Terms of Endearment: An Equilibrium Model of Sex and Matching
Abstract
We develop a directed search model of relationship formation which can disentangle
male and female preferences for types of partners and for di fferent relationship
terms using only a cross-section of observed matches. Individuals direct their search
to a particular type of match on the basis of (i) the terms of the relationship, (ii)
the type of partner, and (iii) the endogenously determined probability of matching.
If men outnumber women, they tend to trade a low probability of a preferred match
for a high probability of a less-preferred match; the analogous statement holds for
women. Using data from National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health we estimate
the equilibrium matching model with high school relationships. Variation in gender
ratios is used to uncover male and female preferences. Estimates from the structural
model match subjective data on whether sex would occur in one's ideal relationship.
The equilibrium result shows that some women would ideally not have sex, but do so
out of matching concerns; the reverse is true for men.
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Peter S. Arcidiacono
Professor of Economics
Professor Arcidiacono specializes in research involving applied microeconomics, applied
economics, and labor economics. His research primarily focuses on education and discrimination.
His work focuses specifically on the exploration of a variety of subjects, such as
structural estimation, affirmative action, minimum wages, teen sex, discrimination,
higher education, and dynamic discrete choice models, among others. He recently received
funding from a National Science Foundation Grant for his pro
Marjorie B. McElroy
Professor of Economics
Professor McElroy focuses her research on the subjects of labor, demand systems, and
financial economics. She has completed several of her research projects under the
funding provided by National Science Foundation grants, including her latest work
on the economics of the family in relation to bargain decision-making and marriage
markets. She is also currently investigating altruism in marriage markets and bargaining
on the core in marriage markets. She has also completed studies involving th
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