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Why Do Young Children Fail in False Belief Tasks: Linguistic Representations and Implicit Processing

dc.contributor.advisor Feng, Gary
dc.contributor.author Yi, Li
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-01T18:35:05Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-01T18:35:05Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1192
dc.description.abstract <p>Despite recent evidence that infants under one year of age have implicit understanding of theory of mind, three-year-old children repeatedly fail in traditional false belief tasks. A serious of 4 studies investigated two possible sources of errors. First, children's comprehension of theory of mind questions was tested in an elicited imitation task. Second, their understanding of mental events was measured using anticipatory eye movements in non-verbal tasks. Results showed that young children's performance in verbal false belief tasks is limited by their understanding of linguistic representations of beliefs and their ability to monitor mental states in real-time. This implies the limitations of young children in keeping track of complex social events in real time and in understanding language conventions in real time.</p>
dc.format.extent 2484415 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.subject Psychology, Developmental
dc.subject Eye movement
dc.subject false belief
dc.subject implicit knowledge
dc.subject language
dc.subject Theory of Mind
dc.title Why Do Young Children Fail in False Belief Tasks: Linguistic Representations and Implicit Processing
dc.type Dissertation
dc.department Psychology and Neuroscience


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