Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

Name-Correa, AJ; Yildirim, H

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2019.104943

Type

Journal article

Subject

Committee
Blame
Transparency
Social Pressure

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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/19355

Published Version (Please cite this version)

10.1016/j.jet.2019.104943

Publication Info

Name-Correa, AJ; & Yildirim, H (2019). Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees. Journal of Economic Theory. pp. 104943-104943. 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104943. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/19355.

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Scholars@Duke

Huseyin Yildirim

Professor of Economics

Professor Yildirim's recent research concerns charitable giving, sequencing of bilateral negotiations, and the value of (non-)blind review. His papers have appeared in top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND journal of Economics.

Articles written by Duke faculty are made available through the campus open access policy. For more information see: Duke Open Access Policy

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