Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.

—John Maynard Keynes

Keynes’ warning went unheard. According to Andrew Glyn’s concise, informed and informative new book, an unrestrained virtual economy is now threatening the world’s real economy. The imposition of the neo-classical paradigm onto the world’s societies during the last quarter of the twentieth century has signified a shift from instability due to labour unrest, typical of the 1960s and 1970s, to instability due to financial speculation, typical of the 1980s and 1990s. The persisting mantra of austerity, privatisation and deregulation made famous—or infamous—by political leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, has not produced the heralded planetary bounty of prosperity, not even in the wealthy North where it was theorised and turned into an anti-union policy. Revealingly, both the rate of growth of output per capita and the rate of reduction of income inequality were higher in the 1950s and 1960s.

Instead, austerity, privatisation and deregulation, along with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, have produced a boom of sophisticated forms of financial speculation disconnecting short-term capital gains from the profitability of the underlying assets and, more crucially, from their medium- and long-term viability. The obsessive and often fraud-prone quest for maximal shareholder value has marginalized other concerns, including the productive sustainability of underpinning enterprises and societies. Glyn does not deny that at the institutional level the world economy may be more resilient to speculative shocks today than in the 1920s and 1930s. Yet, he maintains that these shocks still cause serious damage to societies, impairing countries’ economies and the quality of life of millions.

Glyn’s book discusses much more than the virtualisation of the world’s economy. It covers several aspects of international economic history of the past thirty-six years, such as the retreat of labour, the abandonment of socialist alternatives and the challenges to welfare. However, the theme of the virtualisation of the world’s economy runs like a unifying thread through all these aspects.

Glyn is an accomplished economist, but he does not write for economists alone. His style is dry, but not boring. His language is technical, but not abstruse. He shows neither the awareness nor the desire to disclose the life-blindness of the received lexicon of contemporary economics (e.g. the environment positing “constraints” upon the economy, whilst any economy relies on the environment for its own existence in the first place; “free” market policies being imposed by governments onto largely unwilling or uninformed populations). Nevertheless, Glyn’s candid historical analysis reveals the rhetorical gratuity of several assumptions of the neo-classical paradigm (e.g. the impossibility of economic alternatives, the impotence of economic policy). In this, as in many other aspects, Glyn’s book is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand how capitalism has operated worldwide from the 1970s to the present day.

Giorgio Baruchello
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In Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945, Melani McAlister examines “the intersection between cultural texts, foreign policy, and constructs of identity” in relation to the Middle East. She highlights movies and other cultural artifacts and juxtaposes them with U.S. foreign policy statements to reflect on the formation of cultural and national identities. Following a postmodernist approach to the relationship between power and knowledge, the author highlights Edward Said’s *Orientalism* to begin to understand the West’s views of the Islamic Arabic world. Considering “oriental” as the opposite of “occidental” or western, the “Orient” or east, including the Middle East, has been constructed as a negative inversion of Western culture.

McAlister argues that the West’s idea of itself has been constructed largely by saying what others are not, as the United States seems to be doing in relation to the Islamic Arabic world today. Since the end of the Cold War, which brought an end to its anti-communist ideology, the United States has been seeking a new way to define its interests. With the first Persian Gulf War, however, a stream of images and thoughts flowed through America as the new threat quickly began to materialize in the form of Muslim fundamentalism and tyrannical leaders like Saddam Hussein.

In *Epic Encounters*, McAlister analyzes the way in which the images from the mass media and U.S. policy have reinforced one another to help define U.S. interests and self identity. Her analysis becomes very palpable when the post-Cold War era is discussed. The images from U.S. involvement in the Middle East since the Soviet collapse are very much in America’s consciousness, not only shaping the view Americans have of people far away but shaping the way Americans view themselves.

McAlister points out how the images that are mass produced on television and in Hollywood become part of a shared identity that helps create a national community where otherwise none may exist. Although pictures may seem insignificant at first glance, McAlister reveals their importance in shaping our intellectual analysis of events. Considering that very few Americans have ever lived in the Middle East, it is hard to deny that our political views are shaped in a process that requires cultural work, not just intellectual analysis. In the last chapter entitled, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” McAlister analyzes how individual news photos have become part of the national boundaries of political debate. Sections are entitled: “Snapshot: Firemen Raising the Flag,” “Snapshot: Osama Bin Laden;” and “Snapshot: Afghan Women in Burqas.” It is hard to imagine a debate about U.S. Mideast policy without these images.

Although the prominence of the Middle East in American lives has been very clear since the Soviet collapse, McAlister digs much deeper and looks at images from the past, especially the period since 1945. She examines Charlton Heston’s *The Ten Commandments*, news coverage of the 1972 Munich Olympic hostage situation, and the Iranian hostage crisis when Americans were taken for 444 days. In each, McAlister uncovers a set of political and intellectual views that help guide and reinforce U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. *Epic Encounters* is a fascinating look at a very complex topic and should be considered for every library.

John M. Public
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Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain.
By Stefan Collini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 526 pp. £25.00 cloth.

Stefan Collini is best known as an essayist, so it is something of a surprise to find him producing so long a book at this point in his career, with his reputation already established. The point is that *Absent Minds* has been written in reaction to, and against, what the author calls “the repetitive and under-researched literature on intellectuals,” and especially against the “absence thesis”—that is, “the claim that in Britain intellectuals have been peculiarly
unimportant or even non-existent.” By con-trast, Collini has written a thoroughly-researched book that maintains the opposite thesis. A long book, but happily an extremely readable one. It is lucid, judicious, and enlivened by the sardonic wit we have come to expect from the author and especially by the put-downs of other writers on the topic as well as the intellectuals under discussion for their self-congratulation, self-importance, self-righteousness, self-serving and self-satisfaction. Absent Minds combines the sharp eye for changes in ideas of the “intellectual historian” (Collini’s academic title), aware that the meanings of words are not fixed but floating, with a literary critic’s sensitivity to style, tone and stereotypes. The book is all the more appealing because it may be read as a series of essays, about the concept of the intellectual, for instance, about ambivalence towards the role (illustrated by five cases, including T. S. Eliot and A. J. P. Taylor), and about the repetitive history of laments over increasing specialization.

Collini neatly defines the intellectual as someone “in constant movement between the poles of specialized cultural achievement and general ‘speaking out,’” in other words “perpetually tacking between the Scylla of timidity, hermeticism, and over-specialism, and the Charybdis of exhibitionism, philistinism and over-exposure” (he might have added that individuals tend to think that their colleagues have shipwrecked while they themselves have got the balance just right). He has no difficulty in disposing of the extreme form of the absence thesis, that is, that the species “intellectual” did not exist in Britain. Names such as Russell or Collingwood, Tawney or Leavis, Virginia Woolf and Iris Murdoch are sufficient to refute this view on their own. The milder form of the thesis—that of the “peculiar unimportance” of the breed—both deserves and receives more attention. Collini writes about “Paris envy,” the way in which French intellectuals in general and Sartre in particular are cited, to suggest that the public role of the intellectual is taken more seriously “abroad,” arguing that France is only one country and that there are places, notably the USA, where intellectuals envy the position of their colleagues in Britain.

I found this book 95% convincing. I still think that the French model works quite well in East-Central Europe and in the Latin world, especially at certain moments (the moment of Croce in Italy, for instance, that of Ortega in Spain and that of Gilberto Freyre in Brazil). For better or worse, in these countries academics and men and women of letters are regularly asked by the media to give their opinions about the state of the world to an extent almost inconceivable here. The temptation is to become what Carlo Ginzburg calls a *tuttologo*, an “expert” on everything. It is ironic that one of Collini’s rare examples of an English equivalent, Freddie Ayer—second only to Sartre as a signer of letters to the newspaper—should have been so dismissive of Sartre’s philosophy.

There is one major absence from Absent Minds. The author has much that is both wise and witty to say about anti-intellectualism in British life, including the idea that intellectuals are “foreign bodies,” but he does little to relate this attitude to the importance of foreign (mainly Jewish) intellectuals on British soil in this period. I made a rough list of the most impressive intellectuals in twentieth-century Britain that came immediately to mind, only to discover that it was half foreign—Russell was matched by Wittgenstein, Thompson by Hobsbawm, Goody by Gellner, Keynes by Kaldor, Oakeshott by Berlin and so on. In fact Collini has curiously little to say about Isaiah Berlin, although he was regarded by many in the 1950s and 1960s as Britain’s intellectual par excellence. Nor does he quote Arnaldo Momigliano’s celebrated remark that in England it was sufficient for him to mention the word “idea” to be given the address of the Warburg Institute, that foreign body lodged in the University of London. Momigliano was of course making a rhetorical point, but Absent Minds might have said more about British resistance—if not exactly to ideas, then at least to “theory.” All the same, Stefan Collini has made his point and driven it home. In the process he has also made a major contribution to the intellectual history of twentieth-century Britain.

**Peter Burke**

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You like animals, don’t you, some of them especially? As companions in the home? As comrades on the hunt—or as game? To eat? To wear their skins? To breed and to show, or to bet on as they race? Or just to look upon, in pictures or at a zoo? Perhaps to photograph or to video-record? Or even to paint or sculpt?

The way we answer these questions today (and particularly in the English-speaking countries) results from a long history of changing human-animal interactions and relationships. According to historian Richard W. Bulliet of Columbia University we are living in a new epoch thereof. He offers two theories to explain our behavior and our thinking—ours now as well as that of our remotest identifiably “human” ancestors and of hundreds of generations in between. Our profoundly mixed feelings about sex and violence among ourselves, his opening chapter boldly proposes, are symptoms of a “Postdomesticity” that has removed most of us from physical contact with animals other than those furry or feathered friends we keep for our amusement or solace.

One theory postulates revolutionary shifts in life conditions, in stages Bulliet describes according to how “we” have confronted and eventually exploited non-human (and overwhelmingly non-primate) species. The key event is domestication, human control and normalization of relations with some “tame” animals, but not with “wild” others. Bulliet’s other theory explains how such a stage of “Domesticity” arose and developed. Beforehand, however, “we” had to separate ourselves from other animals, like Enkidu in one of our most ancient extant texts, the Gilgamesh Epic (chapter 3, “Separation”). Animals subsequently became prey and/or sacrificial victims in the long epoch the author calls “Predomesticity” (chapter 4). Some of them became meat, but never just food, sacralized as their flesh was through rituals of hunt and slaughter. Three chapters (5–7)—the heart of this book—offer an unconventional account of domestication, both as a prehistoric process that has often been misrepresented and misunderstood, and as the foundation for an entire ideology and moral system. Bulliet argues throughout that domestication of different animal kinds at different times—often thousands of years apart—in different, widely scattered places, was incidental to “predomestic” uses, some dietary, some affective; and that it was accidental in every or almost every instance (and in absolutely all of the earlier ones). His discussion of non-material, chiefly religious uses, is quite compelling. The fascinating seventh chapter, “From Mighty Hunter to Yajamana,” ends thus: “If a person from the dawn of domesticity could observe our contemporary patterns of human-animal relations, he or she would undoubtedly be more saddened by the spiritual and imaginative impoverishment of our outlook on the animal world than impressed by our industrialization of animal exploitation, our pet cemeteries, and Mickey Mouse. We must keep this in mind when looking at the subsequent history of domesticity” (142).

That subsequent history took some odd turns. The immediately following chapter “Early Domesticity” with its provocative subtitle “My Ass and Yours” announces a wide-ranging treatment of the divergent, often contradictory emotive and symbolic values of an economically valuable beast of burden, the donkey. “Late Domestic Divergences” follows, taking us into a highly urbanized world, where ever fewer of us personally experience the sight, sound, and smell, the manure and blood of that meat-wool-and-leather-on-the-hoof upon which we depend for so much. Ranching, which Bulliet discusses at some length (and which he associates loosely with a “colonialist” mentality), is industry, supplying food and other products, processed and packaged before they reach us; whereas old-fashioned pastoralism and animal husbandry—what connotations this last word brings!—was a way of life for people who were never far from their flocks and herds. On the other hand, just as brutal colonialism provoked kind-hearted moral revulsion, so did the cruelest treatment of animals. Bear-baiting and dog-fights were legally forbidden.

Nearing and finally re-entering our times, chapter 10, “Toward Postdomesticity,” describes cultural and social phenomena of the past century-and-a-half. Animals assumed new roles in literature, becoming characters in depth or even protagonists—transcending the
symbols they had been in beast fable and animal metaphor for millennia; humans founded or promoted institutions to love, honor and protect them (kennel clubs, for example, and societies for the prevention of cruelty). This compensated for our physical separation from most beasts, and led almost inevitably to recent animal rights movements and critical-philosophical demands for a new morality that questions any view that deems other species—at least the vertebrates—“Other” in relation to “Us.” Bulliet’s account of such activism and prescriptive moralism is acute and not unsympathetic. He gives its proponents a hearing; however, he neither jumps onto this postmodern bandwagon himself nor urges the rest of the world to join him there. In fact, beyond the Anglo/English-speaking lands, just across the English Channel, and certainly in East Asia, these trends have taken less hold, or none at all: fox hunts cease, but bull-fights go on! Instead, in a thoughtful concluding chapter on “The Future of Human-Animal Relations,” he maintains that the legacy of domesticity will prevent us from ever really thinking of ourselves as morally equivalent to (other) animals, despite (I might add) the efforts of the likes of Daniel Quinn in his brilliant novel *Ishmael* (1992) and its sequels, and notwithstanding the sympathy of a conservative classicist like John Heath in his epilogue to *The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato* (2005).

“The future of human-animal relations in real world terms,” Bulliet concludes, “will be determined by worldwide expansion of exploitation in a late domestic mode and the reaction to that expansion by increasingly angry postdomestic activists . . . There is no middle ground between meatpackers and vegetarians, hunters and mink liberators . . . Philosophers, scientists, writers, and filmmakers have been drawn into the maelstrom. But in the imaginative realm, the heritage of the late domestic era, with its herds of symbolically degraded beasts being transformed into industrial commodities, has left the creative mind with little to build upon. It will take true genius to rediscover the magic of the pre-domestic era, when animals communed with gods, half-animal beings commanded respect, and killing inspired awe and incurred guilt” (223–24).

The writing here is uniformly elegant and clear, often humorous yet without much flippancy such as “My Ass and Yours” might wrongly suggest; and his argument is informed. Five pages of Suggested Reading cover the essentials, complementing the text’s judicious annotation. Some of that argument proceeds more according to common sense and “thought experiment” than upon linguistic and documentary evidence or archaeological and anthropological vestiges; it is all sensible, however, and likely to persuade, or at least challenge, any but the most dogmatic readers. This book’s readers should be many, attracted by a clever title and a modest price.

**Victor Castellani**

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**Note**

1. The Sanskrit *Yajamana* is a Vedic term for the sponsor of a major sacrifice, the magnate (usually royal) who provides the special animal required and who presides over the ensuing banquet or distribution of meat.

**Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords.** By Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), lvi + 410 pp. $29.95 paper; $64.50 cloth.

This book contains some of Theodor Adorno’s post-World War II essays, written after his return to Germany. A persistent theme is the centrality of and the threat to the critical, self-reflective intelligence—the bulwark of the autonomous personality. The world we inhabit is structured to make us dependent upon fixed institutional norms and ideologies—or totalities—that deny the practice of critique. In the face of this circumstance, society reproduces the modes of thought and conduct that deny autonomy. Moreover, the norms that motivate conformity and domination are not traditional ones such as abstinence, virginity, and chastity. Rather, a cultural industry designed to entertain and to encourage pleasure
on all levels—sexual and otherwise—endears us to the structures of domination that sap our autonomy.

The route to resistance is through reflective, critical reasoning that allows us to unmask the structures that oppress, and then to develop with our imaginative powers strategies for action to free us from the totalizing realities that not only deny freedom but may well advance totalitarian terror, as well. Indeed, we must never forget that totalizing tendencies that may appear relatively harmless today may lead to Auschwitz tomorrow. This circumstance comes about when the fixed structures of the external world dominate our lives to such a degree that our quest for recognition and esteem through the attainment of autonomy is crushed. And, in consequence, we find ourselves compensating for the loss of esteem by identifying completely with the collectivizing tendencies of the mass mind that gives god-like status to the single leader and his unchecked power. When this happens the capacity to critique, to examine, to change, as well as to seek evidence for ideas and proposed plans that make possible actions designed to ensure autonomy among all members of the society, are denied expression.

In effect, critical thought, which enables us to construct theories to guide actions for liberation from structures of domination may even in the modern, enlightened world be subordinated to modes of conduct that merely reproduce the structures that oppress. Even science contributes to this situation when the techniques it produces are over-celebrated, causing people to see “salvation” in scientific methods, and in the process making science “a substitute for the intellectual reflection upon the facts, once the very foundation of science” (32). Other factors dim the critical intelligence as well, including television, the role of public opinion in modern life, and the failure to provide an adequate education to young people. But perhaps most threatening of all to the critical intelligence is the common belief that before criticizing the world, we should “propose something better than what is being criticized” (287). Adorno rejects this view when he paraphrases Spinoza and says that “the false, once determinately known and precisely expressed, is already an index of what is right and better” (288). This statement, sums up for our times the extraordinary value of Adorno’s work and of this collection of essays.

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Dan Brown’s novel, The Da Vinci Code, which has been on the New York Times best seller list for months, has spawned a trial in London, condemnatory remarks from the Vatican, a movie, and an array of books questioning his interpretations of early Christianity. Robert Price, a member of the Jesus Seminar in the United States, has analyzed Brown’s fictional work with an eye to the novelist’s scholarly credentials and has found them lacking. It seems clear, however, that Brown’s work has enlivened the interest of Christians in their early history and their formative experiences.

Responding to Brown’s work, Price explores the questions that resonate with the hermeneutical studies focusing on early Christianity: did Jesus survive the crucifixion and do we have historical evidence for this? Why were some Gospels accepted and some accounts such as the Gospel of Judas suppressed? What was the role of Gnosticism? What was Constantine’s role in the development of Christian doctrine? Who was Mary Magdalene and how did her story inspire a “feminine” dimension in Christianity? Brown adds questions that Catholics themselves would like answered concerning the role of Opus Dei in the modern Church. Both authors focus on the meaning of the Holy Grail and the possibility that Jesus and Mary Magdalene may have been the procreative originators of the Merovingian dynasty.

Price carefully explores the battles that raged in the early church between the “orthodox” Christians and the groups they denounced as heretics and ultimately suppressed. He provides an excellent bibliography of secondary sources for those who may wish to explore these crucial issues more closely.
His text is lucidly written and will serve as a primer for those interested in the early clash of ideas in a pluralistic Christianity that ultimately became a political force in the Roman world.

He has tried not just to expose weaknesses in the Christian tradition, although he does engage in some theology bashing, but to pursue the facts and to follow trails wherever they may lead. In fact, his book could be useful as the background for Brown’s book, which “uses” the research available but fails to provide the scholarly history that supports some of the unconventional themes that emerge in the novel. Price provides this background, but fails to delve deeply enough into early Christian culture as the faithful tried to formulate philosophically and culturally the charismatic faith they embraced. As some theologians have concluded, we may never know which sayings came from Jesus and which “facts” were real, but in the final analysis that may not even matter. The early Christians embraced the faith that had consumed the initial followers of Jesus. The Gospels themselves attest to the varied ways that the authors saw Jesus even at that time. Certainly, Price’s book sheds light on the shortcomings of Brown’s book. Even so, the facts that Price highlights do not detract from the enjoyment gained in reading The Da Vinci Code. If nothing else, Price and Brown have revived interest in the challenges faced by the early Christians as they developed their tradition.

Donald J. Dietrich
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Daniel Hillel, an accomplished environmental scientist, invites us to read the Hebrew Bible through the eyes of his discipline. The region within which Biblical history unfolds, from Mesopotamia to Egypt with some links beyond, is divided into seven ecological domains designated as: riverine, pastoral, desert, rainfed, maritime, urban, and exile. He describes these in detail, integrating discussions of each alongside a narrative from Genesis until the sixth century B.C.E. Aspects of everyday life appearing in the Biblical text are shown to reflect ecological conditions and cultural adaptations to them. In addition, major developments are placed in an ecological context. These range from the gradual silting of the Mesopotamian delta, accounting for the gradual movement of empires northward, through a naturalistic explanation of the salvation of the Israelites at the “Red Sea,” to the first clashes between the Israelites and Philistines, who introduced iron weaponry into the region. The book is up-to-date in the extensive research it cites, including recent challenges by some archeologists to the accepted dating and extent of David’s and Solomon’s monarchy described in Kings.

In other ways, however, the book recalls earlier approaches although it draws its inspiration from the vital new field of environmentalism. It insists on evolutionism not only regarding technology and society but also with reference to religious ideas. The narrative highlights the notion of “ethical monotheism” as the pinnacle of Biblical religion, a nineteenth-century concept formulated mainly by Protestant scholar-theologians who assumed that Christianity took over and surpassed the religious heights of the “Old Testament.” It disregards the critiques of evolution formulated by anthropologists or Biblical scholars offering various methodologies and readings of the Biblical text. The great diversity of human cultures is not adequately explained by any direct model leading from objective conditions to specific ideological creations. Hillel, for example, sees the story of Jonah’s mission to Nineveh as the expansion of the cultural horizons of the Israelites through maritime trade: “The Book of Jonah thus marks an important step in the transformation of Hebrew monotheism from a strictly national religion to a universal one directed toward—and compassionate to—all peoples” (176). Two questions need to be asked: Is this kind of evolution found among other maritime groups? And, could a seafaring story with the texture of Jonah only be canonized where a universal monotheism was already present?

An environmental perspective is welcome, but not entirely new. It has become an
important part of archeology and social anthropology dealing with the Bible—but these are ignored by Hillel. Thus, Gillian Feeley-Harnik has explored food symbolism, placing it in an environmental setting (*The Lord’s Table: The Meaning of Food in Early Judaism and Christianity, 1994*), and Carol Delaney questions the patriarchal aspects of monotheism (*Abraham on Trial: The Social Legacy of Biblical Myth, 1998*). Hillel’s discussion of hospitality and revenge among pastoralists (78–81) might benefit from a Mediterraneanist’s perspective on the violent events at Shechem (Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The Fate of Shechem, or the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean, 1977*). But for those who see the Bible only in terms of “religion,” this book is an informed and readable entrance into a profound world.

**Harvey E. Goldberg**

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This superb history of America’s preeminent conservative magazine (founded in 1955) is also a history of the postwar American right. The founder of *National Review*, William F. Buckley Jr., desired not only to inform a conservative constituency but also to create an intellectually vibrant one under a hostile liberal hegemony. Making the American conservative mind was as important as enlightening it.

Despite the revolutionary changes in American politics since 1955, Jeffrey Hart (himself an editor of *NR*) justly claims that *NR* “amounts to a single great conservative work” which taught conservatives how to think (343, 359). In our current age of abundant conservative think-tanks and political action groups, it is hard to imagine the status of the right in 1955: unorganized, uninspired, and intimidated by a liberal establishment that had held sway since 1933. Yet *NR* succeeded in exciting conservatives about ideas embedded in the American political tradition. The celebration of individual liberty, patriotism, a strong stance against communism, and a respect for America’s institutions—these became the foundation for the triumph of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

As Hart shows, *NR* has intellectually been neither stagnant nor monolithic, despite its long history. The editors of the magazine were originally wary of the Eisenhower presidency, supportive of states’ rights, and even sympathetic with Joe McCarthy; *NR* has somewhat revised its positions on all of these since the 1950s. The magazine’s editors and contributors dramatically reflect the intellectual diversity of American conservatism. With an engaging style which neatly synthesizes anecdotes and philosophical discussion, Hart treats the reader to an appreciation of the divergent views and lives of regular contributors like Frank Meyer (an individualist supporter of Mill), Russell Kirk (a Burkean traditionalist), Willmoore Kendall (a populist admirer of Rousseau), and James Burnham (a devotee of congressional supremacy at home and realpolitik abroad).

Does any *NR* luminary stand out as a lasting influence for Hart? While Buckley believes that Burnham was the most important influence, Hart makes great use of Kendall’s idea of the “deliberate sense” of the American people. This faith in trusting the people to deliberate thoughtfully and decisively on issues through the democratic process revealed that America had achieved the first populist conservatism in history (although one which not all editors of *NR* have embraced in equal doses).

Does this “deliberate sense” still exist among Americans? Hart, in his last chapter, is concerned that two new forces on the right—neoconservatives and evangelical Christians—may remake the American conservative mind for the worst. Contrary to the neoconservative sentiments of his fellow editors, Hart believes that President Bush’s mission of global democracy-building is no more conservative than the religious right’s overemphasis on mystical experience (at the expense of doctrinal truth). In turn, Hart warns that the libertarian obsession with the free market has overshadowed a true conservative goal—the preservation of the environment. If superficially conservative movements succeed in distorting the deliberate sense of Americans, it will be high time for *NR* to save the conservative mind.

**Grant Havers**

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Beyond Hegemony: Towards a New Philosophy of Political Legitimacy. By Darrow Schecter. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2005), viii + 200 pp. £55.00 cloth.

Fifteen years after the fall of the Soviet Union and over thirty years since Jürgen Habermas’s Legitimation Crisis, in the midst of the “war on terror,” the question of the legitimacy of liberal democratic capitalism is perhaps the most pressing issue for social and political theory. Darrow Schecter’s Beyond Hegemony: Towards a New Philosophy of Political Legitimacy makes a bold attempt to address the persistent stranglehold of liberal democracy and to offer a new, alternative theory of political legitimacy.

In his densely argued book, Schecter contends that opponents of liberalism have most often either unsuccessfully tried to assail it from grounds external to it, or made reforms that have been easily assimilated into liberalism. Both responses, Schecter argues, fail to address the fundamental issues that lie at the heart of liberalism and its inadequate claim on legitimacy. His project is to create a new theory of legitimacy as an alternative to liberal democracy by combining what he labels “critical idealism” with legal theory, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason and the libertarian socialism of C. D. H. Cole. I found the strongest element of the book to be its engagement with liberalism through dissecting the relationship of legality and legitimacy. Schecter’s alternative, while provocative and intriguing, seemed to me much less thorough and convincing especially in its continual attempt to get “beyond hegemony” by side-stepping (and criticizing but not thoroughly) questions of collective consciousness and identity formation, or what Schecter dismissively strings together as “the proletariat, the people, the multitude, new social movements or some combination thereof as the successful unity of theory and praxis, and a particular example of subjectivity” (157, cf. 33, 165). His presentation of the problems of commodity production then leave no room for the insights of socialist feminism, the role of capitalist reproduction or the role of racist ideology and imperialism in the persistence of liberal capitalism.

Given his earlier work on Antonio Gramsci, I found his use of the term “hegemony” quite puzzling and almost just a foil for legitimacy and legality. This is no real drawback, except that by arguing that “knowledge” can replace “hegemony” in his new theory of legitimacy, it is unclear to me how the “critical” element of Schecter’s version of “idealism” can have an effect at the level of political practice. Moreover, his indebtedness to Adorno, which is often a strength of the book, becomes a deficiency in the later parts that depend on aesthetics and under-explored notions of “mimetic reason and materialism” to provide what he finds lacking in previous notions of legitimacy. But, as he admits in his notes, how questions of aesthetics can attain the uncoerced reconciliation between humanity and nature remains nebulous.

These problems become most apparent in chapters 4 and 5. The first three chapters, while written in a cumbersome theoretical style, provide a rich discussion that both critiques liberalism and uses it to set the bar appropriately high for anything that could be capable of replacing it. Schecter argues that liberalism from Kant to Rawls promises and legitimates its rule through formal legal measures that use negative liberty to integrate individuals and maintain order without resorting to coercion. Liberalism is such an attractive theory precisely because its alternatives tend to resort to coercion of some sort to reconcile the individual with public authority. However, Schecter agrees with Marx’s early critique of the link between capitalism and liberal democracy to reveal the way liberalism obscures its prohibition against positive and real freedom through recourse to the legitimacy of formal legality. As Schecter summarizes, “The lie is the official dichotomy between legality and legitimacy which in reality turns out to be a legally legitimated form of hegemony based on the socio-political relations implied by commodity production and a deeply ambiguous conception of freedom of the will as freedom of choice” (98), which devalue any real pluralism in a meaningful sense. Schecter criticizes Marx and Marxism’s narrow focus on capitalism which Schecter, following Horkeimer and Adorno, sees as a crucial symptom of the more fundamental problem of instrumental reason. This is one reason, he suggests, why various Marxist alternatives to liberalism have failed to offer a more legitimate reconciliation between humanity and internal and external nature.
While he accepts the stark distance between Marx and the practices of state socialism, Schecter argues that Marxism in practice has been unable to meet the liberal requirements of an uncoerced reconciliation among human individuals, humanity and nature, internal and external. This is the basis of his comparison of the failures of state socialism and new social movements. Much of this assessment focuses on liberalism’s claim of neutrality. Some more liberal readers may regret that he does not engage in any of the recent debates within liberalism around the nature and extent of liberal neutrality by thinkers such as Will Kymlicka, Yael Tamir, and even the later Rawls. Another interesting theme running throughout the book is a critique of Habermas and the general approach of communicative action. On the whole, I found his engagement with liberalism to offer enough to make the book definitely a worthwhile read. The provocative alternatives suggested also offer insights, which, when augmented by Schecter’s earlier books, especially Radical Theories: Paths beyond Marxism and Social Democracy (1994), provide an interesting perspective for critical political theory.

Peter Ives
University of Winnipeg, Canada


This collection originates from the biennial conference of the Hegel Society of America, which took place at Fordham University in 2000. The resulting volume is uneven and idiosyncratic, its disparate materials reflecting their origins in conference proceedings. Despite some excellent individual chapters, the collection as a whole lacks focus and balance, and contains notable gaps. Because of these defects, it is not one of the stronger offerings in SUNY’s generally very valuable series in Hegelian Studies.

While the volume rightly devotes considerable attention to the theoretical status of a history of philosophy within the Hegelian corpus, it contains little of substance on Hegel’s readings in the tradition itself. Reference to the classics is diffuse rather than sustained. One chapter on the Greeks rehearses familiar complaints about Hegel’s Eurocentrism, though with minimal reference to scholarly literature. Robert Bernasconi provides an interesting and insightful discussion of the exclusion of Indian philosophy from Hegel’s history, and suggests a comparison with Schlegel’s views on this subject. Vittorio Hölsle outlines the place of various Greek philosophers in an idea of historical cycles, and Robert R. Williams compares Hegel and Kierkegaard on the status of Socratic irony. These contributions notwithstanding, Hegel’s readings of Plato, Aristotle, or the range of Hellenistic schools, and the value of his interpretations in light of contemporary research, are nowhere systematically addressed.

The only major philosophical author to earn an entire chapter is Rousseau, while Hegel’s critique of Spinoza, on which exists a rich and important literature, is here filtered through the lenses of Derrida. Even Kant figures only indirectly, in a piece by Jere Paul Surber on the end of history. There are, however, two essays on ancient scepticism. One, by Will Dudley, distinguishes variants within both Academic and Pyrrhonian traditions. Dudley stresses the positive role of ancient scepticism for Hegel, and its assimilation as the second, dialectical moment within speculative thought. The other paper, by Tanja Staehler, interrogates the limits of ancient scepticism, and asks what is lacking that must be corrected before it can function as a moment of genuine philosophy. Both these pieces propose comparisons of ancient and modern standpoints. This terrain has been covered with great theoretical refinement in H. F. Fulda and R. P. Horstmann, eds., Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996), which Staehler cites. Fulda and Horstmann’s book, originating from the 1995 Pisa meeting of the Internationale Hegel Vereinigung, sets very high standards for collaborative conference publications. The present volume suffers in comparison.
Among several very good individual pieces, Kevin Thompson offers a useful comparative discussion of the historicity of philosophy as presented in various Hegelian texts. The introductory and concluding chapters of the book, by Angelica Nuzzo and Jere Paul Surber respectively, are especially noteworthy. Nuzzo focuses on the paradoxes involved in the project of a history of philosophy and describes the complementary principles of synchronicity and parallelism that relate history of philosophy to other domains of spirit. Surber addresses the meaning of the end of history as the completion, and not the repudiation, of the Kantian project; this conclusion is established through the relation of reason (whose system is essentially complete) and the ongoing productions and mediations of spirit, and is contrasted with other possible construals.

Aside from the special problem of Rousseau, a surprising absence from the volume is a fuller discussion of Hegel’s relation to the Enlightenment, which makes the epochal discovery that everything exists for the subject (one might profitably consult the excellent collaborative volume on Hegel and Enlightenment, edited by Luca Fonnesu and Barbara Henry, *Diritto naturale e Filosofia classica tedesca* [Pisa: Pacini, 2000]). Nor are Hegel’s presentations of Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling here assessed. The question of how Hegel’s interpretations of individual philosophical positions have stood up in light of current work is not posed.

How little history of philosophy there is in this volume is probably reflective of weaknesses in the curriculum of many North American institutions, as Hösle observes (185), and the editor himself laments (1–2). David Duquette has done a creditable job with the materials at hand, but it is to be regretted that the substance of Hegel’s relation to his predecessors remains largely unexamined in this collection.

Douglas Moggach

*University of Ottawa, Canada*


Two quotations from Hugh Evelyn White’s Loeb Classical Library translation of Hesiod (London: Heinemann, 1914) illustrate two ways of seeing and knowing the world, one through a cosmological *muthos*, the other by applying a human and Mediterranean imagination to the origins of society’s roles:

I

When Zeus has finished sixty wintry days after the solstice, then the star Arcturus [February/March] leaves the holy stream of Ocean and first rises brilliant at dusk. After him the shrilly wailing daughter of Pandion, the swallow, appears to men when spring is just beginning. Before she comes, prune the vines, for it is best so.

But when the House-carrier [the snail] climbs up the plants from the earth to escape the Pleiades, then it is no longer the season for digging vineyards, but to whet your sickles and rouse up your slaves…Avoid shady seats and sleeping until dawn in the harvest season, when the sun scorches the body…Then be busy, and bring home your fruits, getting up early to make your livelihood sure…For dawn takes away a third part of your work, dawn advances a man on his journey and advances him in his work,—dawn which appears and puts yokes on many oxen.

(Hesiod, *Work & Days*, 564–581)

II

They say that Teiresias saw two snakes mating on Cithaeron and that, when he killed the female, he was changed into a woman, and again, when he killed the male, took again his own nature. This same Teiresias was chosen by Zeus and Hera to decide the question whether the male or the female has most pleasure in intercourse. And he said:

‘Of ten parts a man enjoys one only; but a woman’s sense enjoys all ten in full.’

For this Hera was angry and blinded him, but Zeus gave him the seer’s power.

(Hesiod, *The Melaupodia*, 3)
Is there a single key to understanding the ways in which human beings in social groups, clans, tribes and pre- and post nation-state gatherings (or civilizational entities) explain their world(s) and their origins? Myth and the human capacity for mythic explanation, and indeed, inventiveness, remain markers of human diversity and striking reminders of our inescapable interest in ourselves in society (inside as well as outside of historical time and explanation), in a “natural world” characterized by cycles, seasonality and insurgent organic surprise. Certainly, in the Mediterranean and Classical world(s), a variety of popular, mythic and pre-scientific-like reasonings for seismic and volcanic activity co-existed in Hellenic and Greco-Roman historical times: Thucydides, III.89 (cf. II.8.2–3); Diodoros Siculus. IV.21.5–7; Pliny, Letters, VI.16 & 20; Dio Cassius, 66.21–24.

In terms of later developments in knowledge, science, reason and anthropology, some explanations were uncannily intuitive but all were engagingly human. Human beings wish to know as much as they wish to pattern, copy, mimic and predict. The strength of When They Severed Earth from Sky rests in its catalogue of possible (or hypothetical) human accountings for events and behaviours. This catalogue stretches from prehistorical times to our own supposedly ordered and timely world (and worldviews) which remain more or less continuously riven by “Hellenic spirits” of Strife and Chaos which are fortunately interrupted by the always human forces or powers of mythic, spiritual (read: religious sensibility) and intellectual creativity.

Writing about myth and the roles of muthos (mythology as narrative, oral traditions: transmission and reportage) is as intellectually challenging as it is a perilous and essential undertaking or enquiring process. This catalogue stretches from prehistorical times to our own supposedly ordered and timely world (and worldviews) which remain more or less continuously riven by “Hellenic spirits” of Strife and Chaos which are fortunately interrupted by the always human forces or powers of mythic, spiritual (read: religious sensibility) and intellectual creativity.

Writing about myth and its centrality to human understanding presents not dissimilar challenges. Consider the following statement as an elemental, questioning proposition: myth is a species of cosmic conversation with ourselves? We are very much creatures, human creatures, of the worlds, however small or large, in which we live. Yet, the human mind remains a (perhaps the) most remarkable evolutionary character after the Universe itself. As Dr. Edward Holmes observed in relation to human pandemic disease and its causative powers (and agency) of surprise: “The history of evolution is that rare things can happen” (Nature, vol. 439 [2006]: 125). However, by way of contrast, myth or rather muthos, only should be truly surprising to those whose culture and history [or absence of curiosity] lies outside or at a distance from the “original” telling of the myth.

In truth (after Thucydides’ and Aristotle’s usage of alētheia) myth and the fluidity with which the human mind (or rather minds) works, is as complex and as simple as Thucydides’ elegant and charged comparison of the built scale or structural terrain of Athens and Sparta, and its relationship or otherwise to the power and presence of each “city-state” (polis). The mythic projection of power is of another realm of narrative order.Appearances, like resemblances, are potentially deceptive vehicles for argument. Yet, this does not mean that the case (for resemblance) should not be made. Rather, whether in the realm of myths or mythic reputations, such an argument must be highly nuanced and carefully made.
Myth and mythic discourses, and later societies’ reactions to earlier societies’ mythologies constitute a variegated sea of possibilities. After Jean-Pierre Vernant (Myth & Society in Ancient Greece [New York: Zone, 1990]), myth is not unlike our atavistic cousins, Prometheus and Epimetheus, in that it enjoins the enquirer to run the gauntlet of insight and foresight whilst all-the-while being subject to the human forces of bumbling and lack of vision. This book will repay adventurous readers willing to reconsider the foundational bases of mythology.

Neil Morpeth
The University of Newcastle, Australia


This is a volume of overwhelmingly detailed information. Relying on extensive archeological discoveries, John Blair does an outstanding job of describing the place of the Church among the Anglo-Saxons and how it literally shaped their lives and perceptions of the world. He uses the documents of the period as well, and reproduces 50 + illustrations, thus presenting a “multi-media” study of how the Church and society interacted and responded to each other. He does not hesitate, however, to disguise the lack of Anglo-Saxon sources concerning certain subjects but warns us “that the reality was probably much more complex than we tend to assume” and suggests “where some of the complexities may lie” (169).

He begins by examining the Christian neighbors of Anglo-Saxon England (550 C.E.) and concludes with the development of parish church identities (1100 C.E.) Blair describes the para-monastic formation of British Christianity, similar to the Irish system, and suggests that the relatively slow Christianization of the area was the result of the slow development of any kind of central polity: while the organizational structure was “grass-roots,” the conversion process was “top down.”

Not only were these monastic/episcopal centers vital to the spiritual and pastoral life of the new Christians but they became important economic centers as well. Developing on older, abandoned Roman sites these “new cities” (with or without walls) conferred sacral status on all the activities associated with them. This included less distinctly “spiritual” activities as land management, markets, import/export trade, and self-defense.

The breakdown (development?) of the central minster-system into the parish-system was part of the ongoing conversion process as it reached out further into the countryside. Post-Conquest law-codes describe the rights of head ministers, rather smaller ministers, one still smaller, and field-churches (which might have a graveyard attached). These amorphous field-churches “may have given new leases of life to old but informal cult sites” (369). The role of graveyards in establishing the rights of a church are especially fascinating.

The legacy of the minster-system, however, cannot be evaded even in the modern United Kingdom. Blair points out that most of the enduring market towns of medieval, post-medieval, and even Victorian England are the “minster-places”; the map of England “was drawn by the monastic founders of the seventh and eighth centuries” (512).

This is an excellent addition to any scholarly or academic library. While clearly designed with professional scholars in mind, it would also be appropriate for graduate students. Portions could be used by undergraduates who might find the whole overwhelming. Interested non-professionals could also be intrigued and simply skim over the portions that are too detailed or that deal with aspects of the subject that they are less attracted to.

Stephen Morris
New School for Social Research, USA


The trial of Nazi war leaders in 1945–46 in Nuremberg was the first official international meeting in which simultaneous interpreting was used. The trial thus marks the debut of a profession and a technology now ubiquitous at
major international gatherings. Francesca Galba’s account of the interpreting at Nuremberg is thus very much in the mode of a profession paying tribute to its pioneers. The technology was successful; the interpreters and their organizers surmounted innumerable initial difficulties; the end result was a significant contribution to international justice. That much is clear, and superficial.

There are many ambiguities at work. For instance, if this was the origin of simultaneous interpreting, why is it that all legal settings since Nuremberg have been either monolingual or based on consecutive interpreting? Trials have thus become either faster (when kangaroo justice is so sure it can operate at speed) or slower (when importance is attached to the voice of the other and the fact of mediation). If justice was achieved at Nuremberg, it was at best of an intermediary kind.

Galba’s research is not based on the original audio recordings of the interpreters, which have apparently not stood the test of time. Any oral mistakes by the interpreters are thus rendered invisible. What we are left with is a well documented account of the external features of the interpreting service. Reading between those lines, we find that the wheels of justice did not always run as smoothly as did the IBM headphones.

Was there justice when the original documentary evidence in German was not made available to the interpreters? Or when German defendants had to work from documents translated from German into English and then back to German (sic)? Or when defending counsel, unaware of the problems of interpreting, often used such long complex sentences that many of the arguments were lost in the English translation? Or when the interpreters, unhappy with their oral renditions, would go upstairs and change the official transcript (as if the trial were for posterity and not for immediate justice)? Or when some defendants knew more about German legal language than did the interpreters, and would thus openly challenge renditions? The victors at Nuremberg had to learn, on the job, how to prepare evidence in a multilingual courtroom, how to speak for interpreters, how to make the slowness of the exchanges an advantage, and indeed how to blame the interpreting system for all kinds of shortcomings, whenever possible. The general impression, however, is that only the Germans really cared about the interpreting service. Many of the most revealing insights come from the memoirs of Hans Fritzsche; Göring delighted in picking up divergent legalities in German and English, despite the certainty of his own condemnation to the gallows. Their position was in keeping with what Adorno described as the barbarism of Nazi cultural refinement.

Galba’s book has become a standard reference for research on conference interpreting. Graduate students tend to borrow it and not give it back (which might explain why this review comes so late). Her account seeks at every stage to justify the use of interpreting at Nuremberg: “there was no viable alternative to simultaneous interpreting.” However, if read carefully, this book also reveals why international justice has indeed found alternatives to simultaneous interpreting.

ANThony Pym
Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain


Intent on participating in a two-week seminar in Brussels on the European Union in the summer of 2006, I looked forward to the publication of this volume in the spring of 2006 with high expectations, and I was not disappointed. Far too much of the related literature glosses over subtleties that reveal much of what must be learned if we are to know any subject in a mature and unsparing way. While the book is weakened by the sort of repetition and excessively long paragraphs one comes to expect from a rewritten dissertation, these regrettable faults are far outweighed by its careful attention to less-than-obvious matters that shed valuable light on Europe’s future.

In the late 1990s author Georg Menz was employed briefly as a construction worker on a house renovation project in Berlin. He was struck by the fact that while the region was undergoing a spectacular boom in construction
activity, many of the local workers were experiencing a soaring unemployment level (construction is the largest employer in the private sector in Europe). Their jobs, he learned, were being filled by guest (posted) workers from Poland and Portugal all too eager to toil away at a fraction of German wages. (Posted workers are temporarily sent abroad by subcontractors registered in low-wage countries). Germany, a country known to have a powerful labor movement, was nonetheless the site of substandard service wages, though only for posted workers. Menz was struck by the absence of this sort of wage competition in neighboring countries (Belgium, Denmark, Holland, and Sweden). As companies registered anywhere in the EU could provide their services anywhere else in the EU, Menz felt drawn to help explain this anomalous situation, or the impact of top-down Europeanization and the potential for re-regulatory response strategies: “The issue of posted workers highlights the clash between efforts to create a common market by deregulation and ‘negative integration’ and attempts to uphold existing high-wage and social standards in some member states” (197). He asks if companies from low-wage countries should “be permitted to take advantage of their main comparative advantage? Or does this constitute social dumping and undermine social and labor standards elsewhere? Can one survive on Portuguese wages in Copenhagen? Can one manage on a Lithuanian salary in Paris?” (199).

Menz asked how much of this odd situation can be traced back to the transnational posting of employees who were reimbursed only at their home country wages. Theoretically, the European work world in the 1990s could have responded to the EU-led market liberalization in one of two opposite ways: it could have rejected this pressure via renationalization of economic policy or accepted it via a supernationalization of social policy. As these proved equally unlikely, Menz wound up exploring what one of his many respondents called “the true potential of national re-regulatory responses to internationalization.”

The clash here of the political Left and Right is substantial. Center-Left critics charge the EU with “negative integration,” since its policies abolished the capacity of member states to regulate their labor market (as by forcing Portuguese subcontractors to pay prevailing German wages at German work sites). As the EU was unable to require a Europe-wide minimum wage, Euro-skeptics also noted there was no “positive integration.” Admirers, however, denied this was a case of “wage dumping.” They hailed it instead as a gain for Germans who now paid much less for construction work. This downward cost spiral was not a regulatory race to the bottom, but rather a welcomed example of the Single Market at work (unemployed German construction workers would simply have to “adjust”).

After logging in some “major mileage” to interview scores in ten countries, Menz provides a welcomed nuanced analysis, as he maintains that, “if anything, Europeanization highlights existing structural features of different models. Nation-states do have room for maneuver in coping with the challenges and demands inherent in the construction of the EU Single Market. They are not mere passive objects of change” (2). Not surprisingly, the response strategy reflects the preference of the strongest actor. “National response strategies are protective of existing arrangements only in the statist and strongly neo-corporatist countries of Europe [Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden], while intermediate neo-corporatist systems [Germany, Netherlands] generate regulatory outcomes that are liberal, flexible, and business-friendly in the short-term, but that undermine the structure of the labor market in the long run” (200).

As the European Commission intends to push ahead further with the liberalization notion, the Center-Left would seem to have good reason to worry about persistent moves to reduce the regulatory capacity of member states over transnational service providers (the Commission is planning a complete liberalization of local public transportation in 2008). As well, the Center-Left is challenged by a new related social problem: Today’s posted workers “do not receive standard wages in the recipient countries unlike previous migrant workers. They are consigned to the second tier of the labor market characterized by inferior wages and labor conditions. It is this sort of labor migration which the liberalization of service provision (LSP) and European liberalization has fostered” (200).
Menz winds up emphasizing “continued resilience of distinct institutional configurations of politico-economic governance, notwithstanding the considerable external and internal pressures associated with Europeanization and globalization” (4). As EU-level labor and social policy remains weak, member states are taking re-regulatory matters into their own hands. We inherit a complex patchwork pattern of national response strategies, a bottom-up process of Europeanization. Nation-states may re-regulate national level labor market and wage policy, but “not in a form directly counteracting the principles of the Single Market project” (187). Menz contends that different domestic actor coalitions, by winning national re-regulatory responses, produce different outcomes: “different varieties of capitalism generate different responses to a common EU-led impetus” (9).

Menz concludes that “the organizational power, including government access, of domestic interest groups in the ‘pre-liberalization stage,’ combined with these actors’ preferences critically shape the overall policy outcome” (7). Accordingly, he believes “the way in which national systems respond after the initial domestic equilibrium has been challenged by Europeanization can be predicted ex ante... the distribution of power amongst relevant domestic interest groups can be predicted” (8). In the final analysis, then, “what matters is whether unions or employers are organizationally powerful enough to influence national re-regulation that will be protectionist, seeking to re-establish national authority, or liberal, enhancing the EU-induced liberalization” (8). This refutes the overly simplistic charge by the Left that the EU is a crass agent of worker-bruising globalization, as it seeks to eradicate national room for maneuver and promotes (race-to-the-bottom) convergence. Likewise, Menz rejects the overly simplistic notion of the Right that top-down Europeanization trumps all, that it spawns a general trend toward convergence. Both Left and Right are well-advised to study general models, especially four that focus each on absorption, or inertia, or retrenchment, or transformation, as they help explain how EU nation-states cope with the extraordinary pressures of EU-driven economic liberalization. In all, however, the Center-Left would seem to have the most to worry about. Menz concludes from this study that “healthy skepticism towards the prospects of a ‘Social Intermediate neo-corporatist Europe’ is in order. While market liberalization proceeds in great strides and at a jet-like speed, social and labor market policy follows at a horse-and-buggy pace” (198).

As for the book itself, independent of its thesis, a reader should not be put off by such puzzling matters as the use in 2004 of outdated data from 1991 to make a point (i.e., the percent of Danish union membership). Nor should one be put off by paragraphs of exhausting length (e.g., 2, 4, 15, 16, 24, 178–79). Vexing as are such matters (where was a competent editor?), they pale in comparison to its many merits. If you have wondered what the EU means to European work world realities, and what the Single Market project amounts to, this field-research-based book is well-worth a careful read.

Arthur Shostak
Drexel University (retired), USA


Living Novels (its ambiguous title teasing us as to whether it refers to novels destined to endure, or novels affording the reader a more enriched life) turns out to be a meaty collection of Sascha Talmor’s reviews composed during the last fifteen years of her life (d. 2004). Reviews obviously are supposed to leave the emphasis with the works reviewed, in this case by eighteen novelists from fifteen different countries (most of them not from the usual venues such as France or Germany or England; they have their day in court, yes, but we are privileged to hear as well from less well-known witnesses: Albania, Iceland, Estonia, Algeria, even Azerbaijan). We want to concentrate on the fictionalists themselves, as we should. They deserve our attention. But Talmor quickly takes center stage. We begin to ask ourselves about this unique, probing critic and seek for common threads binding
together her interpretations of these eighteen selections.

Talmor has little truck with literary theory as such. Simply put, her aim is to help us share her enthusiasms. The main section of her book is titled “Passionate Readings of Modern Novels,” and that is exactly what they are, however knowingly achieved. (Her own preface, pp. 19–22, demands a careful look). If there’s a bias, it would have to be preference for strong protagonists facing tremendous obstacles and somehow showing humanity’s best face by surviving if not always overcoming them. Survival becomes her signature (see Lovell’s introduction). Her own life was hard, despite success. We know of her days as a Jew in Hitler’s Europe, her forced exile, her life on the kibbutz she and her husband Ezra founded. In failing health during her later years, she experienced in literature, such as these novels on which she lectured to university students and then committed to the written page, the proper medicine (her favorite was Shakespeare, Tolstoy a close second, we are told.) What perfect aesthetic-intellectual balsam they prove to be! If literary theories are not her chosen elixir, it’s such as these eighteen reviews that reveal her true enthusiasms. We are fortunate in being given the chance to share them.

The volume includes a long editor’s “note” by her daughter Edna, a fine introduction by David Lovell, an essay (“The Aesthetic Judgment and Its Criteria of Value”— insights as theoretical as the author ever gets, into an area that stubbornly resists solutions), and the major weight of the book: the reviews themselves, presented under four rubrics: “Phases of History,” “Family Portraits,” “Love and Friendship,” and “Art and Life.”

Here follows a sampling of the present reviewer’s favorites, taken from each of the four subsections. I should add that the original novels (only two in English) are (all but one from the French) available in English translations.

Jean Raspail’s The People (Qui se souvient des hommes, 1986) shows how civilized misunderstanding results in devastating mistreatment of the natives of Tierra del Fuego. Sascha’s review forces us to share their tragedy.

Ivo Andrić’s The Bridge on the Drina (Na Drini Cuprija, 1945) masterfully depicts three centuries of Christian-Moslem conflicts in Bosnia (Andrić was a 1961 Nobelist). Talmor reprises this string of fictionalized accounts of real people, so few of whom survived. The review provides a perfect example of how she can draw us into the byways of history, in regions about which most of us know so little, making us empathize through those “passionate readings.”

Among “Family Portraits” we find a gentler side to Sascha’s preferences: love stories, albeit more than less heroic. She urges us to read Isabel Allende’s The House of the Spirits (La Casa de los Espíritus, 1982), wherein is featured a wonderful extended family including friends, servants, in-laws. We rejoice in Allende’s skilful depictions, greatly influenced by the reviewer’s knowing approval (she aptly compares Allende’s family to Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks). Sascha’s love for the unusual, under “Love and Friendship,” is nicely illustrated in her review of Keri Hulme’s The Bone People (1986), about New Zealand Maoris, with its fascinating details as seen through the eyes of novelist and critic, both equally perceptive.

From “Art and Life,” let me mention two pieces, though allotted space begins to close in. First, Nadezhda Mandelstam’s Hope against Hope: A Memoir (originally in Russian; trans. 1970). Here’s the reviewer begging us never to forget the Soviet persecution of her Jewish-Russian poet-husband Osip Mandelstam (1891–1938). Many of us already know his story, but Sascha’s passion for poetic justice (my double entendre intentional) intensifies our memories, making recollection all the more intense.

And finally, something from the New World, American Susan Vreeland’s The Passion of Artemisia (2002), recently a best-seller in the U.S. We return to the seventeenth century to share the story of Artemisia Gentileschi (1593–1653), a superb woman painter back when men dominated the field. This fictionalized portrait describes her torture (there was a rape trial and to prove her innocence she was forced to undergo the sibille: the intense squeezing of the hands until fingers bled and bones crushed—virtual death for a painter), which she survived to continue her career. Her father was no help, actually part of the injustice. Such an account is the perfect vehicle for our reviewer: survival, the cruelty of ignorance, and the need for greater social justice, a heartwarming victory of sorts. I had already read
the novel but who wouldn't appreciate this fresh interpretation?

The contents conclude with “One Note and Three Poems for Sascha” by longtime friend Heinz-Uwe Haus, but the whole volume stands as a greater tribute to this outstanding exegete of some of the best twentieth-century writers.

Armand E. Singer
West Virginia University, USA


David Sedley's work is always worth reading. Originally more active in the elucidation of the materialist philosophies of the ancient world, he has, partly through work on later Platonism, found himself dealing with one of the most studied of all Plato's texts, the Theaetetus. Any extant ancient work on epistemology is bound to attract much attention today, and this dialogue’s philosophical quality has made certain that it is no exception. It stands, as Sedley argues, at a threshold, straddling the divide between the ultimately unsuccessful Socrates (who, it is argued, lacked the metaphysics necessary for the necessary advances, even on the threshold of his trial) and the mature Plato. Therefore Sedley systematically shows how this mature work, though keeping technically within the bounds of Socratic thought and failing to introduce openly Platonic metaphysics, keeps suggesting Platonic answers, or ways forward towards answers—at least for the experienced reader of Platonic texts.

The systematic attempt to prove such a thesis is welcome, though I do wonder how many Platonists would strongly resist such conclusions today. At this level I should not do so, though I should place a lot more emphasis on the type of expertise that Socrates’ interlocutor, the young Theaetetus, has acquired. For him is at precisely the stage when he needs to be reminded of the gap between the mathematics he has so thoroughly learned and knowledge as Plato conceived it, and he needs to understand that a new way forward must be adopted if he is to answer successfully the kind of questions that Socrates will put to him. Both the Socratic midwife and his interlocutor are barren in the area in which advances must be made. Their considerable intellects allow them together to refute with a surprising degree of conviction certain explanations of knowledge and of false belief that Plato finds unsatisfactory.

While we are often treated to the little insights that are expected from one of the best minds working on ancient philosophy, I have to confess that I found the work somewhat unexciting. While it has certainly been updated, I feel that I am still dealing with a refinement of the Platonism traditionally taught in the UK in the sixties and seventies when I learned my Plato. Whereas I found much of the discussion of the earlier themes of flux and perception convincing, I felt that too much had been made of the earlier puzzles about how false opinion is possible, without it ever being appreciated just how puzzling they could be for Greek intellectuals of the classical era. There was something distinctive about the Greek way of looking at knowledge, something involving an “all or nothing” approach, and linked to the idea that we must “grasp” something within us. It is as if we must actually be physically influenced by the reality that is present to us, at least by its form and for some by its matter too. If we do not see the context in which these puzzles have become genuine puzzles, then we shall not see precisely how Plato is seeking to rescue us from them once he has thrown off the mantle of Socrates.

There are other ways in which I found the book conservative. While it is admittedly a mistake to think that the dramatic features of a Platonic dialogue are everything, I felt that the part that they play here was insufficiently acknowledged. And very few who work on Socrates would nowadays be prepared to call any dialogue of Plato “quintessentially Socratic” as the Charmides is called at 178. On the subject of Socrates, I was also worried that it was too hastily assumed that the difficulties over false belief (thinking what is not) mirror the difficulties over false statement (saying what is not) (126). The distinction found in the Euthydemus, but also in the words attributed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus, between arguing at the level of words and at the level of facts, means that
Socrates had fewer problems with the latter. We can argue in words that have no actual meaning for us—no presumed link with the factual world, while we cannot believe what lacks such meaning. And this is why Socrates regularly insists that interlocutors answer in accordance with their beliefs.

In the end Sedley asks in what direction the Theaetetus points the readers forward (179), and he presumes that they must see “that they must retain the key notion of differentiation for knowledge.” It seems to me that Sedley is too often assuming that the way forward lies through the “Eleatic” methods of the Sophist, which pace Cornford is not an epistemological dialogue any more than its close sequel the Statesman. Division and definition certainly play their part in any systematic approach to knowledge, ironing out the flaws in our thinking, but will never yield the understanding of justice, holiness, and knowledge itself that Socratic inquiry seeks. To me it seems clear that the passage on the assimilation to the divine at 176a–c is already pointing us in a rather different direction, straight from the Republic to the Timaeus. Just as the musician must perfectly train his ear and the painter his eye so too must we perfectly train our minds by ensuring that they run straight and true, for we are ourselves modelled on a perfect cognitive entity. Logical methods may iron out the flaws and the falsehoods, but it is above all by imitation of that perfect cognitive entity that we may grasp unchanging truth to the highest degree possible for a human being.

In spite of a few reservations, I should readily recommend the book to an advanced class.

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Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy. By Andrea Wilson Nightingale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), x + 311 pp. $75.00/£45.00 cloth.

The term ‘myth’ does not appear in the title of this volume, and yet this issue is clearly an apt place for it. Its central theme is the recurrent comparison between the practice of philosophy and the public or private journey to witness some important “international” spectacle beyond the walls of one’s own city. The name for such a journey was theoˆria, and that name lies behind the notion of theory and theoretical philosophy today. With Plato the term theoˆria supplies a carefully chosen metaphor for the philosopher’s supreme activity, a metaphor that marks it as a journey beyond the familiar world to view some marvellous and unfamiliar truth, a journey that for Plato involves a return and the welcoming of the transformed individual back to the city; for Aristotle, this return is no longer part of the concept, but the concept is still crucially influential, and determines how he will present the story of Presocratic philosophy before him.

Andrea Wilson Nightingale is an expert at taking what may appear a peripheral aspect of ancient philosophy and making it central to philosophy’s story, and particularly to the stories upon which Platonism is founded. This had been a feature of her 1995 Cambridge book, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy, and is repeated here. What she offers always rewards serious exploration. After a discussion of Greek theoˆric practice in chapter 1 and a preliminary discussion of public and private Platonist theoˆria in chapter 2, the central focus of the central third chapter becomes the central portion of the Republic, and its myth-like tale of how the philosopher escapes from the chains of the cave, rises with difficulty to the vision of the unfamiliar, and ultimately returns to the cave like an “intellectual ambassador” (82) for the benefit of those who were once his fellow prisoners. The cave-story is described as “a narrative in which the human soul journeys to its enlightenment—a sort of ‘story of the soul’” (113). Plato has constructed a narrative of the central philosophic rite modelled upon the public theoˆric journeys that were part of Greek culture. The very opening of the Republic is associated with the theoˆria of the alien rites of Bendis (74), while its close sees Er “theorizing” the world where souls are rewarded, punished, and prepared for their return (76–77).

Philosophy, in another attempt to revise its own foundation-myth, often tries to de-mythologize Plato, explaining away all that is metaphorical or religious as non-essential quirks of ancient communication. Nightingale, by contrast, claims that “the very effort to
translate myths into analytic discourse is...methodologically unsound” (95). We should not limit the interpretative possibilities of myth by reducing them to a single rationalist meaning, and we must not hamper the reader’s ability to envisage for herself, as a theóros, the theóric life of the Platonist philosopher. As for the religious minimalism of many interpreters, to whom I have offered my own answers in Recollecting Plato’s Meno (London: Duckworth, 2005), it is effectively answered at pages 107–113: Platonic philosophy is modelled on a journey that culminates in a religious vision. It is also an erotic journey (115).

Myth remains with us in chapter 4, with an excellent discussion of the myth-like cosmic geography of the Phaedo, in which the idea of a superior bodily realm distinct from the intelligible realm is hammered, leading on to discussion of the beautiful physical objects of contemplation encountered in myth-like material in the Phaedrus and Timaeus, where the true home of the soul is not beyond the confines of the universe but at its summit (178). Important here is discussion of agalmata—statues and images of the gods (163), to which the gaze may profitably be directed. This leads to Philip of Opus’ Epinomis, where the heavenly bodies become the desired objects of the philosopher’s theóric gaze, these being either gods or their agalmata (182). But ultimately chapter 5 leads on to Aristotle in whom “there is no myth or drama depicting a philosophic protagonist journeying towards the light” (188).

An Epilogue then treats théoria and wonder (thauma), sometimes thought to be etymologically related, but discussed here as the starting-point of the philosophic enterprise, but also as a feature of that final vision of Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus. This book restores the mythical and religious dimensions of Plato to their rightful place; it also makes excellent sense of Aristotle. One neglects its contribution at one’s peril.

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Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. By Frederick Cooper (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), vii + 327 pp. $50.00/£32.50 cloth; $19.95/£12.50 paper.

Frederick Cooper is widely regarded as “the most important historian of Africa” in the Anglo-American academy (to quote from Michael Watts’s blurb on the paperback edition). He is also a formidable practitioner of the historian’s craft, with a penetrating grasp of the theoretical currents informing our disciplinary practices and a penchant for conceptual clarity as rare as it is refreshing. He was also my teacher many years ago, and this collection of his essays (along with an essay on “Identity” co-authored with Rogers Brubaker) displays to great advantage his pedagogical as well as intellectual prowess. The collection is tailor made for graduate courses, not just in African and European colonial history, but in more general core readings courses designed to familiarize students with foundational historiographical debates, broad historical narratives, and methodological alternatives.

Cooper’s historical and historiographical scope is even more geographically and chronologically expansive than Europe’s imperial reach, no mean scholarly feat. Cooper’s is a genuinely European historical vision, encompassing the Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires, in addition to the colonial encounters of the Western European powers more familiar to English-speaking audiences. His discussion also incorporates the English-language scholarship on the empires of China and Japan. The colonialism Cooper questions spans the globe throughout a “modern” period dating back to the seventh century. While appreciative of the contribution of scholarship deploying categories of analysis like modernity or globalization, Cooper rightly complains about their tendency to “flatten” the richly variegated topography across time and space that results from human agency in all its heroic glory, criminal banality, cultural specificity, and internal stratification.

While one might disagree with some of Cooper’s conclusions, the nature of his engagement with theory does the discipline of history proud, displaying its potential for contributing to, as well as consuming, concepts imported from literary and cultural studies, feminism and postcolonialism, as well as anthropology, economics, and political science. Cooper suggests that the historian contributes to the
interdisciplinary study of colonialism by illuminating how as opposed to what, by emphasizing process as opposed to position. Let me be clear here. Cooper is not indicting the interdisciplinary pursuit of knowledge from behind a disciplinary barricade (history with a capital H). To the contrary, Cooper is quick to acknowledge our discipline’s debt to interdisciplinary work in cultural studies, subaltern studies, feminist theory, etc. Cooper is simply urging us to be more attentive to the genealogies of the categories we borrow (e.g. modernity’s debt to modernization) and to refine or replace categories of analysis that have outlived their usefulness.

This kind of dialectical cross-fertilization is not unlike the depiction of paradigm shifts outlined by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Cooper deliberately encourages us to find more respectful and honest alternatives to the patricidal repudiation of all that comes before or the fratricidal contempt for competing frameworks, to which academic debate today is particularly prone. I have succumbed to the ad hominem myself on more than one occasion. I stand here happily corrected.

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