Now showing items 1-9 of 9

    • A Theory of Outsourced Fundraising: Why Dollars Turn into 'Pennies for Charity' 

      Paskalev, Z; Yildirim, H (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, 2014-12-06)
      Charities frequently rely on professional solicitors whose commissions exceed half of total donations. To understand this practice, we propose a principal-agent model in which the charity optimally offers a higher commission ...
    • Andreoni-McGuire algorithm and the limits of warm-glow giving 

      Yildirim, H (Journal of Public Economics, 2014-01-01)
      We provide a full equilibrium characterization of warm-glow giving à la Andreoni (1989, 1990) by extending the Andreoni-McGuire (1993) algorithm. We then generalize and offer an intuitive meaning to the large-economy crowding-out ...
    • “Giving” in to social pressure 

      Name-Correa, AJ; Yildirim, H (Games and Economic Behavior, 2016-09-01)
      © 2016 Elsevier Inc.We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a social norm. Despite a higher level ...
    • Information, Competition, and the Quality of Charities 

      Krasteva, S; Yildirim, H (2015-05-16)
      We propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can explain quality heterogeneity across similar charities. It is this heterogeneity that also creates the demand for information. In equilibrium, ...
    • Managing dynamic competition 

      Lewis, TR; Yildirim, H (American Economic Review, 2002-09-01)
      In many important high-technology markets, including software development, data processing, communications, aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost. This paper ...
    • Managing Switching Costs in Multiperiod Procurements with Strategic Buyers 

      Lewis, TR; Yildirim, H (2005)
      This article examines the use of switching costs by long-lived strategic buyers to manage dynamic competition between rival suppliers. The analysis reveals how buyers may employ switching costs to their advantage. We show ...
    • On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation 

      Romano, R; Yildirim, H (Journal of Economic Theory, 2005-01-01)
      We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial ...
    • Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition 

      Yildirim, H (Journal of Economic Theory, 2007-09-01)
      This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference ...
    • Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees 

      Name-Correa, AJ; Yildirim, H (Journal of Economic Theory, 2019-09)