Now showing items 1-8 of 8

    • Coordination Mechanism Design for Sustainable Global Supply Networks 

      Liu, Fang (2011)
      This dissertation studies coordination mechanism design for sustainable supply networks in a globalized environment, with the goal of achieving long-term profitability, environmental friendliness and social responsibility. ...
    • Decision-Making With Potentially Biased Advisors 

      Kupiec, Kevin (2011-04-18)
      With the world full of situations in which information that is potentially useful to decision-making is dispersed among various individuals, research into how this information can be efficiently shared has been the focus ...
    • Dynamic Mechanism Design in Complex Environments 

      Deng, Yuan (2020)
      Inspired by various applications including ad auctions, matching markets, and voting, mechanism design deals with the problem of designing algorithms that take inputs from strategic agents and return an outcome optimizing ...
    • Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship 

      Boleslavsky, Raphael (2009)
      I characterize optimal long term contracts offered by a monopolist to a buyer whose private valuation evolves according to a branching process with privately known transition probability. The optimal contract can be implemented ...
    • Essays on Privacy, Information, and Anonymous Transactions 

      Wagman, Liad (2009)
      This dissertation uses game theoretic models to examine the effects of agent anonymity on markets for goods and for information. In open, anonymous settings, such as the Internet, anonymity is relatively easy to obtain --- ...
    • Mechanism Design in the Case of Two Objects with the Possibility for Complementarities 

      Varma, Avtar (2011-04-18)
      This research builds upon existing studies in that it investigates the possibility of expanding the mathematical and theoretical models of FPSB auctions, along with a slightly altered versions of this auction format, into ...
    • Stochastic Optimization in Market Design and Incentive Management Problems 

      Chen, Mingliu (2020)
      This dissertation considers practical operational settings, in which a decision maker needs to either coordinate preferences or to align incentives among different parties. We formulate these issues into stochastic optimization ...
    • The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs 

      Kephart, Andrew (2017)
      The revelation principle is a key tool in mechanism design. It allows the designer to restrict attention to the class of truthful mechanisms, greatly facilitating analysis. This is also borne out in an algorithmic sense, ...