responses to their growing vulnerability today, those responses are unlikely to look very much like the Great Upheaval of 1877, but they are again likely to take forms—witness the participation of millions in the immigrant rights protests of 2006—that few anticipated.

Jeremy Brecher, *Global Labor Strategies*

DOI 10.1215/15476715-2009-021

**Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects**

Richard Sandbrook, Marc Edelman, Patrick Heller, and Judith Teichman

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007

ix + 289 pp., $92.00 (cloth); $36.99 (paper)

This collaborative volume by an interdisciplinary and intergenerational group of North American social scientists uses “four exemplary cases” in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to understand how left and center-left governments—of a variety of origins and political colorations—have “reconciled the exigencies of achieving growth through globalized markets with extensions of political, social, and economic rights” (3). Based at the University of Toronto, this project brought together specialists on Latin America (Edelman and Teichman), India (Heller), and Africa (Sandbrook) from political science, sociology, and anthropology. Reflecting the individual expertise of each author, the cases include three countries (Chile, with a population of 15 million; Costa Rica, 4 million; and Mauritius, 1.2 million) and a single state within a federal system (Kerela, India, 32 million) (10–12).

Few readers will fail to learn something new from these chapter-length studies of how governments on the periphery of the global capitalist system have responded since the 1980s to the “disappointing, and sometimes destructive” impact of global neoliberalism and its market-oriented reforms since the 1980s. As is suggested by the diversity of cases (Chile’s per capita income is fifteen times that of largely rural Kerela), the authors are not interested in building causal claims based on systematic comparative analysis within the Global South. Instead, this transcontinental briefing book sketches out the background and trajectory of diverse “experiments in equitable and democratic development” (7) in an effort to highlight left-of-center resilience and creativity in poor nations. In proving that opportunities “exist to achieve significant social progress in the periphery, despite a global economic order that favors the core industrial countries” (3), this volume combats the too-prevalent and disempowering discourse of neoliberal globalization as juggernaut. “That even initially poor, heterogeneous, and agrarian-based former colonies can achieve rapid social progress” under left leadership, they suggest, offers an antidote to the “despairing tone of much contemporary scholarship” in the Global North (12, ix).

Unlike much of the work on globalization, this book focuses on left and center-left governments operating in a world of less-than-perfect options. Although Edelman and Heller have published on grassroots politics, the book’s focus is on the challenges the Left faces once it comes to power through elections; it thus avoids the politics of purity and denunciation that comes so naturally to a more social-movement-based scholarship. The book’s larger political conclusions are especially timely in our emerging post-neoliberal world. First, the authors insist that a twenty-first-century global Left must take up the
north/south challenge by accepting the legitimacy of southern priority on economic development, a goal shared by each government studied. Second, they argue that anti- or non-capitalist principles are central, whether “implicitly or explicitly” (4), to the construction of a replacement for the now-defunct Washington Consensus of 1989, whether on the national or international level. In bringing current alt-global proposals from critics of globalization into the discussion, they also remind us of the limits facing most governments in the Global South where “the negative ‘globalization effect’ is likely to be more substantial” without significant reforms in the international trade and investment regime (34).

Despite their democratic and social achievements, the governments studied are not involved in a direct assault on the power structures of national and international power. Rather, they can be said on the whole to “have accommodated, but avoided capitulating to, global neoliberalism” (3). In doing so, these governments have minimized the damage to and even improved, in a few instances, upon the social achievements that emerged from the social and political struggles of the past—despite the neoliberal offensive that peaked in the 1990s. In grappling with the north/south dimension, the authors recognize that a progressive government on the periphery “inevitably deviates from the European prototypes” given the need to grapple with “the particular (though not insurmountable) development challenges posed by peripherality within the global capitalist economy” (18–19).

However, the authors’ recognition of the north/south divide is undermined by their odd insistence on applying the term social democracy to the governments and movements being studied. Disagreeing explicitly with Latin American political scientist Ken Roberts, the introduction grapples with the difficulties of adopting such an anachronistic label. Is it legitimate to extend social democracy to the global periphery (15)? Can we do so validly when “what characterizes a social democratic route is not self-evident” today, even in the north (32)? In answering these questions, the German Social Democratic Party revisionist Edward Bernstein of the early twentieth century is twice unhelpfully invoked (12–13, 32). More substantively, a distinctive “social democratic” alternative to neoliberalism is presented but at such a level of abstraction that the principles enunciated would gain the assent of proponents of all ideological variants of today’s Left who contest elections, even those who vigorously reject social democracy.

The introduction ends by offering an unconvincing typology that juxtaposes radical, classic, and third way “social democracy” (25). Yet even here, the authors recognize that the wide range of distinctive political histories, parties, and ideologies involved with their cases raises a further question: “in what sense do such diverse cases constitute a general type—social democracy?” (15). The case of Kerela, nicely synthesized by Heller, stands out as the most obvious rebuke of the label. For purposes of the book’s larger argument, Kerela stands as the prototype for “radical social democracy,” but the central role is played by a leftist party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), that “would most emphatically reject the social democratic label” (65). In this fascinating summary of his book on the intersection between class struggle and development (Labor in Development), Heller suggests that it might be viewed as a “prototypical case of social democracy in the periphery” but only in the most limited of ways: as a contrast to the rest of India or “if the baseline definition of social democracy is an activist state that can secure basic social rights, provide protection against market forces, and reduce inequality” (68).

Costa Rica, examined in a fine chapter by Mark Edelman, works far better as a stand-in for “classic social democracy.” There we see a 1948 uprising that ousted a democratic government involving communists, explicit social democratic rhetoric, and the con-
struction of a unique form of tropical welfare state with U.S. support during the height of the Cold War. In his helpful narrative of the post-1979 era, however, we are dealing less with a social democratic party or government than a social democratic society and polity deeply resistant to the erosion of past conquests. Mauritius, by contrast, seems an improbable choice for the label “social democracy,” although a New Left labor insurgency was violently crushed in the 1970s, in a classic echo of the role of German social democracy in 1919 (129). For the most part, this chapter offers a largely laudatory description of the island nation’s “disciplined capitalist state,” and its main achievement is to have “developed an effective democratic developmental state,” unlike other African nations (137). Like Costa Rica, Mauritius too has benefited from being so small and sui generis as to raise questions of replicability.

The final case of Chile raises similar typological difficulties in its role as representative of third wave social democracy. Having ruled since 1989, the Concertación involves a durable political coalition in which a socialist party, formerly allied with the communists, joined with the Christian Democrats to put an end to the Pinochet dictatorship that rose to power in a devastating fascist coup in 1973. Teichman describes the coalition as embracing “the language of social democracy” while implanting “neoliberal reforms with a consistency that has no counterpart” in Latin America (147). She frankly admits that to call it social democratic is controversial, because many would call it neoliberal. In her judgment, the Chilean case involves what she calls either “a hybrid of neoliberal economics and social democracy” (147) or as a diluted, minimal, and even grudging “third-way variant” of social democracy (147–48, 174, 248). However, Teichman recognizes that this designation is an odd one because this compromise originated not from mass movements but from the aftermath of their destruction. She also criticizes the Concertación for discouraging popular mobilization and civil society participation in government, a marked contrast to Kerala, yet the government does rightly win her praise for its progress in substantially reducing poverty across two decades.

The use of an outdated twentieth-century ideological label like “social democracy” is unconvincing to this reader (why not just say left or left-center?), and I register a similar objection to the equally unhelpful use of the fraught concept of “populism” (9, 21, 28, 147–48, 164–65). However, it would be unfortunate to end this review on a negative note. This useful book has much to contribute to new thinking and practice as we strive to build a Left for the twenty-first century. With numerous contingents of Latin America’s plural Lefts having reached national power, this is a politically exciting time. Words are less important than actions as we construct a global convergence on the Left that will, if we are lucky, change the course of history—despite our differences.

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DOI 10.1215/15476715-2008-022