| dc.description.abstract |
Toleration is a core liberal ideal, but it is not an ideal without limits. To tolerate
the intolerant would be to violate the principles and purposes underlying liberal
societies. This important exception to the liberal ideal of toleration is dangerous,
however, in that we may make it too exclusionary in practice. That is, we may mistakenly
apply it to peaceful, beneficial members of our communities as well as to the truly
intolerant. In particular, some contemporary liberals see religion either as inherently
intolerant and dangerous or as violating standards of public discourse that they feel
are necessary to uphold liberalism's core ideals, including toleration.
This work argues that we risk violating the liberal ideal of toleration in a hasty
over-generalization about religious belief. Through an examination of the arguments
of Roger Williams and John Locke, this work argues that religious belief can be compatible
with toleration, and that the practice and popular value of liberal toleration has
at least in part a religious origin. These authors, and believers like them, defended
toleration, partially as a result of their own experiences of intolerance, but also
because they saw toleration as a theological necessity.
Thus, this work shows that we have misunderstood the relationship between religion
and toleration. While some forms of religious belief may incite intolerance and violence,
others provide a firm foundation for toleration. We must show care in distinguishing
the two to avoid violating the fundamental liberal ideal of toleration. Moreover,
it is important that we do so to foster civil comity and cooperation, as well as to
sustain the other benefits that religious groups provide to liberal, democratic societies.
|
|
