Show simple item record Bramoullé, Y Kranton, R 2010-03-09T15:32:17Z 2007-07-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 135 (1), pp. 478 - 494
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.description.abstract This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.format.extent 478 - 494
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.006
dc.title Public goods in networks
dc.type Journal Article
dc.department Economics
dc.relation.journal Journal of Economic Theory
pubs.issue 1
pubs.organisational-group /Duke
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Sanford School of Public Policy
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Sanford School of Public Policy/Duke Population Research Institute
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Sanford School of Public Policy/Duke Population Research Institute/Duke Population Research Center
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group /Duke/Trinity College of Arts & Sciences/Economics
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 135
dc.identifier.eissn 1095-7235

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