Abstract
In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate
the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting
whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to-peer
punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs,
both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing
anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member’s
contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others. We also find
that participating in a democratic punishment procedure makes even non-contributors’
punishment intentions more pro-social.
Material is made available in this collection at the direction of authors according
to their understanding of their rights in that material. You may download and use
these materials in any manner not prohibited by copyright or other applicable law.
Rights for Collection: Research and Writings
Works are deposited here by their authors, and
represent their research and opinions, not that of Duke University. Some materials
and descriptions may include offensive content.
More info
