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Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem”

dc.contributor.author Munger, Michael
dc.date.accessioned 2018-11-01T13:47:57Z
dc.date.available 2018-11-01T13:47:57Z
dc.date.issued 2018-01-01
dc.identifier.issn 0048-5829
dc.identifier.issn 1573-7101
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/17611
dc.description.abstract © 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. Gordon Tullock developed an approach to understanding dynamic processes of political change and policy outcomes. The key insight is the notion that political insiders have a comparative advantage—because they face lower transaction costs—in manipulating rules. The result is that political actors can collect revenues from threatening to restrict, or offering to loosen, access to valuable permissions, permits, or services. To the extent that the ability to pay for such favorable treatment is a consequence of private activities that produce greater social value, there is a “political Coase theorem”: corruption makes bad systems more efficient. But the dynamic consequences are extremely negative, because of the inability to institute reforms resulting from application of Tullock’s “transitional gains trap”.
dc.relation.ispartof Public Choice
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1007/s11127-018-0610-9
dc.title Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem”
dc.type Journal article
dc.date.updated 2018-11-01T13:47:56Z
pubs.organisational-group Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group Duke
pubs.organisational-group Economics
pubs.organisational-group Political Science
pubs.organisational-group Sanford
pubs.organisational-group Sanford School of Public Policy
pubs.publication-status Accepted


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