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Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability

dc.contributor.author Ambrus, Attila
dc.contributor.author Greiner, B
dc.date.accessioned 2016-12-06T17:54:31Z
dc.date.available 2016-12-06T17:54:31Z
dc.date.issued 2015-08-26
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/13202
dc.description.abstract In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member’s contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others. We also find that participating in a democratic punishment procedure makes even non-contributors’ punishment intentions more pro-social.
dc.format.extent 27 pages
dc.relation.ispartof Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID)
dc.subject public good contribution experiments
dc.subject punishment
dc.subject voting
dc.title Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability
dc.type Journal article
pubs.issue 183
pubs.organisational-group Duke
pubs.organisational-group Economics
pubs.organisational-group Trinity College of Arts & Sciences


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