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<p>Today, the trend towards decentralization is far-reaching. Proponents of decentralization
have argued that decentralization promotes responsive and accountable local government
by shortening the distance between local representatives and their constituency. However,
in this paper, I focus on the countervailing effect of decentralization on the accountability
mechanism, arguing that decentralization, which increases the number of actors eligible
for policy making and implementation in governance as a whole, may blur lines of responsibility,
thus weakening citizens’ ability to sanction government in election. By using the
ordinary least squares (OLS) interaction model based on historical panel data for
78 countries in the 2002 – 2010 period, I test the hypothesis that as the number of
government tiers increases, there will be a negative interaction between the number
of government tiers and decentralization policies. The regression results show empirical
evidence that decentralization policies, having a positive impact on governance under
a relatively simple form of multilevel governance, have no more statistically significant
effects as the complexity of government structure exceeds a certain degree. In particular,
this paper found that the presence of intergovernmental meeting with legally binding
authority have a negative impact on governance when the complexity of government structure
reaches to the highest level.</p>
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