. In 1986, Barzani and Talabini met in Tehran to form a coalition. By 1987, a formal alliance was announced. In May 1987, the unification of forces was achieved with the formation
of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) comprised of the KDP, PUK, KSP, KPDP, Pasok and the Toilers’ Party, and the ICP. A joint command was established to oversee political and military activities (McDowall, 2000).

Both globalsecurity.org and Fearon and Laitin “Random Narratives” also describe in some detail the Barzani and Talabani alliance.

Iraq (1959)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This episode refers to the Shammar war in 1959.

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

The Shiite uprising is another ambiguous case. It may be tempting to code the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) or the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as Shia-based alliances. The problem with this is that there appears to be too much tension between groups and too little cooperation / interaction to form meaningful alliances at least during the timeframe under consideration here (1991-1993/4). Tensions between the Dawa and the SCIRI prevented alliances during this time. The National Iraqi Alliance that eventually evolved was not in existence during the Shiite uprising.
Israel (1947-1997)
Alliance: PLO, Fatah-Hamas
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes

D&S note that most datasets do not code this conflict as a civil war. They list it as ambiguous in their 2006 dataset. Given the immense span of time that the episode covers, there is evidence to substantiate numerous codings and interpretations. As D&S view this civil conflict from the basis of a Palestinian uprising/insurrection, I attempt to be consistent with this interpretation.

To a certain extent, it is possible to code the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a tenuous coalition of various factions—e.g., DPLF, PFLP—whose unity has been a longstanding issue, especially during the early years of the organization. For instance, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) was an original member of the PLO, but never endorsed Yasser Arafat. There is also the emergence of Hamas in 1987, whose relationship with Fatah has always been marked by conflict. The groups have very often been at cross-purposes, only to reestablish a level of rapprochement. But Fatah-Hamas alliance only marks the tail end of the conflict episode.

This is coded as a tenuous alliance but also marked as a highly ambiguous case.

Jordan (1971)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no
This is another less than clear-cut case. The civil war was essentially between Jordan and the Palestinian Fedayeen. It also had Syrian involvement, and Israel nearly intervened as well. Iraqi troops were also present, as they had been in Jordan since the Six Day War against Israel. So there were also clearly international components to this war. Depending on how one interprets the nature of the Palestinian factions associated with the PLO, one again might make a case that it represents a loose coalition.

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This episode refers to the Rift Valley violence, which D&S note is not identified by most civil war datasets. There is therefore not an abundance of information on this case.

Korea (1952-1953)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

D&S note that this case may be reclassified as an international conflict.

Laos (1952-1953)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This is a highly internationalized war with all meaningful alliances across states. The most notable is the Pathet Lao allied with the North Vietnamese. Military
interventions by the US, China, and USSR also took place. This episode perhaps reveals the folly of treating civil and interstate conflicts as separate entities. Domestic alliances are not factors.

Lebanon (1958)
Alliance: Muslim-Druze rebels
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: yes

The Muslim and Druze rebels fought together after their political candidates were unsuccessful in the rigged elections of 1958. While these forces were jointly able to seize much of the Syrian countryside, the alliance was far from formal and is therefore coded as ambiguous. See Hirst (2010) for a brief account of the conflict.

Lebanon (1975-1978)
Alliance: Palestinians with Muslim leftists and LLA;
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes, for tenuous

This war shows every form of volte-face and infighting at both the international and domestic levels. “Saving one’s enemies” was not uncommon. The multiple regional participants included Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. The Palestinians also played a formidable role, especially in precipitating the conflict. At the domestic level, parties included Lebanon’s mosaic of ethnic and religious groups as well as tribal clans and militias: Phalangists, Maronite Christians, Druze, Shia, and Sunni. Early in the conflict, the national army broke apart, largely along ethnic lines. The Lebanese Arab Army (LLA) would join forces with the Muslim/leftists and the Palestinians against the Phalangists.
Hirst (2010) notes that in February 1975, Palestinian guerrillas from Ain al-Hilweh joined their Muslim/leftist allies in bloody clashes with the army (p. 102). There was overt support early in the war for the PLO by the Muslim/leftists. But the Shiites would eventually turn against their Palestinian ally, whom they blamed for the early misfortune that befell them in the war’s initial phase. “By 1980, the Shiite militia, Amal, which had come into being to defend Southern villages against Israel, was turning the arms with which the Palestinians had first supplied it against those self-same Palestinians instead… The Palestinians and Muslim/leftists were also losing sympathy and support, though to a lesser extent, in the natural, bedrock Sunni constituency. And there was growing tensions and disenchantment between these allies themselves.” (p. 130).

Timing is an important issue here. It is difficult to divorce the tenuousness of the alliance from the poor outcome (read, endogeneity). Moreover, the D&S (2000) data code an end of the first conflict as 1978. The sources I consult do not begin to discuss infighting and tension between the Muslims and Palestinians until around 1980. To avoid improperly attributing inter-coalition competition to the poor outcome, the tenuous coding is omitted.

Lebanon (1982-1992)
Alliance: Maronite groups; Amal (Shia)-Druze-Sunnis
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

In 1984, there was a clear joining of forces between the Druze, Sunnis and the Shiite militia Amal, as they sized the whole of West Beirut (Hirst, 2010). Marionite
militias managed to actively combine when coming under the attack of the Syrians. But they too engaged in murderous affairs between one another.

In fact, the last five years of this conflict were marked by such a deterioration of fronts and alliances that it is impossible not to characterize alliances as anything but tenuous. Some estimate that there were as many as 150 different militias, gangs, and politico-military factions. Hirst notes that on the Muslim side, “…former allies, Shiites, Sunnis, Druzes, and Palestinians, now turned in varying combinations against each other” (p. 208). The intra-sectarian battles—Christians vs. Christians and Shiites vs. Shiites—were some of the bloodiest.

Liberia (1989-1992)
Alliance: NPFL; NPFL-INPFL
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The Liberian episode confounds all efforts to classify and group warring parties in any coherent manner. This is a civil war in which everything happened and all arrangements were tenuous until proven otherwise; any conceivable treatment variable was present in some form or another during the conflict. This is a war with multiple parties, sometimes coming together, sometimes splitting apart. It was also a highly internationalized conflict with many regional participants including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Natural resources also played a major role in financing both government and rebel forces. They also precipitated turf wars between warring factions. Additionally, the conflict spilled over into bordering regions; and in the case of Sierra Leone spawned an entirely new civil war.
There was also a large peacekeeping / peace monitoring force (ECOMOG) which became heavily involved in the fighting and shifting loyalties. In fact, a divide among ECOMOG’s sponsoring parties emerged along Franco and Anglo lines. There was also tension between this force and the UN sponsored contingency. In short, the discerning scholar can code this conflict in numerous ways and find ample evidence to both justify and impugn such choices.

D&S (2004) code the first episode of this conflict between 1989 and 1992 and then change the coding to 11/1990 to reflect the new government. However, it is not entirely clear why they do this. Fortna (2008) in her coding makes the same comment. The Doe government did fall and was replaced by an interim government (IGNU), which was without a military force. Quinn et al. (2007) also note the revision in the coding by D&S to reflect a rebel victory in the first episode of the conflict.

Regarding alliances, it is conceivable to identify Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) as an alliance between disaffected and exploited groups (Americo-Liberians and Nimba citizens). Adebajo (2002, p. 20) certainly makes this claim. It is worth noting that divisions within the NPFL brought about a new faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) led by Prince Johnson. A fracture within a group does not an alliance make. However, it was the joint efforts of the INPFL and the NPFL that ultimately brought down the Doe regime and his loyal Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) troops. So by the ‘simultaneous engagement’ rule there was a tacit, if overtly tenuous, alliance between the INPFL and the NPFL. These two groups did engage each other but jointly toppled the government. Note Adebajo’s description: “On 2
July 1990, the rebels cut off the supply of water and electricity to Monrovia and started to pound the city with heavy artillery and rocket fire... On 25 July, the NPFL launched attacks on the executive mansion as Doe’s final hideout stood tantalizingly within Taylor’s grasp. …The INPFL engaged the remnants of the AFL in pitched battles on the streets of Monrovia…” In fact, it was Johnson, not Taylor, who ultimately captured Doe. And fittingly, both Taylor and Johnson declared themselves president of Liberia.

Liberia (1989-1992)
Alliance: The Coalition (CRC-NPFL, LPC, LDF); NPFL-ULIMO-K
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

As the war continued, the number of factions grew, as splits between them. The groups included: United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO, later ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K); the AFL; the Liberian Defense Forces (LDF); the Liberian Peace Council (LPC); and the NPFL (which also split). The NPFL eventually split into the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL). The CRC-NPFL formed a loose coalition with the other anti-NPFL factions including the LPC and the LDF. These three factions came to be called the Coalition. According to Adebajo (p. 161): The NPFL became a house divided against itself as NPFL factions battled one another… However, the unlikely coalition between Taylor’s NPFL and the ULIMO-K, a group founded in order to defeat the NPFL, came to be in 1995. Other groups were also party to the fighting and allying. This included the Congo Defense Force, a militia allied with ULIMO-K, and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces, which were allies of Taylor’s NPFL and responsible for instigating the war in Sierra Leone.
In sum, it is difficult to make any certain judgments regarding cause and effect in a war evincing every conceivable arrangement of unity and discord between and among factions.

Malaysia (1948-1959)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This is a case D&S call ambiguous.

Mali (1990-1995)
Alliance: MFUA
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: yes

This is a highly understudied episode of civil war. The Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad (MFUA) was effectively a coordinating body for at least four active factions (Humphreys and ag Mohamed 2002). The war is marked by groups splintering. But there is little evidence in the way of the MFUA groups fighting one another or having a history of animosity. Given the lack of good information, I label this a borderline alliance. The best source I could find is Humphreys and ag Mohamed (2002).

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no
Alliances in this conflict were along international lines, not domestic. The Russians and Ukrainians (Cossacks) supported the Trans-Dniester Slavs, while Romania aided Moldova.

Morocco/Western Sahara (1975-1989)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This episode is over the annexed territory, Western Sahara, claimed by both Morocco and Mauritania in 1976. The local Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) guerrillas are fighting the Moroccan military.

Mozambique (1979-1992)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

Alliances, in as much as they had an impact, were between states and domestic groups, not between the latter. For instance, the sponsorship of Renamo was eventually taken over by South Africa. A small claim could be made to classify Renamo as an alliance, but it is not clear that it was the formation of separate groups. Fearon and Laitin “Random Narratives” offer a good account of this conflict, eventually won by FRELIMO.

Namibia (1965-1989)
Alliance: National Convention (NC), SWAPO, SWANU and NUDO
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no
See Udogu (2011) for a recent account of this conflict.

Nicaragua (1978-1979)
Alliance: FSLN, comprised of Proletarians, Third Way and Prolonged Popular War
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded as a revolutionary movement against the Somoza dynasty. However, “Strategic and tactical differences over how to achieve power, usually present in some degree, escalated to such a point during the 1970s that they were in reality not so much internal disputes as outright conflicts between rival movements, on occasion resulting in the conscious exclusion of one member or another from the FSLN by one faction or another that considered itself the only legitimate bearer of the movement’s name. The fighting among the three branches of Sandinismo became so bitter that unity was reestablished only under pressure in a series of meetings with Cuban leaders, culminating in an agreement signed in Havana in March 1979 with Fidel Castro’s approval.” (Miranda and Ratliff 1993, pp. 12-13).

Nicaragua (1981-1989)
Alliance: Contras (FDN, ARDE, MISURA); RN
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no

The Contras were clearly a loose coalition of resistance groups. The three primary opposition groups were the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), and the Misurasata alliance. Each group drew largely from the peasant population and contained many ex-Sandinistas. While evidence of coordination and cooperation issues between the Contra militias is documented, I could
find no evidence of fighting between groups or of ideological or historical divides. In 1987, all the Contra groups were united, at least nominally, into the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN). D&S coding notes also cite an alliance between Misurasata and the Contras based on the Minorities at Risk dataset. This gives some idea as to what a loose term *Contras* is—describing any group against the Sandinistas.

Nigeria (1967-1970)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no

This conflict was over ethnic Ibo efforts to separate the Biafra region from greater Nigeria. A good account of this war is O’Connell (1993).

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This case refers to the Maitasine rebellion, not coded in most civil war datasets. As D&S note, Zinn (2002) offers a summary of this conflict’s events.

Pakistan (1971)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This case refers to the partition of Pakistan and the independence of Bangladesh, formerly known as East Pakistan. While domestic alliances did not play an apparent role
in the conflict, India’s influence cannot be overstated. India’s assistance was pivotal in contributing to the victory of the liberation forces in Bangladesh.

Pakistan (1973-1977)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This conflict covers the Baluchistan violence in Pakistan. The separatist movement was put down by the Pakistani army. A good account of the conflict can be found at globalsecurity.org.

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This refers to the secessionist movement in Bougainville between the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF).

Paraguay (1947)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

Scheina (2003) offers a good account of this interclass fight between the Febristas and the Colorados. The war’s outcome brought the return of single-party rule by the Colorados—a dominance that would persist uninterrupted until the 2008 elections.
Peru (1980-1996)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This is a conflict marked not by merely the absence of a leftwing alliance between the Sendero Luminoso (SL)—the civil war’s main rebel protagonists—and other armed groups, but by the attacking of the left by the SL. Ron (2001) notes the particularly odd behavior of the SL: “Sendero might well have been expected to cooperate with other leftwing groups, rather than to attack them so.” The SL actually launched attacks on potential allies. Scheina (2003) notes that the Shining Path defined its enemy as anyone who participated with Peruvian society (p. 360). It is little surprise, then, that the group forged no alliances.

While there were political alliances on the left, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) and the Isquerda Unida (IU), there was little in the way of meaningful allies between the armed revolutionary movements: SL, Sendero Rojo, Tupac and Amaru.

Philippines (1972-1996)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

The Moro rebellion is once again one marked by disintegration and splintering of armed groups (Moro National Liberation Front, MNLF) rather than their coming together. See below from onwar.com:
“The Moro rebellion never regained its former vigor. Muslim factionalism was a major factor in the movement's decline. Differing goals, traditional tribal rivalries, and competition among Moro leaders for control of the movement produced a three-way split in the MNLF during the late 1970’s. The first break occurred in 1977 when Hashim Salamat, supported by ethnic Maguindanaos from Mindanao, formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which advocated a more moderate and conciliatory approach toward the government. Misuari's larger and more militant MNLF was further weakened during that period when rival leaders formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization, drawing many Mindanao Maranaos away from the MNLF, dominated by Misuari's Sulu-based Tausug tribe. The Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization eventually collapsed, giving way to the Moro National Liberation Front Reformist Movement. Moro factionalism, compounded by declining foreign support and general war weariness, hurt the Muslim movement both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Moro fighting strength declined to about 15,000 by 1983, and Muslim and government forces only occasionally clashed during Marcos's last years in office.”

Philippines (1972-1992)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This conflict is against the Maoist New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
Philippines (1950-1952)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This episode refers to the Huk Rebellion.

Russia (Chechnya) (1994-1996)
Alliance: Chechen factions
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes

This is a fascinating account of shifting strategies and factions that may be coded a number of ways. For the first war, there is clearly a support from the Russian government for the faction of Chechen moderates against Dudayev. In fact, there was open fighting in Chechnya’s own civil war between the moderates (with Russian aid) and Dudayev’s forces. But Yeltsin’s actions effectively stamped out this partnership, forcing his former ally into the hands of his enemy. So the new arrangement is a contentious coalition of Chechen forces against Russia. This is very much a borderline case. The same dynamic was to repeat itself when the war began anew in 1999: Putin’s actions forced another unlikely alliance of rivals.

From the onwar.com:

“Chechnya itself was divided into two main factions: one dedicated to total freedom from Russia, led by Chechen president and former Soviet air force general, Dzhokhar Dudayev, and the other favoring remaining part of the federation. Before Yeltsin's attack, the Chechen moderates were covertly supported by the Russians and proved effective in diminishing Dudayev's influence. However, once Yeltsin began his
full-fledged military offensive -- motivated by a wish to bolster his flagging popularity and a desire to demonstrate Russia's strength, as well as a stated intention to crush Chechnya's notorious crime culture -- bonds with these Chechens were broken and they united with Dudayev.”

Rwanda (1990-1994)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This case demonstrates the pattern of allies turning on each other after attaining victory. But while the alliance between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) originated in Uganda and effected itself in Rwanda, the conflict between these groups after the civil war in Rwanda transpired in the form of a regional war in the Congo (Zaire). So while the alliance itself is not in doubt, there may be objection on the grounds that the RPF served more as a client to forces in Uganda during its civil war. While there may be a degree of merit to this claim, the UPDF (formerly National Rwandan Army, NRA) was formed with RPF personnel. In fact, Paul Kagame was appointed acting chief of military intelligence of the NRA. Founding member of the RPF, Fred Rwidgema, was at one time second in command of the NRA.

This case easily reveals the inter-connected nature of the regional and civil wars of the Lakes Region in Africa. The highly effective alliance between the RPF (Rwandan Alliance of National Unity, RANU) - UPDF (NRA) transpired before the war in Rwanda. But it was an important aspect to the RPF’s ultimate success in Rwanda. The RPF was able to cut its teeth in Uganda’s civil war before tensions there led to their ultimate and
eventual expulsion from positions of power in Uganda. Ultimately, there is only a limited basis to code an alliance including the RPF for their war in Rwanda, based on the coding rule and timing requirements laid out here (see Scherrer, 2002).

Sierra Leone (1991-1996)
Alliance: RUF-NPFL
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no

The alliance that is salient to this conflict is between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the NPFL. While the NPFL is a Liberian organization, this is a legitimate rebel-on-rebel alliance and not a state sponsored arrangement. At the time of the war’s initiation the NPFL did not control the government but was one of many factions battling for control of Liberia. The connection between the groups was very much one between two rebel groups; and NPFL members were part of the initial attacks in Sierra Leone (Adebajo, 2002). Objections may be raised on the account that the groups did not have entirely consistent goals and enemies. But this certainly helped keep any internal difficulties in check.

Alliance: SNM-USC-SPM
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

This failed state has shown a susceptibility to the war trap—where various groups and clans come together, break apart, remove the government and then fight anew to replace it. During the period in question, there were many insurgent factions and clans fighting one another and the Barre government. D&S (2006) describe the two major
insurgent organizations as the Somali Nation Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). They go on to note that the conflict evolved into a border war fought between the government and a *loose coalition* of rebel organizations (including the SNM and SSDF). This conflict escalated until the Somali army was eventually defeated (p. 147). However, instability and rivalry within the victorious coalition precipitated a new round of fighting and insurrection between the tribal factions.

Shay (2008) lists the five major rival factions in 1991 as the United Somali Congress (USC), SNM, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), SSDF and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM). He notes the movements were generally divided up into two main groups: North Somali movements, headed by the SNM, and Central Somali movements, headed by the USC.

**Somalia (1991- )**
- Alliance: Northern movements (SNM factions); Central movements (USC factions)
- Tenuous: 1
- Borderline: no


**South Africa (1976-1994)**
- Alliance: ANC-PAC
- Tenuous: 0
- Borderline: yes

D&S list the main rebel organizations as the African National Congress (ANC), Inkatha Freedom Party, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). However, indications that there were alliances between these groups are difficult to sustain with a high degree of certainty. By a simultaneous engagement rule,
one could code an alliance between the ANC and the PAC armed factions (see below). In any case, the alliance is certainly an ambiguous one.

From UPPSALA:

“In response to political disenfranchisement opposition groups began to grow in the country, most notably within the black population. Campaigns of civil disobedience and demonstrations, led by the ANC (African National Congress), the PAC (Pan African Congress) and the SACP (South African Communist Party) became a hallmark of the 1970s and 1980s during the struggle for a change in government. Repression by the government followed, and the conflict escalated into an armed conflict, which lasted from 1981 to 1988. In this armed conflict the government faced the armed wings of the ANC and the PAC, and also the Azapo (Azanian People's Organization) group.”

Sri Lanka (1971) (JVP i)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

Sri Lanka (1983- )
Alliance: ENLF and LTTE-ENLF
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) was an alliance between militant Tamil groups given to fighting one another in addition to the Sri Lankan authorities. The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), initially reluctant to join the ENLF, finally did in 1985.

From www.tamilnation.org:

“One of the most significant developments in the history of Sri Lanka's Tamils was the closing of ranks between the militant Tamil groups. One of the weakest points in the Tamils' struggle for liberation was the internecine war between the various revolutionary groups committed to an armed struggle as a means to achieving their goal of Eelam, a separate state.

In fact these militant groups had frittered away their time and energy, liquidating one another and scoring points over one another instead of getting together to fight the "common enemy"—the Sinhala armed forces. The rivalries of the Eelam groups did not stem from ideological differences but from personal disputes and prejudices. Though everybody realises the need for unity, ego problems prevented them from coming together, thus playing into the hands of President Jayewardene.

On 10 April 1985, the Liberation Tigers of Thamil Eelam (LTTE) headed by V. Pirabhakaran, considered to be the most powerful and professional militant organisation joined the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) that had been set up a year ago. The LTTE's decision came as a great boost to the cause of Eelam because more than any other group it was the LTTE that had always been arrogantly keeping away from the unity moves.”
Sudan (1963-1972)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: yes

This was a complicated war. I can find little evidence that Anya Nya was engaged in a meaningful alliance with any other groups or that it reflected an alliance between others.

Sudan (1983-2002)
Alliance: SPLA/NDA
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes, for tenuous

This is also a long and complicated affair, rife with fractionalization, splits, separationist aspirations and other complications. The Anya Nya ii fought against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and eventually were defeated. The SPLA split into three factions. However, an alliance did emerge between the SPLA and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the north, whose goal was the overthrow of the Khartoum government. The NDA itself could be coded as an alliance, as indeed it was in name. But they did not share the SPLA’s primary goal of separation for the south; rather they sought a peaceful solution to the problem. This is an ambiguous case for the tenuous nature of the alliance. Collins (2008) is an excellent historical source for this conflict. www.fas.org also is a good source, noting: “the SPLM/A and its northern allies in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) carried out successful military offensives in areas along the borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea and in large parts of the south during the year.”
Alliance: UTO
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: no

The United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was a mixture of democrats and Islamists that came together in a perhaps unlikely alliance. The fighting was originally between various groups and the government, before the UTO officially formed. By 1994, the Movement for Islamic Revival in Tajikistan (MIRT) was the most dominant group in the UTO for coordination of military as well as political activities. Abdullaev and Akbarzaheh (2010) is a good historical reference.

Thailand (1967-1985)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This conflict refers to the Communist Party Insurgency (CPT) against the Thai government.

Uganda (1966)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This episode refers to the Baganda rebellion.

Uganda (1978-1979)
Alliance: UNLF/A (FRONASA, Kikosi Maalum)
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no
The Ugandan civil wars are marked by contentious ethnic politics, or in the words of Weinstein (2007), “a cyclical power struggle between ethnic groups.” The Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) brought together two major opposition groups already armed and ready to invade Uganda: Kikoosi Maluum, led by Obote, and the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), led by Museveni. The UNLF was a highly politically charged entity. Weinstein (2007) notes that within the UNLF, internal political forces rushed to compete for authority and that the combined military forces were highly politicized. “The unified liberation army was riven by ethnic factionalism… FRONASA followed orders from Museveni, and Kikoosi Maluum was under the leadership of Obote’s commander” (p. 68).

Uganda (1980-1986)
Alliance: NRA with various; Bayonkole-Baganda
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: yes

This episode is merely the continuation of the guerilla warfare that preceded it, but a change in regime marks the start of a new conflict and a reshuffling of the opposition forces. The instability of the UNLF precipitated the new arrangements, after it became the ruling party. D&S (2000) note the presence of seven rebel groups, the NRA being the most prominent and led by former UNLA commander Museveni. The other groups included: UNRG, UFM, FEDEMU, UDMP/A, UFP/A, and FUNA.

Alliances here are less clear-cut than in the preceding period of conflict. Toft (2010) describes a Bayonkole-Baganda alliance within the NRM/A that was “not seamless.” There was also a degree of cooperation between the NRA and other rebel
groups. However, the coordination of activities between groups was limited on account of the distances between the groups and zones of conflict. However one views the coalitions that come together, this is a borderline case.

Vietnam (1960-1975)
Alliance: NLF (VC)-NVA
Tenuous: 0
Borderline: yes

This case is controversial in the sense that many datasets treat it as an international war (COW) instead of a civil war. Less controversial, however, is the relatively seamless arrangement between the Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). This case is also borderline in the sense that the VC-NVA activity was less an alliance than a single force.

Yemen (1962-1969)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This is a complicated case that combines multiple factors. It is a highly internationalized conflict, with regional participants including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. It was also a salient Cold War front, meaning the Soviets and the US also played active supportive roles. Domestically, however, the fronts are less precise. Certainly, this was a conflict between the royalists and the republican rebels. But beneath these two broad categories one finds the murky and highly antagonistic trappings of clan and tribal factions that beset much of the Middle East. Wenner (1993) notes: “the northern tribes have not always been united in their political goals and interests. The tribes of North
Yemen are more like small nations, each with its own network of allies, its own lands, its own set of interests” (p. 96). And these local issues paint a mosaic of various and conflicting allegiances. “The result was that some tribal confederations found themselves split, with some clan/elements siding with the royalists, and some with the republicans. There are too many instances, moreover, of tribes switching their allegiances, often during the course of the conflict—sometimes for base reasons, sometimes on matters of principle” (pp. 102-103).

Given this complicated backdrop, the issue is whether one can classify one or both of the two primary sides in this conflict—royalists and republicans—as an alliance. While more efforts should go into addressing this question, there is not enough evidence to substantiate an alliance of the kind that has been described here. However, better information about this case could alter this judgment.

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: yes

This conflict refers to the independence of Croatia, or the first Croatian war in Yugoslavia and a second war in 1995. D&S discuss the difficulties associated with treating this as two separate wars and their limited justification for doing so, based on battle death assessments from 1992-1994.

Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: yes
This episode refers specifically to events in Bosnia. The chaotic manner in which Yugoslavia broke apart makes a mockery of any attempt to categorize and classify episodes of war. This says nothing of untangling alliances during this period. According to D&S (2000), the Bosnian case from 1992-1995 has five parties: Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. The irony of this conflict—which transpired principally in the newly independent country of Bosnia-Herzegovina—is that it was primarily a war between two former allies: the Muslims and Croatians in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH). In the disintegration of Yugoslavia, expedience dictated that the Muslim dominated central government in Bosnia-Herzegovina cooperate with the Bosnian Croats against the Bosnian Serbs, still enraged at the newly proclaimed “Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Shrader (2003) notes that by the middle of 1992, the BSA (Bosnian Serb Army) aided by the JNA (rump Yugoslav National Army), had surrounded Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslim and Croat defenders and begun slowly compressing them into a number of slowly shrinking enclaves (p. 13) thus forcing a Muslim-Croat alliance. This was part of the residual war spawned by the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, by the end of the year, relations between these two allies had begun to deteriorate at an ever-accelerating pace. The Muslims were in fact planning an open attack on their erstwhile ally, the Bosnian Croats. The war this observation is intended to reflect is the fight between the HVO and the ABiH.
Unfortunately for the social scientist, this conflict overlaps considerably with the international one preceding it. The episode D&S identify and code is the war between the HVO and the ABiH. It is therefore somewhat backwards to talk about an alliance whose very disintegration ushered in the conflict at hand. These difficulties bring to light the tenuous manner in which these wars are often categorized, as it is impossible to separate the Muslim-Croat conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Serbian war of ethnic cleansing against both Muslims and Croats—one D&S do not single out as a separate observation. On some levels, it may make more sense to treat the conflict more holistically as a Yugoslavian affair. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the HVO-ABiH alliance is noted, but not coded for analytical purposes.

Zimbabwe (1972-1980)
Alliance: ZANU-ZAPU / Patriotic Front
Tenuous: 1
Borderline: no

The interested reader is referred to the many references in Chapter 4, especially Stedman (1993, 1991).

Zimbabwe (1980-1984)
Alliance: 0
Tenuous: NA
Borderline: no

This conflict refers to the ZANU versus ZAPU war following Zimbabwean Independence.
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Biography

Sean Zeigler was born in January of 1977 in El Paso, Texas. His mother, a native of Puerto Rico, moved to El Paso because her father, an Army sergeant, was stationed at Fort Bliss. His father, originally from the Midwest, moved to El Paso in 1966 to attend the University of Texas at El Paso. Sean’s family moved to Albuquerque, NM when he was 7 months old, when his father opened a restaurant in the Duke City named Liquid Assets. Sean left New Mexico in 1995 to attend the University of North Carolina, where he earned B.A. degrees in mathematics and economics. After Carolina, Sean became an officer in the U.S. Navy. He served in the military from 2000 until 2004, working primarily in electronic encryption and often deployed. Sean subsequently attended Johns Hopkins University, where he received his M.A. in economics in 2007. In the fall of 2007, Sean accepted an offer to attend Duke University to complete his PhD in Political Science as a Duke University Fellow.

Sean has published the following peer reviewed journal articles: “War and the Re-election Motive: Examining the Effect of Term Limits,” with Jan Pierskalla and Sandeep Mazamder in the Journal of Conflict Resolution; “Turkish Migration to the EU: Non-Monetary Benefits and Selection Effects,” with Ilhan Can Ozen in Economics, Business and Finance; and “Khan on Singer: Orientalism in a Globalized World,” with Ilhan Can Ozen in the Pakistan Development Review.