Credible sales mechanisms and intermediaries
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We consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further, they will prefer to wait before making their best and final offers. This in turn induces the seller to bargain at length with buyers, even if doing so is costly. When the seller's cost of soliciting another round of offers is either very large or very small, the seller credibly commits to an auction and experiences negligible bargaining costs. Otherwise, there may be several rounds of increasing offers and significant seller losses. In these situations, an intermediary with a sufficiently valuable reputation and/or weak marginal incentives regarding price can create value by credibly committing to help sell the object without delay.
Published Version (Please cite this version)10.1257/aer.97.1.260
Publication InfoMcAdams, D; & Schwarz, M (2007). Credible sales mechanisms and intermediaries. American Economic Review, 97(1). pp. 260-276. 10.1257/aer.97.1.260. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1729.
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Professor of Business Administration
David McAdams is Professor of Business Administration at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He is also Professor of Economics in the Economics Department at Duke. He earned a B.S. in Applied Mathematics at Harvard University, an M.S. in Statistics from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in Business from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Associate Professor of Applied Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He has also worked a