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Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments

dc.contributor.author Taylor, Curtis R
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:24:09Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-09T15:24:09Z
dc.date.issued 1995
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1857
dc.description.abstract Contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court. Sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems. A model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor. The winner receives a prespecified prize. The tournament game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants. An optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first-best quality level against the probability of falling short. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
dc.format.extent 643614 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher American Economic Review
dc.subject Golden Carrot Contest
dc.title Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments
dc.type Journal article


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