Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Credible sales mechanisms and intermediaries 

      McAdams, D; Schwarz, M (American Economic Review, 2007-03-01)
      We consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further, they will prefer to wait before making their best and ...
    • Isotone equilibrium in games of incomplete information 

      McAdams, D (Econometrica, 2003-01-01)
      An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which each player's action set is infinite sublattice of multidimensional Euclidean space, types are multidimensional and atomless, and ...
    • On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions 

      McAdams, D (Journal of Economic Theory, 2007-11-01)
      Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar ...
    • Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions 

      McAdams, D (JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 2008-09)
    • Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation 

      McAdams, D (Journal of Economic Theory, 2007-09-01)
      The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.