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Competing for global capital or local voters? The politics of business location incentives

dc.contributor.author Malesky, Edmund
dc.contributor.author Jensen, Nathan M
dc.contributor.author Walsh, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned 2018-12-10T03:37:05Z
dc.date.available 2018-12-10T03:37:05Z
dc.date.issued 2015-09
dc.identifier.issn 0048-5829
dc.identifier.issn 1573-7101
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/17732
dc.description.abstract © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media New York. The competition for global capital has led to interjurisdictional competition between countries, states and cities as to who can offer the most attractive incentives to firms. In this study, we examine the domestic politics of this competition by focusing on incentive use in the United States from 1999 to 2012. We define incentives as the targeted tax deductions or exemptions that are used to lure businesses into a locality. Drawing on data from municipal incentive programs, we examine how electoral competition shapes the use and oversight of targeted incentives. We find evidence that cities with elected mayors provide larger incentives than non-elected city managers by taking advantage of exogeneity in the assignment of city government institutions and a database of over 2000 investment incentives from 2010 to 2012. We also find that elected mayors enjoy more lax oversight of incentive projects than their appointed counterparts. Our results have important implications for the study of interjurisdictional competition and the role of electoral institutions in shaping economic policy.
dc.language English
dc.publisher SPRINGER
dc.relation.ispartof Public Choice
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1007/s11127-015-0281-8
dc.subject Social Sciences
dc.subject Economics
dc.subject Political Science
dc.subject Business & Economics
dc.subject Government & Law
dc.subject Incentives
dc.subject Economic development
dc.subject Pandering
dc.subject Local government
dc.subject ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
dc.subject FOREIGN DIRECT-INVESTMENT
dc.subject UNITED-STATES
dc.subject POLICY-MAKING
dc.subject ACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subject GOVERNMENT
dc.subject AGGLOMERATION
dc.subject PERFORMANCE
dc.subject DYNAMICS
dc.subject GROWTH
dc.title Competing for global capital or local voters? The politics of business location incentives
dc.type Journal article
dc.date.updated 2018-12-10T03:37:04Z
pubs.begin-page 331
pubs.end-page 356
pubs.issue 3-4
pubs.organisational-group Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group Duke
pubs.organisational-group Political Science
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 164


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