Show simple item record McAdams, D 2010-03-09T15:32:14Z 2007-09-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136 (1), pp. 144 - 166
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.description.abstract The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.format.extent 144 - 166
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002
dc.title Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
pubs.issue 1
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Fuqua School of Business
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Institutes and Provost's Academic Units
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Institutes and Provost's Academic Units/Initiatives
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Institutes and Provost's Academic Units/Initiatives/Duke Science & Society
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 136
dc.identifier.eissn 1095-7235

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