Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality.
Abstract
Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves
as a critical input for morality and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental
philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge actions leading to negative
consequences as being more intentional than those leading to positive ones. The implications
of this asymmetry remain unclear because there is no consensus regarding the underlying
mechanism. Based on converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate that
there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two distinct mechanisms together
generate the asymmetry. Emotion drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative
consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms leads to the denial of
intentionality for positive consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model
to illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments of intentionality. This
is consequential for mens rea in legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy
pertaining to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among others.
Type
Journal articlePermalink
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/11093Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1038/srep17390Publication Info
Ngo, L; Kelly, M; Coutlee, CG; Carter, RM; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; & Huettel, SA (2015). Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality. Sci Rep, 5. pp. 17390. 10.1038/srep17390. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/11093.This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this
article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
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Scott Huettel
Professor in the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience
Research in my laboratory investigates the brain mechanisms underlying economic and
social decision making; collectively, this research falls into the field of “decision
neuroscience” or "neuroeconomics". My laboratory uses fMRI to probe brain function,
behavioral assays to characterize individual differences, and other physiological
methods (e.g., eye tracking, pharmacological manipulation, genetics) to link brain
and behavior. Concurrent with research on basic processes, my labo
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Chauncey Stillman Distinguished Professor of Practical Ethics
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department
of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He has secondary
appointments in the Law School and the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience,
and he is core faculty in the Duke Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, the <a href
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