Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
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The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Published Version (Please cite this version)10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002
Publication InfoMcAdams, David (2007). Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1). pp. 144-166. 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1941.
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Professor of Business Administration
David McAdams is Professor of Business Administration at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He is also Professor of Economics in the Economics Department at Duke. He earned a B.S. in Applied Mathematics at Harvard University, an M.S. in Statistics from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in Business from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Associate Professor of Applied Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He has also worked a