to that in corporatist European states, where government agencies voluntarily, or as obliged by law, ask private-interest groups for their opinions. In corporatist states, private-interest groups can often influence the implementation of rules after a law has been passed, in contrast to the situation in weaker states like the United States, where the executive is constrained by the legislature, the judiciary, and the general public—which might further account for the growth of lobbying in policy-making in the United States. This study also provides some insights into how policy-making and lobbying will develop in the European Community. After all, the political organization of the E.C. bears many striking similarities to the political system of the United States.


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In a book rich in detail and insight, Margaret Keck advances an original and innovative interpretation of the formative years of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), founded in 1979 under the leadership of the São Paulo labor leader, Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva. Although the title suggests a national study of the PT's first dozen years, the book's “temporal and geographical scope” is in fact limited to São Paulo from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s (pp. x, 109)—a not unreasonable decision given the complexity of the story of redemocratization, labor insurgency, and political innovation in that heavily industrialized state of 30 million.

Keck's São Paulo focus is all the more compelling in the aftermath of the 1994 presidential race, which pitted two paulista candidates against each other: the socialist Lula against the center-left sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the latter with backing from the right as well. In chapters three and four, Keck brilliantly explores the diverging paths taken in the 1970s by the metalworker Lula and Cardoso, the candidate Lula's union had backed enthusiastically in the 1978 senatorial race. Writing in a dialogue with Cardoso, an opposition strategist of the abertura (political opening), Keck makes a major contribution to our understanding of the simultaneous occurrence of antiregime polarization and deteriorating opposition unity during this tumultuous period (pp. 44, 59, 85). Unlike the dominant celebratory narrative of Brazilian redemocratization, she emphasizes the peculiar nature of “The Opposition,” which “was an idea rather than an organization ... a powerful image of societal convergence ... not dependent on any particular form. It was an image of consensus, superimposed on a society characterized by tremendous social stratification and a multiplicity of visions of the future” (p. 54).

In her persuasive analysis, the PT's emergence is the story of leaders, in particular Lula, whose centrality is underplayed in some academic accounts and denied by a PT party orthodoxy that eschews “personalism” (pp. 74, 77, 81, 182). After offering the best English-language biographical sketch of Lula, Keck insists quite rightly that his ultimate destination was in no sense preordained. She also shrewdly demonstrates how it was precisely “Lula's lack of connection with any political group and his political naivete [that] became assets” in the mid-1970s (p. 74).

It must be emphasized that Keck is far from arguing that the PT exists solely as a consequence of Lula's personal will and ambition. Instead, she shows how leaders such as Lula, in the face of an imponderable future, made decisions that brought with them unforeseen consequences and opportunities. She is especially sensitive to the complex mix of structure, agency, and contingency that determined how a party form crystallized out of social movements during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In this sense, Keck writes less about what the PT was or claimed to be in its early years and instead shows us how the PT became, while exploring the enduring tensions, conflicts, and strengths that its movement origins bequeathed the new party.

Although sympathetic to the PT, Keck suffers from none of the naivete and romantic idealization that has marred so many other accounts. Instead of repackaging the PT's "ideology" or mythic self-representation, Keck offers us an up-close
"feel" for the PT from the perspective of a movement organizer. Placing agency firmly within its structural constraints, she brilliantly analyzes the strategic and tactical dilemmas that confronted the PT's founders as they struggled to build their party-with-a-difference (pp. 125, 83, 222).

Most importantly, Keck eschews abstract structuralist explanations that link class or class struggle unproblematically to the emergence of the PT. Rather than deducing the party from sociological or historical generalizations about the "working class," she recognizes, for example, that "the kinds of popular movements and organizations" involved with the PT "had little in common among themselves" in the 1970s, in addition to sharing "even less in common with elite opposition groups" (p. 52). Rejecting facile structural explanations, Keck's book offers a closely observed study of the politics and process of the Brazilian transition towards democracy. Although she navigates theoretical and comparative discussions with confidence, Keck is not primarily concerned with abstract model-building. With one foot firmly planted in the real world, Keck is not easily bamboozled by the abstractions of "high politics" that befuddled so much of the "democratic transition" theorizing that entranced political scientists in the mid-1980s. She is never afraid to descend to the ground-level of politics; her discussion of the intraparty conflicts occasioned by the PT's takeover of the municipal government in Diadema, for example, is a model of balanced judgment that meshes well with her larger argument about the PT's situation in the aftermath of the 1982 election.

Given the quality of the best sections of the monograph, this reader wanted even more from the book. In light of my own research on the state's metalworkers, I would have preferred an even more explicit focus on São Paulo, which would have allowed her to explore more fully the social ecology of the PT. In particular, it would have been useful to examine the role of the Catholic church and elite intellectuals in the PT—a point raised with great force by Leôncio Martins Rodrigues (Partidos e Sindicatos [São Paulo: Atica, 1990]) as Keck graciously admits (pp. x, 190–1). And it would have also been interesting to better understand the PT's relationship with the women's movements in São Paulo that were studied by Sonia Alvarez (Engendering Democracy in Brazil [Princeton: 1990]).

As for the paulista labor movement during the abertura, we still don't have a really compelling understanding of why the PT's project was strong among the leaders of certain working-class sectors or unions but weak among others. If the presence or absence of a "Lula" is vital, as one might suspect, then questions of generational definition and working-class political and union traditions demand greater analysis. In addition, it would have been fascinating to have Keck's response to Isabel Ribeiro de Oliveira's provocative analysis of the discourse of the "New Unionists" such as Lula, especially their shifting view of the role of the state (Trabalho e Política: As Origens do Partido dos Trabalhadores [Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1988]).

Finally, Keck's quite proper emphasis on Lula's personal contribution to the establishment and success of the PT raises a larger question. Does Lula, in some sense, represent a continuation of the personalist leadership styles that characterized mass politics in São Paulo during the much maligned "populist era" before 1964? After all, Paul Drake's study of the PT's closest Latin American counterpart, the Chilean Socialist Party, long ago disproved the assumption that explicitly leftist or socialist politics are an inherent negation of populism or personalism (Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932–1952 [Urbania: 1978]).

To summarize, Keck's fine monograph explains much about why and how the PT was formed and the reasons for its "dismal failure" in the 1982 gubernatorial elections, when it got 3 percent of the national vote and only 10 percent in its paulista stronghold. Although the depth of coverage and the acuteness of the analysis decline after the early 1980s, she does leave future researchers with provocative suggestions about how, in the end, the PT's own unresolved tensions allowed the party to survive and prosper. By 1989, Lula lost the second round of the presidential election to a rightist candidate by only 6 percent of the total vote. And in the 1994 election, Lula ran first in the polls for many months before finally losing in the first
round to Fernando Henrique Cardoso by 27 percent to 54 percent. We can only hope that Keck will return to the story of Lula and PT once again to fill us in on the social and political dynamics underlying these dramatic results.


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The most memorable thing about the Gulf war, an episode that held most Americans spellbound, may be the rapidity with which it has receded from public memory. Elevated to the "most important problem" facing the country during the seven months between the invasion of Kuwait and the suspension of hostilities by American forces, it never dominated as much as issues like crime and the economy have. Nor was the unprecedentedly high approval President Bush got from his apparently successful military intervention enough to stave off electoral defeat in 1992. Except for the books that keep coming out, references to this episode have all but disappeared from public discourse.

Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War by John Mueller, known for his studies of presidential popularity and popular support for war, undertakes a judicious examination of some 300 poll questions during and about the Gulf war. This is a dazzling number, more questions than were asked over some two years of Watergate. Tables in the appendix take up nearly half the volume.

Still, as Mueller himself warns at the outset, his is an "untidy" study. The public polls, driven as they are by journalistic criteria and responsive to headlines rather than theoretically relevant issues, do not as a rule probe very deeply. And reactions recorded in an instant poll, right after the event, can quickly evaporate. How questions are worded and placed in a questionnaire also affects some results, making Americans before the actual start of hostilities appear both hawkish and dovish: They favored the "use of military force" but were against starting a "war." Nor did the public become "consistently more hawkish or dovish, more war-eager or war-averse, or more or less supportive of Bush or his policies" (p. 43). But support for Bush did erode somewhat between the invasion in early August and October (when the decision for a military showdown was made), as somewhat more people came to believe that sending troops to Saudi Arabia had been a "mistake." But the congressional debate in January produced no further change. Mueller refers to a "fatalistic consensus" (pp. 56, 126) that war was inevitable, but not necessarily wise.

Once the firing began, Bush became the beneficiary of the "rally-round-the-flag-effect" Mueller documented in earlier work and was evident also in higher satisfaction and confidence that the country was moving in the right direction. But indications of intolerance for more than a minimum of casualties also suggest that the euphoria produced by the declaration of victory would not have survived a longer war. Bush lost ground whenever attention shifted, as he already had in the fall after breaking his "no-tax" pledge.

Mueller relates each trend to its political context. His analysis strengthens this reviewer's view that government anticipates and reacts preemptively to public opinion rather than simply following it. The White House must have known that it could not maintain 250,000 troops in the desert indefinitely. Hence, the relevant measure of public opinion is not the momentary response but what people will ultimately settle for, which is a function of their values and perceived interests.

I take issue with Mueller when he argues the insignificance of visuals, on the grounds that Americans were outraged about Pearl Harbor long before they saw pictures. Granted. But TV-pictures of the Gulf, where no clear national interest seemed at stake, brought the war closer. News viewing increased significantly and conveyed a more convincing image of American technological superiority than statements in any other form. Obviously such effects occur only in conjunction with real developments, such as those Mueller cites. All in all, this book is not just a primer on