Now showing items 1-16 of 16

    • A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise 

      Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-09-17)
      We investigate competition in a delegation framework, with a coarsely informed principal. Two imperfectly informed and biased experts simultaneously propose action choices. A principal with a diffuse prior, and only being ...
    • Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal Penalties 

      Ambrus, A; Egorov, G (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2012-03-01)
      Withdrawal penalties are common features of time deposit contracts offered by commercial banks, as well as individual retirement accounts and employer-sponsored plans. Moreover, there is a significant amount of early withdrawals ...
    • Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives 

      Ambrus, A; Egorov, G (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-12-04)
      In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in ...
    • Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability 

      Ambrus, A; Greiner, B (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-08-26)
      In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, ...
    • Either or both competition: A "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships 

      Ambrus, A; Calvano, E; Reisinger, M (American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016-01-01)
      In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. ...
    • Gradual Bidding in Ebay-Like Auctions 

      Ambrus, A; Ishii, Y; Burns, J (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2013-09-05)
      This paper shows that in online auctions like eBay, if bidders can only place bids at random times, then many di fferent equilibria arise besides truthful bidding, despite the option to leave proxy bids. These equilibria ...
    • How Individual Preferences Get Aggregated in Groups - An Experimental Study 

      Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Pathak, PA (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2013-09-19)
      This paper experimentally investigates how individual preferences, through unrestricted deliberation, get aggregated into a group decision in two contexts: reciprocating gifts, and choosing between lotteries. In both contexts ...
    • On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination 

      Ambrus, A; Ishii, Y (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-03-23)
      This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary ...
    • Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models 

      Ambrus, A; Rozen, K (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2012-05-01)
      This paper studies a class of multi-self decision-making models proposed in economics, psychology, and marketing. In this class, choices arise from the set-dependent aggregation of a collection of utility functions, where ...
    • Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality 

      Ambrus, A; Chandrasekhar, A; Elliott, M (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-03-16)
      This paper studies the formation of risk-sharing networks through costly social investments. First, individuals invest in relationships to form a network. Next, neighboring agents negotiate risk-sharing arrangements, in ...
    • Supplement to 'Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences' 

      Ambrus, A; Asgeirsdottir, TL; Noor, J; Sándor, L (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, 2015-03-01)
      This Supplementary Appendix contains the English translations of the experimental questionnaire, survey questions, and instructions that were used in our experimental sessions on June 9th and 10th of 2010. For the original ...
    • Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise' 

      Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-09-17)
      This supplement provides welfare results not contained in the main text and a proof of Lemma A.1. For small bonuses, a mixed equilibrium exists if and only if a downward equilibrium exists; if so, it is unique. For large ...
    • Supplementary Appendix to 'Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives' 

      Ambrus, A; Egorov, G (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-12-04)
      Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."
    • Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives 

      Ambrus, A; You, H; Sandor, L (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2012-10-09)
      Using data on roll calls from the U.S. House of Representatives, this paper finds empirical support for informational theories of legislative decision-making. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, the bias of the committee ...
    • Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary Appendix 

      Ambrus, A; Sandor, L; You, H (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2012-10-09)
      Supplementary Appendix to Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives.
    • The Case for Nil Votes: Voter Behavior Under Asymmetric Information in Compulsory and Voluntary Voting Systems 

      Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Sastro, A (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-12-02)
      We experimentally study the impact of adding an explicit nil vote option to the ballot in both compulsory and voluntary voting settings. We investigate this issue in an informational voting setting, in which some voters ...