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Cooperative game theory and last addition method in the allocation of firm energy rights

dc.contributor.author Lima, Luana
dc.contributor.author Faria, VAD
dc.contributor.author de Queiroz, AR
dc.contributor.author Lima, JWM
dc.date.accessioned 2019-03-13T14:32:32Z
dc.date.available 2019-03-13T14:32:32Z
dc.date.issued 2018-09-15
dc.identifier.issn 0306-2619
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/18147
dc.description.abstract © 2018 Elsevier Ltd The firm energy rights of a hydro plant is a parameter used in some electricity markets to define the maximum amount of energy that a power plant can trade through contracts. In a centralized dispatch scheme, the coordinated operation of the hydro plants generates a synergetic gain in the system firm energy, in this setting, a question that often arises is how to fairly allocate this energy among each hydro plant. This work proposes a formulation to compute the firm energy rights of hydro plants using cooperative game theory and the last addition allocation method. The main goal is to integrate the interests of hydro agents with the needs of the regulatory agencies, searching in the core of the game for solutions that give the right incentives to the optimal system development. In order to make simulations of real instances possible, it is proposed a reformulation of the traditional mixed integer linear programming model that computes the core constraints, which induces a significant speed-up of the algorithm solution time. It is shown an application of the proposed methodology to a real instance representing the Brazilian electric power system.
dc.language en
dc.publisher Elsevier BV
dc.relation.ispartof Applied Energy
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.06.065
dc.title Cooperative game theory and last addition method in the allocation of firm energy rights
dc.type Journal article
dc.date.updated 2019-03-13T14:32:30Z
pubs.begin-page 905
pubs.end-page 915
pubs.organisational-group Nicholas School of the Environment
pubs.organisational-group Duke
pubs.organisational-group Environmental Sciences and Policy
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 226


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