Show simple item record Taylor, Curtis en_US 2010-03-09T15:24:09Z 2010-03-09T15:24:09Z 1995 en_US
dc.description.abstract Contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court. Sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems. A model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor. The winner receives a prespecified prize. The tournament game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants. An optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first-best quality level against the probability of falling short. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association. en_US
dc.format.extent 643614 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher American Economic Review en_US
dc.subject Golden Carrot Contest en_US
dc.title Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.department Economics

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