Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
Abstract
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to
be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize
and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus
an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when
he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with
equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences;
(2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater
probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group
heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are
identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.
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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1936Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008Publication Info
Yildirim, H (2007). Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition.
Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1). pp. 167-196. 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1936.This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this
article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
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Show full item recordScholars@Duke
Huseyin Yildirim
Professor of Economics
Professor Yildirim's recent research concerns charitable giving, sequencing of bilateral
negotiations, and the value of (non-)blind review. His papers have appeared in top
economics journals such as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal
of Economic Theory, and RAND journal of Economics.

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