Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Incentives for Conservation and Quality-Improvement by Public Utilities 

      Lewis, TR; Sappington, D (1992)
      We examine the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service (e.g., electricity supply, local telephone service) and service enhancements (e.g., energy-conservation services, improved ...
    • Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems 

      Lewis, TR; Sappington, D (1989)
      In practice, contracts involve "standard terms" or "rules," allowing for variations only under "exceptional" circumstances. We develop a simple model in which optimal contracts display this feature, even in the absence of ...
    • Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand 

      Lewis, TR; Sappington, D (1988)
      Optimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than the regulator. When marginal production costs increase with output, the regulator can induce the firm to use its private ...
    • Renegotiation and Specific Performance 

      Lewis, TR; Sappington, D; Perry, M (1989)
      This article will examine the implications of enforcing specific performance for attempted breach of contract in a model of renegotiation. It will be shown that after the supplier receives relevant private information, ...